| Dokumendiregister | Riigikogu |
| Viit | 1-2/26-304/1 |
| Registreeritud | 22.05.2026 |
| Sünkroonitud | 22.05.2026 |
| Liik | EL dokument |
| Funktsioon | |
| Sari | |
| Toimik | Komisjoni teatis - SWD(2026) 150, COM(2026) 150 |
| Juurdepääsupiirang | Avalik |
| Adressaat | |
| Saabumis/saatmisviis | |
| Vastutaja | |
| Originaal | Ava uues aknas |
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 18.5.2026
COM(2026) 150 final
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE
REGIONS
2026 State of Schengen Report
{SWD(2026) 150 final}
2026 STATE OF SCHENGEN REPORT
1. SCHENGEN IN A CHANGING WORLD: CONSOLIDATION AND
PREPAREDNESS FOR FUTURE CHALLENGES
Since the launch of the Schengen cycle in 2022 (1), the annual State of Schengen report
has provided a strategic oversight and comprehensive situational overview of the
Schengen area. Through integrated analysis and evidence-based insights, the report has
shaped a coherent and forward-looking policy agenda for Schengen. It has ensured
sustained political attention in the Schengen Council, supported effective priority-setting,
and contributed to a more coordinated engagement on Schengen matters.
The Schengen area continues to demonstrate resilience, underpinned by collective efforts
at both EU and national levels that have delivered concrete results.These include a
decrease in illegal border crossings and secondary movements within the Schengen area,
strengthened cross-border cooperation, and an increase in effective returns of individuals
with no right to stay in the EU.
Despite these tangible achievements, Schengen evaluations continue to identify gaps that
need to be urgently addressed. This is particularly important in the context of today’s
volatile geopolitical environment and an increasingly complex security landscape,
whichcalls for collective responsibility to ensure that the Schengen area remains secure,
united and resilient.
The priorities for the fifth Schengen cycle (2026-2027) will focus on: consolidating
achievements, addressing remaining gaps, and enhancing preparedness to meet
current and future challenges. The Commission's proposal for the next Multiannual
Financial Framework (MFF) represents a strategic opportunity to further support sustained
and targeted investment in reforms that contribute to a well-functioning Schengen area.
By focusing on consolidation and preparedness, the EU will continue to deliver on one of
its most tangible achievements: a Schengen area that is secure, united, and resilient in face
of emerging challenges.
2. THE 2026 STATE OF SCHENGEN REPORT: THE MOMENT TO
CONSOLIDATE
2.1. Schengen’s external dimension: a strategic approach to EU visa policy
In 2025, the Schengen area continued to be the most visited destination in the world,
attracting more than 790 million travellers. Schengen States issued 10 million visas, and
more than 60 countries enjoyed visa-free access to the Schengen area. As the Union’s first
line of security screening, the common visa policy is key to Europe’s security, helping
prevent illegal migration, organised crime and terrorism. It also facilitates access to
Schengen for bona fide travellers and ensures trustworthy relations with partner countries
that are based on the respect of and alignment with the Union rules.
(1) The Schengen cycle is structured around an annual reporting and follow-up framework comprising the
following instruments: the State of Schengen Report, which sets out the main political and operational
priorities to guide the quarterly Schengen Councils; the Schengen Barometer+ which provides twice a
year a regular situational picture of developments across the area, drawing on contributions from Member
States and EU agencies; and the Schengen Scoreboard, cf. footnote 60. The Commission Schengen
Coordinator provides support to the overall functioning of the cycle through structured bilateral and
multilateral engagement with Member States.
2
In January 2026, the Commission adopted the first-ever EU Visa Strategy (2), setting out
a framework for a visa policy that advances Union’s long-term interests, strengthens
security across the Schengen area, fosters EU prosperity and competitiveness, and projects
Union’s position and resilience on the global stage.
The Strategy sets out an ambitious agenda and concrete actions that will contribute to
strengthening Schengen’s external dimension. In this Schengen cycle, the focus will be on
developing a new assessment framework with clear criteria for granting visa-free status to
partner countries, serving the EU’s strategic interests more effectively, as well as preparing
a targeted revision of the Visa Code to strengthen EU security. To further enhance the EU’s
global competitiveness, the Strategy will also foster partnerships with key partner countries
to better match global talent with EU labour market needs. In this context, the opening of
the first Legal Gateway Office in India (3) has marked an important step towards attracting
talent and reinforcing mutually beneficial cooperation. The focus should now be on its
successful roll out as well as replicating the European Legal Gateway Offices in other key
partners.
Furthermore, the Strategy announced targeted measures to support Member States’
capacity to effectively manage the visa process. The 2025 Schengen evaluations and
monitoring activities reveal that the examination of visa applicationsis generally solid,
with established processes that ensure quality decision-making. While significant steps
have been taken to reduce waiting times in granting visa appointments and processing visa
applications, consulates in some locations still face considerable delays. Therefore, the
implementation of the Strategy will also help Member States manage high volumes of
applications, especially during peak periods, for example through the roll out of IT systems
for border management as well as dedicated support of Frontex in delivering training to
consular officers and providing assistance in document verification and detection of
document fraud.
2.2. An integrated external border for a secure Schengen area
Maintaining the security of Schengen external borders requires continuous vigilance
against evolving geopolitical risks, while ensuring that fundamental rights are
respected (4).
In mid-October 2025, the Schengen States started to gradually roll out the Entry/Exit-
System (EES), one of the most advanced border management systems in the world, which
allows to register non-EU nationals and share in real time information about who crosses
EU borders, when and where, as well as information about refusals of entry. During the
six-month progressive start, the system has shown clear benefits for the security of EU
citizens by stopping criminals, imposters, and document fraudsters from crossing borders
under false identities or with fake documents. Since its launch, the Schengen States
registered more than 60 million entries and exits of third county nationals. In addition, over
30,000 refusals of entry were recorded in the system due to lack of compliance with entry
conditions. Among these cases, nearly 800 persons were considered a threat to internal
security while almost 7,000 travellers were denied entry for having overstayed in the
Schengen area (5). Since the EES entered into operations, daily fingerprint checks in
(2) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on EU visa policy
strategy, COM(2026) 43 final, 29 January 2026.
(3) EU Legal Gateway (https://eu-legal-gateway.eu/).
(4) European Council, European Council meeting (19 March 2026) – Conclusions, EUCO 1/26, 19 March
2026.
(5) These numbers are current up until 20 April 2026.
3
Schengen Information System (SIS) and Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(AFIS) conducted by all Member States rose from approximately 17 000 to around 87 000.
During the progressive start, the vast majority of Schengen States implemented the EES
effectively, with most countries surpassing the required thresholds of registrations. The
option to temporarily suspend the operations of the EES, either fully or partially, was
exercised only on a limited number of occasions. Some Schengen States experienced
challenges related to infrastructure, for example with the functioning of self-service
systems, the capacity to fully register the biometric data, and the congestion of flights in
specific timeslots.
The EES was fully deployed with all functionalities at all border crossing points in the
Schengen area on 10 April 2026. Overall, the EES has been operating efficiently, bringing
visible benefits to EU security. To further optimise the implementation of the EES, Member
States are encouraged to make greater use of automation at the borders (6), ensure the
deployment of sufficient number of border guards and flow managers, and provide
adequate infrastructure, equipment, guidance and training. At the same time, the
Commission, Member States as well as transport and tourism stakeholders will continue
to closely coordinate, especially in view of the summer travel period.
The upcoming launch of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System
(ETIAS) will mark another practical step in further strengthening the protection of EU
external borders. It will enable the identification and assessment of persons who represent
potential risks, and prevent them from entering the Schengen area, while preserving
seamless travel for the vast majority of visitors. It will add clear value by strengthening
pre-travel risk assessment and enabling earlier identification of potential security concerns
before arrival at the external borders. Preparations are progressing, with coordinated efforts
underway at EU and national levels to ensure ETIAS’ effective roll-out. Early involvement
of travel industry stakeholders is crucial for the success of this endeavour.
Besides most modern IT systems, strong and permanent border control capabilities
need to be in place to safeguard the security of our common external borders. These
capabilities depend on the availability of adequate equipment as well as on sufficient and
well-trained border guards at the Schengen’s external borders. While improvements were
made in 2025 by several Member States (7) by taking steps to increase staffing levels,
persistent shortages continue to affect key functions (8) due to scarcity of resources and a
lack of structured medium and long-term human resources strategies.
Although further efforts are needed to increase the number of trained border guards, in
2025, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) supported Member States
with 18 453 deployments of Standing Corps personnel (9) that provided operational,
technical, and logistical assistance in 35 operations across key Member States (10). The
Commission is preparing a legislative proposal in 2026 to further strengthen the mandate
of Frontex.
Border checks
(6) Such as the use of pre-registration kiosks, e-gates and the mobile application ‘Travel to Europe’
developed by Frontex.
(7) Notably in Czechia, Estonia, Greece, France, Croatia, Italy, Malta, Austria, Poland and Romania.
(8) Notably in Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia.
(9) These comprise human resources from categories 1, 2 and 3. One human resource can be deployed
multiple times, with the most significant deployments in 2025 being the Joint Operations in Greece, Spain
and Italy.
(10) Frontex, 2025 in brief, (https://www.frontex.europa.eu/2025-in-brief/#under_hero_section).
4
High-quality border checks at the EU’s external borders are essential to prevent serious
security threats before they reach the Schengen area. Several Schengen States enhanced
the quality of border checks through more consistent verification of entry conditions, and
increased use of automation (11). Some countries have shown significant progress in this
area. For example, Romania successfully implemented an automation of hit reporting
procedures from their e-gates to second line border checks and an integration of the
national Advanced Passenger Information System into its border control system. These
measures have made it possible to carry out for efficient and high-quality border checks.
Nevertheless, further efforts are still needed to improve the effective use of EU and
national databases, strengthen measures against document fraud, enhance inter-agency
cooperation, and deploy biometric verification to close existing gaps and bolster
security (12).
In 2025, one unannounced Schengen evaluation was carried out and identified serious
deficiencies in the Member State's (13) capacity to manage their external borders.
Following the evaluation, the Member State authorities, with the support of Frontex,
initiated immediate remedial measures.
Border surveillance
A combination of robust border checks and effective border surveillance delivers the most
effective level of protection. Detections of illegal crossings at the EU’s external borders
has been consistently declining in the last years, falling to fewer than 180 000, representing
a further reduction of over 25% compared to 2024 (14). In several Schengen States (15),
enhanced surveillance has contributed to better detection rates, faster response times,
reduced illegal crossings, and improved situational awareness. The EU Eastern land border
section has also been thoroughly reinforced with sustainable integrated surveillance
actions supported by national and EU funds. Significant investments were made in border
surveillance capacities, including the purchase of new equipment, the refurbishment of
existing equipment and the increased use of advanced technologies, such as unmanned
aerial vehicles and vessels, upgraded radio capabilities and new stationary equipment.
Despite this progress, surveillance coverage and the integration of systems remain
uneven across the Schengen area, reflecting gaps in equipment, maintenance and strategic
planning. In several Member States (16), an integrated border surveillance approach has not
yet been fully established, particularly as regards as the early detection of illegal arrivals,
and real-time risk assessment.
Similarly, building on existing national and European capabilities, further progress
towards a fully integrated and consistent situational picture is needed to strengthen
Member States’ capacity to develop comprehensive and up-to-date intelligence on
migration flows, smuggling networks and emerging threats. This will be achieved through
the effective implementation of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR),
the technological and operational backbone of the EU’s border security. It will contribute
to improving the Schengen area’s capacity to deal with sudden arrivals or emerging
security threats. Closer synergies between border authorities and Europol would also
(11) For example: Bulgaria, France, Austria, Poland, Romania, Finland and Switzerland.
(12) For instance in: Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, France, Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia.
(13) An unannounced Schengen evaluation in Portugal in December 2025 revealed serious deficiencies in the
performance of external border checks at Lisbon Airport.
(14) Frontex, ‘Irregular border crossings down 26% in 2025, Europe must stay prepared’
(https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-irregular-border-crossings-
down-26-in-2025-europe-must-stay-prepared-lyKpVb).
(15) Such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania and Finland.
(16) For example: in Denmark, Greece, France, Croatia and Slovenia.
5
reinforce situational awareness, risk analysis and improve the detection of cross-border
criminal and terrorist threats.
Strengthening the resilience of our common external borders requires stronger
coordination between all the actors involved in border management, migration, and return.
From June 2026, the new screening procedure at the Union’s external borders will allow
to swiftly identify and assess all third-country nationals attempting to illegally enter the
Union. In this context, it is important that all Member States are ready to implement the
new screening rules to ensure that all persons subject to screening are referred to the
relevant procedure(17). This framework will be vital for both security and effective
migration management in the EU, and its practical application will be assessed during the
Schengen evaluations planned for the second half of 2026.
Contingency planning
Significant progress has been made with all Member States having developed contingency
plans for border management in the event of a mass influx of third country nationals at the
EU’s borders. Moreover, the vast majority of Member States have established contingency
plans based on comprehensive risk assessments and scenarios, with only three countries
(18) still in the process of formalising such plans and six (19) that have not yet tested their
contingency plan’s implementation.
Preparedness frameworks have traditionally focused on border management, however,
they need to better integrate other related processes, particularly those for returns. National
preparedness remains uneven, and it is increasingly clear that what may have been
adequate in the past is no longer sufficient for today's challenges especially in light of the
ongoing Middle East crisis. Schengen evaluations reveal that the majority of Schengen
States (20) still need to fully integrate return operations based on risk analyses. To address
this, contingency planning must become more European, with national frameworks more
systematically aligned with EU tools and mechanisms and better connected to the planning
of neighbouring Member States. This will enable faster, more predictable, and more
coordinated collective responses when pressures emerge.
At the same time, it is essential to move from largely formal planning frameworks to
systems that are fully integrated into day-to-day practice and capable of supporting rapid,
coordinated action when crises arise. In eight Schengen States (21), the national plans do
not include the possibility to use European support, eleven (22) do not cover coordination
with Frontex, and ten have not consulted neighbouring Member States in establishing their
contingency plans (23) in order to enable faster, more predictable, and more coordinated
collective responses when pressures emerge.
Furthermore, the European Union needs to be prepared for the potential threat posed to the
EU’s internal security by Russian ex-combatants having participated in the aggression
against Ukraine. Following on the European Council of March 2026, the Commission will
prepare an assessment on possible ways to address this issue.
(17) Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 introducing
the screening of third-country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC) No
767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817 (OJ L, 2024/1356, 22.5.2024).
(18) Greece, Spain and Austria.
(19) Greece, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland.
(20) In particular: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Iceland, Italy, Cyprus,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden.
(21) Belgium, Czechia, Greece, Spain, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden.
(22) Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden.
(23) Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Iceland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden.
6
The 2026-2027 Schengen cycle should continue to focus on ensuring an integrated external
border for a secure Schengen area. This includes reinforced contingency planning and
situational awareness, consistently improving border checks and border surveillance,
including through full use of IT systems, and ensuring the effective implementation of
screening procedures.
2.2 Effective return systems underpinning the integrity of the Schengen area
Over the years, return has emerged as a core priority, recognised as an element that
underpins the credibility, effectiveness and sustainability of the system as a whole.
Ensuring the return of those who do not have a right to stay is therefore a fundamental
condition for a well-functioning Schengen area.
A new legal framework for a common European return system
The Commission proposal for a new Return Regulation (24) addresses key structural
obstacles identified in previous periodic Schengen evaluations and the 2024 thematic
Schengen evaluation on more effective returns. The Commission welcomes the start of
interinstitutional negotiations and stands ready to support a final agreement that meets the
needs of the EU.
In parallel, the Return Coordinator has played a key role in shaping a more coherent and
strategic EU approach to returns through the High-Level Network on Returns by promoting
systematic exchanges of good practices on returns to politically sensitive and priority third
countries, as well as returns of illegally staying third country nationals posing a security
threat. In particular, progress was made through the Task Force on Statistics to enhance
monitoring and improve the reliability of return data. The Coordinator also prioritised
strengthening cooperation regarding unaccompanied minors, including through exchanges
between Member States and by exploring joint approaches with partner countries.
Operational improvements driving more effective returns
The effectiveness of return policies is measured by tangible results on the ground. In 2025,
a slight upward trend in the effectiveness of national return systems was observed in
seventeen Schengen States (25). This progress translated into an increased number of
effective returns in 2025, with a rise of 19% compared to the previous year. National
legislative reforms contributed to progress, including those adopted to implement the Pact
on Migration and Asylum. Frontex provided significant support to Member States in the
area of returns. In 2025, Frontex deployed 140 Return Specialists (26) and supported
63 500 effective returns, representing 42% of the total, confirming the sustained upward
trend observed in recent years.
Further efforts are required across all Member States to address challenges related to the
timely issuance of return decisions, the streamlining of procedures (27) and the
implementation of measures to prevent absconding and unauthorised secondary
movements (28). This is particularly important when dealing with individuals who may
pose security risks, requiring the involvement of multiple authorities, specialised expertise
(24) European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union,
COM(2025) 101 final.
(25) Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Iceland, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Finland and Sweden.
(26) Despite this number, there are still challenges in meeting the deployment needs for Return Specialists
due to high language proficiency requirements and specialised operational skills.
(27) For example, in: Spain, Italy, Poland and Portugal.
(28) For example in: Spain, Portugal and Switzerland.
7
and measures to prevent absconding (29). Schengen evaluations uncovered a discrepancy
between the number of return decisions issued and the number of return alerts created in
the Schengen Information System, as well as the inconsistent lodging of all relevant
information in the system (30). It is therefore essential to make full use of SIS return alerts
by systematically including all relevant information, such as biometrics, photographs and
security flags.
Voluntary return is increasingly recognised as a core component of an effective and
sustainable EU return policy. While some Member States (31) have moved towards more
proactive and tailored models, the full potential of voluntary returns is yet to be realised
through its consistent integration in national return frameworks (32).
Member States have made efforts to strengthen operational capabilities,related to
enhancing training frameworks (33), allocating additional human resources (34), and
strengthening coordination between national authorities (35). Further efforts are necessary
to ensure sustained continued impact in operational performance, particularly where the
lack of adequate and sufficient capabilities remains one of the key obstacles to carrying
out returns (36).
The gradual modernisation of operational tools and systems for returns is progressing
in several Member States (37). However, this process remains incomplete. In particular, the
improvement of return case management systems is still ongoing in several Schengen
countries (38), underlining the need to accelerate digital transformation in preparation for
the next phase of the EU-wide digitalisation of return procedures and the Commission’s
forthcoming legislative proposal in this area in 2026.
The return process must be accompanied by strong and effective safeguards to guarantee
fundamental rights. 2025 shows a general improvement in the quality and application of
these safeguards. Several Member States (39) improved their return decision-making
processes to respect the principle of non-refoulement, the right to be heard, the provision
of adequate information and effective access to remedies. Nevertheless, further efforts are
needed to consolidate and sustain these improvements (40), including as regard forced
return monitoring systems (41), and appeal procedures for return decisions (42).
(29) Cf. 2026 Compendium of best practices identified in the framework of the Schengen evaluation and
monitoring mechanism. Bulgaria’s approach of systematically interviewing apprehended third-country
nationals and checking them against EU and international databases to detect potential security risks was
identified as a best practice during its Schengen evaluation.
(30) According to Article 3(1) of Regulation 2018/1860 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28
November 2018 on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-
country nationals (OJ L 312, 7.12.2018), Member States have an obligation to create a return alert
following the issuance of a return decision.
(31) For example: Belgium and Italy.
(32) For instance: in Spain and Portugal.
(33) Belgium, France and Italy.
(34) For example: Italy, Lithuania and Malta.
(35) Such as in Finland.
(36) In particular in Greece, Spain and Portugal.
(37) Including France and Cyprus.
(38) Such as: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia.
(39) Such as Belgium, Malta and Portugal.
(40) For example in: Greece and Hungary.
(41) For instance in: Czechia, Germany, Spain, Iceland, Austria and Portugal.
(42) Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Finland and Sweden.
8
The effective return of third-country nationals will remain a core priority in the 2026-2027
Schengen cycle. 2026 will see the launch of the new return border procedure under the
Pact on Migration and Asylum. It is therefore essential that national systems are fully
prepared to ensure the effective and consistent Pact’s implementation. Full and timely
implementation of the Schengen evaluation recommendations will play a key role in
achieving this objective.
2.3 Internal security cooperation
Internal security cooperation is essential for the Schengen Area, as it provides measures
that maintain safety and law enforcement efficiency. However, Schengen evaluations
reveal that some challenges still persist.
Effective and secure information exchange
Information exchange is a core element of Schengen's internal security system. Particular
progress has been observed in nineteen Member States that have notified full transposition
of the Information Exchange Directive (43), and in eighteen Member States (44) that have
established national case management systems interoperable with the Secure Information
Exchange Network Application (SIENA). However, the 2025 Schengen evaluations reveal
gaps between formal transposition of the Directive and operational effectiveness. In each
of the five Member States evaluated in 2025 (45), the Single Point of Contact (SPOC) has
not yet fully met the Directive’s requirements, resulting in a slower cross-border
information exchange that is also less standardised and more prone to error than designed.
Schengen evaluations have revealed that the functionalities of the SIS are not being
maximised (46). For example, the systematic attachment of biometric data to SIS alerts, the
roll-out and use of fingerprint searches by all relevant authorities particularly during border
checks and by migration authorities (47), and the sharing of terrorism-related SIS hits with
Europol remain inconsistent (48). By contrast, Member States that have invested in
automation and the systematic integration of case management systems and national
databases are achieving demonstrably better operational results (49).
Additionally, there are structural challenges related to human resources and technical
capacities. Several Member States (50) face staff shortages either in their N.SIS offices
(43) Directive (EU) 2023/977 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on the exchange
of information between law enforcement authorities, OJ L 134, 22.5.2023. The Directive establishes
harmonised rules for the adequate and rapid exchange of information between the competent law
enforcement authorities for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal offences. As of
April 2026, nineteen Member States notified full transposition of the Directive, while four notified partial
transposition. Reasoned opinions were issued for the remaining three Member States (Belgium, Estonia
and Spain).
(44) Czechia, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland and Sweden.
(45) Bulgaria, Austria, Romania, Slovenia and Switzerland.
(46) Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Finland and Sweden.
(47) For example, inconsistencies are observed in Czechia, Spain, France, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden.
(48) This remains an issue in all Member States except Austria.
(49) Germany and Austria.
(50) Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Iceland, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Finland
and Sweden.
9
and/or SI.RE.NE (51) Bureaux, and SPOCs, negatively affecting business continuity and
the quality of information exchange.
Law enforcement cooperation
Schengen evaluations consistently show that the legal and institutional foundations for
cross-border law enforcement cooperation are broadly in place across the Schengen area,
but their operational potential remains underused. Police Cooperation Centres are valuable
hubs for day-to-day cooperation, yet they continue to function predominantly as
information relays rather than operational enablers (52).
Joint operations reveal a mixed picture. Cross-border cooperation between Austria and
Hungary is a strong example of how different tools (53) can be combined to form a single
coherent system. However, joint operations in many Member States remain reactive and
partner-driven. There are systematically fewer outgoing surveillance and hot pursuit
operations than incoming ones, and the infrastructure for joint operational situational
awareness is largely absent.
Working closely with Member States to address these and other challenges, the
Commission established the Informal Expert Group on Cross-Border Operational
Law Enforcement Cooperation to share best practices, identify common challenges and
develop practical solutions. Building on its work, the Commission will prepare a study to
map existing cooperation agreements, providing a basis to assess whether the existing soft-
law framework for cross-border law enforcement cooperation remains adequate. This is
becoming increasingly relevant as the EU’s internal security strategy’s (54) call to establish
a High-Level Group on the future of operational law enforcement cooperation responds
directly to what Schengen evaluations have consistently found: existing tools are largely
sound but require a more solid legal basis. At the same time, the forthcoming proposals to
strengthen Europol's mandate will make it better equipped to provide operational support
to Member States, including by facilitating cross-border analysis, enhanced information
exchange and coordinated actions against threats affecting the Schengen area.
Underpinning all these efforts is the need for a shared professional culture grounded in
mutual trust and interoperable skills. The Commission is assessing how to best support law
enforcement training through the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement
Training (CEPOL). Addressing gaps in specialised areas such as digital forensics, lawful
decryption, and advanced data analysis is particularly important as crime increasingly
exploits emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence.
Situation at internal borders
Schengen contributes significantly to the well-functioning of the internal market and the
economic prosperity of the EU. As goods, workers and services cross internal borders
unhindered, cross-border regions thrive and national economies benefit from lower
administrative burdens and economies of scale. To evaluate the ‘Schengen effect’, the
Commission has commissioned a study into the benefits of Schengen and the cost of
reintroducing internal border control, which will be published in the second half of 2026.
(51) SIRENE stands for supplementary information request at the national entries. Member States that use the
SIS have to set up a national SIRENE Bureau, operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, responsible for
exchanging information and coordinating activities connected to SIS alerts.
(52) Council Recommendation (EU) 2022/915 of 9 June 2022 on operational law enforcement cooperation,
(OJ L 158, 13.6.2022).
(53) Bilateral agreements, shared coordination centres and EMPACT.
(54) European Commission, ‘Commission present ProtectEU – Internal Security Strategy’ (https://home-
affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-presents-protecteu-internal-security-strategy-2025-04-01_en).
10
In 2025, ten Schengen States prolonged and maintained the reintroduction of control at
their internal borders (55), motivated by migration and security concerns. These include the
continued instability along key migratory routes, the weaponisation of migration by hostile
state actors, and the persistent pressure of cross-border organised crime.
Where internal border control is reintroduced, it is crucial that Member States take steps
to limit any negative consequence on cross border commuters and communities.
Therefore, the Schengen Coordinator's structured dialogue with the Member States
concerned as well as the consultation process initiated under the revised Schengen Borders
Code (56), played an important role, both delivering concrete results in addressing waiting
times at the internal borders and improving operational coordination and information
exchange. In most instances, the reintroduction of internal border controls concerned non-
systematic spot checks.
While internal border control may play a role in addressing some Member States’
migration and security concerns, more efficient and effective alternatives and solutions
are available. In particular, operational cooperation, information exchange and checks
within the territory can provide a valuable substitute for controls at internal borders,
especially via non-systematic police checks or mobile biometric identification and vehicle
tracking technologies (57). Romania’s operational approach at its internal borders with
Hungary and Bulgaria provides a model that could be replicated in other Member States.
It combines intelligence-led joint operations, targeted risk-based police checks, joint
patrols, and fully functioning Police Cooperation Centres.
Swift readmission of irregular migrants apprehended in border areas can be achieved
through the transfer procedure, an instrument introduced by the revised Schengen
Borders Code. Several Member States (58) are in the process of agreeing practical
arrangements for its application, while others continue to rely on existing bilateral
readmission agreements.
Looking ahead, the EES and the upcoming entry into application of the instruments of the
Pact on Migration and Asylum will significantly strengthen structural conditions to
progressively lift internal border controls. Both initiatives will provide Member States with
operational tools to manage migratory and security pressures at their external borders and
counter unauthorised movements within the Schengen area.
The Commission remains committed to upholding the principles of free movement and
security across the Schengen area and will soon issue the opinions as set out in the revised
Schengen Borders Code.
3. THE KEY TO CONSOLIDATION AND SUSTAINED IMPLEMENTATION:
SCHENGEN GOVERNANCE
In earlier phases of Schengen integration, the system could largely function through
established routines, practical cooperation, and a strong presumption of trust between
Member States. As a result, Schengen governance, covering all areas enables the
(55) European Commission, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control’ (https://home-
affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen/schengen-area/temporary-reintroduction-border-control_en).
(56) Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across
borders, (OJ L, 2024/1717, 20.6.2024).
(57) Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/268 of 23 November 2023 on cooperation between the
Member States with regard to serious threats to internal security and public policy in the area without
internal border controls, (OJ L, 2024/268, 17.1.2024).
(58) The Schengen evaluations of Austria, Romania, and Slovenia confirm that negotiations to implement it
have not yet been initiated.
11
functioning of the Schengen area, tended to play a supportive rather than central role, with
day-to-day management relying more on informal coordination than on a strong shared
political framework.
That context has fundamentally changed. Today, Schengen operates in a far more complex
and demanding environment, shaped by geopolitical instability, new security threats and
technological disruption. In this setting, the effectiveness and coherence of Schengen can
no longer rely predominantly on informal arrangements. As recognised in the Schengen
Declaration (59), reinforcing the Schengen area under current conditions requires a
governance that is more structured, more collective, and more firmly anchored in the
political level, ensuring clarity, coordination and a shared strategic direction.
Strengthening national Schengen governance is therefore the key condition to ensure
that the Schengen area can respond effectively to both present and future challenges.
3.1 Strengthening Schengen governance
The 2025 Schengen Scoreboard (60) paints a diverse picture of how Member States
contribute to the functioning of the Schengen area:
Aggregated Scoreboard of December 2025
While progress is evident in many areas, disparities persist, leading to operational and
security gaps. At the same time, when responsibilities are not upheld consistently, mutual
trust between Member States can be undermined, affecting the collective strength and unity
of the Schengen area (61). Similarly to previous years, in 2025 the Schengen evaluation and
monitoring mechanism played a crucial role in identifying areas for improvement and
promoting a culture of joint responsibility among Member States. The mechanism,
involving more than 500 experts from all Schengen States, allows for the effective and
timely identification of deficiencies, as well as best practices and innovative solutions.
(59) The Schengen Declaration was adopted by the Council on 12 June 2025, reaffirming Member States
commitment to preserving the integrity of Schengen; Council of the European Union, Schengen
Declaration, adopted on 12 June 2025
(https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/gjrnbywx/st10068en25.pdf).
(60) The aggregated Schengen Scoreboard scores and visualises for all Schengen Member States the overall
implementation of recommendations stemming from Schengen evaluations. In line with the methodology
agreed with the Member States in December 2023, it is structured into six policy dimensions, each
addressing key aspects for the effective functioning of the Schengen area. Based on the individual
Schengen Scoreboards that assign Member States scores on the level of implementation of the
recommendations, the visualisation illustrates the overall average score per dimension across Schengen.
(61) Providing timely and quality reporting on the measures taken to address the deficiencies identified during
the evaluation is a prerequisite for a well-functioning Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism.
12
These best practices are combined in a dedicated Compendium (62), which can provide
useful solutions and serves as an inspiration to Member States.
Number of selected experts per Member State for 2026
The 2025 evaluation activities (63), including the targeted monitoring activities (64) and the
recently launched Schengen monitoring dialogues (65), emphasised the need for Member
States to strengthen their national Schengen governance frameworks, ensuring effective
coordination, clear strategic planning, and full alignment between national priorities,
operational needs and EU funding. These processes have strengthened daily Schengen
implementation, supported by ongoing exchanges with the Schengen Coordinator (66).
Some Member States have made notable progress in this area, with twelve Member States
(67) appointing national Schengen Coordinators. Additionally, Romania’s first periodic
Schengen evaluation after its full integration into the Schengen area demonstrated the
results of a strengthened comprehensive national Schengen governance model, which
ensures a high level of preparedness by integrating institutional arrangements, strategic
planning, national quality control mechanisms, and both political and operational
coordination.
Despite this progress, several Member States still face significant challenges in
implementing Schengen governance effectively. Schengen governance frameworks
remain fragmented, with responsibilities dispersed across multiple authorities and without
a clear central coordination function. This reflects a broader pattern in which Schengen
implementation continues to be managed through siloed national arrangements, with
insufficient integration of responsibilities, coordination and oversight.
(62) Commission Staff Working Document, 2026 Compendium of best practices identified in the framework
of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism.
(63) In 2025, the Commission implemented the annual evaluation programme leading to Schengen country
reports of Bulgaria, Austria, Romania, Slovenia and Switzerland, which will be soon adopted. European
Commission, ‘Schengen evaluation and monitoring’ (https://home-
affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen/schengen-area/schengen-governance/schengen-evaluation-and-
monitoring_en).
(64) In Greece, France, Italy and Cyprus.
(65) Aimed at enhancing the process of evaluating and monitoring the implementation of Schengen standards
by Member States, these dialogues focus on fostering commitment and improving national Schengen
governance through structured discussions led by Country Coordinators, addressing key challenges,
ensuring timely reporting and follow-up on recommendations, and facilitating technical exchanges to
resolve persistent issues.
(66) These efforts have also allowed the Commission to assess the progress made by Member States.
Following the latest assessments of follow-up reports submitted by Member States, the Commission, via
these reports, closes the action plans of Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden in the field of visa policy, in
accordance with Article 21(3) of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism Regulation.
(67) Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, France, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Portugal, Romania, and
Finland.
13
Effective Schengen governance starts with strong national governance structures,
capitalising on the efforts already taken by the European Integrated Border
Management (68). The most advanced national governance models have shown four key
elements. First, a coordinated approach to national Schengen governance is necessary,
involving mapping and connecting all relevant stakeholders, clearly defining roles and
responsibilities at political, administrative and operational levels, establishing formal
coordination mechanisms, and designating a national Schengen Coordinator with
sufficient oversight authority. Second, a comprehensive and strategic framework is
required to set out a coherent medium- and long-term vision for the functioning of the
Schengen area, building on existing sectoral strategies. Third, a coherent vision for
operational follow-up, which translates strategic objectives into concrete measures with
clear timelines, assigned responsibilities, and appropriate resources, ensuring structured
implementation, is necessary to achieve real results. Finally, strong national governance
needs to be accompanied by adequate capabilities that enable the effective
implementation of Schengen obligations. By taking these steps, Member States can ensure
effective national responsibility and strengthen the coherence of Schengen at the EU level.
The stakes go beyond individual national concerns as the strength of the Schengen area
depends on the responsibility of each Member State towards each other. The true value of
evaluations lies in their ability to translate findings into common European level
conclusions. In 2026, the Commission will continue to support Member States in this effort
to strengthen Schengen governance, through the Schengen evaluation and monitoring
mechanism, including with evaluation activities in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands
and Liechtenstein (69). Member States will also receive guidance and resources to
strengthen their national governance frameworks, along with financial support under a
dedicated Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) call.
3.2 Schengen implementation through targeted EU funding
Reinforcing national Schengen governance should go hand in hand with the strategic use
of EU funding. This is particularly important in the preparations for the next Multiannual
Financial Framework for 2028-2034. While still subject to agreement by the European
Parliament and the Council, the Commission proposal on funding for Schengen initiatives
within the framework introduces a stronger focus on performance and the strategic use of
EU funding. In this context, EU funding will contribute supporting national Schengen
governance and actions, in a coordinated and targeted manner, fully aligned with strategic
priorities as determined during Schengen evaluations.
As the preparatory process for the next MFF continues, it is essential to connect the
structural reforms identified by the Schengen evaluations and the Schengen broad priorities
established for the 2026-2027 cycle with programming of EU funding in the area of Home
Affairs through the National and Regional Partnership Plans to translate EU’s objectives
into national investment and reform agendas.
3.3 Completion and expansion of the Schengen area
Schengen is designed as a common framework, where shared rules, standards and
responsibilities apply equally across all participating Member States.
In an increasingly complex geopolitical context, Cyprus makes a unique contribution to
strengthening shared situational awareness of risks and opportunities in its region, while
(68) The European Integrated Border Management aims to ensure the coherent and coordinated management
of the EU's external borders through joint operations, shared resources, and strategic partnerships.
(69) European Commission, ‘Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring – Migration and Home Affairs’,
(https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen/schengen-area/schengen-governance/schengen-
evaluation-and-monitoring_en).
14
bringing experience that strengthens collective capacity in border, migration and security
matters. In this context, the Commission conducted a Schengen monitoring activity in
December 2025 to assess Cyprus’ state of preparedness and support the next steps towards
its full accession to the Schengen Area. Substantial progress was madein 2025, with the
Cypriot authorities implementing significant reforms and measures in line with the highest
Schengen standards. Ireland has continued its efforts to demonstrate its readiness to fully
apply the parts of the Schengen framework related to the internal security of the Schengen
area.
It is also equally necessary to continue deepening structured engagement with enlargement
partners. EU candidates are Schengen candidates, therefore, it is essential to ensure that
Schengen readiness is systematically embedded in the EU accession process. The first step
on the road to Schengen membership is the establishment of robust Schengen governance
frameworks at a national level. This is why the Commission has already stepped up its
engagement with enlargement countries. Together with Frontex and Member State
experts, the Commission held the first Schengen governance awareness-raising session for
enlargement countries in February 2026. Hosted by Montenegro, this initiative provided
practical guidance on building effective national coordination structures. It also confirmed
strong interest from enlargement countries and highlighted the added value of early and
structured preparation. At the same time, there is an intensified focus on early Schengen
preparations in the negotiations, closely monitoring the development and implementation
of Schengen Action Plans in enlargement partners, and providing country-specific
technical assistance to support candidate countries in this process.
4 NEXT STEPS
Consolidating achievements and addressing any remaining gaps will ensure that the
Schengen area remains vigilant and well-prepared, as rapidly evolving geopolitical
conditions could substantially affect the dynamics of migration and security. For the 2026-
2027 Schengen cycle, the Commission invites the Schengen Council to endorse the
following priorities at its next meeting in June 2026.
Priority implementation actions for the 2026-2027 Schengen Cycle
1. To support Schengen’s external dimension
At EU level:
• Propose the revision of the Visa Code with targeted measures to strengthen EU
security.
• Enhance EU’s global competitiveness, by further developing mutually
beneficial partnerships with key countries to attract talent for innovation.
2. To ensure an integrated external border for a secure Schengen area
At national level, Schengen countries need to:
• Advance the digitalisation of procedures and the development of large-scale IT
systems, including their interoperability. Continue the effective implementation
of the Entry/Exit System, at all border crossing points, including by deploying
adequately all functionalities, reducing processing times, increasing automated
solutions at the borders, and improving registration and the quality of biometrics.
Ensure a well-prepared launch of ETIAS with adequate testing and the necessary
resources in place.
• Continue to improve the quality and effectiveness of border checks through
the full use of existing systems and their interoperability, as well as further
15
developments of national capabilities for border surveillance, including training
and infrastructures.
• Ensure a high level of situational awareness and in-depth understanding of
threats and emerging challenges by consolidating evidence-based and
intelligence-driven policy making.
• Ensure the effective implementation of the Screening Regulation, by allocating
resources and capabilities, which includes setting up an independent monitoring
mechanism.
• Strengthen and further develop contingency planning to increase reaction
capabilities during crisis situationsand ensure greater preparedness by
promoting a more European approach.
3. To enhance the effectiveness of return systems
At national level, Schengen countries need to:
• Ensure the effective implementation of the return border procedure.
• Strengthen the necessary operational capacities and tools to support the return
and reintegration process, including sufficient capabilities for return procedures,
as well as modernising tools and systems such as return case management and
making full use of the functionalities of the Schengen Information System.
• Make use of Frontex support and actively address challenges in meeting
deployment needs for Return Specialists.
4. To consolidate the operational framework for internal security cooperation
At EU level:
• Advance the work of the Informal Expert Group on Cross-Border
Operational Law Enforcement Cooperation by addressing joint operations,
cross-border surveillance, and secure communications.
• Continue the structured dialogue facilitated by the Schengen Coordinator
with all Member States concerned by or affected by internal border controls,
in view of the gradual lifting of the controls.
At national level, Schengen countries need to:
• Complete the legal and operational implementation of the Information Exchange
Directive, including through fully functioning Single Points of Contact and
promoting the systematic use of Europol information Systems, such as
SIENA.
• Make full use of all the enhanced functionalities of the Schengen Information
System.
• Address human resources and technical capacity needs (including training
and digital infrastructure) to match operational needs.
• Maximise the use of all instruments made available by the revised Schengen
Borders Code to phase out internal border controls. Deepen regional
cooperation initiatives and strengthen joint operational capacity by expanding
law enforcement cooperation frameworks.
16
5. To strengthen Schengen governance
At EU level:
• Ensure the consolidation of achievements and implementation of the priorities
identified in this report, including through more systematic country-specific
discussions, and with strategic funding under the next MFF.
• Complete Cyprus’ accession to the Schengen area.
• Complete the necessary procedures for the full implementation of the Schengen
rules relevant to internal security in Ireland.
• Continue strong engagement with enlargement countries.
At national level, Schengen States need to:
• Enhance national Schengen governance frameworks, building on the
advanced national governance models, all under the oversight of a designated
national Schengen Coordinator.
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 18.5.2026
SWD(2026) 150 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Compendium of best practices identified in the framework of the Schengen evaluation
and monitoring mechanism
Accompanying the document
2026 State of Schengen Report
{COM(2026) 150 final}
Compendium of best practices identified in the framework of the Schengen evaluation
and monitoring mechanism.
The well-functioning of the Schengen area relies on Member States’ effective and efficient
application of the Schengen rules. The Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism is a
key safeguard to ensure the adequate implementation of the Schengen acquis, which allows not
only for the timely detection of vulnerabilities, but also for the identification of best practices
and innovative solutions put in place by Member States.
The compendium of best practices accompanying the 2026 State of Schengen Report marks its
fifth edition since the new Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Regulation came into force.
As a living document, it encompasses the best practices identified in the Schengen evaluations
carried out over the years, which significantly improve the implementation of common rules
and that could be put into practice by other Member States. New and innovative measures
from the evaluations that took place in 2025 are identified in bold.
The compendium brings together a wide range of best practices covering several aspects of
the Schengen acquis, including national Schengen governance, management of the external
borders, visa policy, returns, as well as measures within the Schengen area, such as internal
borders and internal security. The aim is to provide insights into innovative strategies, tools,
and measures that can support Member State authorities in the implementation of the
Schengen acquis and to facilitate peer-to-peer knowledge sharing. Further exchange of
knowledge and experience should be fostered within the relevant Council bodies to reinforce
this collaborative effort. The compendium serves to complement existing best practices
outlined in applicable Commission or Council Recommendations or handbooks with new
insights.
This compendium is explanatory and has no legally binding status. It is intended as a valuable
resource for policymakers, law enforcement officials, and other stakeholders involved in
ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the Schengen area but also to support possible
solutions for remedial actions addressing future recommendations proposed by evaluation
teams. It is part of the annual report referred to in Article 25 of Council Regulation (EU)
2022/922.
1
2
NATIONAL SCHENGEN GOVERNANCE
1. National strategies
Implementation of European Integrated Border Management (EIBM)
Governance of National Integrated border Management
• The contingency plan includes detailed procedures for a variety of potential crisis
scenarios, defines clear roles and responsibilities for all relevant national authorities
(including police, customs, armed forces, and immigration services), as well as local
stakeholders (such as municipalities and non-governmental organisations). Such plans
are further complemented with procedures for requesting and integrating European
support. Several tests of the contingency planning framework were performed involving
all national authorities with responsibilities in crises. [Finland, 2023]
• The long-term and national development strategy and short-term governmental
programme on internal security include priorities on the implementation of EU and
Schengen acquis, as well as international law enforcement cooperation developments.
The Schengen evaluation recommendations are also covered by the programme.
Annual analysis and reporting ensure efficient implementation and operationalisation.
This national strategic architecture, connecting the EU priorities to the national
strategies, facilitates the efficient implementation (resourcing) and operationalisation
of the EU and Schengen acquis in a systematic manner. [Croatia, 2024]
• An overarching strategic document guides national efforts in implementing Schengen
rules from 2021 to 2027, aligning with European standards to enhance Schengen
cooperation. Public authorities, including various ministerial departments, play key
roles in this national Schengen governance concept. The Schengen Implementation
Plan 2023 serves as the main tool for accomplishing these goals across different areas
of the Schengen framework. The Ministry of Interior is tasked with assessing progress,
updating the concept, and reporting to the government biennially, using indicators and
timelines to measure success and align with Czechia’s European border management
objectives. [Czechia, 2024]
Quality control mechanism
• The Ministry of the Interior has established a national evaluation mechanism for external
borders, built on the European and national quality control mechanisms. It brings
together the recommendations from the Schengen evaluation mechanism, Frontex
vulnerability assessment and national evaluation visits. The latter includes an evaluation
of the Schengen Information System/SIRENE and police cooperation issues. [Austria,
2020]
3
• Border management at national and EU level should be systematically subject to the
application of the European quality control mechanism covering the entire scope of the
EIBM. The permanent national quality control mechanism includes a national
evaluators’ pool, which is trained in Frontex Schengen Evaluators’ courses. [Thematic
Evaluation of national IBM strategies, 2020]
Interagency cooperation
• Close and effective formalised inter-agency coordination and cooperation between the
different national authorities at central, regional, and local level are considered
essential for the effective functioning of integrated border management systems.
Border guard units are deployed in the territorial waters and on land of the third
countries concerned, ensuring constant joint patrolling by sea and air on board vessels
and airplanes of the Member State, supported by electronic means such as the
integrated external surveillance system (SIVE). [Thematic Evaluation of national IBM
strategies, 2020]
• The interagency sharing of intelligence information through the same platform,
contributes to building a common structured picture that improves the quality of
information sharing and supports the main stakeholders in the accomplishment of their
institutional mission, avoiding the duplication of efforts. [Estonia, 2023]
• A joint investigation cell was established involving other national law enforcement
authorities and five other EU members States affected by the migration flow, as well
as Europol and Frontex. This allowed for an effective and high-speed exchange of
information, enabling a rapid reaction, and thus allowed effective measures to be taken
to slow down the migration flow and carry out actions against the facilitators. Cross-
checking of persons by concentrating criminal intelligence and open-source
information collection in this cell made the joint investigation cell an operational hub
supporting the overall management of the external border. [Lithuania, 2023]
2. National capabilities
4
Training
Cooperation with CEPOL
• Coordinated and active participation in European law enforcement training is an integral
part of the inter-agency cooperation within the Police, Customs and Border Guard
permanent governance structure. The training needs are regularly discussed not only by
the national Police University College, but also in constant cooperation with Border
Guards and Customs training institutions. The participation in CEPOL courses is high
and the access to the CEPOL e-learning platform LEED is granted to a wide number of
law enforcement officers. CEPOL trainings are included in the national Police, Customs
and Border Guard annual training plans and under the coordination of the national Police
University College, available CEPOL training seats are shared between the law
enforcement authorities based on their needs and competencies. Moreover, the information
concerning the possibilities of the CEPOL trainings are easily accessible on the police,
Customs and Border Guard intranet. [Finland, 2023]
Returns
• Agreement with an airline company to use aircrafts and simulators on a regular basis
to train the pool of escorts on return operations, not only from an operational
perspective, but also to simulate emergency situations that could take place during the
return operations, such as fires. [Finland, 2023]
• Since 2023, a forced-return monitor from the National Council for Refugees has
participated as an expert in each training organised by the General Inspectorate for
Immigration for national escort officers. Furthermore, the National Council for
Refugees organised two training sessions in 2025 on forced-return monitoring and
fundamental rights compliance for staff in the two public custody centres (Otopeni and
Arad). This practice not only promotes the safeguarding of fundamental rights but also
raises the escort officer’s awareness of the duties of forced return monitors. [Romania,
2025]
SIRENE Bureau
• The SIRENE Bureau of the National Bureau of Investigation has created a national
online training course focusing on the renewed Schengen Information System. The
course contains theoretical material and knowledge checks. The online training package
is mandatory for police officers, border guards and customs officers and completion of
the course is monitored and followed up. [Finland, 2023]
• Establishment of a state-of-the-art Training centre within the premises of the SIRENE
Bureau, which provides comprehensive practical training opportunities for all the end
users of all national Law Enforcement Agencies. The educational activities include
practical sessions in computer labs and the availability of e-learning platforms, including
the police intranet and CEPOL courses, related to Schengen Information System
distance learning. The Police Academy regularly cooperates with the relevant
5
departments in the police, local universities, and non-governmental organisations to
ensure that regular updates are included in the training programme, also in the field of
international police cooperation and Schengen matters. A full set of manuals containing
all relevant information on Schengen Information System, Automated Fingerprint
Identification System and SIRENE matters for all competent national authorities and
Police Services is available via e-libraries on the police intranet. [Cyprus, 2023]
• The national IT system records information and documents about third-country nationals
subject to return, giving a complete picture of their situation. The SIRENE Bureau is in
charge of directly converting the national alerts on return to alerts on refusal of entry
and stay in the migration authorities’ systems upon receiving R-A SIRENE forms from
other Member States on national alerts. The same procedure can be performed by the
border guards when the person, subject to a return alert, is located at exit out of EU
territory. [Estonia, 2023]
• The SIRENE national bureau has implemented outstanding training practices on SIS-
related topics, offering materials like posters, handbooks, and podcasts to enhance
national awareness and usage of SIS. Trainers are available for on-demand sessions
and materials have been distributed across relevant national authorities.[Czechia,
2024]
• The SIRENE Bureau has implemented a structured on-the-job training programme for
all new SIRENE operators, which lasts for up to eighteen months and includes job-
shadowing and placements in all three units, as well as study visits to Bureaus in other
Member States, providing a comprehensive view of the SIRENE work. [Switzerland,
2025]
• Austria implements a robust system to ensure systematic fingerprint queries in the
Schengen Information System. All fingerprints taken by police or immigration
authorities are automatically checked in SIS-AFIS. In case of a match, an automatic
procedure is in place which ensures that two fingerprint experts, both of which are
available 24/7, independently verify the match. Confirmed and proven false matches
are reported automatically to the SIRENE Bureau. [Austria, 2025]
• National authorities issue alerts in the Schengen Information System on invalidated
residence permits systematically through an automated process via a national
application. Every time the status of a residence permit is updated to ‘invalidated but
not retrieved’, a corresponding alert is created. By merging automation, speed, and
precision, this process transforms passive data entry into active, qualitative threat
prevention. [Romania, 2025]
• National immigration authorities conduct security checks in the Schengen Information
System at three stages when issuing a residence permit to a third-country national:
when the application is submitted in person, during the application examination
(within 30 days) and when the residence permit is collected. This systematic process
ensures a thorough examination of the applicant's situation, allowing for immediate
follow-up by authorities. [Romania, 2025]
• Romanian Immigration, Police, Border Police, and Gendarmerie deploy nationwide
6
mobile devices that instantly access and display Schengen Information System (SIS)
alerts. Upon a SIS hit, officers receive comprehensive alert-related data (excluding ID
copies) in the form of biometric scans (fingerprints/facial recognition), MRZ codes, or
personal details, including highlights of victim data in cases of misused identity,
ensuring rapid, error-free identification. The mobile device's search modes and data
display enhance operational efficiency and the security of officers. [Romania, 2025]
Joint training with other Member States
• The Member State has embraced the concept of joint training with the police services of
its neighbouring countries to improve cooperation in the border areas. Joint trainings
with other law enforcement agencies and foreign counterparts stem for instance from the
work of the Bilateral Cooperation Committee. Joint trainings are also organised by the
Police and Customs Cooperation Centre. [Germany, 2020; Spain 2022]
Data protection
• There is well-developed data protection training for expatriate staff at Consular Posts,
which is organised in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Data
Protection Officer and the Data Protection Authority. [Czechia, 2019]
• The National Schengen Information System controller uses a wide-ranging training,
including the provision of e-learning modules and a comprehensive training strategy for
new staff members. [The Netherlands, 2021]
• The Data Protection Officer organises a comprehensive training on data protection
requirements related to the Schengen Information System. It is provided for the
National Schengen Information System and SIRENE Bureau’s staff members and end
users, especially regarding awareness raising efforts. [Italy, 2021]
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs trains and raises awareness of staff on data protection
requirements in relation to the visa issuing procedure and to the Visa Information
System (including the active involvement of the DPO Office) for end users, in particular
for consular staff before posting to embassies/consulates. [Greece, 2021]
• The Data Protection Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides a handbook on
processing and protection of personal data to all Visa Information System end-users.
The guide is concise and user-friendly. [Czechia, 2024]
• Staff training on data protection in large scale IT-Systems through regular online and
in-person sessions, including "train the trainer" courses to maximize reach and
promote a data protection culture. Data Protection Officers of the different authorities
play a key role in organizing and delivering these trainings. [Poland, 2024]
Training
• Regular training was established at all border crossing points, which ensures that
border guards are constantly learning and have up-to-date knowledge of border check
procedures. The online training consists of daily tests which the border guards have to
7
take while on duty. There is a pool of 200 multiple choice questions from which 10 per
day are attributed randomly. The questions cover legal bases, the handling of
equipment and data protection. The shift leader checks the results and, based on gaps
identified in the border guards’ knowledge of certain topics, organises targeted
monthly trainings on those topics. [Hungary, 2024]
• The Border Police training program entails a one year program for Agents and a three
to four year program for Officers. The training aligns with the Frontex Common Core
Curriculum for Border and Coast Guard basic training in the EU and the Sectorial
Qualification Framework for Border Guarding. Officers hold a bachelor's degree, while
Agents complete post-secondary studies. After initial training, agents undergo 6
months of on-the-job training, while officers undergo a one-year mentoring and later
receive refresher training and specialised training, delivered based on a clear strategy
and coherent planning. [Romania, 2025]
• The Schengen Multifunctional Training Centre was established in 2011 by the Ministry
of Home Affairs to provide centralised training on the Schengen acquis to national
authorities, police, border guards, and customs officials. Quality is closely monitored,
with consistently high satisfaction rates (above 4.8/5). The consistent and effective
training on the Schengen acquis fosters cooperation between national authorities,
creating widespread awareness about the use and capabilities of available tools and
strengthening the national Schengen governance structure. [Romania, 2025]
Fundamental rights
• National authorities have online knowledge-refresher tools for border guards with both
mandatory and optional courses. As a complement to these platforms, an online
platform for refresher training has been developed, focused solely on fundamental
rights in border controls and returns. The platform is based on the 2019 Frontex course
manual for fundamental rights trainers and is publicly available, well-structured, and
user-friendly, connecting fundamental rights standards and safeguards to border
control scenarios. [Croatia, 2024]
8
Equipment
Mobile devices
• Mobile devices have been deployed to provide patrol officers with access to relevant
databases via a mobile application. Both user-friendly and powerful, mobile devices can
read vehicle license plates as well as the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) of identity
documents. They are also equipped with facial recognition capabilities (i.e., by sending
photographs for facial recognition purposes to a central database). [Hungary, 2019]
• All police officers with the relevant profile have been equipped with smartphones with
direct access to (inter)national databases and with a secure communication application.
The national police forces use a mobile solution for working outside the office. Via
mobile devices (tablets, smartphones, and laptops), every operational police officer can
query (inter)national databases (such as identity documents, license plates, and
biometrics). Objects, such as license plates, which are scanned with the smartphone are
immediately checked against the central database. [The Netherlands, 2021]
Documents to check entry conditions
• Border guards in the first line at the international airport can use a form containing
necessary questions to establish the fulfilment of most entry conditions laid down in
Article 6(1) of the Schengen Borders Code. The form facilitates the verification of
entry conditions for third-country nationals, improves communication between border
police officers and travellers, and overcomes potential language barriers. The form is
available in 28 languages corresponding to the international traffic at the airport such
as Chinese, Korean, Russian, Ukrainian and Albanian, and is used to facilitate the
check of entry conditions when there is a communication barrier between passengers
and border guards. It requires only a short time to complete the form by the third
country national and does not affect the waiting times at the borders. [Hungary, 2024]
9
3. Large-scale IT systems
National applications
Alerts and queries
• If the SIRENE Bureau creates, updates, or deletes an alert using the national
application, the issuing/requesting authority is automatically notified using an
automatic email notification. This simplifies the procedure, reduces the workload, and
improves the exchange of information between the different authorities involved.
[Hungary, 2019]
• The Member State receives passenger data from all flights coming from third countries,
the Targeting Centre Borders compiles it, and the data is processed automatically
through the national Advance Passenger Information (API) System. The API System
consists of national databases, ‘watch lists’, profiles based on risk analysis, the Schengen
Information System and the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database. In
case of a match, the operators have access to several databases and use the national
application to verify the match and get more information about the alert (photographs,
fingerprints, more details about the ‘action to be taken’, etc.). The hit result displays
identifiers, ‘reason for request’ and ‘action to be taken’. The suspect’s data and flight
details are then sent to the relevant airport or seaport responsible for apprehending the
suspect. [The Netherlands, 2021]
• Besides the owners of firearms, all imported firearms also have to be registered by the
importers and dealers in the police register, with the same automated queries being
made. Since August 2022, it has become mandatory to upload photos of the firearms
indicating all available markings and serial numbers. This ensures that the photographs
are available for attachment to alerts if a weapon is being entered in the Schengen
Information System. [Lithuania, 2023]
• Croatia uses a user-friendly alert creation process with high automation for national
alerts on (national) citizens. It involves the automatic import of national registry data,
including photos. This data is directly transferred to Schengen Information System alerts
when they are created. [Croatia, 2024]
• The national Customs Authority has an automated query system to check vehicle
customs declarations against the Schengen Information System using VIN numbers.
[Croatia, 2024]
• Proactive updates of previously created alerts on persons with the description of their
ID/document increase the likelihood of successfully finding an alert during searches.
[Croatia, 2024]
• The Romanian Advanced Passenger Information application is fully integrated with
the border control system, enabling the border guards to easily identify relevant data
during their risk assessments and processing by the app’s functionalities of colour
coding, notification, reporting, and instructions between first and the second line users.
[Romania, 2025]
10
Hit reporting
• Several practices are in place to ensure the automatic notification of a hit to the SIRENE
Bureau. In particular:
• Displaying information on the second line officer’s screens on a hit as soon as
it is registered in the first line. The border guards in the SIRENE Bureau also
receive information on hits via the border guard application. [Poland, 2015]
• When the National Road Vehicle Agency achieves a hit, the SIRENE Bureau
receives an automatic e-mail notification. This allows the SIRENE operator to
verify the hit and contact the Agency if the latter has not taken the initiative.
[Luxembourg, 2016]
• The border application has a direct ‘chat’ functionality with the case handler
in the SIRENE Bureau, which allows immediate and direct contact with the
SIRENE Bureau if an internal hit reporting form is sent off. [Croatia, 2018]
• At the airport, border guards have set up an effective follow-up procedure for hits on
discreet check alerts in cooperation with customs officers. When border guards notice
that a passenger is subject to a request for a discreet check in the Schengen Information
System, they will discreetly signal this to customs officers. [France, 2021]
• The national application provides the Schengen Information System alerts hit reporting
form for the end users, with a pre-filled template which retrieves from the alert all the
available data. The end users fill out the hit relevant fields and send it directly to the
SIRENE Bureau. A received email message includes HTML format, which can be
directly converted into a SIRENE form. Inquiry check questions are prefilled in the hit-
reporting form. This ensures a very good level of data quality and hit reporting in real
time. [Lithuania, 2023]
• Effective procedure to report that a person who is subject to a return decision and return
alert has left the Schengen area. In such cases, the border guard authority which had the
hit records the departure directly into the application used by the Migration Service. The
SIRENE Bureau deletes the return alert and introduces the refusal of entry alert outside
office hours when the information of the departure is received from other Schengen
Member States or the national Embassies or Consulates. In cases of forced return, the
local police units which executed the forced return also record it directly in the system.
Such procedure ensures an effective management of the return policy at national level
and also ensures that the refusal of entry alert is introduced to the Schengen Information
System without delay when the return decision is accompanied by an entry ban.
[Finland, 2023]
• Automated and user-friendly communication of a hit between the first and the second
line at certain border crossing points. In case of a hit, the first-line officer has the
possibility to send the hit information from the first line directly to the second line.
Subsequently, a notification in red colour will be visible to the second line. In case of a
hit on persons for discreet check, the first line discreetly collects available information
and in addition attaches screenshots of the passport/ID card/vehicle registration
certificate. This will automatically be sent to the second line; a hit reporting form will
11
be established and sent to SIRENE.[Hungary, 2024]
• Upon receiving a national hit form on a foreign Schengen Information System alert,
the SIRENE case management system automatically transfers the data already in
English to SIRENE G, H or R forms depending on the category of the alert. The
necessary manual input is minimal before sending it to other SIRENE bureaus. When
the SIRENE Bureau receives a SIRENE R-A form on a national return alert, the form
is automatically transferred from the management system to a database used by the
Border and Foreign Police authorities. It then automatically converts the alert as needed
or deletes it if the return decision is not accompanied by an entry ban. The same
process applies for the receival of SIRENE R-B or R-E forms. There is timely
processing of the hit forms and the alerts. For national hit alerts on missing persons,
the national hit form includes a mandatory field for consent for sharing location
information with the person filing the missing person’s report. [Slovakia, 2024]
• Switzerland built an App (PolAssist) which provides step-by-step interactive guidance
on alert management and hit follow-up procedures for SIRENE operators and SIS end
users. This ensures that accurate and relevant information is always available to end
users both on desktop and mobile devices and improves the data quality of alerts
entered into SIS and of the overall information exchange. [Switzerland, 2025]
• The SIRENE Bureau developed an Operational Emergency plan, featuring an
impressive logic decision tree diagram which encompasses all possible risks, a
Business Continuity Plan. It also contains an emergency journal and text modules to
report the IT incident to the national and foreign partner authorities. An offline version
of this Operational Emergency plan is kept on an encrypted USB stick, stored in a safe.
[Switzerland, 2025]
• At the e-gates in airports, an automated hit report is instantly sent to the second line
with all available information on the circumstances of the hit, including the flight
number and destination. [Romania, 2025]
12
Alert creation
• In the SIRENE workflow, a warning message was created to remind the authorities of
the necessity to insert biometrics if available when creating an alert in SIS. [The
Netherlands, 2021]
• High level of data quality and automation in two processes in the Register of Wanted
Persons. First, when an alert on a national is created, the register automatically checks
whether there is a vehicle or a firearm registered in the national databases to the name
of the person and automatically offers to the end-user the possibility to include the object
as an extension to the alert, which needs to be confirmed by the end-user. Second, when
entering an alert on a resident, the register pre-fills and imports the alphanumeric data
(including the ID document information) in the alert from the national registers (the
photograph of the ID document is not uploaded automatically, but added manually,
when available). In addition, when creating a return alert in the national application on
a person whose personal information is in the national registers, the national application
imports the alphanumeric and biometric data in the alert as well (including the copy of
the ID document, when available). [Lithuania, 2023]
• Automatic pre-filling of data in alerts. When entering an alert on a national resident in
the warrant registration system, the register pre-fills and imports the alphanumeric data
and photograph of the subject to the alert from the relevant national register. [Hungary,
2024]
Exchange of information
• When a national alert for a missing person is entered into the Schengen Information
System, the national SIRENE Bureau will receive an automatically generated SIRENE
C form. This form includes all relevant supplementary information and can be directly
forwarded to other SIRENE Bureaus by the national SIRENE Bureau. The automatic
generation of SIRENE C forms for Article 32 alerts enables quick transmission of data
to assist other Member States in urgent cases. [Ireland, 2024]
13
National Schengen and Visa Information Systems and IT systems
• The Security operation centre monitors the security of the entire police network at user
level, detecting anomalies that might indicate possible attacks. When the Security
operation centre detects a suspicious use, the operation centre intervenes to verify the
possible anomaly. The active monitoring of ‘atypical behaviour’ from the end users
performing queries allows them to identify signs of improper use of the Schengen
Information System and to prevent possible data security risks. [The Netherlands, 2021]
• In the national IT visa system, urgent applications (e.g., in a case when an applicant
needs to travel very shortly following the submission of the application, such as
hospitalisation of a close family member) are permanently flagged. Therefore, urgent
applications are easy to identify, and their examination can be easily prioritised.
[Malta, 2022]
• The monthly data quality reports produced by eu-LISA are received at the National
Schengen Information System Office and are then prefiltered to include only the alerts
that the SIRENE Bureau needs to check and/or forward to the end users who have
created the specific alert. The two-tier verification of possible errors ensures to a high
degree the good quality of the data entered into the Schengen Information System by
the authorities. [Lithuania, 2023]
• The National Schengen Information System application displays in a prominent manner
“Immediate reporting” and “Misused identity”, by placing the text at the top of the alert,
highlighted in red letters. Such a display allows the end user to be instantly aware of the
situation in terms of urgency, complexity, and sensitivity of the alert. [Cyprus, 2023]
• The visa processing IT infrastructure significantly facilitates the submission and
examination of visa applications in a secure manner, limiting the dependency on the
external service provider concerning the management and control of the systems. First,
by providing an online visa application form available at the Foreign Ministry’s
website and used approximately in 80% of the visa applications, including a “Guide”
with useful explanation in many languages regarding the data to be inserted into the
different fields. At the end of the process, it is possible to generate a checklist for the
necessary supporting documents depending on the place of submission of the
application and the purpose of the journey. Second, through a data entry system
developed for the external service provider for registering applications and combining
them with biometrics and scanned supporting documents, fully managed by the
national authorities. Finally, the “core” application processing system for the
examination of applications and decision-making has an intuitive, user-friendly
interface, allowing the decision-makers to easily contact the consulates, external
service providers, border guards, and the police in relation to a
14
particular application. The VIS Mail is integrated into the system in a user-friendly
manner, and the system has various analytical and statistical tools. The log
management and control functionality of the system notifies the Ministry’s support
team of any unusual activities of users processing data. [Finland, 2023]
• Standardized procedure for capturing photos of third-country nationals in the alien’s
policy registry following ICAO standards. This results in high-quality photographs and
facilitates the identification of persons subject to national alerts on returns and alerts
for refusals of entry. [Hungary, 2024]
• Automated fingerprint checks are performed based on criminal and immigration risk
analysis in addition to establishing the identity of individuals and to confirm hits.
[Hungary, 2024]
• There is a well-planned and documented process for business continuity at data
centres. Identical setups are used for development, preproduction and production
environments and there is a georedundant, highly secured secondary site. There is
regular testing of uninterruptible power supply, backup restoration and failover
systems between the primary data centre and the back-up site. Information security
documentation is regularly reviewed and updated; internal audits are conducted
regularly. [Slovakia, 2024]
• The SIRENE Bureau's case management system includes a robust tool for producing
statistical reports, allowing for detailed reports for each police station and border
crossing point on the basis of internal hit reporting forms. Statistics can be filtered by
various parameters, such as offense type, which aids in monitoring the Schengen
Information System’s use countrywide and reporting to eu-LISA. [Croatia, 2024]
• In situations where direct access to the Schengen Information System is unavailable,
end-users can contact the Central Technical Authority via fax or email to manage alerts
through the web communication channel in emergency mode. Clear national
procedures provide minimum criteria and templates for this process, making sure there
is uninterrupted availability of all functionalities in the Schengen Information System
for the end-users. [Poland, 2024]
• The Privacy Policy Decree 2018 encompasses comprehensive and extensive guidelines
and procedures regarding the routine random log check, which improve the self-
auditing of the management of the Schengen Information System and the Visa
Information System and aim to ensure compliance with the requirements of those
large-scale IT systems. [Austria, 2025]
• The national Schengen governance model is characterised by permanent coordination
structures and well-established working processes, ensuring a high level of
implementation of the Schengen system. It includes a comprehensive national quality
control mechanism covering all Schengen policy areas - except visa policy in
consulates - and is supported by a dedicated Schengen training framework. [Romania,
2025]
• Romania has established a georedundant secondary data centre in Brașov county via the
use of European funds, which provides high security and independence for critical
15
operations in the event of major disruptions. Moreover, they have implemented a robust
disaster recovery and business continuity plan, hiring local personnel to minimise
intervention time and ensure rapid return to operations. [Romania, 2025]
• In the primary site in Bucharest, which hosts the national copy of the Schengen
Information System’s data centre, a backup generator is tested regularly. [Romania,
2025]
Data Protection requirements in relation to the National Schengen Information System
(N.SIS)
• The authorities managing the N.SIS accept data subject’s rights requests made in
languages other than the Member States’ language. [Lithuania, 2018]
• The Data Protection Officer of the N.SIS controller has established a comprehensive
data breach notification policy, including procedures, tools, and instructions to staff.
[Germany, 2020; Norway, 2022]
• The Netherlands uses a decentralised structure of personal data protection monitoring
where contact persons for the issues regarding personal data protection are available in
every unit of the police whilst two data protection officers (DPOs) are in charge of
general supervision. [The Netherlands, 2021]
• The Data Protection Officer is in charge of performing vulnerability management,
coordinating the vulnerability assessment activity, and performing risk assessment and
auditing; they cooperate with the data controller in a proactive and collaborative
manner, e.g. regarding the project for the realisation of a Cyber Security Operation
Centre that allows prompt and effective incident management. [Italy, 2021]
• The user authorisation management of the National Police Board prevents unauthorised
access to personal data. In addition to the situation where the post or tasks change, the
superior of the user controls and assesses annually that the subordinates’ user
authorisations are appropriate and, if necessary, launches an internal procedure to update
them. The responsible system coordinator must annually check that the user rights given
to stakeholder groups and external persons are appropriate and updated. [Finland, 2023]
• The new Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) tool is implemented as a
log analysis tool which significantly improves the detection of anomalies and potential
misuse of the Schengen Information System. This lowers the vulnerability of the
system. [Sweden 2022]
• Proactive provision of information on the data subjects’ rights by the Airport Police.
They provide a link to the police data protection portal through QR codes, which are
placed visibly at the first and second line at the border-crossing points. [Hungary,
2024]
16
Data Protection requirements in relation to the visa issuing procedure / Visa Information
System
• N.VIS controller conducts extensive activities in relation to the supervision of the
consulates and of the external service provider, including data security and data
protection issues. In particular, a series of self-audits were performed in the last years
by the N.VIS controller. [Spain, 2017; Italy, 2021]
• The Data Protection Officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and
Cooperation is involved in the Ministry’s inspections of the visa issuing procedure and
is also in general strongly involved in many data protection aspects of the visa issuing
procedure. [Spain, 2022]
• Extensive log control is carried out by an automated software tool to detect incidents
in the log files. [Denmark, 2022; Sweden 2022]
• The Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solution implemented in the
IT system of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is designed with numerous predefined
rules triggering alarms and notifying by email the Ministry VISA support team in case
of any unusual activity of users processing data in the Central Visa Information System
(C-VIS). As the VISA system (the national core application processing system for the
examination of applications and decision-making) logs all processing of data in the
VISA and C-VIS by all end-user authorities with access rights, the log control covers
all those authorities, as well. The Ministry’s Data Protection team has a well-established
procedure for assessing data breaches and what additional steps need to be taken,
including the timeframe for notifying the Data Protection Authority. [Finland, 2023]
17
SIRENE Bureau
SIRENE procedures
• The Prosecutor’s Office has a duty desk that is available 24/7 for referrals from the
SIRENE Bureau. [Denmark, 2017]
• SIRENE staff are involved in on-spot activities during large-scale police operations.
[Switzerland, 2018]
• There is a facility to submit fingerprints from the Schengen Information System to the
national Automated Fingerprint Identification System through the SIRENE workflow
system and get hit/no-hit responses automatically. This process is only initiated when a
case file is created in the SIRENE workflow system. In accordance with the legislation,
the process does not entail the storage of the SIS fingerprints in the national AFIS.
[Ireland, 2021]
• All relevant authorities related to the police internal secured network have their official
dedicated mail accounts, used to exchange information. All police reports of incidents
are visible to all offices with dedicated mail accounts, including the SIRENE officers
who proactively search against the available databases, including the SIS, all EU and
third-country nationals involved in the reported incidents. As a result of these queries,
in case a positive match is produced, the SIRENE Bureau immediately contacts the
Police station in charge of the case (that has reported the incident) and requests further
action to be taken regarding the subject of the alert. The proactive approach developed
by the SIRENE Bureau ensures that no hits are missed during the queries performed
against the SIS. [Cyprus, 2023]
• A national judicial authority has been assigned to the SIRENE Bureau to ensure the
efficient and accurate execution of European Arrest Warrants within its territory. This
assignment enables prompt and effective communication between the judicial
authority and the SIRENE Bureau, facilitating coordination and legality in all activities
related to the European Arrest Warrant. [Romania, 2025]
SIRENE workflow system
• In the case-management applications, when there is a hit in an alert that contains aliases,
misused identities and/or links, a window pops up highlighting the presence of this
relevant information. This notification effectively addresses one of the most common
problems among the query solutions in the different Member States: the difficulty of
making this information visible to the end user. [Hungary, 2019]
• The SIRENE workflow system automatically checks all incoming messages from all
international channels (including also SIRENE forms), against pre-defined keywords.
18
Personal data included in the forms is automatically checked against the connected
databases. Positive results from such screening are marked as ‘hot hits’ to indicate that
those forms should be handled as a priority. Thanks to this solution, the SIRENE Bureau
can effectively manage incoming requests without any backlog. [Liechtenstein, 2021]
• Incoming A and M forms (used to exchange information on European arrest warrants
and extradition requests, and on miscellaneous supplementary information when no
procedure is laid down, respectively) on persons are processed automatically in the
SIRENE case management system, which automatically transfers the incoming forms
on alerts related to terrorism to the Danish Security and Intelligence Service. [Denmark,
2022]
• The SIRENE forms created by officers are pre-filled with alert data and have predefined
texts available that can be added just with one click. The predefined texts are tailored
for each form and type of alert. [Slovakia, 2019]
• The SIRENE case management system is a single IT application that handles all
messages in a highly automated way: incoming SIRENE forms are registered
automatically to existing cases and assigned to the competent case officer; incoming A
forms are processed automatically and checked against the national databases based on
keywords. This process allows for all incoming A forms including these keywords to
be automatically sent once per day in a batch to the relevant departments and units.
The A forms are assigned to an operator for manual handling only in case of a match.
The dedicated national hit-forms are automatically sent from a preview window in the
Schengen Information System alert by the end-users from the police browser/registers
and received in the ILO’s incoming messages mailbox and then converted into SIRENE
hit-reporting forms. These processes significantly facilitate the performance of the tasks
of the SIRENE Bureau and support the timely effectiveness of the exchange of
supplementary information and forms. [Lithuania, 2023]
4. Fundamental Rights aspects
Forced-return monitoring
• Adequate monitoring is ensured by the full independence of the National Guarantor, the
scope of its action, the trainings provided to the return escorts on fundamental rights
(including on the rights of vulnerable groups of persons) and the principle of non-
refoulement, as well as the regional network of trained forced return monitors operating
on the whole territory. [Italy, 2021]
• The regular online publication of the forced-return monitoring reports by the Public
Defender of Rights, including in English as part of the annual general report of the
Ombudsman ensures an additional layer of scrutiny over the removal process, enhancing
19
its transparency and further supports the effectiveness of the forced-return monitoring
mechanism. [Czechia, 2019]
• The Border Guard Headquarters has a designated human rights advisor to mainstream
and support fundamental rights-compliant border management practices. Regional
Border Guard divisions also have such designated human rights advisors, who take
part in delivering training on fundamental rights at regional and local levels. [Poland,
2024]
• In 2021, the Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding between the Border Police, the
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, and UNHCR was amended to authorise the Bulgarian
Helsinki Committee to monitor all stages of Bulgaria's return procedure. This
encompasses activities from initial apprehension, interviews with returnees,
verification of documentation, visits to pre-removal detention centres, through to the
final removal to a third country. This monitoring approach exceeds the requirements
outlined in Article 8(6) of the EU Return Directive. If the Bulgarian Helsinki
Committee provides recommendations in its reports, the Border Police must consider
these before applying coercive measures, ensuring comprehensive safeguards and
cooperation. [Bulgaria, 2025]
5. Data protection supervision
• The Data State Inspectorate organises supervision of the Schengen and Visa Information
Systems within the Business Process Model and Notation - a graphical representation
for defining business processes in a business process model. Business Process Model
and Notation allows employees to understand their responsibilities at each stage, as well
as the entire process of supervision. [Latvia, 2023]
• The Commission for Personal Data Protection has created a tool for supervisory
activities, featuring a comprehensive questionnaire that addresses both general and
specific aspects concerning EU large scale IT systems. The questionnaire covers areas
such as technical, organisational, network, and information security measures by the
controller. It also includes a dedicated section for inspecting the National Schengen
Information System and the National Visa Information System, with questions on
legislation, public awareness, and data subject rights. [Bulgaria, 2025]
20
EXTERNAL DIMENSION
Cooperation with third countries
Liaison officers
• There is direct access from the International Liaison Office intranet to the Database of
dactyloscopy data that allows the officers to query the national AFIS with a NIST file
attached to an alert, allowing them to retrieve any matches in a matter of minutes.
When the automatic search results in a match, this match is also subject to verification
by a fingerprint expert. This functionality allows not only to query the national
databases with alphanumeric parameters but also with biometrics, which increases the
accuracy of the identification of the person. [Lithuania, 2023]
• Visa advisors or liaison officers are deployed in priority third countries, tasked with
identifying potential irregular migration to the Schengen area and gathering
intelligence on new methods or trends. When fraudulent documents or identities are
detected by visa authorities, not only is the Schengen visa refused but an entry ban is
also issued to prevent the third-country national from attempting entry through another
Member State. The intelligence collected by these officers is regularly shared with
relevant authorities through coordinated meetings, enhancing preparedness at external
borders and for return procedures. This intelligence aids in forming national and
regional plans, allowing targeted actions against entities involved in facilitating
irregular migration. Irregular migrants identified in these operations are directed to the
appropriate return processes. [Hungary, 2024]
• Liaison officers have been given direct access to the case management system
managed by the Single Point of Contact, enabling real-time information retrieval from
national and international databases. This access improves their decision-making,
supports cross-border investigations, and enhances operational efficiency with
international collaborators. Additionally, oversight by the Single Point of Contact
ensures that communications between liaison officers and law enforcement are
coordinated, transparent and secure. [Czechia, 2024].
• The Bulgarian Migration Department in charge of legal migration conducts automated
security checks in the Schengen Information System using its own application at three
stages of the processing of residence permits for third-country nationals. First, when an
application is submitted in person; second, during the application examination
procedure – after having consulted the State Agency for National Security and vetted
against 29 legal grounds to refuse residence permits and long stay visas at the time the
decision is taken; and third, when the residence permit is collected in person.
Additional checks are also performed when new information on the third-country
national is received. This systematic process ensures a thorough examination of the
applicant's situation and allows immediate follow-up by authorities. [Bulgaria, 2025]
21
International cooperation
• The establishment of multilateral cooperation and bilateral agreements with several third
countries allows data exchange in real time on maritime surveillance and in the border
crossing points for checks on ferries and other border-related information. The
authorities actively support the development of national capabilities for border control
in third countries by donating assets. [Italy, 2021]
• The national authorities manage the migration flows and tackle cross-border crime from
outside the Schengen area through the implementation of a regional concept of border
surveillance. It includes the deployment of liaison officers from third countries to the
regional coordination centres of the Member State and vice versa, which aims to
facilitate direct cooperation and exchange of information. Border guard units are
deployed in third countries (including in territorial waters), ensuring constant joint
patrolling by sea and air. A search and rescue mechanism complements the regional
border surveillance system with vessels coordinated by the national search and rescue
agency. [Spain, 2022]
• The "Safe Tourist Destination" project runs since 2006, hosting and deploying police
officers internationally to better serve tourists and nationals abroad. With growing
participation of foreign police organisations, 2023 saw involvement from 24
organizations across 21 countries. Foreign police officers operate under agreed powers,
providing services in tourists' languages which lowers barriers to seek police help.
Visible in their national uniforms, guest police officers contribute to crime prevention
and enhance safety. [Croatia, 2024]
• Arrangements established with neighbouring third countries according to which guest
officers are deployed at the border to support surveillance and other control activities,
such as border checks. It increases reaction capabilities and information exchange.
Within one neighbouring territory, border police officers from a partner third country
are patrolling in cooperation with local border officers on a daily basis to prevent
illegal migration and identify facilitators of human smuggling. Based on a bilateral
agreement with another partner country, an officer is currently working at specific
border crossing points to support checks and facilitate communication with passengers.
[Hungary, 2024]
• Courts and Prosecutor’s offices create alerts for wanted persons along with a European
Arrest Warrant (EAW) in both Polish and English. Attaching the English version to
the alert expedites procedures in the other MS for actions on international hits.
[Poland, 2024]
• A national judicial authority has been assigned to the SIRENE Bureau to ensure the
efficient and accurate execution of European Arrest Warrants within its territory. This
assignment enables prompt and effective communication between the judicial
authority and the SIRENE Bureau, facilitating coordination and legality in all activities
related to the European Arrest Warrant. [Romania, 2025]
22
Visa Policy
External Service Provider
• Imposing financial sanctions on external service providers in case of non- compliance
with the contract, combined with reinforced monitoring of their work, is an effective
way to bring the external service provider in conformity with the provisions of the
contract and improve its performance. [Austria, 2022]
• The local staff working on visa processing in New Delhi attended training activities
organised by the Swiss and German embassies on document fraud and the verification
process. Thanks to these activities, the staff were well equipped to recognise the
authenticity of supporting documents. [Romania, 2025]
23
MANAGEMENT OF THE EXTERNAL BORDERS
National and European situational awareness and early warning system
Cooperation (situational awareness)
• The coordination between the National Coordination Centres of two neighbouring
Member States allows for a common situational picture, efficient exchange of
information, improved situational awareness at the common borders and an increased
response capacity, as the positioning of the assets is also shared between the two
countries. [Portugal/ Spain, 2017]
• Direct access to national databases (beyond those just used for border control) enables
the National Coordination Centre to maintain a comprehensive national situational
picture and ensure enhanced situational awareness for its stakeholders at national and
European level. [Finland, 2023]
• The National Coordination Centre established a procedure for reviewing requests for
activation of EUROSUR Fusion Services at the district and local levels. Such procedure
verifies the legality and relevance of each request of EUROSUR Fusion Services, before
they are submitted to Frontex, ensuring that only relevant and cost-effective requests for
EUROSUR Fusion Services are sent to Frontex and then used in the operational
activities. [Finland, 2023]
• Within the EMPACT framework, the Police Central Bureau of Investigation’s drug
unit Head acts as the "Driver" of the EMPACT operational action plan targeting
criminal networks involved in the production, trafficking and distribution of synthetic
drugs and new psychoactive substances. The “Driver” benefits from unique operational
support, helping to efficiently identify and access various financial opportunities. The
European Project Implementation Centre within the Ministry of Interior Affairs
supports this activity as a priority and assists by handling administrative tasks and
supporting efforts to combat drug trafficking. [Poland, 2024]
• Border Guards and Customs authorities closely cooperate through an integrated Digital
Border procedure at crossing points to strengthen the checks and ensure a smoother
process. Data gathered and first-line checks results, including SIS information, are
directly transferred from Border Guards to Customs, who continue inspections with
pre-filled details. [Poland, 2024]
• The National Coordination Centre maintains a high-quality national situational picture
supported by a comprehensive dataset and fully integrated systems. It has access to
and oversight of all systems and assets used for border checks and surveillance,
structured according to the EUROSUR model, with event, operational, and analysis
layers. Real-time monitoring of border checks is facilitated through a mobile solution,
which provides a single-query interface to all relevant border control databases.
[Romania, 2025]
24
Risk Analysis
Land borders
• The national risk analysis system of the border control institution is efficient and
supported by functional inter-agency cooperation. Twice per year, the border control
institution issues common risk analysis products with Customs and the National Police.
The regular and systematic exchange of information between relevant national
authorities involved in the implementation of the European Integrated Border
Management resulting in joint risk analysis products ensures comprehensive national
situational awareness and supports adequate reaction capabilities. In addition, common
trainings, joint operations, and tailored actions are organised between the relevant
authorities involved in border management. [Lithuania, 2023]
• All police officers involved in border control have access to an application to detect
persons and/or vehicles with a specific risk profile. The application is part of the
national risk analysis system of the Border Police and integrated in the National
Border Management Information System. It ensures effective use of risk analysis
profiles at all organisational levels and increases the quality of border control. To
identify high-risk persons or vehicles, the Border Police developed an automatic risk
indicators application which is integrated into the Border Management Information
System. When activated, the indicators automatically detect potential perpetrators
during border checks. The indicators are automatically linked with risk profiles,
showing a yellow alarm on the border guard’s screen with a link to the profile, giving
targeted instructions to determine a person's status. Border guards can activate these
indicators at specific border crossings and times. [Croatia, 2024]
• Slovenia has implemented an effective system for automatically linking objects and
persons related to the same criminal case when an alert is created in the Schengen
Information System. For any status-classified object or document, such as 'stolen,'
connections are automatically made to related parties involved in the same case. This
system uses a daily batch processing schedule to review all active alerts in Slovenia’s
Central Schengen Information System. It checks for associations with corresponding
police database records and establishes links between alerts with the same reference
case number. This proactive linkage allows law enforcement and relevant authorities
to access pertinent information quickly, enhancing situational awareness and
supporting timely, informed decision-making. [Slovenia, 2025]
25
Border checks
Air borders
• A dedicated unit of six border guards monitors private transport and recreational
aviation, including light aircrafts and helicopters, as it has access to real-time route
tracking and flight data from the military radar. The unit receives all the flight plans
which are then analysed. When the airport of departure or arrival is not a border crossing
point, an alert is given to a police unit to intervene. In case of unauthorised landings at
aerodromes not dedicated to border crossings, the authorities impose fines. Risk
assessments of deviating flight routes are carried out regularly. [Belgium, 2020]
• The communication between the first and the second lines at border crossing points at
the airport via the national application is very highly automated and user-friendly. In
case of a hit, the first-line officer has the possibility to type in comments in a dedicated
Field, and the hit information together with the comments message is then sent
through the national application from the first line to the second line. When it comes to
the e-gates, in case of a hit on a discreet check alert, the e-gate operator can also add a
comment to the hit which is then immediately forwarded to the second line which
collects additional available information and sends the hit form to SIRENE. This
allows the check to be completed without any contact with the subject of the alert,
while collecting the information needed. [Lithuania, 2023]
• Latvia has a Passenger Information Unit responsible for the collection and processing
of passengers’ data on all flights currently operating in the country. Its role is to inform
(24/7) competent law enforcement authorities of the need to further examine incoming
and outgoing passengers, after the automated comparison of their data with relevant
databases (such as the Schengen Information System, I24/7), or against abstract profiles
modelled in cooperation and/or upon request of such authorities. As they receive queries
from all law enforcement agencies, the unit is in a unique position to notice overlapping
investigations and objects of interests and to inform respective agencies. A well-
developed case management system for handling communications with competent
authorities and Passenger Information Units of other Member States, established
following international best practices, is at the heart of the successful fulfilment of the
Unit´s tasks and information exchange. The operations take due account of data
protection and procedural requirements established by the relevant EU and national
law. The Unit proactively runs awareness raising campaigns on the capabilities it offers.
[Latvia, 2023]
Land borders
• Vehicles approaching the land border control booths are automatically pre-checked in
the Schengen Information System via the Automatic Number Plate Recognition,
including object extensions. [Croatia, 2024]
26
Border surveillance
• The border guard uses Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for surveillance and
intervention tasks. Each of the regional units responsible for the external land borders is
connected to the system. It consists of three platforms (unmanned mini motor gliders),
a ground station (with remote control, screens, and antenna) and other supporting
equipment. The platforms are equipped with daylight and night-vision cameras, and at
least one platform can be used at any given time. High-quality images from the cameras
are delivered in real-time either to the ground station or other connected recipients.
This UAV system enhances the border surveillance capacity, improves situational
awareness, and facilitates reaction capacities. Once a flying object is detected, the
Regional Coordination Centre is swiftly informed for specific intervention measures to
be conducted. [Poland, 2019]
• An electronic barrier system has been installed along the majority of the external land
border, consisting of a high number of day, night and thermal cameras and motion and
seismic sensors. Regional centres monitor the system, transmitting automatically
generated alarms to local coordination centres which dispatch patrols. This effectively
detects unauthorized crossings, allows real-time monitoring, and enhances patrol
response times. [Poland, 2024]
• The national border guard uses an IT system for planning, coordinating, and reporting
operational actions, which serves as an all-in-one platform to increase overall efficient
external border control. The system has several modules which enable the user to save
and share information on events, display events on a map, plan patrols and work
schedules, display the position of operational units in real time and transmit reports.
[Poland, 2024]
National database for border surveillance
• The national border surveillance concept is based on a comprehensive and efficient
national database, combining all the relevant functionalities to support operational and
tactical tasks. This system follows all elements of the operational cycle of border
surveillance: providing support for information collection, reporting on the tactical and
operational outcome of activities, planning of shifts, management and coordination of
patrols and designing efficient reaction response in the field and providing coherent
situational awareness. The software provides a single service platform for all law
enforcement thus ensures the effective utilisation of resources in case of an emergency
and benefits of compilation of the situational picture in designated areas of
responsibility. The software is linked with functions of the mobile IT environment of
the patrol deployed at the field. Based on its comprehensive and coherent design, the
system can be operated at local, regional, and national level. [Estonia, 2023]
27
RETURN
Effectiveness of the national return system
Return procedures
• The practice of taking return, removal, and entry ban decisions in one step reduces the
administrative burden while the procedural rights of the returnees are fully respected.
[Austria, 2015]
• The procedure of notifying the ‘intention of issuing an entry ban’ when an irregular stay
is detected during exit checks, giving the third-country national the opportunity to raise
objections, allows the authorities to issue an entry ban without interrupting the departure
of the third-country national while respecting the third-country national’s rights. [The
Netherlands, 2021]
• National authorities developed a notice on available assistance for reintegration, to be
signed by third-country nationals post-consultation. This is stored with their case files,
easing communication with return counsellors at detention centres. [Croatia, 2024]
• If a third-country national with no right to stay is found and has a return decision
issued by another EU country, national authorities will recognise and enforce this
decision without delay. They will not issue a new return decision or contact the issuing
country but will instead proceed with the removal of the individual to their country of
return, following, where justified, an updated assessment. [Czechia, 2024]
Forced-return procedure
• Procedures are in place enabling authorities to take a fast decision on a subsequent
asylum application lodged during the removal process to avoid postponing or delaying
the removal of a third-country national while ensuring effective implementation of the
principle of non-refoulement. [The Netherlands, 2015]
Voluntary return
• Throughout the entire return process, voluntary returns are a priority for the national
authorities. There is a proactive approach to motivate third-country nationals for
voluntary departure during all stages of the procedure, particularly at detention centres.
The detention centres are considered conducive to promoting voluntary returns, with
case managers and authorities actively motivating third-country nationals to leave the
country voluntarily, while providing adequate accommodation and support. [The
Netherlands, 2021]
• The early engagement with returnees when promoting voluntary return/departure and
the possibility for a returnee to participate in a voluntary return scheme at any point of
the return process, promotes and increases the use of voluntary return and reintegration
as an integral part of a common EU system for return in line with the EU strategy on
voluntary return and reintegration. [Luxembourg, 2016; Denmark, 2022]
28
IT system
• The national IT return case management system, which was developed in line with the
Frontex model (RECAMAS), provides return-related authorities with an efficient and
integrated tool, enabling the effective management of return cases. [Italy, 2021;
Estonia 2023]
• The connection of the national migration case management system to the Frontex
Application for Return (FAR) charter flights module allows national authorities to
directly reach all charter operations organised with the support of Frontex and helps
them organise and participate in return operations more efficiently. [Austria, 2020]
Detention for the purpose of removal
Detention centres
• A children's room in registration facilities for foreigners provides appropriate and
stimulating surroundings for children. The long opening hours and accessibility without
restrictions, the presence of a social worker and the large number of games and activities
available make it attractive for children to use. [Lithuania, 2018]
• Family centres and targeted psychiatric facilities can cater to the particular needs of
vulnerable persons in detention. The family centre’s layout, activities and staff
commitment allow for family life as close as possible to normal and provide appropriate
and stimulating surroundings for families and unaccompanied minors. The psychiatric
facility provides for close cooperation between the relevant partners to address the needs
of vulnerable persons with psychological problems in the return process while
increasing the efficiency of return procedures. [The Netherlands, 2021]
• The developed protocols and training of personnel, combined with the design and the
regime contribute to mitigating the stress and trauma for minors in the return process
and are in line with the best interests of the child principle. [Norway, 2022]
• The facilities for foreigners have mental healthcare offices, offering third-country
nationals assistance with mental health issues such as post-traumatic stress disorder and
prevention of suicide as well as supporting their adaptation. The psychologists carry out
an initial appraisal with all new arrivals and inform them about the possibilities of
seeking psychological support within the facility. This allows for the early identification
of psychological issues, which can guarantee an effective approach and handling of such
cases. The mental healthcare offices can be accessed during office hours from Monday
to Friday after an appointment by phone or with an application form. This helps create
29
an open and safe environment, especially when dealing with victims of trafficking and
other vulnerable persons. [Lithuania, 2023]
• Detention conditions feature spacious outdoor recreational areas at a Reception Centre,
with a dedicated outdoor playing area for young children and grassy recreational area
for adults, creating a pleasant atmosphere with space for privacy. It mitigates risk of
conflict and overcrowding. [Croatia, 2024]
• Detention centres are staffed with an educational unit of 11 officers, which organises a
wide variety of educational, social, cultural (with attention to cultural sensitivities) and
sports activities as well as events. The staff is available to the detainees from Monday
to Saturday, 12 hours/day and officers are dressed in civilian clothes, some of which
have a professional background in education and psychology. They have an active role
in conflict prevention within the centre. [Poland, 2024]
• Detention centres offer detainees extensive medical care tailored to their needs. If care
cannot be provided on-site, detainees are quickly taken to outside specialized clinics.
The Border Guard covers costs of these treatments. In case of a serious condition,
detainees are released and transferred to specialized care organisations. [Poland, 2024]
• The Detention Centre provides a dedicated nursery room, available 24/7, where
mothers can care for their newborn children in a private and separate facility. The room
is equipped with essential furniture and items to support the care of infants. There is
also a childcare section, spacious and well-equipped, offering a wide range of age-
appropriate activities, toys, and games. Children whose parents are detained at the
Centre can visit the playroom with their parents' consent. For very young children,
visits can also be supervised by one of their parents, ensuring a safe and supportive
environment for all. [Czechia, 2024]
• The detention centre has implemented a range of visual aids, including orientation
tables, signposts, house rules, and posters, which are designed to be child-friendly and
accessible. These materials feature pictograms and are displayed at a height and
appearance that is easy for minors to understand. Additionally, Frontex’ ‘Toolbox for
Children’ has been made widely available and accessible in multiple languages.
[Czechia, 2024]
• Zurich’s Detention Centre SMAZH initiative offers detainees personal laptops with
unlimited, secure internet access for just 1 CHF per day. The programme’s added
value lies in its multi-layered impact: comprehensive online resources keep detainees
informed about their rights and procedures; smart content filters ensure a safe
browsing environment; real-time translation tools dismantle language barriers to
communication and services; and monitored video calls enable critical family and
social connections, all while maintaining facility security. By prioritising digital
autonomy as a right - not a privilege – this project not only mitigates the psychological
harms of detention but also sets a replicable benchmark for humane, forward-thinking
care, proving that technology can be a powerful tool when deployed responsibly.
[Switzerland, 2025]
• The guarding officers at the Postojna Detention Centre are equipped with body
cameras, which serve as a vital safeguard for both the officers and the detainees,
30
providing an objective and unbiased record of interactions between the two parties.
By documenting all interactions, any incidents or allegations of misconduct can be
thoroughly investigated and addressed, and any conflicts or tensions within the
detention centre can be de-escalated. [Slovenia, 2025]
• The Initial Reception Center West handles asylum and immigration procedures,
supported by the Integrated Foreigners Administration application. This application
provides a comprehensive and efficient tool for managing procedures related to alerts
on return and alerts for refusal of entry and stay, while ensuring data quality. [Austria,
2025]
31
INTERNAL BORDERS
Cross-border cooperation in internal border areas
Operational cooperation with neighbouring Member States
• Joint trilateral patrols with neighbouring countries are conducted on trains. [Austria,
2015]
• A bi-annual joint crime analysis report and an operational crime analysis report are
prepared between Member States on a fortnightly basis. Further, a daily briefing with
information on crimes committed in one Member State is prepared and shared with the
partner Member States. [Liechtenstein, 2015]
• Within a border region police district, there is a joint analysis team. This consists of
several agencies comprising police, customs, and border and criminal offices. The
analyses are used to inform decisions regarding border controls, policing, and customs
matters. It was noted that analysis reports were used to brief officers in advance of joint
patrols, including the determination of the days, times, and locations where such
patrols would take place. For ports authorised for non-Schengen arrivals, monthly risk
analysis reports are compiled. These are used to inform the operational as well as the
administrative aspects of the border controls. [Denmark, 2017]
• To ensure effective cross-border cooperation and mutualisation of resources,
neighbouring Member States signed an agreement on the Common use of Covert Human
Intelligence Sources to carry out undercover intelligence operations through a common
pool of police officers. [Lithuania, 2018]
• The national data system delivers screen flashes when an operation starts thus
immediately alerting operators for necessary follow-up. It also provides a live feed.
The geolocation of the patrolling cars is also visible in the system. Both the Police
Cooperation and Customs Centres and the SPOC have direct access to it. [Czechia,
2019]
• Joint bi-national brigades to combat illegal immigration and smugglers and permanent
international cooperation mechanisms are integrated, enabling two neighbouring
countries to organise controls based on shared analysis of migration risks. Composed of
an equal number of officers from both countries selected for their technical and linguistic
skills, these ‘brigades’ (or ‘joint units’) set up at the Franco-German and Franco-Italian
borders are either governed by the Prüm agreements or by a bilateral agreement. In
addition to the organisation of joint patrols, the joint brigades (or joint units) provide
joint training. This joint brigade system facilitates the exchange of information between
two neighbouring countries and the coordination of control operations. [France, 2021]
At the regional level, cross border cooperation is based on administrative protocols with
the competent authorities of neighbouring Member States, which are further
implemented through annual action plans. This practical cooperation covers joint risk
analysis, joint operations, and patrols, the managing of specific events and joint
trainings. Joint patrols are planned on a regular basis. This cooperation concept creates a
32
good basis for joint operational responses at the regional level, the common use of
limited resources and a more comprehensive crime situational picture. [Estonia, 2023;
Latvia, 2023]
• Proactive measures are taken to limit temporary reintroductions of internal border
controls by having regular and targeted meetings with neighbouring countries and
having tactical and operational cooperation in border regions. Joint cross-border
trainings and cross-border hot pursuit exercises are regularly organised and basic
information on this possibility is spread via leaflets to all national police officers. Via
an extensive network and designated senior officials in every border region, police
authorities are in permanent contact with their (internal) cross-border counterparts.
They conduct constant joint monitoring and analysis, and respond to emerging threats.
This can be upscaled to joint patrols, actions, exercises, planning, etc. when security
threats emerge or increase. If internal border controls are reintroduced, both countries
analyse the implementation to prevent future occurrences. [Slovakia, 2024]
• Police cooperation by neighbouring Schengen States has intensified due to a new joint
patrol concept developed from a 2023 agreement between relevant national police
headquarters. An operational centre with command, control, and communication
capabilities was established at a cross-border police cooperation centre. A regional risk-
based operational plan guides the efforts. Participating patrols are tracked via
GPS devices and are aware of each other's locations through mobile devices. Joint
operations, including 12-16 mixed patrols per month, occur near the shared border.
Patrol types and equipment, such as drones and night vision, are selected according to
the plan. Since June 2022, additional neighbouring Schengen authorities have joined
these operations. [Hungary, 2024]
• The PCCC Chiasso facilitates the exchange of information between the Swiss and the
Italian authorities, coordinates joint measures such as mixed patrols, and conducts
crime analysis providing its outcome to the SPOC and other relevant Swiss and Italian
authorities. Information is exchanged via SIENA in a point-to-point configuration.
National authorities offer internships at PCCC Chiasso for Swiss officers from all
cantons for 6 to 12 months, as well as joint training between the PCCC and Italian
police. [Switzerland, 2025]
33
INTERNAL SECURITY
National Strategies on Law Enforcement
• Every four years, the Minister of Justice and Security sets the National Security Agenda
with national policy objectives for police duties. On a regional level, local
governments translate the national priorities into regional policy objectives for the police
in their Regional Security Agenda. Law enforcement agencies exchange intelligence
and information to gather appropriate information and intelligence to contribute to the
National Security Agenda, the Regional Security Agendas, and Europol’s Serious and
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA). Steering Committees from the Research
Department are tasked with the coordination and monitoring of the whole procedure. A
daily operational briefing allows the different police teams to be informed about the
specific points of attention in their working field. For instance, they are used as a starting
point for policymaking in the fight against organised crime and estimating threat levels
that indicate the likelihood of a terrorist attack. Additionally, the Research and Analysis
desks of all Regional Intelligence Services make their own threat and security
assessments. [The Netherlands, 2021]
• The Office of the Prosecutor General appointed a liaison prosecutor to the SPOC who
is frequently consulted on the flagging of alerts and international arrest warrants,
complex international criminal investigations, and any other cases where the
prosecutorial input is needed. [Portugal, 2022]
• Foreign Liaison officers and the central authority for international judicial cooperation
cooperate very closely, which allows the authority to advise and assist in writing
European Investigation orders or Mutual legal assistance requests addressed to the
Member State. [Portugal, 2022]
• The police use an analysis tool in its criminal analysis units which allows for the
establishment of ‘profiles’ of crime phenomena, based on operational data. They show
the user an interactive visualisation of the phenomenon, its trends, modi operandi and
evolutions. Since starting the roll out of this application in 2019, the police has
significantly increased the number of users and of analysed crime phenomena.
[Lithuania, 2023]
34
Organisation of the Single Point of Contact (SPOC) for international law enforcement
information exchange
Organisation, information exchange
• For better international police cooperation, the Police created a network of contact
officers for international police cooperation. They are located in all Police
headquarters and the capital’s Metropolitan Police headquarters. The contact
officers help to improve the quality of information exchange requests and facilitate
their coordination. [Poland, 2019]
• There is a well-established daily flow of criminal incidents reporting from the local to
the regional and state levels. In practice, an e-report on the events of the last 24 hours is
regularly available to the local station management team, the regional level, and the
State Central Criminal Police Office. It allows all levels to take informed decisions.
[Germany, 2020]
• The system for the coordination of counter-terrorist operations gathers all the
intelligence from the different police organisations and institutions responsible for
preventing and countering terrorism, violent radicalism, and serious and organised
crime. The system presents an adequate alternative, combining information
management with operational coordination in a situation where the relevant national
authorities do not have access to each other’s databases. [Spain, 2022]
• Deployment of international case officers at regional level in different Police
Departments. These officers are part of the Single Point of Contact and have four weeks
training on large-scale IT systems, exchange of supplementary information through the
SIRENE channel, management of biometrics and field visits to Europol and Eurojust.
They have full access to the case management systems of the Single Point of Contact,
Interpol’s I-24/7 secure global police communications system, and have the rights to
introduce Schengen Information System alerts and Interpol notices. They also have
access to the relevant systems and permissions equivalent to a case officer attached to
the national SIRENE Bureau and the International Communications Centre. This has
resulted in expertise available in each local division on the Schengen Information
System. Furthermore, the international case officers verify both the quality and legal
relevance of the requested information, draft SIENA messages to be sent to Liaison
Officers at Europol, and provide training on international police cooperation within the
local Police Department. [Finland, 2023]
• An Integrated Case Management System is used by national police to facilitate real-
time communication, resource coordination and task assignment within command
centres. Its user-friendly design allows swift responses and efficient coordination in
dynamic situations by sharing commands and information directly with patrols and
specialized units. It enhances operational readiness and public safety. The system also
incorporates key non-police partners such as Customs, the Fire Brigade and
Ambulance Services for real-time information exchange and cohesive resource
allocation. [Czechia, 2024]
35
Organisation
• The permanent Police, Customs and Border Guard Crime Intelligence and Analysis
Centre is a form of effective cooperation and coordination between the law enforcement
authorities producing, among others, common analytical and threat assessment products.
[Finland, 2018]
• The creation of Central Offices, pooling resources from different administrations and
focusing on one type of crime, leads to very effective operational results. [France, 2021]
• The structure to produce not only the national threat assessment but also dedicated
threat and risk assessments combines centrally organised quality control with
requirement analysis at regional level. The multi-disciplinary strategic analysis unit is
responsible for strategic crime analysis, consisting of a team working at the national
level and field teams in several regions. Quality control is maintained at the central
level which also ensures coherence between the different analytical products. The unit
produces the annual national threat assessment which focuses on organised crime
groups. [France, 2021]
• A memorandum of understanding between the police and customs enables extensive
cooperation between both administrations. It allows for the exchange and sharing of
relevant information and strategic, tactical and operational intelligence, in particular by
facilitating mutual access to databases, with due regard for individual rights and data
protection rules. It also contributes to the development and promotion of best
practices, as well as procedures for operational matters with respect to joint actions,
such as joint mobile patrol squads, joint investigation teams, or joint intelligence teams.
Finally, it helps coordinate the sharing of equipment between services and cooperation
on the development, purchasing, deployment and use of technology. [Cyprus, 2021]
• The SPOC has a risk analysis group responsible for deeper analysis of national and
international requests received in SPOC, gathering additional information in available
databases, and providing analysis reports on discovered crime trends and modi
operandi. The reports are then forwarded to prosecutors and/or respective police
agencies for supporting relevant investigations. [Portugal, 2022]
• The International Cooperation Division combines operational information exchange
with strategic decision-making at international level. This Division hosts the national
Single Point of Contact for international law enforcement information exchanges. It
benefits from representation from both national police forces, regional police forces,
and customs. Both relevant authorities have a network of experts on international
police cooperation, which assist and advise the criminal intelligence units at regional
level on the use of the instruments of international police cooperation. The main law
enforcement authorities train experts on international police cooperation regularly.
These experts form part of their unit at the regional level and perform this function in
addition to their daily work. Knowledge is transmitted to the network at an annual
meeting, where e.g. national Liaison Officers at Europol are invited as speakers. In
between these meetings, knowledge about new procedures is transmitted to the
network either via newsletters or ad hoc meetings. In addition, the experts of the
authority’s network receive a one-week capability training before joining the network.
36
These expert networks are a low-threshold mechanism to disseminate knowledge on
international police cooperation at the regional level. [Spain, 2022]
• The national PIU is integrated in the national SPOC, managing all PNR-related cases
for various authorities (police, customs, intelligence services, military police,
prosecutors’ office, and courts, etc.). This integration makes the system more
comprehensive and enhances the SPOC's role as a general information hub for all
international security information exchanges. Sharing one case management system
with other SPOC units enables easy integration and cross-checking of information,
leading to a more comprehensive analysis. [Slovakia, 2024]
• In 2025 a comprehensive national quality report was developed, comprising all
findings, recommendations, and solutions to address all shortcomings and to be used in
the strategic planning, to define the required capabilities for border control, to plan the
use of the national and the EU funding and to address the training needs. [Switzerland,
2025]
• The International Police Cooperation Strategy gives a clear strategic basis for the
development of international cooperation and offers a comprehensive strategic
framework in the field of law enforcement cooperation. Furthermore, the development
of cooperation with European partners and international organisations and third
countries, as well as the deployment of liaison officers are evaluated and prioritised
according to specific established indicators. The implementation of the prioritised
Schengen and Schengen-related instruments is also considered when preparing and
implementing the strategy. [Switzerland 2025]
Use of Europol tools for cross-border cooperation and information exchange
• Data from the national system for police investigations is automatically uploaded into
Europol’s Information System. The database of ongoing investigations is connected to
an automated data loader in Europol’s Information System. New information is inserted,
existing information is enhanced, and old information is removed daily. This process is
completely automated. The Europol National Unit handles hits occurring between
national investigations and foreign investigations, already available within Europol’s
Information System. [The Netherlands, 2021]
• QUEST (Querying Europol Systems) has been integrated with the national query system to
perform searches in the Europol Information System. The searching scope was
extended to all objects that are available in the system, and the same search
functionality will be available for Customs. This has increased the number of searches,
making the Member State the third most active using the search functionality in 2024.
[Hungary, 2024]