Soovitus: NÕUKOGU SOOVITUS, mis käsitleb Eesti majandus-, sotsiaal-, tööhõive-, struktuuri- ja eelarvepoliitikat - COM(2026) 206, SWD(2026) 206

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 3.6.2026

COM(2026) 206 final

Recommendation for a

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Estonia

{SWD(2026) 206 final}

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Recommendation for a

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Estonia

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular

Articles 121(2) and Article 148(4) thereof,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council

of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral

budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (1), and in

particular Article 3(3) thereof,

Having regard to the recommendation of the European Commission,

Having regard to the resolutions of the European Parliament,

Having regard to the conclusions of the European Council,

Having regard to the opinion of the Employment Committee,

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee,

Having regard to the opinion of the Social Protection Committee,

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic Policy Committee,

Whereas:

(1) Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 specifies the objectives of the economic governance

framework, which aims at promoting sound and sustainable public finances,

sustainable and inclusive growth and resilience through reforms and investments, as

well as preventing excessive government deficits. The Regulation stipulates that the

Council and the Commission conduct multilateral surveillance in the context of the

European Semester in accordance with the objectives and requirements set out in the

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The European Semester

includes, in particular, the formulation and the surveillance of the implementation of

country-specific recommendations.

(2) On 16 July 2025, the Commission adopted its proposal for a regulation establishing

the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural,

fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending

Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 (2). The proposal

1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective

coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council

Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj). 2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Fund for

economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and

security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom)

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aims to increase the effectiveness of Union funding by reducing the fragmentation of

the financial architecture and to support Member States in the coordination of their

economic policy in line with Article 175 TFEU.

(3) On 25 November 2025, the Commission adopted an opinion on the 2026 draft

budgetary plan of Estonia. On the same date, on the basis of Regulation (EU) No

1176/2011, the Commission adopted the 2026 Alert Mechanism Report, in which it

did not identify Estonia as one of the Member States for which an in-depth review

would be needed. The Commission also adopted a recommendation for a Council

recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area (3), a recommendation for a

Council recommendation on human capital in the European Union, and a proposal for

the 2026 Joint Employment Report, which analyses the implementation of the

Employment Guidelines and the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights.

The Council adopted the Recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area (4)

on 21 April 2026 and the Joint Employment Report, and the Recommendation on

human capital on 9 March 2026.

(4) On 29 January 2025, the Commission published the Competitiveness Compass, a

strategic framework that aims to boost the Union’s global competitiveness over the

next five years. It identifies the three transformational imperatives of innovation,

decarbonisation and competitiveness, and security as critical pillars for sustainable

economic growth. The European Semester is aligned with the Competitiveness

Compass, ensuring that Member States’ economic policies are consistent with the

Commission’s strategic objectives, creating a unified approach to economic

governance that fosters sustainable growth, innovation and resilience across the Union.

(5) In 2026, the European Semester for economic policy coordination continues to

develop alongside the final stage of Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

implementation (5). Recovery and resilience plans, along with cohesion policy

funding, have been essential for delivering on the policy priorities under the European

Semester, as the plans were required to effectively address all or a significant subset of

challenges identified in the relevant country-specific recommendations issued in recent

cycle, and programmes funded by the European cohesion policy were required to take

country-specific recommendations into accounts. As the RRF approaches the end of its

lifetime, it remains essential to sustain the reforms and investments supported and

implemented under the RRF, in particular those that contribute to addressing

challenges identified in the country-specific recommendations.

(6) On 3 June 2026, the Commission published the 2026 country report for Estonia. It

assessed Estonia’s progress in addressing the relevant country-specific

recommendations and took stock of Estonia’s implementation of the RRP. On the

basis of that analysis, the country report identified the most pressing challenges

Estonia is facing. It also assessed Estonia’s progress in implementing the European

Pillar of Social Rights and in achieving the Union headline targets on employment,

2024/2509 - COM(2025) 565 final. The proposed Regulation is currently the subject of negotiations with the

co-legislators. 3 OJ C, C/2026/2434, 28.4.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/2434/oj. 4 OJ C, C/2026/2434, 28.4.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/2434/oj. 5 Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing

the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).

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skills and poverty reduction, as well as progress in achieving the United Nations

Sustainable Development Goals.

(7) On 21 January 2025, the Council, upon the assessment and recommendation of the

Commission, adopted a Recommendation endorsing the national medium-term fiscal-

structural plan of Estonia (6). The plan covers the period from 2025 until 2028 and

presents a fiscal adjustment spread over four years. The Council recommended the

following maximum growth rates of net expenditure: 7.1% in 2025, 5.1% in 2026,

3.6% in 2027 and 3.2% in 2028, which correspond to the maximum cumulative

growth rates calculated by reference to the base year of 2023 of 9.2% in 2025, 14.8%

in 2026, 18.9% in 2027 and 22.6% in 2028.

(8) Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its repercussions constitute an

existential challenge for the European Union. The Commission has invited Member

States to request the activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and

Growth Pact in a coordinated manner to support the EU efforts to achieve a rapid and

significant increase in defence spending (7) and this proposal was welcomed by the

European Council of 6 March 2025. Following the request of Estonia, on 8 July 2025

the Council, upon a recommendation from the Commission, adopted a

Recommendation allowing Estonia to deviate from the recommended maximum

growth rates of net expenditure (8). The period when the national escape clause is

activated (2025-2028) allows Estonia to reprioritise government expenditure or

increase government revenue so that lastingly higher defence expenditure would not

endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.

(9) On 30 April 2026, Estonia submitted its 2026 Annual Progress Report (9) on

adherence to the recommended maximum growth rates of net expenditure and the

implementation of reforms and investments responding to the main challenges

identified in the European Semester country-specific recommendations. The Annual

Progress Report also reflects Estonia’s biannual reporting on the progress made in

implementing its recovery and resilience plan in accordance with Article 27 of

Regulation (EU) 2021/241.

(10) Real GDP growth in 2025 was 0.6% and HICP inflation stood at 4.8%. The

Commission Spring 2026 Forecast projects real GDP to grow by 1.6% in 2026 and

1.7% in 2027, and HICP inflation to stand at 4.4% in 2026 and 2.9% in 2027.

(11) Based on data provided by Eurostat (10), Estonia’s general government deficit

increased from 1.1% of GDP in 2024 to 2.0% of GDP in 2025. The increase in the

deficit in 2025 mainly reflects stronger expenditure dynamics, in particular public

investment on large infrastructure projects, such as Rail Baltica. Based on policy

measures known by the cut-off date of the forecast, the Commission Spring 2026

Forecast projects a deficit of 4.5% of GDP in 2026 and of 4.8% of GDP in 2027. The

6 Council Recommendation of 21 January 2025 endorsing the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan of

Estonia (OJ C/2025/652, 10.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/655/oj). 7 Communication from the Commission, 'Accommodating increased defence expenditure within the Stability

and Growth Pact’, Brussels, 19.3.2025, C(2025) 2000 final. 8 Council Recommendation of 8 July 2025 allowing Estonia to deviate from the maximum growth rate of net

expenditure as set by the Council under Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 (Activation of the national escape

clause), (OJ C/2025/3970, 20.8.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3964/oj). 9 The 2026 Annual Progress Reports are available on: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-and-

fiscal-governance/stability-and-growth-pact/preventive-arm/annual-progress-reports_en. 10 Eurostat-Euro Indicators, 22.4.2026.

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increase in the deficit in 2026 mainly reflects a decrease in revenue in particular due to

the personal income tax reform (transition to a universal tax-exemption system) and an

increase in expenditure mainly on the back of defence spending reaching 5% of GDP,

and of investment projects such as Rail Baltica. The increase of the deficit in 2027

mainly reflects weaker revenue dynamics.

(12) Based on the Commission’s estimates, the fiscal stance (11), which includes both

nationally and EU financed expenditure, was contractionary, by 0.5% of GDP, in

2025. It is projected to be expansionary, by 2.8% of GDP in 2026, and contractionary,

by 0.3% of GDP in 2027.

(13) Based on data provided by Eurostat (12), Estonia’s general government debt increased

from 23.5% of GDP at the end of 2024 to 24.1% of GDP at the end of 2025. The

increase in the debt ratio in 2025 mainly reflects the government deficit. Based on

policy measures known at the cut-off date of the forecast, the Commission Spring

2026 Forecast projects the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase to 26.9% by the end of 2026

and further to 30.5% by the end of 2027. The increases in 2026 and 2027 mainly

reflect high and sustained budget deficits and positive stock-flow adjustments in 2027.

(14) Based on Eurostat data, total general government defence expenditure in Estonia

amounted to 4.2% of GDP in 2025, corresponding to an increase of 2.1 percentage

points of GDP compared to the reference year 2021. According to the Commission

Spring 2026 Forecast, it is projected at 5.0% of GDP in 2026, corresponding to an

increase of 3.0 percentage points of GDP compared to 2021.

(15) The Union continues to face risks of energy supply disruptions and elevated price

volatility, exacerbated by geopolitical tensions which affect global oil and gas

markets. Experience from the 2022–2023 energy crisis has shown that broad and

untargeted measures entail large fiscal costs and are socially and economically

inefficient. Since the outbreak of the war in the Middle East in February 2026, Estonia

adopted a fiscal policy measure to mitigate the impact of high energy prices on

households and firms (13). Namely, it postponed the fuel and electricity excise tax rate

increases from 2026 to 2027. According to the Commission Spring 2026 forecast, the

fiscal cost of this measure is projected to amount to approximately 0.1% of GDP in

2026.

(16) Based on the Commission’s calculations, net expenditure in Estonia grew by 2.0% in

2025 and 5.7% cumulatively over 2024 and 2025. The net expenditure growth in 2025

is below the recommended maximum growth rate. When considering 2024 and 2025

together, the cumulative growth rate of net expenditure is also below the

recommended maximum growth rate.

(17) Based on the Commission’s calculations, net expenditure in Estonia is projected to

grow by 12.0% in 2026, and 18.4% cumulatively over 2024, 2025 and 2026. The

projected net expenditure growth in 2026 is above the recommended maximum

11 The fiscal stance is defined as a measure of the annual change in the underlying budgetary position of the

general government. It aims to assess the economic impulse stemming from fiscal policies, both those that

are nationally financed and those that are financed by the EU budget. The fiscal stance is measured as the

difference between (i) the medium-term potential growth and (ii) the change in primary expenditure net of

discretionary revenue measures and including expenditure financed by non-repayable support (grants) from

the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other Union funds. 12 Eurostat-Euro Indicators, 22.4.2026. 13 This reflects the situation at the cut-off date of the Commission’s Spring 2026 Forecast (4 May 2026).

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growth rate, corresponding to a deviation of 2.8% of GDP in annual terms. When

considering 2024, 2025 and 2026 together, the projected cumulative growth rate of net

expenditure is also above the recommended maximum growth rate, corresponding to a

deviation of 1.5% of GDP in cumulative terms. However, the projected deviation is

within the flexibility of the national escape clause based on current projections for

defence spending.

(18) On 3 June 2026, the Commission adopted a report under Article 126(3) TFEU (14).

That report assessed the situation of Estonia vis-à-vis the deficit criterion, as its

planned general government deficit in 2026 exceeds the reference value of 3% of

GDP. The report concluded that, taking into account all the relevant factors as

appropriate, the deficit criterion is not fulfilled by Estonia. However, the Commission

was of the view that there is no case to open an excessive deficit procedure for

Estonia, as the Council has activated the national escape clause for Estonia and the

projected deficit in excess of the reference value in 2026 is fully explained by the

increase in defence expenditure since 2021, based on the Commission Spring 2026

Forecast. In light of this and after considering the opinion of the Economic and

Financial Committee as established under Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission has

not proposed to open an excessive deficit procedure.

(19) Due to heightened security needs, defence spending is on the rise in Estonia. It

increased from 2% of GDP in 2021 to 4.2% in 2025 and is expected to exceed 5% of

GDP starting in 2026. Therefore, it is important that Estonia finds stable sources of

revenue or expenditure-decreasing instruments, that can support the financing of not

only spending needs for defence but for all structural spending needs, including

healthcare and long-term care, in the medium to long term.

(20) The general government tax revenue remains four percentage points below the EU

average, at 35.2% of GDP in 2024, against 39.4% in the EU. Since 2024, several

measures have been introduced to increase the revenue: the VAT rate was increased

twice, reaching 24% in 2025; personal and corporate income tax rates were raised to

22%; excise duties on alcohol, tobacco and energy are set to increase annually until

2027/28; and a new motor vehicle tax was introduced in 2025. While these reforms

help narrow the revenue gap with the EU average, they further increase the reliance on

labour and consumption taxes, already above the EU average as a share of GDP. They

also risk placing a disproportionate burden on lower-income groups and exacerbating

income inequality. It would be beneficial to broaden the tax base through taxes less

detrimental to growth. For instance, by tapping into property taxation, which remains

underutilised. Property taxation revenues in 2024 amounted to just 0.3% of GDP, well

below the EU average of 1.8%, reflecting Estonia’s focus on taxing land rather than

property. Phasing-in a tax on vacant residential property would broaden the tax base

while reducing housing shortages. Efforts have also been made to improve spending

efficiency. However, most recent spending reviews, the last one in 2025, have had a

rather narrow focus in areas of public spending such as museum funding or

administrative procedures in the social sector. Furthermore, the link between spending

reviews, efficiency gains and resource reallocation remains limited. Strengthening it

would require more frequent reviews and ensuring that the resulting savings are

clearly reflected in the budget and channelled towards priority areas.

14 Report from the Commission, prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of

the European Union, 3.62026, COM(2026)302 final.

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(21) The systematic, meaningful and timely involvement of local and regional authorities,

social partners, civil society and other relevant stakeholders remains essential in order

to ensure broad ownership for the successful implementation of the Union’s funding

instruments, as well as in the context of the European Semester.

(22) The implementation of cohesion policy programmes, which encompass support from

the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Just Transition Fund (JTF),

the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) in Estonia, is

above the average pace at EU level, both in terms of project selection and payments. It

is important to keep current momentum, while maximising the impact of investments

on the ground. Estonia is already taking action under its cohesion policy programmes

to boost competitiveness and growth. Nevertheless, some areas may require further

strengthening, including those relating to persistent territorial disparities, economic

diversification and just transition. While overall good, effective implementation is

challenged by the limited availability and use of regional data. It is essential to ensure

that the new investments identified by Estonia in its mid-term review of the cohesion

policy funds, notably those linked to the five priorities identified in the Mid-Term

Review Regulation (15), are deployed rapidly and effectively.

(23) Persistent regional disparities hamper convergence and growth in Estonia. Economic

activity, high-value public services and skilled labour are concentrated around the

capital region. The remote and rural regions face structural challenges linked to sparse

population, demographic decline, connectivity issues and access to basic public

services. As a country on the eastern external border of the EU, Estonia faces

additional challenges hindering its prospects for economic and social development as

existing structural challenges are exacerbated. Russia’s war of aggression against

Ukraine increases security pressures, disrupts cross-border economic activities and

decreases investment attractiveness and further limits access finance. Security

concerns for people and critical infrastructure require investments in civil protection,

preparedness and military mobility, which could provide opportunities for the regions’

economies, while adding further pressure on the financing of public services.

Supporting economic diversification and strengthening the resilience of the region is

particularly important in Ida-Viru county, which is undergoing a major industrial,

economic and social transformation as the oil shale-based industry is being phased out.

(24) Estonia faces several challenges related to research and innovation, access to finance,

energy efficiency in buildings, renewable energy and energy security, sustainable

transport, labour and skills supply and social protection.

(25) Although Estonia’s overall innovation performance has steadily improved since 2017,

business research and development (R&D) spending as a share of GDP remains below

the EU average. At the same time, support to business R&D has increased markedly,

with direct public support reaching 0.15% of GDP in 2023, above the EU average.

This includes new initiatives such as the national applied research centre, the TemTA

programme for applied research and technology development, performance-based

incentives for science–business collaboration, and measures to strengthen intellectual

property management and technology transfer. However, patenting has declined and

research–business cooperation remains limited, indicating that public investment in

15 Regulation (EU) 2025/1914 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2025 amending

Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic

challenges in the context of the mid-term review.

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R&I is not yet sufficiently leveraged. Fragmentation between innovation support and

broader support initiatives for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) reduces

policy effectiveness and weakens the translation of research into market outcomes.

Addressing these shortcomings, including by ensuring more integrated support

frameworks and sustained investment in applied research and high-impact areas such

as artificial intelligence, would help strengthen the commercialisation of innovation.

(26) Availability of finance is a major investment obstacle for 19% of companies in

Estonia, while the share of finance-constrained firms is significantly higher than the

EU average. Estonian businesses rely heavily on internal financing, reflecting

structural features such as the tax system, the prevalence of SMEs and a modest

institutional investor base. Persistent gaps in SMEs’ access to finance continue to hold

back innovation, commercialisation of research and the uptake of resource-efficient

technologies. While the integration of Baltic capital market infrastructure since 2017

and support from national and supranational institutions have contributed to the

development of the capital market, private equity and venture capital, financing

constraints persist, exacerbated by the 2021 pension reform, which reduced the size of

domestic capital markets and institutional investment. Although instruments such as

the investment account regime, targeted guarantee schemes, and new financing

agreements, notably with the European Investment Fund, have expanded access to

finance, demand continues to exceed supply, as illustrated by the rapid

oversubscription of regional support calls. Improving access to finance, especially for

SMEs outside major urban centres, including through targeted guarantees and a more

integrated innovation and business support framework, would help mobilise

investment, support scale-up, and accelerate the adoption of innovative and resource-

efficient technologies.

(27) Buildings are responsible for 46.1% of energy use in the country, with final energy

consumption improvements in the residential sector stalling in Estonia between 2019

and 2024. Low energy efficiency of the housing stock results in heating costs

consuming a high share of disposable incomes, which affects vulnerable groups

particularly hard. Estonia relies mostly on grant-based support schemes for

renovations, and use of financial instruments remains limited. Increasing availability

of financial instruments could advance decarbonisation and affordability of housing

through lower heating costs in renovated dwellings. Establishing a clear path toward a

decarbonized and energy efficient building stock will also help to tackle the need for

climate adaptation and increasing overall crisis resilience.

(28) Estonia’s energy mix has shifted notably towards renewables, rising from 35% in 2023

to 40% in 2024. However, although its share of the energy mix decreased importantly

from 30% in 2023 to 25% in 2024, domestically sourced oil shale remains Estonia’s

main energy source, hindering the green transition. Although daytime prices have

fallen in recent years due to the increasing penetration of solar power in the electricity

mix (67.9% of renewables in the net electricity generation in 2025, one of the highest

in the EU), Estonia remains vulnerable to severe price spikes during periods of high

demand. While Estonia’s electricity grid was successfully synchronised with the EU

grid in February 2025, other synchronisation projects, notably with Latvia and

Finland, remain to be completed to support the transition and enhance energy security.

Although Estonia’s first large-scale battery energy storage system came into operation

in 2025, the construction of more such systems is essential to increase the country's

energy flexibility. Work to strengthen the resilience of critical energy infrastructure

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must also continue, particularly regarding cybersecurity and infrastructure

surveillance.

(29) Resource productivity in Estonia is dragged down by the prominence of resource-

intensive industries and considerable reliance on oil shale (52.5% of the gross

available energy in Estonia in 2023). In 2024, Estonia generated EUR 1.15 per kg of

material compared to the EU average of EUR 2.99. In terms of resource productivity

measured as gross domestic product (GDP) over domestic material consumption

(DMC), Estonia is still among the worst performers in the EU and shows a slightly

worsening trend – the index value in 2023 was 127.7 and 124.7 in 2024. To boost

resource productivity, Estonia needs to shift away from oil shale, further support bio-

based innovation to turn resources into higher-value applications as well as

development and uptake of resource-efficient technologies and improve circularity,

which requires substantial investment.

(30) Estonia’s transport sector continues to be a large greenhouse gas emitter. Road

transport is responsible for 48% of Estonia’s effort sharing emissions in 2024, having

increased by 27% since 2005. This is due to Estonia having a car fleet that is the oldest

in the EU as well as an above EU average car ownership rate. To tackle this and

implement its own Transport and Mobility development Plan 2021-2035, Estonia must

implement measures to encourage a shift towards the use of sustainable public

transport. To that end, support to move towards integrated solutions and improving

multimodal connection and services for passengers is essential, as is further rail

electrification and the completion of Rail Baltica. Estonia’s transport infrastructure is

vulnerable to climate change impact; this should be taken into account when planning

new investments in the sector.

(31) In light of the crucial role of human capital in enhancing the Union’s competitiveness

and strategic autonomy, in 2026 the Council recommended that Member States take

action to urgently address human capital-related structural challenges in the areas of

skills and education, which hamper competitiveness. The 2026 country-specific

recommendations addressed to Estonia can contribute to the implementation of the

Council Recommendation on human capital in the Union.

(32) Estonia continues to face challenges in strengthening its skills supply and improving

transitions into the labour market. Early school leaving (above 10% in 2025) continues

to weigh on educational attainment, while youth unemployment (above 20% in 2025)

and a high share of young people not in employment, education or training (11.2% in

2025) point to persistent difficulties in school-to-work transitions. The age group 18-

24 is particularly exposed to in-work poverty. Vocational education and training

(VET) and higher education play an important role in upskilling for growing sectors

with high labour demand. However, VET remains insufficiently attractive overall,

while higher education faces shortages of graduates in key fields such as science,

technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). Wide disparities in access to

upskilling and reskilling, depending on age, socio-economic background and

education level, continue to constrain the skills base, particularly in regions

transitioning towards higher value-added activities. Schools face growing diversity in

student needs, including rising demand for additional learning support, while

significant teacher shortages, especially in STEM subjects and in Estonian as a second

language, pose risks to education quality and are particularly severe in rural areas.

Although digital skills are broadly in line with the EU average, Estonia has not yet

reached the EU target of 80%, and many workers still lack adequate ICT and software

skills, while demand for AI and digital competences is expected to increase. Skills

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relevant for the green transition also remain in short supply as it is too early to see the

impact of recent measures, including those supported under the RRF. Strengthening

education-to-work transitions, expanding targeted upskilling and reskilling initiatives

(including outreach to low-skilled and older adults), and supporting early labour

market integration of young people would help improve employment outcomes.

Collective bargaining coverage and trade union density are among the lowest in the

EU and the tripartite social dialogue has weakened in recent years. Enhancing social

dialogue and collective bargaining, including through tripartite engagement could

contribute to addressing these challenges.

(33) Low social expenditure and gaps in social protection coverage contribute to high

poverty risks for vulnerable groups. The minimum income support remains relatively

low, while overall social benefit expenditure remains below the EU average (17.8% of

GDP in 2024, versus the EU average of 27.3%), limiting the poverty-reducing impact

of social transfers. Persons with disabilities, including those in employment, face

substantially higher poverty risks than the general population (working-age population

with disabilities 32.5%, compared with 15% for people without disabilities), partly

reflecting relatively low disability benefits. Single-parent households are also

particularly exposed to poverty and housing cost pressures. A limited social housing

stock and housing affordability challenges further exacerbates poverty risks, especially

among vulnerable groups. While Estonia’s planned housing policy for 2025–2035 is a

positive step, its implementation should be monitored to assess its impact on housing

affordability. Reforms to the minimum income system aim to improve the adequacy

and efficiency of subsistence benefits, but as these reforms remain at an early stage,

their impact is yet to be seen. Despite recent reforms, pension adequacy in Estonia

remains a challenge, with poverty risks among older people remaining among the

highest in the EU. Risks are particularly high for women and older people living alone,

with the latter recording the highest risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU. This

is linked to longer life expectancy, household composition patterns and limited

survivor pension coverage, which result in many older women living alone with

relatively low incomes. Strengthening benefit adequacy and broadening access to

social protection, as well as improving participation in additional pension pillars could

reduce poverty risks.

(34) Estonia continues facing challenges regarding access and affordability of health care

and long-term care, particularly in regions outside main urban centre areas and among

vulnerable groups. While Estonia has undertaken reforms and investments to address

health workforce shortages, to strengthen primary care and the hospital network as

well as promote integration of health care and social services, access remains a

challenge. Public expenditure on health and long-term care is well below the EU

average, contributing to significant unmet needs, high out-of-pocket payments and

limited availability of long-term care services, particularly home-based care, leading to

continued reliance on informal care, that disproportionately affect lower-income

groups and increases poverty risks among those in need of care. Despite quality

guidelines, access to social services varies considerably between municipalities, and

rising waiting lists further constrain access. Significant inequalities in life expectancy

and healthy life years persist in Estonia, closely linked to socio-economic status,

education, income and place of residence. The current social health insurance model is

not financially sustainable in the long term, as expenditure is projected to grow faster

than revenues due to ageing, rising demand and labour market changes. It remains

crucial to continue implementing reforms to better integrate healthcare and social

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services, prioritise prevention and ensure sustainable funding, to address workforce

shortages and reduce disparities in access and affordability.

(35) In view of the close interlinkages between the economies of euro-area Member States

and their collective contribution to the functioning of the economic and monetary

union, in 2026 the Council recommended that the euro-area Member States take

action, including through their RRPs, to implement the 2026 Recommendation on the

economic policy of the euro area. For Estonia, the recommendation (1) helps

implement the first, the second and the third recommendations on the euro area,

recommendation (2) helps implement the fourth recommendation on the euro area,

recommendations (3) and (4) help implement the seventh recommendation on the euro

area, recommendation and the recommendation (5) helps implement the fifth

recommendation on the euro area.

HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Estonia take action in 2026 and 2027 to:

1. Continue adhering to the maximum growth rates of net expenditure recommended by

the Council on 21 January 2025, while making use of the flexibility under the

national escape clause for higher defence expenditure. Reinforce defence readiness

while ensuring spending efficiency and gradually adapting the budget to sustain

structurally higher defence spending. Ensure that any measures taken to mitigate the

impact of the hike in energy prices are temporary, targeted at protecting vulnerable

households or at addressing the needs of energy-intensive firms, preserve incentives

for energy savings while ensuring that their fiscal cost is compatible with the

commitments under the EU fiscal framework. Ensure sustainable financing for

spending needs, including defence, by broadening the tax base, tapping into taxes

that are less detrimental to growth, including property taxation, and directing

spending to priority areas based on public spending reviews.

2. Ensure continuity of reforms and investments implemented under the Recovery and

Resilience Facility. Sustain implementation momentum under cohesion policy

programmes, building, where appropriate, on the reallocation to strategic priorities

and flexibilities in the mid-term review of the cohesion policy framework. Address

the unique socio-economic, security and civil preparedness challenges affecting

regions on the EU's external eastern border.

3. Better leverage public investment in R&I and address obstacles to commercialisation

of R&I. Improve access to finance, including for scaling up, especially for small and

medium-sized enterprises and companies outside main urban areas, including by

integrating innovation and business support frameworks.

4. Further invest into energy efficient renovations, including through financial

instruments, to reduce energy demand and contribute to increasing the affordability

of housing. Reduce overall reliance on fossil fuels and the share of oil shale in the

energy mix by investing in renewable energy and by promoting energy storage.

Increase energy security and resilience against hybrid threats, for example by

ensuring the sufficient capacity of electricity interconnections and strengthening the

grid infrastructure’s resilience. Increase the use of sustainable and less polluting

transport, by accelerating the completion of Rail Baltica, and by facilitating the

integration of public transport systems. Raise resource productivity by supporting the

uptake of resource-efficient technologies.

5. Improve skills by expanding opportunities for low-skilled and older adults and

strengthening STEM education across all levels. Reduce early school leaving by

EN 11 EN

addressing teacher shortages and supporting learners with special needs. Improve

employment of young people through more effective active labour market policies,

while paying particular attention to regional disparities. Strengthen social protection

to reduce the risk of poverty among vulnerable groups by increasing the adequacy

and efficiency of the benefit system. Improve accessibility and affordability of

healthcare and long-term care, including to address regional disparities, by ensuring

funding.

Done at Brussels,

For the Council

The President

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 3.6.2026

SWD(2026) 206 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

2026 Country Report - Estonia

Accompanying the document

Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Estonia

{COM(2026) 206 final}

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND KEY POLICY CHALLENGES

2

The modest recovery driven by domestic demand and inventories faces geopolitical headwinds

High geopolitical uncertainty and weak

external demand coupled with

persistently high inflation weigh on Estonia’s growth. After a few years of contraction and stagnation, the Estonian economy grew by a modest 0.6% in 2025. The tense geopolitical situation over the past few years has led to the private sector postponing investment. Public spending increased, in particular for defence, although most of it was imported, thereby not stimulating the domestic economy. In parallel, the weak economies of Estonia's main trading partners (Sweden, Finland and Germany) weighed on the country’s exports. In 2025, growth was therefore driven by domestic demand, i.e. a combination of public spending, some rebound in investment and accumulation of inventories. Net exports contributed negatively but negligibly to growth. Inflation in Estonia has been high in recent years and was still at 4.8% in 2025, roughly half of which can be attributed to higher and new taxes (1). Inflation was set to slow in 2026 as some tax effects end, but rising energy prices caused by the war in the Middle East might jeopardise this process.

Domestically, a fast rise in nominal wages, a higher debt burden and

downbeat sentiment slowed real growth. The large wage increases that followed the energy-related inflationary shock after Russia's invasion of Ukraine eroded Estonia's competitiveness. Credit growth slowed, with

(1) Bank of Estonia estimates.

higher ECB policy rates directly affecting interest rates, most of which are variable. Households therefore dedicated a larger proportion of income to debt servicing, which reduced private consumption over the last years. Only in the second half of 2025 did lower interest rates start lightening the debt burden and reviving credit expansion. Amid high uncertainty, consumer sentiment remains downbeat, weighing on retail spending.

Graph 1.1: Real GDP growth and contributions

Source: AMECO

In 2026, the Estonian economy is

projected to grow by 1.6% in real terms. The economy has been gaining momentum before the outbreak in the Middle East, supported by fiscal reforms that raised real disposable incomes, and more favourable financing conditions, which were set to encourage investment. Since the outbreak of the conflict, prospects for private consumption have become more muted, while geopolitical concerns are weighing on private investment and exports. Meanwhile, inflation is now expected to be higher due to the energy price shock and its potential spillovers, averaging 4.4% in 2026.

.

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-10

-8

-6

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6

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18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Net exports Investment Priv. consumption

Gov. consumption Inventories Real GDP (y-o-y%)

forecastpps.

3

Graph 1.2: HICP breakdown 2022-2026

Source: Eurostat

There has been a healthy adjustment in the labour market but structural issues persist

The labour market is adjusting to the

economic growth cycle but faces

structural issues such as ageing population, skills shortages and high youth unemployment. The unemployment rate rose to 8.6% at the beginning of 2025, following the protracted economic weakness, but fell to 6.4% towards the end of 2025 on the back of lower labour participation and the nascent recovery. The shift was accompanied by slower wage growth (6% year-on-year) than in

previous years, and a smaller pool of vacancies. Despite the positive drop in unemployment, several structural issues exist. The ageing population is causing the labour force to shrink; a trend that has been only temporarily reversed by the inflow of Ukrainians. This is offset to a certain extent by the historically very high participation rate, also among women (although the gender wage gap is one of the largest in the EU). Shortages of certain professions persist, especially of healthcare and STEM professionals and teachers. Regional differences, in particular in Ida-Viru, are pronounced, with some areas facing language barriers and structurally high unemployment. Youth unemployment is on the rise (above 20%), as is the proportion of young people not in employment or in education or training (see Annex 11).

Public finances face growing pressures from defence and social spending

In 2025, Estonia received country-specific recommendations to broaden the tax

base and ensure sustainable financing for

spending needs including defence, healthcare and long-term care. From 2024 to 2027, the excise duty rates on alcohol,

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0

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15

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22 23 24 25 26

y- o-

y %

c h a ng

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p s.

Services Processed food NEIG

Unprocessed food Energy HICP

Box 1: UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Estonia performs above the EU average and is further improving on most SDGs related to sustainability (SDGs 2, 6, 7, 11 and 15) but needs to catch up with the EU average on others (SDGs 9, 12, 13 and 14).

The country’s performance on SDG-related competitiveness is mixed. On the one hand, the quality of education (SDG 4) is above the EU average and improving, as illustrated by an increase in adult participation in learning. On the other hand, decent work and economic growth (SDG 8) is below the EU average, and Estonia is moving away from the goals, as illustrated by the stagnant real GDP per capita. Industry and innovation (SDG 9) is below the EU average, but improving, as exemplified by trends in gross domestic expenditure on R&D.

Out of the 17 SDGs, 8 remain below the EU average. Besides SDGs 8 and 9 discussed above, these relate to health (SDG 3), gender equality (SDG 5), responsible consumption and production (SDG 12), climate action (SDG 13), life below water (SDG 14) and personal security (SDG 16) (see Annex 15.)

4

tobacco and energy goods will be subject to additional yearly increases (2). In 2025, personal and corporate income tax (PIT and CIT) increases (both from 20% to 22%) entered into force. In 2026, expected PIT and CIT rate increases (both to 24%) were cancelled. Still, the tax rate for advance income tax paid by credit institutions was raised from 14% to 18%. In 2025, a new motor vehicle tax was introduced. In July 2025, the VAT rate was increased from 22% to 24% and there were increases in the reduced VAT rates for accommodation services (from 9% to 13%) and for press publications (from 5% to 9%). Since 2025 an upward correction of the land tax is taking place. Despite these efforts, Estonia's tax base remains narrow and continues to be heavily reliant on labour and consumption taxes. New revenue-increasing or expenditure-reducing measures will be needed to ensure the sustainable financing of priority spending needs, mainly defence and social policies.

The general government deficit increased

to 2.0% of GDP in 2025 and is set to

continue widening. In 2025, the deficit

remained low thanks to: (i) increases in the PIT and CIT rates to 22%; (ii) a rise in the VAT rate to 24%, (iii) a new motor vehicle tax; and (iv) improved tax collection amid the economic recovery. However, the deficit is forecast to increase to 4.5% of GDP (3) in 2026. Revenue is set to be impacted by the transition to a universal tax system that also raises the income threshold to EUR 700 monthly. This measure will lead to significant revenue losses even if it improves work incentives by removing the current hump in effective marginal tax rates (see Annexes 2 and 3). Expenditure is set to increase mainly due to defence spending. Public debt was 24.1% of GDP in 2025 and is set to rise to 26.9% in 2026 on the back of planned higher public spending, particularly on defence.

(2) To help counteract the high energy prices stemming

from the conflict in the Middle East, the government decided to postpone to 2027 the increases in energy (fuel and electricity) excise duty rates foreseen for 2026.

(3) Commission 2026 Spring Forecast.

Estonia appears to be on track to meet its commitments under its medium-term

plan. Under its 2025-2029 medium-term

plan, Estonia committed to limiting expenditure growth, aiming to keep the deficit well below 3% of GDP by 2029 and public debt below the threshold of 60% of GDP (see Annex 2). The above commitment could be jeopardised by lower than projected economic growth resulting in lower fiscal revenues and backtracking on certain revenue-increasing decisions. On the expenditure side, increasing spending pressures, such as the planned increase in defence spending, surpassing 5% of GDP already by 2026, could also jeopardise the commitment.

Budget pressures continue to build on the expenditure side. Under Estonia’s State Budgetary Strategy (4), welfare expenditure (including social and other subsidies, funded social contributions and unemployment insurance premiums) is expected to increase by around EUR 1 billion between 2025 and 2029, followed by health expenditure and security and defence expenditure, which are expected to increase by almost EUR 480 million and 560 million respectively. To counterbalance this trend, certain areas of expenditure, such as family benefits, are being targeted. As of 2026, the maximum rate for parental benefits has been reduced from three times to two times the average wage, with no provision for progressivity.

Defence spending, with support from EU

funds, is on the rise due to heightened

security needs. To enable Estonia to increase

public spending on defence,the Council has activated the country's national escape clause (5). Defence spending increased from 2% of GDP in 2021 to 4.2% in 2025 and is expected to reach 5.0% of GDP in 2026. By composition, the proportion of defence investment in total

(4) State Budget Strategy | Ministry of Finance.

(5) The activation of the national escape clause provides Member States with budgetary flexibility to increase defence expenditure, without an immediate need to finance such an increase with spending cuts or revenue- raising measures. The flexibility gives Member States the necessary time to accommodate higher defence expenditure within national budgets.

5

defence spending will increase from approximately 32% to around 50% in 2026. In terms of EU funding, in February 2026, the Council agreed to make available to Estonia a loan amounting to a maximum of EUR 2.3 billion (5.9% of GDP) under the Security Action for Europe instrument (6) to finance defence projects in 2026-2030. In 2026, Estonia introduced two new specific objectives focused on improving security and defence in its cohesion programme. Both objectives prioritise the dual-use nature of new defence capabilities and together amount to almost EUR 386 million. Additionally, the Border Management and Visa Policy Instrument (7), with an overall budget of EUR 170 million, supports Member States bordering Russia and Belarus in upgrading surveillance systems, telecommunications and counter- drone capabilities. Complementing these efforts, the EU space and secure connectivity programmes provide secure and resilient space-based services able to operate effectively in diverse environments.

New sources of revenue are needed to

cover increased expenditure. Estonia’s revenue composition relies predominantly on labour and consumption taxes, which made up 90% of total tax revenue in 2024 (see Annex 3). In particular, the contribution of consumption taxes far exceeds the EU average. Such reliance is expected only to increase with the raising of the standard VAT rate in 2025, for a second consecutive year, to 24%. Environmental taxes (at 2.6% of GDP) already exceed the EU average as well. As it stands now, property taxation plays a very minor role in public revenues. Even though Estonia is currently undertaking new land valuations, a tax on residential buildings could improve long-term fiscal sustainability and broaden the tax mix. Furthermore, to guarantee progressivity, special provisions for low-income households could be envisaged.

Performing consistent public spending

reviews and policy evaluations could also

(6) Implementing Decision - EU - 2026/407 - EN - EUR-Lex.

(7) Communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.

improve fiscal sustainability. Expenditure reviews have been carried out since 2017 but not in a consistent and comprehensive manner (see Annex 2). Estonia recently completed a training project, under the umbrella of the Commission’s Technical Support Instrument, with the aim of better integrating regular spending reviews and policy evaluations into the medium-term budgetary framework. Estonia could benefit from using this know- how to help alleviate budgetary pressures and redirect the savings obtained to priority areas such as defence and social policies.

Addressing regional disparities to support competitiveness, growth and resilience

Persistent territorial disparities hamper

convergence and growth. Estonia’s convergence with the EU average is still driven largely by the two major cities of Tallinn and Tartu (see Annex 18). The capital region (Northern Estonia, including Tallinn) stands out as the only region with income levels above the EU average, while the other regions remain substantially below it. This reflects the strong concentration of economic activity, high-value services and skilled labour around Tallinn. The regions (excluding the capital region) face structural challenges linked to sparse population, demographic decline and connectivity constraints. These challenges interact with institutional factors, as municipalities operate with relatively limited fiscal capacity, which constrains their ability to support the local economy and provide services to the local population. As the country transitions away from fossil fuels, Ida-Viru county is also undergoing a major industrial and economic transformation as the oil shale- based industry is phased out and its mainly Russian-speaking population faces obstacles to education and labour mobility due to language barriers. While Kagu-Eesti includes the second-largest city Tartu, it also comprises large parts that are among Estonia’s most peripheral areas. Like other remote and rural parts of Estonia, they face challenges regarding (digital) connectivity and access to

6

basic public services, undermining the ability of residents to stay outside the major cities. Finally, investment and innovation activities also remain strongly concentrated in Tallinn and Tartu, while linkages between foreign investors and local SMEs are uneven across regions, not least due to impeded access to finance (see Section 2). Estonia could benefit from stronger place-based policy coordination that could support economic diversification and strengthen the resilience of regions (including those along the eastern border) that are facing structural adjustment. Strengthening inter-municipal cooperation and regional planning capacity would help to ensure the sustainable provision of public services.

Estonia, as a country on the eastern

external border of the EU, faces additional challenges hindering its

prospects for economic and social

development (8). Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine not only exacerbates some of the existing structural challenges, but also increases security pressures, disrupts cross- border economic activities and decreases investment attractiveness, thereby making it even more difficult to access finance in the country. Security concerns for people and critical infrastructure require investments in civil protection, preparedness and military mobility. This is recognised by Estonia and has led to a significant increase in defence spending. While these investments could have the double benefit of addressing security concerns and providing opportunities for the regions’ economies, they will also put further pressure on the financing of public services.

(8) The Commission’s 2026 Communication on the EU’s

eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine defines eastern border regions as NUTS 2-level areas that are geographically proximate to Russia, Belarus or Ukraine. Estonia is classified as an eastern border region.

Efforts are being made to address economic security challenges related to energy

Estonia faces several challenges related to economic security, mostly in the

energy sector. As one of the most resource- intensive economies in the EU, Estonia depends heavily on fossil fuel imports for its energy needs, while phasing out the domestic production of oil shale at the same time. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was followed by sanctions, has led to significant energy price increases and competitive pressures in energy-intensive industries. Estonia also faces significant risks to the physical security of critical grid infrastructure, having experienced hybrid attacks on undersea cables by the Russian shadow fleet in the past. Efforts to increase energy security include ceasing Russian gas imports, expanding imports from alternative suppliers, and strengthening the grid infrastructure resilience and interconnections. The recent war in the Middle East nevertheless exposes Estonia’s vulnerability to energy imports. Further investments in renewables, energy storage and energy efficiency are needed to boost energy security.

7

Broader productivity gains still need to be unlocked

Estonia faces the challenge of achieving stronger labour and resource productivity beyond maintaining its position as a digital front runner. While Estonia has a digitally- savvy public service and buoyant ICT sector, it lacks private investments in research and innovation (R&I) and new technologies are not used in the economy. Significant steps have been taken to close this gap, including the strengthening of the applied R&I framework through the establishment of a national applied research centre and the launch of the TemTA programme to support use-oriented R&D in smart specialisation areas. Estonia has

also: (i) advanced regulatory simplification efforts; (ii) expanded digitalisation support in traditional sectors such as manufacturing, construction and transport and logistics through RRF measures, cohesion policy funds and the Just Transition Fund; and (iii) updated the investment account system in 2025 to broaden investment opportunities for households. In future, sustaining competitiveness will require: (i) a coordinated approach to strengthen investment in skills across the workforce; (ii) faster diffusion of AI and advanced digital technologies; (iii) stronger incentives for private-sector innovation combined with improved access to finance for SMEs, particularly outside major urban centres; and (iv) a predictable, efficient business environment. Resource productivity in Estonia is dragged down by resource-intensive industries and considerable use of oil shale in

Box 2: Key achievements of the recovery and resilience plan

Estonia's recovery and resilience plan has a total budget of EUR 953 million (corresponding to 3.0 %

of 2023 GDP) to support reforms and investments contributing to the green and digital transitions,

strengthen economic resilience and address the long-standing structural challenges identified in the European Semester.

As of 5 May 2026, EUR 763 million (around 80% of the total allocation) have been disbursed to

Estonia following the satisfactory fulfilment of 86 milestones and targets. Implementation has

progressed steadily, with a growing number of reforms and investments already fulfilled and delivering tangible results on the ground.

Highlights and impact of the plan

• Accelerated renewable energy deployment. Streamlined permitting procedures for renewable

energy generation and storage facilities and an investment is to increasethe installed capacity for the production of sustainable biomethane by at least 4 000 000 cubic metres by 2026 (expected).

• Energy efficiency in buildings. At least 80 multi-apartment buildings and at least 900 small

residential buildings have been renovated.

• Strengthening access to healthcare. The new general hospital and health centre in Viljandi

provides access to healthcare and social services in an integrated way.Furthermore, doctors, nurses and pharmacists are incentivised to work in remote areas to improve access to healthcare across the country.

• Supporting youth employment. The 'My First Job' scheme enables young people with no or little

work experience to gain work experience and improve their skills so they can find a job.

• Developing new green technologies. The Green Fund provides EUR 90 million to be invested in

venture capital for the development of new green technologies in different sectors such as energy, agriculture and the food industry.

• Increased internet access in rural areas. This will be achieved by expanding very high-capacity

broadband networks, which offer a connection of at least 100 Mbps, to over 8 000 dwellingsand other sites (expected).

8

the energy sector. To boost resource productivity, Estonia needs to shift away from oil shale, further develop resource-efficient green technologies and further improve circularity. Without stronger diffusion of innovation and new technologies and broader mobilisation of private investment, Estonia may find it difficult to achieve broad-based productivity gains (see Section2).

There is still scope to strengthen the social protection of vulnerable groups, and access to and the affordability of healthcare and long-term care

While the overall poverty rate has

decreased, poverty risks remain high for

persons with disabilities, older people and

single-parent households. The main drivers remain: (i) the low spending on social protection; (ii) the limited effectiveness of social transfers; (iii) the adequacy of pensions (); (iv) high housing costs; and (v) uneven access to and affordability of healthcare and long-term care. High out-of-pocket payments, long waiting times and workforce shortages coupled with regional disparities are persistent challenges to accessing care services. Estonia has taken steps to address these challenges, but the lack of adequate funding remains a key obstacle to eliminating poverty and addressing the key challenges related to the affordability of and access to healthcare and long-term care. As for pensions, around a quarter of working-age Estonians take advantage of the tax break on contributions and participate in the third (supplementary) pillar pension scheme, which will help to address the issue of pension adequacy for participants in the future. However, contributions remain relatively low and are often irregular (Annex 6).

Since the mid-2010s, Estonia has experienced one of the longest and most

pronounced increases in nominal house

prices and in the price-to-income ratio in Europe. Several factors have contributed to

this, including high demand, rising construction costs, lack of construction workers and low productivity in the sector. The increase in rents was lower but still substantial. Because of the very limited social housing stock, this led to a rising cost overburden, particularly for low- income households and single parents, with single parents at risk of poverty devoting one of the highest proportions of disposable household income to rent in the EU (Annex 16). While affordability challenges are most pronounced in urban areas, housing issues in the rest of the country relate more to quality and availability (Annex 18). To address this issue, Estonia is currently designing a general housing policy for 2025–2035 to cover a series of aspects relevant to housing affordability.

Energy efficiency in the Estonian housing

stock is very low. As a result, Estonians spend a very high proportion of their disposable incomes on heating (see Section 3). This affects the whole population significantly but hits vulnerable groups particularly hard, highlighting the need to accelerate the energy efficiency renovation of old buildings and residential buildings, in particular.

EU funding instruments provide

considerable resources to Estonia. They

support investments and structural reforms to increase competitiveness, environmental sustainability, skills, social fairness and security, while helping to address challenges identified in the CSRs. Key instruments include the Recovery and Resilience Facility (see Box 2) and Cohesion policy funds (see Box 3). In addition, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides Estonia with an EU contribution of EUR 1.4 billion under the CAP strategic plan for 2023-2027(9). A further EUR 168.7 million are available under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), together with the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF). Other EU programmes also support

(9) An overview of Estonia ’s formally approved strategy to

implement the EU’s common agricultural policy nationally can be found at https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/cap-my-country/cap- strategic-plans/estonia_en

9

competitiveness in Estonia, for instance through open calls under Horizon Europe and the Connecting Europe Facility.

(10) ERDF, ESF+, CF and JTF.

(11) The mid-term review is carried out halfway through the 2021-2027 programming period. It is a formal assessment process required under Article 18 of the Common Provisions Regulation that aims to assess the implementation of programmes and, where necessary, propose adjustments to improve their performance, ensure their relevance in light of new and emerging needs and keep them aligned with other EU policies.

Box 3: Contribution of cohesion policy funds

EU cohesion policy funding is supporting Estonia’s efforts to boost competitiveness,

environmental sustainability, skills and social fairness. In the 2021-2027 programming

period cohesion policy funds (10) are providing EUR 3.4 billion (amounting to EUR 4.1 billion with national co-financing), or 9% of 2024 GDP to Estonia. This makes cohesion policy one of the main sources of public investment in the country. The value of selected projects corresponded to 110% of the total allocation as of March 2026, with additional calls for projects in the pipeline.

• Innovation, business environment and productivity. Over EUR 1.1 billion are allocated

to R&I, SMEs' competitiveness and to the regions most affected by the transition away

from carbon-intensive activities. Around 14 000 firms have already had their projects approved.

• Decarbonisation, energy affordability and sustainability. Around EUR 690 million

are dedicated to the green transition, supporting renewable energy deployment and energy efficiency improvements in buildings and district heating systems. Investments also support drinking water supply and wastewater treatment, improving environmental performance and service quality, while reducing greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption.

• Skills, quality jobs and social fairness. The total European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)

allocation amounts to EUR 491 million. The Fund's main activities cover active labour market measures (EUR 47 million), work ability reform (EUR 31.3 million), and investments in education and skills (EUR 227.5 million). In addition, digital skills, youth measures, long-term care reform and integration are also supported. Around EUR 157 million are dedicated to fostering social inclusion, with EUR 24.9 million allocated to addressing child poverty and EUR 16.2 million to supporting the most deprived.

The mid-term review (11) strengthened the contribution of cohesion policy funds to emerging strategic priorities in Estonia, reallocating around EUR 396 million (including EUR 42.7 million

from the ESF+). A significant proportion of the reallocations supports security and resilience, including military mobility and civil preparedness.

INNOVATION, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY

10

In 2025, Estonia received country-specific

recommendations (CSRs) to: (i)

raise resource productivity; (ii) invest in skills; (iii) focus investment on research

and innovation; and (iv) improve access

to finance. Several measures have been

implemented to prioritise funding for applied research, but the private sector's leverage of public investment in research and innovation (R&I) remains limited. Similarly, extensive reforms are under way to strengthen the supply of specialist skills . Several funding programmes are available for improving resource productivity and transitioning to green technologies, but the industry uptake remains limited (Annex 1).

Translating policy efforts into stronger

innovation performance and productivity

growth remains difficult, particularly for

small and medium-sized enterprises

(SMEs). Patenting activity has declined and collaboration between science and business remains uneven. While start-ups benefit from a developed venture capital market, SMEs in general continue to face constraints in accessing finance to invest, innovate and scale up, and companies still report the need for skilled workers. Low resource productivity also indicates scope to improve the efficient use of materials and accelerate the transition towards a more circular economy.

Low labour and resource productivity hamper competitiveness and convergence

Low productivity growth reflected both

weak labour productivity and low

resource productivity, as highlighted in

the 2025 CSR. Productivity growth has been subdued amid weak investment, labour

hoarding and uneven technology diffusion across firms (see Section 1), with persistent productivity gaps across firms and regions (see Annex 18). Despite strong digital public infrastructure and generally good connectivity, these strengths have yet to translate fully into business digitalisation and productivity gains. In particular, relatively high fixed broadband prices, especially for higher speeds, together with gaps in very high capacity network deployment (see Annex 5), may constrain firms’ ability to adopt advanced digital solutions and innovate. The uneven uptake of digital technologies across firms continues to weigh on productivity performance, pointing to the scope for diffusing digital tools and capabilities more effectively across the economy.

The supply of specialist skills remains a challenge, as highlighted in a 2025 CSR.

While the shortage of labour has somewhat eased, the lack of skilled workers still poses a challenge for 80% of businesses, and the shortage of highly skilled workers holds back Estonia’s innovation capacity (see Annexes 4, 5 and 11). Despite major ongoing initiatives (see Section 4), there is still a critical gap in science, technology, engineering, maths, computers and software. Current challenges are likely to intensify as the diffusion of AI requires a broader and more advanced skills base than the current education system seems to supply. Without an effective skills policy with strong outreach, Estonia risks getting stuck in a low-skills trap, limiting firms’ capacity to move into higher value-added activities and widening regional disparities.

Estonia is still among the worst

performers in the EU in terms of resource

productivity and needs green skills, as flagged in the 2025 CSR. Estonia ranks

24th among the EU-27 Member States for resource productivity (see Annexes 5 and 8). The economy is highly energy-intensive due to

11

the still quite considerable use of oil shale in the energy sector (see Section 3), and for transport and heating. Resource productivity is also dragged down by resource-intensive industries, especially as the construction, wood and metalworking industries are heavy consumers of energy and raw materials. The development of new green and energy- efficient technologies by innovative start-ups continues to be supported by national programmes, cohesion policy funds and the Recovery and Resilience Facility-financed Green Fund and measures to improve the supply of green skills. Estonia has adopted a circular economy roadmap and introduced several circular economy support measures, including a resource-efficiency measure for manufacturing that is of particular importance to improving resource productivity. However, despite the available funding, the implementation by industry is lagging. Beyond the shift away from oil shale, further development of green technologies is hindered by regulatory and demand uncertainty, with permitting procedures also having room for improvement (see Annex 5). Other significant measures could include support for energy and resource efficiency in major sectors, as outlined in the 2023 circular economy action plan, and further improvements in circularity.

Improving access to finance, leveraging public funding and improving the regulatory framework to support investment

Access to finance remains a constraint

for businesses, hampering innovative investment, as highlighted in the 2025

CSR. The availability of finance is increasingly

an investment obstacle to companies (12) and the proportion of companies constrained by a lack of finance also continues to be higher thanthe EU average, demonstrating the need for improved financial instruments and market access (see Annexes 5 and 6). While venture capital markets in the Baltics have developed

(12) EIB Investment Survey 2025: Estonia overview.

and Estonia’s per capita venture capital investments are among the highest in the OECD (13), the size of institutional investors, including pension funds, is small. Thus, overall, Estonian firms rely only marginally on funding from capital markets, with three quarters of investment funded internally (see Graph 2.1); a much larger proportion than the EU average.

Graph 2.1: Composition of non-financial

corporation (NFC) funding in % of GDP

(1) The sum of NFC liabilities reflects only the total of the NFC liabilities considered. Reference period 2024. Source: Eurostat, FISMA E2 calculations

Outside the ICT sector, the financing gaps

persist and are increasingly structural and regional. Lending to SMEs and firms in regions outside main urban centres is constrained by perceived higher risk and limited collateral (see Annexes 5 and 18). Targeted initiatives, such as the EUR 17 million regional grant scheme for SMEs in Ida-Viru attracted more applications than the budget permitted, demonstrating strong demand (14). Proposed state loan guarantees for energy projects represent another step forward. Strengthening risk-sharing instruments that blend grants with guarantees and equity-type instruments, could crowd in private investment more effectively than isolated schemes. This positive effect could be increased further by better integrating policies that target investment, SME support and innovation. Especially outside urban centres, more effective leveraging of national, private and

(13) OECD (2026). Economic survey: Estonia (forthcoming).

(14) Ida-Viru väike- ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtjate investeeringute toetus - EIS.

0

50

100

150

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EE EU

% of GDP

Loans Trade credit and advances

Bonds Listed shares

Unlisted shares Other equity

12

institutional financing to improve access to finance at regional level would also require a coherent regional development strategy that takes into account the cross-cutting regional needs (Annex 18).

A growing need to boost private investment in innovation and R&D, also in the defence sector

Underinvestment in applied research and

development impedes technological advancement, as flagged in the 2025

CSR. Estonia has significantly strengthened its applied R&I framework (see Annex 4), and public R&I expenditure (0.78% of GDP in 2024) exceeds the EU average. Yet the translation of public R&I into scalable business innovation remains uneven, and private R&D intensity (1.21%) remains below the EU average. Moreover, patent activity has declined recently, suggesting limited commercialisation and diffusion. New applied research capacities and thematic funding instruments have been rolled out, and performance-based components in research funding increasingly reward collaboration and commercialisation. Ensuring that public R&I spending crowds in private investment and leads to marketable products and productivity gains is therefore essential. This could be addressed by stronger science–industry collaboration, better alignment of funding with market demand, and improved financing conditions for innovative SMEs, especially in areas with limited access to finance.

Estonia’s defence sector is undergoing

rapid transformation, evolving from niche

services into a high-tech innovation hub. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has acted both as a significant driver of innovation and as a real-world evaluation environment for Estonia’s military tech sector. Currently, over 10 Estonian firms are supplying a diverse array of hardware and services to Ukraine, including autonomous vehicles, surveillance sensors, anti-unmanned aircraft

systems technology, mobile medical facilities and specialised training programmes (15). As of late 2025, the Estonian defence industry comprises over 180 companies (16), with the startup ecosystem growing from a dozen to at least 100 players in just three years. However, the sector faces challenges such as a small domestic market, a shortage of highly qualified specialists, and grant and other procedures that are not adapted to the rapidly evolving pace of technology and innovation. For example, developments in the battlefield might result in a need to alter product design or requirements, but grant and other procedures tailored to civilian activities could, at times, be too slow or rigid in such situations.

(15) https://defence.ee/news/the-estonian-defence-and-

aerospace-industry-association-is-growing.

(16) ibid.

DECARBONISATION, ENERGY AFFORDABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

13

In 2025, Estonia received country-specific

recommendations (CSRs) to: (i) reduce the

overall reliance on fossil fuels and the proportion of oil shale in the energy mix;

(ii) invest in renewable energy and

promote energy storage; (ii) increase

energy security; (iii) improve energy

efficiency; and (iv) increase the

availability of sustainable transport. Several measures have been implemented to increase the proportion of renewables in the energy mix and promote energy storage, but further investments are needed to improve energy security. Progress has been limited in improving energy efficiency and the emissions from transport remain high, indicating the need for further steps to implement the CSR (see Annex 1).

Promoting renewable energy and energy storage to reduce the reliance on oil shale

In 2025, Estonia received a CSR to invest

in renewable energy and promote energy

storage. Estonia’s energy mix saw a notable

shift towards renewables, between 2023 and 2024, from 35% to 40%. Domestically sourced oil shale remains an important part of the mix but it share of the energy mix has decreased importantly, from 30% in 2023 to 25% in 2024. Oil and petroleum products still represents 27% of the mix as it did in 2023, and the share of natural gas increased slightly from 6% to 7% Estonia had one of the highest proportions of renewables in net electricity generated in the EU (67.9%) in 2025,an increase of 5.3 percentage points compared to the previous year (62.7% in 2024)., with wind power being the main source of renewable electricity (see Annex 9).

The implementation of key reforms to

improve the energy infrastructure

permitting process has enabled progress to be made in the uptake of renewables.

In 2024, legislative amendments under the Estonian recovery and resilience plan streamlined planning, permitting and environmental assessments for wind projects, and led to designating priority development areas with a total capacity of 1 000 MW. In addition, Estonia has aligned its permitting procedures with the European Commission’s Recommendation on Permitting, by introducing a single contact point for developers, early public consultations and full digitalisation of permit processes. Clear deadlines for environmental assessments and overall permitting timelines have also been set to improve efficiency and transparency. Advancing the Estonia-Latvia offshore Elwind project, which has a planned capacity of 700- 1000 MW, remains a priority.

While Estonia is expanding its energy

flexibility through energy storage

solutions, demand response mechanisms, and market integration, price hikes

remain a challenge. In its 2035 energy sector development plan Estonia aims to remove market and regulatory barriers to the development of electricity storage, while preparing long-term financial guarantee mechanisms. As of 2024, 734 MW of battery storage infrastructure was in the process of being connected to the grid (see Annex 9). However, there is scope for additional measures to promote investment in renewables and support flexibility technologies such as battery storage systems. Such measures will also ensure grid stability, renewable energy integration and tackle price hikes, to which Estonia remains vulnerable. Severe price hikes take place during peak- demand hours and in winter when the high supply-demand gap is covered by ramping up

14

oil-shale fired power plants for short periods. As a result, price spreads in Estonia averaged EUR 159/MWh in 2025, significantly above the EU average of EUR 121/MWh (Annex 9).

In 2025, Estonia received a CSR to reduce

overall reliance on fossil fuels and the proportion of oil shale in the energy mix. Shifting away from fossil fuels could also improve resource productivity (see Section 2). Under the recovery and resilience plan, the government adopted the national energy development plan in December 2025, which sets a clear deadline for the phasing out of oil shale in electricity generation by 2035 (with a strategic reserve exception). However, the impact is expected to start materialising only as of 2026, with oil shale remaining a significant part of the energy mix today. Oil shale-based energy production is concentrated in the eastern border regions (Kirde-Eesti), and its phasing out adds to the region’s structural challenges. The just transition plan supports economic diversification and reskilling in these areas.

Rural and coastal areas in Estonia offer

potential for renewable energy

generation as the country transitions away from oil shale-based production.

Electricity network reliability challenges are particularly relevant in rural and coastal areas. The potential of solar and wind power, together with strengthening the grids, particularly in rural, coastal and sparsely populated areas, could therefore also support regional development, in addition to increasing energy security.

Strengthening energy security through interconnections and grid infrastructure resilience

Estonia is well interconnected but further investments are needed to improve the

resilience of the grid infrastructure. In 2025, Estonia received a CSR to increase energy security, for example by ensuring the sufficient capacity of electricity interconnections. Estonia has achieved an

electricity interconnection level of 89.04%, significantly surpassing the EU target of 15% (see Annex 9). This high level of interconnection was a key factor in the successful synchronisation of Estonia’s electricity system with the EU grid in February 2025. The investment phase of the synchronisation project is progressing well, although upgrades to Estlink 1 and Estlink 2 have faced delays. In January 2026, EU funding was secured for a project on the protection of critical synchronisation infrastructure, which will be jointly implemented by the transmission system operators of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Poland. Recent attacks on grid infrastructure and undersea cables underline the need to improve the resilience of the grid infrastructure and to ensure the efficient functioning of the energy market.

Estonia remains vulnerable to hybrid

threats, highlighting the importance of

cross-border connections. Estonia is pursuing major cross-border interconnection projects, such as EstLink 3 (Estonia-Finland) and the Estonia-Latvia 'fourth interconnection', which are both expected to be completed by 2035. Price differences between Finland and Estonia, along with incidents affecting undersea cables, highlight the importance of these initiatives. Estonia also actively participates in the Baltic energy market interconnection plan to strengthen regional energy cooperation.

Progress in energy efficiency slowing down

Estonia has made no significant progress

in energy efficiency. In 2025, Estonia received a CSR on improving energy efficiency by taking new financing and support measures to meet the targets of the long-term renovation strategy. Between 2019 and 2024, Estonia's final energy consumption in the residential sector remained largely unchanged. Although buildings are responsible for 46.1% of energy use in the country, Estonia has not set an energy savings objective in its long- term renovation strategy. Households have

15

made little progress in reducing their energy use through energy efficiency improvements such as insulation or heating upgrades. Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) investments in energy efficiency are yet to produce an impact. The cost of renovating apartment buildings and private houses is estimated at EUR 15 billion (see Annex 16).Estonia continues to rely mostly on grant- based funding schemes for energy efficiency and the use of financial instruments remains limited. Increasing the availability of financial instruments (e.g. loan guarantees for remote areas) could advance decarbonisation and make housing more affordable through lower heating costs in renovated dwellings (see Section 1). In addition to preparing a clear path toward a decarbonised and energy-efficient building stock, better national-level planning in housing renovation could also help to tackle the need for climate adaptation and increase overall crisis resilience.

Decarbonisation of transport and the finalisation of Rail Baltica

Emissions from the transport sector

remain high. Road transport remains

dominant and the use of private cars is increasing. The2025 CSR highlighted challenges concerning the availability and use of sustainable and less polluting transport.Estonia has made some progress with investments, notably through the RRF and cohesion policy funds, including rail electrification, a new tramline in Tallinn, Rail Baltica viaducts and the construction of the Ülemiste terminal. The RRF also contributed to a new strategic approach to mobility through the adoption of a new transport and mobility development plan and the implementation of a common transport system for the Tallinn capital region. However, emissions remain high, as 48% of Estonia’s effort-sharing emissions came from road transport in 2024, up 27% from 2005 levels. The proportion of electric vehicles in the total fleet remains low. Not only has Estonia seen the number of cars increase significantly over the last decade to over 635 cars per 1 000 inhabitants in 2024 (which is above the EU average), but its car

fleet is also the oldest in Europe (17). Meanwhile, charging infrastructure is expanding, with almost 2 000 publicly accessible charging points in 2025. The motor vehicle tax introduced in 2025 provides for lower tax on fully electric vehicles, however its overall impact on car fleet renewal remains still to be seen.

Further efforts are needed to implement

the objectives of the 2021-2035

transport and mobility development plan, including on increasing the use of public transport and improving road safety. There is a general lack of integrated solutions and further development is needed to improve multimodal connection and services for passengers (see Annex 18). Moreover, to improve decarbonisation and connectivity, it will be important to ensure sufficient funding to complete Rail Baltica and further encourage sustainable transport, multi-modality and the integration of public transport.

Strengthening climate resilience

Climate adaptation, resilience and

preparedness could be strengthened

through more investments and a systemic approach to climate-proofing across

sectors. Investmentneeds for climate adaptation measures in Estonia are estimated to amount to EUR 650 million per year up to 2050 (1.3% of GDP), with the most beneficial investments being in ecosystems restoration (around 48% of the total), followed by infrastructure retrofitting and reinforcement (around 40% of the total) (18). As for ecosystems restoration, scaling up the deployment of nature-based solutions would contribute both to land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) objectives and to

(17) Eurostat

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/road_eq s_carhab__custom_9275964/default/table?lang=en.

(18) European Commission, 2026, Assessment of adaptation investment needs https://op.europa.eu/en/publication- detail/-/publication/d2039eac-f742-11f0-b9bc- 01aa75ed71a1/language-en%20(Table%208).

16

increased climate resilience. Net carbon removals turned into net emissions in 2014 and have remained above zero since then. Restoring wetlands and improving forest management will help to increase climate resilience and reverse the decline in net carbon removals from the atmosphere. Further investments in healthy forests and soils as natural carbon stores will also help to contribute to a competitive bioeconomy.

Challenges in strengthening climate

adaptation remain due to: (i) the high

vulnerability of the transport

infrastructure; (ii) the low insurance

coverage of climate-related risks; and

(iii) gaps in the adaptation governance

framework. The high vulnerability of the transport infrastructure is reflected in the transport vulnerability index of the TEN-T network, where Estonia ranks among the highest in the EU. Insurance coverage of climate-related losses remains limited, with coverage of only 15% of the economic losses caused by weather- and climate-related extreme events in Estonia between 1980 and 2024 (EU-27: 19%). While Estonia has had a national climate change adaptation strategy and action plan in place since 2017 and is seeking to further strengthen its governance framework, progress has been constrained by delays in adopting key legislation. In particular, the adoption of the Climate-Resilient Economy Act, which is expected to provide the legal basis for further sectoral integration, has been delayed. At the same time, a national climate change adaptation roadmap is under development. The systematic application of climate-proofing across sectors and key infrastructure would further strengthen preparedness and resilience.

SKILLS, QUALITY JOBS AND SOCIAL FAIRNESS

17

In 2025, Estonia received country-specific

recommendations (CSRs) to: (i) improve

the skills supply; (ii) reduce early school

leaving; (iii) better attract and retain

talent; and (iv) strengthen social protection, also through improving the

benefit system and ensuring sustainable

financing for healthcare and long-term care. Several measures have been implemented to address these challenges, but there is still a high rate of early school leaving, and further efforts are needed to improve the skills-related policy outreach. There is scope to further strengthen social protection for vulnerable groups and improve access to and the affordability of healthcare and long-term care.

Despite Estonia's progress with reforming its education and training and social

protection systems, the country still

faces major challenges. Extending skills

policies and training opportunities to those who do not yet fully benefit from them remains a challenge. Evaluating recent education reforms and measures will be important to assess their effectiveness to inform future policy adjustments. Regional differences in education and training opportunities and attainment levels remain significant and young people face barriers to getting into work or training. Vulnerable groups such as older people, persons with disabilities and single-parent households are still at a relatively high risk of poverty in Estonia. In particular, challenges remain regarding the adequacy and coverage of social protection and the affordability of and access to healthcare and long-term care, which could become more acute if no effective policy action is taken.

Expanding the supply of skills is essential to meet future labour market needs

Improving the labour market relevance of

education is essential for productivity growth, as highlighted in the 2025 CSR.

As discussed in Section 2, demand for specialist skills remains high, especially in some sectors such as ICT, healthcare and education, while emerging green and technical fields face shortages of engineers and technical specialists. Although ICT enrolment at tertiary level has grown, enrolment in engineering remains low and drop-out rates in the first year of undergraduate studies and at PhD level are high. To improve the supply of specialists in science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM), Estonia is preparing a new STEAM (19) strategy covering all education levels (see Annex 13). The green skills programme strengthens the supply of green skills (20). The increasing adoption of AI in the economy is reflected in education policy.

The ongoing vocational education and

training (VET) reform is set to improve

the skills supply. In 2025, Estonia introduced

applied VET programmes in high-demand fields like ICT, engineering, construction and healthcare to improve the employment prospects of VET graduates. To be successful, the reform would require strong employer engagement, and VET schools to be adequately prepared and funded to accept students with learning difficulties. The professional qualification reform planned to take effect in 2026 could also improve responsiveness to labour market needs by

(19) Science, technology, engineering, arts and maths.

(20) Roheoskused - uue aja oskused | Haridus- ja Noorteamet.

18

better integrating the qualifications and skills systems with the OSKA forecasting framework.

To address skills shortages, Estonia has

taken measures to attract highly qualified professionals from abroad, in

line with the 2025 CSR. In particular, in 2025, it introduced the EU Blue Card scheme and targeted visa pathways, such as the Startup Visa and Digital Nomad Visa. Further measures to simplify the recruitment and retention of foreign talent are planned through amendments to the Aliens Act and the integration of the 'Work in Estonia' and 'Study in Estonia' initiatives under the upcoming 2026–2029 talent strategy.

Early school leaving continues to

constrain educational attainment, as

flagged in the 2025 CSR. One in ten young

people lacks an upper-secondary qualification, limiting the pool of skilled workers. Estonia has taken significant steps to address this by extending compulsory education to age 18 from 2025 and launching a comprehensive reform of vocational education. At the same time, schools face increasingly diverse student needs, including a rising number of pupils requiring additional learning support, while teacher training and support services have struggled to keep pace (see Annex 13). Strengthening specialised training for teachers and expanding access to specialised support services would help improve pupils’ outcomes and increase upper-secondary completion rates.

Growing difficulties in maintaining the

teaching workforce pose a risk to the

quality of education. The country’s teaching

workforce is one of the oldest in the EU. Around half of newly trained teachers do not remain in the profession for more than five years. This results in an increasing proportion of teachers who are not fully qualified (26% in 2025) being hired to compensate for the shortages, undermining the effectiveness of education spending. Teacher shortages are particularly severe in STEM subjects, in Estonian as a second language and in rural schools (see Annex 13). Initiatives like the new teacher career model, Teachers’ Academy micro-credentials and creating more places in

initial teacher education are promising measures. However, without further policy efforts and suitable funding, shortages risk increasing further. Implementing incentives targeting STEM teachers, as well as extending the teacher action plan beyond 2026 and focusing on retention would provide additional support.

Youth unemployment and the rising

proportion of young people neither in

employment, nor in education or training highlight persistent challenges faced by

young people leaving school and entering

the labour market. It is increasingly difficult for young people entering the labour market to find a job, with youth unemployment above the EU average of 15%. At the same time, the proportion of young people neither in employment, nor in education or training

rose to 11.2% in 2025, matching the EU average and signalling growing risks of labour market detachment among young people. Young people with limited qualifications or work experience are particularly exposed to unemployment or precarious jobs (see Annex 11). Limited job opportunities, particularly in rural areas, and gaps in the effectiveness and coverage of support to help young people transition from school to work also contribute to these trends. Estonia has introduced several reforms to address these issues, including initiatives funded by the Recovery and Resilience Facility. Strengthening integrated education-to-work pathways, scaling up preventive and outreach measures, and further developing initiatives that help to get young people into work or training at an early stage could help improve their employment prospects.

Targeted adult learning could help

address skills disparities across age

groups, regions and socio-economic

backgrounds. While overall adult skills in Estonia remain above the OECD average, proficiency declines markedly with age, with the strongest results among younger adults and the weakest among those approaching retirement age. Disparities in adults' skills persist by region (e.g. Ida-Virumaa scores significantly lower in literacy and numeracy) and by socio-economic background (see Annex

19

13). Expanding targeted upskilling and reskilling programmes for low-skilled and older adults, particularly in regions that are lagging behind, could narrow these gaps. The basic level of digital skills slightly exceeds the EU average, but a high proportion of employees still report inadequate computer and software skills (Estonia 12% vs OECD 4%), while demand for AI and ICT skills is expected to grow further. Providing stronger digital and AI skills and improving rural access to online learning infrastructure could also improve adults’ skill levels. Future adult education and retraining offers should better target the areas identified by OSKA studies as most needed.

Increasing social dialogue could improve

labour market outcomes. Collective bargaining coverage and trade union density remain among the lowest in the EU (see Annex 11). Not only are the in-work poverty rate and the proportion of low-wage earners among the highest in the EU, but the gender pay gap is also high. The involvement of social partners in labour market reforms, wage setting and policymaking remains limited, partly due to weak institutional capacity. Resuming the tripartite dialogue, implementing the 2025 action plan on strengthening collective bargaining and increasing social partner involvement could help improve labour market outcomes.

Strengthening social protection remains a challenge

Low social expenditure and gaps in social

protection coverage put vulnerable

groups at high risk of poverty. In 2025, Estonia received a CSR to reduce poverty risks by strengthening social protection for older people, single-person households, persons with disabilities and the unemployed. Estonia has taken steps to address these challenges. Planned reforms to the unemployment insurance system aim to improve coverage, also for workers with limited employment histories and persons with disabilities. Preliminary analysis suggests that most self- employed workers are covered through a

secondary job, although some gaps in effective coverage still exist. The minimum income support remains relatively low compared with commonly used adequacy benchmarks, while overall social benefit expenditure remains below the EU average, limiting the poverty-reducing impact of social transfers (see Annex 12). In-work poverty also remains relatively high despite some gradual improvement. Persons with disabilities, including those in employment, are at a much higher risk of poverty than the general population, partly reflecting relatively low disability benefits and the limited effectiveness of social transfers. Single-parent households are also particularly exposed to poverty and housing cost pressures. Housing affordability further exacerbates poverty risks, especially among tenants, while the supply of social housing remains very limited, pointing to structural gaps (see Annex 16). Reforms to the minimum income system aim to improve the adequacy and efficiency of subsistence benefits, but as these reforms remain at an early stage, their impact has yet to be seen. Strengthening benefit adequacy and broadening access to social protection could improve the system’s capacity to reduce poverty risks among vulnerable groups.

Low pension adequacy contributes to high

risks of poverty among older people in

the context of population ageing. Despite recent reforms, pension adequacy in Estonia remains a challenge, with poverty risks among older people remaining among the highest in the EU, as also highlighted in the 2025 CSR. Although the aggregate replacement ratio has improved in recent years, it remains below the EU average, reflecting relatively low pension levels (see Annex 12). Risks are particularly high for women and older people living alone, with the latter recording the highest risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU. This is linked to longer life expectancy, household composition patterns and limited survivor pension coverage. These factors result in many older women living alone with relatively low incomes. Estonia has taken measures to support pension adequacy, notably through regular pension indexation, linking retirement age to life expectancy, and initiatives to strengthen pension literacy and increased

20

flexibility in contribution to funded pension schemes (second pillar). However, complementary pension savings remain largely voluntary. Strengthening complementary pension savings and improving participation in the second and third pension pillars could therefore help support future pension adequacy while limiting long-term pressures on the public pension system.

Regional socio-economic disparities are compounded by unequal access to social services

Structural factors, such as reliance on

the oil shale industry in the Ida-Viru

region, limited economic diversification

and lower disposable incomes continue to

weigh on remote regions’ socio-economic

performance (see Annex 11). Labour market outcomes differ markedly across regions, with significantly higher unemployment in rural areas. In North -East Estonia, the unemployment rate reached 12.7% in 2025, compared with 6.2%–7.4% in other regions, contributing to higher poverty risks.

Access to social services also varies

across municipalities. Smaller and rural

municipalities often face administrative and financial capacity constraints, affecting service availability and quality. Differences in local provision and pricing contribute to uneven access, while the out-of-packet payment by users do not systematically take individual economic circumstances into account. The Ida- Viru region benefits from EU support, including through the Just Transition Fund, but further efforts are needed to strengthen labour market opportunities, improve access to services and support economic diversification.

There is scope to improve access to and the affordability of healthcare and long-term care

Estonia has made some progress in implementing the 2025 CSR to improve

access to and the affordability of

healthcare and long-term care. Estonia has undertaken reforms and investments with the support of the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the European Social Fund Plus to: (i) address healthcare workforce shortages; (ii) strengthen primary care and the hospital network; and (iii) promote the integration of healthcare and social services (Annexes 12 and 15). However, Estonia still faces challenges regarding access to and the affordability of healthcare and long-term care, particularly in regions outside the main urban centres and among vulnerable groups. The government’s proposal to integrate social and healthcare services and the undertaking of a broader review of healthcare financing to improve long-term sustainability are steps in the right direction.

Access to healthcare and long-term care remains constrained by

limited funding. Public expenditure on healthcare and long-term care is well below the EU average, leading to significant unmet needs and high out-of-pocket payments that disproportionately affect lower-income groups. Significant inequalities in life expectancy and healthy life years that are closely linked to education, income and place of residence persist in Estonia (see Annex 12). The current social health insurance model is not financially sustainable in the long term, as expenditure is projected to grow faster than revenues due to the ageing population, rising demand and labour market changes.

Access to care is further hindered by persistent workforce shortages,

particularly in rural

areas, exacerbated by an ageing workforce. Strengthening financial and non-

financial incentives for healthcare professionals to work in regions outside main urban areas, including improved

21

reimbursement, housing support and professional development opportunities, could help address shortages. While the care reform implemented since 2023 has reduced out-of- pocket costs for residential care, it has also increased demand for nursing home places and exacerbated staff shortages, while not sufficiently strengthening home-based care (see Annexes 12 and 15). It remains crucial to continue implementing reforms to: (i) better integrate healthcare and social services; (ii) prioritise prevention; (iii) ensure sustainable funding; (iv) address workforce shortages; and (v) reduce regional disparities in access to and the affordability of care.

KEY FINDINGS

22

In the areas covered by existing country-

specific recommendations, Estonia would

benefit from:

• increasing tax revenue from sources

that are less detrimental to growth,

increasing spending efficiency, and directing spending to priority areas, such as healthcare, social policies and defence, while guaranteeing fiscal sustainability;

• improving access to financing, particularly for small businesses and firms outside main urban areas, by expanding targeted grants and guarantees, and moving towards a more integrated innovation and business support framework;

• boosting innovation and R&D

investment by addressing obstacles to the commercialisation of research and by better leveraging public investment in R&I;

• boosting the competitiveness and resilience of Estonia’s regions, in

particular, those at the eastern border, also by supporting the transition to new resource-efficient technologies;

• reducing overall reliance on fossil

fuels and the proportion of oil shale in the energy mix by promoting renewable energy and energy storage;

• accelerating the energy-efficiency

renovation and improving the crisis resilience of old buildings and, in particular, residential buildings, by introducing new financing and support measures, including financial instruments;

• increasing energy and economic

security, also byinvesting in the resilience of the grid infrastructure and cross-border interconnections;

• further decarbonising transport and

improving connectivity by completing Rail Baltica, further encouraging sustainable transport, multi-modality and integrating public transport;

• promoting human capital

development by strengthening STEM education across all levels, expanding upskilling and reskillingforadult learners, and improving artificial intelligence skills across the workforce;

• reducing early school leaving byaddressing teacher shortages and providing support to students with special needs;

• strengthening social protection to

reduce poverty among older people,

persons with disabilities and single-parent households, including by increasing the adequacy and efficiency of the benefit system, targeting vulnerable groups, and increasing the affordability of housing and the availability of social housing;

• improving access to and the

affordability of healthcare and long-

term care to reduce unmet needs and

out-of-pocket payments by reforming the funding of healthcare and long-term care, tackling workforce shortages to address geographical disparities and investing, among other things, in integrated care models and prevention.

In other areas, Estonia would benefit from:

• reducing youth unemployment by

strengthening active labour market policy outreach to young people not in employment, education or training and improving the transition from education to work, while improving social dialogue.

ANNEXES

LIST OF ANNEXES

25

A1. CSR implementation 27

Fiscal 31

A2. Fiscal developments and debt sustainability 31

A3. Taxation 35

Productivity 39

A4. Innovation to business 39

A6. Savings, investment and access to finance 53

A7. Effective institutional framework 59

Sustainability 64

A8. Industry decarbonisation, circularity and climate mitigation 64

A9. Affordable energy transition 69

A10. Climate adaptation, preparedness and environment 75

Fairness 81

A11. Labour market 81

A12. Social policies 85

A13. Education and skills 90

A14. Social scoreboard 95

A15. Health and health systems 96

A16. Housing 100

Horizontal 105

A17. Sustainable development goals 105

A18. Competitive regions 107

A19. Transport 114

LIST OF TABLES

A1.1. CSR implementation and Commission assessment 27 A2.1. Supplementary pension schemes - scope for expansion 33 A2.2. Projected change in ageing-related expenditure in 2025-2040 and 2025-2070 33 A2.3. Fiscal governance database indicators and public accounting maturity 34 A3.1. Taxation Indicators 36 A4.1. Key Innovation Indicators 44 A5.1. Single Market and Industry 52

26

A6.1. Savings and Investments Union summary diagnostic 53 A6.2. Financial sector indicators 58 A7.1. Estonia. Selected indicators on better regulation practices for primary legislation 60 A7.2. Digital Decade key performance indicators: availability of digital public services 61 A8.1. Key clean industry and climate mitigation indicators: Estonia 68 A10.1. Key Adaptation Indicators 80 A14.1. Social Scoreboard for Estonia 95 A15.1. Key health indicators 97 A18.1. Main development trends, challenges and the concentration of resources 108 A18.2. Key regional indicators (at NUTS 3 level) in Estonia 110 A18.3. Main socio-demographic indicators by degree of urbanisation in Estonia, 2024 112

LIST OF GRAPHS

A2.1. Public investment composition 31 A2.2. Primary spending evolution and composition 32 A3.1. Tax revenue by economic function in 2024, Estonia (outer ring) and EU-27 (inner ring) 35 A3.2. Tax wedge for single and second earners as a % of total labour costs, 2025 37 A4.1. R&D intensity (GERD, GOVERD, BERD as % of GDP) 39 A6.1. Composition of non-financial corporations' funding 54 A6.2. Capital markets and financial intermediaries 55 A6.3. Composition of households' financial assets 55 A7.1. Trust in the justice system, regional / local authorities and in government 59 A7.2. Most time-consuming aspects of service delivery 60 A8.1. Greenhouse gas emissions in the effort sharing sectors, 2005, 2023, and 2024 65 A9.1. Electricity and gas prices for household and non-household consumers, first half of 2025 70 A9.2. Low-carbon electricity generation vs. electricity wholesale prices, 2025 71 A9.3. Estonia’s installed renewable capacity vs electricity generation mix 72 A11.1. Key labour market indicators 81 A11.2. Labour market outcomes of young people (15-24) 82 A12.1. At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate by age group 85 A13.1. Development of STEM enrolments in Estonia, 2015-2023 94 A15.1. Treatable mortality 96 A15.2. Out-of-pocket payments: share in healthcare spending and categories, 2023 98 A16.1. Housing affordability selected indicators 101 A16.2. House prices, rents and price-to-income evolution in EE and EU27 since 2005 101 A16.3. House supply indicators in EE since 2005 102 A17.1. Progress towards the SDGs in Estonia 105 A18.1. Labour productivity growth (2014 - 2024) and labour productivity (2024) per hour worked; NUTS 3 level 107 A19.1. Estonia's road fatalities per million, 2024 116

LIST OF MAPS

A18.1. GDP per head compared with the EU average (NUTS2). 107 A18.2. Population growth, 2015-2024 (average annual change) 109 A19.1. TEN-T Cross-Border & National Priority Sections in Estonia. 115 A19.2. Estonia's road safety map 116

ANNEX 1: CSR IMPLEMENTATION

27

Table A1.1: CSR implementation and Commission assessment

(Continued on the next page)

Estonia faces challenges in a wide range of policy areas, as identified in the country-specific recommendations (CSRs). Estonia was recommended, among other things, to boost defence spending, expand the tax base, prioritise research funding and access to finance for SMEs, to encourage investment into venture capital, improve energy efficiency, invest in renewables and energy storage, strengthen energy security and promote bio-based innovation, expand sustainable transport, enhance productivity and skills including green transition skills, and to reduce poverty by strengthening social protection whilst ensuring fiscal sustainability.

The Commission has assessed the degree of implementation of the 2025 CSRs considering the policy action taken by Estonia to date*. To do so, the Commission has taken into account the information provided by Estonia in its Annual Progress Report as well as other information sources. This annex provides summary information on the policy actions taken or planned by Estonia for each CSR. More detailed information on these actions is included in the relevant chapters and other annexes of the report.

*CSR 2 is not assessed in CeSaR. RRP implementation is monitored through the assessment of RRP payment requests and analysis of the bi-annual reporting on the achievement of the milestones and targets, to be reflected in the country reports. Progress with the cohesion policy is monitored in the context of the Cohesion Policy of the European Union.

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or

implemented By 30 April 2026

Preparatory steps/ credibly

announced measures By 30 April 2026

Assessm. of

progress

1.1 Reinforce overall defence and security spending and readiness while ensuring debt sustainability in line with the European Council conclusions of 6 March 2025.

Total general government defence expenditure in 2026 is projected at 5.0% of GDP, corresponding to an increase of 0.9 ppt. compared to 2024.

Total general government defence expenditure in 2027 is projected at 5.4% of GDP, corresponding to an increase of 1.2 ppt. compared to 2024.

Substantial progress

1.2. In line with the requirements of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact, limit the growth in net expenditure in 2025 and 2026 to a rate consistent with putting the general government debt on a plausibly downward trajectory over the medium term and maintaining the general government deficit below the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value, while making use of the allowance under the national escape clause for higher defence expenditure.

Cumulated deviation in 2025 amounted to -1.4% of GDP. Cumulated deviation in 2026 projected at 1.5% of GDP but it is fully explained by the NEC flexibility (1.5pps of GDP).

Full implementation

1.3. Broaden the tax base by tapping into taxes that are less detrimental to growth.

From 2024 to 2027, the excise duties on alcohol, tobacco and energy goods will have additional yearly increases. In January 2025 personal and corporate income tax increases (both from 20% to 22%) entered into force and certain personal income tax benefits (housing loan interest, spouse's additional basic allowance, additional basic allowance for children) were abolished. Also, the advance income tax rate for credit institutions was increased from 14% to 18%. In 2026, expected PIT and CIT rate increases, both to 24%, were abrogated. Still, the advanced income tax rate for credit institutions was raised from 14% to 18%. In January 2025 a new motor vehicle tax was introduced. In July 2025 the VAT rate was increased from 22% to 24% and the reduced VAT rates of accommodation services (9% to 13%) and press publications (5% to 9%) were increased. In 2025 an upward correction of the land tax is taking place.

Some progress

28

Table (continued)

(Continued on the next page)

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or

implemented By 30 April 2026

Preparatory steps/ credibly

announced measures By 30 April 2026

Assessm. of

progress

1.4. Ensure sustainable financing for spending needs including healthcare and long-term care to improve accessibility and affordability.

The RRP reform regarding the Hospital Network Development

Plan was adopted in 2025 and Strategic Framework on health workforce shortages is being implemented. Law passed in 2025 to boost the Health Insurance Fund reimbursements for essential primary care services and dental treatments and adding protections, higher benefits for vulnerable adults.

Estonia took preparatory steps to present a legislative proposal to improve the integration of health

and social services in mid-2026 aimed at more efficient use of resources and better access to care. Estonia is also planning to review health care financing to ensure its sustainability.

Some Progress

3.1. Focus investment on research and innovation by prioritising funding for applied research.

Support to business R&I has increased with direct public support around 0.15% of GDP, above the EU average. New instruments include the national applied research centre (established 2023; operational in 2025), the EUR 102 million TemTA

programme (2024–2029) supporting applied research with commercialisation requirements, performance-based funding incentives for science–business collaboration, and Structural Funds- backed measures to strengthen IP management and technology transfer.

Estonia is piloting tax-based and

voucher support for innovation. Since 2024, there is a grant covering up to 50% of the income tax paid on R&D employees’ salaries, while innovation vouchers provide small grants for SMEs to purchase services supporting innovative activities.

Some Progress

3.2. Improve access to finance, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises and companies in remote regions, to facilitate innovative investment, for example investment in the green and digital transitions, including by promoting institutional investor participation in the venture capital and equity market.

The three Baltic states have integrated their capital market infrastructure. The investment

account regime (expanded in 2025) has promoted retail participation in capital markets. Support from national and supranational institutions have fostered private equity and venture capital. Region-

specific call (EUR 13 million) in

2025. Targeted guarantee scheme

for energy sector (EUR 100 million) was launched.

In 2025, Enterprise Estonia signed a landmark agreement with the EIF (EUR 109 million) in financing to

support Estonian businesses with more favourable loans and guarantees.

Some Progress

4.1. Improve energy efficiency by taking new financing and support measures to meet the targets of the long-term renovation strategy.

RRF and Cohesion Policy support the energy efficiency investments, especially the renovation of apartment buildings and dwellings, through grants, loans, guarantees and other support instruments.

RRF investments in energy

efficient renovation account for EUR 76 million and should be completed by mid-2026.

Limited Progress

4.2. Reduce overall reliance on fossil fuels and the share of oil shale in the energy mix by investing in renewable energy and by promoting energy storage. Increase energy security, for example by ensuring the sufficient capacity of electricity interconnection.

The Government has adopted the National Energy Development

Plan 2035 in December 2025 (a measure in RRP). Estonia has successfully connected to the EU electricity system in February 2025, and its level of electricity interconnections is four times higher than the EU target of 15% by 2030.

Phase-out of direct burning of oil shale for electricity production by 2035 with an exception for out-of- market oil shale for potential strategic reserve needs in case of deviation from the reliability standard. Phase-out of the use of shale oil in domestic heat production by 2040.

Some Progress

4.3. Raise resource productivity through bio-based innovation

Estonia has a circular bioeconomy

roadmap which is being implemented and has national, cohesion policy and RRF funding allocated for bioeconomy topics and green technologies. Estonia also introduced several circular economy

Some Progress

29

Table (continued)

(Continued on the next page)

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or

implemented By 30 April 2026

Preparatory steps/ credibly

announced measures By 30 April 2026

Assessm. of

progress

support measures where calls were opened in late 2024 and 2025, including a resource efficiency measure for manufacturing industry which has particular importance to improve resource productivity, and which will be continued.

4.4. Take further action to increase the availability and use of sustainable and less polluting transport, including by electrification of the rail network, renewal of the stock of road vehicles, and integration of public transport systems.

RRF contributed to decarbonisation and sustainability of the Estonian transport sector. A new strategic approach to mobility was facilitated through adoption new Transport and

Mobility Development Plan and implementing a common transport system for the Tallinn capital region. RRF also contributed to connecting Rail Baltic to sea connections with the Nordic countries via the construction of the Tallinn Old Port tram line. In addition, RRF and cohesion policy invested in Rail Baltica: Ülemiste Terminal and viaducts. Estonia adopted a Motor Vehicle Tax in 2025 with lower taxation on electric and other less polluting vehicles.

Continued rail electrification (Tallinn-Tartu in 2026, Tallinn-Narva in 2027) and infrastructural improvements from cohesion policy funds and RRF. Cohesion funds are planned to support more sustainable and connected mobility in Estonia through tram and multimodal transport investments, rail electrification and upgrades, better integrated public transport, and safer walking and cycling links to services, Cohesion policy funds, through to mid-term review allocation, are planned to support dual-use transport infrastructure for military mobility and civil preparedness, including upgrades to the Tallinn–Pärnu–Ikla (Via Baltica) and Tallinn–Tartu TEN-T corridors and further investment in Rail Baltica.

Some Progress

5.1.Improve labour productivity and skills supply through action on reskilling and upskilling.

Estonia has significantly strengthened its skills policy

framework through expanded upskilling and reskilling, reinforced skills forecasting and governance, major VET reform, micro-credentials, and digital skills infrastructure. Recent measures to address skills shortages include initiatives in career services, special measures for those working in the oil shale sectors, and programs to develop skills through obtaining qualifications or employer training grants. The activation criteria for the unemployed was updated and ALMP measures revised in 2025-2026, including to improve career services.

All major reforms are ongoing Some Progress

5.2. Step up policy measures aimed at the provision and acquisition of skills and competences needed for the green transition.

RRP measures on supporting the green skills are still under way and planned to be completed by August 2026. The Green Technologies

Development Programme was set- up and is being implemented.

Some Progress

5.3. Improve labour productivity and skills supply} by reducing early school leaving, by improving the job market relevance of the education and training system, in particular by meeting the growing demand for STEM specialists, and by better attracting and retaining talent.

Estonia amended the Aliens Act in

2025, tightening employer oversight and adjusting conditions for labour migration. In education, compulsory

schooling was extended in 2024 to age 18, with 2025 measures introducing a preparatory year to prevent early school leaving. Comprehensive VET reforms are underway to improve labour market relevance, a shift to competence- based qualifications by 2026, and consolidation of the VET network into regional centres.

The new Aliens Act is expected to enter into force as of 2027. Policy discussions focus on possible

exemptions from the immigration quota for skilled workers and sectors facing labour shortages

Some Progress

30

Table (continued)

Source: Estonia’s reporting and Commission assessment

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or

implemented By 30 April 2026

Preparatory steps/ credibly

announced measures By 30 April 2026

Assessm. of

progress

5.4. Reduce the risk of poverty by strengthening social protection for older people, single-person households and people with disabilities by increasing the adequacy and efficiency of the benefit system, and for the unemployed, inter alia by extending the coverage of unemployment benefits, in particular to those in non- standard forms of work, while maintaining fiscal sustainability.

In 2025, contributions to the second pension pillar were increased from the usual 2% to 4% or 6% of gross salary. Reform was adopted so that the retirement age will be linked to life expectancy (for 2027 this has been set at 65 years and one month). Due to indexation in 2025, pensions have been increased. The tax-free income threshold for old-age pensioners was increased. From June 2025, disability benefits

increased.

Reform of unemployment allowance and unemployment insurance and extension of unemployment insurance coverage to new forms of work was adopted in 2025 and entered into force on 1 January 2026.

Estonia plans reforms in 2026: including replacing its unemployment insurance system with a single scheme and improving social protection, especially for workers with disabilities; increasing flexibility in second-pillar contributions, and shorter waiting periods to rejoin the mandatory second pillar is being under preparation to enhance pension adequacy and participation; reviewing its minimum income methodology,

Some Progress

FISCAL

ANNEX 2: FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY

31

This annex discusses selected topics in public finance and developments in fiscal-structural country-specific recommendations (CSRs) addressed to Estonia in July 2025. These CSRs include a call to strengthen defence spending and readiness while implementing a fiscal strategy in line with the Council Recommendation of 21 January 2025. Estonia also received a recommendation in 2025 to improve the accessibility and affordability of healthcare and long-term care while safeguarding against inflationary pressures.

On 21 January 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the Recommendation endorsing Estonia’s medium-term fiscal-structural plan (21). The plan includes a fiscal adjustment over four years. On 8 July 2025, the Council also activated the national scape clause for Estonia in order to facilitate the transition to higher levels of defence spending (22)(23).

Developments in the government balance, debt and public expenditure (24)

At the end of 2025, Estonia’s government

deficit was equivalent to 2.0% of GDP and the government debt-to-GDP ratio stood

at 24.1%. Based on theCommission Spring 2026 Forecast, Estonia’s government deficit is projected to widen to 4.5% of GDP in 2026 and to 4.8% of GDP in 2027, driven by developments on both the revenue and expenditure sides. On the revenue side, the main reason behind the forecast for lower revenue is Estonia’s planned transition to a universal tax system and the increase in the tax-

(21) OJ C, C/2025/655, ELI: EUR-Lex - 32025H00655 – EN –

EUR-Lex.

(22) OJ C, C/2025/3964, ELI: EUR-Lex - 32025H03964 – EN – EUR-Lex.

(23) Compliance by Estonia with the maximum growth rates of net expenditure recommended by the Council is assessed in [COM(2026)200].

(24) Figures underpinning fiscal surveillance (net expenditure growth) are provided in the Fiscal Statistical Tables SWD(2026)200 providing background data relevant for the assessment of the budgetary policies of the Member States.

free income threshold to EUR 700 per month. This measure raises concerns about significant revenue losses even though it improves work incentives by removing the previous hump that existed in effective marginal tax rates. Given rising public spending needs, Estonia should consider a more revenue-neutral design of changes to its tax system. On the expenditure side, defence spending, rising from 3.8% of GDP in 2025 to 5.1% in 2026, will also contribute to a higher deficit.

Rising defence expenditure and EU funds are

contributing to growth in public

investment over the medium term. Following

the Commission 2026 Spring Forecast, public investment is expected to reach 7.9% of GDP in 2026, up from 5.8% in 2021. It is set to decrease somewhat in 2027 due to a relatively smaller contribution by defence investment (See Graph A2.1).

Graph A2.1: Public investment composition

Source: AMECO

Spending on defence is forecast to increase

in the coming years, but policy areas such as

healthcare and social protection remain

underfinanced. Estonia received a CSR in 2025 to ensure the sustainable financing of spending needs, including defence, healthcare and long- term care.The current budget and the medium- term budgetary plan commit Estonia to higher spending on defence, but they fall short of providing sufficient funding to address structural

32

spending needs in healthcare and social protection. Total government expenditure on defence was equivalent to 3.7% GDP in 2024 and is forecast by the Commission to be equivalent to 4.2% GDP in 2025 and 5% in 2026. In 2023, government spending on healthcare and social protection stood at only 6.4% and 13.5% of GDP, respectively – 0.6 pps and 5.7 pps below the EU average.

Graph A2.2: Primary spending evolution and

composition

Notes: Based on economic literature, the categories considered to have a greater growth impact include education, R&D, health, transport and communication (See Barbiero and Cournede (2013), Gemmel et al. (2016), Lupu et al. (2018), Cepparulo and Mourre (2020) and OECD (2025)). Source: Eurostat

The type of expenditure that has a greater

impact on GDP had remained broadly stable

over three decades but has slightly increased

since 2019. This may be related to the impact of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which possibly facilitated a more quality-based fiscal strategy. Between 2022 and 2026, Estonia’s recovery and resilience plan is forecast to have allocated an average of 0.15% of GDP annually to public investment. Zooming in on the composition of spending, in 2024 social protection accounts for the largest share of total expenditure (around 30%), followed by health, education, economic affairs(25) and general public services (each of

(25) This refers to the set of government activities, policies, and

expenditures aimed at regulating, supporting, and developing

which is above – or at – 10% of total spending). Since 2019, public expenditure on interest on debt and defence has increased sharply, with the increase in defence spending reflecting recent security developments (See Graph A2.2). Spending on health and R&D has risen more modestly in that time. By contrast, spending on transport and education expenditure has declined. This trend deserves attention, as these categories (transport and education) are generally considered growth- friendly spending categories.

Estonia has relatively low tax revenues as a

share of GDP, mostly relying on labour and consumption taxes, while recurrent property

taxes are underused. In 2024 Estonia’s total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP (including compulsory social contributions) amounted to 34.3% compared with an EU average of 39.5%.Total tax revenues are projected to increase to 36.2% of GDP in 2025 and fall back to 34.6% of GDP in 2026 according to the Autumn 2025 Forecast (26). The tax mix in Estonia relies heavily on labour and consumption taxation. Meanwhile, recurrent property taxation, considered less detrimental to growth, is underused (see Annex 3).

The costs of ageing

Total ageing-related spending in Estonia is

projected to remain broadly stable. Total ageing-related spending, in both the medium and long term, is set to hold steady at a level well below the EU average (see Table A2.2). Limited increases in spending on healthcare and long-term care are expected to be more than offset by a fall in spending on pensions and education.

Spending on public pensions as a share of

GDP is projected to fall, especially in the

longer term. Between now and 2070, public

economic activity across major sectors, including general economic and labour policies, agriculture and natural resources, energy, industry, construction, and other economic functions not elsewhere classified. Although transport and communication, as well as research and development activities, are normally considered part of this function, they are treated separately in the graph presented.

(26) Data retrieved from the AMECO database (https://economy- finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-research-and- databases/economic-databases/ameco-database_en)

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Primary expenditure Spending with higher impact on GDP (rhs)

-1.50 -1.00 -0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50

Social protection

Education

O ther econom

ic

C ulture

Transport

Public order

G eneral

services

Environm ent

H ousing

C om

m unication

R&D

H ealth

Interest spending

D efence

33

pension outlays are set to fall by about 1 pp. of GDP, to around 7% of GDP, which would be substantially lower than the projected EU average of around 12%.

Supplementary pension schemes can make

the pension system more resilient by diversifying retirement income sources. In Estonia, the uptake of these supplementary schemes remains modest. At the end of 2024, private pension assets amounted to around 20% of GDP while participation covered around 67% of the working-age population(27). This coincides with decreasing medium-term public pension spending pressures and a projected decrease in the replacement rate by 3.4 pps between 2025 and 2040 (Tables A2.2 and A2.3) (28).

Estonia’s expenditure on public healthcare

and long-term care remains below the EU

average and is set to remain mostly stable

over the forecast horizon. Public healthcare expenditure is projected to be 5.1% of GDP in 2025 (below the EU average of 6.6%) and is expected to increase by 0.3 pps between 2025 and 2040 and by a further 0.3 pps between 2040 and 2070. Public expenditure on long-term care is projected to be 0.5% of GDP in 2025 (below the EU average of 1.7%) and is expected to increase by 0.2 pps of GDP between 2025 and 2040 and by a further 0.4 pps of GDP between 2025 and 2070.

(27)Source: OECD Pension Market in Focus 2025. The highest

participation rate in at least one supplementary pension plan is reported.

(28) The (gross) replacement rate refers, depending on data availability, to both public and private pensions. It is based on projections from the 2024 Ageing Report.

National fiscal framework

The Fiscal Council of Estonia (FCE) is a

relatively small independent fiscal

institution with a secretariat of only three

people and a narrow mandate. It focuses on endorsing the government’s macroeconomic forecast and assessing compliance with the budget balance rule. It is also involved in assessing the government’s budgetary plans but does not provide an endorsement of these. The FCE is strongly connected to the Estonian central bank, from which it receives its budget. All members of the FCE’s secretariat are central bank employees. Its policy dialogue with both the government and the national parliament and its communication activities are not fully developed, and it has never been subject to an independent external evaluation.

Estonia’s spending review framework is

relatively well established, but could be used

in a more regular and comprehensive

manner. Since 2017 several technical support

instrument projects were directed at increasing Estonia’s know-how to: (i) improve the integration of spending reviews into the budget cycle; and (ii) strengthen the link between spending reviews and performance management, helped by the high digitalisation of the administration. Estonia’s latest spending reviews covered culture and museum

Table A2.2: Projected change in ageing-related expenditure in 2025-2040 and 2025-2070

Source: 2024 Ageing Report (EC/EPC).

Table A2.1: Supplementary pension schemes - scope for expansion

Source: European Commission.

EE 17.4 -0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.4 ## 17.1 EE

EU 24.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 -0.3 0.9 25.2 EU

EE 17.4 -1.1 0.5 0.6 -0.5 ## 16.9 EE

EU 24.3 0.2 0.6 0.8 -0.3 1.3 25.6 EU

ageing-related

expenditure

change in 2025-2040 (pps GDP) due to: ageing-related

expenditure pensions healthcare long-term care education total

ageing-related

expenditure

change in 2025-2070 (pps GDP) due to: ageing-related

expenditure pensions healthcare long-term care education total

Assets in 2024

(% GDP)

Participation in 2024

(% working-age

population)

EE 18.0 -3.4 66.7 EE

EU 32.4 -2.8 55.9 EU

Gross replacement rate

at retirement:

(pps change 2025-2040)

34

funding in 2022 and a permit procedure and supervision enhancement plan by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2025. The spending review tool is expected to help make public spending more efficient by redirecting any savings resulting from spending reviews to spending priorities. Nevertheless, this link between savings made by spending reviews and increased spending on budget priorities should be made clearer.

Table A2.3: Fiscal governance database indicators and public accounting maturity

(1) "The Country Fiscal Rule Strength Index (C-FRSI) shows the strength of national fiscal rules aggregated at the country level based on: i) the legal base; ii) how binding the rule is; iii) monitoring bodies; iv) correction mechanisms; and v) resilience to shocks. The Medium-Term Budgetary Framework Index (MTBFI) shows the strength of the national MTBF based on: i) coverage of the targets/ceilings included in the national medium-term fiscal plans; ii) connectedness between these targets/ceilings and the annual budgets; iii) involvement of the national parliament in the preparation of the plans; iv) involvement of independent fiscal institutions in their preparation; and v) their level of detail. A higher score is associated with higher rule and MTBF strength. The score for public accounting reflects the degree of maturity in relation to the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). Countries with an accounting maturity of 70% or more in relation to IPSAS are deemed to apply accrual accounting. For more information, see the report on public accounting in the EU (COM(2025)746 and accompanying Staff Working Document SWD(2025)396)." Source: Fiscal Governance Database, European Commission

2024 Estonia EU Average

Country Fiscal Rule Strength Index (C-FRSI) 13.65 14.81

Medium-Term Budgetary Framework Index (MTBFI) 0.72 0.72

2025 Public accounting maturity of general government 91% 65%

ANNEX 3: TAXATION

35

This annex provides an indicator-based

overview of Estonia’s tax system. It includes information on the: (i) tax mix; (ii) competitiveness and fairness aspects of the tax system; and (iii) tax collection and compliance. In the area of taxation, the 2025 country-specific recommendations for Estonia highlighted challenges in broadening the tax base by tapping into taxes that are less detrimental to growth.

The tax burden in Estonia remains relatively

low as a percentage of its economy, although

it has risen recently. In 2024, tax revenues in

Estonia (including social security contributions) reached 35.2% of GDP (see Table A3.1) (29). This represents a marked increase compared to the previous year (33.7%), partly due to new tax measures. The difference with the EU average decreased to 4.2 percentage points (pps), down from 5.3 pps in 2023. Estonia relies heavily on labour and consumption taxes, which made up about 51.5% and 38.5% of total tax revenue respectively in 2024.

The reliance on consumption taxes is

particularly high and far exceeds the EU

average (26.8%). Recent tax reforms have

further tilted the tax mix towards consumption. The standard VAT rate was raised from 20% to 22% as of January 2024. Reduced VAT rates were also increased for certain goods and services. The standard VAT rate was increased once more to 24% from 1 July 2025. The latest 2 pp. increase was originally planned as temporary but is now expected to be permanent. In contrast, revenue from capital remains low (10.0%) compared to the EU average (21.8%).

Estonia still raises very little revenue from property taxes despite their growth-friendly

potential. Property tax revenue amounts to only

0.3% of GDP, significantly below the EU average (1.8%), reflecting Estonia’s approach of taxing land rather than property. Recent analysis has pointed to the potential merits of moving beyond land taxation alone by exploring a phased-in tax on unoccupied residential property to discourage vacancy and ease housing-market pressures (30).

(29) Preliminary Eurostat data point to a tax-to-GDP ratio of

36.4% in 2025

(30) See In-Depth Review 2025 Estonia

Environmental tax revenue, by contrast, is

higher than the EU average (2.6% versus

2.1% of GDP). This is largely due to relatively high fuel excise duties though certain excise tax reductions and exemptions remain in place. In 2025, Estonia introduced a new motor vehicle tax to encourage cleaner transport, complementing other existing pollution and resource taxes (i.e. NOx emissions, waste landfilling, water discharges, plastics).

Graph A3.1: Tax revenue by economic function in

2024, Estonia (outer ring) and EU-27 (inner ring)

Source: Taxation Trends Data, DG TAXUD

Despite recent reforms, Estonia’s corporate

income tax (CIT) system is expected to

remain competitive, while contributing more

to public revenues. Estonia increased the statutory tax rate on distributed profits from 20% to 22% in 2025. In addition, it abolished the previously available reduced CIT rate of 14%, which had applied to regular dividends. These rate increases will generate additional revenue but may somewhat diminish Estonia’s tax attractiveness for businesses. At the same time, Estonia’s investment-friendly approach of not taxing corporate profits as they are earned, but only when profits are distributed or deemed distributed, remains in place. This preserves incentives for companies to reinvest profits, while raising the cost of payouts. Furthermore, Estonia’s effective CIT rate remains significantly below the EU average (15.7% versus 19.1% in 2024), indicating a relatively low tax burden faced by companies. In international comparisons, Estonia continues to score very highly on tax system competitiveness, ranking first globally in 2024, according to the Tax Complexity Index (31).

(31) See Tax Complexity Index 2024

51.5

26.8

21.6

51.5

38.5

10.0

Taxes on labour Taxes on consumption Taxes on capital

36

Estonia’s personal income taxation (PIT)

continues to prioritise simplicity and work

incentives. Built around a flat rate, which was increased from 20% to 22% in 2025, Estonia’s PIT system remains simple and transparent. Recent reforms have further streamlined the system by replacing the progressive basic exemption with a uniform tax-free allowance of EUR 8 400 per year for all taxpayers. While this will remove an undesired hump in marginal tax rates, it may lead to significant revenue losses (32). The tax wedge (33) at the average wage (at 42.6% in

(32) See International Monetary Fund. European Dept. "Republic

of Estonia: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report"

(33) The tax wedge is an indicator of the tax burden on labour that can be assessed at various levels of earnings. It is calculated as the sum of personal income tax, employee social-security contributions, employer social-security contributions and other mandatory contributions, net of cash family benefits where relevant, expressed as a percentage of total labour costs (composed of the gross wage plus employer social-security contributions). In other words, the tax wedge measures the gap between the total cost of employing a worker and that worker’s net earnings, as a share of total labour costs. Tax wedge data in the 2026 country reports are calculated by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission and based on the EUROMOD model, while in the past country reports were based on the OECD tax and benefit model. While the underlying methodology is very similar, differences in the assumptions can lead to different results between both models.

2025) was slightly above the EU average of 40% (see Table A3.1). In contrast, at low earnings levels that are considered especially relevant for employment (in particular at 50% of the average wage), the Estonian tax wedge (32.8%) was close to the EU average (31.6%). The tax wedge for second earners earning 67% of the average wage was at 37.4% and remains equal to that of single earners and slightly below the EU average (38.5%; see Graph A3.2).

However, in recent years the overall redistributive effect of Estonia’s tax and

benefits system has increased. The reduction

in income inequality caused by the tax and benefits system, as measured by the Gini coefficient (34), was 7.7 points in 2024, showing an increased trend in recent years and now close to the EU average of 7.8 points (Table A3.1).

(34) The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the

distribution of income within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A coefficient of 0 expresses perfect equality where everyone has the same income, while a coefficient of 100 expresses full inequality where only one person has all the income.

Table A3.1: Taxation Indicators

(1) Forward-looking effective tax rate (KPMG). (2) A higher value indicates a stronger redistributive impact of taxation. (*) EU-27 simple average. (**) Forecast value for 2024. EU-27 refers to the median value. For more data on tax revenues as well as the methodology applied, see the Data on Taxation Trends webpage. Source: European Commission, OECD, ISORA.

2019 2022 2023 2024 2025 2019 2022 2023 2024 2025

Tax structure Total taxes (including compulsory actual social contributions) (% of

GDP) 33.0 32.9 33.7 35.2 36.4 39.9 39.7 39.0 39.4

Taxes on labour (% of GDP) 16.5 17.1 17.7 18.1 20.6 20.1 19.9 20.3

of which, social security contributions (SSC, % of GDP) 11.4 11.4 12.0 12.2 13.0 12.7 12.7 13.0

Taxes on consumption (% of GDP) 13.9 13.2 13.1 13.6 11.2 10.9 10.5 10.6

of which, value added taxes (VAT, % of GDP) 8.7 9.1 9.1 9.6 7.1 7.4 7.1 7.1

Taxes on capital (% of GDP) 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.5 8.1 8.7 8.5 8.5

Personal income taxes (PIT, % of GDP) 5.4 6.3 6.2 6.5 9.6 9.4 9.3 9.6

Corporate income taxes (CIT, % of GDP) 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.1

Total property taxes (% of GDP) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8

Recurrent taxes on immovable property (% of GDP) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9

Environmental taxes (% of GDP) 3.4 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.1

Effective carbon rate in EUR per tonne of CO2 equivalents na na 73.4 na na na 84.8 na

Tax wedge at 50% of average wage (single person) (*) 32.2 32.9 31.2 31.8 32.8 32.4 31.6 31.5 31.5 31.6

Tax wedge at 100% of average wage (single person) (*) 38.8 39.8 40.4 41.1 42.6 40.1 39.7 39.9 39.9 40.0

Corporate income tax - effective average tax rates (1) (*) 15.7 15.7 15.7 17.1 20.0 19.2 19.0 19.3

Difference in Gini coefficient before and after taxes and cash social

transfers (pensions excluded from social transfers) (2) (*) 5.3 6.7 7.2 7.7 7.8 8.0 7.9 7.8

Outstanding tax arrears: total year-end tax debt (including debt

considered not collectable) / total revenue (in %) (*) 6.1 4.9 4.9 na 31.8 32.6 30.7 na

VAT gap (% of VAT total tax liability, VTTL) (**) 5.9 5.2 10.3 10.0 10.5 7.3 8.2 na

Progressivity &

fairness

Tax administration &

compliance

By tax base

Some tax types

EU-27Estonia

37

Graph A3.2: Tax wedge for single and second

earners as a % of total labour costs, 2025

Note: The second earner tax wedge shows a household’s tax wedge resulting from the wage that a second earner taking up a job at 67% of the average wage receives. It does not show the total tax wedge of the household. The household is assumed to have a first earner at 100% of the average wage and no children. For the methodology of the tax wedge for second earners, see OECD (2024), Taxing Wages 2024. Source: European Commission.

Estonia reports tax expenditures annually

alongside the budget, but lacks a dedicated

framework to systematically evaluate tax

expenditures. Over 30% of tax expenditure

schemes are not assessed for cost-effectiveness or unintended consequences (35), limiting evidence- based prioritisation. Foregone revenues due to PIT- related tax expenditures have a modest budgetary impact, amounting to around 4% of total PIT revenues in 2022. Most tax expenditures are related to employment and households, with a limited impact on reducing income inequality. Reduced VAT rates have also had limited effects on regressivity due to limited pass-through effects, suggesting that reduced VAT rates are not optimally achieving policy objectives (36).

Estonia performs well on tax compliance, but

the monitoring of tax gaps still has some

scope for improvement. It lacks comprehensive practices for monitoring tax gaps. Currently, it does not estimate compliance gaps for corporate income tax (CIT) extensively, despite having a CIT compliance gap estimate of around 5% (based on Commission estimates). The VAT compliance gap in Estonia is impacted by several socio-economic factors, including the increasing share of services

(35) See the Mind the Gap Report.

(36) Gini coefficient: less than 0.001% (upcoming DG ECFIN/JRC Publication on VAT reduced rates).

in the economy, which traditionally pose higher compliance risks.

In 2023, the VAT compliance gap (measuring

VAT enforcement and compliance

effectiveness) was estimated at 10.3% of the VAT total tax liability (EUR 398 million). In comparison, the EU average VAT compliance gap was 9.5% in 2023, and Estonia had the ninth- largest VAT compliance gap among EU Member States. This represents an increase over time, with an exceptional fall to 2.2% in 2021, followed by a rebound in 2022 and a further increase in 2023. Despite some reforms, VAT losses due to missing trader intra-community fraud were estimated at approximately EUR 155 million in 2023. Improving awareness and integration of data could enhance tax gap assessments and compliance practices across all tax categories.

The level of outstanding tax arrears for

Estonia was stable from 2020 to 2023, at

5% in 2023, and the country was among the

best EU performers in 2023. The amount of

arrears that the Estonian tax administration considers collectible was consistent between 2021 and 2023, at around 88%, reflecting strong performance in the EU.

Estonia's tax administration is highly

digitised, ensuring efficiency in tax collection but still faces challenges in reducing

compliance costs. Estonia is a leader in digital tax administration, with 98% of tax returns filed electronically, significantly reducing administrative burdens and costs. It is one of only seven EU countries which has both launched and implemented: (i) a strategy for digital transformation; (ii) a strategy to identify the skills required for a successful digital transformation; and (iii) a strategy for building a digital culture within the tax administration. Estonia’s tax administration pre-fills personal-income-tax files, but not corporate-income-tax and value-added-tax returns. Nevertheless, the percentage of e-filing stands at above 95% for corporate-income-tax returns, personal-income-tax returns and VAT returns (100% of all three types of returns have been submitted electronically since 2018).

Estonia continues to prioritize advanced data

analysis to tackle fraudulent activities and

to enhance efficiency in tax collection. Recent reforms have focused on expanding these

32.8 37.4

42.6 42.6

37.4

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

50 100 150

Ta x

w ed

ge , %

o f

to ta

l l ab

o u

r co

st s

Earnings as % of the average wage

Single earner - EE Single earner - EU average

Second earner - EE Second earner - EU average

38

frameworks, aligning with commitments under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, and enhancing technological infrastructure for improved tax administration outcomes. The cost of collecting taxes expressed as a percentage of total net tax revue remained stable and below 0.5% between 2018 and 2022.

PRODUCTIVITY

ANNEX 4: INNOVATION TO BUSINESS

39

Estonia’s innovation system is performing

above the EU average, but the quality of the

public science base does not yet fully

translate into technological performance and business innovation. According to the 2025 European Innovation Scoreboard (37), Estonia continues to belong to the ‘strong innovators’. In 2025, Estonia’s performance in the Summary Innovation Index reached 104.8% of the EU average, while the figure was still below EU average in 2022 (98.6%). Its performance is, however, below the average of strong innovators in the EU (104.8% vs 114.1% of the EU average in 2025). Estonia’s R&D intensity (38) steadily increased over the 2018-2O24 period: R&D intensity was 1.99% in 2024, compared to 1.38% in 2018, with the main growth coming from business R&D while public R&D intensity remained stable. For Estonia, the 2025 country-specific recommendations (CSRs) highlighted the need to focus investment on research and innovation (R&I) by prioritising funding for applied research and to improve access to finance to facilitate innovative investment. The dynamic R&D base and the good framework conditions for tech startups support the innovativeness of Estonia’s economy. Digital transformation among small and medium-sized enterprises has been steadily advancing. Notably, Estonia’s adoption of AI has almost doubled within a year. However, technological developments as captured by patent data have declined in recent years, cooperation between public research and businesses remains suboptimal and there are still gaps in the innovation support system, in particular in relation to access to finance for SMEs.

Excellent science

Estonia has a good quality public research

base, with stable funding. The quality of

research outputs, as measured by the proportion of scientific publications within the top 10% most-

(37) 2025 European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), country profile

Estonia. The EIS provides a comparative analysis of innovation performance in EU countries, including the relative strengths and weaknesses of their national innovation systems (also compared to the EU average).

(38) Defined as gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP.

cited publications worldwide, increased over the last decade (from 7.13% in 2012 to 9.84% in 2022) and is now slightly above the EU average (9.44%). Public expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP (0.78% in 2024) is also just above the EU average (0.72%), without any major change over the last years, as under the national target of 1% (39) for public funding of R&D, the priority has been public support to business R&D. The public research system is well connected to the international research networks, as witnessed by the proportion of international co-publications among total publications, which has been growing steadily over the last decade (69.4% in 2024).

Graph A4.1: R&D intensity (GERD, GOVERD, BERD

as % of GDP)

Source: Eurostat, 2025

Estonia faces difficulties in ensuring that the next generation of scientists is large enough.

The number of PhD students has decreased over the last decade from 2 983 in 2013 to 2 283 in 2023 while the number of foreign PhD students has risen from 241 to 792 during the same period (40). The national objective of at least 300 new PhD graduates per year has not been reached yet. To achieve it, a doctoral studies reform was initiated in 2022, and the government has decided to raise the number of new PhD positions from 300 to 350 in 2026 with the aim to reach a further 500 by 2035. At the same time, it is also important to ensure that PhD graduates are coming from fields matching the existing and future needs of the economy and society (see Annex 13).

(39) Estonian research, development, innovation and

entrepreneurship strategy 2021-2035.

(40) Eesti Teadus 2025, Eesti_Teadus_2025.pdf

3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00

1.73 1.75 1.77 1.83 1.99

0.95 0.98 0.99 1.06 1.19

0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.78

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

National target Total R&D intensity (GERD)

Private R&D intensity (BERD) Public R&D intensity (GOVERD+HERD)

40

R&I funding of data and computer science is

lagging behind, despite the increasing pace

of developments in digital and AI tools. Estonia has established itself as a hub for data science and ICT. The new national Applied Research Centre has health data solutions as one of its five priorities and is hosting a new competence centre for chips, established in 2025. The European Digital Innovation Hub in Estonia, AI and Robotics Estonia (AIRE), has successfully completed its first period and is continuing to support SMEs and technology transfer in the field of AI over 2026-2029 period. However, computer science and ICT continue to receive just a small percentage of funding allocated by the Estonian Research Agency (41). Further investments in AI research and applications in the fields where Estonia has developed scientific excellence could allow it to exploit many underused and untapped opportunities. For instance, Estonia could further capitalise on its extensive work on health data and genome research.

Estonia reformed its R&I system governance in 2025, clarifying roles and responsibilities. A significant reform of the R&I system governance was completed in 2025 with the adoption of the new Organisation of Research and Development and Innovation Act replacing the 1997 act and bringing the research and innovation organisation under one umbrella while clarifying the roles and responsibilities of various R&I actors and funders (42).

Business innovation

Business R&D activities have significantly increased in recent years, but technological

performance as measured by patents

applications has declined. Many Estonian businesses have increased R&D investments, particularly by hiring researchers. This is reflected in the researchers employed by business per thousand of the active population which increased

(41) The share of public R&D funding allocated to computer

sciences and informatics was 5,4% in 2023, 4,5% in 2024, and 5,8% in 2025 according to data from Estonian Research Information System

(42) Teadus- ja arendustegevuse ning innovatsiooni korralduse seadus, Riigi Teataja I, 12.07.2025

from 2.50 in 2018 to 5.40 in 2024, almost reaching the EU average of 5.90. Since 2019, business R&D intensity exceeds public R&D intensity and has continued to grow steadily in recent years: business enterprise expenditure on R&D reached 1.19% of GDP in 2024, compared to 0.58% in 2018. Despite this remarkable growth, it remains below the EU average of 1.49% and below the targeted 2% level. On technology developments captured by patent data, Estonia’s patent applications per billion euro of GDP filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty have steadily declined from 1.52 in 2017 to 0.72 in 2022 and remain significantly below the EU average (2.81).

While the level of direct public support to

business R&D strongly increased in recent

years, gaps remain in the innovation support system beyond grant schemes. Support to business R&I has been substantially strengthened in recent years. Direct public support to business R&D increased from 0.06% of GDP in 2017 to 0.15% in 2023, well above the EU average. However, there are still gaps in the innovation support system, in particular in relation to access to finance. As indicated in the 2025 CSRs, Estonia needs to improve access to finance, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises, to facilitate innovative investment. While startups benefit from a well-developed venture capital market (see ‘Entrepreneurial dynamism’ below), there is still significant market failure in financing innovation (43). Estonia is planning to address this deficiency by increasing the volume of financial instruments offered by the Estonian Business and Innovation Agency and by introducing an innovation loan in 2026. While Estonian corporate income tax system has no special provisions to favour investment in R&D. In 2024. dedicated support for hiring R&D personnel by compensating part of the personal income tax was introduced and is continuing in 2026.

Cooperation between public research and businesses remains limited, but the Applied

Research Centre is expected to improve the

situation. In 2023, R&D activities commissioned by businesses to universities and public research organisations represented 5.61% of public R&D. This has remained almost stagnant since 2018

(43) Innovatsioonimahukate investeeringute rahastamise

turutõrke uuring koos kaitsetööstuse valdkonna analüüsiga, Saaresalu, 2025

41

(5.81%) and is still below the EU average of 7.51%. In 2023, Estonia launched the national Applied Research Centre (44) and all five focus areas started to become operational during 2025. When it becomes fully functional it will benefit a wide range of businesses and reaching its objective to receive at least one third of its income from contract research. This will require significant public investment to build capacities, as highlighted in the 2025 CSR which called for prioritising funding for applied research. While no new additional measures were taken to speed up the development of the Applied Research Centre, a EUR 30 million programme to support the institutional knowledge transfer capacity of research and higher education institutions (Astra+) (45) was implemented in 2025. In addition, the second call under the TemTA (Thematic R&D programmes), established in 2024 to strengthen applied and use-oriented research in smart specialisation priority areas and fund public- private applied research projects, is planned for 2026 (46). The programme has a total budget of around EUR 102 million for 2024–2029(47).

Investments in green technologies are not

fully translating in innovation outputs.

According to the European Innovation Scoreboard, Estonia ranks 24th among EU Member States for resource productivity and 23rd for production- based CO2 productivity, indicating a need to invest in the development and adaptation of green technologies. The Applied Research Programme continues to invest in innovative startups developing and adapting new green and energy- efficient technologies, and through the SmartCap Green Fund. In 2025, the Green Fund decided to broaden its investment portfolio to leverage private investment and make investments in other venture capital and private equity funds investing in green technologies. However, despite several notable R&D projects funded by Horizon Europe and national programmes in the field of hydrogen and bio-based industry, the implementation of the solutions by industry has been lagging.

(44) Estonian Applied Research Centre,

https://metrosert.ee/en/services/applied-research-center/

(45) https://rtk.ee/Teadusuuringute-moju-suurendamine-ning- teadusasutuste-ja-korgkoolide-institutsionaalse- teadmussiirde-suutlikkuse-toetamine

(46) Teadmussiirde programm 2026-2029.

(47) https://etag.ee/en/funding/programmes/temta-thematic-rd- programmes/

Estonia has made steady progress in digital

transformation among small and medium-

sized enterprises, but areas like AI adoption need further attention to align with its EU

Digital Decade targets (48). Estonia has made positive strides in digitalisation, with 72.12% of SMEs achieving a basic level of digital intensity, (EU average 71.39%). Estonia also outperforms the EU average in cloud adoption, with a rate of 56.23% against the EU 46.69%, and in data analytics, with 55.99% to the EU's 39.85%. Estonia has demonstrated remarkable growth in AI adoption, rising from 13.89% in 2024 to 23.40% in 2025. The digital innovation hub AIRE alongside with the Technopol AI development programme provide support for business digitalisation. Additionally, the AI startup incubator has launched 30 businesses, with another 19 new AI-based products entering the market.

Entrepreneurial dynamism

Estonian startups achieved a record turnover

in 2024: however, the growth rate of the

sector has slowed compared to previous

years. Estonian startups recorded a turnover of

EUR 3,9 billion in 2024(49), representing an increase of almost 15% from 2023 (EUR 3,4 billion) outperforming the economy amid economic pressures. Despite the strong increase, annual growth has slowed over the last years (73% in 2021, 46% in 2022, 19% in 2023). Deep-tech startups continued to gain momentum, accounting for 63% of total investments in the Estonian startup sector in 2024 and generating EUR 325 million in turnover (+19.3% year-over-year). They employed 2 439 people, representing 17% of all startup’s employees (50).

Venture capital (VC) market intensity

decreased in 2024 but remains the highest in

the EU. VC investments picked up from 2018 to 2023 (from O.06% of GDP to 0.33%) but decreased to 0.24% of GDP in 2024. This is still four times higher than EU average (0.06%) (51).

(48) Estonia 2025 Digital Decade country report

(49) Estonia’s Startup Sector in 2024: Growth, Challenges, and Key Insights, Startup Estonia, 2025

(50) idem

(51) see also Annex 6.

42

Estonia has a well-established tech ecosystem that has attracted investments of over 1% of GDP in the last decade (52). The Estonian government recently launched a EUR 100 million DefenceTech fund, which will further increase the development of new defence-oriented deep-tech companies. In addition, Enterprise Estonia signed an agreement with the European Investment Fund in 2025 unlocking EUR 109 million in financing to support Estonian businesses with more favourable loans and guarantees. The startup sector’s ability to attract talent, secure funding and scale innovations will be crucial in maintaining its competitive edge.

Estonia’s innovation strategy emphasises the

development of regulatory experimentation

frameworks. Estonia is planning to introduce a national experimentation framework that allows startups to test unregulated or non-compliant solutions under controlled conditions, effectively shortening the path from concept to deployable product. The government has prepared draft legislation for the national experimentation framework which is expected to be adopted in 2026. This complements the existing regulatory sandbox initiatives supported by Accelerate Estonia and major cities (e.g. Test in Tallinn, Test in Tartu).

The innovation procurement framework has

been improving but significant effort is still

needed. In the benchmarking of national innovation procurement policy frameworks across Europe, Estonia ranks second with a total score of 52.43% compared to the EU average of 33.05% (53). Most national horizontal policies, including the public procurement, R&I and ICT policies, advocate for wider use of innovation procurement. A good expenditure measurement system for innovation procurement has been put in place. Innovation procurement target levels of 2% in volume and 5% in value were set for the year 2025. However, the policy framework for innovation procurement still requires significant reinforcement measures such as developing a national action plan and incentives for procurers, recognising the strategic importance of innovation procurement in all sectoral policies and strengthening capacity

(52) ‘State of European Tech 24: The definitive take on European

tech’.

(53) ESTONIA. COUNTRY PROFILE – Benchmarking of national policy frameworks for innovation procurement, 2024

building measures further spreading innovation procurement practices.

The shortage of highly skilled workers holds

up Estonia’s innovation capacity. While the number of new graduates in the field of ICT per thousand population aged 25-34 is above the EU average, there has been a downward trend over the last years (4.61 in 2023 vs 4.90 in 2022 and 5.50 in 2021). The declining number of new graduates in science and engineering is also a matter of concern, as it has constantly fallen since 2013 (from 13.11 to 8.98 per thousand of those aged 25-34 in 2023, significantly behind the EU average of 16.82). These declines may hinder Estonia’s innovation performance in the long run. Foreign talent plays a vital role in Estonia’s startup sector, with 31% of employees holding foreign citizenship (54). The high proportion of global talent plays a major part in the startup ecosystem’s dependence on international expertise and the necessity of policies that facilitate worldwide hiring and talent retention.

Entrepreneurship education in Estonia is fully

embedded in its education system through

teacher competence frameworks, curricula and guidance to school leaders. Teacher

competence frameworks applicable to all teachers specifically referto entrepreneurship, making it one of the few European countries to do so (55). The professional qualification standard for general education teachers includes entrepreneurship as one of the defined competences. The national curriculum specifies eight general competences, including entrepreneurship, which are intended to be incorporated across all subjects, extracurricular activities and out-of-school initiatives.

Estonia also offers designated subjects relating to entrepreneurship within the primary and general secondary education curriculum. Additionally, entrepreneurship education is integrated through practice-oriented and project-based learning components, especially in upper secondary education, with projects such as the Junior Achievement (JA) programme (56). Estonia provides

(54) Estonia’s Startup Sector in 2024: Growth, Challenges, and

Key Insights, Startup Estonia, 2025

(55) Eurydice Report, Entrepreneurship education at school in Europe, https://eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/publications/entrepreneur ship-education-school-europe-2025

(56) JA Europe, https://jaeurope.org/

43

schools with guidance for promoting a whole- school approach to entrepreneurship education, assisted by material from the Edu&Tegu entrepreneurship and career education programme (57), including cooperation between schools and businesses. School leaders receive advice on how to implement this whole-school approach effectively. Certificates like the entrepreneurial school quality label (58) recognise schools that systematically integrate entrepreneurship education and foster partnerships with local communities and businesses. Estonian higher education institutions also make efforts to integrate entrepreneurship courses into curricula in various fields of study. Even so, OSKA’s 2022 study on generic work-life skills pointed out that employers expect better skills related to entrepreneurship from graduates of higher education programmes (59).

(57) Entrepreneurship and Career Education Programme Edu ja

Tegu, https://ettevotlusope.edu.ee/

(58) Kvaliteedimärgise taotlemise protsess - Ettevõtlik Kool, https://evkool.ee/vorgustiku-liikmele/seire/

(59) Leemet, A. & Ungro, A. (2022). Tööelu üldoskuste klassifikatsioon ja tulevikuvajadus (Classification and future needs of generic work life skills). Tallinn: SA Kutsekoda. https://uuringud.oska.kutsekoda.ee/uuringud/tooelu- uldoskutse-klassifikatsioon-tulevikuvajadus.

44

Table A4.1: Key Innovation Indicators

(1) EU average for the last available year or the year with the highest number of country data. * Break in series Source: Eurostat, OECD, DG JRC, Science-Metrix (Scopus database), Invest Europea, European Innovation Scoreboard.

R&D intensity (gross domestic expenditure on R&D as % of GDP)

1.58 1.44 1.73 1.77 1.83 1.99 : 2.24 3.44

Public expenditure on R&D as % of GDP 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.78 : 0.72 0.64

Scientific publications of the country within the top 10% most cited publications worldwide as % of total publications of the country

7.62 8.48 9.36 9.84 : : : 9.44 12.31

Researchers (FTEs) employed by public sector (Gov+HEI) per thousand active population

4.1 4.5 4.3 4.7 4.9 5.2 : 4.3 :

International co-publications as % of total number of publications

45.39 55 65.71 67.62 68.41 69.4 : 57.24 :

Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) as % of GDP

0.79 0.66 0.95 0.99 1.06 1.19 : 1.49 2.69

Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) performed by SMEs as % of GDP

0.55 0.31 0.5 0.51 0.56 : : 0.47 0.30

Researchers employed by business per thousand active population

1.9 1.3 3.2 4.3 4.3 5.4 : 5.9 :

Patent applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty per billion GDP (in PPS €)

3.29 1.25 1.46 0.72 : : : 2.81 2.20

Employment share of high-growth enterprises measured in employment (%)

: : : 0.85 1.02 0.99 : 0.87 :

SMEs with at least a basic level of digital intensity % SMEs (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 90%)

: : : : 55.93 : 72.12 71.39 :

Data analytics adoption % enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)

: : : : 25.57 : 55.99 39.85 :

Cloud adoption % enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)

: : : : 52.60 : 56.23 46.69 :

Artificial intelligence adoption % enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)

: : : : 5.19 13.89 23.40 19.95 :

Public-private scientific co-publications as % of total number of publications

6.87 6.14 8.7 8.46 8.66 9.15 : 7.62 :

Public expenditure on R&D financed by business enterprises (national) as % of GDP

0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 : : 0.06 0.02

Total public sector support for BERD as % of GDP : : 0.08 0.10 0.15 : : 0.21 :

R&D tax incentives: foregone revenues as % of GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 : : 0.10 :

BERD financed by the public sector (national and abroad) as % of GDP

: : 0.08 0.10 0.15 : : 0.11 :

Venture capital (market statistics) as % of GDP (calculated as a 3-year moving average)

0.03 0.04 0.10 0.34 0.33 0.24 : 0.06 :

Seed stage funding share (% of GDP) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 : 0.01 : Start-up stage funding share (% of GDP) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.15 0.12 : 0.03 : Later stage funding share (as % of GDP) 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.08 : 0.03 :

New graduates in science & engineering per thousand population aged 25-34

: 11.77* 9.5 9.18 8.98 10.05 : 16.82 :

Graduates in the field of computing per thousand population aged 25-34

: 2.69* 4.19 4.90 4.61 5.38 : 3.84 :

2023 2024 2025 EU average

(1) USEstonia 2010 2015 2020 2022

R&D investment & researchers employed in businesses

Innovation outputs

Digitalisation of businesses

Academia-business collaboration

Innovative talent

Public support for business innovation

Financing innovation

Science and innovative ecosystems

Headline indicator

ANNEX 5: SINGLE MARKET AND INDUSTRY

45

Estonia is prioritising competitiveness and

economic growth, and taking action on the

problems it is facing in its economy. SMEs are particularly important to the Estonian economy, and they have been struggling despite the slow recovery of the economy. This is linked with problems in accessing finance, lack of skilled labour and regulatory burdens, coupled with insufficient use of digital tools. More widely, the economy is still very resource-intensive and measurable progress in terms of resource- productivity remains for now limited. Green technologies, also for industrial decarbonisation, face challenges in scaling up due to finance issues and regulatory and demand uncertainty. Estonia is also falling behind the EU average in connectivity infrastructure, while showing an impressive 5G coverage in sparsely populated areas. The 2025 country-specific recommendations linked with Single Market and Industry called on Estonia to improve access to finance, particularly for SMEs and for companies on remote regions (CSR 3 2025), and to raise resource-productivity through bio-based innovation (CSR 4 2025).

Business dynamics

The Estonian economy has begun to slowly

recover and the government has set raising

competitiveness and economic growth as its

priority. Industry’s gross value added makes up

14.7% of Estonia’s GDP (60). While industrial output as well as value added (61) decreased in 2024 in both industry and manufacturing, the decline in value added was less marked than in the two previous years (62). Estonia also saw two years of quick growth in unit labour costs before the pace finally eased in 2024, when also the real labour productivity per hour worked in industry increased for the first time since 2021. In terms of structure of the economy, within manufacturing, wood products and fabricated metals constitute the two largest manufacturing sub-sectors in terms of value added. Wood products in particular had a

(60) Eurostat: [nama_10_a10] Gross value added and income by

main industry (NACE Rev.2 )

(61) Eurostat: [nama_10_a10] Gross value added and income by main industry (NACE Rev.2 )

(62) Eurostat: nama_10_lp_a21] Labour productivity and unit labour costs by industry (NACE Rev.2)

large drop in value added in 2023, following the 2022 energy shock to energy-intensive industries (EIIs) (63). Fabricated metals and construction are both important sectors to Estonia, and also sectors where Estonia is particularly affected by industrial decline and would struggle to cope with the decline of the industry based on a recent economic brief (64). See also the Annex on Housing. Nevertheless, Estonia retained its 33rd position in the IMD World Competitiveness Ranking 2025, following a significant drop in position in 2024. The ‘Estonia 2035’ strategy targets the 10th place in this ranking and the government is currently strongly prioritising competitiveness and economic growth, along with defence.

Estonia continues to stay within the EU

countries with highest total investment in

relation to GDP. Despite a decrease of 1.5 p.p. in

total investment as share of GDP in 2024, Estonia still has the sixth highest investment rate among EU countries (EE 23.9% vs EU 21.7%). Business investment however continued in 2024 on the decreasing trend, and was barely over EU average (EE 12.9% vs EU 12.6%) (65). Inward foreign direct investment also decreased in 2024 (66). Estonian firms are yet signalling a more growth-oriented approach towards investment than the EU average. In the last financial year, over half of the investment was used on capacity expansion, new products or services and other areas – in comparison to replacement investment, which in the EU was more common. In future investment priorities, Estonian firms are also more strongly focusing on growth than EU average (67)

SMEs are particularly important for Estonian economy but have had difficult few years.

Estonian SMEs make up 99.9% of Estonian enterprises, and 81.1% of total value added, significantly higher than the average in the EU (53.6%). Particularly the number of micro enterprises, employing 0 to 9 persons, is high as they represent 94.9% of Estonian companies (EU

(63) Eurostat: [nama_10_a64] Gross value added and income by

detailed industry (NACE Rev.2 )

(64) Mapping the impact of industrial decline, European Commission 2025

(65) Eurostat: Investment share of GDP by institutional sectors [sdg_08_11]

(66) Eurostat: [tec00105] Inward FDI stocks in % of GDP

(67) EIB Investment Survey 2025: Estonia overview

46

average 93.6%) and 32.2% of the value added. (68). Integrating micro enterprises in clusters through a dedicated cluster policy could improve their productivity and competitiveness, because of the synergies it could create and the innovation spillovers deriving from connections with other stakeholders, such as research institutions. In 2024, SMEs in Estonia grew in employment but their real value added dropped significantly for the second consecutive year: the decline of -5.8% in 2023 was followed by a further drop equal to -5.4 Only the information and communication, an important sector for Estonia, grew in SME real value added in 2024(69). Gross value added has generally decreased in Estonia since 2021, and even the well performing information and communication sector decreased slightly in the overall gross value added in 2024 (70).

The Estonian economy is quite dynamic. The business churn rate is continuously well above the EU average (in 2023, EE 41.74% vs EU 18.97%). In 2023, the business death rate rose starkly from 8.91% to 27.48%, reflecting the economic challenges companies are facing. Bankruptcies in Estonia continued to increase in 2024(71). The business birth rate is also trending down but is still above the EU average at 14.26% (72). A recent paper on allocative efficiency in the Baltics however suggests that new firms in general have lower labour productivity than incumbent peers in Estonia, indicating that there is room to support in particular entry for businesses with high growth potential (such as R&D intensive start-ups). Similarly, the paper stressed the importance of streamlined insolvency procedures(73). See the annexes on Capital Markets, Financial Stability and Access to Finance.

Now a strong innovator according to the European Innovation Scoreboard, Estonia is

looking to increase its R&D investment. In

(68) 2025 SME country fact sheet Estonia

(69) 2025 SME country fact sheet Estonia

(70) Eurostat: [nama_10_a10] Gross value added and income by main industry (NACE Rev.2 )

(71) Eurostat: [sts_rb_a] Business registration and bankruptcy index by NACE Rev.2 activity - annual data

(72) Eurostat: Business demography by size class and NACE Rev. 2 activity [bd_size__custom_19037959]

(73) Hu, Bingjie and Can Ugur, 2025. Allocative Efficiency, Firm Dynamics, and Productivity in the Baltics; Republic of Estonia; IMF Selected Issues Paper No. 2025/103; June 23, 2025

particular direct, and also R&D expenditure in the business sector is relatively low (74), (75), (76). The Estonian Recovery and Resilience Plan also has measures on digital state, including e.g. a digital gateway for entrepreneurs. See also the annexes on Innovation to Business and Effective Institutional Framework).

Uncertainty about the future, availability of skilled staff and energy costs remain

Estonia’s three biggest investment obstacles. According to the 2025 EIB Investment Survey, 89% of Estonian firms consider uncertainty about the future to be an investment obstacle, higher than EU average 83%. Similarly slightly higher than EU average, 80% of Estonian firms consider the lack of available skilled staff an investment obstacle (77), and this issue has also been recently highlighted in a report to Riigikogu (78), a paper by IMF (79) and by business stakeholders(80). Estonia has taken steps to address skills mismatches and the issue of skilled labour, and labour shortages have eased overall (see the annexes on Labour Market and Education and Skills). Lack of demand is not a major obstacle to investment in Estonia, but it has still been limiting industrial production as well as business activity for services (81). The situation is gradually improving for both the industry and service sectors (82). Increasing domestic consumption and export demand from key markets should support in this. Estonian government is taking action to boost competitiveness by helping increase companies’ export capacity and reach new markets to diversify exports (83). 72% of Estonian exporters, higher

(74) ec_rtd_eis-country-profile-ee.pdf

(75) Estonia 2025 Digital Decade Country Report | Shaping Europe’s digital future

(76) Government information.

(77) EIB Investment Survey 2025: Estonia overview

(78) Kaasik, Ülo; Männasoo, Kadri; Varblane, Urmas; Varblane, Uku (2025). Eesti majanduse olukord ja väljavaated 2025. Konkurentsivõime eksperdikogu raport Riigikogule. Tallinn: Riigikogu Kantselei. Majanduse konkurentsivõime tulevik - Arenguseire Keskus

(79) Hu, Bingjie and Can Ugur, 2025. Allocative Efficiency, Firm Dynamics, and Productivity in the Baltics; Republic of Estonia; IMF Selected Issues Paper No. 2025/103; June 23, 2025

(80) Stakeholder feedback

(81) ECFIN business and consumer survey data

(82) E.g. Estonia’s Recovery and Resilience Plan

(83) Government information

47

than the EU average of 62%, reported that they have to comply with different standards and consumer protection rules in different EU Member States. This share however decreased 16 pp. compared to the previous year (84).

Business environment

In the areas of simplification, burden reduction and permitting/licensing, there is

still scope for Estonia to improve. Business

regulations are stated as an obstacle to investment by 53% of Estonian companies and labour regulations by 46% of Estonian companies, both lower than EU average (69% and 64%). However, among micro/small companies, this percentage is higher (65% for business regulations), indicating that there would be room to reduce regulatory burden particularly for the smallest companies. In fact, 29% of Estonian companies, and 52% of micro/small companies, reported that they need to dedicate over 10% of their personnel to comply with the regulatory requirements (85). According to the OECD Product Market Regulation indicator, in particular in licensing Estonia could simplify its regulatory and administrative burden (86) and simplifying obtaining licenses and permits could improve the regulatory environment overall (87).

Estonia is taking significant steps to

alleviate its regulatory burden. This issue has

been tackled through the Council for Economic Growth and Efficiency, which was first convened in March 2025 and operated until September 2026. Consisting of Estonian business leaders, the council received has received over 700 proposals to cut red tape from various stakeholders. Government has reviewed and approved over 200 of these proposals (88) (89). Some of the proposals that have already been implemented include a

(84) EIB Investment Survey 2025: Estonia overview

(85) EIB Investment Survey 2025: Estonia overview

(86) Estonia_PMR country note.pdf

(87) OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2025 Issue 2 (EN)

(88) Majanduskasvu ja efektiivsuse nõukoda: kestlikkusaruandluse lihtsustamine hoiab 2 aasta jooksul kokku 115 miljonit eurot | Riigikantselei

(89) Efektiivsuse ja majanduskasvu nõukoda | Riigikantselei

significant easing of sustainability and reporting for companies, abandoning the obligation to send paper invoices, and simplifying cybersecurity requirements for small businesses. In addition to the Council, ministries and the government have also submitted proposals, some of which have already been implemented (90).

Estonia is positioning itself as a leader in e- government, with its digital public services

continuing to outperform the EU average. The country also focuses on digital sovereignty, emphasising government resilience. Measures have also been put in place to ensure that it can continue to be digitally governed beyond its geographical borders in various disaster scenarios. Estonia also scored above the EU average for cross-border digital public services for citizens and businesses in 2024 (91).The provision of digital public services cross-border is also expected to improve with the advancing implementation of the Single Digital Gateway (see the Effective Institutional Framework Annex). Estonia has also set a long-term vision to establish the country as a leading in data economy and an AI-powered state by 2030 across private and public sector.(92)

However, the country is falling behind the EU

average in terms of its connectivity

infrastructure (VHCN, 5G), while showing

impressive 5G coverage in sparsely

populated areas. Estonia faces challenges in matching EU averages for Very High Capacity Networks (VHCN) and 5G coverage but excels in 5G coverage in sparsely populated areas and the assignment of 5G spectrum. As of 2024, Estonia’s VHCN and Fiber to the premises (FTTP) coverage stands at 76.27%, below the EU's 82.49% for VHCN but above the EU's 69.24% for FTTP. The stagnating coverage for VHCN (it stood at 76.94% in 2023) can be attributed to drops in DSL, VDSL and VSDL 2 vectoring caused by network decommissioning. Estonia's competitive telecom market includes significant efforts towards improving infrastructure, backed by initiatives like the Recovery and Resilience Facility support scheme. As Estonia progresses towards its

(90) Economic Growth Council: abandoning paper invoices and

strict sustainability requirements is only the beginning of cutting red tape | Government Office

(91) European Commission, 2025, Digital Decade Country Report Estonia, Ec.europa.eu.

(92) The White Paper on Data and AI 2024-30

48

2030 targets for VHCN and 5G, its policies continue to foster private investment and enhance spectrum accessibility for innovative applications.

The availability of finance is a major

investment obstacle for more Estonian

companies than in the previous year. 19% of companies state it as a major obstacle to investment and 29% as a minor obstacle to investment. Altogether, this represents an increase of 13 pp. to the previous year and is also slightly higher than EU average (45%). The share of finance-constrained companies also more than doubled in 2024 and continues in 2025 to besignificantly higher than the EU average. Rejections are the key issue causing finance constraint. Access to finance is a significant issue in particular for SMEs, and Estonia has a 2025 CSR (3) on improving access to finance, especially for SMEs and companies in remote regions. Estonia is taking action on this issue through offering grants, loan guarantees and loans to businesses, notably increasing existing loan volumes by 55 MEUR in 2026. Estonia has also recently introduced a new innovation loan to finance higher-risk investment in novel technologies, and a specific support measure for large-scale investment (93) (see also the annexes on the Capital Markets, Financial Stability and Access to Finance).

Late payments remain an issue in Estonia. 63 % of Estonian companies reported issues due to late payments in 2024 and 53% of Estonian SMEs experienced late payments in 2025. While higher than EU average, this is a decrease to previous year. Their direct operational and financial impacts on companies also seem to have eased in 2024 (94).

Single Market

Recent economic volatility and trade tensions underlined the importance of the EU

Single Market for growth and resilience.

Estonia continues to be well integrated into the Single Market and to actively engage in international trade.72% of Estonian companies

(93) Government information

(94) EU Payment Observatory Annual Report 2025

engage in international trade (95) and Estonia continued to be placed fifth among EU countries in terms of EU trade integration, demonstrating a high level of EU trade integration (measured using the percentage ratio of trade volumes to GDP). This percentage increased slightly from last year (58.6% in 2025, 57% in 2024).

Estonia's compliance with Single Market law shows mixed results. Its Single Market

transposition deficit (which measures the percentage of all directives not transposed into national law) increased in 2025 to 1.3% and is now worse than both the EU average 1.1% and the 1% target set up by the EU Council, signalling a need to work on the timely transposition of directives. The conformity deficit (the percentage of wrongly transposed Single Market directives) in Estonia is still below EU average at 0.8% (vs 1.1%). The transposition of 13 Single Market directives was overdue (in December 2025) and the average delay in transposing those directives was lower than EU average. Estonia had 14 pending Single Market infringement proceedings in December 2025, which was well below the EU average (25). This represented an increase compared to the three previous years, but Estonia is still one of the best performers in the number of infringements this year (6th out of 27 Member States). The same remark applies to the duration of infringement proceedings (4th position) (96). In 2025, Estonia resolved 100% of the SOLVIT cases it handled as lead centre (the EU average was 84.6%).

Compliance of products circulating in the

Single Market (97) is key to ensuring a level- playing field for law-abiding companies and

the safety of consumers. In Estonia, the number of market surveillance investigations has increased compared with 2019. In 2025, national authorities reported in the EU system for market surveillance (ICSMS) a total of 231.4 investigations per one million inhabitants, which is higher than the EU median of 136.2. The number of notifications remains limited in

(95) EIB Investment Survey 2025: Estonia overview

(96) Part of the barriers highlighted in the Single market strategy (‘Terrible Ten’) and the 2026 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report.

(97) Part of the barriers highlighted in the Single market strategy (‘Terrible Ten’) and the 2026 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report.

49

absolute terms, which may also be the result of insufficient IT national interoperability to the ICSMS system. The upcoming revision of the Market Surveillance Regulation will upgrade ICSMS to a fully interoperable EU digital platform.

Limited resources of the Estonian National Standardisation Body (EVS) are negatively

affecting the functioning of the Single

Market(98), and the competitiveness of EU companies. While National Standardisation Bodies play a key role in the functioning of the European Standardisation System, the Estonian EVS has limited resources, reporting having a staff of 18 people. Consequently, strengthening its capacity is essential to ensure sufficient participation of experts and stakeholders in European standardisation processes. It is therefore recommended that Estonia supports the EVS to reduce market fragmentation, improving the competitiveness of Estonian companies, and fully benefiting from the opportunities of the Single Market.

While barriers persist in some professions,

regulatory restrictiveness as well as

restrictions to trade in services (99) continue

to be comparatively lower than EU and OECD

averages. In terms of services trade, Estonia is

the fifth most open country among the Member States surveyed (100). However, in terms of regulated professions, lawyers and notaries are subject to relatively heavy regulation as they face particularly stringent entry and conduct regulations (101). This can impact competitiveness in the legal sector and easing rules for notaries and lawyers could improve the regulatory environment (102).

Estonia continues to be an average

performer in public procurement. In single bids, Estonia scored slightly above the EU median in

(98) Part of the barriers highlighted in the Single market strategy

(‘Terrible Ten’) and the 2026 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report.

(99) Part of the barriers highlighted in the Single market strategy (‘Terrible Ten’) and the 2026 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report.

(100) OECD, 2026, Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI), Services trade restrictiveness index | OECD.

(101) Estonia_PMR country note.pdf

(102) OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2025 Issue 2 | OECD

2025 with 30%. Estonia continued to be among the worst performers in direct awards in 2025 (the percentage of public procurement negotiated without any call for bids), but the percentage slightly decreased from previous year (from 13% to 11%).

Estonia is advancing on strategic public procurement. National statistics show that in 2024, 12.3% of all procurement was recorded as green public procurement (GPP) and the trend for 2025 seems increasing, largely due to awareness- raising efforts as well as national action in the context of the 2024-2026 GPP action plan(103). To tackle the lack of professionalism in strategic public procurement, Estonia and OECD have a project called ‘Promoting the Uptake of Strategic Public Procurement in Estonia through Professionalising the Public Procurement Workforce’. A recent report on this pointed out that the uptake of strategic public procurement in Estonia remains somewhat limited, despite wide recognition of its strategic value. The report also pointed out the need for further clarity on the legal framework and guidance on its use, transparency on compliance, a stand-alone policy on professionalisation of workforce and capability building. Importantly, the challenges faced by SMEs in the tendering processes were highlighted (104). Beyond this project, Estonia has taken action on the professionalisation, e.g. through training and a novel skills matrix for buyers. Simplification of public procurement processes is a key consideration for Estonia (105).

Businesses’ views on corruption risks in

public procurement are below the EU average. In Estonia, 49% of companies (EU

average: 58%) consider tailor-made specifications for particular companies in public procurement procedures, and 39% (EU average: 53%) conflicts of interest in the evaluation of bids, 'very' or 'fairly widespread' practice. Among companies that have experience in and/or participated in a public procurement procedure, 17% think that corruption has prevented them from winning a public tender or a public procurement contract in practice (EU average: 25%). 31% of businesses perceive the

(103) Government information.

(104) OECD (2025), Strategic Public Procurement and Professionalisation Initiatives in Estonia: Diagnostic Report, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris.

(105) Government information.

50

level of independence of the public procurement review committee as ‘very’ or ‘fairly good’ when it is reviewing public procurement cases. The National Audit Office has consistently highlighted the need to improve transparency in public procurement to prevent corruption, increase competition and enhance efficiency in the use of public funds and a level playing field for businesses.

Estonia’s eProcurement landscape and data

quality issues highlight the need for interoperable systems, common standards,

and stronger data governance. Estonia’s centralised eProcurement service allows economic operators to use a single system to access all national public procurement procedures. However, concerning cross-border procurement issues remain creating complexity and barriers to participation for firms of other Member States. This fragmentation underscores the need for introducing interoperability and common standards. Although the once-only principle is implemented at national level, the service needs updating to prevent the need for additional registering for this service. Additionally, buyers across the EU still lack digital access to relevant evidence. Despite some monitoring, Estonian national authorities do not provide a public procurement data strategy with clear objectives and management of public procurement processes data. Therefore, the Estonian system would benefit from a dedicated public procurement data collection and analysis service within the government to support data- driven oversight of the procurement lifecycle (106).

Industry and economic security

Energy-intensive industries have been facing

particular challenges. Energy prices in Estonia

have been an issue, also one of the biggest obstacles to long-term investment (107), and Estonian government recently introduced a renewable energy fee reduction for large industrial

(106) European Court of Auditors, Special Report 28/2023: Public

Procurement in the EU. Less competition for contracts awarded for works, goods and services in the 10 years up to 2021, 2023, Special report 28/2023: Public procurement in the EU.

(107) EIB Investment Survey 2025: Estonia overview

energy consumers, notably to attract investment in EIIs and boost industrial competitiveness (108). Electricity prices for non-household consumers in Estonia in 2024 and early 2025 were also lower than previous years and EU average (EE 0.1405 vs EU 0.1462(109)). In 2025, the key issue for the industry seems to have been the volatility of the energy price (see Annex on Affordable Energy).

Beyond energy topics, the resource intensity

of Estonian industries continues to be an issue. In terms of resource productivity, measured

as gross domestic product (GDP) over domestic material consumption (DMC), Estonia was still among the worst EU performers in 2024. Estonia’s performance also slightly worsened compared to 2023 (index value 2023:127.7, 2024: 124.7) (110). Estonia has a 2025 CSR (4) on raising resource- productivity through bio-based innovation. Estonia has a circular bioeconomy roadmap, which it is implementing, and has both national and Recovery and Resilience Facility funding allocated for bioeconomy topics and green technologies (111). Estonia also introduced several circular economy support measures where calls were opened in late 2024 and 2025, including a resource efficiency measure for manufacturing industry which has particular importance to improve resource productivity and which will be continued. However, Estonia reports that the results will not be visible in statistical terms quickly (112). See more in the annexes on Industry Decarbonisation, Circularity and Climate Mitigation.

Estonia has progressed effectively in

implementing the Net-Zero Industry Act

(NZIA). It has successfully designated a Single Point of Contact, which is crucial for streamlining communication and coordination among stakeholders, as well as establishing a dedicated website. Furthermore, Estonia has established a national contact point to administer applications, facilitating the advancement of Net-Zero Strategic Projects. However, so far, Estonia has not

(108) Government information and Planned amendment to lower

major consumers' electricity costs | News | ERR

(109) kw-hour at PPS, excluding taxes and levies, all consumption bands

(110) Resource productivity statistics - Statistics Explained - Eurostat

(111) Government information

(112) Government information

51

confirmed any Net-Zero Strategic Projects and has not designated any Net-Zero Acceleration Valleys. Overall, Estonia’s manufacturing capacity across all net zero technologies remains modest, but there is potential for innovative technologies (113) and there are some frontrunner companies such as Eleon (wind turbines), Stargate Hydrogen (electrolysers) and UpCatalyst (carbon materials from CO2). See more information on net zero technologies in Estonia in Annex 7 of the 2025 Country Report (114).

Estonia is taking action to support the

development of its clean-tech sector. For example, its permitting framework is being reviewed by the Estonian Ministry of Economy to reduce uncertainties (115). The Estonian Ministry of Climate and Cleantech Estonia are in the process of creating an Estonian Cleantech Roadmap 2025- 2035 (116) and the government has also introduced several support measures to clean technologies through Enterprise Estonia, Estonia’s SmartCap Green Fund and the green accelerator programmes. Furthermore, Estonia has also introduced a support measure for large-scale investment, with grants of up to EUR 20 million. This support measure is not only for net-zero technologies, but in the first round one of the three selected projects was on green hydrogen. (117) This large-scale measure is meant to address the lack of large-scale investment to scale up green technologies. This, together with regulatory hurdles and lack of demand, is hindering these technologies in Estonia.

Estonia is taking a leading role in rare earth

metal separation and is a key player in magnet manufacturing. A new rare earth

magnet manufacturing facility, the largest in Europe, was recently opened in Narva. One strategic project under the Critical Raw Materials Act was also selected in Estonia, a project focusing on graphite processing by the previously mentioned UpCatalyst. Estonia largely relies on imports for critical raw materials, but recently

(113) European Commission: Directorate-General for Energy, The

net-zero manufacturing industry landscape across the Member 2025, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2833/2181110.

(114) 753a50ca-44e7-410a-a845-41e4c91fbf6a_en

(115) Government information.

(116) Estonian Cleantech Roadmap 2025-2035 in progress

(117) Government information.

prepared the Estonian National Programme of Geological Studies on Critical Raw Materials (118) which will guide exploration of critical raw materials in Estonia. More generally, Estonia’s material import dependency in 2024 is 22.8%, slightly higher than EU average. Dependency on imports of non-metallic minerals, biomass and fossil energy materials is relatively low, but Estonia is fully dependent on metal ores.

(118) Kriitiliste_toormete_uuringuprogramm

52

Table A5.1: Single Market and Industry

Source: (1) Eurostat, (2) EIB Investment Survey, (3) EIF SME Access to Finance Index, (4) Intrum Payment Report, (5) SAFE survey,

(6) OECD, (7) data up to 2024: Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard, 2025: Commission calculation based on TED data, accessible at the Public Procurement Data Space (PPDS) (*) the value represented here under EU average is the median, (8) Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard, (9) European Commission calculations.

POLICY AREA 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 EU-27

average

78.1 76.1 73.0 72.7 73.0 100.0

19.0 14.2 13.6 12.9 - 12.6

5.8 5.4 6.5 6.2 - 3.9

Business environment

and simplification 5.6 9.5 14.7 14.9 20.0 34.0

0.47 0.36 0.23 0.31 - 0.43

0.41 0.19 0.37 0.22 - 0.19

13.9 13.2 15.3 - - 17.4

11.0 15.9 18.1 - - 13.6

from private entities in the previous

or current quarter - - - 56.7 53.1 47.1

from public entities in the previous or

current quarter - - - 9.0 6.3 15.9

58.1 65.6 59.4 57.0 58.6 40.7

0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.050

25 31 31 28 30 27

9 11 11 13 11 6

1.2 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.3 1

0.9 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.1

100 100 100 100 100 84.6

8 7 10 12 14 25

0.1556 0.2225 0.1597 0.1470 0.1405 0.1462

49.5 50.1 45.5 - - 32.7

37.3 38.5 41.0 42.2 - 25.2

30.5 26.4 21.9 22.8 - 22.4

19.9 21.8 20.5 20.5 - 12.2

Estonia

INDICATOR NAME

Business environment and investment

Productivity and

investment

Labour productivity (GDP per hour worked in PPP terms), % of

EU271

Business investment (share of GDP)1

Public investment (share of GDP)1

Impact of regulation on long-term investment, % of firms

reporting business regulation as a major obstacle2

SME liquidity

EIF Access to Finance for SMEs index - loans3

EIF Access to Finance for SMEs index - equity3

Late payments

Payment gap - corporates B2B, difference in days between

offered and actual payment4

Payment gap - public sector, difference in days between offered

and actual payment4

Share of SMEs experiencing late

payments, %5

Industry and economic security

Single Market

Integration

EU trade integration, average(intra-EU imports + intra EU

exports)/GDP, %1

EEA Services Trade Restrictiveness index6

Public procurement

Single bids, % of total contractors7*

Direct awards, % of negotiated procedures7*

Compliance

Transposition deficit, % of all directives not transposed8

Conformity deficit, % of all directives transposed incorrectly8

SOLVIT, resolution rate per country, %8

Number of pending infringement proceedings8

Energy-intensive

industries

Electricity prices for non-household consumers1

Electrification (electricity as a share of total energy consumption

in industry)1

Share of energy from renewable sources (renewable energy

generation as a share of overall energy consumption)1

Critical raw materials Material import dependency, %1

Circular material use rate1

Operational cleantech

manufacturing capacity

in 20259

- Solar PV (c: cell, w: wafer, M:module), GW 0.07 (m) - Electrolyzer, GW 0.500

- Heat pump assembly - - Battery, GW -

ANNEX 6: SAVINGS, INVESTMENT AND ACCESS TO FINANCE

53

Estonia’s companies rely mainly on internal financing for investments and rely only marginally on funding through the capital markets. The country’s financial sector is dominated by a very concentrated banking sector. Capital markets could play a bigger role in providing financing to the economy. The market capitalisation of Estonia’s stock market is one of the smallest in the EU. Despite joint efforts by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to support an integrated regional capital market, low levels of depth and liquidity prevent them from being upgraded from ‘frontier markets’ to ‘emerging markets’. This acts as a deterrent for institutional investors to invest in those markets. To promote retail investor participation in financial markets, the government introduced an investment account in 2011. Estonia ranks very high in terms of financial literacy. Private-equity and venture- capital funds aimed at SMEs have largely benefited from the support of national and European institutions. Estonia shows some weaknesses in the main indicators of progress with the policy goals of the Savings and Investments Union (see Table A6.1) For Estonia, the 2025 CSRs highlighted the need to improve access to finance, including by promoting institutional investors’ participation in the venture- capital and equity markets.

Business landscape and company funding

The business landscape in Estonia is largely

dominated by SMEs, and by micro enterprises

in particular. Micro firms represent 94.9% of

firms in the country (vs 93.6% in the EU). They employ 38.8% (vs 30.1% in the EU) of the working population and produce 32.2% (vs 20.1% in the EU) of total value added (119) (See Annex 5 for more details).This business landscape has concrete implications for the corporate sector’s demand for funding.

Companies in Estonia fund a large share of

their investments internally. According to the 2025 EIB Investment Survey (120), 75% of Estonian firms’ investment needs are covered by internal funding, compared with an EU average of 66%. The dominant role of internal funding in financing companies is partly due to the Estonian corporate income tax system, under which profits are not taxed until they are paid out as dividends. Another reason for the reliance on internal funding is the fact that Estonian companies are generally micro firms, and external funding is more expensive for smaller companies than it is for large companies. Overall, the number of Estonian firms that report being finance-constrained is one of the highest in the EU (11.6% vs an EU average of 6.1%).

Estonian companies rely only marginally on

funding through the capital markets. At the end of 2024 (see Graph A6.1), finance through loans accounted for 26.7% of total corporate funding in Estonia, similar to the EU average, while listed shares and bonds accounted for only 1.8% of funding (19.1% in the EU). The value of finance

(119) SME Performance Review - Internal Market, Industry,

Entrepreneurship and SMEs.

(120) EIB Investment Survey 2025: Estonia overview.

Table A6.1: Savings and Investments Union summary diagnostic

Source: OECD (pensions), Eurostat (households' financial wealth), FISMA CMU dashboard (VC and PE), national sources (capital taxation). End-2024

Main features Relative EU positioning

Assets at 18.0% of GDP (32.3% in the EU) 10-year real return of 0.0 (1.4% in the EU)

The medium pension assets yield a low real return.

EUR 40 636 per capita (EUR 85 090 in the EU) o/w 3.8% in listed shares and bonds (7.6% in the EU) o/w 13.9% in investment funds (11.0% in the EU) o/w 0.7% in life insurance (13.4% in the EU) o/w 0.0% in pension claims (13.6% in the EU)

A very low share of households' low financial assets is invested in listed shares and bonds, in life insurance and pensions. Savings and Investment Account available,

VC at 0.246% of GDP (0.064% in the EU) PE at 0.609% of GDP (0.487% in the EU)

Very high venture capital and high private equity investments.

Capital gains are taxed at 22%. No tax on dividends since companies only pay when benefits are distributed. Tax on interest income of 22%. Third pillar pension contributions tax refund (calculated on 15% of annual gross income or up to 6 000 EUR)

Relatively low taxes on capital without debt equity bias

1-3 4-10 11-17 18-24 25-27 Colours indicate the country's relative ranking based on five groups, ranging from the three best to the three worst performers. The relative ranking as regards

an SIU diagnostic topic derives from a consistent cross-country comparison, the starting point of which is the average of the underlying main features.

Topic

Asset-backed pension

schemes

Households' financial assets

Venture capital (VC)

Private equity (PE)

Capital taxation

54

though unlisted shares in Estonia was the equivalent of almost 124% of GDP (55% in the EU).

Graph A6.1: Composition of non-financial

corporations' funding

Source: Eurostat. End-2024..

Size and structure of the financial sector

Banks represent the largest share of the

Estonian financial sector, accounting for

about 70% of the country’s financial assets. Nevertheless, the banking system remains relatively small in comparison with other euro area countries. In Q3 2025, Estonian banks’ total assets were equivalent to 112.3% of GDP, significantly below the EU average of 246.1% (see Table A6.2).

The institutional investor base remains

small. Total assets under management by

pension funds, insurance corporations and investment funds (see Graph A6.2) were equivalent to 47% of GDP in Estonia in 2024, (where the average in the EU is equivalent to around 188% of GDP). Domestic institutional investors place only a small portion of their assets on the domestic market.

Authorities from Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have made efforts to develop an

integrated capital market in the Baltic

region. These three Baltic states have been working towards integrating their capital markets’ infrastructure and signed a memorandum of understanding in 2017 to ‘cooperate in developing a deeper and more efficient regional capital market’. This commitment was followed by efforts

to harmonise regulation between the three countries and create pan-Baltic products. The three national central securities depositories (CSDs) were also merged in 2017, resulting in the creation of Nasdaq CSD SE, legally based in Latvia.

The market capitalisation of Estonia’s stock market expressed as a percentage of national GDP is one of the lowest in the EU. Nasdaq Tallinn belongs to the Nasdaq group, which in the EU operates other trading venues in Lithuania and Latvia, as well as in Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Nasdaq Tallinn operates the only regulated market in Estonia, as well as a multilateral trading facility. The country’s equity market is small in terms of both capitalisation and volumes traded. The market capitalisation of listed stocks was equivalent to 10.7% of GDP in Estonia in Q3 2025, which is more than in Lithuania (6.2%) and Latvia (0.8%), but significantly lower than the EU average of 70% of GDP (see Table A6.1). Capital markets in Estonia have contracted in recent years, partly due to the country's 2021 pension reforms, which enabled savers to withdraw funds from pillar 2 pension schemes. In addition, the start of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has led to a deterioration in investor sentiment. Despite the sound macro-economic and institutional frameworks of Estonia and the pan-Baltic region, benefiting from a single market classification by MSCI, index providers continue to classify the three countries as ‘frontier’ markets because of the small size and low liquidity of their securities markets. This ‘frontier’ designation can in turn act as a deterrent for institutional investors to invest in those markets, which can also prevent the markets from reaching the scale and liquidity necessary to be upgraded.

Estonian debt markets remain undersized.

Although the level of government debt sharply increased in 2025, it remains the lowest in the EU, at 23.5% of GDP. This has resulted in a very limited float of sovereign bonds, which typically serve as a benchmark for pricing debt securities. The corporate bond market (see Graph A6.2) is also very small (equivalent to only 1.8% of GDP vs 10.7% in the EU) and activity there was very weak, even when low interest rates prevailed in financial markets over the previous decade.

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Graph A6.2: Capital markets and financial

intermediaries

Source: ECB, OCDE, AMECO. End-2024.

Households’ participation in capital markets

Estonian households’ financial assets are mainly held in non-listed shares, followed by

deposits and investment funds. The saving rate of Estonian households is relatively low and, in absolute terms, they hold relatively few financial assets compared with their EU peers. Unlisted shares (i.e. the capital invested by firms’ owners and kept within firms as retained earnings) represent the largest share of household assets (54% vs 10.6% in the EU). This is followed by bank deposits, equivalent to 37% of GDP, which is slightly below the EU average. Since the country’s 2021 pension reform, households’ financial assets held in insurance and pension funds has fallen from the equivalent of 21% of GDP in 2020 to 1.3% of GDP in 2024 (vs 59% in the EU on average in 2024) (Graph A6.3). However, the percentage of households’ financial assets held in investment funds has increased over the last couple of years, rising to 19.6% of GDP in 2024 (this is still below the EU average of 23.5% of GDP in 2024). Both interest income and capital gains are taxed at 22%.

To promote retail participation in capital

markets, the Estonian government introduced an investment account in 2011.

This account allows taxpayers to invest in a variety of financial instruments, deferring taxes on their investment gains until money is withdrawn from the account. The investment account regime was

amended in 2025 to allow for greater flexibility by: (i) adding new financial instruments such as crowdfunding investments and crypto assets; and (ii) allowing other service providers to offer these investment accounts in addition to credit institutions (e.g. investment firms and payment service providers). This investment account initiative helps to address the 2025 CSR on access to finance. Since its creation in 2025, the number of taxpayers in Estonia who declared an investment account has increased steadily. However, Estonian companies are taxed only when profits are distributed, and many taxpayers use a company to make their investments as this provides more flexibility.

Estonia ranks very high in terms of financial

literacy. According to the 2023 Eurobarometer survey, 39% of Estonians have a high level of financial knowledge, 47% have a medium level, and the remaining 14% possess a low level. In contrast, the EU average is 26% for high literacy, 50% for medium, and 24% for low. The Estonian authorities have put in place a financial literacy strategy for 2021–2030 and from 2023 a separate strategy for pension awareness, the Estonian pension literacy strategy for 2023-2027.

Graph A6.3: Composition of households' financial

assets

Source: Eurostat. End-2024.

The banking sector: resilience and financing of the economy

Estonian banks have remained strong, despite facing a challenging macroeconomic

environment; they are thus not constrained

in their role of funding the economy. Estonia’s

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banking sector has coped relatively well with multiple shocks in recent years, from the pandemic crisis to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the subsequent energy crisis. The common equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio (see Table A6.2) has exhibited a marked downward trajectory in recent years, falling from 30% in 2017 to 19.7% in Q3 2025. However, this ratio is still above the EU average of 16.8%. The return on equity ratio of Estonian banks fell to 14.2% in Q3 2025, but also still significantly exceeds the EU average (9.6%). Banks’ balance sheets show improved asset quality in recent years, with an aggregate non- performing loan ratio of 1.3% in Q3 2025, which is below the EU average of 1.9%. However, the banks’ asset quality outlook is subject to increased uncertainty due to the current conflict in the Middle East and its impact on energy prices and economic growth. Funding risk remains low in general and liquidity ratios remain at a good level (121). The Estonian Central Bank has kept the countercyclical capital buffer rate for banks at 1.5%, in face of rapid growth in lending.

Credit growth to both households and non-

financial companies accelerated in 2025.

After the interest rate cycle turned downwards in 2024, Estonian banks’ portfolio of loans to non- financial companies and households started to grow strongly, reaching an annualised 12% and 9.9% respectively by Q3 2025, which is well above the average in the EU (see Table A6.2) (see Annex 18 for more on access to finance in remote regions). Growth in 2024 and 2025 was driven by strong take-up of both: (i) corporate loans in construction and real estate; and (ii) housing loans to households. Increased demand for loans has also been boosted by falling interest rates on both corporate and household loans (122).

Role of non-bank financial intermediaries

The Estonian insurance sector is very small. The total value of assets of the insurance sector in EU countries is equivalent to 53.9% of GDP on average. By contrast, the figure for insurers registered in Estonia was only 6.6% in Q3 2025

(121) Consolidated banking data | ECB Data Portal.

(122) The Financial Stability Review 2/2025.

(see Table A6.2). The small size of the insurance sector in the country can be explained by the underdevelopment of life insurance. Non-life insurance has the largest share of the total insurance market (87% at the end of Q2 2025) (123). A major role in the Estonian insurance sector is played by mandatory insurance products that are compulsory either by law or as a requirement of a lender financing the purchase of an asset. About half of all insurers operating in the Estonian market are branches of foreign insurance companies. Several Estonian insurers also operate in the Latvian and Lithuanian markets.

The private pension sector remains

underdeveloped and has a limited role in

providing long-term investments to the economy and contributing to the pension

system. The value of assets of Estonian pension funds dropped after the second pillar was made voluntary in 2021 and citizens were free to make early withdrawals. However, pension fund assets have started to rise again more recently, reaching 18% of GDP in 2024, albeit remaining below the EU average of 32.3% (see Table A6.2). No separate occupational pension scheme is in place in Estonia. Nevertheless, employers may contribute to their employees’ pillar 3 pension schemes, although, in practice, this option is not widely used and contributions remain relatively low and irregular. Estonia benefits from a pension tracking system in line with the European Commission Recommendation (124) in this area. In addition, according to OECD data, private pension funds in Estonia invest 79% of their assets in shares (the highest percentage in the EU). Despite this, the 10- year real rate of return in 2024 for these private pension funds was close to zero (despite the high real returns in 2023 and 2024) (see Table A6.2)

Estonia has a relatively small domestic fund

sector. Assets of investment funds were equivalent to 22% of GDP in 2024 (see Graph A6.2), below the EA average of 130%. However, they have increased steadily in recent years, especially for ‘non-public investment funds’ aimed at professional investors. These non-public

(123) The Estonian financial services market.

(124) Commission Recommendation on Pension tracking systems, pension dashboards and auto-enrolment.

57

investment funds constitute 80% of total assets (125) in Estonia’s fund sector.

Venture-capital ecosystem

Venture and growth capital financing has gained traction in the Estonian financial

ecosystem thanks to the combination of: (i) a

thriving ecosystem for start-ups and tech

businesses; and (ii) publicly funded initiatives

(see Annex 4). Over the past decade, new

private-equity and venture-capital funds targeting innovative companies in Estonia have largely benefited from the support of both national promotional institutions (e.g. Enterprise Estonia) and supranational organisations (European Investment Fund, Baltic Innovation Fund, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). Public support has played an essential role in expanding alternative sources of funding and creating a critical mass of investors. Initiatives such as EstFund (established in 2016 by the Estonian government and the European Investment Fund) have encouraged the growth of local private- equity/venture-capital funds. The ecosystem of Baltic SMEs with high growth potential has also benefited from initiatives such as the Baltic Innovation Fund in 2012, which was extended for a further five years in July 2019. This public support has been complemented by a range of organisations that not only foster the entrepreneurial spirit among Estonians but also seek to attract foreign founders and investors, such as pension funds and other private institutional investors. This has injected significant momentum into the Estonian private-equity market. The country’s business-friendly legislation and tax system also support entrepreneurship. These initiatives help to address the 2025 CSR on access to finance.

Even though its venture-capital and private-

equity markets are very young, Estonia

(when adjusted for the size of its economy) is one of the leading private-equity/venture-

capital ecosystems in the EU. According to the CMU dashboard (see Table A6.2), Estonia ranks among the leading countries in private-equity investments relative to GDP (its three-year

(125) Eesti Pank Investment and pension funds statistics.

average of 0.609% in 2024 compares favourably with an EU average of 0.487%) and leads Europe in venture capital relative to GDP (a three-year average of 0.246% in 2024 vs an EU average of 0.064%) (126). Nevertheless, financing gaps (127) have been identified at both: (i) the very early stages of financing of firms, when risk is too high forsome investors, and (ii) the later financing stage, when companies need to ‘scale-up’ and raise large amounts of capital.

(126) Differences in VC/PE indicators across annexes reflect the

use of distinct data sources. Annex 6 uses CMU dashboard data for consistency across CMU indicators, while Annex 4 uses InvestEurope data, which are disaggregated by investment stage. Variations in reported figures are therefore due to underlying source definitions.

(127) See EBRD Estonia diagnostic paper.

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Table A6.2: Financial sector indicators

(1) Annualised data. EU data for credit growth and pension funds refer to the EA average. Source: ECB, Eurostat, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, DG FISMA CMU dashboard, AMECO.

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025-Q3 EU

Total assets of MFIs, % of GDP 99.1 101.1 123.4 121.4 105.1 108.9 114.6 112.3 246.1

Common equity Tier 1 ratio 30.3 25.7 27.0 23.3 20.9 20.9 18.9 19.7 16.8

Total capital adequacy ratio 31.0 26.3 27.8 24.3 22.0 22.2 21.3 23.1 20.2

Overall NPL ratio, % of all loans 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.9

NPL ratio, loans to NFCs 2.2 2.5 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.4 3.5

NPL ratio, loans to HHs 1.3 1.7 1.6 0.9 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.1

Return on equity ratio 1 9.8 8.3 7.4 9.5 10.9 18.5 16.4 14.2 9.6

Loans to NFCs, % of GDP 27.7 25.6 27.4 26.3 25.4 25.6 27.0 27.6 29.3

Loans to HHs, % of GDP 32.9 32.5 35.0 32.9 31.6 31.8 33.2 34.1 43.6

NFC credit growth rate, % 4.7 2.7 3.4 6.8 11.7 5.8 9.3 12.0 2.5

HH credit growth rate, % 6.6 6.4 5.1 7.9 11.1 6.4 7.7 9.9 2.6

Stock market capitalisation, % of GDP 9.9 9.8 9.7 17.2 12.9 13.1 12.6 10.7 69.9

Initial public offerings, % of GDP 0.84 0.00 0.02 0.84 0.23 1.45 0.00 - 0.06

Market funding ratio 24.5 24.1 22.3 22.5 20.5 15.8 16.1 - 49.7

Private equity, % of GDP 0.359 1.041 1.451 1.762 1.379 1.057 0.609 - 0.487

Venture capital, % of GDP 0.055 0.076 0.104 0.222 0.331 0.338 0.246 - 0.064

Financial literacy, composite index - - - - - 46.5 - - 45.5

Bonds, % of HHs' financial assets 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 - 2.8

Listed shares, % of HHs' financial assets 1.4 1.6 2.0 3.4 2.8 3.2 3.4 - 4.8

Investment funds, % of HHs' financial assets 1.2 1.3 1.4 11.9 10.4 12.1 13.9 - 11.0

Insurance/pension funds, % of HHs' financial assets 14.3 15.4 15.4 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.9 - 27.8

Total assets of insurers, % of GDP 7.2 7.0 7.3 7.2 5.9 6.3 6.8 6.6 53.9

Pension assets, bn EUR - - - 5.2 4.7 5.8 7.2 - 5813.8

Pension assets, % of GDP - - - 16.4 12.9 15.3 18.0 - 32.3

10y real return average of pension assets, % - - - - - -0.5 0.0 - 1.4

Pension funds assets, ECB (% of GDP) - 16.7 19.0 - - - - - 23.0

1-3 4-10 11-17 18-24 25-27 Colours indicate performance ranking among the 27 EU Member States.

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An effective institutional framework is

essential for competitiveness. This requires public trust built on integrity, high-quality legislation, regulatory simplification and efficient services for people and businesses. For Estonia, the 2025 country specific recommendations emphasise strengthening fiscal sustainability, enhancing competitiveness and innovation, and ensuring the effective use of EU funding.

Public trust

Graph A7.1: Trust in the justice system, regional /

local authorities and in government

(1) EU-27 since 2019; EU-28 before Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer surveys.

Public trust in the government is slightly

above the EU average (Graph A7.1). Although

trust has risen (Estonia 0.36, EU 0.33) from a historic low in spring 2024, the long-term downward trend is continuing. Confidence in local government is higher, but the overall trend is also downward. To address concerns about the ability of local governments to handle crises, Estonia has worked to increase transparency, accountability and civic engagement by reducing bureaucracy and enhancing regional governance through digital solutions and drawing up regional agreements (128). (See Annex 18).

(128) OECD, 2025, Strengthening Place-Based Regional

Development Policy in Estonia (TSI2022).

Quality of lawmaking

Estonia has a good lawmaking framework

but could improve in terms of reducing

regulatory burdens and effective implementation (Table A7.1). Estonia applies preliminary and simplified regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) to all draft laws. Assessments are expected to explore the impact on competition, innovation, regions and social groups, and the costs and benefits for business, people and government. This approach is backed by systematic training for drafters and a network of public officials, but full RIAs remain rare.

Non-regulatory options are available for all new primary laws. Compliance and enforcement assessments are conducted only for certain proposals, which may limit the effectiveness of legislation on complex or high-impact issues. Under recent reforms the government is required to review all draft laws twice before approval, and a new procedure for assessing the quality of RIAs is being tested. Estonia is boosting legislative quality through initiatives such as the “Principles for legislative policy” covering the period to 2030, ex post evaluations must be carried out systematically to strengthen post-implementation scrutiny. Estonia also identified ways to strengthen evidence-informed policymaking by means of the Technical Support Instrument (129).

Public consultations are conducted via

multiple channels. Early involvement of stakeholders remains inconsistent, limiting opportunities to consider policy options and their impact. Consultation is required for all primary and secondary legislation. Mandatory ex post evaluations focus on effectiveness, competition, the administrative burden and regulatory overlap. These evaluations provide valuable insights, yet their publication is discretionary, which reduces transparency and public accountability. The Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs (Justiits- ja Digiministeerium) and the Government Office (Riigikantselei) coordinate regulatory quality, stakeholder engagement, EU law transposition and reviews of subordinate regulations. While this

(129) OECD, 2025, Strengthening National Evidence-Informed

Policymaking Ecosystems: Lessons from Seven European Countries.

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60

provides structured oversight, there is limited evidence on how effectively these mechanisms improve actual legislative outcomes.

Public service delivery and digitalisation

Graph A7.2: Most time-consuming aspects of

service delivery

Source: European Commission, 2026, Flash Eurobarometer

surveys 567 and 568 on satisfaction with administrative services.

Estonia stands out as a pioneer in

digitalisation and user-friendliness of public

services. Both the public (68%) and businesses

(59%) are among the most satisfied in the EU (130). However, 40% of people would welcome a single point of contact, 39% want more intuitive services

(130) European Commission, 2026, Flash Eurobarometer surveys

567 and 568 on satisfaction with administrative services.

and 38% need clearer guidance on procedures. ID delivery time (131) remains a concern. Although most businesses do not report any challenges in interacting with administrative bodies, 22% find that compliance and reporting is still time- consuming (Graph A7.2).

Estonia offers almost all public services for

people and businesses online (Table A7.2). It has enabled full online access to electronic health records (See also Annex Health and health systems). Digital public administration services are widely valued by both people (81%) and businesses (94%) but remain underused. Companies still prefer email communication with the administration, which suggests potential shortcomings in terms of usability, traceability and guidance. Repeated information requests affect 58% of people — a striking figure given Estonia's state-of-the-art interoperability infrastructure. The infrastructure exists but not all administrative processes have been redesigned to use it (132).

Estonia has made progress in the digitalisation of permitting, including —

building, environmental and business

licences. Estonia's e-construction platform, operational and gradually expanding since 2016, benefits from automated compliance checks and cross-referencing of data from the land, planning

(131) European Commission, forthcoming, Simplification of key life

events.

(132) European Commission, 2026, Flash Eurobarometer surveys 567 and 568 on satisfaction with administrative services.

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Table A7.1: Estonia. Selected indicators on better regulation practices for primary legislation

Source: OECD, 2025, Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025 and Better Regulation across the European Union 2025.

Tools for smart legislation:

Share of possible impacts assessed for all primary laws when developing legislation 1

Regulators are required to identify and quantify the benefits of a new primary law 0

Regulators are required to identify and assess the impacts of alternative non-regulatory options 1

Tools for effective implementation: when developing laws, regulators are required to:

Assess the level of compliance 0

Identify and assess potential enforcement mechanisms 0

Specify the methodology of measuring progress in achieving the law's goals 1

Oversight of better regulation:

There is an external body responsible for reviewing the quality of RIAs and of ex post evacuations 1

There are publicly available assessments of the effectiveness of RIA in modifying regulatory proposals 0

There are reports on the level of compliance by government department with the requirements of RIA 1

There are indicators on the percentage of ex post evaluations that comply with guidelines 0

The effectiveness of ex post evaluations in improving the regulatory stock has been assessed in the last five years 0

61

and property registers. A notification tool launched in 2025 simplified the process for large infrastructure projects involving hundreds of stakeholders. Many environmental permits can be obtained online (133) with pre-filled forms, automatic preliminary controls, helper calculators and deadline reminders. The digitalisation of spatial planning is lagging behind. Under its recovery and resilience plan (134), Estonia is working to simplify the overall process, create uniform standards and automate procedures.

Estonia ranks among Europe's top digital

performers, yet monitoring has highlighted gaps in data quality and deployment. Part of

the problem is staff capacity: this is especially true at local level, where most data owners are small organisations without dedicated data personnel (135). The technical interoperability infrastructure is mature, but the internal workflows and legal frameworks governing data responsibility lag behind (136). That gap complicates the path forward. Estonia is addressing this through its Data and AI White Paper 2024–2030, which sets out reforms encompassing data governance, the once-only principle and AI transparency, acknowledging that infrastructure alone is not enough (137).

Estonia has enabled the cross-border

exchange of data and documents between authorities through the EU Once-Only

(133) Keskkonnaamet, link

(134) Planeerimine.ee, 2026, Planning database and proceedings information system.

(135) European Commission, 2024, Government data-driven decision-making (DDDM) framework implementation.

(136) 2024 Digital Public Administration Factsheet for Estonia (interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu)

(137) Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, 2024, Data and AI White Paper 2024–2030.

Technical System (OOTS)(138). As services via

this system become accessible, people and businesses will no longer have to search for their data, download and upload documents manually across e-government portals in different EU Member States. Estonia has yet to identify the types of documents and data they need to exchange through the system and explore ways to shift from the submission of unstructured to structured data formats. Estonia has one connected registry in the field of education(139).

Civil service

Estonia plans to reduce public-sector staff numbers as part of broader spending and

state-reform measures. The government will cut labour, management, operating and targeted subsidy costs in public administration and state- owned companies by 10% over three years (5% in 2025, 3% in 2026, 2% in 2027) (140). It will also review public sector tasks to remove duplication and bureaucracy. The measures aim to make administration more efficient and reduce the projected budget deficit from 5.6% of GDP in 2025 to around 3% or below in subsequent years (141).

Estonia has a highly skilled civil service and

continues to invest in skills in this field. Participation in lifelong learning has fluctuated in

(138) European Commission, Once-Only Technical System

Acceleratormeter, Ec.europa.eu.

(139) Procedure types under Annex II of the SDGR (2018/1724/EU) and directives 2005/36/EC, 2006/123/EC, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU.

(140) Government of the Republic of Estonia, Estonia Coalition agreement 2024-2027.

(141) Ibid.

Table A7.2: Digital Decade key performance indicators: availability of digital public services

(1) Digital Decade target by 2030: 100. (2) Publishing year, data was collected in the previous year Source: European Commission, State of the Digital Decade report 2025

EU-27

2023 2024 2025 2025

94 96 96 82

99 99 98 86

89 98 100 83Access to electronic health records (0 to 100)

Digital public services for citizens (0 to 100)

Digital public services for businesses (0 to 100)

Estonia

62

recent years, yet remains well above the EU average (Estonia 42%, EU 19% in 2025) (142). The public administration workforce remains younger than the EU average, but is visibly ageing – the ratio of staff below 50 years and those above has declined from 2.6 in 2023 to 1.9 in 2025(143). Aging affects especially local administrations. Gender representation is strong, with women making up 56% of the senior civil service, well above the EU average of 48%, and this proportion has remained stable (144).

The attractiveness of civil service remains

hindered by high workloads and limited resources. Salary growth for senior positions is capped until 2028. Around 10% of Estonia’s labour force hold two jobs concurrently and 2.4% have three or more (145), above the EU average of around 4%. Multiple employment is particularly common in healthcare and social welfare, and the proportion of civil servants with more than one job has increased, partly due to inflation-related income pressures.

Integrity

The perception and experience of corruption

when doing business is low among Estonia’s businesses. Only 32% of businesses consider

corruption to be widespread, (EU 63%). Nevertheless, a significant 74% of respondents believe that overly close links between business and politics lead to corruption, broadly in line with the EU average of 76% (146). Only 9% of businesses consider corruption as a problem when

(142) European Commission, Eurostat, 2026, European Union

Labour Force Survey, Participation rate of employees in education and training (last 4 weeks) by NACE Rev. 2 activity (2008-2026).

(143) European Commission, Eurostat, 2026, European Union Labour Force Survey, Employed persons by economic activity (NACE Rev. 2) (2008-2026).

(144) European Institute for Gender Equality, 2025, Gender Statistics Database.

(145) Estonia Statics report, 2024, 12% töötajatest on korraga rohkem kui üks töökoht | Statistikaamet.

(146) European Commission, 2025, Flash Eurobarometer survey 557 on Businesses' attitudes towards corruption in the EU.

doing business, well below the EU average of 35% (147).

The authorities report good implementation

of the rules on prevention of conflicts of

interest. These rules are still implemented through anti-corruption contact points set up in every ministry. The secondary purpose of this scheme is to familiarise the ministers themselves and their advisers with the rules. It includes compulsory e-training and awareness raising among ministers and political advisers. According to the authorities, those rules have helped to standardise corruption-prevention procedures, which had previously varied between different institutions.

Several measures were introduced to help

combat financial crime, including corruption. According to the authorities, the creation of a district service dedicated to fighting economic crime, including corruption, has led to better streamlining of activities, ensuring consistency and easier access to tools, including training. In 2024, the Ministry of the Interior published a report on how to improve the effectiveness of investigation and prosecution of financial crimes, including corruption.

Justice

The justice system is performing efficiently.

The time taken to reach a decision in civil and commercial cases in first-instance courts decreased from 196 days in 2023 to 185 days in 2024. The estimated time taken to resolve administrative cases at first instance also decreased, from 167 days in 2023 to 137 days in 2024. The quality of the justice system is good overall. Estonia is leading the way digitalising its justice system, reaping the benefits in terms of efficiency and access to justice for people and businesses alike. Estonia performs very well in digital solutions to initiate and follow proceedings in civil/commercial and administrative cases, and in online access for the public to published

(147) European Commission, 2025, Flash Eurobarometer survey

557 on Businesses' attitudes towards corruption in the EU.

63

judgments and regarding arrangements for producing machine-readable judicial decisions (148).

(148) For a more detailed analysis of the performance of the

justice system in Estonia, see the upcoming 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard and the 2025 Rule of Law Report.

SUSTAINABILITY

ANNEX 8: INDUSTRY DECARBONISATION, CIRCULARITY AND CLIMATE MITIGATION

64

Estonia’s industry is undergoing a

transformation to meet climate targets and

remain competitive in a net-zero and circular

setting, but Estonia faces challenges to reduce emissions from effort-sharing sectors. Despite progress, the electrification of road transport and rail — including the upcoming Tallinn-Tartu line — proceeds slowly. For Estonia, the 2025 country- specific recommendations highlighted challenges in raising resource productivity through bio-based innovation and regarding the availability and use of sustainable and less-polluting transport, including by electrifying the rail network, renewing the stock of road vehicles and integrating public transport systems.

Industry decarbonisation

Manufacturing production in Estonia has a

low greenhouse gas (GHG) emission intensity and only accounts for a small share of total

emissions (149). Around 5% of Estonia’s total

emissions are from manufacturing, which is among the lowest in the EU (150). At 189 g CO2eq per euro of gross value added (GVA) in 2024, emission intensity of manufacturing in Estonia lies above the EU average of 200 g CO2eq. Between 2019 and 2024, the emission intensity of

(149) This Annex discusses the transition of Estonia's

manufacturing industry, specifically its energy-intensive industries, to low-carbon and net-zero modes of production, which is key to preserving competitiveness on the path towards climate neutrality as mandated by the European Climate Law. A broader perspective on the current competitiveness challenges facing Estonia's manufacturing industry is provided in Annex 5. For a more detailed description of greenhouse gas emissions from industry, see European Commission (2025), 2025 Country Report - Estonia, Commission staff working document, SWD (2025) 205 final, Brussels, 4.6.2025, Annex A7. Clean industry and climate mitigation.

(150) In 2024. Data on the manufacturing sector exclude the NACE division C19 – manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products, for better match of the sectoral data from Eurostat (gross value added) with those from the UNFCCC under the Common Reporting Format. Also see further indicators on industry decarbonisation, as well as the annotation for further information, in table A8.1 at the end of this Annex. – The manufacture of coke and refined petroleum has been a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions in Estonia, with about 1 mn tons of CO2eq in 2023, accounting for more than 7 % of Estonia’s total greenhouse gas emissions.

Estonia’s manufacturing industry fell by 43%, among the highest in the EU. The share of energy- related emissions in industrial GHG emissions is low at 46%, compared with 58% in the EU overall in 2023; it has fallen by 58 % since 2018. The paper and paper products sector is the largest industrial GHG emitter in Estonia’s manufacturing, with emissions that exceed the EU average for this sector.

Reduction of effort sharing emissions

Compliance with effort sharing limits with

domestic measures

Estonia’s effort sharing emissions are projected to be above its target in 2030;

previous years’ unused emission allocations

would not suffice to cover the gap for compliance with the Effort Sharing Regulation (151). In 2024, GHG emissions from Estonia’s effort sharing sectors are expected to have been 4.3% below 2005 levels (152). By 2030, current and planned policies and measures are expected to lead to a decrease by 18.1%, leaving a gap of 5.9 percentage points to the 2030 target of −24%. Estonia could bridge part of this gap with own unused annual emission allocations from previous

(151) The national GHG emission reduction target is set out in

Regulation (EU) 2018/842 (the Effort Sharing Regulation). It applies jointly to buildings (heating and cooling), road transport, agriculture, waste and small industry (known as the effort sharing sectors). The emissions from effort sharing sectors for 2024 are based on approximated inventory data. The final data will be estimated in 2027 after a comprehensive review. Projections about the impact of current policies (‘with existing measures’, WEM) and additional policies (‘with additional measures’, WAM) as per Estonia’s 2025 reporting under Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (the Governance Regulation). Estonia’s additional measures will be outlined in the Climate-Resilient Economy Act, tentatively expected by mid-2026. Also see European Commission (2025), Climate Action Progress Report 2025 – Technical Information, Commission staff working document, Brussels, Chapter 9 (pp. 111ff.), and in particular Tables 25 and 26.

(152) Based on final GHG inventories notified in 2026, Estonia’s effort sharing emissions in 2024 were 7.3 % below the levels of 2005. The change may also impact the above assessment of progress under the Effort Sharing Regulation, which will only be fully established after the publication of the European Semester country report.

65

years but would also need transfers of allocations from other Member States to comply with the Effort Sharing Regulation. The timely implementation of its additional measures and identification of new ones will remain crucial for Estonia to progress towards climate neutrality.

Sustainable transport

Graph A8.1: Greenhouse gas emissions in the

effort sharing sectors, 2005, 2023, and 2024

Source: European Environment Agency.

Swift action on decarbonising transport

appears particularly pressing in Estonia, as

road transport retains its dominant share in

land transport. In 2024, 48% of Estonia’s effort sharing emissions came from road transport (153), which is a 27% increase from 2005 levels.For Estonia, the 2025 country-specific recommendations highlighted a number of challenges concerning the availability and use of sustainable and less-polluting transport. They included electrification of the rail network, renewal of the stock of road vehicles and integration of public transport systems.

Estonia is making progress on charging

infrastructure and electrification of the

railway network, but the uptake of electric

vehicles remains slow. In 2023, four fifths of

inland freight transport in Estonia took place by road and one fifth by rail. For passenger transport, cars accounted for 83%, buses and coaches for 1% and rail for 2.3% (154). Estonia has over 635 cars per 1 000 inhabitants (2024), a figure that has increased significantly over the last decade and is above the EU average. Estonia also has the oldest car fleet in Europe, with about one third of

(153) See Graph A8.1, and Table A8.1 at the end of this Annex.

(154) Eurostat.

its cars being more than 20 years old (155). The share of battery electric vehicles in new car registrations has remained low and even fell from 2023 to 2024, to 5%. Including plug-in hybrid electric vehicles increases the share of electric vehicles to 10%, which is 11% lower than the EU average. The share of electric vehicles in the total fleet remains below 1% (156). The Motor Vehicle Tax Act, in force since January 2025, provides for a lower tax for fully electric vehicles, but its overall impact on car fleet renewal and decarbonisation needs to be further monitored, particularly because older (non-electric) cars also enjoy lower rates. Meanwhile, the infrastructure needed to support the use of electric vehicles is improving, with almost 2 000 publicly accessible charging points in 2025, representing a year-on-year increase of 88% (157). Estonia is also expected to finalise the electrification of the Tallinn-Tartu railway line by the end of 2026, while the electrification of the Tallinn-Narva railway line is not expected before 2027. However, the construction of the Rail Baltica railway system, connecting Estonia to the rest of Europe, is delayed and is not expected before 2030 (see also Annex 19).

Sustainable industry

Circular economy industry

Estonia’s circular economy strategy is

ambitious, but implementation remains uneven, with slow adoption of secondary

materials. In 2023, Estonia published an action

plan for a circular economy under its recovery and resilience plan. The action plan groups together 10 key actions from various policy sectors. Other circular-economy-related activities in the plan include support for the digitalisation of the economy, the reskilling of workers and the adoption of resource-efficient green technologies. Between 2021 and 2023, a project was carried out to promote a circular economy by developing circular economy road maps for all municipalities

(155) 32.3%, [road_eqs_carhab] Passenger cars - per thousand

inhabitants.

(156) New registrations of electric cars in Europe | Indicators | European Environment Agency (EEA).

(157) See Infrastructure | European Alternative Fuels Observatory.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2005 2023 2024

M tC

O 2

e

Domestic transport (excl. aviation) Buildings (under ESR) Agriculture Small industry Waste

66

in Estonia. As a result, 79 road maps were prepared. The road maps are mostly informative and their implementation is not monitored (158).

Estonia is on track to decouple municipal

waste generation from economic growth. It has made slow but steady progress over the past decade in increasing its recycling rate. Although Estonia is one of the Member States with the lowest municipal waste generation per capita, concerns have been raised about the lack of a unified data management system at local level and the quality of the data provided. Estonia has diverted municipal waste away from landfill. In 2022, the incineration rate reached 42%, while the landfill rate fell to 13%, which is close to the 2035 target (159).

Resource productivity in Estonia is dragged down by resource-intensive industries. In 2024, Estonia generated EUR 1.15 per kg of material, compared with the EU average of EUR 2.99. In domestic extraction used, which is a significant component within the domestic material consumption, fossil fuels (including oil shale) still represent a large share for Estonia (around 20%, at 6.9 tonnes per capita) (160). (see also Annex 5)

Only 4.5% of all procurements and 17% of

the total procurement costs are accounted

for by green public procurement (GPP) (161). The total value of public procurement in Estonia was EUR 3.7 billion, which makes up 14% of Estonia’s GDP and 32% of the state budget (). On 1 January 2022, mandatory GPP criteria were introduced for the central government sector for furniture, cleaning products and services, copying and graphic paper, and computers and monitors. In 2023, a Regulation entered into force on environmental criteria and conditions in procurement documents for the procurement of road vehicles comprising the subject matter of the procurement contract. It sets out the conditions for

(158) Based on available assessments of Estonia’s circular

economy policy framework, which indicate that while many road maps exist, they mainly serve as guidance documents and lack formal monitoring or enforcement mechanisms.

(159) [env_wasmun] Municipal waste by waste management operations.

(160) Statistics Estonia

(161)European Commission, Environmental Implementation Review, Estonia country report,2025 Link. 

procuring environmentally friendly light vehicles, trucks and buses.

The 2021-2028 waste management plan envisages the implementation of measures under the circular economy strategy for products containing critical raw materials. It also sets the following aims: (i) increasing qualifications and skills for the effective use of resources under the green transition and the circular economy; and (ii) raising awareness of practices and behaviours for sustainable consumption and in relation to the circular economy.

The circular material use rate (CMUR) is a measure of one aspect of circularity: the share of the total amount of material used in the economy that is accounted for by recycled waste. Estonia’s CMUR has been increasing since 2014 and reached 20.5% in 2023 and still remained above the EU average of 12.1% (162).

Finally, as of September 2024, Estonia had 1 874 of the 109 096 products and 22 of the 3 384 licences registered under the EU Ecolabel scheme, indicating a low take-up of licences in particular(163)). Moreover, 19 organisations from Estonia are currently registered in the Eco- Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), one fewer than in 2021.

Bioeconomy industry

Estonia’s bioeconomy vision (164) is guided by

the Circular Bioeconomy Road Map for 2023-

2035, which aims to increase the added value derived from local bio-resources and to

position Estonia as a competitive,

innovation-driven bioeconomy within the

European context (165). While bioeconomy value added has lagged behind domestic GDP growth in Estonia in recent years, it has nonetheless remained in positive territory, reflecting an upward trend. A notable exception is the bio-based chemicals and plastics manufacturing sector, which has outpaced GDP, with value added growth

(162) Eurostat, circular material use rate, Link.

(163) Ecolabel facts and figures – European Commission.

(164) Bioeconomy | Ministry of Regional Affairs and Agriculture.

(165) Estonian Ministry of Rural Affairs (2023), Circular Bioeconomy Roadmap 2023–2035, Available at: https://www.agri.ee.

67

averaging 7.5% between 2018 and 2023, signalling the emergence of higher-value, innovation-driven activity within Estonia’s traditionally resource-based bioeconomy (166). Employment trends tell a similar story: overall bioeconomy employment has fallen slightly. This pattern was observed across most subsectors, but the bio-based chemicals and plastics subsector stands out again, with strong employment growth of 7.4% over the same period (167). Labour productivity in the bioeconomy, measured as value added per person employed, stood at 75.0% of the national average and has edged slightly downward from 79.5% in 2018. On the innovation front, R&D business expenditure from bioeconomy-relevant subsectors has grown marginally faster than overall R&D expenditure in Estonia (18.5% compared with an average of 17.4% between 2018 and 2023), a modest but encouraging signal of rising private sector interest in bioeconomy research (168).

Zero-pollution industry

The air quality in Estonia is generally good,

with some positive development trends in

recent years. The latest available annual estimates (for 2022) by the European Environment Agency (EEA) for Estonia attribute 90 deaths each year (or 880 years of life lost (YLL)) to fine particulate matter (PM2.5), 20 deaths each year (or 180 YLL) to nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and 130 deaths each year (or 1 300 YLL) to ozone (169).

Emissions of several air pollutants have

decreased significantly in Estonia since

2005, while GDP growth has continued (see Figure 16). According to the inventories submitted under Article 10(2) of the National Emission Reduction Commitments Directive (NECD) in 2024, Estonia has met its emission reduction commitments for 2020-2029 for the following air pollutants: nitrogen oxides (NOx), non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC), sulfur dioxide (SO2), ammonia (NH3) and PM2.5. According to the latest projections submitted

(166) Joint Research Centre, Developments of Economic Growth

and Employment in Bioeconomy Sectors across the EU, Link.

(167) Ibid.

(168) Joint Research Centre, Business expenditure in Research and Development (R&D) in the EU bioeconomy, Link,.

(169) . EEA, Harm to human health from air pollution in Europe: burden of disease status, 2024, Link.

under Article 10(2) of the NECD in 2023, Estonia is projected to meet its emission reduction commitments for 2030 onwards for NOx, NMVOC, SO2, NH3 and PM2.5. Estonia submitted its updated national air pollution control programme to the Commission on 30 March 2023.In 2023, no exceedances above the limit values set by the Ambient Air Quality Directive were registered in Estonia.Emissions of key air pollutants have decreased significantly over the last few years, but it would be beneficial for Estonia to continue to address emissions to air from fossil fuels and other emission sources by replacing them with cleaner solutions.

As regards industrial emissions to water,

Estonia has the fifth lowest emissions of

heavy metals to water and is the eighth lowest for emission intensity (below the EU average intensity of 0.864 kg/EUR 1 billion GVA). The main industrial contributors to emissions to water in Estonia are the energy sector and the pulp, paper and wood sector for heavy metals. Water pollution by industry imposes direct and indirect costs of around EUR 1 million a year for the country (170).

(170) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment,

IEEP, Green taxation and other economic instruments – Internalising environmental costs to make the polluter pay, 2021, Link.

68

Table A8.1: Key clean industry and climate mitigation indicators: Estonia

Sources and notes: Industry decarbonisation: All data are from Eurostat; data following the UNFCCC Common Reporting Format (CRF) are from the European Environment Agency (EEA), republished by Eurostat. (1) Sectors covered: all divisions of section C - Manufacturing - of the NACE Rev. 2 statistical classification of economic activities, except C19 (manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products). (2) GHG emissions as per UNFCCC Common Reporting Framework (CRF) categories 1.A.2 - fuel combustion in manufacturing in industries and construction (that broadly correspond to the broadly correspond to the NACE sections C - Manufacturing and E - Construction, excluding C-19), and CRF2 - industrial processes and product use. The figures shows the emissions in the 1.A.2 category as a share of the sum of CRF1.A.2. and CRF2 emissions. (3) Sectors covered: CRF 1.A.2 as described above. Gross value added (GVA) data in the denominator aligned in sectoral coverage, in 2020 prices. (4) Sectors covered: NACE section C excluding C19. (5) Nominator: NACE divisions C17, 20, 23, 24; denominator: NACE section C excluding C19 (see above). (6) GVA (denominator) in 2020 prices. Reduction of effort sharing emissions: Data source: European Environment Agency, greenhouse gas data viewer; European Commission, Climate Action Progress Report, 2025. For details, see the footnote in the "Reduction of effort sharing emissions" section. Sustainable road transport: (7) Source: Eurostat; (8) Source: European Alternative Fuels Observatory; (9) Source: Eurostat. For all climate mitigation indicators, the trend arrows compare the latest available data (year t) with the data four years earlier (t-4). Sustainable industry: Bioeconomy value added, employment

and productivity: JRC, Developments of Economic Growth and Employment in Bioeconomy Sectors across the EU. Bioeconomy R&D business expenditure: JRC, Business expenditure in Research and Development (R&D) in the EU bioeconomy. Damage cost for industrial pollution: EEA, The costs to health and the environment from industrial air pollution in Europe, 2024. Water industrial pollutants releases: EEA, Industrial releases of pollutants to water and economic activity in the EU-27, 2024. Water chemical status: WISE, Surface water bodies: Chemical status, 2024 and WISE Groundwater bodies: chemical status, 2024. Other indicators: Eurostat. For circular economy indicators, the trend arrows compare the latest available data (year t) with the data two years earlier (t-2).

Climate mitigation Trend

Industry decarbonisation 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2018 2023

GHG emissions intensity of manufacturing production, g/€ (1) 329 331 176 114 148 154 189 330 -

Share of energy-related emissions in industrial GHG emissions (2) 49.5 50.9 58.8 51.2 49.2 46.2 - 55.5 57.9

Energy-related GHG emissions intensity of manufacturing and

construction, g/€ (3) 175.4 172.9 119.3 83.7 79.1 73.6 - 203.9 163.0

Share of electricity and renewables in final energy consumption in

manufacturing, % (4) 48.9 43.5 49.7 54.4 56.1 58.9 61.1 42.8 43.9

Energy intensity of manufacturing, GWh/€ (4) 1.40 1.25 1.16 1.07 1.09 1.12 1.79 1.27 1.05

Share of energy-intensive industries in manufacturing production, % in GVA (5) 12.15 11.13 10.44 10.94 10.01 8.82 9.46 - -

GHG emissions intensity of production in sector [...], g/€ (6) - paper and paper products (NACE C17) 622 720 940 955 1 035 953 838 722 619 - chemicals and chemical products (NACE C20) 173 175 128 193 348 274 248 - - - other non-metallic mineral products (NACE C23) 3 604 3 906 667 310 499 733 790 2 495 2 352 - basic metals (NACE C24) 199 169 176 103 118 116 86 2 842 3 099

Reduction of effort sharing emissions 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2018 2023

GHG emission reductions relative to base year, % -7.8 -7.4 -9.7 -4.3

- domestic road transport 18.2 16.8 9.8 13.2 18.1 18.2 26.5 -1.4 -5.6 - buildings -11.5 -19.1 -23.2 -26.7 -41.9 -44.1 -29.3 -20.3 -33.5

2005 2021 2022 2023 2024 Target WEM WAM

Effort sharing: GHG emissions, Mt; target, gap, % 6.2 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.9 -24.0% -18.1% -18.1%

Sustainable road transport 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2018 2021

New zero-emission vehicles, electricity motor, % (7) 0.32 0.28 1.78 2.15 3.37 6.30 5.14 1.03 8.96

Number of publicly accessible AC/DC charging points (8) - - 56 74 147 594 1051 1976 446956 n/a

Share of electrified railways, % of total (9) 11.37 11.83 11.83 19.28 11.91 11.96 11.96 55.47 56.49

Sustainable industry Trend EU-27

Circular economy transition 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2018 latest data

Material footprint, tonnes per person 31.4 28.6 27.9 27.1 25.0 23.3 24.9 14.8 13.7

Circular material use rate, % 13.8 15.2 16.3 19.9 21.8 20.5 20.5 11.6 12.2

Resource productivity, €/kg 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 2.1 3.0 Employees in circular economy 3.8 3.8 3.7 4.2 7.3 7.9 - 2.1 2.0

Patents in circular economy 0 - - 1.0 12.3 12.0

Recycling rate 28.0 30.8 28.9 30.3 33.4 37.9 36.4 46.40 48.1

Plastic recyling 38% 41% 41% 42% 44% 42% - 41% 42%

Construction and demolition waste (CDW) recovery 95 - 93 88 89

Bioeconomy industry   2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 CAGR 2018-

2023 2018 2023

Value added, million EUR 1 766 1 881 1 923 2 294 2 654 2 192 - 3.7% 642 438 863 436

Employment, total number of people employed 62 738 61 700 60 777 60 832 59 476 58 958 - -1.0% 17 649 040 17 085 642

Productivity

Valued added per worker, thousand EUR 28.1 30.5 31.6 37.7 44.6 37.2 - 4.7% 36.4 50.5

Valued added per worker, % of national average 79.5 79.7 83.5 88.8 92.7 75.0 - - 62.2 70.7

R&D business expenditure

Total bioeconomy (biomass producing and converting sectors) 7 9 12 15 20 20 18.5% 15 672 23 335

Total R&D business expenditure 155 242 264 308 361 406 - 17.4% 196 587 259 525

Zero pollution industry 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2018 2021

Damage cost for industrial pollution 3.6 1.7 1.0 1.2 - - - 414.9 352.7

Water industrial pollutants releases

2021 change

(2010) 2021

change

(2010) 2021

change

(2010) 2021 change (2010)

232 8% 450 100 -42% 24 839 400 23% 18 700 -64%

Water chemical status Good 72 Good (%) 0.1 Poor 57.0 Poor (%) 8%

EU

TOC Phosporus

Estonia

Estonia

Cd, Hg, Ni, Pb nitrogen

ANNEX 9: AFFORDABLE ENERGY TRANSITION

69

This annex outlines the progress made and

the ongoing challenges faced in increasing

energy affordability, while advancing the transition to net zero. It reflects the

implementation of past energy-related country- specific recommendations.

Estonia’s core challenges are to manage the

phase-out of oil shale-fuelled electricity

generation (leaving only a tightly governed strategic reserve for exceptional situations)

by 2035, and to continue rapidly scaling up

new generation and controllable capacity to

help bring down energy prices and further

secure the country’s energy independence.

Other crucial challenges include fully synchronising the market with the Continental Europe Synchronous Area to strengthen cross-border trade, and tackling the major issue of heat loss from the ageing multi-apartment housing stock which is a key driver of winter energy demand.

Energy prices and costs

Retail gas prices for household and industrial

consumers in Estonia have been increasing

since 2024, whereas retail electricity prices have remained stable and below the EU

average. During the first half of 2025, household gas and electricity prices in Estonia remained below the EU average, at EUR 0.0856 /kWh and EUR 0.2298/kWh respectively.

Electricity prices for industrial consumers

have followed a similar trend, i.e. remaining

significantly below the EU average, while gas

prices for industrial consumers have

remained slightly above the EU average and on an upward trend since 2024. Imbalances continue to be observed in final energy prices in Estonia. For industry, electricity was 2.2 times more expensive than gas during the first half of 2025, and for non-household consumers, taxes and levies accounted on average for 8% of electricity bills but only 2% of gas bills. Excluding taxes and levies, the electricity-to-gas price ratio would have fallen to 2.1, meaning that Estonia’s

fiscal measures have no balancing effect (171) For household consumers, the effect of taxes and levies on the electricity-to-gas price ratio is non- existent (172).

Graph A9.1: Electricity and gas prices for

household and non-household consumers, first

half of 2025

(i) For household consumers, the consumption band is DC for electricity and D2 for gas. (ii) For non-household consumers, the consumption band is ID for electricity and I4 for gas. VAT and recoverable charges are not displayed for non-household consumers as these are typically recovered by businesses. This also applies to the ‘% of taxes and levies’, which is shown excluding VAT and recoverable charges for non-household consumers. (iii) ‘Without taxes and levies’ indicates the retail price excluding all taxes and levies. It always includes the energy/supply and network cost components, which are not disaggregated in Eurostat’s six-monthly price dataset. Source: Eurostat

Due to the growing share of clean energy in Estonia’s electricity mix, wholesale electricity prices in Estonia averaged 83 EUR/MWh in 2025, below the EU average of 85 EUR/MWh.

Fossil fuels accounted for over 32.1% of

Estonia’s electricity generation in 2025, the

eighth highest share in the EU, while natural gas maintained its structural role as the

marginal price-setting technology, keeping

costs elevated. Short run marginal costs of gas in the EU increased from EUR 96/MWh to nearly EUR 103/MWh in 2025. Nevertheless, average day-ahead electricity prices decreased by 7% in 2025 amid rising natural gas procurement costs. The effect of the latter on electricity prices was

(171) A 'balancing effect' would occur if the fiscal system

narrowed the electricity-to-gas price ratio, thereby supporting electrification.

(172) Analysis based on S1 2025 Eurostat data.

70

largely offset thanks to the growing penetration of renewables in Estonia’s energy mix. Although daytime prices have fallen in recent years owing to the growing penetration of solar power, Estonia’s remains vulnerable to severe price spikes during peak-demand hours. This is notably due to falling solar output in the evening and early morning, combined with limited non-fossil flexibility which requires gas-fuelled plants to significantly ramp- up generation to cover the supply–demand gap, especially during the winter months. As a result, price spreads in Estonia averaged EUR 159/MWh in 2025, up 3% from 2024 while significantly above the EU average of EUR 121/MWh.

Graph A9.2: Low-carbon electricity generation vs.

electricity wholesale prices, 2025

Unavailable data for Cyprus and Malta. Wholesale price is given as average of day-ahead electricity prices over 2025. EU-27 average is calculated as consumption-weighted. EU low-carbon share is calculated out of total EU electricity generation. Low-carbon share by country is calculated out of total public electricity generation. Low-carbon includes renewables and nuclear. Source: Eurostat

Flexibility and electricity grids

In February 2025, Estonia, alongside Latvia

and Lithuania, disconnected from the

Russian-operated IPS/UPS electricity system and successfully synchronised with the

Continental European Synchronous Area

(CESA) via Poland. The synchronisation with CESA allows the three Baltic countries to manage their electricity systems, ensuring stable and reliable frequency regulation, thereby increasing energy independence and energy security throughout the region.

Estonia is part of the Baltic capacity

calculation region (CCR) (173). It is connected to Finland and Latvia and indirectly to Sweden via the Estlink interconnectors and the Baltic transmission network. In 2024, regional electricity trading continued to be influenced by dependence on imports from Nordic countries, in particular Finland. Congestion on the Estlink interconnectors prevented full price convergence with Finland. Moreover, cross-border capacity with Latvia was limited at times, affecting market integration with the rest of the Baltic region. Member States must ensure that a minimum of 70% of technical cross- border capacity is available for trading. The small size of Estonia’s wholesale electricity market and its reliance on oil shale generation, which is often the main driver of prices (especially when renewable generation is low), continue to pose challenges, stressing the need for new dispatchable capacities.

The EU has set a target for Member States to

reach an electricity interconnection level of

at least 15% by 2030, however Estonia has

already reached 89.04% and is therefore

well above the EU target. This served as an

important basis when Estonia’s electricity grid was successfully synchronised with the EU grid in February 2025. Investments related to this synchronisation project have been progressing well, however it is crucial for the upgrades to Estlink 1 and Estlink 2, which have suffered delays, to be accelerated. Further attention should also be paid to advancing ELWIND, the joint Estonian-Latvian offshore wind project. Other important projects which Estonia is currently involved in to improve cross-border interconnections and thus ensure its energy market operates efficiently include EstLink 3 between Estonia and Finland and the ‘fourth interconnection’ between Estonia and Latvia (both of which could be completed by 2035). Price differentials between Finland and Estonia and recent incidents affecting undersea cables underscore the importance of these projects. Estonia is an active participant in the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) High-Level Group which is aimed at boosting cooperation with neighbouring countries in the Baltic region.

(173) Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and Sweden are

part of the Baltic capacity calculation region (CCR). A CCR is a group of countries that calculate cross-border electricity trade flows together.

71

Estonia is actively increasing its energy

flexibility by means of energy storage,

demand response solutions and market integration. Eesti Energia has developed

Estonia’s first large-scale battery energy storage system, with a capacity of 26.5MW, which it brought into operation in early 2025. Moreover, it is preparing other larger projects. Other renewable energy operators have also started constructing battery energy storage systems in Estonia (as stand-alone systems or coupled with additional generation capacity), some of which were brought into operation at the end of 2025, while others are expected to enter operation in 2026.

Estonia has rolled out a smart metering system (99% penetration) that gives all

consumers access to granular information

about their energy usage. Dynamic price contracts are offered to household consumers, facilitated by the availability of smart meters. Unlike in 2021-2023, the Estonian government did not implement direct compensation measures for household energy bills in 2025. It instead shifted its focus to long-term strategies to enhance energy security and stabilise prices, offering support for vulnerable and energy-poor households. Energy poverty primarily affects the most vulnerable groups in Estonia (see Annex 12).

In relation to energy communities, Estonian

legislation defines the concepts of energy

communities (ECs) and renewable energy communities (RECs) and lays down certain

rights and obligations in this regard. According to the final version of Estonia’s updated 2021-2030 national energy and climate plan, Estonia is planning to promote individual and collective self-consumption of renewable energy and RECs by issuing an REC handbook. The national energy and climate plan does not set quantitative targets for self-consumption or for ECs. Overall, the legal framework for energy communities would benefit from further improvements.

In 2024, electricity accounted for 19.4% of

Estonia’s final energy consumption (FEC)

(slightly below the EU average of 23.4%), a share which has increased slightly over the

last decade (174), partly due to an

unfavourable electricity-to-gas price ratio

that disincentivises electrification and cost-

effective decarbonisation. Electricity accounts for 20.6% and 31.3% of household and industrial FEC respectively (see Annex 8). In the transport sector, the share of FEC accounted for by electricity is negligible at 0.6%. Further progress in electrification across sectors would help to cost- effectively decarbonise the economy and bring the benefits of affordable renewable generation to consumers.

Renewables and long-term contracts

In 2025, Estonia’s share of renewables in its net electricity generation was one of the

highest in the EU (67.9%) (175) an increase of

5.3 percentage points compared to the previous year (62.7% in 2024). Installed

capacity for renewables represented 2 684 MW in 2025. The installed capacity for wind energy stalled to 0.7 GW in 2025 (compared to 0.69 GW in 2024) whilst installed capacity for solar grew (+12.2% compared to 2024), reaching 1 GW.(176)

(174) The CAGR (compound annual growth rate) was -1.07%

between 2015 and 2024. The minimum/maximum shares were 19.4% and 24.3% respectively. (Source: Eurostat)

(175) Eurostat (nrg_cb_pem)

(176) International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) - Renewable Capacity Statistics 2026

72

Graph A9.3: Estonia’s installed renewable capacity

vs electricity generation mix

Electricity mix is given as net electricity generation (gross electricity production minus consumption of power stations’ auxiliary services). Electricity produced in pumped hydro plants is excluded from total net electricity production, as it was previously counted as electricity produced from another source. “Other” includes renewable municipal waste, solid biofuels, liquid biofuels, and biogas. Source: IRENA, Eurostat

Estonia’s share of renewable electricity is legally mandated to cover 100% of the gross final electricity consumption by 2030(177). Wind power will become the primary source of renewable electricity, with 2.8 GW of onshore wind capacity expected to come online by 2030, with offshore not coming online until after 2030. Solar capacity is projected to reach approximately 1.5 GW by 2030 (178). However, according to the Estonian Ministry of Climate, existing renewable energy units under development are not sufficient to meet the 100% target.

Estonia is reforming its energy infrastructure

permitting processes to boost the development of renewables. Estonia amended

its national legislation in 2024 and early 2026 in order to streamline the planning, permitting and environmental impact assessment processes for wind energy projects on state-owned land, and to establish the concept of priority development areas for wind power (1 000 MW total capacity). These efforts were part of Estonia’s recovery and resilience plan. Estonia has since implemented a comprehensive audit of its permitting processes and has now aligned them more closely with the Commission’s recommendation on permit-granting procedures for renewable energy projects. A single contact point has been set up to mediate

(177) Energy Sector Organisation Act

(178) Estonian updated NECP.

discussions between project developers and the relevant authorities, and regular public hearings are organised in a timely manner.

All permit procedures have been digitalised which has improved efficiency and transparency. Environmental legislation lays down clear deadlines, including a maximum duration for the entire permitting process. Additionally, Estonia has taken significant steps towards promoting training and knowledge sharing, with a particular focus on wind energy. More could be done, e.g. allowing sandboxing, since barriers to permit-granting may be delaying the development of more innovative research projects. Estonia has committed to reaching 400 MW of installed onshore wind capacity by 2026 as part of the ‘wind pledges’ under the European wind power action plan. However, in 2025 only one auction was successful while another failed to result in an award. Estonia announced in March 2026 onshore wind energy reverse auctions with an annual volume of 1 TWh and the option to increase the procurement to 2 TWh. Production must start no later than December 31, 2030, though it may begin earlier. The power purchase agreement (PPA) market in Estonia has not yet matured and remains underdeveloped. In total, only four PPA deals were concluded between 2021-2024 and no PPAs were signed in 2025. Estonia’s national energy and climate plan includes measures to boost the PPA market, such as allowing the network operator to cover up to 50% of network losses through renewable PPAs.

Energy efficiency

In 2024, Estonia’s final energy consumption

(FEC) increased to 2.93 Mtoe, mainly due to

statistical adjustments. The overall increase in FEC in 2024, relative to 2023, concerned the following three sectors: industry (+46.5%), transport (+17.5%) and services (+21.2%). While for medium-term services FEC has decreased substantially (-5.3% since 2019), notable increases have been seen in industry (7.6%) and transport (15.6%).

Between 2019 and 2024, final energy consumption in Estonia’s residential sector

remained largely unchanged. Very little improvement was achieved through technical

73

energy savings by households. Moreover, the limited energy savings achieved as a result of the weather conditions and increased size of dwellings was offset by the expansion of the housing stock. In addition, Estonia did not set an energy savings objective in its long-term renovation strategy.

Given that buildings are responsible for 46.1% of energy use in Estonia, they play an

important role in improving energy

efficiency. Estonia is therefore encouraged to

submit its draft national building renovation plan pursuant to the recast of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive to ensure a clear and predictable pathway towards an energy efficient and decarbonised building stock. Heating and cooling account for 82% of Estonia’s residential final energy consumption, with renewables supplying 61% of total energy used for heating and cooling across all sectors. Approximately 11 000 heat pumps were sold in 2024, a decrease of 43% compared to the previous year, taking Estonia’s total stock of heat pumps nearly 260 000.

Estonia reported four energy labelling checks

in 2025 and no ecodesign checks. This is considered insufficient relative to the size of the country and overall levels of non-compliance in the EU and is possibly a breach of Estonia’s legal obligations.

Security of supply and diversification

As early as 2022, Estonia banned imports

and purchases of Russian natural gas.

Demand for natural gas in Estonia dropped by 28% between August 2022 and July 2024, which was well beyond the EU’s 15% target. Estonia accesses natural gas via Lithuania’s floating storage regasification unit (FSRU) in Klaipeda (called ‘Independence’), Finland’s Inkoo FSRU via the Balticconnector and Latvia’s Inčukalns underground storage facility.

Estonia’s energy mix has seen a notable shift

towards renewables between 2023 and

2024, from 35% to 40%. Domestically sourced

oil shale remains an important source of energy but it share of the energy mix has decreased importantly, from 30% in 2023 to 25% in 2024. Oil and petroleum products still represents 27% of

the mix as it did in 2023, and the share of natural gas increased slightly from 6% to 7% (179).

Estonia is establishing a national framework for nuclear energy, but requires a clearer deployment path through finalized site selection and closer cooperation between technology suppliers and off- takers. Key technical hurdles remain in planning the nuclear fuel cycle and waste management. Furthermore, Estonia faces financing challenges due to its newcomer status and small domestic market, alongside significant workforce gaps that necessitate participation in EU-level training initiatives. Given the technology’s profile, sustained stakeholder engagement is essential to maintain public acceptance.

In response to rising energy prices following

the regional crisis in the Middle East, Estonia

has cancelled a planned rise in excise duties

for energy carriers and is processing a

proposal to reduce the renewable energy fee

by 85% for high-consumption firms. Estonia

contributed approximately 0.3 million barrels to the IEA collective action to release 400 million barrels of emergency oil reserves.

(179)Source: EUROSTAT, Gross Inland Consumption.

Note for readers: Estonia's raw GIC figures show a negative value for oil and petroleum products (−54 ktoe in 2024), which creates an analytical distortion. This occurs because GIC records oil shale extraction and petroleum product exports on separate lines without linking them. Estonia processes a significant share of its oil shale into shale oil through coal liquefaction plants, which is then entirely exported (Source: IEA 2023 Estonia Energy Policy Review). The GIC methodology captures the full oil shale extraction as a positive input and the resulting petroleum exports as a negative outflow on a separate line, effectively double- counting the same energy in opposite directions. The result is an overstated oil shale figure and a meaningless negative petroleum value, obscuring over 1100 ktoe of genuine domestic petroleum consumption.

To correct this, DG ENER subtracted the transformation output of Estonia's coal liquefaction plants (Eurostat nrg_bal_s: 1167 ktoe in 2024, 1171 ktoe in 2023) from the oil shale GIC line and added it back to the petroleum line, restoring the genuine domestic petroleum consumption that the export outflow had masked. Corrected figures: oil shale +1025 ktoe, petroleum +1113 ktoe. Total GIC share of fossil fuels remains unchanged at 4316 ktoe and 59% respectively. Estonia is the only EU Member States where this distinct methodology correction was applied within the European Semester 2026 cycle.

74

Fossil fuel subsidies

In 2024, environmentally harmful (180) fossil fuel subsidies without a planned phase-out before 2030 represented 0.11% (181) of Estonia’s GDP (182). Additionally, Estonia’s 2023 Effective Carbon Rate (183) averaged EUR 96.85 per tonne of CO₂, above the EU weighted mean of EUR 84.80 (184).

(180) Explicit fossil fuel subsidies (e.g. direct transfers) and implicit

fossil fuel subsidies (i.e. tax expenditures linked to forgone tax revenues that have an identifiable fiscal impact for the central budget) that support fossil fuel energy production, transmission and/or consumption.

(181) European Commission calculation based on underlying data from the Study on energy subsidies and other government interventions in the EU – 2025 edition, Enerdata.

(182) 2024 Gross Domestic Product at market prices, Eurostat.

(183) The Effective Carbon Rate is the sum of carbon taxes, ETS permit prices and fuel excise taxes, representing the aggregate effective carbon rate paid on emissions.

(184) OECD (2024), Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2024

ANNEX 10: CLIMATE ADAPTATION, PREPAREDNESS AND ENVIRONMENT

75

Estonia faces significant economic risks from

climate impacts that will require substantial

investment to address and call for cross- sectoral adaptation measures. Estonia also

faces challenges related to water productivity and degradation of surface waterbodies as well as issues regarding drained peatlands. It has set up a new 2030 environmental development plan with general targets for biodiversity conservation and nature restoration. Peatland restoration remains critical for climate mitigation, adaptation and biodiversity protection, as drained peatlands are a major source of greenhouse gas emissions in Estonia. Pesticide contamination remains an issue, especially regarding the soil.

Climate adaptation and preparedness

Estonia is vulnerable to climate change. Northern Europe experiences greater warming that is above the global average (mainly in the winter). The main impacts in Estonia are decreased snow and ice cover, more frequent winter storms and increased precipitation. Temperature, flooding and extreme precipitation trends are increasing, and this is projected to impact infrastructure, health and ecosystems (185). Coastal regions are at risk of more frequent flooding and erosion due to rising sea levels and increased precipitation. The heat- related mortality rate in Estonia between 2022- 2024 was in the lower ranges of estimates for EU Member States (186). However, heatwaves are expected to become more frequent and intense, thus posing a public health threat. An increase in the frequency of extreme weather events will increase the likelihood and extent of catastrophes, resulting in significant economic damage, health issues and deaths (187). A recent study commissioned by DG CLIMA estimates (188) that

(185)EEA, 2024, European Climate Risk Assessment, Link.

(186)Janoš, et al., 2025, Heat-related mortality in Europe during 2024 and health emergency forecasting to reduce preventable deaths, Link.

(187)National reporting under Article 17 of Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, March 2025, Link

(188) European Commission, 2026, Assessment of adaptation investment needs,Table 25, Link. The study provides detailed estimates of adaptation investment needs at the level of the EU and individual Member States per type of measure. It relies on a common methodology that makes estimates comparable across the EU. Four accompanying methodological reports provide a detailed description of how the results were estimated to ensure full transparency.

Estonia will need to invest about EUR 650 million per year up to 2050 – one of the highest levels in the EU relative to GDP (1.3%). Investment would be most beneficial in ecosystem restorations (around 48% of the total), followed by infrastructure retrofitting and reinforcement (around 40%) and health (around 8%). Investments in the resilience of agriculture plays a smaller role than in other Member States (189).

The national adaptation policy framework is

being further developed. Estonia has had a national adaptation strategy and plan on climate change adaptation in place since 2017 and is now seeking to build further on its adaptation governance structures. However, the adoption of Estonia’s Climate-Resilient Economy Act that is expected to provide the legal basis for further sectoral integration of adaptation has been delayed. In parallel, a national climate change adaptation roadmap is currently under development that should implement that future legal requirement. The roadmap’s aim is to strengthen preparedness and adaptive capacity at both the national and local levels by setting clear adaptation objectives for all sectors that are vulnerable to climate change. It should ensure close cooperation with sectoral ministries to integrate adaptation goals, indicators and measures into their development plans and programmes. This should support a more systematic and measurable approach to building climate resilience across all relevant sectors. At the sub-national level, the share of Estonia’s population covered by the EU Covenant of Mayors signatories has remained relatively stable and was 32% in 2024 (EU-27 average: 34%). The fact that none of the signatories has submitted a sustainable energy and action plan or a monitoring report points to a lack of implementation (190). As of February 2025, local energy and climate plans existed in 61 of the 79 local governments (191).

(189) Typical investments in ecosystems include soil and peatland

restoration, adaptive forest management, biodiversity protection and coastal ecosystems restorations. Typical investments in infrastructure include flood protection, coastal protection, improved energy assets and land use planning. Typical investments in health are linked to occupational health and safety and wastewater treatment facilities upgrading and prevention of infectious diseases.

(190) European Commission, Link.

(191) National reporting under Article 17 of Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, March 2025, Link.

76

Five of the main local authorities are participating in the EU mission on adaptation to climate change in order to enhance their work on climate adaptation.

Climate risks have a direct effect on

Estonia’s economy. Between 1980 and 2024, Estonia recorded EUR 352 million in economic losses caused by weather and climate-related extreme events. The insurance coverage over this period only covered 15% of the economic losses (EU-27: 19%), with the highest protection gap for windstorms (192). Estonia has made the development of a climate damages model a priority for the next two years. This model would summarise past climate change costs and forecast potential future costs under different climate scenarios. It would also cover economic losses from floods, storms, heatwaves, cold spells, droughts, wildfires and landslides, as well as associated human impacts such as fatalities and injuries. The aim is to support a more systematic integration of climate risks into macroeconomic strategy and long-term financial planning.

Climate-proofing has not been

systematically applied across sectors and

key infrastructure so far. The Estonian Energy

Sector Development Plan until 2035 was adopted in January 2026 and identifies the climate risks associated with the electricity distribution grid. Higher humidity and higher summer temperatures are resulting in a marginal increase in electricity losses on overhead lines. More frequent storms during winter are causing more power outages. Ensuring climate resilience of the energy sector includes climate-proofing of electricity grids and increasing security of supply by diversifying external connections and developing the maritime interconnector towards Latvia and Germany (193). Estonia’s RRP includes investment to strengthen the electricity grid and protect it against storms. The transport vulnerability index of the TEN-T network in Estonia to climate change has been assessed as among the highest in the EU. This is mainly driven by lower general adaptation preparedness, a lack of mainstreaming of the transport sector into the national adaptation strategy and limited interoperability on the TEN-T

(192) EEA, 2024, Economic losses from weather- and climate- related extremes in Europe,Link.

(193) ENMAK 2035 (Energy Sector Development Plan until 2035) Annex 1, 2026.

network (194). In the future, extreme temperatures and more frequent extreme weather events are likely to play an important role. An estimated total of almost EUR 1 billion will need to be invested until mid-century in the TEN-T network, mostly in maritime ports (EUR 745 million) (195). The fact that Estonia plans to invest only around EUR 15 million from 2024 until 2035 (196) indicates that key parts of the infrastructure are likely to remain exposed to climate-related risks.

Nature-based solutions (NbS) have not been

deployed at large scale or widely across

sectors. The main challenges for the roll-out of NbS include policy and legal framework challenges (i.e. lack of clear legal definitions and regulations for many NbS types), financial and resource limitations (i.e. insufficient funding for NbS projects from national budgets and private investments) and capacity barriers (i.e. limited local expertise in NbS planning, design, maintenance etc.). NbS provide broad-spectrum risk management. Tapping into the potential of NbS better could not only contribute to disaster management by buffering hazards such as floods and droughts, but also protect the ecosystem services provided by biodiversity – and thereby bolster food security while mitigating the risk of high food prices due to crop losses and improving the health of fish stocks. The LIFE-SIP AdaptEst project (197) aims to increase the resilience of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems to a changing climate and will draw on several EU funds. NbS are equally relevant for urban areas, helping to make regions more resilient to extreme weather events in the future (as demonstrated by the LIFE LATESTadapt project (198)). The key challenge moving forward is to scale up these projects towards a more systematic level of implementation.

(194) European Commission, 2024, Support study on the climate adaptation and cross-border investment needs to realise the TEN-T network, Publications Office of the European Union, Link, p. 70.

(195) Ibid, p. 230.

(196) Ibid, p. 116.

(197) LIFE 3.0 – LIFE21-IPC-EE-LIFE-SIP-AdaptEst/101069566.

(198) Home – LIFE LATESTadapt.

77

Water resilience

Water productivity in Estonia (199) stood at

EUR 26 per m³ of abstracted water in 2023 (below the EU-27 average of EUR 153 per

m³). Estonia’s water productivity has been on an increasing trend since 2020. The Water Exploitation Index Plus (WEI+) was 1.14 in 2022. The WEI+ value (200) is generally very low and ranged between 1.1 and 1.14 between 2016 and 2022. The main consumers of water (besides public water supply) are energy cooling followed by mining and quarrying (201). Between 2018 and 2023, water abstraction in energy cooling more than halved but increased by 80% in mining and quarrying (202).

Estonia’s three river basin districts contain

746 surface waterbodies (mainly river

tributaries and 31 groundwater bodies). Most surface waterbodies are natural. Only around 7.1% are heavily modified and 5.7% artificial. Heavily modified water and artificial waterbodies must reach good ecological potential rather than good ecological status, so measures must be taken to mitigate the adverse impact of unsustainable human development activities that cause a waterbody to be heavily modified/artificial, while not significantly affecting these activities. The EC’s assessment of Estonia’s third river basins management plans (RBMPs) is that the ecological status/potential of surface waterbodies has deteriorated since the second RBMPs. Only 53% currently have good ecological status/potential. The chemical status situation has not improved since the second RBMPs, with only 9.7% of surface waterbodies classified as having good chemical status. Only 53% of the surface waterbodies have good or better ecological status/potential (203). The most significant pressure identified is diffuse pollution – more precisely, nutrient pollution, which

(199) Water productivity is a metric that is calculated by dividing

GDP (in chain-linked volume) by total water abstraction. It indicates the average economic value (GDP) a Member State creates for each unit of water it takes from nature.

(200) Eurostat, Water Exploitation Index, plus, Link.

(201) EEA, 2025, Water abstraction by source and economic sector in Europe, Link.

(202) EEA, 2025, Water abstraction by source and economic sector in Europe, Link.

(203) WISE, Surface water Bodies: ecological status or potential. Link. Note that the deterioration can be due to more accurate monitoring rather than a genuine decline of parameters.

affects 93% of the waterbodies. Nutrient pollution significantly impairs the quality of coastal waters (where most of the spawning grounds of valuable fish species are located). Water abstraction is seen as one of the key pressures on groundwater in Estonia. Just 1 of Estonia’s 56 agglomerations is not compliant with the Waste Treatment Directive (WWTD) (204).

Nature restoration

Estonia’s new environmental development plan for 2030 (KEVAD) combines all

environmental development plans and sets

general targets for biodiversity conservation

and nature restoration. Estonia will ensure a network of protected areas that is ecologically well-functioning and effectively protected. It will also enhance biodiversity mainstreaming in the planning process in order to preserve biodiversity elsewhere than in protected landscapes and to implement new ways of incentivising landowners to recognise and protect natural values. Estonia will also promote the performance of its green network, which will support the ecological coherence of habitats and the adequacy of species corridors. A national action plan for all forest habitats will be prepared under the financial instrument for the environment (LIFE) integrated project (to be finalised by 2029).

Peatland restoration and sustainable

management is highly important, both in combating climate change and in preserving

biodiversity. Living peatlands not only sequester

carbon dioxide (CO2) but also provide a healthy habitat for valuable species and remove nitrates from polluted agricultural run-off through denitrification. Peatland loss also means biodiversity loss, more floods and droughts, degraded drinking water for local communities and eutrophication of open waters. It is particularly important to avoid eutrophication (especially around the Baltic Sea, which has a 97% eutrophication rate (205)). Damage is caused when peatlands are drained for agriculture and tree planting, with peat being extracted for fuel or horticulture. Peat extraction has directly destroyed

(204) Internal documents, implementation of Directive 91/271/EEC

(UWWTD), 2022.

(205)Helcom, Eutrophication Thematic Assessment 2016-2021, Link.

78

about 30 000 ha of raised bogs in Estonia, of which around 20 000 ha are still used.

In Estonia, drained peatlands are one of the

important emitters of greenhouse gases

(GHG). As a result of bog drainage, total GHG emissions (carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O)) in Estonia are, when converted into CO2 equivalent, estimated to be 2.3–2.7 times higher than they would have been if those wetlands were still in their natural state. Restoring the natural state of degraded areas from drainage is therefore important not only for biodiversity conservation but also for climate change mitigation. According to its nature conservation and development plan for 2012– 2020, Estonia intends to restore the water regime of 10 000 ha of mire habitats and of 1 000 ha of former peat-mining areas. Estonia has established an action plan for the restoration of mires (2015– 2023), which sets out a priority list of mires in need of restoration.

Sustainable agriculture and land use

Estonia has scope for reinforcing its natural

carbon sink. In 2014, net carbon removals turned into net emissions and have remained above zero since then. To meet its 2030 LULUCF target, Estonia is required to increase carbon removals or reduce emissions by an additional 0.4 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2eq) compared to the average level of the 2016-2018 period (206). The reported projections show a surplus over the target of around 1.07 MtCO2eq for 2030 (207). Despite this positive projection for meeting the 2030 target, Estonia could further increase carbon removals by improving forest management and restoring wetlands, helping to firmly increase the carbon removals in the coming years (208). Future climate warming could turn peatlands from crucial carbon sinks into emission sources. However, further pursuing peatland-rewetting projects and limiting the expansion of new peat extraction areas could produce a double climate dividend. In addition to increasing LULUCF net removals, further investments in healthy forests and soils as

(206)National LULUCF targets of the Member States in line with

Regulation (EU) 2023/839, Link.

(207)Climate action progress report 2025,Link.

(208) This would also ensure that over the whole 2026-2029 period Estonia would be compliant with the LULUCF trajectory.

natural carbon stores are key and can (when ecosystem capacity is taken into account) help build resilient biobased product value chains and enable a growing, competitive EU bioeconomy.

Continued improvements to the monitoring

system of net removal data and projections

will be crucial in supporting timely and

effective action in the LULUCF sector. A network of Baltic LULUCF experts is cooperating in research projects to improve GHG inventories and projections. For example, Estonia intends to apply the emission factors for drained organic soils developed under the LIFE project ‘Demonstration of climate change mitigation potential of nutrient- rich organic soils in the Baltic states and Finland’ (209). Estonia is also developing a governance system for the sustainable use of land and soil, protection of biodiversity and climate change mitigation. This research programme (210) aims to create an efficient national land and soil use monitoring and management system based on coherent science-based digital data, that will guide spatial decisions on land management. Estonia aims to have a new national soil map with more functionality, by end-2026.

Estonia’s functional urban area (FUA) has

considerably expanded in the last few years. Net land taken between 2018 and 2021 accounts for 1 223 parts per million per year of Estonia’s total urban surface. Most land has been taken from pastures (57%), forests (27%) and arable land (14%). This ongoing ‘land take’ and the associated soil-sealing results makes ecosystems less resilient, decreases carbon sequestration and impairs flood protection (211).

Pesticide contamination remains an issue. 78% of soil samples analysed were contaminated above 0.05 mg kg-1 (212). Water contamination is at a lower level but still exceeds regulatory thresholds in 19% of rivers and 22% of lakes (213).

(209) Updated NECP 2030, p. 84.

(210) Maa- ja mullakasutuse teadus-arendusprojekt | Keskkonnaportaal

(211) EEA, 2022, Land take and land degradation in functional urban areas, Link.

(212) Vieira et al. (JRC), 2023, Pesticides residues in European agricultural soils – Results from LUCAS 2018 soil module, Publications Office of the European Union,Link.

(213) EEA, 2024, Pesticides in rivers, lakes, and groundwater in Europe, Link.

79

Pesticides not only threaten aquatic ecosystems but also pose long-term risks to human health through contaminated drinking water and food chains.

80

Table A10.1:Key Adaptation Indicators

(1) EFFIS (European Forest Fire Information System), Link. (2) The climate protection gap refers to the share of non-insured economic losses caused by climate-related disasters, based on modelling of the risk from floods, wildfires and windstorms, and on the insurance penetration rate. Scale: 0 (no protection gap) – 4 (very high gap). EIOPA, 2025, Dashboard on insurance protection gap for natural catastrophes. (3) This measures total water consumption as a percentage of the renewable freshwater resources available for a given territory and period. Values above 20% are generally considered to be a sign of water scarcity, while values equal to or greater than 40% indicate severe water scarcity. (4) European Commission, 2024, Seventh Implementation Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) (Third River Basin Management Plans and Second Flood Risk Management Plans). (5) Indicator refers to concentrations of nitrate (NO3) in groundwater, measured as milligrams per litre (mgNO3/L). Nitrate can persist in groundwater for a long time and accumulate at a high level through inputs from anthropogenic sources (mainly agriculture). The EU drinking water standard is limited to 50 mgNO3/L to avoid threats to human health. (6) Net removals are expressed in negative figures and net emissions are expressed in positive figures. Reported data are from the 2025 greenhouse gas inventory submission. The 2030 value of net greenhouse gas removals is taken from Regulation (EU) 2023/839 – Annex IIa. Sources: Eurostat, EEA and JRC.

Climate adaptation and preparedness: EU-27

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 latest data

Drought impact on ecosystems 7.84 0 9.07 4.73 15.55 - 2.76

[area impacted by drought as % of total]

Forest fires burned area (1) - - - - 173 - 354 510

[burned area in ha. per year]

Economic losses from extreme events - - - - 4 - 40 452

[EUR million at constant 2022 prices]

Insurance protection gap (2) - - - 1 1 1 -

[composite score between 0 and 4]

Sub-national climate adaptation action 33 33 34 34 33 32 34

[% of population covered by the EU Covenant of Mayors

for Climate & Energy]

Water resilience: EU-27

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 latest data

Water Exploitation Index Plus, WEI+ (3) 1.09 0.99 1.71 2.15 1.14 - 4.53

[total water consumption as % of renewable freshwater resources]

Water productivity 21 24 22 18 26 - 151

[EUR per m 3 ]

Water abstraction

Water abstraction by source (% from surface water) 77.19% 73.87% 76.53% 80.28% 71.96% -

Water abstraction by sector

Agriculture Electricity

cooling

Manufactu-

ring

Public water

supply

Mining and

Quarrying

Constru-

ction

0.65% 62.29% 8.67% 8.15% 20.24% 0.01%

Status of water bodies (4)

[% of water bodies in a good status]

Surface water bodies (ecological) - - - - - 53% 38%

Groundwater bodies (quantitative) - - - - - 94% 93%

Nature restoration: EU-27

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 latest data

Ecosystem dependency - - - 40% - - 44%

[% of direct dependency]

Protected area 20.7 20.8 20.9 20.9 21.3 26.4

[% of terrestrial protected areas]

Invasive alien species (IAS) - - - - - 17 29.2

[number of IAS of Union concern]

Damage cost of IAS - - - - 0.08 1.69

[EUR billion]

Eutrophication 37 37 295

[AAE of area at risk of euthrophication]

Sustainable agriculture and land use: EU-27

2012-2018 2018-2021 latest data

Yearly net land taken by Member State 438 1 223 670

[ppm of total urban surface per Member State]

Land conversion in functional urban area [% of total land taken from 2018-2021]

Arable land 14%

Complex and mixed cultivation 0%

Forests 27%

Herbaceous vegetation associations 4%

Open spaces with little or no vegetation 0%

Pastures 54%

Permanent crops 0%

Water 1%

Wetlands 1%

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 latest data

Nitrates in groundwater (5) 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9 7.0

[mgNO₃/l]

Livestock density 0.3 0.3 0.75

(number of livestock units per hectare of utilised agricultural area)

Ammonia emissions 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% - 94%

[% of total utilised agrictultural area]

Pesticide contamination on rivers and lakes water bodies rivers 19% 27%

[% of monitoring sites with pesticides exceeding thresholds, 2018-2023] lakes 22% 18%

Pesticide contamination in soil 78% 57%

[% of samples with a concentration over 0.5 mg/Kg⁻¹]

Net greenhouse gas removals from LULUCF (6) 3122.3 1140.8 848.5 198.2 2130.8 - -198 421

[ktCO₂-eq]

FAIRNESS

ANNEX 11: LABOUR MARKET

81

As the Estonian economy returned to

moderate growth in 2025, the labour market

stabilised. Despite efforts to tackle labour market challenges, skills shortages and regional and social disparities persist. Weaker labour demand has disproportionately affected vulnerable groups, in particular young people. Real wage growth slowed in 2025, and labour productivity stagnated. Collective bargaining coverage remains one of the lowest in the EU, limiting progress in improving wage-setting mechanisms and working conditions.

Graph A11.1: Key labour market indicators

Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a, une_rt_a, lfsi_neet_a, une_ltu_a]

Although the employment rate is still high,

the number of people employed declined,

reflecting adverse demographic trends and

reduced hiring intensity. In 2025, the

employment rate reached 81,7% (vs 76.1% in the EU), and above the 2030 national target of 81.3%.In 2025, the inflow of non-EU nationals decreased substantially and was insufficient to offset declining labour market participation and employment among Estonian nationals. The share of workers in jobs for less than three months dropped from 4.8% in 2024 to 4.2% in Q3-2025, pointing to weaker hiring dynamics.

High overall unemployment continues to

weigh on the labour market outlook. The

unemployment rate stabilised at around 7.5% in 2025 (vs 6% in the EU). It is only projected to

decline to 7.2% in 2026 and 7.1% in 2027 despite the expected economic recovery. Long-term unemployment remained broadly unchanged at 1.7% in the first three quarters of 2025, close to the EU average of 1.9%. Labour market slack, a broader concept of unused labour potential, reached 12.9% in 2025, exceeding the EU average (11.7%). This increase has been mainly driven by a rise in people seeking work but who are not immediately available.

Vulnerable groups, especially young people

and persons with disabilities, face barriers to

labour market integration. Labour market entrants face significant and rising difficulties in securing a job, as youth unemployment increased further from 19,1% in 2024 to 20.7% in 2025 (vs 15,2% in the EU). The share of young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEETs) remained broadly stable at 11,2% in 2025, in line with the EU average (11%). Young people with limited qualifications or work experience are particularly exposed to unemployment or precarious jobs (214). Limited job opportunities, especially in rural areas, and inadequate support for transitions from education to work also play a role in the increasing NEET rate. With the support of the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), Estonia has strengthened its Youth Guarantee and introduced targeted support services to help young people obtain qualifications and re-engage with training or the labour market. Nevertheless, gaps persist in reaching and supporting the most marginalised young people. Outreach efforts aimed at those outside the labour market could be strengthened and cooperation improved between businesses, local municipalities and social programmes, youth and social institutions, schools and public employment services. Ongoing measures supporting transitions from education to work could be further reinforced, particularly through work-based learning and closer cooperation with employers. After rising sharply in 2022, the disability employment gap has decreased significantly from 26,2pp in 2022 to 16pp in 2025 below the EU average of 24,2 pps. The labour market integration of persons with disabilities could be further

(214) Estonian National Action Plan to Strengthening Youth

Guarantee 2022-2027: ENG_Noortegarantii tugevdamise riigisisene tegevuskava perioodiks.

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promoted through: (i) continued investment in tailored recruitment and employment pathways; (ii) workplace adaptations and employer engagement; and (iii) stronger accessibility policies and reasonable accommodation policies. Greater support and involvement of social economy organisations in implementing labour market policies could also help improve employment outcomes for young people and persons with disabilities.

Regional differences are considerable, with

higher unemployment in rural areas. The

traditionally higher unemployment rate in North- East Estonia increased further to 12.7% in 2025, compared with rates between 6.2% and 7.4% in other regions. Employment in this region is heavily concentrated in the industrial sector (including oil shale companies), which has been particularly affected by the recession, while most jobs are to be found in the major cities (215). The north-east and south-east regions bordering Russia also recorded poverty rates above the national average, reflecting a lack of entrepreneurial activity. This has led to fewer well-paid jobs and lower incomes, as well as lower skills levels and limited access to services in rural areas (see Annex 13).

The gender pay gap remains high although

the situation is slowly improving. Afterrising

to 21.1% in 2022, the gender pay gap fell to 18.8% in 2024. While it is still among the highest in the EU (EU: 11.1%),it has decreased significantly over time. By contrast, Estonia is among the best performers as regards the gender employment gap (0.5pp vs 9.6pp in the EU in 2025). Under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, steps have been taken to reduce the gender pay gap, including the development of a digital prototype to help employers analyse the wage gap in their companies.

(215) Statistics Estonia: Unemployment rate | Statistikaamet.

Graph A11.2: Labour market outcomes of young

people (15-24)

Employment rate (% of population), total, ages 15-24 Youth in education and training (% of population), total, ages 15-24 Youth unemployment rate (% of labour force), total, ages 15-24 Youth unemployment-to-population ratio (% of population), total, ages 15-24 NEET: Young people neither in employment nor in education and training (% of population), total, ages 15-24 Source: Eurostat, LFS [edat_lfse_18, lfsi_emp_a, une_rt_a, lfsi_neet_a]

Estonia is putting in place policy measures to

address labour market challenges. Public employment services and active labour market policies (ALMPs) are being continuously updated based on labour demand monitoring, which informs upskilling and reskilling initiatives and career guidance services. Ongoing studies in 2025 and 2026 covering unemployment prevention, work-ability assessment and Youth Guarantee schemes are expected to help further refine policy design and future measures. Key ALMP changes in 2025 and 2026 include: (i) employer subsidies for green skills; (ii) job shadowing; (iii) a simplified pay subsidy extended to workers over 55; and (iv) better integration of measures to avoid overlaps. Actions financed by the ESF+ support activation and skills development for women, Roma, migrants, people over 55 and other vulnerable groups. The ESF+ also funds support for social enterprises. Government measures also target youth unemployment and inactivity through early identification of at-risk individuals and case management under the Youth Guarantee.

Stagnant productivity growth hampers

competitiveness and real wage dynamics. Compensation per employee growth slowed from 7% in 2024 to 4.4% in 2025, which could reflect labour market slack. Real wage growth contracted

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83

by -0.5% as inflation edged up, due to tax and administered price increases. The minimum wage rose by 8% in 2025 (EUR 886), supporting low- income earners. At the same time, labour productivity increased by 1.1% and nominal unit labour costs grew by 3.3% in 2025. The strong link between labour productivity and wages across economic sectors suggests that the recovery in Estonia’s more dynamic sectors could support both income growth and competitiveness gains in the future.

Weak social dialogue continues to hinder

progress in ensuring quality jobs and inclusive wage-setting. The involvement of social partners in reforms and policymaking remains limited. Collective bargaining coverage (19.1% in 2021) is the third-lowest in the EU and trade union density (5.6% in 2023) is the lowest, limiting meaningful social dialogue. Collective bargaining is highly decentralised and predominantly conducted at company level, with only a few collective agreements at sectoral and national level. Cooperation between social partners and public authorities has not improved in recent years. No tripartite meetings at national level were held in 2025, and the 2023 tripartite agreement on the minimum wage framework, which aimed to raise the minimum wage to 50% of the average wage by 2027, has been postponed. Against this background, in-work poverty in Estonia has remained above the EU average, at around 10% since 2022, while it has declined in the EU overall to 8.2% in 2024. Similarly, the share of low-wage earners has been consistently above the EU average (21.2% in Estonia vs 14.7% in the EU for 2022). The prevalence of low-wage earners is more pronounced for women, in line with the relatively high gender pay gap. Weak institutional capacity among social partners further limits effective engagement in policymaking. Trade unions have also raised concerns about their insufficient involvement in shaping policies, including the proposed amendments to the Employment Contracts Act to introduce flexible working hours. In September 2025, following a consultation with the social partners, an action plan was adopted to promote collective bargaining. In particular, the plan announced a review of the regulation on collective bargaining agreements extension. EUROMOD simulations (216) suggest that

(216) The simulation was performed by the European Commission,

Joint Research Centre, based on the EUROMOD model, J2.0+.

increasing the minimum wage to 50% of the average wage would have a limited impact on lower-income deciles and the at-risk-of-poverty rate. This is because higher taxes and lower social benefits would partially offset the direct effects.

Labour shortages have eased, but some sectors and occupations still face significant

challenges, and skills mismatches persist.

The job vacancy rate remained stable at 1.6% in 2025, below the EU average and slightly below its pre-pandemic level (1.8% in 2019). However, this rate masks substantial differences across sectors (217). Labour shortages were high in public sector services, electricity, gas, steam and air- conditioning supply, and financial and insurance activities. Estonia faces an annual shortage of around 1 400 highly skilled workers. In April 2025, the share of employers expecting labour shortages to limit their production was still significantly lower than the EU average (218). ICT specialists make up 7.2% of the population, and the country leads in the EU with the highest amount of female ICT specialists in employment at 27.60%. On the skills side, although the macroeconomic skills mismatch and the overqualification rate increased slightly in 2024, they remain relatively stable. However, 12% of workers are underqualified according to the OECD, and 23% report that some of their skills are lower than what is required for their job (OECD average: 10%) (219). Skills shortages in the education system remain particularly acute (see Annex 13).

The green transition is reshaping Estonia’s

labour market. Employment in energy-intensive

industries declined from 2.8% of total employment in 2020 to 1.7% in 2024. However, the share of workers in these industries participating in education and training is growing significantly, from 8.7% in 2015 to 21.3% in 2025 (EU: 12%). The percentage of the population with at least basic digital skills continues to stagnate at62.52% despite ambitious investments and initiatives. Investments under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the ESF+ and the Just Transition Fund include measures to mitigate the social and employment impact of the green transition. These

(217) See Eurostat for sectoral differences.

(218) Source: European Business and Consumer Surveys, data up to Q2-2026 (i.e. they refer to ~April 2025).

(219) Survey of Adults Skills 2023: Estonia | OECD.

84

measures include retraining and upskilling programmes for workers in the oil shale industry and support for effective job transitions.

Estonia is taking steps to attract and retain

foreign talent in line with the 2025 country-

specific recommendations and reduce labour shortages to sustain its human capital. However, skills shortages are expected to increase, with annual labour demand projected to exceed new labour market entrants in the coming years. This suggests that involving foreign workers to a certain extent is inevitable (220). The country’s immigration quota was not fully used in 2024, which has renewed debate on reforming the quota system. To address structural labour shortages, a more flexible model is proposed to enter into force in 2027 through amendments to the Aliens Act. Meanwhile, Estonia has made progress in attracting talent by simplifying procedures for qualified workers and innovation-driven sectors. In May 2024, the country transposed the revised EU Blue Card Directive, introducing more flexible eligibility requirements, shorter contract duration thresholds, recognition of professional experience and improved labour market mobility. Also, a pilot fast-track procedure was launched in October 2025 for top specialists as well as for start-up and scale-up employees. To boost competitiveness, Estonia could benefit from better skills anticipation, particularly through a broad use of the OSKA system, and accessible pathways for skilled foreign workers in sectors affected by shortages.

(220) OSKA(2025) Välistööjõud | OSKA uuringud.

ANNEX 12: SOCIAL POLICIES

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While many social outcomes in Estonia are

relatively good, the country faces several

significant social policy challenges. Progress towards the 2030 poverty reduction target is slow, and the capacity of social benefits to reduce poverty and inequality is limited. This highlights the need to further strengthen the adequacy and efficiency of the social protection system. Access to long-term care (LTC) services remains insufficient amid rising demand and relatively low public spending. These issues are covered in the 2025 country-specific recommendations addressed to Estonia, particularly those on strengthening social protection and ensuring sustainable financing for healthcare and LTC, where further policy action is needed. Addressing these challenges would contribute to inclusive growth and competitiveness.

Graph A12.1: At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion

rate by age group

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_peps01n].

Despite some improvement, poverty and

social exclusion risks remain high in Estonia. In 2025, the at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate decreased by 0.4 percentage points (pps) to 21.8% (EU average: 20,8%). Between 2019 and 2025, the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion fell by15 000 to 296 000,still far from Estonia’s 2030 target of reducing the number by 39 000 compared with 2019.

People with disabilities are particularly

exposed to poverty risks. In 2024, 39.1% of

people in this category were at risk of poverty or social exclusion (compared with the EU average of 28.7%).

Among people with severe disabilities, the

rate stood at 49%. Relatively low disability benefits and the limited effectiveness of social benefits are key factors contributing to the high AROPE rate among persons with disabilities. Disability benefits per person, adjusted for purchasing power parity, are significantly below the EU average (485.8 PPS in Estonia vs 725 PPS in the EU in 2023). The AROPE rate for the working-age population with disabilities is 32.5%, compared with 15% for people without disabilities. The in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate among employed persons with disabilities is also considerably higher in Estonia than the EU average. This reflects a higher prevalence of part- time work due to disability and higher rates of early school leaving among students with disabilities. Among older persons with disabilities, the AROPE rate is 46.4%, compared with 33.6% among those without disabilities, reflecting the general inadequacy of pensions. To tackle these persistent challenges, Estonia has allocated EUR 161 million under the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) for social inclusion measures, complemented by a further EUR 16.2 million address material deprivation. A comprehensive approach, as set out in the EU anti-poverty strategy, could help address the multiple dimensions of poverty and achieve the national anti-poverty target.

Despite recent reforms, pension adequacy

remains weak, contributing to higher poverty risks among older people. Although the AROPE

rate among people aged 65 and over have decreased from their 2022 peak, it remains significantly above the EU average (34.5% vs 19.2% for the EU). In 2025 the rate stood at 24.4% for men and 40% for women 65 and over, compared with 15,8% and 21,2% respectively for the EU. The situation is most severe for older people living alone: in 2024, 71.5% of people aged 65 and over and living alone were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This was the highest rate in the EU, where the average was 30.0%. The aggregate replacement ratio of pensions decreased by 1 percentage points (pps) to 49% in 2025 but remains substantially below the EU average. Although Estonia has one of the lowest gender pension gaps in the EU, largely reflecting its predominantly flat-rate pension system,

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women aged 65 and over face one of the highest AROPE rates in the EU, which is significantly higher than that of men. This is mainly driven by longer life expectancy, household composition and limited survivor benefits for women. Expenditure on survivor pensions and other survivor benefits is 0.05% of GDP in Estonia, compared with 1.48% of GDP in the EU. In response to the 2025 country- specific recommendations, Estonia is taking measures to tackle old-age poverty, including pension indexation, which increased the average pension from EUR 774 in 2024 to EUR 817 in 2025, and raising the tax-free income threshold for pensioners from EUR 654 to EUR 776. Other measures include pension literacy initiatives, the introduction of a pension calculator and increased flexibility in second-pillar contributions to allow employees to contribute 4% or 6% from 2025 onwards. In addition, the government has announced plans to reduce the waiting time for rejoining the mandatory second pillar after opting out from 10 to 5 years. As demographic pressures are projected to increase, further efforts to strengthen complementary pension savings, including through simplified employer participation in second-pillar contributions, could improve retirement adequacy.

Household composition and parental

educational attainment remain key

determinants of child poverty risks. In 2025, the AROPE rate among persons living in single- parent households reached 42%, up by 6.7 percentage points from 2024, while remaining below the EU average of 44.3%. In 2025, the overall AROPE rate among children in Estonia increased sharply to 19,4% in 2025, approaching pre-pandemic levels but remaining below the EU average of 24.3%. The educational background of parents remains a key determinant of child poverty risk, ranging from 13.1% among children of parents with higher education to 47.6% among those whose parents have lower secondary education or less. Single-parent households also face significantly higher cost burdens, with 26.8% of them (compared with 14% in the EU) spending more than 40% of disposable income on housing. To tackle these challenges, Estonia has increased single-parent benefits, alimony assistance and child allowances and has strengthened support for large families. The country is also implementing the Child Guarantee to support children in need, including by establishing an automatic exchange of data between state and local authorities on persons with disabilities to

enable proactive outreach and additional support for families. Measures also include strengthening the family benefits system, promoting inclusive education and increasing funding for quality family-based alternative care. In total, EUR 33 million is dedicated to addressing child poverty in Estonia under ESF+.

The eastern border regions continue to face significant challenges due to entrenched

socio-economic disparities. Relative poverty rates in eastern border counties such as Ida-Viru and Jõgeva (33% and 24% in 2024, respectively) are much higher than those in better-performing regions such as Harju and Rapla (both 17%), highlighting stark and persistent regional disparities.(221) These differences are compounded by significant regional inequalities in access to social services, affecting people with disabilities, older people, families with children and other vulnerable groups. The availability and quality of social services varies widely across municipalities, with smaller and rural areas often lacking the administrative and financial capacity to provide adequate and timely support. Long-standing structural weaknesses, such as reliance on the oil shale industry, low economic diversification, high unemployment and lower disposable income, continue to weigh on these regions’ socio- economic performance (see Annex 11). While Ida- Viru has been allocated substantial EU support, including 354 million EUR from the Just Transition Fund, continued efforts are needed to support small and medium-sized enterprises, green reskilling and community initiatives and strengthen the economic resilience and social outcomes of Estonia’s eastern border regions.

In-work poverty and economic inequality remain relatively high, despite some

improvement. In 2025, the in-work poverty rate fell slightly from 10.3% in 2024 to 10.1% but remained above the EU average (8.1% in 2024). In the 18-24 age group, in-work poverty is much higher (14.1% in 2024 and 15% in 2025; EU: 10.9% in 2024), reflecting higher unemployment among the young population and higher rates of young people neither in employment nor in education and training. Part-time workers in Estonia face a particularly high risk of falling below the poverty threshold (18.5%), well above

(221) Statistics Estonia (2025): Suhteline vaesus on Eestis

vähenenud, absoluutne vaesus suurenenud | Statistikaamet.

87

both full-time workers in Estonia and the EU average (13.5% in 2025). Income inequality, as measured by the S80/S20 ratio, declined to 5.03 in 2024 but remained above the EU average (4.66). This is largely due to the low redistributive effect of the tax and benefits system (post-market inequality). In 2024, the inequality-reducing effect of taxes and social benefits (excluding pensions) stood at 40%, compared with the EU average of 48.3%. Estonia has taken steps to address these challenges by improving the adequacy of its statutory minimum wage in line with the Directive on adequate minimum wages. The minimum wage was increased by 13.1% (standing at 40% of the average wage) in 2024, by 8% in 2025, and by 6.8% in 2026, reaching EUR 946.(222) However, the 2023 social partner agreement to gradually increase the minimum wage to 50% of the average wage by 2027 has been postponed, slowing progress in reducing in-work poverty and inequality (see Annex 11).

Despite ongoing reforms, challenges persist

in the adequacy and coverage of social

protection. These challenges are particularly pronounced among minimum income recipients and unemployed and self-employed people (including farmers),. Although a relatively high proportion of self-employed people receive cash benefits (29% compared with an average of 12% in the EU), this support is insufficient to protect against the risk of poverty. As a result, the at-risk- of-poverty (AROP) rate among the self-employed remained high at 25.9% in 2024, compared with 20.9% in the EU. Self-employed people are excluded from contributory unemployment insurance, although they are eligible for means- tested social assistance benefits. While a relatively high proportion of registered unemployed people receive benefits, the AROP rate for this group remains high (50.6% in 2024 compared with 48.8% in the EU). Moreover, the income of those in poverty falls significantly below the poverty threshold, with a gap of 44.2% in 2024 (compared with 32.4% in the EU). Estonia’s minimum income benefit, the subsistence benefit, falls short of commonly used adequacy benchmarks. In 2024 (based on 2023 income), the net income of a minimum income recipient reached only 47% of the smoothed poverty threshold, compared with 56.3% in the EU.

(222) Eurofound (2025): Minimum wages in 2025: Annual review.

Social benefits expenditure remains low.

Although spending on social benefits increased by0.9 pps to 17.8% of GDP in 2024, it remains far below the EU average of 27.3%. Estonia allocates a larger proportion of benefits than the EU average to disability benefits (10.7% of total benefits expenditure compared with 7.0% for the EU), while spending a smaller proportion on old- age and survivor benefits (43.3% vs 47.0% in 2024). Estonia allocates only 0.38% of total benefits expenditure to housing benefits, highlighting a potential gap in the social protection system. Despite substantial improvements since 2023, the impact of social benefits (excluding pensions) on poverty reduction remains below the EU average (31.5% vs 34.2%).

Reforms to the unemployment insurance

system and minimum income aim to improve

the adequacy and coverage of the social

protection system. In 2026, Estonia will replace its current two-tier unemployment insurance system, consisting of unemployment allowances and unemployment insurance, with a single scheme. The new scheme will also be accessible to workers with limited employment history. In addition, it will also improve social protection, in line with the 2025 country-specific recommendation, as workers with disabilities will be able to combine work ability allowance with unemployment benefits. Preliminary analysis conducted in response to the 2025 country- specific recommendation indicates that extending unemployment benefits to non-standard forms of work would mainly affect a small uninsured segment of the self-employed population (6.1% of 207 000), as 76.5% are already covered through parallel employment and 17.4% have insufficient income to qualify.(223) To improve the adequacy and efficiency of the minimum income benefits, Estonia is reforming its minimum income methodology (with analysis results expected in April 2026) and modernising the subsistence benefit system.

Long-term care and healthcare face low investment and regional inequalities. Unmet

medical needs remain high at 7,7%, compared with 2.4% in the EU in 2025), with strong regional and income disparities (see Annex 15). While unmet long-term care (LTC) needs are considerably higher than the EU average (58.9% in

(223) Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (2025).

88

Estonia, compared with 46.6% in EU in 2019), public expenditure on LTC is considerably lower (0.4% of GDP compared with the EU average of 1.7%). Public support for person’s share of the payment for LTC is strictly means-tested, resulting in high out-of-pocket costs for all population groups except the most vulnerable. Public social protection for home and residential care recipients is limited across all levels of care needs, resulting in financial burdens that are well above the EU average.(224) Public social protection does not significantly reduce poverty risks associated with LTC, as support for home care is almost non- existent for individuals with a median income(225) Combined with the high costs of LTC, this results in out-of-pocket expenses for older people with a median income that are among the highest in the EU.(226) As a result, the risk of being pushed into poverty by home care needs is among the highest in the EU, regardless of the level of need.(227) The poverty risks for older people in need of LTC are substantially above the EU average, reaching nearly 100% for those with moderate or severe needs(228). The LTC sector also faces staff shortages, driven in part by the absence of collective bargaining and much lower pay compared with other sectors (65.3% vs an EU average of 82.4%) (229). Despite quality guidelines, access to social services varies considerably between municipalities due to unequal provision and different pricing of services offered locally.(230) User co-payments for social services are not adjusted to individual economic circumstances. Waiting lists for specialised care services nearly doubled between 2018 and 2024(231). During the same period, funding levels failed to keep pace with actual costs, with regulated service prices covering on average only

(224) OECD (2026): Adequacy of social protection for long-term

care Estonia (Tallinn).

(225) OECD (2025).

(226) OECD (2025.

(227) Ibid.

(228) OECD (2026): Adequacy of social protection for long-term care – Estonia.

(229) DG EMPL calculations from the 2022 Structure of Earnings Survey.

(230) National Audit Office (2025).

(231) National Audit Office (2025) : Riigikontroll: Valitsus ja Riigikogu on olnud aastaid teadlik psüühikahäiretega inimeste abivajadusest, kuid vajadus aina kasvab ja abi viibib üha rohkem.

slightly over 60% of real expenses. This has reduced service availability(232) and lengthened waiting times.

Estonia is implementing long-term care

reforms while strengthening the integration

of health and social services. The care reform entered into force on 1 July 2023 and aims to alleviate the financial burden on individuals requiring residential care and improve the accessibility of home care. While the reform has substantially reduced out-of-pocket costs for residential care, which fell from around 78% in 2022 to about 51% by 2024, it has also led to an increase in both supply and demand for nursing home places, further exacerbating staff shortages.(233) At the same time, the reform has not sufficiently strengthened the provision of home-based care, despite it being more cost- effective and a stated policy priority(234). In 2025, Estonia put forward a proposal to integrate social and healthcare services, although implementation is still pending (see also Annex 15). Estonia is continuing to improve the accessibility, availability and quality of long-term care, through ongoing measures under the ESF+. The ESF+ also supports the continued implementation of person-centred approaches, community-based care models and workforce training. A total of EUR 38.6 million has been allocated to long-term care and access to services under the ESF+.

Energy and transport poverty primarily

affect vulnerable groups. In 2025, only 3.1% of all households and 5.7% of households below the poverty threshold were unable to keep their homes adequately warm (EU average: 8.8% and 19.7% respectively). 7.6% of all households and 15.7% of those below the poverty threshold reported arrears on mortgages, rents or utility bills (EU averages: 9.2% and 20.5% respectively). Among single- parent households, 16.8% report arrears, with the share rising to 27.7% for those below the poverty threshold. Due to low population density, Estonia’s public transport network in many rural areas does not provide sufficient access to essential services within acceptable timeframes (see also Annex 19).

(232) National Audit Office (2025) : Riigikontroll: Valitsus ja

Riigikogu on olnud aastaid teadlik psüühikahäiretega inimeste abivajadusest, kuid vajadus aina kasvab ja abi viibib üha rohkem.

(233) Ibid.

(234) Ibid.

89

A rising number of households cannot afford a personal car, with single-parent households being the most affected (17.5% compared with an EU average of 14.7% in 2025). This is offset by increased private car use. However, in 2025, challenges to car affordability were more pronounced in Estonia (7%) than in the EU on average (5.5%).

ANNEX 13: EDUCATION AND SKILLS

90

Estonia provides high-quality education and

training, but persistent teacher shortages

risk undermining its sustainability, while early school leaving and broader skills

shortages and mismatches, particularly in

science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields, pose challenges

to competitiveness. Ongoing reforms aim to equip all young people with at least upper- secondary qualifications and better adapt vocational education and training (VET) and adult learning pathways to labour market needs. However, persistent shortages of teachers and special needs support staff risk undermining education quality. The 2025 country-specific recommendations (CSRs) for Estonia highlighted the need to improve labour productivity and skills supply by reducing early school leaving, improving the labour-market relevance of the education and training system and promoting reskilling and upskilling, particularly in green skills. The CSRs highlighted meeting the growing shortages of STEM specialists and better attracting and retaining talent as crucial to increasing skills supply.

Estonia equips its young people with a high

level of basic skills but is facing growing

challenges in sustaining its teaching staff. Estonia is one of the EU’s top performers in basic skills (see 2025 Country Report). In upper- secondary education, the AI Leap was launched in September 2025 to equip students and teachers with the skills to use artificial intelligence effectively and responsibly and help theeducation system keep pace with rapid technological change. Nevertheless, educational inequalities have slightly increased over the last decade, and growing challenges in the teaching profession represent a serious risk to education quality. Estonia has one of the oldest teaching populations in the EU, with 27.8% of teachers aged 60 and over in 2023, more than double the EU average (10.9%). Ageing has intensified over the past decade, while the share of teachers under 35 has remained relatively stable (16.6%; EU average: 17.5%), and is insufficient to offset retirements. The situation is particularly acute in STEM subjects. For example, in some regions, over 40% of mathematics teachers are older than 60 (220). The gender imbalance in the profession is also pronounced,

narrowing the pool of available professionals. The trend in pupil numbers, influenced by declining demographics, varies unevenly across the country, with small increases in two densely populated counties (Harju and Tartu) in 2024 and declines of varying depth in the rest of the country. These regional discrepancies sustain higher demand, typically concentrated in more populated regions (235) (see Annex 18). Teacher shortages are already evident in practice, as 26% of general education teachers do not meet formal qualification requirements in 2025 (236).

Retaining novice teachers is difficult. Estonia’s 2021-2035 education strategy aims to retain at least 60% of initial teacher education graduates in teaching roles for five consecutive years after graduation by 2035. In 2023, the share stood at 56% (237). In 2023, almost half of teachers under 30 (49%) expressed uncertainty about continuing in the profession for more than four years (EU average: 15.2%). This highlights significant retention risks (238). Participation in induction programmes among new teachers has improved, rising from 31% in 2018 to 58% in 2024, yet working conditions remain demanding. The reported overall stress is rising (28.5% of teachers feel stressed ‘a lot’; EU average: 16%), driven mainly by the responsibility for students’ learning outcomes and social-emotional well- being, and the need to adapt teaching to students with special educational needs (239). Shortages of support staff further exacerbate workload pressures.

Policies to attract and retain teachers focus

on initial education, career structures,

leadership development and working

conditions. Enrolment in teacher education

programmes has increased in recent years, supported by government scholarships and efforts to promote the profession. In 2026, salaries were increased by around 10%. The 2022-2026 teacher action plan introduced measures such as leadership training for school heads and micro-

(235) Statistics Estonia.

(236) Education statistics portal HaridusSilm.

(237) Ministry of Education and Research. (2025). Haridus- ja noorteprogramm 2025-2028 (Education and Youth Programme 2025-2028).

(238) OECD, 2024 TALIS.

(239) OECD, 2024 TALIS.

91

credentials for non-fully qualified teachers. Further policy responses are a new career model linking pay to experience (which took effect in March 2026), and additional support for schools during the transition towards introducing Estonian as the language of instructionin all public schools. Public reports on the implementation of the action plan and a follow-up plan beyond 2026 are not (yet) available (240).

Estonia is strengthening compulsory

education to reduce early school leaving and support labour market participation. In 2025,

10.2% of young people left the education and training system with no or very low qualifications (EU average: 9.1%). Estonia aims to reduce early school leaving by implementing a reform initiated in 2025 that makes education compulsory until at least age 18 or until completion of upper- secondary or vocational education (see 2025 Country Report). This reform will be complemented by the introduction of a preparatory year for learners who have completed lower secondary school but do not have a place in upper-secondary or vocational education, offering small-group learning, individual curricula and targeted support, including for learners with skills gaps or limited Estonian proficiency. The regulation on preparatory education was adopted in January 2026. A unified digital admissions platform connects upper- secondary, vocational and preparatory programmes and helps municipalities guide transitions. Monitoring through national education and youth systems enables early identification and support of young people who are not in employment, education or training. The reform aims to raise upper-secondary completion to 90%, reduce the share of low-qualified 18-24-year-olds outside education or training to below 5% by 2035, and add around 1 300 qualified young people to the labour market each year.

Reducing early school leaving also depends

on the capacity of the education system to effectively respond to pupils with special

educational needs (SEN). Pupils with some disabilities are more than twice as likely to leave school early compared to their peers, with a rate of 20.5% in 2024, above the EU average of 17.1%. While schools are required by law (241) to

(240) OSKA. (2022). OSKA general forecast 2022-2031 - Key

findings.

(241) Basic Schools and Upper Secondary Schools Act, §6.

help pupils with SEN by adjusting learning goals and providing specialist support, this is hindered by acute shortages of support specialists such as speech therapists or psychologists (242), especially in VET, where 90% of schools were found not to adequately support learners with SEN (243). In 2023, 57.1% of teachers worked in schools with over 10% of pupils with SEN (EU average: 50.2%), up from only 29.8% in 2018 (EU average: 34%) (244). This greater student diversity requires teachers to adapt their teaching; 2024, 23% of teachers expressed a high need for professional learning in teaching learners with SEN (EU average: 24.2%). Yet, only around half of teachers (51.2%) had attended professional training in the previous year that they found impactful (EU average: 56%) (245).

Alongside the reforms of mandatory schooling and VET, in February 2026, the

authorities amended the Employment

Contracts Act to expand work opportunities for minors. The amendments allow 7-17-year-

olds to work in family businesses in any sector, to work more during school holidays, and to work more hours during school days. The amendments also raise the maximum working time for minors aged 15-17 to the level applicable prior to the education reform. Given the objectives of the compulsory schooling reform, continued monitoring will be important to assess the interaction between increased work opportunities for minors and educational outcomes.

Ongoing system-wide VET reforms aim to

improve VET attractiveness as well as VET

graduates’ employability, and to strengthen

skills supply and labour- market relevance. In

2024, only 74.7% of people who had recently completed VET were employed, below the EU average of 80.0%. Nevertheless, of all people who had recently completed VET, a high share had experienced work-based learning (79.8%; EU average: 65.2%). At the same time, participation of Estonian VET students in STEM fields is above the EU average. In 2024, 49.9% of VET pupils at

(242) OSKA. (2022). OSKA general forecast 2022-2031 - Key

findings.

(243) Riigikontroll, 2025, Haridusliku erivajadusega noorte kutseõpingute ja töölesiirdumise toetamine.

(244) OECD, 2024 TALIS.

(245) OECD, 2024 TALIS.

92

medium level were enrolled in STEM fields (EU average: 36.6%), and 24.0% of them were female (EU average: 15.9%). From the 2025/2026 academic year, four-year applied upper-secondary VET programmes are being introduced, with the volume of general education subjects more than doubled to support smoother progression from VET to higher education. In 2025, 13 programmes were launched, notably in information and communications technology (ICT), engineering, construction, biotechnology and healthcare. In total, 32 new applied VET programmes will be launched from next academic year. Quality assurance and optimisation of the VET provider network are ongoing, including mergers and reorganisation into regional education centres.

The professional qualifications system

reform, financed by the European Social Fund

Plus (ESF+), aims to improve flexibility and

responsiveness to labour market needs. It will introduce competence-based profiles, and improved assessment and recognition of competencies, with implementation expected from autumn 2026. Estonia is also developing a national skills register as part of the OsKuS initiative, supported by the ESF+. The OSKA skills forecasts help align qualifications with the labour market. To effectively tackle persistent skills shortages, education policy should be closely aligned with OSKA’s labour market forecasts, while education programmes could better reflect these skills projections to support a more targeted response to changing workforce demands.

Adult participation in learning remains above

the EU average, although access varies

across population groups. In 2022,41.8% of

adults aged 25-64 had participated in education and training during the previous 12 months (EU average: 39.5%) (246). However, access to adult learning remains uneven. It is higher among younger adults (49.5% among those aged 25-34, compared with 31.2% among those aged 55-64) and substantially lower among adults with low levels of education (18.9%, in line with the EU average). Regional disparities persist and are linked to differences in educational attainment. For example, in Harju county, 46% of the population

(246) Adult education survey.

has tertiary education, compared with 34% in Ida- Viru county (247).

Recent adult learning policies focus on

quality assurance, flexible learning pathways

and targeted financial support. Amendments to the Adult Education Act adopted in January 2025 introduced a national framework for micro- qualifications, covering their scope, structure and study volume, and clarified requirements for training providers to ensure quality. The amendments introduced professional and pedagogical competence requirements for adult educators that entered into force from January 2026. Amendments to the Employment Programme 2024-2029 approved in October 2025 improve access to skills development services from 2026 and reorganise Estonian language learning. In addition, large-scale programmes (supported by the ESF+ and the Recovery and Resilience Facility) promote the development of professional and general skills.

Adult skills outcomes are strong on average,

but gaps persist by age, socio-economic

background and skills domain.

Results from the 2023 PIAAC survey show that adult skills in Estonia exceed the OECD average across literacy, numeracy and problem- solving (248). However, the survey highlights substantial disparities across population groups. Skills levels are highest among adults aged 25-29 and lowest among those aged 60-65, with a marked decline already observable in the 35-39 age group. PIAAC 2023 also identifies persistent skills differences linked to socio-economic characteristics and indicates a widening skills gap compared with the previous PIAAC cycle. In addition, in every region, the average results of Russian-speakers are lower than those of Estonian-speakers. In digital competences, 12% of employees report lacking sufficient computer and software skills, compared with an OECD average of 4%. At population level, 62.5% of adults had at least a basic level of digital skills in 2025, slightly above the EU average of 60.4%, but internal disparities, particularly among older adults, risk undermining overall competitiveness. Furthermore, in light of changes in job profiles due to the uptake of artificial intelligence (AI), more focus on AI skills

(247) Statistics Estonia (2024).

(248) OECD (2024): Survey of Adults Skills 2023.

93

is needed. To help narrow skills gaps, boost productivity and ease labour shortages, Estonia could take measures such as: (i) providing targeted outreach via employers and employment services; (ii) expanding modular and workplace-based training; (iii) providing financial support and guidance for low-skilled and older adults; (iv) strengthening digital and AI skills provision; and (v) improving rural access to online learning infrastructure.

The green transition requires skills that are

still in relatively short supply. The Green Skills

programme, financed by ESF+, strengthens the supply of green skills by offering free up- and reskilling training to companies and individuals. Aligning VET programmes with green transition needs couldhelp mitigate skills gaps in emerging sectors. Since the pandemic, the energy sector has been experiencing rising labour shortages (2.5% in 2024 vs 1.3% in 2019; EU average: 1.7% in 2024). At occupational level, persistent shortages have been reported for industrial and production engineers, building and related electricians, and electrical mechanics and fitters, which are relevant both to the clean energy transition and climate adaptation. At the same time, in energy-intensive industries, workers’ participation in education and training was 8.6% in 2024, slightly below the EU average (9.4%).

Access to higher education remains uneven. Whereas overall tertiary attainment is high (44.3% in 2025; EU average: 44.8%), some groups remain under-represented (men, Russian-speaking students, first-generation students). Financial support has been increased (through needs-based grants and a study loan reform), but non-financial aid addressing the concerns of under-represented groups, such as mentoring or peer networks, is not yet common. The ongoing VET reform (see above) presents opportunities for stronger collaboration between VET and applied higher education, especially outside urban centres, which can help reach under-represented groups, and alleviate labour market demands.

Demand for tertiary educated STEM

specialists still significantly exceeds

supply. Three reasons for this can be identified: (i) overall tertiary student numbers have been falling in the last decade, reducing the number of STEM graduates enteringthe labour market (see Graph A13.1); (ii) the average dropout rate from the first undergraduate year in STEM courses is

higher than in other fields; and (iii) the green and digital transitions alone require more STEM specialists than are currently anticipated to graduate from higher education (249). While Estonia remains among the leading EU countries in gender diversity among ICT specialists - with women accounting for around 22.5% of employed ICT specialists in 2025 (19.5% for the EU) (250) – critical labour shortages persist across key sectors. ICT, industry and construction are among the sectors with the most severe shortages of skilled workers, and rising demand for engineers, electricians and technicians (251). In 2023, Estonia ranked last among EU countries for the availability of engineers (252). While the proportion of students studying ICT has grown, this increase has come at the expense of engineering students. To counter this trend, the government established an Engineering Academy (with EUR 39 million of ESF+ funding) alongside the well-established IT Academy programme. First results of the Engineering Academy point towards an improvement in drop-out rates of engineering programmes. A comprehensive STE(A)M strategy is under development and expected in June 2026. However, according to the National Audit Office, the Engineering Academy programme alone will not solve the shortage of engineers if the foundation in mathematics and science education remains weak in basic schools. Basic schools continue to struggle with uneven STEM teaching quality, teacher shortages, and limited opportunities for technology-related extracurricular learning (253).

(249) OSKA. (2020). Eesti tööturg täna ja homme 2019-2027.

(250) Eurostat, [isoc_sks_itsps] Employed information and communications technology (ICT) specialists by sex.

(251) OSKA. (2022). OSKA general forecast 2022-2031 - Key findings.

(252) Competitevness Report Estonia (2024): Konkurentsivõime raport 2024

(253) Riigi tegevus inseneride järelkasvu tagamisel | Riigikontroll.

94

Graph A13.1: Development of STEM enrolments in

Estonia, 2015-2023

Source: Eurostat, educ_uoe_enrt03

Attracting and retaining talent from abroad remains critical for strengthening Estonia’s

research and innovation capacity. Recent growth in PhD student numbers has been primarily driven by international candidates, particularly in engineering and ICT, where around 50% of PhD students come from abroad. This inflow is essential to offset demographic decline, meet the national target for PhD graduates (300 per year) and address persistent skills shortages in priority sectors. However, graduate retention varies by field, and constraints related to residence permits and post-study pathways continue to limit Estonia’s ability to capitalise fully on this talent pool. To improve retention and better link domestic and international graduates to the labour market, Estonia is promoting applied research and industry-oriented doctoral pathways, supported by stronger science-business cooperation. However, the uptake of industry-oriented doctoral studies has remained below expectations (see Annex 4). A new 2026-2029 talent strategy, set to be presented in September 2026, aims to better attract and retain talent from abroad, by aligning with the ‘Work in Estonia’ and ‘Study in Estonia’ initiatives.

0

1 000

2 000

3 000

4 000

5 000

6 000

7 000

8 000

9 000

10 000

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

N u

m b

e r

o f

st u

d e

n ts

e n

ro ll

e d

b y

a re

a o

f st

u d

y

Natural sciences ICT Engineering

ANNEX 14: SOCIAL SCOREBOARD

95

Table A14.1:Social Scoreboard for Estonia

Update of 4 May 2026. Members States are categorised based on the Social Scoreboard according to a methodology agreed with the EMCO and SPC Committees. Please consult the Annex of the Joint Employment Report 2026 for details on the methodology (https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/joint-employment-report-2026_en). Source: Eurostat

41.8

10.2

62.5

11.2

0.5

5.07

81.7

7.5

1.8

131.0

21.8

19.4

29.6

16.0

8.8

34.8

7.7

Critical situation To watch Weak but

improving

Good but to

monitor On average

Dynamic labour markets

and fair working conditions

Social protection and

inclusion

Share of individuals who have basic or above basic overall digital skills

(% of the population aged 16-74, 2025)

Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction

(% reduction of AROP, 2025)

Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare

(% of the under 3-years-old population, 2025)

Self-reported unmet need for medical care

(% of the population aged 16+, 2025)

Disability employment gap

(percentage points, population aged 20-64, 2025)

Housing cost overburden

(% of the total population, 2025)

Adult participation in learning (during the last 12 months, excl. guided on

the job training, % of the population aged 25-64, 2022)

Equal opportunities and

access to the labour market

Best performersBetter than average

Early leavers from education and training

(% of  the population aged 18-24, 2025)

Young people not in employment, education or training

(% of the population aged 15-29, 2025)

Gender employment gap

(percentage points, population aged 20-64, 2025)

Income quintile ratio

(S80/S20, 2025)

At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate 

(% of the total population, 2025)

Employment rate

(% of the population aged 20-64, 2025)

Unemployment rate

(% of the active population aged 15-74, 2025)

Long term unemployment

(% of the active population aged 15-74, 2025)

Gross disposable household income (GDHI) per capita growth

(index, 2008=100, 2024)

At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate for children

(% of the population aged 0-17, 2025)

ANNEX 15: HEALTH AND HEALTH SYSTEMS

96

Estonia’s health system faces challenges

that need to be addressed to improve the

health of its population, social fairness, competitiveness and productivity. These

challenges include: (i) limited access to healthcare and low life expectancy, the latter linked to high treatable mortality; (ii) suboptimal funding and cost-effectiveness of the health system; (iii) shortages of healthcare workers; and (iv) an uneven geographical distribution of healthcare resources. Sustainable funding of healthcare and the need to improve accessibility and affordability of healthcare were raised in the 2025 country-specific recommendations (CSRs).

Life expectancy at birth in Estonia remains lower than the EU average. As in other EU countries, women can expect to live longer than men (8.3 years longer in 2024). However, they can only expect to live about 3.1 years longer than men in good health. The gender gap in healthy life years at age 65 is much lower – only a single year. As a result, Estonian women tend to live longer, but with greater limitations on their daily activities. Inequalities in life expectancy linked to socio-economic status also remain substantial. In 2023, educational inequalities translated into a life expectancy gap at age 30 of 10 years for men and 8.5 years for women (254). There are also large regional differences; for example, people in Hiiumaa live more than 10 years longer than in Võru County (255).

Treatable mortality remains much higher

than the EU average (see Graph A15.1). Although it has improved over the last 10 years, the high level of treatable mortality suggests shortcomings in the effectiveness of the health system. Diseases of the circulatory system (cardiovascular diseases (CVDs)) and cancer remain the leading causes of death, with mortality rates higher than the EU average. Mortality from CVDs is particularly high, led by ischaemic heart diseases and hypertension. Cancer prevalence in Estonia has increased substantially over the last decade, but remains slightly below the EU average. The 2021-2030 Estonian Cancer Control Plan seeks to lower it further by strengthening

(254) OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies

(2025), Country Health Profile 2025: Estonia. State of Health in the EU.

(255) Sustainability of healthcare. Scenarios until 2035 - Foresight Centre.

prevention, promoting early detection and ensuring timely access to treatment. Estonia participates in several joint actions funded by EU4Health, which address treatable mortality, particularly when caused by cancer. Estonia’s suicide rate is one of the highest in the EU. To address it, Estonia launched its first Suicide Prevention Action Plan for 2025-2028. A mental health action plan for 2023-2026 is also being implemented.

Graph A15.1: Treatable mortality

Age-standardised death rate - mortality that could be avoided through optimal quality healthcare. Source: Eurostat (indicator: hlth_cd_apr)

Preventable mortality in Estonia was also

very high in 2022 despite a comparatively

high level of investment in disease

prevention. Spending on prevention in 2023

accounted for 4.2% of Estonia’s total health expenditure, above the EU average of 3.65%. It has increased slightly over the last 10 years. However, the rate of preventable mortality is among the highest in the EU, with only a 5% decrease over the last decade. The newly adopted Public Health Act (2025) establishes the legislative framework for organising and protecting public health, defining the roles and duties of state and local authorities, outlining requirements and restrictions to safeguard population health and setting out the basis for financing public health measures and oversight.

Alcohol consumption is one of the leading drivers of preventable mortality in Estonia. It accounts for approximately one quarter of all preventable deaths (256). A large proportion of deaths was also linked to dietary risk factors, including insufficient intake of fruit and vegetables and high consumption of sugar-sweetened

(256) Country Health Profile 2025: Estonia - see earlier footnote.

152.3 129.4 123.9

135.6 126.2 115.8

94.8 89.2 91.7 93.3 89.7 86.8

2014 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

per 100 000 population

Estonia EU

97

beverages. Smoking rates have declined over recent years and are below the EU average. However, the proportion of young people who report smoking e-cigarettes/vaping is particularly high. Estonia has introduced several policies to address these challenges, including its national health plan for 2020-2030 and the Estonia 2035 strategy. Tobacco product excise taxes were increased in 2025, following greater marketing regulation introduced in 2019. When it comes to vaccinations, Estonia has experienced a steep decline in childhood immunisation rates (particularly for measles). As a result of the low vaccination uptake and misinformation impacting trust in vaccines, the Ministry of Social Affairs introduced tools to improve vaccine management.

These poor health outcomes negatively

affect Estonia’s workforce, productivity and

competitiveness. In Estonia, mortality at working age as a proportion of total mortality is among the highest in the EU, exacerbating the effects of population ageing on a shrinking labour force (see Annex 11). Gains in health status from further prevention investments could alleviate this impact. For example, preventing all deaths from non-communicable diseases in Estonia would result in a 1.1% gain in working-life years from 2022 to 2040 (vs 0.9% for the EU). The gain in working-life years would save about 136 397 life years in Estonia over 2022-2040. This increase would mitigate an otherwise expected 7% reduction of the workforce due to demographic

ageing of the 2022 population (7% for the EU) (257).

The functioning of the health system is

hampered by low public spending. Spending on public health has grown substantially in Estonia over the last decade (38% increase). The most recent increases were driven by higher wages for healthcare workers, with doctors’ wages increasing by approximately 25% and nurses’ salaries by 21% in 2023. Yet in 2024, health spending per inhabitant (adjusted for differences in purchasing power) was one of the lowest in the EU and just 77% of it was publicly funded. The allocation of spending by function in 2023 reveals that outpatient care represents the largest portion of current health expenditure. This is followed by inpatient care, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, long-term care and preventive care. Historically, investment levels have been low in Estonia and relied heavily on EU funds. At the same time, ageing infrastructure (with many facilities over 50 years old) and low availability of key diagnostic technology raise concerns. The government is also undertaking a broader review of healthcare financing to improve its long-term sustainability and financial protection. Also, the Estonian recovery and resilience plan (RRP) includes investments that can address the 2025 CSR: (i) improvement of health infrastructure (construction of a county hospital and health centre in Viljandi); (ii) implementation of

(257) EC/OECD, State of Health in the EU: 2025 Synthesis Report.

Table A15.1:Key health indicators

*The EU average is weighted for all indicators except for doctors and nurses per 1 000 population, for which the EU simple average is used based on 2023 data (or latest available). Doctors’ density data refer to practising doctors in all countries except Greece, Portugal (licensed to practise) and Slovakia (professionally active). Density of nurses: data refer to practising nurses (EU recognised qualification) in most countries except Portugal (licensed to practice) and Slovakia (professionally active). Latest data update on nurses for Belgium and Sweden: 2022; for France: 2021; for Luxembourg: 2017. ** latest available 10-year trend: ratio 2023/2014 or 2024/2013; a factor of 2.00 means that it has doubled in 10 years. ***‘Available hospital beds’ covers somatic care, not psychiatric care. Source: Eurostat

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 10-year

change**

EU average*

(latest year)

Cancer mortality per 100 000 population 265.0 265.8 246.7 238.0 n.a. 0.79 233.1 (2023)

Mortality due to circulatory diseases per 100 000 population 560.2 599.4 575.0 521.6 n.a. 0.75 313.0 (2023)

Current expenditure on health, purchasing power standards, per capita 1 901 2 038 1 989 2 145 2 338 1.64 3834.9 (2023)

Public share of health expenditure, % of current health expenditure 77.1 76.1 74.8 75.8 76.6 1.03 80.6 (2023)

Spending on prevention, % of current health expenditure 4.9 8.8 5.7 4.2 n.a. 1.44 3.7 (2023)

Available hospital beds per 100 000 population*** 397 389 374 364 n.a. 0.84 440 (2023)

Doctors per 1 000 population* 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 n.a. 1.04 4.3 (2023)*

Nurses per 1 000 population* 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 n.a. 1.17 7.6 (2023)*

Mortality at working age (20-64 years), % of total mortality 19.0 17.6 17.8 18.3 17.7 0.84 14.3 (2023)

Consumption of antibiotics in the community and hospital sectors,

defined daily doses per 1 000 inhabitants 10.5 10.1 12.4 12.7 13.0 1.07 20.3 (2024)

98

organisational reforms; and (iii) strengthening of primary healthcare.

Linked to low public funding, the country has

a high level of OOP payments for healthcare (22% in 2023 vs an EU average of 15%). OOP payments went predominantly on outpatient medical goods, followed by dental care, long-term care and outpatient specialist care. Existing measures to mitigate OOP spending include exemptions and reduced user charges for vulnerable groups, annual caps on pharmaceutical co-payments and recent expansions in benefit coverage, notably in primary and dental care. The most recent legislative measure to be mentioned here is the Medicines and Medical Devices Reimbursement Act from 2025. These measures, together with the RRP and cohesion policy funding (see previous paragraph), can help address the 2025 CSRs on affordability and accessibility.

Estonia continues its efforts to reduce

hospitalisations and improve patients’ outcomes. Estonia has gradually downsized its

hospital bed capacity in recent years. From 2018 to 2023, the number of beds per 1 000 inhabitants fell by more than 9% (see Table A15.1). Adopted in December 2024, the Hospital Network Development Plan aims to further consolidate the hospital sector, with the number of hospitals planned to decrease from 20 to 17 by 2040 (part of the RRP). Occupancy rates for curative care beds have remained below 70% since 2020, suggesting an inefficient allocation of resources. Estonia has successfully reduced hospitalisations for chronic conditions by effectively moving care into community settings (258). Despite modest improvements in secondary- care quality indicators, Estonia's 30-day mortality rates for acute myocardial infarction and stroke remain above the EU average. To address this, a nationwide ischemic stroke care pathway was implemented in January 2025. Apart from the RRP measures related to hospitals and primary care, cohesion policy funds also play a role: Estonia is improving its primary care by setting up multidisciplinary healthcare centres and offering complex services via multiprofessional teams and investing in integrated care. Estonia also participates in the joint action CIRCE-JA (259) funded by EU4Health aimed at transferring good

(258) Country Health Profile 2025: Estonia – see earlier footnote.

(259) Home | CIRCE-JA.

practices in primary care between EU countries. The EU Technical Support Instrument (TSI) has supported Estonia in implementing major primary care reforms, including efforts to strengthen mental health management. All this is expected to help address the 2025 CSR.

Graph A15.2: Out-of-pocket payments: share in

healthcare spending and categories, 2023

Household out-of-pocket payment: direct payment for healthcare goods and services from the household primary income or savings, where the payment is made by the user at the time of the purchase of goods or the use of the services (Eurostat). VHI: voluntary health insurance. (1) Others: eyeglasses, hearing aids, lab tests... Source: Eurostat and Country Health Profiles - Dashboard

Estonia faces challenges in access to

healthcare, with high unmet needs and

significant inequalities. In 2025, the proportion

of the Estonian population reporting unmet needs for medical care remained among the highest in the EU (7.7% vs an EU average of 2.4%). Long waiting times are the main reason for these unmet needs and they are more pronounced among people at risk of poverty, with a gap of around 13 % (see Annex 12). Comparatively high unmet needs for medical examination are reported in rural areas (74% in 2025). There are also significant regional differences in access; for example, just 49% of the population lived within a 10-minute drive of a hospital in 2023, one of the lowest percentages in the EU (see Annex 18). Estonia is taking steps to integrate health and social policies (see Annex 12) and to advance personalised medicine. Both can contribute to addressing the 2025 CSRs on access and affordability by improving coordination and continuity of care, strengthening prevention, and supporting more targeted, person-centred service delivery.

76%

22%

2%

28%

13%

18%

8%

33%

1%

Gov. & Compulsory

Out-of-pocket (OOP)

Voluntary (VHI)

Pharmaceuticals

Outpatient care

Long-term care

Others

Dental care

Inpatient care

Sh ar

e o

f sp

en d

in g

O O

P B

re ak

d o

w n

OOP share - EU- 27 average: 15%

99

Shortages of health workforce limit the

availability of care, particularly in rural

areas. Estonia faces persistent shortages in its health workforce. In 2023, Estonia had fewer doctors and nurses than the EU average (see Table A15.1). The number of nurse graduates is increasing at a moderate rate and remains below the EU average. As for doctors’ graduates, the rate is among the lowest in the EU and it dropped further in 2023. A high proportion of doctors and nurses are 55 years of age and over, raising concerns about the long-term accessibility of health services (particularly in rural areas (260)). Shortages are particularly high in family medicine, psychiatry and nursing. Over the next decade, Estonia’s health system faces a projected shortage of around 1 300 doctors and nearly 750 nurses, and significant gaps in psychologists and pharmacists (261). The situation is even more challenging outside the major cities of Tallinn and Tartu (262).

Working conditions are a major deterrent to

entering the profession. The government has taken steps to address these challenges by increasing doctors’ and nurses’ wages. The Hospital Network Development Roadmap also includes measures to train the workforce on teamwork, task shifting between specialists and using digital solutions. The government has also approved a strategic framework for addressing health workforce shortages as part of the Estonian RRP. The RRP also includes measures to improve the reimbursement system for doctors, nurses and pharmacists and to incentivise health staff to work in remote areas. It is also addressing the low graduation levels of nurses by increasing admissions to nursing training by 5%. In addition, Estonia participates in the joint action HEROES (263) funded by EU4Health, aimed at sharing expertise among EU countries on health workforce planning. All these measures and funding could help address the 2025 CSR on access.

(260) Tervishoiutöötajatega seotud trendid Eestis, Arenguseire

keskus, 2025.

(261) OSKA_Tervishoid_ENG_Key-findings.pdf.

(262) Country Health Profile 2025: Estonia – see earlier footnote

(263) The project – JA HEROES | Health Workforce Planning Project.

Estonia’s health system is among the most

digitally mature in the EU, but

interoperability challenges persist. Estonia makes extensive use of digital tools to support the collection, management and sharing of health data across care providers. The shares of people accessing their personal health records online and using online health services (excluding phone) instead of in-person consultations are well above the EU average and doubled between 2022 and 2024. Notable progress has been achieved through the roll-out of the nationwide e-booking system and the introduction of the redesigned Health Portal which improves usability for patients and professionals. At the same time, persistent challenges remain in ensuring full standardisation, interoperability and the timely exchange of data within the e-health ecosystem. Measures to boost the digital transformation of Estonia’s health sector set out in its RRP include updating the governance framework for e-health and coordinating the development of e-health services. Estonia also participates in joint actions and direct grants under EU4Health aimed at improving the interoperability of health data and facilitating the implementation of the European Health Data Space. All these measures and funding have the potential to partially address the 2025 CSR on access.

Estonia's pharmaceutical sector holds a

modest position in the EU. It is characterised by one of the smallest economic contributions in the manufacturing of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations. Clinical trials in Estonia have seen a reduction over recent years to 14.5 per million population in 2024 (from 32.2 in 2022), lower than the EU average of 18.3 (264). Estonia's patent activity is limited, with just 0.7 patents granted per million population, while the EU average stands at 1.8 (2024) (265). The industry has a consistently low share of extra-EU exports (0.56% in 2025 vs 13.85% for the EU average).

(264) US National Library of Medicine, https://clinicaltrials.gov.

(265) European Patent Office: Statistics & Trends Centre | epo.org.

ANNEX 16: HOUSING

100

House prices have been rising for a long

time. The increase in house and rental prices in Estonia since the mid-2010s is among the highest in the EU, with the strongest growth recorded in Tallinn and its commuter belt. Construction of new dwellings expanded in response but then halted due to a lack of demand caused by higher borrowing and construction costs.

Housing affordability in Estonia has

weakened over the past decade. Strong house

price and rent growth has contributed to a rising cost overburden, particularly for low-income households and single parents, with single parents at risk of poverty in Estonia allocating one of the highest shares of disposable household income to rent in the EU. Housing vulnerability remains strongly linked to tenure, and is close to the EU average, although substantially higher for owners without a mortgage. Housing availability also remains a concern, including due to labour shortages in construction, limited municipal social housing stock and increasing pressure in urban areas.

By contrast, energy poverty remains relatively

limited on average, affecting primarily

vulnerable groups. The proportion of households unable to keep their homes adequately warm and in arrears on utility bills is well below the EU average. The proportion of households unable to keep their homes adequately warm is however higher among low-income households and households with older adults than the general population.

Estonia’s decentralised and market-driven

housing policy is impacted by territorial

development gaps and low local

administrative capacity. Estonia’s housing policy is focused on support to homeownership via tax relief and loan guarantees, with minimal provision of housing benefits. Estonia decentralised model for housing development and support faces challenges due to low local administrative capacity although increasing support through digitalisation is envisaged.

Estonia is currently designing a housing

policy for 2025–2035 which might touch

upon several aspects relevant to housing affordability. Confirmation of this and policy implementation will require monitoring to assess

progress, the impact on housing affordability, and support to vulnerable groups.

Housing market developments

A long-standing trend of rising house prices continues. House prices have maintained a pronounced uptrend from the mid-2010s, following their post-2008-09 crisis correction. Nominal house prices increased particularly sharply in 2020-2022, when very low mortgage interest rates, rising household incomes, the release of second-pillar pension funds and the sale of a few unicorn start-ups incentivised households with a willingness to pay a higher price to purchase real estate. Price increases were geographically concentrated, with the strongest growth recorded in Tallinn and its commuter belt, reflecting population concentration and labour market dynamics. By 2025, house prices were 64% higher than in 2020 in nominal terms, corresponding to an increase of about 15% in real terms (Graph A16.1). This price growth slowed in 2023, as tighter financing conditions quickly translated into a higher financial burden due to the prevalence of variable-rate mortgages in Estonia, and economic stagnation discouraged the purchase of real estate. The weaker demand was also reflected by far fewer transactions. Since 2023, however, mortgage interest rates have declined, and lending volumes have expanded. Together with more favourable income taxation as of 2026, this has led to a housing market revival (266). The price-to-income ratio has fluctuated and increased over the last 15 years by 24%, one of the highest increases in the EU (Graph A16.1).

(266) The Estonian Economy and Monetary Policy 4/2025.

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Rental prices increased more gradually

during the 2010s but rose sharply in 2022. Since 2020, rental prices (including existing and new rental contracts) have increased by 32%, but the steepest increase of more than 20% was recorded in 2022. That year Estonia witnessed a large inflow of Ukrainian refugees. The rental market in Estonia is small, with home ownership at 79.3% (EU average of 68.4% in 2024), while the share of renters is correspondingly lower (19.3%; EU: 30.2%). Although the rent to income ratio is on a decreasing trend after a peak in 2017, the 16% increase between 2010 and 2024 is one of the highest in the EU.

Construction of new dwellings expanded in

response to rising house prices but has

dwindled over the last years. Housing supply

has expanded over the past decade, albeit falling short of satisfying demand in high-growth regions. Residential construction activity increased substantially in response to fast price growth in the early 2020s, as profitability rose. The number of residential building permits issued increased sharply in 2019-2021. However, completions have become constrained by labour shortages, sharply rising construction costs and more stringent financing conditions for developers. The number of building permits issued has therefore been falling during the last few years, suggesting that new housing supply has become weaker. Meanwhile population growth has become increasingly concentrated in certain areas, exacerbating regional disparities. Tallinn and Tartu keep experiencing high demand and insufficient supply, while rural Estonia faces excess supply and housing quality deterioration. The housing construction gap for the decade till 2035 (based on population and construction projections) is estimated at 15 300 dwellings, with the biggest

investment needs concentrated in the capital city metropolitan region (267).

Graph A16.2: House prices, rents and price-to-

income evolution in EE and EU27 since 2005

Source: Eurostat

Older buildings are in need of renovation. Due

to a large stock of Soviet-era buildings, Estonia has sizeable investment needs related to energy efficiency retrofitting, climate adaptation and urban infrastructure. Up to 14 000 apartment buildings, accounting for a total area of 18 million m2 will need to be fully renovated (defined as an upgrade to at least energy class C by 2050, considering (i) the number of residential buildings currently in use; (ii) the volume of renovations completed to date (3 000 apartment buildings with a total area of 5 million m2 in 2020); (iii) the estimated residential building abandonment rate). In addition, Estonia intends to use the Social Climate Fund in particular for housing renovation, allocating substantial funding to the renovation of apartment buildings to reduce

(267) Balouktsi et al. (2026) Housing investment needs in the EU.

JRC Technical Report 144419.

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Source: Eurostat and European Commission calculations.

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energy costs and improve living conditions for vulnerable households. Public support schemes and EU-funded renovations therefore play an important role but remain limited in scale (see Annex 9).

Graph A16.3: House supply indicators in EE since

2005

(1) 4-quarters moving sums (averages for prices) Source: Eurostat

Productivity in construction is weak. The Estonian construction sector is characterised by 28% lower productivity (gross value added per hour worked) than the EU average, despite a gradual improvement over the previous decade. Costs have risen particularly sharply since 2021 due to rising prices of materials (many previously sourced from Russia), supply chain disruptions and increasing wages. As a result, in 2024, construction producer costs were 38% higher than in 2020 and nominal unit labour costs in the construction sector were 62% higher – one of the highest sectoral increases in the EU (see Annex 5). Because of these sharp increases in costs and prices, combined with higher borrowing costs, the main factor limiting construction activity in 2024- 2025 was lack of demand.

Structural policies

Estonia is currently designing a

comprehensive housing policy for 2025–

2035. It might touch upon several aspects

(taxation, spatial planning, funding, development of affordable rental housing, measurement and monitoring) relevant to housing affordability and studied in this annex. Confirmation of this and

policy implementation will require monitoring to assess progress, the impact on housing affordability, and support to vulnerable groups.

Estonia’s housing policy is focused on

support to homeownership via tax relief and

loan guarantees, with minimal provision of

housing benefits. Several tax relief schemes

were recently reformed. Mortgage interest tax relief, which had encouraged households to take on more debt, driving demand and potentially increasing house prices, was abolished in 2024. Residential land taxation rates in Estonia are set by municipalities (0.1%–1% of the land’s value), which can provide incentives to occupy the property (the homeownership tax incentive has not been set based on the surface area since 2026 but as an absolute figure – maximum EUR 1 000) (268). Estonia’s tax system still raises very little revenue from property taxes, reflecting Estonia’s approach of taxing land rather than property. While residential land taxation can provide a first incentive to activate the land, exploring a phased-in tax on unoccupied residential property could further discourage owners from leaving their properties vacant in areas under housing pressure (see Annex 3). Housing support is tied to the subsistence allowance; there is no separate housing allowance. Although social housing has increased in recent years, it only accounted for around 1.1% of the housing stock in 2017, compared with an OECD average of about 7%.

Estonia decentralised model for housing

development and support faces challenges due to low local administrative capacity

although increasing support through

digitalisation is envisaged. The state provides

public funding support (subsidies, guarantees, loans) while local authorities are responsible for housing support, spatial planning and land policy implementation. The OECD recently pointed out significant limitations (269), such as the lack of policy coherence between national and local levels and the low administrative capacity of local authorities. The creation of Maa-ja Ruumiamet (Land and Spatial Development Board) in 2025, harnessing digitalisation, aims to rationalise and

(268) Land tax | Estonian Tax and Customs Board.

(269) Adapting land use and spatial planning to shrinkage in Estonia: Shrinking Smartly in Estonia | OECD, 2022

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103

foster best practice, facilitate access to expertise and improve implementation of planning decisions. This reform can build on Estonia’s fully digitalised building permit system, which allows the same project to be evaluated simultaneously by all public authorities. Lastly, according to the World Bank, Estonia was among the most performant Member States as regards construction regulation (270).

Estonia’s housing policy is also characterised

by the search to attenuate territorial development gaps. These gaps pose a significant

challenge for Estonia, reflected for housing in the proportion of vacant housing units in rural areas from 16% in 2010 to 25% in 2024 and an annual abandonment rate of 0.7%), representing a worrying trend (see Annex 18). Low incomes and low property values in rural areas also hinder investment in the renovation of the existing stock to prolong its duration. Several measures have been put in place, such as a specific co-loan scheme without collateral for households, or state financial support for municipal build-to-rent schemes in rural areas. Complementary support from EU funds was also directed to municipalities, with EUR 23.4 million supporting the construction of housing for people in need of assistance in 2023. In the previous programming period, an EU- co-financed programme (around EUR 9.4 million) also supported the adaptation of over 2 000 homes for persons with disabilities. Estonia is also working with the European Investment Bank on a major project (1 000-1 500 affordable new rental dwellings) outside the main cities to balance regional development.

Vulnerable groups

Housing affordability pressures are

particularly pronounced for low-income and single-parent households. In 2024, while 8.6% of the population had housing costs exceeding 40% of disposable household income (slightly above the EU average of 8.2% and 3.7 percentage points (pps) higher than in 2022), this rate rose to 26.8% among single parents, well above the EU

(270) Housing in the European Union: Market Developments,

Underlying Drivers, and Policies, 2025, p 62.

average of 14% (271). Among people at risk of poverty, the housing cost overburden rate also increased sharply by 10.7 pps to 29.6%, reflecting limited access to affordable housing. Single parents at risk of poverty in Estonia allocate one of the highest shares of disposable household income to rent in the EU (46.7% vs 32.3% in 2024), up significantly from 29.3% in 2015. Rising housing costs have contributed to a deterioration in housing conditions, with the share of households living in overcrowded dwellings increasing to 18.4% in 2024, 5.7 pps higher than in 2020.

Housing vulnerability in Estonia is closely

linked to housing tenure and dependence on

municipal support, with tenue status strongly correlated with the risks of poverty and

social exclusion. In2024, the at-risk-of-poverty- or-social-exclusion (AROPE) rate was lowest among homeowners with a mortgage or loan (8.1%; EU: 9.6%), while it was substantially higher among owners without a mortgage (23.5%; EU 18.4%). Tenants renting at market price recorded an AROPE rate of 31.2% (EU: 30.8%), rising to 41.2% among those renting at a reduced price or free of charge (EU: 38.4%). The at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) rate among tenants stood at 29.3% (EU: 25.6%), compared with 19.1% among homeowners (EU: 12.7%).

Housing affordability pressures are

particularly pronounced in large urban areas. A recent study led by the Ministry of Climate found that the availability of affordable housing was limited in the urban regions of Tallinn, Tartu and Pärnu (272). Housing prices and rents have increased significantly faster than incomes, exceeding the average financial capacity of households, with particularly adverse effects on young people and low-income households. For this sector of the population, this trend contributes to spatial inequalities, encourages outward migration from city centres and delays household formation and housing-related investment. In contrast, many households in rural areas are locked into housing with a very low residual value.

(271)The overburden rate should be read together with the tenure

structure (homeowner, tenants), that may differ across country and regions.

(272) Affordable and accessible housing policy analysis: Taskukohane eluase_Eesti_11-10.pdf.

104

For older persons in Estonia, housing

challenges are closely linked to owning an

ageing home and high poverty risks impeding capacity for investment in renovation. Older

people are more likely to remain in long-standing owner-occupied dwellings, many of which were built several decades ago and are not adapted to accessibility or energy-efficiency needs. Older-age poverty risks are particularly pronounced among single-older-person households, which can limit the ability to cover maintenance, renovation and energy costs (see Annex 6).

Energy poverty remains relatively limited.

The proportion of households unable to keep their homes adequately warm stood at 3.6% in 2024, well below the EU average of 9.2%, while arrears on utility bills were also lower than the EU average (5.7% compared with 6.9%). However, the proportion of households unable to keep their homes adequately warm is higher among low- income households (6.7 %) and households with older adults (7.9 %).

Municipalities play a key role in housing support, but with limited capacity. Targeted support is provided through emergency shelters, temporary accommodation, day centres, which offer basic services such as meals, hygiene facilities and social work support, and general housing-related benefits. High housing development prices constrain municipal(273) investment, which the current level of state financial support does not compensate. In 2023, 14 795 people used municipal dwelling services. The most recent partial homelessness count, conducted in 2021, identified just over 1 000 homeless persons. In 2023, 1 836 people stayed in emergency accommodation. Persons with disabilities have among the highest poverty rates (see Annex 12). Although they represented 12.9% of social housing residents in 2021, limited data on affordable and accessible housing restricts the assessment of how effectively municipal social services meet their housing needs across regions.

(273) Affordable and accessible housing policy analysis Taskukohane eluase_Eesti_11-10.pdf

HORIZONTAL

ANNEX 17: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

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This annex assesses Estonia’s progress on

the sustainable development goals (SDGs) along the dimensions of competitiveness,

sustainability, social fairness and

macroeconomic stability. The 17 SDGs and their related indicators provide a policy framework under the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The aim is to end all forms of poverty, fight inequalities and tackle climate change and the environmental crisis, while ensuring that no one is left behind. The EU and its Member States are committed to this historic global framework agreement and to playing an active role in maximising progress on the SDGs. The graph below is based on the EU SDG indicator set developed to monitor progress on the SDGs in the EU.

Estonia is performing well and improving on

one SDG on competitiveness (Quality

education, SDG 4). The country is performing well and improving on adult learning (SDG 4). The

participation in learning in the past four years up from 19.6% of the active population aged 25-64 in 2019 to 23.8% in 2025 (EU average: 13.7%).

However, it still needs to catch up with the EU average on SDG 9 (Industry, innovation

and infrastructure) and SDG 8 (Decent work

and economic growth). Estonia’s in-work at-risk- of-poverty rate (SDG 8) increased from 10.0% of population aged 18 or over in 2019 to 10.3% in 2024 (EU average: 8.2%). Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (SDG 9) increased from 1.59% of GDP in 2019 to 1.99% in 2024, but is still below the EU average of 2.24%. Similarly, the percentage of households with high-speed internet connection (SDG 9) increased from 57.4% of households in 2019 to 76.3% in 2024, but remains below the EU average of 82.5%. The Estonian recovery and resilience plan (RRP) includes significant reforms and investments to increase access to high-speed internet in rural areas, and to boost innovation and digital

h ea

lth

Graph A17.1: Progress towards the SDGs in Estonia

For a detailed progress assessment towards the various SDGs, see the annual Eurostat report ‘Sustainable development in the European Union’; for extensive data on the short-term SDG progress of EU countries, see Key findings – Sustainable development indicators; for an interactive visualization of SDG progress of EU countries, see SDG country overview. A high status does not mean that a country is close to reaching a specific SDG, but signals that it is doing better than the EU on average. The progress score is an absolute measure based on the indicator trends over the past five or six years. The calculation does not take into account any target values, as most EU policy targets are only valid for the aggregate EU level. Depending on data availability for each goal, not all 17 SDGs are shown for each country. Source: Eurostat, latest update of 29 April 2026. Data refer mainly to the period 2019-2024 or 2019-2025. Data on SDGs may vary across the report and its annexes due to different cut-off dates.

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transition in businesses. There is further room for improvement in addressing the remaining challenges.

While Estonia performs well and is improving

on several of the SDGs related to

sustainability (SDGs 2, 6, 7, and 15), the

country needs to catch up with the EU

average on SDGs 12, 13 and 14. The area under organic farming (SDG 2) increased from 22.3% of utilised agricultural area in 2019 to 22.6% in 2024 (the EU average: 10.9%). The country is also performing well and has made progress on most of the affordable and clean energy indicators (SDG 7), including on the percentage of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption, from 31.7% in 2019 to 42.2% in 2024 (EU average 25.2%). However, while Estonia’s material footprint (SDG 12) decreased from 28.6 tonnes per inhabitant in 2019 to 24.9 in 2024, it is still above the EU average of 13.7 tonnes per inhabitant. Similarly, while the country’s air emissions intensity of fine particulate matter from industry (SDG 9) has fallen from 0.24 grams per euro in 2018 to 0.16 in 2023, it is still above the EU average of 0.05 grams per euro.

Conversely, it is performing well but is moving away from SDG 11 (Sustainable

cities and communities). The population living in households suffering from noise has increased from 8.6% in 2018 to 9.6% in 2023 (EU average 18.1%). Similarly, the percentage of the population suffering from the housing cost overburden rate in cities has increased from 5.1% in 2019 to 8.4% in 2019, but remains well below the EU average of 9.8%.

Estonia is performing well and improving on

four indicators related to social fairness

(SDGs 1, 4, 7 and 10). It is also improving but

still needs to catch up on two indicators for

SDGs 3 and 5. Estonia is performing well and improving on poverty reduction (SDGs 1 and 10), including the relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap (down from 22.0% distance to poverty threshold in 2019 to 18.8% in 2024; EU average: 22.7%). But it still needs to catch up on some gender equality indicators (SDG 5). The average gross hourly earnings of women went from being 21.6% lower than men in 2019 to 18.8% lower in 2024 but this is still above the EU average of 11.1%. On the other hand, tertiary educational attainment (SDG 4) increased from 40.6% of the

population aged 25 to 34 in 2019 to 44.3% in 2025 (EU average: 44.8%). While there is an improvement on the self-reported unmet needs for medical care (SDG 3), falling from 15.5% of the population aged 16 or over in 2019 to 8.5% in 2024, this is still above the EU average of 2.5%. The Estonian RRP includes measures to address challenges in primary healthcare and long-term care.

Estonia is moving away from SDGs and still

needs to catch up on one indicator related to

macroeconomic stability (SDG 8). But the

country performs well and is improving on SDG 17 (Partnerships for the SDGs). Real GDP per capita (SDG 8) declined (from EUR 21 650 in 2019 to EUR 21 250 in 2025) and remains below the EU average of EUR 34 110.(274) The general government gross debt (SDG 17) grew from 9.0% of the GDP in 2019 to 24.1% of the GDP in 2025, but it remains one of the lowest in the EU, well below the EU average of 81.7%.

As the SDGs form an overarching framework, any links to relevant SDGs are either explained or depicted with icons in the other annexes.

(274) Adjusted for inflation using a chain-linked methodology and

with 2020 serving as the reference point.

ANNEX 18: COMPETITIVE REGIONS

107

Regional development trends

Estonia’s convergence on the EU average

GDP per head since its accession to the EU

has been driven mainly by the stronger performance of the regions hosting its two

largest cities, Tallinn and Tartu. Over the past

two decades, Estonia’s GDP per head has grown significantly, rising from 55% of the EU average in 2004 to 79% in 2024 (in purchasing power standard, PPS), reflecting substantial long-term economic convergence (Map A18.1). There are persistent territorial disparities: all NUTS 3 regions, except the capital region (107%), are well below the EU average in GDP per head, with rates ranging from 51% in Kesk-Eesti to 63% in Lõuna- Eesti.

Over the last decade there has been regional

convergence in the country, but labour

productivity has been sluggish. This trend

partly reflects a slowdown in the capital region. Along with Kirde-Eesti, these two areas were the only ones that registered real GDP per head growth far below the EU average (EU 1.5% vs 0.9% for both areas) between 2014 and 2024. Labour productivity in all regions remains significantly below the EU average (Graph A18.1, with differences in productivity across regions among the most pronounced in the OECD(275). Strong wage growth has contributed to rising unit labour costs in recent years, weakening cost competitiveness.

(275) OECD (2025) Strengthening Place-Based Regional

Development Policy in Estonia (EN)

Map A18.1: GDP per head compared with the EU

average (NUTS2).

2021-2023 average GDP per head in purchasing power standard compared with the EU average. Source: Commission calculations based on Eurostat 16 July 2025 data

Graph A18.1: Labour productivity growth (2014 -

2024) and labour productivity (2024) per hour

worked; NUTS 3 level

Source: Commission calculations based on Joint Research Centre (JRC) data

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108

Key challenges for regional competitiveness

Estonia’s research and innovation system is

characterised by relatively low R&D

intensity and a strong concentration of

research capacity in the capital region and Tartu. R&D expenditure in Estonia remains below the EU average (2.2%) at 2% of GDP in 2024. Regions outside main urban centres lack coherent innovation ecosystems, including adequate R&D supply, tailored business support services and skilled professionals, which limits firms’ ability to innovate and diversify (276). However, several

(276) Strengthening Place-Based Regional Development Policy in

Estonia, OECD, 2025.

regional institutions and players have the potential to play a stronger role in place-based innovation ecosystems, particularly those in more remote regions. These include regional university colleges, which already play a significant role in regional development, particularly in Kirde-Eesti and Lääne-Eesti, located further from the innovation poles of Tallinn and Tartu. There is also room to better anchor these bodies into national innovation and regional development policies.

Estonia’s demographic trends are

characterised by population growth in the

main urban centres of Tallinn and Tartu and

population decline in most other regions. Between 2001 and 2021, the population increased by 14.9% in the capital region, one of the steepest increases in the OECD, but declined

Table A18.1:Main development trends, challenges and the concentration of resources

Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data; categories of regions based on Map A18.1

Main development trends

Transition regions (population 1,37 million)

Estonia is a single NUTS 2 region. Large disparities exist at NUTS 3 level, with only the capital region above the EU average in GDP per head (PPS). The key challenge, particularly outside the capital, is to boost labour productivity and sustain growth amid declining cost competitiveness.

Specific territories

Regions on the eastern border are faced with particular challenges. Kirde-Eesti is undergoing major economic and social transformation as oil shale-based energy production is phased out. The region, which has a large Russian-speaking populatoin, has seen a significant fall in its population. However, there are opportunities for diversifying into other industrial acitivities thanks to a strong industrial base, accumulated know-how, relatively good transport connectivity, regional university colleges, and a workforce transitioning out of fossil fuel industries. It is therefore crucial to continue and consolidate the economic transformation that began with support from the Just Transition Fund. Louna Eest includes Estonia's second-largest citiy, Tartu, as well as Kagu/Eesti, which cimprises some of the most peripheral parts of Estonia. These areas face challenges linked to low population density and demographic decline, including difficulties in accessing basic services as well as weaker transport and energy connectivity. The islands and coastal areas benefit from tourism, but their reliance on ferries and, on the two larger islands air services, can complicate access to services, including healthcare. Differences in settlement patterns, infrastructure and connectivity mean that these regions are more sensitive to disruptions, highlighting the importance of strengthening regional resilience and the continuity of essential services. The capital region and, to a lesser extent, other urban areas face increasing congestion driven by urban sprawl, alongside growing challenges in climate adaptation, urban resilience, crisis preparedness and population protection.

Transport and energy challenges

The flagship TEN-T project in the region is Rail Baltica, supported primarily from the Connecting Europe Facility, as well as SF, RRF, and considerable state budget support. More broadly, promoting a modal shift away from road transport, further decarbonising transport, and ensuring that the transport network is consistent with military mobility needs remain relevant objectives. Improving the take-up and effectiveness of rail services, other public transport and light mobility would help to resolve a number of regional development bottlenecks.

109

by 16.5% in the rest of the country (277). A continued pattern of population decline affects most regions: growth or relative stability is concentrated in the capital region and Lõuna-Eesti (Tartu), and the greatest population losses are observed in Kirde-Eesti (A18.2). The latest population projections from Statistics Estonia show that, over the next 25 years, the population will decline in all counties, except Harju (capital region) and Tartu County, suggesting a further concentration of the population in the two largest urban areas (278). Harju County alone makes up almost half of Estonia’s population (279). Outmigration of the working-age population (15– 39) has been particularly pronounced in Kirde- Eesti, while the capital region recorded strong net in-migration in this age group, exacerbating demographic and economic polarisation.

Estonia’s eastern border regions – particularly Kirde-Eesti (Ida-Viru) and parts

of Lõuna-Eesti – face serious structural and

demographic challenges (280).Kirde-Eesti is

undergoing economic restructuring linked to the phase-out of oil shale-based energy production and has experienced sustained population decline and high unemployment. Although Lõuna-Eesti includes Estonia's second-largest city, Tartu, it also comprises extensive low-density and rural areas, particularly in Kagu-Eesti, that are affected by ageing and outward migration. The just transition plan is being implemented in Kirde-Eesti to support economic diversification and reskilling as part of the energy transition. In Kagu-Eesti, the World Bank Catching-up Regions Initiative has supported local authorities in identifying long- term development priorities and strengthening project preparation and implementation capacity. These initiatives illustrate differentiated, place- based approaches to address long-term development needs in Estonia’s eastern border regions.

Diverging demographic trends create distinct development challenges across

regions. In regions with shrinking populations,

(277) Regionaalarengu programm 2025-2028, Regionaal- ja

põllumajandusministeerium, 2025.

(278) Statistics Estonia, 2024.

(279) Population, Statistics Estonia, 2026.

(280) Communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, European Commission, 2026.

there is more pressure on labour supply, the provision of public services and local administrative capacity. Additionally, existing infrastructure, which was often built to accommodate larger populations, requires costly changes in relation to the reduced demand (281), posing challenges to the ‘right to stay’. By contrast, rapidly growing urban areas face challenges related to population growth, infrastructure demand and competing land-use needs.

Map A18.2: Population growth, 2015-2024

(average annual change)

Source: Eurostat

Tertiary educational attainment in Estonia

presents strong regional disparities, with the

two biggest urban areas having nearly twice

the share of highly educated residents as

other regions (282). Higher education and vocational institutions are concentrated in Tallinn and Tartu. Limited post-secondary education options in other regions encourage outmigration of young people. This limits the creation of and access to quality jobs (283). Peripheral regions also face greater difficulties in attracting qualified staff, and the general shortage of teachers will

(281) Shrinking Smartly in Estonia: Preparing Regions for

Demographic Change, OECD, 2022.

(282) Education, Statistics Estonia, 2025.

(283) Strengthening Place-Based Regional Development Policy in Estonia, OECD, 2025.

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make it harder to maintain good-quality education in these areas in the future (see Annex 13). Together, these trends risk undermining the ability of regions to build and retain human capital, exacerbating existing territorial disparities and intergenerational inequalities (284).

Estonia faces a decline in public transport

use and inadequate access to jobs and

services, particularly outside urban

areas (285).Key challenges include rising car use in urban areas and the difficulty in providing cost- effective services in sparsely populated regions. These challenges are aggravated by weak integration between passenger rail, long distance coach, regional and local bus networks (286) (see Annex 7).

Regional disparities persist in access to

social and healthcare services and people’s satisfaction with these services. In rural

(284) Strengthening Place-Based Regional Development Policy in

Estonia, OECD, 2025.

(285) Ühistranspordireform. Kontseptsioon, Regionaal- ja põllumajandusministeerium, 2026.

(286) Ibid.

areas, healthcare facilities are often less accessible than the EU average for rural regions (287). Estonia is one of the Member States where distance to healthcare services contributes to unmet healthcare needs (Table A18.2). This suggests there is scope to improve service provision in rural areas and islands, particularly in primary care (288) and transport connectivity. These challenges are compounded by acute shortages of healthcare workers, in particular general practitioners and mental health specialists. Over half of general practitioners are aged over 60, and the risk of shortages is greatest in rural areas (289) (see Annex 15).

Large urban areas face housing affordability

challenges, while in the rest of the country

housing issues relate more to housing

quality and availability. Estonia’s housing challenges reflect a widening territorial divide between dynamic large urban centres and other

(287) 14% of the population in rural areas lives within a 10-

minute drive from a hospital compared with the EU average of 30% in rural areas.

(288) Primary Health Care Development Plan 2035.

(289) Tervishoiutöötajatega seotud trendid Eestis, Arenguseire keskus, 2025.

Table A18.2:Key regional indicators (at NUTS 3 level) in Estonia

Dark green – the indicator is at least 120% of the EU average Light green – the indicator is at least 100% but less than 120% of the EU average Yellow – the indicator is at least 90% but less than 100% of the EU average Light red – the indicator is at least 75% but less than 90% of the EU average Dark red – the indicator is less than 75% of the EU average. The colour scale applies to 'positive' indicators where higher values are favourable. For 'negative' indicators (where higher values are unfavourable) the colours are reversed. Source: Eurostat and JRC

GDP per head

(PPS, index)

Population

growth

Net migration of

population aged

15-39

Real GDP per

head growth

Productivity:

GDP (PPS) per

hour worked

(index)

Real productivity

growth (per hour

worked)

Population aged

20-64

Access to

healthcare -

Rural areas

Access to

primary schools -

Rural areas

EU27=100

Average annual

change per 1000

residents

Average annual

change per 1000

residents aged

15-39

Average annual

% change EU27=100

Average annual

% change

% of total

population

Population

within 10

minutes by car

from nearest

hospital (%)

Children under

15 within 15-

minute walk to

primary school

(%)

2024 2015-2024 2014-2023 2014-2024 2024 2014-2024 2025 2023 2023

EU 100 1.8 7.1 1.4 100.0 0.7 58.3 30 34

Estonia 79 4.2 11.5 1.4 73.1 1.5 57.7 14 30

Põhja-Eesti 106 11.7 22.7 0.7 85.9 0.9 59.9 12 22

Lääne-Eesti 51 1.0 6.7 2.4 57.8 3.0 55.6 7.0 38

Lõuna-Eesti 62 0.0 1.5 2.7 60.2 2.3 56.9 32 22

Kesk-Eesti 49 -1.9 2.2 1.2 56.5 1.8 55.0 11 33

Kirde-Eesti 49 -10.1 -6.7 0.7 54.7 0.9 53.9 13 31

111

regions of the country. In active housing markets, such as Tallinn, Tartu and Pärnu, housing prices, rents and running costs have risen faster than household income. This reduces affordability and increases inequality, particularly for lower-income households and young people. Continued population concentration in the capital region further intensifies these dynamics. By contrast, shrinking regions face an undersupply of quality housing alongside low attractiveness and dereliction, despite relatively favourable price-to- income ratios (290). Efforts to regenerate housing are hampered by high vacancy rates, weak and illiquid housing markets, limited access to finance, limited renovation incentives and an ageing, energy-inefficient housing stock. This reduces the ability of regional centres to attract and retain residents and skilled workers, ultimately weakening their growth potential (291).

Regional disparities in access to finance

remain a challenge. Companies located outside major urban centres often face greater difficulties in obtaining loan capital for investment, partly due to the low market value and limited liquidity of collateral assets (292). Similar constraints apply to residential real estate collateral (293). Limited access to finance may also restrict businesses’ ability to co-finance investments and participate in broader investment and development initiatives.

Coastal areas face both challenges and

opportunities linked to the sustainable blue

economy. Coastal tourism accounts for the largest share of both added value (34%) and employment (53%) in the blue economy. It is followed by port activities (as value added) and marine living resources (as employment) (294).On the western coast, tourism and fisheries are major employers but remain constrained by strong seasonality, environmental pressures and declining fish stocks, which limits productivity growth and income stability. Beyond connectivity

(290) Eesti taskukohase ja kättesaadava eluasmepoliitika

võimaluste analüüs, Kliimaministeerium 2025.

(291) Ibid.

(292) Regionaalarengu programm 2025-2028 ja programmi rahastamiskava.

(293) Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, 2025.

(294) Estonia - EU Blue Economy Observatory - European Commission.

challenges Estonian islands suffer from low economic diversification, and they are particularly exposed to the impact of climate change. Harju County, hosting the ports of Tallinn and Muuga, is a national logistics and energy gateway. It faces challenges related to port capacity, digital logistics, decarbonisation costs and geopolitical and security risks in the Baltic Sea.

Rural areas struggle to integrate young

people into the labour market. Estonia’s high youth unemployment rate (19.4%, EU: 15.2%, 2025) is not just a rural phenomenon. However, rural areas tend to record higher shares of young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) and higher rates of early leavers from education and training (Table A18.3). These trends constrain future labour supply and weaken regional competitiveness. In regions undergoing economic restructuring, such as Kirde- Eesti, analyses highlight the importance of aligning education and skills development with emerging labour market needs to support job creation and economic diversification. Improving access to education and employment opportunities is therefore critical for the long- term economic viability of these regions (295).

(295) Analüüs. Investeeringud Ida-Virumaale eeldavad tarka

hariduskorraldust | Arvamus | ERR

112

Table A18.3:Main socio-demographic indicators by

degree of urbanisation in Estonia, 2024

Note: The overburden rate should be read together with the tenure structure (homeowner, tenants), that may differ across country and regions. Source: Eurostat

Rural areas in Estonia have the potential for

renewable energy generation as the country

transitions away from oil shale-based production. However, the reliability of the

electricity network is a particular concern in rural areas, and while strengthening the electricity grid would improve well-being, network service prices need to remain affordable (296). Tapping into the country’s large potential for solar and wind power – particularly in rural and sparsely populated areas – could support regional development and contribute to EU-wide economic cohesion and the

(296) ENMAK 2035, Kliimaministeerium, 2025.

green transition (297). Offshore wind development in the Gulf of Riga and around the islands could deliver significant gains in energy security, industrial investment and regional development.

Municipalities face challenges ranging from

limited service provision to financial

sustainability. Despite administrative reforms in 2017, many municipalities remain small in size and have limited administrative, financial and human capacity. Limited local fiscal autonomy further constrains the ability of many municipalities to deliver services efficiently and implement place-based development policies(298). Highly fragmented water services, combined with population decline, reduces efficiency and results in large regional disparities in water prices. This leads to increasing difficulties in maintaining reliable, high-quality and environmentally compliant services(299). Fragmented governance and weak coordination, inadequate stormwater management, and insufficient climate adaptation, lead to growing damage to public infrastructure and heightened risks in urban areas(300). Limited cooperation between municipalities further contributes to fragmentation in the provision of basic services, such as water services.

Estonia’s regional competitiveness is

affected by limited coordination of sectoral policies and low fiscal autonomy at local

level. National policies often fail to take into account regional differences (301): territorial considerations are not systematically embedded in sectoral policy design, budgeting and implementation due in part to the limited availability and use of regional data. As a result, central government regional spending and investment decisions are not consistently aligned with a shared vision for regional development, and ministries continue to pursue separate approaches. These coordination challenges are compounded by the low fiscal autonomy of

(297) Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion,

JRC, 2024.

(298) Strengthening Place-Based Regional Development Policy in Estonia, OECD, 2022; Shrinking Smartly in Estonia, OECD, 2022.

(299) Veeteenuse reform, Kliimaministeerium, 2025.

(300) Floods, Governments Office, 2025, Estonian cities, farmers must adapt to increasingly heavy rainfall, ERR, 2025.

(301) Strengthening Place-Based Regional Development Policy in Estonia, OECD, 2025.

Cities

Towns

and

suburbs

Rural

areas

49.5 38.5 34.3

46.5 32.3 27.7

9.9 11.8 10.6

8.0 10.1 9.6

9.8 12.6 12.0

11.2 12.3 13.2

21.2 22.9 22.1

21.3 20.3 21.3

8.1 8.3 6.3

6.8 5.6 5.3

10.4 7.2 7.7

9.8 7.8 6.3

2.2 2.9 3.8

4.9 3.2 3.5

Severe housing deprivation rate

% of population

Population with high educational

attainment

% of population aged 25-64

Early leavers from education and

training

% of population aged 18-24

NEET 15-34: Neither in

employment nor in education or

training

% of population aged 15-34

At-risk-of-poverty or social

exclusion rate (AROPE)

% of population

Unemployment rate

% of labour force

Housing cost overburden

% of total population

113

municipalities, which is one of the lowest in the OECD (302). This limits their ability to allocate resources in line with local needs and to effectively implement place-based regional policies. This fragmentation weakens policy effectiveness from a regional competitiveness perspective and contributes to the continued concentration of economic development in the capital region (303). There are emerging civil preparedness needs, such as for emergency shelters and strengthening the resilience of essential services, which could impact municipal capacity and budgets that are already strained.

(302) Adapting intergovernmental fiscal transfers for the future:

Emerging trends and innovative approaches, OECD, 2024.

(303) National Spatial Plan 2050, 2025.

ANNEX 19: TRANSPORT

114

This Transport Annex presents the state of play and the challenges Estonia faces in the implementation of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T), the European railway traffic management system (ERTMS), and road safety.

Two European transport corridors run

through Estonia, the North Sea – Baltic

corridor and the Baltic Sea – Black Sea – Adriatic Sea corridor. Estonia’s railway network

is built on the Russian railway gauge (1 520 mm). The TEN-T in Estonia comprises 1 158 km of rail (404 of which are on the core network) and 1 344 km of road (369 of which on the core network). Estonia has no inland waterways on the TEN-T, five airports (including one core airport), eight ports (including one core port) and two urban nodes.

Passenger rail traffic around Tallinn and the

second biggest city Tartu is developing, and

lines and rolling stock are gradually being

modernised. Although the rail network – except

for Rail Baltica – is considered isolated and exempt from TEN-T requirements, the modernisation efforts will have to continue, for instance for electrification and the removal of level-crossings.

The largest railway project by far in Estonia

and the Baltic states in the next multiannual

financial period is Rail Baltica. Once

completed, this railway line will connect the Baltic states to the European railway network at the European standard gauge (1 435 mm). Rail Baltica is also significant for military mobility. Given the significant investment needs of Rail Baltica, a combination of funding programmes should be used for covering the different elements of the project in Estonia.

The ERTMS is essential to digitalising the railways and to modernising and harmonising

railway operations across Europe. TheERTMS

ensures the safety of rail networks by providing a unified signalling system. that significantly reduces the risk of accidents. It also provides interoperability between national rail systems, improving cross-border train movements. In this context, it is important to advance efforts towards a comprehensive multilateral agreement among the Baltic states, to strengthen coordination and support smooth cross‑border railway operations. Finally, the ERTMS enhances network capacity and operational efficiency, increasing the competitiveness of the rail sector. Only Rail Baltica will have to be ERTMS-equipped, with the costs being included in the total project cost estimates.

Continuing the implementation of the Rail

Baltica mainline and constructing the

Ulemiste terminal in Tallinn remains a priority as is the acceleration of the design

and construction of the EU gauge railway

connection to the Port of Muuga.

Estonia has little experience with operating

trains on the existing railway network to

Latvia and Lithuania. In addition, a joint model

between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, on how to operate railway traffic on the Rail Baltica line as a seamless cross-border infrastructure, including traffic management, maintenance and operations, in line with the rules of the single European railway area is still lacking. Harmonising technical and operational rules with the minimisation of national rules in line with the EU directives on rail interoperability and safety remains critical to ensuring that a new landmark rail infrastructure such as Rail Baltica does not inherit legacy operational rules.

115

Road crashes impose an enormous social,

economic and health burden on the EU

economy. The external socio-economic costs of fatal, serious and minor injuries have remained persistently high despite the progress made in reducing crash frequency and severity. These resources could otherwise fuel innovation, education, healthcare and other crucial public investments(304).

In 2024, Estonia was above the EU average

(45) with 50 road fatalities per million inhabitants. Compared with the EU average, the

distribution of fatalities in Estonia showed a relatively high proportion of fatalities on roads outside urban areas. Data for the period between 2019 and 2024 indicate an increase of 33% in road fatalities was recorded.

(304) Report on the implementation of the EU Road Safety

Policy framework at the Mid-Point, COM(2026) 77 final.

This indicates that Estonia is unlikely to

reach the 2030 target of halving the

number of road fatalities although it is a

small country where the number of

fatalities is subject to annual fluctuations. Possible ways to address this could be by exploring new financial resources for the implementation of delayed road safety measures, with a focus on road infrastructure works (305).

(305) More details in Report on the Implementation of the EU

Road Safety Policy framework at the Mid-Point – Estonia, SWD(2026) 40 final.

Map A19.1: TEN-T Cross-Border & National Priority Sections in Estonia.

116

Graph A19.1: Estonia's road fatalities per million,

2024

Source: Report at the Mid-Point - Estonia, SWD(2026) 40 final.

The map below presents the roads where the infrastructure safety is poor and where urgent action is therefore required.

Map A19.2: Estonia's road safety map

Source: TENtec Information System and TEN-T map library - European Commission

117

ET ET

EUROOPA KOMISJON

Brüssel, 3.6.2026

COM(2026) 206 final

Soovitus:

NÕUKOGU SOOVITUS,

mis käsitleb Eesti majandus-, sotsiaal-, tööhõive-, struktuuri- ja eelarvepoliitikat

{SWD(2026) 206 final}

ET 1 ET

Soovitus:

NÕUKOGU SOOVITUS,

mis käsitleb Eesti majandus-, sotsiaal-, tööhõive-, struktuuri- ja eelarvepoliitikat

EUROOPA LIIDU NÕUKOGU,

võttes arvesse Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingut, eriti selle artikli 121 lõiget 2 ja artikli 148

lõiget 4,

võttes arvesse Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 29. aprilli 2024. aasta määrust (EL) 2024/1263

majanduspoliitika tulemusliku koordineerimise ja mitmepoolse eelarvejärelevalve kohta ning

millega tunnistatakse kehtetuks nõukogu määrus (EÜ) nr 1466/97,1 eriti selle artikli 3 lõiget 3,

võttes arvesse Euroopa Komisjoni soovitust,

võttes arvesse Euroopa Parlamendi resolutsioone,

võttes arvesse Euroopa Ülemkogu järeldusi,

võttes arvesse tööhõivekomitee arvamust,

võttes arvesse majandus- ja rahanduskomitee arvamust,

võttes arvesse sotsiaalkaitsekomitee arvamust,

võttes arvesse majanduspoliitika komitee arvamust

ning arvestades järgmist:

(1) Määruses (EL) 2024/1263 on selgitatud majandusjuhtimise raamistiku eesmärke;

raamistik peaks reformide ja investeeringute abil edendama usaldusväärset ja

jätkusuutlikku riigi rahandust, kestlikku ja kaasavat majanduskasvu ning

vastupidavust, samuti ära hoidma valitsemissektori ülemäärast eelarvepuudujääki.

Määruses on sedastatud, et nõukogu ja komisjon teevad Euroopa poolaasta raames

mitmepoolset järelevalvet kooskõlas ELi toimimise lepingus sätestatud eesmärkide ja

nõuetega. Euroopa poolaasta raames sõnastatakse eelkõige riigipõhised soovitused ja

jälgitakse nende rakendamist.

(2) 16. juulil 2025 võttis komisjon vastu ettepaneku määruse kohta, millega luuakse

Euroopa majandusliku, sotsiaalse ja territoriaalse ühtekuuluvuse, põllumajanduse ja

maaelu, kalanduse ja merenduse, heaolu ja julgeoleku fond aastateks 2028–2034 ning

muudetakse määrust (EL) 2023/955 ja määrust (EL, Euratom) 2024/25092. Ettepaneku

eesmärk on suurendada finantsarhitektuuri killustatuse vähendamise teel liidupoolse

1 Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 29. aprilli 2024. aasta määrus (EL) 2024/1263 majanduspoliitika

tulemusliku koordineerimise ja mitmepoolse eelarvejärelevalve kohta ning millega tunnistatakse kehtetuks

nõukogu määrus (EÜ) nr 1466/97 (ELT L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj). 2 Ettepanek: Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määrus, millega luuakse Euroopa majandusliku, sotsiaalse ja

territoriaalse ühtekuuluvuse, põllumajanduse ja maaelu, kalanduse ja merenduse, heaolu ja turvalisuse fond

aastateks 2028–2034 ning muudetakse määrust (EL) 2023/955 ja määrust (EL, Euratom) 2024/2509,

COM(2025) 565 final. Kavandatud määruse üle peetakse praegu läbirääkimisi kaasseadusandjatega.

ET 2 ET

rahastamise tulemuslikkust ja toetada liikmesriike nende majanduspoliitika

koordineerimisel kooskõlas ELi toimimise lepingu artikliga 175.

(3) Komisjon võttis 25. novembril 2025 vastu arvamuse Eesti 2026. aasta eelarvekava

kohta. Samal kuupäeval võttis komisjon määruse (EL) nr 1176/2011 alusel vastu

2026. aasta häiremehhanismi aruande, milles ei nimetatud Eestit ühe liikmesriigina,

kelle olukorda tuleb põhjalikult analüüsida. Komisjon võttis vastu ka soovituse euroala

majanduspoliitikat käsitleva nõukogu soovituse kohta,3 soovituse Euroopa Liidus

inimkapitali käsitleva nõukogu soovituse kohta ning ettepaneku 2026. aasta ühise

tööhõivearuande kohta, milles analüüsitakse tööhõivesuuniste rakendamist ja Euroopa

sotsiaalõiguste samba põhimõtete järgimist. Nõukogu võttis euroala majanduspoliitikat

käsitleva soovituse4 vastu 21. aprillil 2026 ning ühise tööhõivearuande ja inimkapitali

käsitleva soovituse 9. märtsil 2026.

(4) Komisjon avaldas 29. jaanuaril 2025 konkurentsivõime kompassi – strateegilise

raamistiku, mille eesmärk on suurendada järgmisel viiel aastal liidu üleilmset

konkurentsivõimet. Selles on määratud kindlaks kestliku majanduskasvu elutähtsad

tugisambad, milleks on kolm hädavajalikku tegevusvaldkonda – innovatsioon,

süsinikuheite vähendamine ja konkurentsivõime – ning julgeolek. Euroopa poolaasta

on kooskõlas konkurentsivõime kompassi põhimõtetega, tagades, et liikmesriikide

majanduspoliitika vastab komisjoni strateegilistele eesmärkidele, ning kujundades

ühtse majandusjuhtimise käsituse, mis edendab kestlikku majanduskasvu,

innovatsiooni ja vastupidavust kogu liidus.

(5) 2026. aastal jätkub majanduspoliitika koordineerimise Euroopa poolaasta areng koos

taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastu viimase etapi rakendamisega5. Taaste- ja

vastupidavuskavad koos ühtekuuluvuspoliitika rahastusega on olnud Euroopa

poolaasta poliitiliste prioriteetide elluviimiseks esmatähtsad, kuna kavad peavad

tulemuslikult käsitlema kõiki viimase Euroopa poolaasta raames esitatud riigipõhistes

soovitustes esile toodud probleeme või märkimisväärset osa neist ja Euroopa

ühtekuuluvuspoliitika rahastatavates programmides tuleb riigipõhiseid soovitusi

arvesse võtta. Nüüd, kus taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastu kehtivusaeg läheneb lõpule, on

jätkuvalt oluline jätkata rahastu raames toetatud ja rakendatud reforme ja

investeeringuid, eelkõige neid, mis aitavad lahendada riigipõhistes soovitustes esile

toodud probleeme.

(6) Komisjon avaldas 3. juunil 2026 Eesti kohta 2026. aasta riigiaruande. Selles on

hinnatud Eesti edusamme asjaomaste riigipõhiste soovituste järgimisel ning tehtud

kokkuvõte sellest, kuidas Eesti on rakendanud taaste- ja vastupidavuskava. Kõnealuse

analüüsi põhjal on riigiaruandes kindlaks tehtud Eesti kõige pakilisemad probleemid.

Samuti on hinnatud Eesti edusamme Euroopa sotsiaalõiguste samba rakendamisel ning

liidu peamiste tööhõive, oskuste ja vaesuse vähendamise eesmärkide ning Ühinenud

Rahvaste Organisatsiooni kestliku arengu eesmärkide saavutamisel.

(7) Nõukogu võttis 21. jaanuaril 2025 komisjoni hinnangu ja soovituse põhjal vastu

soovituse, millega kiidetakse heaks Eesti riiklik keskpika perioodi eelarve- ja

3 ELT C, C/2026/2434, 28.4.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/2434/oj. 4 ELT C, C/2026/2434, 28.4.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/2434/oj. 5 Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 12. veebruari 2021. aasta määrus (EL) 2021/241, millega luuakse taaste- ja

vastupidavusrahastu (ELT L 57, 18.2.2021, lk 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).

ET 3 ET

struktuurikava6. Kava hõlmab ajavahemikku 2025–2028 ja sellega nähakse ette

eelarvekohandus, mis jaotub nelja aasta peale. Nõukogu soovitas kehtestada järgmised

netokulude maksimaalsed kasvumäärad: 7,1 % 2025. aastaks, 5,1 % 2026. aastaks,

3,6 % 2027. aastaks ja 3,2 % 2028. aastaks; need määrad vastavad maksimaalsetele

kumulatiivsetele kasvumääradele, mis on arvutatud võrdluses baasaastaga 2023 ning

mis on 2025. aastal 9,2 %, 2026. aastal 14,8 %, 2027. aastal 18,9 % ja 2028. aastal

22,6 %.

(8) Venemaa agressioonisõda Ukraina vastu ja selle tagajärjed kujutavad endast Euroopa

Liidu jaoks eksistentsiaalset väljakutset. Komisjon on kutsunud liikmesriike üles

taotlema stabiilsuse ja kasvu paktiga ette nähtud riikide vabastusklausli koordineeritud

aktiveerimist, et toetada ELi jõupingutusi, mille eesmärk on suurendada kiiresti ja

märkimisväärselt kaitsekulutusi;7 Euroopa Ülemkogu kiitis selle ettepaneku 6. märtsil

2025 heaks. Eesti taotluse alusel võttis nõukogu 8. juulil 2025 komisjoni soovituse

alusel vastu soovituse, millega lubatakse Eestil netokulude maksimaalsetest

kasvumääradest kõrvale kalduda8. Ajavahemik, mil on aktiveeritud riikide

vabastusklausel (2025–2028), võimaldab Eestil vaadata ümber valitsemissektori

kulude prioriteedid või suurendada valitsemissektori tulusid nii, et püsivalt suuremad

kaitsekulutused ei ohusta keskpikas perspektiivis riigi rahanduse jätkusuutlikkust.

(9) Eesti esitas 30. aprillil 2026 oma 2026. aasta eduaruande9 netokulude soovitatud

maksimaalsete kasvumäärade järgimise ning Euroopa poolaasta riigipõhistes

soovitustes kindlaks tehtud peamiste probleemide käsitlemiseks vajalike reformide ja

investeeringute rakendamise kohta. Vastavalt määruse (EL) 2021/241 artiklile 27

kajastab iga-aastane eduaruanne ka Eesti kaks korda aastas esitatavat aruannet taaste-

ja vastupidavuskava rakendamisel tehtud edusammude kohta.

(10) SKP reaalkasv oli 2025. aastal 0,6 % ja THHI inflatsioon 4,8 %. Komisjoni 2026.

aasta kevadprognoosi kohaselt kasvab reaalne SKP 2026. aastal 1,6 % ja 2027. aastal

1,7 % ning THHI inflatsioon on 2026. aastal 4,4 % ja 2027. aastal 2,9 %.

(11) Eurostati esitatud andmete10 põhjal suurenes Eesti valitsemissektori eelarve puudujääk

1,1 %-lt SKPst 2024. aastal 2,0 %-le SKPst 2025. aastal. Eelarvepuudujäägi

suurenemine 2025. aastal kajastab peamiselt tugevamat kuludünaamikat, eelkõige

avaliku sektori investeeringuid suurtesse taristuprojektidesse, nagu Rail Baltica. 2026.

aasta kevadprognoosi koostamise ajal teada olnud poliitikameetmete põhjal

prognoositakse komisjoni 2026. aasta kevadprognoosis valitsemissektori eelarve

puudujäägiks 2026. aastal 4,5 % ja 2027. aastal 4,8 % SKPst. Eelarvepuudujäägi

suurenemine 2026. aastal kajastab peamiselt tulude vähenemist, mis on tingitud

eelkõige üksikisiku tulumaksu reformist (üleminek ühtse maksuvabastuse süsteemile),

ja kulude kasvu, mis on peamiselt tingitud kaitsekulutustest, mis ulatuvad 5 %ni

6 Nõukogu 21. jaanuari 2025. aasta soovitus, millega kiidetakse heaks Eesti riiklik keskpika perioodi eelarve-

ja struktuurikava (ELT C, C/2025/652, 10.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/655/oj). 7 Komisjoni teatis „Suuremate kaitsekulutuste võimaldamine stabiilsuse ja kasvu pakti raames“ (Brüssel,

19.3.2025, C(2025) 2000 final). 8 Nõukogu 8. juuli 2025. aasta soovitus, millega lubatakse Eestil määruse (EL) 2024/1263 kohaselt nõukogu

kehtestatud netokulude maksimaalsetest kasvumääradest kõrvale kalduda (riikide vabastusklausli

aktiveerimine) (ELT C, C/2025/3970, 20.8.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3964/oj). 9 2026. aasta eduaruannetega saab tutvuda aadressil https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-and-

fiscal-governance/stability-and-growth-pact/preventive-arm/annual-progress-reports_en. 10 Eurostat, Euro Indicators, 22. aprill 2026.

ET 4 ET

SKPst, ja sellistest investeerimisprojektidest nagu Rail Baltica. Eelarvepuudujäägi

suurenemine 2027. aastal kajastab peamiselt nõrgemat tuludünaamikat.

(12) Komisjoni prognooside kohaselt oli eelarvepoliitika,11 mis hõlmab nii riigi enda kui ka

ELi rahastatavaid kulutusi, 2025. aastal pärssiv (0,5 % SKPst). Prognooside kohaselt

on see 2026. aastal ekspansiivne (2,8 % SKPst) ja 2027. aastal pärssiv (0,3 % SKPst).

(13) Eurostati esitatud andmete12 põhjal suurenes Eesti valitsemissektori võlg 23,5 %-lt

SKPst 2024. aasta lõpus 24,1 %-le SKPst 2025. aasta lõpus. Valitsemissektori võla ja

SKP suhte kasv 2025. aastal on peamiselt tingitud valitsemissektori eelarve

puudujäägist. Prognoosi koostamise ajal teada olnud poliitikameetmete põhjal

prognoositakse komisjoni 2026. aasta kevadprognoosis, et valitsemissektori võla suhe

SKPsse tõuseb 2026. aasta lõpuks 26,9 %-le ja 2027. aasta lõpuks 30,5 %-le. Võla

kasv 2026. ja 2027. aastal tuleneb peamiselt suurest ja püsivast eelarvepuudujäägist

ning positiivsest võlakoormuse muutuse ja eelarvepositsiooni vahelisest erinevusest

2027. aastal.

(14) Eurostati andmete kohaselt ulatusid valitsemissektori kaitsekulutused Eestis 2025.

aastal 4,2 %ni SKPst, mis tähendab baasaastaga 2021 võrreldes 2,1 protsendipunkti

suurust kasvu. Komisjoni 2026. aasta kevadprognoosi kohaselt on see 2026. aastal

5,0 % SKPst, mis tähendab 2021. aastaga võrreldes 3,0 protsendipunkti suurust kasvu.

(15) Liit seisab jätkuvalt silmitsi energiavarustushäirete ja suure hinnavolatiilsuse ohuga,

mida süvendavad üleilmseid nafta- ja gaasiturge mõjutavad geopoliitilised pinged.

2022.–2023. aasta energiakriisist saadud kogemused on näidanud, et ulatuslikud ja

mittesihipärased meetmed toovad kaasa suured eelarvekulud ning on sotsiaalselt ja

majanduslikult ebatõhusad. Pärast sõja puhkemist Lähis-Idas 2026. aasta veebruaris

kehtestas Eesti eelarvepoliitika meetme, et leevendada kõrgete energiahindade mõju

kodumajapidamistele ja ettevõtetele13. Nimelt lükati kütuse- ja elektriaktsiisi tõstmine

2026. aastalt 2027. aastale. Komisjoni 2026. aasta kevadprognoosi kohaselt on selle

meetme eelarvekulu 2026. aastal ligikaudu 0,1 % SKPst.

(16) Komisjoni arvutuste kohaselt suurenesid Eesti netokulud 2025. aastal 2,0 % ning

2024. ja 2025. aastal kumulatiivselt 5,7 %. Netokulude kasv 2025. aastal on alla

soovitatud maksimaalse kasvumäära. 2024. ja 2025. aasta kokkuvõttes jääb netokulude

kumulatiivne kasvumäär samuti alla soovitatud maksimaalse kasvumäära.

(17) Komisjoni arvutuste kohaselt peaksid Eesti netokulud 2026. aastal suurenema 12,0 %

ning 2024., 2025. ja 2026. aastal kumulatiivselt 18,4 %. Prognoositud netokulude kasv

2026. aastal on üle soovitatud maksimaalse kasvumäära, kusjuures aastane

kõrvalekalle on 2,8 % SKPst. 2024., 2025. ja 2026. aasta kokkuvõttes peaks

netokulude kumulatiivne kasvumäär olema samuti üle soovitatud maksimaalse

kasvumäära (kumulatiivne kõrvalekalle 1,5 % SKPst). Prognoositud kõrvalekalle jääb

praeguste kaitsekulutuste prognooside alusel siiski riikide vabastusklausliga

võimaldatud paindlikkuse piiridesse.

11 Eelarvepoliitika on määratletud valitsemissektori eelarvepositsiooni iga-aastase muutuse näitajana. Selle

eesmärk on hinnata nii riiklikult kui ka liidu eelarvest rahastatavast eelarvepoliitikast tulenevat

majanduslikku impulssi. Eelarvepoliitikat hinnatakse järgmiste näitajate vahena: i) keskpika perioodi

potentsiaalne kasv ja ii) muutus esmastes kuludes, millest on maha arvestatud kaalutlusõigusel põhinevad

tulumeetmed, kuid mis hõlmavad taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastust ning muudest liidu vahenditest saadud

tagastamatust abist (toetustest) rahastatud kulusid. 12 Eurostat, Euro Indicators, 22. aprill 2026. 13 See kajastab olukorda komisjoni 2026. aasta kevadprognoosi aluseks oleva kuupäeva seisuga (4. mai 2026).

ET 5 ET

(18) 3. juunil 2026 võttis komisjon ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 126 lõike 3 alusel vastu

aruande14. Selles aruandes hinnati Eesti eelarveseisundit eelarvepuudujäägi kriteeriumi

seisukohast, kuna riigi 2026. aastaks kavandatud valitsemissektori eelarve puudujääk

ületab kontrollväärtust 3 % SKPst. Aruandes jõuti järeldusele, et kõiki asjakohaseid

tegureid arvesse võttes ei täida Eesti eelarvepuudujäägi kriteeriumi. Komisjon leidis

siiski, et ei ole põhjust algatada Eesti suhtes ülemäärase eelarvepuudujäägi menetlust,

sest nõukogu on Eesti puhul aktiveerinud riikide vabastusklausli ja kontrollväärtust

ületav kavandatud eelarvepuudujääk 2026. aastal on komisjoni 2026. aasta

kevadprognoosi kohaselt täielikult põhjendatud kaitsekulutuste suurenemisega alates

2021. aastast. Seda hinnangut silmas pidades ning ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 126

lõike 4 alusel loodud majandus- ja rahanduskomitee arvamust arvesse võttes ei ole

komisjon teinud ettepanekut algatada ülemäärase eelarvepuudujäägi menetlus.

(19) Suurenenud julgeolekuvajaduste tõttu on Eesti kaitsekulutused suurenemas. Need

suurenesid 2 %-lt SKPst 2021. aastal 4,2 %ni SKPst 2025. aastal ja peaksid alates

2026. aastast ületama 5 % SKPst. Seetõttu on oluline, et Eesti leiaks stabiilsed

tuluallikad või kulusid vähendavad vahendid, mille abil saab keskpikas ja pikas

perspektiivis rahastada mitte ainult kaitsekulutusi, vaid kõiki struktuurseid

kuluvajadusi, sealhulgas tervishoidu ja pikaajalist hooldust.

(20) Valitsemissektori maksutulu on endiselt neli protsendipunkti alla ELi keskmise (2024.

aastal 35,2 % SKPst, võrreldes 39,4 %ga ELis). Alates 2024. aastast on tulude

suurendamiseks võetud mitmesuguseid meetmeid: käibemaksumäära tõsteti kaks

korda ja see jõudis 2025. aastal 24 %ni; üksikisiku ja äriühingu tulumaksu määr tõsteti

22 %ni; alkoholi-, tubaka- ja energiaaktsiisi tõstetakse igal aastal kuni 2027/28. aastani

ning 2025. aastal kehtestati uus mootorsõidukimaks. Kuigi need reformid aitavad

vähendada tulude erinevust ELi keskmisest, suurendavad need veelgi sõltuvust tööjõu-

ja tarbimismaksudest, mille suhe SKPsse on juba üle ELi keskmise. Samuti on oht, et

need panevad ebaproportsionaalselt suure koormuse väiksema sissetulekuga

rühmadele ja süvendavad sissetulekute ebavõrdsust. Oleks kasulik laiendada

maksubaasi majanduskasvu vähem kahjustavate maksude abil. Näiteks suurendada

omandi maksustamist, mida endiselt ei kasutata piisavalt. Omandi maksustamisest

saadav tulu oli 2024. aastal vaid 0,3 % SKPst, mis on tublisti alla ELi keskmise

(1,8 %) ja kajastab Eesti keskendumist pigem maa kui omandi maksustamisele.

Tühjalt seisva elamukinnisvara maksu järkjärguline kehtestamine laiendaks

maksubaasi ja vähendaks samal ajal eluasemenappust. Samuti on tehtud jõupingutusi

kulutuste tõhususe parandamiseks. Viimased kulude läbivaatamised, millest kõige

hiljutisem toimus 2025. aastal, keskendusid siiski üsna kitsalt sellistele avaliku sektori

kulutustele nagu muuseumide rahastamine või sotsiaalsektori haldusmenetlused.

Lisaks on seos kulude läbivaatamise, tõhususe suurendamise ja ressursside

ümberjaotamise vahel endiselt piiratud. Selle tugevdamiseks tuleks kulud sagedamini

läbi vaadata ja tagada, et sellest saadav kokkuhoid kajastuks selgelt eelarves ja

suunataks prioriteetsetesse valdkondadesse.

(21) Jätkuvalt on oluline süstemaatiliselt, sisuliselt ja õigeaegselt kaasata kohalikke ja

piirkondlikke omavalitsusi, sotsiaalpartnereid, kodanikuühiskonda ja muid

asjaomaseid sidusrühmi, et tagada laialdane isevastutus liidu rahastamisvahendite

eduka rakendamise eest, sealhulgas Euroopa poolaasta kontekstis.

14 Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 126 lõike 3 kohaselt koostatud komisjoni aruanne, 3.6.2026,

COM(2026)302 final.

ET 6 ET

(22) Euroopa Regionaalarengu Fondi (ERF), Õiglase Ülemineku Fondi (JTF), Euroopa

Sotsiaalfond+ (ESF+) ja Ühtekuuluvusfondi toetust hõlmavate ühtekuuluvuspoliitika

programmide rakendamine edeneb Eestis nii projektide väljavalimise kui ka maksete

tegemise seisukohast ELi keskmisest kiiremini. Oluline on säilitada praegune hoog,

maksimeerides samal ajal investeeringute mõju kohapeal. Eesti juba võtab oma

ühtekuuluvuspoliitika programmide raames meetmeid konkurentsivõime ja

majanduskasvu edendamiseks. Mõnda valdkonda võib olla vaja siiski täiendavalt

tugevdada, sealhulgas neid, mis on seotud püsivate piirkondlike erinevuste, majanduse

mitmekesistamise ja õiglase üleminekuga. Kuigi rakendamine on üldiselt hea, takistab

seda piirkondlike andmete piiratud kättesaadavus ja kasutamine. Esmatähtis on tagada,

et uued investeeringud, mille Eesti pani paika ühtekuuluvuspoliitika fondide

vahehindamise käigus, eelkõige need, mis on seotud vahehindamise määruses15

kindlaks määratud viie prioriteediga, tehakse kiiresti ja tulemuslikult.

(23) Püsivad piirkondlikud erinevused pärsivad Eestis lähenemist ja majanduskasvu.

Majandustegevus, suure väärtusega avalikud teenused ja kvalifitseeritud tööjõud on

koondunud pealinnapiirkonda. Ääremaad ja maapiirkonnad seisavad silmitsi

struktuursete probleemidega, mis on seotud hõreda asustuse, rahvastiku vähenemise,

ühenduvusprobleemide ja põhiliste avalike teenuste kehva kättesaadavusega. ELi

idapoolsel välispiiril asuva riigina seisab Eesti silmitsi täiendavate probleemidega, mis

tumestavad tema majandusliku ja sotsiaalse arengu väljavaateid, samal ajal kui

olemasolevad struktuursed probleemid süvenevad. Venemaa agressioonisõda Ukraina

vastu suurendab julgeolekusurvet, häirib piiriülest majandustegevust, vähendab

investeeringute atraktiivsust ja piirab veelgi juurdepääsu rahastusele. Inimeste ja

elutähtsa taristu julgeoleku probleemid nõuavad investeeringuid elanikkonnakaitsesse,

valmisolekusse ja sõjaväelisse liikuvusse, mis võib pakkuda võimalusi piirkondade

majandusele, kuid veelgi suurendada survet avalike teenuste rahastamisele. Majanduse

mitmekesistamise toetamine ja piirkonna vastupidavuse tugevdamine on eriti oluline

Ida-Virumaal, kus on aset leidmas suured tööstuslikud, majanduslikud ja sotsiaalsed

muutused, kuna põlevkivipõhist tööstust järk-järgult vähendatakse.

(24) Eesti seisab silmitsi mitme probleemiga, mis on seotud teadusuuringute ja

innovatsiooni, rahastusele juurdepääsu, hoonete energiatõhususe, taastuvenergia ja

energiajulgeoleku, kestliku transpordi, tööjõu ja oskuste pakkumise ning

sotsiaalkaitsega.

(25) Kuigi Eesti üldised innovatsioonitulemused on alates 2017. aastast pidevalt paranenud,

on ettevõtete teadus- ja arendustegevuse kulutused suhtena SKPsse endiselt alla ELi

keskmise. Samal ajal on toetus ettevõtete teadus- ja arendustegevusele

märkimisväärselt suurenenud, kusjuures avaliku sektori otsetoetus oli 2023. aastal

0,15 % SKPst, mis on üle ELi keskmise. See hõlmab uusi algatusi, nagu riiklik

rakendusuuringute keskus, TemTA programm rakendusuuringuteks ja tehnoloogia

arendamiseks, tulemuspõhised stiimulid teadusasutuste ja ettevõtete koostööks ning

meetmed intellektuaalomandi haldamise ja tehnosiirde tugevdamiseks. Patentimine on

siiski vähenenud ning teadusasutuste ja ettevõtete koostöö on endiselt piiratud, mis

näitab, et avaliku sektori investeeringuid teadus- ja arendustegevusse ning

innovatsiooni ei võimendata veel piisavalt. Innovatsioonitoetuse ning väikeste ja

keskmise suurusega ettevõtjate laiemate toetusalgatuste killustatus piirab poliitika

15 Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 18. septembri 2025. aasta määrus (EL) 2025/1914, millega muudetakse

määrusi (EL) 2021/1058 ja (EL) 2021/1056 seoses erimeetmetega strateegiliste probleemide lahendamiseks

vahehindamise raames.

ET 7 ET

tulemuslikkust ja pärsib teadusuuringute tulemuste kasutamist turul. Nende puuduste

kõrvaldamine, sealhulgas integreeritumate toetusraamistike ja püsivate investeeringute

tagamisega rakendusuuringutesse ja suure mõjuga valdkondadesse, nagu tehisintellekt,

aitaks edendada innovatsiooni turustamist.

(26) Rahastuse ebapiisav kättesaadavus on suur investeerimistakistus 19 %-le Eesti

ettevõtetest, samas kui piiratud rahastamisega ettevõtete osakaal on märkimisväärselt

suurem kui ELi keskmine. Eesti ettevõtted sõltuvad suurel määral siserahastamisest;

see tuleneb struktuursetest teguritest, nagu maksusüsteem, VKEde suur osakaal ja

tagasihoidlik institutsionaalne investoribaas. Püsivad probleemid VKEde juurdepääsul

rahastamisele pärsivad jätkuvalt innovatsiooni, teadusuuringute turustamist ja

ressursitõhusate tehnoloogiate kasutuselevõttu. Kuigi Balti riikide kapitaliturgude

taristu integreerimine alates 2017. aastast ning riiklike ja riigiüleste institutsioonide

toetus on aidanud kaasa kapitalituru, börsivälise kapitali ja riskikapitali arengule,

püsivad rahastamispiirangud, mida võimendas 2021. aasta pensionireform, mis

vähendas riigisiseste kapitaliturgude ja institutsionaalsete investeeringute suurust.

Ehkki sellised vahendid nagu investeerimiskonto süsteem, sihtotstarbelised

tagatisskeemid ja uued rahastamislepingud, eelkõige Euroopa Investeerimisfondiga,

on laiendanud juurdepääsu rahastusele, ületab nõudlus jätkuvalt pakkumist, nagu

näitab piirkondlike toetusmeetmete kiire ülemärkimine. Rahastusele juurdepääsu

parandamine, eelkõige väljaspool suuri linnakeskusi asuvate VKEde jaoks, sealhulgas

sihipäraste tagatiste ning integreerituma innovatsiooni ja ettevõtluse toetamise

raamistiku kaudu, aitaks kaasata investeeringuid, toetada ettevõtete kasvu ning

kiirendada uuenduslike ja ressursitõhusate tehnoloogiate kasutuselevõttu.

(27) Hoonete arvele jääb 46,1 % riigi energiatarbimisest ning energia lõpptarbimise

paranemine eluasemesektoris on Eestis aastatel 2019–2024 seiskunud. Elamufondi

kehva energiatõhususe tõttu läheb suur osa netosissetulekust küttekuludele, mis

mõjutab eriti rängalt haavatavaid elanikkonnarühmi. Eesti tugineb renoveerimisel

jätkuvalt toetuspõhistele kavadele ja rahastamisvahendite kasutamine on endiselt

piiratud. Rahastamisvahendite kättesaadavuse parandamine võib renoveeritud

eluruumide küttekulude vähenemise kaudu piirata eluasemete süsinikuheidet ja muuta

eluasemed taskukohasemaks. Selge kava paikapanek vähese süsinikuheitega ja

energiatõhusa hoonefondi kujundamiseks aitab samuti tegeleda vajadusega kohaneda

kliimamuutustega ja suurendada üldist kriisidele vastupanu võimet.

(28) Eesti energiaallikate jaotuses on märkimisväärselt suurenenud taastuvate

energiaallikate osakaal: 35 %-lt 2023. aastal 40 %-le 2024. aastal. Kuigi riigisiseselt

kaevandatava põlevkivi osakaal Eesti energiaallikate jaotuses vähenes oluliselt (30 %-

lt 2023. aastal 25 %-le 2024. aastal), on põlevkivi endiselt Eesti peamine

energiaallikas, mis pärsib rohepööret. Ehkki päevane elektrihind on viimastel aastatel

langenud tänu päikeseenergia üha suuremale osakaalule energiaallikate jaotuses (2025.

aastal oli taastuvate energiaallikate osakaal elektri netotootmises 67,9 %, mis on üks

kõrgemaid ELis), on Eesti suure nõudlusega perioodidel endiselt haavatav järskude

hinnatõusude suhtes. Eesti elektrivõrk sünkroniseeriti küll edukalt ELi võrguga 2025.

aasta veebruaris, kuid lõpule tuleb veel viia muud sünkroniseerimisprojektid, eelkõige

Läti ja Soomega, et toetada üleminekut ja suurendada energiajulgeolekut. Kuigi Eesti

esimene suuremahuline akupõhine energiasalvestussüsteem võeti kasutusele 2025.

aastal, on riigi energiapaindlikkuse suurendamiseks oluline ehitada rohkem selliseid

süsteeme. Tuleb jätkata tööd elutähtsa energiataristu vastupidavuse suurendamiseks,

eelkõige seoses küberturvalisuse ja taristu valvega.

ET 8 ET

(29) Ressursitootlikkust pärsib Eestis ressursimahukate tööstusharude tähtsus ja

märkimisväärne sõltuvus põlevkivist (2023. aastal 52,5 % Eestis kättesaadavast

koguenergiast). 2024. aastal saadi ühe kilogrammi materjali kohta Eestis tulu

1,15 eurot, ELis keskmiselt aga 2,99 eurot. Mis puudutab ressursitootlikkust

mõõdetuna sisemajanduse koguprodukti suhtena kodumaisesse materjalitarbimisse,

siis on Eesti näitajad endiselt ühed ELi halvimad ja isegi kerges langustrendis –

indeksi väärtus oli 2023. aastal 127,7 ja 2024. aastal 124,7. Ressursitootlikkuse

suurendamiseks peab Eesti vähendama põlevkivi kasutamist, toetama veelgi

bioressursipõhist innovatsiooni, et muuta ressursid väärtuslikumateks rakendusteks,

samuti toetama ressursitõhusa tehnoloogia arendamist ja kasutuselevõttu ning

parandama ringlust, mis nõuab märkimisväärseid investeeringuid.

(30) Eesti transpordisektor on jätkuvalt suur kasvuhoonegaaside tekitaja.

Maanteetranspordi arvele jäi 2024. aastal 48 % Eesti jõupingutuste jagamise sektorite

heitest; see on 27 % rohkem kui 2005. aastal. See on tingitud sellest, et Eesti autopark

on ELi vanim ja auto omamise määr on üle ELi keskmise. Selle probleemi

lahendamiseks ning oma transpordi ja liikuvuse arengukava (2021–2035)

rakendamiseks peab Eesti võtma meetmeid kestlikule ühistranspordile ülemineku

soodustamiseks. Selleks on esmatähtis toetada üleminekut integreeritud lahendustele

ning parandada mitmeliigilise transpordi ühendusi ja reisijateveoteenuseid, samuti

jätkata raudtee elektrifitseerimist ja viia lõpule Rail Baltica. Eesti transporditaristu on

kliimamuutuste mõju suhtes tundlik ja seda tuleks sektorisse uute investeeringute

kavandamisel arvesse võtta.

(31) Võttes arvesse inimkapitali olulist rolli liidu konkurentsivõime ja strateegilise

autonoomia edendamisel, soovitas nõukogu 2026. aastal liikmesriikidel võtta

meetmeid, et kiiresti lahendada oskuste ja hariduse vallas inimkapitaliga seotud

struktuursed probleemid, mis pärsivad konkurentsivõimet. Eestile adresseeritud 2026.

aasta riigipõhised soovitused võivad aidata rakendada nõukogu soovitust inimkapitali

kohta liidus.

(32) Eestil on jätkuvalt probleeme oskuste pakkumise tugevdamisel ja tööturule sisenemise

hõlbustamisel. Haridussüsteemist varakult lahkumine (2025. aastal üle 10 %) pärsib

jätkuvalt haridustaset, samas kui noorte töötus (2025. aastal üle 20 %) ning

mittetöötavate ja mitteõppivate noorte suur osakaal (2025. aastal 11,2 %) osutavad

püsivatele raskustele koolist tööellu üleminekul. 18–24aastaste vanuserühmal on

palgavaesuse oht eriti suur. Kutseharidusel ja -õppel ning kõrgharidusel on oluline roll

oskuste täiendamisel kasvavate suure tööjõunõudlusega sektorite jaoks. Kutseharidus

ja -õpe ei ole siiski üldiselt piisavalt atraktiivne, samal ajal kui kõrghariduses napib

lõpetajaid sellistes olulistes valdkondades nagu matemaatika, teadus, tehnoloogia,

inseneeria (nn MATI). Oskuste baasi piiravad jätkuvalt suured erinevused täiend- ja

ümberõppe kättesaadavuses, sõltuvalt vanusest, sotsiaal-majanduslikust taustast ja

haridustasemest, eelkõige piirkondades, mis on üle minemas suurema lisaväärtusega

tegevustele. Koolid peavad toime tulema õpilaste vajaduste mitmekesistumisega,

sealhulgas kasvava nõudlusega täiendava õppetoe järele, samal ajal kui

märkimisväärne õpetajate nappus, eelkõige MATI-ainetes ja eesti keeles teise keelena,

ohustab hariduse kvaliteeti ja on eriti terav maapiirkondades. Kuigi digioskused on

üldiselt ELi keskmisel tasemel, ei ole Eesti veel saavutanud ELi 80 % eesmärki ning

paljudel töötajatel puuduvad piisavad IKT- ja tarkvaraoskused, samal ajal kui nõudlus

tehisintellekti- ja digipädevuste järele eeldatavasti suureneb. Ka rohepöördeks

vajalikke oskusi napib endiselt, sest hiljutiste meetmete, sealhulgas taaste- ja

vastupidavusrahastust toetatavate meetmete mõju ei ole veel avaldunud. Tööhõivet

ET 9 ET

aitaks edendada koolist tööle ülemineku hõlbustamine, sihipäraste täiend- ja

ümberõppe algatuste laiendamine (sealhulgas madala kvalifikatsiooniga ja eakate

kaasamine) ning noorte varase tööturule integreerimise toetamine.

Kollektiivläbirääkimiste katvus ja ametiühingutesse kuulumise määr on ühed ELi

väikseimad ning kolmepoolne sotsiaaldialoog on viimastel aastatel takerdunud. Nende

probleemide lahendamisele võib kaasa aidata sotsiaaldialoogi ja

kollektiivläbirääkimiste edendamine, sealhulgas kolmepoolse kaasamise kaudu.

(33) Väikesed sotsiaalkulutused ja sotsiaalkaitsega kaetuse puudujäägid suurendavad

haavatavate rühmade vaesusriski. Toimetulekutoetus on endiselt suhteliselt väike ja

sotsiaaltoetuste kogukulu jääb alla ELi keskmise (2024. aastal 17,8 % SKPst, ELis

keskmiselt 27,3 %), mis piirab sotsiaalsiirete mõju vaesuse vähendamisele. Puudega

inimesed, sealhulgas puudega töötajad, seisavad silmitsi oluliselt suurema

vaesusriskiga kui elanikkond üldiselt (puudega tööealine elanikkond 32,5 %, puudeta

inimesed 15 %), mis kajastab osaliselt suhteliselt madalat invaliidsushüvitiste taset.

Vaesuse ja eluasemekulude surve ohustab eriti ka üksikvanemaga leibkondi.

Vaesusriski süvendavad veelgi sotsiaaleluruumide piiratud arv ja eluasemete

taskukohasuse probleemid, eriti haavatavate rühmade puhul. Kuigi Eesti kavandatud

eluasemepoliitika aastateks 2025–2035 on positiivne samm, tuleks jälgida selle

rakendamist, et hinnata selle mõju eluasemete taskukohasusele. Miinimumsissetuleku

süsteemi reformide eesmärk on parandada toimetulekutoetuste piisavust ja tõhusust,

kuid kuna need reformid on alles algusjärgus, ei ole nende mõju veel tunda. Hoolimata

hiljutistest reformidest on pensionide piisavus Eestis endiselt probleem, kusjuures

eakate vaesusrisk on jätkuvalt üks suuremaid ELis. Riskid on eriti suured üksi elavate

naiste ja eakate puhul, kusjuures viimaste puhul on vaesuse või sotsiaalse tõrjutuse oht

ELi suurim. See on seotud pikema oodatava eluea, leibkondade koosseisu ja

toitjakaotuspensioni piiratud katvusega, mistõttu paljud eakad naised elavad üksi ja

nende sissetulek on suhteliselt väike. Vaesusriski võib vähendada hüvitiste piisavuse

suurendamine ja sotsiaalkaitsele juurdepääsu laiendamine, samuti täiendavates

pensionisammastes osalemise suurendamine.

(34) Eestil on jätkuvalt probleeme tervishoiu ja pikaajalise hoolduse kättesaadavuse ja

taskukohasusega, eelkõige väljaspool peamisi linnakeskusi asuvates piirkondades ja

haavatavate rühmade seas. Kuigi Eesti on teinud reforme ja investeeringuid, et

leevendada tervishoiutöötajate nappust, tugevdada esmatasandi arstiabi ja

haiglavõrgustikku ning edendada tervishoiu- ja sotsiaalteenuste integreerimist, on

nende teenuste kättesaadavusega endiselt probleeme. Avaliku sektori kulutused

tervishoiule ja pikaajalisele hooldusele on tublisti alla ELi keskmise; see toob kaasa

märkimisväärsed rahuldamata vajadused, suured omaosalusmaksed ja pikaajalise

hoolduse teenuste, eelkõige koduhoolduse piiratud kättesaadavuse, millega kaasneb

jätkuv sõltuvus mitteametlikust hooldusest, mis mõjutab ebaproportsionaalselt

väiksema sissetulekuga rühmi ja suurendab hooldust vajavate inimeste vaesusriski.

Hoolimata kvaliteedisuunistest on sotsiaalteenuste kättesaadavus omavalitsuste lõikes

väga erinev ning üha pikemad ootejärjekorrad piiravad kättesaadavust veelgi. Eestis

püsib märkimisväärne ebavõrdsus oodatavas elueas ja tervena elatud aastate arvus, mis

on tihedalt seotud sotsiaal-majandusliku staatuse, hariduse, sissetuleku ja elukohaga.

Praegune sotsiaalne tervisekindlustuse mudel ei ole pikas perspektiivis rahaliselt

jätkusuutlik, kuna vananemise, kasvava nõudluse ja tööturu muutuste tõttu kasvavad

kulud prognooside kohaselt tuludest kiiremini. Väga oluline on jätkata reformide

elluviimist, et paremini integreerida tervishoiu- ja sotsiaalteenuseid, seada esikohale

ennetamine ja tagada kestlik rahastamine, tegeleda tööjõupuudusega ning vähendada

erinevusi kättesaadavuses ja taskukohasuses.

ET 10 ET

(35) Arvestades euroala liikmesriikide majanduse tihedat seotust ning nende ühist panust

majandus- ja rahaliidu toimimisse, soovitas nõukogu 2026. aastal euroala

liikmesriikidel võtta meetmeid, sealhulgas oma taaste- ja vastupidavuskavade kaudu,

et rakendada 2026. aasta soovitust euroala majanduspoliitika kohta. Eestil aitab

soovitus 1 rakendada esimest, teist ja kolmandat euroala soovitust, soovitus 2

neljandat euroala soovitust, soovitused 3 ja 4 seitsmendat euroala soovitust ja soovitus

5 viiendat euroala soovitust,

SOOVITAB Eestil võtta 2026. ja 2027. aastal järgmisi meetmeid.

1. Jätkuvalt pidada kinni netokulude maksimaalsetest kasvumääradest, mida soovitas

nõukogu 21. jaanuaril 2025, kasutades samal ajal suuremate kaitsekulutuste

tegemiseks riikide vabastusklausliga võimaldatavat paindlikkust. Tugevdada

kaitsevalmidust, tagades samal ajal kulutuste tõhususe ja kohandades järk-järgult

eelarvet, et säilitada struktuurselt suuremad kaitsekulutused. Tagada, et kõik

energiahindade tõusu mõju leevendamiseks võetud meetmed on ajutised, suunatud

haavatavate leibkondade kaitsmisele või energiamahukate ettevõtete vajaduste

rahuldamisele, säilitavad stiimulid energiasäästuks ning et nende eelarvekulud on

kooskõlas ELi eelarveraamistiku kohaste kohustustega. Tagada kuluvajaduste,

sealhulgas kaitsekulutuste jätkusuutlik rahastamine, laiendades maksubaasi,

kasutades majanduskasvu vähem kahjustavaid makse, sealhulgas omandimakse, ning

suunates kulutused prioriteetsetesse valdkondadesse, tuginedes avaliku sektori

kulutuste läbivaatamisele.

2. Tagada taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastu raames rakendatavate reformide ja

investeeringute järjepidevus. Säilitada ühtekuuluvuspoliitika programmide

rakendamise hoog, tuginedes vajaduse korral ühtekuuluvuspoliitika raamistiku

vahehindamise käigus vahendite strateegilistele prioriteetidele ümberjaotamisele ja

raamistikus ette nähtud paindlikkusele. Tegeleda ainulaadsete sotsiaal-majanduslike,

julgeoleku- ja tsiviilvalmisoleku probleemidega, mis mõjutavad eelkõige ELi

idapoolsel välispiiril asuvaid piirkondi.

3. Võimendada paremini avaliku sektori investeeringuid teadusuuringutesse ja

innovatsiooni ning kõrvaldada teadusuuringute ja innovatsiooni turustamise

takistused. Parandada eelkõige väikeste ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtjate ning

väljaspool peamisi linnapiirkondi asuvate ettevõtjate juurdepääsu rahastusele,

sealhulgas tegevuse laiendamiseks, sealhulgas integreerides innovatsiooni ja

ettevõtluse toetamise raamistikud.

4. Suurendada investeeringuid energiatõhusaks renoveerimisse, sealhulgas

rahastamisvahendite kaudu, et vähendada energianõudlust ja aidata muuta eluasemed

taskukohasemaks. Vähendada taastuvenergiasse investeerimise ja energia

salvestamise edendamise kaudu üldist sõltuvust fossiilkütustest ja põlevkivi osakaalu

energiaallikate jaotuses. Suurendada energiajulgeolekut ja hübriidohtudele vastupanu

võimet, näiteks tagades elektriühenduste piisava võimsuse ja tugevdades võrgutaristu

vastupidavust. Suurendada kestliku ja vähem saastava transpordi kasutamist,

kiirendades Rail Baltica lõpuleviimist ja hõlbustades ühistranspordisüsteemide

integreerimist. Suurendada ressursitootlikkust, toetades ressursitõhusate

tehnoloogiate kasutuselevõttu.

5. Parandada oskusi, laiendades väheste oskustega täiskasvanute ja eakate

õppevõimalusi ning tugevdades MATI-haridust kõigil tasanditel. Vähendada

haridussüsteemist varakult lahkumist, leevendades õpetajate nappust ja toetades

erivajadustega õppijaid. Suurendada noorte tööhõivet tõhusama aktiivse

ET 11 ET

tööturupoliitika abil, pöörates samal ajal erilist tähelepanu piirkondlikele

erinevustele. Tugevdada sotsiaalkaitset, et vähendada haavatavate

elanikkonnarühmade vaesusriski, suurendades toetussüsteemi piisavust ja tõhusust.

Parandada rahastamise tagamise kaudu tervishoiu ja pikaajalise hoolduse

kättesaadavust ja taskukohasust, sealhulgas selleks, et vähendada piirkondlikke

erinevusi.

Brüssel,

Nõukogu nimel

eesistuja

ET ET

EUROOPA KOMISJON

Brüssel, 3.6.2026

SWD(2026) 206 final

KOMISJONI TALITUSTE TÖÖDOKUMENT

2026. aasta riigiaruanne – Eesti

järgmise dokumendi juurde:

Soovitus: NÕUKOGU SOOVITUS,

mis käsitleb Eesti majandus-, sotsiaal-, tööhõive-, struktuuri- ja eelarvepoliitikat

{COM(2026) 206 final}

MAJANDUSARENG JA PEAMISED POLIITILISED VÄLJAKUTSED

2

Sisenõudlusest ja varudest tulenev mõõdukas taastumine on geopoliitiliste probleemide tõttu löögi all

Eesti majanduskasvu pärsivad suur

geopoliitiline ebakindlus ja nõrk välisnõudlus koos püsivalt kõrge

inflatsiooniga. Pärast mõnda aastat kestnud majanduslangust ja seisakut kasvas Eesti majandus 2025. aastal tagasihoidlikult (0,6 %). Viimaste aastate pingelise geopoliitilise olukorra tõttu on erasektor investeeringuid edasi lükanud. Avaliku sektori kulutused on kasvanud, eelkõige kaitsevaldkonnas, kuid suurem osa neist kulutustest läheb impordile ega elavda seega sisemajandust. Samal ajal mõjutas Eesti eksporti peamiste kaubanduspartnerite (Rootsi, Soome ja Saksamaa) majanduse nõrkus. 2025. aastal tõukas seega majanduskasvu tagant sisenõudlus, s.t avaliku sektori kulutused, investeeringute mõningane taastumine ja varude kogunemine. Netoekspordi mõju majanduskasvule oli negatiivne, kuid väheoluline. Inflatsioon on Eestis viimastel aastatel olnud kõrge ja oli 2025. aastal endiselt 4,8 %, kusjuures ligikaudu poole sellest põhjustasid maksutõusud ja uued maksud(1). 2026. aastal peaks inflatsioon aeglustuma, kuna maksumõju peatub, kuid Lähis-Ida sõjast tingitud energiahindade tõus võib seda protsessi kahjustada.

Riigisiseselt aeglustasid reaalkasvu nominaalpalkade kiire tõus, suurem

võlakoormus ja negatiivsed meeleolud.

Eesti konkurentsivõimet vähendas suur

(1) Eesti Panga hinnang.

palgatõus, mis järgnes energiaga seotud inflatsioonišokile pärast Venemaa sissetungi Ukrainasse. Laenumahu kasv on aeglustunud, kuna EKP kõrgemad baasintressimäärad mõjutavad otseselt intresse (mis on peamiselt ujuvad). Kodumajapidamistel kulub seega rohkem sissetulekust võla teenindamisele ning see on viimastel aastatel vähendanud eratarbimist. Madalamad intressimäärad hakkasid võlakoormust leevendama ja laenutegevust elavdama alles 2025. aasta teises pooles. Suure ebakindluse tingimustes jäävad tarbijate meeleolud pessimistlikuks ning avaldavad negatiivset mõju jaemüügikulutustele.

Joonis 1.1. SKP reaalkasv ja selle komponendid

Allikas: AMECO andmebaas

Eesti majanduse reaalkasvuks 2026.

aastal prognoositakse 1,6 %. Enne Lähis- Ida konflikti on majandus kiiremini kasvama hakanud tänu eelarvereformidele, mis suurendasid reaalset kasutatavat tulu, ja soodsamatele rahastamistingimustele, mille eesmärk oli soodustada investeeringuid. Alates konflikti puhkemisest on eratarbimise väljavaated muutunud tagasihoidlikumaks, samal ajal kui geopoliitilised probleemid pärsivad erainvesteeringuid ja eksporti. Ühtlasi prognoositakse nüüd energiahinnakriisi ja selle võimaliku ülekanduva mõju tõttu kiiremat inflatsiooni, mis peaks 2026. aastal olema keskmiselt 4,4 %.

-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Netoeksport Investeeringud

Eratarbimine Valitsemissekt. tarbimine

Varud Reaalne SKP (%, aastavõrdlus)

prognoosPP

3

Joonis 1.2. THHI jaotus 2022–2026

Allikas: Eurostat

Tööturg on hästi kohanenud, kuid struktuursed probleemid püsivad

Tööturg kohaneb majanduskasvu tsükliga,

kuid seisab silmitsi struktuursete

probleemidega, nagu elanikkonna vananemine, oskuste nappus ja suur noorte töötus. Pärast pikaajalist majanduslikku nõrkust tõusis töötuse määr 2025. aasta alguses 8,6 %ni, kuid langes 2025. aasta lõpus 6,4 %ni samal ajal väiksema tööjõus osalemise ja esimeste majanduse elavnemise

märkidega. Selle muutusega kaasnes eelmiste aastatega võrreldes aeglasem palgakasv (6 % aastas) ja väiksem vabade töökohtade arv. Töötuse vähenemine on positiivne, kuid esineb mitmeid struktuurseid probleeme. Tööjõud on elanikkonna vananemise tõttu vähenemas ning ukrainlaste sissevool on seda suundumust muutnud vaid ajutiselt. Ajalooliselt on teataval määral tasakaalustavaks teguriks olnud väga kõrge tööjõus osalemise määr, sealhulgas naiste suur osalemine (kuigi sooline palgalõhe on ELi üks suuremaid). Endiselt on puudus teatavate kutsealade esindajatest, eelkõige tervishoiutöötajatest ning matemaatika, teaduse, tehnoloogia ja inseneeria (MATI) valdkonna spetsialistidest ning õpetajatest. Piirkondlikud erinevused (eelkõige Ida- Virumaal) on märkimisväärsed, kusjuures mõnes piirkonnas esineb keelebarjäär ja struktuurselt suur tööpuudus. Noorte töötus on tõusuteel (üle 20 %), nagu ka nende noorte osakaal, kes ei tööta, ei õpi ega osale koolitusel (vt 11. lisa).

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

22 23 24 25 26

m u u tu

se %

a a st

a võ

rd lu

se s

, P P

Energia Töötlemata toit

Tööstuskaubad (v.a energia) Töödeldud toit

Teenused THHI

Tekstikast 1. ÜRO kestliku arengu eesmärgid

Ehkki Eesti tulemused on üle ELi keskmise ja paranevad mitme kestlikkusega seotud eesmärgi puhul (eesmärgid 2, 6, 7, 11 ja 15), tuleb mõne eesmärgi puhul veel ELi keskmisele järele jõuda (eesmärgid 9, 12, 13 ja 14).

Riigi tulemused kestliku arengu eesmärkidega seotud konkurentsivõime valdkonnas on ebaühtlased. Ühest küljest on hariduse kvaliteet (eesmärk 4) üle ELi keskmise ja paraneb, mida näitab täiskasvanute suurem osalemine õppes. Teisest küljest on inimväärse töö ja majanduskasvu näitaja (eesmärk 8) alla ELi keskmise ning Eesti eemaldub eesmärkidest, nagu näitab stagneeruv reaalne SKP elaniku kohta. Tööstuse ja innovatsiooni näitaja (eesmärk 9) on alla ELi keskmise, kuid paraneb; selle näiteks on teadus- ja arendustegevuse osa kasv sisemajanduse kogukulutustes.

17st kestliku arengu eesmärgist kaheksa puhul jääb riik alla ELi keskmise. Lisaks eespool käsitletud kestliku arengu eesmärkidele 8 ja 9 on need seotud tervise (eesmärk 3), soolise võrdõiguslikkuse (eesmärk 5), vastutustundliku tarbimise ja tootmise (eesmärk 12), kliimameetmete (eesmärk 13), ookeani- ja mereökosüsteemide (eesmärk 14) ja isikliku julgeolekuga (eesmärk 16) (vt 15. lisa).

4

Riigi rahandus on kaitse- ja sotsiaalkulutuste tõttu üha suurema surve all

2025. aastal esitati Eestile riigipõhised soovitused laiendada maksubaasi ja

tagada kuluvajaduste, sealhulgas

kaitsevaldkonna ning tervishoiu ja pikaajalise hoolduse kestlik rahastamine. Aastatel 2024–2027 suurendatakse alkoholi-, tubaka- ja energiakaupade aktsiisimäärasid igal aastal veelgi(2). 2025. aastal tõsteti üksikisiku ja äriühingu tulumaksu määra (mõlemad 20 %-lt 22 %-le). 2026. aastal tühistati üksikisiku ja äriühingu tulumaksu määra oodatav tõus 24 %-le. Krediidiasutuste avansilise tulumaksu määr tõsteti aga 14 %-lt 18 %-le. 2025. aastal kehtestati uus mootorsõidukimaks. 2025. aasta juulis tõsteti käibemaksumäär 22 %-lt 24 %-le ning tõsteti ka vähendatud käibemaksumäärasid majutusteenustele (9 %-lt 13 %-le) ja ajakirjandusväljaannetele (5 %-lt 9 %-le). Alates 2025. aastast toimub maamaksu ülespoole korrigeerimine. Nendele jõupingutustele vaatamata on Eesti maksubaas endiselt kitsas ning sõltub suurel määral tööjõu- ja tarbimismaksudest. Prioriteetsete kuluvajaduste, eelkõige kaitse- ja sotsiaalpoliitika kestliku rahastamise tagamiseks on vaja uusi tulusid suurendavaid või kulusid vähendavaid meetmeid.

Valitsemissektori eelarve puudujääk tõusis 2025. aastal 2,0 %ni SKPst ning

prognooside kohaselt tõuseb veelgi. 2025. aastal jäi eelarvepuudujääk madalale tasemele tänu: i) üksikisiku tulumaksu ja äriühingu tulumaksu määrade tõstmisele 22 %-le; ii) käibemaksumäära tõstmisele 24 %-le, iii) uuele mootorsõidukimaksule; ning iv) paremale maksukogumisele majanduse elavnemise ajal. Prognooside kohaselt suureneb eelarvepuudujääk 2026. aastal aga

(2) Selleks et aidata toime tulla Lähis-Ida konfliktist

tulenevate kõrgete energiahindadega, otsustas valitsus lükata 2026. aastaks ette nähtud energiaaktsiisi (kütus ja elekter) määrade tõstmise edasi 2027. aastasse.

4,5 %ni SKPst(3). Tulusid mõjutab üleminek ühtsele maksusüsteemile, millega tõstetakse maksuvaba tulu määr 700 euroni kuus. See meede toob kaasa tulude märkimisväärse vähenemise, ehkki parandab tööstiimuleid, sest kaotab praeguse maksuküüru (vt 2. ja 3. lisa). Kulud peaksid suurenema peamiselt kaitsekulutuste tõttu. Valitsemissektori võlg oli 2025. aastal 24,1 % SKPst ja peaks 2026. aastal suurenema 26,9 %ni. See on tingitud kavandatud suurematest avaliku sektori kulutustest, eelkõige kaitsekulutustest.

Näib, et Eesti täidab oma keskpika perioodi eelarve- ja struktuurikavast

tulenevaid kohustusi. Eesti võttis oma 2025.–2029. aasta keskpika perioodi kavas kohustuse piirata kulude kasvu, et hoida eelarvepuudujääk 2029. aastaks tunduvalt alla 3 % SKPst ja valitsemissektori võlg alla 60 % SKPst (vt 2. lisa). Selle kohustuse täitmist võivad kahjustada prognoositust väiksem majanduskasv, mille tulemuseks on väiksemad eelarvetulud, ja taganemine teatavatest tulusid suurendavatest otsustest. Kulude poolel võib selle kohustuse täitmist kahjustada kasvav kulusurve, näiteks kaitsekulutuste kavandatud suurenemine. Need ületavad juba 2026. aastal 5 % SKPst.

Kulude poole eelarvesurve kasvab. Eesti

eelarvestrateegia(4) kohaselt peaksid sotsiaalkulud (sealhulgas sotsiaal- ja muud toetused, rahastatavad sotsiaalmaksed ja töötuskindlustusmaksed) suurenema aastatel 2025–2029 ligikaudu 1 miljardi euro võrra. Neile järgnevad tervishoiu- ning julgeoleku- ja kaitsekulud, mis peaksid suurenema vastavalt peaaegu 480 miljoni ja 560 miljoni euro võrra. Selle suundumuse tasakaalustamiseks on löögi all teatavad kuluvaldkonnad, näiteks peretoetused. Alates 2026. aastast on vanemahüvitiste maksimummäära vähendatud kolmelt keskmiselt kuupalgalt kahele, kuid progresseeruvust ei ole ette nähtud.

Suurenenud julgeolekuvajaduste tõttu

kasvavad kaitsekulutused, mida

(3) Komisjoni 2026. aasta kevadprognoos.

(4) Riigi eelarvestrateegia | Rahandusministeerium.

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toetatakse ELi vahenditest. Et Eestil oleks võimalik suurendada avaliku sektori kaitsekulutusi, on nõukogu aktiveerinud Eesti puhul riikide vabastusklausli(5). Kaitsekulutused suurenesid 2 %-lt SKPst 2021. aastal 4,2 %ni SKPst 2025. aastal ja peaksid 2026. aastal jõudma 5,0 %ni SKPst. Koosseisu vaadates kasvab kaitseinvesteeringute osakaal kaitsekulutustes ligikaudu 32 %-lt 2026. aastal umbes 50 %ni. Seoses ELi rahastamisega leppis nõukogu 2026. aasta veebruaris kokku, et Eestile tehakse Euroopa julgeolekumeetmete rahastamisvahendi raames kättesaadavaks kuni 2,3 miljardi euro (5,9 % SKPst) suurune laen(6) kaitseprojektide rahastamiseks aastatel 2026–2030. 2026. aastal lisas Eesti oma ühtekuuluvusprogrammi kaks uut erieesmärki, mis on mõeldud julgeoleku ja kaitse tugevdamiseks. Mõlemad eesmärgid seavad esikohale uue kaitsevõime kahesuguse kasutuse ja nende kogusumma on peaaegu 386 miljonit eurot. Lisaks eraldatakse piirihalduse ja viisapoliitika rahastust(7) kokku 170 miljonit eurot Venemaa ja Valgevenega piirnevate liikmesriikide toetamiseks seiresüsteemide, telekommunikatsiooni ja droonitõrjevõime ajakohastamisel. Lisaks nendele jõupingutustele pakuvad ELi kosmose- ja turvalise ühenduvuse programmid turvalisi ja vastupidavaid kosmosepõhiseid teenuseid, mis toimivad tõhusalt eri keskkondades.

Suurenenud kulude katmiseks on vaja uusi tuluallikaid. Eesti tulude struktuur

põhineb peamiselt tööjõu- ja tarbimismaksudel, mis moodustasid 2024. aastal 90 % kogu maksutulust (vt 3. lisa). Eelkõige tarbimismaksude osakaal ületab märgatavalt ELi keskmist. Sõltuvus tarbimismaksudest eeldatavasti üksnes suureneb, kuna harilikku käibemaksumäära

(5) Riikide vabastusklausli aktiveerimine annab

liikmesriikidele eelarvelise paindlikkuse suurendada kaitsekulutusi, ilma et seda oleks vaja kohe rahastada kulukärbete või tulude suurendamise meetmetega. Paindlikkus annab liikmesriikidele piisavalt aega suuremate kaitsekulutuste mahutamiseks riigieelarvesse.

(6) Rakendusotsus – EL – 2026/407 – ET – EUR-Lex.

(7) Teatis ELi idapoolsete piirkondade kohta, mis piirnevad Venemaa, Valgevene ja Ukrainaga.

tõsteti 2025. aastal teist aastat järjest (24 %- le). Keskkonnamaksud (2,6 % SKPst) ületavad juba samuti ELi keskmist. Praegu on omandimaksudel avaliku sektori tuludes väga väike osakaal. Kuigi Eesti viib praegu läbi uusi maa hindamisi, võiks eluhoonete maks parandada eelarve pikaajalist jätkusuutlikkust ja laiendada maksude kombinatsiooni. Lisaks võiks progresseeruvuse tagamiseks ette näha erisätted väikese sissetulekuga kodumajapidamiste jaoks.

Riigi rahanduse jätkusuutlikkust võiks

parandada ka korrapärane avaliku

sektori kulutuste läbivaatamine ja

poliitika hindamine. Kulude läbivaatamisi on

tehtud alates 2017. aastast, kuid mitte järjepidevalt ja põhjalikult (vt 2. lisa). Eesti lõpetas äsja komisjoni tehnilise toe instrumendi raames koolitusprojekti, mille eesmärk on paremini integreerida korrapärane kulude läbivaatamine ja poliitika hindamine keskpika perioodi eelarveraamistikku. Eestil võiks olla abi selle oskusteabe kasutamisest, et aidata leevendada eelarvesurvet ning suunata kokku hoitud vahendid ümber prioriteetsetesse valdkondadesse, nagu kaitse- ja sotsiaalpoliitika.

Piirkondlike erinevuste vähendamine konkurentsivõime, majanduskasvu ja vastupidavuse toetamiseks

Püsivad piirkondlikud erinevused

takistavad lähenemist ja majanduskasvu.

Eestit toovad ELi keskmisele lähemale endiselt peamiselt kaks suuremat linna – Tallinn ja Tartu (vt 18. lisa). Pealinnapiirkond (Põhja- Eesti, sealhulgas Tallinn) on ainus piirkond, mille sissetulekute tase on üle ELi keskmise, ülejäänud piirkonnad aga jäävad sellest tunduvalt allapoole. See näitab majandustegevuse, väärtuslike teenuste ja kvalifitseeritud tööjõu tugevat koondumist Tallinna ümbrusse. Teised piirkonnad peale pealinnapiirkonna seisavad silmitsi struktuursete probleemidega, mis on seotud hõreda ja väheneva rahvastiku ning ühenduvuspiirangutega Need väljakutsed on

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seotud institutsiooniliste teguritega, sest omavalitsuste fiskaalvõimekus on suhteliselt piiratud ja see omakorda piirab nende suutlikkust toetada kohalikku majandust ja osutada teenuseid kohalikule elanikkonnale. Samal ajal, kui riik loobub fossiilkütustest, toimuvad Ida-Viru maakonnas suured tööstuslikud ja majanduslikud muutused. Järkjärgulisel loobumisel põlevkivitööstusest seisab maakonna peamiselt vene keelt kõnelev elanikkond keelebarjääri tõttu silmitsi hariduse ja tööjõu liikuvuse takistustega. Kagu-Eesti, kus asub riigi suuruselt teine linn Tartu, hõlmab ka suurt osa Eesti kõige äärepoolsematest piirkondadest. Nagu ka muud Eesti äärealad ja maapiirkonnad, esineb neis probleeme seoses (digitaalse) ühenduvuse ja juurdepääsuga põhilistele avalikele teenustele, mis pärsib elanike võimalust jääda suurematest linnadest väljapoole. Ka investeerimis- ja innovatsioonitegevus on endiselt tugevalt koondunud Tallinnasse ja Tartusse, samal ajal kui välisinvestorite ja kohalike VKEde vahelised sidemed on piirkonniti ebaühtlased, muu hulgas piiratud rahastamisvõimaluste tõttu (vt 2. jagu). Eesti võiks saada kasu tugevamast kohapõhisest poliitika koordineerimisest, mis võiks toetada majanduse mitmekesistamist ja tugevdada struktuurse kohandamisega silmitsi seisvate piirkondade vastupidavust, ka idapiiril. Omavalitsustevahelise koostöö ja piirkondliku planeerimise suutlikkuse tugevdamine aitaks tagada avalike teenuste jätkusuutliku osutamise.

Eesti kui ELi idapoolsel välispiiril asuv riik

seisab silmitsi lisaprobleemidega, mis

pärsivad selle majandusliku ja sotsiaalse arengu väljavaateid(8). Venemaa agressioonisõda Ukraina vastu süvendab mõningaid olemasolevaid struktuurseid probleeme ning toob kaasa suurema julgeolekusurve, piiriülese majandustegevuse häired ja investeeringute atraktiivsuse vähenemise ning piirab seega riigis veelgi

(8) Komisjoni 2026. aasta teatises ELi idapoolsete

piirkondade kohta, mis piirnevad Venemaa, Valgevene ja Ukrainaga, määratletakse idapoolsed piirialad NUTS 2 tasandi piirkondadena, mis asuvad geograafiliselt Venemaa, Valgevene või Ukraina lähedal. Eesti on liigitatud idapoolseks piirialaks.

rahastamisvõimalusi. Inimeste ja elutähtsa taristu julgeolekuprobleemid nõuavad investeeringuid elanikkonnakaitsesse, valmisolekusse ja sõjaväelisse liikuvusse. Eesti mõistab seda ja on märkimisväärselt suurendanud kaitsekulutusi. Need investeeringud võivad tuua kahekordset kasu – lahendada julgeolekuprobleeme ja pakkuda võimalusi piirkondade majandusele –, kuid avaldavad ka täiendavat survet avalike teenuste rahastamisele.

Jõupingutused energiaga seotud majandusjulgeoleku probleemide lahendamiseks

Eesti seisab silmitsi mitme

majandusjulgeoleku probleemiga,

peamiselt energiasektoris. Eesti majandus on üks ressursimahukamaid ELis ning sõltub energianõudluse rahuldamisel seetõttu suurel määral fossiilkütuste impordist. Lisaks sellele on ta samal ajal järk-järgult lõpetamas omamaist põlevkivitootmist. Venemaa sissetung Ukrainasse ja sellele järgnenud sanktsioonid tõid kaasa suure energiahindade tõusu ja konkurentsisurve energiamahukates tööstusharudes. Eesti seisab silmitsi ka märkimisväärsete riskidega elutähtsa võrgutaristu füüsilisele julgeolekule olukorras, kus Venemaa varilaevastik on korraldanud hübriidrünnakuid riigi merealuste kaablite vastu. Energiajulgeoleku suurendamiseks tehtavad jõupingutused hõlmavad Venemaa gaasiimpordi lõpetamist, alternatiivsetelt tarnijatelt pärit impordi laiendamist ning võrgutaristu vastupidavuse ja ühenduste tugevdamist. Lähis-Idas äsja alanud sõda toob aga esile Eesti sõltuvuse energiaimpordist. Energiajulgeoleku suurendamiseks on vaja täiendavaid investeeringuid taastuvatesse energiaallikatesse, energia salvestamisse ja - tõhususse.

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Laiem tootlikkuse kasv ei ole veel saavutatud

Lisaks oma positsiooni säilitamisele digivaldkonna eestvedajana oleks Eestil vaja saavutada suurem tööviljakus ja ressursitootlikkus. Kuigi Eestis on digitaalselt võimekas avalik sektor ja elav IKT-sektor, on puudus erasektori investeeringutest teadusuuringutesse ning innovatsiooni ning majanduses ei kasutata uut tehnoloogiat. Selle lünga kõrvaldamiseks on astutud olulisi samme: muu hulgas on tugevdatud teadusuuringute ja innovatsiooni raamistikku riikliku rakendusuuringute keskuse loomise ja TemTA programmi käivitamise kaudu, et toetada nutika spetsialiseerumise valdkondades kasutussuunitlusega teadus- ja arendustegevust. Eesti on ka i) edendanud ka

õigusnormide lihtsustamist, laiendanud digitaliseerimise toetust taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastu meetmete, ühtekuuluvuspoliitika fondide ja õiglase ülemineku fondi kaudu traditsioonilistes sektorites, nagu tootmine, ehitus ning transport ja logistika, ning iii) ajakohastanud 2025. aastal investeerimiskontode korda, et laiendada kodumajapidamiste investeerimisvõimalusi. Edaspidi nõuab konkurentsivõime säilitamine i) kooskõlastatud lähenemisviisi, et suurendada investeeringuid oskustesse kogu tööjõu hulgas, ii) tehisintellekti ja tipptasemel digitehnoloogia kiiremat levikut, iii) tugevamaid stiimuleid erasektori innovatsiooniks koos VKEde parema juurdepääsuga rahastamisele, eelkõige väljaspool peamisi linnakeskusi, ning iv) prognoositavat ja tõhusat ettevõtluskeskkonda. Ressursimahukad tööstusharud ja põlevkivi märkimisväärne kasutamine energiasektoris pärsivad Eestis

Tekstikast 2. Taaste- ja vastupidavuskava peamised saavutused

Eesti taaste- ja vastupidavuskava kogueelarve on 953 miljonit eurot, mis vastab 3,0 %-le 2023.

aasta SKPst, ning selle eesmärk on toetada reforme ja investeeringuid, mis aitavad kaasa rohe- ja

digipöördele, tugevdada majanduse vastupanuvõimet ja lahendada Euroopa poolaasta raames kindlaks tehtud pikaajalisi struktuurseid probleeme.

5. mai 2026. aasta seisuga on pärast 86 eesmärgi ja sihi rahuldavat täitmist Eestile välja makstud

763 miljonit eurot (ligikaudu 80 % kogueraldisest). Rakendamine on edenenud stabiilselt ning üha

rohkem reforme ja investeeringuid on juba ellu viidud ja andnud kohapeal käegakatsutavaid tulemusi.

Kava põhipunktid ja mõju

• Taastuvenergia kiirendatud kasutuselevõtt. Taastuvenergia tootmise ja salvestamise rajatiste

lihtsustatud loamenetlused ning investeeringud, et suurendada kestliku biometaani tootmiseksülesseatud võimsust 2026. aastaks (eeldatavasti) vähemalt 4 000 000 kuupmeetri võrra.

• Hoonete energiatõhusus. Renoveeritud on vähemalt 80 kortermaja ja vähemalt 900 väikeelamut.

• Tervishoiuteenuste ligipääsetavuse parandamine. Viljandi uus üldhaigla ja tervisekeskus

pakub integreeritult tervishoiu- ja sotsiaalteenuseid.Lisaks motiveeritakse arste, õdesid ja proviisoreid töötama äärepoolsetes piirkondades, et parandada tervishoiuteenuste kättesaadavust kogu riigis.

• Noorte tööhõive toetamine. Teenus „Minu esimene töökoht“ võimaldab töökogemuseta või

vähese töökogemusega noortel saada töökogemusi ja parandada töö leidmiseks oma oskusi.

• Uute keskkonnahoidlike tehnoloogiate arendamine. Rohefondist eraldatakse 90 miljonit eurot,

et investeerida riskikapitali uute keskkonnahoidlike tehnoloogiate arendamisse eri sektorites, nagu energeetika, põllumajandus ja toiduainetööstus.

• Parem internetiühendus maapiirkondades. See saavutatakse, laiendades väga suure

läbilaskevõimega lairibavõrke, mis pakuvad ühendust kiirusega vähemalt 100 Mbit/s, rohkem kui 8 000 eluruumile ja muudele kohtadele (prognoosi kohaselt).

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ressursitootlikkust. Ressursitootlikkuse suurendamiseks on vaja loobuda põlevkivist, arendada edasi ressursitõhusat keskkonnahoidlikku tehnoloogiat ning parandada veelgi ringlust. Ilma innovatsiooni ja uute tehnoloogiate suurema levikuta ning erainvesteeringute ulatuslikuma kaasamiseta võib Eestil olla raske saavutada laiapõhjalist tootlikkuse kasvu (vt 2. jagu).

Endiselt on ruumi haavatavate rühmade sotsiaalkaitse tugevdamiseks ning tervishoiu ja pikaajalise hoolduse kättesaadavuse ja taskukohasuse parandamiseks

Kuigi üldine vaesuse määr on vähenenud,

on vaesuse oht puuetega inimeste,

eakate ja üksikvanemaga leibkondade

puhul endiselt suur. Peamised põhjused on

endiselt: i) väikesed kulutused sotsiaalkaitsele, ii) sotsiaalsiirete piiratud tõhusus, iii) väiksed pensionid, iv) suured eluasemekulud ning v) tervishoiu ja pikaajalise hoolduse ebaühtlane kättesaadavus ja taskukohasus. Hooldusteenuste kättesaadavust pärsivad jätkuvalt suur omaosalus, pikad ooteajad, tööjõupuudus ning piirkondlikud erinevused. Eesti on astunud nende probleemide lahendamiseks samme, kuid ebapiisav rahastamine takistab endiselt vaesuse kaotamist ning tervishoiu ja pikaajalise hoolduse taskukohasuse ja kättesaadavusega seotud peamiste probleemide lahendamist. Mis puudutab pensione, siis umbes veerand tööealistest eestlastest kasutab ära sissemaksete maksusoodustust ja osaleb kolmanda (täiendava) pensionisamba skeemis, mis aitab tulevikus lahendada selles osalejate jaoks pensionide piisavuse probleemi. Sissemaksed on siiski endiselt suhteliselt väikesed ja sageli ebaregulaarsed (6. lisa).

Alates 2010. aastate keskpaigast on Eestis aset leidnud Euroopa üks pikemaid

ja tuntavamaid eluaseme

nominaalhindade ning eluasemehindade ja sissetulekute suhte kasvuperioode.

Seda on tõuganud tagant mitmed tegurid, nagu suur nõudlus, kasvavad ehituskulud, ehitustöötajate puudus ja sektori vähene tootlikkus. Üürihinnad kasvasid aeglasemalt, kuid siiski märkimisväärselt. Sotsiaaleluruumide väga piiratud arvu tõttu on see toonud kaasa liiga suured eluasemekulud, eelkõige väikese sissetulekuga kodumajapidamiste ja üksikvanemate jaoks, kusjuures vaesuse ohus üksikvanemate puhul on üüri osakaal kodumajapidamiste kasutatavast tulust üks ELi suuremaid (16. lisa). Kui taskukohasusega seotud probleemid on kõige suuremad linnapiirkondades, siis ülejäänud riigis on eluasemeprobleemid seotud pigem kvaliteedi ja kättesaadavusega (18. lisa). Selle probleemi lahendamiseks töötab Eesti praegu välja üldist eluasemepoliitikat aastateks 2025–2035, mis peaks hõlmama mitmeid eluaseme taskukohasusega seotud aspekte.

Eesti elamufondi energiatõhusus on väga

väike. Selle tulemusena kulutavad eestlased väga suure osa oma kasutatavast tulust küttele (vt 3. jagu). See mõjutab märkimisväärselt kogu elanikkonda, kuid eriti rängalt haavatavaid rühmi, ning näitab vajadust kiirendada vanade hoonete ja eelkõige eluhoonete energiatõhusaks renoveerimist.

ELi rahastamisvahenditest eraldatakse

Eestile märkimisväärseid vahendeid. Need toetavad investeeringuid ja struktuurireforme, et suurendada konkurentsivõimet, keskkonnasäästlikkust, oskusi, sotsiaalset õiglust ja julgeolekut, aidates samal ajal lahendada riigipõhistes soovitustes kindlaks tehtud probleeme. Peamised vahendid on taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastu (vt tekstikast 2) ja ühtekuuluvuspoliitika fondid (v tekstikast 3). Peale selle antakse ühise põllumajanduspoliitika (ÜPP) raames Eestile ÜPP strateegiakava 2023–2027 alusel 1,4 miljardi euro suurune ELi toetus (9). Lisaks eraldatakse kokku 168,7 miljardit eurot

(9) Ülevaade Eesti ametlikult heakskiidetud strateegiast ELi

ühise põllumajanduspoliitika rakendamiseks riiklikul tasandil on kättesaadav aadressil: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/cap-my-country/cap- strategic-plans/estonia_et

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Varjupaiga-, Rände- ja Integratsioonifondist, piirihalduse ja viisapoliitika rahastust ja Sisejulgeolekufondist. Eesti konkurentsivõimet toetavad ka muud ELi programmid, näiteks programmi „Euroopa horisont“ ja Euroopa ühendamise rahastu raames korraldatavate avatud konkursside kaudu.

(10) Euroopa Regionaalarengu Fond, Euroopa Sotsiaalfond+,

Ühtekuuluvusfond ja Õiglase Ülemineku Fond.

(11) Vahehindamine toimub programmitöö perioodi 2021– 2027 keskel. See on ühissätete määruse artikli 18 kohaselt nõutav ametlik protsess, mille käigus hinnatakse programmide rakendamist ja tehakse vajaduse korral ettepanekuid kohandusteks, et parandada nende tulemuslikkust, tagada nende asjakohasus uute ja tekkivate vajaduste valguses ning säilitada nende sidusus muude ELi poliitikavaldkondadega.

Tekstikast 3. Ühtekuuluvuspoliitika fondide panus

ELi ühtekuuluvuspoliitika vahenditest toetatakse Eesti püüdlusi suurendada

konkurentsivõimet, keskkonnakestlikkust ning oskusi ja sotsiaalset õiglust. Programmitöö perioodil 2021–2027 eraldatakse ELi ühtekuuluvuspoliitika fondidest(10) Eestile 3,4 miljardit eurot (koos riikliku kaasrahastamisega 4,1 miljardit eurot) ehk 9 % 2024. aasta SKPst. Sellega on ühtekuuluvuspoliitika üks peamisi avaliku sektori investeeringute allikaid riigis. Väljavalitud projektide väärtus moodustab 2026. aasta märtsi seisuga 110 % kogueraldisest ning täiendavad projektikonkursid on tulekul.

• Innovatsioon, ettevõtluskeskkond ja tootlikkus. Üle 1,1 miljardi euro eraldatakse

teadusuuringutele ja innovatsioonile, VKEde konkurentsivõimele ning piirkondadele, mida süsinikumahukast tegevusest loobumine kõige rohkem mõjutab. Ligikaudu 14 000 ettevõtte projektid on juba heaks kiidetud.

• Süsinikuheite vähendamine, energia taskukohasus ja kestlikkus.Rohepöördeks on ette

nähtud ligikaudu 690 miljonit eurot, millest toetatakse taastuvenergia kasutuselevõttu ning

hoonete ja kaugküttesüsteemide energiatõhususe parandamist. Investeeringutega toetatakse ka joogiveega varustamist ja reovee puhastamist, parandatakse keskkonnatoimet ja teenuste kvaliteeti ning vähendatakse samal ajal kasvuhoonegaaside heidet ja energiatarbimist.

• Oskused, kvaliteetsed töökohad ja sotsiaalne õiglus. Euroopa Sotsiaalfond+-st (ESF+) on

Eestile kokku eraldatud 491 miljonit eurot. Fondi põhitegevus hõlmab aktiivseid tööturumeetmeid (47 miljonit eurot), töövõimereformi (31,3 miljonit eurot) ning investeeringuid haridusse ja oskustesse (227,5 miljonit eurot). Lisaks toetatakse digioskusi, noortemeetmeid, pikaajalise hoolduse reformi ja lõimimist. Ligikaudu 157 miljonit eurot on ette nähtud sotsiaalse kaasatuse edendamiseks, kusjuures 24,9 miljonit eurot on eraldatud laste vaesuse vähendamiseks ja 16,2 miljonit eurot enim puudust kannatavate isikute toetamiseks.

Vahehindamisega(11) suurendati ühtekuuluvuspoliitika fondide panust Eesti uutesse strateegilistesse prioriteetidesse, paigutades ümber ligikaudu 396 miljonit eurot (sealhulgas 42,7 miljonit eurot

ESF+ vahendeid). Märkimisväärne osa ümberpaigutustest toetab julgeolekut ja vastupidavust, sealhulgas sõjaväelist liikuvust ja tsiviilvalmisolekut.

INNOVATSIOON, ETTEVÕTLUSKESKKOND JA TOOTLIKKUS

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2025. aastal esitati Eestile riigipõhised

soovitused i) suurendada

ressursitootlikkust, ii) investeerida oskustesse, iii) suunata investeeringud

teadusuuringutesse ja innovatsiooni ning

iv) parandada juurdepääs rahastusele.

Rakendusuuringute rahastamise prioriseerimiseks on rakendatud mitmeid meetmeid, kuid teadus- ja arendustegevusse ning innovatsiooni tehtavate avaliku sektori investeeringute võimendav mõju erasektoris on endiselt piiratud. Samuti on käimas ulatuslikud reformid, et tugevdada erioskuste pakkumist. Ressursitootlikkuse parandamiseks ja keskkonnahoidlikule tehnoloogiale üleminekuks on olemas mitu rahastamisprogrammi, kuid nende kasutuselevõtt tööstuses on endiselt piiratud (1. lisa).

Poliitilistest jõupingutustest suurema

innovatsiooni ja tootlikkuse kasvuni

liikuda on endiselt keeruline, eriti väikeste ja keskmise suurusega

ettevõtjate (VKEd) jaoks. Patentimine on vähenenud ning teadus- ja äriringkondade koostöö on endiselt ebaühtlane. Kuigi idufirmad saavad kasu arenenud riskikapitaliturust, on VKEde investeerimise, innovatsiooni ja laienemise rahastamisvõimalused üldiselt jätkuvalt piiratud ning ettevõtjad teatavad endiselt vajadusest kvalifitseeritud töötajate järele. Vähene ressursitootlikkus osutab ka võimalusele parandada materjalide tõhusat kasutamist ja kiirendada üleminekut ringmajandusele.

Vähene tööviljakus ja ressursitootlikkus pärsib konkurentsivõimet ja lähenemist

Tootlikkuse aeglane kasv peegeldab nii

väikest tööviljakust kui ka väikest

ressursitootlikkust, nagu on rõhutatud 2025. aasta riigipõhistes soovitustes. Tootlikkuse kasv on olnud tagasihoidlik investeeringute vähesuse, varutööjõu hoidmise ja tehnoloogia ebaühtlase leviku tõttu ettevõtetes (vt 1. jagu), kusjuures tootlikkuse erinevused ettevõtete ja piirkondade vahel püsivad (vt 18. lisa). Tugev avalik digitaristu ja üldiselt hea ühenduvus ei ole veel täielikult üle kandunud ettevõtete digitaliseerimisse ja tootlikkuse kasvu. Eelkõige võivad suhteliselt kõrged püsivõrgu lairibaühenduse hinnad, eriti suurema kiiruse puhul, ja lüngad väga suure läbilaskevõimega võrkude kasutuselevõtus (vt 5. lisa) piirata ettevõtete suutlikkust võtta kasutusele täiustatud digilahendusi ja teha uuendusi. Digitehnoloogia ebaühtlane kasutuselevõtt ettevõtetes pärsib jätkuvalt tootlikkust, mis osutab sellele, et digivahendeid ja -võimekust saaks majanduses tõhusamalt levitada.

Nagu on rõhutatud 2025. aasta

riigipõhistes soovitustes, on endiselt

probleemiks erioskuste pakkumine. Kuigi tööjõupuudus on mõnevõrra vähenenud, on 80 % ettevõtjate jaoks endiselt probleemiks kvalifitseeritud töötajate nappus ning kõrge kvalifikatsiooniga töötajate nappus pärsib Eesti innovatsioonisuutlikkust (vt 4., 5. ja 11. lisa). Hoolimata olulistest käimasolevatest algatustest (vt 4. jagu) on teaduses, tehnoloogias, inseneerias ja matemaatikas ning arvuti- ja tarkvaravaldkonnas endiselt kriitiline lünk. Praegused probleemid tõenäoliselt süvenevad, kuna tehisintellekti

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levik nõuab laiemat ja arenenumat oskuste baasi kui praegune haridussüsteem näib pakkuvat. Ilma tõhusa oskuste poliitika ja tugeva teavitustegevuseta on Eestil oht jääda madalate oskuste lõksu, mis piirab ettevõtete suutlikkust minna üle suurema lisaväärtusega tegevustele ja suurendab piirkondlikke erinevusi.

Nagu on märgitud 2025. aasta

riigipõhistes soovitustes, on Eestil

ressursitootlikkuse poolest endiselt üks ELi kehvemaid tulemusi ja ta vajab

rohelisi kutseoskusi. Eesti on ressursitootlikkuse poolest EL 27 liikmesriigi seas 24. kohal (vt 5. ja 8. lisa). Eesti majandus on väga energiamahukas, kuna põlevkivi osakaal energiasektoris (vt 3. jagu), transpordis ja kütmisel on endiselt märkimisväärne. Ressursitootlikkust pärsivad ka ressursimahukad tööstusharud, kuna eelkõige ehitus-, puidu- ja metallitööstus on suured energia ja toorainete tarbijad. Uute keskkonnahoidlike ja energiatõhusate tehnoloogiate arendamist uuenduslike idufirmade poolt toetavad jätkuvalt riiklikud programmid, ühtekuuluvuspoliitika fondid ning taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastust rahastatav rohefond, samuti meetmed roheliste kutseoskuste pakkumise parandamiseks. Eesti on võtnud vastu ringmajanduse tegevuskava ja võtnud kasutusele mitu ringmajanduse toetusmeedet, sealhulgas töötleva tööstuse ressursitõhususe meetme, mis on eriti oluline ressursitootlikkuse parandamiseks. Olemasolevast rahastamisest hoolimata on rakendamine tööstuses aeglane. Põlevkivist on kavas küll loobuda, aga keskkonnahoidlike tehnoloogiate edasist arendamist takistab regulatiivne ja nõudlusega seotud ebakindlus, kusjuures loamenetluses on samuti arenguruumi (vt 5. lisa). Muud olulised meetmed võiksid olla energia- ja ressursitõhususe toetamine peamistes sektorites, nagu on kirjeldatud 2023. aasta ringmajanduse tegevuskavas, ning ringluspõhisuse edasine parandamine.

Rahastamisvõimaluste parandamine, avaliku sektori rahastamise võimendamine ja

õigusraamistiku parandamine investeeringute toetamiseks

Nagu on rõhutatud 2025. aasta

riigipõhises soovituses, on

rahastamisvõimalused ettevõtjate jaoks endiselt piiratud ja see takistab

uuenduslikke investeeringuid. Rahastamise kättesaadavus on ettevõtete jaoks üha suurem investeerimistakistus(12) ning piiratud rahastamisega ettevõtete osakaal on jätkuvalt suurem kuiELis keskmiselt, mis näitab vajadust paremate rahastamisvahendite ja turulepääsu järele (vt 5. ja 6. lisa). Kuigi riskikapitaliturud Balti riikides on arenenud ja Eesti riskikapitaliinvesteeringud elaniku kohta on ühed suuremad OECD riikides,(13) on institutsionaalsed investorid (sh pensionifondid) väikesed. Seega sõltuvad Eesti ettevõtted üldiselt kapitaliturgudelt saadavast rahastamisest vaid vähesel määral, sest kolm neljandikku investeeringutest rahastatakse sisemiselt (vt joonis 2.1), mis on palju suurem osakaal kui ELis keskmiselt.

Joonis 2.1. Finantssektoriväliste ettevõtete

rahastuse koosseis (% SKPst)

(1) Finantssektoriväliste ettevõtete kohustuste summa kajastab ainult arvesse võetud finantssektoriväliste ettevõtete kohustuste kogusummat. Vaatlusperiood 2024. Allikas: Eurostat, FISMA E2 arvutused

(12) Euroopa Investeerimispanga 2025. aasta

investeerimisuuring: ülevaade olukorrast Eestis.

(13) OECD (2026). Majandusuuring: Eesti (peagi)

0

50

100

150

200

250

EE EL

% SKPst

Muud omandiväärtpaberid Noteerimata aktsiad

Noteeritud aktsiad Võlakirjad

Kaubanduskrediit ja ettemaksed Laenud

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Väljaspool IKT-sektorit püsivad rahastamispuudujäägid, mis on üha

struktuursemad ja piirkondlikumad.

Väljaspool peamisi linnakeskusi asuvatele VKEdele ja muudele ettevõtetele laenamist piiravad suurem tajutav risk ja piiratud tagatised (vt 5. ja 18. lisa). Sihtotstarbelised algatused, nagu 17 miljoni euro suurune piirkondlik toetuskava Ida-Virumaa VKEdele, on saanud rohkem taotlusi kui lubatud eelarve, mis näitab suurt nõudlust(14). Kavandatud riigi laenutagatised energiaprojektidele on järjekordne samm edasi. Selliste riskijagamisvahendite tugevdamine, mis kombineerivad toetusi tagatiste ja omakapitaliga seotud vahenditega, võivad kaasata erainvesteeringuid tõhusamalt kui isoleeritud kavad. Seda positiivset mõju suurendaks veelgi investeeringutele, VKEde toetamisele ja innovatsioonile suunatud poliitika parem integreerimine. Selleks et parandada rahastamisvõimalusi piirkondlikul tasandil, eelkõige väljaspool linnakeskusi, oleks riikliku, era- ja institutsioonilise rahastamise tõhusamaks võimendamiseks vaja ka sidusat regionaalarengu strateegiat, milles võetakse arvesse valdkondadeüleseid piirkondlikke vajadusi (18. lisa).

Kasvav vajadus suurendada erainvesteeringuid innovatsiooni ning teadus- ja arendustegevusse, muu hulgas kaitsesektoris

Ebapiisav investeerimine rakenduslikku teadus- ja arendustegevusse takistab

tehnoloogia arengut, nagu on märgitud

2025. aasta riigipõhises soovituses. Eesti on märkimisväärselt tugevdanud oma rakendusuuringute ja innovatsiooni raamistikku (vt 4. lisa) ning avaliku sektori kulutused teadusuuringutele ja innovatsioonile (0,78 % SKPst 2024. aastal) ületavad ELi keskmist. Avaliku sektori teadusuuringute ja innovatsiooni muutmine laiendatavaks ettevõtlusinnovatsiooniks on siiski endiselt

(14) Ida-Viru väike- ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtjate

investeeringute toetus – EIS

ebaühtlane ning erasektori teadus- ja arendustegevuse intensiivsus (1,21 %) jääb alla ELi keskmise. Lisaks on patentimine viimasel ajal vähenenud, mis viitab piiratud turustamisele ja levitamisele. Kasutusele on võetud uus rakendusuuringute suutlikkus ja temaatilised rahastamisvahendid ning teadusuuringute rahastamise tulemuspõhised komponendid premeerivad üha enam koostööd ja turustamist. Seetõttu on oluline tagada, et avaliku sektori kulutused teadusuuringutele ja innovatsioonile kaasaksid erainvesteeringuid ning tooksid kaasa turustatavad tooted ja tootlikkuse kasvu. Selleks võiks tugevdada teadus- ja tööstusvaldkonna koostööd, viia rahastamise paremini kooskõlla turunõudlusega ning parandada uuenduslike VKEde rahastamistingimusi, eelkõige valdkondades, kus rahastamisvõimalused on piiratud.

Eesti kaitsesektor on kiiresti muutumas

nišiteenustest kõrgtehnoloogilise

innovatsiooni keskuseks. Venemaa agressioonisõda Ukraina vastu on mõjunud nii innovatsiooni tugeva tõukejõuna kui ka olnud Eesti sõjatehnoloogiasektori jaoks tegelikes tingimustes tehtava hindamise keskkond. Praegu tarnib üle kümne Eesti ettevõtte Ukrainale mitmesugust riistvara ja teenuseid, sealhulgas autonoomseid sõidukeid, seireandureid, mehitamata õhusõidukite süsteemide vastast tehnoloogiat, mobiilseid meditsiinirajatisi ja erikoolitusprogramme(15). 2025. aasta lõpu seisuga koosneb Eesti kaitsetööstus rohkem kui 180 ettevõttest,(16) kusjuures idufirmade ökosüsteem kasvas vaid kolme aastaga tosinalt osalejalt vähemalt 100 osalejani. Sektori arengut takistavad aga siseturu väiksus, kõrgelt kvalifitseeritud spetsialistide nappus ning asjaolu, et toetus- ja muud menetlused ei ole kohandatud kiiresti areneva tehnoloogia ja innovatsiooni jaoks. Näiteks võib lahinguväljal toimuvate arengute tõttu tekkida vajadus muuta tootedisaini või nõudeid, kuid tsiviiltegevusele kohandatud toetus- ja muud menetlused on sellises olukorras mõnikord liiga aeglased või jäigad.

(15) https://defence.ee/news/the-estonian-defence-and-

aerospace-industry-association-is-growing

(16) Samas.

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SÜSINIKUHEITE VÄHENDAMINE, ENERGIA TASKUKOHASUS JA KESTLIKKUS

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2025. aastal esitati Eestile riigipõhised

soovitused i) vähendada üldist sõltuvust

fossiilkütustest ja põlevkivi osakaalu energiaallikate jaotuses, ii) investeerida

taastuvenergiasse ja edendada energia

salvestamist, ii) suurendada

energiajulgeolekut, iii) parandada

energiatõhusust ning iv) suurendada

kestliku transpordi kättesaadavust. Taastuvate energiaallikate osakaalu suurendamiseks energiaallikate jaotuses ja energia salvestamise edendamiseks on rakendatud mitmeid meetmeid, kuid energiajulgeoleku parandamiseks on vaja täiendavaid investeeringuid. Edusammud energiatõhususe parandamisel on olnud piiratud ja transpordist tulenev heide on endiselt suur, mis osutab vajadusele võtta täiendavaid meetmeid riigipõhiste soovituste rakendamiseks (vt 1. lisa).

Taastuvenergia ja energia salvestamise edendamine, et vähendada sõltuvust põlevkivist

2025. aastal esitati Eestile riigipõhine

soovitus investeerida taastuvenergiasse ja edendada energia salvestamist.

Taastuvate energiaallikate osakaal Eesti energiaallikate jaotuses on märkimisväärselt suurenenud: 35 %-lt 2023. aastal 40 %-le 2024. aastal. Kodumaisel põlevkivil on jaotuses endiselt suur tähtsus, kuid selle osakaal energiaallikate jaotuses on märgatavalt vähenenud – 30 %-lt 2023. aastal 25 %-le 2024. aastal. Toornafta ja naftatoodete osakaal energiaallikate jaotuses on endiselt 27 %, nagu see oli 2023. aastal, ja maagaasi osakaal suurenes veidi – 6 %-lt 7 %-le. Taastuvenergia osakaal elektrienergia netotoodangus oli 2025. aastal ELi üks suurimaid (67,9 %). Selle kasv võrreldes 2024.

aasta 62,7 %ga oli 5,3 protsendipunkti, kusjuures peamine taastuvelektri allikas on tuuleenergia (vt 9. lisa).

Olulised reformid energiataristu

loamenetluse parandamiseks võimaldasid

teha edusamme taastuvate energiaallikate kasutuselevõtul. 2024. aastal ühtlustati Eesti taaste- ja vastupidavuskava seadusandlike muudatustega tuuleprojektide planeerimist, neile lubade andmist ja nende keskkonnamõju hindamist ning selle tulemusel määrati kindlaks prioriteetsed arenduspiirkonnad koguvõimsusega 1 000 MW. Lisaks on Eesti viinud oma loamenetlused kooskõlla Euroopa Komisjoni soovitusega lubade andmise kohta, võttes kasutusele ühtse kontaktpunkti arendajatele ja varajased avalikud konsultatsioonid ning muutes loamenetluste täielikult digitaalseks. Tõhususe ja läbipaistvuse suurendamiseks on kehtestatud ka keskkonnamõju hindamise selged tähtajad ja lubade andmise üldised tähtajad. Eesti-Läti avamere Elwindi projekti, mille kavandatud võimsus on 700–1 000 MW, peetakse endiselt esmatähtsaks.

Kuigi Eesti laiendab oma energiaalast

paindlikkust energiasalvestuslahenduste,

tarbimiskaja mehhanismide ja turu integreerimise abil, on hinnatõus endiselt

probleem. Eesti eesmärk tema 2035. aasta energiamajanduse arengukavas on kõrvaldada elektri salvestamise arengu turu- ja regulatiivsed tõkked, valmistades samal ajal ette pikaajalisi finantstagatismehhanisme. 2024. aasta seisuga oli käimas 734 MW akupõhise salvestustaristu ühendamine võrguga (vt 9. lisa). Siiski on võimalik võtta täiendavaid meetmeid, et edendada investeeringuid taastuvatesse energiaallikatesse ja toetada paindlikkustehnoloogiaid, nagu akusalvestussüsteemid. Need meetmed

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tagada ka võrgu stabiilsuse ja taastuvenergia integreerimise ning tegelevad hinnatõusude probleemiga, mis on Eestis jätkuvalt aktuaalne. Suur hinnatõus toimub nõudluse tipptundidel ja talvel, kui suur pakkumise ja nõudluse vahe katmiseks võetakse lühikestest perioodideks kasutusele põlevkiviküttel töötavad jõujaamad. Seetõttu olid hinnavahed Eestis 2025. aastal keskmiselt 159 eurot/MWh, mis on märkimisväärselt üle ELi keskmise (121 eurot/MWh) (9. lisa).

2025. aastal esitati Eestile riigipõhine

soovitus vähendada üldist sõltuvust

fossiilkütustest ja põlevkivi osakaalu

energiaallikate jaotuses. Fossiilkütustest

loobumine võib parandada ka ressursitootlikkust (vt 2. jagu). Taaste- ja vastupidavuskava raames võttis valitsus 2025. aasta detsembris vastu riikliku energia arengukava, milles on sätestatud selge tähtaeg põlevkivist elektri tootmise järkjärguliseks lõpetamiseks 2035. aastaks (strateegilise reservi erandiga). Selle mõju peaks aga hakkama avalduma alles alates 2026. aastast ja praegu on põlevkivil energiaallikate jaotuses endiselt märkimisväärne osa. Põlevkivipõhine energiatootmine on koondunud idapoolsetele piirialadele (Kirde-Eestisse) ja selle järkjärguline kaotamine suurendab piirkonna struktuurseid probleeme. Õiglase ülemineku territoriaalse kavaga toetatakse nendes piirkondades majanduse mitmekesistamist ja ümberõpet.

Eesti maa- ja rannikupiirkonnad pakuvad

võimalusi taastuvenergia tootmiseks, kui

riik loobub põlevkivipõhisest tootmisest.

Elektrivõrgu usaldusväärsusega seotud probleemid on eriti teravad maa- ja rannikupiirkondades. Päikese- ja tuuleenergia potentsiaal koos võrkude tugevdamisega, eelkõige maa-, ranniku- ja hõredalt asustatud piirkondades, võiks seega lisaks energiajulgeoleku suurendamisele toetada ka regionaalarengut.

Energiajulgeoleku tugevdamine võrkude sidumise ja võrgutaristu vastupidavuse abil

Eesti on hästi ühendatud, kuid võrgutaristu vastupidavuse

parandamiseks on vaja täiendavaid

investeeringuid. 2025. aastal esitati Eestile riigipõhine soovitus suurendada energiajulgeolekut, näiteks tagades elektrivõrkude ühenduste piisava võimsuse. Eesti on saavutanud elektrivõrkude omavahelise ühendatuse taseme 89,04 %, mis ületab märkimisväärselt ELi 15 % eesmärki (vt 9. lisa). See kõrge ühendatuse tase oli oluline tegur Eesti elektrisüsteemi edukal sünkroniseerimisel ELi võrguga 2025. aasta veebruaris. Sünkroniseerimisprojekti investeerimisetapp edeneb hästi, kuigi Estlink 1 ja Estlink 2 ajakohastamisel on esinenud viivitusi. 2026. aasta jaanuaris tagati ELi rahastus elutähtsa sünkroniseerimistaristu kaitse projektile, mida rakendavad ühiselt Leedu, Eesti, Läti ja Poola põhivõrguettevõtjad. Hiljutised rünnakud võrgutaristu ja merealuste kaablite vastu näitavad vajadust parandada võrgutaristu vastupidavust ja tagada energiaturu tõhus toimimine.

Eesti on endiselt tundlik hübriidohtude

suhtes, mis näitab piiriüleste ühenduste

tähtsust. Eesti viib ellu suuri piiriüleseid ühendusprojekte, nagu EstLink 3 (Eesti-Soome) ning Eesti-Läti „neljas ühendus“, mis mõlemad peaksid valmima 2035. aastaks. Soome ja Eesti elektrihindade erinevus ning vahejuhtumid merealuste kaablitega näitavad nende projektide tähtsust. Eesti osaleb aktiivselt ka Läänemere energiaturu ühendamise tegevuskavas, et tugevdada piirkondlikku energiakoostööd.

Edusammud energiatõhususe valdkonnas on aeglustunud

Eesti ei ole teinud energiatõhususe valdkonnas märkimisväärseid edusamme. 2025. aastal esitati Eestile riigipõhine soovitus

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parandada energiatõhusust, võttes pikaajalise renoveerimisstrateegia eesmärkide saavutamiseks uusi rahastamis- ja toetusmeetmeid. Aastatel 2019–2024 püsis Eesti lõppenergia tarbimine eluasemesektoris üldiselt muutumatuna. Kuigi hoonete arvele langeb 46,1 % riigi energiatarbimisest, ei ole Eesti oma pikaajalises renoveerimisstrateegias energiasäästu eesmärki kindlaks määranud. Kodumajapidamised on teinud vähe edusamme oma energiatarbimise vähendamisel energiatõhususe parandamise, näiteks soojustamise või küttesüsteemi ajakohastamise abil. Taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastu investeeringud energiatõhususse ei ole veel mõju avaldanud. Korterelamute ja eramajade renoveerimise kulud on hinnanguliselt 15 miljardit eurot (vt 16. lisa).Eesti tugineb jätkuvalt peamiselt energiatõhususe toetuspõhistele rahastamiskavadele ja rahastamisvahendite kasutamine on endiselt piiratud. Rahastamisvahendite (nt laenutagatised äärepoolsetele piirkondadele) kättesaadavuse suurendamine võib edendada eluasemete süsinikuheite vähendamist ja taskukohasust, vähendades renoveeritud eluruumide küttekulusid (vt 1. jagu). Lisaks sellele, et luuakse selge tee vähese süsinikuheitega ja energiatõhusa hoonefondi suunas, võib parem riiklik planeerimine hoonete renoveerimisel aidata rahuldada ka kliimamuutustega kohanemise ja üldise kriisikerksuse suurendamise vajadust.

Transpordi süsinikuheite vähendamine ja Rail Baltica lõpuleviimine

Transpordisektori heitkogused on

jätkuvalt suured. Maanteetransport

domineerib endiselt ning eraautode

kasutamine suureneb. 2025.aasta riigipõhistes soovitustes toodi esile probleemid, mis on seotud kestliku ja vähem saastava transpordi kättesaadavuse ja kasutamisega.Eesti on teinud mõningaid edusamme investeeringutega, eelkõige taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastu ning ühtekuuluvuspoliitika fondide kaudu, muu

hulgas raudtee elektrifitseerimine, uus trammiliin Tallinnas, Rail Baltica viaduktid ja Ülemiste terminali ehitamine. Taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastu aitas kaasa ka liikuvuse uuele strateegilisele lähenemisviisile – vastu võeti uus transpordi ja liikuvuse arengukava ning Tallinnas ja selle ümbruses võeti kasutusele ühine transpordisüsteem. Heide on siiski endiselt suur, kuna 48 % Eesti jõupingutuste jagamisega seotud heitest pärines 2024. aastal maanteetranspordist ja see on 2005. aasta tasemega võrreldes suurenenud 27 %. Elektrisõidukite osa sõidukipargis on endiselt väike. Lisaks sellele, et Eestis on viimase kümne aasta jooksul autode arv märkimisväärselt kasvanud ning 2024 oli Eestis 1 000 elaniku kohta üle 635 auto (mis ületab ELi keskmist), on Eestis ka Euroopa vanim autopark(17). Laadimistaristu aga laieneb ja 2025. aastal oli peaaegu 2 000 üldkasutatavat laadimispunkti. 2025. aastal kehtestatud mootorsõidukimaksuga nähakse ette väiksem maks täiselektrisõidukitele, kuid selle üldine mõju autopargi uuendamisele alles selgub.

Täiendavaid jõupingutusi on vaja teha 2021.–2035. aasta transpordi ja liikuvuse

arengukava eesmärkide saavutamiseks, muu hulgas ühistranspordi kasutamise suurendamiseks ja liiklusohutuse parandamiseks. Integreeritud lahendused üldiselt puuduvad ja neid on vaja arendada, et parandada mitmeliigilisi ühendusi ja reisijatele osutatavaid teenuseid (vt 18. lisa). Lisaks on süsinikuheite vähendamiseks ja ühenduste parandamiseks oluline tagada piisav rahastamine Rail Baltica lõpuleviimiseks ning veelgi soodustada kestlikku transporti, mitmeliigilist transporti ja ühistranspordi integreerimist.

(17) Eurostat

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/road_eq s_carhab__custom_9275964/default/table?lang=en

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Kliimamuutustele vastupanu võime tugevdamine

Kliimamuutustega seotud kohanemist, vastupanuvõimet ja valmisolekut saaks

tugevdada suuremate investeeringute ja

süsteemse lähenemisviisiga kliimakindluse tagamisele kõigis

sektorites. Kliimamuutustega kohanemise meetmetesse investeerimisevajadus on Eestis kuni 2050. aastani hinnanguliselt 650 miljonit eurot aastas (1,3 % SKPst), kusjuures kõige kasulikumad on investeeringud ökosüsteemide taastamisse (ligikaudu 48 % kogusummast) ning taristu moderniseerimisse ja tugevdamisse (ligikaudu 40 % kogusummast)(18). Mis puudutab ökosüsteemide taastamist, siis looduspõhiste lahenduste ulatuslikum kasutuselevõtt aitaks kaasa nii maakasutuse, maakasutuse muutuse ja metsanduse (LULUCF) eesmärkide saavutamisele kui ka kliimamuutustele vastupanu võime suurendamisele. 2014. aastal asendus süsinikdioksiidi netoeemaldamine netoheitega, mis on sellest ajast alates püsinud üle nulli. Märgalade taastamine ja parem metsa majandamine aitab suurendada vastupanuvõimet kliimamuutustele ja pöörata tagasi atmosfäärist süsinikdioksiidi netosidumise vähenemise. Täiendavad investeeringud heas seisundis metsadesse ja muldadesse kui looduslikesse süsiniku talletajatesse aitavad samuti kaasa konkurentsivõimelisele biomajandusele.

Kliimamuutustega kohanemise tugevdamisel esineb endiselt probleeme,

mis on tingitud i) transporditaristu

suurest haavatavusest, ii) kliimaga

seotud riskide vähesest kindlustuskattest ja iii) lünkadest kohanemise juhtimise

raamistikus. Transporditaristu suur

haavatavus kajastub TEN-T võrgu transpordi

(18) Euroopa Komisjon, 2026, „Assessment of adaptation

investment needs“ (Kohanemisinvesteeringute vajaduste hindamine), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/- /publication/d2039eac-f742-11f0-b9bc- 01aa75ed71a1/language-en%20 (tabel%208).

haavatavuse indeksis, mille näitaja on Eesti puhul üks ELi suuremaid. Kliimaga seotud kahjude kindlustuskate on endiselt piiratud: aastatel 1980–2024 kaeti Eestis ainult 15 % ilmastiku ja kliimaga seotud äärmuslikest sündmustest põhjustatud majanduslikust kahjust (EL 27: 19 %). Kuigi Eestil on alates 2017. aastast olemas riiklik kliimamuutustega kohanemise strateegia ja tegevuskava ning ta püüab oma juhtimisraamistikku veelgi tugevdada, on edusamme takistanud viivitused peamiste õigusaktide vastuvõtmisel. Eelkõige on edasi lükkunud kliimakindla majanduse seaduse vastuvõtmine, mis peaks looma õigusliku aluse edasiseks valdkondlikuks integratsiooniks. Samal ajal on väljatöötamisel riiklik kliimamuutustega kohanemise tegevuskava. Kliimakindluse tagamise süstemaatiline kohaldamine kõigis sektorites ja olulises taristus tugevdaks valmisolekut ja vastupidavust.

OSKUSED, KVALITEETSED TÖÖKOHAD JA SOTSIAALNE ÕIGLUS

18

2025. aastal esitati Eestile riigipõhised

soovitused i) parandada oskuste

pakkumist, ii) vähendada haridussüsteemist varakult lahkumist, iii)

meelitada paremini ligi ja hoida talente

ning iv) tugevdada sotsiaalkaitset, muu

hulgas parandada hüvitiste süsteemi ning

tagada tervishoiu ja pikaajalise hoolduse

kestlik rahastamine. Nende probleemide lahendamiseks on rakendatud mitmeid meetmeid, kuid haridussüsteemist varakult lahkunud noorte osakaal on endiselt suur ning oskustega seotud poliitika haarde suurendamiseks on vaja teha täiendavaid jõupingutusi. Endiselt on ruumi haavatavate rühmade sotsiaalkaitse tugevdamiseks ning tervishoiu ja pikaajalise hoolduse kättesaadavuse ja taskukohasuse parandamiseks.

Hoolimata Eesti edusammudest haridus-

ja koolitus- ning sotsiaalkaitsesüsteemide reformimisel,

seisab Eesti endiselt silmitsi oluliste

probleemidega. Oskuste poliitika ja

koolitusvõimaluste laiendamine nii, et need jõuaksid nendeni, kes ei ole veel täielikult hõlmatud, on endiselt ebapiisav. Hiljutiste haridusreformide ja -meetmete hindamine on oluline, et analüüsida nende tõhusust ja edaspidi poliitikat kohandada. Piirkondlikud erinevused haridus- ja koolitusvõimalustes ning haridustasemes on endiselt märkimisväärsed ja noortel on jätkuvalt probleeme töö leidmise või koolitustele pääsemisega. Samuti püsib Eestis jätkuvalt suhteliselt suur vaesusrisk selliste haavatavate rühmade seas nagu eakad, puuetega inimesed ja üksikvanemaga leibkonnad. Eelkõige on endiselt probleeme sotsiaalkaitse piisavuse ja katvusega ning tervishoiu ja pikaajalise hoolduse taskukohasuse ja kättesaadavusega. Tõhusate poliitikameetmeteta võivad need probleemid süveneda.

Tööturu tulevaste vajaduste rahuldamiseks tuleb suurendada oskuste pakkumist

Nagu on rõhutatud 2025. aasta

riigipõhistes soovitustes, on tootlikkuse

kasvuks vaja parandada hariduse vastavust tööturu vajadustele. Nagu on selgitatud 2. jaos, on nõudlus erioskuste järele endiselt suur, eriti mõnes sektoris, nagu IKT, tervishoid ja haridus, samal ajal kui esilekerkivates rohelistes ja tehnilistes valdkondades valitseb inseneride ja tehniliste spetsialistide nappus. Kuigi kolmanda taseme hariduses IKT erialal õppima asujate arv on suurenenud, asub inseneriteadust õppima endiselt vähe inimesi ning koolist väljalangemise määr kõrghariduse esimese astme õppes ja doktoriõppes on kõrge. Matemaatika, teaduse, tehnoloogia ja inseneeria (MATI) valdkonna spetsialistide arvu suurendamiseks valmistab Eesti selles valdkonnas ette uut MATIK-strateegiat(19), mis hõlmab kõiki haridustasemeid (vt 13. lisa). Roheoskuste programmiga tugevdatakse roheoskuste pakkumist(20). Tehisintellekti üha suurem kasutuselevõtt majanduses kajastub ka hariduspoliitikas.

Käimasolev kutsehariduse reform peaks

parandama oskuste pakkumist. Kutsehariduse omandanute tööhõive parandamiseks võttis Eesti 2025. aastal kasutusele rakenduslikud kutsehariduse programmid suure nõudlusega valdkondades, nagu IKT, inseneriteadus, ehitus ja tervishoid. Selleks et reform oleks edukas, on vaja

(19) Matemaatika, teadus, tehnoloogia, inseneeria ja kunst.

(20) Roheoskused – uue aja oskused | Haridus- ja Noorteamet.

19

tööandjate aktiivset osalemist ning kutseharidusasutuste piisavat ettevalmistust ja rahastamist, et võtta vastu õpiraskustega õpilasi. 2026. aastal jõustuv kutsekvalifikatsioonide reform võiks samuti aidata tööturu vajadusi rahuldada, integreerides kvalifikatsioonide ja oskuste süsteemid paremini OSKA prognoosiraamistikku.

Oskuste nappuse leevendamiseks on Eesti

võtnud kooskõlas 2025. aasta riigipõhise

soovitusega meetmeid, et meelitada ligi

kõrgelt kvalifitseeritud spetsialiste

välismaalt. Eelkõige võeti 2025. aastal

kasutusele ELi sinise kaardi süsteem ja sihipärased viisavõimalused, nagu idufirmade viisa ja diginomaadi viisa. Täiendavad meetmed välistalentide värbamise ja hoidmise hõlbustamiseks on kavandatud välismaalaste seaduse muudatustega ning algatuste „Tööta Eestis“ ja „Õpi Eestis“ integreerimisega tulevase 2026.–2029. aasta talendistrateegia raames.

Haridussüsteemist varakult lahkumine

piirab jätkuvalt haridustaset, nagu on

märgitud 2025. aasta riigipõhises

soovituses. Igal kümnendal noorel puudub keskharidus ning see piirab oskustööliste arvu. Eesti on astunud selle probleemi lahendamiseks olulisi samme, pikendades alates 2025. aastast kohustuslikku haridust 18. eluaastani ja käivitades põhjaliku kutseharidusreformi. Samal ajal peavad koolid toime tulema üha suuremate erinevustega õpilaste vajadustes, muu hulgas on suurenemas täiendavat õpituge vajavate õpilaste arv. Õpetajakoolitusel ja tugiteenistustel on olnud raske selle suundumusega sammu pidada (vt 13. lisa). Õpetajate erikoolituse tugevdamine ja spetsialiseeritud tugiteenuste kättesaadavuse laiendamine aitaks parandada õpilaste õpitulemusi ja suurendada keskhariduse omandamise määra.

Üha suuremad raskused õpetajaskonna

säilitamisel ohustavad hariduse

kvaliteeti. Eesti õpetajad on ELis ühed

vanemad. Ligikaudu pooled uutest õpetajatest ei jää sellele kutsealale rohkem kui viieks aastaks. Seetõttu suureneb nende õpetajate

osakaal, kes ei ole täielikult kvalifitseeritud (2025. aastal 26 %) ja on palgatud nappuse kompenseerimiseks. See vähendab hariduskulutuste tõhusust. Õpetajate nappus on eriti suur matemaatika, teaduse, tehnoloogia ja inseneeria (MATI) õppeainetes, eesti keeles teise keelena ning maakoolides (vt 13. lisa). Sellised algatused nagu uus õpetajate karjäärimudel, Õpetajate Akadeemia mikrokvalifikatsioonid ja õpetajate põhikoolituse kohtade laiendamine on paljutõotavad meetmed. Õpetajate nappus võib ilma täiendavate poliitiliste jõupingutuste ja piisava rahastamiseta siiski veelgi suureneda. Täiendavat toetust pakuks MATI valdkonna õpetajatele suunatud stiimulite rakendamine, õpetajate tegevuskava pikendamine pärast 2026. aastat ja keskendumine töötajate hoidmisele.

Noorte töötus ning nende noorte

osakaalu suurenemine, kes ei tööta, ei õpi ega osale koolitusel (NEET-noored),

osutab püsivatele probleemidele noorte

üleminekul haridussüsteemist tööturule.

Tööturule sisenevatel noortel on üha raskem tööd leida ning noorte töötus on üle ELi keskmise (15 %). Samal ajal suurenes nende noorte osakaal, kes ei tööta, ei õpi ega

osale koolitusel, 2025. aastal 11,2 %ni, mis vastab ELi keskmisele tasemele ja annab märku kasvavast noorte tööturult eemalejäämise ohust. Piiratud kvalifikatsiooni või töökogemusega noored võivad eriti kergesti jääda töötuks või sattuda ebakindlasse töösuhtesse (vt 11. lisa). Neid suundumusi süvendavad piiratud töövõimalused, eelkõige maapiirkondades, ning lüngad selliste toetuste tulemuslikkuses ja katvuses, mis peaksid aitama noortel koolist tööellu üle minna. Eesti on nende probleemide lahendamiseks teinud mitu reformi, sealhulgas taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastust rahastatavad algatused. Noorte tööhõiveväljavaateid võib aidata parandada haridusest tööellu siirdumise integreeritud võimaluste tugevdamine, ennetus- ja teavitusmeetmete laiendamine ning kiiresti töö leidmist või koolitusele saamist toetavate algatuste edasiarendamine.

Sihipärane täiskasvanuharidus võib aidata vähendada oskuste erinevusi

20

vanuse, piirkonna ja sotsiaal- majandusliku tausta lõikes. Kuigi täiskasvanute üldised oskused on Eestis endiselt üle OECD keskmise, väheneb oskuste tase vanusega märkimisväärselt, kusjuures kõige paremad tulemused on noorematel täiskasvanutel ja kõige nõrgemad pensionieale lähenevatel isikutel. Täiskasvanute oskuste erinevused püsivad piirkondade (nt Ida- Virumaal on kirja- ja arvutusoskuse tulemused oluliselt nõrgemad) ja sotsiaal-majandusliku tausta lõikes (vt 13. lisa). Neid lünki võiks vähendada väheste oskustega ja eakatele täiskasvanutele suunatud oskuste täiendamise ja ümberõppe programmide laiendamine, eelkõige mahajäänud piirkondades. Digioskuste algtaseme poolest ületab Eesti veidi ELi keskmist, kuid suur osa töötajatest teatab endiselt ebapiisavatest arvuti- ja tarkvaraoskustest (Eesti 12 % vs OECD 4 %) ning nõudlus tehisintellekti- ja IKT-oskuste järele suureneb ilmselt veelgi. Täiskasvanute oskuste taset võiks parandada ka digi- ja tehisintellektioskuste parem pakkumine ning maapiirkondade parem juurdepääs internetipõhisele õppetaristule. Tulevased täiskasvanuhariduse ja ümberõppe pakkumised peaksid olema paremini suunatud valdkondadele, mida OSKA uuringute kohaselt kõige rohkem vajatakse.

Tööturutulemusi võiks parandada

sotsiaaldialoogi

tõhustamine. Kollektiivläbirääkimistega hõlmatuse ja ametiühingutesse kuulumise määr on endiselt ühed ELi madalamad (vt 11. lisa). Palgavaesuse määr ja madalapalgaliste osakaal on ühed ELi kõrgemad ning ka sooline palgalõhe on suur. Sotsiaalpartnerite kaasamine tööturureformidesse, palgakujundusse ja poliitika kujundamisse on endiselt piiratud, mis on osalt tingitud vähesest institutsioonilisest suutlikkusest. Tööturutulemusi võiks aidata parandada kolmepoolsete kohtumiste jätkamine, kollektiivläbirääkimiste edendamise 2025. aasta tegevuskava rakendamine ja sotsiaalpartnerite suurem kaasamine.

Sotsiaalkaitse vajab endiselt tugevdamist

Väikesed sotsiaalkulutused ja lüngad sotsiaalkaitsega kaetuses suurendavad

haavatavate rühmade vaesusriski. 2025.

aastal sai Eesti riigipõhise soovituse vähendada vaesusriski, tugevdades eakate, ühe inimesega leibkondade, puuetega inimeste ja töötute sotsiaalkaitset. Eesti on astunud samme nende probleemide lahendamiseks. Töötuskindlustussüsteemi kavandatud reformide eesmärk on parandada kaetust, sealhulgas piiratud tööstaažiga töötajate ja puuetega inimeste puhul. Esialgne analüüs näitab, et enamik füüsilisest isikust ettevõtjaid on sotsiaalkaitsega kaetud lisatöökoha kaudu, kuid tegelikus kaetuses esineb endiselt lünki. Toimetulekutoetus on üldiselt kasutatavate piisavuse võrdlusalustega võrreldes endiselt suhteliselt väike, sotsiaaltoetuste kogukulud aga jäävad alla ELi keskmise, mis piirab sotsiaalsiirete vaesust vähendavat mõju (vt 12. lisa). Palgavaesus on samuti suhteliselt suur, hoolimata olukorra mõningasest järkjärgulisest paranemisest. Puuetega inimesi, ka tööga hõivatuid, ähvardab oluliselt suurem vaesusrisk kui elanikkonda üldiselt, mis on osalt tingitud suhteliselt väikestest invaliidsushüvitistest ja sotsiaalsiirete piiratud tõhususest. Vaesus ja eluasemekulude surve ohustab eriti ka üksikvanemaga leibkondi. Eluasemete kallidus suurendab vaesusriski veelgi, eriti üürnike seas, sotsiaaleluruumide pakkumine on aga endiselt väga piiratud. See osutab struktuursetele lõhedele (vt 16. lisa). Toimetulekutoetuse süsteemi reformide eesmärk on parandada toimetulekutoetuste piisavust ja tõhusust, kuid kuna need reformid on alles varases etapis, ei ole nende mõju veel näha. Hüvitiste piisavuse suurendamine ja sotsiaalkaitse kättesaadavuse laiendamine võiks parandada süsteemi suutlikkust vähendada vaesusriski haavatavate rühmade seas.

Pensionide ebapiisavus suurendab vananevas elanikkonnas eakate vaesuse

ohtu. Hiljutistest reformidest hoolimata on pensionide piisavus Eestis endiselt probleem, kusjuures eakate vaesusrisk on jätkuvalt üks

21

suuremaid ELis, nagu on rõhutatud ka 2025. aasta riigipõhistes soovitustes. Kuigi üldine asendusmäär on viimastel aastatel paranenud, jääb see alla ELi keskmise ja näitab suhteliselt madalat pensionitaset (vt 12. lisa). Riskid on eriti suured üksi elavate naiste ja eakate puhul, kusjuures viimaste puhul on vaesuse või sotsiaalse tõrjutuse oht ELi suurim. See on seotud pikema oodatava eluea, leibkondade koosseisu ning toitjakaotuspensioni piiratud katvusega. Seetõttu elavad paljud eakad naised üksi ja nende sissetulek on suhteliselt väike. Eesti on võtnud meetmeid pensionide piisavuse toetamiseks, eelkõige pensionide korrapärase indekseerimise abil, sidudes pensioniea oodatava elueaga, ning teinud algatusi, mis suurendavad pensionialast teadlikkust ja muudavad kogumispensioni skeemidesse (teine sammas) sissemaksete tegemise paindlikumaks. Täiendavad pensionisäästud on siiski suures osas vabatahtlikud. Täiendavate pensionisäästude tugevdamine ja suurem osalemine teises ja kolmandas pensionisambas võiks seega aidata toetada tulevast pensionide piisavust, piirates samal ajal pikaajalist survet riiklikule pensionisüsteemile.

Piirkondlikke sotsiaal- majanduslikke erinevusi süvendab ebavõrdne juurdepääs sotsiaalteenustele

Struktuursed tegurid, nagu Ida-Viru maakonna sõltuvus põlevkivitööstusest,

majanduse vähene mitmekesisus ja

väiksem kasutatav tulu, pärsivad

jätkuvalt äärealade sotsiaal-

majanduslikke tulemusi (vt 11. lisa). Tööturutulemused on piirkonniti väga erinevad, kusjuures maapiirkondades on töötuse määr märkimisväärselt kõrgem. Kirde-Eestis jõudis töötuse määr 2025. aastal 12,7 %ni (võrreldes 6,2–7,4 %ga teistes piirkondades), mis suurendas vaesusriski.

Juurdepääs sotsiaalteenustele on

valdade lõikes samuti erinev. Väiksemate ja vallasisese linnata valdade haldus- ja finantssuutlikkus on sageli piiratud, mis

mõjutab teenuste kättesaadavust ja kvaliteeti. Erinevused kohalike teenuste osutamises ja hindades põhjustavad ebavõrdset juurdepääsu ning kasutajate omaosaluse kindlaksmääramisel ei võeta süstemaatiliselt arvesse individuaalset majanduslikku olukorda. Ida-Viru maakond saab ELi toetust, muu hulgas õiglase ülemineku fondi kaudu, kuid vaja on täiendavaid jõupingutusi, et tugevdada tööturu võimalusi, parandada teenuste kättesaadavust ja toetada majanduse mitmekesistamist.

Tervishoiuteenuste ja pikaajalise hoolduse kättesaadavust ja taskukohasust saaks parandada

Eesti on teinud mõningaid edusamme, et viia ellu 2025. aasta riigipõhine soovitus

parandada tervishoiuteenuste ja

pikaajalise hoolduse kättesaadavust ja

taskukohasust. Eesti on taaste- ja

vastupidavusrahastu ning Euroopa Sotsiaalfond+ toel viinud ellu reforme ja teinud investeeringuid, et i) leevendada tervishoiutöötajate nappust, ii) tugevdada esmatasandi arstiabi ja haiglavõrgustikku ning iii) edendada tervishoiu- ja sotsiaalteenuste integreerimist (12. ja 15. lisa). Eestil on siiski jätkuvalt probleeme tervishoiuteenuste ja pikaajalise hoolduse kättesaadavuse ja taskukohasusega, eelkõige väljaspool peamisi linnakeskusi asuvates piirkondades ja haavatavate rühmade seas. Valitsuse ettepanek integreerida sotsiaal- ja tervishoiuteenused ning tervishoiu rahastamise laiem läbivaatamine pikaajalise jätkusuutlikkuse parandamiseks on sammud õiges suunas.

Tervishoiuteenuste ja pikaajalise

hoolduse kättesaadavust piiravad

endiselt rahalised tegurid. Avaliku sektori kulutused tervishoiule ja pikaajalisele hooldusele on tublisti alla ELi keskmise, mis toob kaasa märkimisväärsed rahuldamata vajadused ja suure omaosaluse, mis mõjutab ebaproportsionaalselt väiksema sissetulekuga rühmi. Eestis püsib märkimisväärne ebavõrdsus oodatavas elueas ja tervena

22

elatud aastate arvus, mis on tihedalt seotud hariduse, sissetuleku ja elukohaga (vt 12. lisa). Praegune sotsiaalne tervisekindlustuse mudel ei ole pikas perspektiivis rahaliselt jätkusuutlik, kuna vananemise, kasvava nõudluse ja tööturu muutuste tõttu kasvavad kulud prognooside kohaselt tuludest kiiremini.

Teenuste kättesaadavust pärsib veelgi

püsiv tööjõupuudus, eelkõige

maapiirkondades, ja seda süvendab tööjõu vananemine. Nappust võiks aidata vähendada tervishoiutöötajate rahaliste ja mitterahaliste stiimulite tugevdamine töötamiseks väljaspool peamisi linnapiirkondi, sealhulgas paremad hüvitamis-, eluasemetoetuse ja kutsealase arengu võimalused. Kuigi alates 2023. aastast rakendatud hooldereform on vähendanud hoolekandeasutustes toimuva hoolduse omaosaluskulusid, on see suurendanud ka nõudlust hooldekodude kohtade järele ja süvendanud töötajate nappust, tugevdamata samal ajal piisavalt koduhooldust (vt 12. ja 15. lisa). Väga tähtis on jätkata reformide elluviimist, et i) tervishoiu- ja sotsiaalteenused paremini integreerida, ii) seada esikohale ennetamine, iii) tagada kestlik rahastamine, iv) tegeleda tööjõupuudusega ning v) vähendada kättesaadavuse ja taskukohasuse piirkondlikke erinevusi.

PEAMISED JÄRELDUSED

23

Olemasolevates riigipõhistes soovitustes

käsitletud valdkondades oleks Eestil kasu

järgmisest.

• Majanduskasvu vähem kahjustavatest

allikatest saadava maksutulu ja

kulutuste tõhususe suurendamine ning kulutuste suunamine prioriteetsetesse valdkondadesse, nagu tervishoid, sotsiaalpoliitika ja kaitse, tagades samal ajal riigi rahanduse jätkusuutlikkuse.

• Rahastamisvõimaluste parandamine,

eelkõige väikeettevõtjate ja väljaspool peamisi linnapiirkondi asuvate ettevõtjate jaoks, laiendades sihtotstarbelisi toetusi ja tagatisi ning liikudes integreerituma innovatsiooni ja ettevõtluse toetamise raamistiku poole.

• Innovatsiooni ning teadus- ja

arendustegevusse tehtavate investeeringute edendamine,

kõrvaldades teadusuuringute turustamise takistused ning võimendades paremini avaliku sektori investeeringuid teadus- ja arendustegevusse ning innovatsiooni.

• Eesti piirkondade, eelkõige idapiiril

asuvate piirkondade konkurentsivõime ja vastupidavuse suurendamine, muu hulgas toetades üleminekut uutele ressursitõhusatele tehnoloogiatele.

• Üldise fossiilkütustest sõltuvuse

vähendamine ja põlevkivi osakaalu kahandamine energiaallikate jaotuses, edendades taastuvenergiat ja energia salvestamist.

• Hoonete energiatõhusamaks

renoveerimise kiirendamine ja vanade hoonete, eelkõige eluhoonete kriisikindluse parandamine, võttes kasutusele uued rahastamis- ja toetusmeetmed, sealhulgas rahastamisvahendid.

• Energia- ja majandusjulgeoleku

suurendamine, investeerides muu hulgas võrgutaristu vastupidavusse ja piiriülestesse ühendustesse.

• Transpordi süsinikuheite vähendamine

ja ühenduste parandamine Rail Baltica lõpuleviimise, kestliku transpordi ja mitmeliigilise transpordi täiendava soodustamise ning ühistranspordi integreerimise teel.

• Inimkapitali arendamine, tugevdades

matemaatika, teaduse, tehnoloogia ja inseneeria (MATI) valdkonna haridust kõigil tasanditel, laiendadestäiskasvanud õppijate täiendus- ja ümberõpet ning parandades tehisintellektialaseid oskusi kogu tööjõu hulgas.

• Haridussüsteemist varakult lahkumise

vähendamine, tegeledes õpetajate nappuse probleemiga ning pakkudes toetust erivajadustega õpilastele.

• Sotsiaalkaitse tugevdamine, et

vähendada eakate, puuetega inimeste ja üksikvanemaga leibkondade vaesust, muu hulgas suurendades toetussüsteemi piisavust ja tõhusust, keskendudes haavatavatele rühmadele ning suurendades eluasemete taskukohasust ja sotsiaaleluruumide kättesaadavust.

• Tervishoiuteenuste ja pikaajalise

hoolduse kättesaadavuse ja taskukohasuse parandamine, et vähendada rahuldamata vajadusi ja omaosalust, reformides tervishoiu ja pikaajalise hoolduse rahastamist, tegeledes tööjõupuuduse probleemiga, et vähendada geograafilisi erinevusi, ning investeerides, muu hulgas integreeritud hooldusmudelitesse ja ennetustegevusse.

24

Muudes valdkondades saaks Eesti kasu järgmisest.

• Noorte töötuse vähendamine,

tugevdades aktiivset tööturupoliitikat nende noorte suhtes, kes ei tööta, ei õpi ega osale koolitusel, ning parandades üleminekut hariduse omandamiselt tööellu, tugevdades samal ajal sotsiaaldialoogi.

LISAD

LISADE LOETELU

27

A1. Riigipõhiste soovituste rakendamine 30

Eelarve 34

A2. Eelarvesuundumused ja võla jätkusuutlikkus 33

A3. Maksustamine 38

Tootlikkus 42

A4. Ettevõtlusinnovatsioon 42

A6. Hoiused, investeeringud ja juurdepääs rahastusele 56

A7. Tõhus institutsiooniline raamistik 62

Kestlikkus 67

A8. Tööstuse süsinikuheite vähendamine, ringlus ja kliimamuutuste leevendamine 67

A9. Taskukohasele energiale üleminek 74

A10. Kliimamuutustega kohanemine, nendeks valmisolek ja keskkond 80

Õiglus 87

A11. Tööturg 87

A12. Sotsiaalteenused 91

A13. Haridus ja oskused 96

A14. Sotsiaalvaldkonna tulemustabel 101

A15. Tervis ja tervishoiusüsteemid 102

A16. Eluase 107

Horisontaalsed eesmärgid 112

A17. Kestliku arengu eesmärgid 112

A18. Konkurentsivõimelised piirkonnad 115

A19. Transport 122

TABELITE LOETELU

A1.1. Riigipõhiste soovituste rakendamine ja komisjoni hinnang 30 A2.1. Täiendavad pensioniskeemid – arenguruumi on 36 A2.2. Elanikkonna vananemisega seotud kulude prognoositav muutus aastatel 2025-2040 ja 2025-2070 36 A2.3. Eelarvejuhtimise andmebaasi näitajad ja avaliku sektori raamatupidamisarvestuse küpsus 37 A3.1. Maksustamisnäitajad 39 A4.1. Peamised innovatsiooninäitajad 47 A5.1. Ühtne turg ja tööstus 55

28

A6.1. Hoiuste ja investeeringute liidu kokkuvõtlik diagnostika 56 A6.2. Finantssektori näitajad 61 A7.1. Eesti. Valitud näitajad esmaste õigusaktide parema õigusloome tavade kohta 63 A7.2. Digikümnendi peamised tulemusnäitajad: digitaalsete avalike teenuste kättesaadavus 64 A8.1. Peamised puhta tööstuse ja kliimamuutuste leevendamise näitajad: Eesti 72 A10.1. Peamised kliimamuutustega kohanemise näitajad 85 A14.1. Sotsiaalvaldkonna tulemustabel - Eesti 101 A15.1. Peamised tervisenäitajad 103 A18.1. Põhilised arengusuundumused, probleemid ja ressursside koondumine 116 A18.2. Eesti piirkondlikud põhinäitajad (NUTS 3 tasandil) 118 A18.3. Peamised sotsiaal-demograafilised näitajad linnastumise astme järgi Eestis 2024. aastal 120

JOONISTE LOETELU

A2.1. Avaliku sektori investeeringute koosseis 34 A2.2. Esmaste kulutuste areng ja koosseis 35 A3.1. Maksutulu majandusfunktsioonide lõikes 2024. aastal, Eesti (välisring) ja EL 27 (sisering) 38 A3.2. Esimese ja teise palgasaaja maksukiil, % kogu tööjõukulust, 2025 40 A4.1. Teadus- ja arengutegevuse intensiivsus (GERD, GOVERD, BERD % SKPst) 42 A6.1. Mittefinantsettevõtete rahastamise struktuur 57 A6.2. Kapitaliturud ja finantsvahendajad 58 A6.3. Kodumajapidamiste finantsvarade koosseis 58 A7.1. Usaldus kohtusüsteemi, piirkondlike/kohalike omavalitsuste ja valitsuse vastu 62 A7.2. Kõige aeganõudvamad teenuse osutamise aspektid 63 A8.1. Kasvuhoonegaaside heide jõupingutuste jagamise sektorites, 2005, 2023, ja 2024 68 A9.1. Kodutarbijate ja mitte-kodutarbijate elektri- ja gaasihinnad, 2025. aasta esimene pool 74 A9.2. Vähese CO2 heitega elektritootmine vs elektri hulgimüügihinnad, 2025 75 A9.3. Eesti ülesseatud taastuvenergiavõimsus ja elektrienergiaallikate jaotus 77 A11.1. Tööturu põhinäitajad 87 A11.2. Noorte (15-24aastased) tööturutulemused 88 A12.1. Suhtelise vaesuse ja sotsiaalse tõrjutuse riski määr vanuserühmade kaupa 91 A13.1. MATI-eriala üliõpilaste arvu muutumine Eestis aastatel 2015-2023 100 A15.1. Ennetatav suremus 102 A15.2. Omaosaluse osakaal tervishoiukuludes teenuseliikide kaupa 2023. aastal 104 A16.1. Eluaseme taskukohasuse valitud näitajad 108 A16.2. Eluasemehinnad, üürid ning hinna ja sissetuleku suhe Eestis ja EL 27s alates 2005. aastast 108 A16.3. Eluaseme pakkumise näitajad Eestis alates 2005. aastast 109 A17.1. Eesti edusammud kestliku arengu eesmärkide saavutamisel 112 A18.1. Tööjõu tootlikkuse kasv (2014-2024) ja tööjõu tootlikkus töötatud tunni kohta (2024) NUTS 3 tasandil 115 A19.1. Surmaga lõppenud liiklusõnnetused miljoni elaniku kohta Eestis 2024. aastal 124

KAARTIDE LOETELU

A18.1. SKP inimese kohta, võrreldes ELi keskmisega (NUTS 2). 115 A18.2. Rahvastiku kasv 2015-2024 (keskmine aastane muutus) 117 A19.1. TEN-T piiriülesed ja prioriteetsed riiklikud lõigud Eestis. 123 A19.2. Eesti liiklusohutuskaart 124

1. LISA. RIIGIPÕHISTE SOOVITUSTE RAKENDAMINE

29

Tabel A1.1. Riigipõhiste soovituste rakendamine ja komisjoni hinnang

(Jätkub järgmisel leheküljel)

Estonia faces challenges in a wide range of policy areas, as identified in the country-specific recommendations (CSRs). Estonia was recommended, among other things, to boost defence spending, expand the tax base, prioritise research funding and access to finance for SMEs, to encourage investment into venture capital, improve energy efficiency, invest in renewables and energy storage, strengthen energy security and promote bio-based innovation, expand sustainable transport, enhance productivity and skills including green transition skills, and to reduce poverty by strengthening social protection whilst ensuring fiscal sustainability.

The Commission has assessed the degree of implementation of the 2025 CSRs considering the policy action taken by Estonia to date*. To do so, the Commission has taken into account the information provided by Estonia in its Annual Progress Report as well as other information sources. This annex provides summary information on the policy actions taken or planned by Estonia for each CSR. More detailed information on these actions is included in the relevant chapters and other annexes of the report.

*CSR 2 is not assessed in CeSaR. RRP implementation is monitored through the assessment of RRP payment requests and analysis of the bi-annual reporting on the achievement of the milestones and targets, to be reflected in the country reports. Progress with the cohesion policy is monitored in the context of the Cohesion Policy of the European Union.

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or

implemented By 30 April 2026

Preparatory steps/ credibly

announced measures By 30 April 2026

Assessm. of

progress

1.1 Reinforce overall defence and security spending and readiness while ensuring debt sustainability in line with the European Council conclusions of 6 March 2025.

Total general government defence expenditure in 2026 is projected at 5.0% of GDP, corresponding to an increase of 0.9 ppt. compared to 2024.

Total general government defence expenditure in 2027 is projected at 5.4% of GDP, corresponding to an increase of 1.2 ppt. compared to 2024.

Substantial progress

1.2. In line with the requirements of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact, limit the growth in net expenditure in 2025 and 2026 to a rate consistent with putting the general government debt on a plausibly downward trajectory over the medium term and maintaining the general government deficit below the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value, while making use of the allowance under the national escape clause for higher defence expenditure.

Cumulated deviation in 2025 amounted to -1.4% of GDP. Cumulated deviation in 2026 projected at 1.5% of GDP but it is fully explained by the NEC flexibility (1.5pps of GDP).

Full implementation

1.3. Broaden the tax base by tapping into taxes that are less detrimental to growth.

From 2024 to 2027, the excise duties on alcohol, tobacco and energy goods will have additional yearly increases. In January 2025 personal and corporate income tax increases (both from 20% to 22%) entered into force and certain personal income tax benefits (housing loan interest, spouse's additional basic allowance, additional basic allowance for children) were abolished. Also, the advance income tax rate for credit institutions was increased from 14% to 18%. In 2026, expected PIT and CIT rate increases, both to 24%, were abrogated. Still, the advanced income tax rate for credit institutions was raised from 14% to 18%. In January 2025 a new motor vehicle tax was introduced. In July 2025 the VAT rate was increased from 22% to 24% and the reduced VAT rates of accommodation services (9% to 13%) and press publications (5% to 9%) were increased. In 2025 an upward correction of the land tax is taking place.

Some progress

30

Tabel (järg)

(Jätkub järgmisel leheküljel)

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or

implemented By 30 April 2026

Preparatory steps/ credibly

announced measures By 30 April 2026

Assessm. of

progress

1.4. Ensure sustainable financing for spending needs including healthcare and long-term care to improve accessibility and affordability.

The RRP reform regarding the Hospital Network Development

Plan was adopted in 2025 and Strategic Framework on health workforce shortages is being implemented. Law passed in 2025 to boost the Health Insurance Fund reimbursements for essential primary care services and dental treatments and adding protections, higher benefits for vulnerable adults.

Estonia took preparatory steps to present a legislative proposal to improve the integration of health

and social services in mid-2026 aimed at more efficient use of resources and better access to care. Estonia is also planning to review health care financing to ensure its sustainability.

Some Progress

3.1. Focus investment on research and innovation by prioritising funding for applied research.

Support to business R&I has increased with direct public support around 0.15% of GDP, above the EU average. New instruments include the national applied research centre (established 2023; operational in 2025), the EUR 102 million TemTA

programme (2024–2029) supporting applied research with commercialisation requirements, performance-based funding incentives for science–business collaboration, and Structural Funds- backed measures to strengthen IP management and technology transfer.

Estonia is piloting tax-based and

voucher support for innovation. Since 2024, there is a grant covering up to 50% of the income tax paid on R&D employees’ salaries, while innovation vouchers provide small grants for SMEs to purchase services supporting innovative activities.

Some Progress

3.2. Improve access to finance, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises and companies in remote regions, to facilitate innovative investment, for example investment in the green and digital transitions, including by promoting institutional investor participation in the venture capital and equity market.

The three Baltic states have integrated their capital market infrastructure. The investment

account regime (expanded in 2025) has promoted retail participation in capital markets. Support from national and supranational institutions have fostered private equity and venture capital. Region-

specific call (EUR 13 million) in

2025. Targeted guarantee scheme

for energy sector (EUR 100 million) was launched.

In 2025, Enterprise Estonia signed a landmark agreement with the EIF (EUR 109 million) in financing to

support Estonian businesses with more favourable loans and guarantees.

Some Progress

4.1. Improve energy efficiency by taking new financing and support measures to meet the targets of the long-term renovation strategy.

RRF and Cohesion Policy support the energy efficiency investments, especially the renovation of apartment buildings and dwellings, through grants, loans, guarantees and other support instruments.

RRF investments in energy

efficient renovation account for EUR 76 million and should be completed by mid-2026.

Limited Progress

4.2. Reduce overall reliance on fossil fuels and the share of oil shale in the energy mix by investing in renewable energy and by promoting energy storage. Increase energy security, for example by ensuring the sufficient capacity of electricity interconnection.

The Government has adopted the National Energy Development

Plan 2035 in December 2025 (a measure in RRP). Estonia has successfully connected to the EU electricity system in February 2025, and its level of electricity interconnections is four times higher than the EU target of 15% by 2030.

Phase-out of direct burning of oil shale for electricity production by 2035 with an exception for out-of- market oil shale for potential strategic reserve needs in case of deviation from the reliability standard. Phase-out of the use of shale oil in domestic heat production by 2040.

Some Progress

4.3. Raise resource productivity through bio-based innovation

Estonia has a circular bioeconomy

roadmap which is being implemented and has national, cohesion policy and RRF funding allocated for bioeconomy topics and green technologies. Estonia also introduced several circular economy

Some Progress

31

Tabel (järg)

(Jätkub järgmisel leheküljel)

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or

implemented By 30 April 2026

Preparatory steps/ credibly

announced measures By 30 April 2026

Assessm. of

progress

support measures where calls were opened in late 2024 and 2025, including a resource efficiency measure for manufacturing industry which has particular importance to improve resource productivity, and which will be continued.

4.4. Take further action to increase the availability and use of sustainable and less polluting transport, including by electrification of the rail network, renewal of the stock of road vehicles, and integration of public transport systems.

RRF contributed to decarbonisation and sustainability of the Estonian transport sector. A new strategic approach to mobility was facilitated through adoption new Transport and

Mobility Development Plan and implementing a common transport system for the Tallinn capital region. RRF also contributed to connecting Rail Baltic to sea connections with the Nordic countries via the construction of the Tallinn Old Port tram line. In addition, RRF and cohesion policy invested in Rail Baltica: Ülemiste Terminal and viaducts. Estonia adopted a Motor Vehicle Tax in 2025 with lower taxation on electric and other less polluting vehicles.

Continued rail electrification (Tallinn-Tartu in 2026, Tallinn-Narva in 2027) and infrastructural improvements from cohesion policy funds and RRF. Cohesion funds are planned to support more sustainable and connected mobility in Estonia through tram and multimodal transport investments, rail electrification and upgrades, better integrated public transport, and safer walking and cycling links to services, Cohesion policy funds, through to mid-term review allocation, are planned to support dual-use transport infrastructure for military mobility and civil preparedness, including upgrades to the Tallinn–Pärnu–Ikla (Via Baltica) and Tallinn–Tartu TEN-T corridors and further investment in Rail Baltica.

Some Progress

5.1.Improve labour productivity and skills supply through action on reskilling and upskilling.

Estonia has significantly strengthened its skills policy

framework through expanded upskilling and reskilling, reinforced skills forecasting and governance, major VET reform, micro-credentials, and digital skills infrastructure. Recent measures to address skills shortages include initiatives in career services, special measures for those working in the oil shale sectors, and programs to develop skills through obtaining qualifications or employer training grants. The activation criteria for the unemployed was updated and ALMP measures revised in 2025-2026, including to improve career services.

All major reforms are ongoing Some Progress

5.2. Step up policy measures aimed at the provision and acquisition of skills and competences needed for the green transition.

RRP measures on supporting the green skills are still under way and planned to be completed by August 2026. The Green Technologies

Development Programme was set- up and is being implemented.

Some Progress

5.3. Improve labour productivity and skills supply} by reducing early school leaving, by improving the job market relevance of the education and training system, in particular by meeting the growing demand for STEM specialists, and by better attracting and retaining talent.

Estonia amended the Aliens Act in

2025, tightening employer oversight and adjusting conditions for labour migration. In education, compulsory

schooling was extended in 2024 to age 18, with 2025 measures introducing a preparatory year to prevent early school leaving. Comprehensive VET reforms are underway to improve labour market relevance, a shift to competence- based qualifications by 2026, and consolidation of the VET network into regional centres.

The new Aliens Act is expected to enter into force as of 2027. Policy discussions focus on possible

exemptions from the immigration quota for skilled workers and sectors facing labour shortages

Some Progress

32

Tabel (järg)

Allikas: Eesti aruandlus ja komisjoni hinnang

Recommendation text Main measures adopted or

implemented By 30 April 2026

Preparatory steps/ credibly

announced measures By 30 April 2026

Assessm. of

progress

5.4. Reduce the risk of poverty by strengthening social protection for older people, single-person households and people with disabilities by increasing the adequacy and efficiency of the benefit system, and for the unemployed, inter alia by extending the coverage of unemployment benefits, in particular to those in non- standard forms of work, while maintaining fiscal sustainability.

In 2025, contributions to the second pension pillar were increased from the usual 2% to 4% or 6% of gross salary. Reform was adopted so that the retirement age will be linked to life expectancy (for 2027 this has been set at 65 years and one month). Due to indexation in 2025, pensions have been increased. The tax-free income threshold for old-age pensioners was increased. From June 2025, disability benefits

increased.

Reform of unemployment allowance and unemployment insurance and extension of unemployment insurance coverage to new forms of work was adopted in 2025 and entered into force on 1 January 2026.

Estonia plans reforms in 2026: including replacing its unemployment insurance system with a single scheme and improving social protection, especially for workers with disabilities; increasing flexibility in second-pillar contributions, and shorter waiting periods to rejoin the mandatory second pillar is being under preparation to enhance pension adequacy and participation; reviewing its minimum income methodology,

Some Progress

EELARVE

2. LISA. EELARVESUUNDUMUSED JA VÕLA JÄTKUSUUTLIKKUS

33

Käesolevas lisas käsitletakse riigi rahanduse valdkonna valitud teemasid ning 2025. aasta juulis Eestile esitatud eelarve- ja struktuuripoliitika riigipõhiste soovituste täitmist. Need soovitused sisaldavad üleskutset suurendada kaitsekulutusi ja -valmidust ning rakendada samal ajal eelarvestrateegiat kooskõlas nõukogu 21. jaanuari 2025. aasta soovitusega. Samuti soovitati Eestil 2025. aastal parandada tervishoiuteenuste ja pikaajalise hoolduse kättesaadavust ja taskukohasust ning tõrjuda inflatsioonisurvet.

21. jaanuaril 2025 võttis Euroopa Liidu Nõukogu vastu soovituse, millega kiidetakse heaks Eesti riiklik keskpika perioodi eelarve- ja struktuurikava(21). Kava sisaldab eelarve kohandamist nelja aasta jooksul. 8. juulil 2025 aktiveeris nõukogu Eesti jaoks ka riikide vabastusklausli, et hõlbustada üleminekut suurematele kaitsekulutustele(22)(23).

Valitsemissektori eelarvepositsiooni, võla ja avaliku sektori kulutuste suundumused(24)

2025. aasta lõpus oli Eesti valitsemissektori

eelarve puudujääk 2,0 % SKPst ja

valitsemissektori võla suhe SKPsse

24,1 %. Komisjoni 2026. aasta kevadprognoosi

kohaselt suureneb Eesti valitsemissektori eelarve puudujääk 2026. aastal 4,5 %ni SKPst ning 2027. aastal 4,8 % SKPst, mis on tingitud nii tulude kui ka kulude poole suundumustest. Tulude poolel on väiksema tuluprognoosi peamine põhjus Eestis kavandatud üleminek ühtsele maksusüsteemile ja maksuvaba tulu künnise tõstmine 700 euroni kuus. See meede tekitab muret seoses tulude

(21) ELT C, C/2025/655, ELI: EUR-Lex – 32025H00655 – ET –

EUR-Lex.

(22) ELT C, C/2025/3964, ELI: EUR-Lex – 32025H03964 – ET – EUR-Lex.

(23) Nõukogu soovitatud netokulude maksimaalsete kasvumäärade järgimist Eesti poolt hinnatakse [COM(2026)200].

(24) Eelarvejärelevalve aluseks olevad näitajad (netokulude kasv) on esitatud eelarvestatistika tabelites (SWD(2026)200), milles esitatakse liikmesriikide eelarvepoliitika hindamiseks vajalikud taustandmed.

märkimisväärse vähenemisega, ehkki see parandab tööstiimuleid, kaotades varasema maksuküüru. Võttes arvesse kasvavat vajadust avaliku sektori kulutuste järele, peaks Eesti kaaluma oma maksusüsteemi muutmiseks tuluneutraalsemat lahendust. Kulude poolel suurendavad eelarvepuudujääki kaitsekulutused, mis kasvavad 3,8 %-lt SKPst (2025) 5,1 %ni SKPst (2026).

Suurenevad kaitsekulutused ja ELi vahendid

aitavad keskpikas perspektiivis kaasa

avaliku sektori investeeringute kasvule. Komisjoni 2026. aasta kevadprognoosi

kohaselt peaksid avaliku sektori investeeringud jõudma 2026. aastal 7,9 %ni SKPst, võrreldes 5,8 %ga 2021. aastal. See näitaja peaks 2027. aastal mõnevõrra vähenema, kuna kaitseinvesteeringute panus on suhteliselt väiksem (vt joonis A2.1).

Joonis A2.1. Avaliku sektori investeeringute

koosseis

Allikas: AMECO andmebaas

Kaitsekulutused peaksid prognooside

kohaselt lähiaastatel suurenema, kuid

sellised poliitikavaldkonnad nagu tervishoid ja sotsiaalkaitse jäävad endiselt

alarahastatuks. 2025. aastal esitati Eestile riigipõhine soovitus tagada kuluvajaduste, sealhulgas kaitse-, tervishoiu- ja pikaajalise hoolduse vajaduste kestlik rahastamine.Praeguses eelarves ja keskpika perioodi eelarvekavas on Eesti võtnud kohustuse suurendada kaitsekulutusi, kuid

34

ei näe ette piisavaid vahendeid tervishoiu ja sotsiaalkaitse struktuursete kulutuste rahastamiseks. Valitsemissektori kaitsekulutused moodustasid 2024. aastal 3,7 % SKPst ning komisjoni prognoosi kohaselt on need 2025. aastal 4,2 % SKPst ja 2026. aastal 5 % SKPst. 2023. aastal olid valitsemissektori kulutused tervishoiule ja sotsiaalkaitsele vastavalt ainult 6,4 % ja 13,5 % SKPst – 0,6 protsendipunkti ja 5,7 protsendipunkti alla ELi keskmise.

Joonis A2.2. Esmaste kulutuste areng ja koosseis

Märkused: Majandusalase kirjanduse põhjal peetakse suurema majanduskasvu mõjuga kategooriateks haridust, teadus- ja arendustegevust, tervishoidu, transporti ja kommunikatsiooni (vt Barbiero ja Cournede (2013), Gemmel et al. (2016), Lupu et al. (2018), Cepparulo ja Mourre (2020) ning OECD (2025)). Allikas: Eurostat

Kulutused, millel on suurem mõju SKP-le, on

püsinud kolme aastakümne jooksul

üldjoontes stabiilsena, kuid alates 2019.

aastast on need veidi suurenenud. See võib olla seotud taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastu mõjuga, mis võis hõlbustada kvaliteedipõhisemat eelarvestrateegiat. Prognooside kohaselt eraldatakse aastatel 2022–2026 Eesti taaste- ja vastupidavuskavast avaliku sektori investeeringutele keskmiselt 0,15 % SKPst aastas. 2024. aastal moodustas kulude struktuurist suurima osa (ligikaudu 30 %) sotsiaalkaitse, järgnesid tervishoid, haridus, majandusküsimused(25) ja üldised avalikud

(25) See osutab valitsuse tegevustele, poliitikale ja kulutustele,

mille eesmärk on reguleerida, toetada ja arendada

teenused (mis kõik moodustasid kogukuludest 10 % või rohkem). Alates 2019. aastast on avaliku sektori kulutused laenuintressidele ja kaitsele järsult kasvanud, kusjuures kaitsekulutuste suurenemine peegeldab hiljutisi julgeolekusuundumusi (vt joonis A2.2). Samal ajal on kulutused tervishoiule ning teadus- ja arendustegevusele on kasvanud tagasihoidlikumalt. Seevastu kulutused transpordile ja haridusele on vähenenud. See suundumus väärib tähelepanu, kuna transporti ja haridust peetakse üldiselt majanduskasvu soodustavateks kulukategooriateks.

Eesti maksutulu on SKPga võrreldes

suhteliselt väike ning sõltub peamiselt

tööjõu- ja tarbimismaksudest, samal ajal kui korduvad omandimaksud on alakasutatud.

2024. aastal oli Eesti maksutulude kogusumma protsendina SKPst (sh kohustuslikud sotsiaalmaksed) 34,3 %, ELi keskmine näitaja aga oli 39,5 %.2025. aasta sügisprognoosi(26) kohaselt peaks maksutulude kogusumma suurenema 2025. aastal 36,2 %ni SKPst ja langema 2026. aastal 34,6 %ni SKPst. Eesti maksude kombinatsioon põhineb suurel määral tööjõu- ja tarbimismaksudel. Samal ajal on alakasutatud korduvad omandimaksud, mida peetakse majanduskasvu vähem pärssivaks (vt 3. lisa).

Vananemisega seotud kulud

Elanikkonna vananemisega seotud kogukulud

jäävad Eestis prognooside kohaselt üldjoontes stabiilseks. Vananemisega seotud

kogukulud peaksid nii keskpikas kui ka pikas perspektiivis jääma stabiilselt tasemele, mis on märkimisväärselt alla ELi keskmise (vt tabel A2.2). Tervishoiule ja pikaajalisele hooldusele tehtavate kulutuste piiratud kasvu peaks suurelt üles

majandustegevust peamistes sektorites, sealhulgas üldist majandus- ja tööhõivepoliitikat, põllumajandust ja loodusvarasid, energeetikat, tööstust, ehitust ja muud mujal liigitamata majandustegevust. Kuigi transporti ja kommunikatsiooni ning teadus- ja arendustegevust peetakse tavaliselt selle tegevuse osaks, käsitletakse neid esitatud graafikul eraldi.

(26) Andmed AMECO andmebaasist (https://economy- finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-research-and- databases/economic-databases/ameco-database_et).

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Primary expenditure Spending with higher impact on GDP (rhs)

-1.50 -1.00 -0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50

Social protection

Education

O ther econom

ic

C ulture

Transport

Public order

G eneral

services

Environm ent

H ousing

C om

m unication

R&D

H ealth

Interest spending

D efence

35

kaaluma pensioni- ja hariduskulutuste vähenemine.

Riiklike pensionikulude osakaal SKPs peaks

prognooside kohaselt vähenema, eriti

pikemas perspektiivis. Praegusest kuni 2070. aastani peaksid riiklikud pensionikulud vähenema ligikaudu ühe protsendipunkti võrra ja jõudma ligikaudu 7 %ni SKPst, mis oleks oluliselt väiksem kui prognoositud ELi keskmine (ligikaudu 12 %).

Täiendavad pensioniskeemid võivad

suurendada pensionisüsteemi vastupidavust,

mitmekesistades pensionisissetuleku allikaid. Eestis on nende täiendavate skeemide kasutuselevõtt endiselt tagasihoidlik. 2024. aasta lõpuks moodustasid erapensionivarad ligikaudu 20 % SKPst ning sellistes skeemides osales ligikaudu 67 % tööealisest elanikkonnast(27). See langeb kokku avaliku sektori pensionikulutuste surve vähenemisega keskpikas perspektiivis ja asendusmäära prognoositava vähenemisega 3,4 protsendipunkti võrra aastatel 2025–2040 (tabelid A2.2 ja A2.3)(28).

Eestis püsivad avaliku sektori kulutused

tervishoiuteenustele ja pikaajalisele

hooldusele ELi keskmisest väiksemad ning

peaksid prognoosiperioodil üldiselt

stabiilseks jääma. Avaliku sektori kulutused tervishoiule peaksid 2025. aastal olema 5,1 % SKPst (alla ELi keskmise, mis on 6,6 %) ning need peaksid aastatel 2025–2040 suurenema 0,3

(27) Allikas: OECD Pension Market in Focus 2025. Teatatud on

vähemalt ühes täiendavas pensioniskeemis osalemise kõrgeim määr.

(28) Asendusmäär (bruto) viitab sõltuvalt andmete kättesaadavusest nii riiklikele kui ka erapensionidele. See põhineb rahvastiku vananemist käsitleva 2024. aasta aruande prognoosidel.

protsendipunkti ja aastatel 2040–2070 veel 0,3 protsendipunkti võrra. Avaliku sektori kulutused pikaajalisele hooldusele peaksid 2025. aastal olema 0,5 % SKPst (alla ELi keskmise, mis on 1,7 %) ning need peaksid aastatel 2025–2040 suurenema 0,2 protsendipunkti ja aastatel 2025– 2070 veel 0,4 protsendipunkti võrra.

Riiklik eelarveraamistik

Eesti eelarvenõukogu on suhteliselt väike

sõltumatu eelarveasutus, millel on ainult

kolmest töötajast koosnev sekretariaat ja

kitsas mandaat. Tema ülesandeks on kinnitada

valitsuse makromajanduslik prognoos ning hinnata eelarvetasakaalu nõude täitmist. Ta osaleb valitsuse eelarvekavade hindamises, kuid ei kiida neid heaks. Eelarvenõukogu on tihedalt seotud Eesti Pangaga, kellelt ta saab oma eelarve. Kõik eelarvenõukogu sekretariaadi liikmed on keskpanga töötajad. Tema poliitiline dialoog valitsuse ja parlamendiga ning teabevahetustegevus ei ole täielikult välja kujunenud. Eelarvenõukogu suhtes ei ole kunagi tehtud sõltumatut välishindamist.

Eesti kulude läbivaatamise raamistik on

suhteliselt hästi välja kujunenud, kuid seda

saaks kasutada korrapärasemalt ja

terviklikumalt. Alates 2017. aastast on mitme

Tabel A2.2.Elanikkonna vananemisega seotud kulude prognoositav muutus aastatel 2025–2040 ja 2025–

2070

Allikas: 2024. aasta aruanne rahvastiku vananemise kohta (EC/EPC).

Tabel A2.1.Täiendavad pensioniskeemid – arenguruumi on

Allikas: Euroopa Komisjon.

EE 17.4 -0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.4 ## 17.1 EE

EU 24.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 -0.3 0.9 25.2 EU

EE 17.4 -1.1 0.5 0.6 -0.5 ## 16.9 EE

EU 24.3 0.2 0.6 0.8 -0.3 1.3 25.6 EU

ageing-related

expenditure

change in 2025-2040 (pps GDP) due to: ageing-related

expenditure pensions healthcare long-term care education total

ageing-related

expenditure

change in 2025-2070 (pps GDP) due to: ageing-related

expenditure pensions healthcare long-term care education total

Assets in 2024

(% GDP)

Participation in 2024

(% working-age

population)

EE 18.0 -3.4 66.7 EE

EU 32.4 -2.8 55.9 EU

Gross replacement rate

at retirement:

(pps change 2025-2040)

36

tehnilise toe instrumendi projekti eesmärk olnud suurendada Eestis oskusteavet, et: i) parandada kulude läbivaatamise integreerimist eelarvetsüklisse ning ii) tugevdada seost kulude läbivaatamise ja tulemusjuhtimise vahel, millele aitab kaasa halduse ulatuslik digitaliseerimine. Eesti viimased kulude läbivaatamised hõlmasid kultuuri ja muuseumide rahastamist 2022. aastal ning sotsiaalministeeriumi loamenetlust ja järelevalve tõhustamise kava 2025. aastal. Kulutuste läbivaatamise vahend peaks aitama suurendada avaliku sektori kulutuste tõhusust, suunates kulude läbivaatamisest tuleneva kokkuhoiu kuluprioriteetidesse. Siiski tuleks selgemaks muuta seos kulude läbivaatamisest tuleneva kokkuhoiu ja eelarveprioriteetidele tehtavate suuremate kulutuste vahel.

Tabel A2.3.Eelarvejuhtimise andmebaasi näitajad ja avaliku sektori raamatupidamisarvestuse küpsus

(1) Riigi eelarve-eeskirjade tugevusindeks näitab riigi tasandil koondatud riiklike eelarve-eeskirjade tugevust, mis põhineb: i) õiguslikul alusel, ii) eeskirja siduvusel, iii) järelevalveasutustel, iv) korrektsioonimehhanismidel ja v) šokkidele vastupanu võimel. Keskpika perioodi eelarveraamistiku indeks näitab riikliku keskpika perioodi eelarveraamistiku tugevust, mis põhineb: i) riiklikes keskpika perioodi eelarvekavades sisalduvate eesmärkide/ülemmäärade katvusel, ii) nende eesmärkide/ülemmäärade ja aastaeelarvete seotusel, iii) riigi parlamendi kaasamisel kavade koostamisse, iv) sõltumatute eelarveasutuste kaasamisel kavade koostamisse ja v) kavade üksikasjalikkusel. Suurem punktisumma kajastab suuremat eelarve-eeskirjade ja keskpika perioodi eelarveraamistiku tugevust. Avaliku sektori raamatupidamisarvestuse punktisumma kajastab küpsusastet seoses rahvusvaheliste avaliku sektori raamatupidamise standarditega (IPSAS). Riigid, mille raamatupidamise küpsus võrrelduna IPSASega on 70 % või enam, loetakse tekkepõhist arvestust rakendavateks. Lisateabe saamiseks vt aruanne avaliku sektori raamatupidamise kohta ELis (COM(2025) 746 ja sellele lisatud komisjoni talituste töödokument SWD(2025) 396). Allikas: Eelarvejuhtimise andmebaas, Euroopa Komisjon

2024 Estonia EU Average

Country Fiscal Rule Strength Index (C-FRSI) 13.65 14.81

Medium-Term Budgetary Framework Index (MTBFI) 0.72 0.72

2025 Public accounting maturity of general government 91% 65%

3. LISA. MAKSUSTAMINE

37

Selles lisas antakse näitajatel põhinev

ülevaade Eesti maksusüsteemist. See sisaldab teavet järgmise kohta: i) maksustruktuur, ii) maksusüsteemi konkurentsivõime ja õigluse aspektid ning iii) maksude kogumine ja maksukuulekus. Maksustamise valdkonnas soovitati Eestile esitatud 2025. aasta riigipõhistes soovitustes laiendada maksubaasi, keskendudes majanduskasvu vähem kahjustavatele maksudele.

Maksukoormus on Eestis endiselt suhteliselt

väike (protsendina riigi majandusest), kuigi

see on viimasel ajal tõusnud. 2024. aastal oli

maksutulu (sh sotsiaalkindlustusmaksed) Eestis 35,2 % SKPst (vt tabel A3.1)(29). See tähendab märkimisväärset kasvu võrreldes eelmise aastaga (33,7 %), mis on osaliselt tingitud uutest maksumeetmetest. Erinevus ELi keskmisest vähenes 2023. aasta 5,3 protsendipunktilt 4,2 protsendipunktile. Eesti tugineb suurel määral tööjõu- ja tarbimismaksudele, mis moodustasid 2024. aastal vastavalt 51,5 % ja 38,5 % kogu maksutulust.

Tarbimismaksude osakaal on eriti suur ja

ületab kaugelt ELi keskmist (26,8 %).

Hiljutised maksureformid on veelgi kallutanud maksustruktuuri tarbimise suunas. Alates 2024. aasta jaanuarist tõsteti harilik käibemaksumäär 20 %-lt 22 %-le. Samuti tõsteti teatavate kaupade ja teenuste puhul vähendatud käibemaksumäära. Harilikku käibemaksumäära tõsteti 1. juulil 2025 veel kord (24 %-le). Viimane kahe protsendipunkti suurune kasv oli algselt kavandatud ajutisena, kuid peaks nüüd jääma püsivaks. Seevastu kapitalitulu on ELi keskmisega (21,8 %) võrreldes endiselt väike (10,0 %).

Hoolimata kinnisvaramaksude

majanduskasvu soodustavast potentsiaalist

saab Eesti neist endiselt väga vähe tulu. Kinnisvaramaksust saadav tulu moodustab vaid 0,3 % SKPst, mis on märkimisväärselt alla ELi keskmise (1,8 %) ja kajastab Eesti lähenemisviisi maksustada pigem maad kui omandit. Hiljutises analüüsis on juhitud tähelepanu võimalikele eelistele, mis kaasneksid sellega, kui üksnes maa maksustamisest kaugemale minnes kaalutaks võimalust kehtestada järk-järgult maks tühjalt seisvale elamukinnisvarale, et vähendada tühjalt

(29) Eurostati esialgsed andmed osutavad, et maksude suhe

SKPsse oli 2025. aastal 36,4 %.

seisvate eluasemete arvu ja leevendada survet eluasemeturul(30)

Keskkonnamaksudest saadav tulu on

seevastu üle ELi keskmise (vastavalt 2,6 %

ja 2,1 % SKPst). See on suuresti tingitud suhteliselt kõrgetest kütuseaktsiisidest, kuigi teatavad aktsiisivähendused ja -vabastused on endiselt jõus. 2025. aastal kehtestas Eesti uue mootorsõidukimaksu, et edendada puhtamat transporti. Sellega täiendatakse muid kehtivaid saaste- ja ressursimakse (st NOx-heide, prügilasse ladestamine, reovesi, plast).

Joonis A3.1. Maksutulu majandusfunktsioonide

lõikes 2024. aastal, Eesti (välisring) ja EL 27

(sisering)

Allikas: Taxation Trends Data, DG TAXUD

Hoolimata hiljutistest reformidest peaks

Eesti äriühingu tulumaksu süsteem jääma

konkurentsivõimeliseks, panustades samal

ajal rohkem avaliku sektori tuludesse. Eesti

tõstis jaotatud kasumi seadusjärgset maksumäära 2025. aastal 20 %-lt 22 %-le. Lisaks kaotati äriühingu tulumaksu vähendatud määr (14 %), mida kohaldati regulaarsete dividendide suhtes. Selline maksumäärade tõstmine toob lisatulu, kuid võib mõnevõrra vähendada Eesti maksuatraktiivsust ettevõtjate jaoks. Samal ajal jääb Eestis kehtima investeerimissõbralik lähenemisviis, mille kohaselt ei maksustata äriühingute kasumit selle teenimise ajal, vaid üksnes siis, kui kasum jaotatakse või loetakse jaotatuks. See loob ettevõtjate stiimulid kasumi reinvesteerimiseks, suurendades samal ajal väljamaksmise kulusid. Lisaks on Eestis tegelik äriühingu tulumaksu määr endiselt märkimisväärselt alla ELi keskmise (vastavalt 15,7 % ja 19,1 % 2024. aastal), mis näitab, et

(30) Vt 2025. aasta põhjalik analüüs Eesti kohta.

51.5

26.8

21.6

51.5

38.5

10.0

Taxes on labour Taxes on consumption Taxes on capital

38

äriühingute maksukoormus on suhteliselt väike. Rahvusvahelistes võrdlustes on Eesti maksusüsteemi konkurentsivõime jätkuvalt väga hea, olles maksukeerukuse indeksi (31) järgi 2024. aastal maailmas esikohal.

Eesti üksikisiku tulumaksu puhul on jätkuvalt

prioriteediks lihtsus ja tööstiimulid. Eesti üksikisiku tulumaksu süsteem, mis põhineb ühtsel määral, mida 2025. aastal suurendati 20 %-lt 22 %-le, on endiselt lihtne ja läbipaistev. Hiljutiste reformidega ühtlustati süsteemi veelgi, asendades astmelise põhimaksuvabastuse ühtse maksuvaba summaga 8 400 eurot aastas kõigi maksumaksjate puhul. Kuigi sellega kõrvaldatakse soovimatu maksuküür, võib see kaasa tuua tulude märkimisväärse vähenemise(32). Keskmise palga maksukiil(33) (2025. aastal 42,6 %) oli veidi üle ELi

(31) Vt 2024. aasta maksukeerukuse indeks.

(32) Vt Rahvusvaheline Valuutafond. Euroopa osakond „Republic of Estonia: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report"

(33) Maksukiil on tööjõu maksukoormuse näitaja, mida saab hinnata erinevatel töötasu tasemetel. See arvutatakse üksikisiku tulumaksu, töötaja sotsiaalkindlustusmaksete, tööandja sotsiaalkindlustusmaksete ja muude kohustuslike maksete summana, millest on asjakohasel juhul maha arvatud rahalised perehüvitised, väljendatuna protsendina kogu tööjõukulust (koosneb brutopalgast ja tööandja sotsiaalkindlustusmaksetest). Teisisõnu mõõdab maksukiil

keskmise (40 %) (vt tabel A3.1).. Seevastu madala sissetuleku puhul, mida peetakse eriti oluliseks tööhõive seisukohast (eelkõige 50 % keskmisest palgast), oli Eesti maksukiil (32,8 %) ELi keskmise (31,6 %) lähedal. 67 % keskmisest palgast teenivate leibkonna teise palgasaajate maksukiil oli 37,4 %, mis on võrdne ühe palgasaaja maksukiiluga ja veidi alla ELi keskmise (38,5 %; vt joonis A3.2).

Viimastel aastatel on Eesti maksu- ja

hüvitiste süsteemi üldine ümberjaotav mõju

siiski suurenenud. Maksu- ja hüvitiste süsteemist tulenev sissetulekute ebavõrdsuse vähenemine, mida mõõdetakse Gini koefitsiendiga, on viimastel aastatel kasvanud, olles 2024. aastal 7,7 protsendipunkti(34) ja seega ELi keskmise (7,8 punkti) lähedal (tabel A3.1).

töötaja töölevõtmise kogukulu ja töötaja netotöötasu vahet suhtena kogu tööjõukulusse. 2026. aasta riigiaruannetes esitatud maksukiilu andmed on arvutanud Euroopa Komisjoni Teadusuuringute Ühiskeskus ja need põhinevad EUROMODi mudelil, samas kui varasemates riigiaruannetes põhinesid need OECD maksude ja hüvitiste mudelil. Kuigi aluseks olev metoodika on väga sarnane, võivad eelduste erinevused viia nende mudelite puhul erinevate tulemusteni.

(34) Gini koefitsient mõõdab seda, mil määral erineb sissetulekute jaotus riigi sees täiesti võrdsest jaotusest. Koefitsient 0 väljendab täiuslikku võrdsust, kus kõigil on

Tabel A3.1.Maksustamisnäitajad

(1) Tulevikku suunatud tegelik maksumäär (KPMG). (2) Suurem väärtus osutab maksustamise suuremale ümberjaotavale mõjule. (*) EL 27 aritmeetiline keskmine. (**) 2024. aasta prognoositav väärtus. EL 27 osutab mediaanväärtusele. Rohkem andmeid maksutulude ja kasutatud metoodika kohta leiab Maksustamissuundumuste andmete veebilehelt. Allikas: Euroopa Komisjon, OECD, ISORA.

2019 2022 2023 2024 2025 2019 2022 2023 2024 2025

Tax structure Total taxes (including compulsory actual social contributions) (% of

GDP) 33.0 32.9 33.7 35.2 36.4 39.9 39.7 39.0 39.4

Taxes on labour (% of GDP) 16.5 17.1 17.7 18.1 20.6 20.1 19.9 20.3

of which, social security contributions (SSC, % of GDP) 11.4 11.4 12.0 12.2 13.0 12.7 12.7 13.0

Taxes on consumption (% of GDP) 13.9 13.2 13.1 13.6 11.2 10.9 10.5 10.6

of which, value added taxes (VAT, % of GDP) 8.7 9.1 9.1 9.6 7.1 7.4 7.1 7.1

Taxes on capital (% of GDP) 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.5 8.1 8.7 8.5 8.5

Personal income taxes (PIT, % of GDP) 5.4 6.3 6.2 6.5 9.6 9.4 9.3 9.6

Corporate income taxes (CIT, % of GDP) 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.1

Total property taxes (% of GDP) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8

Recurrent taxes on immovable property (% of GDP) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9

Environmental taxes (% of GDP) 3.4 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.1

Effective carbon rate in EUR per tonne of CO2 equivalents na na 73.4 na na na 84.8 na

Tax wedge at 50% of average wage (single person) (*) 32.2 32.9 31.2 31.8 32.8 32.4 31.6 31.5 31.5 31.6

Tax wedge at 100% of average wage (single person) (*) 38.8 39.8 40.4 41.1 42.6 40.1 39.7 39.9 39.9 40.0

Corporate income tax - effective average tax rates (1) (*) 15.7 15.7 15.7 17.1 20.0 19.2 19.0 19.3

Difference in Gini coefficient before and after taxes and cash social

transfers (pensions excluded from social transfers) (2) (*) 5.3 6.7 7.2 7.7 7.8 8.0 7.9 7.8

Outstanding tax arrears: total year-end tax debt (including debt

considered not collectable) / total revenue (in %) (*) 6.1 4.9 4.9 na 31.8 32.6 30.7 na

VAT gap (% of VAT total tax liability, VTTL) (**) 5.9 5.2 10.3 10.0 10.5 7.3 8.2 na

Progressivity &

fairness

Tax administration &

compliance

By tax base

Some tax types

EU-27Estonia

39

Joonis A3.2. Esimese ja teise palgasaaja maksukiil,

% kogu tööjõukulust, 2025

Märkus: Teise palgasaaja maksukiil näitab leibkonna maksukiilu, mis tuleneb palgast, mida saab teine palgasaaja, kes asub tööle ja teenib 67 % keskmisest palgast. See ei näita leibkonna kogu maksukiilu. Leibkonna puhul eeldatakse, et esimene palgasaaja teenib 100 % keskmisest palgast ja et lapsi ei ole. Leibkonna teise palgasaaja maksukiilu metoodika kohta vt OECD (2024), Taxing Wages 2024. Allikas: Euroopa Komisjon.

Eesti esitab maksukulutused igal aastal koos

eelarvega, kuid tal puudub spetsiaalne

raamistik maksukulutuste süstemaatiliseks

hindamiseks. Üle 30 % maksukulutuskavade

puhul ei hinnata nende kulutõhusust ega soovimatuid tagajärgi,(35) mis piirab tõenditel põhinevat prioriseerimist. Üksikisiku tulumaksuga seotud maksukulutuste tõttu saamata jäänud tulul on eelarvele tagasihoidlik mõju (2022. aastal ligikaudu 4 % üksikisiku tulumaksu kogutulust). Enamik maksukulutusi on seotud tööhõive ja kodumajapidamistega ja neil on piiratud mõju sissetulekute ebavõrdsuse vähendamisele. Ka vähendatud käibemaksumääradel on piiratud edasikanduva mõju tõttu olnud piiratud mõju regressiivsusele, mis näitab, et vähendatud käibemaksumääradega ei saavutata poliitikaeesmärke optimaalselt(36).

Eesti tulemused maksukuulekuse valdkonnas

on head, kuid maksulõhe jälgimisel on veel

arenguruumi. Riigil puuduvad põhjalikud tavad maksulõhe jälgimiseks. Praegu ei hinnata

võrdne sissetulek, samas kui koefitsient 100 väljendab täielikku ebavõrdsust, kus kogu sissetulek läheb ainult ühele inimesele.

(35) Vt Mind the Gap Report.

(36) Gini koefitsient: alla 0,001 % (tulevane majandus- ja rahandusküsimuste peadirektoraadi/Teadusuuringute Ühiskeskuse väljaanne vähendatud käibemaksumäärade kohta).

põhjalikult äriühingu tulumaksu kohustuste täitmise lõhet, kuigi äriühingu tulumaksu kohustuste täitmise lõhe on komisjoni hinnangul ligikaudu 5 %. Käibemaksukohustuste täitmise lõhet Eestis mõjutavad mitmed sotsiaal- majanduslikud tegurid, sealhulgas teenuste osakaalu suurenemine majanduses, mis tavaliselt kujutab endast suuremat kohustuste täitmisega seotud riski.

2023. aastal oli käibemaksukohustuste

täitmise lõhe (mõõdab käibemaksu sissenõudmise ja kohustuste täitmise

tulemuslikkust) hinnanguliselt 10,3 %

käibemaksukohustuste kogusummast (398 miljonit eurot). ELi keskmine

käibemaksukohustuste täitmise lõhe oli 2023. aastal 9,5 % ja Eesti käibemaksukohustuste täitmise lõhe oli ELi liikmesriikide seas suuruselt üheksas. See tähendab aja jooksul kasvu, kusjuures 2021. aastal oli erakordne langus 2,2 %, millele järgnes taastumine 2022. aastal ja edasine kasv 2023. aastal. Hoolimata mõningatest reformidest oli varifirmadega seotud ühendusesiseste pettuste tõttu saamata jäänud käibemaksusumma 2023. aastal hinnanguliselt ligikaudu 155 miljonit eurot. Teadlikkuse suurendamine ja andmete integreerimine võib parandada maksulõhe hindamist ja maksukuulekuse tavasid kõigis maksukategooriates.

Tasumata maksuvõlgnevuste tase püsis

Eestis aastatel 2020–2023 stabiilne (2023.

aastal 5 %) ning riik oli 2023. aastal ELi

parimate hulgas. Võlgnevuste summa, mida Eesti Maksuamet peab sissenõutavaks, oli ajavahemikul 2021–2023 stabiilne (ligikaudu 88 %). See on ELis hea tulemus.

Eesti maksuhaldus on väga digitaliseeritud,

mis tagab maksukogumise tõhususe, kuid nõuete täitmisega seotud kulude

vähendamisel esineb endiselt probleeme.

Eesti on digimaksuhalduses juhtpositsioonil: 98 % maksudeklaratsioonidest esitatakse elektrooniliselt, mis vähendab märkimisväärselt halduskoormust ja kulusid. Eesti on üks seitsmest ELi liikmesriigist, kes on nii käivitanud kui ka rakendanud: i) digiülemineku strateegia, ii) strateegia edukaks digiüleminekuks vajalike oskuste kindlakstegemiseks ning iii) strateegia digikultuuri loomiseks maksuametis. Eesti maksuhaldur eeltäidab üksikisiku

32.8 37.4

42.6 42.6

37.4

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

50 100 150

Ta x

w ed

ge , %

o f

to ta

l l ab

o u

r co

st s

Earnings as % of the average wage

Single earner - EE Single earner - EU average

Second earner - EE Second earner - EU average

40

tuludeklaratsioonid, kuid mitte äriühingu tulu- ja käibedeklaratsioonid. Sellest hoolimata on e- deklaratsioonide osakaal ettevõtete ja üksikisikute tuludeklaratsioonide ja käibedeklaratsioonide puhul üle 95 % (100 % kõigist kolme liiki deklaratsioonidest on alates 2018. aastast esitatud elektrooniliselt).

Eesti peab jätkuvalt esmatähtsaks täiustatud andmeanalüüsi, et võidelda

pettuste vastu ja muuta maksukogumine

tõhusamaks. Hiljutised reformid on keskendunud nende raamistike laiendamisele kooskõlas taaste- ja vastupidavusrahastu raames võetud kohustustega ning tehnoloogiataristu edendamisele, et parandada maksuhalduse tulemusi. Maksukogumiskulud, väljendatuna protsendina kogu netomaksutulust, olid aastatel 2018–2022 stabiilsed ja jäid alla 0,5 %.

TOOTLIKKUS

4. LISA. ETTEVÕTLUSINNOVATSIOON

41

Eesti innovatsioonisüsteemi tulemused on üle

ELi keskmise, kuid avaliku teadusbaasi

kvaliteet ei kajastu veel täielikult

tehnoloogilistes tulemustes ja ettevõtlusinnovatsioonis. 2025. aasta Euroopa innovatsioonitegevuse tulemustabeli(37) kohaselt on Eesti jätkuvalt tugevate novaatorite hulgas. 2025. aastal oli Eesti tulemus innovatsiooni koondindeksis 104,8 % ELi keskmisest, samas kui 2022. aastal oli see näitaja veel alla ELi keskmise (98.6 %). Eesti tulemus jääb siiski alla ELi tugevate novaatorite keskmise (2025. aastal vastavalt 104,8 % ja 114,1 % ELi keskmisest). Eesti teadus- ja arendustegevuse intensiivsus(38) suurenes aastatel 2018–2024 pidevalt. Teadus- ja arendustegevuse intensiivsus oli 2024. aastal 1,99 % (2018. aastal 1,38 %), kusjuures peamine kasv tulenes ettevõtete teadus- ja arendustegevusest, samal ajal kui avaliku sektori teadus- ja arendustegevuse intensiivsus püsis stabiilne. Eesti puhul rõhutati 2025. aasta riigipõhistes soovitustes vajadust keskenduda investeeringute tegemisel teadusuuringutele ja innovatsioonile, seades esikohale rakendusuuringute rahastamise, ning parandada juurdepääsu rahastusele, et hõlbustada uuenduslikke investeeringuid. Dünaamiline teadus- ja arendustegevuse baas ning tehnoloogiavaldkonna idufirmade head raamtingimused toetavad Eesti majanduse innovaatilisust. Väikeste ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtjate digiüleminek on hästi edenenud. Tehisintellekti kasutuselevõtt on Eestis aasta jooksul peaaegu kahekordistunud. Patendiandmetes kajastuv tehnoloogia areng on viimastel aastatel siiski aeglustunud, avaliku sektori teadusasutuste ja ettevõtjate koostöö ei ole endiselt optimaalne ning innovatsiooni toetamise süsteemis on endiselt vajakajäämisi, eelkõige seoses VKEde juurdepääsuga rahastusele.

(37) 2025. aasta Euroopa innovatsioonitegevuse tulemustabel,

Eesti riigiprofiil. Innovatsioonitegevuse tulemustabelis esitatakse võrdlev analüüs ELi riikide innovatsioonitulemuste kohta, sh nende riiklike innovatsioonisüsteemide tugevate ja nõrkade külgede kohta (võrreldes ka ELi keskmisega).

(38) Määratletud kui riiklikud kogukulutused teadus- ja arendustegevusele protsendina SKPst.

Tipptasemel teadus

Eestil on hea kvaliteediga avalik teadusbaas, mida rahastatakse stabiilselt. Teadusväljundite kvaliteet, mida mõõdetakse teaduspublikatsioonide osakaaluna 10 % kogu maailmas enim tsiteeritud publikatsioonides, on viimase kümne aasta jooksul paranenud (7,13 %-lt 2012. aastal 9,84 %-le 2022. aastal) ja on nüüd veidi üle ELi keskmise (9,44 %). Avaliku sektori kulutused teadus- ja arendustegevusele protsendina SKPst on samuti veidi üle ELi keskmise (0,78 % vs 0,72 % 2024. aastal) ja need on viimastel aastatel püsinud enam-vähem samal tasemel. Avaliku sektori teadus- ja arendustegevuse riikliku eesmärgi 1 % SKPst(39) raames on seatud prioriteediks avaliku sektor toetus ettevõtete teadus- ja arendustegevusele. Riiklik teadussüsteem on hästi ühendatud rahvusvaheliste teadusvõrgustikega, nagu näitab rahvusvaheliste ühispublikatsioonide osakaal publikatsioonide koguarvus, mis on viimase kümne aasta jooksul pidevalt kasvanud (2024. aastal 69,4 %).

Joonis A4.1. Teadus- ja arendustegevuse

intensiivsus (GERD, GOVERD, BERD % SKPst)

Allikas: Eurostat, 2025

Eestil on raskusi selle tagamisel, et järgmine

teadlaste põlvkond oleks piisavalt suur. Doktorantide arv on viimase kümne aasta jooksul vähenenud 2983-lt 2013. aastal 2283-le 2023. aastal, samas kui välismaiste doktorantide arv on kasvanud 241-lt 792-le(40). Riiklikku eesmärki tekitada vähemalt 300 uut doktorikraadi

(39) Eesti teadus- ja arendustegevuse, innovatsiooni ning

ettevõtluse arengukava 2021–2035.

(40) Eesti Teadus 2025, Eesti_Teadus_2025.pdf

3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00

1.73 1.75 1.77 1.83 1.99

0.95 0.98 0.99 1.06 1.19

0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.78

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

National target Total R&D intensity (GERD)

Private R&D intensity (BERD) Public R&D intensity (GOVERD+HERD)

42

omandanut aastas ei ole veel saavutatud. Selle saavutamiseks algatati 2022. aastal doktoriõppe reform ja valitsus on otsustanud suurendada uute doktorikraadi omandanute arvu 2026. aastal 300- lt 350-le, et jõuda 2035. aastaks 500ni. Samal ajal on oluline tagada, et doktorikraadi omandanud tuleksid eelkõige valdkondadest, mis vastavad majanduse ja ühiskonna praegustele ja tulevastele vajadustele (vt 13. lisa).

Hoolimata digi- ja tehisintellektivahendite

kiirenevast arengust on teadus- ja innovatsioonitegevuse rahastamine andme-

ja arvutiteaduses maha jäänud. Eesti on kujunenud andmeteaduse ja IKT keskuseks. Uue riikliku rakendusuuringute keskuse üks viiest prioriteedist on terviseandmete lahendused ja keskuses asub 2025. aastal loodud uus kiibipädevuskeskus. Eestis asuv Euroopa digiinnovatsiooni keskus –tehisintellekti- ja robootikakeskus AIRE – on oma esimese perioodi edukalt lõpule viinud ning jätkab aastatel 2026– 2029 VKEde ja tehnosiirde toetamist tehisintellekti valdkonnas. Arvutiteadusele ning IKT-le eraldatakse jätkuvalt siiski vaid väike protsent Eesti Teadusagentuuri vahenditest(41). Täiendavad investeeringud tehisintellektialastesse teadusuuringutesse ja rakendustesse valdkondades, kus Eesti on aastate jooksul saavutanud tipptaseme, võivad lasta ära kasutada mitmeid alakasutatud ja kasutamata võimalusi. Näiteks võiks Eesti veel enam ära kasutada oma ulatuslikku tööd terviseandmete ja genoomiuuringute valdkonnas.

Eesti reformis 2025. aastal oma teadus- ja

innovatsioonisüsteemi juhtimist, täpsustades

rolle ja kohustusi. Oluline teadus- ja

innovatsioonisüsteemi juhtimise reform viidi lõpule 2025. aastal, kui võeti vastu uus teadus- ja arendustegevuse ning innovatsiooni korralduse seadus, millega asendati 1997. aasta seadus ning koondati teadus- ja innovatsiooni korraldus ühe katuse alla, selgitades samal ajal erinevate teadus- ja innovatsioonitegevuses osalejate ja rahastajate rolle ja kohustusi(42).

(41) Eesti teadusinfosüsteemi andmetel oli arvutiteadusele ja

informaatikale eraldatud avaliku sektori teadus- ja arendustegevuse rahastuse osakaal 2023. aastal 5,4 %, 2024. aastal 4,5 % ja 2025. aastal 5,8 %.

(42) Teadus- ja arendustegevuse ning innovatsiooni korralduse seadus, Riigi Teataja I, 12.7.2025

Ettevõtlusinnovatsioon

Ettevõtete teadus- ja arendustegevus on

viimastel aastatel märkimisväärselt

hoogustunud, kuid tehnoloogialased tulemused, mida mõõdetakse

patenditaotlustega, on halvenenud. Paljud

Eesti ettevõtted on suurendanud investeeringuid teadus- ja arendustegevusse, eelkõige võttes tööle teadlasi. See kajastub selles, et ettevõtetes töötavate teadlaste arv tuhande töötaja kohta suurenes 2,50-lt 2018. aastal 5,40-le 2024. aastal, jõudes peaaegu ELi keskmiseni (5,90). Alates 2019. aastast ületab ettevõtete teadus- ja arendustegevuse intensiivsus avaliku sektori teadus- ja arendustegevuse intensiivsust ning on viimastel aastatel pidevalt kasvanud: Kui 2018. aastal moodustasid ettevõtete kulutused teadus- ja arendustegevusele 0,58 % SKPst, siis 2024. ulatusid need 1,19 %ni. Sellest märkimisväärsest kasvust hoolimata jääb see alla ELi keskmise (1,49 %) ja eesmärgiks seatud taset (2 %). Mis puudutab patendiandmetega kajastatud tehnoloogia arengut, siis on Eesti patendikoostöölepingu alusel esitatud patenditaotlused miljardi euro kohta SKPst pidevalt vähenenud (1,52-lt 2017. aastal 0,72-le 2022. aastal) ja jäävad märkimisväärselt alla ELi keskmise (2,81).

Kuigi avaliku sektori otsene toetus

ettevõtete teadus- ja arendustegevusele on

viimastel aastatel hoogsalt kasvanud, on väljaspool toetuskavasid innovatsiooni

toetamise süsteemis jätkuvalt vajakajäämisi. Ettevõtete teadusuuringute ja innovatsiooni toetamist on viimastel aastatel märkimisväärselt suurendatud. Avaliku sektori otsene toetus ettevõtete teadus- ja arendustegevusele suurenes 0,06 %-lt SKPst 2017. aastal 0.15 %-le SKPst 2023. aastal ja on oluliselt üle ELi keskmise. Innovatsiooni toetamise süsteemis on siiski veel vajakajäämisi, eelkõige seoses juurdepääsuga rahastusele. Nagu on märgitud 2025. aasta riigipõhistes soovitustes, peaks Eesti parandama juurdepääsu rahastusele, eelkõige väikeste ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtjate jaoks, et soodustada uuenduslikke investeeringuid. Kuigi idufirmad saavad kasu hästi arenenud riskikapitaliturust (vt allpool punkt „Ettevõtluse dünaamilisus“), esineb innovatsiooni rahastamisel

43

endiselt märkimisväärseid turutõrkeid(43). Eesti kavatseb selle puuduse kõrvaldada, suurendades Eesti Ettevõtluse ja Innovatsiooni Sihtasutuse pakutavate rahastamisvahendite mahtu ning võttes 2026. aastal kasutusele innovatsioonilaenu. Eesti ettevõtete tulumaksu süsteemis puuduvad erisätted teadus- ja arendustegevusse tehtavate investeeringute soodustamiseks. 2024. aastal kehtestati teadus- ja arendustöötajate värbamiseks sihtotstarbeline toetus, mille raames hüvitatakse osa üksikisiku tulumaksust, ja see toetus jätkub ka 2026. aastal.

Avaliku sektori teadusasutuste ja ettevõtete

koostöö on endiselt piiratud, kuid uus

rakendusuuringute keskus peaks aitama olukorda parandada. 2023. aastal moodustasid ettevõtete tellimused ülikoolidele ja avaliku sektori teadusasutustele 5,61 % avaliku sektori teadus- ja arendustegevusest. See on alates 2018. aastast püsinud peaaegu muutumatuna (5,81 %) ja jääb endiselt alla ELi keskmise (7,51 %). 2023. aastal käivitas Eesti riikliku rakendusuuringute keskuse(44) ja kõik viis sihtvaldkonda hakkasid toimima 2025. aastal. Kui keskus täielikult toimima hakkab, toob see kasu paljudele ettevõtjatele ja saavutab oma eesmärgi saada vähemalt kolmandik oma tulust lepingulisest teadustegevusest. See nõuab suutlikkuse suurendamiseks märkimisväärseid avaliku sektori investeeringuid, nagu on rõhutatud 2025. aasta riigipõhistes soovitustes, milles kutsuti üles seama esikohale rakendusuuringute rahastamine. Kuigi rakendusuuringute keskuse arengu kiirendamiseks ei võetud uusi lisameetmeid,(45) rakendati 2025. aastal 30 miljoni euro suurune programm teadusasutuste ja kõrgkoolide institutsioonilise teadmussiirde suutlikkuse toetamiseks (Astra+). Lisaks on 2026. aastaks kavandatud TemTA (temaatilised teadus- ja arendusprogrammid) teine projektikonkurss. TemTA loodi 2024. aastal, et tugevdada rakendus- ja kasutuskeskseid uuringuid aruka spetsialiseerumise prioriteetsetes valdkondades ning rahastada avaliku ja erasektori

(43) Innovatsioonimahukate investeeringute rahastamise

turutõrke uuring koos kaitsetööstuse valdkonna analüüsiga, Saaresalu, 2025

(44) Eesti Rakendusuuringute Keskus, https://metrosert.ee/en/services/applied-research-center/

(45) https://rtk.ee/Teadusuuringute-moju-suurendamine-ning- teadusasutuste-ja-korgkoolide-institutsionaalse- teadmussiirde-suutlikkuse-toetamine

rakendusuuringute projekte(46). Programmi kogueelarve aastateks 2024–2029 on ligikaudu 102 miljonit eurot(47).

Investeeringud rohetehnoloogiatesse ei

kajastu täielikult innovatsioonitulemustes. Euroopa innovatsioonitegevuse tulemustabeli kohaselt on Eesti ressursitootlikkuse poolest ELi liikmesriikide seas 24. kohal ja tootmispõhise CO 2 tootlikkuse poolest 23. kohal, mis osutab vajadusele investeerida rohetehnoloogia arendamisse ja kohandamisse. Rakendusuuringute programmi raames jätkatakse investeerimist uuenduslikesse idufirmadesse, kes arendavad ja kohandavad uusi rohe- ja energiatõhusaid tehnoloogiaid, ning tehakse seda SmartCapi rohefondi kaudu. 2025. aastal otsustas rohefond laiendada oma investeerimisportfelli, et võimendada erainvesteeringuid ning investeerida muudesse riskikapitali- ja börsivälistesse ettevõtetesse investeerivatesse fondidesse, mis investeerivad rohetehnoloogiasse. Hoolimata mitmest märkimisväärsest teadus- ja arendusprojektist, mida rahastatakse programmist „Euroopa horisont“ ning riiklikest programmidest vesinikul ja biotoorainel põhineva tööstuse valdkonnas, on lahenduste rakendamine tööstuses siiski viibinud.

Eesti on teinud edusamme väikeste ja

keskmise suurusega ettevõtjate digipöörde

edendamisel, kuid rohkem tähelepanu tuleb

pöörata sellistele valdkondadele nagu tehisintellekti kasutuselevõtt, et viia need

kooskõlla ELi digikümnendi eesmärkidega(48). Eesti on teinud digiüleminekul edusamme: 72,12 % VKEdest on saavutanud algtasemel digimahukuse (ELi keskmine on 71,39 %). Eesti tulemused on ELi keskmisest paremad ka pilvandmetöötluse kasutuselevõtu puhul (56,23 % võrreldes ELi 46,69 %-ga) ja andmeanalüüsi puhul (55,99 % võrreldes ELi 39,85 %-ga). Eestis on tehisintellekti kasutuselevõtt märkimisväärselt kasvanud: 13,89 %-lt 2024. aastal 23,40 %-le 2025. aastal. Digiinnovatsiooni keskus AIRE koos Technopoli tehisintellekti arendusprogrammiga toetab ettevõtete digiüleminekut. Lisaks on tehisintellekti idufirmade inkubaator käivitanud 30

(46) Teadmussiirde programm 2026-2029.

(47) https://etag.ee/en/funding/programmes/temta-thematic-rd- programmes/

(48) Eesti 2025. aasta digikümnendi riigiaruanne.

44

ettevõtet ja turule on tulnud veel 19 uut tehisintellektil põhinevat toodet.

Ettevõtluse dünaamilisus

Eesti idufirmade käive oli 2024. aastal rekordiline, kuid sektori kasvutempo on

võrreldes eelmiste aastatega aeglustunud. Eesti idufirmade käive oli 2024. aastal 3,9 miljardit eurot(49), mis on peaaegu 15 % rohkem kui 2023. aastal (3,4 miljardit eurot) ja ületab majandusliku surve tingimustes üldist majanduskasvu. Kasv on küll olnud hoogne, kuid see on viimastel aastatel aeglustunud (2021. aastal 73 %, 2022. aastal 46 %, 2023. aastal 19 %). Süvatehnoloogia idufirmad said jätkuvalt hoogu juurde; nende arvele jäi 2024. aastal 63 % Eesti idufirmade sektorisse tehtud investeeringutest ja nende käive oli 325 miljoni eurot (+19,3 % võrreldes eelmise aastaga). Nad andsid tööd 2 439 inimesele, mis moodustab 17 % kõigist idufirmade töötajatest(50).

Riskikapitalituru intensiivsus vähenes 2024.

aastal, kuid on endiselt suurim ELis. Riskikapitaliinvesteeringud suurenesid 2018.– 2023. aastal (O.06 %-lt SKPst 0,33 %-le), kuid vähenesid 2024. aastal 0,24 %-le SKPst. See on ikkagi neli korda suurem kui ELi keskmine (0,06 %)(51). Eestis on hästi toimiv tehnoloogia ökosüsteem, mis on viimasel kümnendil meelitanud ligi investeeringuid mahus üle 1 % SKPst(52). Eesti valitsus käivitas hiljuti 100 miljoni euro suuruse kaitsefondi, mis hoogustab veelgi uute kaitsesuunitlusega süvatehnoloogiaettevõtete arengut. Lisaks allkirjastas Ettevõtluse Arendamise Sihtasutus 2025. aastal Euroopa Investeerimisfondiga lepingu, millega eraldatakse 109 miljonit eurot Eesti ettevõttete toetamiseks soodsamate laenude ja tagatistega. Idufirmade sektori suutlikkus meelitada ligi talente, leida rahastus ja laiendada innovatsiooni on ülimalt oluline, et säilitada konkurentsieelis.

(49) Estonia’s Startup Sector in 2024: Growth, Challenges, and

Key Insights, Startup Estonia, 2025

(50) Samas.

(51) vt ka 6. lisa.

(52) „State of European Tech 24: The definitive take on European tech“.

Eesti innovatsioonistrateegias pannakse

rõhku regulatiivsete

eksperimenteerimisraamistike väljatöötamisele. Eesti kavatseb luua riikliku

eksperimenteerimisraamistiku, mis võimaldab idufirmadel katsetada reguleerimata või nõuetele mittevastavaid lahendusi kontrollitud tingimustes, lühendades tõhusalt teed kontseptsioonilt kasutuskõlblikele toodetele. Valitsus on koostanud riikliku eksperimenteerimisraamistiku õigusakti eelnõu, mis võetakse eeldatavasti vastu 2026. aastal. See täiendab olemasolevaid regulatiivse testkeskkonna algatusi, mida toetavad programm „Accelerate Estonia“ ja suurlinnad (nt Test in Tallinn, Test in Tartu).

Innovatsioonihangete raamistik on

paranenud, kuid tuleb veel teha märkimisväärseid jõupingutusi. Euroopa riiklike innovatsioonihangete poliitikaraamistike võrdlusanalüüsis on Eesti punktisummaga 52,43 % teisel kohal, samas kui ELi keskmine on 33,05 %(53). Enamik riiklikke horisontaalpoliitikaid, sealhulgas riigihanked, teadus- ja arendustegevus ning innovatsioon ning info- ja kommunikatsioonitehnoloogia, toetavad innovatsioonihangete laialdasemat kasutamist. Innovatsioonihangete puhul on kehtestatud hea kulude mõõtmise süsteem. 2025. aastaks seati innovatsioonihangete sihttasemeks mahu järgi 2 % ja väärtuse järgi 5 %. Innovatsioonihangete poliitikaraamistik vajab siiski veel märkimisväärseid tugevdavaid meetmeid, nagu riikliku tegevuskava väljatöötamine ja hankijatele stiimulite loomine, innovatsioonihangete strateegilise tähtsuse tunnistamine kõigis valdkondlikes poliitikates ning suutlikkuse suurendamise meetmete tugevdamine innovatsioonihangete tavade edasiseks levitamiseks.

Kõrge kvalifikatsiooniga töötajate nappus

pärsib Eesti innovatsioonisuutlikkust. Kuigi IKT valdkonna uute kõrgkoolilõpetajate arv tuhande 25–34aastase elaniku kohta on üle ELi keskmise, on see viimastel aastatel langenud (2023. aastal 4,61, 2022. aastal 4,90 ja 2021. aastal 5,50). Muret tekitab ka uute kõrgkoolilõpetajate arvu vähenemine loodus- ja inseneriteaduste valdkonnas, kuna see on alates 2013. aastast pidevalt vähenenud (13,11-lt 8,98-

(53) ESTONIA. COUNTRY PROFILE – Benchmarking of national

policy frameworks for innovation procurement, 2024

45

le tuhande 25–34aastase kohta 2023. aastal, mis on märkimisväärselt vähem kui ELi keskmine 16,82). Selline langus võib pikas perspektiivis pärssida Eesti innovatsioonitulemusi. Välistalentidel on Eesti idufirmade sektoris oluline roll: 31 %-l töötajatest on välisriigi kodakondsus(54). Välistalentide suur osakaal mängib suurt rolli idufirmade ökosüsteemi sõltuvuses rahvusvahelistest eksperditeadmistest ning vajaduses poliitikameetmete järele, mis hõlbustavad ülemaailmset värbamist ja talentide hoidmist.

Ettevõtlusharidus on Eestis täielikult

lõimitud haridussüsteemi õpetajate

pädevusraamistike, õppekavade ja koolijuhtide juhendamise kaudu. Õpetajate pädevusraamistikes, mida kohaldatakse kõigi õpetajate suhtes,viidatakse konkreetselt ettevõtlusele, kusjuures Eesti on üks vähestest Euroopa riikidest, kes seda teeb(55). Üldhariduskoolide õpetajate kutsekvalifikatsiooni standardi kohaselt kuulub ettevõtlus määratletud pädevuste hulka. Riiklikus õppekavas on kindlaks määratud kaheksa üldpädevust, sealhulgas ettevõtlus, mis on kavas kaasata kõikidesse õppeainetesse, õppekavavälistesse tegevustesse ja koolivälistesse algatustesse.

Eesti pakub ettevõtlusega seotud õppeaineid ka põhi- ja üldkeskhariduse õppekava raames. Lisaks on ettevõtlusharidus integreeritud praktikale suunatud ja projektipõhise õppe komponentide kaudu (eelkõige keskhariduses) selliste projektidega nagu programm „Junior Achievement(56). Eesti annab koolidele suuniseid, et edendada kogu kooli hõlmavat lähenemisviisi ettevõtlusharidusele. Seda toetavad ettevõtlus- ja karjääriõppe programmi „Edu ja Tegu“(57) materjalid, sealhulgas koolide ja ettevõtete koostöö. Koolijuhtidele antakse nõu, kuidas seda kogu kooli hõlmavat lähenemisviisi tulemuslikult rakendada. Selliste tunnistustega nagu Ettevõtliku

(54) Estonia’s Startup Sector in 2024: Growth, Challenges, and

Key Insights, Startup Estonia, 2025

(55) Eurydice’i aruanne „Entrepreneurship education at school in Europe“, https://eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/publications/entrepreneur ship-education-school-europe-2025

(56) JA Europe, https://jaeurope.org/

(57) Ettevõtlus- ja karjääriõppe programm Edu ja Tegu, https://ettevotlusope.edu.ee/

Kooli kvaliteedimärgis(58) tunnustatakse koole, mis integreerivad süstemaatiliselt ettevõtlusharidust ning edendavad partnerlust kohalike kogukondade ja ettevõtetega. Eesti kõrgkoolid teevad jõupingutusi ka ettevõtluskursuste integreerimiseks eri õppevaldkondade õppekavadesse. Sellest hoolimata juhiti OSKA 2022. aasta uuringus üldiste töö- ja eraelu oskuste kohta tähelepanu sellele, et tööandjad ootavad kõrgharidusprogrammide lõpetajatelt paremaid ettevõtlusega seotud oskusi(59).

(58) Kvaliteedimärgise taotlemise protsess - Ettevõtlik Kool,

https://evkool.ee/vorgustiku-liikmele/seire/

(59) Leemet, A. & Ungro, A. (2022). Tööelu üldoskuste klassifikatsioon ja tulevikuvajadus. Tallinn: SA Kutsekoda. https://uuringud.oska.kutsekoda.ee/uuringud/tooelu- uldoskutse-klassifikatsioon-tulevikuvajadus.

46

Tabel A4.1.Peamised innovatsiooninäitajad

(1) ELi keskmine viimasel aastal, mille kohta on andmed kättesaadavad, või aastal, mil riikide andmeid on kõige rohkem. * aegrida katkeb Allikas: Eurostat, OECD, Teadusuuringute Ühiskeskus, JRC, Science-Metrix (Scopuse andmebaas), Invest Europe, Euroopa innovatsioonitegevuse tulemustabel.

R&D intensity (gross domestic expenditure on R&D as % of GDP)

1.58 1.44 1.73 1.77 1.83 1.99 : 2.24 3.44

Public expenditure on R&D as % of GDP 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.78 : 0.72 0.64

Scientific publications of the country within the top 10% most cited publications worldwide as % of total publications of the country

7.62 8.48 9.36 9.84 : : : 9.44 12.31

Researchers (FTEs) employed by public sector (Gov+HEI) per thousand active population

4.1 4.5 4.3 4.7 4.9 5.2 : 4.3 :

International co-publications as % of total number of publications

45.39 55 65.71 67.62 68.41 69.4 : 57.24 :

Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) as % of GDP

0.79 0.66 0.95 0.99 1.06 1.19 : 1.49 2.69

Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) performed by SMEs as % of GDP

0.55 0.31 0.5 0.51 0.56 : : 0.47 0.30

Researchers employed by business per thousand active population

1.9 1.3 3.2 4.3 4.3 5.4 : 5.9 :

Patent applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty per billion GDP (in PPS €)

3.29 1.25 1.46 0.72 : : : 2.81 2.20

Employment share of high-growth enterprises measured in employment (%)

: : : 0.85 1.02 0.99 : 0.87 :

SMEs with at least a basic level of digital intensity % SMEs (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 90%)

: : : : 55.93 : 72.12 71.39 :

Data analytics adoption % enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)

: : : : 25.57 : 55.99 39.85 :

Cloud adoption % enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)

: : : : 52.60 : 56.23 46.69 :

Artificial intelligence adoption % enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)

: : : : 5.19 13.89 23.40 19.95 :

Public-private scientific co-publications as % of total number of publications

6.87 6.14 8.7 8.46 8.66 9.15 : 7.62 :

Public expenditure on R&D financed by business enterprises (national) as % of GDP

0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 : : 0.06 0.02

Total public sector support for BERD as % of GDP : : 0.08 0.10 0.15 : : 0.21 :

R&D tax incentives: foregone revenues as % of GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 : : 0.10 :

BERD financed by the public sector (national and abroad) as % of GDP

: : 0.08 0.10 0.15 : : 0.11 :

Venture capital (market statistics) as % of GDP (calculated as a 3-year moving average)

0.03 0.04 0.10 0.34 0.33 0.24 : 0.06 :

Seed stage funding share (% of GDP) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 : 0.01 : Start-up stage funding share (% of GDP) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.15 0.12 : 0.03 : Later stage funding share (as % of GDP) 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.08 : 0.03 :

New graduates in science & engineering per thousand population aged 25-34

: 11.77* 9.5 9.18 8.98 10.05 : 16.82 :

Graduates in the field of computing per thousand population aged 25-34

: 2.69* 4.19 4.90 4.61 5.38 : 3.84 :

2023 2024 2025 EU average

(1) USEstonia 2010 2015 2020 2022

R&D investment & researchers employed in businesses

Innovation outputs

Digitalisation of businesses

Academia-business collaboration

Innovative talent

Public support for business innovation