KOMISJONI ARUANNE EUROOPA PARLAMENDILE JA NÕUKOGULE direktiivi (EL) 2018/1673 (rahapesu vastu võitlemise kohta kriminaalõiguse abil) hindamise kohta - COM(2026) 277, SWD(2026) 148

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 17.6.2026

COM(2026) 277 final

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND

THE COUNCIL

on the evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on combating money laundering by

criminal law

{SWD(2026) 148 final}

1

1. INTRODUCTION

Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on combating money laundering by criminal law (hereafter “the

Directive”) was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 23 October 2018 and

entered into force on 2 December 2018. The Directive strengthens law enforcement and judicial

responses to money laundering, fosters cross-border cooperation both within the EU and

internationally, and complements the wider legislative framework on the prevention of money

laundering.

The Directive applies to 25 Member States; Ireland and Denmark are not bound by it. The

deadline for transposition was 3 December 2020.

The Directive establishes minimum rules on the activities that have to be considered as money

laundering offences across all Member States (i.e. transferring or converting property derived

from criminal activity, hiding or disguising its illicit origin, or acquiring, possessing or using

property knowing of its criminal origin) and the corresponding sanctions for such acts. The

Directive specifies the criminal activities that constitute predicate offences for money

laundering, i.e. the criminal acts from which the laundered money originated. Among the

novelties introduced, the Directive enables the prosecution of money laundering without

requiring a conviction for the predicate offence, and without requiring authorities to prove all

the elements of the predicate offence (‘stand-alone money laundering’). It also enables the

prosecution and conviction for money laundering activities committed by the perpetrator of the

criminal activity that generated the property (‘self-laundering’). The Directive contains rules

to clarify which Member State is competent for prosecution in cross-border cases. Furthermore,

it lays down minimum rules on penalties and additional sanctions applicable to both natural

and legal persons, including ‘aggravating circumstances’.

This report responds to the requirement in Article 14(2) of the Directive, which requires the

European Commission to submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing

the added value of the Directive with regard to combating money laundering as well as its

impact on fundamental rights and freedoms.

This evaluation report builds on the transposition report from the Commission to the European

Parliament and the Council – required under Article 14(1) – assessing the extent to which

Member States have taken the necessary measures to comply with the Directive. The

transposition report showed that, while the transposition of the Directive has been broadly

compliant, some gaps and inconsistencies remain, such as the incorrect transposition by some

Member States of the provisions regarding aggravating circumstances. The transposition report

is presented in the annex.

The detailed findings of the evaluation, as well as the methodology used, are presented in the

Commission staff working document accompanying the report.

This Directive is part of a broader toolkit against criminal finances which, as highlighted in the

European Internal Security Strategy (‘ProtectEU’), is a central component of the fight against

organised crime. Confiscating criminal profits remains essential to dismantle organised

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criminal groups, and the effective implementation of EU legislation on countering financial

crime and fostering asset recovery is a key step in this regard.

2. BACKGROUND

As a general objective, the Directive aims at strengthening the judicial and law enforcement

responses to money laundering across Member States. Although all Member States

criminalised money laundering, there were significant differences regarding the way the

offence was defined, the scope of predicate offences and the respective sanctions. The previous

framework lacked coherence and comprehensiveness, making it less effective and allowing

criminals and terrorists to exploit weaker national systems. To meet these needs, the Directive

introduced a common EU framework for criminalising money laundering and

strengthening judicial and law enforcement responses. Its overall aim is to reinforce the

EU’s anti-money laundering regime through criminal law.

This translates into specific objectives:

• ensuring the effective criminalisation of money laundering across the EU;

• introducing clear and uniform definitions of predicate offences;

• establishing consistent and proportionate penalties and sanctions;

• enhancing cooperation and information exchange between Member States.

The expected impacts of the Directive are:

• more effective investigation and prosecution of money laundering perpetrators, through

the adoption of harmonised offences, penalties and sanctions;

• increased protection of EU citizens and of the internal market against threats of

organised crime and terrorist financing, through the availability of effective tools for

authorities to investigate money laundering and bring perpetrators to justice, including

legal entities;

• more efficient and coordinated cross-border action against money laundering, through

strengthened cooperation and information exchange between Member States;

• more effective investigative tools available to authorities in money laundering

investigations;

• measures to strengthen confiscation by enhancing the tracing, freezing and confiscation

of proceeds of money laundering offences.

This evaluation report covers the legislative and practical application of the Directive, analysed

in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, EU-added value, relevance, in line with the

Better Regulation principles, as well as its impact on fundamental rights and freedoms, as

requested by Article 14(2) of the Directive. The evaluation report also contains conclusions and

concrete recommendations for future actions.

3

The evaluation was done with the support of an external study1, which included desk research,

interviews, targeted consultations, surveys, etc. A wide range of stakeholders were consulted,

including EU agencies and bodies, judicial authorities, law enforcement authorities, asset

recovery offices, Financial Intelligence Units, legal experts, non-governmental organisations,

think-tanks, and academic institutions. The evaluation covers the period from 2018 to 2025.

3. MAIN FINDINGS This section presents the results of the evaluation as regards the effectiveness, efficiency,

coherence, EU-added value and relevance of the Directive. Moreover, it presents the results of

the evaluation in relation to the impact of the Directive on fundamental rights and freedoms,

as specifically requested by Article 14(2) of the Directive.

3.1. Effectiveness

Concerning effectiveness, the evaluation finds that the Directive has contributed

significantly to the harmonisation of money laundering offences and penalties across

Member States, providing new tools for practitioners to combat money laundering. By

ensuring the criminalisation of all relevant money laundering methods from a broad scope of

profit-generating crimes, the Directive allows authorities to investigate and prosecute more

effectivelyall the relevant activities carried out to launder illicit money. The introduction of

novelties such as stand-alone money laundering and self-laundering has been particularly

relevant in this sense: such conducts can now be prosecuted in all Member States.

In this regard, judicial and law enforcement authorities highlighted clear benefits, particularly

the removal of the need to prove the predicate offence when prosecuting money laundering,

which facilitated judicial proceedings. Judicial authorities also underlined the increased

prosecutorial reach through the introduction of the self-laundering offence. These changes also

led to an increased deterrent effect of the money laundering legislation according to judicial

and law enforcement authorities.

The possibilities for prosecuting legal entities and for applying higher penalties in cases where

an obliged entity2 commits money laundering provides opportunities for authorities to tackle

more effectively the complex schemes set up by criminals to hide their illicit gains, thereby

increasing the protection of the internal market against threats of organised crime and

terrorist financing, with practitioners underlining the deterrent effect of independent criminal

prosecution for legal entities separate from natural persons, as well as of aggravating

circumstances generally.

Another aspect that has increased the effectiveness in the fight against money laundering is the

extension of the investigative tools available for investigating money laundering offences.

Stakeholders reported that the Directive’s obligation to make available for money laundering

1 Link to study (publication is pending, to be added after ISC). 2 See in particular Article 2(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20

May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or

terrorist financing, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, pp. 73–117, latest consolidated version available under: EUR-Lex -

02015L0849-20241230 - EN - EUR-Lex.

4

investigations the investigative techniques used in organised crime cases, as well as the raising

of maximum penalties, has facilitated access to specialised tools such as communication

interception. This allows to follow the financial trail and allows authorities to gather further

evidence, enhancing their capacity to uncover and dismantle criminal networks and their

finances, thereby increasing the protection of EU citizens against the threat from organised

crime.

Moreover, thanks to more aligned money laundering offences across the EU and clearer rules

defining the country competent for leading the investigation and prosecution of a certain case,

according to judicial authorities and some of the law enforcement authorities, the Directive has

overall contributed to a more efficient and coordinated cross-border action against money

laundering. Overall, by approximating legal frameworks, the Directive has enabled authorities

from different Member States to “speak a common language”: the more offences and penalties

resemble between jurisdictions, the easier it is for them to cooperate across borders, and to

recognise judgements from another Member State.

Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the Directive is affected to some extent by a number of

challenges.

One challenge concerns the inconsistent interpretation and application of stand-alone money

laundering across Member States, which causes legal uncertainty and problems during

investigations and prosecutions. The extent to which the predicate offence has to be proven

differs greatly among Member States: in some countries, the authorities only have to prove

some prior criminal activity from which the laundered property stems, while in others the

authorities are required to clearly define the predicate offence, and in some cases even establish

the place and time of the crime (see also pages 3-4 of the transposition report). Therefore, the

effectiveness of the Directive in facilitating the prosecution of stand-alone money laundering

varies across the EU: this is consequence of the vague wording of the Directive, which allows

for such a broad variety of transposition measures.

There is also a divergent interpretation among Member States’ jurisdictions of the property

that can be object of money laundering Even though the Directive has an all-encompassing

definition of property in order to comprise all sorts of money laundering activities, some

Member States’ legislations don’t consider saved expenses (such as taxes withheld through

committing a tax crime) as property that can be laundered. They consider that only property

that represents a positive increase of a person’s assets, e.g. money gained through a drug

trafficking offence or a tax rebate, can be object of a laundering offence. These countries

exclude from the scope of property the money that was saved by illegally not paying VAT tax.

This represents a considerable gap considering the impact of VAT fraud on public budgets,

which costs tax authorities several tens of billion euros every year according to Europol3 and

to the European Public Prosecutor Office4.

3 https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf 4 In its 2024 annual report, EPPO has highlighted how VAT fraud accounted for more than 53% of the overall

estimated damage under investigation, with an estimated damage of €13.15 billion

https://www.eppo.europa.eu/assets/annual-report-2024/pdfs/EPPO_Annual_Report_2024_en.pdf

5

Furthermore, it should be noted that the provision concerning the establishment of jurisdiction

over money laundering offences – specifically in the instance where the offender is a national

of the Member State, pursuant to Article 10(1)(b) – was transposed in a divergent manner,

particularly with respect to the requirement of double criminality5.

A particular area where the evaluation did not conclude on the effectiveness is the expected

impact on the strengthening of confiscation measures, due particularly the length of criminal

proceedings, which have resulted in insufficient data. Furthermore, it has to be noted that the

Directive, in Article 9, only refers to the application of Directive 2014/42/EU on confiscation,

which was in 2024 replaced by the new Directive on asset recovery and confiscation. Therefore,

such aspects can only be analysed in the evaluation of the latter instrument, which the

Commission is required to submit to the European Parliament and to the Council by

24 November 2031.

3.2. Efficiency

In terms of efficiency, the assessment of costs and benefits can only be preliminary, given the

length of criminal proceedings in money laundering cases. Therefore, the full impact of the

Directive in quantitative terms (number of prosecutions and convictions, volume of assets

frozen and confiscated in these money laundering cases) will only be visible in the coming

years.

While stakeholders’ views were mixed (some expressed neutrality; others were divided on

whether the Directive’s benefits outweighed its associated costs), due to a lack of reported data

it has not been possible to perform a full assessment of costs, both monetary and in terms of

administrative burden, against outcomes such as number of prosecutions and convictions, and

the related volume of assets frozen and confiscated in these money laundering cases. In any

event, the majority of Member States that took part in consultation activities reported zero or

minimal implementation costs and administrative burden. This reflects the nature of the

Directive, which essentially requires changes in the criminal code or criminal procedural code

of Member States, and such amendments to national legislation imply only

limited additional costs. Some additional costs that the Directive entails are trainings for

judicial authorities and law enforcement authorities, especially with a view to the investigation

and prosecution of new forms of money laundering introduced by the Directive. In general

terms, stakeholders indicate that the Directive has provided new tools for authorities to more

effectively investigate and prosecute money laundering offences, while implementation costs

are reported as limited, suggesting an overall positive effect in terms of efficiency.

3.3.Internal and external coherence

5 That is the principle whereby jurisdiction can only be established where the conduct in question is criminalised

both in the prosecuting state and in the state in which it was committed.

6

Regarding internal coherence, the evaluation shows that the different components of the

Directive are working well together in achieving its objectives, and that there is no

contradiction among the various provisions in the Directive.

External coherence covers both the international and EU level.

On the international scale, the evaluation notes that the Directive is not fully aligned with

the Council of Europe Warsaw Convention6, which contains rules on the criminalization of

money laundering regulating to a large extent the matters covered by this Directive. The EU

has signed the Convention in 2009, but not yet ratified it. Specifically, Article 2(1) of the

Directive restricts the scope of predicate offences compared to the Warsaw Convention, which

is an option permitted under the Convention. The Commission envisages to adopt a proposal

for a Council Decision to allow the EU to ratify the Warsaw Convention and could address this

issue in that context.

At EU level, the Directive is consistent with other legislative instruments in the field. As

recognised in the European Internal Security Strategy (‘ProtectEU’)7, the EU has bolstered its

efforts with the new anti-money laundering rules, including the establishment of the EU Anti-

Money Laundering Authority, and with the new Directive on asset recovery and confiscation,

which is crucial to tackle the financial motives behind organised crime, freeze illicit assets

swiftly and confiscate criminal gains. Such developments are in line with the reinforced

criminal law response to money laundering brought by the Directive.

Nevertheless, the Directive presents some gaps as compared to the most recent criminal law

directives, for example on environmental crime or on the violation of restrictive measures,

regarding the application of additional penalties against natural persons and the sanctions

against legal ones.

Regarding the application of additional penalties against natural persons, the Directive

requires Member States to introduce, in addition to prison sentences, additional sanctions or

measures against perpetrators of money laundering, without specifying which type of

measures, which leads to a variation in national transpositions. In contrast, more recent EU

criminal law instruments explicitly list possible measures for Member States to apply against

natural persons, such as fines, exclusion from funding and public tenders, withdrawals of

permits or temporary bans on running for public office.

A similar issue occurs with regards to sanctions for legal persons. The Directive requires

Member States to provide for criminal or non-criminal fines and includes a list of possible

additional sanctions, which are only optional and not defined in sufficient detail. While this

provides the necessary flexibility to Member States, this contrasts with the most recent criminal

law legislation, which foresees a minimum level of the maximum fines for all offences, to be

6 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime

and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No. 198).     7 EUR-Lex - 52025DC0148 - EN - EUR-Lex.

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calculated either based on a percentage of the legal person’s worldwide turnover or based on a

fixed amount8.

3.4. EU added value

In terms of EU added value, the implementation of the Directive provides a positive benefit

stemming from EU-level legislative action that would likely not have been achieved by

Member States individually. The Directive has created a more homogeneous level playing

field for combating money laundering across the EU, which is regarded by judicial and law

enforcement stakeholders as positive as it contributes to greater legal consistency

and facilitates cross-border cooperation. However, the above-mentioned discrepancies in the

definition and prosecution of money laundering offences, especially as regards stand-alone

money laundering, and the divergent application of optional provisions (“may clauses”)

regarding penalties for natural and legal persons indicate that there still potential for further

EU-wide harmonisation.

3.5. Relevance

The Directive’s objectives and measures continue to be of relevance considering the challenges

in money laundering and organised crime: according to Europol’s Serious and Organised

Threat Assessment 2025, money laundering continues to play a crucial role in enabling

criminals to profit from illegal activities and is the backbone of organised crime9. Moreover,

modi operandi of money laundering often involve multiple transactions across various non-EU

jurisdictions, exploiting regulatory disparities and creating a complex trail that challenges

financial investigations: a harmonised criminal response across Member States is therefore as

important as ever. At the same time, according to Europol, money laundering is increasingly

facilitated by digital platforms and enhanced by emerging technologies10 – the technology

neutral character of the Directive allows to adapt the criminal law response to such evolutions,

ensuring the Directive maintains its relevance irrespective of technological developments.

3.6. Impacts on fundamental rights and freedoms

Finally Member State authorities, EU and international bodies generally consider the Directive

to be in line with fundamental rights standards, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights

of the European Union, or reported no available data. Other stakeholders – particularly NGOs,

think-thank and academia – voiced concerns regarding a possible impact on the protection of

the presumption of innocence when applying the stand-alone money laundering offence, the

principle of double jeopardy (ne bis in idem) in cases of self-laundering11, as well as regarding

8 For example, Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the

protection of the environment through criminal law obliges Member States to foresee fines for legal persons

in case of specific offences. The Directive, furthermore specifies that the maximum level of those fines is at

least 5 % or a lump sum of 40 000 000 euro for certain offences related to the pollution of the environment

and 3 % or 24 000 000 euro for other offences such as wildlife trafficking. 9 europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf 10 Ibid. 11 As in self-laundering, the distinction between predicate offence and money laundering offence is often not clear-

cut, so that there is a risk of a double punishment for the same act if there is a conviction for the predicate

offence and the money laundering offence.

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the clarity of the definition of offences and penalties and/or the proportionality of the latter,

especially when the predicate offence is a minor offence.

Overall, the feedback provided from the majority of stakeholders allows to conclude that

money laundering offences are formulated in a clear, precise and foreseeable manner and

penalties are appropriate and proportionate to the seriousness of the offences. Fundamental

rights are ensured through the rules set out in six EU Procedural Rights Directives, the Charter

and the European Convention of Human Rights as well as the general principles of criminal

law. In addition, the application of the national rules transposing the Directive is subject to the

review of national courts that have to ensure their compliance with fundamental rights and

freedoms.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSON LEARNT

The Directive is considered to largely meet its objectives, having enhanced the capacity of

competent authorities to investigate and prosecute money laundering through reinforced

offences and penalties and having facilitated cross-border investigations, without creating

significant additional costs or negatively impacting fundamental rights. Nevertheless, some

challenges remain, notably to increase the effectiveness and the coherence of some of its

provisions with other EU instruments.

Moreover, considering the length of criminal proceedings, the full impact of the Directive will

only be visible in the coming years. It is therefore important for the Commission to continue to

monitor the impacts of the Directive, including on fundamental rights and freedoms.

The evaluation has identified a number of lessons learnt, which Member States may wish to

consider in their transposition and implementation of the Directive.

• Enhanced clarity on stand-alone money laundering

To ensure that authorities are not obliged to essentially prove all elements of the predicate

offence, the requirements necessary to establish a predicate offence or the illicit origin of

laundered property should be clarified, thereby promoting a uniform application of the stand-

alone money laundering offence and facilitating the investigation and prosecution of money

laundering across EU Member States.

• Assessing minimum maximum levels of penalties and sanctions for natural

persons and legal entities, as well as setting out additional penalties and measures

It would ensure greater coherence to align the provisions on penalties and sanctions for natural

and legal persons to newly adopted EU criminal legislation, such as Directive (EU) 2024/1203

on the protection of the environment through criminal law and Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on

the violation of Union restrictive measures. This should include setting out the type of

additional penalties or measures that Member States can impose on perpetrators of money

laundering in addition to imprisonment, and set out specific sanctions for legal entities, notably

a minimum of the maximum level of fines, to be calculated either based on the global

worldwide turnover of the legal person or based on fixed amounts. This would ensure a level-

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playing field across Member States and reinforce the deterrent effect of the sanctions for money

laundering offences.

• Refinement of the definition of property

The definition of "property" should be refined to more expressly encompass all potential forms

of illicit gains, including direct proceeds, cost savings derived from tax crimes, and indirect

proceeds derived from criminal activities.

• Alignment with international instruments

Ensuring alignment between the Directive and the Warsaw Convention would enhance the

coherence between the two instruments.

• Monitoring of the impacts of the Directive

In order to monitor the impacts of the Directive, the Commission will continue to engage with

relevant stakeholders through fora such as the Commission Expert Group on EU Criminal

Policy, the Anti-Money Laundering Operational Network of financial investigators (AMON),

the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), the new

Cooperation Network on Asset Recovery and Confiscation, the Camden Asset Recovery Inter-

agency Network (CARIN), Eurojust’s Judicial Focus Group on Money Laundering and Asset

Recovery and the European Judicial Organised Crime Network.

The Commission will continue its dialogue with Member States and all stakeholders, to ensure

that the criminal law response to money laundering is effective, in line with EU policies in this

field and up to date, considering the evolving trends and modi operandi of criminal groups in

the financial sphere.

These recommendations are an important contribution to the efforts at EU level to promote the

follow-the-money approach as a key component in the fight against organised crime, an area

which is highlighted in the ProtectEU strategyas crucial to ensure a strong judicial response to

the most threatening criminal networks.

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 17.6.2026

COM(2026) 277 final

ANNEX

ANNEX

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND

THE COUNCIL

on the evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on combating money laundering by

criminal law

{SWD(2026) 148 final}

1

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND

THE COUNCIL

assessing the extent to which the Member States have taken the necessary measures to

comply with Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of

23 October 2018 on combating money laundering by criminal law

1 INTRODUCTION

Directive 2018/1673 on combating money laundering by criminal law (hereafter ‘the

Directive’) entered into force on 2 December 2018. The 25 EU Member States1 bound by the

Directive (i.e. all except Denmark and Ireland) had to bring into force the laws, regulations and

administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 3 December 2020.

In line with Article 14(1) of the Directive this report assesses the extent to which the Member

States have taken the necessary measures to comply with the Directive. The current report is

submitted as annex to the report pursuant to Article 14(2) of the Directive assessing the added

value of the Directive.

This analysis is based on information provided by the Member States to the European

Commission until 20 October 2025, as well as on an external study.

The Directive sets out common definitions of criminal offences and sanctions across EU

Member States aimed at combating money-laundering, in order to facilitate police and judicial

cooperation and prevent criminals from exploiting less stringent national systems. As the

laundering of illicit proceeds constitutes a core enabler of organised crime, the Directive helps

to weaken the financial base of criminal networks and supports efforts to dismantle them. It

requires Member States to criminalise, when committed intentionally, the conversion or transfer

of property known to come from criminal activity, the concealment or disguise of the true

nature, source, location, movement or ownership of that property, and the acquisition,

possession or use of such property. The Directive also allows Member States to extend the

offence of money-laundering to cases where the offender “suspected or ought to have known”

that the property derived from criminal activity. It obliges Member States to introduce

aggravating circumstances (e.g., involvement of a criminal organisation, or laundering via

professional activities) and requires penalties to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive,

including a minimum maximum imprisonment term of at least four years and, where relevant,

legal-entity liability measures. It contains rules on jurisdictions and the obligation to freeze and

confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities and obliges Member States to ensure that effective

investigative tools for the investigation of money laundering are in place.

The report indicates that Member States have made considerable efforts to ensure the alignment

of national laws with the provisions of the Directive, with some apparent inconsistencies and

gaps by a limited number of Member States.

Beyond the analysis provided by this report on the basis of the information made available to

the Commission to-date, there may be further challenges in transposition and other provisions

not reported to the Commission or further legislative and non-legislative developments that

1 When this report refers to “25 Member States” or any other number of Member States, this implies that these are

Member States bound by the Directive.

2

affect transposition. Therefore, this report should not prevent the Commission from further

assessing transposition and implementation of the Directive in the Member States.

2 COMPLIANCE OF TRANSPOSITION OF THE DIRECTIVE BY PROVISION

This chapter reviews the transposition of the Directive by Member States into national law,

assessing article by article the completeness and conformity of national laws and regulations

with the requirements of the Directive.

Article 2 – Definitions (including predicate offences)

Article 2 contains three definitions. Article 2(1) defines “criminal activity” as all offences

punishable by a maximum term of at least one year of imprisonment, or, where no maximum

penalty is prescribed, all offences punishable by a minimum term of more than six months of

imprisonment. The offences constituting criminal activity shall be considered as predicate

offences for money laundering, i.e. Member States shall criminalise the laundering of property

derived from these offences, as a minimum.

In addition, irrespective of the penalty thresholds, Member States are in any case required to

include a range of offences within each of the 22 categories of offences listed in Article 2(1),

(these include the offences harmonised at EU level)2.

A large majority of Member States bound by the Directive have gone beyond it by adopting a

so-called “all-crime approach”, whereby any criminal offence can constitute a predicate offence

to money laundering. Five Member States (France, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Portugal,

Austria) designate specific categories of criminal offences that can represent predicate offences

to money laundering.

All Member States have correctly transposed the definition of criminal activity as laid down

in Article 2(1).

Article 2(2) provides for a broad definition of ‘property’ that can be a suitable object of a

money laundering offence. In this regard, property is defined as assets of any kind, whether

corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents

or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or an interest in,

such assets. While Member States have not specifically transposed the term property in their

money laundering legislation, they often foresee definitions in other legal texts, which are used

also for the purposes of defining the objects of money laundering ensuring compliance with the

provision.

While 23 Member States have transposed the definition of property as laid down in Article

2(2), it appears that the legislation in Germany and Austria does not consider saved expenses

(such as taxes withheld through committing a tax crime) as property that can be laundered.

Essentially, Section 165 para. 6 of the Austrian Criminal Code excludes mere savings such as

unrealised losses that did not occur, waivers of claims or avoided expenses and charges from

the scope of money laundering. This prevents Austrian authorities from applying a money

laundering offence in the case of money saved by unlawfully not paying taxes and then

laundered. In the old version of Section 261 para. 5 of the German Criminal Code, expenses

2 See recital 5.

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saved through tax evasion were explicitly included in the scope of money laundering. With a

reform in 2021 this paragraph was deleted, consequently excluding such saved expenses from

the scope. Therefore, both jurisdictions seem to consider that only property that represents a

positive increase of a person’s assets, e.g. money gained through a drug trafficking offence or

a tax rebate, can be object of a laundering offence. However, the broad definition of property

in the Directive covers all types of property, including saved expenses even if not explicitly

mentioned.

Article 2(3) defines “legal person” as any entity having legal personality under the applicable

law, except for states or public bodies in the exercise of state authority and for public

international organisations. In similar fashion as with the term “property”, many Member States

define “legal person” in other pieces of legislation, which also apply for the purpose of money

laundering offences. This is compliant with the Directive.

Article 3 – Money laundering offences

Article 3(1) requires Member States to criminalise (a) the conversion or transfer of property,

(b) the concealment or disguise of various features of the property, and (c) the acquisition,

possession, or use of property, to the extent that the perpetrator of such acts knows that such

property is derived from criminal activity.

Member States have transposed this provision in different ways. Seven Member States

(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Finland, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) have

transposed the element of intent indirectly by relying on general criminal law principles that

establish that an offence is characterised only if the element of intent is present. The remaining

Member States have explicitly included the element of intent in the national provisions

criminalising money laundering.

Article 3(2) provides Member States with the option to further criminalise money laundering

when the offender did not know but suspected or ought to have known that the property was

derived from criminal activity (negligent money laundering). 15 Member States3 made use of

this option, criminalising negligent money laundering.

Considering that complex money laundering schemes make it hard to prove the predicate

offence, the Directive also intends to remove practical and legal barriers for the prosecution of

money laundering as a stand-alone offence. To do so, it obliges Member States to enable the

prosecution and conviction for money laundering without requiring a conviction for the

predicate offence (Article 3(3)(a)), and without requiring authorities to prove all the elements

of the predicate offence (which could include the identity of the perpetrator of the criminal

activity from which the property was derived)(Article 3(3)(b)). This is hereafter referred to as

‘stand-alone money laundering’.

Sixteen Members States4 have not transposed the provision explicitly but through ‘implied

transposition’, i.e. by not mentioning expressly in their national legislation on money

laundering that conditions such as a prior or simultaneous conviction for the predicate offence

or the establishment of all facts and circumstances of the predicate offence must be fulfilled.

3 Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Finland, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands,

Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, and Slovakia 4 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland,

Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, and Slovakia.

4

The Commission notes that the threshold for proving the illicit origin of the property in

court differs considerably among Member States.

In fourteen Member States5, it is not necessary to specify the type of the predicate offence,

when proving the illicit origin of the property. Rather, it is sufficient to establish that the

laundered property originates from a criminal activity that has been committed, which

significantly facilitates the prosecution of money laundering.

However, courts in a number of Member States still impose high standards for proving the

existence of a predicate offence. Ten Member States6 still require authorities to identify the

category of offence to which the predicate offence belongs (e.g. drug trafficking, trafficking in

human beings, fraud etc.). Among these, two Member States (Bulgaria and Poland) require

a specifically high threshold of proof regarding the predicate offence. Bulgaria7 still requires

proving the type of criminal offence, and the time and place of its commission. In Poland, case

law8 requires to establish that specific assets were derived from a specific predicate offence in

a sufficiently specific way.

As also indicated in the evaluation report, the wording of the Directive is very broad,

allowing for such transposition. The Directive requires that a conviction for money laundering

is possible “without it being necessary to establish all the factual elements or all circumstances”

of the predicate offence, but such a wording means that legislation can still require authorities

to prove all elements of the predicate offence except one.

Taking into account this wide margin that the Directive provides for Member States, as regards

Article 3(3)(a) and (b) no case of non-compliance has been identified.

All Member States transposed in a compliant manner that money laundering offences

extend to property derived from conduct in another Member State or non-EU country,

where the conduct would constitute a predicate offence had it occurred domestically (Article

3(3)(c)).

For proportionality reasons, Article 3(4) gives Member States the option to narrow down the

scope of cross-border cases where money laundering is punishable, i.e. when the predicate

offence took place in countries where such conduct is not criminalised (requirement of “double

criminality”). For certain categories of serious offences, however, such possibility to narrow

down the cross-border scope is not available. In cases of participation in an organised criminal

group, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation, drug

trafficking and corruption, committed in another EU Member State or third country, it must still

be possible to prosecute a person for money laundering even if the conduct that generated the

money does not constitute a criminal offence in that other country.

5 Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden,

Slovakia, and Slovenia. 6 Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Portugal 7 Art. 253 Bulgarian criminal code. 8 Supreme Court ruling on Art. 299 § 1 criminal code.

5

Eight Member States9made use of the option to require “double criminality”. However,

Luxemburg10 requires double criminality for some of the offences for which such a principle

should not be applied, namely the participation in a criminal organisation and racketeering. .

Finally, Member States must ensure that the conducts being criminalised as money laundering

in Article 3(1)(a) and (b) are punishable in case of “self-laundering” (Article 3(5)), meaning

a case where the person who committed or was involved in the commission of the predicate

offence is laundering the proceeds of its own crime.

Member States implemented this provision expressly in their national legislation or

implicitly by not making it a condition that the perpetrator of the predicate offence is distinct

from the perpetrator of the money laundering offence. Some Member States included

exceptions in their national legislation that do not affect compliance, e.g. Germany requires

that the illegal assets are somehow brought into circulation, and Italy and Estonia exclude the

use for personal enjoyment from the scope. Therefore, no case of non-conformity has been

identified.

Article 4 – Aiding and abetting, inciting and attempting

Article 4 requires that ancillary offences, i.e. aiding and abetting, inciting someone to

commit a money laundering offence and attempting a money laundering offence, must be

punishable as a criminal offence.

All 25 Member States transposed Article 4 correctly.

Article 5 – Penalties for natural persons

Article 5 requires that money laundering offences and ancillary offences are punishable by

effective, proportionate, and dissuasive criminal penalties, specifying that money

laundering offences must be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least four

years.

In this regard, the Commission notes that Sweden11 has set in its legislation a maximum of

two years, while Greece12 seems not to have followed the four years threshold if the predicate

offence is a misdemeanor, which in practice means that the penalty for money laundering is not

sufficiently high for a wide range of the predicate offences established in the Directive.

Article 6 – Aggravating circumstances

Article 6(1) establishes two mandatory aggravating circumstances: when money laundering is

committed within a criminal organisation or when it is committed in the course of the

professional activities of an “obliged entity”, meaning an entity subject to specific reporting

and customer verification obligations under the EU’s anti-money laundering legislation13.

9 Austria, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Finland, Hungary, Luxemburg, and Portugal. 10 Art. 506-3(2) code pénal, in combination with Article 5-1 Code de procédure pénale. 11 Lag (2014:307) om straff för penningtvättsbrott, 3 §. 12 Article 39(1)(d), L. 4557/2018. 13 See in particular Article 2(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20

May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist

financing, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, pp. 73–117, latest consolidated version available under: EUR-Lex - 02015L0849-

20241230 - EN - EUR-Lex

6

In this regard, it should be noted that Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia have not introduced in

their legislation the aggravating circumstance money laundering being committed by an obliged

entity; Cyprus14 does not provide for aggravating circumstances for aiding, abetting, inciting,

and attempting money laundering; Greece15 cannot apply aggravating circumstances where the

predicate offence is a misdemeanour, which in practice excludes a wide range of the predicate

offences established in the Directive.

Article 6(2) offers Member States the possibility to introduce two additional aggravating

circumstances, (a) when the laundered property is of considerable value or (b) when the

laundered property was derived from a set of specific offences16. Option (a) was transposed

by 14 Member States17, option (b) by four Member States18.

All Member States that used the options transposed them in a manner compliant with the

Directive.

Article 7 – Liability of legal persons

According to the Directive it must be possible to hold legal persons liable for money laundering

offences, including self-laundering. This includes actions by any person, acting either

individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, and having a leading position within that

entity (Article 7(1)). Member States also need to ensure that legal persons can be held liable

where lack of supervision or control has made the commission of the offence possible (Article

7(2)). Liability of legal persons should however not exclude the possibility of bringing criminal

proceedings against natural persons involved as perpetrators in the commission of the offences

(Article 7(3)).

With regard to the liability of legal persons, France has not introduced in its legislation the

possibility to hold legal persons liable when the money laundering offences were possible due

to the lack of supervision or control by a person in leading position within that entity.

Article 8 – Sanctions for legal persons

Article 8 requires Member States to ensure that a legal person held liable pursuant to Article 7

is punishable by effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions including, in any case,

criminal or non-criminal fines. All Member States have transposed this provision in a

compliant manner.

In addition, Article 8 lists options for further sanctions, from excluding the legal entity from

public benefits or aid, to the exclusions from access to public funding, the disqualification from

the practice of commercial activities, placing the entity under judicial supervision, the closure

of establishments used for committing the offence and even the possibility for a judicial order

14 Part I §4(4). L. 188(I)/2007. 15 Article 39(1)(d), L. 4557/2018. 16 Participation in an organised criminal group or racketeering, terrorism, trafficking in human beings and migrant

smuggling, sexual exploitation, illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, and corruption. 17 Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Finland, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Sweden,

Slovenia, and Slovakia. 18 Greece, Span, Finland, and Croatia.

7

to dissolve the company (i.e. winding-up). 19 Member States19 have made use of one or more

of these options. Six Member States have not used any of the options at all.

All Member States that used these options have transposed them in a manner compliant with

the Directive.

Article 9 – Confiscation

Article 9 requires Member States to ensure, as appropriate, that national competent

authorities freeze or confiscate the proceeds derived from, and instrumentalities used or

intended to be used in the commission or contribution to the commission of the money

laundering offences as referred to in this Directive in accordance with the confiscation Directive

2014/42/EU20.

All 25 Member States transposed Article 9 in compliance with the Directive.

Article 10 – Jurisdiction

Article 10(1) requires a Member State to establish its jurisdiction over money laundering

offences, when the offence is committed on their territory (Article 10(1)(a)), or when the

offender is one of their nationals (Article 10(1)(b)). All Member States have transposed the

provision in compliance with the Directive.

As regards Article 10(1)(b), it should be noted that specifically in the instance where the

offender is a national of the Member State, the provision has been transposed in a divergent

manner, particularly with respect to the requirement of double criminality21.

In the absence of a specific provision addressing this matter, 10 Member States22 seem to have

implemented the Directive without explicitly stipulating double criminality as a precondition

for the assertion of jurisdiction. Conversely, 11 Member States23 have expressly incorporated

the aforementioned requirement as a condition for establishing jurisdiction over their nationals.

Meanwhile, three Member States24 have explicitly excluded the double criminality

requirement for money laundering offences.

Article 10(2) allows Member States to extend their jurisdiction to cases when (a) the offender

is a habitual resident on their territory, or (b) when the offence was committed for the benefit

of a legal person established on their territory. 14 Member States25 have made use of the option

under Article 10(2)(a). Ten Member States26 have made use of the option under Article

10(2)(b) in a compliant manner.

19 Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania,

Luxemburg, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. 20 See recital 16 of the CMLD Directive: “[…] Member States should, as a minimum, ensure the freezing and confiscation of

the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in all cases provided for in Directive 2014/42/EU. Member States should also

strongly consider enabling confiscation in all cases where it is not possible to initiate or conclude criminal proceedings,

including in cases where the offender has died.”. 21 That is the principle whereby jurisdiction can only be established where the conduct in question is criminalised both in the

prosecuting state and in the state in which it was committed. 22 Bulgaria, Czechia, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland. 23 Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Austria, Sweden. 24 Greece, The Netherlands, Romania. 25 Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Croatia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden,

and Slovakia. 26 Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Luxemburg, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia.

8

Article 11 – Investigative tools

Article 11 requires that effective investigative tools, such as those used in organised crime

or other serious crime cases, are available to the persons, units, or services responsible for

investigating or prosecuting money laundering offences, including their aiding, abetting,

inciting and attempt27. All 25 Member States transposed Article 11 in compliance with the

Directive.

3 CONCLUSIONS

Given the importance of money laundering for organised crime networks as a crucial financing

tool, and as a mean to secure illicit gains and to infiltrate the legal economy, the harmonisation

of the criminal law response to money laundering is an essential component in the Union’s

broader efforts to disrupt and dismantle criminal networks, as highlighted in the European

Internal Security Strategy ProtectEU28.

The Commission acknowledges the efforts made by Member States to take measures to comply

with the Directive. Although some inconsistencies and gaps remain, in sum the transposition of

the Directive has been broadly compliant, with Member States taking comprehensive measures

to align national laws with EU standards. Most Member States have adopted specific legislation

to meet the requirements of the Directive, while a few relied completely or to a large extent on

existing national provisions.

To ensure full and correct transposition of the Directive the Commission will continue to

support the Member States to address identified deficiencies. This includes monitoring and

ensuring that national measures comply with the provisions in the Directive.

27 See also recital 19: “It should thereby be ensured that sufficient personnel and targeted training, resources and

up-to-date technological capacity are available. […].” 28 EUR-Lex - 52025DC0148 - EN - EUR-Lex

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 17.6.2026

SWD(2026) 148 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

EVALUATION

Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October

2018 on combating money laundering by criminal law

{COM(2026) 277 final}

Table of contents

1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 3

1.1 General introduction ........................................................................................... 3

1.2 Purpose and scope of the evaluation .................................................................. 3

1.3 Methodology of the evaluation ........................................................................... 4

2. WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? ............. 5

2.1 Description of the main elements and objectives of Directive (EU) 2018/1673

on combating money laundering by criminal law .......................................................... 5

3. HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION

PERIOD? ..................................................................................................................... 8

3.1 Transposition ............................................................................................................ 8

3.2 Other developments in the field ................................................................................ 8

4. EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) ............................................... 9

4.1. TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE INTERVENTION SUCCESSFUL AND

WHY? .......................................................................................................................... 9

4.1.1 Effectiveness ...................................................................................................... 9

4.1.2. Efficiency ........................................................................................................ 23

4.2. HOW DID THE EU INTERVENTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE AND TO

WHOM? .................................................................................................................... 29

4.2.1 EU added value ................................................................................................ 29

4.2.2. Fundamental rights and freedoms ................................................................... 30

4.3. IS THE INTERVENTION STILL RELEVANT? .................................................... 34

4.3.1. Current and future threats and needs concerning the development of organised

crime, particularly focusing on evolving money laundering activities ..................... 34

4.3.2. Remaining obstacles/legal and practical issues in the fight against money

laundering .................................................................................................................. 34

5. WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED? ....................... 35

ANNEX I. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ................................................................. 38

1. Lead DG .................................................................................................................... 38

2. Organisation and timing............................................................................................ 38

3. Evidence, sources and quality ................................................................................... 38

ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED ....................... 39

1. Methods and sources ............................................................................................ 39

2. Known limitations ................................................................................................ 39

3. Process description ............................................................................................... 41

3.1. Stakeholder consultation .............................................................................. 43

3.2. Data analysis techniques and tools ............................................................... 43

ANNEX III. EVALUATION MATRIX ........................................................................... 44

1. Evaluation matrix ................................................................................................. 44

2. Effectiveness......................................................................................................... 45

3. Efficiency ............................................................................................................. 53

4. Relevance ............................................................................................................. 56

5. Coherence ............................................................................................................. 59

6. EU added value..................................................................................................... 60

7. Fundamental rights ............................................................................................... 61

ANNEX IV. OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS ................................................ 64

ANNEX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT ................. 66

Desk research ................................................................................................................ 66

Discovery interviews .................................................................................................... 66

Ad hocinterviews: ........................................................................................................ 67

Interviews (and written contributions) for case studies ................................................ 67

Online surveys .............................................................................................................. 68

Participation in meetings and workshops ..................................................................... 69

Tertiary experts ............................................................................................................. 69

Results of the stakeholder consultation activities ......................................................... 69

Glossary

Term or acronym Meaning or definition

The Directive Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on combating money laundering by

criminal law

Warsaw Convention Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and

Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of

Terrorism (CETS No 198)

AML Anti-money laundering

AROs Asset Recovery Offices

CEPOL European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training

CMLD Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the criminalisation of money

laundering

DG HOME Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs of the European

Commission

EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats

Eurojust European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation

Europol European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation

EJTN European Judicial Training Network

EPPO European Public Prosecutor’s Office

FATF Financial Action Task Force

FIUs Financial Intelligence Units

FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organisation

LEAs Law enforcement agencies

Moneyval  Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money

Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism  

TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  

UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  

3

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 General introduction1

Combating money laundering is essential for addressing the threats posed by organised

crime networks, including their infiltration of the legal economy and the risks they create

for public security. Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on combating money laundering through

criminal law (‘the CMLD’ or ‘the Directive’) was adopted by the European Parliament

and the Council on 23 October 20182. The Directive strengthens law enforcement and

judicial responses to money laundering, fosters cross-border cooperation both within the

EU and internationally, and complements the legislative framework on the prevention of

money laundering.

The Directive establishes minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences in the

field of money laundering and ensures that illicit proceeds from a broad range of criminal

activities can be effectively addressed by specifying the criminal activities that constitute

‘predicate offences’ for money laundering, i.e. the criminal acts from which the laundered

property originated.

Furthermore, it lays down provisions on penalties and sanctions applicable to both natural

and legal persons, as well as rules on freezing and confiscation, jurisdiction, and the use

of certain investigative tools against money laundering.

The deadline for transposition was 3 December 2020. The Directive applies in 25

Member States; Ireland and Denmark are not bound by it.

1.2 Purpose and scope of the evaluation

Article 14(2) of the Directive requires the European Commission to submit a report to the

European Parliament and the Council to assess the Directive’s added value and its impact

on fundamental rights and freedoms.

This evaluation presents evidence on the legislative and practical implementation of the

Directive and its effects on fundamental rights. This includes a description of the

implementation process (see Chapter 3) as well as an analysis in terms of effectiveness,

efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU-added value in line with the rules for Better

regulation3. In this context, this evaluation draws a number of conclusions and makes

concrete recommendations for future action.

1 It should be noted that this SWD is an informative supporting document accompanying the act; it has no

legal effect and cannot commit the European Commission. 2 Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on

combating money laundering by criminal law, OJ L 284, 12.11.2018, p. 22-30, available here. 3 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-guidelines-evaluation-fitness-

checks.pdf

4

The temporal scope of this report covers the period from 2018 to 2025 and all Member

States bound by the Directive, that is all except Ireland and Denmark, which have opted

out of its adoption.

1.3 Methodology of the evaluation

In support of the evaluation, an external study4 was carried out, guided by the Better

Regulation Guidelines. The study assessed the Directive against the five evaluation

criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence, and EU added value) as well as

its impact on fundamental rights in the context of criminal proceedings. The study

applied the intervention logic and an evaluation matrix (see Annex II) to structure data

collection, guide analysis, and support conclusions and recommendations.

Evidence was collected through six complementary activities carried out under the close

supervision of DG Migration and Home Affairs: desk research, interviews, targeted

consultations (surveys and interviews), statistical data collection, case studies and expert

workshops.

The study placed particular emphasis on stakeholder perspectives. Extensive surveys and

interviews were conducted between late 2023 and early 2024, allowing for insights into

the Directive’s implementation.

The external study also produced a total of three case studies (i) on crypto-asset financial

investigations; (ii) on the stand-alone money-laundering offence and (iii) on information

exchange and cooperation between a Member State and a third country. The purpose of

these case studies was to obtain a deeper view on the practical impact of the Directive

within Member States.

The study acknowledges certain limitations in relation to stakeholder engagement and

availability of data given the short period since the transposition of the Directive. Many

money laundering cases, particularly those involving newer forms such as stand-alone or

self-laundering, often take several years to reach final adjudication, especially when

appealed to higher courts. In an effort to compensate for these limitations, the study

provided alternative engagement options, such as bilateral consultations or focus group

discussions, to gather opinions and views that would still give insights into the practical

application of the Directive on the ground.

Notwithstanding the limitations, the adopted methodology provided a sufficiently robust

evidence base for assessing the Directive’s performance, identifying shortcomings and

proposing recommendations for possible future revision. A detailed description of the

methodology and analytical tools is set out in Annex I.

4 Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by criminal law. Final

Report. ISBN 978-92-68-37245-6 (Print version) - ISBN 978-92-68-37240-1 (PDF)

5

2. WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION?

2.1 Description of the main elements and objectives of Directive (EU)

2018/1673 on combating money laundering by criminal law

Annex II shows the intervention logic of the Directive in full detail.

As emphasised in recital 1 of the Directive, money laundering poses a serious threat to

the integrity, stability and reputation of the financial sector and to the internal market, as

well as to the security of people in the EU. There was therefore a need to strengthen the

EU’s legal framework to effectively combat money laundering by criminal law (need 1).

The lack of harmonisation in the definition of money laundering offences and predicate

offences limited the effectiveness of measures at the time. There was therefore a need to

ensure consistent and uniform definitions across the EU (need 2).

The absence of proportionate and consistent penalties and sanctions for money laundering

offences across Member States further hindered effective enforcement. There was

therefore a need to establish minimum rules across the EU on penalties and sanctions

(need 3).

6

Finally, the evolving nature of organised crime, including new forms of criminal activity

and modi operandi such as self-laundering, called for a reinforced and future-proof legal

framework (need 4).

To address these needs, the Directive sought to provide a common EU-wide framework

for the criminalisation of money laundering and the strengthening of judicial and law

enforcement responses. The Directive’s general objective is to reinforce the EU’s anti-

money laundering regime through criminal law. More specifically, the Directive had the

following objectives:

• ensuring the effective criminalisation of money laundering offences across the

EU;

• introducing clear and uniform definitions of predicate offences;

• establishing consistent and proportionate penalties and sanctions;

• enhancing cooperation and information exchange between Member States.

The expected impacts of the Directive were:

• more effective investigation and prosecution of money laundering perpetrators,

through the adoption of harmonised offences, penalties and sanctions;

• increased protection of people in the EU and of the internal market against threats

of organised crime and terrorist financing, through the availability of effective

tools for authorities to investigate money laundering and bring perpetrators,

including legal entities, to justice;

• more efficient and coordinated cross-border action against money laundering,

through strengthened cooperation and information exchange between Member

States;

• more effective investigative tools available to authorities in money laundering

investigations;

• strengthened confiscation measures.

At the same time, the Directive is being applied in a context where external factors

continue to increase the threat from money laundering to Europe’s security and to the

integrity of the financial system. Criminal groups are continuously evolving in terms of

their modi operandi and using new technologies, including those emerging in the

financial sector. The Directive’s application further coincides with other regulatory

developments at EU level in the fight against money laundering, with the 2024 Anti-

Money Laundering Package and the Directive on asset recovery and confiscation, which

was also adopted in 2024, presenting significant novelties of relevance for this analysis.

7

2.2 Point(s) of comparison

To reconstruct the baseline scenario and the point of comparison, this evaluation takes as

its point of departure the EU legislative framework addressing the threat from money

laundering activities which existed at the time of the Directive’s adoption.

The main EU instrument against money laundering back in 2018 was the Fifth Anti-

Money Laundering Directive5, which established measures to prevent money laundering.

On the repressive side, the main rules to facilitate the prosecution of this offence were set

out in Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA on money laundering, the identification,

tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime6.

However, this instrument was limited in scope and did not ensure a comprehensive

criminalisation of money-laundering offences. Although all Member States criminalised

money laundering, significant differences existed. These differences concerned first and

foremost the respective definitions of what constitutes money laundering, the predicate

offences, as well as the level of sanctions. The former legislative framework, before the

2018 Directive, was neither comprehensive nor sufficiently coherent to be fully effective.

This situation had clear operational consequences. Differences in national laws hindered

cross-border police and judicial cooperation and complicated information exchange

between Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). Practitioners and EU agencies such as

Europol and Eurojust reported that these inconsistencies reduced the effectiveness of

investigations and prosecutions, particularly in cases involving cross-border money

laundering and links to terrorist financing7.

At the same time, the scale of the problem was substantial. Criminal proceeds were

estimated at around EUR 110 billion annually in the EU, while only a small share was

recovered. Terrorist groups increasingly relied on criminal activities and money

laundering schemes to finance their operations8. Without intervention, these trends were

expected to continue, reinforcing organised crime and increasing security risks.

The pre-intervention situation therefore constitutes the main point of comparison for the

assessment. The intervention will be evaluated against this baseline by examining

changes in the level of legal harmonisation, the effectiveness of investigations, cross-

border cooperation and the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions.

5 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the

prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist

financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and

repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission

Directive 2006/70/EC, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, pp. 73–117, available at: https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/849/oj/eng 6 Council Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing,

seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime, OJ L 182, 05.07.2001, p. 1-2,

available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/nl/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32001F0500 7 See explanatory memorandum of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the

Council on countering money laundering by criminal law, COM/2016/0826 final - 2016/0414 (COD) 8 Ibid.

8

3. HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD?

3.1 Transposition

The deadline for Member States to formally incorporate Directive (EU) 2018/1673 into

their national laws was December 2020. Only nine Member States had transposed the

Directive by this deadline9. The degree of the delay in transposition for the remaining

Member States varied to a great extent.

Most Member States adopted specific legislation to transpose the Directive. There was

only a handful of Member States, that considered the pre-existing legislation (largely)

sufficient to transpose the Directive10. Where legislation was adopted for transposing the

Directive, this was primarily done via amendments to the Criminal Code and, to a lesser

extent, to the Code of Criminal Procedure or other, more specific, legislation.

In its transposition report the Commission acknowledges the efforts made by Member

States to take comprehensive measures to transpose the Directive and align national laws

with EU standards. However, some gaps and inconsistencies were detected and detailed

in the report.

3.2 Other developments in the field

In parallel with the application of the Directive, important changes have taken place in

criminal practices, in technological advancements and in the overall regulatory

framework.

In recent years, money laundering practices have undergone significant developments.

Criminals take advantage of the possibilities offered by technological innovation and the

rise of the digital economy, combining them with traditional money laundering

techniques11.

Crypto-assets have opened new avenues for illicit financial flows, creating challenges for

both regulators and law enforcement authorities. Europol observes that crypto-assets are

increasingly misused for money laundering and terrorist financing12.

The constantly evolving techniques of money launderers, such as the use of decentralised

finance (DeFi) platforms, crypto-asset mixers, but also the misuse of cash, high-value

goods or traditional informal value transfer systems (such as hawala13) and the criminal

9 Czechia, Estonia, France, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden. 10 France, Poland, Slovenia, and Sweden. 11 Europol, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment – The changing DNA of

serious and organised crime, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2025. 12 See Europol, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment – The changing DNA of

serious and organised crime, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2025; Europol,

European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, Publications Office of the European Union,

Luxembourg, 2025. 13 Hawala is an informal, trust-based money-transfer system often used for money remittances. It operates

outside traditional banking, without using authorised financial institutions.

9

infiltration into the legal economy, continue to pose significant and sometimes novel

risks.

At the same time, authorities across the EU and globally have intensified efforts to curb

money laundering and tackle criminal finances. Measures taken after the adoption of the

Directive include establishing new supervisory frameworks14, such as through the

creation of an EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority, and the strengthening of the

legislation on the prevention of money laundering15, asset recovery16, regulation of the

crypto-asset sector17, or access of law enforcement to financial information18. There are

also efforts to (i) establish specialised investigative units in different Member States

focused on financial crime; (ii) foster closer cooperation between Financial Intelligence

Units (FIUs)19 as well as between the public and private sector20; or (iii) strengthen

cooperation with third countries in the fight against money laundering. Effectively, the

changing modi operandi of criminal networks underline the need for sustained vigilance

and coordinated actions between all stakeholders involved.

4. EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART)

4.1. To what extent was the intervention successful and why?

4.1.1 Effectiveness

Main findings:

• The Directive has made progress in providing a comprehensive and harmonised legal

framework, ensuring a closer alignment of predicate offences. However, issues remain,

particularly in relation to the definition of property, the interpretation of the stand-alone money

laundering, and sanctions for legal persons.

14 In particular, the EU created the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of

Terrorism, on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council

of 31 May 2024 establishing the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing

of Terrorism, OJ L, 2024/1620, 19.6.2024. AMLA will also support closer cooperation among

Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). 15 See in particular the EU’s ‘Anti-Money Laundering Package’ adopted in 2024, including Regulation

(EU) 2024/1624 of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes

of money laundering or terrorist financing, OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024, and Directive (EU) 2015/849

of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money

laundering or terrorist financing, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015. 16 See in particular Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of 24 April 2024 on asset recovery and confiscation, OJ L,

2024/1260, 2.5.2024. This Directive also introduces the obligation to conduct parallel financial

investigations into organised crime cases. 17 See in particular Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets, OJ L 150,

9.6.2023, and Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers of

funds and certain crypto-assets, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, pp. 1–3. 18 See Directive (EU) 2024/1654 of 31 May 2024 amending Directive (EU) 2019/1153 as regards access by

competent authorities to centralised bank account registries through the interconnection system and

technical measures to facilitate the use of transaction records, OJ L, 2024/1654, 19.6.2024. 19 At EU-level for example through the new EU Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the

Financing of Terrorism, which started its operations in 2025. 20 See for example Europol Financial Intelligence Public Private partnership (EFIPPP), EFIPPP Practical

Guide for Operational Cooperation between Investigative Authorities and Financial Institutions,

Publication Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2025.

10

• In regard to the facilitation of investigation and prosecution stakeholders have reported both

improvements and ongoing challenges, as divergent interpretations and applications continue to

affect the Directive’s effectiveness.

• In relation to the prevention of money laundering, responses varied: some stakeholders

reported that the Directive made a significant contribution, while others noted a limited impact, as

their national frameworks had already addressed money laundering.

• Responses generally suggest a moderate to high facilitation of cross-border cooperation.

The evaluation looks at the extent to which the instrument delivers on its intended goals

and generates the expected outcomes. This entails examining its impact on the key

problems it seeks to address, the level of compliance and practical implementation by

Member States, and the degree to which objectives are met.

This section presents how the Directive has brought changes into Member States’

systems and the main issues that hamper the effective application of the Directive. It

further presents (i) an assessment of the extent to which the Directive has strengthened

the capacity of authorities to investigate and prosecute money laundering across the EU

and (ii) an analysis of the effectiveness of the optional provisions and of the impacts of

the Directive on cross-border cooperation, mainly based on stakeholders’ views.

4.1.1.1 Comprehensive and harmonised legal framework on the criminalisation of

money laundering, including money laundering offences and penalties

The evaluation aims to answer the question of whether the Directive’s goals of ensuring a

sufficient degree of harmonisation of money laundering offences and related penalties

have been achieved. In this regard, the evaluation finds that the Directive has achieved

progress in providing for a comprehensive and harmonised legal framework on money

laundering, including its offences and related penalties across Member States.

As described in the above Section 3.1 on transposition and in the transposition report,

most Member States have fully transposed with the Directive and included similar

definitions of offences (including self-laundering) and penalties as well as aggravating

circumstances in their national legislation.

Stakeholders consulted in the context of the supporting study accompanying the

evaluation, including all the judicial authorities consulted, reported either a high or very

high degree of alignment between their national legislation and the Directive’s provisions

on offences and penalties. It is to be noted that a number of national frameworks were

already in line with international standards reflected in the Directive (a point also raised

by criminal law practitioners and one international organisation), in particular regarding

the ‘standard’ money-laundering offence, i.e. transferring or converting property derived

from criminal activity, hiding or disguising its illicit origin, or acquiring, possessing or

using property knowing of its criminal origin21. Despite this, the Directive still led to

further approximation, for instance, thanks to the introduction of new money laundering

21 One of the evaluation questions relates to the extent to which there were any legislative national

measures already in place before the adoption of the Directive.

11

offences and the clarification of aggravating circumstances22. There was also an

approximation in the level of penalties among Member States for these offences, with all

Member States being conform with the thresholds set out in the Directive (a maximum of

at least four years for the standard money laundering offences as well as for self-

laundering). Members of the EMPACT community have indicated the deterrent effect of

the national laws transposing the Directive, including with regard to penalties, according

to the consultation carried out by the external study supporting the evaluation.

The transposition of the Directive also ensured a closer alignment of predicate offences,

in line with the approach in the Directive which defines the concept of ‘criminal activity’

(Article 2). This definition sets a minimum threshold (offences with a maximum penalty

of imprisonment of at least one year), while enumerating a list of categories of serious

offences which should, as a minimum, be considered predicate offences (e.g. eurocrimes23

such as drug trafficking or trafficking in human beings but also other categories of crime

such as robbery, forgery etc.). Stakeholders consulted – notably academics and criminal

law practitioners – have underlined that while some Member States have opted for an all-

crimes approach, others have included a list of crimes in their legislation. This still

implies a high level of harmonisation and, by ensuring that a wide range of criminal

activities is considered predicate offences, it facilitates the investigation and prosecution

of money laundering.

This means not only that there is alignment among Member States’ provisions, but also

that authorities across the EU can now count on having a comprehensive set of tools to

respond more effectively to the various acts that constitute money laundering, through a

sufficiently broad definition of the money laundering offence, a comprehensive scope of

predicate offences and through sufficiently dissuasive penalties.

Nonetheless, certain issues may still warrant closer attention to ensure a common

understanding and a more consistent approach in practice. This will be discussed below.

- Definition of ‘property’ and the interpretation of the concept of property in the

context of money laundering (Article 2)

Article 2(2) of the CMLD Directive defines ‘property’ as including ‘assets of any kind,

whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and

legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing

title to, or an interest in, such assets’. While the definition of property in the Directive is,

in principle, very broad, the Commission was made aware in exchanges with national

22 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, pages 32-25. 23 According to Art. 83 TFEU, eurocrimes are particularly serious crimes with a cross-border dimension

resulting from the nature or impact of such offenses or from a special need to combat them on a

common basis. They are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation

of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption,

counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime.

12

practitioners as well as with EU authorities that some Member States apply a more

limited interpretation and exclude saved expenses (such as taxes withheld through

committing a tax crime) from the scope of ‘property’ that can be the object of a money

laundering offence. During the consultation with stakeholders, one EU body also

highlighted this issue, stressing that this limitation can have consequences for offences

such as VAT and customs fraud, which can involve hundreds of millions of euro24.

Although saved expenses (such as taxes withheld through committing a tax crime) are not

explicitly mentioned, the Directive’s recitals (13 and 16) clarify that no distinction should

be made between property derived directly from criminal activity and that derived

indirectly.

- Harmonised implementation, interpretation and application of stand-alone money

laundering (Article 3(3)(a)(b))

A major step taken by the Directive was the introduction of provisions on stand-alone

money laundering. This enables authorities to prosecute and convict a person for money

laundering without requiring a prior conviction for the underlying predicate offence that

generated the property to be laundered. The intention was to eliminate legal and practical

barriers to investigations and prosecutions, given that it is often difficult to prove a

predicate offence from which the perpetrator is often distant in time and space.

At the same time, the transposition checks and consultations with stakeholders (e.g.

during bilateral meetings with prosecutors or during the second Eurojust meeting on

money laundering and asset recovery)25 as well as case work carried out by Eurojust26

revealed that, although Member States did incorporate stand-alone money laundering into

their national legislation, the interpretation of this offence still varies considerably,

particularly as regards the extent to which the predicate offence must be proven27. As a

result, in some Member States it is relatively simple to prosecute and convict for stand-

alone money laundering, whereas in others the evidentiary threshold for proving the illicit

origin of the laundered property remains so high that the situation differs little from the

one that existed before the Directive entered into force28. Therefore, there are significant

differences in the extent to which the provision for stand-alone money laundering has

been effectively applied in practice, depending on the way in which Member States

transposed the Directive. Several national courts require a high level of proof that a

24 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 33. 25https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/eurojust-leads-efforts-step-judicial-response-money-laundering-

and-asset-recovery 26Eurojust (2022), Report on Money-Laundering, p. 8 available here:

https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/publication/eurojust-report-money-laundering 27 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 27. 28 Ibid.

13

specific predicate offence took place, which makes prosecution particularly difficult in

complex or cross-border cases29.

In principle, this is not an issue of transposition, as the Directive’s wording allows for

such divergent interpretations: the Directive only requires that money laundering should

be punishable even in the absence of a conviction and that not all elements of the

predicate offence have to be proven. As such the Directive, while taking an important

step forward in creating a more uniform legal framework, left a lot of room for

interpretation during transposition and practical application. This continues to create

difficulties for effective cross-border law enforcement and weakens harmonisation across

the EU. The effects on investigations for practitioners are further elaborated under

Section 4.1.1.3.

- Harmonised implementation, interpretation and application of self-laundering

(Article 3(5))

Article 3(5) of the Directive introduces the concept of self-laundering, enabling the

prosecution of money laundering even in cases where the perpetrator of the predicate

offence also laundered the money derived from the offence – something which was not

possible in many Member States before the Directive. With the application of the

Directive, it is now possible for authorities to prosecute self-laundering, at least for the

cases of conversion, transfer, concealment or disguise of the property (Article 3(1)(a) and

(b) of the Directive). For the cases of acquisition possession and use (Article 3(1)(c) of

the Directive) it was left for Member States to decide if self-laundering should be

criminalised.

Overall, this has led to an approximation of Member States’ laws in this area, with a

number of differences among Member States. Some have an extensive scope of self-

laundering, comprising acquisition, possession and use. Others do not, even introducing

additional requirements, for example, that self-laundering can only be punishable if the

laundered property is brought into circulation. These differences derive not only from the

optional nature of self-laundering for the offences of acquisition, possession and use as

regulated in Article 3(1)(c) but also from the indications of flexibility that the Directive

provides in this area as per recital 1130. Therefore, it is worth continuing the analysis of

the concrete application of self-laundering in the long-term, to understand whether the

differences could create any problem in practice, in particular with respect to cross-border

cooperation. Another aspect to further monitor and assess is the effect on the right to

defence (regarding the effect on fundamental rights, see more details below in Section

29 See also Eurojust (2022), Report on Money-Laundering, p.8 ‘This has an impact on international

cooperation, as prosecutors from these countries are more reluctant to start money laundering

investigations’. 30 Recital 11 states that money laundering should at least be punishable “where, the money laundering

activity does not simply amount to the mere possession or use of property, but also involves the

transfer, conversion, concealment or disguise of property and results in further damage than that

already caused by the criminal activity, for instance by putting the property derived from criminal

activity into circulation and, by doing so, concealing its unlawful origin”.

14

4.2.2.). The judicial and law enforcement authorities consulted underscore the important

role of self-laundering laws in combating financial crimes. The range of behaviours

constituting self-laundering has been expanded, enhancing prosecutorial reach. The

criminal-law practitioners consulted confirm that self-laundering is punishable in their

jurisdictions, with most stating that self-laundering offences also cover the mere

acquisition, possession, or use of illicit property. According to these stakeholders, this has

facilitated an increase in international cooperation requests, facilitating cross-border

investigations and prosecutions.

However, they also note several challenges that can complicate the effective application

of these provisions, such as the difficulties associated with differentiating self-laundering

from the predicate offence, or with ensuring consistency when initiating investigations

for both the underlying and laundering offences.

- Penalties for natural persons (Article 5)

Article 5 introduces harmonised penalties for natural persons, notably by requiring a

maximum threshold of at least four years imprisonment for intentional money laundering

and self-laundering. This represents a step forward compared to the previous framework.

However, Article 5(3) allows for additional, unspecified sanctions, leaving scope for

variation across Member States. While this flexibility does not fundamentally undermine

the Directive’s objectives, desk research conducted for the supporting study showed that

it may affect uniformity31. This may limit the deterrent potential of sanctions to the extent

that it may provide fewer tools for sanctioning perpetrators than for other crimes recently

regulated at EU level (see section on coherence).

- Aggravating circumstances (Article 6)

Article 6 sets out a number of situations which Member States must consider as

aggravating circumstances, making it possible to impose harsher punishments for such

conducts: money laundering activities committed within a criminal organisation, as well

as cases where obliged entities commit money laundering in the course of professional

activities. The study supporting the evaluation showed that applying the aggravating

circumstance of committing money laundering as an obliged entity is complex, as it

requires precise determination of professional conduct32.

Moreover, the Directive provides for optional aggravating circumstances, which Member

States may decide to apply, i.e. for cases where the laundered property is of high value or

when it derives from ‘more serious’ offences, such as drug trafficking. The Directive

excludes from this aggravating category offences such as fraud, environmental crime,

market abuse, and cybercrime, despite being listed under Article 83(1) TFEU as crimes of

31 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 29. 32 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 30.

15

particular seriousness with a cross-border dimension. Although Member States may

broaden aggravating circumstances nationally, such discretion presents some risks of

divergent interpretation, reduced consistency, and weakened EU-wide deterrence.

- Harmonised application of penalties to legal entities (Article 8)

The Directive foresees that fines are mandatorily made available under national law as

well as optional additional sanctions for legal persons (e.g. exclusion from public

benefits, bans on commercial activities) and leaves Member States the choice between

criminal, administrative, or civil liability. This reflects national differences on corporate

criminal liability but risks uneven enforcement.

Although fines are mandatory, the Directive grants wide discretion as to their level,

unlike newer EU criminal law instruments which prescribe the minimum maximum

levels of fines to be calculated either based on percentages of the legal person’s total

worldwide turnover or on fixed amounts. Likewise, while the Directive makes additional

sanctions optional, more recent instruments foresee them as mandatory, while providing a

non-binding list of such other criminal and non-criminal penalties or measures. Such

flexibility may result in unequal treatment of comparable cases (see section on

coherence).

- Strengthen confiscation measures (Article 9)

The Directive requires Member States to take measures to ensure that their competent

authorities freeze or confiscate the proceeds derived from money laundering, in

accordance with Directive 2014/42/EU (hereinafter ‘the Confiscation Directive’).

The evaluation assesses the impact of the Directive regarding confiscation of property

deriving from activities of a criminal nature, including in the absence of a conviction, and

the key obstacles for implementing such confiscation measures. Nevertheless, the

assessment on the impact of the Directive with regard to confiscation has posed

significant challenges.

First, it should be noted that the Directive 2014 already covered money laundering

offences through references to the Council Framework Decision on money laundering

from 2001. The Directive criminalising money laundering only expanded these existing

confiscation measures to the newly introduced money laundering offences (e.g. the

offence of self-laundering). Therefore, the practical impact of the provision on

confiscation is difficult to assess. Secondly, such practical impact would need to be

analysed over a longer period, considering the length of criminal and confiscation

proceedings. Third, the confiscation regime in the EU has been significantly reinforced in

the meantime, with the 2024 Directive on asset recovery and confiscation33 bringing in

new possibilities, notably in relation to non-conviction based confiscation. Therefore,

33 Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on asset

recovery and confiscation, OJ L, 2024/1260, 2.5.2024

16

such aspects can only be analysed as part of the evaluation of the latter instrument. The

Commission is required to submit that evaluation to the European Parliament and to the

Council by 24 November 2031.

- Jurisdiction (Article 10)

Article 10 requires Member States to establish jurisdiction over money laundering

offences committed on their territory or by their nationals, and allows for optional

extension of jurisdiction to offences committed abroad by habitual residents or for the

benefit of locally established legal persons, while providing that where multiple Member

States have jurisdiction over the same facts, they shall cooperate – involving Eurojust

where appropriate – to centralise proceedings in a single Member State.

It should be noted that the provision concerning the establishment of jurisdiction over

money laundering offences – specifically in the instance where the offender is a national

of the Member State, pursuant to Article 10(1)(b) – was transposed in a divergent

manner, particularly with respect to the requirement of double criminality34.

4.1.1.2 Facilitating investigation and prosecution of money laundering and use of

investigative tools

Among other things, the evaluation aims to establish the extent to which the application

of the Directive has contributed to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of money

laundering in the Member States and at EU level. Overall, Directive (EU) 2018/1673 has

contributed to strengthening the investigation and prosecution of money laundering

across the EU, notably thanks to the introduction of the stand-alone money laundering

offence. However, its implementation has produced mixed outcomes, with stakeholders

reporting both improvements and ongoing challenges when asked if the Directive

facilitated their investigations into money laundering. While the Directive did

approximate national legislation, divergent interpretations and applications continue to

affect its overall effectiveness. This section examines how these differences influence

investigations and prosecutions.

As indicated above, judicial authorities reported uneven effects when it comes to the

facilitation of investigations35. Some saw little change, as their national frameworks were

already largely compliant with the Directive’s obligations. Others highlighted clear

benefits, particularly the removal of the need to prove intent behind the predicate offence,

which simplified judicial proceedings. Law enforcement authorities, including

members of the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats

(EMPACT) community, generally reported that investigative action has been

34 That is the principle whereby jurisdiction can only be established where the conduct in question is

criminalised both in the prosecuting state and in the state in which it was committed.

35 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 37.

17

significantly facilitated following legislative alignment with the Directive36. Depending

on the Member State, national reforms inspired by the Directive expanded investigative

tools and introduced the criminalisation of self-laundering and of negligent money

laundering, the possibility to investigate laundering independently of the predicate

offence, and clearer definitions of criminal proceeds. Financial Intelligence Units

(FIUs) gave mixed feedback37: while some noted improved analysis and cooperation,

others observed limited change in daily practice (it should be noted that the FIUs’ work is

governed by Directive (EU) 2024/1640 (the EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive -

AMLD)38.

- The impact of stand-alone money laundering (money laundering without prior

conviction for the predicate offence) on the investigation and prosecution of

money laundering

Feedback from judicial and law enforcement authorities, including EMPACT

members, suggests that removing the requirement for a prior conviction, prosecution, or

factual establishment of the predicate offence has generally facilitated prosecutorial and

investigative work39. National authorities highlighted that this enabled them to pursue

money laundering independently, even where the perpetrator of the predicate offence

could not be identified, prosecuted, or convicted. The change also removed certain

procedural obstacles, for example in cases of tax-related laundering where prosecutions

were previously blocked by the absence of a complaint from tax authorities.

Nevertheless, some authorities reported limited impacts, often because national

legislation had already provided equivalent tools. Opinions from NGOs, think tanks, and

professional associations were equally diverse, ranging from significant facilitation in

securing convictions to minimal impact.

At the same time, as explained in Section 4.1.1.1., several Member States continue to

require an identification of the predicate offence to establish the criminal origin of the

property, thereby maintaining high evidentiary standards for prosecutors40. Criminal law

practitioners and one EU body confirmed this picture, noting that courts in many

jurisdictions still expect prosecutors to prove the underlying offence41.

Overall, the obligation to introduce a stand-alone money laundering offence has had

positive, albeit mixed effects. While many authorities emphasised that it facilitated

36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Directive (EU) 2024/1640 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the

mechanisms to be put in place by Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system

for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Directive(EU) 2019/1937, and

amending and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849. 39 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 39. 40 As further analysed in the transposition report. 41 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 39.

18

investigations and prosecutions, others stressed that its potential remained limited by the

high national threshold required to prove the criminal origin of assets.

Figure 1: Level of facilitation of the investigation of money-laundering without prior

conviction, prosecution or extensive factual establishment of the predicate offence42

- Use of investigative tools

The Directive requires Member States to ensure that effective investigative tools used for

cases involving, for example, organised crime, are also available for investigating or

prosecuting money laundering. Law enforcement authorities in many jurisdictions

reported that the Directive strengthened investigations by raising maximum penalties,

thereby enabling access to specialised tools such as communication interception and

enhancing cross-border cooperation. Others reported limited impact, as these tools had

already been available under national law.

Stakeholders such as academics and professional associations expressed concerns about

applying investigative powers designed for organised crime to all money laundering

cases43, warning that this could raise proportionality issues and risk diverting resources

from the fight against organised crime.

- Effects of optional provisions on the effectiveness of the Directive

42 JAs: judicial authorities; LEAs: law enforcement authorities; NGOs: non-governmental organisations. 43 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 38.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1: Very low

facilitation

2: Low

facilitation

3: Moderate

facilitation

4: High

facilitation

5: Very high

facilitation

Level of facilitation of the investigation of money-laundering without prior conviction, prosecution or extensive factual establishment of the predicate offence

(Judicial Authorities:7, LEAs: 13, NGOs: 2, Int.Org: 1)

Judicial authorities LEAs NGOs Int Orgs

19

The evaluation also looked into whether the implementation of optional provisions had

positive effects on cross-border cooperation and the fight against money laundering.

Some of the optional provisions in the Directive, such as on negligent money laundering,

under Article 3(2), or the possibilities for further aggravating circumstances e.g. enabling

a higher penalty if the money laundering relates to property of significant value or to

property generated through a specifically serious offence (Article 6(2)(a) and (b)), had

some positive effects on the investigations.

The provisions on negligent money laundering were included in several legal systems,

according to the judicial authorities consulted. These provisions are widely regarded as

highly effective across various stakeholder categories44 because intent does not have to be

proven, making a conviction for money laundering easier to achieve. Members of the

EMPACT community also recognised the positive effects of the optional aggravating

circumstances45.

The optionality of certain provisions does not lead to a harmonised legal framework;

however, this does not seem to have an impact on the effectiveness of the Directive. In

this context, some stakeholders supported retaining the non-mandatory nature of these

provisions, giving Member States flexibility to implement them in line with their

respective legal traditions and constraints. Several legal experts and academics from the

Expert Group on EU Criminal Policy explicitly referred to Article 3(2), commenting that

negligence should only be used to protect important legal interests, such as life or bodily

integrity, and is not appropriate for money laundering46. They argued that money

laundering, as a crime against the administration of justice, should always require a form

of intent.

4.1.1.3. Money Laundering prevention

Stakeholders offered differing assessments regarding the deterrent impact of Directive

(EU) 2018/1673 on money laundering.

Certain Judicial Authorities emphasised the significance of the Directive’s new criminal

offences, while also stressing that enhanced international cooperation was crucial in

reinforcing deterrence. Others, however, contended that their domestic legal frameworks

had already addressed money laundering effectively before the Directive’s introduction.

Law Enforcement Authorities presented similarly varied perspectives—some identified

Article 3(2) and (3) as particularly effective in preventing money laundering, whereas

44 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, pages 45-46. 45 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 46. 46 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 45.

20

others either lacked sufficient evidence to evaluate its impact or asserted that pre-existing

national laws already met the Directive’s standards.

Financial Intelligence Units, for the most part, observed little change following

implementation, though an International Organisation highlighted the importance of

standardised definitions across EU Member States to ensure consistency.

Meanwhile, participants within the EMPACT network confirmed that the Directive’s

transposition had a discernible deterrent effect, citing provisions such as the removal of

the need for prior conviction or extensive proof of the predicate offence, the ability to

prosecute laundering of illicit proceeds linked to crimes committed in other Member

States, and the liability of legal entities for failures in supervision or control. They also

noted the introduction of independent criminal proceedings against legal entities,

aggravating circumstances in sentencing, penalties for individuals, and sanctions for

corporate entities.

4.1.1.4 Cross-border and international cooperation

The evaluation seeks to establish the extent to which the provisions of the Directive have

facilitated cross-border as well as international cooperation.

It must be noted that the Directive has certainly facilitated cross-border cooperation in an

indirect way, by approximating legal frameworks so that authorities from different

Member States ‘speak a common language’: the more offences and penalties resemble

each other, the easier it is for Member States to cooperate across borders and recognise

judgments. However, the Directive does not contain provisions specifically governing

cross-border cooperation, which is regulated in other instruments such as the Directives

on the European Investigation Order and on the exchange of information between police

forces47.

The responses on this topic varied depending on the authorities consulted, and often

views within each group differed48, the responses generally suggest that there was

moderate to high facilitation of cross-border cooperation.

Judicial authorities (five out of seven) generally consider that cross-border cooperation

has improved to a moderate to very high extent, primarily thanks to the clarification of

jurisdiction (Article 10), and to more common criminal law standards, which facilitate the

use of mutual legal assistance instruments.

47 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the

European Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, pp. 1–36, and Directive (EU)

2023/977 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on the exchange of

information between the law enforcement authorities of Member States and repealing Council

Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA, OJ L 134, 22.5.2023, pp. 1–24. 48 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 41.

21

Law enforcement authorities expressed more diverse views. Only a few law enforcement

authorities saw little impact on cross-border cooperation, while most stressed the

Directive’s role in fostering a common understanding and facilitating information

exchange. More than half of the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) consulted considered

the Directive to have a moderate effect, noting that pre-existing international standards

already provided a solid basis for cooperation. Asset recovery offices reported mixed

experiences: some observed increased requests and case numbers, while others stated that

their work was largely unaffected. However, it’s not clear whether the implementation of

the Directive led to the aforementioned increase in requests.

Civil society stakeholders, including NGOs, think tanks, and professional associations,

highlighted enhanced information exchange and the creation of cooperation networks

among law enforcement authorities.

Figure 2: Overview of national authorities’ responses to cross-border cooperation

facilitation under Directive (EU) 2018/1673

Regarding the evaluation question about the extent to which the competent authorities of

the Member States cooperate with each other in criminal proceedings regarding money

laundering, a 2026 analysis by Eurojust49 shows that the number of money laundering

cases has steadily increased since the adoption of the Directive.

49 Source: Eurojust Case Management System. DMU Reference: 2026/OPD/DMU-3801/AW. Due to the

ongoing nature of cases, the figures may change after the reporting date.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2: Low facilitation 3: Moderate

facilitation

4: High facilitation 5: Very high

facilitation

National Authorities' Assessment of Cross-Border Cooperation Facilitation under Directive (EU) 1673/2018 (Judicial Authorities:7, LEAs:13, AROs:8, FIUs:11)

Judicial authorities LEAs AROs FIUs

22

Figure 3: Number of money laundering cases registered at Eurojust since 2016

On international cooperation beyond the EU, the impact was less evident, as suggested by

stakeholders’ opinions, which diverged within each group50. Judicial authorities noted

that most facilitation was confined to intra-EU cooperation and that they did not see a

high degree of facilitation at international level, Meanwhile law enforcement authorities

generally took the view that harmonisation within the EU contributes indirectly to global

cooperation, with 10 out of 13 observing moderate or high facilitation of international

cooperation, though concrete effects outside the EU remained limited.

Overall, the Directive appears to have indirectly facilitated cross-border cooperation

within the EU to some extent, especially for judicial authorities, but its impact remains

uneven across stakeholders and appears more modest in the field of international

cooperation with non-EU countries.

50 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 42.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

Number of money laundering cases, per year

23

Figure 4: Overview of national authorities’ responses to international cooperation

facilitation under Directive (EU) 2018/1673

4.1.2. Efficiency

Main findings:

• Costs →Implementing the Directive did not entail significant costs or excessive administrative

burden for MSs.No major legal amendments were required, nor were new structures established.

• Benefits →Data are limited, and further monitoring is deemed necessary. Most stakeholders

report greater legal clarity and effectiveness, enhanced deterrence and improved cooperation

According to the Better Regulation Guidelines, the efficiency criterion determines

whether the Directive meets its objectives with minimal cost and no undue burdens. The

assessment compared implementation costs and outcomes across the EU to determine if

the Directive’s results justified its costs and if the regulatory burden on Member States

was proportional to the benefits.

4.1.2.1. Costs and benefits of the Directive

The evaluation indicates that implementing the Directive did not entail significant costs

or excessive administrative burden for Member States51. It considers the Directive largely

built on existing legislation and therefore required no major legal amendments. The

obligations of the Directive mainly produce changes in national criminal codes or

criminal procedural laws, but do not necessarily entail the creation of new structures or

procedures. Some additional costs that the Directive entails are training for judicial and

law enforcement authorities, especially with a view to the investigation and prosecution

of new forms of money laundering introduced by the Directive. However, these elements

have been integrated in the existing continuous training opportunities offered to

investigators, prosecutors and judges.

51 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, pages 50 and 51.

0

2

4

6

8

2: Low level of

facilitation

3: Moderate

facilitation

4: High level of

facilitation

5: Very high level

of facilitation

National Authorities' Assessment of International Cooperation Facilitation under Directive (EU) 1673/2018 (Judicial Authorities:7, LEAs: 13, AROs:8)

Judicial authorities LEAs AROs

24

Figure 5: Implementation costs of the Directive for law enforcement authorities

Figure 6: Overview of the reported outsized administrative burden associated with

Directive (EU) 2018/1673

On the benefits side, data are limited in view of the length of criminal proceedings. The

evaluation is therefore largely based on observations of the practical benefits that

authorities have experienced so far52. Asset recovery offices pointed to greater legal

clarity and effectiveness (particularly regarding information exchange) as a result of the

the notion of money laundering being redefined. Judicial authorities highlighted enhanced

deterrence and improved cooperation, while law enforcement reported stronger

investigative tools due to the provision in Article 11 of the Directive, deterrence effects,

52 Ibid.

0

2

4

6

8

FIUs Judicial authorities LEAs

Implementation costs of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 for the law

enforcement authorities of the Member State

No Yes

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

AROs Judicial authorities LEAs FIUs

If aspects of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 represent an outsized

administrative burden

No Yes

25

and cross-border collaboration. At the same time, those Member States whose national

framework already largely reached the standards set by the Directive at the time of its

adoption noted only limited improvements.

Overall, there are indications that the Directive supports the fight against money

laundering and safeguards financial integrity, but the lack of comprehensive data

underlines the need for continued monitoring to fully capture its benefits.

In conclusion, the assessment of costs and benefits can only be considered preliminary as

it is largely based on anecdotal evidence/unquantifiable general observations by

stakeholders, given the lack of comparative quantitative data (as discussed above). The

full impact of the Directive in quantitative terms (number of prosecutions and

convictions, volume of assets frozen and confiscated in these money laundering cases)

can only be assessed once a statistically significant number of proceedings concerning

money laundering have been concluded.

Finally, the evaluation assesses whether the administrative burden (including monitoring

and reporting) could be simplified or reduced without undermining the intended

objectives of the Directive. Considering the limited administrative burden that the

Directive entails (confined to the legislative steps to transpose the Directive and the

updating of training curricula for competent authorities), and the absence of reporting

obligations incumbent upon Member States, the evaluation has not identified any

opportunities for simplifying the Directive

4.1.3. Coherence

Main findings:

• Internal coherence: No regulatory gaps arise from the Directive.

• External coherence: The Directive is generally consistent with EU legislation and internal

security policies, though minor divergences exist regarding penalties and sanctions against natural

and legal persons compared to other EU criminal law instruments.

Some elements still hinder full coherence between the CMLD and the international framework.

Notably, the Directive adopts a narrower definition of predicate offences than does the Warsaw

Convention. However, the Convention allows parties, upon accession, to restrict the list of

predicate offences via a declaration.

In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines, coherence is assessed in terms of internal

and external coherence. Internal coherence examines how the components of the

Criminalisation of Money Laundering Directive (CMLD) work together to achieve its

objectives, while external coherence looks at how the Directive interacts with other EU

measures, identifying synergies as well as possible overlaps.

26

4.1.3.1. Internal coherence

Based on the survey results, it appears that there are no regulatory gaps stemming from

the Directive53. The different stakeholder groups consulted (judicial authorities, law

enforcement authorities, Financial Intelligence Units, and Asset Recovery Offices)

concur that the CMLD Directive does not present any instances of internal incoherencies.

The different components of the Directive are working well together in achieving its

objectives.

4.1.3.2 External coherence

At international level, the international framework against money laundering is largely

shaped by the 2003 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime

(UNTOC) and its Protocols, the United Nations Convention against Corruption

(UNCAC), the 2005 Warsaw Convention, as well as the recommendations of the

Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The Directive contributes to the facilitation of

international cooperation efforts achieved under these instruments, to the extent that it is

aligned and, in some instances, goes beyond the provisions of these instruments, ensuring

external coherence54.

Despite this general alignment, some elements hamper full consistency between the

CMLD and the international framework. Most notably, the Directive restricts the scope of

predicate offences in its Article 2(1) to crimes punishable by more than one year’s

imprisonment (or by more than six months in certain cases) and to those belonging to

specifically listed categories. This narrower scope contrasts with the broader approach of

the Warsaw Convention, which defines the predicate offences for money laundering as

‘any criminal offence’, regardless of the punishment (Article 1, lit. e). However, Article

9(4) of the Warsaw Convention permits parties, upon accession, to restrict the list of

predicate offences through a declaration (it is possible to restrict it, as was done in the

Directive). The European Union has not yet acceded to the Convention and not yet

exercised this option.

At the level of the European Union, the CMLD Directive is consistent with policies and

legislation in the area of internal security.

The reinforced penal response to money laundering introduced by the Directive is in line

with the European Internal Security Strategy (‘ProtectEU’)55, which highlighted that

following the money is crucial in policy combating organised crime. The Strategy pointed

out the essential role of seizing assets and confiscating criminal gains to dismantle the

financial motives behind organised crime, providing information on the work strands to

53 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 53.

54 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 54. 55 EUR-Lex - 52025DC0148 - EN - EUR-Lex

27

be pursued to reinforce the follow-the-money approach, including the effective

implementation of new EU rules in this area.

The Directive is equally consistent with such rules, including the Anti-Money Laundering

Package adopted between 2023 and 2024. This package, which includes the

establishment of a new EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA), a directly

applicable Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR)56, a new Directive (AMLD6)57

and a revision of the Regulation on Transfers of Funds58, is intended to create a uniform

set of rules for the private sector and to close loopholes exploited by criminals.

Importantly, the new rules also address crypto assets, which had previously constituted a

major vulnerability. These reforms are fully coherent with, and complementary to, the

CMLD Directive, since they reinforce the preventive side of the framework and thus

support its provisions on criminalisation.

Similarly, consistency is evident between the CMLD and the new Asset Recovery and

Confiscation Directive (ARCD), adopted in 2024, which replaces earlier legislation on

asset recovery and confiscation. The ARCD directly refers to the CMLD’s definition of

money laundering, ensuring consistency in terminology and scope. Both instruments are

mutually reinforcing, with the ARCD complementing the CMLD by extending the range

of confiscation mechanisms, notably through the introduction of confiscation of

unexplained wealth linked to criminal activities.

The CMLD Directive is also consistent with Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight

against fraud to the Union's financial interests (PIF Directive)59, which regulates offences

affecting the Union’s financial interests. Recital 10 of the CMLD explicitly excludes

these offences from its scope, clarifying that they fall under the PIF Directive, but also

leaves open the possibility for Member States to transpose both directives through a

single legislative framework. Given that the PIF Directive refers to definitions from

AMLD4, minor adjustments may be needed to ensure consistency with the more recent

CMLD Directive.

In conclusion, the Directive shows partial consistency with the international framework,

contributing to global efforts in this field, with the remaining issue of the narrower

approach of predicate offences. At EU level, the CMLD fits consistently within the

56 Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 establishing

the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending

Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010. 57 Directive (EU) 2024/1640 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the

mechanisms to be put in place by Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system

for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937, and

amending and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849. 58 Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on

information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets and amending Directive (EU)

2015/849. 59 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight

against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law, OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, pp. 29–

41.

28

broader legislative landscape. The AML package, the PIF Directive and the ARCD not

only complement the CMLD but also fill important gaps, particularly in the areas of

crypto-assets and asset confiscation.

At the same time, the Directive diverges on some points from more recent criminal law

directives, for example the Directive (EU) 2024/1203 on the protection of the

environment through criminal law60 and Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on the violation of

Union restrictive measures61. As a consequence, there is a lack of consistency between

EU criminal law instruments. The need for a more consistent approach to criminal

legislation was also highlighted by the Council. It adopted conclusions on ‘the future of

EU criminal law: recommendations on the way forward‘62, inviting the Commission to

ensure and reinforce the internal consistency of the EU criminal law and in the Council

conclusions on ‘Model provisions on EU substantive criminal law’63 where standard non-

binding provisions, inter alia for penalties and sanctions against natural and legal persons,

were adopted.

Regarding the application of additional penalties against natural persons, the

Directive requires Member States to make provision for, in addition to imprisonment,

additional sanctions or measures against perpetrators of money laundering. The fact that

the Directive does not specify which type of measure should be imposed, causes

variations in national transpositions. In contrast, more recent EU criminal law instruments

explicitly list possible optional measures for Member States to apply against natural

persons, such as fines, exclusion from funding and public tenders, withdrawals of permits

or temporary bans on running for public office.

A similar issue occurs with regards to sanctions for legal persons. While in this case the

Directive does provide a list of possible additional sanctions these remain optional and

are not outlined in sufficient detail. Fines are foreseen to be mandatorily implemented by

Member States, but the Directive does not further specify how they are calculated. This

contrasts with the most recent criminal law legislation, which foresees that the minimum

levels of maximum fines for legal persons for offences covered by the respective

Directive are to be calculated either based on a percentage of the global worldwide

turnover or on a specific fixed amount64.

60 Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the

protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and

2009/123/EC. 61 Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the

definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and

amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673. 62 Council conclusions on the future of criminal law: recommendations on the way forward:

https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10984-2024-INIT/en/pdf 63Council conclusions on Model provisions on EU substantive criminal law:

https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16638-2025-INIT/en/pdf 64 For example, Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024

on the protection of the environment through criminal law obliges Member States to make provision

for fines for legal persons in the case of specific offences. The Directive, also stipulates that the

maximum level of those fines should be at least 5 % or a lump sum of EUR 40 000 000for certain

29

4.2. How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom?

4.2.1 EU added value

Main findings:

• Stakeholders broadly agreed that the Directive created significant EU added value by establishing

a level playing field and harmonising money laundering offences and penalties across Member

States.

• The Directive offers limited added value to countries where its core provisions were already

enshrined in national law—though they still gain from improved cross-border cooperation—while

the inconsistent adoption of optional measures has undermined full harmonisation.

This section assesses the EU added value of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 compared with

what Member States could have achieved individually to face a threat that is transnational

in nature. Criminal organisations and their money launderers transfer money and assets

across borders and set up complex transnational ownership schemes to obscure the illicit

origin of the funds and hide the financial trail from the radar of authorities. Criminals

take advantage of the fragmented overview authorities have of the financial flows to hide

their money across entities and countries. The only way of effectively addressing this

challenge is through robust cross-border cooperation, which, in order to be effective,

requires a more aligned penal framework against money laundering across Member

States. The analysis draws on desk research, surveys, expert consultations and interviews.

Stakeholders broadly agreed that the Directive created significant EU added value by

establishing a level playing field and harmonising money laundering offences and

penalties across Member States65. This common framework was seen as particularly

beneficial for cross-border investigations and international police cooperation.

However, the Directive’s added value is limited in some other respects. In approximately

10 Member States, key provisions were already part of national law, meaning the

Directive brought only marginal change for those countries internally66. However, those

Member States also benefited from smoother cross-border cooperation thanks to the

approximation of other Member States’ legislation.

Optional provisions (‘may clauses’) were transposed in several countries, but not

uniformly. Moreover, some stakeholders stressed that minimum EU rules do not go far

enough to eliminate differences on issues such as negligence, self-laundering, stand-alone

money laundering, or liability of legal persons67. As a result, full harmonisation has not

yet been achieved causing some missed opportunities as outlined in the effectiveness

section.

offences related to the pollution of the environment and 3 % or EUR 24 000 000 for other offences

such as wildlife trafficking. 65 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 59. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid.

30

Overall, the Directive is assessed as having high EU added value, providing common

definitions – especially for self-laundering and stand-alone money laundering – and

closer sanctions amongst Members States. This facilitates a smoother cooperation to

combat money laundering across borders, which could not have been achieved by

Member States acting alone.

4.2.2. Fundamental rights and freedoms

Main findings:

• Member State authorities and EU/international bodies generally consider the Directive to be in

line with fundamental rights standards.

• NGOs and academics have voiced some concerns, particularly with regard to the vagueness of the

definition of “criminal activity” (principle of legality), the stand-alone money laundering offence

(presumption of innocence) and the self-laundering offences (ne bis in idem principle).

In line with Article 14(2) of Directive (EU) 2018/1673, the evaluation also considers the

impact of the Directive on fundamental rights following the Better Regulation Guidelines

on this aspect. Feedback diverges considerably depending on the stakeholder group.

NGOs and academics have voiced concerns, notably regarding the stand-alone money

laundering offence and the self-laundering offence with regards to their possible impact

on the presumption of innocence, access to legal representation, privacy and the

proportionality of penalties. Member State authorities and EU/international bodies either

considered the Directive to be in line with fundamental rights standards or reported no

available data.

Overall, the evidence base remains insufficient to allow firm conclusions to be drawn, in

the absence of firm case law and concrete data showing that any limitations on the

exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

do not comply with the requirements of Article 52 thereof.

International organisations and EU bodies broadly confirmed that the Directive

respects fundamental rights68. They noted that the offences listed in Articles 3 and 4 are

defined in a clear and foreseeable manner and that the penalties provided for in Article 5

are proportionate. One organisation reported no impact on freedom of association, while

another considered the Directive to be consistent with both the Charter of Fundamental

Rights of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights.

Generally, these stakeholders have not reported significant issues but highlighted a lack

of systematic data. It should be noted that the Court of Justice of the European Union

(CJEU) 69, in interpreting Directive 2005/60/EC, has ruled on the compatibility of self-

laundering with Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The Court held that there is no breach of the principle of ne bis in idem provided that the

68 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, pages 61-62. 69Judgment of 2.9.2021 Case C-709/19 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62019CJ0790.

31

facts underlying the money-laundering prosecution are not identical to those constituting

the predicate offence.

NGOs, think tanks, academics and associations expressed more critical perspectives70

on the potential direct impact on fundamental rights and freedoms by the Directive.

With regard to the definition of ‘criminal activity’ in Article 2, for example, some

stakeholders have voiced concerns that it does not fully meet the legality principle,

pointing to vague terminology such as ‘cybercrime’ and ‘corruption’”, which undermines

legal certainty.

Concerns were also raised about Article 3 (2), which allows Member States to convict for

money laundering where the person concerned suspected or ought to have known of the

illicit origin of the property. Stakeholders, consider that this may undermine the

presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial, due to a low burden of proof.

The introduction of the stand-alone money laundering offence (Article 3 (3) (a) (b)),

which allows for conviction when the illicit origin of property is proven, without

requiring all factual elements of the predicate offence or the identity of the perpetrator of

that predicate offence to be demonstrated, has also raised some concerns in this

stakeholder group. On the one hand, the reduced evidentiary threshold has been deemed

potentially against the principle of proportionality; especially where Member States apply

an all-crimes approach – meaning that all crimes can constitute a predicate offence – even

minor offences could potentially give rise to money laundering charges. Judges may

therefore lack sufficient context regarding the underlying conduct, which could risk

imposing potentially disproportionate sanctions. On the other hand, NGOs indicated that

these provisions raise concerns on the right to be presumed innocent until proved

otherwise and might affect defence rights and general principles which govern any

criminal procedure.

Regarding self-laundering under Article 3(5), certain stakeholders have pointed out the

risk of violations of the principle of ne bis in idem (double jeopardy), as enshrined in

Article 50 of the Charter, where Member States go beyond the minimum standards set by

the Directive and punish as self-laundering the acquisition, possession, or use of property

by the author of the predicate offence. This concerns, for instance, cases where an

offender steals a vehicle (predicate offence) and the possession and/or use of the vehicle

are regarded as self-laundering offences. The Directive does not foresee the

criminalisation of the acquisition, possession or use of property derived from criminal

activity when these conducts are committed by the person who committed or was

involved in the criminal activity from which the property was derived. These stakeholders

argued that use and possession of proceeds may be inherent in the predicate offence itself,

and the use and possession can be viewed as a direct and logical consequence of the theft

70 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, pages 62-63.

32

and not as a separate money laundering offence. As a result, also prosecuting the offender

for money laundering could be seen as punishing the same conduct twice.

In addition, they criticised Article 11 for extending special investigative tools – typically

reserved for combating organised crime or serious offenses - to simple money laundering

cases, which they considered disproportionate and potentially infringing on privacy.

While one NGO considered that the Directive itself provides adequate guarantees, two

NGOs argued that explicit safeguards for each fundamental right should be included in

the main body of the legislation.

Feedback from national authorities was generally more positive or inconclusive71. On

the issue of private and family life and data protection, Asset Recovery Offices and

Financial Intelligence Units mostly reported no available data on which to base an

assessment, with a few noting no identifiable effect. A minority of Asset recovery offices

suggested that fundamental rights implications were inherent in but not exacerbated by

the extension of the list of crimes that can constitute a predicate offence. Law

enforcement agencies were evenly divided between those reporting no data and those

observing no impact. Several underlined that the Directive was consistent with the

principles set out in Article 2 TEU and with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the

European Union, and that it largely reflected existing criminal law provisions on money

laundering. Judicial authorities were the most consistent, with the majority reporting no

effects of the Directive on this topic, and one authority indicating a lack of relevant data.

Figure 7 – Effect of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the protection of private and family life

and personal data

71 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, page 64.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

AROs FIUs Judicial authorities LEAs

No Data No effects

33

When asked about the proportionality of the penalties laid down in Article 5 of Directive

(EU) 2018/1673, all judicial authorities considered them appropriate to the nature and

gravity of the offences. By contrast, on questions concerning the presumption of

innocence and the rights of suspects and accused persons both judicial authorities and law

enforcement agencies either reported no data or did not identify any effects.

Figure 8: Effect of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on upholding the presumption of innocence

and ensuring the rights of suspects and accused persons

Figure 9: Concerns about fundamental rights of self- laundering suspects, based on stakeholders’

input

In conclusion, while some stakeholders, in particular representatives of civil society

organisations and academia, have voiced concerns regarding the presumption of

innocence when applying the stand-alone money laundering offence, the principle of

double jeopardy (ne bis in idem) in cases of self-laundering72, and the clarity and

72 As in self-laundering the distinction between predicate offence and money laundering offence is often not

clear-cut, so that there is a risk of a double punishment for the same act if there is a conviction for the

predicate offence and the money laundering offence.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Judicial authorities LEAs

No Data No effects

No Yes

34

proportionality of the definition of offences and penalties, other stakeholders, in

particular Member States’ authorities and EU/international bodies, do not appear to

identify major issues or do not have relevant data on this matter.

While the Directive does not contain specific provisions on procedural rights, such rights

are ensured through horizontal rules set out in the six EU procedural rights directives, in

the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the European

Convention of Human Rights. The application and interpretation of national rules that

transpose the Directive is subject to review of national courts that have to ensure

compliance with the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in above-mentioned

instruments.

The Commission will continue to assess any possible problem associated with

fundamental rights in the application of the Directive as part of its continuous monitoring

activities.

4.3. Is the intervention still relevant?

The relevance criterion examines whether the objectives of an intervention remain fit for

purpose and adequately respond to the problems they were designed to address. In the

case of Directive (EU) 2018/1673, this means assessing to what extent its objectives and

measures continue to tackle the key challenges of money laundering and organised crime,

while also addressing newly emerging risks and needs in this area, and how the

provisions can be enhanced to effectively respond to current and future threats. The

evaluation further aims to identify any provisions that might be considered obsolete or

that should be adapted to take certain developments into account.

4.3.1. Current and future threats and needs concerning the development of

organised crime, particularly focusing on evolving money laundering activities

According to some law enforcement authorities, the Directive remains too general in

scope, setting out standards that were already largely applied in the Member States prior

to its adoption. However, most survey respondents consider that the Directive adequately

addresses the difficulties faced by authorities in investigating and prosecuting money

laundering. Emerging challenges flagged by stakeholders, such as money laundering

facilitated by virtual currencies, are adequately covered by the Directive because of its

technology-neutral character, and addressed through other EU legislative instruments,

such as the Anti-Money Laundering Package.

4.3.2. Remaining obstacles/legal and practical issues in the fight against money

laundering

Most stakeholders did not point out any provisions of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 that

have become less effective in terms of addressing current challenges associated with

investigating money laundering and predicate offences73. One law enforcement authority,

73 Deloitte (2024). Evaluation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on the fight against money laundering by

criminal law, final report, pages 69-70.

35

however, stressed that the rapid emergence of new technologies, such as fintech services

and virtual currencies, requires the European legislator to consider more specific rules on

investigative tools adapted to these developments. The respondent referred in particular

to Article 11, which addresses the use of such tools in preparatory proceedings only in

broad and general terms.

Overall, the Directive’s objectives and measures continue to meet identified needs and

current challenges in relation to money laundering and organised crime. According to

Europol’s Serious and Organised Threat Assessment 2025, money laundering plays a

crucial role in enabling criminals to profit from illegal activities and is the backbone of

organised crime74. Moreover, modi operandi of money laundering often involve multiple

transactions across various non-EU jurisdictions, exploiting regulatory disparities and

creating a complex trail that challenges financial investigations: a harmonised criminal

response across Member States therefore remains as important as ever.

5. WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED?

The overall objective of this Staff Working Document is to evaluate Directive (EU)

2018/1673 on combating money laundering by criminal law. The evaluation considers the

Directive in light of six evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency,

coherence, EU added value and the impact of the Directive on fundamental rights and

freedoms.

• The Directive is assessed as being overall effective in strengthening the fight

against money laundering. In particular, while in some Member States a certain

alignment with its obligations had already been achieved, desk research and

stakeholder input shows that it has contributed to greater harmonisation of the

legal framework. This includes the definitions of money laundering offences

including stand-alone money laundering and self-laundering, and related

penalties.

• The Directive also indirectly facilitated law enforcement and judicial action

and cross-border cooperation against money laundering. This was stressed by

several stakeholders consulted.

• The Directive can be considered efficient as it did not incur implementation costs

or administrative burden; only a possible increased investigative workload was

mentioned in terms of possible costs. While this aligns with the nature of a

criminal law directive that updates existing legislation, there was also a lack of

quantifiable data which. This made it impossible to collect conclusive evidence on

the costs of achieving the results of the Directive. As mentioned in Section

4.1.2.1., however, the assessment of costs and benefits can only be preliminary

and qualitative and will be more visible in the coming years, given the length of

criminal proceedings.

74 europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf

36

• The evaluation shows that the different components of the Directive are working

well together in achieving its objectives (internal coherence) and broadly align

with the international framework and with other EU policies in the area of

fighting criminal finances (external coherence).

• The evaluation shows that the Directive demonstrates some EU added value

through the creation of a more aligned criminal law framework against money

laundering across the EU. This was also underlined by several of the stakeholders

consulted, who saw this as a positive step contributing to greater legal consistency

across jurisdictions and facilitating cross-border cooperation in the EU. This could

not have been achieved if the criminalisation of money laundering had been left to

Member States individually.

• Concerns regarding the compatibility of the Directive and its transposition in the

Member States with fundamental rights and freedoms were expressed by some

academics and criminal law practitioners. These concerns relate to the clarity of

the definition of offences and penalties and/or the proportionality of the latter as

well as undue interferences with the presumption of innocence and the principle

of ne bis in idem, in particular in relation to self-laundering offences and

‘negligent’ money laundering. Other stakeholders either considered that there was

no undue impact on fundamental rights or did not have sufficient data to draw

conclusions on this issue

• Overall, the Directive’s objectives and measures continue to address identified

needs and ongoing challenges related to money laundering and organised crime,

although new technological developments mean that the criminal landscape in

which authorities operate has been slightly altered.

In general, the Directive achieved its objectives, and the assessment of its functionality

is positive.

On the availability of relevant data for the purpose of the assessment, the report and

supporting external study were limited in specific areas. This includes data on the

practical implementation of the Directive across all Member States regarding case

numbers on investigations and judicial proceedings, as well as quantifiable data regarding

the costs. Member States did not always provide sufficient evidence during the

consultations for the external study. Where possible, this problem has been mitigated to

the greatest possible extent by drawing on other exchanges with practitioners, for instance

in bilateral meetings or in meetings at Eurojust, and by relying on desk research done by

the Commission or by drawing on reports from Eurojust and Europol. Nevertheless, the

evaluation would have benefited from additional data input.

Despite the overall positive assessment, the evaluation identified several issues limiting

the functioning of the Directive. There is scope for further improvement based on the

lessons learned as set out below.

One area of concern relates to the differing interpretations of the required standard of

proof to establish the existence of a predicate offence or the illicit origin of

37

laundered assets for the stand-alone money laundering offence. While the Directive

leaves margin for interpretation, the lack of detailed rules on the requirements to establish

the existence of a predicate offence or the illicit origin of laundered property does not

ensure a uniform application of stand-alone money laundering, brings challenges in

relation to the investigation and prosecution of money laundering across EU Member

States, and according to some stakeholders carries risks with regards to the impact on the

rights of affected persons. The Directive has shown misalignment with newly adopted

EU criminal legislation, such as Directive (EU) 2024/1203 on the protection of the

environment through criminal law75 and Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on the violation of

Union restrictive measures76. Compared with these recently adopted instruments, the

Directive does not list the penalties that can be applied to natural persons in addition to

imprisonment, and for legal person it does not define in sufficient detail the calculation of

the fines and additional sanctions that Member States may apply and they are, unlike in

most recent instruments, only optional.

Similarly, stakeholders report that the definition of ‘property’ under the Directive is

applied inconsistently across Member States. Although the Directive defines property

broadly, it does not explicitly refer to all types of illicit economic advantages, such as

cost savings or indirect proceeds from criminal activities. This leads to uncertainty

concerning the interpretation of the scope of the Directive and its consistent

implementation across Member States. It also makes it difficult to identify, freeze and

confiscate criminal assets.

While there is general consistency, as described above, the evaluation points to minor

inconsistencies with the Council of Europe Warsaw Convention77, and some gaps as

compared to the most recent criminal law directives. These inconsistencies can lead to

confusion in the application of the legal frameworks and can lead to a non-uniform

application of law and should be addressed.

Furthermore, it would be beneficial if Member States consistently monitor aspects such

as the costs or burdens associated with implementing of the Directive or case data

regarding investigations into newly created offences. This would enhance both the

Member States’ as well as the Commission’s ability to evaluate the functioning of the

Directive in the future.

75 Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the

protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and

2009/123/EC. 76 Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the

definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and

amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673. 77 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from

Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No. 198).    

38

ANNEX I. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION

1. Lead DG

The Terms of Reference for engaging a contractor to carry out the external study as part

of the evaluation were drawn up by DG Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). A

request for service was issued on 1.8.2023, and a contractor selected by an evaluation

committee consisting of staff from DG HOME78. The study began on 12 October 2023

and ended on 23 October 2024.

2. Organisation and timing

As per the Better Regulation Guidelines, an inter-service group was set up within the

Commission to oversee the evaluation. Several Directorates-General (DGs) within the

Commission79 were invited to nominate representatives to the steering group.

The meetings of the inter-service group were chaired by DG HOME. The group was

consulted over the course of the evaluation. The following list provides an overview of

the steering group’s work over the course of the evaluation:

• The inter-service group was convened for the first time on 12 July 2023 in order

to receive initial information about and provide feedback on draft versions of the

Terms of Reference for the external study and on the Call for Evidence.

• On 3 April 2024 the inter-service group met to discuss the contractor’s interim

report and provided written feedback after the meeting.

• On 19 June 2025, the steering group convened to receive and provide feedback on

the contractor’s draft Final Report. The participants were invited to provide

additional written feedback after the meeting.

On 24 September 2024, the Final Report was re-submitted by the contractor to DG

HOME and subsequently accepted.

3. Evidence, sources and quality

The evaluation drew on different types of documents at EU, international and national

level.

78 The call for service was issued via framework contract HOME/2018/ISFB/PR/EVAL/0017. One

contractor submitted a bid to carry out the evaluation. The evaluation committee considered a number

of criteria, namely: compliance with the technical specifications described in the Terms of Reference;

demonstrated understanding of the objectives and tasks; the quality of the preliminary assessment of

difficulties and expected results; the quality of the proposed methodology; and the quality of the

project management and team organisation. The Commission awarded the contract to Deloitte. 79 The DGs invited to participate in the steering group included: the Secretariat-General of the Commission

(SG); Legal Service (LS); Justice and Consumers (JUST); GROW; FISMA; BUDG; OLAF; EEAS;

NEAR; TAXUD; ECFIN; FPI

39

Policy documents, legal instruments and research reports the EU level provided

indications as to the nature and scope of EU anti-money laundering policy, in particular

when related to criminal law. At international level, the contractor reviewed documents

describing international standards and initiatives relating to criminal law provisions in the

field of money laundering, such as the Warsaw Convention and FATF

Recommendations. Finally, at the national level, national legislative measures, strategies,

administrative procedures and guidelines that in one way or another were relevant in

transposing and implementing the provisions contained in the Directive were of

relevance. The contractor also conducted an analysis of national implementation

measures with the aim of creating a better picture of the situation in practice and

identifying challenges and opportunities.

Besides a review of the relevant documents, the evaluation also relied on extensive

consultations with a wide range of stakeholders with desk research, discovery interviews,

targeted consultations (via surveys and interviews), statistical data collection, case

studies and, expert input through workshops. These consultations served as opportunities

to collect new data or to confirm the validity of already collected data. Additional

information concerning the stakeholder consultations is provided in Annex V.

ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED

1. Methods and sources

The external study was carried out by Deloitte, following a call for services under a

framework contract. Evidence was collected through six complementary activities that

were carried out under the close supervision of DG HOME: desk research, discovery

interviews, targeted consultations (surveys and interviews), statistical data collection,

three case studies, and expert workshops. Data triangulation was applied systematically

to ensure objectivity and robustness by balancing qualitative and quantitative evidence.

The study placed particular emphasis on stakeholder perspectives. Extensive surveys and

interviews were conducted between late 2023 and early 2024, allowing for

contemporaneous insights into the Directive’s implementation and practical implications.

Sensitive information collected during the consultations was processed under strict

confidentiality rules in line with EU classified information and relevant national

requirements.

2. Known limitations

The table below outlines challenges, risks and limitations encountered when collecting

and analysing the data, along with the mitigating measures taken:

40

Challenge/Risk/Limitation Mitigation action (proactive and reactive)

Reach the relevant

stakeholders and avoid

consultation fatigue

The involvement of the right stakeholders was crucial for the

success of the study supporting the evaluation. The study team

therefore incorporated several mitigation measures in this

regard:

• Stakeholder mapping and engagement: A

stakeholder mapping strategy facilitated timely and

appropriate engagement, supported by introductions

and endorsements from DG HOME.

• Monitoring response rate: Response rates to online

surveys were closely monitored, with the circulation of

personalised reminders and time extensions if

necessary.

• Alternative engagement: Stakeholders encountering

challenges in submitting their responses within the

designated deadline for the online survey were given

the opportunity to participate in a brief interview with

the evaluation team to provide their input.

Timely data

availability and low

response rate

Several consulted stakeholders noted challenges regarding

providing the study team with the requested data in a timely

manner. The supporting study implemented the following

mitigation actions, to promote further stakeholder engagement

and fill in any data gaps:

• Follow-up emails: Send follow-up emails to

stakeholders who had not provided input to remind

them of the survey and encourage their participation.

• Deadline extension with formal communication:

Formally communicate the extension of the deadline

for providing input, ensuring stakeholders are aware of

the opportunity to contribute.

• Edit survey question rules (optional response):

Convert any remaining mandatory surveys to optional,

enabling stakeholders to provide partial input if

necessary.

• Provision of alternative engagement options: Offer

alternative engagement avenues such as private

consultations or focus group discussions to gather

insights from stakeholders who may prefer or require

alternative means of participation.

• Expansion of stakeholder list: Consider broadening

the list of stakeholders to promote further

representation and input.

41

Challenge/Risk/Limitation Mitigation action (proactive and reactive)

Reluctance from

stakeholders to share

their views

Stakeholders may hesitate to share views due to privacy

concerns or discomfort. As their insights are crucial for

assessing the performance of the Directive, the study team

tried to address these concerns as follows:

• Anonymity assurance: Stakeholders were assured of

anonymised data usage for aggregate study purposes.

• Clarification of purpose: The study team clarified the

purpose and confidentiality measures at the outset of

interviews and surveys.

• Adjusted approach for partial input: The study

team revised the online survey questions, shifting them

from mandatory to optional for specific stakeholder

categories unable to provide input on all survey

inquiries. This modification enabled stakeholders to

provide partial input on questions they are

knowledgeable about, ensuring their insights were still

captured effectively.

• Alternative engagement: Stakeholders unable to

provide responses to all survey questions were offered

the option of participating in interviews to share their

input effectively.

3. Process description

To assess the Directive’s impact, a multifaceted approach involving both qualitative and

quantitative data collection methods was developed.

The qualitative data were sourced for the period 2001-2018 (to the extent possible), thus

taking into account the fact that Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA was in

force until Directive (EU) 2018/1673 was adopted. This approach ensured that an

exhaustive analysis was carried out into the situation before the Directive was adopted

and into the Directive’s influence on the harmonising of money-laundering offences.

Furthermore, the external study drew on in-depth surveys and interviews at the end of

2023 and in early 2024, providing contemporaneous insight into stakeholders’

perspectives and enabling an academic exploration of the Directive’s practical

implications.

The evaluation used qualitative and quantitative data and evidence to assess the

performance of existing programmes, compared with expectations prior to

42

implementation of Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on combating money laundering by

criminal law.

The research was structured along the five core evaluation criteria listed in the Better

Regulation Guidelines: effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU added

value. In addition to these, the evaluation team also assessed the impact of the Directive

on the fundamental rights and freedoms having regard to the different stages of the

criminal procedure.

Fig. 1 Intervention logic and evaluation criteria

In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines, the evaluation used the intervention logic

(IL) (see Figure 1 above) and the evaluation matrix (EM) (see Annex III) to

conceptualise the key elements of the policy intervention, design the data collection, help

to establish judgements and conclusions in response to the evaluation questions, and,

finally, provide grounds for the recommendations as a basis for possible future revisions

of the Directive. The intervention logic is to be found in Figures 1 and 2.

43

Fig. 2 Intervention logic

The study supporting the evaluation involved organising and making use of six different

data collection activities to assess the performance of the Directive: desk research,

discovery interviews, targeted consultations (via surveys and interviews), statistical data

collection, case studies and, expert input through workshops.

3.1. Stakeholder consultation

Continuous stakeholder engagement was crucial for the success of this assignment, since

the stakeholders’ input in the ecosystem was key to gathering the required data and

formulating findings.

The data-collection tools selected for this study included: desk research, interviews,

online survey, meetings and tertiary experts. The interviews and online survey are the

stakeholder consultation tools of most importance for this synopsis report (v. Annex V).

3.2. Data analysis techniques and tools

To ensure the robustness of the data and the independence of the evaluation, the study

team performed data triangulation as the main data analysis technique, in order to

conduct a comprehensive assessment of the evaluation matrix and carry out the case

studies.

Once the empirical data had been gathered, triangulation was used to ensure data quality,

objectivity and relevance. Furthermore, triangulation proved useful when putting together

the quantitative and qualitative data and ensuring overall coherence of the analysis. The

44

figure below shows the main sources of data feeding into the triangulation exercise (desk

research, online survey and interviews):

ANNEX III. EVALUATION MATRIX

1. Evaluation matrix

In keeping with the Better Regulation Guidelines, this evaluation used the intervention

logic (IL) and the evaluation matrix (EM) to conceptualise the key elements of the

policy intervention, design the data collection, help to establish judgements and

conclusions in response to the evaluation questions, and, finally, provide grounds for the

recommendations as a basis for possible future revisions of the Directive.

Through dedicated data collection activities and analysis, the study aimed to provide an

evidence-based answer to the following overarching questions, matching the evaluation

criteria:

• How effective has the Directive been? (effectiveness criterion);

• How efficient has the Directive been? (efficiency criterion);

• How relevant is the Directive? (relevance criterion);

• What is the added value provided by addressing this issue via the Directive

compared with an approach at national level? (EU added value criterion);

• How coherent and consistent is the Directive with other ongoing initiatives

(coherence criterion);

• Did the implementation of the Directive and its assessed impact respect

fundamental rights (fundamental rights criterion).

45

The Evaluation Matrix contained questions that address the following three levels of

evaluation of the Directive:

• Evaluation of the Directive itself;

• Evaluation of the transposition of the Directive;

• Evaluation of the practical implementation of the Directive.

Beyond the assessment of the Directive’s impact based on the five criteria – as well as

the fundamental rights – in accordance with the Better Regulation Guidelines and based

on the analysis and input received from different stakeholders, the study also drew on its

data collection exercises and the case studies to identify potential improvements

regarding any legal, technical, and operational aspects associated with the Directive. It

thus provided DG HOME with clear and actionable recommendations. This future-

oriented comprehensive analysis of the Directive was also included in the evaluation

matrix.

Furthermore, three case studies were carried out in the context of the study, in order to

provide additional insights into the performance of the Directive and supplement the

overall assessment.

2. Effectiveness

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Effectiveness

EQ1: Have the

Directive’s goals to

ensure a sufficient

degree of

harmonisation of

the money

laundering

offences and

related penalties

been achieved?

EQ1.1: To what extent

have the Member States

aligned their definitions

of money laundering

offences with the

Directive’s provisions?

• Percentage of Member States

that have incorporated the

definitions of money

laundering offences in their

legal systems

• Existence of legal provisions

addressing the specific

aggravating circumstances

outlined in the Directive

• Desk research

• Surveys and interviews

targeted at national

authorities in EU Member

States (Financial

Intelligence Units, law

enforcement authorities

and judicial authorities)

• Surveys and interviews

targeted at international

organisations (FATF,

OECD, MONEYVAL,

GRECO)

EQ1.2: To what extent

have the Member States

aligned the penalties for

money laundering

offences with the

Directive’s provisions?

• Range of penalties before and

after the implementation of

the Directive

• Presence of disparity in

penalties across Member

States

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Effectiveness

EQ2: Has the

application of the

provisions of the

Directive

contributed to

facilitating the

investigation and

prosecution of

money laundering

in the Member

States and at EU

EQ2.1: To what extent

has the application of the

provisions of the

Directive facilitated the

investigation of money

laundering in Member

States and at EU level?

• Number of money laundering

investigations before and after

the application of the

provisions per Member State

and at EU level

• Qualitative assessment by

stakeholders on the extent to

which the application of the

provisions of the Directive

facilitated the investigation of

money laundering in the

• Surveys and interviews

targeted at national

judicial authorities in EU

Member States

• Surveys and interviews

targeted at national law

enforcement authorities in

EU Member States

• Desk research on public

resources (country-

46

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

level? Have

Member States

made sufficient use

of investigative

tools available for

serious and

organised crime

cases?

Member States and on EU

level

specific evaluation

reports, statistical data)

• Surveys and interviews

targeted at academic and

think-tanks

EQ2.2: To what extent

has the application of the

provisions of the

Directive facilitated the

prosecution of money

laundering in Member

States and at EU level?

• Number of money laundering

prosecutions before and after

application of the provisions

per Member State and at EU

level

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders with regard to

prosecutions before and after

the application of the

Directive

EQ2.3: To what extent

have Member States

made use of investigative

tools for serious and

organised crime cases?

• Number of instances

investigative tools were used

per Member State and at EU

level

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which Member States have

made use of investigative

tools for serious and organised

crime cases

EQ2.4: What can be

further done so that the

Directive and its

application further

contribute to facilitating

the investigation and

prosecution of money

laundering offences in the

Member States and at EU

level, including greater

use of investigative tools

for serios and organised

crime?

• Qualitative input from

stakeholders on the ways the

Directive can better facilitate

investigation and prosecution

of money laundering offences

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Effectiveness

EQ3: Have

provisions

allowing Member

States to convict

for money

laundering

offences without

prior conviction,

prosecution or

extensive factual

establishment of

the predicate

offence been

effectively applied

in practice, and

have they

facilitated the

prosecution and

conviction for

money laundering?

EQ4.1: To what extent

have Member States

applied in practice the

prosecution for money

laundering offences

without prior conviction,

prosecution or extensive

factual establishment of

the predicate offence?

• Number of prosecutions for

money laundering without

prior conviction, prosecution

or extensive factual

establishment of predicate

offence before and after the

application of the Directive’s

provisions

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on extent to

which Member States have

applied in practice the

prosecution for money

laundering without prior

conviction, prosecution or

extensive factual

establishment of predicate

offence before and after the

application of the Directive’s

provisions

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at EU

bodies (Eurojust, Europol)

and international bodies

(Interpol)

47

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

EQ4.2: To what extent

has the conviction for

money laundering

offences without prior

conviction, prosecution

or extensive factual

establishment of the

predicate offences

facilitated prosecutions

and convictions for

money laundering in the

Member States?

• Number of convictions for

money laundering without

prior conviction, prosecution

or extensive factual

establishment of the predicate

offence before and after the

application of the Directive’s

provisions

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on extent to

which the convictions for

money laundering without

prior conviction, prosecution

or extensive factual

establishment of the predicate

offence has facilitated

prosecution and convictions

for money laundering before

and after the application of the

Directive’s provisions

EQ4.3: To what extent

have provisions allowing

Member States to convict

for money laundering

offences without prior

conviction, prosecution

or extensive factual

establishment of the

predicate offence

contributed to the

effectiveness of the

overall AML legal

framework?

• Number of money laundering

convictions before and after

the entry into force and

transposition of the Directive,

in cases where a Member

State has allowed convictions

without prior conviction,

prosecution or extensive

factual establishment of the

predicate offence

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the provisions allowing

Member States to convict for

money laundering offences

without prior conviction,

prosecution or extensive

factual establishment of the

predicate offence contributed

to the effectiveness of the

overall AML legal framework

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Effectiveness

EQ4: Have the

provisions of the

Directive

facilitated cross

border as well as

international

cooperation? To

what extent do

competent

authorities of the

Member States

cooperate with

each other in

criminal

EQ5.1: To what extent

have the Directive’s

provisions facilitated

cross border cooperation

among Member States in

criminal proceedings

regarding money

laundering?

• Number of cross border and

international money

laundering investigations and

prosecutions before and after

the entry into force and

transposition of the Directive

• Qualitative assessment by

stakeholders on the extent to

which the Directive’s

provisions facilitated cross

border cooperation among

Member States in criminal

proceedings regarding money

laundering

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

48

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

proceedings

regarding money

laundering?

EQ5.2: To what extent

have the Directive’s

provisions facilitated

international cooperation

in criminal proceedings

regarding money

laundering?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the Directive’s

provisions facilitated

international cooperation in

criminal proceedings

regarding money laundering

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at EU

bodies (Eurojust, Europol)

and international bodies

(Interpol)

EQ5.3: To what extent do

Member States cooperate

with each other in

criminal proceedings

regarding money

laundering in accordance

with national legislation

and the existing Union

legal framework?

• Number of cross border and

international forms of

cooperation in criminal

proceedings regarding money

laundering before and after

the entry into force and

transposition of the Directive

• Qualitative assessment by

stakeholders on the extent to

which Member States

cooperate with each other in

criminal proceedings

regarding money laundering

in accordance with national

legislation and the existing

Union legal framework

following the entry into force

and transposition of the

Directive

EQ5.5: To what extent

have the Directive’s

provisions facilitated the

effective and timely

information exchange in

criminal proceedings

regarding money

laundering?

• Number of information

exchange requests before and

after the entry into force and

transposition of the Directive

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the Directive’s

provisions facilitated the

effective and timely

information exchange in

criminal proceedings

regarding money laundering

EQ5.4: In what ways

could the effectiveness of

the Directive be

improved to further

enhance the effective and

timely cross border and

international exchange of

information and

cooperation?

• Qualitative assessment from

stakeholders on the way the

Directive can be further

improved to further enhance

the effective and timely cross

border and international

exchange of information and

cooperation

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Effectiveness

EQ: Are there

remaining

obstacles regarding

the criminalisation

of “self-

laundering” in

certain cases?

What has been the

effectiveness and

impact of the

criminalisation of

self-laundering in

EQ6.1: What have been

the key challenges or

successes encountered in

the implementation of

self-laundering?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the presence

of any challenges in relation

to the implementation of self-

laundering

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

EQ6.2: To what extent

has the criminalisation of

self-laundering

contributed to deterring

individuals and entities

from engaging in money

laundering?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the criminalisation of

self-laundering has

contributed to deterring

individuals and entities from

49

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

the EU Member

States, and how

has this contributed

to the broader

efforts in

combating money

laundering and

related financial

crimes?

engaging in money laundering

after the implementation of

the Directive

States

• Surveys and interviews

targeted at EU bodies

(e.g., Eurojust, Europol)

EQ6.3: To what extent

has the criminalisation of

self-laundering led to

enhanced collaboration

and exchange of

information between the

Member States?

• Number of exchanges of

information and collaboration

requests in relation to self-

laundering before and after

the entry into force and the

transposition of the Directive

• Qualitative assessment by

stakeholders on the extent to

which the criminalisation of

self-laundering led to

enhanced collaboration and

exchange of information

between the Member States

EQ6.4: To what extent

has the criminalisation of

self-laundering led to

greater or lower number

of money laundering

prosecutions?

• Number of “self-laundering”

prosecutions before and after

the entry into force and

transposition of the Directive

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the criminalisation of

self-laundering led to change

in number of the money

laundering prosecutions after

the implementation of the

Directive

EQ 6.5: To what extent

has the criminalisation of

self-laundering led to

greater or lower number

of money laundering

convictions?

• Number of “self-laundering”

convictions before and after

the entry into force and

transposition of the Directive

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the criminalisation of

self-laundering led to change

in number of money

laundering convictions after

the implementation of the

Directive

EQ 6.6: How can the

Directive be further

improved to close any

gaps in cases where the

prosecution of self-

laundering does not lead

to a conviction?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the ways to

further improve the Directive

with regard to ‘’self-

laundering’’ provisions

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Effectiveness

EQ7: Has the

implementation of

the Directive

resulted in

confiscation of

property deriving

from activities of a

criminal nature,

including in the

absence of a

EQ7.1: To what extent

has the implementation of

the Directive led to

confiscation of property

derived from criminal

activities, including in the

absence of a conviction

of a specific person or

persons for those

activities?

• Value of confiscated property

derived from criminal activity

before and after the entry into

force and the transposition of

the Directive

• Value of confiscated property

derived from criminal activity

in case of non-conviction

before and after the entry into

force and the transposition of

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

50

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

conviction of a

specific person or

persons for those

activities? If yes,

and if applicable,

what was the share

of non-conviction-

based confiscation

proceedings? If

not, what are the

key obstacles

hindering the

implementation of

such confiscation

measures?

the Directive

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the implementation of

the Directive led to

confiscation of property

derived from criminal

activities, including in the

absence of a conviction of a

specific person or persons for

those activities

EQ7.2: To what extent

has the Directive

contributed to greater

challenges or successes in

relation to confiscation of

property derived from

criminal activities,

including in the absence

of a conviction of a

specific person or persons

for those activities? What

are those challenges and

successes?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the presence

of any challenges in relation

to the confiscation of

property, including non-

conviction-based confiscation

• Indication of specific

challenges and successes with

regard to the confiscation of

property, including non-

conviction-based confiscation

EQ7.3: To what extent

has the Directive led to

the initiation and

execution of non-

conviction-based

confiscation?

• Number of initiations and

executions of non-conviction-

based confiscations

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the Directive has led to

the initiation and execution of

non-conviction-based

confiscation

EQ7.4: How can the

Directive be further

improved to overcome

challenges in relation to

the confiscation of

property derived from

criminal activity,

including in the context

of non-conviction-based

confiscation?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the ways to

further improve the Directive

with regard to confiscation of

property derived from

criminal activity, including in

the context of non-conviction-

based confiscation

Effectiveness

EQ8: To what

extent have

Member States

implemented

optional provisions

(“may clauses”) of

the Directive?

What positive

impact does it have

in the fight against

money laundering

and cross border

cooperation?

EQ8.1: Which Member

States have implemented

optional provisions

(“may clauses”) of the

Directive?

• List of Member States which

have implemented optional

provisions

• Surveys targeted at

judicial authorities in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Survey at EU bodies and

agencies, incl. discovery

interviews with DGs

EQ8.2: What specific

optional provisions

within the Directive have

been implemented by the

Member States?

• List of optional provisions

implemented per Member

State

EQ8.2: To what extent

are the optional

provisions (“may

clauses”) of the Directive

aligned across Member

States?

• Qualitative assessment on the

degree of alignment of the

optional provisions across the

Member States

EQ8.3: To what extent

has the introduction of

optional provisions

(‘’may clauses’’)

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the introduction of

optional provisions (‘’may

51

contributed to cross-

border cooperation and

exchange of information

within the European

Union?

clauses’’) contributed to

cross-border cooperation and

exchange of information

within the European Union

EQ8.4: To what extent

has the introduction of

the optional provisions of

the Directive (‘’may

clauses’’) impacted the

operational capacities of

law enforcement

agencies?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the introduction of the

optional provisions of the

Directive (‘’may clauses’’)

impacted the operational

capacities of law enforcement

agencies

EQ8.5: To what extent

has the introduction of

the optional provisions of

the Directive (‘’may

clauses’’) impacted the

work of the judiciary

(i.e., the jurisprudence)?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the introduction of the

optional provisions of the

Directive (‘’may clauses’’)

impacted the work of the

judiciary (i.e., the

jurisprudence)

EQ8.6: What are the

main challenges and

obstacles identified by

Member States in the

implementation of the

optional provisions

(‘’may clauses)’’?

• The presence of any

challenges in the

implementation of the

optional provisions of the

Directive (‘’may clauses’’)

EQ8.7: How can the

Directive be further

improved to overcome

any challenges or

obstacles in relation to

the implementation of the

optional provisions of the

Directive (‘’may

clauses’’)?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the ways to

overcome any challenges or

obstacles in relation to the

implementation of the

optional provisions of the

Directive (‘’may clauses’’)

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Effectiveness

EQ9: Regarding

the application of

the new provisions

of the Directive, to

what extent were

any legislative

national measures

already in place

before the adoption

of the Directive?

EQ9.1: What specific

national legislative

measures were already in

place prior to the

adoption of the Directive,

and to what extent has the

entry into force and the

transposition of the

Directive impacted or

complemented these

existing measures?

• List of Member States that

had already national

legislative measures in place

prior to the adoption of the

Directive

• List of national legislative

measures already in place

before the adoption of the

Directive

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the entry into force and

the transposition of the

Directive has impacted or

complemented these existing

measures

• State of overall effectiveness

of the combination of pre and

post existing measures

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

EQ9.2: To what extent

did the integration of the

new provisions of the

Directive with pre-

existing national

legislative measures

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the integration of the

new provisions of the

Directive with pre-existing

national legislative measures

52

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

contribute to the

enhancement of the

regulatory framework

and in what way?

contributed to the

enhancement of the overall

regulatory framework

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the way the

integration of the new

provisions of the Directive

with pre-existing national

legislative measures

contributed to the

enhancement of the overall

regulatory framework

EQ9.3: To what extent

have any national

legislative measures or

good practices, which

were previously effective,

become ineffective or

significantly restricted

following the

implementation of the

Directive (if any)?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent (if

any) to which any national

legislative measures or good

practices, which were

previously effective, become

ineffective or significantly

restricted following the

implementation of the

Directive

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Effectiveness

EQ10: To what

extent and why is

the level of

effectiveness of the

relevant provisions

of the Directive

different in the

different Member

States?

EQ10.1: To what extent

are the relevant

provisions of the

Directive effective in

each Member State?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the relevant provisions

of the Directive are effective

in each Member State

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

• Surveys and interviews

targeted at EU bodies

(e.g., Europol, Eurojust)

• Surveys to other

stakeholders (e.g.,

academic and think-tank)

EQ10.2: To what extent

does the level of

effectiveness of the

relevant provisions differ

between each Member

State?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the level of

effectiveness of the relevant

provisions differs between

each Member State

EQ10.3: What are the

reasons for the

differences in

effectiveness between

Member States?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the reasons

for the differences in the

effectiveness between the

Member States

EQ10.4: How can the

Directive be further

improved to increase the

level of effectiveness

across the EU?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the ways the

Directive can be further

improved to increase the level

of effectiveness across the EU

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Effectiveness

EQ11: Are there

any shortcomings

in the

implementation or

regulatory gaps in

the Directive that

hinder the effective

combating of

money laundering

from a criminal

justice perspective?

EQ11.1: To what extent

are there any operational

or technical shortcomings

in the implementation of

the Directive that hinder

the effective combating

of money laundering

from a criminal justice

perspective?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the presence

of any operational or technical

shortcomings in the

implementation of the

Directive that hinder the

effective combating of money

laundering from a criminal

justice perspective Number of

shortcomings in the

implementation of the

Directive

• Surveys targeted at EU

agencies and bodies

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

53

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

EQ11.2: To what extent

are there any regulatory

gaps in the Directive that

hinder the effective

combating of money

laundering from a

criminal justice

perspective?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which there are regulatory

gaps in the Directive that

hinder the effective combating

of money laundering from a

criminal justice perspective

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at

academics and think-tanks

• Desk research EQ11.3: To what extent

and in what ways do any

shortcomings in the

implementation of the

Directive and regulatory

gaps impact reaching

convictions for money

laundering?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which any shortcomings in the

implementation of the

Directive and regulatory gaps

impact reaching convictions

for money-laundering

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the ways in

which any shortcomings in the

implementation of the

Directive and regulatory gaps

impact reaching convictions

for money laundering

EQ11.4: To what extent

do differences in the

implementation of money

laundering offences in the

national law of the

Member States create

dual criminality issues

that impact the overall

effectiveness of the

Directive?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on extent to

which any issues related to

dual criminality of money

laundering impact the

effective implementation of

the Directive

EQ11.5: To what extent

do differences in the

national law of the

Member States between

money laundering, tax

fraud and tax evasion

impose limitations on the

effective investigation,

prosecution and

conviction of money

laundering?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the differences in the

national law of the Member

States between money

laundering, tax fraud and tax

evasion (if any) impact the

effective investigation,

prosecution and conviction of

money laundering

EQ11.6: How can the

Directive be further

improved to address any

other shortcomings in its

implementation in order

to optimise its

effectiveness?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on how to further

improve the Directive to

address any shortcomings in

its implementation

3. Efficiency

In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines on evaluation, the efficiency criterion aims

to assess whether the activities evaluated are delivering their objectives at minimum costs

and while avoiding unnecessary costs or burdens. This means that the evaluation looks at

the relationship between the costs deriving from the implementation of Directive (EU)

2018/1673 and the outcomes and results it has generated in each country and per

stakeholder following the transposition. As there are differences between the

implementation of activities across the Member States, the project team also looked at

54

how the implementation differs between the countries and whether some approaches are

more efficient than other. The analysis of efficiency covered administrative and

adjustment costs, aspects of simplification and a cost-benefit comparison by Member

State.

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Efficiency

EQ13: What are

the

implementation

costs and the

benefits of the

Directive – in the

individual

Member States

and overall? Are

there differences

between Member

States and what

causes them?

What are the

administrative

costs and benefits

of the Directive

for citizens and

businesses?

EQ13.1: What are the

implementation costs

(including costs for

citizens and businesses)

of the Directive for each

Member State and

overall?

• Estimation by stakeholders

on the costs expressed in

monetary value of the

implementation of the

Directive per Member State

and overall

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at other

stakeholders

EQ13.2: What are the

causes of the differences

in the implementation

costs between Member

States?

• Qualitative assessment on the

causes of the differences in

the implementation cost

between Member States

EQ13.3: What are the

benefits (including

benefits for citizens and

businesses) of

implementing the

Directive for each

Member State and

overall?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the benefits

expressed in monetary value

of the implementation of the

Directive per Member State

and overall

EQ13.4: What are the

causes of the benefits of

the implementation of

the Directive between

Member States?

• Qualitative assessment on the

causes of the benefits in the

implementation cost between

Member States

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Efficiency

EQ14: Have the

results that can be

attributed to the

Directive been

achieved at a

reasonable cost? Is

the regulatory

burden placed on

Member States by

the

implementation of

the Directive

proportional to the

observed results?

EQ14.1: To what extent

do the costs associated

with the implementation

and enforcement of the

Directive compare to the

achieved outcomes in

terms of the prevention

and deterrence of money

laundering activities

within the European

Union?

• Qualitative assessment,

including by stakeholders, on

the ratio of costs to benefits

per Member State

• Number of FTEs per Member

State competent authorities

needed to implement the

Directive

• Financial costs per Member

State in relation to the

implementation of the

Directive

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the costs associated

with the implementation and

enforcement of the Directive

compared to the achieved

outcomes in terms of the

prevention and deterrence of

money laundering activities

within the European Union

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at other

stakeholders

• Survey at EU bodies and

agencies, incl. discovery

interviews with DGs

EQ14.2: What specific

financial, administrative,

and resource-related

challenges have Member

States encountered

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the financial,

administrative, and resource-

related challenges faced by

Member States in the

55

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

during the

implementation of the

Directive, and to what

extent have these

challenges impacted the

overall efficiency and

effectiveness of anti-

money laundering

measures?

implementation of the

Directive

• List of financial,

administrative, and resource-

related challenges faced by

Member States in the

implementation of the

Directive

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent

these challenges impacted the

overall efficiency and

effectiveness of anti-money

laundering measures

EQ14.3: How has the

regulatory burden on

Member States,

stemming from the

implementation of the

Directive, affected their

capacity to meet other

regulatory obligations

and effectively address

emerging financial crime

threats?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the

regulatory burden of the

Directive

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the ways the

regulatory burden on

Member States stemming

from the implementation of

the Directive affected their

capacity to meet other

regulatory obligations and

effectively address emerging

financial crime threats

EQ14.4: What measures

or adjustments with

regard to the

implementation of the

Directive can be

undertaken to ensure a

balanced approach that

minimises unnecessary

regulatory burden,

streamlines regulatory

requirements, optimises

resource allocation while

maintaining robust anti-

money laundering

standards and achieving

the desired results

outlined in the

Directive?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the measures

or adjustments needed with

regard to the implementation

of the Directive in order to

minimise regulatory burden,

streamline regulatory

requirements, optimise

resource allocation while

maintaining robust anti-

money laundering standards

and achieving the desired

results outlined in the

Directive

• Survey at EU bodies and

agencies, incl. discovery

interviews with DGs

EQ15: Is there a

potential to

simplify or reduce

administrative

burden (including

monitoring and

reporting) without

undermining the

intended

objectives of the

Directive?

EQ15.1: Which elements

of the implementation of

the Directive represent

an outsized

administrative burden?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on

administratively burdensome

elements of the

implementation of the

Directive

• List of administrative

burdens associated with the

implementation of the

Directive as identified by

stakeholders

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at other

stakeholders

• Survey at EU bodies and

agencies, incl. discovery

EQ15.2: Is there scope to

simplify those elements

which represent an

outsized administrative

burden without reducing

the desired benefits?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on

simplification of

administratively burdensome

elements which would not

undermine the objectives of

the Directive

56

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

interviews with DGs

4. Relevance

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Relevance

EQ17: To what

extent does the EU

Directive

2018/1673 address

current and future

threats and needs

concerning the

development of

organised crime,

particularly

focusing on

evolving money

laundering

activities outlined

in the 2021

Serious and

Organised Crime

Threat Assessment

(SOCTA)? How

can the provisions

be enhanced to

effectively

respond to recent

developments and

anticipated trends,

including criminal

networks’

displacement of

money laundering

attempts to

underground

remittance

systems, increased

use of virtual

currencies, and the

exploitation of

non-fungible

tokens (NFTs) for

money laundering

purposes?

EQ17.1: To what extent

does the Directive

address current and

future threats and needs

related to cybercrime as

outlined in the 2021

SOCTA?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

alignment of the Directive’s

provisions with the current

and future threats of cyber

crime

• Desk research based on

the 2021 SOCTA report

and other publications by

relevant authorities and

research papers

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at other

stakeholders

• Survey at EU bodies and

agencies, incl. discovery

interviews with DGs

EQ17.2: To what extent

does the Directive

address the current and

future threats and needs

related to the trade in

illegal drugs in the EU as

outlined in the 2021

SOCTA?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

alignment of the Directive’s

provisions with the current

and future threats and needs

related to illegal drug trade

EQ17.3: To what extent

does the Directive

address the current and

future threats and needs

related to environmental

crime as outlined in the

2021 SOCTA?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

alignment of the Directive’s

provisions with the current

and future threats and needs

related to environmental

crime

EQ17.4: To what extent

does the Directive

address the current and

future threats and needs

related to the trade in

illegal firearms and

explosives as outlined in

the 2021 SOCTA?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

alignment of the Directive’s

provisions with the current

and future threats and needs

related to the trade in illegal

firearms and explosives

EQ17.5: To what extent

does the Directive

address the current and

future threats and needs

related to fraud as

outlined in the 2021

SOCTA?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

alignment of the Directive’s

provisions with the current

and future threats and needs

related to fraud

EQ17.6: To what extent

does the Directive

address the current and

future threats and needs

related to match fixing

and betting-related

scams as outlined in the

2021 SOCTA?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

alignment of the Directive’s

provisions with the current

and future threats and needs

related to match fixing and

betting-related scams

EQ17.7: To what extent

does the Directive

address the current and

future threats and needs

related to “people as a

commodity” as outlined

in the 2021 SOCTA?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

alignment of the Directive’s

provisions with the current

and future threats and needs

related to “people as a

commodity”

57

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

EQ17.8: To what extent

does the Directive

address the current and

future threats and needs

related to document

fraud as outlined in the

2021 SOCTA?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

alignment of the Directive’s

provisions with the current

and future threats and needs

related to document fraud

EQ17.9: To what extent

does the Directive

address the current and

future threats and needs

related to product

counterfeiting and

intellectual property

crime as outlined in the

2021 SOCTA?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

alignment of the Directive’s

provisions with the current

and future threats and needs

related to product

counterfeiting and

intellectual property crime

EQ17.10: To what extent

does the Directive

address the current and

future threats and needs

related to currency

counterfeiting as

outlined in the 2021

SOCTA?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

alignment of the Directive’s

provisions with the current

and future threats and needs

related to currency

counterfeiting

EQ17.11: To what extent

does the Directive

address the current and

future threats and needs

related to organised

property crime as

outlined in the 2021

SOCTA?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

alignment of the Directive’s

provisions with the current

and future threats and needs

related to organised property

crime

EQ17.12: To what extent

are the provisions still

appropriate and

sufficient to respond to

recent developments and

anticipated trends such

as the response by

criminal networks

displacing money

laundering attempts to

underground remittance

systems?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

relevance of the Directive’s

provisions with the

anticipated trends in money

laundering via underground

remittance systems

EQ17.13: To what extent

are the provisions still

appropriate and

sufficient to respond to

recent developments and

anticipated trends related

to the use of virtual

currencies and the

tokenisation economy

(such as NFTs)?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

relevance of the Directive’s

provisions with the

anticipated trends in money

laundering via virtual

currencies

EQ17.14: How can the

Directive be further

enhanced to better

address the emerging

trends and techniques

observed in organised

crime as well as new

threats identified in

SOCTA 2021?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on how to

improve the Directive to

better address the new threats

and the emerging trends and

techniques observed in

organised crime

58

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Relevance

EQ18: Are there

provisions

contained in the

Directive that

might be

considered

obsolete or

provisions that

should be aligned

due to certain

developments (for

example: Proposal

for a Directive on

asset recovery and

confiscation as

well as sanction

evasion)?

EQ18.1: Which specific

provisions within the

Directive may no longer

effectively address the

current challenges posed

by emerging forms of

financial crime, and

what amendments or

revisions could be

proposed to enhance

their efficacy and

alignment with

contemporary regulatory

standards and practices?

• Qualitative assessment from

stakeholders on the

provisions of the Directive

that may no longer

effectively address the

current challenges posed by

emerging forms of financial

crime

• Qualitative input from

stakeholders on points of

improvement of the

Directive’s provisions that

may no longer effectively

address the current

challenges posed by

emerging forms of financial

crime

• Desk research analysing

evolutions in the financial

crime trends and the

regulatory landscape

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at other

stakeholders

• Survey at EU bodies and

agencies, incl. discovery

interviews with DGs

EQ18.2: In what ways

can the Directive be

better harmonised with

the proposed measures

outlined in the Directive

on asset recovery and

confiscation and other

relevant initiatives, e.g.,

sanction evasion?

• Qualitative input from

stakeholders on points of

improvement of the Directive

for further alignment with the

proposed measures outlined

in the Directive on asset

recovery and confiscation

and other relevant initiatives

(e.g., the AML package,

sanction evasion)

EQ18.3: Are there

provisions that might be

considered obsolete or

need to be aligned due to

any other changes?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the

provisions which could be

considered obsolete due to

other changes

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the

provisions which might

require alignment due to

other changes

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Relevance

EQ19: Are there

other remaining

obstacles/legal and

practical issues in

the fight against

money laundering

identified by

relevant

stakeholders such

as EUROJUST or

FATF that are not

sufficiently

addressed or taken

into account in the

Directive?

EQ19.1: Are there any

legal issues in the fight

against money

laundering identified by

relevant stakeholders

such as EUROJUST or

FATF which are not

sufficiently addressed in

the Directive?

• List of unaddressed legal

issues in the Directive as

identified by relevant

stakeholders

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the

importance of the

unaddressed legal issues to

the overall effectiveness of

the Directive

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at

international bodies

• Survey at EU bodies and

agencies, incl. discovery

interviews with DGs

EQ19.2: Are there any

practical issues in the

fight against money

laundering identified by

relevant stakeholders

such as EUROJUST or

FATF which are not

sufficiently addressed in

the Directive?

• List of unaddressed practical

issues in the Directive as

identified by relevant

stakeholders

• Qualitative assessment from

stakeholders on the

importance of the

unaddressed practical issues

to the overall effectiveness of

the Directive

59

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

• Surveys at other

stakeholders

5. Coherence

In accordance with the Better regulation guidelines, the evaluation of coherence entails

assessing how well different interventions work together and are consistent with each

other. The coherence evaluation criterion is twofold: internal and external. On the one

hand, internal coherence means looking at how the different components of the same EU

intervention (the CMLD, in this case) operate together to achieve its objectives. On the

other hand, external coherence examines how different interventions complement each

other (e.g. assessing whether there are synergies, but also duplication or overlaps). This

section will thus focus first on the internal consistency of the CMLD and then study the

external consistency of this legal instrument.

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Coherence

EQ20: Is the

Directive coherent

with developments

in the international

context including

as international

agreements,

frameworks etc.?

EQ20.1: To what extent

does the Directive lay

down rules in line with

international frameworks

and standards, such as

2003 United Nations

Convention against

Transnational Organised

Crime (Palermo

Convention), 2005

Warsaw Convention, the

FATF Recommendations

etc.?

• Degree of alignment between

the Directive and relevant

international

frameworks/standards with

regard to provisions on the

criminalisation of money

laundering, asset freezing and

confiscation as well as

international cooperation

• Desk research

• Surveys and interviews

with relevant

stakeholders (FATF,

OECD, MONEYVAL,

TI)

• Survey at EU bodies and

agencies, incl. discovery

interviews with DGs

EQ20.2: What steps can

be taken to address any

inconsistencies or

conflicts between the

Directive and other

relevant international

instruments?

• Qualitative input from

stakeholders on possible

ways for further alignment of

the Directive with relevant

international instruments

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Coherence

EQ21: Is the

Directive coherent

with other relevant

EU acts? In

particular to what

extent does the

EQ21.1: To what extent

does the Directive

complement and

reinforce existing EU

acts such as the

Directive 2014/42/EU on

• Degree of alignment between

the Directive and relevant EU

acts

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the Directive has a

• Desk research

• Survey at EU bodies and

agencies, incl. discovery

interviews with DGs

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

60

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Directive usefully

complement and

reinforce the

preventative

money laundering

provisions in light

of recent

developments? Is

this the case for

the Directive

2014/42/EU of the

European

Parliament and of

the Council of 3

April 2014 on the

freezing and

confiscation of

instrumentalities

and proceeds of

crime in the

European Union as

well as Proposal

for a Directive on

asset recovery and

confiscation?

the freezing and

confiscation of

instrumentalities and

proceeds of crime in the

EU?

positive impact on the

existing legislative initiatives

currently going on in the EU

level

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at other

stakeholders

EQ21.2: In what ways

can the Directive better

complement and

reinforce the objectives

outlined in the Directive

2014/42/EU and the

Proposal for a Directive

on asset recovery and

confiscation?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on how to

improve the Directive to

better compliment or

reinforce the objectives

outlined in the Directive

2014/42/EU and the Proposal

for a Directive on asset

recovery and confiscation

EQ21.3: To what extent

does the Directive

complement and

reinforce other existing

initiatives at the EU

level, (e.g., Regulation

(EU) 2023/1114

(MiCA), Regulation

(EU) 2023/1113 for

information

accompanying Transfer

of Funds, Directive

2019/1153 on the use of

financial and other

information for certain

criminal offences,

Directive (EU) 2023/977

on the exchange of

information between law

enforcement authorities

of Member States)?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholder stakeholders on

the extent to which the

Directive has a positive

impact on the existing

initiatives on EU level to

strengthen the EU’s AML

rules

6. EU added value

As described in Tool #47 of the Better Regulation Guidelines, the criterion of EU added

value looks for changes that are due to the EU intervention, over and above what could

reasonably have been expected from national actions by the Member State. As outlined

within Article 5 of the Treaty on EU on the principle of subsidiarity, EU action is only

desirable when the objectives of legislative action can be better achieved by the EU

rather than by the Member States.

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

EU Added Value

EQ22: To what

extent has the

Directive generated

EU added value as

opposed to what

could have been

achieved by

Member States on

their own (also

taking into account

EQ22.1: To what extent

have specific legal,

technical, and

operational advantages

been realised at the EU

level as a result of the

implementation of the

EU Directive

2018/1673, in

comparison to the

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the Directive provides

added value in the fight

against money laundering as

compared to potential

outcomes from the Member

States’ individual approach

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU

Member States

• Surveys targeted at

61

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

their requirements

under international

law and standards

such as the

Warsaw

Convention or

FATF

recommendations)?

potential outcomes if

Member States had

acted independently?

Financial Intelligence

Units in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

EQ22.2: To what extent

has the Directive

provided additional

incentive to Member

States in the fight

against money

laundering compared to

what has been required

under their international

law obligations?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the Directive provided

additional incentive to

Member States in the fight

against money laundering as

compared to relevant

obligations under

international law

7. Fundamental rights

According to the Better Regulation Guidelines there is the option of including additional

criteria for the sake of the study, including an evaluation of fundamental rights. from the

study is also based on Article 14(2) of Directive (EU) 2018/1673, which stipulates that

the evaluation will also look at the instrument’s impact on fundamental rights and

freedoms. According to Tool#29 from the Better Regulation Toolbox 2023 policy

options can have both positive and negative effects on fundamental rights. Furthermore,

in the case of adverse effects, effects any limitations to fundamental rights can only be

justified if they meet the requirement of necessity and proportionality.

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

Fundamental Rights

EQ25: What has

been the impact of

the

implementation of

the Directive on

fundamental rights

and freedoms as

enshrined in the

Charter of

Fundamental

Rights of the

European Union,

including those set

out in Titles II, III,

V and VI which

encompass, inter

alia, the right to

respect for private

and family life and

the right to

protection of

personal data, the

right to freedom of

association, the

right to property,

the principles of

legality and

EQ25.1: How has the

implementation of the

Directive affected the

protection of private and

family life, as well as the

safeguarding of personal

data, in accordance with

the Charter of

Fundamental Rights of

the European Union?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the impact of

the Directive on fundamental

rights and freedoms as

enshrined in the Charter of

Fundamental Rights of the

European Union

• Surveys targeted at think-

thanks, academic

institutions

• Surveys targeted at

national judicial

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

national law enforcement

authorities in EU Member

States

• Surveys targeted at

Financial Intelligence

Units

• Surveys targeted at Asset

Recovery Offices in EU

Member States

• Survey targeted at EU

bodies and agencies (e.g.,

FRA)

EQ25.2: To what extent

has the Directive

impacted the freedom of

association among

individuals and

organisations,

considering the

provisions outlined in

the relevant sections of

the Charter of

Fundamental Rights of

the European Union?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the directive impacted

the freedom of association

among individuals and

organisations

EQ25.3: In what ways

has the Directive

impacted the respect of

principles such as

legality and

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the ways in

which the Directive impacted

the principles of legality and

proportionality of criminal

62

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

proportionality of

criminal offences

and penalties,

covering also the

requirement of

precision, clarity

and foreseeability

in criminal law,

the presumption of

innocence, as well

as the rights of

suspects and

accused persons to

have access to a

lawyer, the right

not to incriminate

oneself and the

right to a fair trial?

proportionality of

criminal offences and

penalties, including

aspects related to

precision, clarity, and

foreseeability in criminal

law, as stipulated in the

Charter of Fundamental

Rights of the European

Union?

offences and penalties

EQ25.4: What effects

has the implementation

of the Directive had on

upholding the

presumption of

innocence and ensuring

the rights of suspects and

accused persons, such as

the right to access legal

representation, the right

not to self-incriminate,

and the right to a fair

trial, in accordance with

the Charter of

Fundamental Rights of

the European Union?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the effects of

the Directive in upholding

the presumption of innocence

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the effects of

the Directive in upholding

the rights of suspects and

accused persons

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the effects of

the Directive in upholding

the right to access legal

representation

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the effects of

the Directive in upholding

the right not to self-

incriminate

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the effects of

the Directive in upholding

the right to a fair trial

EQ25.5: In what ways

could the Directive be

further improved to

ensure or enhance the

protection of these

rights?

• Qualitative input by

stakeholders on the way the

Directive can be further

improved to safeguard the

fundamental rights and

freedoms as enshrined in the

Charter of Fundamental

Rights of the EU

EQ26.1: To what extent

does the implementation

of the Directive align

with the provisions

outlined in the Charter of

Fundamental Rights of

the European Union,

specifically concerning

the rights and principles

related to the Directive’s

scope and application?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent to

which the Directive has been

implemented in accordance

with human rights obligations

under European law

• Survey targeting think-

tanks/academic

institutions

• Survey targeted at other

stakeholders (e.g.,

ECBA)

• Survey targeted at EU

bodies and agencies (e.g.,

EPPO, FRA, Eurojust,

Europol)

EQ26.2: How

effectively has the

implementation of the

Directive adhered to the

standards and principles

set forth in the European

Convention for the

Protection of Human

Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms, particularly in

the context of the

protection of

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on whether the

Directive has been

implemented in accordance

with human rights obligations

under the European

Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms

63

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

fundamental rights

during the enforcement

and implementation of

the Directive?

EQ26.3: In what ways

has the implementation

of the Directive

demonstrated

compliance with the

provisions stipulated in

the International

Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights,

considering the

obligations under this

international human

rights instrument and

their impact on the

Directive’s enforcement?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on whether the

Directive has been

implemented in accordance

with human rights obligations

under the International

Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights

EQ26.4: What measures

have been taken to

ensure that the

implementation of the

Directive aligns with

other human rights

obligations under

international law, and

how has this affected the

Directive’s overall

application and

enforcement across

Member States of the

European Union?

• List of measures adopted to

ensure alignment with other

human rights obligations

under international law

• Qualitative assessment by

stakeholders on the impact of

these measures on the

Directive’s overall

application and enforcement

across EU Member States

EQ26.5: In what ways

could the Directive be

further enhanced to

ensure that its legal

provisions and

implementation align

more effectively with

international human

rights obligations and

standards, promoting a

balanced approach to

combating criminal

activities while

safeguarding individual

rights?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on how to

improve the Directive to

enhance its alignment with

international human rights

obligations and promote a

balanced approach while

combating criminal activities

EQ27: To what

extent and why

can any observed

impact on

fundamental rights

and freedoms be

directly attributed

to the Directive

(and specific

provisions) or to

EQ27.1: Which

provisions of the

Directive lead to direct

impact on the

fundamental rights and

freedoms?

• List of provisions of the

Directive that have a direct

impact on fundamental rights

and freedoms

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the extent of

the Directive’s impact on the

fundamental rights and

freedoms

• Survey targeted at other

stakeholders (e.g.,

ECBA)

• Survey targeted at EU

bodies and agencies (e.g.,

EPPO, FRA, Eurojust,

Europol)

64

Evaluation

question

Sub-questions Indicators Data collection methods &

sources

other

developments?

EQ27.2: Has the

punishable conduct

enumerated in Article 3

and 4 of the Directive as

criminal offence been

defined in a clear,

precise and foreseeable

way so as not to

jeopardise the principles

of legality of criminal

offences?

• Qualitative assessment by

stakeholders on the clarity,

precision and foreseeability

of the punishable conducts in

the Directive

EQ27.3: Are the

penalties envisaged for

the punishable offences

in Article 5 of the

Directive proportionate

given the nature and

severity of the conduct?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on the

proportionality of the

penalties for the punishable

offence of the Directive in

relation to the nature and

severity of the conduct

EQ27.4: Are there other

developments leading to

impact on fundamental

rights and freedoms

resulting from the

implementation of the

Directive?

• Qualitative assessment by the

stakeholders on whether there

are other developments

resulting in impact on

fundamental rights and

freedoms while

implementing the Directive

ANNEX IV. OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS

65

Citizens/Consumers Businesses Administrations

Quantitative Comment Quantitativ

e

Commen

t

Quantitative Comment

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Costs:

Direct

compliance costs (adjustment costs, administrative costs,

regulatory charges)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A The main

administrative costs

relate to the

transposition of the

Directive, in terms of

amending national

legislation as needed.

Enforcement

costs: (costs

associated with

activities linked to

the implementation

of an initiative such as monitoring,

inspections and

adjudication/litigatio n)

Indirect costs (indirect compliance

costs or other indirect costs such as

transaction costs)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Costs related to

acquiring /

developing specific

expertise reported by

a small number of

administrations /

authorities (e.g., costs

for FTEs, in order to

cover specific areas

of expertise in

combatting money

laundering (e.g.,

virtual currencies)).

Costs associated with

heavier workload

reported by a small

number of

administrations /

authorities, although

it is unclear whether

this can be attributed

to the Directive or

also accounts for

other usual activity of

the stakeholder

Benefits:

Direct benefits (such as improved

wellbeing: changes

in pollution levels, safety, health,

employment; market

efficiency)

N/

A

N/A Harmonisin

g money

laundering

offences and

penalties

across

Member

States

N/A N/A N/A Legal clarity and

effectiveness

stemming from

harmonisation of

definitions

Enhanced

investigative

capabilities for law

66

ANNEX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT

Continuous stakeholder engagement was crucial for the success of the study supporting

the evaluation, since the input by stakeholders in the process was key to gathering the

required data and formulating findings.

The data-collection tools selected for this supporting study included: desk research,

interviews, online survey, meetings and tertiary experts – of which the interviews and

online survey are the stakeholder consultation tools of most importance for this synopsis

report.

Desk research

A fundamental component of the study, desk research was ongoing from the inception of

the project until its conclusion. This encompasses the review of existing legal AML

frameworks, international AML standards, specialised reports, relevant initiatives,

updates and current trends.

Discovery interviews

A total of 11 discovery interviews were conducted between staff of the European

Commission and the Evaluation Team, comprising 5 interviews with representatives

from Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) and 6 interviews

with the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST), the Directorate-

General for Taxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD), the Directorate‑General for

Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA), the

Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), the

European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and the European External Action Service (EEAS).

These interviews were organised to gain a deeper understanding of expectations

regarding the evaluation process and to glean insights into the perspectives of the staff

regarding the implementation of the Directive.

enforcement

Indirect benefits (such as wider

economic benefits,

macroeconomic benefits, social

impacts,

environmental impacts)

N/

A

N/A None

reported

N/A N/A N/A Enhanced deterrence

Improved

cooperation

Confiscation of

laundered goods

adding to the state

treasury

67

Ad hocinterviews:

The aim of these ad hoc interviews was to collect further qualitative evidence from key

stakeholders and fill in any information gaps (e.g. online survey).

Overview of interviews conducted (discovery interviews and ad hoc interviews)

Stakeholder Stakeholder Type

# of

Interviews Interview type Date(s)

DG HOME EU institutions 5 Discovery interviews

12/1/2024 (2),

15/1/2024

16/1/2024, 19/1/2024

DG JUST EU institutions 1 Discovery interview 17/1/2024

DG FISMA EU institutions 1 Discovery interview 17/1/2024

DG TAXUD EU institutions 1 Discovery interview 10/1/2024

DG NEAR EU institutions 1 Discovery interview

Case study Interview

19/1/2024

4/6/2024

OLAF EU institutions 1 Discovery interview 16/1/2024

EEAS EU institutions 1 Discovery interview 31/1/2024

European Tax

Federation EU business association 1 Ad hoc interview 12/2/2024

Accountancy Europe EU business association 1 Ad hoc interview 15/2/2024

Tax Advisors Europe EU business association 1 Ad hoc interview 6/3/2024

European Public

Prosecutor Office

(EPPO)

EU institutions 1 Ad hoc interview 13/3/2024

European Union

Agency for Law

Enforcement

Cooperation (Europol)

EU institutions 1 Case study interview 28/5/2024

The European Union

Agency for

Fundamental Rights

(FRA)

EU institutions 1 Case study interview 5/6/2024

EU Delegations EU institutions 1 Case study interview 4/6/2024

EMPACT network

(representative of FR) National authorities 1 Case study interview 28/5/2024

Interviews (and written contributions) for case studies

The purpose of these interviews was to hold in-depth discussions on specific topics

identified for the three case studies with stakeholders with practical, operational / field

experience in the fields covered by the case studies. These interviews included

representatives of national authorities identified through the EMPACT network (e.g., DE,

EE, FR, LV, IS), representatives of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement

Cooperation (Europol) and representatives of DG NEAR and EU delegations in

accession countries.

68

Online surveys

Twelve online surveys were developed to gather insights for the evaluation of Directive

(EU) 2018/1673, targeting four distinct groups. Four surveys were specifically tailored to

national authorities of the Member States, including judicial authorities, law enforcement

authorities, Asset Recovery Offices, and Financial Intelligence Units. Additionally, six

surveys were designed for various EU bodies such as the European Union Agency for

Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), the European Union Agency for Criminal

Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against

Criminal Threats (EMPACT), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the

European Banking Authority, and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

(FRA). One survey was targeted at key international stakeholders in AML, including the

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Financial Action Task Force

(FATF), the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering

Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval), and the International Criminal

Police Organisation (INTERPOL), while another survey was aimed at specialised

European associations, think tanks, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The surveys were distributed online to each stakeholder category via the EU Survey

platform. The response rate was low, but feedback indicated that stakeholders require

additional time to gather pertinent information or could be unable to address all survey

questions, so adjustments were made. Following consultation with DG HOME, survey

questions were switched from mandatory to optional for several stakeholder categories,

allowing for partial input where feasible. Moreover, recognising the time constraints and

difficulties faced by stakeholders in responding comprehensively, dedicated individual

consultations were put in place to accommodate stakeholders’ needs (ad hoc interviews).

Responses were received from various national authorities: 6 judicial authorities, 13 law

enforcement authorities, 11 Financial Intelligence Units, and 8 Asset Recovery Offices.

External stakeholders also contributed, with submissions from three EU bodies, two

NGOs/Think-tanks/professional associations, and one International Organisation.

Additionally, we have conducted individual consultations with three professional

associations and one EU body (ad hoc interviews).

Overview of surveys and responses

Stakeholder Type Stakeholders # Responses

(Received by

24/05/2024)

National Authorities National judicial authorities * 8

National law enforcement authorities * 14

Financial Intelligence Units * 11

Asset Recovery Offices * 8

NGOs, think-tanks, Royal United Services Institute, Global Initiative against 6

69

academic institutions

and European

associations *

Transnational Organised Crime, Transcrime, Basel Institute of

Governance, Transparency International, Global Initiative to Fight

Financial Crime, Institute for Financial Crime – University of

Groningen, Centre for European Policy Studies, Tax Justice

Network, European Criminal Bar Association, The Council of Bars

and Law Society of Europe, European Banking Federation, Tax

Advisors Europe, European Tax Advisors Federation,

Accountancy Europe

International

organisations *

UNODC, Council of Europe, Financial Action Task Force,

INTERPOL

1

European Union

Bodies and Agencies

European Banking Authority * 1

EMPACT * 4

EPPO * 1

Eurojust* 1

Europol – Anti-Money Laundering Operational Network (AMON)

– European Financial and Economic Crime Centre (EFECC) *

1

FRA * -

* Unique surveys

Participation in meetings and workshops

Participation in the Meeting of the Expert Group of the Commission on EU Criminal

Policy (March 1, 2024) provided a unique opportunity to gather expert input and relevant

insights to complement initial observations from surveys and interviews. The Horizontal

Expert group gathered Prosecutors, Criminal lawyers and Criminal Law Professors from

Member States.

Tertiary experts

Generally, stakeholder participation can be considered relatively low, especially with

regard to participation in the survey. In view of this, the team in charge of the supporting

study also relied on input from tertiary experts, who provided information about the

implementation of the Directive across the Member States. In total, 14 legal experts

provided their input in this regard, covering the following Member States: Bulgaria,

Germany, Greece, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria,

Poland, Portugal, Romania and Sweden.

Results of the stakeholder consultation activities

The results of the stakeholder consultations are reflected in the assessment of the

evaluation of the Directive in Section 4. The consultation activities were tailored towards

and targeted at specific stakeholder groups, providing the necessary input for assessing of

the performance of the Directive.

70

In light of this, contacting different groups of stakeholders made it possible to obtain

varied input for the study with regard to the evaluation of the Directive.

The European Commission’s DGs provided information on the inputs and outputs of

the Directive, and on the interplay with other policies and legislation in the area of anti-

money laundering, financial crime prevention in the EU, and other policies. The DGs

were primarily involved during the inception phase of the study supporting the

evaluation, providing guidance on the assessment of the CMLD, and in the context of the

ISG. Meanwhile, the EU agencies and bodies provided input on the practical

implementation of the study, on best practices and on challenges seen at EU level.

Furthermore, stakeholders from the EU institutions contributed to the assessment of the

evaluation criteria for the CMLD. For effectiveness, the EU institutions generally

underlined the harmonisation established by the CMLD, whilst also highlighting the

limiting factors in this regard, such as a degree of ambiguity in the definitions (e.g.

regarding property or predicate offences) and the differences in transposition across

various Member States. Moreover, the Commission recommended that alignment be

ensured between the Directive and newly adopted criminal-law instruments in the EU –

in particular regarding the approach towards sanctions. The EU added value stemming

from the contributions to harmonisation was also underscored by the stakeholder group.

For the assessment of the relevance criterion, the stakeholder group generally indicated

that the Directive consistently addressed current and future threats. Finally, the EU

institutions and bodies indicated that the CMLD Directive complied with the key

fundamental rights principles.

The international stakeholders provided insights into the positioning and application of

the Directive in the broader international context of the fight against financial crime,

which is of particular relevance for the external coherence dimension. Given the low

response rate of this stakeholder group, it is difficult to extrapolate the insights from the

consultation activities without potentially breaching the anonymity principle ensured by

the study team during the consultation activities. In view of this, a detailed assessment of

their input is not included here.

The national authorities – covering the judicial authorities, law enforcement agencies,

Financial Intelligence Units and Asset Recovery Offices – gave their views on the

practical implementation of the Directive at national level, shared best practices and

pointed out possible challenges associated with the Directive’s transposition and

implementation. As highlighted above, the national authorities were primarily consulted

via the use of surveys.

In terms of effectiveness, they contributed, for example, to the assessment of the

harmonisation of offences and penalties (indicating that the national regulatory

frameworks are aligned with the provisions of the Directive), cross-border and

international cooperation, the use of investigative tools and money laundering

prevention. Generally, national authorities were aligned on most elements linked to

effectiveness, but they diverged, for example, diverged when it came to facilitating

71

investigation and prosecution, with LEAs reporting a higher level of support than the

Financial Intelligence Units of the Member States.

In terms of efficiency, all branches of the national authorities which were consulted in the

surveys reported no significant costs or additional administrative burden associated with

indicated that this aspect should be further assessed, as the timing of the external study

meant that limited data were available on this subject.

When it came to coherence, all national authorities’ stakeholders indicated no significant

regulatory gaps linked to the CMLD beyond some minor points requiring improvement,

in particular, the monitoring by Asset Recovery Offices of the current balance of bank

accounts. The national authorities assessed internal coherence positively. Regarding

external coherence, all branches of the national authorities were generally aligned: the

JAs, LEAs and Asset Recovery Offices all indicated that the CMLD Directive did not

affect international cooperation given its sole European focus, contributing only

moderately given pre-existing national provisions on the matter. Nevertheless, some

elements of the CMLD affect its external coherence of the Directive, in particular the

provisions on the scope of predicate offences.

Mirroring the aforementioned availability of pre-existing provisions, national authorities

had different views on the EU added value of the CMLD. Whilst some national

authorities highlighted further harmonisation across the EU, other stakeholders reported

that given the pre-existing regulatory framework, the added value of the CMLD was

limited. The same split holds true for the assessment of additional reforms sparked by the

Directive, with all JAs reporting no additional reforms, whilst 62% of the LEAs stated

that the transposition of the CMLD prompted reforms in the area of AML and the

contrast to terrorism financing.

Finally, regarding relevance, national authorities generally indicated not only that the

CMLD addressed current and future threats sufficiently, but was also future-proof given

recent development and anticipated trends such as AI, virtual currencies and crypto.

Nonetheless, some significant potential issues were raised. For example, LEAs

highlighted the lack of clear provisions on what constitutes a predicate offence or self-

laundering.

The European associations gave insights into the views of the private sector, which was

also impacted by the Directive’s provisions. In particular, they contributed important

insights regarding coherence, flagging up the importance of improving the wording

regarding the link between the CMLD and Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing and

confiscation of proceeds of crime in the European Union.

The final stakeholder group consulted in the context of the study supporting the

evaluation consisted of NGOs, think-tanks and academic institutions. This stakeholder

group contributed to the academic analysis of the Directive and its potential impact and

challenges. Regarding effectiveness, NGOs and academic institutions indicated a

diverging situation across the EU in terms of implementation of the CMLD within

72

national regulatory frameworks. Though they recognised the harmonisation prompted by

the Directive, they pointed out that this was a limiting factor. Furthermore, the

stakeholder group also noted the challenges faced regarding the predicate offences

described in the CMLD. Finally, academics also raised concerns about the

proportionality of the CMLD, given the plans to use investigative tools designed for

organised crime to investigate all forms of money laundering. They indicated that this

would potentially divert resources away from the fight against terrorism and organised

crime.

In terms of efficiency, a subset of the stakeholder group was the only one to indicate

potential costs associated with the implementation of the Directive given the additional

requirements and rules. Given that this particular subset of the stakeholder group was the

sole one to express this position and given the lack of available data, it was difficult to

verify the statement, but it was nevertheless important to include it in the qualitative

assessment on the efficiency criterion.

The final set of key contributions made by NGOs, think-tanks and academic institutions

focused on the assessment of fundamental rights. Key observations include (i) the

possible impact on the presumption of innocence given the implementation of the

Directive; (ii) potential issues with the principle of proportionality based on a potential

conflict when transposing the Directive in Member States that do not recognise corporate

criminal liability and (iii) the potential need to include specific provisions to guarantee

each individual fundamental right in the Directive.

ET ET

EUROOPA KOMISJON

Brüssel, 17.6.2026

COM(2026) 277 final

KOMISJONI ARUANNE EUROOPA PARLAMENDILE JA NÕUKOGULE

direktiivi (EL) 2018/1673 (rahapesu vastu võitlemise kohta kriminaalõiguse abil)

hindamise kohta

{SWD(2026) 148 final}

1

1. SISSEJUHATUS

Euroopa Parlament ja nõukogu võtsid vastu direktiivi (EL) 2018/1673 rahapesu vastu

võitlemise kohta kriminaalõiguse abil (edaspidi „direktiiv“) 23. oktoobril 2018 ja see jõustus

2. detsembril 2018. Direktiiviga tugevdatakse õiguskaitse- ja õigusasutuste meetmeid rahapesu

vastu, edendatakse piiriülest koostööd nii ELis kui ka rahvusvahelisel tasandil ning

täiendatakse rahapesu tõkestamist käsitlevat laiemat õigusraamistikku.

Direktiivi kohaldatakse 25 liikmesriigis. See ei ole siduv Iirimaa ja Taani suhtes. Direktiivi

ülevõtmise lõplik tähtaeg oli 3. detsember 2020.

Direktiiviga nähakse ette miinimumreeglid tegevuse kohta, mida tuleb kõigis liikmesriikides

käsitada rahapesukuritegudena (st kuritegelikust tegevusest saadud vara üleandmine või

muundamine, selle ebaseadusliku päritolu varjamine või vara omandamine, valdamine või

kasutamine, teades selle kuritegelikku päritolu), ning vastavad karistused selliste tegude eest.

Direktiivis täpsustatakse selline kuritegelik tegevus, mille puhul on tegemist rahapesu

eelkuritegudega (kuriteod, millest pestud raha pärineb). Ühe uuendusena võimaldab direktiiv

rahapesu eest süüdistust esitada ilma süüdimõistmiseta eelkuriteos ning ilma, et ametiasutustel

tuleks tõendada kõiki eelkuriteo elemente („eraldiseisev rahapesu“). Samuti võimaldab see

süüdistust esitada ja süüdi mõista rahapesu eest isikut, kelle kuritegeliku tegevuse tõttu

asjaomane vara saadi („omaenda kuritegeliku raha pesu“). Direktiiv sisaldab reegleid, millega

täpsustatakse, milline liikmesriik on piiriülestes juhtumites pädev süüdistust esitama. Lisaks

on selles ette nähtud nii füüsilistele kui ka juriidilistele isikutele kohaldatavate karistuste ja

lisakaristuste miinimumreeglid ning „raskendavad asjaolud“.

Käesolev aruanne vastab direktiivi artikli 14 lõikes 2 sätestatud nõudele, mille kohaselt peab

Euroopa Komisjon esitama Euroopa Parlamendile ja nõukogule aruande, milles hinnatakse,

milline lisaväärtus on direktiivil rahapesuvastase võitluse seisukohast ja kuidas on see

mõjutanud põhiõigusi ja -vabadusi.

Käesolev hindamisaruanne tugineb komisjoni Euroopa Parlamendile ja nõukogule esitatud

ülevõtmisaruandele, mis on ette nähtud artikli 14 lõikega 1 ning milles hinnatakse, millises

ulatuses on liikmesriigid direktiivi järgimiseks vajalikke meetmeid võtnud. Ülevõtmisaruanne

näitas, et kuigi direktiivi ülevõtmine on olnud üldjoontes nõuetekohane, esineb endiselt

mõningaid lünki ja vastuolusid, näiteks raskendavaid asjaolusid käsitlevate sätete ebaõige

ülevõtmine mõnes liikmesriigis. Ülevõtmisaruanne on esitatud lisas.

Hindamise üksikasjalikud tulemused ja kasutatud metoodika on esitatud aruandele lisatud

komisjoni talituste töödokumendis.

Direktiiv on osa laiemast kriminaaltulu vastasest töövahendist, mis on organiseeritud

kuritegevuse vastase võitluse keskmeks, nagu on rõhutatud Euroopa sisejulgeoleku strateegias

(ProtectEU). Kuritegelikul teel saadud tulu konfiskeerimine on endiselt oluline organiseeritud

kuritegelike rühmituste lõhkumiseks. Finantskuritegevuse vastu võitlemist ja kuritegeliku vara

tagasivõitmise edendamist käsitlevate ELi õigusaktide tõhusal rakendamisel on selles oluline

roll.

2

2. TAUST

Direktiivi üldine eesmärk on tugevdada õigus- ja õiguskaitseasutuste rahapesuvastaseid

meetmeid kõigis liikmesriikides. Kuigi kõik liikmesriigid on rahapesu kriminaliseerinud,

esineb märkimisväärseid erinevusi kuriteo määratlemises, eelkuritegude ulatuses ja vastavates

karistustes. Varasem raamistik ei olnud sidus ega terviklik, mis vähendas selle tulemuslikkust

ning võimaldas kurjategijatel ja terroristidel nõrgemaid riiklikke süsteeme ära kasutada. Nende

vajaduste arvessevõtmiseks kehtestati direktiiviga ühine ELi raamistik rahapesu

kriminaliseerimiseks ning õigus- ja õiguskaitseasutuste meetmete tugevdamiseks. Selle

üldine eesmärk on parandada ELi rahapesuvastast tegevust kriminaalõiguse abil.

Selleks seatakse konkreetsed erieesmärgid:

• tagada rahapesu tulemuslik kriminaliseerimine kogu ELis,

• kehtestada selged ja ühtsed eelkuritegude määratlused,

• kehtestada ühtsed ja proportsionaalsed karistused,

• tõhustada liikmesriikidevahelist koostööd ja teabevahetust.

Direktiivi eeldatav mõju on järgmine:

• tõhusam rahapesu toimepanijate uurimine ja neile süüdistuse esitamine tänu ühtlustatud

kuriteomääratluste ja karistuste kehtestamisele;

• ELi kodanike ja siseturu parem kaitse organiseeritud kuritegevuse ja terrorismi

rahastamise eest tõhusate vahendite kättesaadavaks tegemise kaudu ametiasutustele

rahapesu uurimiseks ja kuritegude toimepanijate, sealhulgas juriidiliste isikute

vastutusele võtmiseks;

• tõhusam ja koordineeritum piiriülene rahapesuvastane tegevus liikmesriikidevahelise

tugevdatud koostöö ja teabevahetuse kaudu;

• tõhusamad uurimisvahendid, mis on ametiasutustele kättesaadavad rahapesuga seotud

uurimistes;

• meetmed konfiskeerimise tugevdamiseks rahapesukuritegudest saadud tulu jälitamise,

arestimise ja konfiskeerimise kaudu.

Käesolevas hindamisaruandes käsitletakse direktiivi õiguslikku ja praktilist kohaldamist,

analüüsides selle tulemuslikkust, tõhusust, sidusust, ELi lisaväärtust, asjakohasust kooskõlas

parema õigusloome põhimõtetega ning mõju põhiõigustele ja -vabadustele, nagu on nõutud

direktiivi artikli 14 lõikes 2. Hindamisaruanne sisaldab ka järeldusi ja konkreetseid soovitusi

tulevaste meetmete kohta.

Hindamine toimus välisuuringu toel,1 mis hõlmas dokumentide analüüsi, intervjuusid,

sihtkonsultatsioone, küsitlusi jne. Konsulteeriti paljude sidusrühmadega, sealhulgas ELi

asutuste ja organite, õigusasutuste, õiguskaitseasutuste, kriminaaltulu jälitamise talituste,

1 Link uuringule (seni avaldamata, link lisatakse pärast talitustevahelist konsultatsiooni).

3

rahapesu andmebüroode, õigusekspertide, valitsusväliste organisatsioonide, mõttekodade ja

akadeemiliste asutustega. Hindamine hõlmab ajavahemikku 2018–2025.

3. PEAMISED JÄRELDUSED Selles osas esitatakse hindamise tulemused direktiivi tulemuslikkuse, tõhususe, sidususe, ELi

lisaväärtuse ja asjakohasuse kohta. Lisaks esitatakse selles hindamise tulemused seoses

direktiivi mõjuga põhiõigustele ja -vabadustele, nagu on konkreetselt nõutud direktiivi artikli

14 lõikes 2.

3.1. Tulemuslikkus

Tulemuslikkuse osas leiti hindamise käigus, et direktiiv on aidanud märkimisväärselt

kaasa rahapesukuritegude määratluste ja karistuste ühtlustamisele liikmesriikides,

pakkudes praktikutele uusi vahendeid rahapesu vastu võitlemiseks. Direktiiviga tagatakse kõigi

selliste asjakohaste rahapesumeetodite kriminaliseerimine, mida kasutatakse mitmesuguste

tulu teenivate kuritegude puhul, ja see võimaldab ametiasutustel tõhusamalt uurida kõiki

asjakohaseid ebaseadusliku raha pesemise toiminguid ja esitada nende eest süüdistusi. Selles

kontekstis on eriti asjakohane selliste uuenduslike mõistete nagu eraldiseisev rahapesu ja

omaenda kuritegeliku raha pesu kasutuselevõtt: nende tegude eest saab nüüd süüdistust

esitada kõigis liikmesriikides.

Sellega seoses tõid õigus- ja õiguskaitseasutused esile selged eelised, eelkõige eelkuriteo

tõendamise vajaduse kaotamine rahapesu eest süüdistuse esitamisel, mis lihtsustas

kohtumenetlusi. Õigusasutused rõhutasid ka prokuratuuri suuremat tegutsemisruumi tänu

sellele, et omaenda kuritegeliku raha pesu kehtestati kuriteona. Lisaks on need muudatused

õigus- ja õiguskaitseasutuste sõnul suurendanud rahapesu käsitlevate õigusaktide hoiatavat

mõju.

Võimalused esitada juriidilistele isikutele süüdistusi ja määrata suuremaid karistusi juhtudel,

kui kohustatud isik2 paneb toime rahapesu, suurendavad ametiasutuste suutlikkust võidelda

tulemuslikumalt keerukate skeemidega, mille kurjategijad on loonud oma ebaseadusliku tulu

varjamiseks, tõhustades seeläbi siseturu kaitset selliste ohtude eest nagu organiseeritud

kuritegevus ja terrorismi rahastamine. Praktikud rõhutavad seejuures, et heidutav mõju on

juriidiliste isikute ja füüsiliste isikute vastutuselevõtmise eraldamise kui ka raskendavatel

asjaolude kehtestamisel.

Veel üks aspekt, mis on suurendanud rahapesuvastase võitluse tõhusust, on rahapesukuritegude

uurimiseks kättesaadavate uurimisvahendite laiem valik. Sidusrühmad teatasid, et direktiivis

ette nähtud kohustus teha rahapesuga seotud uurimiste jaoks kättesaadavaks organiseeritud

kuritegevuse juhtumite puhul kasutatavad uurimismeetodid, aga ka maksimumkaristuste

suurendamine, on hõlbustanud juurdepääsu erivahenditele, nagu side pealtkuulamine. See

võimaldab jälgida finantsjälge ja ametiasutustel koguda täiendavaid tõendeid, mis parandab

2 Vt eelkõige Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 20. mai 2015. aasta direktiivi (EL) 2015/849 (mis käsitleb

finantssüsteemi rahapesu või terrorismi rahastamise eesmärgil kasutamise tõkestamist) artikli 2 lõige 1 ELT

L 141, 5.6.2015, lk 73–117, viimane konsolideeritud versioon: EUR-Lex - 02015L0849-20241230 - ET -

EUR-Lex.

4

nende suutlikkust avastada ja lõhkuda kuritegelikke võrgustikke ja nende rahalisi vahendeid,

suurendades seeläbi ELi kodanike kaitset organiseeritud kuritegevusest tuleneva ohu eest.

Tänu rahapesukuritegude ühtlustatumale määratlusele kogu ELis ja selgematele eeskirjadele,

millega määratakse kindlaks riik, mis on õigusasutuste ja mõne õiguskaitseasutuse sõnul pädev

juhtima konkreetse juhtumi uurimist ja selle eest süüdistuse esitamist, on direktiiv üldiselt

muutnud piiriülese rahapesuvastase tegevuse tõhusamaks ja paremini koordineerituks.

Direktiiv on õigusraamistikke ühtlustades võimaldanud eri liikmesriikide ametiasutustel

„rääkida ühes keeles“: mida sarnasemad on õigusrikkumised ja karistused eri

jurisdiktsioonides, seda lihtsam on teha piiriülest koostööd ning tunnustada teises liikmesriigis

tehtud kohtuotsuseid.

Sellegipoolest mõjutavad teataval määral direktiivi tulemuslikkust mitmed probleemid.

Üks probleem on seotud eraldiseisva rahapesu mõiste ebajärjekindla tõlgendamise ja

kohaldamisega liikmesriikides, mis põhjustab uurimiste ja süüdistuste esitamise ajal

õiguskindlusetust ja probleeme. Eelkuriteo tõendamise ulatus on liikmesriigiti väga erinev:

mõnes riigis peavad ametiasutused tõendama ainult teatavat varasemat kuritegevust, millest

pestav vara pärineb, samas kui teistes peavad ametiasutused eelkuriteo selgelt määratlema ning

mõnel juhul isegi määrama kindlaks kuriteo toimepanemise koha ja aja (vt ka

ülevõtmisaruanne, lk 3–4). Seega on direktiiv eraldiseisva rahapesu eest vastutusele võtmise

hõlbustamisel andnud ELis erinevaid tulemusi: see tuleneb direktiivi ebamäärasest sõnastusest,

mis võimaldab väga erinevaid ülevõtmismeetmeid.

Liikmesriikide jurisdiktsioonides on erinevalt mõistetud ka vara, mis võib olla rahapesu

objektiks. Kuigi direktiivis on esitatud vara kõikehõlmav määratlus, mis hõlmab

mitmesuguseid rahapesu liike, ei loeta mõne liikmesriigi õigusaktide alusel kokkuhoitud

kulusid (nt maksukuriteo toimepanemisel kinni peetud maksud) varaks, mida saab pesta. Nad

leiavad, et rahapesukuriteo objektiks võib olla üksnes selline vara, mille puhul on tegu isiku

vara positiivse suurenemisega, näiteks uimastikaubandusega seotud süüteo või maksutagastuse

kaudu saadud raha. Need riigid jätavad vara hulgast välja raha, mis hoiti kokku käibemaksu

ebaseadusliku maksmata jätmise tõttu. See kujutab endast märkimisväärset puudujääki, võttes

arvesse riigieelarvet mõjutavaid käibemaksupettusi, mis Europoli3 ja Euroopa Prokuratuuri4

andmetel põhjustavad maksuhalduritele igal aastal kümneid miljardeid eurosid kahju.

Lisaks tuleb märkida, et säte, millega määratakse kindlaks kohtualluvus rahapesukuritegude

puhul – eelkõige juhul, kui süüteo toimepanija on artikli 10 lõike 1 punkti b kohaselt

liikmesriigi kodanik – on üle võetud erinevalt, eelkõige seoses topeltkaristatavuse5 nõudega.

Üks valdkond, kus hindamise käigus tulemuslikkuse kohta järeldusi ei tehtud, on eeldatav mõju

konfiskeerimismeetmete tugevdamisele. See on tingitud eelkõige kriminaalmenetluste

3 https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf 4 Euroopa Prokuratuur on oma 2024. aasta aruandes välja toonud, et käibemaksupettused moodustasid üle 53 %

kogu uuritavast hinnangulisest kahjust, mille hinnanguline summa oli 13,15 miljardit eurot

https://www.eppo.europa.eu/assets/annual-report-2024/pdfs/EPPO_Annual_Report_2024_en.pdf. 5 See on põhimõte, mille kohaselt saab kohtualluvust kindlaks teha ainult siis, kui kõnealune tegevus on

kriminaliseeritud nii süüdistuse esitanud riigis kui ka riigis, kus see toime pandi.

5

kestusest, mille tõttu on andmed ebapiisavad. Lisaks tuleb märkida, et direktiivi artiklis 9

viidatakse üksnes direktiivi 2014/42/EL (konfiskeerimise kohta) kohaldamisele, mis asendati

2024. aastal uue direktiiviga kriminaaltulu tuvastamise ja konfiskeerimise kohta. Seetõttu saab

neid aspekte analüüsida üksnes selle viimati nimetatud vahendi hinnangus, mille komisjon

peab esitama Euroopa Parlamendile ja nõukogule 24. novembriks 2031.

3.2. Tõhusus

Tõhususe seisukohast saab kulude ja tulude hindamine olla üksnes esialgne, arvestades

rahapesujuhtumitega seotud kriminaalmenetluste pikkust. Seega on direktiivi täielik

kvantitatiivne mõju (süüdistuste ja süüdimõistmiste arv, nende rahapesujuhtumite puhul

arestitud ja konfiskeeritud varade maht) nähtav alles lähiaastatel.

Sidusrühmade seisukohad olid erinevad (mõned jäid neutraalseks; teised olid eriarvamusel

küsimuses, kas direktiivist saadav kasu kaalub üles sellega seotud kulud), sest puudulike

andmete tõttu ei olnud võimalik täielikult hinnata kulusid (nii rahalisi kui ka halduskoormust)

võrreldes selliste andmetega nagu süüdistuste ja süüdimõistvate kohtuotsuste arv ning nende

rahapesujuhtumitega seotud arestitud ja konfiskeeritud varade maht. Igal juhul teatas enamik

konsultatsioonides osalenud liikmesriike, et rakenduskulud ja halduskoormus puuduvad või

need on minimaalsed. See näitab direktiivi olemust, mis sisuliselt nõuab liikmesriikide

karistusseadustiku või kriminaalmenetluse seadustiku muutmist; sellised muudatused

siseriiklikes õigusaktides põhjustavad üksnes piiratud lisakulusid. Mõned direktiiviga

kaasnevad lisakulud puudutavad õigusasutustele ja õiguskaitseasutustele suunatud koolitusi,

eelkõige seoses direktiiviga hiljuti hõlmatud rahapesu uute vormide uurimise ja nende eest

vastutusele võtmisega. Üldiselt märgivad sidusrühmad, et direktiiv on andnud ametiasutustele

uued vahendid rahapesukuritegude tõhusamaks uurimiseks ja nende eest süüdistuste

esitamiseks, samas kui rakendamiskulusid peetakse piiratuks. See näitab, et mõju tõhususele

on olnud üldiselt positiivne.

3.3.Sisemine ja väline sidusus

Sisemise sidususe osas näitab hindamine, et direktiivi eri komponendid toimivad direktiivi

eesmärkide saavutamiseks koos hästi ning et direktiivi eri sätete vahel ei ole vastuolusid.

Väline sidusus hõlmab nii rahvusvahelist kui ka ELi tasandit.

Rahvusvahelisel tasandil märgitakse, et direktiiv ei ole täielikult kooskõlas Euroopa

Nõukogu Varssavi konventsiooniga,6 mis sisaldab rahapesu kriminaliseerimise norme, mis

juba suures osas reguleerivad käesoleva direktiiviga hõlmatud küsimusi. EL kirjutas

konventsioonile alla 2009. aastal, kuid ei ole seda veel ratifitseerinud. Täpsemalt piirab

direktiivi artikli 2 lõige 1 Varssavi konventsiooniga võrreldes eelkuritegude ulatust, mis on

konventsiooniga lubatud võimalus. Komisjon kavatseb vastu võtta ettepaneku nõukogu otsuse

6 Euroopa Nõukogu konventsioon rahapesu ning kriminaaltulu avastamise, arestimise ja konfiskeerimise ning

terrorismi rahastamise kohta (CETS nr 198).    

6

kohta, millega võimaldatakse ELil ratifitseerida Varssavi konventsioon ning seda küsimust

vastavalt käsitleda.

ELi tasandil on direktiiv kooskõlas muude selle valdkonna õigusaktidega. Nagu on

tunnistatud Euroopa sisejulgeoleku strateegias (ProtectEU),7 on EL tugevdanud oma

jõupingutusi uute rahapesuvastaste normidega, sealhulgas ELi Rahapesu ja Terrorismi

Rahastamise Tõkestamise Ameti loomise ning uue direktiiviga kriminaaltulu tuvastamise ja

konfiskeerimise kohta, mis on väga oluline organiseeritud kuritegevuse rahaliste motiividega

võitlemiseks, ebaseadusliku vara kiireks külmutamiseks ja kuritegelikul teel saadud tulu

konfiskeerimiseks. Need on kooskõlas direktiiviga ette nähtud tugevamate kriminaalõiguslike

meetmetega rahapesu vastu võitlemiseks.

Viimaste kriminaalõiguse direktiividega võrreldes esineb direktiivis siiski mõningaid puudusi,

näiteks keskkonnakuritegude või piiravate meetmete rikkumise, füüsiliste isikute suhtes

kohaldatavate lisakaristuste ja juriidiliste isikute suhtes kohaldatavate karistuste valdkonnas.

Lisakaristuste kohaldamise puhul füüsiliste isikute suhtes nõutakse direktiivis, et

liikmesriigid kehtestaksid lisaks vanglakaristustele rahapesukuritegude toimepanijate suhtes

lisakaristused või -meetmed, täpsustamata, milliseid meetmeid tuleks võtta, mis põhjustab

erinevusi riikide ülevõtmismeetmete vahel. Seevastu on hiljutistes ELi kriminaalõiguse

õigusaktides sõnaselgelt loetletud võimalikud meetmed, mida liikmesriigid võivad füüsiliste

isikute suhtes kohaldada, näiteks trahvid, rahastamisest ja avalikest hangetest kõrvalejätmine,

lubade tühistamine või ajutine keeld kandideerida avalikule ametikohale.

Sarnane probleem tekib seoses juriidiliste isikute karistustega. Direktiivis nõutakse, et

liikmesriigid näeksid ette kriminaalõiguslikud või muud trahvid, ning see sisaldab loetelu

võimalikest lisakaristustest, mis on siiski üksnes vabatahtlikud ega ole piisavalt üksikasjalikult

määratletud. See annab liikmesriikidele küll vajaliku paindlikkuse, kuid teisalt on see vastuolus

kõige uuemate karistusõigusnormidega, millega nähakse kõigi kuritegude eest ette

maksimumtrahvide miinimummäär, mis arvutatakse kas protsendina juriidilise isiku

ülemaailmsest käibest või kindlaksmääratud summa alusel8.

3.4. ELi lisaväärtus

Direktiiv mõjutab positiivselt ELi lisaväärtust tänu ELi tasandi seadusandlikele meetmetele,

mida liikmesriigid üksi ei oleks tõenäoliselt suutnud saavutada. Direktiiviga on loodud

ühtlasemad võrdsed tingimused rahapesu vastu võitlemiseks kogu ELis ning õigus- ja

õiguskaitsevaldkonna sidusrühmad peavad seda positiivseks, kuna see aitab kaasa suuremale

õiguslikule järjepidevusele ja hõlbustab piiriülest koostööd. Eespool nimetatud lahknevused

rahapesukuritegude määratluses ja nende eest süüdistuse esitamisel, eelkõige seoses

7 EUR-Lex - 52025DC0148 - ET - EUR-Lex 8 Näiteks Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 11. aprilli 2024. aasta direktiiviga (EL) 2024/1203, mis käsitleb

keskkonna kaitsmist kriminaalõiguse kaudu, kohustatakse liikmesriike nägema juriidilistele isikutele ette

trahvid konkreetsete rikkumiste korral. Lisaks on direktiivis täpsustatud, et selliste trahvide maksimummäär

on vähemalt 5 % juriidilise isiku ülemaailmsest kogukäibest või ühekordne summa 40 000 000 eurot teatavate

keskkonnareostusega seotud kuritegude puhul ja 3 % juriidilise isiku ülemaailmsest kogukäibest või

24 000 000 eurot muude kuritegude, näiteks looduslike liikidega kaubitsemise puhul.

7

eraldiseisva rahapesuga, ning füüsiliste ja juriidiliste isikute karistusi käsitlevate vabatahtlike

sätete erinev kohaldamine viitavad siiski sellele, et kogu ELi hõlmavaks edasiseks

ühtlustamiseks on veel ruumi.

3.5. Asjakohasus

Direktiivi eesmärgid ja meetmed on jätkuvalt asjakohased, võttes arvesse rahapesu ja

organiseeritud kuritegevusega seotud probleeme: Europoli 2025. aasta raske ja organiseeritud

ohu hinnangu kohaselt võimaldab rahapesu kurjategijatel ebaseaduslikust tegevusest jätkuvalt

kasu saada ning see on organiseeritud kuritegevuse selgroog9. Lisaks hõlmavad

rahapesumeetodid sageli mitut tehingut erinevates ELi-välistes jurisdiktsioonides, kasutades

ära regulatiivseid erinevusi ja tekitades keerulise jälje, mis takistab finantsuurimisi: seetõttu on

ühtlustatud kriminaalõiguslikud meetmed kõigis liikmesriikides olulisemad kui kunagi varem.

Samal ajal hõlbustavad Europoli andmetel rahapesu üha enam digiplatvormid ja

kujunemisjärgus tehnoloogiad10 – direktiivi tehnoloogianeutraalne olemus võimaldab

kriminaalõiguslikke meetmeid selliste muutustega kohandada, tagades, et direktiiv säilitab oma

asjakohasuse tehnoloogia arengu kontekstis.

3.6. Mõju põhiõigustele ja -vabadustele

Liikmesriikide ametiasutused, ELi ja rahvusvahelised organid üldiselt leiavad, et direktiiv on

kooskõlas põhiõiguste standardite, sealhulgas Euroopa Liidu põhiõiguste hartaga, või on

märkinud, et vastavad andmed puuduvad. Teised sidusrühmad, eelkõige valitsusvälised

organisatsioonid, mõttekojad ja akadeemilised ringkonnad, väljendasid muret võimaliku mõju

pärast süütuse presumptsiooni kaitsele eraldiseisva rahapesukuriteo kohaldamisel,

topeltkaristamise (ne bis in idem) põhimõtte kohaldamise pärast omaenda kuritegeliku raha

pesu11 korral, samuti kuritegude ja karistuste määratluse selguse ja/või proportsionaalsuse

pärast, eriti kui eelkuritegu on väärtegu.

Üldiselt on enamikult sidusrühmadelt saadud tagasiside põhjal võimalik järeldada, et

rahapesukuriteod on määratletud selgelt, täpselt ja prognoositavalt ning karistused on

asjakohased ja proportsionaalsed kuritegude raskusastmega. Põhiõigused on tagatud

eeskirjadega, mis on sätestatud kuues ELi menetlusõiguste direktiivis, põhiõiguste hartas,

inimõiguste ja põhivabaduste kaitse konventsioonis ning kriminaalõiguse üldpõhimõtetes.

Lisaks kontrollivad direktiivi ülevõtmiseks kasutatavate siseriiklike õigusnormide kohaldamist

liikmesriikide kohtud, kes peavad tagama nende vastavuse põhiõigustele ja -vabadustele.

4. JÄRELDUSED JA SAADUD KOGEMUSED

Leitakse, et direktiiv täidab suures osas oma eesmärke, kuna see on parandanud pädevate

asutuste suutlikkust uurida rahapesu ja esitada selle eest süüdistusi tänu kuritegude ja karistuste

paremale määratlemisele ning hõlbustanud piiriüleseid uurimisi, ilma et see tekitaks

9 europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf 10 Samas. 11 Nagu omaenda kuritegeliku raha pesu puhul, ei ole ka eelkuriteo ja rahapesukuriteo eristamine sageli selge, nii

et eelkuriteo ja rahapesukuriteo eest süüdimõistmise korral on oht, et sama teo eest karistatakse kaks korda.

8

märkimisväärseid lisakulusid või mõjutaks negatiivselt põhiõigusi. Mõned probleemid on

siiski veel lahendamata, näiteks direktiivi teatavate sätete tõhususe ja sidususe suurendamine

muude ELi vahenditega.

Lisaks, võttes arvesse kriminaalmenetluste kestust, on direktiivi täielik mõju nähtav alles

lähiaastatel. Seetõttu on oluline, et komisjon jälgiks ka edaspidi direktiivi mõju, sealhulgas

põhiõigustele ja -vabadustele.

Hindamise käigus selgusid ka saadud õppetunnid, mida liikmesriigid saavad direktiivi

ülevõtmisel ja rakendamisel arvesse võtta.

• Suurem selgus eraldiseisva rahapesu kohta

Selle tagamiseks, et ametiasutused ei ole kohustatud tõendama sisuliselt kõiki eelkuriteo

elemente, tuleks selgitada nõudeid, mis on vajalikud eelkuriteo või pestava vara

ebaseadusliku päritolu kindlakstegemiseks. See aitaks kaasa eraldiseisva rahapesukuriteo

määratluse ühetaolisele kohaldamisele ning hõlbustaks rahapesu uurimist ja selle eest

süüdistuse esitamist kõigis ELi liikmesriikides.

• Füüsilistele ja juriidilistele isikutele määratavate maksimumkaristuste

miinimummäärade hindamine ning lisakaristuste ja -meetmete kehtestamine

Suurema sidususe tagamiseks oleks otstarbekas viia füüsiliste ja juriidiliste isikute karistusi

käsitlevad sätted kooskõlla hiljuti vastu võetud ELi kriminaalõigusnormidega, nagu direktiiv

(EL) 2024/1203, mis käsitleb keskkonna kaitsmist kriminaalõiguse kaudu, ja direktiiv (EL)

2024/1226 liidu piiravate meetmete rikkumise kohta. See peaks hõlmama selliste lisakaristuste

või -meetmete kindlaksmääramist, mida liikmesriigid võivad lisaks vangistusele rahapesu

toimepanijatele määrata, ning konkreetseid karistusi juriidilistele isikutele, eelkõige

maksimumtrahvide miinimummäära kehtestamist, mis arvutatakse kas juriidilise isiku

ülemaailmse käibe või kindlaksmääratud summade alusel. See tagaks võrdsed tingimused

kõigis liikmesriikides ja suurendaks rahapesukuritegude eest määratavate karistuste hoiatavat

mõju.

• Vara määratluse täpsustamine

Vara määratlust tuleks täpsustada, et see hõlmaks selgemalt kõiki ebaseadusliku tulu

võimalikke vorme, sealhulgas otsest tulu, maksukuritegudest tulenevat kulude kokkuhoidu ja

kuritegevusest saadud kaudset tulu.

• Kooskõla rahvusvaheliste õigusaktidega

Direktiivi vastavusse viimine Varssavi konventsiooniga suurendaks nende kahe õigusakti

sidusust.

• Direktiivi mõju jälgimine

Direktiivi mõju jälgimiseks jätkab komisjon koostööd asjaomaste sidusrühmadega selliste

foorumite kaudu nagu komisjoni ELi kriminaalpoliitika eksperdirühm, rahapesuvastane

operatiivvõrgustik (AMON), kuritegevusega seotud ohte käsitlev valdkondadevaheline

9

Euroopa platvorm (EMPACT), uus kriminaaltulu tuvastamise ja konfiskeerimise

koostöövõrgustik, kriminaaltulu jälitamisega tegelevate asutuste vaheline Camdeni võrgustik

(CARIN), Eurojusti rahapesu ja kriminaaltulu tuvastamise õigusküsimuste teemarühm ning

organiseeritud kuritegevuse vastase õigusalase koostöö Euroopa võrgustik.

Komisjon jätkab dialoogi liikmesriikide ja kõigi sidusrühmadega, et tagada tõhusad ja

ajakohased kriminaalõiguslikud meetmed rahapesu vastu kooskõlas ELi poliitikaga selles

valdkonnas, pöörates nõuetekohast tähelepanu kuritegelike rühmituste muutuvatele

suundumustele ja tegutsemisviisidele finantssektoris.

Need soovitused annavad olulise panuse ELi tasandi jõupingutustesse tugevdada rahavoo

jälgimise põhimõtet, mis on organiseeritud kuritegevuse vastase võitluse keskne element ja

valdkond, mis on Euroopa sisejulgeoleku strateegia kohaselt ülioluline, et tagada tõhusad

õigusasutuste meetmed kõige ohtlikumate kuritegelike võrgustike vastu.

ET ET

EUROOPA KOMISJON

Brüssel, 17.6.2026

COM(2026) 277 final

ANNEX

LISA

järgmise dokumendi juurde:

KOMISJONI ARUANNE EUROOPA PARLAMENDILE JA NÕUKOGULE

direktiivi (EL) 2018/1673 (rahapesu vastu võitlemise kohta kriminaalõiguse abil)

hindamise kohta

{SWD(2026) 148 final}

1

KOMISJONI ARUANNE EUROOPA PARLAMENDILE JA NÕUKOGULE,

milles hinnatakse, millises ulatuses on liikmesriigid võtnud vajalikke meetmeid Euroopa

Parlamendi ja nõukogu 23. oktoobri 2018. aasta direktiivi (EL) 2018/1673 (rahapesu

vastu võitlemise kohta kriminaalõiguse abil) järgimiseks

1 SISSEJUHATUS

Direktiiv 2018/1673 rahapesu vastu võitlemise kohta kriminaalõiguse abil (edaspidi

„direktiiv“) jõustus 2. detsembril 2018. 25 ELi liikmesriiki,1 kelle suhtes direktiiv oli siduv (st

kõik peale Taani ja Iirimaa), pidid jõustama selle direktiivi järgimiseks vajalikud õigus- ja

haldusnormid 3. detsembriks 2020.

Direktiivi artikli 14 lõike 1 kohaselt hinnatakse siinses aruandes, mil määral on liikmesriigid

võtnud direktiivi järgimiseks vajalikke meetmeid. Käesolev aruanne on esitatud direktiivi

artikli 14 lõike 2 kohase aruande lisana, milles hinnatakse direktiivi lisaväärtust.

See analüüs põhineb teabel, mille liikmesriigid esitasid Euroopa Komisjonile kuni 20.

oktoobrini 2025, ning ühel välisuuringul.

Direktiivis on sätestatud kõiki ELi liikmesriike hõlmavad ühised kuritegude ja karistuste

määratlused, eesmärgiga tõkestada rahapesu, et hõlbustada politsei- ja õiguskoostööd ning

vältida olukorda, kus kurjategijad kasutavad ära leebemaid riiklikke süsteeme. Kuna

ebaseadusliku tulu puhtakspesemine on organiseeritud kuritegevuse peamine võimaldaja, aitab

direktiiv nõrgendada kuritegelike võrgustike finantsbaasi ja toetab jõupingutusi nende

lõhkumiseks. Selles nõutakse, et liikmesriigid kriminaliseeriksid kuritegelikul teel saadud vara

muundamise või üleandmise, vara tegeliku olemuse, päritolu, asukoha, liikumise või

omandiõiguse varjamise või saladuses hoidmise ning sellise vara omandamise, valdamise või

kasutamise, kui need tegevused on toime pandud tahtlikult. Samuti võimaldab direktiiv

liikmesriikidel lugeda rahapesukuritegudeks juhtumid, kus õigusrikkuja „kahtlustas või oleks

pidanud teadma“, et vara on saadud kuritegelikust tegevusest. Direktiiviga kohustatakse

liikmesriike kehtestama raskendavaid asjaolusid (nt kuritegelikus organisatsioonis osalemine

või rahapesu kutsetegevuse kaudu) ning nõutakse, et karistused oleksid tõhusad,

proportsionaalsed ja hoiatavad, hõlmates vangistust, mille maksimummäär on vähemalt neli

aastat, ja asjakohasel juhul meetmeid juriidilise isiku vastutuselevõtmiseks. Direktiiv sisaldab

norme jurisdiktsioonide kohta ning kohustust arestida ja konfiskeerida tulu ja kuriteovahendid

ning kohustab liikmesriike tagama, et rahapesu uurimiseks on olemas tõhusad uurimisvahendid.

Aruandest nähtub, et liikmesriigid on teinud märkimisväärseid jõupingutusi, et tagada

siseriiklike õigusaktide kooskõla direktiivi sätetega, kuid mõne liikmesriigi puhul on leidub

ilmseid vastuolusid ja lünki.

Lisaks käesolevas aruandes esitatud analüüsile, mis põhineb komisjonile seni kättesaadavaks

tehtud teabel, võib ülevõtmisel ette tulla täiendavaid ülevõtmisprobleeme ja sätteid, millest ei

ole komisjonile teatatud, või täiendavaid seadusandlikke ja muid kui seadusandlikke arenguid,

mis ülevõtmist mõjutavad. Seetõttu ei tohiks käesolev aruanne takistada komisjonil täiendavalt

hinnata direktiivi ülevõtmist ja rakendamist liikmesriikides.

1 Kui käesolevas aruandes viidatakse „25 liikmesriigile“ või mis tahes muule arvule liikmesriikidele, tähendab see,

et direktiiv on nende suhtes siduv.

2

2 NÕUETE JÄRGIMINE DIREKTIIVI SÄTETE ÜLEVÕTMISEL

Selles peatükis antakse ülevaade direktiivi ülevõtmisest liikmesriikide õigusesse, hinnates

artiklite kaupa riigisiseste õigusnormide täielikkust ja vastavust direktiivi nõuetele.

Artikkel 2 – Mõisted (sealhulgas eelkuriteod)

Artikkel 2 sisaldab kolme määratlust. Artikli 2 lõikes 1 on „kuritegelik tegevus“ määratletud

kui igasugune süütegu, mille eest määratava karistuse maksimummäär on vähemalt üheaastane

vangistus, või kui maksimumkaristust ei ole ette nähtud, igasugune süütegu, mille eest

määratava karistuse miinimummäär on üle kuue kuu pikkune vangistus. Kuritegelikuks

tegevuseks liigitatavad süüteod loetakse rahapesu eelkuritegudeks, st liikmesriigid peavad

kriminaliseerima vähemalt nendest kuritegudest saadud varaga seonduva rahapesu.

Lisaks peavad liikmesriigid olenemata karistusmääradest igal juhul lisama artikli 2 lõikes 1

loetletud kõigisse 22 kuriteokategooriasse rea süütegusid (nende hulka kuuluvad liidu tasandil

ühtlustatud süüteod)2.

Enamik liikmesriike, kelle suhtes direktiiv on siduv, on läinud sellest kaugemale, võttes

kasutusele nn kõiki kuritegusid hõlmava lähenemisviisi, mille kohaselt võib iga kuritegu

kujutada endast rahapesu eelkuritegu. Viis liikmesriiki (Prantsusmaa, Madalmaad,

Luksemburg, Portugal, Austria) on kindlaks määranud konkreetsed kuriteokategooriad, mis

võivad kujutada endast rahapesu eelkuritegusid.

Kõik liikmesriigid on nõuetekohaselt üle võtnud artikli 2 lõikes 1 sätestatud kuritegeliku

tegevuse määratluse.

Artikli 2 lõikes 2 on laialt määratletud mõiste „vara“, mis võib olla sobiv rahapesukuriteo ese.

Selles tähenduses on vara määratletud kui igasugune vara, nii kehaline kui ka kehatu, nii kinnis-

kui ka vallasvara, nii materiaalne kui ka mittemateriaalne, samuti sellise vara omandiõigust või

muid selle varaga seotud õigusi tõendavad juriidilised dokumendid, sealhulgas elektroonilised

ja digitaalsed dokumendid; Kuigi liikmesriigid ei ole mõistet „vara“ oma rahapesu

käsitlevatesse õigusaktidesse konkreetselt üle võtnud, kasutavad nad selle sätte järgimiseks

paljudel juhtudel muudes õigusaktides sätestatud määratlusi, mida kasutatakse ka rahapesu

eseme kindlaksmääramiseks.

23 liikmesriiki on üle võtnud artikli 2 lõikes 2 sätestatud vara määratluse, kuid näib, et

Saksamaa ja Austria õigusaktides ei käsitata varana, mida saab pesta, kokkuhoitud kulusid (nt

maksukuriteo toimepanemise tõttu maksmata jäänud maksud). Sisuliselt on Austria

karistusseadustiku § 165 lõikega 6 rahapesu kohaldamisalast välja jäetud lihtsalt säästetud raha,

nagu realiseerimata kahjum, mida ei tekkinud, nõuetest loobumine või välditud kulud ja tasud.

See ei võimalda Austria ametiasutustel käsitleda rahapesukuriteona juhtumeid, mil raha on

säästetud ebaseaduslikult makse tasumata jättes ja seejärel pestud. Saksamaa karistusseadustiku

varasema redaktsiooni § 261 lõike 5 kohaselt käsitleti maksudest kõrvalehoidumise teel

kokkuhoitud kulusid sõnaselgelt rahapesuna. 2021. aasta reformiga jäeti see lõige välja, jättes

seega sellised kokkuhoitud kulud kohaldamisalast välja. Seetõttu tundub, et mõlemas

jurisdiktsioonis loetakse rahapesukuriteo esemeks üksnes sellist vara, mille puhul on tegu

2 Vt põhjendus 5.

3

endast isiku vara positiivse suurenemisega, näiteks uimastikaubandusega seotud süüteo või

maksutagastuse kaudu saadud raha. Vara lai määratlus direktiivis hõlmab siiski igat liiki vara,

sealhulgas kokkuhoitud kulusid, isegi kui neid ei ole sõnaselgelt nimetatud.

Artikli 2 lõikes 3 määratletakse „juriidiline isik“ kui õigussubjekt, millel on kohaldatava

õiguse alusel juriidilise isiku staatus, välja arvatud riigid ja avalik-õiguslikud asutused, kes

teostavad riigivõimu, ning avalik-õiguslikud rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid. Sarnaselt

mõistega „vara“ määratlevad paljud liikmesriigid mõistet „juriidiline isik“ muudes

õigusaktides, mida kohaldatakse ka rahapesuga seotud süütegude suhtes. See on direktiiviga

kooskõlas.

Artikkel 3 – Rahapesukuriteod

Artikli 3 lõike 1 kohaselt peavad liikmesriigid kriminaliseerima a) vara muundamise või

üleandmise, b) vara eri tunnuste varjamise ja saladuses hoidmise ning c) vara omandamise,

valdamise või kasutamise juhul, kui sellise teo toimepanija teab, et selline vara on saadud

kuritegelikust tegevusest.

Liikmesriigid on selle sätte üle võtnud erinevalt. Seitse liikmesriiki (Bulgaaria, Kreeka,

Poola, Rumeenia, Soome, Tšehhi Vabariik ja Ungari) on tahtluse elemendi üle võtnud

kaudselt, tuginedes üldistele kriminaalõiguse põhimõtetele, mis näevad ette, et süütegu

iseloomustab üksnes tahtluse element. Ülejäänud liikmesriigid on rahapesu

kriminaliseerivatesse siseriiklikesse sätetesse sõnaselgelt lisanud tahtluse elemendi.

Artikli 3 lõige 2 annab liikmesriikidele võimaluse rahapesu täiendavalt kriminaliseerida, kui

õigusrikkuja ei teadnud, kuid kahtlustas või oleks pidanud teadma, et vara on saadud

kuritegelikust tegevusest (hooletusest toime pandud rahapesu). Seda võimalust kasutas ja

hooletu rahapesu kriminaliseeris 15 liikmesriiki3.

Võttes arvesse, et rahapesuks kasutatavad keerukad skeemid raskendavad eelkuriteo

tõendamist, on direktiivi eesmärk kõrvaldada ka praktilised ja õiguslikud takistused rahapesu

kui eraldiseisva kuriteo eest vastutusele võtmisel. Selleks kohustab see liikmesriike

võimaldama rahapesu eest vastutusele võtmist ja süüdimõistmist, nõudmata süüdimõistmist

eelkuriteo eest (artikli 3 lõike 3 punkt a) ja nõudmata, et ametiasutused teeksid kindlaks

kõik eelkuriteo elemendid (sh selle süüteo toimepanija isiku, mille tulemusel vara saadi)

(artikli 3 lõike 3 punkt b). Edaspidi nimetatakse seda „eraldiseisvaks rahapesuks“.

Kuusteist liikmesriiki4 ei ole seda sätet üle võtnud mitte otseselt, vaid „vaikimisi“, st nad ei

ole oma rahapesu käsitlevates siseriiklikes õigusaktides sõnaselgelt maininud, et täidetud

peavad olema sellised tingimused nagu eelnev või samaaegne süüdimõistmine eelkuriteo eest

või kõigi eelkuriteoga seotud faktide ja asjaolude kindlakstegemine.

Komisjon märgib, et kohtus vara ebaseadusliku päritolu tõendamise tingimused on

liikmesriigiti väga erinevad.

3 Belgia, Hispaania, Horvaatia, Küpros, Läti, Madalmaad, Malta, Poola, Rootsi, Saksamaa, Sloveenia, Slovakkia,

Soome, Tšehhi Vabariik ja Ungari 4 Belgia, Bulgaaria, Eesti, Horvaatia, Itaalia, Madalmaad, Poola, Portugal, Prantsusmaa, Rootsi, Rumeenia,

Sloveenia ja Slovakkia, Soome, Tšehhi Vabariik ja Ungari.

4

14 liikmesriigis5 ei ole vara ebaseadusliku päritolu tõendamisel vaja eelkuriteo liiki täpsustada.

Pigem piisab sellest, kui tuvastatakse, et pestud vara pärineb toimepandud kuritegelikust

tegevusest, mis hõlbustab oluliselt rahapesu eest vastutusele võtmist.

Mitme liikmesriigi kohtutes tuleb eelkuriteo toimumist siiski põhjalikult tõendada. Kümme

liikmesriiki6 nõuavad endiselt, et ametiasutused määraksid kindlaks kuriteokategooria,

millesse eelkuritegu kuulub (nt uimastikaubandus, inimkaubandus, pettus jne). Neist kahes

liikmesriigis (Bulgaarias ja Poolas) on eelkuriteo puhul tõendamiskünnis eriti kõrge.

Bulgaaria7 nõuab endiselt kuriteo liigi ning selle toimepanemise aja ja koha tõendamist. Poolas

on kohtupraktikast8 tulenevalt vaja piisavalt konkreetselt kindlaks teha, et konkreetne vara saadi

konkreetsest eelkuriteost.

Nagu on märgitud ka hindamisaruandes, on direktiivi sõnastus väga lai ning võimaldab

sellist ülevõtmist. Direktiivis nõutakse, et rahapesu eest süüdimõistmine oleks võimalik, „ilma

et oleks vaja teha kindlaks kõik seotud tegelikud üksikasjad ja asjaolud“, kuid selline sõnastus

tähendab, et õigusaktidega võidakse siiski nõuda, et ametiasutused tõendaksid kõiki eelkuriteo

elemente peale ühe.

Võttes arvesse direktiiviga liikmesriikidele antud suurt tegutsemisruumi, ei ole seoses artikli 3

lõike 3 punktidega a ja b tuvastatud ühtegi nõuete rikkumise juhtumit.

Kõik liikmesriigid on nõuetekohaselt üle võtnud, et rahapesusüütegude koosseisud

hõlmavad vara, mis saadi tegevusega muu liikmesriigi või kolmanda riigi territooriumil,

kui sellist tegevust käsitataks eelkuriteona, kui see oleks toime pandud asjaomases liikmesriigis

(artikli 3 lõike 3 punkt c).

Proportsionaalsuse huvides antakse artikli 3 lõikega 4 liikmesriikidele võimalus kitsendada

selliste piiriüleste juhtumite ulatust, mille puhul rahapesu on karistatav, st kui eelkuritegu pandi

toime riikides, kus selline tegevust ei ole kriminaliseeritud (topeltkaristatavuse nõue). Teatavate

raskete kuritegude kategooriate puhul ei ole siiski võimalik piiriülest kohaldamisala kitsendada.

Organiseeritud kuritegelikus rühmituses osalemise, terrorismi, inimkaubanduse, rändajate

ebaseadusliku üle piiri toimetamise, seksuaalse ärakasutamise, uimastikaubanduse ja

korruptsiooni korral, mis on toime pandud teises ELi liikmesriigis või kolmandas riigis, peab

siiski olema võimalik isikut rahapesu eest vastutusele võtta, isegi kui tegevus, mille tulemusel

raha saadi, ei ole selles teises riigis kuritegu.

Kaheksa liikmesriiki9 kasutasid võimalust kehtestada topeltkaristatavuse nõue. Kuid

Luksemburg10 nõuab topeltkaristatavust teatavate kuritegude puhul, mille suhtes sellist

põhimõtet ei tuleks kohaldada, nimelt kuritegelikus ühenduses osalemine ja väljapressimine.

Üldiselt peavad liikmesriigid tagama, et artikli 3 lõike 1 punktides a ja b rahapesuna

kriminaliseeritud teod on karistatavad „omaenda kuritegeliku raha pesu“ korral (artikli 3

lõige 5), mis tähendab, et eelkuriteo toime pannud või selle toimepanemises osalenud isik

tegeleb omaenda kuritegelikul teel saadud tulu rahapesuga.

5 Austria, Belgia, Hispaania, Itaalia, Leedu, Luksemburg, Läti, Malta, Madalmaad, Prantsusmaa, Rootsi,

Rumeenia, Slovakkia ja Sloveenia. 6 Bulgaaria, Eesti, Horvaatia, Kreeka, Küpros, Poola, Portugal, Saksamaa, Tšehhi ja Ungari. 7 Bulgaaria karistusseadustiku artikkel 253. 8 Ülemkohtu otsus karistusseadustiku artikli 299 lõike 1 kohta. 9 Austria, Eesti, Kreeka, Luksemburg, Portugal, Saksamaa, Soome ja Ungari. 10 Karistusseadustiku artikli 506–3 lõige 2 koostoimes kriminaalmenetluse seadustiku artikliga 5–1.

5

Liikmesriigid võtsid selle sätte oma siseriiklikesse õigusaktidesse üle otse või kaudselt, jättes

kehtestamata tingimuse, et eelkuriteo toimepanija oleks rahapesukuriteo toimepanijast

eraldiseisev. Mõned liikmesriigid lisasid oma siseriiklikesse õigusaktidesse erandid, mis ei

mõjuta nõuete täitmist, nt nõuab Saksamaa, et ebaseaduslik vara tuleb mingil viisil ringlusse

lasta, ning Itaalia ja Eesti jätavad kohaldamisalast välja kasutamise isiklikul eesmärgil.

Seetõttu ei tuvastatud ühtegi nõuetele mittevastava ülevõtmise juhtumit.

Artikkel 4 – Kuriteo toimepanemisele kaasaaitamine, kuriteole kihutamine ja

kuriteokatse

Artiklis 4 nõutakse, et kõrvalkuriteod, st rahapeasukuriteo toimepanemisele

kaasaaitamine, sellele kihutamine ja rahapesukatse, peavad olema kriminaalkorras

karistatavad.

Kõik 25 liikmesriiki on artikli 4 õigesti üle võtnud.

Artikkel 5 – Füüsilistele isikutele ette nähtud karistused

Artiklis 5 nõutakse, et rahapesukuriteod ja nendega seotud süüteod oleksid karistatavad

tõhusate, proportsionaalsete ja hoiatavate kriminaalkaristustega, täpsustades, et

rahapesukuriteod peavad olema karistatavad vangistusega, mille maksimummäär on vähemalt

neli aastat.

Sellega seoses märgib komisjon, et Rootsi11 on oma õigusaktides kehtestanud ülempiiriks

kaks aastat, samas kui tundub, et Kreeka12 ei ole järginud nelja aasta künnist juhtudel, kui

eelkuritegu on väärtegu, mis praktikas tähendab, et rahapesu eest määratav karistus ei ole

paljude direktiivis sätestatud eelkuritegude puhul piisavalt kõrge.

Artikkel 6 – Raskendavad asjaolud

Artikli 6 lõikes 1 sätestatakse kaks kohustuslikku raskendavat asjaolu: kui rahapesu toimub

kuritegeliku ühenduse raames või kui selle paneb ametialase tegevuse käigus toime

„kohustatud isik“, st üksus, kelle puhul kehtib ELi rahapesuvastastest õigusaktidest tulenev

konkreetne aruande- ja kliendi isikusamasuse kontrollimise kohustus13.

Sellega seoses tuleb märkida, et Leedu, Poola ja Sloveenia ei ole raskendavat asjaolu seoses

kohustatud isiku poolt toime pandud rahapesuga oma õigusaktidesse lisanud; Küpros14 ei ole

lisanud raskendavat asjaolu rahapeasukuriteo toimepanemisele kaasaaitamise, sellele

kihutamise ja rahapesukatse eest; Kreeka15 ei saa viidata raskendavatele asjaoludele juhtudel,

mil eelkuritegu on väärtegu ning praktikas välistab see suure hulga direktiivis sätestatud

eelkuritegudest.

11 Lag (2014:307) om straff för penningtvättsbrott, 3 §. 12 Seaduse nr 4557/2018 artikli 39 lõike 1 punkt d. 13 Vt eelkõige Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 20. mai 2015. aasta direktiivi (EL) 2015/849 (mis käsitleb

finantssüsteemi rahapesu või terrorismi rahastamise eesmärgil kasutamise tõkestamist) artikli 2 lõige 1 ELT L 141,

5.6.2015, lk 73–117, viimane konsolideeritud versioon: EUR-Lex - 02015L0849-20241230 - ET - EUR-Lex. 14 Seaduse nr 188(I)/2007 I osa §4(4). 15 Seaduse nr 4557/2018 artikli 39 lõike 1 punkt d.

6

Artikli 6 lõikega 2 antakse liikmesriikidele võimalus kehtestada kaks täiendavat raskendavat

asjaolu: a) kui pestav vara on märkimisväärse väärtusega või b) kui pestav vara on saadud

teatavate konkreetsete kuritegude tulemusel16. Variandi a) võtsid üle 14 liikmesriiki17 ja

variandi b) neli liikmesriiki18.

Kõik valikuvõimalusi kasutanud liikmesriigid võtsid need üle direktiiviga kooskõlas oleval

viisil.

Artikkel 7 – Juriidiliste isikute vastutus

Direktiivi kohaselt peab juriidilist isikut saama rahapesukuritegude, sealhulgas omaenda

kuritegeliku raha pesu eest vastutusele võtta. See hõlmab mis tahes isiku tegevust, kes juriidilise

isiku juhtivtöötajana tegutseb iseseisvalt või juriidilise isiku organi liikmena (artikli 7 lõige 1).

Samuti peavad liikmesriigid tagama, et juriidilist isikut saab vastutusele võtta juhul, kui

kuritegu on võimalik olnud toime panna järelevalve või kontrolli puudumise tõttu (artikli 7

lõige 2). Juriidiliste isikute vastutus ei tohiks siiski välistada võimalust alustada

kriminaalmenetlust füüsilise isiku suhtes, kes on osalenud kuriteo täideviijana (artikli 7 lõige

3).

Mis puudutab juriidiliste isikute vastutust, siis ei ole Prantsusmaa oma õigusaktides

sätestanud võimalust võtta juriidilisi isikuid vastutusele juhul, kui rahapesukuriteod pandi toime

selles üksuses juhtival kohal oleva isiku puuduliku järelevalve või kontrolli tõttu.

Artikkel 8 – Juriidiliste isikute suhtes kohaldatavad karistused

Artikli 8 kohaselt peavad liikmesriigid tagama, et artikli 7 kohaselt vastutusele võetud

juriidilise isiku suhtes kohaldatakse tõhusaid, proportsionaalseid ja hoiatavaid karistusi,

sealhulgas igal juhul kriminaalõiguslikke või muid trahve. Kõik liikmesriigid on selle sätte

nõuetekohaselt üle võtnud.

Lisaks on artiklis 8 loetletud võimalikud lisakaristused, alates juriidilise isiku riiklike

hüvitiste või abi saajate hulgast väljaarvamisest kuni avaliku sektori asutuselt raha saamise

võimalusest ilmajätmiseni, ettevõtluskeeluni, juriidilise isiku kohtuliku järelevalve alla

võtmiseni, kuriteo toimepanemiseks kasutatud üksuste sulgemiseni ja isegi võimaluseni, et

kohus annab korralduse äriühing lõpetada (st likvideerida). Neist võimalustest üht või mitut

on kasutanud 19 liikmesriiki19. Kuus liikmesriiki ei ole kasutanud ühtki neist

võimalustest.

Kõik valikuvõimalusi kasutanud liikmesriigid võtsid need üle direktiiviga kooskõlas oleval

viisil.

Artikkel 9 – Konfiskeerimine

16 Osalemine organiseeritud kuritegelikus rühmituses või väljapressimises, terrorismis, inimkaubanduses ja

rändajate ebaseaduslikus üle piiri toimetamises, seksuaalses ärakasutamises, ebaseaduslikus uimastikaubanduses

ja korruptsioonis. 17 Austria, Bulgaaria, Eesti, Horvaatia, Kreeka, Küpros, Läti, Poola, Rootsi, Sloveenia, Slovakkia, Soome, Tšehhi

Vabariik, ja Ungari. 18Hispaania, Horvaatia, Kreeka ja, Soome. 19 Belgia, Hispaania, Horvaatia, Kreeka, Küpros, Itaalia, Leedu, Luksemburg, Läti, Malta, Poola, Portugal,

Prantsusmaa, Rumeenia, Saksamaa, Sloveenia, Slovakkia, Tšehhi Vabariik ja Ungari.

7

Artiklis 9 nõutakse, et liikmesriigid tagaksid, et asjakohasel juhul arestivad või

konfiskeerivad nende pädevad asutused vastavalt konfiskeerimist käsitlevale direktiivile

2014/42/EU20 kasu, mis on saadud antud direktiivis osutatud rahapesukuriteo toimepanemisest

või sellele kaasaaitamisest, ja vahendid, mida niisuguse süüteo toimepanemiseks või sellele

kaasaaitamiseks kasutati või kavatseti kasutada.

Kõik 25 liikmesriiki võtsid artikli 9 üle kooskõlas direktiiviga.

Artikkel 10 – Kohtualluvus

Artikli 10 lõike 1 kohaselt peab liikmesriik tagama, et süüteod on tema kohtute alluvuses, kui

süütegu on toime pandud tema territooriumil (artikli 10 lõike 1 punkt a) või kui süüteo

toimepanija on tema kodanik (artikli 10 lõike 1 punkt b). Kõik liikmesriigid on selle sätte

nõuetekohaselt üle võtnud.

Seoses artikli 10 lõike 1 punktiga b tuleb märkida, et juhul, kui õigusrikkuja on liikmesriigi

kodanik, on see säte üle võetud erinevalt, eelkõige seoses topeltkaristatavuse21 nõudega.

Kuna seda küsimust käsitlev erisäte puudub, näib, et kümme liikmesriiki22 on direktiivi

rakendanud ilma topeltkaristatavust kohtualluvuse määramise eeltingimusena sõnaselgelt

sätestamata. Seevastu 11 liikmesriiki23 on eespool nimetatud nõude oma kodanike suhtes

kohtualluvuse kindlaksmääramise tingimusena sõnaselgelt lisanud. Samal ajal on kolm

liikmesriiki24 topeltkaristatavuse nõude rahapesuga seotud süütegude puhul sõnaselgelt

välistanud.

Artikli 10 lõige 2 võimaldab liikmesriikidel laiendada oma kohtualluvust juhtudele, kui a)

süüteo toimepanija alaline elukoht on tema territooriumil või b) süütegu on toime pandud tema

territooriumil asutatud juriidilise isiku huvides. 14 liikmesriiki25 on kasutanud artikli 10 lõike

2 punktis a sätestatud võimalust. Kümme liikmesriiki26 on kasutanud artikli 10 lõike 2

punktis b sätestatud võimalust direktiiviga kooskõlas oleval viisil.

Artikkel 11 – Uurimisvahendid

Artiklis 11 nõutakse, et isikutel, üksustel või talitustel, kelle ülesanne on rahapesukuritegude

uurimine või nende eest vastutusele võtmine, sealhulgas nendele kaasaaitamise, nendele

kihutamise ja kuriteokatse eest,27 oleksid tõhusad uurimisvahendid, näiteks organiseeritud

kuritegevuse või muude raskete kuritegude puhul kasutatavad uurimisvahendid. Kõik 25

liikmesriiki on artikli 11 üle võtnud kooskõlas direktiiviga.

20 Vt direktiivi (EL) 2018/1673 põhjendus 16: „[…] Liikmesriigid peaksid kuriteovahendite ja kriminaaltulu arestimise ja

konfiskeerimise tagama vähemalt kõigil nendel juhtudel, mis on direktiivis 2014/42/EL ette nähtud. Ühtlasi peaksid

liikmesriigid igati kaaluma konfiskeerimise lubamist ka kõigil nendel juhtudel, kus kriminaalmenetluse alustamine või lõpule

viimine ei ole võimalik, sealhulgas juhul, kui süüteo toimepanija sureb.“. 21 See on põhimõte, mille kohaselt saab kohtualluvust kindlaks teha ainult siis, kui kõnealune tegevus on kriminaliseeritud nii

süüdistuse esitanud riigis kui ka riigis, kus see toime pandi. 22 Bulgaaria, Itaalia, Läti, Malta, Poola, Sloveenia, Slovakkia, Soome, Tšehhi, Ungari. 23 Austria. Belgia, Eesti, Hispaania, Horvaatia, Küpros, Leedu, Luksemburg, Prantsusmaa, Rootsi, Saksamaa. 24 Kreeka, Madalmaad, Rumeenia. 25Austria, Belgia, Eesti, Hispaania, Horvaatia, Leedu, Luksemburg, Läti, Malta, Madalmaad, Portugal, Rootsi, Slovakkia ja

Soome. 26 Austria, Eesti, Hispaania, Kreeka, Luksemburg, Läti, Poola, Sloveenia ja Slovakkia ja Tšehhi Vabariik. 27Vt ka põhjendus 19: „Seetõttu tuleks võimaldada piisaval hulgal töötajaid, otstarbekat koolitust, vahendeid ja

ajakohast tehnoloogiat. […].“

8

3 JÄRELDUSED

Võttes arvesse rahapesu tähtsust organiseeritud kuritegelike võrgustike jaoks olulise

rahastamisvahendina ning vahendina, mille abil ebaseaduslikku tulu saada ja seaduslikku

majandusse sisse imbuda, on rahapesule kriminaalõiguslike meetmetega reageerimise

ühtlustamine oluline osa liidu laiematest jõupingutustest kuritegelike võrgustike lõhkumiseks

ja likvideerimiseks, nagu on rõhutatud Euroopa sisejulgeoleku strateegias ProtectEU28.

Komisjon hindab kõrgelt liikmesriikide jõupingutusi direktiivi järgimisel. Kuigi mõned

vastuolud ja lüngad on endiselt alles, on direktiivi ülevõtmine toimunud üldiselt nõuetekohaselt,

kusjuures liikmesriigid on võtnud ulatuslikke meetmeid, et viia siseriiklikud õigusaktid ELi

normidega vastavusse. Enamik liikmesriike on direktiivi nõuete täitmiseks vastu võtnud

konkreetsed õigusaktid, samas kui mõned liikmesriigid tuginesid täielikult või suures osas

olemasolevatele siseriiklikele sätetele.

Selleks et tagada direktiivi täielik ja nõuetekohane ülevõtmine, jätkab komisjon liikmesriikide

toetamist leitud puuduste kõrvaldamisel. Selle raames jälgitakse ja tagatakse, et riiklikud

meetmed oleksid kooskõlas direktiivi sätetega.

28 EUR-Lex - 52025DC0148 - ET - EUR-Lex