Komisjoni teatis - SWD(2026) 150, COM(2026) 150

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 18.5.2026

COM(2026) 150 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE

REGIONS

2026 State of Schengen Report

{SWD(2026) 150 final}

2026 STATE OF SCHENGEN REPORT

1. SCHENGEN IN A CHANGING WORLD: CONSOLIDATION AND

PREPAREDNESS FOR FUTURE CHALLENGES

Since the launch of the Schengen cycle in 2022 (1), the annual State of Schengen report

has provided a strategic oversight and comprehensive situational overview of the

Schengen area. Through integrated analysis and evidence-based insights, the report has

shaped a coherent and forward-looking policy agenda for Schengen. It has ensured

sustained political attention in the Schengen Council, supported effective priority-setting,

and contributed to a more coordinated engagement on Schengen matters.

The Schengen area continues to demonstrate resilience, underpinned by collective efforts

at both EU and national levels that have delivered concrete results.These include a

decrease in illegal border crossings and secondary movements within the Schengen area,

strengthened cross-border cooperation, and an increase in effective returns of individuals

with no right to stay in the EU.

Despite these tangible achievements, Schengen evaluations continue to identify gaps that

need to be urgently addressed. This is particularly important in the context of today’s

volatile geopolitical environment and an increasingly complex security landscape,

whichcalls for collective responsibility to ensure that the Schengen area remains secure,

united and resilient.

The priorities for the fifth Schengen cycle (2026-2027) will focus on: consolidating

achievements, addressing remaining gaps, and enhancing preparedness to meet

current and future challenges. The Commission's proposal for the next Multiannual

Financial Framework (MFF) represents a strategic opportunity to further support sustained

and targeted investment in reforms that contribute to a well-functioning Schengen area.

By focusing on consolidation and preparedness, the EU will continue to deliver on one of

its most tangible achievements: a Schengen area that is secure, united, and resilient in face

of emerging challenges.

2. THE 2026 STATE OF SCHENGEN REPORT: THE MOMENT TO

CONSOLIDATE

2.1. Schengen’s external dimension: a strategic approach to EU visa policy

In 2025, the Schengen area continued to be the most visited destination in the world,

attracting more than 790 million travellers. Schengen States issued 10 million visas, and

more than 60 countries enjoyed visa-free access to the Schengen area. As the Union’s first

line of security screening, the common visa policy is key to Europe’s security, helping

prevent illegal migration, organised crime and terrorism. It also facilitates access to

Schengen for bona fide travellers and ensures trustworthy relations with partner countries

that are based on the respect of and alignment with the Union rules.

(1) The Schengen cycle is structured around an annual reporting and follow-up framework comprising the

following instruments: the State of Schengen Report, which sets out the main political and operational

priorities to guide the quarterly Schengen Councils; the Schengen Barometer+ which provides twice a

year a regular situational picture of developments across the area, drawing on contributions from Member

States and EU agencies; and the Schengen Scoreboard, cf. footnote 60. The Commission Schengen

Coordinator provides support to the overall functioning of the cycle through structured bilateral and

multilateral engagement with Member States.

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In January 2026, the Commission adopted the first-ever EU Visa Strategy (2), setting out

a framework for a visa policy that advances Union’s long-term interests, strengthens

security across the Schengen area, fosters EU prosperity and competitiveness, and projects

Union’s position and resilience on the global stage.

The Strategy sets out an ambitious agenda and concrete actions that will contribute to

strengthening Schengen’s external dimension. In this Schengen cycle, the focus will be on

developing a new assessment framework with clear criteria for granting visa-free status to

partner countries, serving the EU’s strategic interests more effectively, as well as preparing

a targeted revision of the Visa Code to strengthen EU security. To further enhance the EU’s

global competitiveness, the Strategy will also foster partnerships with key partner countries

to better match global talent with EU labour market needs. In this context, the opening of

the first Legal Gateway Office in India (3) has marked an important step towards attracting

talent and reinforcing mutually beneficial cooperation. The focus should now be on its

successful roll out as well as replicating the European Legal Gateway Offices in other key

partners.

Furthermore, the Strategy announced targeted measures to support Member States’

capacity to effectively manage the visa process. The 2025 Schengen evaluations and

monitoring activities reveal that the examination of visa applicationsis generally solid,

with established processes that ensure quality decision-making. While significant steps

have been taken to reduce waiting times in granting visa appointments and processing visa

applications, consulates in some locations still face considerable delays. Therefore, the

implementation of the Strategy will also help Member States manage high volumes of

applications, especially during peak periods, for example through the roll out of IT systems

for border management as well as dedicated support of Frontex in delivering training to

consular officers and providing assistance in document verification and detection of

document fraud.

2.2. An integrated external border for a secure Schengen area

Maintaining the security of Schengen external borders requires continuous vigilance

against evolving geopolitical risks, while ensuring that fundamental rights are

respected (4).

In mid-October 2025, the Schengen States started to gradually roll out the Entry/Exit-

System (EES), one of the most advanced border management systems in the world, which

allows to register non-EU nationals and share in real time information about who crosses

EU borders, when and where, as well as information about refusals of entry. During the

six-month progressive start, the system has shown clear benefits for the security of EU

citizens by stopping criminals, imposters, and document fraudsters from crossing borders

under false identities or with fake documents. Since its launch, the Schengen States

registered more than 60 million entries and exits of third county nationals. In addition, over

30,000 refusals of entry were recorded in the system due to lack of compliance with entry

conditions. Among these cases, nearly 800 persons were considered a threat to internal

security while almost 7,000 travellers were denied entry for having overstayed in the

Schengen area (5). Since the EES entered into operations, daily fingerprint checks in

(2) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on EU visa policy

strategy, COM(2026) 43 final, 29 January 2026.

(3) EU Legal Gateway (https://eu-legal-gateway.eu/).

(4) European Council, European Council meeting (19 March 2026) – Conclusions, EUCO 1/26, 19 March

2026.

(5) These numbers are current up until 20 April 2026.

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Schengen Information System (SIS) and Automated Fingerprint Identification System

(AFIS) conducted by all Member States rose from approximately 17 000 to around 87 000.

During the progressive start, the vast majority of Schengen States implemented the EES

effectively, with most countries surpassing the required thresholds of registrations. The

option to temporarily suspend the operations of the EES, either fully or partially, was

exercised only on a limited number of occasions. Some Schengen States experienced

challenges related to infrastructure, for example with the functioning of self-service

systems, the capacity to fully register the biometric data, and the congestion of flights in

specific timeslots.

The EES was fully deployed with all functionalities at all border crossing points in the

Schengen area on 10 April 2026. Overall, the EES has been operating efficiently, bringing

visible benefits to EU security. To further optimise the implementation of the EES, Member

States are encouraged to make greater use of automation at the borders (6), ensure the

deployment of sufficient number of border guards and flow managers, and provide

adequate infrastructure, equipment, guidance and training. At the same time, the

Commission, Member States as well as transport and tourism stakeholders will continue

to closely coordinate, especially in view of the summer travel period.

The upcoming launch of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System

(ETIAS) will mark another practical step in further strengthening the protection of EU

external borders. It will enable the identification and assessment of persons who represent

potential risks, and prevent them from entering the Schengen area, while preserving

seamless travel for the vast majority of visitors. It will add clear value by strengthening

pre-travel risk assessment and enabling earlier identification of potential security concerns

before arrival at the external borders. Preparations are progressing, with coordinated efforts

underway at EU and national levels to ensure ETIAS’ effective roll-out. Early involvement

of travel industry stakeholders is crucial for the success of this endeavour.

Besides most modern IT systems, strong and permanent border control capabilities

need to be in place to safeguard the security of our common external borders. These

capabilities depend on the availability of adequate equipment as well as on sufficient and

well-trained border guards at the Schengen’s external borders. While improvements were

made in 2025 by several Member States (7) by taking steps to increase staffing levels,

persistent shortages continue to affect key functions (8) due to scarcity of resources and a

lack of structured medium and long-term human resources strategies.

Although further efforts are needed to increase the number of trained border guards, in

2025, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) supported Member States

with 18 453 deployments of Standing Corps personnel (9) that provided operational,

technical, and logistical assistance in 35 operations across key Member States (10). The

Commission is preparing a legislative proposal in 2026 to further strengthen the mandate

of Frontex.

Border checks

(6) Such as the use of pre-registration kiosks, e-gates and the mobile application ‘Travel to Europe’

developed by Frontex.

(7) Notably in Czechia, Estonia, Greece, France, Croatia, Italy, Malta, Austria, Poland and Romania.

(8) Notably in Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia.

(9) These comprise human resources from categories 1, 2 and 3. One human resource can be deployed

multiple times, with the most significant deployments in 2025 being the Joint Operations in Greece, Spain

and Italy.

(10) Frontex, 2025 in brief, (https://www.frontex.europa.eu/2025-in-brief/#under_hero_section).

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High-quality border checks at the EU’s external borders are essential to prevent serious

security threats before they reach the Schengen area. Several Schengen States enhanced

the quality of border checks through more consistent verification of entry conditions, and

increased use of automation (11). Some countries have shown significant progress in this

area. For example, Romania successfully implemented an automation of hit reporting

procedures from their e-gates to second line border checks and an integration of the

national Advanced Passenger Information System into its border control system. These

measures have made it possible to carry out for efficient and high-quality border checks.

Nevertheless, further efforts are still needed to improve the effective use of EU and

national databases, strengthen measures against document fraud, enhance inter-agency

cooperation, and deploy biometric verification to close existing gaps and bolster

security (12).

In 2025, one unannounced Schengen evaluation was carried out and identified serious

deficiencies in the Member State's (13) capacity to manage their external borders.

Following the evaluation, the Member State authorities, with the support of Frontex,

initiated immediate remedial measures.

Border surveillance

A combination of robust border checks and effective border surveillance delivers the most

effective level of protection. Detections of illegal crossings at the EU’s external borders

has been consistently declining in the last years, falling to fewer than 180 000, representing

a further reduction of over 25% compared to 2024 (14). In several Schengen States (15),

enhanced surveillance has contributed to better detection rates, faster response times,

reduced illegal crossings, and improved situational awareness. The EU Eastern land border

section has also been thoroughly reinforced with sustainable integrated surveillance

actions supported by national and EU funds. Significant investments were made in border

surveillance capacities, including the purchase of new equipment, the refurbishment of

existing equipment and the increased use of advanced technologies, such as unmanned

aerial vehicles and vessels, upgraded radio capabilities and new stationary equipment.

Despite this progress, surveillance coverage and the integration of systems remain

uneven across the Schengen area, reflecting gaps in equipment, maintenance and strategic

planning. In several Member States (16), an integrated border surveillance approach has not

yet been fully established, particularly as regards as the early detection of illegal arrivals,

and real-time risk assessment.

Similarly, building on existing national and European capabilities, further progress

towards a fully integrated and consistent situational picture is needed to strengthen

Member States’ capacity to develop comprehensive and up-to-date intelligence on

migration flows, smuggling networks and emerging threats. This will be achieved through

the effective implementation of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR),

the technological and operational backbone of the EU’s border security. It will contribute

to improving the Schengen area’s capacity to deal with sudden arrivals or emerging

security threats. Closer synergies between border authorities and Europol would also

(11) For example: Bulgaria, France, Austria, Poland, Romania, Finland and Switzerland.

(12) For instance in: Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, France, Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia.

(13) An unannounced Schengen evaluation in Portugal in December 2025 revealed serious deficiencies in the

performance of external border checks at Lisbon Airport.

(14) Frontex, ‘Irregular border crossings down 26% in 2025, Europe must stay prepared’

(https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-irregular-border-crossings-

down-26-in-2025-europe-must-stay-prepared-lyKpVb).

(15) Such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania and Finland.

(16) For example: in Denmark, Greece, France, Croatia and Slovenia.

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reinforce situational awareness, risk analysis and improve the detection of cross-border

criminal and terrorist threats.

Strengthening the resilience of our common external borders requires stronger

coordination between all the actors involved in border management, migration, and return.

From June 2026, the new screening procedure at the Union’s external borders will allow

to swiftly identify and assess all third-country nationals attempting to illegally enter the

Union. In this context, it is important that all Member States are ready to implement the

new screening rules to ensure that all persons subject to screening are referred to the

relevant procedure(17). This framework will be vital for both security and effective

migration management in the EU, and its practical application will be assessed during the

Schengen evaluations planned for the second half of 2026.

Contingency planning

Significant progress has been made with all Member States having developed contingency

plans for border management in the event of a mass influx of third country nationals at the

EU’s borders. Moreover, the vast majority of Member States have established contingency

plans based on comprehensive risk assessments and scenarios, with only three countries

(18) still in the process of formalising such plans and six (19) that have not yet tested their

contingency plan’s implementation.

Preparedness frameworks have traditionally focused on border management, however,

they need to better integrate other related processes, particularly those for returns. National

preparedness remains uneven, and it is increasingly clear that what may have been

adequate in the past is no longer sufficient for today's challenges especially in light of the

ongoing Middle East crisis. Schengen evaluations reveal that the majority of Schengen

States (20) still need to fully integrate return operations based on risk analyses. To address

this, contingency planning must become more European, with national frameworks more

systematically aligned with EU tools and mechanisms and better connected to the planning

of neighbouring Member States. This will enable faster, more predictable, and more

coordinated collective responses when pressures emerge.

At the same time, it is essential to move from largely formal planning frameworks to

systems that are fully integrated into day-to-day practice and capable of supporting rapid,

coordinated action when crises arise. In eight Schengen States (21), the national plans do

not include the possibility to use European support, eleven (22) do not cover coordination

with Frontex, and ten have not consulted neighbouring Member States in establishing their

contingency plans (23) in order to enable faster, more predictable, and more coordinated

collective responses when pressures emerge.

Furthermore, the European Union needs to be prepared for the potential threat posed to the

EU’s internal security by Russian ex-combatants having participated in the aggression

against Ukraine. Following on the European Council of March 2026, the Commission will

prepare an assessment on possible ways to address this issue.

(17) Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 introducing

the screening of third-country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC) No

767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817 (OJ L, 2024/1356, 22.5.2024).

(18) Greece, Spain and Austria.

(19) Greece, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland.

(20) In particular: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Iceland, Italy, Cyprus,

Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden.

(21) Belgium, Czechia, Greece, Spain, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden.

(22) Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden.

(23) Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Iceland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden.

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The 2026-2027 Schengen cycle should continue to focus on ensuring an integrated external

border for a secure Schengen area. This includes reinforced contingency planning and

situational awareness, consistently improving border checks and border surveillance,

including through full use of IT systems, and ensuring the effective implementation of

screening procedures.

2.2 Effective return systems underpinning the integrity of the Schengen area

Over the years, return has emerged as a core priority, recognised as an element that

underpins the credibility, effectiveness and sustainability of the system as a whole.

Ensuring the return of those who do not have a right to stay is therefore a fundamental

condition for a well-functioning Schengen area.

A new legal framework for a common European return system

The Commission proposal for a new Return Regulation (24) addresses key structural

obstacles identified in previous periodic Schengen evaluations and the 2024 thematic

Schengen evaluation on more effective returns. The Commission welcomes the start of

interinstitutional negotiations and stands ready to support a final agreement that meets the

needs of the EU.

In parallel, the Return Coordinator has played a key role in shaping a more coherent and

strategic EU approach to returns through the High-Level Network on Returns by promoting

systematic exchanges of good practices on returns to politically sensitive and priority third

countries, as well as returns of illegally staying third country nationals posing a security

threat. In particular, progress was made through the Task Force on Statistics to enhance

monitoring and improve the reliability of return data. The Coordinator also prioritised

strengthening cooperation regarding unaccompanied minors, including through exchanges

between Member States and by exploring joint approaches with partner countries.

Operational improvements driving more effective returns

The effectiveness of return policies is measured by tangible results on the ground. In 2025,

a slight upward trend in the effectiveness of national return systems was observed in

seventeen Schengen States (25). This progress translated into an increased number of

effective returns in 2025, with a rise of 19% compared to the previous year. National

legislative reforms contributed to progress, including those adopted to implement the Pact

on Migration and Asylum. Frontex provided significant support to Member States in the

area of returns. In 2025, Frontex deployed 140 Return Specialists (26) and supported

63 500 effective returns, representing 42% of the total, confirming the sustained upward

trend observed in recent years.

Further efforts are required across all Member States to address challenges related to the

timely issuance of return decisions, the streamlining of procedures (27) and the

implementation of measures to prevent absconding and unauthorised secondary

movements (28). This is particularly important when dealing with individuals who may

pose security risks, requiring the involvement of multiple authorities, specialised expertise

(24) European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council

establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union,

COM(2025) 101 final.

(25) Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Iceland, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania,

Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Finland and Sweden.

(26) Despite this number, there are still challenges in meeting the deployment needs for Return Specialists

due to high language proficiency requirements and specialised operational skills.

(27) For example, in: Spain, Italy, Poland and Portugal.

(28) For example in: Spain, Portugal and Switzerland.

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and measures to prevent absconding (29). Schengen evaluations uncovered a discrepancy

between the number of return decisions issued and the number of return alerts created in

the Schengen Information System, as well as the inconsistent lodging of all relevant

information in the system (30). It is therefore essential to make full use of SIS return alerts

by systematically including all relevant information, such as biometrics, photographs and

security flags.

Voluntary return is increasingly recognised as a core component of an effective and

sustainable EU return policy. While some Member States (31) have moved towards more

proactive and tailored models, the full potential of voluntary returns is yet to be realised

through its consistent integration in national return frameworks (32).

Member States have made efforts to strengthen operational capabilities,related to

enhancing training frameworks (33), allocating additional human resources (34), and

strengthening coordination between national authorities (35). Further efforts are necessary

to ensure sustained continued impact in operational performance, particularly where the

lack of adequate and sufficient capabilities remains one of the key obstacles to carrying

out returns (36).

The gradual modernisation of operational tools and systems for returns is progressing

in several Member States (37). However, this process remains incomplete. In particular, the

improvement of return case management systems is still ongoing in several Schengen

countries (38), underlining the need to accelerate digital transformation in preparation for

the next phase of the EU-wide digitalisation of return procedures and the Commission’s

forthcoming legislative proposal in this area in 2026.

The return process must be accompanied by strong and effective safeguards to guarantee

fundamental rights. 2025 shows a general improvement in the quality and application of

these safeguards. Several Member States (39) improved their return decision-making

processes to respect the principle of non-refoulement, the right to be heard, the provision

of adequate information and effective access to remedies. Nevertheless, further efforts are

needed to consolidate and sustain these improvements (40), including as regard forced

return monitoring systems (41), and appeal procedures for return decisions (42).

(29) Cf. 2026 Compendium of best practices identified in the framework of the Schengen evaluation and

monitoring mechanism. Bulgaria’s approach of systematically interviewing apprehended third-country

nationals and checking them against EU and international databases to detect potential security risks was

identified as a best practice during its Schengen evaluation.

(30) According to Article 3(1) of Regulation 2018/1860 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28

November 2018 on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-

country nationals (OJ L 312, 7.12.2018), Member States have an obligation to create a return alert

following the issuance of a return decision.

(31) For example: Belgium and Italy.

(32) For instance: in Spain and Portugal.

(33) Belgium, France and Italy.

(34) For example: Italy, Lithuania and Malta.

(35) Such as in Finland.

(36) In particular in Greece, Spain and Portugal.

(37) Including France and Cyprus.

(38) Such as: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein,

Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia.

(39) Such as Belgium, Malta and Portugal.

(40) For example in: Greece and Hungary.

(41) For instance in: Czechia, Germany, Spain, Iceland, Austria and Portugal.

(42) Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,

Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia,

Finland and Sweden.

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The effective return of third-country nationals will remain a core priority in the 2026-2027

Schengen cycle. 2026 will see the launch of the new return border procedure under the

Pact on Migration and Asylum. It is therefore essential that national systems are fully

prepared to ensure the effective and consistent Pact’s implementation. Full and timely

implementation of the Schengen evaluation recommendations will play a key role in

achieving this objective.

2.3 Internal security cooperation

Internal security cooperation is essential for the Schengen Area, as it provides measures

that maintain safety and law enforcement efficiency. However, Schengen evaluations

reveal that some challenges still persist.

Effective and secure information exchange

Information exchange is a core element of Schengen's internal security system. Particular

progress has been observed in nineteen Member States that have notified full transposition

of the Information Exchange Directive (43), and in eighteen Member States (44) that have

established national case management systems interoperable with the Secure Information

Exchange Network Application (SIENA). However, the 2025 Schengen evaluations reveal

gaps between formal transposition of the Directive and operational effectiveness. In each

of the five Member States evaluated in 2025 (45), the Single Point of Contact (SPOC) has

not yet fully met the Directive’s requirements, resulting in a slower cross-border

information exchange that is also less standardised and more prone to error than designed.

Schengen evaluations have revealed that the functionalities of the SIS are not being

maximised (46). For example, the systematic attachment of biometric data to SIS alerts, the

roll-out and use of fingerprint searches by all relevant authorities particularly during border

checks and by migration authorities (47), and the sharing of terrorism-related SIS hits with

Europol remain inconsistent (48). By contrast, Member States that have invested in

automation and the systematic integration of case management systems and national

databases are achieving demonstrably better operational results (49).

Additionally, there are structural challenges related to human resources and technical

capacities. Several Member States (50) face staff shortages either in their N.SIS offices

(43) Directive (EU) 2023/977 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on the exchange

of information between law enforcement authorities, OJ L 134, 22.5.2023. The Directive establishes

harmonised rules for the adequate and rapid exchange of information between the competent law

enforcement authorities for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences. As of

April 2026, nineteen Member States notified full transposition of the Directive, while four notified partial

transposition. Reasoned opinions were issued for the remaining three Member States (Belgium, Estonia

and Spain).

(44) Czechia, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland and Sweden.

(45) Bulgaria, Austria, Romania, Slovenia and Switzerland.

(46) Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia,

Finland and Sweden.

(47) For example, inconsistencies are observed in Czechia, Spain, France, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania,

Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden.

(48) This remains an issue in all Member States except Austria.

(49) Germany and Austria.

(50) Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Iceland, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia,

Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Finland

and Sweden.

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and/or SI.RE.NE (51) Bureaux, and SPOCs, negatively affecting business continuity and

the quality of information exchange.

Law enforcement cooperation

Schengen evaluations consistently show that the legal and institutional foundations for

cross-border law enforcement cooperation are broadly in place across the Schengen area,

but their operational potential remains underused. Police Cooperation Centres are valuable

hubs for day-to-day cooperation, yet they continue to function predominantly as

information relays rather than operational enablers (52).

Joint operations reveal a mixed picture. Cross-border cooperation between Austria and

Hungary is a strong example of how different tools (53) can be combined to form a single

coherent system. However, joint operations in many Member States remain reactive and

partner-driven. There are systematically fewer outgoing surveillance and hot pursuit

operations than incoming ones, and the infrastructure for joint operational situational

awareness is largely absent.

Working closely with Member States to address these and other challenges, the

Commission established the Informal Expert Group on Cross-Border Operational

Law Enforcement Cooperation to share best practices, identify common challenges and

develop practical solutions. Building on its work, the Commission will prepare a study to

map existing cooperation agreements, providing a basis to assess whether the existing soft-

law framework for cross-border law enforcement cooperation remains adequate. This is

becoming increasingly relevant as the EU’s internal security strategy’s (54) call to establish

a High-Level Group on the future of operational law enforcement cooperation responds

directly to what Schengen evaluations have consistently found: existing tools are largely

sound but require a more solid legal basis. At the same time, the forthcoming proposals to

strengthen Europol's mandate will make it better equipped to provide operational support

to Member States, including by facilitating cross-border analysis, enhanced information

exchange and coordinated actions against threats affecting the Schengen area.

Underpinning all these efforts is the need for a shared professional culture grounded in

mutual trust and interoperable skills. The Commission is assessing how to best support law

enforcement training through the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement

Training (CEPOL). Addressing gaps in specialised areas such as digital forensics, lawful

decryption, and advanced data analysis is particularly important as crime increasingly

exploits emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence.

Situation at internal borders

Schengen contributes significantly to the well-functioning of the internal market and the

economic prosperity of the EU. As goods, workers and services cross internal borders

unhindered, cross-border regions thrive and national economies benefit from lower

administrative burdens and economies of scale. To evaluate the ‘Schengen effect’, the

Commission has commissioned a study into the benefits of Schengen and the cost of

reintroducing internal border control, which will be published in the second half of 2026.

(51) SIRENE stands for supplementary information request at the national entries. Member States that use the

SIS have to set up a national SIRENE Bureau, operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, responsible for

exchanging information and coordinating activities connected to SIS alerts.

(52) Council Recommendation (EU) 2022/915 of 9 June 2022 on operational law enforcement cooperation,

(OJ L 158, 13.6.2022).

(53) Bilateral agreements, shared coordination centres and EMPACT.

(54) European Commission, ‘Commission present ProtectEU – Internal Security Strategy’ (https://home-

affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-presents-protecteu-internal-security-strategy-2025-04-01_en).

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In 2025, ten Schengen States prolonged and maintained the reintroduction of control at

their internal borders (55), motivated by migration and security concerns. These include the

continued instability along key migratory routes, the weaponisation of migration by hostile

state actors, and the persistent pressure of cross-border organised crime.

Where internal border control is reintroduced, it is crucial that Member States take steps

to limit any negative consequence on cross border commuters and communities.

Therefore, the Schengen Coordinator's structured dialogue with the Member States

concerned as well as the consultation process initiated under the revised Schengen Borders

Code (56), played an important role, both delivering concrete results in addressing waiting

times at the internal borders and improving operational coordination and information

exchange. In most instances, the reintroduction of internal border controls concerned non-

systematic spot checks.

While internal border control may play a role in addressing some Member States’

migration and security concerns, more efficient and effective alternatives and solutions

are available. In particular, operational cooperation, information exchange and checks

within the territory can provide a valuable substitute for controls at internal borders,

especially via non-systematic police checks or mobile biometric identification and vehicle

tracking technologies (57). Romania’s operational approach at its internal borders with

Hungary and Bulgaria provides a model that could be replicated in other Member States.

It combines intelligence-led joint operations, targeted risk-based police checks, joint

patrols, and fully functioning Police Cooperation Centres.

Swift readmission of irregular migrants apprehended in border areas can be achieved

through the transfer procedure, an instrument introduced by the revised Schengen

Borders Code. Several Member States (58) are in the process of agreeing practical

arrangements for its application, while others continue to rely on existing bilateral

readmission agreements.

Looking ahead, the EES and the upcoming entry into application of the instruments of the

Pact on Migration and Asylum will significantly strengthen structural conditions to

progressively lift internal border controls. Both initiatives will provide Member States with

operational tools to manage migratory and security pressures at their external borders and

counter unauthorised movements within the Schengen area.

The Commission remains committed to upholding the principles of free movement and

security across the Schengen area and will soon issue the opinions as set out in the revised

Schengen Borders Code.

3. THE KEY TO CONSOLIDATION AND SUSTAINED IMPLEMENTATION:

SCHENGEN GOVERNANCE

In earlier phases of Schengen integration, the system could largely function through

established routines, practical cooperation, and a strong presumption of trust between

Member States. As a result, Schengen governance, covering all areas enables the

(55) European Commission, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control’ (https://home-

affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen/schengen-area/temporary-reintroduction-border-control_en).

(56) Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending

Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across

borders, (OJ L, 2024/1717, 20.6.2024).

(57) Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/268 of 23 November 2023 on cooperation between the

Member States with regard to serious threats to internal security and public policy in the area without

internal border controls, (OJ L, 2024/268, 17.1.2024).

(58) The Schengen evaluations of Austria, Romania, and Slovenia confirm that negotiations to implement it

have not yet been initiated.

11

functioning of the Schengen area, tended to play a supportive rather than central role, with

day-to-day management relying more on informal coordination than on a strong shared

political framework.

That context has fundamentally changed. Today, Schengen operates in a far more complex

and demanding environment, shaped by geopolitical instability, new security threats and

technological disruption. In this setting, the effectiveness and coherence of Schengen can

no longer rely predominantly on informal arrangements. As recognised in the Schengen

Declaration (59), reinforcing the Schengen area under current conditions requires a

governance that is more structured, more collective, and more firmly anchored in the

political level, ensuring clarity, coordination and a shared strategic direction.

Strengthening national Schengen governance is therefore the key condition to ensure

that the Schengen area can respond effectively to both present and future challenges.

3.1 Strengthening Schengen governance

The 2025 Schengen Scoreboard (60) paints a diverse picture of how Member States

contribute to the functioning of the Schengen area:

Aggregated Scoreboard of December 2025

While progress is evident in many areas, disparities persist, leading to operational and

security gaps. At the same time, when responsibilities are not upheld consistently, mutual

trust between Member States can be undermined, affecting the collective strength and unity

of the Schengen area (61). Similarly to previous years, in 2025 the Schengen evaluation and

monitoring mechanism played a crucial role in identifying areas for improvement and

promoting a culture of joint responsibility among Member States. The mechanism,

involving more than 500 experts from all Schengen States, allows for the effective and

timely identification of deficiencies, as well as best practices and innovative solutions.

(59) The Schengen Declaration was adopted by the Council on 12 June 2025, reaffirming Member States

commitment to preserving the integrity of Schengen; Council of the European Union, Schengen

Declaration, adopted on 12 June 2025

(https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/gjrnbywx/st10068en25.pdf).

(60) The aggregated Schengen Scoreboard scores and visualises for all Schengen Member States the overall

implementation of recommendations stemming from Schengen evaluations. In line with the methodology

agreed with the Member States in December 2023, it is structured into six policy dimensions, each

addressing key aspects for the effective functioning of the Schengen area. Based on the individual

Schengen Scoreboards that assign Member States scores on the level of implementation of the

recommendations, the visualisation illustrates the overall average score per dimension across Schengen.

(61) Providing timely and quality reporting on the measures taken to address the deficiencies identified during

the evaluation is a prerequisite for a well-functioning Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism.

12

These best practices are combined in a dedicated Compendium (62), which can provide

useful solutions and serves as an inspiration to Member States.

Number of selected experts per Member State for 2026

The 2025 evaluation activities (63), including the targeted monitoring activities (64) and the

recently launched Schengen monitoring dialogues (65), emphasised the need for Member

States to strengthen their national Schengen governance frameworks, ensuring effective

coordination, clear strategic planning, and full alignment between national priorities,

operational needs and EU funding. These processes have strengthened daily Schengen

implementation, supported by ongoing exchanges with the Schengen Coordinator (66).

Some Member States have made notable progress in this area, with twelve Member States

(67) appointing national Schengen Coordinators. Additionally, Romania’s first periodic

Schengen evaluation after its full integration into the Schengen area demonstrated the

results of a strengthened comprehensive national Schengen governance model, which

ensures a high level of preparedness by integrating institutional arrangements, strategic

planning, national quality control mechanisms, and both political and operational

coordination.

Despite this progress, several Member States still face significant challenges in

implementing Schengen governance effectively. Schengen governance frameworks

remain fragmented, with responsibilities dispersed across multiple authorities and without

a clear central coordination function. This reflects a broader pattern in which Schengen

implementation continues to be managed through siloed national arrangements, with

insufficient integration of responsibilities, coordination and oversight.

(62) Commission Staff Working Document, 2026 Compendium of best practices identified in the framework

of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism.

(63) In 2025, the Commission implemented the annual evaluation programme leading to Schengen country

reports of Bulgaria, Austria, Romania, Slovenia and Switzerland, which will be soon adopted. European

Commission, ‘Schengen evaluation and monitoring’ (https://home-

affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen/schengen-area/schengen-governance/schengen-evaluation-and-

monitoring_en).

(64) In Greece, France, Italy and Cyprus.

(65) Aimed at enhancing the process of evaluating and monitoring the implementation of Schengen standards

by Member States, these dialogues focus on fostering commitment and improving national Schengen

governance through structured discussions led by Country Coordinators, addressing key challenges,

ensuring timely reporting and follow-up on recommendations, and facilitating technical exchanges to

resolve persistent issues.

(66) These efforts have also allowed the Commission to assess the progress made by Member States.

Following the latest assessments of follow-up reports submitted by Member States, the Commission, via

these reports, closes the action plans of Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden in the field of visa policy, in

accordance with Article 21(3) of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism Regulation.

(67) Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, France, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Portugal, Romania, and

Finland.

13

Effective Schengen governance starts with strong national governance structures,

capitalising on the efforts already taken by the European Integrated Border

Management (68). The most advanced national governance models have shown four key

elements. First, a coordinated approach to national Schengen governance is necessary,

involving mapping and connecting all relevant stakeholders, clearly defining roles and

responsibilities at political, administrative and operational levels, establishing formal

coordination mechanisms, and designating a national Schengen Coordinator with

sufficient oversight authority. Second, a comprehensive and strategic framework is

required to set out a coherent medium- and long-term vision for the functioning of the

Schengen area, building on existing sectoral strategies. Third, a coherent vision for

operational follow-up, which translates strategic objectives into concrete measures with

clear timelines, assigned responsibilities, and appropriate resources, ensuring structured

implementation, is necessary to achieve real results. Finally, strong national governance

needs to be accompanied by adequate capabilities that enable the effective

implementation of Schengen obligations. By taking these steps, Member States can ensure

effective national responsibility and strengthen the coherence of Schengen at the EU level.

The stakes go beyond individual national concerns as the strength of the Schengen area

depends on the responsibility of each Member State towards each other. The true value of

evaluations lies in their ability to translate findings into common European level

conclusions. In 2026, the Commission will continue to support Member States in this effort

to strengthen Schengen governance, through the Schengen evaluation and monitoring

mechanism, including with evaluation activities in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands

and Liechtenstein (69). Member States will also receive guidance and resources to

strengthen their national governance frameworks, along with financial support under a

dedicated Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) call.

3.2 Schengen implementation through targeted EU funding

Reinforcing national Schengen governance should go hand in hand with the strategic use

of EU funding. This is particularly important in the preparations for the next Multiannual

Financial Framework for 2028-2034. While still subject to agreement by the European

Parliament and the Council, the Commission proposal on funding for Schengen initiatives

within the framework introduces a stronger focus on performance and the strategic use of

EU funding. In this context, EU funding will contribute supporting national Schengen

governance and actions, in a coordinated and targeted manner, fully aligned with strategic

priorities as determined during Schengen evaluations.

As the preparatory process for the next MFF continues, it is essential to connect the

structural reforms identified by the Schengen evaluations and the Schengen broad priorities

established for the 2026-2027 cycle with programming of EU funding in the area of Home

Affairs through the National and Regional Partnership Plans to translate EU’s objectives

into national investment and reform agendas.

3.3 Completion and expansion of the Schengen area

Schengen is designed as a common framework, where shared rules, standards and

responsibilities apply equally across all participating Member States.

In an increasingly complex geopolitical context, Cyprus makes a unique contribution to

strengthening shared situational awareness of risks and opportunities in its region, while

(68) The European Integrated Border Management aims to ensure the coherent and coordinated management

of the EU's external borders through joint operations, shared resources, and strategic partnerships.

(69) European Commission, ‘Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring – Migration and Home Affairs’,

(https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen/schengen-area/schengen-governance/schengen-

evaluation-and-monitoring_en).

14

bringing experience that strengthens collective capacity in border, migration and security

matters. In this context, the Commission conducted a Schengen monitoring activity in

December 2025 to assess Cyprus’ state of preparedness and support the next steps towards

its full accession to the Schengen Area. Substantial progress was madein 2025, with the

Cypriot authorities implementing significant reforms and measures in line with the highest

Schengen standards. Ireland has continued its efforts to demonstrate its readiness to fully

apply the parts of the Schengen framework related to the internal security of the Schengen

area.

It is also equally necessary to continue deepening structured engagement with enlargement

partners. EU candidates are Schengen candidates, therefore, it is essential to ensure that

Schengen readiness is systematically embedded in the EU accession process. The first step

on the road to Schengen membership is the establishment of robust Schengen governance

frameworks at a national level. This is why the Commission has already stepped up its

engagement with enlargement countries. Together with Frontex and Member State

experts, the Commission held the first Schengen governance awareness-raising session for

enlargement countries in February 2026. Hosted by Montenegro, this initiative provided

practical guidance on building effective national coordination structures. It also confirmed

strong interest from enlargement countries and highlighted the added value of early and

structured preparation. At the same time, there is an intensified focus on early Schengen

preparations in the negotiations, closely monitoring the development and implementation

of Schengen Action Plans in enlargement partners, and providing country-specific

technical assistance to support candidate countries in this process.

4 NEXT STEPS

Consolidating achievements and addressing any remaining gaps will ensure that the

Schengen area remains vigilant and well-prepared, as rapidly evolving geopolitical

conditions could substantially affect the dynamics of migration and security. For the 2026-

2027 Schengen cycle, the Commission invites the Schengen Council to endorse the

following priorities at its next meeting in June 2026.

Priority implementation actions for the 2026-2027 Schengen Cycle

1. To support Schengen’s external dimension

At EU level:

• Propose the revision of the Visa Code with targeted measures to strengthen EU

security.

• Enhance EU’s global competitiveness, by further developing mutually

beneficial partnerships with key countries to attract talent for innovation.

2. To ensure an integrated external border for a secure Schengen area

At national level, Schengen countries need to:

• Advance the digitalisation of procedures and the development of large-scale IT

systems, including their interoperability. Continue the effective implementation

of the Entry/Exit System, at all border crossing points, including by deploying

adequately all functionalities, reducing processing times, increasing automated

solutions at the borders, and improving registration and the quality of biometrics.

Ensure a well-prepared launch of ETIAS with adequate testing and the necessary

resources in place.

• Continue to improve the quality and effectiveness of border checks through

the full use of existing systems and their interoperability, as well as further

15

developments of national capabilities for border surveillance, including training

and infrastructures.

• Ensure a high level of situational awareness and in-depth understanding of

threats and emerging challenges by consolidating evidence-based and

intelligence-driven policy making.

• Ensure the effective implementation of the Screening Regulation, by allocating

resources and capabilities, which includes setting up an independent monitoring

mechanism.

• Strengthen and further develop contingency planning to increase reaction

capabilities during crisis situationsand ensure greater preparedness by

promoting a more European approach.

3. To enhance the effectiveness of return systems

At national level, Schengen countries need to:

• Ensure the effective implementation of the return border procedure.

• Strengthen the necessary operational capacities and tools to support the return

and reintegration process, including sufficient capabilities for return procedures,

as well as modernising tools and systems such as return case management and

making full use of the functionalities of the Schengen Information System.

• Make use of Frontex support and actively address challenges in meeting

deployment needs for Return Specialists.

4. To consolidate the operational framework for internal security cooperation

At EU level:

• Advance the work of the Informal Expert Group on Cross-Border

Operational Law Enforcement Cooperation by addressing joint operations,

cross-border surveillance, and secure communications.

• Continue the structured dialogue facilitated by the Schengen Coordinator

with all Member States concerned by or affected by internal border controls,

in view of the gradual lifting of the controls.

At national level, Schengen countries need to:

• Complete the legal and operational implementation of the Information Exchange

Directive, including through fully functioning Single Points of Contact and

promoting the systematic use of Europol information Systems, such as

SIENA.

• Make full use of all the enhanced functionalities of the Schengen Information

System.

• Address human resources and technical capacity needs (including training

and digital infrastructure) to match operational needs.

• Maximise the use of all instruments made available by the revised Schengen

Borders Code to phase out internal border controls. Deepen regional

cooperation initiatives and strengthen joint operational capacity by expanding

law enforcement cooperation frameworks.

16

5. To strengthen Schengen governance

At EU level:

• Ensure the consolidation of achievements and implementation of the priorities

identified in this report, including through more systematic country-specific

discussions, and with strategic funding under the next MFF.

• Complete Cyprus’ accession to the Schengen area.

• Complete the necessary procedures for the full implementation of the Schengen

rules relevant to internal security in Ireland.

• Continue strong engagement with enlargement countries.

At national level, Schengen States need to:

• Enhance national Schengen governance frameworks, building on the

advanced national governance models, all under the oversight of a designated

national Schengen Coordinator.

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 18.5.2026

SWD(2026) 150 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Compendium of best practices identified in the framework of the Schengen evaluation

and monitoring mechanism

Accompanying the document

2026 State of Schengen Report

{COM(2026) 150 final}

Compendium of best practices identified in the framework of the Schengen evaluation

and monitoring mechanism.

The well-functioning of the Schengen area relies on Member States’ effective and efficient

application of the Schengen rules. The Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism is a

key safeguard to ensure the adequate implementation of the Schengen acquis, which allows not

only for the timely detection of vulnerabilities, but also for the identification of best practices

and innovative solutions put in place by Member States.

The compendium of best practices accompanying the 2026 State of Schengen Report marks its

fifth edition since the new Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Regulation came into force.

As a living document, it encompasses the best practices identified in the Schengen evaluations

carried out over the years, which significantly improve the implementation of common rules

and that could be put into practice by other Member States. New and innovative measures

from the evaluations that took place in 2025 are identified in bold.

The compendium brings together a wide range of best practices covering several aspects of

the Schengen acquis, including national Schengen governance, management of the external

borders, visa policy, returns, as well as measures within the Schengen area, such as internal

borders and internal security. The aim is to provide insights into innovative strategies, tools,

and measures that can support Member State authorities in the implementation of the

Schengen acquis and to facilitate peer-to-peer knowledge sharing. Further exchange of

knowledge and experience should be fostered within the relevant Council bodies to reinforce

this collaborative effort. The compendium serves to complement existing best practices

outlined in applicable Commission or Council Recommendations or handbooks with new

insights.

This compendium is explanatory and has no legally binding status. It is intended as a valuable

resource for policymakers, law enforcement officials, and other stakeholders involved in

ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the Schengen area but also to support possible

solutions for remedial actions addressing future recommendations proposed by evaluation

teams. It is part of the annual report referred to in Article 25 of Council Regulation (EU)

2022/922.

1

2

NATIONAL SCHENGEN GOVERNANCE

1. National strategies

Implementation of European Integrated Border Management (EIBM)

Governance of National Integrated border Management

• The contingency plan includes detailed procedures for a variety of potential crisis

scenarios, defines clear roles and responsibilities for all relevant national authorities

(including police, customs, armed forces, and immigration services), as well as local

stakeholders (such as municipalities and non-governmental organisations). Such plans

are further complemented with procedures for requesting and integrating European

support. Several tests of the contingency planning framework were performed involving

all national authorities with responsibilities in crises. [Finland, 2023]

• The long-term and national development strategy and short-term governmental

programme on internal security include priorities on the implementation of EU and

Schengen acquis, as well as international law enforcement cooperation developments.

The Schengen evaluation recommendations are also covered by the programme.

Annual analysis and reporting ensure efficient implementation and operationalisation.

This national strategic architecture, connecting the EU priorities to the national

strategies, facilitates the efficient implementation (resourcing) and operationalisation

of the EU and Schengen acquis in a systematic manner. [Croatia, 2024]

• An overarching strategic document guides national efforts in implementing Schengen

rules from 2021 to 2027, aligning with European standards to enhance Schengen

cooperation. Public authorities, including various ministerial departments, play key

roles in this national Schengen governance concept. The Schengen Implementation

Plan 2023 serves as the main tool for accomplishing these goals across different areas

of the Schengen framework. The Ministry of Interior is tasked with assessing progress,

updating the concept, and reporting to the government biennially, using indicators and

timelines to measure success and align with Czechia’s European border management

objectives. [Czechia, 2024]

Quality control mechanism

• The Ministry of the Interior has established a national evaluation mechanism for external

borders, built on the European and national quality control mechanisms. It brings

together the recommendations from the Schengen evaluation mechanism, Frontex

vulnerability assessment and national evaluation visits. The latter includes an evaluation

of the Schengen Information System/SIRENE and police cooperation issues. [Austria,

2020]

3

• Border management at national and EU level should be systematically subject to the

application of the European quality control mechanism covering the entire scope of the

EIBM. The permanent national quality control mechanism includes a national

evaluators’ pool, which is trained in Frontex Schengen Evaluators’ courses. [Thematic

Evaluation of national IBM strategies, 2020]

Interagency cooperation

• Close and effective formalised inter-agency coordination and cooperation between the

different national authorities at central, regional, and local level are considered

essential for the effective functioning of integrated border management systems.

Border guard units are deployed in the territorial waters and on land of the third

countries concerned, ensuring constant joint patrolling by sea and air on board vessels

and airplanes of the Member State, supported by electronic means such as the

integrated external surveillance system (SIVE). [Thematic Evaluation of national IBM

strategies, 2020]

• The interagency sharing of intelligence information through the same platform,

contributes to building a common structured picture that improves the quality of

information sharing and supports the main stakeholders in the accomplishment of their

institutional mission, avoiding the duplication of efforts. [Estonia, 2023]

• A joint investigation cell was established involving other national law enforcement

authorities and five other EU members States affected by the migration flow, as well

as Europol and Frontex. This allowed for an effective and high-speed exchange of

information, enabling a rapid reaction, and thus allowed effective measures to be taken

to slow down the migration flow and carry out actions against the facilitators. Cross-

checking of persons by concentrating criminal intelligence and open-source

information collection in this cell made the joint investigation cell an operational hub

supporting the overall management of the external border. [Lithuania, 2023]

2. National capabilities

4

Training

Cooperation with CEPOL

• Coordinated and active participation in European law enforcement training is an integral

part of the inter-agency cooperation within the Police, Customs and Border Guard

permanent governance structure. The training needs are regularly discussed not only by

the national Police University College, but also in constant cooperation with Border

Guards and Customs training institutions. The participation in CEPOL courses is high

and the access to the CEPOL e-learning platform LEED is granted to a wide number of

law enforcement officers. CEPOL trainings are included in the national Police, Customs

and Border Guard annual training plans and under the coordination of the national Police

University College, available CEPOL training seats are shared between the law

enforcement authorities based on their needs and competencies. Moreover, the information

concerning the possibilities of the CEPOL trainings are easily accessible on the police,

Customs and Border Guard intranet. [Finland, 2023]

Returns

• Agreement with an airline company to use aircrafts and simulators on a regular basis

to train the pool of escorts on return operations, not only from an operational

perspective, but also to simulate emergency situations that could take place during the

return operations, such as fires. [Finland, 2023]

• Since 2023, a forced-return monitor from the National Council for Refugees has

participated as an expert in each training organised by the General Inspectorate for

Immigration for national escort officers. Furthermore, the National Council for

Refugees organised two training sessions in 2025 on forced-return monitoring and

fundamental rights compliance for staff in the two public custody centres (Otopeni and

Arad). This practice not only promotes the safeguarding of fundamental rights but also

raises the escort officer’s awareness of the duties of forced return monitors. [Romania,

2025]

SIRENE Bureau

• The SIRENE Bureau of the National Bureau of Investigation has created a national

online training course focusing on the renewed Schengen Information System. The

course contains theoretical material and knowledge checks. The online training package

is mandatory for police officers, border guards and customs officers and completion of

the course is monitored and followed up. [Finland, 2023]

• Establishment of a state-of-the-art Training centre within the premises of the SIRENE

Bureau, which provides comprehensive practical training opportunities for all the end

users of all national Law Enforcement Agencies. The educational activities include

practical sessions in computer labs and the availability of e-learning platforms, including

the police intranet and CEPOL courses, related to Schengen Information System

distance learning. The Police Academy regularly cooperates with the relevant

5

departments in the police, local universities, and non-governmental organisations to

ensure that regular updates are included in the training programme, also in the field of

international police cooperation and Schengen matters. A full set of manuals containing

all relevant information on Schengen Information System, Automated Fingerprint

Identification System and SIRENE matters for all competent national authorities and

Police Services is available via e-libraries on the police intranet. [Cyprus, 2023]

• The national IT system records information and documents about third-country nationals

subject to return, giving a complete picture of their situation. The SIRENE Bureau is in

charge of directly converting the national alerts on return to alerts on refusal of entry

and stay in the migration authorities’ systems upon receiving R-A SIRENE forms from

other Member States on national alerts. The same procedure can be performed by the

border guards when the person, subject to a return alert, is located at exit out of EU

territory. [Estonia, 2023]

• The SIRENE national bureau has implemented outstanding training practices on SIS-

related topics, offering materials like posters, handbooks, and podcasts to enhance

national awareness and usage of SIS. Trainers are available for on-demand sessions

and materials have been distributed across relevant national authorities.[Czechia,

2024]

• The SIRENE Bureau has implemented a structured on-the-job training programme for

all new SIRENE operators, which lasts for up to eighteen months and includes job-

shadowing and placements in all three units, as well as study visits to Bureaus in other

Member States, providing a comprehensive view of the SIRENE work. [Switzerland,

2025]

• Austria implements a robust system to ensure systematic fingerprint queries in the

Schengen Information System. All fingerprints taken by police or immigration

authorities are automatically checked in SIS-AFIS. In case of a match, an automatic

procedure is in place which ensures that two fingerprint experts, both of which are

available 24/7, independently verify the match. Confirmed and proven false matches

are reported automatically to the SIRENE Bureau. [Austria, 2025]

• National authorities issue alerts in the Schengen Information System on invalidated

residence permits systematically through an automated process via a national

application. Every time the status of a residence permit is updated to ‘invalidated but

not retrieved’, a corresponding alert is created. By merging automation, speed, and

precision, this process transforms passive data entry into active, qualitative threat

prevention. [Romania, 2025]

• National immigration authorities conduct security checks in the Schengen Information

System at three stages when issuing a residence permit to a third-country national:

when the application is submitted in person, during the application examination

(within 30 days) and when the residence permit is collected. This systematic process

ensures a thorough examination of the applicant's situation, allowing for immediate

follow-up by authorities. [Romania, 2025]

• Romanian Immigration, Police, Border Police, and Gendarmerie deploy nationwide

6

mobile devices that instantly access and display Schengen Information System (SIS)

alerts. Upon a SIS hit, officers receive comprehensive alert-related data (excluding ID

copies) in the form of biometric scans (fingerprints/facial recognition), MRZ codes, or

personal details, including highlights of victim data in cases of misused identity,

ensuring rapid, error-free identification. The mobile device's search modes and data

display enhance operational efficiency and the security of officers. [Romania, 2025]

Joint training with other Member States

• The Member State has embraced the concept of joint training with the police services of

its neighbouring countries to improve cooperation in the border areas. Joint trainings

with other law enforcement agencies and foreign counterparts stem for instance from the

work of the Bilateral Cooperation Committee. Joint trainings are also organised by the

Police and Customs Cooperation Centre. [Germany, 2020; Spain 2022]

Data protection

• There is well-developed data protection training for expatriate staff at Consular Posts,

which is organised in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Data

Protection Officer and the Data Protection Authority. [Czechia, 2019]

• The National Schengen Information System controller uses a wide-ranging training,

including the provision of e-learning modules and a comprehensive training strategy for

new staff members. [The Netherlands, 2021]

• The Data Protection Officer organises a comprehensive training on data protection

requirements related to the Schengen Information System. It is provided for the

National Schengen Information System and SIRENE Bureau’s staff members and end

users, especially regarding awareness raising efforts. [Italy, 2021]

• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs trains and raises awareness of staff on data protection

requirements in relation to the visa issuing procedure and to the Visa Information

System (including the active involvement of the DPO Office) for end users, in particular

for consular staff before posting to embassies/consulates. [Greece, 2021]

• The Data Protection Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides a handbook on

processing and protection of personal data to all Visa Information System end-users.

The guide is concise and user-friendly. [Czechia, 2024]

• Staff training on data protection in large scale IT-Systems through regular online and

in-person sessions, including "train the trainer" courses to maximize reach and

promote a data protection culture. Data Protection Officers of the different authorities

play a key role in organizing and delivering these trainings. [Poland, 2024]

Training

• Regular training was established at all border crossing points, which ensures that

border guards are constantly learning and have up-to-date knowledge of border check

procedures. The online training consists of daily tests which the border guards have to

7

take while on duty. There is a pool of 200 multiple choice questions from which 10 per

day are attributed randomly. The questions cover legal bases, the handling of

equipment and data protection. The shift leader checks the results and, based on gaps

identified in the border guards’ knowledge of certain topics, organises targeted

monthly trainings on those topics. [Hungary, 2024]

• The Border Police training program entails a one year program for Agents and a three

to four year program for Officers. The training aligns with the Frontex Common Core

Curriculum for Border and Coast Guard basic training in the EU and the Sectorial

Qualification Framework for Border Guarding. Officers hold a bachelor's degree, while

Agents complete post-secondary studies. After initial training, agents undergo 6

months of on-the-job training, while officers undergo a one-year mentoring and later

receive refresher training and specialised training, delivered based on a clear strategy

and coherent planning. [Romania, 2025]

• The Schengen Multifunctional Training Centre was established in 2011 by the Ministry

of Home Affairs to provide centralised training on the Schengen acquis to national

authorities, police, border guards, and customs officials. Quality is closely monitored,

with consistently high satisfaction rates (above 4.8/5). The consistent and effective

training on the Schengen acquis fosters cooperation between national authorities,

creating widespread awareness about the use and capabilities of available tools and

strengthening the national Schengen governance structure. [Romania, 2025]

Fundamental rights

• National authorities have online knowledge-refresher tools for border guards with both

mandatory and optional courses. As a complement to these platforms, an online

platform for refresher training has been developed, focused solely on fundamental

rights in border controls and returns. The platform is based on the 2019 Frontex course

manual for fundamental rights trainers and is publicly available, well-structured, and

user-friendly, connecting fundamental rights standards and safeguards to border

control scenarios. [Croatia, 2024]

8

Equipment

Mobile devices

• Mobile devices have been deployed to provide patrol officers with access to relevant

databases via a mobile application. Both user-friendly and powerful, mobile devices can

read vehicle license plates as well as the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) of identity

documents. They are also equipped with facial recognition capabilities (i.e., by sending

photographs for facial recognition purposes to a central database). [Hungary, 2019]

• All police officers with the relevant profile have been equipped with smartphones with

direct access to (inter)national databases and with a secure communication application.

The national police forces use a mobile solution for working outside the office. Via

mobile devices (tablets, smartphones, and laptops), every operational police officer can

query (inter)national databases (such as identity documents, license plates, and

biometrics). Objects, such as license plates, which are scanned with the smartphone are

immediately checked against the central database. [The Netherlands, 2021]

Documents to check entry conditions

• Border guards in the first line at the international airport can use a form containing

necessary questions to establish the fulfilment of most entry conditions laid down in

Article 6(1) of the Schengen Borders Code. The form facilitates the verification of

entry conditions for third-country nationals, improves communication between border

police officers and travellers, and overcomes potential language barriers. The form is

available in 28 languages corresponding to the international traffic at the airport such

as Chinese, Korean, Russian, Ukrainian and Albanian, and is used to facilitate the

check of entry conditions when there is a communication barrier between passengers

and border guards. It requires only a short time to complete the form by the third

country national and does not affect the waiting times at the borders. [Hungary, 2024]

9

3. Large-scale IT systems

National applications

Alerts and queries

• If the SIRENE Bureau creates, updates, or deletes an alert using the national

application, the issuing/requesting authority is automatically notified using an

automatic email notification. This simplifies the procedure, reduces the workload, and

improves the exchange of information between the different authorities involved.

[Hungary, 2019]

• The Member State receives passenger data from all flights coming from third countries,

the Targeting Centre Borders compiles it, and the data is processed automatically

through the national Advance Passenger Information (API) System. The API System

consists of national databases, ‘watch lists’, profiles based on risk analysis, the Schengen

Information System and the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database. In

case of a match, the operators have access to several databases and use the national

application to verify the match and get more information about the alert (photographs,

fingerprints, more details about the ‘action to be taken’, etc.). The hit result displays

identifiers, ‘reason for request’ and ‘action to be taken’. The suspect’s data and flight

details are then sent to the relevant airport or seaport responsible for apprehending the

suspect. [The Netherlands, 2021]

• Besides the owners of firearms, all imported firearms also have to be registered by the

importers and dealers in the police register, with the same automated queries being

made. Since August 2022, it has become mandatory to upload photos of the firearms

indicating all available markings and serial numbers. This ensures that the photographs

are available for attachment to alerts if a weapon is being entered in the Schengen

Information System. [Lithuania, 2023]

• Croatia uses a user-friendly alert creation process with high automation for national

alerts on (national) citizens. It involves the automatic import of national registry data,

including photos. This data is directly transferred to Schengen Information System alerts

when they are created. [Croatia, 2024]

• The national Customs Authority has an automated query system to check vehicle

customs declarations against the Schengen Information System using VIN numbers.

[Croatia, 2024]

• Proactive updates of previously created alerts on persons with the description of their

ID/document increase the likelihood of successfully finding an alert during searches.

[Croatia, 2024]

• The Romanian Advanced Passenger Information application is fully integrated with

the border control system, enabling the border guards to easily identify relevant data

during their risk assessments and processing by the app’s functionalities of colour

coding, notification, reporting, and instructions between first and the second line users.

[Romania, 2025]

10

Hit reporting

• Several practices are in place to ensure the automatic notification of a hit to the SIRENE

Bureau. In particular:

• Displaying information on the second line officer’s screens on a hit as soon as

it is registered in the first line. The border guards in the SIRENE Bureau also

receive information on hits via the border guard application. [Poland, 2015]

• When the National Road Vehicle Agency achieves a hit, the SIRENE Bureau

receives an automatic e-mail notification. This allows the SIRENE operator to

verify the hit and contact the Agency if the latter has not taken the initiative.

[Luxembourg, 2016]

• The border application has a direct ‘chat’ functionality with the case handler

in the SIRENE Bureau, which allows immediate and direct contact with the

SIRENE Bureau if an internal hit reporting form is sent off. [Croatia, 2018]

• At the airport, border guards have set up an effective follow-up procedure for hits on

discreet check alerts in cooperation with customs officers. When border guards notice

that a passenger is subject to a request for a discreet check in the Schengen Information

System, they will discreetly signal this to customs officers. [France, 2021]

• The national application provides the Schengen Information System alerts hit reporting

form for the end users, with a pre-filled template which retrieves from the alert all the

available data. The end users fill out the hit relevant fields and send it directly to the

SIRENE Bureau. A received email message includes HTML format, which can be

directly converted into a SIRENE form. Inquiry check questions are prefilled in the hit-

reporting form. This ensures a very good level of data quality and hit reporting in real

time. [Lithuania, 2023]

• Effective procedure to report that a person who is subject to a return decision and return

alert has left the Schengen area. In such cases, the border guard authority which had the

hit records the departure directly into the application used by the Migration Service. The

SIRENE Bureau deletes the return alert and introduces the refusal of entry alert outside

office hours when the information of the departure is received from other Schengen

Member States or the national Embassies or Consulates. In cases of forced return, the

local police units which executed the forced return also record it directly in the system.

Such procedure ensures an effective management of the return policy at national level

and also ensures that the refusal of entry alert is introduced to the Schengen Information

System without delay when the return decision is accompanied by an entry ban.

[Finland, 2023]

• Automated and user-friendly communication of a hit between the first and the second

line at certain border crossing points. In case of a hit, the first-line officer has the

possibility to send the hit information from the first line directly to the second line.

Subsequently, a notification in red colour will be visible to the second line. In case of a

hit on persons for discreet check, the first line discreetly collects available information

and in addition attaches screenshots of the passport/ID card/vehicle registration

certificate. This will automatically be sent to the second line; a hit reporting form will

11

be established and sent to SIRENE.[Hungary, 2024]

• Upon receiving a national hit form on a foreign Schengen Information System alert,

the SIRENE case management system automatically transfers the data already in

English to SIRENE G, H or R forms depending on the category of the alert. The

necessary manual input is minimal before sending it to other SIRENE bureaus. When

the SIRENE Bureau receives a SIRENE R-A form on a national return alert, the form

is automatically transferred from the management system to a database used by the

Border and Foreign Police authorities. It then automatically converts the alert as needed

or deletes it if the return decision is not accompanied by an entry ban. The same

process applies for the receival of SIRENE R-B or R-E forms. There is timely

processing of the hit forms and the alerts. For national hit alerts on missing persons,

the national hit form includes a mandatory field for consent for sharing location

information with the person filing the missing person’s report. [Slovakia, 2024]

• Switzerland built an App (PolAssist) which provides step-by-step interactive guidance

on alert management and hit follow-up procedures for SIRENE operators and SIS end

users. This ensures that accurate and relevant information is always available to end

users both on desktop and mobile devices and improves the data quality of alerts

entered into SIS and of the overall information exchange. [Switzerland, 2025]

• The SIRENE Bureau developed an Operational Emergency plan, featuring an

impressive logic decision tree diagram which encompasses all possible risks, a

Business Continuity Plan. It also contains an emergency journal and text modules to

report the IT incident to the national and foreign partner authorities. An offline version

of this Operational Emergency plan is kept on an encrypted USB stick, stored in a safe.

[Switzerland, 2025]

• At the e-gates in airports, an automated hit report is instantly sent to the second line

with all available information on the circumstances of the hit, including the flight

number and destination. [Romania, 2025]

12

Alert creation

• In the SIRENE workflow, a warning message was created to remind the authorities of

the necessity to insert biometrics if available when creating an alert in SIS. [The

Netherlands, 2021]

• High level of data quality and automation in two processes in the Register of Wanted

Persons. First, when an alert on a national is created, the register automatically checks

whether there is a vehicle or a firearm registered in the national databases to the name

of the person and automatically offers to the end-user the possibility to include the object

as an extension to the alert, which needs to be confirmed by the end-user. Second, when

entering an alert on a resident, the register pre-fills and imports the alphanumeric data

(including the ID document information) in the alert from the national registers (the

photograph of the ID document is not uploaded automatically, but added manually,

when available). In addition, when creating a return alert in the national application on

a person whose personal information is in the national registers, the national application

imports the alphanumeric and biometric data in the alert as well (including the copy of

the ID document, when available). [Lithuania, 2023]

• Automatic pre-filling of data in alerts. When entering an alert on a national resident in

the warrant registration system, the register pre-fills and imports the alphanumeric data

and photograph of the subject to the alert from the relevant national register. [Hungary,

2024]

Exchange of information

• When a national alert for a missing person is entered into the Schengen Information

System, the national SIRENE Bureau will receive an automatically generated SIRENE

C form. This form includes all relevant supplementary information and can be directly

forwarded to other SIRENE Bureaus by the national SIRENE Bureau. The automatic

generation of SIRENE C forms for Article 32 alerts enables quick transmission of data

to assist other Member States in urgent cases. [Ireland, 2024]

13

National Schengen and Visa Information Systems and IT systems

• The Security operation centre monitors the security of the entire police network at user

level, detecting anomalies that might indicate possible attacks. When the Security

operation centre detects a suspicious use, the operation centre intervenes to verify the

possible anomaly. The active monitoring of ‘atypical behaviour’ from the end users

performing queries allows them to identify signs of improper use of the Schengen

Information System and to prevent possible data security risks. [The Netherlands, 2021]

• In the national IT visa system, urgent applications (e.g., in a case when an applicant

needs to travel very shortly following the submission of the application, such as

hospitalisation of a close family member) are permanently flagged. Therefore, urgent

applications are easy to identify, and their examination can be easily prioritised.

[Malta, 2022]

• The monthly data quality reports produced by eu-LISA are received at the National

Schengen Information System Office and are then prefiltered to include only the alerts

that the SIRENE Bureau needs to check and/or forward to the end users who have

created the specific alert. The two-tier verification of possible errors ensures to a high

degree the good quality of the data entered into the Schengen Information System by

the authorities. [Lithuania, 2023]

• The National Schengen Information System application displays in a prominent manner

“Immediate reporting” and “Misused identity”, by placing the text at the top of the alert,

highlighted in red letters. Such a display allows the end user to be instantly aware of the

situation in terms of urgency, complexity, and sensitivity of the alert. [Cyprus, 2023]

• The visa processing IT infrastructure significantly facilitates the submission and

examination of visa applications in a secure manner, limiting the dependency on the

external service provider concerning the management and control of the systems. First,

by providing an online visa application form available at the Foreign Ministry’s

website and used approximately in 80% of the visa applications, including a “Guide”

with useful explanation in many languages regarding the data to be inserted into the

different fields. At the end of the process, it is possible to generate a checklist for the

necessary supporting documents depending on the place of submission of the

application and the purpose of the journey. Second, through a data entry system

developed for the external service provider for registering applications and combining

them with biometrics and scanned supporting documents, fully managed by the

national authorities. Finally, the “core” application processing system for the

examination of applications and decision-making has an intuitive, user-friendly

interface, allowing the decision-makers to easily contact the consulates, external

service providers, border guards, and the police in relation to a

14

particular application. The VIS Mail is integrated into the system in a user-friendly

manner, and the system has various analytical and statistical tools. The log

management and control functionality of the system notifies the Ministry’s support

team of any unusual activities of users processing data. [Finland, 2023]

• Standardized procedure for capturing photos of third-country nationals in the alien’s

policy registry following ICAO standards. This results in high-quality photographs and

facilitates the identification of persons subject to national alerts on returns and alerts

for refusals of entry. [Hungary, 2024]

• Automated fingerprint checks are performed based on criminal and immigration risk

analysis in addition to establishing the identity of individuals and to confirm hits.

[Hungary, 2024]

• There is a well-planned and documented process for business continuity at data

centres. Identical setups are used for development, preproduction and production

environments and there is a georedundant, highly secured secondary site. There is

regular testing of uninterruptible power supply, backup restoration and failover

systems between the primary data centre and the back-up site. Information security

documentation is regularly reviewed and updated; internal audits are conducted

regularly. [Slovakia, 2024]

• The SIRENE Bureau's case management system includes a robust tool for producing

statistical reports, allowing for detailed reports for each police station and border

crossing point on the basis of internal hit reporting forms. Statistics can be filtered by

various parameters, such as offense type, which aids in monitoring the Schengen

Information System’s use countrywide and reporting to eu-LISA. [Croatia, 2024]

• In situations where direct access to the Schengen Information System is unavailable,

end-users can contact the Central Technical Authority via fax or email to manage alerts

through the web communication channel in emergency mode. Clear national

procedures provide minimum criteria and templates for this process, making sure there

is uninterrupted availability of all functionalities in the Schengen Information System

for the end-users. [Poland, 2024]

• The Privacy Policy Decree 2018 encompasses comprehensive and extensive guidelines

and procedures regarding the routine random log check, which improve the self-

auditing of the management of the Schengen Information System and the Visa

Information System and aim to ensure compliance with the requirements of those

large-scale IT systems. [Austria, 2025]

• The national Schengen governance model is characterised by permanent coordination

structures and well-established working processes, ensuring a high level of

implementation of the Schengen system. It includes a comprehensive national quality

control mechanism covering all Schengen policy areas - except visa policy in

consulates - and is supported by a dedicated Schengen training framework. [Romania,

2025]

• Romania has established a georedundant secondary data centre in Brașov county via the

use of European funds, which provides high security and independence for critical

15

operations in the event of major disruptions. Moreover, they have implemented a robust

disaster recovery and business continuity plan, hiring local personnel to minimise

intervention time and ensure rapid return to operations. [Romania, 2025]

• In the primary site in Bucharest, which hosts the national copy of the Schengen

Information System’s data centre, a backup generator is tested regularly. [Romania,

2025]

Data Protection requirements in relation to the National Schengen Information System

(N.SIS)

• The authorities managing the N.SIS accept data subject’s rights requests made in

languages other than the Member States’ language. [Lithuania, 2018]

• The Data Protection Officer of the N.SIS controller has established a comprehensive

data breach notification policy, including procedures, tools, and instructions to staff.

[Germany, 2020; Norway, 2022]

• The Netherlands uses a decentralised structure of personal data protection monitoring

where contact persons for the issues regarding personal data protection are available in

every unit of the police whilst two data protection officers (DPOs) are in charge of

general supervision. [The Netherlands, 2021]

• The Data Protection Officer is in charge of performing vulnerability management,

coordinating the vulnerability assessment activity, and performing risk assessment and

auditing; they cooperate with the data controller in a proactive and collaborative

manner, e.g. regarding the project for the realisation of a Cyber Security Operation

Centre that allows prompt and effective incident management. [Italy, 2021]

• The user authorisation management of the National Police Board prevents unauthorised

access to personal data. In addition to the situation where the post or tasks change, the

superior of the user controls and assesses annually that the subordinates’ user

authorisations are appropriate and, if necessary, launches an internal procedure to update

them. The responsible system coordinator must annually check that the user rights given

to stakeholder groups and external persons are appropriate and updated. [Finland, 2023]

• The new Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) tool is implemented as a

log analysis tool which significantly improves the detection of anomalies and potential

misuse of the Schengen Information System. This lowers the vulnerability of the

system. [Sweden 2022]

• Proactive provision of information on the data subjects’ rights by the Airport Police.

They provide a link to the police data protection portal through QR codes, which are

placed visibly at the first and second line at the border-crossing points. [Hungary,

2024]

16

Data Protection requirements in relation to the visa issuing procedure / Visa Information

System

• N.VIS controller conducts extensive activities in relation to the supervision of the

consulates and of the external service provider, including data security and data

protection issues. In particular, a series of self-audits were performed in the last years

by the N.VIS controller. [Spain, 2017; Italy, 2021]

• The Data Protection Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and

Cooperation is involved in the Ministry’s inspections of the visa issuing procedure and

is also in general strongly involved in many data protection aspects of the visa issuing

procedure. [Spain, 2022]

• Extensive log control is carried out by an automated software tool to detect incidents

in the log files. [Denmark, 2022; Sweden 2022]

• The Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solution implemented in the

IT system of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is designed with numerous predefined

rules triggering alarms and notifying by email the Ministry VISA support team in case

of any unusual activity of users processing data in the Central Visa Information System

(C-VIS). As the VISA system (the national core application processing system for the

examination of applications and decision-making) logs all processing of data in the

VISA and C-VIS by all end-user authorities with access rights, the log control covers

all those authorities, as well. The Ministry’s Data Protection team has a well-established

procedure for assessing data breaches and what additional steps need to be taken,

including the timeframe for notifying the Data Protection Authority. [Finland, 2023]

17

SIRENE Bureau

SIRENE procedures

• The Prosecutor’s Office has a duty desk that is available 24/7 for referrals from the

SIRENE Bureau. [Denmark, 2017]

• SIRENE staff are involved in on-spot activities during large-scale police operations.

[Switzerland, 2018]

• There is a facility to submit fingerprints from the Schengen Information System to the

national Automated Fingerprint Identification System through the SIRENE workflow

system and get hit/no-hit responses automatically. This process is only initiated when a

case file is created in the SIRENE workflow system. In accordance with the legislation,

the process does not entail the storage of the SIS fingerprints in the national AFIS.

[Ireland, 2021]

• All relevant authorities related to the police internal secured network have their official

dedicated mail accounts, used to exchange information. All police reports of incidents

are visible to all offices with dedicated mail accounts, including the SIRENE officers

who proactively search against the available databases, including the SIS, all EU and

third-country nationals involved in the reported incidents. As a result of these queries,

in case a positive match is produced, the SIRENE Bureau immediately contacts the

Police station in charge of the case (that has reported the incident) and requests further

action to be taken regarding the subject of the alert. The proactive approach developed

by the SIRENE Bureau ensures that no hits are missed during the queries performed

against the SIS. [Cyprus, 2023]

• A national judicial authority has been assigned to the SIRENE Bureau to ensure the

efficient and accurate execution of European Arrest Warrants within its territory. This

assignment enables prompt and effective communication between the judicial

authority and the SIRENE Bureau, facilitating coordination and legality in all activities

related to the European Arrest Warrant. [Romania, 2025]

SIRENE workflow system

• In the case-management applications, when there is a hit in an alert that contains aliases,

misused identities and/or links, a window pops up highlighting the presence of this

relevant information. This notification effectively addresses one of the most common

problems among the query solutions in the different Member States: the difficulty of

making this information visible to the end user. [Hungary, 2019]

• The SIRENE workflow system automatically checks all incoming messages from all

international channels (including also SIRENE forms), against pre-defined keywords.

18

Personal data included in the forms is automatically checked against the connected

databases. Positive results from such screening are marked as ‘hot hits’ to indicate that

those forms should be handled as a priority. Thanks to this solution, the SIRENE Bureau

can effectively manage incoming requests without any backlog. [Liechtenstein, 2021]

• Incoming A and M forms (used to exchange information on European arrest warrants

and extradition requests, and on miscellaneous supplementary information when no

procedure is laid down, respectively) on persons are processed automatically in the

SIRENE case management system, which automatically transfers the incoming forms

on alerts related to terrorism to the Danish Security and Intelligence Service. [Denmark,

2022]

• The SIRENE forms created by officers are pre-filled with alert data and have predefined

texts available that can be added just with one click. The predefined texts are tailored

for each form and type of alert. [Slovakia, 2019]

• The SIRENE case management system is a single IT application that handles all

messages in a highly automated way: incoming SIRENE forms are registered

automatically to existing cases and assigned to the competent case officer; incoming A

forms are processed automatically and checked against the national databases based on

keywords. This process allows for all incoming A forms including these keywords to

be automatically sent once per day in a batch to the relevant departments and units.

The A forms are assigned to an operator for manual handling only in case of a match.

The dedicated national hit-forms are automatically sent from a preview window in the

Schengen Information System alert by the end-users from the police browser/registers

and received in the ILO’s incoming messages mailbox and then converted into SIRENE

hit-reporting forms. These processes significantly facilitate the performance of the tasks

of the SIRENE Bureau and support the timely effectiveness of the exchange of

supplementary information and forms. [Lithuania, 2023]

4. Fundamental Rights aspects

Forced-return monitoring

• Adequate monitoring is ensured by the full independence of the National Guarantor, the

scope of its action, the trainings provided to the return escorts on fundamental rights

(including on the rights of vulnerable groups of persons) and the principle of non-

refoulement, as well as the regional network of trained forced return monitors operating

on the whole territory. [Italy, 2021]

• The regular online publication of the forced-return monitoring reports by the Public

Defender of Rights, including in English as part of the annual general report of the

Ombudsman ensures an additional layer of scrutiny over the removal process, enhancing

19

its transparency and further supports the effectiveness of the forced-return monitoring

mechanism. [Czechia, 2019]

• The Border Guard Headquarters has a designated human rights advisor to mainstream

and support fundamental rights-compliant border management practices. Regional

Border Guard divisions also have such designated human rights advisors, who take

part in delivering training on fundamental rights at regional and local levels. [Poland,

2024]

• In 2021, the Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding between the Border Police, the

Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, and UNHCR was amended to authorise the Bulgarian

Helsinki Committee to monitor all stages of Bulgaria's return procedure. This

encompasses activities from initial apprehension, interviews with returnees,

verification of documentation, visits to pre-removal detention centres, through to the

final removal to a third country. This monitoring approach exceeds the requirements

outlined in Article 8(6) of the EU Return Directive. If the Bulgarian Helsinki

Committee provides recommendations in its reports, the Border Police must consider

these before applying coercive measures, ensuring comprehensive safeguards and

cooperation. [Bulgaria, 2025]

5. Data protection supervision

• The Data State Inspectorate organises supervision of the Schengen and Visa Information

Systems within the Business Process Model and Notation - a graphical representation

for defining business processes in a business process model. Business Process Model

and Notation allows employees to understand their responsibilities at each stage, as well

as the entire process of supervision. [Latvia, 2023]

• The Commission for Personal Data Protection has created a tool for supervisory

activities, featuring a comprehensive questionnaire that addresses both general and

specific aspects concerning EU large scale IT systems. The questionnaire covers areas

such as technical, organisational, network, and information security measures by the

controller. It also includes a dedicated section for inspecting the National Schengen

Information System and the National Visa Information System, with questions on

legislation, public awareness, and data subject rights. [Bulgaria, 2025]

20

EXTERNAL DIMENSION

Cooperation with third countries

Liaison officers

• There is direct access from the International Liaison Office intranet to the Database of

dactyloscopy data that allows the officers to query the national AFIS with a NIST file

attached to an alert, allowing them to retrieve any matches in a matter of minutes.

When the automatic search results in a match, this match is also subject to verification

by a fingerprint expert. This functionality allows not only to query the national

databases with alphanumeric parameters but also with biometrics, which increases the

accuracy of the identification of the person. [Lithuania, 2023]

• Visa advisors or liaison officers are deployed in priority third countries, tasked with

identifying potential irregular migration to the Schengen area and gathering

intelligence on new methods or trends. When fraudulent documents or identities are

detected by visa authorities, not only is the Schengen visa refused but an entry ban is

also issued to prevent the third-country national from attempting entry through another

Member State. The intelligence collected by these officers is regularly shared with

relevant authorities through coordinated meetings, enhancing preparedness at external

borders and for return procedures. This intelligence aids in forming national and

regional plans, allowing targeted actions against entities involved in facilitating

irregular migration. Irregular migrants identified in these operations are directed to the

appropriate return processes. [Hungary, 2024]

• Liaison officers have been given direct access to the case management system

managed by the Single Point of Contact, enabling real-time information retrieval from

national and international databases. This access improves their decision-making,

supports cross-border investigations, and enhances operational efficiency with

international collaborators. Additionally, oversight by the Single Point of Contact

ensures that communications between liaison officers and law enforcement are

coordinated, transparent and secure. [Czechia, 2024].

• The Bulgarian Migration Department in charge of legal migration conducts automated

security checks in the Schengen Information System using its own application at three

stages of the processing of residence permits for third-country nationals. First, when an

application is submitted in person; second, during the application examination

procedure – after having consulted the State Agency for National Security and vetted

against 29 legal grounds to refuse residence permits and long stay visas at the time the

decision is taken; and third, when the residence permit is collected in person.

Additional checks are also performed when new information on the third-country

national is received. This systematic process ensures a thorough examination of the

applicant's situation and allows immediate follow-up by authorities. [Bulgaria, 2025]

21

International cooperation

• The establishment of multilateral cooperation and bilateral agreements with several third

countries allows data exchange in real time on maritime surveillance and in the border

crossing points for checks on ferries and other border-related information. The

authorities actively support the development of national capabilities for border control

in third countries by donating assets. [Italy, 2021]

• The national authorities manage the migration flows and tackle cross-border crime from

outside the Schengen area through the implementation of a regional concept of border

surveillance. It includes the deployment of liaison officers from third countries to the

regional coordination centres of the Member State and vice versa, which aims to

facilitate direct cooperation and exchange of information. Border guard units are

deployed in third countries (including in territorial waters), ensuring constant joint

patrolling by sea and air. A search and rescue mechanism complements the regional

border surveillance system with vessels coordinated by the national search and rescue

agency. [Spain, 2022]

• The "Safe Tourist Destination" project runs since 2006, hosting and deploying police

officers internationally to better serve tourists and nationals abroad. With growing

participation of foreign police organisations, 2023 saw involvement from 24

organizations across 21 countries. Foreign police officers operate under agreed powers,

providing services in tourists' languages which lowers barriers to seek police help.

Visible in their national uniforms, guest police officers contribute to crime prevention

and enhance safety. [Croatia, 2024]

• Arrangements established with neighbouring third countries according to which guest

officers are deployed at the border to support surveillance and other control activities,

such as border checks. It increases reaction capabilities and information exchange.

Within one neighbouring territory, border police officers from a partner third country

are patrolling in cooperation with local border officers on a daily basis to prevent

illegal migration and identify facilitators of human smuggling. Based on a bilateral

agreement with another partner country, an officer is currently working at specific

border crossing points to support checks and facilitate communication with passengers.

[Hungary, 2024]

• Courts and Prosecutor’s offices create alerts for wanted persons along with a European

Arrest Warrant (EAW) in both Polish and English. Attaching the English version to

the alert expedites procedures in the other MS for actions on international hits.

[Poland, 2024]

• A national judicial authority has been assigned to the SIRENE Bureau to ensure the

efficient and accurate execution of European Arrest Warrants within its territory. This

assignment enables prompt and effective communication between the judicial

authority and the SIRENE Bureau, facilitating coordination and legality in all activities

related to the European Arrest Warrant. [Romania, 2025]

22

Visa Policy

External Service Provider

• Imposing financial sanctions on external service providers in case of non- compliance

with the contract, combined with reinforced monitoring of their work, is an effective

way to bring the external service provider in conformity with the provisions of the

contract and improve its performance. [Austria, 2022]

• The local staff working on visa processing in New Delhi attended training activities

organised by the Swiss and German embassies on document fraud and the verification

process. Thanks to these activities, the staff were well equipped to recognise the

authenticity of supporting documents. [Romania, 2025]

23

MANAGEMENT OF THE EXTERNAL BORDERS

National and European situational awareness and early warning system

Cooperation (situational awareness)

• The coordination between the National Coordination Centres of two neighbouring

Member States allows for a common situational picture, efficient exchange of

information, improved situational awareness at the common borders and an increased

response capacity, as the positioning of the assets is also shared between the two

countries. [Portugal/ Spain, 2017]

• Direct access to national databases (beyond those just used for border control) enables

the National Coordination Centre to maintain a comprehensive national situational

picture and ensure enhanced situational awareness for its stakeholders at national and

European level. [Finland, 2023]

• The National Coordination Centre established a procedure for reviewing requests for

activation of EUROSUR Fusion Services at the district and local levels. Such procedure

verifies the legality and relevance of each request of EUROSUR Fusion Services, before

they are submitted to Frontex, ensuring that only relevant and cost-effective requests for

EUROSUR Fusion Services are sent to Frontex and then used in the operational

activities. [Finland, 2023]

• Within the EMPACT framework, the Police Central Bureau of Investigation’s drug

unit Head acts as the "Driver" of the EMPACT operational action plan targeting

criminal networks involved in the production, trafficking and distribution of synthetic

drugs and new psychoactive substances. The “Driver” benefits from unique operational

support, helping to efficiently identify and access various financial opportunities. The

European Project Implementation Centre within the Ministry of Interior Affairs

supports this activity as a priority and assists by handling administrative tasks and

supporting efforts to combat drug trafficking. [Poland, 2024]

• Border Guards and Customs authorities closely cooperate through an integrated Digital

Border procedure at crossing points to strengthen the checks and ensure a smoother

process. Data gathered and first-line checks results, including SIS information, are

directly transferred from Border Guards to Customs, who continue inspections with

pre-filled details. [Poland, 2024]

• The National Coordination Centre maintains a high-quality national situational picture

supported by a comprehensive dataset and fully integrated systems. It has access to

and oversight of all systems and assets used for border checks and surveillance,

structured according to the EUROSUR model, with event, operational, and analysis

layers. Real-time monitoring of border checks is facilitated through a mobile solution,

which provides a single-query interface to all relevant border control databases.

[Romania, 2025]

24

Risk Analysis

Land borders

• The national risk analysis system of the border control institution is efficient and

supported by functional inter-agency cooperation. Twice per year, the border control

institution issues common risk analysis products with Customs and the National Police.

The regular and systematic exchange of information between relevant national

authorities involved in the implementation of the European Integrated Border

Management resulting in joint risk analysis products ensures comprehensive national

situational awareness and supports adequate reaction capabilities. In addition, common

trainings, joint operations, and tailored actions are organised between the relevant

authorities involved in border management. [Lithuania, 2023]

• All police officers involved in border control have access to an application to detect

persons and/or vehicles with a specific risk profile. The application is part of the

national risk analysis system of the Border Police and integrated in the National

Border Management Information System. It ensures effective use of risk analysis

profiles at all organisational levels and increases the quality of border control. To

identify high-risk persons or vehicles, the Border Police developed an automatic risk

indicators application which is integrated into the Border Management Information

System. When activated, the indicators automatically detect potential perpetrators

during border checks. The indicators are automatically linked with risk profiles,

showing a yellow alarm on the border guard’s screen with a link to the profile, giving

targeted instructions to determine a person's status. Border guards can activate these

indicators at specific border crossings and times. [Croatia, 2024]

• Slovenia has implemented an effective system for automatically linking objects and

persons related to the same criminal case when an alert is created in the Schengen

Information System. For any status-classified object or document, such as 'stolen,'

connections are automatically made to related parties involved in the same case. This

system uses a daily batch processing schedule to review all active alerts in Slovenia’s

Central Schengen Information System. It checks for associations with corresponding

police database records and establishes links between alerts with the same reference

case number. This proactive linkage allows law enforcement and relevant authorities

to access pertinent information quickly, enhancing situational awareness and

supporting timely, informed decision-making. [Slovenia, 2025]

25

Border checks

Air borders

• A dedicated unit of six border guards monitors private transport and recreational

aviation, including light aircrafts and helicopters, as it has access to real-time route

tracking and flight data from the military radar. The unit receives all the flight plans

which are then analysed. When the airport of departure or arrival is not a border crossing

point, an alert is given to a police unit to intervene. In case of unauthorised landings at

aerodromes not dedicated to border crossings, the authorities impose fines. Risk

assessments of deviating flight routes are carried out regularly. [Belgium, 2020]

• The communication between the first and the second lines at border crossing points at

the airport via the national application is very highly automated and user-friendly. In

case of a hit, the first-line officer has the possibility to type in comments in a dedicated

Field, and the hit information together with the comments message is then sent

through the national application from the first line to the second line. When it comes to

the e-gates, in case of a hit on a discreet check alert, the e-gate operator can also add a

comment to the hit which is then immediately forwarded to the second line which

collects additional available information and sends the hit form to SIRENE. This

allows the check to be completed without any contact with the subject of the alert,

while collecting the information needed. [Lithuania, 2023]

• Latvia has a Passenger Information Unit responsible for the collection and processing

of passengers’ data on all flights currently operating in the country. Its role is to inform

(24/7) competent law enforcement authorities of the need to further examine incoming

and outgoing passengers, after the automated comparison of their data with relevant

databases (such as the Schengen Information System, I24/7), or against abstract profiles

modelled in cooperation and/or upon request of such authorities. As they receive queries

from all law enforcement agencies, the unit is in a unique position to notice overlapping

investigations and objects of interests and to inform respective agencies. A well-

developed case management system for handling communications with competent

authorities and Passenger Information Units of other Member States, established

following international best practices, is at the heart of the successful fulfilment of the

Unit´s tasks and information exchange. The operations take due account of data

protection and procedural requirements established by the relevant EU and national

law. The Unit proactively runs awareness raising campaigns on the capabilities it offers.

[Latvia, 2023]

Land borders

• Vehicles approaching the land border control booths are automatically pre-checked in

the Schengen Information System via the Automatic Number Plate Recognition,

including object extensions. [Croatia, 2024]

26

Border surveillance

• The border guard uses Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for surveillance and

intervention tasks. Each of the regional units responsible for the external land borders is

connected to the system. It consists of three platforms (unmanned mini motor gliders),

a ground station (with remote control, screens, and antenna) and other supporting

equipment. The platforms are equipped with daylight and night-vision cameras, and at

least one platform can be used at any given time. High-quality images from the cameras

are delivered in real-time either to the ground station or other connected recipients.

This UAV system enhances the border surveillance capacity, improves situational

awareness, and facilitates reaction capacities. Once a flying object is detected, the

Regional Coordination Centre is swiftly informed for specific intervention measures to

be conducted. [Poland, 2019]

• An electronic barrier system has been installed along the majority of the external land

border, consisting of a high number of day, night and thermal cameras and motion and

seismic sensors. Regional centres monitor the system, transmitting automatically

generated alarms to local coordination centres which dispatch patrols. This effectively

detects unauthorized crossings, allows real-time monitoring, and enhances patrol

response times. [Poland, 2024]

• The national border guard uses an IT system for planning, coordinating, and reporting

operational actions, which serves as an all-in-one platform to increase overall efficient

external border control. The system has several modules which enable the user to save

and share information on events, display events on a map, plan patrols and work

schedules, display the position of operational units in real time and transmit reports.

[Poland, 2024]

National database for border surveillance

• The national border surveillance concept is based on a comprehensive and efficient

national database, combining all the relevant functionalities to support operational and

tactical tasks. This system follows all elements of the operational cycle of border

surveillance: providing support for information collection, reporting on the tactical and

operational outcome of activities, planning of shifts, management and coordination of

patrols and designing efficient reaction response in the field and providing coherent

situational awareness. The software provides a single service platform for all law

enforcement thus ensures the effective utilisation of resources in case of an emergency

and benefits of compilation of the situational picture in designated areas of

responsibility. The software is linked with functions of the mobile IT environment of

the patrol deployed at the field. Based on its comprehensive and coherent design, the

system can be operated at local, regional, and national level. [Estonia, 2023]

27

RETURN

Effectiveness of the national return system

Return procedures

• The practice of taking return, removal, and entry ban decisions in one step reduces the

administrative burden while the procedural rights of the returnees are fully respected.

[Austria, 2015]

• The procedure of notifying the ‘intention of issuing an entry ban’ when an irregular stay

is detected during exit checks, giving the third-country national the opportunity to raise

objections, allows the authorities to issue an entry ban without interrupting the departure

of the third-country national while respecting the third-country national’s rights. [The

Netherlands, 2021]

• National authorities developed a notice on available assistance for reintegration, to be

signed by third-country nationals post-consultation. This is stored with their case files,

easing communication with return counsellors at detention centres. [Croatia, 2024]

• If a third-country national with no right to stay is found and has a return decision

issued by another EU country, national authorities will recognise and enforce this

decision without delay. They will not issue a new return decision or contact the issuing

country but will instead proceed with the removal of the individual to their country of

return, following, where justified, an updated assessment. [Czechia, 2024]

Forced-return procedure

• Procedures are in place enabling authorities to take a fast decision on a subsequent

asylum application lodged during the removal process to avoid postponing or delaying

the removal of a third-country national while ensuring effective implementation of the

principle of non-refoulement. [The Netherlands, 2015]

Voluntary return

• Throughout the entire return process, voluntary returns are a priority for the national

authorities. There is a proactive approach to motivate third-country nationals for

voluntary departure during all stages of the procedure, particularly at detention centres.

The detention centres are considered conducive to promoting voluntary returns, with

case managers and authorities actively motivating third-country nationals to leave the

country voluntarily, while providing adequate accommodation and support. [The

Netherlands, 2021]

• The early engagement with returnees when promoting voluntary return/departure and

the possibility for a returnee to participate in a voluntary return scheme at any point of

the return process, promotes and increases the use of voluntary return and reintegration

as an integral part of a common EU system for return in line with the EU strategy on

voluntary return and reintegration. [Luxembourg, 2016; Denmark, 2022]

28

IT system

• The national IT return case management system, which was developed in line with the

Frontex model (RECAMAS), provides return-related authorities with an efficient and

integrated tool, enabling the effective management of return cases. [Italy, 2021;

Estonia 2023]

• The connection of the national migration case management system to the Frontex

Application for Return (FAR) charter flights module allows national authorities to

directly reach all charter operations organised with the support of Frontex and helps

them organise and participate in return operations more efficiently. [Austria, 2020]

Detention for the purpose of removal

Detention centres

• A children's room in registration facilities for foreigners provides appropriate and

stimulating surroundings for children. The long opening hours and accessibility without

restrictions, the presence of a social worker and the large number of games and activities

available make it attractive for children to use. [Lithuania, 2018]

• Family centres and targeted psychiatric facilities can cater to the particular needs of

vulnerable persons in detention. The family centre’s layout, activities and staff

commitment allow for family life as close as possible to normal and provide appropriate

and stimulating surroundings for families and unaccompanied minors. The psychiatric

facility provides for close cooperation between the relevant partners to address the needs

of vulnerable persons with psychological problems in the return process while

increasing the efficiency of return procedures. [The Netherlands, 2021]

• The developed protocols and training of personnel, combined with the design and the

regime contribute to mitigating the stress and trauma for minors in the return process

and are in line with the best interests of the child principle. [Norway, 2022]

• The facilities for foreigners have mental healthcare offices, offering third-country

nationals assistance with mental health issues such as post-traumatic stress disorder and

prevention of suicide as well as supporting their adaptation. The psychologists carry out

an initial appraisal with all new arrivals and inform them about the possibilities of

seeking psychological support within the facility. This allows for the early identification

of psychological issues, which can guarantee an effective approach and handling of such

cases. The mental healthcare offices can be accessed during office hours from Monday

to Friday after an appointment by phone or with an application form. This helps create

29

an open and safe environment, especially when dealing with victims of trafficking and

other vulnerable persons. [Lithuania, 2023]

• Detention conditions feature spacious outdoor recreational areas at a Reception Centre,

with a dedicated outdoor playing area for young children and grassy recreational area

for adults, creating a pleasant atmosphere with space for privacy. It mitigates risk of

conflict and overcrowding. [Croatia, 2024]

• Detention centres are staffed with an educational unit of 11 officers, which organises a

wide variety of educational, social, cultural (with attention to cultural sensitivities) and

sports activities as well as events. The staff is available to the detainees from Monday

to Saturday, 12 hours/day and officers are dressed in civilian clothes, some of which

have a professional background in education and psychology. They have an active role

in conflict prevention within the centre. [Poland, 2024]

• Detention centres offer detainees extensive medical care tailored to their needs. If care

cannot be provided on-site, detainees are quickly taken to outside specialized clinics.

The Border Guard covers costs of these treatments. In case of a serious condition,

detainees are released and transferred to specialized care organisations. [Poland, 2024]

• The Detention Centre provides a dedicated nursery room, available 24/7, where

mothers can care for their newborn children in a private and separate facility. The room

is equipped with essential furniture and items to support the care of infants. There is

also a childcare section, spacious and well-equipped, offering a wide range of age-

appropriate activities, toys, and games. Children whose parents are detained at the

Centre can visit the playroom with their parents' consent. For very young children,

visits can also be supervised by one of their parents, ensuring a safe and supportive

environment for all. [Czechia, 2024]

• The detention centre has implemented a range of visual aids, including orientation

tables, signposts, house rules, and posters, which are designed to be child-friendly and

accessible. These materials feature pictograms and are displayed at a height and

appearance that is easy for minors to understand. Additionally, Frontex’ ‘Toolbox for

Children’ has been made widely available and accessible in multiple languages.

[Czechia, 2024]

• Zurich’s Detention Centre SMAZH initiative offers detainees personal laptops with

unlimited, secure internet access for just 1 CHF per day. The programme’s added

value lies in its multi-layered impact: comprehensive online resources keep detainees

informed about their rights and procedures; smart content filters ensure a safe

browsing environment; real-time translation tools dismantle language barriers to

communication and services; and monitored video calls enable critical family and

social connections, all while maintaining facility security. By prioritising digital

autonomy as a right - not a privilege – this project not only mitigates the psychological

harms of detention but also sets a replicable benchmark for humane, forward-thinking

care, proving that technology can be a powerful tool when deployed responsibly.

[Switzerland, 2025]

• The guarding officers at the Postojna Detention Centre are equipped with body

cameras, which serve as a vital safeguard for both the officers and the detainees,

30

providing an objective and unbiased record of interactions between the two parties.

By documenting all interactions, any incidents or allegations of misconduct can be

thoroughly investigated and addressed, and any conflicts or tensions within the

detention centre can be de-escalated. [Slovenia, 2025]

• The Initial Reception Center West handles asylum and immigration procedures,

supported by the Integrated Foreigners Administration application. This application

provides a comprehensive and efficient tool for managing procedures related to alerts

on return and alerts for refusal of entry and stay, while ensuring data quality. [Austria,

2025]

31

INTERNAL BORDERS

Cross-border cooperation in internal border areas

Operational cooperation with neighbouring Member States

• Joint trilateral patrols with neighbouring countries are conducted on trains. [Austria,

2015]

• A bi-annual joint crime analysis report and an operational crime analysis report are

prepared between Member States on a fortnightly basis. Further, a daily briefing with

information on crimes committed in one Member State is prepared and shared with the

partner Member States. [Liechtenstein, 2015]

• Within a border region police district, there is a joint analysis team. This consists of

several agencies comprising police, customs, and border and criminal offices. The

analyses are used to inform decisions regarding border controls, policing, and customs

matters. It was noted that analysis reports were used to brief officers in advance of joint

patrols, including the determination of the days, times, and locations where such

patrols would take place. For ports authorised for non-Schengen arrivals, monthly risk

analysis reports are compiled. These are used to inform the operational as well as the

administrative aspects of the border controls. [Denmark, 2017]

• To ensure effective cross-border cooperation and mutualisation of resources,

neighbouring Member States signed an agreement on the Common use of Covert Human

Intelligence Sources to carry out undercover intelligence operations through a common

pool of police officers. [Lithuania, 2018]

• The national data system delivers screen flashes when an operation starts thus

immediately alerting operators for necessary follow-up. It also provides a live feed.

The geolocation of the patrolling cars is also visible in the system. Both the Police

Cooperation and Customs Centres and the SPOC have direct access to it. [Czechia,

2019]

• Joint bi-national brigades to combat illegal immigration and smugglers and permanent

international cooperation mechanisms are integrated, enabling two neighbouring

countries to organise controls based on shared analysis of migration risks. Composed of

an equal number of officers from both countries selected for their technical and linguistic

skills, these ‘brigades’ (or ‘joint units’) set up at the Franco-German and Franco-Italian

borders are either governed by the Prüm agreements or by a bilateral agreement. In

addition to the organisation of joint patrols, the joint brigades (or joint units) provide

joint training. This joint brigade system facilitates the exchange of information between

two neighbouring countries and the coordination of control operations. [France, 2021]

At the regional level, cross border cooperation is based on administrative protocols with

the competent authorities of neighbouring Member States, which are further

implemented through annual action plans. This practical cooperation covers joint risk

analysis, joint operations, and patrols, the managing of specific events and joint

trainings. Joint patrols are planned on a regular basis. This cooperation concept creates a

32

good basis for joint operational responses at the regional level, the common use of

limited resources and a more comprehensive crime situational picture. [Estonia, 2023;

Latvia, 2023]

• Proactive measures are taken to limit temporary reintroductions of internal border

controls by having regular and targeted meetings with neighbouring countries and

having tactical and operational cooperation in border regions. Joint cross-border

trainings and cross-border hot pursuit exercises are regularly organised and basic

information on this possibility is spread via leaflets to all national police officers. Via

an extensive network and designated senior officials in every border region, police

authorities are in permanent contact with their (internal) cross-border counterparts.

They conduct constant joint monitoring and analysis, and respond to emerging threats.

This can be upscaled to joint patrols, actions, exercises, planning, etc. when security

threats emerge or increase. If internal border controls are reintroduced, both countries

analyse the implementation to prevent future occurrences. [Slovakia, 2024]

• Police cooperation by neighbouring Schengen States has intensified due to a new joint

patrol concept developed from a 2023 agreement between relevant national police

headquarters. An operational centre with command, control, and communication

capabilities was established at a cross-border police cooperation centre. A regional risk-

based operational plan guides the efforts. Participating patrols are tracked via

GPS devices and are aware of each other's locations through mobile devices. Joint

operations, including 12-16 mixed patrols per month, occur near the shared border.

Patrol types and equipment, such as drones and night vision, are selected according to

the plan. Since June 2022, additional neighbouring Schengen authorities have joined

these operations. [Hungary, 2024]

• The PCCC Chiasso facilitates the exchange of information between the Swiss and the

Italian authorities, coordinates joint measures such as mixed patrols, and conducts

crime analysis providing its outcome to the SPOC and other relevant Swiss and Italian

authorities. Information is exchanged via SIENA in a point-to-point configuration.

National authorities offer internships at PCCC Chiasso for Swiss officers from all

cantons for 6 to 12 months, as well as joint training between the PCCC and Italian

police. [Switzerland, 2025]

33

INTERNAL SECURITY

National Strategies on Law Enforcement

• Every four years, the Minister of Justice and Security sets the National Security Agenda

with national policy objectives for police duties. On a regional level, local

governments translate the national priorities into regional policy objectives for the police

in their Regional Security Agenda. Law enforcement agencies exchange intelligence

and information to gather appropriate information and intelligence to contribute to the

National Security Agenda, the Regional Security Agendas, and Europol’s Serious and

Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA). Steering Committees from the Research

Department are tasked with the coordination and monitoring of the whole procedure. A

daily operational briefing allows the different police teams to be informed about the

specific points of attention in their working field. For instance, they are used as a starting

point for policymaking in the fight against organised crime and estimating threat levels

that indicate the likelihood of a terrorist attack. Additionally, the Research and Analysis

desks of all Regional Intelligence Services make their own threat and security

assessments. [The Netherlands, 2021]

• The Office of the Prosecutor General appointed a liaison prosecutor to the SPOC who

is frequently consulted on the flagging of alerts and international arrest warrants,

complex international criminal investigations, and any other cases where the

prosecutorial input is needed. [Portugal, 2022]

• Foreign Liaison officers and the central authority for international judicial cooperation

cooperate very closely, which allows the authority to advise and assist in writing

European Investigation orders or Mutual legal assistance requests addressed to the

Member State. [Portugal, 2022]

• The police use an analysis tool in its criminal analysis units which allows for the

establishment of ‘profiles’ of crime phenomena, based on operational data. They show

the user an interactive visualisation of the phenomenon, its trends, modi operandi and

evolutions. Since starting the roll out of this application in 2019, the police has

significantly increased the number of users and of analysed crime phenomena.

[Lithuania, 2023]

34

Organisation of the Single Point of Contact (SPOC) for international law enforcement

information exchange

Organisation, information exchange

• For better international police cooperation, the Police created a network of contact

officers for international police cooperation. They are located in all Police

headquarters and the capital’s Metropolitan Police headquarters. The contact

officers help to improve the quality of information exchange requests and facilitate

their coordination. [Poland, 2019]

• There is a well-established daily flow of criminal incidents reporting from the local to

the regional and state levels. In practice, an e-report on the events of the last 24 hours is

regularly available to the local station management team, the regional level, and the

State Central Criminal Police Office. It allows all levels to take informed decisions.

[Germany, 2020]

• The system for the coordination of counter-terrorist operations gathers all the

intelligence from the different police organisations and institutions responsible for

preventing and countering terrorism, violent radicalism, and serious and organised

crime. The system presents an adequate alternative, combining information

management with operational coordination in a situation where the relevant national

authorities do not have access to each other’s databases. [Spain, 2022]

• Deployment of international case officers at regional level in different Police

Departments. These officers are part of the Single Point of Contact and have four weeks

training on large-scale IT systems, exchange of supplementary information through the

SIRENE channel, management of biometrics and field visits to Europol and Eurojust.

They have full access to the case management systems of the Single Point of Contact,

Interpol’s I-24/7 secure global police communications system, and have the rights to

introduce Schengen Information System alerts and Interpol notices. They also have

access to the relevant systems and permissions equivalent to a case officer attached to

the national SIRENE Bureau and the International Communications Centre. This has

resulted in expertise available in each local division on the Schengen Information

System. Furthermore, the international case officers verify both the quality and legal

relevance of the requested information, draft SIENA messages to be sent to Liaison

Officers at Europol, and provide training on international police cooperation within the

local Police Department. [Finland, 2023]

• An Integrated Case Management System is used by national police to facilitate real-

time communication, resource coordination and task assignment within command

centres. Its user-friendly design allows swift responses and efficient coordination in

dynamic situations by sharing commands and information directly with patrols and

specialized units. It enhances operational readiness and public safety. The system also

incorporates key non-police partners such as Customs, the Fire Brigade and

Ambulance Services for real-time information exchange and cohesive resource

allocation. [Czechia, 2024]

35

Organisation

• The permanent Police, Customs and Border Guard Crime Intelligence and Analysis

Centre is a form of effective cooperation and coordination between the law enforcement

authorities producing, among others, common analytical and threat assessment products.

[Finland, 2018]

• The creation of Central Offices, pooling resources from different administrations and

focusing on one type of crime, leads to very effective operational results. [France, 2021]

• The structure to produce not only the national threat assessment but also dedicated

threat and risk assessments combines centrally organised quality control with

requirement analysis at regional level. The multi-disciplinary strategic analysis unit is

responsible for strategic crime analysis, consisting of a team working at the national

level and field teams in several regions. Quality control is maintained at the central

level which also ensures coherence between the different analytical products. The unit

produces the annual national threat assessment which focuses on organised crime

groups. [France, 2021]

• A memorandum of understanding between the police and customs enables extensive

cooperation between both administrations. It allows for the exchange and sharing of

relevant information and strategic, tactical and operational intelligence, in particular by

facilitating mutual access to databases, with due regard for individual rights and data

protection rules. It also contributes to the development and promotion of best

practices, as well as procedures for operational matters with respect to joint actions,

such as joint mobile patrol squads, joint investigation teams, or joint intelligence teams.

Finally, it helps coordinate the sharing of equipment between services and cooperation

on the development, purchasing, deployment and use of technology. [Cyprus, 2021]

• The SPOC has a risk analysis group responsible for deeper analysis of national and

international requests received in SPOC, gathering additional information in available

databases, and providing analysis reports on discovered crime trends and modi

operandi. The reports are then forwarded to prosecutors and/or respective police

agencies for supporting relevant investigations. [Portugal, 2022]

• The International Cooperation Division combines operational information exchange

with strategic decision-making at international level. This Division hosts the national

Single Point of Contact for international law enforcement information exchanges. It

benefits from representation from both national police forces, regional police forces,

and customs. Both relevant authorities have a network of experts on international

police cooperation, which assist and advise the criminal intelligence units at regional

level on the use of the instruments of international police cooperation. The main law

enforcement authorities train experts on international police cooperation regularly.

These experts form part of their unit at the regional level and perform this function in

addition to their daily work. Knowledge is transmitted to the network at an annual

meeting, where e.g. national Liaison Officers at Europol are invited as speakers. In

between these meetings, knowledge about new procedures is transmitted to the

network either via newsletters or ad hoc meetings. In addition, the experts of the

authority’s network receive a one-week capability training before joining the network.

36

These expert networks are a low-threshold mechanism to disseminate knowledge on

international police cooperation at the regional level. [Spain, 2022]

• The national PIU is integrated in the national SPOC, managing all PNR-related cases

for various authorities (police, customs, intelligence services, military police,

prosecutors’ office, and courts, etc.). This integration makes the system more

comprehensive and enhances the SPOC's role as a general information hub for all

international security information exchanges. Sharing one case management system

with other SPOC units enables easy integration and cross-checking of information,

leading to a more comprehensive analysis. [Slovakia, 2024]

• In 2025 a comprehensive national quality report was developed, comprising all

findings, recommendations, and solutions to address all shortcomings and to be used in

the strategic planning, to define the required capabilities for border control, to plan the

use of the national and the EU funding and to address the training needs. [Switzerland,

2025]

• The International Police Cooperation Strategy gives a clear strategic basis for the

development of international cooperation and offers a comprehensive strategic

framework in the field of law enforcement cooperation. Furthermore, the development

of cooperation with European partners and international organisations and third

countries, as well as the deployment of liaison officers are evaluated and prioritised

according to specific established indicators. The implementation of the prioritised

Schengen and Schengen-related instruments is also considered when preparing and

implementing the strategy. [Switzerland 2025]

Use of Europol tools for cross-border cooperation and information exchange

• Data from the national system for police investigations is automatically uploaded into

Europol’s Information System. The database of ongoing investigations is connected to

an automated data loader in Europol’s Information System. New information is inserted,

existing information is enhanced, and old information is removed daily. This process is

completely automated. The Europol National Unit handles hits occurring between

national investigations and foreign investigations, already available within Europol’s

Information System. [The Netherlands, 2021]

• QUEST (Querying Europol Systems) has been integrated with the national query system to

perform searches in the Europol Information System. The searching scope was

extended to all objects that are available in the system, and the same search

functionality will be available for Customs. This has increased the number of searches,

making the Member State the third most active using the search functionality in 2024.

[Hungary, 2024]