| Dokumendiregister | Riigikogu |
| Viit | 1-2/26-445/1 |
| Registreeritud | 26.06.2026 |
| Sünkroonitud | 27.06.2026 |
| Liik | EL dokument |
| Funktsioon | |
| Sari | |
| Toimik | Ettepanek - SEC(2026) 570, SWD(2026) 570, SWD(2026) 571, SWD(2026) 572, SWD(2026) 573, COM(2026) 570 |
| Juurdepääsupiirang | Avalik |
| Adressaat | |
| Saabumis/saatmisviis | |
| Vastutaja | |
| Originaal | Ava uues aknas |
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 24.6.2026
COM(2026) 570 final
2026/0164 (COD)
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and
repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1727
{SEC(2026) 570 final} - {SWD(2026) 570 final} - {SWD(2026) 571 final} -
{SWD(2026) 572 final} - {SWD(2026) 573 final}
EN 1 EN
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
This proposal for a new Eurojust Regulation responds to the evolving challenges posed by
serious and organised cross-border crime in the European Union. Eurojust was set up under
Council Decision 2002/187/JHA1 as an intergovernmental body and was later transformed
into an EU agency under Regulation (EU) 2018/17272. Ever since, Eurojust has facilitated
coordination and cooperation between national investigative and prosecutorial authorities. It
has significantly contributed to building mutual trust and bridging the EU's wide variety of
legal systems and traditions. By rapidly solving legal problems, and identifying competent
authorities in other countries, Eurojust has facilitated the execution of requests for cooperation
and mutual recognition. Article 85 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)
explicitly provides that Eurojust's mission is to support and strenghten coordination and
cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious
crime affecting two or more Member States or requiring a prosecution on common bases. It is
therefore important to ensure that Eurojust is used in the best possible way and to remove any
obstacles that prevent it from functioning efficiently.
The 2025 evaluation of Eurojust3, published on 2 July 2025, identified significant structural
and operational constraints that impede its ability to fully realise its potential. According to
the evaluation, these constraints include inefficiencies in internal governance, inconsistencies
in the application of the Regulation across Member States, and limitations on cooperation
with EU partners and third countries.
The primary objective of this proposal is to address the shortcomings identified by the 2025
evaluation and to modernise the Agency's legal framework in line with the Lisbon Treaty and
the Common Approach on EU decentralised agencies4. This revision aims to improve
Eurojust’s internal functioning, governance, and operational performance, while strengthening
its cooperation with EU partners and third countries, including EU candidate countries and
potential candidates. In addition, the proposal seeks to expand Eurojust’s mandate to cover
emerging crime areas such as cybercrime, gender-based violence, and violations of EU
restrictive measures, including where they present a hybrid dimension, and to reinforce its
analytical and proactive capabilities.
The ProtectEU Strategy Internal Security Strategy, Protect EU Agenda to prevent and counter
terrorism and the EU Roadmap to Fight Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime highlight
Eurojust’s critical role in cross-border criminal justice cooperation, and acknowledge the need
to further strengthen its operational role in combating organised crime, terrorism and evolving
cross-border threats.
The initiative is set out in the 2026 Commission Work Programme5, which prioritises the
revision of Eurojust’s legal framework to uphold EU values and protect democracy, together
1 OJ L 063, 6.3.2002, p. 1. 2 OJ L 295 21.11.2018, p. 138. 3 SWD(2025) 182 final. 4 Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission on
decentralised agencies. 5 2026 Commission work programme and annexes, 21 October 2025.
EN 2 EN
and in complementarity with the revisions of the Europol Regulation, the European
Investigation Order (EIO) Directive and the European Union Data Protection Regulation
(EUDPR).
The proposal also seeks to address the recommendations of the High-Level Forum on the
Future of EU Criminal Justice6, which underscored the need for a more cohesive criminal
justice architecture, and for Eurojust to act as a central hub for judicial cooperation in relation
to EU justice and security more widely.
This proposal takes all these elements into consideration and provides a single and renewed
legal framework for Eurojust. While maintaining the management and operation elements that
have proven efficient, it modernises Eurojust's legal framework and streamlines its
functioning and structure in line with the requirements of the Common Approach on
decentralised agencies.
• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
The present package of criminal justice initiatives pursues a coherent and complementary
objective: strengthening the Union's capacity to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute
serious cross-border crime in an increasingly complex security environment. By modernising
the legal frameworks governing cooperation between law enforcement, judicial and other
relevant authorities, the package seeks to reinforce the effectiveness, coherence and
interoperability of the Union's internal security architecture.
The proposed revisions of the Europol and Eurojust Regulations constitute the core of this
effort. Europol and Eurojust perform distinct yet complementary functions within the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice: while Europol supports the prevention, detection and
investigation of criminal activities, Eurojust facilitates judicial cooperation and ensures
effective prosecutorial and judicial follow-up. The package therefore aims to strengthen
cooperation and complementarity between the two agencies, as well as with other relevant
Union actors in the Justice and Home Affairs and Anti-Fraud Architecture areas, with a view
to ensuring a seamless continuum between law enforcement action and judicial follow-up
across all stages of the criminal justice chain.
In this context, the amendments to the European Investigation Order framework and to the
data protection rules applicable in the Justice and Home Affairs domain, further contribute to
this objective by facilitating effective cross-border cooperation, improving the conditions for
information exchange and ensuring a coherent legal framework adapted to operational
realities and technological developments. Taken together, the measures proposed in this
package will enhance the Union’s ability to respond to evolving security threats while fully
respecting fundamental rights, the rule of law and the division of responsibilities between the
different actors involved.
Furthermore, the proposal for the revision of the Eurojust Regulation is fully consistent with
other the existing policy provisions in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It
aligns with Article 85 TFEU, which provides Eurojust with the mandate to support cross-
border judicial cooperation, and complements recent legislative developments such as the e-
evidence framework (Regulation (EU) 2023/1543) and the Anti-Money Laundering Package
(Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 and Regulation 2024/1620). The proposal also supports
implementation of the interoperability of EU information systems (Regulation (EU)
6 Report of the High-Level Forum on the Future of EU Criminal Justice, February-December 2025.
EN 3 EN
2019/818), which necessitates closer cooperation between Eurojust, Europol and other Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies.
Previous changes to the Eurojust Regulation made targeted, thematic amendments: Regulation
(EU) 2022/838 created the Core International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED) following
Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine; Regulation (EU) 2023/2131
strengthened information-sharing in terrorism cases; and Regulation (EU) 2025/2082
extended the timeframe for the establishment of the new Eurojust case management system
(CMS).
The proposal improves the way in which existing judicial cooperation instruments work. For
example, it improves Eurojust's capacity to facilitate the application of, and to resolve
conflicts of jurisdiction in relation to EIO, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and the
mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders. By addressing the structural and
operational constraints identified in the 2025 evaluation, this proposal ensures that Eurojust
can more effectively support Member States in combating serious and organised crime.
• Consistency with other Union policies
The proposal aligns with several broader Union policies, reinforcing coherence across the
EU’s judicial and law enforcement framework. In the realm of digitalisation, the proposed
revision of the Europol Regulation improves Eurojust’s CMS and outlines parallel
developments in Europol's operational infrastructure, while ensuring seamless interoperability
between the two. The developments include the modernisation of cross-checking services,
analytical environments and secure infrastructure, which will ensure more efficient
information exchange and coordination between Eurojust, Europol and national authorities.
Moreover, the proposal strengthens Eurojust’s capacity to use digital tools, including the Core
International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED) and an automated hit/no-hit system for
faster data exchange with Europol, the EPPO and OLAF, together with its role in ECRIS-
TCN, thereby facilitating access to third-country criminal records. These measures align with
the EU’s digital justice priorities of improving efficiency and cooperation in cross-border
investigations. Finally, Eurojust will be better equipped to handle electronic evidence, cross-
border data requests and digital forensic analysis, thereby improving its capacity to support
Member States in investigating cybercrime, terrorism and organised crime, reflecting the
priorities set out in the e-evidence framework7.
The proposal reinforces compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, particularly in the area of data protection. The revision ensures that Eurojust’s
expanded mandate and operational capabilities are exercised in full respect of individual
rights, including the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial. This is achieved by including
strict legal bases for data exchange, aligned with the EUDPR8, which governs the processing
of personal data by EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including Eurojust.
Oversight by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) ensures that Eurojust adheres
to the highest standards of transparency and accountability in its data processing activities.
Improved procedural safeguards for cross-border evidence gathering reflect the principles of
7 Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 on European
Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal proceedings and for
the execution of custodial sentences following criminal proceedings (OJ L 191, 28.7.2023, pp. 118–180,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1543/oj). 8 In its revised form, amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
EN 4 EN
mutual recognition and judicial cooperation embedded in the European Investigation Order
(EIO) Directive9, which was also revised in parallel to this proposal.
The proposal aligns with the strategic priorities identified in the Anti-Fraud Architecture
(AFA) Review, particularly the White Paper for the EU's Anti-Fraud Architecture review10
which emphasises the need for complementary mandates, seamless information flow and
operational synergies between Eurojust, OLAF, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office
(EPPO), Europol and national authorities. By reinforcing Eurojust's role as a judicial
coordination hub, the proposal ensures that its activities are fully integrated into the broader
EU anti-fraud ecosystem, supporting the investigation and prosecution of PIF (Protection of
the Union’s Financial Interests) offences and other forms of serious cross-border crime.
The proposal strengthens Eurojust's cooperation with third countries, including candidate
countries and potential candidates, and international organisations, in coherence with the EU
Global Strategy and the Action Plan against Drug Trafficking, both of which emphasise the
importance of international cooperation in combating transnational crime. The revision of the
Eurojust Regulation ensures that Eurojust’s external engagements are consistent with the
Union’s external policies, including those governing data transfers to third countries under the
EUDPR and the Law Enforcement Directive11.
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
• Legal basis
Article 85 TFEU is the legal basis for the proposal and provides that Eurojust's structure,
operation, field of action and tasks are to be determined by regulations adopted in accordance
with the ordinary legislative procedure. It also requires that those regulations determine
arrangements for involving the European Parliament and national parliaments in the
evaluation of Eurojust's activities and thus contribute to an EU-level democratic oversight of
its activities.
• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)
Eurojust's functions (coordination, cooperation facilitation and operational support) are
transnational by nature and cannot be performed effectively solely at Member State-level. The
Agency provides a neutral, EU-level perspective across jurisdictions, facilitates multilateral
cooperation in parallel, and ensures that no Member State is placed at a disadvantage. The
scale and complexity of cross-border investigations render EU-level coordination
indispensable for national prosecutorial and judicial authorities, thus necessitating EU-level
action and adhering to the subsidiarity principle. Eurojust offers operational, legal and
strategic value that improves the functioning of national systems and the coherence of the
EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Action by Eurojust does not replace action by
national authorities, but rather enhances it through support services. There are clear
ecomonies of scale and efficiency gains to be made by further improving Eurojust, which will
9 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European
Investigation Order in criminal matters (OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, pp. 1–36,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/41/oj). 10 COM(2025) 546 final, 16 July 2025. 11 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision,
2008/977/JHA (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 89–131, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/680/oj).
EN 5 EN
enable it to bring together expertise from national practitioners in one agency, coordinate
quickly and more efficiently in the fight against transnational crime, and avoid duplication
and conflicting investigations.
• Proportionality
In conformity with the principle of proportionality, this proposal does not go beyond what is
necessary to achieve its objectives. It is targeted, as it focuses on structural and operational
improvements without overstepping Eurojust’s supportive and coordinative role.
The preferred package of measures addresses the problems identified in the most
comprehensive and cost-effective manner. The multi-criteria analysis carried out in an
accompanying impact assessment, which took into account the effectiveness, efficiency,
coherence and proportionality of all policy options, showed that all measures identified had a
net positive benefit and that the preferred measures ranked the highest (see chapter 7 of the
impact assessment and Annex 4 on analytical methods). The estimated costs of this proposal
are proportionate to the objectives and, overall, Eurojust is expected to benefit greatly, in
particular due to its revised governance model, as set out in the impact assessment (see
chapter 8). For example, the introduction of a Management Board for strategic oversight and
an Executive Board for administrative decisions streamlines governance without
compromising the operational independence of National Members. Similarly, the expansion
of Eurojust’s mandate to better counter emerging forms of crime such as cybercrime,
violation of Union’s restrictive measures, and gender-based violence is necessary to keep pace
with the evolving nature of cross-border crime, however, this is carefully balanced to avoid
overlapping with the competences of other EU agencies and Member States.
• Choice of the instrument
The present proposal takes the form of a Regulation, which is stipulated by Article 85 TFEU
as the legal instrument to be used to determine Eurojust's structure, operation, field of action
and tasks.
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
• Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation
The 2025 evaluation of Eurojust identified two core problems necessitating legislative
intervention. The first problem concerns the suboptimal efficiency of Eurojust's internal
organisation and processes. This problem is characterised by a lack of case prioritisation, with
the majority of Eurojust's caseload consisting of bilateral and lower-complexity cases, which
divert resources from high-added value multilateral investigations. Governance inefficiencies
were also highlighted, with National Members spending 40 to 50% of their time on
administrative tasks, reducing their ability to focus on operational work. Additionally, the
powers of National Members vary significantly across Member States, leading to uneven
support and operational fragmentation.
The second problem relates to limitations in Eurojust's interaction with partners, including
suboptimal cooperation with Europol and the EPPO, as well as challenges in third-country
cooperation. The evaluation found the hit/no-hit system for data exchange with Europol and
the EPPO to be cumbersome and manual, delaying operational follow-up. Furthermore, the
process of negotiating international agreements with third countries is time-consuming, and
Liaison Magistrates and Prosecutors are underutilised. The evaluation concluded that without
EN 6 EN
EU intervention, these problems would persist due to legal, structural and cultural barriers,
underscoring the need for a comprehensive revision of the Eurojust Regulation.
• Stakeholder consultations
In order to prepare this Regulation, the Commission consulted specialist stakeholders on a
number of occasions. These consultations included a Public Consultation launched in all 24
official EU languages, a Call for Evidence and an online survey. Moreover, interviews with a
wide range of stakeholders including Eurojust staff, National Members, national authorities,
practitioners and representatives from third countries and international organisations were
carried out by an external contractor.
The Public Consultation, which ran for twelve weeks from 3 December 2025 to 24 February
2026, received 20 responses, with the majority of respondents emphasising the importance of
Eurojust’s role in addressing serious and organised cross-border crime. Stakeholders also
highlighted the need to better consider the perspectives of victims and witnesses and to clarify
case allocation between Eurojust and the European Judicial Network (EJN). The Call for
Evidence, available on the 'Have Your Say' website, received 42 responses from stakeholders
across 21 EU Member States. The feedback emphasised the complementary roles of Eurojust
and the EJN, the need to strengthen Eurojust’s mandate with more operational roles, and the
importance of improving governance and decision-making processes. Stakeholders also
stressed the need for Eurojust to prioritise cooperation with third countries and invest in
technological tools to respond to the evolving nature of crime. The online survey, which was
open until 4 March 2026, targeted practitioners, Eurojust administration representatives and
National Members, and public officials from both EU and non-EU countries. The survey
results indicated broad support for governance reform, including the introduction of a
Management Board to alleviate the College from administrative burden, and clarify the
division of tasks. Stakeholders also agreed on the need to harmonise the status and powers of
National Members and to strengthen cooperation with relevant EU agencies and bodies, such
as Europol and the EPPO. Concerns were raised about the varying levels of engagement with
Eurojust among third countries, with some respondents suggesting that conditionality clauses
be introduced to enhance cooperation, particularly in EU candidate countries and potential
candidates. In addition to open public consultations, interviews were conducted with 115
stakeholders, including Eurojust administration representatives, National Members, Liaison
Prosecutors, EU agencies, national authorities and international organisations. These
interviews provided deeper insights into the operational challenges faced by Eurojust,
including outdated tools, limited cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
and the need for clearer competences in areas such as e-evidence. Although stakeholders from
third countries and international organisations recognised Eurojust's work as valuable, they
also highlighted opportunities to improve cooperation through measures such as establishing
resident contact points and appointing Liaison Magistrates.
The input received from stakeholders has been carefully considered in developing this
proposal.
• Collection and use of expertise
A combination of internal and external expertise was used to develop this proposal. Eurojust's
internal evaluations, including the 2025 evaluation and the Action Plan for 2026-2027,
provided critical insights into the Agency's operational and governance challenges. External
expertise was sourced from a support study, which analysed the operational and governance
constraints facing Eurojust and proposed policy options to address them. The Commission
also drew on the recommendations of the High-Level Forum on the Future of EU Criminal
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Justice, which emphasised the need for a more cohesive criminal justice architecture with
Eurojust as a central hub. This expertise was used to inform the policy choices in the
proposal, ensuring they are evidence-based.
• Impact assessment
This proposal is supported by an impact assessment that evaluated various approaches to
addressing Eurojust's operational and structural challenges. The selected measures represent
the most effective solution, focusing on expanding Eurojust's mandate to include emerging
crime areas, standardising National Members' status and powers and improving governance
efficiency. These changes are expected to enhance cross-border judicial cooperation, reduce
administrative burden and strengthen collaboration with Europol, the EPPO and other
partners. The estimated costs are justified by significant operational benefits, including faster
case processing and improved resource allocation.
The assessment compared various policy options against a baseline scenario whereby Eurojust
would continue operating under its current mandate without structural reform. The most
comprehensive solution emerged as the preferred option: it combines legislative changes,
governance reforms and operational improvements to transform Eurojust into a more
proactive and effective judicial cooperation hub in relation to EU justice and security more
widely.
The selected measures focus on three key areas of improvement. First, the revision expands
Eurojust's mandate to reinforce Eurojust’s response in emerging crime areas such as
cybercrime, violations of EU restrictive measures, and gender-based violence, while
establishing semi-permanent operational platforms to support strengthened coordination
among national authorities, including via joint investigation teams. This expansion enables
Eurojust to better address the evolving nature of cross-border criminal activities, particularly
those with digital components or a geopolitical dimension. Second, the reform clarifies certain
definitions and harmonises the status and powers of National Members across Member States,
so as to ensure even operational capabilities, including the authority to issue freezing orders
and e-evidence orders. Standardising powers and capabilities in this way addresses current
inconsistencies in how different Member States implement Eurojust's mandate and ensures
more uniform support for national authorities. Third, the revision will align the governance
structure to the Common Approach applicable to all EU decentralised agencies by
establishing a Management Board, which assumes administrative and management
responsibilities and allows the College of National Members to focus exclusively on
operational matters. This separation of functions is expected to significantly reduce the
administrative burden on National Members, currently estimated at 40% of their workload.
The impact assessment demonstrates that these measures will collectively improve Eurojust's
ability to detect, coordinate and prosecute complex, transnational criminal activities. By
strengthening operational cooperation with Europol through automated data exchange systems
and establishing clearer cooperation frameworks with the European Public Prosecutor's
Office, the reform creates a more integrated EU criminal justice ecosystem. As regards
external relations, the revision clarifies the legal framework for Liaison Magistrates and
institutionalises resident contact points from priority third countries, creating more stable
channels for international judicial cooperation. The assessment concludes that, while these
comprehensive changes require a commensurate increase in resources for Eurojust, they will
generate substantial operational benefits, including faster case processing, improved resource
allocation, and an enhanced ability to combat emerging criminal threats.
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The impact assessment received a positive opinion from the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB)
on 4 May 2026 and was updated to reflect the remarks of the RSB.
• Regulatory fitness and simplification
The proposal complies with the principles of the Regulatory Fitness and Performance
Programme (REFIT) by streamlining Eurojust's governance, clarifying case allocation and
automating data exchange. The introduction of a Management Board reduces the
administrative burden on the College, allowing National Members to focus more on
operational tasks. By clarifying the boundaries of Eurojust’s competences, in particular in
relation to the European Judicial Network (EJN), the proposal aims to minimise duplication of
effort, ensuring that Eurojust's resources are directed toward complex, high-value
investigations. The automation of the hit/no-hit system for data exchange with Europol and
the EPPO reduces manual intervention, improving efficiency and operational responsiveness.
• Fundamental rights
The consequences of the proposal for the protection of fundamental rights have been carefully
considered. The proposal's design ensures compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, particularly in areas where Eurojust's expanded mandate intersects
with criminal procedural safeguards and data protection. The revision of the Eurojust
Regulation includes strict legal bases for data exchange, ensuring that any processing of
personal data is necessary, proportionate, and subject to oversight by the European Data
Protection Supervisor (EDPS). Purpose limitation safeguards prevent the reuse of data for
unintended objectives, and transparency is embedded in operational procedures to provide
clear avenues for individuals to challenge data processing or operational decisions that affect
their rights.
Procedural safeguards have also been reinforced to ensure that Eurojust's role remains
supportive and coordinative, without interfering with national judicial independence. The
proposal includes mechanisms for transparency and legal remedies, allowing individuals to
challenge decisions that may impact their rights. This ensures that the expansion of Eurojust's
operational role, particularly in areas such as e-evidence and asset recovery, does not
compromise the fundamental rights of individuals involved in cross-border criminal
proceedings.
4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
The revision of the Eurojust Regulation will require an increase of the EU contribution to the
agency of approximately EUR 119 million over the 2028-2034 period (EUR 83 million of
which on top of the financial programming, and EUR 36 million coming from contribution
agreements which will be incorporated into the Agency's regular budget). The total EU
contribution to Eurojust over the next MFF will total EUR 625 million, as detailed in the
Legislative Financial and Digital Statement. This increase will support the Agency’s
expanded mandate, including proactive case handling, enhanced analytical capabilities, and
stronger cooperation with EU and international partners.
The budget will primarily fund 87 additional staff (40 Temporary Agents, 20 Contract Agents,
27 Seconded National Experts) phased in gradually, and IT infrastructure upgrades, including
the expansion of the Core International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED) and digital
cooperation tools as the improved hit/no-hit system. Costs will be distributed progressively
EN 9 EN
before stabilising in 2033. The proposal ensures financial sustainability, while aligning with
EU priorities on security, digitalisation and judicial cooperation.
Besides its regular activities, Eurojust currently implements five projects financed through
contribution agreements with Commission Directorate Generals. Since some of the tasks
related to these projects are now firmly embedded in Eurojust's mandate, such agreements
will be integrated into the Agency's regular budget. This will entail a corresponding increase
in the EU contribution to Eurojust, offset by an equivalent reduction in the envelopes of the
programmes currently financing those agreements, leaving the overall financial programming
unchanged. Existing project funding will be integrated into Eurojust’s regular budget from the
entry into application of the new Regulation, ensuring continuity without additional costs.
This will allow for the stabilisation of 16 staff members (11 Temporary Agents, 5 Contract
Agents) to ensure continuity in the areas of e-evidence and core international crimes.
The reform will address factors identified in the evaluation as limiting the efficiency of
Eurojust’s functioning. In particular, the streamlined governance structure, based on a clearer
separation between operational and administrative responsibilities, will enable National
Members and National Desks to dedicate a greater share of their time and expertise to
casework. In parallel, enhanced cooperation mechanisms, supported by modernised working
methods and systems, will reduce duplication of efforts, improve coordination with partners
and facilitate the handling of requests and information exchanges.
At the same time, the reform significantly expands Eurojust's tasks and responsibilities,
enabling the Agency to provide enhanced support in addressing evolving forms of serious
cross-border crime. While the proposed measures are expected to generate substantial
efficiency gains and a more effective use of existing resources, these gains alone would not be
sufficient to absorb the additional workload resulting from the new mandate. The resource
needs presented above have therefore been estimated after taking into account the expected
efficiency gains generated by the reform.
5. OTHER ELEMENTS
• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
Implementation of the revised Eurojust Regulation will be supported by a robust monitoring,
evaluation and reporting framework. Key performance indicators (KPIs) have been
established to track progress toward the proposal's objectives, which include reducing
National Members' administrative workloads, increasing own-initiative cases (that Eurojust
opens proactively where it identifies a need for coordination or judicial involvement) and
increasing follow-ups to data exchange hits. The data supplied for these KPIs will be sourced
from Eurojust’s CMS, the Consolidated Annual Activity Report (CAAR), and reports from
the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on data protection compliance.
An interim review will be conducted after four years to assess the initial impact of the
Regulation, followed by a full evaluation after five years. This evaluation will examine the
operational effectiveness of the new measures, the quality of cooperation with EU partners
and third countries and compliance with fundamental rights. The results of the evaluation will
be made public and shared with the European Parliament, the Council and national
parliaments to ensure transparency and accountability. Eurojust will transmit its consolidated
annual report to the European Parliament, the Council and national parliaments, which may
present observations and conclusions. These reporting arrangements ensure ongoing oversight
and enable stakeholders to provide feedback on the implementation of the Regulation.
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• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
The proposed Regulation consists of nine chapters comprising 87 articles.
Chapter I – General provisions, objectives and tasks
This chapter sets out the foundational framework of Eurojust. It confirms Eurojust's legal
status as a Union agency with legal personality and provides that its seat is in The Hague. It
sets out Eurojust's overall objectives of supporting and strengthening coordination and
cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious
cross-border crime. It lays down a full list of the tasks to be performed by Eurojust to fulfil
those objectives, including assisting national and international authorities in coordinating
investigations, cross-checking information to identify links between cross-border cases,
collecting and preserving evidence of core international crimes, supporting asset recovery,
and cooperating with Union agencies and bodies such as Europol and the EPPO. It also
defines Eurojust's competence, covering the serious crimes listed in Annex I and related
offences, and sets out the geographic and situational conditions in which Eurojust may act,
including in relation to the EPPO and third countries.
Chapter II – Organisation of Eurojust
This chapter defines the governance structure of Eurojust and is divided into four sections,
distinguishing between the management structure and the operational structure.
Section I sets out Eurojust's dual structure: the management structure comprises the
Management Board, the Executive Board and the Administrative Director, while the
operational structure comprises the National Members and the College.
Section II contains the provisions governing the Management Board, which takes key
management decisions and provides strategic orientation for Eurojust's activities. It is
composed of one representative per Member State and one representative of the Commission,
and is responsible for adopting the single programming document, the annual budget, the staff
and security rules and other non-operational decisions. Chapter II lays down the rules,
stemming from the Common approach on decentralised agencies, on composition, election of
the Chairperson, frequency and conduct of meetings, functions and voting arrangements,
including the specific two-thirds majority required for key decisions such as the appointment
of the Administrative Director and the adoption of the budget. It also establishes the annual
and multi-annual programming process, requiring the Management Board to adopt a single
programming document by 30 November each year.
Section III establishes the Executive Board, which is chaired by the President of Eurojust and
assists the Management Board by preparing its decisions, reviewing draft budgets and work
programmes, ensuring follow-up to audit findings and adopting a defined set of administrative
decisions.
Section IV contains the provisions governing the Administrative Director, who manages the
Agency independently and is accountable to the Management Board. The Administrative
Director is appointed by the Management Board for a five-year term on the basis of merit and
is responsible for day-to-day administration, budget implementation, anti-fraud measures and
staff management.
Section V covers the National Members and their National Desks. Each Member State
seconds one National Member to Eurojust's seat in The Hague, supported by at least one
Deputy and one Assistant. National Members must hold high-level prosecutorial or judicial
qualifications and be endowed with certain judicial powers. Notably, Article 19 lists the
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powers of the National Members, distinguishing between powers that can be exercised
without prior authorisation, and those requiring the agreement of the competent national
authority. Under the first category, National Members may directly contact and exchange
operational information and evidence with competent national and third-country authorities
and relevant Union bodies, open and manage cases in the CMS, organise coordination
meetings and coordination centres, participate in and facilitate joint investigation teams,
including by signing JIT agreements, participate in joint operational platforms and judicial
coordination platforms, ask competent national authorities to undertake investigations or
prosecutions, and assist in the identification and resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction. Under
the second one, with the agreement of the competent national authority, or without in urgent
cases, National Members may issue or execute requests for judicial cooperation or mutual
recognition instruments, including issuing the underlying order in accordance with national
law. Section V also introduces a compensation mechanism for the Member State whose
National Member is President of Eurojust, to cover the costs of reinforcing the National Desk
during the presidential mandate.
Section VI governs the College, composed of all National Members, which is responsible for
the operational functions of Eurojust and acts with full independence. The College deals with
casework, taking the appropriate operational decisions in relation to cases referred by Member
States or, where appropriate, opening cases on its own initiative. It elects the President and
Vice-President from among the National Members by a two-thirds majority for four-year
terms.
Chapter III – Operational matters
This chapter is the core operational chapter of the Regulation. It is divided into four sections
that cover the different modes and forms of Eurojust's operational activities.
Section I addresses Eurojust's primary operational function of facilitating judicial cooperation
and coordination. It sets out the way in which Eurojust supports cross-border investigations
and prosecutions, including organising coordination meetings and coordination centres,
facilitating judicial cooperation instruments, assisting in the resolution of conflicts of
jurisdiction and cross-checking information in relevant databases. It details the operational,
technical, analytical, legal and financial support Eurojust provides to joint investigation
teams, including assistance in drafting JIT agreements and managing Eurojust's financial
contribution to JIT activities. It also establishes judicial coordination platforms, which
Eurojust may set up at the request of two or more Member States or on its own initiative to
support particularly complex cross-border investigations, providing operational, technical,
analytical, legal and financial support to the platforms and their participants.
Section II governs operational activities carried out by Eurojust on its own initiative, in the
absence of a request from national authorities or the EPPO. It sets out the conditions and
procedures under which National Members may ask competent national authorities to
undertake or extend investigations, set up joint investigation teams, prioritise judicial
cooperation requests or take other justified measures. It also addresses Eurojust's capacity to
preserve, analyse and store evidence related to core international crimes, making it available
to Member States, third countries and international criminal courts and tribunals to facilitate
case-building. Section II further provides for the retention of operational knowledge derived
from Eurojust's casework, the development of guidelines and best practices, and the
establishment of Eurojust Centres of Expertise in criminal matters (ECE) to provide strategic,
analytical and operational support in priority crime areas.
Section III covers additional forms of operational support provided by Eurojust, including its
role as a contact point for third countries and international organisations under Regulation
EN 12 EN
(EU) 2019/816 on ECRIS-TCN, its support for victims of crime in cross-border criminal
proceedings, and its involvement, together with Europol and within their respective mandate,
in the EMPACT cycles, contributing to the preparation of strategic analyses and the
operational implementation of Union priorities for combating serious crime.
Section IV establishes the framework for the exchange of information between Eurojust and
national authorities. It requires each Member State to set up a Eurojust national coordination
system to ensure effective coordination between the National Desk and national authorities, to
include the contact points of relevant European networks and the national correspondent for
terrorism matters. It lays down the general obligation incumbent on competent national
authorities to exchange all information necessary for Eurojust's tasks, which includes specific
notification requirements for cases involving at least three Member States and for all terrorism
cases referred to judicial authorities.
This section also regulates the flow of operational information between Eurojust staff and the
Member States through the National Members, provides for secure digital communication
through a decentralised IT system based on e-CODEX, and establishes the CMS as the central
tool for processing operational personal data, managing cases, cross-checking information and
preserving evidence. Finally, it sets out the rules on access to the CMS at national level and
on the management of information by National Members and authorised staff.
Chapter IV – Processing of information
This chapter sets out the data protection framework governing the processing of personal data
by Eurojust. It establishes that both this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 apply to
Eurojust's data processing activities, with the operational data protection rules in this
Regulation taking precedence (as lex specialis) over the general rules of Regulation (EU)
2018/1725. This approach ensures legal clarity while preserving the general data protection
framework applicable to Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.
Chapter IV defines the categories of operational personal data that Eurojust may process. This
includes data on suspects, convicted persons, victims and other parties to proceedings,
together with, in exceptional and time-limited circumstances, additional data immediately
relevant to ongoing coordinated investigations. It lays down strict time limits for the storage
of operational personal data after the termination of a proceedings, and imposes requirements
in relation to automated review mechanisms to ensure compliance.
This chapter also sets out the rights of data subjects in relation to operational personal data,
including the right of access and the limitations on that right, the right to restriction of
processing, and the conditions under which access may be refused where it would jeopardise
an ongoing investigation or the safety of an individual. Under chapter 4, access to operational
personal data within Eurojust is restricted to National Members, authorised seconded national
experts, designated national system users and authorised Eurojust staff. It provides for the
designation of a Data Protection Officer by the Executive Board and establishes the rules on
notification in the event of a personal data breach. It concludes by allocating responsibility for
data accuracy and legal compliance either to Eurojust or to the Member States, depending on
the origin and subsequent handling of the data.
Chapter V – Relations with partners
This chapter governs Eurojust's external relations. It comprises three sections that cover
relations with Union bodies and agencies and international cooperation.
Section I sets out the common provisions applicable to all of Eurojust's cooperative relations.
It provides that Eurojust may conclude working arrangements with Union institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies, and with third-country authorities and organs of international
EN 13 EN
organisations, subject to prior consultation with the Commission. Such arrangements may not
constitute legal basis for the exchange of personal data and do not create legal obligations
incumbent on the Union or Member States. Section I also regulates the common hit/no-hit
system enabling designated Union agencies and bodies — in particular Europol, the EPPO,
OLAF, AMLA and the EUCA — to obtain indirect access to Eurojust's CMS through an
automated index, with the Commission empowered to adopt implementing acts specifying the
technical and functional specifications of the hit/no-hit system.
Section II governs Eurojust's relations with specific Union bodies, offices and agencies. It
establishes a privileged relationship with the European Judicial Network, which involves
hosting the Network's Secretariat within Eurojust's staff and handling coordination through
the national coordination system. It requires Eurojust to support a range of other networks and
bodies active in judicial cooperation, including the JITs Network, the European Judicial
Cybercrime Network and the European Judicial Organised Crime Network. It governs
Eurojust’s cooperation with Europol, which provides for a working arrangement setting out
practical cooperation modalities, mutual access to selected information stored in the
respective databases through the hit/no-hit system, and the possibility of establishing joint
operational platforms. It establishes the framework for cooperation with the EPPO, based on
mutual cooperation within their respective mandates, including an obligation to report any
criminal conduct falling within the EPPO's competence without undue delay, and the
secondment of an EPPO liaison officer to Eurojust. It also sets out Eurojust's cooperative
relations with OLAF, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, the Authority for Anti-
Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) and the EU Customs
Authority.
The proposal refers to the current legal framework governing the relationship between
Eurojust and the EPPO, reflecting the fact that the EPPO was established by means of
enhanced cooperation. This is without affecting any future developments that may arise from
changes in the participation of Member States in the EPPO, including in the context of the
envisaged accession of Hungary.
Section III governs international cooperation between Eurojust and third-country authorities
and international organisations. It provides for the adoption of a four-year cooperation
strategy and the posting of Eurojust liaison magistrates to third countries to facilitate judicial
cooperation. It establishes the conditions for the secondment of liaison prosecutors from third
countries and international organisations to Eurojust on the basis of international agreements,
including their access to the case management system. It allows for the hosting of contact
points from third countries at Eurojust to expedite judicial cooperation and the designation of
contact points in third countries and international organisations, where this is provided for in a
working arrangement between Eurojust and the third country authorities or organs of
international organization concerned, specifying that such contact points are not to have direct
access to the case management system or to operational personal data.
Chapter VI – Establishment and structure of the budget
This chapter describes the annual budgetary process, requiring the Administrative Director to
draw up a draft statement of estimates, which is reviewed by the Executive Board and
approved by the Management Board before being forwarded to the Commission by 31
January each year. The budget becomes definitive following final adoption of the general
budget of the Union by the budgetary authorities.
Provisions are set out relating to the structure, implementation and control of Eurojust's
budget. It specifies that the budget must be balanced in terms of revenue and expenditure,
with revenue sources including the Union contribution, voluntary Member State
EN 14 EN
contributions, third-country contributions and charges for publications and services. The
Administrative Director acts as authorising officer and is responsible for implementing the
budget in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The
chapter lays down detailed deadlines and procedures for the presentation of provisional and
final accounts, the submission of reports to the Court of Auditors, the Commission, the
European Parliament and the Council, and the grant of discharge by the European Parliament.
It provides for the adoption of financial rules by the Management Board, which must not
depart from the Framework Regulation for Decentralised Agencies without the Commission's
prior consent. The Anti-Fraud Framework, applying Regulation (EU, Euratom) No
883/201312, grants audit powers to the Court of Auditors and investigative powers to OLAF,
and recognises the EPPO's competence to investigate fraud affecting the Union's financial
interests.
Chapter VII – Staff
This chapter lays down the general provisions applicable to Eurojust's staff, establishing that
they work under the authority of the Administrative Director and are subject to the Staff
Regulations and Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union. It
defines 'authorised Eurojust staff' as members of staff designated to perform specific
operational, administrative or technical tasks and sets out their functions, which include
supporting National Desks, case management, operational analysis and a range of
administrative activities. Chapter VII also provides that Eurojust may make use of seconded
national experts and other staff not directly employed by it, and confirms that Protocol No 7
on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union applies to Eurojust and its staff.
Chapter VIII – Evaluation and reporting
This chapter establishes Eurojust's accountability and reporting framework. It requires
Eurojust to transmit its consolidated annual report to the European Parliament, the Council
and national parliaments by 1 May each year, and requires the President to appear annually
before the European Parliament and national parliaments at an interparliamentary committee
meeting. It requires Eurojust to contribute to the annual report on the protection of the Union's
financial interests under Article 325(5) TFEU, using reporting indicators defined by the
Commission. Chapter VIII also provides that the Commission and Member States may
request Eurojust's opinion on proposed legislative acts falling within the scope of Article 76
TFEU. A five-yearly independent evaluation of Eurojust's performance is required, as is an
assessment every ten years of whether the continuation of the Agency remains justified.
Chapter IX – General and final provisions
This chapter sets out the general framework for Eurojust's operation and the transitional
arrangements accompanying the entry into force of the Regulation. It provides that Regulation
(EC) No 1049/2001 on public access to documents applies to documents held by Eurojust,
requires Eurojust to adopt security rules for the protection of classified and sensitive non-
classified information based on Commission Decisions (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 and
2015/444, and confirms that Council Regulation No 1 on language arrangements applies. It
establishes a five-yearly evaluation process, lays down the liability regime governing
Eurojust's contractual and non-contractual liability, and provides for a Headquarters
Agreement with the Netherlands. Chapter IX repeals Regulation (EU) 2018/1727, while
ensuring full continuity of Eurojust as a legal entity, of its staff and appointed officials, of
12 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September
2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing
Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation
(Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, pp. 1–22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/883/oj).
EN 15 EN
ongoing operational activities and cases, of the case management system and data processed
thereunder, and of existing international agreements and working arrangements. It provides
that references in existing legal instruments to Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 are to be read as
references to this Regulation, and that the Regulation will enter into force on the twentieth
day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
EN 1 EN
2026/0164 (COD)
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and
repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1727
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular
Article 85 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,
Whereas:
(1) The European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) was
established by Council Decision 2002/187/JHA13 as a Union body with legal
personality, to stimulate and improve coordination and cooperation between
competent judicial authorities of the Member States in relation to serious crime and
organised crime with a cross-border dimension. Following the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon, Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the
Council14 was adopted on 14 November 2018, repealing and replacing Council
Decision 2002/187/JHA. Eurojust's legal framework has since been amended by
Regulation (EU) 2022/83815, Regulation (EU) 2023/213116 and Regulation (EU)
2025/208217.
(2) Article 85 TFEU provides that Eurojust's mission is to support and strengthen
coordination and cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting
authorities in relation to serious crime affecting two or more Member States or
requiring prosecution on common bases, on the basis of operations conducted and
information supplied by the Member States' authorities and by the European Union
13 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight
against serious crime (OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p. 1), as amended by Council Decision 2003/659/JHA (OJ L 245,
29.9.2003, p. 44) and Council Decision 2009/426/JHA (OJ L 138, 4.6.2009, p. 14). 14 Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the
European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), and replacing and repealing Council
Decision 2002/187/JHA (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 138). 15 Regulation (EU) 2022/838 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 amending
Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 as regards the preservation, analysis and storage at Eurojust of evidence relating
to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and related criminal offences (OJ L 148, 31.5.2022, p. 1). 16 Regulation (EU) 2023/2131 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 October 2023 amending
Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decision
2005/671/JHA, as regards digital information exchange in terrorism cases (OJ L, 2023/2131, 11.10.2023). 17 Regulation (EU) 2025/2082 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 October 2025 amending
Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 as regards the extension of the timeframe for the establishment of the Eurojust
case management system (OJ L, 2025/2082, 15.10.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2082/oj).
EN 2 EN
Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol)18. Article 85 TFEU further
requires the European Parliament and national parliaments to be involved in the
evaluation of Eurojust's activities.
(3) This Regulation aims to ensure that Eurojust remains fit for purpose in light of the
evolving criminal landscape and internal security architecture of the Union. It
therefore strengthens Eurojust's operational mandate, makes its governance structure
more agile, and adapts its legal framework to reflect developments in the nature and
scale of serious cross-border crime, technological advancements shaping both criminal
activity and judicial cooperation, and the broader evolution of the Union's area of
freedom, security and justice.
(4) Since the amendments necessary to achieve those objectives are substantial in number
and nature, Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 should, in the interests of clarity and legal
certainty, be repealed and replaced in its entirety by this Regulation in relation to the
Member States bound by it. Eurojust as established by this Regulation is the legal
successor of Eurojust as established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. The continuity of
agreements, working arrangements and other instruments governing Eurojust's
cooperation with third countries, international organisations and Union bodies should
be ensured, in accordance with their terms.
(5) Eurojust should support and strengthen coordination and cooperation between national
investigating and prosecuting authorities in cases where serious crime affects two or
more Member States or requires prosecution on common bases, including where it has
repercussions at Union level. The concept of repercussions at Union level should be
interpreted having regard to the increasingly transnational nature of serious crime and
the operational realities faced by national judicial authorities. Criminal activities
planned, organised or directed from outside the Union can generate significant security
and judicial repercussions within it, especially where such crimes present a hybrid
dimension. This is particularly manifest in cases involving terrorism planned or
financed abroad but carried out within the Union, trafficking in human beings and
migrant smuggling along routes originating outside the Union, drug trafficking by
organisations based in third countries supplying consumer markets within the Union,
and cyberattacks launched from outside the Union against critical infrastructure or
public authorities of Member States. Activities of criminal nature, such as money
laundering or organised crime, can also be linked to foreign information manipulation
and interference and disinformation campaigns, posing an additional risk to security in
the Union. Where such criminal conduct presents a nexus to the security, citizens or
fundamental interests of the Union, Eurojust may assist in the relevant investigations
and prosecutions, provided that the offences concerned fall within the scope of Annex
I to this Regulation and that any such assistance is provided in compliance with
applicable international agreements and Union data protection rules.
(6) In view of the shifting landscape of serious and cross-border crime, it is necessary to
update Eurojust's competence to ensure that the legal framework remains fit for
purpose and able to address the new realities of crime. The Union is confronted with
evolving and increasingly sophisticated criminal threats, including cyber-dependent
and cyber-enabled crime, and the terrorist use of digital infrastructures, which
18 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions
2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p.
53).
EN 3 EN
undermine democratic institutions, public security, critical infrastructure and societal
resilience. Other forms of serious crime, such as gender-based violence, particularly
where facilitated by digital technologies or involving cross-border elements, also have
a profound and lasting impact on victims, equality and fundamental rights. The
effective investigation and prosecution of such crimes require a coordinated Union
approach, enhanced cross-border judicial cooperation, and the strengthening of
common security and information integrity capabilities, in full respect of fundamental
rights and the rule of law. The list of forms of serious crime in respect of which
Eurojust is competent should therefore be updated to reflect those evolving criminal
threats, including violations of Union restrictive measures and gender-based violence,
and should be regularly reviewed to ensure that Eurojust's mandate remains relevant
and effective.
(7) Eurojust's tasks should be expanded and specified to reflect its role as a strategic,
analytical and proactive hub for cross-border judicial cooperation, supporting
competent national authorities through operational and analytical assistance. Its
involvement in Union policy-making and relevant strategic cycles should also be
enhanced, enabling Eurojust to bring its casework-based expertise to the definition of
Union priorities for combating serious crime. Particular emphasis should be placed on
Eurojust's role in facilitating and supporting the issuance and execution of judicial
cooperation and mutual recognition instruments, resolving conflicts of jurisdiction
between competent national authorities, supporting cross-border asset recovery,
collecting, preserving and storing evidence of core international crimes, and assisting
victims of serious crime in cross-border criminal proceedings.
(8) Eurojust should also develop and maintain specialised knowledge and expertise in
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including through the establishment of
Eurojust Centres of Expertise in criminal matters (ECE). ECE should cooperate
closely with any similar specialised structures established at Union level, including
Union Centres of Specialised Expertise and the EU Centre for the Protection of
Children from Child Sexual Abuse, within their respective mandates and ensuring
complementarity, to maximise the operational value of their combined expertise for
the benefit of the competent national authorities of the Member States.
(9) It is essential that Eurojust assumes a more prominent role in supporting victims of
serious crime in cross-border cases, in accordance with the Union's strategy in that
area and with Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of
crime19. That is of particular relevance in cases involving a large number of victims or
victims of mass fraud, especially online, with links to different Member States and in
cases potentially falling under multiple jurisdictions, as well as in cases involving
gender-based violence with a cross-border dimension. Eurojust should actively assist
Member States in upholding victims' rights in cross-border criminal proceedings,
including by facilitating the identification of victims, advising competent national
authorities on victims' procedural rights under national and Union law, and assisting
with access to compensation and restitution, including of property subject to freezing
and confiscation measures.
19 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57).
EN 4 EN
(10) Eurojust's competence in relation to the forms of serious crime listed in Annex I
should be clearly defined, covering not only those offences directly listed but also
criminal offences committed in order to procure the means of committing, to facilitate
or commit, or to ensure the impunity of those committing, the forms of serious crime
listed. In addition to the forms of crime explicitly listed, Eurojust should have the
flexibility to assist in other cases, within the limits of its mandate set out in this
Regulation, at the request of a competent national authority where there is a specific
operational need to do so.
(11) As the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) has been established by means of
enhanced cooperation, Council Regulation (EU) 2017/193920 is binding in its entirety
and directly applicable only to Member States that participate in that enhanced
cooperation. For the cases not falling within the competence of the EPPO, Eurojust
remains fully competent for the forms of serious crime listed in Annex I to this
Regulation. In light of their respective mandates, Eurojust should be able to operate in
cases concerning crimes falling within the EPPO’s remit where those cases involve
both participating and non-participating Member States, or where the EPPO decides
not act, at the request of the non-participating Member States or of the EPPO. Eurojust
should in any case remain competent to support cases concerning criminal offences
affecting the financial interests of the Union wherever the EPPO is not competent or
does not exercise its competence. The EPPO and Eurojust should develop close
operational cooperation within their respective mandates, as further governed by the
working arrangement between them.
(12) In accordance with Article 85 TFEU, Eurojust's tasks may include the initiation of
criminal investigations. The role of Eurojust should not be limited to reacting to
requests for assistance and operational support by Member States, but should extend to
proactively promoting a coordinated and strategic judicial response against serious
crime at Union level. Drawing on its position at the intersection of national
investigations and Union level’s cooperation, Eurojust should be able to use its
analytical capabilities and expertise to facilitate actions taken on its own initiative, in
cooperation with Member States and on the basis of information provided by them, by
Europol, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), established by Commission
Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom21, the EPPO and other Union bodies and
agencies. This should include involving Member States that might not initially have
been included in a case, as well as requesting Member States to open investigations or
undertake certain investigative measures, in particular where Eurojust identifies, on
the basis of its analysis, links between cases or other situations requiring judicial
coordination. To that end, National Members should be empowered to open cases on
their own initiative in the Eurojust case management system, thereby strengthening
Eurojust's capacity to drive coordination proactively while preserving the primacy of
competent national authorities in the conduct of investigations and prosecution.
(13) Consistency in the status, profile and powers of National Members across Member
States is essential to the effective and even application of this Regulation. Member
States should therefore be required to appoint National Members who are active
members of the public prosecution service or of the judiciary, and who possess the
20 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (the EPPO) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1). 21 Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-fraud
Office (OLAF) (notified under document number SEC(1999) 802) (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1999/352/oj).
EN 5 EN
qualifications required for appointment to high prosecutorial or judicial offices,
together with relevant practical experience of national legal systems and of
international judicial cooperation in criminal matters. National Members should, in
accordance with the law of their Member State, be entrusted at least with the powers
necessary to exercise fully their competences and perform effectively their tasks under
this Regulation, so that differences in national arrangements do not impede Eurojust’s
operations, in particular in urgent cases. Those powers should include at a minimum:
directly contacting and exchanging operational information and evidence with
competent national and third-country authorities and with relevant Union bodies,
offices and agencies; opening, registering and managing cases in the case management
system; organising coordination meetings and coordination centres; participating in,
and where appropriate initiating or facilitating the establishment and operation of, joint
investigation teams, including by signing an agreement establishing a joint
investigation team (JIT agreement); participating in joint operational platforms, ECE
and judicial coordination platforms; requesting competent national authorities to
undertake investigations or prosecutions or to take any other measure justified for the
purposes of an investigation or prosecution.
(14) In order to ensure timely action in cross-border cases, with the agreement of the
competent national authority, and in accordance with national law, National Members
should also be empowered to issue or execute requests for judicial cooperation or
mutual recognition, including investigative measures under Directive 2014/41/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council22, freezing and confiscation orders under
Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council23, and
European Production Orders or European Preservation Orders under Regulation (EU)
2023/1543 of the European Parliament and of the Council24. Where required under
national law and consistently with the status of the National Member as active member
of prosecutions services or of the judiciary, that empowerment should also cover the
issuing of the underlying national measures necessary to give legal effect to those
instruments in accordance with applicable Union and national law. They should
furthermore be able to request their asset recovery offices to provide information on
instrumentalities, proceeds or property which are or might become the object of a
freezing or confiscation order and to take immediate action until a freezing order is
issued, as provided for under Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament
and of the Council25, In urgent cases where it is not possible to identify or contact the
competent national authority in a timely manner, National Members should be
competent to take those measures in their own capacity in accordance with national
law, informing the competent national authority without undue delay. Measures taken
by National Members in such circumstances remain subject to the review of the
respective competent national authorities and courts, in accordance with applicable
national procedural law. Member States may grant additional powers to National
Members beyond those set out in this Regulation and shall notify the Commission and
the College accordingly. In order to ensure that National Members, their Deputies and,
22 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European
Investigation Order in criminal matters (OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, p. 1). 23 Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the
mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders (OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, p. 1). 24 Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 on European
Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal proceedings and for
the execution of custodial sentences following criminal proceedings (OJ L 191, 28.7.2023, p. 1). 25 Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on asset recovery
and confiscation (OJ L, 2024/1260, 2.5.2024).
EN 6 EN
where applicable, their Assistants can effectively exercise the powers conferred upon
them under this Regulation and act as fully empowered judicial cooperation authorities
within the Union's judicial cooperation architecture, Member States should appoint
them, as competent authority for the purposes of the applicable Union acts on judicial
cooperation in criminal matters, in particular those referred to in this Regulation.
When acting on its own initiative, Eurojust should be able to act through its National
Members, who may, giving their reasons, ask the competent authorities of their
Member States to undertake an investigation or prosecution in respect of specific acts,
or any other measure justified for the purposes of the investigation or prosecution. By
way of illustration, this could cover requests to issue the relevant instrument of judicial
cooperation, to carry out a financial investigation, to take pre-trial provisional
measures, to conduct a hearing of witnesses or experts, or to adopt measures aimed at
protecting victims and witnesses.
(15) It is necessary to provide Eurojust with a governance structure that enables it to
perform its tasks more effectively and efficiently, aligning it with the principles
applicable to Union agencies, in particular the 2012 Joint Statement of the European
Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on
decentralised agencies. At the same time, such an approach should take due account of
Eurojust’s specific nature as a judicial cooperation agency. Accordingly, the
independence of National Members and of the College in the exercise of their
operational functions should be safeguarded. Eurojust should consist of a management
structure, comprising the Management Board, the Executive Board and the
Administrative Director, and an operational structure, comprising the National
Members and the College, with the respective functions of those bodies clearly
delineated in this Regulation.
(16) In order for Eurojust to fulfil its mission and deploy its full potential in the fight
against serious cross-border crime, its operational dimension should be strengthened
by reducing the administrative burden on National Members, allowing them to focus
on casework. The College should be competent for operational matters, in keeping
with the unique character of the agency in handling judicial cases and interacting with
national authorities on the basis of mutual trust, while administrative and budgetary
responsibilities should be assumed by the Management Board and the Executive
Board. In the same spirit of simplification and of reducing the involvement of the
College in non-core tasks, the preparation and coordination of strategic reports,
guidance documents and other analytical outputs of relevance to practitioners should
increasingly be entrusted to Eurojust staff, including in the context of ECE.
(17) To improve quality and efficiency decision-making processes, a Management Board
should be established as an independent oversight body, and entrusted with adopting
the most high-level decisions regarding budget, strategic priorities and management
matters, including the single programming document, the annual budget, the staff rules
and the security rules. Member States will be fully involved in the governance of the
agency through their representation on the Management Board. In order to preserve
the separation between administrative and operational matters, Member States should
be precluded from appointing National Members as their representatives in the
Management Board, so that operational casework and administrative oversight are
entrusted to persons with the appropriate respective expertise. All parties represented
in the Management Board should make efforts to limit the turnover of their
representatives so as to ensure continuity of work, and should aim to achieve a gender-
balanced representation.
EN 7 EN
(18) An Executive Board should be established to prepare, inform and assist the work of
the Management Board and the preparation of its meetings. In addition, the Executive
Board should, in the cases provided for in this Regulation, take decisions in its own
capacity on matters relating to the day-to-day administration of Eurojust.
(19) While fully respecting the separation between administrative and operational
responsibilities, the views of the College should be taken into account where
administrative decisions are liable to have a significant impact on Eurojust’s
operational work, in particular as regards the definition of priority crime areas. For
that reason, in the matters listed in this Regulation, the Management Board and the
Executive Board, within their respective remits, should consult the College in advance
before taking a decision. To ensure that the views of the College are duly represented,
the President of Eurojust should participate in the Management Board and in the
Executive Board as representative of the College. Where reports, opinions, policy
papers and guidelines that the Executive Board may adopt are likely to be of direct
operational relevance, particularly where they may relate to ongoing investigations or
prosecutions or to other non-public strategic information, the College should be
consulted in advance.
(20) The Administrative Director should be the manager of Eurojust and should be
accountable to the Management Board. The Administrative Director should be
responsible for the implementation of the tasks assigned to Eurojust by this
Regulation, including ensuring the day-to-day administration of the agency,
implementing decisions adopted by the Management Board and the Executive Board,
and preparing and implementing the budget and the single programming document.
The Administrative Director should be appointed on the basis of merit and
documented administrative and managerial skills, as well as relevant competence and
experience. The Administrative Director is the legal representative of Eurojust.
(21) A President and a Vice-President of Eurojust should be elected by the College from
among the National Members for a term of office of four years, renewable once. When
a National Member is elected President, the Member State concerned should be able to
second, for the duration of the presidential mandate, an official with the necessary
qualifications and experience to reinforce the National Desk and ensure that it
continues to function effectively, as well as to apply for compensation from Eurojust's
budget. They may have the status of a Deputy or Assistant to the National Member
who has been elected President, or they may have a more administrative or technical
function, and each Member State should be able to determine its own requirements in
this regard. Since the compensation mechanism has a budgetary impact, implementing
powers to determine that mechanism should be conferred on the Council. While the
Administrative Director is the legal representative of Eurojust, the President of the
College represents Eurojust in political fora, in particular when presenting Eurojust's
activities, operational priorities and strategic considerations to Union institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies, third countries and international organisations.
(22) To ensure that Eurojust is able to fulfil its tasks without delay in urgent cases, each
National Desk should be available at all times to receive and process urgent requests.
To that end, arrangements should be made to ensure that at least one member of each
National Desk can be reached at any time, so that urgent requests concerning their
Member State are handled without delay.
(23) Each Member State should establish a Eurojust national coordination system to
support the work of its National Member and ensure coordination between the
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National Desk and the competent national authorities of that Member State. Those
systems should include the contact points of networks with which Eurojust maintains
relations, such as the Network of National Experts on Joint Investigation Teams (JITs
Network), the European network of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes established by Council Decision 2002/494/JHA26, the
European contact-point network against corruption established by Council Decision
2008/852/JHA27, the European Judicial Cybercrime Network, the European Judicial
Organised Crime Network, and the contact points designated under Council Decision
2007/845/JHA28, as well as the national correspondents for Eurojust, for terrorism
matters, for issues relating to the competence of the EPPO, and for the European
Judicial Network established by Council Decision 2008/976/JHA29. Member States
may decide that one or more of those tasks are to be performed by the same national
correspondent.
(24) For the purposes of stimulating and strengthening coordination and cooperation
between national investigating and prosecuting authorities, it is crucial that Eurojust
receives from national authorities the information necessary for the performance of its
tasks. Competent national authorities should inform their National Members without
undue delay of the setting up and results of joint investigation teams. They should also
inform National Members without undue delay of cases falling under the competence
of Eurojust that directly involve at least three Member States and for which requests
for or decisions on judicial cooperation have been transmitted to at least two Member
States. In certain circumstances, they should also inform National Members of
conflicts of jurisdiction, controlled deliveries and repeated difficulties encountered in
the execution of requests for judicial cooperation. As regards terrorist offences,
competent national authorities should inform their National Members of all relevant
criminal investigations as soon as they are referred to judicial authorities, regardless of
whether a known link to another Member State or third country exists, subject to the
conditions set out in this Regulation.
(25) One of the main challenges in combating serious cross-border crime is the timely
identification of links and overlaps between ongoing investigations and prosecutions
of criminal networks, in particular transnational organised crime networks involved in
drug trafficking, and investigations and prosecutions concerning financial or other
forms of serious fraud. In this context, the cross-checking of relevant information also
serves to promote the efficiency of judicial administration by preventing the
duplication of parallel proceedings before different national courts, thereby reducing
the risk of violating the ne bis in idem principle. Eurojust should systematically cross-
check information contained in relevant databases in order to identify links between
cross-border investigations and provide effective coordination and support to
competent national authorities. The availability of analysed datasets and cross-checked
information is essential for effective case-building and supports competent national
authorities in developing strategic prosecutorial approaches.
26 Council Decision 2002/494/JHA of 13 June 2002 setting up a European network of contact points in respect
of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (OJ L 167, 26.6.2002, p. 1). 27 Council Decision 2008/852/JHA of 24 October 2008 on a contact-point network against corruption (OJ L
301, 12.11.2008, p. 38). 28 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA of 6 December 2007 concerning cooperation between Asset Recovery
Offices of the Member States in the field of tracing and identification of proceeds from, or other property
related to, crime (OJ L 332, 18.12.2007, p. 103). 29 Council Decision 2008/976/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the European Judicial Network (OJ L 348,
24.12.2008, p. 130, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2008/976/oj).
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(26) The establishment and support of joint investigation teams is a cornerstone of
Eurojust's operational activities. Eurojust should provide operational, technical,
analytical, legal and financial support to joint investigation teams, including by
advising on the opportunity and legal requirements for setting up a joint investigation
team, assisting in the drafting and negotiation of JIT agreements, advising on
prosecutorial strategies and the implementation of operational actions and the
possibility to involve Europol. Financial support should be provided in accordance
with the applicable financial rules and may include simplified forms of funding, such
as lump sums, unit costs and flat-rate financing. Eurojust should also support the JITs
Network through its staff, in particular by organising its meetings and training
activities, collecting and analysing evaluations of individual joint investigation teams,
and managing Eurojust's financial support to those teams. Where appropriate for
efficient cross-border investigations, Eurojust should also facilitate and support the
participation of third countries, including EU candidate countries and potential
candidates, in JITs.
(27) To support particularly complex cross-border investigations or prosecutions, or to
enhance judicial cooperation in addressing specific forms of serious crime, Eurojust
should be able to establish judicial coordination platforms at the request of two or
more Member States or on its own initiative with the agreement of the Member States
concerned. Those semi-permanent structured cooperation mechanisms should bring
together representatives of the competent national authorities, including members of
the National Desks, and be supported by authorised Eurojust staff. They should
facilitate the synchronisation of investigations and prosecutions across multiple
jurisdictions, help prevent potential conflicts of jurisdiction, enable timely sharing of
information and evidence relevant to judicial authorities, support the development and
implementation of common prosecution strategies, and provide specialised assistance
to competent national authorities. Information processed in the framework of a judicial
coordination platform should be handled in accordance with this Regulation and stored
in the case management system. The establishment of judicial coordination platforms
builds on the successful operational experience of the International Centre for the
Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA), hosted by Eurojust,
which has demonstrated the value of a structured, sustained and multi-jurisdictional
judicial cooperation mechanism in addressing the most serious crimes.
(28) The capacity for Eurojust to collect, preserve, analyse and store information that may
be used as evidence in criminal proceedings is of the highest importance in the field of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of aggression and related
criminal offences. The Core International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED),
established and operated by Eurojust, has demonstrated the unique value of a
centralised and secure mechanism for preserving and cross-checking evidence of core
international crimes from multiple jurisdictions, supporting national prosecutorial
authorities and facilitating the work of international criminal courts and tribunals. For
the purposes of the interpretation of this Regulation, and without affecting any further
development of international law, the notion of core international crimes should be
understood as encompassing the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and the crime of aggression, as defined in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
(29) This Regulation strengthens Eurojust's mandate to preserve, analyse and store
evidence, providing a legal framework for the further development of CICED. Where
necessary, that capacity should be extended to other forms of serious crime within
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Eurojust's mandate, in particular organised crime, to support specific investigations
and prosecutions for which a joint investigation team or a judicial coordination
platform has been established. Particularly in this respect, Eurojust and Europol should
cooperate closely within their respective mandates, avoiding duplication of effort, as
regards the processing and analysis of information in the fight against organised crime.
(30) The prevention and resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States is a
key function of Eurojust, complementing the framework established by Council
Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA30. That Framework Decision established
obligations for competent authorities of Member States to enter into direct
consultations where there are reasonable grounds to believe that parallel proceedings
are being conducted in different Member States, and provides for the involvement of
Eurojust where those consultations do not lead to a consensus. Building on that
framework, Eurojust should play a key role in assisting competent national authorities
in the identification, prevention and resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction, including by
identifying parallel or linked proceedings, providing legal advice on the application of
the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, issuing non-binding reasoned opinions or
recommendations on the resolution of such conflicts, and facilitating the transfer of
proceedings to the jurisdiction best placed to prosecute. That function is essential to
prevent impunity, avoid duplicative proceedings and ensure the efficient use of
judicial resources across Member States.
(31) The tracing, freezing, confiscation and recovery of criminal assets is a priority area for
Eurojust's operational support. Eurojust should assist Member States in cross-border
asset recovery cases, including in relation to post-conviction and non-conviction-based
confiscation, and should cooperate closely with Asset Recovery Offices designated in
accordance with Council Decision 2007/845/JHA and other competent authorities to
maximise the effectiveness of financial investigations and asset recovery proceedings,
including through the use of the instruments provided for in Directive (EU)
2024/1260.
(32) Eurojust should, in complementarity with Europol and within their respective
mandates, support the competent authorities of the Member States in the context of
digital investigations and access to electronic evidence. Given the ever growing
importance of electronic evidence in cross-border criminal investigations, there is a
need for Eurojust to serve as a dedicated operational and knowledge hub for judicial
authorities navigating the complex legal landscape governing cross-border access to
data, including as regards direct requests to service providers under Regulation (EU)
2023/154331. In that context, Eurojust and Europol should build on and further develop
their established cooperation in the field of electronic evidence, including through the
SIRIUS project, which provides judicial and law enforcement practitioners with
knowledge, tools and training on cross-border access to electronic evidence.
(33) Communication between the competent national authorities and Eurojust should be
carried out through a secure decentralised IT system based on e-CODEX access
points, enabling the reliable and secure cross-border exchange of information. The
Commission should be responsible for the creation, maintenance and development of
30 Council Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on prevention and settlement of conflicts
of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings (OJ L 328, 15.12.2009, p. 42). 31 Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 on European
Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal proceedings and for
the execution of custodial sentences following criminal proceedings (OJ L 191, 28.7.2023, p. 1).
EN 11 EN
reference implementation software which Member States and Eurojust may choose to
apply as their back-end system, free of charge. Eurojust should establish a case
management system for the processing of operational personal data, enabling the
management and coordination of investigations and prosecutions, the secure exchange
of information, the cross-checking of data to identify links between cases, and the
preservation and analysis of evidence. Access to the case management system should
be strictly limited to authorised persons within the limits provided for in this
Regulation. The decentralised IT system established under this Regulation is the same
technical infrastructure as referred to under Regulation (EU) 2023/2844 of the
European Parliament and of the Council32, Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 of the
European Parliament and of the Council, and Regulation (EU) 2024/3011 of the
European Parliament and of the Council33, which rely on the same network of e-
CODEX access points and reference implementation software. This Regulation should
not affect the use of that common decentralised IT system for the communication,
facilitation and exchanges in relation to judicial cooperation instruments under those
Regulations, thereby ensuring coherence and interoperability across the Union's digital
judicial cooperation architecture and avoiding the duplication of technical
infrastructure across different legal instruments.
(34) Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 sets out
harmonised rules for the protection and the free movement of personal data processed
for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and
the prevention of threats to public security. In order to ensure the same level of
protection for natural persons through legally enforceable rights throughout the Union
and to prevent divergences hampering the exchange of personal data between Eurojust
and competent authorities in Member States, the rules for the protection and the free
movement of operational personal data processed by Eurojust should be consistent
with Directive (EU) 2016/680. This Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the
European Parliament and of the Council35 should apply to the processing of personal
data by Eurojust, with the specific data protection rules of this Regulation taking
precedence as lex specialis over the general rules of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
Those specific rules are consistent with the principles underpinning Regulation (EU)
2018/1725, as well as with the provisions of that Regulation relating to independent
supervision, remedies, liability and penalties.
(35) All processing of personal data by Eurojust within the framework of its competence
and for the fulfilment of its tasks should be considered as processing of operational
personal data. The processing of operational personal data by Eurojust should be
32 Regulation (EU) 2023/2844 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on the
digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal
matters, and amending certain acts in the field of judicial cooperation (OJ L, 2023/2844, 27.12.2023). 33 Regulation (EU) 2024/3011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 on the
transfer of proceedings in criminal matters (OJ L, 2024/3011, 18.12.2024). 34 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA
(OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89). 35 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and
Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).
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strictly limited to the categories of data listed in Annex II and should be subject to
strict time limits for storage linked to the conclusion of proceedings, acquittals and
final judicial decisions, with automated review mechanisms to ensure compliance. In
order to support Eurojust's expanded analytical and strategic functions, this Regulation
provides for the possibility of retaining operational personal data for a longer period
where strictly necessary for analytical and strategic purposes, subject to clear
conditions and robust data protection safeguards, and within a clear and legally certain
framework consistent with the applicable Union data protection rules. As Eurojust also
processes administrative personal data unrelated to criminal investigations, the
processing of such data should be subject to the general rules of Regulation (EU)
2018/1725. The data protection provisions of this Regulation do not affect the
applicable rules on the admissibility of personal data as evidence in criminal pre-trial
and court proceedings. Data processed by Eurojust should be stored in a European
cloud infrastructure so as to progressively ensure sovereign digital infrastructures and
cloud capabilities.
(36) The protection of the rights and freedoms of data subjects requires a clear attribution
of responsibilities for data protection under this Regulation. Member States should be
responsible for the accuracy of data they have transmitted to Eurojust and which have
been processed unaltered by Eurojust, for keeping such data up to date and for the
legality of transmitting those data to Eurojust. Eurojust should be responsible for the
accuracy of data provided by other data suppliers or resulting from its own analyses or
data collection activities. Eurojust should ensure that personal data are processed fairly
and lawfully, collected and processed for specific purposes, adequate, relevant and not
excessive in relation to those purposes, stored no longer than necessary, and processed
in a manner that ensures appropriate security and confidentiality.
(37) Appropriate safeguards for the storage of operational personal data for archiving
purposes in the public interest or for statistical purposes should be included in
Eurojust's rules of procedure. Where operational personal data are transmitted or
supplied to Eurojust by a Member State, the competent authority, the National
Member or the national correspondent for Eurojust should have the right to request the
rectification or erasure of those data in accordance with the applicable provisions of
this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
(38) A data subject should be able to exercise the right of access to operational personal
data relating to him or her which are processed by Eurojust, in accordance with
Regulation (EU) 2018/1725. Such a request may be made at reasonable intervals, free
of charge, to Eurojust or to the national supervisory authority in the Member State of
the data subject's choice. Limitations to the right of access may apply where disclosure
would jeopardise an ongoing investigation or the safety of an individual, in accordance
with the conditions established by this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
Access to operational personal data within Eurojust should be strictly limited to
National Members, their Deputies, authorised seconded national experts, designated
national system users and authorised Eurojust staff, within the limits provided for in
this Regulation.
(39) The person designated as Data Protection Officer of Eurojust should possess the
requisite expert knowledge in data protection law and practice, commensurate with the
data processing operations carried out by Eurojust and the level of protection required
for the personal data processed.
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(40) In order to facilitate cooperation between the EDPS and national supervisory
authorities, the EDPS and national supervisory authorities should regularly meet
within the European Data Protection Board, in accordance with the rules on
coordinated supervision laid down in Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, without affecting
the independence of the EDPS or to its responsibility for supervision of Eurojust with
regard to data protection.
(41) As the first recipient on the territory of the Union of personal data provided by or
retrieved from third countries or international organisations, Eurojust should be
responsible for the accuracy of such data and should take all reasonable measures to
verify their accuracy upon receipt or when making them available to other authorities.
In exceptional cases, Eurojust should be able to extend the storage deadlines for
operational personal data in order to achieve its objectives, subject to the principle of
purpose limitation and following careful consideration of all interests at stake,
including those of the data subjects, and subject to oversight by the EDPS. Under the
applicable legal framework on data protection, Eurojust is subject to the general rules
on contractual and non-contractual liability applicable to Union institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies.
(42) Eurojust should maintain privileged relations with the European Judicial Network in
criminal matters, based on consultation and complementarity, in particular through the
members of each National Desk designated as contact points for the European Judicial
Network. The complementarity between the European Judicial Network and Eurojust
should be exercised in accordance with their respective mandates, with Eurojust being
competent for complex cases involving serious cross-border crime requiring active
coordination and possibly a joint prosecutorial strategy among multiple jurisdictions.
A system for the allocation of cases between Eurojust and the European Judicial
Network (EJN) should ensure that Eurojust focuses its resources on the most complex
cross-border investigations of serious crimes, characterised in particular by parallel
investigations or prosecutions in different Member States, conflicts of jurisdiction, the
involvement of more than two legal frameworks or judicial authorities, links with
organised crime or exceptional operational urgency or strategic importance at Union
level.
(43) Among decisions regarding the establishment of Eurojust's internal structures, the
Management Board should determine the institutional and administrative relationships
between Eurojust and the networks it hosts, in particular the networks set up by
Council Decisions 2002/494/JHA, 2007/845/JHA and 2008/852/JHA and by the
Council conclusions establishing the European Judicial Organised Crime Network of
14 June 2024.
(44) Eurojust should establish and maintain close cooperation with Europol, with a view to
ensuring the coherent and coordinated exercise of their respective mandates and
avoiding duplication of effort, and to establishing a continuum between law
enforcement intelligence and judicial coordination that enables the swift translation of
criminal intelligence into timely and well-coordinated judicial investigations and
prosecutions. The combination of Europol's criminal intelligence and analytical
capabilities and Eurojust's judicial coordination functions allows the competent
authorities to detect cross-border criminal patterns more quickly and to respond
effectively to emerging criminal threats. A working arrangement, subject to regular
review and updated upon request of and in consultation with the Commission, should
set out the practical modalities of that cooperation and consolidate established
cooperation practices, including the practical arrangements for mutual indirect access
EN 14 EN
to information respectively held by Eurojust and Europol through an optimised
automated hit/no-hit system. That system should be optimised through technical
measures to improve cross-checking capabilities. The possibility of establishing joint
operational platforms with the consent of the competent national authorities should
also be provided for, as should the participation of Europol representatives in meetings
of the College where matters of common interest are discussed, so as to enhance
operational discussions by bringing additional expertise and information to case-
related deliberations. Any access by Europol to data held by Eurojust should be
limited by technical means to information falling within the respective mandates of
those Union agencies. Eurojust and Europol should keep each other informed of any
activity involving the financing of joint investigation teams.
(45) Eurojust should establish and maintain a close relationship with the EPPO, based on
mutual cooperation within their respective mandates and competences. Eurojust
should be entrusted with an explicit mandate to provide reinforced support in cases
falling within the EPPO's competence, at the request of the EPPO, in particular in
cases which require investigative measures or other forms of cooperation in Member
States which do not participate in enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the
EPPO or in cases involving third countries or requiring coordination between
investigations conducted by the EPPO and those conducted by competent national
authorities of Member States that do not participate on the EPPO. Stronger
coordination between the two bodies should help avoid duplication of effort, facilitate
cooperation with non-participating Member States and third countries, and support
comprehensive case handling in investigations with a cross-border dimension. The
participation of EPPO representatives in meetings of the College where matters of
common interest are discussed should be provided for, so as to enhance operational
coordination and mutual awareness. The automated hit/no-hit system between Eurojust
and the EPPO should also be optimised through technical measures to improve
information exchange. Eurojust should without undue delay report to the EPPO any
criminal conduct in respect of which the EPPO could exercise its competence and
should notify the Member States, unless the EPPO considers that such a notification
would affect the effectiveness or the confidentiality of its investigations. The practical
arrangements for cooperation between Eurojust and the EPPO should be laid down in
a working arrangement, which should be subject to regular review.
(46) To contribute to effective protection of the Union's financial interests, Eurojust should
cooperate with the other anti-fraud actors involved in the protection of the Union’s
financial interests, such as the EPPO, Europol, OLAF, AMLA and the EU Customs
Authority to addresses matters relevant to the coordination of anti-fraud activities,
such as facilitating the exchange of information, the undertaking of coordinated or
joint actions, exchanging on emerging criminal trends in activities affecting the
financial interests of the Union, the sharing of best practices including matters relating
to information technology security and development, establishing criteria for common
reporting or coordinating training activities or general developments concerning the
anti-fraud architecture of the Union. Being a relevant actor in the protection of the
Union financial interests, Eurojust should participate actively in such joint cooperation
activities.
(47) To ensure that the report to be submitted each year by the Commission pursuant to
Article 325(5) TFUE includes a comprehensive overview of the measures taken to
counter fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests, Eurojust should contribute to
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the preparation of that report. That contribution should cover the results achieved and
the activities carried out to that end by Eurojust.
(48) Eurojust should be able to exchange personal data with Union institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies to the extent necessary for the fulfilment of its tasks, with full
respect for the protection of privacy and other fundamental rights and freedoms.
Eurojust should enhance its cooperation with competent authorities of third countries
and organs of international organisations on the basis of a cooperation strategy drawn
up every four years in consultation with the Commission. Working arrangements
between Eurojust and the competent authorities of a third country may take the form
of strategic working arrangements, which are independent from but often precede an
international agreement concluded by the Union pursuant to Article 218 TFEU, or of
arrangements implementing such an international agreement. Where relevant,
cooperation commitments with financial implications should be included in
international agreements concluded by the Union with third countries to ensure
adequate resourcing of operational cooperation. In order to facilitate cooperation and
build mutual trust with international partners, the legal framework governing the
posting of liaison magistrates to third countries should be clarified, including as
regards their tasks, data protection obligations, and the conditions under which they
may exchange operational personal data with the competent authorities of the third
country. Where Eurojust identifies an operational need for cooperation with a third
country or an international organisation, it should be able to draw the attention of the
Commission to the need for an adequacy decision or a recommendation for the
opening of negotiations on an international agreement pursuant to Article 218 TFEU.
(49) Even in the absence of an international agreement, Eurojust should establish and
maintain operational relations with third countries considered to be of strategic
importance for judicial cooperation, in particular EU candidate countries and potential
candidates, where EU-funded projects aim to provide operational support and
assistance, equipping those partners with EU judicial cooperation and working
methods. To that end, resident contact points from priority third countries should be
hosted by Eurojust on the basis of a working arrangement and following appointment
by the Management Board, providing reliable and stable channels for judicial
exchanges and reducing delays in the handling of cooperation requests. The role of
those contact points is to expedite, coordinate or facilitate the execution of requests for
judicial cooperation, to support communication and coordination between Eurojust,
Member States and the competent authorities of the third country concerned, and to
facilitate the participation of those authorities in coordination meetings and joint
investigation teams supported by Eurojust. The access of those contact points to the
Eurojust case management system should be strictly limited to data relevant to the
performance of their functions, and any exchange of operational personal data should
only take place on the basis of the derogations for specific situations provided for in
this Regulation. Specific organisational arrangements should be made to ensure that
the integration of such actors within Eurojust is accompanied by appropriate
information security and data protection safeguards.
(50) The participation of liaison prosecutors seconded to Eurojust from third countries or
from international organisations in meetings of the College where matters of common
interest are discussed should be provided for, so as to strengthen operational
relationships and facilitate direct exchanges between practitioners.
(51) To guarantee the full autonomy and independence of Eurojust, it should be granted an
autonomous budget with revenue coming essentially from a contribution from the
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general budget of the Union, except as regards the salaries and emoluments of the
National Members, Deputies and Assistants, which are borne by their respective
Member State. The Union budgetary procedure should be applicable as far as the
Union contribution and other subsidies chargeable to the general budget of the Union
are concerned. The auditing of accounts should be undertaken by the Court of
Auditors and approved by the Committee on Budgetary Control of the European
Parliament. Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of
the Council36 should apply to Eurojust.
(52) In order to combat fraud, corruption and other unlawful activities affecting the
financial interests of the Union or serious matters relating to the discharge of
professional duties constituting a dereliction of the obligations of officials and other
servants of the Union liable to result in disciplinary or, as the case may be, criminal
proceedings, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and
of the Council37, as amended, should apply to Eurojust without restriction, and OLAF
should be able to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and
inspections. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the EPPO is competent to
investigate and prosecute fraud and other illegal activities affecting the financial
interests of the Union as provided for in Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European
Parliament and of the Council38.
(53) The College should be provided with detailed and comprehensive expert advice on
fundamental rights that may be affected by the agency's activities. To that end,
Eurojust staff should include at least one expert responsible for supporting Eurojust in
safeguarding respect for fundamental rights in all its activities and tasks, in particular
its operational activities, including the exchange of personal data with third countries.
It should be possible to designate a member of Eurojust's staff who has received
specialist training in fundamental rights law and practice. That designated expert
should cooperate closely with the Data Protection Officer within the scope of their
respective competences. To the extent that data protection matters are concerned, full
responsibility should lie with the Data Protection Officer.
(54) In order to increase the transparency and democratic oversight of Eurojust, it is
necessary to provide a mechanism pursuant to Article 85(1) TFEU for the joint
evaluation of Eurojust's activities by the European Parliament and national
parliaments. That evaluation should take place in the framework of an
interparliamentary committee meeting, with the participation of members of the
competent committees of the European Parliament and of the national parliaments, and
should fully respect Eurojust's independence as regards actions to be taken in specific
operational cases and as regards the obligation of discretion and confidentiality. It is
appropriate to evaluate the application of this Regulation regularly. Not later than five
years after the entry into force of this Regulation, and every five years thereafter, the
36 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024
on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024). 37 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September
2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing
Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation
(Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1), as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/2030
of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 317, 23.11.2016, p. 1) and Regulation (EU, Euratom)
2020/2223 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 49). 38 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight
against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).
EN 17 EN
Commission should evaluate Eurojust's performance in relation to its objectives,
mandate, tasks, governance and location, including an assessment every ten years of
whether the continuation of the Agency remains justified.
(55) Eurojust's functioning should be transparent in accordance with Article 15(3) TFEU.
Specific provisions on how the right of public access to documents is ensured should
be adopted by the Management Board. The transparency obligation should apply to
Eurojust in a manner that does not jeopardise the obligation of confidentiality in its
operational work. Administrative inquiries conducted by the European Ombudsman
should respect that obligation. In order to increase Eurojust's transparency vis-à-vis
Union citizens and to strengthen its accountability, Eurojust should publish on its
website a list of the members of its Management Board and Executive Board and,
where appropriate, summaries of the outcomes of the meetings of the Management
Board, while respecting applicable data protection requirements.
(56) The necessary provisions regarding accommodation for Eurojust in the Netherlands,
where it has its seat, and the specific rules applicable to Eurojust staff and members of
their families should be laid down in a Headquarters Agreement between Eurojust and
the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Given that this Regulation establishes a Management
Board that was not provided for under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727, the Headquarters
Agreement should be amended or replaced to ensure that its personal scope covers
members of the Management Board and their families. The same should apply, where
appropriate, to resident contact points posted from third countries and their families.
The host Member State should provide the best possible conditions to ensure the
effective functioning of Eurojust, including multilingual, European-oriented schooling
and appropriate transport connections, so as to attract high-quality human resources
from as wide a geographical area as possible.
(57) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the setting up of an entity responsible
for supporting and strengthening coordination and cooperation between the judicial
authorities of the Member States in relation to serious crime affecting two or more
Member States or requiring prosecution on common bases, cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of the
action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU. In accordance with the
principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.
(58) [In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 21 on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed
to the TEU and to the TFEU, and without affecting Article 4 of that Protocol, Ireland
is not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not bound by it or subject to
its application.] OR [In accordance with Article 3 of Protocol No 21 on the position of
the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice,
annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, Ireland has notified, by letter of [date], its wish
to take part in the adoption and application of this Regulation.]
(59) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark,
annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of
this Regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application.
(60) The EDPS was consulted in accordance with Article 42 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725
and delivered an opinion on [date].
EN 18 EN
(61) This Regulation fully respects the fundamental rights and freedoms and observes the
principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, in particular the right to the protection of personal data and the right
to privacy as protected by Articles 8 and 7 of the Charter respectively, as well as by
Article 16 TFEU, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial under Article 47 of
the Charter, the presumption of innocence under Article 48 of the Charter, and the
rights of victims of crime.
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
EN 19 EN
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS, OBJECTIVES AND TASKS
Article 1
Subject matter
1. This Regulation establishes the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice
Cooperation ('Eurojust').
2. Eurojust as established by this Regulation shall replace and succeed the agency
established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1727.
3. This Regulation lays down rules concerning the structure, operation, field of action
and tasks of Eurojust.
4. Eurojust shall support and strengthen coordination and cooperation between national
investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime which Eurojust
is competent to deal with in accordance with Article 5, where that crime affects two
or more Member States, or requires prosecution on common bases, including where
it has repercussions at Union level.
Article 2
Legal status
1. Eurojust shall be an agency of the Union and shall have legal personality.
2. In each of the Member States, Eurojust shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity
accorded to legal persons under national law. It may, in particular, acquire and
dispose of movable and immovable property and be party to legal proceedings.
3. Eurojust shall be represented by an Administrative Director.
Article 3
Seat
The seat of Eurojust shall be in The Hague, the Netherlands.
Article 4
Tasks
Eurojust shall perform the following tasks:
(a) assist the competent national authorities and competent organs of international
organisations in ensuring the best possible coordination of investigations and
prosecutions, including by facilitating and supporting the issuing and execution
of requests for, and decisions on, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, in
particular those based on instruments giving effect to the principle of mutual
recognition;
EN 20 EN
(b) receive, collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information, including
operational personal data, to the extent necessary for the performance of its
tasks, with competent national authorities of the Member States, Union
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, third countries, international
organisations, and relevant private parties, in accordance with this Regulation
and applicable data protection rules;
(c) cross-check information stored in relevant databases to identify links between
cross-border investigations and inform the Member States concerned, or where
appropriate, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), thereof;
(d) collect, preserve, analyse and store evidence of core international crimes and
related criminal offences and facilitate the exchange of such evidence with, or
its direct availability to, competent national authorities of the Member States
and third countries, and competent organs of international criminal courts and
tribunals;
(e) support competent national authorities in activities aimed at tracing, freezing,
confiscating and recovering criminal assets in cross-border cases, including
post-conviction and non-conviction-based confiscation in proceedings in
criminal matters;
(f) support competent national authorities of the Member States in establishing
and maintaining cooperative relations with third countries and international
organisations with a view to facilitating judicial cooperation in criminal
matters;
(g) cooperate closely with Union bodies, offices and agencies, in particular:
i. with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
(Europol), including through mutual involvement and coordination of
operational activities;
ii. with the EPPO, by supporting its investigations for which investigative
measures or any other cooperation are required in Member States which
do not participate in enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the
EPPO39 or third countries, and cases requiring coordination between
investigations conducted by the EPPO and those conducted by competent
authorities of the Member States not participating in the EPPO, including
through support to the setting up of joint investigation teams;
iii. with other Union bodies, offices and agencies which, within their
respective mandates, gather information relevant to the performance of
Eurojust’s tasks;
(h) cooperate with, coordinate and support networks and bodies active in judicial
cooperation in criminal matters, including by hosting them where appropriate;
(i) assist competent national authorities in upholding the rights of victims in the
context of cross-border criminal proceedings;
(j) collect and analyse specialised knowledge, in particular through the
examination of information stored in the Eurojust case management system and
39 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office ('the EPPO Regulation') (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p.
1).
EN 21 EN
relevant national, international and Union case-law, and by developing best
practices and providing advice within its mandate, where appropriate in the
context of Eurojust Centres of Expertise in criminal matters (ECE);
(k) provide, upon request, analytical findings and technical advice based on its
casework expertise to Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies;
(l) provide, where necessary, technical, operational, analytical, legal, financial and
strategic assistance in matters within its mandate;
(m) cooperate in a structured way and on a regular basis, including by concluding
bilateral or multilateral working arrangements governing the modalities of such
cooperation, with the anti-fraud actors involved in the protection of the Union’s
financial interests, such as the EPPO, Europol, OLAF, AMLA and the EU
Customs Authority.
Article 5
Competence of Eurojust
1. Eurojust shall be competent in respect of the following offences, including where
such offences are committed in connection with, or form part of, activities having a
hybrid dimension:
(a) the forms of serious crime listed in Annex I;
(b) criminal offences for which the EPPO is competent;
(c) criminal offences committed in order to procure the means of committing, to
facilitate or commit, or to ensure the impunity of those committing, the serious
crimes listed in Annex I.
2. Eurojust shall act, at the request of a competent national authority, a competent organ
of an international organisation, the EPPO within the limits of its competence, or on
its own initiative.
3. In respect of forms of crime other than those listed in Annex I, Eurojust may assist
investigations and prosecutions at the request of a competent national authority of the
Member States.
4. In relation to criminal offences for which the EPPO is competent, Eurojust shall
exercise its competence:
(a) in cases involving Member States which do not participate in enhanced
cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO, at the request of those Member
States or of the EPPO;
(b) in cases involving Member States which participate in enhanced cooperation
on the establishment of the EPPO, where the EPPO has decided not to exercise
its competence.
5. Eurojust shall be competent to assist the EPPO also in cases involving third countries
or where coordination is required between investigations carried out by the EPPO
and investigations carried out by competent authorities of the Member States which
do not participate in enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO.
6. Eurojust may assist with investigations and prosecutions affecting:
(a) at least two Member States;
EN 22 EN
(b) one Member State, where the case has repercussions at Union level;
(c) at least one Member State and a third country or an international organisation,
provided that any of the following conditions apply:
i. an adequacy decision was adopted in accordance with Article 36 of
Directive (EU) 2016/680, or an international agreement, a cooperation
agreement or a working arrangement has been concluded with that third
country or international organisation;
ii. a contact point has been designated in that third country or international
organisation; or
iii. there is an essential interest in providing such assistance;
(d) two or more third countries or international organisations, where the case may
have repercussions at Union level, provided that an adequacy decision was
adopted in accordance with Article 36 of Directive (EU) 2016/680, an
international agreement, a cooperation agreement or working arrangement has
been concluded with each of them, and subject to prior approval by the
College.
EN 23 EN
CHAPTER II
ORGANISATION OF EUROJUST
SECTION I
STRUCTURE
Article 6
Structure of Eurojust
1. Eurojust shall consist of a management structure and an operational structure.
2. The management structure shall comprise:
(a) a Management Board, which shall exercise the functions set out in Article 10;
(b) an Executive Board, which shall exercise the functions set out in Article 13;
(c) an Administrative Director, who shall exercise the responsibilities set out in
Article 15.
3. The operational structure shall comprise:
(a) the National Members, who shall exercise the powers set out in Article 18;
(b) the College, which shall exercise the powers set out in Article 20.
SECTION II
THE MANAGEMENT BOARD
Article 7
Composition of the Management Board
1. The Management Board shall be composed of one representative from each Member
State and one representative of the Commission.
2. The Management Board shall also include:
(a) The President of Eurojust, without the right to vote;
(b) The Administrative Director, without the right to vote.
3. Each member of the Management Board shall have an alternate. The alternate shall
represent the member concerned in their absence. Neither the Member of the
Management Board nor their alternate representing a Member State shall be the
National Member or any other member of the National Desk of that Member State
seconded to Eurojust.
4. Members of the Management Board and their alternates shall be appointed on the
basis of their expertise in the field of criminal justice, taking into account their
relevant level of seniority and experience, including in managerial, administrative
and budgetary matters.
EN 24 EN
5. All parties represented in the Management Board shall endeavour to minimise
turnover of the representatives, in order to ensure continuity of the Board’s work. All
parties shall aim to achieve gender balance in the Management Board.
6. The term of office for members and their alternates shall be four years, renewable
once.
Article 8
Chairperson of the Management Board
1. The Management Board shall elect a Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson from
among members with voting rights by a two-thirds majority of those members. The
Deputy Chairperson shall automatically replace the Chairperson where the latter is
prevented from attending their duties.
2. The term of office of the Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson shall be four
years, renewable once. Where their membership of the Management Board ends at
any time during their term of office, their term of office shall automatically expire on
that date.
Article 9
Meetings of the Management Board
1. The Chairperson shall convene the meetings of the Management Board.
2. The President and Administrative Director of Eurojust shall take part in the
deliberations, without the right to vote.
3. The Management Board shall hold at least two meetings per year. In addition, it shall
meet on the initiative of its Chairperson, at the request of the Commission, or at the
request of at least one third of its members.
4. The Management Board may invite any person whose opinion may be of interest to
attend its meetings as an observer.
5. Where necessary, the Management Board may hold joint meetings with the
Management Board of Europol.
6. The members of the Management Board and their alternates may, subject to the
Rules of Procedure of the Management Board, be assisted at the meetings by
advisers or experts.
7. Where a matter of confidentiality or conflict of interests is on the agenda, the
Management Board shall discuss and decide on that matter without the presence of
the member concerned. Detailed rules for the application of this provision may be
laid down in the rules of procedure.
Article 10
Functions of the Management Board
1. The Management Board shall provide the strategic orientations for Eurojust's
activities and shall, in particular:
EN 25 EN
(a) adopt the draft single programming document referred to in Article 12 before
its submission to the Commission for its opinion;
(b) taking into account the opinion of the Commission, adopt the single
programming document by a majority of two-thirds of members with voting
rights;
(c) adopt the consolidated annual activity report and the annual and multi-annual
work programme;
(d) adopt its rules of procedure as well as the rules of procedure of the Executive
Board;
(e) adopt rules for the prevention and management of conflicts of interest in
respect of its members, the National Members and the members of the National
Desks;
(f) adopt the security rules;
(g) exercise, the appointing authority powers conferred by the Staff Regulations on
the Appointing Authority and by the Conditions of Employment of Other
Servants40 on the Authority Empowered to Conclude a Contract of
Employment with respect to the staff of Eurojust, in accordance with paragraph
2;
(h) adopt implementing rules for giving effect to the Staff Regulations and the
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants in accordance with Article
110(2) of the Staff Regulations;
(i) appoint the Administrative Director and, where relevant, extend their term of
office or remove him or her from office in accordance with Article 14;
(j) appoint Liaison officers posted to third countries referred to in Article 61;
(k) appoint and dismiss an accounting officer and a Data Protection Officer, who
shall be functionally independent in the performance of their duties;
(l) adopt the Security Plan, the Business Continuity Plan and the Disaster
Recovery Plan;
(m) adopt a decision laying down rules on the secondment of national experts to
Eurojust referred to in Article 72;
(n) adopt, by a majority of two-thirds of members with voting rights, the annual
budget of Eurojust and exercise other budgetary functions in respect of
Eurojust’s budget pursuant to Chapter VI;
(o) adopt the financial rules applicable to Eurojust in accordance with Article 69;
(p) adopt the cooperation strategy referred to in Article 60, after consulting the
College;
(q) authorise the conclusion of working arrangements in accordance with Article
54, paragraph 3;
40 Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff
Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities
and instituting special measures temporarily applicable to officials of the Commission (OJ L 56, 4.3.1968, p.
1).
EN 26 EN
(r) adopt decisions regarding the establishment of Eurojust's internal structures
and, where necessary, their modification taking into consideration Eurojust’s
activity needs and having regard to sound budgetary management;
(s) adopt any other non-operational decision which is not expressly attributed to
the Executive Board or the Administrative Director in accordance with this
Regulation.
2. The Management Board shall adopt, in accordance with Article 110 (2) of the Staff
Regulations, a decision based on Article 2(1) of the Staff Regulations and on Article
6 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, delegating relevant appointing
authority powers to the Administrative Director and defining the conditions under
which that delegation may be suspended. The Administrative Director shall be
authorised to sub-delegate those powers.
3. Where exceptional circumstances so require, the Management Board may, by way of
a decision adopted by a two-thirds majority of its members with voting rights,
temporarily suspend the delegation of the appointing authority powers to the
Administrative Director and those sub-delegated by the latter and exercise them itself
or delegate them to one of its members or to a staff member other than the
Administrative Director.
Article 11
Voting rules of the Management Board
1. Unless otherwise provided in this Regulation, the Management Board shall take
decisions by majority of its members with voting rights.
2. In the event the Commission raises serious concerns regarding a proposal for a
decision presented to the Management Board on matters related to the Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/71541 and the Staff Regulations of Officials and the
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, the
Management Board shall postpone the adoption of the decision. Within 15 days, the
Management Board shall re-examine and adopt it, possibly amended, in second
reading either with a two-thirds majority of its members with voting rights, including
the Commission representative, or by four-fifth majority of its members with voting
rights of the representatives of the Member States.
3. Each member with voting rights shall have one vote. In the absence of a member
with the right to vote, their alternate shall be entitled to exercise that right to vote.
4. The Chairperson shall take part in the voting.
5. The President and Administrative Director of Eurojust shall not take part in the
voting.
6. Where the President raises serious concerns regarding a decision under Article 10(1)
points (a), (c), (p) and (r), acting on the basis of a decision of the College adopted by
consensus, the Management Board shall give those concerns full consideration and,
where appropriate, re-examine the draft decision before proceeding to adoption.
41 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial
regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 122, 10.5.2019,
p. 1).
EN 27 EN
7. The Management Board's rules of procedure shall establish more detailed voting
arrangements, in particular the circumstances in which a member may act on behalf
of another member.
Article 12
Annual and multi-annual programming
1. By 30 November each year, the Management Board shall adopt a single
programming document containing annual and multi-annual programming, based on
a draft prepared by the Administrative Director and reviewed by the Executive
Board, taking into account the opinion of the Commission. The Management Board
shall forward the programming document to the European Parliament, the Council,
and the Commission.
2. The programming document shall become definitive after final adoption of the
general budget of the Union and shall be adjusted accordingly, where necessary.
3. The annual work programme shall comprise detailed objectives and expected results
including performance indicators. It shall also contain a description of the actions to
be financed and an indication of the financial and human resources allocated to each
action, in accordance with the principles of activity-based budgeting and
management. The annual work programme shall be coherent with the multi-annual
work programme referred to in paragraph 4. It shall clearly indicate which tasks have
been added, changed or deleted in comparison with the previous financial year.
4. The Management Board shall amend the adopted annual work programme when a
new task is assigned to Eurojust. Any substantial amendment to the annual work
programme shall be adopted by the same procedure as the initial annual work
programme. The Management Board may delegate to the Administrative Director the
power to make non-substantial amendments to the annual work programme.
5. The multi-annual work programme shall set out overall strategic programming
including objectives, the strategy for cooperation with the authorities of third
countries and organs of international organisations referred to in Article 60, expected
results and performance indicators. It shall also set out resource programming
including multi-annual budget and staff. The resource programming shall be updated
annually. The strategic programming shall be updated where appropriate, and in
particular to address the outcome of the evaluation referred to in Article 74.
SECTION III
EXECUTIVE BOARD
Article 13
Executive Board
1. The Management Board shall be assisted by an Executive Board.
2. The Executive board shall be chaired by the President of Eurojust.
3. The Executive Board shall:
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(a) prepare the decisions to be adopted by the Management Board and monitor the
implementation of the decisions adopted by it;
(b) review the draft annual budget, the draft annual work programme and the draft
consolidated annual activity report prepared by the Administrative Director;
(c) ensure, together with the Management Board, adequate follow-up to the
findings and recommendations resulting from internal or external audit reports
and evaluations, to the findings of investigations conducted by the European
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)42, and to the outcomes, including judicial decisions,
of investigations, conducted by the EPPO, in accordance with applicable Union
law;
(d) without affecting the responsibilities of the Administrative Director, assist and
advise him or her in the implementation of the decisions of the Management
Board, with a view to reinforcing supervision of administrative and budgetary
management;
(e) adopt reports, policy papers, guidelines for the benefit of competent national
authorities and opinions pertaining to the work of Eurojust, subject to prior
consultation of the College in exceptional cases where the matter is of essential
operational relevance;
(f) undertake any other tasks delegated by the Management Board.
4. The Executive Board shall adopt administrative decisions, including:
(a) an anti-fraud strategy proportionate to the fraud risks, taking into account the
costs and benefits of the measures to be implemented and based on a draft
prepared by the Administrative Director;
(b) follow-up to audit reports, including those of the European Data Protection
Supervisor (EDPS)43;
(c) strategies related to the relations with Union institutions, budgetary planning
and negotiations, including in the context of the multiannual financial
framework;
(d) the confirmation of liaison prosecutors as well as of contact points posted at
Eurojust;
(e) the initiation of negotiations for the conclusion of working arrangements.
5. Where necessary on grounds of urgency, the Executive Board may adopt provisional
decisions on behalf of the Management Board, in particular in matters relating to
administrative and budgetary management, including the suspension of the
delegation of appointing authority powers. Such decisions shall be submitted to the
Management Board for confirmation at its next meeting.
42 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September
2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing
Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation
(Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1). 43 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and
Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).
EN 29 EN
6. The Executive Board shall be composed of the following members with the right to
vote:
(a) the President of Eurojust,
(b) the Vice-President,
(c) two members appointed by the Management Board from among its voting
members,
(d) one representative of the Commission.
7. The Administrative Director shall participate in the meetings of the Executive Board
without the right to vote and may delegate their participation as necessary.
8. The Executive Board may also invite as observers without the right to vote other
participants for specific agenda items.
9. The term of office of the members of the Management Board serving on the
Executive Board shall be two years. That term shall expire before its end where the
member concerned ceases to be a member of the Management Board.
10. The Executive Board shall meet at least once every month. It shall also meet at the
initiative of the President or at the request of its members.
11. The Executive Board shall take its decisions by a majority of its members.
SECTION IV
ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR
Article 14
Appointment, dismissal, and extension of the term of office
1. The Administrative Director shall be engaged as a temporary agent of Eurojust under
Article 2 point (a) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants.
2. The Administrative Director shall be appointed by the Management Board on the
basis of merit and documented skills from a list of candidates proposed by the
Executive Board, following an open and transparent selection procedure aimed at
ensuring the broadest possible participation of candidates and an appropriate gender
balance.
3. For the purpose of signing the contract of the Administrative Director, Eurojust shall
be represented by the Chairperson of the Management Board.
4. The term of office of the Administrative Director shall be five years. Prior to the end
of that period, the Executive Board shall carry out an assessment that takes into
account an evaluation of the performance of the Administrative Director and
Eurojust’s future tasks and challenges.
5. The Management Board, acting on a proposal from the Executive Board which takes
into account the assessment referred to in paragraph 4, may extend the term of office
of the Administrative Director once for no more than five years.
EN 30 EN
6. An Administrative Director whose term of office has been extended may not
participate in another selection procedure for the same post at the end of the overall
period.
7. The Administrative Director may be removed from office only upon a decision of the
Management Board acting on a proposal from the Executive Board.
8. The Management Board shall adopt decisions on appointment, extension of the term
of office or removal from office of the Administrative Director with a two-thirds
majority of its members with voting rights.
Article 15
Tasks and responsibilities of the Administrative Director
1. The Administrative Director shall manage Eurojust and shall be accountable to the
Management Board. The Administrative Director shall be assisted in the fulfilment
of their duties by the staff of Eurojust, in accordance with Article 71.
2. The Administrative Director shall be independent in the performance of their tasks
and shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government nor from any other
body.
3. The Administrative Director shall be the legal representative of Eurojust.
4. The Administrative Director shall be responsible for the implementation of the tasks
assigned to Eurojust by this Regulation. In particular, the Administrative Director
shall be responsible for:
(a) ensuring the day-to-day administration of Eurojust;
(b) implementing decisions adopted by the Management Board and the Executive
Board;
(c) ensuring compliance with the financial rules of Eurojust;
(d) preparing the draft single programming document and submitting it to the
Executive Board for review and to the Management Board for adoption after
consulting the Commission;
(e) implementing the single programming document and reporting to the
Management Board on its implementation;
(f) preparing Eurojust's consolidated annual activity report and presenting it to the
Management Board for assessment and adoption;
(g) supporting the Chairperson of the Management Board in preparing
Management Board meetings and supporting the President of Eurojust in
preparing the Executive Board meetings and the College meetings;
(h) developing an action plan to address findings and recommendations resulting
from internal or external audit reports and evaluations, on the findings of
investigations conducted by OLAF, and on the outcomes, including judicial
decisions, of investigations conducted by the EPPO, in accordance with
applicable Union law, and report on progress twice a year to the Commission
and regularly to the Management Board and the Executive Board;
(i) protecting the financial interests of the Union by applying preventive measures
against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities, without affecting the
EN 31 EN
competence of OLAF and the EPPO, and, if irregularities are detected, by
recovering amounts wrongly paid;
(j) preparing strategies on anti-fraud measures, efficiency gains and synergies, a
strategy for cooperation with third countries and international organisations
and a strategy for the organisational management and internal control systems,
for Eurojust and presenting it to the Management Board for approval;
(k) preparing draft financial rules applicable to Eurojust for adoption by the
Management Board;
(l) preparing the Eurojust's draft statement of estimates of revenue and
expenditure and implementing its budget for adoption by the Management
Board;
(m) promoting diversity and gender balance as regards the recruitment of
Eurojust’s staff.
SECTION V
NATIONAL MEMBERS
Article 16
Status of National Members
1. Eurojust shall have one National Member seconded by each Member State in
accordance with its legal system. That National Member shall have their regular
place of work at the seat of Eurojust.
2. The National Members shall:
(a) be active members of the public prosecution service or judiciary of their
Member State;
(b) possess the qualifications required for appointment to high prosecutorial or
judicial office in their respective Member States, and have relevant practical
experience of national legal systems, or in relevant international or Union
bodies, and of international judicial cooperation in criminal matters; and
(c) have at least the powers referred to in Article 18 in order to be able to fulfil
their tasks.
3. The terms of office of the National Members shall be five years, renewable once. In
cases where a Deputy to the National Member is unable to act on behalf of a
National Member or is unable to substitute for a National Member, the National
Member shall remain in office upon expiry of their term of office until the renewal of
their term or their replacement, subject to the consent of the Member State
concerned.
4. Each National Member shall be supported by a National Desk as referred to in
Article 17.
EN 32 EN
Article 17
National Desks
1. Each National Desk shall consist of the National Member, at least one Deputy to the
National Member and one Assistant. The Deputy shall have their regular place of
work at the seat of Eurojust. Where a Member State so decides, the Assistant may
have their regular place of work in the Member State concerned.
2. The Deputy shall, under the applicable national law, have the same status, powers
and access rights as the National Member. The Deputy shall be able to act on behalf
of, or substitute for, the National Member. The terms of office of the Deputies shall
be five years, renewable once.
3. An Assistant may also act on behalf of, or substitute for, the National Member where
he or she has a status referred to in Article 16, paragraph 2.
4. Additional Deputies or Assistants may support the National Member. Where
necessary, and subject to the agreement of the College, they may have their regular
place of work at the seat of Eurojust. Member States shall notify the President of
Eurojust and the Commission of the appointment of National Members, Deputies and
Assistants.
5. The salaries and emoluments of the National Members, Deputies and Assistants shall
be borne by their Member State, without affecting Article 24.
6. Each National Desk shall be supported by at least one seconded national expert.
Seconded national experts shall have the status of a prosecutor, a judge or a
representative of a judicial authority with competences equivalent to those of a
prosecutor or judge under their national law.
7. Member States may assign additional staff to the National Desk for short-term
operational assignments, including trainees from the European Judicial Training
Network.
8. Seconded national experts and other additional staff shall be subject to the authority
of the National Member in the exercise of tasks related to Eurojust’s operational
functions.
9. National Desks shall be supported by authorised Eurojust staff. The number of
authorised Eurojust staff allocated to each national desk and their job assignments
shall be determined by the Administrative Director after consultations with the
National Member.
10. At least one member of each National Desk shall be designated as contact point for
the European Judicial Network44 in order to assist in determining whether a request
should be handled with the assistance of Eurojust or the European Judicial Network.
11. The National Member, the Deputy, an Assistant entitled to replace the National
Member, or a seconded national expert shall be available to receive and process
urgent requests at all times, including 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in order to
ensure that Eurojust is able to fulfil its tasks in urgent cases without delay.
44 Council Decision 2008/976/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the European Judicial Network (OJ L 348,
24.12.2008, p. 130).
EN 33 EN
12. Where members of national desks act within the framework of Eurojust's operational
functions, the relevant expenditure related to those activities shall be regarded as
operational expenditure.
Article 18
Powers of the National Members
1. The National Member shall have the power to:
(a) open, register and manage cases in the Eurojust Case Management System;
(b) directly contact, consult and exchange operational information and evidence
with any competent national authority of their Member State, as well as with
any relevant Union body, office or agency, including the EPPO and Europol;
(c) directly contact, consult and exchange operational information and evidence
with competent national authorities of third countries and competent organs of
international organisations, in accordance with the international commitments
of their Member State and in accordance with data protection rules;
(d) facilitate or otherwise support the issuing or execution of any request for
judicial cooperation or mutual recognition;
(e) authorise, on the basis of all relevant information available, including, where
appropriate, input from the Data Protection Officer, the transfer of operational
personal data necessary for the purposes of a specific investigation in which
their Member State is involved, in accordance with Articles 94b, 94c and 94d
of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725; where the operational personal data to be
transferred have been provided by more than one Member State in the context
of that investigation, the authorisation shall be granted by each National
Member of all the Member States that provided those data;
(f) organise coordination meetings or coordination centres;
(g) participate in joint investigation teams and, where appropriate, initiate or
facilitate their establishment and operation, including by signing JIT
agreements;
(h) participate in joint operational platforms, ECE and judicial coordination
platforms;
(i) where appropriate, participate in operational task forces and Europol
operational meetings;
(j) ask the competent national authorities of their Member States to agree to the
establishment of coordination mechanisms, including joint operational
platforms, with Europol as referred to in Article 57, paragraph 5;
(k) ask the competent national authorities of their Member State to undertake an
investigation or prosecution of specific acts, or to undertake a specific act of
criminal procedure or any other measure justified for the purposes of an
investigation or prosecution;
(l) assist in the identification, prevention and resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction,
including by issuing reasoned opinions, by inviting the competent national
authorities to accept that one of them is the best placed to prosecute, and by
facilitating the transfer of proceedings.
EN 34 EN
2. With the agreement of the competent national authority and in accordance with
national law, National Members may:
(a) issue or execute any request for judicial cooperation or mutual recognition,
including:
i. order, request or execute investigative measures, as provided for in
Directive 2014/41/EU;
ii. issue, request or execute freezing orders, as provided for in Regulation
(EU) 2018/1805;
iii. issue a European Production Order or a European Preservation Order, as
provided for in Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 of the European Parliament
and of the Council45;
(b) request their national Asset Recovery Offices to provide information on
instrumentalities, proceeds or property which are or might become the object of
a freezing or confiscation order and to take immediate action until a freezing
order is issued, as provided for in Directive (EU) 2024/126046.
3. In urgent cases where it is not possible to contact the competent national authority in
a timely manner, National Members shall be competent to take the measures referred
to in paragraph 2 in accordance with their national law. They shall inform the
competent national authority without undue delay of any measures taken pursuant to
this paragraph.
4. Where, under national law, the powers referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 are
conferred upon another competent national authority, the National Member may
request that authority to issue or execute the measure concerned.
5. Without affecting paragraphs 1 and 2, Member States may grant additional powers to
National Members for the purpose of exercising their tasks under this Regulation.
Those Member States shall notify the Commission and the College of those powers.
6. The National Members shall have access to, or shall be able to obtain without undue
delay, in accordance with their national law, the information contained in the
following registers of their Member State:
(a) criminal records;
(b) registers of arrested persons;
(c) investigation registers;
(d) DNA, fingerprint, and vehicle registration registers, where relevant for criminal
investigations;
(e) the ECRIS-TCN in accordance with Article 14(1) and (4) of Regulation
(EU)2019/816 of the European Parliament and of the Council47;
45 Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 on European
Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal proceedings and for
the execution of custodial sentences following criminal proceedings (OJ L 191, 28.7.2023, p. 118). 46 Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on asset recovery
and confiscation (OJ L, 2024/1260, 2.5.2024). 47 Regulation (EU) 2019/816 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 establishing a
centralised system for the identification of Member States holding conviction information on third-country
nationals and stateless persons (ECRIS-TCN) to supplement the European Criminal Records Information
System and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 (OJ L 135, 22.5.2019, p. 1.
EN 35 EN
(f) centralised bank account registers and retrieval systems established pursuant to
Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council48;
(g) other registers of public authorities where such information is necessary for the
performance of their tasks under this Regulation.
SECTION VI
THE COLLEGE
Article 19
Composition of the College
1. The College shall be composed of all National Members.
2. Members of the College may be assisted by advisers or experts.
Article 20
Powers and functions of the College
1. The College shall be responsible for the operational functions of Eurojust and shall
act with full independence.
2. The College shall in particular:
(a) facilitate the identification of connected proceedings, including by requesting
National Members to verify whether parallel investigations or prosecutorial
actions concerning analogous facts or offences are pending within their
respective Member States;
(b) identify cross-cutting issues and best practices in operational matters, where
necessary by requesting National Members to liaise with relevant national
contact points of judicial networks or other competent national authorities;
(c) request the Administrative Director to prepare analyses on the impact of
international, Union and national case-law on operational matters;
(d) provide operational input to the Executive Board for the definition of priorities
in cooperation with third countries and for operational documents for which
Europol requests Eurojust’s contribution;
(e) request the Executive Board to establish ECE in accordance with Article 31
and judicial coordination platforms in accordance with Article 27;
(f) upon request of the Executive Board or the Management Board provide advice
on issues that are directly linked to operational matters;
(g) adopt the implementing rules necessary to carry out its functions.
3. The College shall take the operational decisions, including on:
48 Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 laying down rules
facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or
prosecution of certain criminal offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA (OJ L 186,
11.7.2019, p. 12.
EN 36 EN
(a) the opening, registration and management of own initiative cases in the
Eurojust case management system, on the basis of information provided by one
or more Member States or on the basis of information received from a third
country, an international organisation or any Union body, office or agency, in
particular Europol and the EPPO, or developed by the Eurojust staff;
(b) in the context of own initiative cases opened pursuant to point (a), the
transmission to the competent national authorities of the Member States
concerned of information relevant for the initiation, extension or conduct of
investigations and prosecutions potentially falling within their competence;
(c) in the context of own initiative cases opened pursuant to point (a), the
organisation of a coordination meeting where the College considers that direct
engagement between the competent national authorities of the Member States
concerned is necessary to ensure effective coordination of their investigations
and prosecutions;
(d) the assessment of whether a case involving one Member State has
repercussions at Union level within the meaning of Article 5(6), point (b);
(e) the determination of whether there is an essential interest in providing
assistance in cases involving at least one Member State and a third country or
international organisation, in accordance with Article 5(5), point (c)(iii);
(f) the approval of requests for cooperation submitted by third countries or
international organisations falling within the scope of Article 5(6), point (d);
Article 21
Meetings of the College
1. The President shall convene meetings of the College.
2. The College shall meet at least once per month. It shall also meet at the initiative of
the President or at the request of at least one third of its members.
3. The Administrative Director and authorised Eurojust staff shall be invited to attend
meetings of the College, as appropriate, without the right to vote.
4. The College shall invite representatives of the EPPO and Europol to attend its
meetings, without the right to vote, when matters of common interest are discussed.
It may also invite representatives of Union bodies, liaison prosecutors seconded to
Eurojust, Contact Points posted at Eurojust and other national or international
competent authorities, as appropriate, without the right to vote.
5. The College may invite any other person whose opinion may be of interest to attend
its meetings as an observer.
Article 22
Voting rules of the College
1. The College shall endeavour to adopt its decisions by consensus. Where a consensus
cannot be reached, the College shall adopt its decisions by a majority of its members
without undue delay.
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2. Each National Member shall have one vote. In the absence of a voting member, the
Deputy shall be entitled to exercise the right to vote subject to the conditions set out
in Article 17(2). In the absence of the deputy, the Assistant shall also be entitled to
exercise the right to vote subject to the conditions set out in Article 17(3).
Article 23
President and Vice-President of Eurojust
1. The College shall elect a President and one Vice-President from among the National
Members by a two-thirds majority of its members. In the event that a two-thirds
majority cannot be reached after the second round of election, the Vice-President
shall be elected by a simple majority of the members of the College, while a two-
thirds majority shall continue to be necessary for the election of the President.
2. The President shall exercise their functions on behalf of the College. The President
shall:
(a) represent Eurojust in external institutional relations;
(b) call and preside over the meetings of the College and the Executive Board and
keep the College informed of any matters that are of interest to it;
(c) direct the work of the College;
(d) participate in the Management Board meetings without the right to vote;
(e) exercise any other functions set out in its rules of procedure.
3. The Vice-President shall exercise the functions set out in paragraph 2 which the
President entrusts to him or her and shall replace the President where the latter is
prevented from attending to their duties. The President and Vice-President shall be
assisted in the performance of their specific duties by the staff of Eurojust.
4. The term of office of the President and the Vice-President shall be four years,
renewable once.
5. Where a National Member is elected President or Vice-President of Eurojust, their
term of office shall be extended to ensure that he or she can fulfil their function as
President or Vice-President.
6. If the President or Vice-President no longer fulfils the conditions required for the
performance of their duties, he or she may be dismissed by the College acting on a
proposal from one third of its members. The decision shall be adopted on the basis of
a two-thirds majority of the members of the College, excluding the President or
Vice-President concerned.
7. When a National Member is elected President of Eurojust, the Member State
concerned may second another suitably qualified person to reinforce the national
desk for the duration of the former’s mandate as President. A Member State which
decides to second such a person shall be entitled to apply for compensation in
accordance with Article 24.
EN 38 EN
Article 24
Compensation mechanism for the election to the position of President
1. The Member State whose National Member is elected President shall be entitled to
compensation for the purpose of Article 23(7), in accordance with the mechanism
determined by the Council by means of implementing acts.
2. The compensation shall be available to any Member State if:
(a) its National Member has been elected President;
(b) it requests compensation from the College and provides justification for the
need to reinforce its national desk on grounds of an increased workload.
3. The compensation provided shall equate to 50 % of the national salary of the
seconded person. Compensation for living costs and other associated expenses shall
be provided on a comparable basis to that provided to Union officials or other
servants seconded abroad.
4. The costs of the compensation mechanism shall be borne by Eurojust's budget.
EN 39 EN
CHAPTER III
OPERATIONAL MATTERS
SECTION I
FACILITATION OF JUDICIAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION
Article 25
Support to cross-border investigations and prosecutions
1. Eurojust shall support and strengthen cooperation between competent authorities of
Members States, third countries and competent organs of international organisations,
and ensure the best possible coordination of investigations and prosecutions, in
particular by providing operational, analytical, and strategic support.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, Eurojust may in particular:
(a) organise and facilitate coordination meetings and coordination centres, and
provide the necessary logistical support, including translation and
interpretation;
(b) facilitate and support the issuing, transmission and execution of requests of
judicial cooperation and mutual recognition instruments, in particular by:
i. advising on the appropriate instruments and applicable legal
requirements;
ii. supporting the drafting, transmission and follow-up of requests;
iii. facilitating contacts with competent national authorities of Member
States and with competent authorities of third countries and competent
organs of international organisations and, where relevant, private parties;
iv. identifying alternative solutions in the event of refusals of execution of
requests;
v. providing assistance in cases of competing or conflicting requests for
judicial cooperation, including European Arrest Warrants issued in
accordance with Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA49, such as
by issuing reasoned opinions;
(c) assist in the prevention, identification and resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction
between competent national authorities, including by:
i. identifying parallel or linked proceedings;
ii. providing legal advice, including as regards the application of the ne bis
in idem principle;
iii. issuing non-binding reasoned opinions or recommendations on the
resolution of such conflicts;
49 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the
surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1), as amended by Council
Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 (OJ L 81, 27.3.2009, p. 24).
EN 40 EN
iv. inviting the competent authorities to accept that one of them is the
jurisdiction best placed to prosecute;
v. facilitating the transfer of proceedings.
(d) facilitate and support the exchange of information between competent national
authorities and competent organs of international organisations;
(e) cross-check, in accordance with this Regulation, information contained in
relevant databases in order to identify links between cross-border
investigations and support such investigations;
(f) facilitate and support the cross-border tracing, freezing, confiscation and
recovery of criminal assets in cross-border cases, including in relation to post-
conviction and non-conviction based confiscation in proceedings in criminal
matters;
(g) request Europol to provide support, including through operational analysis in
an ongoing specific criminal investigation on the basis of investigative
data provided by Eurojust or the Member States.
3. The competent national authorities shall, upon request, inform Eurojust of the
outcome of proceedings in respect of which they have received assistance under this
Article, including, where available, relevant judicial decisions and any follow-up
measures taken.
4. Eurojust shall support the implementation of this Article through its authorised staff,
acting under the direction of the National Members in accordance with this
Regulation.
Article 26
Support to joint investigation teams
1. Eurojust shall provide operational, technical, analytical, legal and financial support to
joint investigation teams (JIT), including by:
(a) advising on the opportunity and legal requirements for setting up a joint
investigation team, including the possible participation of Europol;
(b) assisting in the drafting and negotiation of agreements establishing joint
investigation teams;
(c) advising on prosecutorial strategies and on the implementation of operational
actions.
2. The roles and status of National Members and other members of the National Desks
within a joint investigation team shall be determined by the agreement establishing
the JIT.
3. Eurojust staff may, where the agreement establishing a JIT so provides, participate in
the activities of that JIT, under the conditions laid down therein, including as regards
the applicable liability regime.
4. Eurojust staff may, within the limits of the law of the Member States in which a joint
investigation team operates, assist in its activities and in the exchange of information
between its members.
EN 41 EN
5. Information obtained by authorised Eurojust staff in the course of their participation
in a joint investigation team shall, with the consent and under the responsibility of
the Member State which provided the information, be processed by Eurojust under
the conditions laid down in this Regulation.
6. Eurojust shall support the Network of National Experts on Joint Investigation Teams
(JIT Network) through its staff, in particular by:
(a) organising its meetings and training activities;
(b) collecting and analysing evaluations of individual joint investigation teams;
(c) managing Eurojust’s financial support to joint investigation teams;
(d) performing the tasks assigned to the JITs Network Secretariat under Regulation
(EU) 2023/96950of the European Parliament and of the Council.
7. Eurojust financial support shall be provided in accordance with Regulation (EU,
Euratom) 2024/2509 and may include the use of simplified forms of funding,
including lump sums, unit costs and flat-rate financing. Eurojust may directly cover
or reimburse expenditure necessary for the establishment and functioning of joint
investigation teams, including costs relating to travel, accommodation, interpretation,
translation, coordination activities, equipment and operational support.
Article 27
Judicial coordination platforms
1. At the request of two or more Member States, or on its own initiative with the
agreement of the Member States concerned, Eurojust may establish judicial
coordination platforms to support particularly complex cross-border investigations or
prosecutions or to enhance cooperation in addressing specific forms of serious crime.
2. Judicial coordination platforms shall be composed of representatives of the
competent national authorities of the Member States concerned, including members
of the National Desks, and shall be supported by authorised Eurojust staff.
3. Representatives of Union agencies, bodies, offices and other relevant international
justice actors, as well as of third countries and international organisations, may be
invited to participate, subject to the agreement of the competent national authorities
concerned.
4. Eurojust shall provide operational, technical, analytical, legal and financial support to
the judicial coordination platforms. It shall also provide the necessary logistical
support, including premises and secure communication tools.
5. Judicial coordination platforms shall in particular:
(a) facilitate the exchange of information and evidence relevant to judicial
authorities, including in support of the development and implementation of a
common prosecution strategy;
(b) provide Eurojust with information for the purposes of operational analysis in
accordance with this Regulation;
50 Regulation (EU) 2023/969 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a
support centre for the setting up of joint investigation teams and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1726 and
(EU) 2018/1727 (OJ L 132, 17.5.2023, p. 1).
EN 42 EN
(c) provide specialised assistance to competent national authorities, including,
where appropriate, with the support of the ECEs referred to in Article 31.
6. Information processed in the framework of a judicial coordination platform shall be
handled in accordance with this Regulation and shall be stored and processed in the
case management system referred to in Article 41.
SECTION II
OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES ON OWN INITIATIVE
Article 28
Own initiative
1. In the absence of a request from the competent national authorities or the EPPO,
Eurojust may carry out operational activities on its own initiative, in accordance with
this Regulation, on the basis of information provided by Member States, third
countries, international organisations, Union institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies, or private parties, or obtained from publicly available sources, in
connection with investigations or prosecutions, ongoing or potential, involving
serious crime falling within the scope of Eurojust's competence in accordance with
this Regulation.
2. When Eurojust acts on its own initiative, National Members may, giving their
reasons, ask the competent authorities of their Member States to:
(a) undertake an investigation or prosecution in respect of specific acts;
(b) agree that one of them may be in a better position to undertake an investigation
or to prosecute specific acts;
(c) extend the scope of investigations to include other Member States or third
countries not initially involved;
(d) prioritise a request for judicial cooperation in cases of conflicting or competing
requests;
(e) authorise, where appropriate, the cross-checking of relevant databases, in order
to identify links between cases;
(f) coordinate between the competent authorities of the Member States concerned;
(g) request operational or analytical support from Europol in accordance with
Article 57;
(h) set up a joint investigation team;
(i) take special investigative measures;
(j) transmit to Eurojust information necessary for the performance of its tasks;
(k) take any other measure justified for the purposes of the investigation or
prosecution.
3. National Members may further:
EN 43 EN
(a) inform the competent national authorities of investigations or prosecutions that
may have repercussions at Union level or affect Member States other than
those directly concerned;
(b) transmit to the competent national authorities information relevant for the
initiation, extension or conduct of investigations and prosecutions falling
within Eurojust’s competence;
(c) issue reasoned opinions in relation to specific cases and transmit those opinions
to the Member States concerned;
(d) issue or execute requests for judicial cooperation in urgent cases in accordance
with this Regulation.
4. Where obstacles arise in relation to requests for, or decisions on, judicial cooperation
between two or more Member States, including those based on instruments giving
effect to the principle of mutual recognition, and where such obstacles cannot be
resolved through consultation between the competent authorities concerned, National
Members may, on their own initiative or at the request of the competent national
authorities concerned, issue a reasoned opinion on the case.
5. The competent national authorities of the Member States concerned shall respond,
without undue delay, to requests made by National Members under paragraph 2 and
to the reasoned opinions referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4. They may refuse to
comply with such requests or not follow such opinions where compliance would
adversely affect essential national security interests, jeopardise the success of an
ongoing investigation or prosecution, or endanger the safety of an individual.
6. On the basis of the information referred to in paragraph 1, and for the purposes of
paragraph 2, authorised Eurojust staff may compile, analyse and transmit relevant
operational information to the National Members or the College for appropriate
follow-up. For that purpose, authorised Eurojust staff may temporarily store and
analyse personal data in the case management system solely for the purpose of
enabling the National Member or the College to determine whether such data are
relevant to Eurojust’s tasks and whether a case should be opened in the case
management system. Those data may be held for a period not exceeding six months
in a secure and controlled environment provided by Eurojust for this purpose, subject
to appropriate safeguards substantially equivalent to those identified for the case
management system. Where, exceptionally, the National Member or the College has
not been able to make that determination within that period, the period may be
extended once for a further period not exceeding six months.
7. Eurojust staff may also prepare reasoned opinions for the purposes of paragraphs 3
and 4 and transmit them to the National Members or the College for appropriate
follow-up.
8. The competent national authorities of the Member States concerned shall retain
responsibility for deciding on any action to be taken as a result of Eurojust's activities
carried out under this Article, in accordance with applicable national and Union law.
EN 44 EN
Article 29
Preservation, analyses and storage of evidence
1. In order to support the action of the Member States in combating core international
crimes and related criminal offences, Eurojust shall, in accordance with this
Regulation, develop and maintain the capacity to collect, preserve, analyse and store
evidence and information that may be used as evidence related to those crimes.
2. At the request of the College or of the Commission, Eurojust may, in duly justified
cases, extend the capacities referred to in paragraph 1 to other forms of serious crime
within its competence in accordance with this Regulation, provided that this is
essential to support specific investigations and prosecutions in respect of which a
joint investigation team or a judicial coordination platform has been established.
3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, Eurojust may, in accordance with this Regulation,
receive evidence from the competent national authorities of the Member States and
third countries as well as competent organs of international criminal courts and
tribunals. Eurojust may also collect relevant information that may be used as
evidence from Union agencies, bodies and offices, international organisations,
private parties and from publicly available sources.
4. Eurojust shall facilitate the secure and timely exchange of information and evidence
referred to in paragraph 1 between the competent national authorities of the Member
States and third countries as well as competent organs of international criminal
courts and tribunals or, where appropriate and in accordance with this Regulation,
make such information and evidence directly available to them.
5. For the purposes of this Article, Eurojust shall, through authorised staff:
(a) support the competent national and international authorities in the transmission
of evidence to Eurojust and collect information from publicly available
sources;
(b) support the competent national and international authorities in their
investigations and prosecutions, including by identifying evidentiary gaps and
parallel investigations, and advising on prosecution strategies; and
(c) cooperate closely with Europol, within their respective mandates, to identify
links between information processed by both agencies, including through the
preparation of joint analytical reports where appropriate.
Article 30
Retention of knowledge
1. Authorised Eurojust staff shall retain, analyse and, where appropriate, exchange
operational knowledge related to judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including
knowledge derived from Eurojust's casework, the European Judicial Network, and
the experience of contact points of other relevant networks and bodies active in
judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
2. Eurojust shall identify cross-cutting issues and best practices in judicial cooperation
in criminal matters, and shall develop tools, including guidelines, policy documents
and casework analyses, to assist practitioners in their cross-border investigations and
prosecutions.
EN 45 EN
3. Eurojust may compile and analyse, including through the use of automated tools,
national and Union case-law relevant to judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
including on the admissibility of evidence.
Article 31
Eurojust Centres of Expertise in criminal matters (ECE)
1. Eurojust may establish ECE as specialised internal structures to provide strategic,
analytical and operational support to the National Desks, the competent national
authorities and other relevant stakeholders in combating priority forms of crime at
Union level and addressing cross-cutting issues in judicial cooperation in criminal
matters.
2. ECE shall be coordinated by Eurojust staff, who shall decide, after consulting the
members of the National Desks associated with the relevant ECE, on the
prioritisation of activities and outcomes. Such members may also request the support
of the ECE in analytical and operational activities. Judicial networks and other
bodies of national practitioners may also contribute to the work of the centres.
3. Representatives of other Union agencies, bodies, offices, as well as other relevant
stakeholders, may be invited to participate in the work of an ECE where appropriate
for the fulfilment of their respective tasks.
4. The College, the Administrative Director or the Commission may request the
establishment of an ECE. The Executive Board shall assess the operational added
value and the financial implications of such a request and submit the assessment to
the Management Board, which shall decide in accordance with Article 10(1), point
(r).
SECTION III
ADDITIONAL FORMS OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
Article 32
Contact point for third countries and international organisations for the purposes of
Regulation (EU) 2019/816
1. In performing its role as a contact point for third countries and international
organisations for the purpose of identifying the Member States holding criminal
records information on a third-country national pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation
(EU) 2019/816, Eurojust shall ensure the efficient and secure handling of requests,
and their follow-up as referred to therein, in compliance with applicable data
protection rules. To that end, it shall establish appropriate organisational and
technical measures for the processing, prioritisation and follow-up of such requests.
2. Upon the establishment of the measures referred to in paragraph 1, the procedure laid
down in Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2019/816 shall be carried out by electronic
means.
EN 46 EN
Article 33
Assistance in relation to victims of crime in cross-border criminal proceedings
Eurojust shall assist investigating and prosecuting authorities in upholding victims' rights in
cross-border criminal investigations. In particular, at the request of competent national
investigating and prosecuting authorities of the Member States, Eurojust may:
(a) assist in facilitating the identification of victims in cases involving a large
number of victims;
(b) advise competent national authorities on the rights of victims to participate in
criminal proceedings under national or Union law in cross-border cases;
(c) assist competent national authorities with victims' access to compensation and
the restitution of property, including property subject to freezing or
confiscation measures;
(d) provide any additional assistance in relation to victims' rights in cross-border
criminal proceedings, within the limits of its competence in accordance with
this Regulation.
Article 34
Involvement in the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats
(EMPACT)
1. Eurojust shall support Europol in the preparation of analytical products on internal
security, including strategic analysis, threat assessment, trend report and situational
briefings, in particular with a view to assisting the Council and the Commission in
establishing the Union's strategic, policy and operational priorities for combating
serious crime.
2. Eurojust shall assist Europol in the operational implementation of the Union's
priorities in the fight against serious crime, in particular by supporting the
participation of judicial authorities in the EMPACT.
3. In coordination with Europol, Eurojust may provide operational, analytical, legal,
administrative and logistical support to activities led by Member States within the
framework of EMPACT. Such support may include facilitating the exchange of
information between the competent authorities concerned.
4. Such support shall be limited to activities led by, or involving, judicial authorities.
The practical arrangements for the coordination between Europol and Eurojust in this
context shall be laid down in the working arrangement concluded between the two
agencies as referred to in Article 57.
EN 47 EN
SECTION IV
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH COMPETENT NATIONAL AUTHORITIES IN
THE MEMBER STATES
Article 35
Eurojust national coordination system
1. Each Member State shall establish a Eurojust national coordination system to support
the work of the National Member of its Member State and ensure coordination
between the National Desk and the competent national authorities of that Member
State.
2. The Eurojust national coordination system shall include the contact points of
networks with which Eurojust maintains relations pursuant to Article 56, the national
correspondents for terrorism matters and any other relevant judicial authority.
3. Each Member State may appoint a national correspondent for Eurojust to act as
coordinator of the members of the Eurojust national coordination system at national
level.
4. Each Member State shall designate a competent national authority as Eurojust
national correspondent for terrorism matters. That national correspondent for
terrorism matters shall be a judicial or other competent authority. Where the national
legal system so requires, a Member State may designate more than one competent
national authority as Eurojust national correspondent for terrorism matters. The
national correspondent for terrorism matters shall have access to all relevant
information in accordance with Article 37. That national correspondent shall be
competent to collect such information and to transmit it to Eurojust, in compliance
with national and Union law, in particular national criminal procedural law and
applicable data protection rules.
5. Members of the Eurojust national coordination system shall in particular:
(e) ensure that information related to the Member State concerned in accordance
with Article 37 is transmitted to the case management system referred to in
Article 41 in an efficient and reliable manner;
(a) assist the National Member in identifying the competent authorities for the
execution of requests for, and decisions on, judicial cooperation, including
those based on instruments giving effect to the principle of mutual recognition;
(b) inform the National Member of meetings at which operational matters of
relevance to Eurojust are discussed, and invite the National Member to attend
such meetings;
(c) maintain close relationship with the Europol national unit;
(d) raise awareness among investigating and prosecuting authorities in their
Member State of the support Eurojust can provide in cross-border cases;
(e) transmit to Eurojust national case-law relevant to judicial cooperation in
criminal matters, including on the admissibility of evidence;
(f) bring to Eurojust's attention cross-cutting issues and best practices in judicial
cooperation in criminal matters, with a view to contributing to Eurojust’s
EN 48 EN
retention of knowledge in accordance with Article 30 and participate in the
work of ECE in accordance with Article 31.
6. The National Member shall meet regularly with the members of the Eurojust national
coordination system of their Member State. The National Member shall in particular
hold dedicated regular meetings with the contact points of each network referred to
in paragraph 2, in order to address matters falling within the remit of that network
and to ensure effective coordination between the National Desk and the relevant
competent national authorities.
7. In order to meet the objectives referred to in paragraph 5, the persons referred to in
paragraph 2, in so far as they act as competent national authorities, shall be
connected to the decentralised IT system referred to in Article 40.
8. Authorised Eurojust staff may assist in the implementation of this Article.
Article 36
Exchanges of information with the Member States and between National Members
1. The competent authorities of the Member States shall exchange with Eurojust all
information necessary for the performance of its tasks under Articles 4 and 25 in
accordance with the applicable data protection rules. That shall at least include the
information referred to in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of this Article.
2. The transmission of information to Eurojust shall only be interpreted as a request for
the assistance of Eurojust in the case concerned where specified as such by a
competent authority of the Member State.
3. The National Members shall exchange all information necessary for the performance
of Eurojust’s tasks among themselves and with their competent national authorities,
without prior authorisation. In particular, the competent national authorities shall
promptly inform their National Members of a case which concerns them.
4. The competent national authorities shall inform their National Members of the
setting up of joint investigation teams and of the results of the work of such teams.
5. The competent national authorities shall inform their National Members without
undue delay of any case affecting at least three Member States for which requests for
or decisions on judicial cooperation, including requests and decisions based on
instruments giving effect to the principle of mutual recognition, have been
transmitted to at least two Member States, where one or more of the following apply:
(a) the offence involved is punishable in the requesting or issuing Member State
by a custodial sentence or a detention order, the maximum period of which is at
least five or six years, to be decided by the Member State concerned, and is
included in the following list:
i. trafficking in human beings;
ii. sexual abuse or sexual exploitation including child pornography and
solicitation of children for sexual purposes;
iii. drug trafficking;
iv. illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts or components or ammunition or
explosives;
EN 49 EN
v. corruption;
vi. crime against the financial interests of the Union;
vii. forgery of money or means of payment;
viii. money laundering activities;
ix. computer crime;
(b) there are factual indications that a criminal organisation is involved;
(c) there are indications that the case may have a serious cross-border dimension
or may have repercussions at Union level, or that it may affect Member States
other than those directly involved.
6. The competent national authorities shall inform their National Members of:
(a) cases in which conflicts of jurisdiction have arisen or are likely to arise;
(b) controlled deliveries affecting at least three countries, at least two of which are
Member States;
(c) repeated difficulties or refusals regarding the execution of requests for, or
decisions on, judicial cooperation, including requests and decisions based on
instruments giving effect to the principle of mutual recognition.
7. The competent national authorities shall not be obliged to supply information in a
particular case if doing so would harm essential national security interests or
jeopardise the safety of individuals.
8. This Article shall not affect conditions set out in bilateral or multilateral agreements
or arrangements between Member States and third countries, including any
conditions set by third countries concerning the use of information once supplied.
9. This Article shall not affect other obligations regarding the transmission of
information to Eurojust.
10. The competent national authorities shall not be obliged to provide information as
referred to in this Article where such information has already been transmitted to
Eurojust in accordance with other provisions of this Regulation.
Article 37
Exchanges of information on terrorism cases
1. As regards terrorist offences, the competent national authorities shall inform the
National Member of their Member State of any ongoing or concluded criminal
investigations supervised by judicial authorities as soon as the case is referred to the
judicial authorities in accordance with national law, in particular national criminal
procedural law, of any ongoing or concluded prosecutions and court proceedings,
and of any court decisions on terrorist offences. That obligation shall apply to all
criminal investigations related to terrorist offences regardless of whether there is a
known link to another Member State or a third country unless the criminal
investigation, due to its specific circumstances, clearly affects only one Member
State.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where:
EN 50 EN
(a) the sharing of information would jeopardise an ongoing investigation or the
safety of an individual; or
(b) the sharing of information would be contrary to essential security interests of
the Member State concerned.
3. Terrorist offences for the purpose of this Article are offences referred to in Directive
(EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council51.
4. The information transmitted in accordance with paragraph 1 shall include the
operational personal data and non-personal data set out in Annex III. Such
information may include personal data in accordance with Annex III, paragraph 4,
but only if such personal data are held by or can be communicated to the competent
national authorities in accordance with national law and if the transmission of those
data is necessary to identify reliably a data subject under Article 44(5).
5. Where the situation referred to in paragraph 2 is at stake, the competent national
authorities shall inform their National Members about any changes to the information
transmitted under paragraph 1 without undue delay and, where possible, no later than
10 working days after such changes.
6. The competent national authority shall not be obliged to provide such information
where it has already been transmitted to Eurojust.
7. The competent national authority may at any stage request the support of Eurojust in
the follow-up action as regards links identified on the basis of information provided
under this Article.
Article 38
Information provided by Eurojust to competent national authorities
1. Eurojust shall provide competent national authorities with information on the results
of the processing of information, including the existence of links with cases already
stored in the case management system, without undue delay. That information may
include personal data.
2. Where a competent national authority requests that Eurojust provide it with
information within a certain timeframe, Eurojust shall transmit that information
within that timeframe.
Article 39
Exchanges of operational information between authorised Eurojust staff and the
Member States
1. Except where otherwise provided in this Regulation, exchanges of operational
information between Eurojust and the competent authorities of the Member States
shall take place through the National Members, in accordance with the rules on
management of information in the case management system set out in Article 42.
51 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision
2005/671/JHA (OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6).
EN 51 EN
2. Where exchanges of operational information between Eurojust and the competent
authorities of the Member States take place through the National Members in
accordance with paragraph 1, a National Member may, on a case-by-case basis,
authorise one or more members of the authorised Eurojust staff, under their
supervision and responsibility, to exchange operational information directly with the
competent authorities of their Member State where that is necessary for the
performance of Eurojust's tasks under this Regulation.
3. Where authorised Eurojust staff act pursuant to paragraph 2, such exchanges shall be
carried out through the decentralised IT system referred to in Article 40, unless
paragraph 2 of Article 40 applies. The National Member concerned shall remain
responsible for the content of the information exchanged and for its further
processing in the case management system in accordance with Article 42(1).
Article 40
Secure digital communication and data exchange between competent national
authorities and Eurojust
1. Communication between the competent national authorities and Eurojust under this
Regulation shall be carried out through a network of IT systems and interoperable e-
CODEX access points, which operate under the individual responsibility and
management of each Member State and Eurojust, enabling the secure and reliable
cross-border exchange of information ('the decentralised IT system'). The case
management system referred to in Article 41 shall be connected with the
decentralised IT system.
2. Where exchange of information in accordance with paragraph 1 is not possible due
to, for instance, the unavailability of the decentralised IT system, the nature of the
transmitted material, technical limitations, such as data size, legal constraints relating
to the admissibility as evidence of the requested data or to forensic requirements
applicable to the requested data, or exceptional circumstances, the transmission shall
be carried out by the most appropriate alternative means, taking into account the
need to ensure an exchange of information which is swift, secure and reliable, and
allows the recipient to establish authenticity.
3. The competent national authorities shall transmit the information referred to in
Articles 36 and 37 of this Regulation to Eurojust in a semi-automated and structured
manner from national registers in accordance with the Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2025/244752.
4. The Commission shall be responsible for the creation, maintenance and development
of reference implementation software which Member States and Eurojust may
choose to apply as their back-end system. That reference implementation software
shall be based on a modular setup, meaning that the software is packaged and
delivered separately from the e-CODEX components needed to connect it to the
decentralised IT system. That setup shall enable Member States to reuse or enhance
their existing national judicial communication infrastructures for the purpose of
52 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2447 of 4 December 2025 laying down the rules for the
application of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the
technical specifications, measures and other requirements for the establishment and use of the decentralised
IT system for secure processing and communication of information (OJ L, 2025/2447, 5.12.2025).
EN 52 EN
cross-border use and Eurojust to connect its case management system to the
decentralised IT system.
5. The Commission shall provide, maintain and support the reference implementation
software free of charge. The creation, maintenance and development of the reference
implementation software shall be financed from the general budget of the Union.
6. Member States and Eurojust shall bear their respective costs for establishing and
operating an authorised e-CODEX access points as defined in Article 3, point 3, of
Regulation (EU) 2022/850, and for establishing and adjusting their relevant IT
systems to make them interoperable with the access point.
7. Where Eurojust establishes or procures cloud computing services for the purposes of
this Regulation, it shall ensure that such services comply with applicable Union law,
including requirements on the EU cloud sovereignty framework, data security, data
protection, cybersecurity and digital sovereignty, thereby ensuring the secure hosting
and processing of data exchanged under this Regulation, with strict access control
and data compartmentalisation.
Article 41
Case management system
1. Eurojust shall establish a case management system for the processing of operational
personal data listed in Annex II, data listed in Annex III and non-personal data.
2. The case management system shall serve the following purposes:
(a) support the management and coordination of investigations and prosecutions in
respect of which Eurojust is providing assistance;
(b) support Eurojust in the exercise of its own initiative functions pursuant to
Article 28;
(c) ensure secure access to, and the secure exchange of, information on ongoing
investigations and prosecutions;
(d) facilitate the secure exchange of information and evidence with competent
national authorities of the Member States, Union bodies, offices and agencies,
competent authorities of third countries, competent organs of international
organisations and private parties, including through the communication
channels referred to in paragraph 3 and subject to the handling restrictions set
out in Article 42(3);
(e) enable the analysis and systematic cross-checking of information and evidence
in order to identify links between cross-border investigations and prosecutions,
to support case -building by competent national authorities;
(f) preserve, analyse and store evidence in accordance with Article 29;
(g) enable the extraction of data for operational, analytical and statistical purposes;
(h) facilitate monitoring to ensure that the processing of operational personal data
within the system is lawful and complies with this Regulation and the
applicable data protection rules.
3. The case management system shall be connected to the decentralised IT system a
referred to in Article 40. It may also be linked to the secure telecommunications
EN 53 EN
connection referred to in Article 9 of Council Decision 2008/976/JHA and to other
secure communication channels established in accordance with applicable Union
law.
4. Where Eurojust has been granted access to data in or from other Union information
systems established under other Union legal acts, it may use the case management
system to access data in or to connect to such information systems for the purpose of
retrieving and processing information, including personal data, provided that it is
necessary for the performance of its tasks and is in accordance with the Union legal
acts establishing such information systems.
5. Paragraphs 3 and 4 shall not extend the access rights granted to Eurojust to other
Union information systems under the Union legal acts establishing those systems.
6. For the processing of operational personal data, Eurojust shall not carry out any
automated processing outside the integrated data processing environment of the case
management system, except in the cases explicitly provided for under this
Regulation. National Members may temporarily store and analyse personal data for
the purpose of determining whether such data are relevant to Eurojust’s tasks and
whether a case should be opened in the case management system. Those data may be
held for a period not exceeding six months in a secure and controlled environment
provided by Eurojust for this purpose, subject to appropriate safeguards substantially
equivalent to those identified for the case management system. Where, exceptionally,
the National Member has not been able to make that determination within that
period, the period may be extended once for a further period not exceeding six
months.
7. Where Eurojust is authorised to process operational or non-operational personal data
but does not act as controller in respect of such data, it shall ensure the secure
processing thereof. By way of derogation from paragraph 6, Eurojust may, where
necessary, establish a separate system for the processing of such data. Such data shall
not be used for any other task or purpose of Eurojust, including cross-checking.
8. In the performance of their tasks, National Members may process personal data on
the individual cases on which they are working, in accordance with this Regulation
or other applicable instruments. They shall allow the Data Protection Officer to have
access to the personal data processed in the case management system.
Article 42
Management of the information in the case management system
1. The National Member, or any other member of the National Desk acting under their
authority, shall store the information gathered by or transmitted to that National
Member in accordance with this Regulation or other applicable instruments in the
case management system. The National Member shall be responsible for the
management of the data processed by that National Member.
2. The National Member shall decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether to keep access
to the information restricted or to grant access to it, or to parts of it, to one or more of
the following:
(a) other National Members;
(b) liaison prosecutors posted at Eurojust pursuant to Article 63;
EN 54 EN
(c) the EPPO liaison officer seconded to Eurojust pursuant to Article 58;
(d) the contact points posted at Eurojust pursuant to Article 63;
(e) authorised Eurojust staff pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article; or
(f) any other person working on behalf of Eurojust who has received the necessary
authorisation from the Administrative Director pursuant to Article 71(5).
3. Where a link as referred to in Article 41(2), point (e), has been identified, the
National Member shall indicate, in consultation with the competent national
authorities that provided the relevant information, in general or specific terms, any
restrictions on the further handling, access and transfer of that information. Such
restrictions shall be binding on all persons granted access to the information pursuant
to paragraph 2 of this Article and shall be recorded in the case management system
4. Authorised Eurojust staff may store information in the case management system
under the supervision of a National Member or the College, in accordance with this
Regulation.
5. Authorised Eurojust staff shall be granted access to the case management system to
the extent strictly necessary for the performance of the specific tasks assigned to
them under this Regulation, and in particular for the following purposes:
(a) the retention and management of operational knowledge pursuant to Article 31;
(b) the performance of tasks related to own initiative cases pursuant to Article 28;
(c) the processing of requests under the automated hit/no-hit system pursuant to
Article 55, subject to the handling restrictions indicated pursuant to paragraph
3 of this Article.
6. The College shall lay down the details of the practical implementation of paragraph
5.
EN 55 EN
CHAPTER IV
PROCESSING OF INFORMATION
Article 43
Processing of personal data by Eurojust
1. References to 'applicable data protection rules' in this Regulation shall be understood
as references to the provisions on data protection set out in this Regulation and in
Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
2. Eurojust shall determine the time limits for the storage of administrative personal
data in the data protection provisions of its rules of procedure.
Article 44
Processing of operational personal data
1. Where necessary to perform its tasks, Eurojust may, within the framework of its
competence and in order to carry out its operational functions, process by automated
means or in structured manual files in accordance with this Regulation only the
operational personal data listed in point 1 of Annex II of persons who, under the
national law of the Member States concerned, are persons with regard to whom there
are serious grounds for believing that they have committed or are about to commit a
criminal offence in respect of which Eurojust is competent or who have been
convicted of such an offence.
2. Eurojust may process only the operational personal data listed in point 2 of Annex II
of persons who, under the national law of the Member States concerned, are regarded
as victims or other parties to a criminal offence, such as persons who might be called
to testify in a criminal investigation or prosecution regarding one or more of the
types of crime and the criminal offences referred to in Article 6, persons who are
able to provide information on criminal offences, or contacts or associates of a
person referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. The processing of such operational
personal data may only take place if it is necessary for the fulfilment of the tasks of
Eurojust, within the framework of its competence and in order to carry out its
operational functions.
3. In exceptional cases, for a limited period of time which shall not exceed the time
needed for the conclusion of the case in relation to which the data are processed,
Eurojust may also process operational personal data other than the personal data
referred to in Annex II relating to the circumstances of an offence, where such data
are immediately relevant to and are included in ongoing investigations which
Eurojust is coordinating or helping to coordinate and when their processing is
necessary for the purposes specified in paragraph 1. The Data Protection Officer
referred to in Article 50 shall be informed immediately when such operational
personal data are processed, and shall be informed of the specific circumstances
which justify the necessity of the processing of those operational personal data.
Where such other data refer to witnesses or victims within the meaning of paragraph
2, the decision to process them shall be taken jointly by the National Members
concerned.
EN 56 EN
4. Where special categories of operational personal data refer to witnesses or victims
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, the decision to process them shall
be taken by the National Members concerned.
5. Where operational personal data are transmitted in accordance with Article 37
Eurojust may process the operational personal data listed in Annex III of the
following persons:
(a) persons for whom, in accordance with the national law of the Member State
concerned, there are serious grounds for believing that they have committed or
are about to commit a criminal offence in respect of which Eurojust is
competent;
(b) persons who have been convicted of such offence.
6. Unless the competent national authority decides otherwise on a case-by-case basis,
Eurojust may continue to process the operational personal data referred to in point (a)
of paragraph 5 also after the proceedings have been concluded under the national law
of the Member State concerned, even in the event of an acquittal or of a final
decision not to prosecute. Where the proceedings did not result in a conviction,
processing of operational personal data shall take place only in order to identify links
between ongoing, future or concluded investigations and prosecutions as referred to
in Article 41(2), point (c).
Article 45
Time limits for the storage of operational personal data
1. Operational personal data processed by Eurojust shall be stored by Eurojust for only
as long as is necessary for the performance of its tasks. In particular, without
affecting paragraph 4 of this Article, the operational personal data referred to in
Article 44 may not be stored beyond the first applicable date among the following
dates:
(a) the date on which prosecution is barred under the statute of limitations of all
the Member States concerned by the investigation and prosecutions;
(b) the date on which Eurojust is informed that the person has been acquitted and
the judicial decision became final, in which case the Member State concerned
shall inform Eurojust without delay;
(c) three years after the date on which the judicial decision of the last of the
Member States concerned by the investigation or prosecution became final;
(d) the date on which Eurojust and the Member States concerned mutually
established or agreed that it was no longer necessary for Eurojust to coordinate
the investigation and prosecutions, unless there is an obligation to provide
Eurojust with this information in accordance with Article 36(5) or (6);
(e) three years after the date on which operational personal data were transmitted
in accordance with Article 36(5) or (6), unless those data relate to a case in
respect of which criminal proceedings are still pending, including any appeal
proceedings, at the time of expiry of that period, in which case the data may be
retained until a final judgment has been rendered.
EN 57 EN
2. Eurojust shall not store operational personal data transmitted in accordance with
Article 38 beyond the first of the following dates:
(a) the date on which prosecution is barred under the statute of limitations of all
the Member States concerned by the investigation or prosecution;
(b) five years after the date on which the judicial decision of the last of the
Member States concerned by the investigation or prosecution became final, or
two years in the case of an acquittal or final decision not to prosecute;
(c) the date on which Eurojust is informed of the decision of the competent
national authority pursuant to Article 46(5).
3. Observance of the storage deadlines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be
reviewed constantly by appropriate automated processing conducted by Eurojust, in
particular from the moment Eurojust ceases to provide support. A review of the need
to store the data shall also be carried out every three years after they were entered. If
operational personal data referred to in Article 44(4) are stored for a period
exceeding five years, the EDPS shall be informed thereof.
4. Before one of the storage deadlines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 expires,
Eurojust shall review the need for the continued storage of the operational personal
data where and as long as that is necessary to perform its tasks. It may decide by way
of derogation to store those data until the following review. The reasons for the
continued storage shall be justified and recorded. If no decision is taken on the
continued storage of operational personal data at the time of the review, those data
shall be deleted automatically.
5. Where, in accordance with paragraph 3, operational personal data have been stored
beyond the storage deadlines referred to in paragraph 1, the EDPS shall also carry
out a review of the need to store those data every three years.
6. Once the deadline for the storage of the last item of automated data from the file has
expired, all documents in the file shall be destroyed with the exception of any
original documents which Eurojust has received from competent national authorities
and which need to be returned to their provider.
7. Where Eurojust has coordinated an investigation or prosecutions, the National
Members concerned shall inform each other whenever they receive information that
the case has been dismissed or that all judicial decisions related to the case have
become final.
8. Paragraph 6 shall not apply where:
(a) that would damage the interests of a data subject who requires protection; in
such cases, the operational personal data shall be used only with the express
and written consent of the data subject;
(b) the accuracy of the operational personal data is contested by the data subject; in
such cases paragraph 5 shall not apply for a period enabling Member States or
Eurojust, as appropriate, to verify the accuracy of such data;
(c) the operational personal data are to be maintained for purposes of proof or for
the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims;
(d) the data subject opposes the erasure of the operational personal data and
requests the restriction of their use instead; or
EN 58 EN
(e) the operational personal data are further needed for archiving purposes in the
public interest or statistical purposes. Eurojust and Member States shall define
mechanisms to ensure that the security measures referred to in Article 91 of
Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 are addressed across information system
boundaries.
Article 46
Security of operational personal data
Eurojust and Member States shall define mechanisms to ensure that the security measures
referred to in Article 91 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 are addressed across information
system boundaries.
Article 47
Right of access by the data subject
1. Any data subject who wishes to exercise the right of access referred to in Article 80
of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 to operational personal data that relate to the data
subject and which have been processed by Eurojust may make a request to Eurojust
or to the national supervisory authority in the Member State of the data subject’s
choice. That authority shall refer the request to Eurojust without delay, and in any
case within one month of its receipt.
2. The request shall be answered by Eurojust without undue delay and in any case
within three months of its receipt by Eurojust.
3. The competent authorities of the Member States concerned shall be consulted by
Eurojust on the decision to be taken in response to a request. The decision on access
to data shall only be taken by Eurojust in close cooperation with the Member States
directly concerned by the communication of such data. Where a Member State
objects to Eurojust’s proposed decision, it shall notify Eurojust of the reasons for its
objection. Eurojust shall comply with any such objection. The National Members
concerned shall thereafter notify the competent authorities of the content of
Eurojust’s decision.
4. The National Members concerned shall deal with the request and reach a decision on
Eurojust’s behalf. Where the National Members concerned are not in agreement, they
shall refer the matter to the College, which shall take its decision on the request by a
two-thirds majority.
Article 48
Limitations to the right of access
In the cases referred to in Article 81 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, Eurojust shall inform the
data subject after consulting the competent authorities of the Member States concerned in
accordance with Article 47(3) of this Regulation.
EN 59 EN
Article 49
Right to restriction of processing
Without affecting the exceptions set out in Article 45(8) of this Regulation, where the
processing of operational personal data has been restricted under Article 82(3) of Regulation
(EU) 2018/1725, such operational personal data shall only be processed for the protection of
the rights of the data subject or another natural or legal person who is a party to the
proceedings to which Eurojust is a party, or for the purposes laid down in Article 82(3) of
Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
Article 50
Data Protection Officer
1. The Management Board shall designate a Data Protection Officer. The Data
Protection Officer shall be a member of Eurojust staff specifically appointed for this
purpose.
2. The Data Protection Officer shall be appointed for a term of four years and shall be
eligible for reappointment.
3. The Executive Board shall adopt implementing rules concerning the Data Protection
Officer. Those implementing rules shall in particular concern the procedure for the
selection of the Data Protection Officer, and their dismissal, tasks, duties and powers
as well as, safeguards for the independence of the Data Protection Officer.
4. In the exercise of their functions, if the Data Protection Officer considers that the
provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 related to the processing of administrative
personal data or related to the processing of operational personal data have not been
complied with, he or she shall inform the Executive Board, requesting that it resolve
the non-compliance within a specified time. If the Executive Board does not resolve
the non-compliance within the specified time, the Data Protection Officer shall refer
the matter to the EDPS.
Article 51
Notification of a personal data breach to the authorities concerned
1. In the event of a personal data breach, Eurojust shall, without undue delay and
without affecting Articles 34 or 92 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, notify the
competent authorities of the Member States concerned of that breach.
2. The notification referred to in paragraph 1 shall, as a minimum, describe the
following:
(a) the nature of the personal data breach including, where possible and
appropriate, the categories and number of data subjects concerned and the
categories and number of data records concerned;
(b) the likely consequences of the personal data breach;
(c) the measures proposed or taken by Eurojust to address the personal data
breach.
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3. Where appropriate, the notification referred to in paragraph 1 shall recommend
measures to mitigate the possible adverse effects of the personal data breach.
Article 52
Cooperation between the EDPS and national supervisory authorities
1. The EDPS shall act in close cooperation with national supervisory authorities with
respect to specific issues requiring national involvement, in particular if the EDPS or
a national supervisory authority finds major discrepancies between practices of the
Member States or potentially unlawful transfers using Eurojust’s communication
channels, or in the context of questions raised by one or more national supervisory
authorities on the implementation and interpretation of this Regulation.
2. In the cases referred to in paragraph 1, coordinated supervision shall be ensured in
accordance with Article 62 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
3. The EDPS shall keep national supervisory authorities fully informed of all issues that
directly affect them or are otherwise relevant to them. Upon a request from one or
more national supervisory authorities, the EDPS shall inform them on specific issues.
4. In cases relating to data originating from one or several Member States, the EDPS
shall consult the national supervisory authorities concerned. The EDPS shall not
decide on further action to be taken before those national supervisory authorities
have informed the EDPS of their position, within a deadline specified by the EDPS.
That deadline shall not be shorter than one month or longer than three months. The
EDPS shall take utmost account of the position of the national supervisory
authorities concerned. In cases where the EDPS intends not to follow their position,
he or she shall inform them, provide a justification, and submit the matter to the
European Data Protection Board. In cases which the EDPS considers to be extremely
urgent, he or she may decide to take immediate action. In such cases, the EDPS shall
immediately inform the national supervisory authorities concerned and substantiate
the urgent nature of the situation and justify the action he or she has taken.
5. National supervisory authorities shall keep the EDPS informed of any actions they
take with respect to the transfer, retrieval, or any other communication of operational
personal data under this Regulation by the Member States.
Article 53
Responsibility in data protection matters
1. Eurojust shall process operational personal data in such a way that it can be
established which authority provided the data or from where the data were retrieved.
2. Responsibility for the accuracy of operational personal data shall lie with:
(a) Eurojust for operational personal data provided by a Member State, or by a
Union institution, body, office or agency where the data provided has been
altered in the course of processing by Eurojust;
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(b) the Member State or the Union institution, office, body or agency which
provided the data to Eurojust, where the data provided has not been altered in
the course of processing by Eurojust;
(c) Eurojust for operational personal data provided by third countries or by
international organisations, for operational personal data retrieved by Eurojust
from publicly available sources, and for operational personal data received
from private parties.
3. Responsibility for compliance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 in relation to
administrative personal data and for compliance with this Regulation and with
Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 in relation to operational personal data shall lie with
Eurojust. Responsibility for the legality of a transmission of operational personal
data shall lie:
(a) where a Member State has provided the operational personal data concerned to
Eurojust, with that Member State;
(b) with Eurojust, where it has provided the operational personal data concerned to
Member States, to Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, to third
countries or to international organisations.
4. Subject to other provisions of this Regulation, Eurojust shall be responsible for all
data processed by it.
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CHAPTER V
RELATIONS WITH PARTNERS
SECTION I
COMMON PROVISIONS
Article 54
Common provisions
1. Where necessary for the achievement of the objectives set out in this Regulation,
Eurojust may establish and maintain cooperative relations with Union institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies in accordance with their respective objectives, and with
the competent authorities of third countries and international organisations in
accordance with the cooperation strategy referred to in Article 65.
2. Where relevant to the performance of its tasks and subject to any restrictions
pursuant to Article 36(8) and Article 80, Eurojust may exchange any information
with the entities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article directly, with the exception
of operational personal data.
3. For the purposes set out in paragraphs 1 and 2, Eurojust may, subject to prior
consultation with the Commission, conclude working arrangements with the entities
referred to in paragraph 1. Such working arrangements shall not form the basis for
allowing the exchange of personal data and shall not create legal obligations
incumbent on the Union or its Member States.
4. Eurojust may receive and process personal data received from the entities referred to
in paragraph 1 in so far as necessary for the performance of its tasks, subject to the
applicable data protection rules.
5. Where the data to be transmitted have been provided by a Member State, Eurojust
shall obtain the consent of the relevant competent authority in that Member State,
unless the Member State has granted its prior authorisation to such onward
transmission, either in general terms or subject to specific restrictions. Such consent
may be withdrawn at any time.
6. Where Member States, Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, third countries
or international organisations have received personal data from Eurojust, onward
transmission of such data to third parties shall be prohibited unless all of the
following conditions have been met:
(a) Eurojust has obtained prior consent from the competent national authorities
that provided the data;
(b) Eurojust has given its explicit consent after considering the circumstances of
the case at hand;
(c) the onward transmission is only for a specific purpose that is not incompatible
with the purpose for which the data were transmitted.
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Article 55
Common provisions on indirect information exchange on the basis of a hit/no-hit system
1. Eurojust shall take all appropriate measures to ensure indirect access by other Union
bodies, offices and agencies, where such access is provided for in Union law, to
information held by Eurojust, under conditions of reciprocity, by means of an
automated hit/no-hit system operated through the searching of indexes which shall be
kept up to date.
2. Indirect access to information under the first paragraph shall not affect any
restrictions indicated by the Member States, Union institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies, third countries or international organisations providing the information.
3. In the case of a hit, Eurojust shall initiate the procedure by which the information
that generated the hit is to be transmitted to the searching Union body, office or
agency, as referred to in paragraph 1, in accordance with the restrictions set by the
provider of the information pursuant to this Regulation. In case of a hit with
information that is subject to restrictions, the automated hit/no-hit system referred to
in paragraph 1 shall not notify the searching Union body, office or agency of that hit.
In that case, Eurojust shall expeditiously contact the provider of the information to
enquire if the information that generated the hit can be shared with the searching
Union body, office or agency. Where the provider of the information lifts those
restrictions, Eurojust shall transmit the information that generated the hit to the
searching Union body, office or agency. Where the provider of the information
maintains those restrictions, Eurojust shall comply with those restrictions and not
transmit the information that generated the hit to the searching Union body, office or
agency.
4. Searches of information in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be carried out
only for the purpose of identifying whether information available at another Union
body, office or agency matches information processed at Eurojust.
5. While preserving the automated nature of the hit/no-hit system, Eurojust shall allow
searches in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 only by persons designated by other
Union bodies, offices or agencies as authorised to perform such searches.
6. Under the conditions of reciprocity referred to in the first paragraph, Eurojust shall,
within the limits of its competence, have indirect access, on the basis of an
automated hit/no-hit system, to information provided to Union bodies, offices and
agencies, subject to the conditions set out in Union law.
Such access shall not affect any restrictions indicated by the Member State, Union
institution, body, office or agency, third country or international organisation that
providing that information.
7. Eurojust and other Union bodies, offices and agencies shall inform each other if, as a
result of a hit in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3, there are indications that data
may be incorrect or may conflict with other data.
8. Where necessary for the implementation of the hit/no-hit system referred to in
paragraphs 1 to 7, the technical procedure, including the data sets that should be
included in the indexes as well as performance and availability requirements, shall be
laid down by means of implementing acts adopted in accordance with Article 84(2).
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SECTION II
RELATIONS WITH UNION BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES
Article 56
Relations with the European Judicial Network and other Union networks involved in
judicial cooperation in criminal matters
1. Eurojust and the European Judicial Network in criminal matters shall maintain
privileged relations with each other in criminal matters, based on consultation and
complementarity, in particular through the members of each National Desk
designated as contact points for the European Judicial Network in accordance with
Article 17. The complementarity between Eurojust and the European Judicial
Network shall be exercised in accordance with their respective mandates. Eurojust
shall exercise its competence in cases involving serious cross-border crime where the
effective conduct of investigations or prosecutions requires the coordination of
competent national authorities, involve third countries or international organisations
or require the development of a common prosecutorial strategy across two or more
jurisdictions. To that end, the following arrangements shall apply:
(a) the Secretariat of the European Judicial Network shall form part of the staff of
Eurojust; it may draw on the administrative resources of Eurojust which are
necessary for the performance of the European Judicial Network’s tasks,
including for covering the costs of the plenary meetings of the European
Judicial Network;
(b) contact points of the European Judicial Network may be invited on a case-by-
case basis to attend relevant Eurojust meetings;
(c) Eurojust and the European Judicial Network may make use of the Eurojust
national coordination system established pursuant to Article 35 when
determining whether a request should be handled with the assistance of
Eurojust or the European Judicial Network.
2. Eurojust shall support the following networks and bodies active in judicial
cooperation in criminal matters:
(a) the European Judicial Network, established by Decision 2008/976/JHA;
(b) the European network of contact points in respect of persons responsible for
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, established by Decision
2002/494/JHA;
(c) the network of contact points against corruption, established by Decision
2008/852/JHA;
(d) the JITs Network,
(e) the European Judicial Cybercrime Network;
(f) the European Judicial Organised Crime Network;
(g) other specialised networks or bodies of judicial practitioners active in areas
falling within Eurojust's mandate.
3. The networks and bodies referred to in paragraph 2 may draw on the administrative
resources of Eurojust where necessary for the performance of their tasks.
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4. The connection between the networks and bodies referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2
and the competent national authorities shall be ensured at national level through the
Eurojust national coordination system established pursuant to Article 35.
5. Networks and bodies referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall contribute to Eurojust's
retention of knowledge and may participate in the work of ECE in accordance with
Articles 30 and 31 respectively.
Article 57
Relations with Europol
1. Eurojust shall establish and maintain close cooperation with Europol, with a view to
ensuring the coherent and coordinated exercise of their respective mandates and
avoiding duplication of effort.
2. Eurojust shall conclude a working arrangement with Europol53, including any
amendment thereof, in consultation with the Commission, setting out the practical
modalities of their cooperation. That arrangement shall be subject to regular review,
where necessary and, in any event, upon request of the Commission.
3. Where, in the context of Eurojust's activities, including at any stage of a joint
investigation team, Eurojust or a Member State identifies the need for coordination,
cooperation or support falling within Europol's mandate, Eurojust shall notify
Europol thereof and shall initiate the procedure for sharing the relevant information
in accordance with the decision of the Member State that provided it. In such cases,
Eurojust shall consult with Europol.
4. Where Eurojust receives a notification pursuant to Article 74, paragraph 1 of
Regulation (EU) [Europol Regulation] indicating that judicial follow-up may
be required, it shall, without undue delay, examine the information received and take
all appropriate measures within its mandate, including by informing the competent
authorities of the Member States concerned and, where appropriate, acting on its own
initiative in accordance with Article 28. Eurojust shall consult Europol,
as appropriate, and shall keep Europol informed of the use made of
that information, in accordance with the decision of the Member State that provided
the information.
5. Eurojust and Europol may, where necessary for the achievement of their objectives
and with the consent of the competent national authorities of the Member States
concerned, establish coordination mechanisms, including joint operational
platforms to support strategic and operational coordination in cross-border criminal
investigations requiring coordination between two or more Member States For the
purposes of such coordination mechanisms, Member States may determine
information to be made directly accessible to the Member States, Eurojust and
Europol for joint operational analysis in specific investigations or crime area, without
prejudice to any restrictions indicated by the Member States and subject to the rules
and safeguards for personal data processing set out in this Regulation.
53 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions
2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p.
53).
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6. In the context of cross-border criminal investigations supported by Eurojust, Eurojust
may, with the agreement of the competent national authorities, request Europol to
provide support, in particular by:
(a) providing relevant information, analyses, expertise and operational support;
(b) carrying out operational analysis on the basis of investigative data supplied by
Eurojust, the Member States or other competent authorities;
(c) cross-checking information against its databases and exchanging information
as provided for in Article 55
7. This Article shall not affect any restriction of access or use, whether in general or
specific terms, indicated by a Member State, a Union body, office or agency, a third
country or an international organisation in relation to information that it has
provided, which Europol shall respect.
8. Eurojust shall cooperate with Europol, within their respective mandates, in
supporting the competent authorities of the Member States in the context of
digital investigations and access to data, and in particular act as a knowledge hub for
advising, assisting and providing capacity building on the cross-border access to e-
evidence.
Article 58
Relations with the EPPO
1. Eurojust shall establish and maintain a close relationship with the EPPO based on
mutual cooperation within their respective mandates and competences. The President
of Eurojust and the European Chief Prosecutor shall meet on a regular basis to
discuss issues of common interest. They shall meet at the request of the President of
Eurojust or of the European Chief Prosecutor.
2. Eurojust and the EPPO shall cooperate closely and shall, to the extent necessary for
the performance of their tasks and within their respective mandates, exchange
information in a timely and efficient manner, in accordance with Article 55.
3. Eurojust shall assist the EPPO, in particular in cases where investigative measures or
other forms of cooperation are required in Member States which do not participate
in enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO or third countries or
requiring coordination between investigations conducted by the EPPO and those
conducted by competent authorities of the Member States which do not participate in
the EPPO. To that end, upon request of the EPPO, or the competent national
authorities of the Member States, Eurojust shall support the EPPO in the
performance of its tasks, including by:
(a) facilitating the setting up and operation of joint investigation teams;
(b) organising coordination meetings and centres;
(c) facilitating judicial cooperation with Member States which do not participate in
enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO or third countries.
4. Eurojust shall treat requests for support from the EPPO without undue delay and,
where appropriate, as if they had been submitted by a national authority competent
for judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
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5. The support provided pursuant to paragraph 3 shall not affect the independence of
the EPPO in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions.
6. In operational matters falling within the competence of the EPPO, Eurojust shall
inform the EPPO of, and, where appropriate, associate it with, its activities relating to
cross-border cases, including by
(a) sharing relevant information on its cases, including personal data, in
accordance with this Regulation; or
(b) requesting the EPPO to provide support.
7. In accordance with Article 24(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, Eurojust shall,
without undue delay, report to the EPPO any criminal conduct in respect of which
the EPPO could exercise its competence in accordance with Regulation (EU)
2017/1939.
8. When Eurojust receives information from the EPPO on forms of crime falling
outside the scope of the EPPO’s competence and within Eurojust’s mandate,
Eurojust shall examine the information received and take any appropriate action
within its mandate.
9. For the purposes of cooperation under this Article, the EPPO shall second a liaison
officer to Eurojust. The liaison officer shall be granted access to the case
management system for the purpose of the secure exchange of data relevant to the
performance of their functions, including, where appropriate, the opening,
registration and management of cases falling within the scope of cooperation
between Eurojust and the EPPO under this Article. Eurojust shall remain liable for
the processing of personal data by the liaison officer in the case management system.
10. Representatives of the EPPO, including its liaison officer, shall be invited to
participate in meetings of the College of Eurojust where matters of common interest
are discussed.
11. The practical arrangements for the implementation of this Article shall be laid down
in a working arrangement between Eurojust and the EPPO, which shall be subject to
regular review.
Article 59
Relations with other Union bodies, offices and agencies
1. Eurojust shall establish and maintain cooperative relations with the Union bodies,
offices and agencies referred to in this Article, to the extent necessary for the
achievement of its objectives and the performance of its tasks under this Regulation,
within their respective mandates and in full compliance with the applicable data
protection rules.
2. Eurojust shall establish and maintain cooperative relations with OLAF with a view to
facilitating OLAF's contribution shall contribute to Eurojust's coordination work
regarding the protection of the financial interests of the Union, in accordance with its
mandate under Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. To that end:
(a) for the purposes of receiving and transmitting information between Eurojust
and OLAF, and without affecting Article 8 of this Regulation, Member States
shall ensure that the National Members of Eurojust are regarded as competent
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authorities of the Member States solely for the purposes of Regulation (EU,
Euratom) No 883/2013;
(b) the exchange of information between OLAF and the National Members shall
be without prejudice to not affect any obligations to provide such information
to other competent authorities under Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013
or any other applicable Union or national law;
3. Eurojust shall establish and maintain cooperative relations with the European Border
and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), governed by Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the
European Parliament and of the Council54,with a view to facilitating Frontex
contribution to Eurojust's work, including by transmitting relevant information
processed in accordance with its mandate, in particular as regards criminal activities
falling within Eurojust's competence under Article 6 of this Regulation. The practical
modalities of cooperation between Eurojust and Frontex shall be set out in a working
arrangement concluded in accordance with Article 58(3) of this Regulation.
4. Eurojust shall establish and maintain cooperative relations with AMLA, and shall
conclude a working arrangement with AMLA setting out the details of their
cooperation in accordance with Article 54(3) of this Regulation. To that end:
(a) Member States shall ensure that the National Members of Eurojust are
regarded as relevant national authorities for the purposes of Article 27(8) of
Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, in order to facilitate the exchange of information
between AMLA and Eurojust in cases falling within Eurojust's competence;
(b) the exchange of information between AMLA and the National Members shall
not affect any obligations to provide such information to other competent
authorities under Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 or any other applicable Union or
national law;
5. Eurojust shall establish and maintain cooperative relations with the EU Customs
Authority, once established, and shall conclude a working arrangement setting out
the modalities of their cooperation in accordance with Article 54(3) of this
Regulation, with a view to facilitating judicial cooperation in criminal matters
involving customs offences and other crimes affecting the Union's financial and
economic interests.
SECTION III
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Article 60
Relations with the authorities of third countries and international organisations
1. Eurojust may establish and maintain cooperation with authorities of third countries
and international organisations, including by concluding working arrangements as
referred to Article 54 (3).
54 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the
European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (OJ L
295, 14.11.2019, p. 1).
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2. Eurojust shall, after prior consultation with the Commission, adopt a cooperation
strategy every four years on strengthening judicial cooperation with third countries
and international organisations, including with a view to concluding working
arrangements referred to in paragraph (1) and to posting contact points at Eurojust as
referred to in Article 63. Such strategy shall be implemented in cooperation with the
Commission.
Article 61
Liaison officers posted to third countries
1. For the purpose of facilitating judicial cooperation of Member States with third
countries, Eurojust may post liaison officers to a third country subject to the
existence of a working arrangement as referred to in Article 54(3) with the competent
authorities of that third country.
2. The liaison officer shall be a member of Eurojust staff and shall have adequate
expertise in judicial cooperation.
3. The tasks of the liaison officers shall include any activity designed to encourage and
accelerate judicial cooperation in criminal matters, in particular by establishing direct
contacts with the competent authorities of the third country. National Members may
authorise the liaison officers, under their supervision and responsibility, to exchange
operational personal data involving their Member State directly with the competent
authorities of the third country.
4. The competent authorities of the Member States and liaison officers referred to in
paragraph 1 may contact each other directly. In such cases, the liaison officer shall
inform the National Member concerned of such contacts.
5. The liaison officers shall report to the College on a regular basis. The liaison officer
shall inform National Members and competent national authorities of all cases
concerning their Member State.
6. The liaison officers shall have access to the case management system and their
operational exchanges with third countries shall be recorded therein.
Article 62
Liaison prosecutors posted at Eurojust
1. A liaison prosecutor from a third country or from an international organisation may
be seconded to Eurojust where:
(a) a cooperation agreement concluded before 12 December 2019 between
Eurojust and that third country;
(b) an international agreement concluded between the Union and that third country
or international organisation pursuant to Article 218 TFEU; or
(c) an adequacy decision adopted by the Commission in accordance with Article
36 of Directive (EU) 2016/680.
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2. The rights and obligations of the liaison prosecutor shall be set out in the cooperation
agreement or in the international agreement referred to in paragraph 1 and may be
supplemented by a working arrangement as referred to in Article 54(3).
3. Liaison prosecutors seconded to Eurojust shall be granted access to the case
management system for the secure exchange of data relevant for the performance of
their functions, including, where appropriate, the opening, registration and
management of cases. Eurojust shall remain liable for the processing of personal
data by liaison prosecutors in the case management system.
4. Transfers of operational personal data to liaison prosecutors through the case
management system shall take place only in compliance with this Regulation and
Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
5. As regards the management of the data by liaison prosecutors and access to
information, Article 42 paragraphs 1 and 2, shall apply mutatis mutandis.
6. The College shall lay down the detailed conditions governing the access of liaison
prosecutors to the case management system.
Article 63
Contact points posted at Eurojust
1. Eurojust may, on the basis of a working arrangement concluded in accordance with
Article 54(3), cooperate with contact points designated by the competent authorities
of a third country and hosted at Eurojust for that purpose.
2. Contact points posted at Eurojust may:
(a) expedite, coordinate or facilitate the execution of requests for judicial
cooperation in criminal matters;
(b) support communication and coordination between Eurojust, the Member States
and the competent authorities of the third country;
(c) provide information on the national law and procedures of the third country
relevant to judicial cooperation;
(d) facilitate the participation of the competent authorities of the third country in
coordination meetings, coordination centres and judicial coordination platforms
organised by Eurojust, as well as in joint investigation teams supported by
Eurojust; and
(e) submit requests to Eurojust for assistance in relation to the matters referred to
in points (a) to (d).
3. Contact points posted at Eurojust shall be designated by the competent authority of
the third country from among officials of prosecution services, central authorities or
equivalent services of ministries of justice with competence in judicial cooperation in
criminal matters.
4. The practical modalities of cooperation with contact points posted at Eurojust shall
be laid down in the working arrangement referred to in paragraph 1.
5. Contact points posted at Eurojust shall be granted access to the case management
system for the purpose of the secure exchange of data. Such access shall be limited to
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data relevant to the performance of their functions as set out in paragraph 2,
including, where appropriate, the opening, registration and management of cases.
Any exchange of operational personal data shall take place exclusively in accordance
with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 and in compliance with Article 54(3).
6. Eurojust shall remain liable for the processing of personal data by contact points
posted at Eurojust in the case management system.
7. Article 42, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis to contact points hosted
at Eurojust.
8. The College shall lay down the detailed conditions governing the access of contact
points hosted at Eurojust to the case management system and to other Eurojust
services.
Article 64
Contact points in third countries and international organisations
1. Eurojust may cooperate with contact points designated by the competent authorities
of a third country or of an international organisation and based in that third country
or international organisation.
2. Through its contact points in third countries and international organisations, Eurojust
shall seek to support and facilitate cooperation with the competent authorities of the
third country or international organisation concerned, in particular in cases involving
serious crime with a cross-border dimension. When acting pursuant to this paragraph,
those contact points may perform the functions referred to in Article 63(2) as laid
down in the in the working arrangement concluded in accordance with Article 54(3).
3. For the purposes of this Article, Eurojust shall seek to ensure that its contact points in
third countries and international organisations are designated from among officials of
prosecution services, central authorities or equivalent services of ministries of justice
with competence in judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
4. Contact points in third countries and international organisations shall not have access
to the case management system or to operational personal data held by Eurojust.
5. Without affecting paragraph 4, any exchange of operational personal data with the
third country or international organisation concerned shall be carried out by Eurojust
in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725. Such operational personal data may
only be entered into the case management system by authorised Eurojust staff.
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CHAPTER VI
ESTABLISHMENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE BUDGET
Article 65
Establishment of the budget
1. Each year, the Administrative Director shall draw up a draft statement of estimates of
Eurojust’s revenue and expenditure for the following financial year, including the
establishment plan, and shall submit it to the Executive Board. The European
Judicial Network and, where appropriate, other Union networks involved in judicial
cooperation in criminal matters referred to in Article 56 shall be informed of the
parts related to their activities in due time before the estimate is forwarded to the
Commission.
2. The Executive Board shall, on the basis of that draft, examine the provisional draft
estimate of Eurojust’s revenue and expenditure for the following financial year and
shall forward it to the Management Board.
3. The draft estimate of Eurojust’s revenue and expenditure, as approved by the
Management Board, shall be sent to the Commission by 31 January of each year.
4. The Commission shall transmit the statement of estimates to the budgetary authority
together with the draft general budget of the Union.
5. On the basis of the statement of estimates, the Commission shall enter in the draft
general budget of the Union the estimates it considers necessary for the
establishment plan, which it shall submit to the budgetary authority in accordance
with Articles 313 and 314 TFEU.
6. The budgetary authority shall authorise the appropriations for the contribution to
Eurojust.
7. The budgetary authority shall adopt Eurojust’s establishment plan.
8. Eurojust's budget shall be adopted by the Management Board. It shall become
definitive following the final adoption of the general budget of the Union. Where
necessary, it shall be adjusted by the Management Board accordingly.
Article 66
Structure of the budget
1. Estimates of all revenue and expenditure of Eurojust shall be prepared for each
financial year and shall be shown in Eurojust’s budget. The financial year shall
correspond to the calendar year.
2. Eurojust’s budget shall be balanced in terms of revenue and expenditure.
3. Without affecting other resources, Eurojust’s revenue shall comprise the following:
(a) a contribution from the Union entered in the general budget of the Union;
(b) any voluntary financial contributions from the Member States;
(c) any contributions from third countries participating in the work of the Eurojust;
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(d) Union funding in the form of contribution agreements or ad hoc grants, in
accordance with Eurojust’s financial rules referred to in Article 69 and the
provisions of the relevant Union instruments supporting its policies, taking into
account the exceptional nature of such agreements;
(e) charges for publications and for any services provided by Eurojust.
4. The expenditure of Eurojust shall include staff remuneration, administrative and
infrastructure expenditure and operational expenditure.
Article 67
Implementation of the budget
1. The Administrative Director shall act as the authorising officer and shall implement
Eurojust’s budget in compliance with the principles of economy, efficiency and
effectiveness, and in accordance with the principle of sound financial management.
2. Each year the Administrative Director shall submit to the budgetary authority all
information relevant to the results of evaluation procedures.
Article 68
Presentation of accounts and discharge
1. Eurojust's accounting officer shall send the provisional accounts for the financial
year (year N) to the Commission's Accounting Officer and to the Court of Auditors
by 1 March of the following financial year (year N + 1).
2. Eurojust shall send the report on the budgetary and financial management for year N
to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors
by 31 March of year N + 1.
3. The Commission's Accounting Officer shall send Eurojust's provisional accounts for
year N, consolidated with the Commission's accounts, to the Court of Auditors by 31
March of year N + 1.
4. In accordance with Article 246(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, the Court
of Auditors shall make its observations on Eurojust's provisional accounts by 1 June
of year N + 1.
5. On receipt of the Court of Auditors' observations on Eurojust's provisional accounts
pursuant to Article 246 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, the Administrative
Director shall draw up Eurojust's final accounts under their own responsibility and
shall submit them to the Executive Board for an opinion.
6. The Executive Board shall deliver an opinion on Eurojust's final accounts for year N
and forward those accounts together with its opinion to the Management Board for
adoption.
7. The Management Board shall deliver its opinion on Eurojust's final accounts for year
N.
8. The Administrative Director shall, by 1 July of year N + 1, send the final accounts
for year N to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of
Auditors, together with the Executive Board's opinion and the Management Board's
opinion.
EN 74 EN
9. A link to the pages of the website containing the final accounts of Eurojust shall be
published in the Official Journal of the European Union by 15 November of year N +
1.
10. The Administrative Director shall send the Court of Auditors a reply to its
observations by 30 September of year N + 1. The Administrative Director shall also
send this reply to the Executive Board, the Management Board and the Commission.
11. At the European Parliament's request, the Administrative Director shall submit to it
any information required for the smooth application of the discharge procedure for
the financial year in question, in accordance with Article 261(3) of Regulation (EU,
Euratom) 2024/2509.
12. On a recommendation from the Council acting by a qualified majority, the European
Parliament shall, before 15 May of year N + 2, grant a discharge to the
Administrative Director in respect of the implementation of the budget for year N.
13. The discharge of Eurojust's budget shall be granted by the European Parliament on a
recommendation of the Council following a procedure comparable to that provided
for in Article 319 TFEU and Articles 260, 261 and 262 of Regulation (EU, Euratom)
2024/2509, and based on the audit report of the Court of Auditors.
14. If the European Parliament refuses to grant the discharge by 15 May of year N + 2,
the Administrative Director shall be invited to explain their position to the
Management Board, which shall take its final decision on the matter. The
Management Board may, where appropriate, take any necessary measures, including
measures relating to the Administrative Director's mandate, in accordance with this
Regulation.
Article 69
Financial Rules
1. The financial rules applicable to Eurojust shall be adopted by the Management Board
after consulting the Commission. They shall not depart from Delegated Regulation
(EU) 2019/71555 unless such a departure is specifically required for Eurojust’s
operation and the Commission has given its prior consent.
2. Eurojust shall establish and implement its budget in accordance with its financial
rules and the Regulation (EU, Euratom)2024/2509.
3. In respect of the financial support to be provided to joint investigation teams’
activities, Eurojust and Europol shall jointly establish the rules and conditions upon
which applications for such support are to be processed.
4. Eurojust may award grants related to the fulfilment of its tasks under Article 4(1).
Grants provided for tasks relating to Article 4(1), point (d), may be awarded to the
Member States without a call for proposals.
55 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial
regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 122, 10.5.2019,
p. 1).
EN 75 EN
Article 70
Preventing and combating fraud and irregularities
1. In order to combat fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity the provisions of
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, shall apply without restriction.
2. The Court of Auditors shall have the power of audit, on the basis of documents and
on the spot, over all grant beneficiaries, contractors and subcontractors who have
received Union funds from Eurojust.
3. OLAF may carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections
with a view to establishing whether there has been fraud, corruption or any other
illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union or serious matters
relating to the discharge of professional duties constituting a dereliction of the
obligations of officials and other servants of the Union liable to result in disciplinary
or, as the case may be, criminal proceedings, in accordance with the provisions and
procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 and Regulation
(Euratom, EC) No 2185/96.
4. Without affecting paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, working arrangements with authorities of
third countries and international organisations, contracts, grant agreements and grant
decisions of Eurojust shall contain provisions expressly empowering the Court of
Auditors and OLAF to conduct such audits and investigations, according to their
respective competences.
5. The staff of Eurojust, the Administrative Director and the members of the College
and Executive Board shall, without delay and without their responsibility being
called into question as a result, notify OLAF and the EPPO of any suspicion of
irregular or illegal activity within their respective mandate which has come to their
attention in the fulfilment of their duties.
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CHAPTER VII
STAFF
Article 71
General provisions
1. Eurojust shall employ staff necessary for the performance of its tasks and the
functioning of its services.
2. The staff shall be placed under the authority of the Administrative Director and shall
act in accordance with their instructions, without affecting the powers conferred on
other bodies of Eurojust under this Regulation.
3. The Administrative Director shall be responsible for the management of the staff in
accordance with the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, which,
together with the rules adopted by agreement between the institutions of the Union
for giving effect thereto, shall apply to the staff of Eurojust. Where the Management
Board so decides pursuant to Article 10(2), the Administrative Director shall also
exercise the powers of the appointing authority in respect of the staff of Eurojust,
including recruitment, supervision, evaluation and the exercise of disciplinary
authority.
4. The staff shall support Eurojust in carrying out its operational and administrative
functions, in particular:
(a) supporting National Desks and competent national authorities with cross-
border investigations and prosecutions;
(b) case management and operational analysis;
(c) human resources management;
(d) budgetary and financial administration;
(e) information technology and data management;
(f) strategic, legal and policy support;
(g) security and facility management;
(h) communication and knowledge management;
(i) external relations and institutional matters.
5. For the purposes of this Regulation, “authorised Eurojust staff” means members of
staff designated by the Administrative Director to perform specific operational,
administrative or technical tasks, including tasks involving access to operational
personal data and to the case management system.
6. When exercising operational functions, authorised Eurojust staff shall act under the
authority of the Administrative Director and, where appropriate, under the
supervision of the National Members or the College in accordance with this
Regulation and the applicable internal rules.
7. The staff shall provide expertise on fundamental rights matters and, where deemed
necessary or where requested, shall advise on any activity of Eurojust from a
EN 77 EN
fundamental rights perspective, without impeding or delaying those activities. In that
context, they may issue non-binding opinions on relevant documents or measures.
They shall contribute to ensuring respect for fundamental rights within Eurojust in
the performance of its tasks and activities.
Article 72
Seconded national experts and other staff
Eurojust may make use of seconded national experts and other staff not employed by
Eurojust. The provisions of Article 71 shall not apply to the persons referred to in this Article.
EN 78 EN
CHAPTER VIII
EVALUATION AND REPORTING
Article 73
Involvement of the Union institutions and national parliaments
1. Eurojust shall transmit its consolidated annual report to the European Parliament, to
the Council and to national parliaments, which may present observations and
conclusions. The annual report shall be transmitted by 1 May of each year. The
Commission shall adopt implementing acts establishing reporting indicators to
ensure a uniform approach to the collection and presentation of information by
Eurojust in respect of crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union.
2. Upon their election, the newly elected President of Eurojust shall address the
competent committee or committees of the European Parliament and answer
questions put by its members. Discussions shall not refer directly or indirectly to
concrete actions taken in relation to specific operational cases.
3. The President of Eurojust shall appear once a year for the joint evaluation of the
activities of Eurojust by the European Parliament and national parliaments within the
framework of an interparliamentary committee meeting, to discuss Eurojust's current
activities and to present its consolidated annual report or other key documents of
Eurojust. Discussions shall not refer directly or indirectly to concrete actions taken in
relation to specific operational cases.
4. In addition to the other obligations of information and consultation set out in this
Regulation, Eurojust shall transmit to the European Parliament and to national
parliaments in their respective official languages for their information:
(a) the results of studies and strategic projects elaborated or commissioned by
Eurojust;
(b) the programming document referred to in Article 12;
(c) working arrangements concluded with third parties.
Article 74
Evaluation
1. Not later than five years after the entry into force of this Regulation, and every five
years thereafter, the Commission shall commission an evaluation of Eurojust's
performance in relation to its objectives, tasks, governance and location in
accordance with Commission's guidelines. The Management Board shall be heard in
the evaluation.
2. The evaluation shall, in particular, address the possible need to modify the mandate
of Eurojust, and the financial implications of any such modification.
3. On the occasion of every second evaluation, there shall be an assessment of the
results achieved by Eurojust having regard to its objectives, mandate, governance
and tasks, including an assessment of whether the continuation of Eurojust is still
justified with regard to those objectives, mandate, governance and tasks.
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4. The Commission shall report to the European Parliament, the Council and the
Management Board on the evaluation findings. The findings of the evaluation shall
be made public.
EN 80 EN
CHAPTER IX
GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 75
Privileges and immunities
Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty
on European Union and to the on the Functioning of the European Union shall apply to
Eurojust and its staff56.
Article 76
Language arrangements
1. The provisions laid down in Council Regulation No 157 shall apply to Eurojust.
2. The Management Board shall decide Eurojust's internal language arrangements by a
two-thirds majority of its members.
3. Translation and all other linguistic services required by Eurojust, other than
interpretation, shall be provided by the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the
European Union, as established by Council Regulation (EC) No 2965/9458.
Article 77
Confidentiality
1. The National Members and their Deputies and Assistants, Eurojust staff, national
correspondents, seconded national experts, liaison officers, the Data Protection
Officer, and the members and staff of the EDPS shall be bound by an obligation of
confidentiality with respect to any information which has come to their knowledge in
the course of the performance of their tasks.
2. The obligation of confidentiality shall apply to all persons and to all bodies that work
with Eurojust.
3. The obligation of confidentiality shall also apply after leaving office or employment
and after the termination of the activities of the persons referred to in paragraphs 1
and 2.
4. The obligation of confidentiality shall apply to all information received or exchanged
by Eurojust, unless that information has already lawfully been made public or is
accessible to the public.
56 Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union (OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 266). 57 Council Regulation No 1 of 15 April 1958 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic
Community (OJ 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385). 58 Council Regulation (EC) No 2965/94 of 28 November 1994 setting up a Translation Centre for bodies of the
European Union (OJ L 314, 7.12.1994, p. 1).
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Article 78
Conditions of confidentiality of national proceedings
1. Without affecting Article 36(3), where information is received or exchanged via
Eurojust, the authority of the Member State which provided the information may
stipulate conditions, pursuant to its national law, on the use by the receiving authority
of that information in national proceedings.
2. The authority of the Member State which receives the information referred to in
paragraph 1 shall be bound by those conditions.
Article 79
Transparency and communication
1. Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council59
shall apply to documents held by Eurojust. The Management Board shall, within six
months of the date of its first meeting, adopt the detailed rules for applying
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
2. Decisions taken by Eurojust under Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 may
be the subject of a complaint to the European Ombudsman or of an action before the
Court, under the conditions laid down in Articles 228 and 263 TFEU respectively.
3. Eurojust shall publish on its website a list of the Executive Board members and
summaries of the outcome of the meetings of the Executive Board. The publication
of those summaries shall be temporarily or permanently omitted or restricted if such
publication would risk jeopardising the performance of Eurojust’s tasks, taking into
account its obligations of discretion and confidentiality and the operational character
of Eurojust.
4. The Management Board shall, within six months of the date of its first meeting,
establish measures for the application of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 by Eurojust,
including those concerning the appointment of a Data Protection Office. Those
measures shall be established after consultation of the EDPS.
5. Eurojust may engage in communication activities on its own initiative within its field
of competence. The allocation of resources to communication activities shall not be
detrimental to the effective exercise of the tasks of Eurojust. Communication
activities shall be carried out in accordance with relevant communication and
dissemination plans adopted by the Management Board.
Article 80
Security rules on the protection of classified and sensitive non-classified information
1. Eurojust shall adopt security rules that shall be based on the principles and rules laid
down in the Commission's security rules for protecting European Union classified
information (EUCI) and sensitive non-classified information including, inter alia,
provisions for the exchange of such information with third countries, and processing
59 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43).
EN 82 EN
and storage of such information as set out in Commission Decisions (EU, Euratom)
2015/44360 and (EU, Euratom) 2015/44461. Any administrative arrangement on the
exchange of EUCI with the relevant authorities of a third country or, in the absence
of such an arrangement, any exceptional ad hoc release of EUCI to those authorities,
shall be subject to the Commission's prior approval.
2. The management board shall adopt Eurojust's security rules following approval by
the Commission. When assessing the proposed security rules, the Commission shall
ensure that they are compatible with Decisions (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 and (EU,
Euratom) 2015/444.
Article 81
Administrative inquiries
The administrative activities of Eurojust shall be subject to the inquiries of the European
Ombudsman in accordance with Article 228 TFEU.
Article 82
Liability
1. Eurojust's contractual liability shall be governed by the law applicable to the contract
in question. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to
give judgment pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded
by Eurojust.
2. In the case of non-contractual liability, Eurojust shall, in accordance with the general
principles common to the laws of the Member States and independently of any
liability under Article 44, make good any damage caused by its departments or by its
staff in the performance of their duties.
3. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in disputes over
compensation for damages referred to in paragraph 2. The national courts of the
Member States competent to deal with disputes involving Eurojust's liability as
referred to in this Article shall be determined by reference to Regulation (EU) No
1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.
4. Paragraph 2 shall also apply to damage caused through the fault of a National
Member, a Deputy or an Assistant in the performance of their duties. However,
where a National Member, a Deputy or an Assistant causes damage while acting on
the basis of the powers granted to him or her pursuant to Article 18 of this
Regulation, their Member State shall reimburse Eurojust the sums which Eurojust
has paid to make good such damage.
5. Each Member State shall be liable, in accordance with its national law, for any
damage caused to an individual resulting from the unauthorised or incorrect
processing by that Member State of data communicated to Eurojust.
60 Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 of 13 March 2015 on Security in the Commission (OJ L 72,
17.3.2015, p. 41). 61 Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/444 of 13 March 2015 on the security rules for protecting EU
classified information (OJ L 72, 17.3.2015, p. 53).
EN 83 EN
6. The personal liability of staff towards Eurojust shall be governed by the provisions
laid down in the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of
Other Servants of the European Union applicable to them.
7. The financial liability of the Union and the Member States for the debts of Eurojust
shall be limited to their contributions already made for the administrative costs.
Article 83
Headquarters Agreement and operating conditions
The necessary arrangements concerning the accommodation to be provided for Eurojust in the
Netherlands and the facilities to be made available by the Netherlands together with the
specific rules applicable in the Netherlands to the members of the Management Board, the
members of the Executive Board, the National Members, Deputies and Assistants, the
Administrative Director, Eurojust staff, liaison prosecutors seconded to Eurojust, contact
points hosted at Eurojust, and members of their families, as well as to any other persons
whose presence at or association with Eurojust is necessary for the performance of its tasks,
shall be laid down in a Headquarters Agreement between Eurojust and the Netherlands.
Article 84
Committee Procedure
1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a
committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European
Parliament and of the Council62.
2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No
182/2011 shall apply.
3. Where the committee delivers no opinion, the Commission shall not adopt the draft
implementing act and Article 5(4), third subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No
182/2011 shall apply.
Article 85
Repeal
1. Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 is repealed with effect from the date of application of
this Regulation.
2. References to Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 shall be construed as references to this
Regulation.
62 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying
down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the
Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).
EN 84 EN
Article 86
Transitional provisions
1. Eurojust as established by this Regulation shall be the legal successor of Eurojust as
established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1727.
2. The National Members seconded by the Member States under Regulation (EU)
2018/1727 shall take the role of National Members under this Regulation and shall
continue to exercise their functions until the end of their respective terms of office as
determined under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. Their terms of office may be
extended once under this Regulation, provided that the overall duration of their
mandate, including any period served under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727, does not
exceed ten years. Where the status or powers of National Members are not in
compliance with this Regulation, the Member States concerned shall take the
necessary measures to ensure such compliance without undue delay after [the date of
entry into force of this Regulation].
3. The President and Vice-President of Eurojust elected under Regulation (EU)
2018/1727 shall take the role of President and Vice-President under this Regulation
and shall continue to exercise their functions until the end of their respective terms of
office as determined under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. They may be re-elected once
under this Regulation, provided that the overall duration of their mandate, including
any period served under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727, does not exceed eight years.
4. The Administrative Director last appointed under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 shall
take the role of Administrative Director under this Regulation and shall continue to
exercise their functions until the end of their term of office as determined under
Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. The term of office of that Administrative Director may
be extended once under this Regulation, provided that the overall duration of their
term of office, including any period served under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727, does
not exceed ten years.
5. The College and the Executive Board established under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727
shall continue to exercise their functions under this Regulation until the Management
Board established under this Regulation holds its first meeting. The Management
Board shall hold its first meeting without undue delay after [the date of entry into
force of this Regulation]. The Administrative Director shall take the necessary
measures to ensure the establishment of the Management Board in accordance with
this Regulation. Until the Management Board is operational, the College shall
exercise, on a transitional basis, those management and strategic functions assigned
to the Management Board under this Regulation that are strictly necessary to ensure
the continuity of Eurojust's operations, in particular the adoption of the budget and
the single programming document.
6. Staff employed under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 shall continue in service under this
Regulation. All rights and obligations of staff, including those arising from
employment contracts concluded under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727, shall be
maintained.
7. The Data Protection Officer last appointed under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 shall
take the role of Data Protection Officer under this Regulation and shall continue to
exercise their functions until the end of their term of office as determined under
Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. The term of office of that Data Protection Officer may
be renewed once under this Regulation, provided that the overall duration of their
EN 85 EN
term of office, including any period served under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727, does
not exceed eight years
8. This Regulation shall not affect the validity of cooperation agreements and working
arrangements concluded by Eurojust under Decision 2002/187/JHA or Regulation
(EU) 2018/1727. Such cooperation agreements and working arrangements shall
remain in force and shall be applied until they expire, or are amended or replaced.
9. Decisions adopted by the College, the Executive Board and the Administrative
Director, as well as implementing measures and internal rules adopted under
Regulation (EU) 2018/1727, shall remain in force under this Regulation unless
otherwise decided by the Management Board in the application of this Regulation.
10. Budgetary commitments, financial operations and contractual obligations entered
into under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 shall remain valid and shall continue to be
executed in accordance with this Regulation. Financial support provided to joint
investigation teams under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 shall continue to be
administered in accordance with this Regulation. The discharge procedure in respect
of budgets approved on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 shall be carried out
in accordance with the rules established by that Regulation.
11. The first single programming document adopted under this Regulation shall cover
the period beginning on [date]. Until that document becomes definitive, the single
programming document adopted under Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 for the relevant
period shall continue to apply.
12. Transfers of personal data to third countries or international organisations carried out
before the date of application of this Regulation shall remain valid, provided that
they comply with Union law as applicable prior to that date. Where ongoing transfers
were based on provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 that differ from those of
Regulation 2018/1725, such transfers shall be brought into compliance with
Regulation 2018/1725 within [X months] of its date of application
13. The Headquarters Agreement concluded between Eurojust and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands under Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 200263 shall
remain in force. Where necessary, Eurojust and the Kingdom of the Netherlands
shall adapt that Agreement to bring it into compliance with this Regulation within [X
months] of its date of application.
Article 87
Entry into force
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in
the Official Journal of the European Union.
It shall apply from [...].
63 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight
against serious crime (OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p. 1), as amended by Council Decision 2003/659/JHA (OJ L 245,
29.9.2003, p. 44) and Council Decision 2009/426/JHA (OJ L 138, 4.6.2009, p. 14).
EN 86 EN
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in
accordance with the Treaties.
Done at Brussels,
For the European Parliament For the Council
The President The President
EN 87 EN
LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL STATEMENT- AGENCIES
Contents
1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE ............................................... 89
1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative .................................................................................... 89
1.2. Policy area(s) concerned ............................................................................................ 89
1.3. Objective(s) ................................................................................................................ 89
1.3.1. General objective(s) ................................................................................................... 89
1.3.2. Specific objective(s) ................................................................................................... 89
1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact .................................................................................... 90
1.3.4. Indicators of performance .......................................................................................... 90
1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to: ............................................................................... 91
1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative ............................................................................ 92
1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for
roll-out of the implementation of the initiative .......................................................... 92
1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g.
coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For
the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting
from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise
created by Member States alone. ............................................................................... 93
1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past ................................................ 93
1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with
other appropriate instruments ..................................................................................... 94
1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for
redeployment .............................................................................................................. 94
1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact .................................. 95
1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned ........................................................... 96
2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES................................................................................. 97
2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules .................................................................................. 97
2.2. Management and control system(s) ........................................................................... 97
2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation
mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed ................ 97
2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up
to mitigate them.......................................................................................................... 98
2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between
the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the
expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure) ......................................... 98
2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities .............................................................. 99
3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE .......... 101
EN 88 EN
3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s)
affected ..................................................................................................................... 101
3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations ................................. 102
3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations.................................. 102
3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget ........................................................................... 102
3.2.8. Estimated human resources and the use of appropriations required in a decentralised
agency ...................................................................................................................... 107
3.2.9. Overview of the contribution agreements integrated in the budget ............................. 110
EN 89 EN
1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF
THE COUNCIL recasting Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the European Union Agency for
Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), and replacing and repealing Council
Decision 2002/187/JHA.
1.2. Policy area(s) concerned
Criminal justice cooperation, fight against cross-border crime.
1.3. Objective(s)
1.3.1. General objective(s)
The revision of the Eurojust Regulation seeks to better attain the goals that the
Treaties set out for the Agency.
In particular it aims to enhance Eurojust's role in supporting and strengthening
coordination and cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting
authorities in cross-border cases and thus strengthen its role as a hub of criminal
justice cooperation in the Union's justice and security architecture.
This revision is part of a broader legislative package intended to ensure a high level
of security across the EU through measures that prevent and combat crime, and that
foster coordination and cooperation between competent authorities in the criminal
justice domain.
1.3.2. Specific objective(s)
The general objective is articulated into two interrelated specific objectives, which
address the structural and functional limitations that currently constraints Eurojust's
capacity to fully exploit its potential in the fight against cross-border crime.
Specific objective 1: To make Eurojust's support and coordination action more
efficient, timely, and strategically focused across the full lifecycle of serious cross-
border crime.
Eurojust's focus on operations (work on criminal cases) will be maximised. This will
result from a revision of its governance structure, aimed at streamlining decision-
making processes and relieving National Members (judges and prosecutors leading
the operations) from their administrative burden. The tasks and competences of the
Agency will be updated and its proactivity enhanced, to enable Eurojust to better
address the new realities of cross-border crime and keep pace with cooperation
needs.
Specific objective 2: To achieve more institutionalised cooperation and more timely
information exchanges between Eurojust and EU and international partners.
The degree of institutionalisation of cooperation with partners will be increased
through the strenghtening of reciprocal notification obligations and the improvement
of information exchange systems. This is intended to maximise opportunities for
detection of criminal activity and early invovement of competent judicial authorities.
EN 90 EN
1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact
Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted.
The revision of the Eurojust Regulation is expected to deliver significant, measurable
impacts for Member States, victims, and EU citizens by strengthening Eurojust’s
operational role in combating seriosu corss-border crime, including, most notably,
organised crime, terrorism, cybercrime, and financial crime.
The proposal is anticipated to minimise the handling-time of support requests
from Member States and maximise the added value of Eurojust’s coordination
effort. This will derive from a strenghtened 'filtering' system for support requests –
so that they are dealt with through the appropriate channels and that Eurojust can
focus on complex, multilateral cases. In addition, new tasks for the Agency and
powers of the National Members will lead to better support to the national
authorities, early invovlement of judicial authorities in cross-border
investigations, and ultimately a higher success rate in prosecutions.
Efficiency gains will stem from the reorganisation of the governance system and
enhanced coherence with the operations of Europol and the EPPO. The new
framework is envisaged to free up resources for operational activities by shifting
responsibilities for administrative and management decisions and streamlining
decision-making processes. Enhanced cooperation and mutual involvement with
partners are expected to limit overlapping activities, exploit synergies and avoid
duplication of work.
The revision will also strengthen external cooperation, formalising structured
channels for engagement with third country authorities, ensuring faster and smoother
follow up to judicial requests.
Cumulatively, these measures will transform Eurojust from a reactive coordinator
into a proactive judicial hub, reinforcing the EU’s ability to detect, investigate,
and prosecute cross-border crime.
The reform aligns with EU strategic priorities, delivers tangible benefits for
beneficiaries (judiciaries, law enforcement, victims), and ensures long-term
coherence with the broader EU justice and security architecture.
1.3.4. Indicators of performance
Specify the indicators for monitoring progress and achievements.
The achievement of the objectves of the reform will be monitored mainly through the
following indicators:
1. Time-share spent by National Members on administrative tasks.
The reform aims to reduce the administrative workload of National Members.
Moving from a current baseline of approximately 40% of their overall workload, this
share is expected to decrease to around 20-25% within two years from the entry into
application of the revised Regulation, taking into account a transitional adjustment
period, and to reach a steady-state level of 10-15% within five years. Progress
against this indicator will be monitored through the Commission's involvement in the
Executive Board and Management Board, and assessed in the context of the next
evaluation of the Regulation and Agency.
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2. Number of own-initiative cases64.
Progress towards a more proactive Eurojust will be reflected by a higher number of
own-initiative cases opened and handled by the Agency. Following an initial
adjustment phase, a gradual increase is expected, with the annual average number of
own-initiative cases opened increasing by 10-15% within five years. To avoid
distortions resulting from the normal year-on-year fluctuations in Eurojust casework,
the baseline will be calculated on the basis of the average annual number of own-
initiative cases opened during the five years preceding the entry into application of
the revised Regulation. Progress will be assessed against that baseline by reference to
the corresponding annual average over the five years following its entry into
application, using the data reported in Eurojust's Consolidated Annual Activity
Report (CAAR).
3. Share of ‘simple’ cases handled by Eurojust.
The reform should bring to a gradual but significant reduction in the share of
bilateral and simpler cases handled by Eurojust. While a residual share of 20-25% is
expected to remain, reflecting cases that initially appear complex or are escalated
from the European Justice Network, a gradual reduction is expected to reach around
60% within two years, down to 40% within five years, then 20-25% within ten
years. The baseline will be determined by reference to the share of simple cases in
the total number of cases opened in the year preceding the entry into application of
the revised Regulation. Progress will be monitored on the basis of the statistics and
KPIs regularly reported by Eurojust in its CAARs.
4. Number of follow-ups to system “hits”65.
Improved information exchange with EU partners, in particular Europol, is expected,
notably through an increase in follow-ups to “hits” identified in information systems,
reflecting enhanced timeliness and relevance. The baseline will be determined by
reference to the number of follow-ups to hits recorded in the year preceding the entry
into application of the revised Regulation. An increase of up to 50% may be expected
within five years. Progress will be monitored on the basis of the data reported in
Eurojust's CAARs, cross-checked against corresponding data reported in Europol's
CAARs.
1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to:
a new action
a new action following a pilot project / preparatory action66
the extension of an existing action
a merger or redirection of one or more actions towards another/a new action
64 Own-initiative cases are cases opened by Eurojust proactively, on the basis of information received,
analytical work carried out and links identified between investigations, in order to bring situations of
potential judicial interest to the attention of the competent national authorities, rather than merely responding
to requests for support or coordination from Member States. 65 A hit in the hit/no-hit system is a positive match indicating that information held by Eurojust corresponds to
information held by another competent authority or EU partner, without automatically disclosing the
underlying data, and may therefore signal a possible link between investigations requiring judicial follow-up
or coordination. A follow-up to a hit is the subsequent transmission, where appropriate and in accordance
with the applicable legal framework, of the relevant information necessary to assess and act upon that link. 66 As referred to in Article 58(2), point (a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation.
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1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative
1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for
roll-out of the implementation of the initiative
The initiative is expected to require a gradual implementation over the course of the
2028–2034 MFF period.
Taking into account the expected timeline for negotiations in the Council and
subsequently with the European Parliament under the ordinary legislative procedure,
political agreement and entry into force of the revised Regulation are currently
estimated towards the end of 2027. The application of the Regulation and the roll-out
of the related implementation measures are expected to start progressively from 2028
onwards.
The Regulation is expected to enter into application as a whole, accompanied by
transitional provisions governing the shift from the current governance and
operational model to the revised framework.
The new competences entrusted to Eurojust would become applicable upon entry
into force of the Regulation. At the same time, a gradual adaptation of working
practices and a progressive evolution in the nature and volume of support requests
from Member States are expected.
Investments in Eurojust's IT infrastructure are expected to start during the first year
of application of the revised Regulation. Expenditure would follow the normal
development cycle of IT projects, including design, development, testing,
deployment and maintenance phases, and would be progressively disbursed in line
with project implementation milestones.
As Eurojust would start exercising its new competences from the entry into
application of the revised Regulation, recruitment of most additional staff is also
expected to begin from 2028 onwards. Recruitment would be phased in accordance
with Eurojust’s administrative and HR capacity to conduct recruitment and
onboarding procedures, which Eurojust estimates at a maximum of approximately 20
additional staff members per year.
An initial recruitment phase in 2028 would focus on addressing short-term
operational and technical needs. This would notably include the recruitment of
contract agents supporting the adaptation of the hit/no-hit system and the
development of IT infrastructures, including improvements to workflows supporting
Joint Investigation Teams and Joint Operational Platforms. Recruitment would also
prioritise the areas identified by Eurojust as operational priorities, generally focusing
on staff directly supporting core operational activities, in particular SNEs reinforcing
National Desks in view of increasing casework.
During the subsequent years of the MFF period, and progressively as Eurojust
expands its activities in the new areas covered by the revised Regulation, additional
temporary agents would be recruited to take up newly assigned tasks, including
enhanced support to practitioners in areas such as e-evidence and asset recovery.
A key milestone foreseen between 2030 and 2031 is the extension of Eurojust's
evidence storage capacities. In particular, the current Core International Crimes
Evidence Database (CICED), which is expected to be integrated into the Case
Management System, would be enhanced and expanded in order to store and
preserve evidence relating to other forms of serious cross-border crime. In parallel,
EN 93 EN
the main recruitment phase of temporary agents with analyst officer/assistant profiles
would take place.
The reinforcement and recruitment plan is expected to be substantially completed
between 2032 and 2033. Staffing levels are then expected to stabilise for 2034 and
the post-MFF period. Non-staff expenditure, by contrast, is expected to decrease
progressively after the initial investment phase, with remaining costs mainly linked
to maintenance and operational support following the completion of the main
development and enhancement projects.
1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g.
coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For
the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting
from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise
created by Member States alone.
Reasons for action at EU level (ex-ante): Eurojust's functions (coordination,
cooperation facilitation, and operational support) are transnational by nature and
cannot be performed effectively solely on Member State level. The agency provides
a neutral EU-level perspective across jurisdictions, facilitates multilateral
cooperation in parallel, and ensures that no Member State is placed at a disadvantage.
Scale and complexity of cross-border investigations render EU-level coordination
indispensable for national prosecutorial and judicial authorities, calling for EU-level
action and thus adhering to the subsidiarity principle. Eurojust offers operational,
legal, and strategic value that improves the functioning of national systems and the
coherence of the EU's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Action by Eurojust
does not replace that of national authorities but enhances it through services of
support, coordination and stimulation.
Expected generated EU added value (ex-post): There are clear ecomonies of scale
and efficiency gains by further improving Eurojust, enabling it to bring together
expertise from national practicioners in one agency, coordinate fast and more
efficiently in the fight against transnational crime, avoiding duplication and
conflicting investigations.
1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past
DG JUST has relevant policy and legislative experience stemming from the
preparation and implementation of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727, which established
Eurojust as a decentralised agency and replaced the previous framework set out in
Council Decision 2002/187/JHA.
Further lessons have been drawn from the continuous monitoring of Eurojust’s
functioning, including through the involvement of DG JUST, as parent DG, in the
Agency’s governance structures. This experience culminated in the 2025 evaluation
of the Eurojust Regulation and of the Agency’s functioning.
A key lesson learned is that the institutional design of an agency's governance
structure must be sufficiently streamlined, functional and clearly allocated, with
responsibilities and related accountability. Decision-making processes should be as
efficient as possible, while administrative burden should be kept to the minimum
necessary.
Experience has also shown that established working practices and institutional
culture can be difficult to change through soft measures alone. Targeted advocacy or
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limited adjustments may not be sufficient where the governance framework itself
does not create clear incentives for change.
In particular, where institutional arrangements leave grey areas in the allocation of
responsibilities, or do not provide sufficient clarity on accountability for certain
decisions, this may result in complex and lengthy decision-making processes. This
can be further compounded by an excessive reliance on consensus-building, even for
matters of administrative or managerial nature.
These lessons have informed the preparation of the present initiative, in particular as
regards the need to ensure a governance framework that is clear, efficient and
capable of supporting Eurojust’s operational mandate.
1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with
other appropriate instruments
While the proposal requires resources in addition to those included in the
Commission proposal for the MFF 2028-2034, the need to reinforce Eurojust’s
capacity is fully justified by the broader context of the EU’s future security needs.
Additional resources are necessary to ensure that Eurojust can keep pace with
evolving and increasingly complex forms of crime, cooperate effectively with its
partners, preserve the continuum between law enforcement action and judicial
follow-up, and ultimately deliver on the objectives of the reform. These
considerations will need to be duly reflected in the negotiations on the next MFF,
with a view to ensuring that adequate resources are allocated to Eurojust within the
future financial framework.
The amount of appropriations to be allocated to the agency in the next MFF is
indicative and subject to the agreement on the MFF. It should be integrated into
the Agency’s subsidy due to the permanent nature of the tasks allocated by this
proposal and will be compensated, if relevant, by an equivalent reduction of a
relevant programme envelope under the same MFF heading. If a compensatory
reduction is needed, the resources allocated to the Agency may also need to be
revised through the annual budgetary procedure.
1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for
redeployment
The revision of the legal framework governing Eurojust is designed to strengthen the
Agency's operational contribution to the prevention and combating of serious cross-
border crime, while ensuring that resources are used in the most efficient and
proportionate manner. In assessing the available financing options, particular
attention has been paid to the Agency's capacity to absorb new tasks through internal
reorganisation, reprioritisation and efficiency gains, in line with the principles of
sound financial management.
Eurojust has already undertaken substantial efforts to recalibrate the internal
allocation of resources in order to maximise operational delivery. This has included a
consequential redeployment of staff and budgetary resources from administrative and
support functions towards operational activities directly linked to judicial
cooperation, coordination of investigations and prosecutions, and support to Member
States in complex cross-border cases. By now Eurojust reached the limits of internal
reallocation of staff.
EN 95 EN
The Agency has pursued these redeployment adjustments while maintaining to the
best of its capacity the continuity and quality of essential corporate services,
including governance, security, data protection, information technology, human
resources and financial management, the latter albeit regular observations by the
Court of Auditors of payment delays, mostly due to lack of resources and the
implementation of SUMMA as one to the 3 pilot agencies. Efficiency gains have
been achieved through the streamlining of internal workflows, increased
digitalisation of administrative processes, strengthened intra-agency cooperation, and
the optimisation of support structures. These efforts have enabled Eurojust to
reinforce its operational focus despite the absence of corresponding increases in
establishment plan posts or financial appropriations.
In the context of the present revision, the Agency will be required to continue to
actively pursue opportunities for further efficiency gains and internal redeployment
wherever feasible. This includes continued efforts to optimise the balance between
administrative and operational expenditure, to simplify procedures, and to exploit
synergies arising from digital transformation and cross-organisational cooperation.
Such measures will continue to be implemented in a manner that safeguards the
Agency's capacity to fulfil its legal, governance, cybersecurity, data protection and
accountability obligations.
At the same time, the assessment demonstrates that the scope for additional
redeployment is inherently limited. The substantial reallocation of resources already
undertaken by the Agency has reduced administrative capacities to levels closely
aligned with minimum compliance and support requirements. Further transfers of
resources from administrative to operational functions, if pursued without
corresponding reinforcement, would risk affecting the sustainability, resilience and
legal compliance of the Agency's support structures, particularly in areas subject to
increasing regulatory and security obligations.
Against this background, while efficiency gains and internal reprioritisation will
continue to form an integral part of the Agency's management approach, these
measures alone cannot fully absorb the additional workload and enhanced
operational expectations resulting from the revised mandate. The proposed financing
approach therefore reflects a balanced assessment combining continued internal
efficiency efforts with the need to ensure that the Agency possesses sufficient
operational and technical capacity to effectively implement the objectives of the
revised Regulation, enabling Eurojust to keep pace with broader EU justice and
security context.
1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact
limited duration
– in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY
– financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations and
from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.
unlimited duration
– Implementation with a start-up period from 2028 to 2033,
– followed by full-scale operation.
EN 96 EN
1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned
Direct management by the Commission
– by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;
– by the executive agencies
Shared management with the Member States
Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to:
– third countries or the bodies they have designated
– international organisations and their agencies (to be specified)
– the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund
– bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation
– public law bodies
– bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that
they are provided with adequate financial guarantees
– bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with
the implementation of a public-private partnership and that are provided with
adequate financial guarantees
– bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the
common foreign and security policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on
European Union, and identified in the relevant basic act
– bodies established in a Member State, governed by the private law of a
Member State or Union law and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance with
sector-specific rules, with the implementation of Union funds or budgetary
guarantees, to the extent that such bodies are controlled by public law bodies or
by bodies governed by private law with a public service mission, and are provided
with adequate financial guarantees in the form of joint and several liability by the
controlling bodies or equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for each
action, limited to the maximum amount of the Union support.
EN 97 EN
2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES
2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules
The implementation of the revised mandate of Eurojust will be monitored and
reported in accordance with the existing framework applicable to decentralised
agencies, while taking into account the specific operational nature of the Agency’s
activities in the field of criminal justice cooperation. Monitoring arrangements will
aim to ensure transparency, accountability, sound financial management and
effective performance measurement in relation to the objectives pursued under the
revised Regulation.
In line with the Agency's governance framework, Eurojust will report regularly on
the implementation of its activities through its annual and multiannual programming
documents, in particular the Single Programming Document (SPD), which integrates
strategic planning, annual work programming and resource planning. The SPD will
set out the operational objectives, expected outputs, performance indicators and
resource allocation linked to the implementation of the revised mandate. Progress
achieved against these objectives will be assessed and reported annually through the
CAAR, enabling the Executive Board, the College of Eurojust, the Commission (DG
JUST), the European Parliament and the Council to monitor implementation,
efficiency and operational effectiveness.
Monitoring will also rely on established internal control and performance
management mechanisms, including regular reporting by the Administrative Director
to the Executive Board, regarding external audits and evaluations of the activities of
the Agency, including the implementation of its internal risk management processes.
Where appropriate, key performance indicators and qualitative assessments will be
further refined in order to capture the impact of the enhanced operational support
provided by the Administration to the National Desks, and theron where appropriate
and measurable to national judicial authorities, including in relation to coordination
of cross-border investigations and prosecutions, judicial cooperation tools,
digitalisation measures and support in complex criminal cases.
External oversight will continue to be ensured in accordance with the applicable
financial and institutional framework. In particular, the accounts and underlying
transactions of Eurojust will remain subject to annual external audit by the European
Court of Auditors, in accordance with the Financial Regulation applicable to
decentralised agencies. The Agency will also remain subject to the annual discharge
procedure conducted by the European Parliament upon recommendation of the
Council. In addition, evaluations of the implementation and effectiveness of the
Regulation may be carried out by the Commission in accordance with the Better
Regulation principles and the evaluation provisions contained in the legal
framework.
2.2. Management and control system(s)
2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation
mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed
This Legislative Financial Statement includes an increase of the contribution to the
Agency for the next period 2028-2034. It relates to ensuring adequate resources for
the new activities under the revised mandate to be implemented in accordance with
the expectation of the legislator and stakeholders. The financial and staff resources
EN 98 EN
necessary to conduct these tasks will be included in the EU contribution to the
Agency and in the overall staff allocation to the agency during the annual budgetary
procedure. The Commission, in the context of its supervision of decentralised
entities, will apply its respective control strategies to this expenditure. In addition,
every financial year, the European Parliament, following a recommendation from the
Council, grants discharge to each EU agency for the implementation of its budget;
this procedure also applies to the Agency.
2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up
to mitigate them
The implementation of the revised mandate of Eurojust will continue to be supported
by a robust internal control framework designed to ensure legality and regularity of
operations, sound financial management and effective risk mitigation. Building on
experience gained under previous programming cycles, the Agency has identified
and already improved a number of operational and administrative processes where
complexity, fragmentation of procedures or increasing regulatory requirements were
prone to generate elevated risks of error or inefficiency. Particular attention has
therefore been given over the years to simplifying workflows, clarifying
responsibilities and strengthening control mechanisms in areas involving operational
expenditure, procurement, grants, information management and digital cooperation
tools.
The measures introduced were sought in order to address the root causes of
previously identified risks and potential error sources. In particular, the Agency has
pursued the simplification and standardisation of financial and administrative
procedures, including greater use of harmonised templates, clearer operational
guidance, streamlined verification processes and increased digitalisation of
workflows (including eSignature). These measures have reduced the risk of
inconsistent application of rules and improve traceability and auditability of
transactions. In parallel, Eurojust continues to reinforce staff awareness and
compliance capacity through targeted training, updated internal guidance and
strengthened coordination between operational, legal, financial and internal control
functions.
For activities assessed as inherently higher risk due to their operational sensitivity,
complexity or financial impact, the Agency will continue to apply reinforced ex-ante
and ex-post controls proportionate to the level of risk identified. This includes
enhanced verification procedures, risk-based sampling, strengthened supervisory
review and targeted monitoring of sensitive transactions and operational support
activities. Internal Audit Service (IAS) recommendations, lessons learned exercises
and findings from external oversight bodies, including the European Court of
Auditors, will continue to feed into the continuous improvement of the Agency’s
control environment. These arrangements are intended to ensure that the enhanced
operational role foreseen under the revised Regulation is implemented in a
financially sound, compliant and resilient manner.
2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between
the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the
expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure)
Given that the implementation of the Regulation is primarily carried out under direct
management and through the Agency's own operational and administrative
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structures, the costs of controls are expected to remain largely concentrated at
Agency level. Control-related expenditure mainly concerns financial verification,
procurement and contract management, information security, data protection
compliance, (financial) ex-ante and ex-post verification procedures integrated into
financial and operational workflows. The estimation of control costs is based on
existing administrative and financial management structures, and experience
gathered from previous implementation cycles and annual discharge procedures.
The overall cost of controls is considered proportionate to the financial volume
managed and to the specific risk profile associated with the Agency's activities.
Certain control functions necessarily generate comparatively higher administrative
costs due to the sensitive operational environment in which Eurojust operates,
including handling of operational cooperation data, secure information exchange,
judicial coordination support and compliance with evolving cybersecurity and data
protection obligations. In addition, the relatively specialised nature of the Agency’s
activities and the limited scale of certain operational expenditure lines may reduce
the scope for economies of scale compared to larger EU spending programmes. At
the same time, resource constraints and the absence of significant additional
administrative capacity require the Agency to pursue a risk-based and targeted
approach to controls, prioritising areas with higher inherent risk while simplifying
and streamlining lower-risk procedures wherever possible.
In line with the applicable Union internal control principles, the Agency aims to
maintain the expected level of risk of error below the materiality threshold of 2%
both at payment and at closure. This objective is supported by reinforced ex-ante
verification procedures, risk-based ex-post controls, continuous monitoring
mechanisms and regular supervisory review. Simplification measures introduced
under the revised framework, including standardised procedures, increased
digitalisation and clearer operational guidance and governance are expected to
further reduce the likelihood of errors linked to procedural complexity or inconsistent
application of rules. Nevertheless, the Agency's ability to sustain a high level of
control assurance while simultaneously responding to expanding operational
demands remains dependent on maintaining an appropriate balance between
operational reinforcement and minimum administrative and control capacities.
Continuous monitoring of the effectiveness and proportionality of the control
framework will therefore remain necessary throughout the implementation period.
2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities
Eurojust will continue to apply the existing EU and Agency-level framework for the
prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and
other irregularities. The revision of the Regulation does not alter the Agency’s
obligations in this area. Eurojust will therefore maintain a comprehensive internal
control and anti-fraud environment based on the principles set out in the EU
Financial Regulation, the internal control framework applicable to decentralised
agencies and the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy.
Preventive measures include clear segregation of duties, systematic ex-ante
verification of financial and procurement procedures, risk-based controls, conflict-of-
interest management, secure and traceable financial workflows, staff awareness
measures and mandatory ethics and compliance obligations applicable to all staff and
seconded personnel.
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The Agency will continue to cooperate as appropriate with the European Anti-Fraud
Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), within their
respective competences, and the European Court of Auditors.
Existing reporting, audit and investigative mechanisms will remain fully applicable,
including internal reporting channels and whistleblower protection measures in
accordance with the relevant EU framework. In addition, Eurojust will continue to
regularly assess fraud-related risks within its corporate risk management processes
and adapt mitigating measures where necessary, notably in areas involving
procurement, JIT grants, information technology, external contracts and operational
support expenditure.
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3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget
line(s) affected
• Existing budget lines
In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.
Heading of
multiannual
financial
framework
Budget line Type of
expenditure Contribution
Number
Diff./Non-
diff.
from
EFTA
countries
from
candidate
countries
and
potential
candidates
From
other
third
countries
other assigned
revenue
2 [E.07100700] Diff. NO NO NO NO
EN 102 EN
3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations
3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations
– The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations
– The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below
3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget
EUR million (to three decimal places)
Heading of multiannual financial framework Number 2
DG: / Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
TOTAL MFF 2028-2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Operational appropriations
Budget line Commitments (1a) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payments (2a) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Budget line Commitments (1b) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Payments (2b) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope of specific programmes67
Budget line (3) 0
TOTAL appropriations Commitments =1a+1b+3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
for DG / Payments =2a+2b+3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EUR million (to three decimal places)
67 Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former ‘BA’ lines), indirect research, direct research.
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[Agency]: Eurojust Year
2028 Year
2029 Year
2030 Year
2031 Year
2032 Year
2033 Year
2034
TOTAL
MFF 2028-
2034
Budget line: E.07100700 / EU Budget contribution to the agency
Former contribution agreements incorporated into the regular budget68 5.109 5.109 5.109 5.109 5.109 5.109 5.109 35.763
Budget line: E.07100700 / EU Budget contribution to the agency
Extra resources requested for the new mandate69 2.988 6.454 9.086 12.077 16.689 17.382 18.476 83.152
Total increase in the EU contribution to the agency linked to the new
mandate 8.097 11.56314.19517.18621.79822.49123.585118.915
Budget line: E.07100700 / EU Budget contribution to the agency
BASELINE: Commission proposal MFF 2028-203470 72.360 72.360 72.360 72.360 72.360 72.360 72.360 506.520
Budget line: E.07100700 / EU Budget contribution to the agency
TOTAL
80.457 83.923 86.555 89.546 94.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
* The amount of appropriations to be allocated to the agency in the next MFF is indicative and subject to the agreement on the MFF. It should
be integrated into the Agency’s subsidy due to the permanent nature of the tasks allocated by this proposal and will be compensated, if
relevant, by an equivalent reduction of a relevant programme envelope under the same MFF heading. If a compensatory reduction is needed,
the resources allocated to the Agency may also need to be revised through the annual budgetary procedure.
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL MFF
68 The inclusion of contribution agreements in the EU budget contribution to Eurojust is offset by an equivalent reduction in the envelopes of the respective programmes
from which those agreements were previously financed, the increase therefore does not affect the overall financial programming.
69 The figures in this row are requested on top of the envisaged financial programming.
70 The 2028–2034 MFF proposal is presented in 2025 prices.
EN 104 EN
2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2028-2034
TOTAL
operational
appropriations
(including
contribution to
decentralised
agency)
Commitments (4) 80.457 83.923 86.555 89.546 94.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
Payments (5) 80.457 83.923 86.555 89.546 94.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
TOTAL appropriations of an
administrative nature financed
from the envelope for specific
programmes
(6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL
appropriations
under
HEADING
<2.>
Commitments =4+6 80.457 83.923 86.555 89.546 94.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
of the
multiannual
financial
framework
Payments =5+6 80.457 83.923 86.555 89.546 94.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
EN 105 EN
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL MFF
2028-2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
• TOTAL
operational
appropriations
(all operational
headings)
Commitments (4) 80.457 83.923 86.555 89.546 94.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
Payments (5) 80.457 83.923 86.555 89.546 94.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
• TOTAL appropriations of an
administrative nature financed
from the envelope for specific
programmes (all operational
headings)
(6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL
appropriations
under
Headings 1 to
3
Commitments =4+6 80.457 83.923 86.555 89.546 94.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
of the
multiannual
financial
framework
(Reference
amount)
Payments =5+6 80.457 83.923 86.555 89.546 94.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
EN 106 EN
Heading of multiannual financial framework 4 ‘Administrative expenditure’
EUR million (to three decimal places)
DG: / Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL
MFF
2028-2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Human resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other administrative expenditure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL DG /Appropriations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL appropriations under HEADING 4 of
the multiannual financial framework
(Total
commitments =
Total payments) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EUR million (to three decimal places)
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL MFF
2028-2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
TOTAL
appropriations
under HEADINGS
1 to 4
Commitments 80.457 83.923 86.555 89.546 94.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
of the multiannual
financial framework Payments 80.457 83.923 86.555 89.546 94.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
EN 107 EN
3.2.8. Estimated human resources and the use of appropriations required in a
decentralised agency
* The amount of appropriations to be allocated to the agency in the next MFF is indicative and subject
to the agreement on the MFF. It should be integrated into the Agency's subsidy due to the permanent
nature of the tasks allocated by this proposal and will be compensated, if relevant, by an equivalent
reduction of a relevant programme envelope under the same MFF heading. If a compensatory
reduction is needed, the resources allocated to the Agency may also need to be revised through the
annual budgetary procedure.
Staff requirements (full-time equivalent units)
The figure in brackets (+n) indictes the increase from the previous year, i.e., the number of staff
members recruited in the current year.
A total of +87 extra FTEs over the course of the next MFF is envisaged, plus the stabilisation or hiring
of 16 FTEs employed by Eurojust to carry out projects based on contribution agreements.
Agency: Eurojust Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
Temporary agents
(AD Grades) 4 (+4) 8 (+4) 13 (+5) 19 (+6) 28 (+9) 36 (+8) 36 (+0)
Temporary agents
(AST grades) 0 (+0) 2 (+2) 3 (+1) 4 (+1) 4 (+0) 4 (+0) 4 (+0)
Temporary agents
(AD+AST) subtotal 4 (+4) 10 (+6)16 (+6)23 (+7)32 (+9) 40 (+8) 40 (+0)
Contract agents 0 (+0) 4 (+4) 8 (+4) 12 (+4) 16 (+4) 20 (+4) 20 (+0)
Seconded national experts 0 (+0) 6 (+6) 15 (+9) 21 (+6) 25 (+4) 27 (+2) 27 (+0)
Contract agents and
seconded national experts
subtotal
0 (+0) 10 (+10)23 (+13)33 (+10)41 (+8) 47 (+6) 47 (+0)
TOTAL staff (on top of
financial programming) 4 (+4) 20 (+16) 39 (+19) 56 (+17) 73 (+17) 87 (+14) 87 (+0)
Staff hired/stabilised
through the resources
coming from (former)
contribution agreements –
Temporary agents (AD)
11 (+11)11 (+0)11 (+0)11 (+0)11 (+0)11 (+0)11 (+0)
Staff hired/stabilised
through the resources
coming from (former)
contribution agreements –
Contract agents
5 (+5)5 (+0)5 (+0)5 (+0)5 (+0)5 (+0)5 (+0)
TOTAL staff
hired/stabilised through the
resources coming from
(former) contribution
agreements
16 (+16)16 (+0)16 (+0)16 (+0)16 (+0)16 (+0)16 (+0)
Total staff for the proposal 20 (+20) 36 (+16) 55 (+19) 72 (+17) 89 (+17) 103
(+14) 103 (+0)
EN 108 EN
BASELINE: Commission
proposal MFF 2028-203471
Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
Temporary agents
(AD Grades) 141 141 141 141 141 141 141
Temporary agents
(AST grades) 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
Temporary agents
(AD+AST) subtotal 251 251251251251 251 251
Contract agents 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Seconded national experts 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Contract agents and
seconded national experts
subtotal
42 42424242 42 42
TOTAL staff (baseline) 293 293 293 293 293 293 293
TOTAL staff
(revised Eurojust)
Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031 Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
Temporary agents
(AD Grades) 156 160 165 171 180 188 188
Temporary agents
(AST grades) 110 112 113 114 114 114 114
Temporary agents
(AD+AST) subtotal 266 272278285294 302 302
Contract agents 23 27 31 35 39 43 43
Seconded national experts 24 30 39 45 49 51 51
Contract agents and
seconded national experts
subtotal
47 57708088 94 94
TOTAL staff (total) 313 329 348 365 382 396 396
71 Staffing level prior to the enter into application of the revised Regulation, based on the authorised posts for
2026. The envisaged financial programming foresees Eurojust’s staffing level as stable.
EN 109 EN
Appropriations covered by the EU budget contribution in EUR million (to three decimal places)
Agency: Eurojust Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL
2028 - 2034
Title 1: Staff expenditure
on top of the envisaged
financial programming
0.388
1.892
4.286 6.777 9.289 11.682 12.776 47.090
Title 2: Infrastructure and
operating expenditure
on top of the envisaged
financial programming
1.900 3.300 3.100 3.300 5.200 3.500 3.500 23.800
Title 3: Operational
expenditure
on top of the envisaged
financial programming
0.700 1.262 1.700 2.000 2.200 2.200 2.200 12.262
TOTAL of
appropriations covered
by the EU budget on top
of the envisaged
financial programming
2.9886.4549.08612.07716.68917.38218.47683.152
(Former) contribution
agreements
incorporated into the
regular budget
(All Titles)
5.1095.1095.109 5.1095.1095.1095.10935.763
Commission proposal
MFF 2028-2034 72.360 72.360 72.360 72.360 72.360 72.360 72.360 506.520
TOTAL of
appropriations covered
by the EU budget
80.457 83.92386.55589.54694.158 94.851 95.945 625.435
Overview/summary of human resources and appropriations (in EUR million) required by the
proposal/initiative in a decentralised agency
Agency: Eurojust Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL
2028 -
2034
Temporary agents
(AD+AST) 15
(+15) 21 (+6) 27 (+6) 34 (+7) 43 (+9) 51 (+8) 51 (+0) 51
Contract agents 5 (+5) 9 (+4) 13 (+4) 17 (+4) 21 (+4) 25 (+4) 25 (+0) 25
Seconded national experts 0 (+0) 6 (+6) 15 (+9) 21 (+6) 25 (+4) 27 (+2) 27 (+0) 27
Total staff (required by
the proposal, including
staff hired/stabilised
through former
contribution agreements)
20
(+20) 36 (+16) 55 (+19) 72 (+17) 89 (+17) 103 (+14) 103 (+0) 103
EN 110 EN
Appropriations covered by
the EU budget 8.097 11.563 14.195 17.186 21.798 22.491 23.585 118.915
Appropriations covered by
fees
(if applicable)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appropriations co-financed
(if applicable) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOTAL appropriations
(required by the proposal) 8.09711.56314.19517.18621.79822.49123.585118.915
3.2.9. Overview of the contribution agreements integrated in the budget
Eurojust receives funding for the following contribution agreements:
Project Duration
Budget over
duration
(mln)
FTE/year Counterpart Aim of the project
EuroMed
Justice
project
4 years € 6,000,000
(1.5 million ca
pa)
6.5 European
Commission –
DG MENA
The project aims to enhance judicial
cooperation between Member States
and South Partner countries
(Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine
and Tunisia).
SIRIUS
project
3 years € 1,475,622
(0.492 million
ca pa)
4 European
Commission
Service for
Foreign Policy
Instruments
The project aims to improve cross
border access to e-evidence by
providing knowledge and tools to
public authorities and facilitating
their cooperation with service
providers located all around the
world.
WB
CRIM
JUST
project
4 years € 6,000,000
(1.5 million ca
pa)
5European
Commission –
DG ENEST
The project aims to support
operational cooperation, including
through JITs, among Western
Balkan countries and between them
and EU Member States. By
Commission Implementing
Decision C(2025) 4066 final of 24
June 2025, the Commission
financed a three-year phase II of the
project, starting on 1 January 2027,
with a budget EUR 6 million for the
Western Balkans and EUR 3 million
for the Eastern Partnership.
ICPA 13
months
€ 5,000,000
(4.617 million
ca pa)
12 European
Commission –
DG ENEST
The centre aims to strengthen the
international judicial cooperation
efforts to ensure accountability for
the crime of aggression against
Ukraine.
EN 111 EN
IMPNA 4 years € 3,000,000
(0.750 million
ca pa)
3 European
Commission –
DG INTPA
The project aims to contribute to
justice and accountability efforts for
core international crimes by
enhancing the cooperation between
civil society organisations and
national authorities investigating
and prosecuting core international
crimes in both EU and non-EU
countries.
The tasks carried out under the contribution agreements relating to the following projects have
become stably embedded in the Agency's mandate. As of the year of entry into application of the
revised Regulation, the funding currently received through these contribution agreements will be
integrated into Eurojust's budget. The corresponding increase in the EU contribution to Eurojust
for these activities is offset by an equivalent reduction in the envelopes of the respective
programmes. As a result, the overall financial programming remains unchanged.
The resources and staffing summarised below are included in the tables above indicating the EU
contribution to the decentralised agency.
Project / yearly budget Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL
2028 -
2034
SIRIUS project 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 3.444
ICPA 4.617 4.617 4.617 4.617 4.617 4.617 4.617 32.319
TOTAL contribution 5.109 5.109 5.109 5.109 5.109 5.109 5.109 35.763
Project / staff Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL
2028 -
2034
SIRIUS project 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
ICPA 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
TOTAL staff (TAs+CAs) 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
The EuroMed Justice project, the WB CRIM JUST project and the IMPNA project, established on
an ad hoc basis and requiring the performance of tasks outside of Eurojust's mandate, will continue
to be operated on the basis of contribution agreements.
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 24.6.2026
COM(2026) 570 final
ANNEXES 1 to 3
ANNEXES
to the Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and
repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1727
{SEC(2026) 570 final} - {SWD(2026) 570 final} - {SWD(2026) 571 final} -
{SWD(2026) 572 final} - {SWD(2026) 573 final}
EN 1 EN
ANNEX I
List of forms of serious crime with which Eurojust is competent to deal in accordance with
Article 5(1)(a):
(1) terrorism;
(2) organised crime;
(3) drug trafficking;
(4) money-laundering activities;
(5) crime connected with nuclear and radioactive substances;
(6) immigrant smuggling;
(7) trafficking in human beings;
(8) motor vehicle crime;
(9) murder and grievous bodily injury;
(10) illicit trade in human organs and tissue;
(11) kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage taking;
(12) racism and xenophobia;
(13) robbery and aggravated theft;
(14) illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiquities and works of art;
(15) swindling and fraud;
(16) crime affecting the financial interests of the Union;
(17) insider dealing and financial market manipulation;
(18) racketeering and extortion;
(19) counterfeiting and product piracy;
(20) forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein;
(21) forgery of money and means of payment;
(22) computer crime, including cyberattacks;
(23) corruption;
(24) illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and explosives;
(25) illicit trafficking in endangered animal species;
(26) illicit trafficking in endangered plant species and varieties;
(27) environmental crime, including ship source pollution;
(28) illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters;
(29) sexual abuse and sexual exploitation, including child abuse material and solicitation
of children for sexual purposes;
(30) gender-based violence;
(31) genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression;
(32) violation of Union restrictive measures.
EN 2 EN
ANNEX II
CATEGORIES OF PERSONAL DATA REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 46
(1) Categories of personal data referred to in Article 44(1):
(a) surname, maiden name, given names and any alias or assumed names;
(b) date and place of birth;
(c) nationality;
(d) sex;
(e) place of residence, profession and whereabouts of the person concerned;
(f) social security number or other official numbers used in the Member State to
identify individuals, driving licences, identification documents and passport
data, customs and Tax Identification Numbers;
(g) information concerning legal persons if it includes information relating to
identified or identifiable individuals who are the subject of a judicial
investigation or prosecution;
(h) details of accounts held with banks or other financial institutions;
(i) description and nature of the alleged offences, the date on which they were
committed, the criminal category of the offences and the progress of the
investigations;
(j) the facts pointing to an international extension of the case;
(k) details relating to alleged membership of a criminal organisation;
(l) telephone numbers, email addresses, traffic data and location data, as well as
any related data necessary to identify the subscriber or user;
(m) vehicle registration data;
(n) DNA profiles established from the non-coding part of DNA, photographs and
fingerprints.
(2) Categories of personal data referred to in Article 44(2):
(a) surname, maiden name, given names and any alias or assumed names;
(b) date and place of birth;
(c) nationality;
(d) sex;
(e) place of residence, profession and whereabouts of the person concerned;
(f) the description and nature of the offences involving the person concerned, the
date on which the offences were committed, the criminal category of the
offences and the progress of the investigations;
(g) social security number or other official numbers used by the Member States to
identify individuals, driving licences, identification documents and passport
data, customs and Tax Identification Numbers;
(h) details of accounts held with banks and other financial institutions;
EN 3 EN
(i) telephone numbers, email addresses, traffic data and location data, as well as
any related data necessary to identify the subscriber or user;
(j) vehicle registration data.
EN 4 EN
ANNEX III
Personal data referred to in Article 37(4), Article 41(1) and Article 44(5):
(1) information to identify the suspected, accused, convicted or acquitted person:
(a) for a natural person:
(i) surname (family name);
(ii) first names (given names);
(iii) any aliases;
(iv) date of birth;
(v) place of birth (town and country);
(vi) nationality or nationalities;
(vii) identification document (type and document number);
(viii) gender;
(ix) place of residence;
(b) for a legal person:
(i) business name;
(ii) legal form;
(iii) place of head office;
(c) for both natural and legal persons:
(i) telephone numbers;
(ii) email addresses;
(iii) details of accounts held with banks or other financial institutions;
(2) information on the terrorist offence:
(i) information concerning legal persons involved in the preparation or
commission of a terrorist offence;
(ii) legal qualification of the offence under national law;
(iii) applicable form of serious crime from the list referred to in Annex I;
(iv) any affiliation with a terrorist group;
(v) type of terrorism, such as jihadist, separatist, left-wing or right-wing;
(vi) brief summary of the case;
(3) information on the national proceedings:
(i) status of such proceedings;
(ii) responsible public prosecutor’s office;
(iii) case number;
EN 5 EN
(iv) date of opening of formal judicial proceedings;
(v) links with other relevant cases;
(4) additional information to identify the suspect:
(i) fingerprint data that have been collected in accordance with national law
during criminal proceedings;
(ii) photographs.
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 24.6.2026
SWD(2026) 572 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Subsidiarity grid
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and
repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1727
{COM(2026) 570 final} - {SEC(2026) 570 final} - {SWD(2026) 570 final} -
{SWD(2026) 571 final} - {SWD(2026) 573 final}
1
1. Can the Union act? What is the legal basis and competence of the Unions’ intended
action?
1.1 Which article(s) of the Treaty are used to support the legislative proposal or policy
initiative?
The legal basis of the initiative is Article 85 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU). Article 85(1) TFEU states that Eurojust's mission shall be to support and
strengthen coordination and cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting
authorities in relation to serious crime affecting two or more Member States or requiring a
prosecution on common bases, based on operations conducted and information supplied by
the Member States' authorities and by Europol.
1.2 Is the Union competence represented by this Treaty article exclusive, shared or
supporting in nature?
In the area of freedom, security and justice, the Union’s competence is shared (Article 4§2
(j) TFEU).
2. Subsidiarity Principle: Why should the EU act?
2.1 Does the proposal fulfil the procedural requirements of Protocol No. 21:
- Has there been a wide consultation before proposing the act?
- Is there a detailed statement with qualitative and, where possible, quantitative
indicators allowing an appraisal of whether the action can best be achieved at Union
level?
In the context of the evaluation of the Eurojust Regulation (EJR) and impact assessment, the
Commission conducted numerous consultation activities, including public and targeted
stakeholder consultations. The consultations were carried out as widely as possible to receive
relevant input, evidence and explanations of the needs of different categories of stakeholders.
The consultation strategy was designed to ensure that the supporting study captures the
perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders, both internal and external to Eurojust. These
included notably Eurojust staff, national desks, national authorities and practitioners,
representatives of other EU agencies and bodies in the area of criminal justice, academics as
well as representatives of international organisations.
- A Call for Evidence was launched by the Commission and made available on the
“Have Your Say” website from 28 October 2025 until 3 December 2025, with 42
replies received.
- The Commission launched a public consultation in all 24 official EU languages. The
consultation was questionnaire-based. The consultation period was twelve weeks (3
December 2025 to 24 February 2026) with 20 replies received.
- An Online survey was conducted until 4 March 2026, targeting a range of stakeholder
types, including practitioners, the Eurojust administration and national desks, and
public officials. Several non-EU and EU countries
were represented. Practitioners from EU Member States accounted for nearly half of
all responses (48%), making them the most prominent stakeholder group in this
1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016E/PRO/02&from=EN
2
survey, followed by members of the Eurojust administration. 429 replies have been
received.
- 115 Interviews with stakeholders have been carried out. These interviews covered
representatives of the Eurojust administration, national desks and liaison prosecutors,
EU agencies and bodies, EU and third country national-level stakeholders (authorities
and practitioners), and international organisations. They include in-person
consultation with Eurojust personnel during the site visit, as well as online interviews
with a range of stakeholders.
- In addition, other consultations of experts and senior officials representing Members
States have been carried out: technical workshops by Eurojust (vision 2035), two
meetings of the Consultative forum of the Prosecutors General and Directors of
Public Prosecutions of the EU Member States, working meeting with the Criminal
Law Expert Group (composed of practitioners and academics), exchanges with
experts and representatives of Member States during EU Council’s meetings
organised at technical and political levels (COPEN working parties and JHA
Councils).
The Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal includes a detailed statement with
qualitative and, where possible, quantitative indicators allowing an appraisal of whether the
action can best be achieved at Union level (see Chapter 3).
2.2 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying
the Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the
conformity with the principle of subsidiarity?
Both documents accompanying the Commission’s legislative initiative, contain an adequate
justification that this legislative imitative aimed at revising the current Eurojust regulation
complies with the principle of subsidiarity as enshrined in Article 5(3) TFEU.
2.3 Based on the answers to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed
action be achieved sufficiently by the Member States acting alone (necessity for EU
action)?
Eurojust is an EU Agency which has been set up to support national prosecutorial and judicial
authorities to cooperate in cross-border criminal cases. Given the very nature of Eurojust
being an EU agency, a revision of its mandate and functioning cannot be achieved by Member
States action alone. The issues addressed by the revision of Eurojust are inherently
transnational, as serious and organised crime increasingly operates across borders, exploits
differences between national legal systems, and affects all Member States. Individual
national authorities, while retaining core criminal justice competences, are limited in their
ability to ensure effective multilateral coordination, interoperable cooperation tools, and
consistent information exchange across jurisdictions.
Without EU-level action, judicial cooperation would risk fragmentation, delays,
inconsistencies in evidence handling, and weakened collective capacity to investigate and
prosecute cross-border offences, thereby undermining the objectives of the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice under Article 67 TFEU. The growing complexity, scale, and
technological sophistication of cross-border criminal activity also place increasing pressure
on national authorities, many of which lack sufficient resources or operational capacities to
manage multinational investigations alone. Although national, regional, and local authorities
across the EU differ in their legal traditions and judicial structures, a strengthened Eurojust
3
mandate provides a neutral and overarching European framework capable of reconciling
these differences while ensuring coherent, efficient, and effective judicial cooperation
throughout the Union, thus enhancing the overall efficiency of the Union’s justice and
security architecture.
(a) Are there significant/appreciable transnational/cross-border aspects to the problems
being tackled? Have these been quantified?
Eurojust’s functions (coordination, cooperation facilitation, and operational support) are
transnational by nature and cannot be performed effectively by any single Member State. Its
Union-level structure allows it to take a neutral and overarching European view across
jurisdictions, facilitate simultaneous multilateral cooperation, and ensure that no Member
State is disadvantaged.
(b) Would national action or the absence of the EU level action conflict with core
objectives of the Treaty2 or significantly damage the interests of other Member
States?
The objectives pursued by the revision of the mandate of Eurojust cannot be sufficiently
achieved by Member States acting alone because serious cross-border crime inherently
affects several jurisdictions simultaneously. If national authorities acted independently, this
would risk fragmentation of judicial cooperation, inconsistencies in evidence handling, and
delays in coordination, thereby undermining the objectives of the Treaties relating to the Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice under Articles 67. The absence of EU-level action would
also negatively affect other Member States by weakening the collective capacity to
investigate and prosecute organised crime and other transnational offences.
(c) To what extent do Member States have the ability or possibility to enact appropriate
measures?
While Member States retain important competences in criminal justice and judicial
cooperation, their ability to enact appropriate measures individually is limited. National
authorities cannot by themselves ensure uniform coordination mechanisms, interoperable
judicial cooperation tools, or effective information exchange across the EU. Differences in
legal systems, procedural rules, and operational capacities create structural obstacles that
only an EU-level agency such as Eurojust can address through coordinated support, common
operational frameworks, and centralised cooperation mechanisms.
(d) How does the problem and its causes (e.g. negative externalities, spill-over effects)
vary across the national, regional and local levels of the EU?
The problem primarily manifests itself at the transnational level, as criminal networks operate
across borders and exploit differences between national legal systems. At the national level,
authorities may face difficulties in obtaining evidence, coordinating prosecutions, or
executing judicial requests involving several Member States. At the regional and local levels,
prosecutors and law enforcement authorities encounter operational burdens linked to
increasingly complex cross-border investigations. Negative external factors and spill-over
effects are significant because ineffective action in one Member State may compromise
2 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en
4
investigations and prosecutions in others, thereby reducing the overall effectiveness of EU
criminal justice cooperation.
(e) Is the problem widespread across the EU or limited to a few Member States?
The problem is widespread across the EU rather than confined to a limited number of Member
States. Cross-border crime affects all Member States to varying degrees, irrespective of their
geographic location or legal tradition. The increasing digitalisation of crime, mobility within
the Schengen area, and the transnational nature of organised criminal networks mean that
even offences originating in one Member State frequently produce effects across the Union.
Consequently, all Member States have an interest in strengthening coordinated judicial
cooperation at EU level.
(f) Are Member States overstretched in achieving the objectives of the planned measure?
Member States are increasingly overstretched in achieving the objectives of effective cross-
border judicial cooperation on their own. The growing volume, complexity, and
technological sophistication of cross-border criminal cases place substantial pressure on
national judicial authorities, a trend confirmed by Europol’s reports on organised crime.
Individual Member States may lack sufficient resources, technical capacities, or access to
timely information necessary to manage complex multinational investigations effectively.
Strengthening the mandate of Eurojust helps alleviate these burdens by facilitating
coordination, operational support, and information sharing at EU level.
(g) How do the views/preferred courses of action of national, regional and local
authorities differ across the EU?
The views and preferred approaches of national, regional, and local authorities differ across
the EU due to variations in legal traditions, administrative structures, prosecutorial systems,
and operational capacities. Some Member States favour deeper EU-level integration and
stronger coordination mechanisms, while others prioritise maintaining national procedural
autonomy. Regional and local prosecutorial authorities may also differ in their operational
needs and levels of experience with cross-border cooperation. An EU-level framework
through Eurojust provides a common platform capable of reconciling these differences while
ensuring coherent and effective judicial cooperation throughout the Union.
2.4 Based on the answer to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed
action be better achieved at Union level by reason of scale or effects of that action
(EU added value)?
By pooling expertise and information, supporting Joint Investigation Teams, avoiding
duplication and assisting less-resourced Member States, Eurojust creates economies of scale
and strengthens the fight against serious transnational crime. Its work also supports the
internal market by increasing legal certainty, reducing criminal loopholes across borders, and
reinforcing trust for citizens and businesses operating within the EU. At the same time,
Eurojust does not replace national authorities nor reduces Member States’ competences but
rather complements their work within national legal frameworks. The planned reform is also
expected to improve legal clarity, particularly regarding governance, cooperation with
partners, and data protection rules.
(a) Are there clear benefits from EU level action?
5
The EU level action regarding the judicial cooperation between competent national
authorities provides clear benefits.
Eurojust represents a genuine EU-level added value: it creates efficiencies, pooling resources,
information and expertise; enables and facilitates coherent, coordinated, cross-border action
against serious crime; fosters mutual trust and legal cooperation; and by doing so, strengthens
the rule-of-law foundations and trust that underpin the internal market and citizens’ mobility.
Without Eurojust (or a similar EU-level mechanism), national efforts alone, even if bilateral
cooperation exists and that European MLA tools (EAW, EIO, etc.) are very efficient, would
struggle to respond effectively to the scale, complexity and transnational nature of serious
organised crime, terrorism, human trafficking, money-laundering, cybercrime, etc. The
speed, coordination, and institutional capacity that Eurojust provides are difficult to replicate
through bilateral cooperation alone, especially across many Member States.
(b) Are there economies of scale? Can the objectives be met more efficiently at EU level
(larger benefits per unit cost)? Will the functioning of the internal market be
improved?
There are clear economies of scale and efficiency gains from having an executive agency like
Eurojust at EU level rather than relying solely on individual national systems or bilateral
cooperation. Eurojust clearly contributes to the following actions:
• Pooling information, expertise and resources by bringing together national
practitioners from all Member States in one institution. Eurojust concentrates know-
how, specialised skills and experience that no single national authority would have at
scale. This reduces duplication and ensures that cross-border cases benefit from
expert coordination and institutional memory rather than ad-hoc bilateral attempts.
• Faster and more efficient coordination for transnational crime, time and coordination
matter. Eurojust’s structure allows rapid convening of coordination meetings, setting
up JITs, steering “coordination centres” for cross-border operations, and facilitating
swift execution of EAWs, EIOs or freezing orders.
• Avoiding duplication and conflicting investigations. When several Member States
would independently investigate overlapping cross-border crimes, Eurojust can help
avoid multiple, overlapping, inefficient investigations which would waste public
resources. Instead, it helps coordinate a single, coherent cross-border investigation or
prosecution.
• Support for states with fewer resources. Indeed, for Member States with limited
capacity, handling complex transnational crime can be resource-intensive: Eurojust
provides operational, technical and financial support levelling the playing field and
ensuring that all states, large or small, can effectively participate in cross-border crime
prosecution.
In addition, Eurojust contributes to the functioning of the internal market and EU as a whole.
By strengthening trust, ensuring consistent enforcement of criminal law, and reducing the
risk of cross-border criminal exploitation of jurisdictional fragmentation, Eurojust helps
underpin the internal market and general rule-of-law foundations that economic integration
depends on. Eurojust plays a non negligeable role in the following actions:
• The reduction of “safe havens” for criminals. Serious and cross-border crimes can
undermine trust in the internal market, distort competition, damage legitimate
6
businesses, and discourage cross-border economic activity. By enabling efficient
cross-border prosecution, Eurojust helps close loopholes that criminals could exploit
across borders. This reinforces a level playing field for businesses across the EU.
• The building of confidence for individuals and businesses to operate across borders.
A predictable, efficient and fair criminal-justice cooperation system strengthens trust
for citizens, in terms of rights protection, for suspects and victims alike, but also for
businesses and cross-border economic actors (it fosters cross-border trade and
investment). This supports the deeper integration of the internal market.
• The facilitation of judicial cooperation for crimes affecting EU financial interests or
cross-border economic crime. Some of the crimes Eurojust handles (e.g., money-
laundering, fraud, drug trafficking, cybercrime) often have direct or indirect
economic consequences (asset seizures, disrupted supply chains, reputational
damage). Efficient cross-border prosecution helps preserve the integrity of the market
and protect citizens/businesses from being victims.
• The facilitation of movement and social/economic integration. As noted in EU
strategy on criminal justice, when judiciaries across Member States trust each other
and share minimal common standards, “people are more likely to use their right to
live, work or study in another EU country.” In that sense, a strong EU-level judicial
cooperation mechanism supports the broader internal market not only in economic
trade but also mobility and labour market integration.
(c) What are the benefits in replacing different national policies and rules with a more
homogenous policy approach?
The Eurojust’s action does not replace different national authorities. It does not substitute the
work of national judicial authorities: it enhances this work. EU-level action and the services
provided by Eurojust support and reinforce the work of national judicial authorities (public
prosecutors offices and, depending on national systems, investigation judges), helping them
to prosecute cross-border crimes and to conduct related criminal proceedings, such as
proceedings for asset recovery, more effectively.
(d) Do the benefits of EU-level action outweigh the loss of competence of the Member
States and the local and regional authorities (beyond the costs and benefits of acting
at national, regional and local levels)?
There is no loss of competence of the Member States or local authorities: they will retain all
their powers, as Eurojust will support their actions within the framework of national
procedures. Furthermore, each Member State will be represented twice within the agency: at
the operational level through the national desks, and at the managerial level through the
Management Board.
(e) Will there be improved legal clarity for those having to implement the legislation?
One of the objectives of the revision is precisely to clarify the agency’s governance system,
and in particular the relationships between its decision-making bodies. Another focus of the
reform is to improve relations between the agency and its European and other partners, which
will also promote legal certainty. The legal framework applicable to data protection and
processing will also be clarified.
3. Proportionality: How the EU should act
7
3.1 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying
the Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the
proportionality of the proposal and a statement allowing appraisal of the
compliance of the proposal with the principle of proportionality?
The assessment of measures and options followed a four-step process (construct baseline,
compile wide range of alternative policy options, identify most viable, describe key aspects
of retained ones). The choice of the preferred option is compliant with the principle of
proportionality laid down in Article 5(4) TEU. In this regard, the EU action will not exceed
what is necessary to achieve legitimate interests.
The rationale has been developed according to the degree of intensity of the measure and by
topic (specific objective and area of intervention). The assessment of the measures and policy
options is based on a mixed methods approach in which their effectiveness, efficiency and
coherence are graded using a scoring system that reflects the available data and its
acknowledged limitations. The measures selected for further analysis in the impact
assessment were the most proportionate and feasible (legally and politically).
3.2 Based on the answers to the questions below and information available from any
impact assessment, the explanatory memorandum or other sources, is the
proposed action an appropriate way to achieve the intended objectives?
The initiative is justified at Union level because Member States cannot effectively address
the growing complexity of serious cross-border crime on their own, making coordinated EU
action through Eurojust indispensable. In line with Article 85 TFEU, a regulation is
considered the most appropriate and coherent legal instrument to strengthen Eurojust’s
structure, governance, operational tasks, and cooperation mechanisms, since non-legislative
measures would not adequately resolve the identified shortcomings. While the regulation
leaves limited room for national implementation, it still allows flexibility for Member States
in areas such as the allocation of powers to National Members and the granting of additional
competences under national law. Although the reform entails additional financial and
administrative costs, these are viewed as proportionate and necessary given Eurojust’s
expanding responsibilities, expected efficiency gains, and the broader objective of reducing
the significant economic and social costs of crime across the EU.
(a) Is the initiative limited to those aspects that Member States cannot achieve
satisfactorily on their own, and where the Union can do better?
Yes. The scale and effects of cross-border crime investigations make Union-level
coordination indispensable. As the EU agency supporting and improving the coordination
and cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities, Eurojust is a
strong expression of this. There is a need for EU action to step up the support to Member
States in fighting serious and cross-border crime to keep pace with these threats. Indeed,
Member States alone would not be able to effectively tackle the new operational issues and
criminal threats identified in the evaluation study and the impact assessment.
(b) Is the form of Union action (choice of instrument) justified, as simple as possible, and
coherent with the satisfactory achievement of, and ensuring compliance with the
objectives pursued (e.g. choice between regulation, (framework) directive,
recommendation, or alternative regulatory methods such as co-legislation, etc.)?
8
The choice of the instrument is guided by the legal basis, Article 85 TFEU stating that the
European Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with
the ordinary legislative procedure, shall determine Eurojust's structure, operation, field of
action and tasks.
(c) Does the Union action leave as much scope for national decision as possible while
achieving satisfactorily the objectives set? (e.g. is it possible to limit the European
action to minimum standards or use a less stringent policy instrument or approach?)
One option discarded at an early stage was to adopt only non-legislative measures to address
the identified problems. The effects of an absence of legislative measures have been
considered in the baseline scenario described in the impact assessment. A legislative initiative
(a regulation) is the only means to address the problems identified in the functioning and the
governance of Eurojust as for the need to improve the tasks and operational competences of
the agency.
(d) Does the initiative create financial or administrative cost for the Union, national
governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators or citizens? Are these
costs commensurate with the objective to be achieved?
Eurojust is a decentralised agency mainly financed by the EU budget. Possibilities for internal
redeployment within Eurojust to cover part of the new tasks have been seriously explored
and pursued to the extent feasible.
• The reform is expected to generate certain efficiency gains. In particular, relieving
National Members from administrative burden and refocusing them on operational
casework should allow National Desks to devote more resources to cases and requests
from Member States, rather than supporting lengthy administrative discussions within
the College.
• Enhanced cooperation with partners is also expected to reduce the number of FTEs
currently devoted to follow-up activities linked to information exchange, thereby
freeing additional operational capacity.
• Nevertheless, additional resources are required to fulfil the Agency’s new tasks. The
figures currently reflected in the draft Impact Assessment are already net of the
estimated efficiency gains. These numbers are proportionate and correspond to the
operational needs of the reformed agency.
• This should also be seen against the background of the current resource situation at
Eurojust, where resources are already significantly stretched and several
reprioritisation exercises have taken place in recent years. Eurojust has repeatedly
indicated that, without reinforcements, it may soon be required to scale back certain
core activities.
The preferred option is expected to enhance the ability of national judicial authorities to
successfully prosecute cross-border organised crime, including large criminal enterprises,
particularly those with a third country dimension. This improvement acts as a deterrent to
future criminal activity, increases legal certainty, and reduces crime levels, thus
ultimately benefiting citizens and businesses alike. Given the size of the cost of crime in the
EU (approximately EUR 200 billion per annum), even a small contribution from the Agency
to the reduction of crime is expected to be high in monetary terms. To illustrate this, should
9
the proposed improvements to Eurojust contribute to addressing a mere 0.05%, this would
result overall in a EUR 100 million reduction to the cost of crime.
(e) While respecting the Union law, have special circumstances applying in individual
Member States been taken into account?
The legislative tool will be a regulation, without margin for manoeuvre concerning its
implementation (there is no transposition). Nevertheless, the implementation of some
provisions will leave some flexibility to Members States.
For instance, despite the reinforcement of the eligibility criteria for appointing College’s
National Members, if, under national law, the powers of National Members are conferred
upon another competent national authority, the National Member may request that authority
to issue or execute the measure concerned. In addition, Member States will have the
possibility to grant additional powers to National Members for the purpose of exercising their
tasks (in this hypothesis these Member States shall notify it the Commission and the College).
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
4.5.2026
SEC(2026) 570
REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD OPINION
{COM(2026) 570}
{SWD(2026) 570-573}
Impact assessment / Revision of the Eurojust Regulation
________________________________
This opinion concerns a draft impact assessment which may differ from the final version.
Commission européenne/Europese Commissie, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË - Tel. +32 22991111
EUROPEAN COMMISSION REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD
Brussels, RSB
Opinion
Title: Impact assessment / Revision of the Eurojust Regulation
Overall opinion: POSITIVE WITH RESERVATIONS
(A) Policy context
The EU agency for criminal justice cooperation, Eurojust, was set up in 2002. Amidst
growing sophistication of transnational criminal networks and accelerating digitalisation
of illegal activities, an evaluation published in 2025 identified structural and
organisational constraints affecting negatively the operational performance of the agency.
This impact assessment tries to address these issues and seeks to identify the way forward
towards stronger coordination and cooperation between national investigating and
prosecuting authorities to combat serious cross-border crime in the EU. The impact
assessment comes in parallel with related initiatives on Europol, Data Retention and the
Anti-Fraud Architecture (AFA) package (OLAF, EPPO and PIF).
(B) Key issues
The Board notes the additional information provided and commitments to make
changes to the report.
However, the report still contains significant shortcomings. The Board gives a
positive opinion with reservations because it expects the lead Service to rectify the
following aspects:
(1) The identification of the problems and their drivers is not sufficiently clear on
issues arising from legal obstacles despite recent amendments, and from
implementation problems.
(2) The specific and operational objectives, are not defined in a SMART manner to
allow measuring success through a comprehensive set of key performance
indicators.
(3) The impact of the initiative on fundamental rights (use of personal data) is not
sufficiently analysed.
2
(C) What to improve
(1) The report should better present the current situation of the agency and clarify
elements such as the prioritisation of simple versus complex files, nationally led cases
versus Eurojust ‘own’ cases and the involvement of external bodies and third
countries, to the extent possible and illustrated by examples/evidence. Concepts such
as what constitutes a ‘complex’ case should be explained in a clear way.
(2) The report should make better use of the 2025 evaluation, by including concrete
findings and examples in the analysis of the relevant problems and their drivers. The
problem definition should clarify the extent to which the current legislation is at the
origin of the problems and their drivers. It should better explain why the amendments
of the Eurojust Regulation since 2022 have not been sufficient for Eurojust to address
the challenges of a fast-evolving crime landscape. Issues related to governance and
organisational culture and why addressing them requires legislative changes rather
than management decisions should be better analysed.
(3) Specific and operational objectives should be reviewed to make them SMARTer. The
related key performance indicators should be adjusted accordingly, prioritising those
that can track the progress on achieving the objectives in a sufficiently reliable,
objective and proportionate manner, fully taking into account digital solutions.
(4) Certain measures, such as the ones expanding Eurojust’s competences to new or
emerging crimes, should be more clearly explained. The assessment of the policy
options should be enhanced, notably as regards the assessment on fundamental rights
of the impact of the measures leading to enhanced sharing of personal data. In this
respect, the report should provide a detailed analysis of the associated risks and
clearly explain the safeguards envisaged to mitigate them.
(5) The analysis of the coherence of the measures with recent or ongoing initiatives
related to EU bodies in the field of Justice and Home affairs as well as the EU
antifraud architecture, such as Europol, EPPO, OLAF, AMLA, etc. as well as in
relation to the EU external policies should be strengthened.
(6) Finally, efforts should be made to improve the accessibility of the report to non-
experts, while keeping it to a reasonable size.
Some more technical comments have been sent directly to the author Service.
(D) Conclusion
The lead Service must revise the report and its executive summary in accordance
with the Board’s findings before launching the interservice consultation.
Full title Revision of the Eurojust Regulation
Reference number PLAN/2025/1408
Submitted to RSB on 1 April 2026
Date of RSB meeting 29 April 2026
Electronically signed on 04/05/2026 16:12 (UTC+02) in accordance with Article 11 of Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2121
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 24.6.2026
SWD(2026) 570 final
PART 1/2
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and
repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1727
{COM(2026) 570 final} - {SEC(2026) 570 final} - {SWD(2026) 571 final} -
{SWD(2026) 572 final} - {SWD(2026) 573 final}
1. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ..................................... 1
1.1. Eurojust .............................................................................................................. 1
1.2. Legal context: the Eurojust Regulation ............................................................. 1
1.3. Political context ................................................................................................. 2
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION .......................................................................................... 4
2.1. Suboptimal efficiency of Eurojust’s internal organisation and processes ......... 5
2.1.1. What is the problem? .......................................................................................... 5
2.1.2. What are the problem drivers? ........................................................................... 6
2.2. Limitations in Eurojust’s interaction with partners ........................................... 9
2.2.1. What is the problem? .......................................................................................... 9
2.2.2. What are the problem drivers? ......................................................................... 10
2.3. How likely are the problems to persist (in absence of external intervention)? 13
2.3.1. Internal structural and governance limitations ................................................. 14
2.3.2. External interaction and cooperation ................................................................ 15
3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? .............................................................................. 15
3.1. Legal basis ....................................................................................................... 15
3.2. Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action ............................................................... 16
3.3. Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action .......................................................... 16
4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ..................................................... 17
4.1. General objective ............................................................................................. 17
4.2. Specific objectives ........................................................................................... 17
5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? .......................................... 18
5.1. What is the baseline from which the options are assessed? ............................ 19
5.2. Description of the policy options per specific objective ................................. 21
5.2.1. Specific Objective 1: Strengthen Eurojust’s Internal Functioning,
Governance and Operational Performance .............................................................. 22
5.2.1.1 Area of intervention A. Extending the scope of material competences to
face the new judicial landscape ............................................................................. 23
5.2.1.2 Area of intervention B. Harmonising Member State implementation of
the EJR, including on allocation of cases .............................................................. 24
5.2.1.3 Area of intervention C. Establishing a streamlined, coherent and role-
clear governance system that accelerates decision-making ................................... 25
5.2.2. Specific Objective 2: Achieve optimal operational integration with
Member States, EU partners and third countries ..................................................... 27
5.2.2.1 Area of intervention D. Fostering and strengthening structured
operational cooperation with Europol ................................................................... 28
5.2.2.2 Area of intervention E. Promoting fully developed cooperation with the
EPPO ............................................................................................................... 30
5.2.2.3 Area of intervention F. Consolidating cooperation with third countries
and international organisations .............................................................................. 31
5.3. Measures discarded at an early stage ............................................................... 32
6. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ........................................ 34
6.1. Specific Objective 1 ........................................................................................ 34
6.2. Specific Objective 2 ........................................................................................ 39
7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .................................................................. 44
8. PREFERRED OPTION ............................................................................................. 45
8.1. Presentation of the cumulative impact of the preferred option ....................... 46
8.2. Impact of the preferred option ......................................................................... 48
8.2.1. Effectiveness .................................................................................................... 48
8.2.2. Efficiency ......................................................................................................... 49
8.2.3. Coherence ......................................................................................................... 51
8.2.4. Impacts on Fundamental Rights ....................................................................... 53
8.3. REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) and ‘one in, one out’ approach
....................................................................................................................... 54
9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? ....... 55
9.1. Measurable indicators of success and proposed targets ........................................ 55
9.2. Operational objectives and related indicators proposed ........................................ 56
Glossary
Term or acronym Meaning or definition
AD Administrative Director
AFA Anti-fraud Architecture
AMLA Anti-Money Laundering Agency
ARO Asset Recovery Office
CAAR Consolidated Annual Activity Report
CATS Informal Coordinating Committee in the area of police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters
CC Coordination Centres
CEPOL European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training
CF Consultative Forum of Prosecutors General and Directors of Public
Prosecutions
CICED Core International Crimes Evidence Database
CM Coordination Meeting
CMS Case Management System
CTR European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register
DG HOME Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
DG JUST Directorate General for Justice and Consumers
DPR Data Protection Rules
EAW European Arrest Warrant
ECRIS European Criminal Records Information System
ECRIS-TCN European Criminal Records Information System – Third Country
Nationals
EDPS European Data Protection Supervisor
EJN European Judicial Network
EJR Eurojust Regulation
EIO European Investigation Order
EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats
ENCS Eurojust National Coordination Systems
EPPO European Public Prosecutor’s Office
EU European Union
EUCA European Union Customs Authority
EUDPR EU Data Protection Regulation
Eurojust European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation
Europol European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
eu-LISA European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale
IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
EB Executive Board
FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
FRONTEX European Border and Coast Guard Agency
FTE Full-Time Equivalent
GBV Gender-Based Violence
IBOA EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies
ICF Internal Control Framework
ICPA International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression
against Ukraine
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
JIT Joint Investigation Team
JOP Joint Operational Platform
JUDEX
JUstice Digital EXchange system, the constellation of decentralised IT
systems established by various EU legal instruments in civil, commercial,
and criminal matters
KPI Key Performance Indicator
LM Liaison Magistrate
LP Liaison Prosecutor
MAS Multi-Annual Strategy
MB Management Board
MFF Multiannual Financial Framework (EU financial programming)
MLA Mutual Legal Assistance
MoJ Ministry of Justice
NM National Member
OLAF European Anti-Fraud Office
PIF
Protection of the European Union’s financial interests. In EU criminal law,
it refers to offences that harm the EU budget, such as fraud, corruption, or
related financial crime.
RACER Relevant, Accepted, Credible, Easy to monitor and Robust.
SMART Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound
SOCTA Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
VURM Violation of Union Restrictive Measures
1
1. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT
1.1. Eurojust
Eurojust is the EU agency for criminal justice cooperation,supporting national
authorities in combating serious cross-border crime by strengthening coordination between
national authorities. As criminal networks increasingly operate across borders, national
authorities rely on Eurojust to facilitate parallel investigations across multiple Member
States, resolve conflicts of jurisdiction, coordinate prosecutorial strategies and support the
gathering and exchange of evidence.
Originally proposed in the Tampere Programme of 1999,1 Eurojust was formally
established in 2002 as an intergovernmental body under the Third Pillar on Police and
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.2 The Treaty of Lisbon3 transformed it into an
EU agency within the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ in the TFEU, culminating
in Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice
Cooperation (EJR), which modernised its governance and aligned it with post-Lisbon EU
agency structures. This Regulation has since been amended three times in a targeted
manner to address pressing operational needs: Regulation (EU) 2022/838,created the
Core International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED) following Russia’s full-scale
war of aggression against Ukraine; Regulation (EU) 2023/2131, strengthened
information-sharing in terrorism cases; and Regulation (EU) 2025/2082, extended the
timeframe for the establishment of the new Eurojust Case Management System (CMS).4
Today, Eurojust is an indispensable operational and strategic hub for judicial
cooperation, directly supporting the fight against cross-border criminal cases.
1.2. Legal context: the Eurojust Regulation
Eurojust’s mandate, structure, and operational framework are governed by the EJR, which
establishes it as a decentralised EU agency with legal personality. The Regulation defines
the mission of Eurojust as supporting and strengthening coordination and cooperation
between national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious
crime, particularly in cases affecting multiple Member States, based on information
supplied by Member States’ authorities, Europol, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office
(EPPO) and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).
Eurojust’s material competence extends to serious forms of crime listed in Annex I of
the EJR, and related offences. While Eurojust itself does not exercise prosecutorial powers,
the EJR equips it with coordination tools that go beyond informal facilitation. These
include the power to request national authorities to initiate investigations, to recommend
jurisdictional leadership, and to issue opinions to resolve disputes.
Operational tasks are performed by National Members (NMs) – judicial representatives
from each Member State – who may act in individual capacity or collectively as the
College. This ensures that all actions undertaken remain grounded in national law, while
enabling coordination among Member States. Strategic planning and management are, as
a rule, entrusted to the Executive Board (EB) and Administrative Director (AD).
1 Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999, Presidency conclusions, para 46. 2 2002/187/JHA: Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against
serious crime. 3 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed
13 December 2007. 4 Regulation (EU) 2025/2082.
2
Eurojust’s operational model relies on multilateral judicial coordination, primarily through
case management, Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), and strategic platforms like the
Counter-Terrorism Register.
Recent years have seen a shift toward crisis-driven coordination, exemplified by Eurojust’s
pivotal role in the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression
(ICPA). Established under the CICED framework, ICPA facilitates evidence-sharing for
war crimes linked to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, requiring close collaboration with the
ICC, Europol’s War Crimes Task Force, and national war crimes units. This expansion
underscores Eurojust’s evolving mandate in international criminal justice, with resource
demands outpacing current capacities.
The Regulation imposes on Member States specific information-sharing obligations,
coupled with data protection rules (DPR) governing the transfer of data. It also provides
the legal basis for Eurojust’s CMS.
Finally, it establishes a framework for cooperation with judicial networks – notably the
European Judicial Network (EJN) – as well as Europol and the EPPO, other EU
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (IBOAs), third countries, and international
organisations.
Internal functioning of Eurojust
The main governance organs of Eurojust are the Eurojust’s College, the Executive Board (EB) and the
Administrative Director (AD). The College is the body in charge of operational and operational-related
decisions; it is chaired by the President, who is a National Member elected by their peers for a four-year term
and is assisted by two Vice-Presidents. When exercising its management functions, the College also includes
a representative of the European Commission. The College adopts the Agency’s budget, Rules of Procedure,
as well as policy papers and guidelines related to the operational work of Eurojust. There is one National
Member per Member State. National Members are responsible for overseeing the operational work of their
respective National Desks. They are supported by a deputy and assistant(s). While the National Members are
organs of Eurojust, they are appointed and continue to be employed by their respective Member States. The
introduction of the EB by the Eurojust Regulation aimed at reducing the administrative burden on the
College. The Board consists of Eurojust’s President, its two Vice-Presidents, a representative of the
European Commission, and two other College Members designated on a two-year rotation system. As such,
membership of the Board is not conditional on any managerial skill or experience. The EB is not involved
in the operational functions of Eurojust. Instead, it focuses on ensuring the Agency’s proper functioning.
Activities of the Board include reviewing key programming and planning documents (e.g. the draft annual
budget), assisting and advising the AD on the implementation of College decisions, and adopting the anti-
fraud strategy and financial rules. The administration of Eurojust is headed by the AD, who is appointed by
the College. The AD is responsible for the day-to-day administration of Eurojust, in line with the Eurojust
Regulation, College decisions, and Eurojust programming documents, etc. The administration (Eurojust
staff) is further divided into two main departments, the Operations Department and the Resources
Department.
1.3. Political context
The EU’s internal security landscape is evolving rapidly, shaped by increasingly complex
criminal ecosystems, a steady expansion of cross-border threats,andongoing
geopolitical instability. Criminal networks operate seamlessly across borders, exploiting
jurisdictional fragmentation and technical innovation to commit illegal activities and evade
detection. While Europe’s institutional systems are largely recognised as effective and
resilient, there are regional variations.5 National judicial and law enforcement systems are
5 Global Organized Crime Index 2025, Crime at a crossroads, Europe, p. 2.
3
under unprecedented strain, intensifying the operational demand for coordinated support
at EU level.
The recent Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA)6 underlines this
shift, depicting a highly interconnected, technology-driven criminal ecosystem that
systematically outpaces national law enforcement and judicial responses.
In response, the EU has strengthened its strategic framework for internal security. The
ProtectEU Strategy7 explicitly prioritises judicial cooperation, recognising that
operational intelligence must translate into effective prosecutions. It highlights the need to
assess and strengthen Eurojust’s mandate in 2026, underscoring the Agency’s central
role in coordinating cross-border prosecutions, enabling information exchange between
judicial authorities, and ensuring coherent prosecution at EU level and beyond. This is
echoed in the EU Roadmap to fight Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime and the
EU Drugs Strategy and EU Action Plan against drug trafficking8.Given that
successful prosecutions hinge on swift mutual legal assistance and parallel investigations,
Eurojust’s role as the EU’s criminal justice hub has never been more critical.
A clear trend has emerged: the line between domestic and cross-border crime is
blurring, and effectiveness of national judicial action now depends on robust EU-level
support. Recent reforms – such as the E-evidence framework,9 the Anti-Money
Laundering package,10and the interoperability of EU information systems11 – are
transforming data-sharing practices of national authorities, making coordination even more
essential.
Member States increasingly depend on Eurojust’s support, using Joint Investigation
Teams (JITs)12, Coordination Meetings (CMs)and Coordination Centres (CC) to
manage parallel investigations, prevent jurisdictional conflicts, and secure admissible
evidence.13 Judicial cooperation needs have expanded in both volume and complexity,
particularly in cyber-enabled crime, financial crime, terrorism, and organised crime cases.
Eurojust must be ready to rise to these challenges.
The 2025 evaluation of Eurojust,14carried out pursuant to Article 69 of the EJR, found
that while the Agency plays a pivotal role in supporting cross-border investigations, it
faces structural and organisational constraints which ultimately affect its operational
performance.
Therefore, the EU needs a more effective, more efficient, and better-equipped Eurojust
to ensure cross-border crimes are prosecuted effectively and justice systems can respond
swiftly to evolving threats.
In light of this, the High-Level Forum on the Future of EU Criminal Justice called for
a more cohesive criminal justice architecture, recognising Eurojust’s decisive role in
6 EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2025 (EU-SOCTA). 7 COM(2025) 148 final (01.04.2025). 8 COM(2023) 641 final (18.10.2023), COM(2025) 743 final (04.12.2025), COM(2025) 744 final (04.12.2025). 9 Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 and Directive (EU) 2023/1544. 10 Regulations (EU) 2023/1113, 2024/1620, 2024/1624, Directives (EU) 2024/1640, 2024/1654. 11 Regulation (EU) 2019/818, Regulation (EU) 2019/817. 12 As defined under Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA A Joint Investigation Team (JIT) is set
up for a specific purpose and limited duration, based on an agreement between two or more EU Member States (and
possibly third parties), to carry out criminal investigations in one or more of the states involved. Since 2024, around 300
JITs are supported by Eurojust every year. 13 Demand for CMs grew by 50% between 2019 and 2024, applications for JIT financial support rose by 17% over the
same period, Support study, pp. 19-20. 14 SWD(2025) 182 final (02.7.2025).
4
coordinating cross-border investigations, both within the EU and with third countries.15
Consequently, the Commission work programme 2026 has prioritised revising
Eurojust’s legal framework to protect democracy, upholding EU values.16
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The evaluation found that Eurojust is highly effective in fulfilling its mandate to support
and strengthen coordination and cooperation between national authorities in the field of
criminal justice.17 However, improvements are needed, particularly in efficiency and
cooperation with EU partners and third countries18 – issues that were not addressed by
previous amendments19 of the EJR. Optimising internal processes and interactions with
the broader criminal justice ecosystem would unlock its full potential in the fight
against serious and organised cross-border crime.
Two sets of problems have been identified: one relating to the internal dimension,
stemming from limitations in the organisational structure and processes; and one relating
to the external dimension, concerning challenges in coordination with partners.
The evaluation also highlighted the slow pace of Eurojust’s digitalisation and the issues
arising from its outdated IT infrastructures, particularly its CMS, hindering
interoperability, data exchange and analysis and effective workflows. This ultimately
affects Eurojust’s capacity to manage increasing data volumes and address digitally
enabled crime.20 However, as a new CMS and other digital tools are already in
development, this problem is not explored further in this impact assessment.21
Table 1: Problem tree
15 Report of the High Level-Forum on the Future of EU Criminal Justice, February-December 2025 (HLF report). 16 COM(2025) 870 final (21.10.2025), Annex I, No. 31. 17 Eurojust Evaluation, p. 43. 18 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 47-49. 19 Changes to the EJR since 2022 were targeted amendments (Counter Terrorism Register, CICED and new CMS) adding
competences, in particular in reaction to crisis situations. These amendments did not constitute a comprehensive reform
of the Agency that would address broader structural deficiencies. 20 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 18, 33. 21 COM/2025/143 final.
5
2.1. Suboptimal efficiency of Eurojust’s internal organisation and processes
2.1.1. What is the problem?
Eurojust’s ability to maximise its added value in supporting cross-border criminal cases is
compromised by an insufficient focus on its core operational activities.22
While demand for its services grows across Member States,23 it still struggles to
systematically filter out lower-complexity cases, such as routine information exchange or
bilateral mutual legal assistance requests, which could be handled more efficiently through
bilateral cooperation or the EJN. Instead, resources are diverted from complex cases,24
which involve serious cross-border crime requiring active coordinationand a common
strategy among multiple jurisdictions. These are the cases where Eurojust’s involvement
generates the greatest added value, particularly when multiple legal frameworks and
judicial authorities, or third countries are involved.25
Example EncroChat26: Eurojust’s strategic impact is exemplified in the dismantling of EncroChat, an
encrypted phone network widely used by organised crime groups across Europe and beyond. Initiated in
2017 by French authorities, followed by a case opening at Eurojust in 2019 and escalated into a JIT in 2020
with the Netherlands under Eurojust’s coordination, the operation exemplifies how the Agency optimises
resources for high-stakes cases. By facilitating nine CMs, resolving jurisdictional conflicts, and processing
nearly 170 European Investigation Orders (EIOs), Eurojust enabled the interception of millions of encrypted
messages, leading to 6,558 arrests globally and the seizure of EUR 900 million in criminal assets. The case
also demonstrated Eurojust’s role in scaling cooperation: what began as a bilateral effort expanded to 13
countries, triggering spin-off investigations into drug trafficking, money laundering, and violent crime.
Crucially, Eurojust’s involvement ensured that admissible evidence was shared efficiently across
jurisdictions, avoiding duplication and legal fragmentation. This case shows how Eurojust’s intervention on
complex, multi-jurisdictional threats delivers transformative results in combating organised crime.
In recent years, Eurojust’s mandate has expanded into new and resource-intensive areas,
namely international crimes and terrorism.27 Despite allocations of some additional budget
and staff to account for the new tasks,28 a level of tension is noted between workload and
staff availability, leading to reduced support capacity and delays in responding to Member
States.29 Some resource dispersion results from Eurojust’s unstructured participation in
policy and strategic cycles.30 While the Agency is uniquely positioned to contribute to
policy development in the area of criminal justice and judicial cooperation, its role in this
field remains largely based on ad hoc requests, resulting in both limited involvement and
challenges in determining the appropriate level of resources to be allocated to such work.31
22Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 25, 30-31; Support study, p. 18.23 The number of registered cases grew by 66% between 2019 and 2024, at an average growth rate of 11%. The projected
annual growth in workload for the period 2026-2028 is 8%. Support study, pp. 18-19.24 Core characteristics of a complex case are for example: multilateral investigations (several Member States and/or third
countries) linked to organised crime, parallel proceedings and prosecutions with risks of jurisdictional conflicts, several
legal frameworks and judicial authorities involved, operations demanding coordination tools or synchronised actions
(e.g., JITs, simultaneous arrests, or searches), operational urgency or strategic importance. 25Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 18-20, 25-27.26 https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/ar2020/7-casework-crime-type/72-encrochat-dismantling-encrypted-network-used-
criminal-groups; https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/dismantling-encrypted-criminal-encrochat-communications-6-
500-arrests-900-eur-seized; https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/fr/document/encrochat-investigation-france. 27 Amending Regulations (EU) 2022/838 (establishing the Core International Crimes Evidence Database and supporting
the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression) and 2023/2131 (establishing the Counter
Terrorism Register). 28Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 23-24, 27-28.29Support study, p. 21.30Support study, p. 22.31 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 14, 37; Support study, p. 21.
6
These constraints have shaped an operational model in which Eurojust primarily responds
to Member States’ requests rather than acting proactively. This limits the use of its own-
initiative powers and reduces its capacity to identify and act on cross-border criminal
developments, leaving its potential to contribute to crime detection underexploited.32
Part of the problem lies in Eurojust’s partially outdated toolset. Its competences remain
focused on the coordination of investigations and prosecutions, with no clearly defined
mandate in related areas of growing importance, such as asset freezing, the processing of
e-evidence, victim support and analysis of judicial data. Though Eurojust already engages
in these activities at the request of Member States, it does so in an unstructured manner,
without a clear legal basis and defined scope.33
Finaly, the Agency’s governance, decision-making and management do not consistently
support timely and effective steering. Despite the change of legal framework, the Agency’s
internal structures and working practices have not fully evolved to operate as an EU
decentralised agency.34 Decisions that could be taken at managerial or administrative level
are often escalated to collective governance bodies, increasing procedural burden,
potentially delaying strategic direction and operational follow-through. Administrative
work tends to absorb a significant share of the attention of NMs and their desks, diverting
time and focus from casework.35
2.1.2. What are the problem drivers?
Problem driver #1 relates to limitations in Eurojust’s case selection and prioritisation
model. This driver stems primarily from implementation challenges, though the absence
of a legal definition of a “Eurojust case” which adds procedural ambiguity. Beyond limited
instances of own-initiative action, Eurojust’s operational work is driven by Member States’
demand, as it is national authorities that refer cases and provide information.36
When dealing with incoming requests, Eurojust does not systematically apply clear criteria
to select, redirect, or prioritise cases. One reason appears to be the lack of a common
definition of a “Eurojust case”,37 leading to inconsistent approaches to case handling. In
addition, NMs may prioritise certain referrals over others based less on objective or
strategic considerations and more on thematic preferences, interests of the Member State
they represent, or established relationships with their respective national authorities.38 In
2023, an estimated 82% of Eurojust’s new case work was made up of bilateral and low-
complexity cases.39 In this context, high levels of ambition, combined with inconsistent
prioritisation, can create the perception that additional resources are the primary solution
to workload pressure, rather than a change in operational practices,40
A similar definitional gap affects ‘own-initiative’ cases as mentioned in Article 2(3) EJR.41
Coupled with the high number of referrals, this restricts the Agency’s ability to act
proactively.
32Support study, pp. 17-18.33Support study, p. 19.34Support study, p. 20.35Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 30-34. Support study, pp. 22-25.36Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 18-20, 26-27; Support study, pp. 18, 27.37 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 41-42. 38Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 30-31, 36. Support study, p. 27.39 Support study p. 18. 40Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 33-35. The support study suggests that by streamlining governance structures, Eurojust has
the potential to deliver greater impact with the same or even reduced level of resources, Support study, p. 24.41Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 20, 27; Support study, pp. 19-20.
7
Problem driver #2 relates to Eurojust’s partially outdated competences and associated
toolset.
This driver arises primarily from gaps in Eurojust’s formal mandate and competences.
As a hub connecting criminal justice authorities, Eurojust is well placed to support national
authorities in investigative activities of growing relevance, such as asset freezing – by
coordinating Asset Recovery Offices (AROs) and judicial authorities when proceeds of
crime are identified – and the issuance and execution of e-evidence orders. However,
Eurojust lacks an explicit mandate in these areas, resulting in unstructured activities carried
out at the request of national authorities, leaving much potential untapped.42
The lack of clearly defined competences also affects Eurojust’s analytical work, for which
a specific mandate has so far been granted only in relation to international crimes and
terrorism (for the data stored in the CICED and CTR). The positive experience with these
instruments suggests that such analytical functions could bring added value also in other
highly complex areas of crime.43
Moreover, emerging areas of criminalisation – such as violations of the Union’s restrictive
measures and cybercrime– currently fall outside Eurojust’s competence, meaning that the
Agency can only be involved upon specific request from national authorities, thereby
limiting its proactivity and strategic involvement.
Finally, despite its recognised value,44 no institutionalised mechanisms are in place to
translate Eurojust‘s operational expertise into reusable knowledge for EU policy
development in the area of criminal justice and judicial cooperation.45
Problem driver #3 concerns differences in EJR implementation across Member
States.
This driver stems from a mix of legal and practical problems, rooted in the fragmented
implementation of the EJR, divergent national legal frameworks governing NMs, and
inconsistent operational practices in case referrals and information sharing.
When appointed as NMs, the status and powers of the designated officials remain governed
by national law. While the implementation of the EJR has led to some harmonisation of
NMs’ judicial powers,46 differences persist, meaning that NMs from different Member
States may be empowered to carry out acts that others are precluded from performing.47
Under the current framework, Member States may appoint a prosecutor, a judge, or a
representative of a judicial authority as NM48 – a choice which affects the scope of powers
and the handling of cases. This is particularly evident in the issuance of judicial
instruments: some may be issued by a prosecutor, others require an independent judge,
while none can be issued by a representative who does not hold the status of an active
member of the judiciary.
42Interviews. Practitioners highlight how Eurojust could speed up asset freezing.43 Interviews. Practitioners using CICED value the analytical reports prepared by Eurojust at their request. 44 HLF report, p. 24. 45Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 14, 37; Support study, pp. 21-22.46 Evaluation study, p. 85. 47Eurojust Evaluation, p. 12; Support study, p. 26.48 Article 7(4) of the Eurojust Regulation. In some national systems, the appointed NM no longer retains judicial status
and assumes a role comparable to a civil servant within the MoJ.
8
Another consequence of differing practices and legal systems is that NMs have varying
levels of expertise which affects how administrative tasks are performed.49
These discrepancies lead to an uneven distribution of added value from the Agency’s
services across Member States, with some benefiting more than others.
Inconsistencies also affect the referral practices of Member States, exacerbating problem
driver #1. National authorities do not always apply appropriate criteria to distinguish
between lower-complexity cases, to be referred to the EJN, and more complex cases
requiring Eurojust’s involvement. In some instances, national authorities resort to Eurojust
as a “fast track” helpdesk for convenience rather than based on objective needs; in others,
they may favour bilateral cooperation or EJN channels, underusing Eurojust. Even the
Eurojust National Coordination System (ENCS) – the national hub responsible for
coordination between Eurojust and Member States – may lack sufficient authority to
effectively enforce such filtering.50
Finally, information sharing obligations are applied inconsistently. Member States lack a
shared understanding of what constitutes serious cross-border crime requiring Eurojust
involvement, leading to selective reporting. This reduces the completeness and timeliness
of the information shared, thereby limiting the Agency’s ability to gain an overview of
cross-border crime and to intervene proactively.51
Problem driver #4 concerns unclear separation between operational and
administrative responsibilities.
This driver stems from a mix of legal ambiguity and implementation challenges, primarily
arising from divergent interpretations of the EJR.
Interpretations of “operational” and “administrative” matters under the EJR diverge, with
Eurojust’s reading not fully aligning with the Commission’s institutional position.52 By
broadly defining “operational” matters, the College has effectively retained control over a
number of administrative decisions, sidelining the EB, which now functions largely as a
preparatory body for College meetings. This is partly due to reluctance from NMs to
delegate administrative authority, fearing it may compromise operational autonomy or
prosecutorial independence.53
The blurring of operational and administrative roles contributes to lengthy decision-
making processes and high administrative burden for NMs, who currently spend around
40-50% of their time on administrative work, at the expense of operational work.54
Problem driver #5 concerns the complex governance structure and legacy
organisational culture that adversely impact decision-making.
This driver stems primarily from implementation problems. However, the lack of clear
legal mandates for roles intensifies these challenges.
Eurojust’s governance is distributed across the College, the EB, College Working Groups
and the Administration, which can lead to misaligned priorities.
49Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 32-33. This is exacerbated by the existing rotation system for National Members’ membership
to the EB, which fails to take into account the specific expertise, interest, capacity and availability of the National
Members on duty. Support study, pp. 23, 26.50Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 12, 25-26; Support study, pp. 26-27.51Eurojust Evaluation, p. 27.52Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 25, 30-32, 38-39; Support study, p. 24.53 Support study, pp. 23-24.54Eurojust Evaluation, p. 30; Support study, p. 26.
9
The College informally shapes strategy, overlapping with responsibilities of the EB, while
the AD holds formal responsibility for planning and implementation.55 College Working
Groups play a role in shaping strategic planning through their influence rooted in legacy
practices. This undermines coherent governance and dilutes accountability.56 Despite
raising the issue and pushing for changes, the Commission, in its role as a member of the
EB and within the College, has not been able to effect reform.57
Governance inefficiencies are also rooted in a legacy culture. Established practices and
institutional culture preserve pre-EJR working methods, like consensus-based decision-
making, that favours inclusiveness over agility. This reflects an unresolved institutional
identity that oscillates between an intergovernmental coordination unit and a full EU
agency. The resulting ambiguity slows adaptation to new mandates or operational threats.58
2.2. Limitations in Eurojust’s interaction with partners
2.2.1. What is the problem?
Eurojust’s effectiveness as an EU criminal justice coordination hub is constrained in the
way it interacts with partner at the EU and international level.
While the mandates of EU agencies and bodies are designed to complement each other and
provide for close cooperation, their implementation in practice may give rise to procedural
complexity and duplication, affecting the EU’s response to serious and organised cross-
border crime.59 Stakeholders have drawn attention to the need to reinforce the judicial
dimension of cross-border cooperation by addressing gaps and enhancing coherence across
existing instruments.60
Eurojust’s cooperation with EU agencies and bodies is overall effective on a case-by-case
basis but lacks a fully structured or systematic approach. This can lead to withholding of
information, which may affect the identification of criminal activity at an early stage. 61
This is particularly relevant for Eurojust’s main partners in the criminal justice domain:
Europol and the EPPO. Cooperation with other IBOAs – notably OLAF – as well as the
EJN and other judicial networks, show scope for further improvement in terms of the
distribution of tasks and information exchange.62
Moreover, Eurojust’s capacity to support cooperation in cases with an extra-EU dimension,
while increasing, faces challenges. Cooperation with third countries is often irregular and
slow to operationalise, as existing arrangements may not be sufficiently robust or stable,
or are unevenly implemented.63 Following changes in the Treaty framework applicable to
international agreements, the EJR removed Eurojust’s power to conclude cooperation
agreements directly. Instead, in accordance with Article 218 TFEU, the Commission
55Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 30-33. Support study, p. 23.56Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 11-12, 30-33, 36. Support study, p. 23.57In the context of EB meetings, the Commission representative consistently pointed to agenda items which should not
have been brought before the EB, as well as others that should have been decided by the EB rather than being referred
to the College.58Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 30-33, 36.59 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 25, 28-29. 60 HLF report, p. 10. 61 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 28-29. 62 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 29-30. 63 Interviews, Annex II.
10
conducts negotiations, while the Council authorises signature and conclusion following the
consent of the European Parliament. This has made the process more time-consuming.64
In the absence of an international agreement, Eurojust has only limited and unstructured
means to engage with international partners. 65
2.2.2. What are the problem drivers?
Problem driver #6 relates to uncertainties in the application of the data protection
framework and constraints stemming from the data ownership principle.
This driver stems from a mix of legal and implementation problems.
Differences in the understanding of data protection requirements across Member States,
Eurojust and EU partners may result in delays and under-sharing of data for investigations.
Data Protection Officers apply varying levels of caution when assessing whether the
conditions for the transfer of operational data are met, with such assessments often proving
complex and burdensome.66
In addition, the flow of information is constrained by the data ownership principle. The
checks to ensure that Member States retain control over the use of the data they provide
may slow down exchanges between partner agencies, which must verify conditions or seek
the data owner’s consent before onward sharing relevant data.67
Regarding international cooperation, the absence of a data protection framework in third
countries and international organisations – or its misalignment with the EU requirements
– may delay or prevent the conclusion of international agreements enabling a structured
transfer of information.68
Transfers subject to appropriate safeguards – or based on derogations for specific situations
– may remain unused due to divergent interpretation of the provisions or over-
compliance.69
Problem driver #7 concerns the still-developing institutionalisation of cooperation
among partners at EU level.
This driver stems from legal and implementation problems, driven especially by the lack
of formalised frameworks for cooperation.
Eurojust cooperates with IBOAs within and beyond the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
area, as well as with networks and other actors at EU level. However, the arrangements in
place vary widely, reflecting the degree to which cooperation is institutionalised within
each actor’s framework, ranging from ad hoc to more structured forms of cooperation. A
share of the engagement may rely on informal contacts or personal networks rather than
stable, predictable mechanisms.70
64 Agreements have been concluded with Armenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; agreements with Lebanon and Algeria
are in the interinstitutional process; others are being negotiated. 65 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 23, 30. 66 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 17-18, 28-29. 67 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 28-29. 68 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 18, 30; Support study p. 32. 69 In the absence of adequacy decisions, data transfers must rely on these alternative legal bases. 70 Support study, pp. 30-32.
11
Where roles and responsibilities are not defined in detail in the legal framework, gaps may
arise in the identification of opportunities for mutual support, increasing coordination costs
and administrative burden for both Eurojust and its partners.71
Cooperation among EU agencies and bodies is structurally constrained by the existence of
separate data repositories between Eurojust, Europol, the EPPO, OLAF, AMLA, EUCA
and Frontex. While the separation of data storage reflects differing mandates and reinforces
data protection safeguards, it may slow down the timely identification of links between
cases handled by different actors, potentially generating missed opportunities for
uncovering criminal activity and supporting case-building.
The exchange of information currently takes place through a system of indirect mutual
access to databases – the so-called “hit/no-hit” system – which at present is codified and
exists only in bilateral relations between Eurojust, Europol, the EPPO and OLAF.72 The
functioning of this system remains cumbersome73. Even where a “hit” is identified, the
operational added value is often limited due to the time-consuming nature of the
procedures involved.74
While cooperation with Europol and the EPPO is central (and is therefore addressed under
separate problem drivers #8 and #9) cooperation with other actors remains comparatively
limited.
Cooperation between Eurojust and OLAF concerns a relatively small number of cases,
given the administrative nature of OLAF’s investigations, from which indications of
serious cross-border crime may occasionally arise.75 Nonetheless, there may be some
uncertainty as to whether Eurojust is expected to take on a coordinating role.
Engagement with agencies such as FRA and CEPOL remains largely ad hoc, often limited
to training or seminars and dependent on informal contacts rather than structured
workflows. Most partnerships are based on long-standing, non-binding memoranda of
understanding (e.g. with CEPOL, FRA and eu-LISA), which lack the legal weight and
operational detail of formal working arrangements.76
Finally, the distribution of work between Eurojust and judicial networks is not fully
codified nor consistent, making it less straightforward for practitioners to identify the
appropriate channel for their cooperation needs. As a result, referrals, requests for support
and information exchanges may not always follow the most streamlined approach.
Problem driver #8 concerns the insufficiently institutionalised cooperation between
Europol and Eurojust.
This driver stems from legal and implementation problems.
While the mandates of the two agencies are closely linked, ensuring a “continuum”
between law enforcement operations and judicial follow-up, criminal intelligence and
analytical datasets produced by Europol do not systematically feed into Eurojust’s
71 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 29-30. 72 Articles 49-51 EJR. 73 One actor must submit a request to another regarding a case or suspect; the receiving party then manually verifies
whether relevant information is held in its database and communicates a “hit” or “no hit”. In the event of a hit, a further
request is required for disclosure, followed by additional manual follow-up. 74 Support study, p. 33. 75 Support study, pp. 29-30. 76 Renewing cooperation arrangements is a lengthy process that may face challenges. For instance, discussions between
Eurojust and Frontex on a new working arrangement were halted in 2022 due to data protection concerns raised by the
EDPS.
12
casework.77 This reduces opportunities for early alignment between investigative and
judicial action and the consistent translation of analytical insights into operational action,
particularly in priority domains such as organised crime.78
Such constraints are further compounded by the fact that the existing working arrangement
between the two agencies, concluded in 2010, may no longer fully reflect their current
mandates and evolving operational realities, limiting the scope for integrated
cooperation.79
In key areas of common interest, the boundaries between respective competences may not
always be clear, reflecting the often-blurred distinction between the gathering of criminal
intelligence and collection of evidence in the course of criminal investigations. This gives
rise to grey areas affecting the allocation of responsibilities and the timing of engagement.
This gives rise to grey areas affecting the allocation of responsibilities and the timing of
engagement, and in some cases resulting in duplication of work.
Further issues related to information flow and link detection stem from the time-consuming
procedures associated with the hit/no-hit system described under problem driver #7.80
Problem driver #9 relates to constrained cooperation with the EPPO.
This driver stems from legal constraints and implementation problems.
The EPPO is the EU prosecution service competent for the investigation and prosecution
of crimes affecting the Union’s financial interests; cooperation with Eurojust is therefore,
in principle, confined to such offences. Nonetheless, EPPO cases may lead to the discovery
of serious cross-border crime falling outside the EPPO’s competence, in which case
Eurojust may take on a role in coordinating national authorities.
Information held by the EPPO is processed for the purposes of investigation and
prosecution and is therefore subject to high standards of confidentiality. Limited disclosure
of investigation-related information may lead to the under-involvement of Eurojust, even
where multilateral coordination would add value for case-building and follow-up on
offences beyond the EPPO’s competence.81
This is particularly relevant in organised crime. EPPO investigations may uncover criminal
organisations engaged in offences beyond the Union’s financial interests. However,
limited or delayed transmission of such information may hinder efforts to address broader
criminal networks.82 As above, the time-consuming procedures of the hit/no-hit system
give rise to delays in follow-up (#7).
Problem driver #10 relates to the cumbersome process for establishing formal
relations with third countries and international justice actors.
The obstacles are mainly of a legal nature stemming from the non-compliance of partners
outside the EU with EU standards, particularly in the area of data protection.
77 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 31-32. 78 Improvements in the operation cooperation between Europol and Eurojust are also addressed in the context of the
ongoing revision of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
(Europol). 79 Support study, p. 27. 80 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 28-29, 41; Support study, p. 28. 81 When the EPPO started its operations (1 June 2021), 22 Member States participated in the enhanced cooperation on
the establishment of the EPPO. Two more Member States joined the enhanced cooperation in 2024 and another one is
expected to join it in 2027. Eurojust Evaluation, p. 29. 82 Eurojust Evaluation support study, p. 92; Support study, p. 29.
13
Eurojust’s coordination role increasingly extends to cases involving third countries, either
because they concern transnational crimes involving one or more Member States and third
countries, or where there is a clear EU interest in engagement beyond the Union’
territory.83
For example, a significant share of proceeds of crime generated within the EU is
transferred to third countries with less stringent financial controls, particularly in the Gulf
region. Another relevant area concerns drug trafficking from Latin America, the tackling
of which requires a coordinated approach at EU and Member States level.84
The need to establish cooperation relationships and receive timely feedback from third
countries may face challenges in light of the procedure for concluding international
agreements, which involves complex negotiations and approval procedures.85 Moreover,
such agreements require a degree of convergence with EU standards, particularly on data
protection, which may entail legislative changes in the third country and prolong the
process.
Even in the absence of an international agreement, Eurojust may conclude working
arrangements with a third country or international organisation.86 However, such
instruments do not carry the same legal weight as international agreements and may lead
to a misalignment with the EU’s external action priorities as defined by the EU institutions.
This risk of misalignment is also linked to capacity-building activities in which Eurojust
engages in third countries through dedicated projects. As these are largely carried out
informally, without a legal basis in the EJR, they lack defined requirements and
boundaries.
Finally, the functions of Liaison Magistrates (LMs) (Eurojust officials posted in third
countries) and Liaison Prosecutors (LPs) (third country officials posted at Eurojust on the
basis of an international agreement) appear to be underutilised.87
2.3. How likely are the problems to persist (in absence of external intervention)?
Following the publication of the Evaluation, Eurojust has drawn up an action plan aimed
at addressing the main findings. The action plan covers 44 identified issues, half of which,
according to Eurojust’s assessment, would require legislative amendments to the EJR. The
remaining issues can be addressed through internal reorganisation, procedural review and
awareness-raising measures.88
Changes to the Eurojust Regulation since 2022 were targeted amendments (CTR,
CICED and new CMS) aimed to add competences to the agency, in particular in reaction
to situations of crisis that did not and could not constitute a comprehensive reform of
the agency which would respond to broader structural deficiencies. These circumscribed
and contextual modifications of the legal framework did not constitute a global revision
and as such they were not intended to address systemic issues of the agency.
Therefore, without external intervention several problem drivers are likely to persist,
as they are associated with Eurojust’s legal framework, governance design, legacy
organisational culture, dependence on Member States, and the broader dynamics in the EU
83 Eurojust Evaluation, p. 46. 84 EB discussions on the establishment of a UAE Resident Contact Point; Eurojust Annual Report 2024. 85 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 23, 30; Support study, p. 308. 86 Article 47 EJR. 87 Eurojust Evaluation, pp. 221, 315. 88 The Action Plan is a Eurojust internal document that was also shared with the Commission.
14
justice architecture. It appears unlikely that long-established practices will change
spontaneously without amending the legal framework.
2.3.1. Internal structural and governance limitations
Regarding operational work and operational prioritisation, the absence of a clear
prioritisation model and defined case intake thresholds are unlikely to be remedied under
the current framework nor through changes introduced by Eurojust’s action plan, which
rely largely on internal guidance and voluntary alignment. Such measures may not
overcome structural incentives for NMs to prioritise national interests or informal
relationships with the respective national authorities.
Equally, while the Agency’s Action Plan for 2026 – 2027 intends to strengthen proactive
activities, it cannot address the lack of a clear legal framework. A new KPI to measure the
number of complex cases supported by Eurojust could prove useful, but it will not correct
long-standing referral practices. Since Eurojust itself lacks the authority to impose
harmonised referral standards or systematically filter cases, its caseload will remain shaped
primarily by national demand rather than strategic agency-wide planning and operational
steering.
Limitations in Eurojust’s operational tools are also unlikely to be overcome without
external intervention. To gain full competence in new crime areas, these need to be
included in Annex I to the EJR. Without greater legal clarity, Eurojust will not step up
action in fields such as asset recovery and engagement with service providers (electronic
evidence), resulting in missed opportunities for judicial follow-up. Moreover, without an
explicit mandate to translate operational experience into systematic EU-level policy input
and threat analysis, Eurojust’s strategic contribution will remain ad hoc and minimal.
The EJR contains ambiguities – and to some respect discretion – regarding key matters
such as the status and powers of NMs, the organisation of the ENCS, and information
sharing by Member States. Under-implementation of the ENCS or the on-call
coordination mechanism (OCC) – seen as burdensome89 – persist. In absence of external
intervention, meaningful progress is unlikely; these matters fall under national or legal
obligations and Eurojust currently has no enforcement competence to harmonise these
divergences which also impact the Agency’s governance and operational functioning.
In response to the administrative and governance issues, Eurojust plans to streamline
decision-making and improve managerial skills and leadership.90 Steps will be taken to
rationalise the functioning of Working Groups to avoid task overlap and a long-term
Eurojust Vision 2035 will be prepared. While these proposed measures seek to mitigate
inefficiencies, the current structure inherently limits strong and more centralised leadership
and oversight and are likely only to result in incremental improvements. They will not
address the blurred distinction between operational and administrative responsibilities,
which is rooted in legacy practices.91 NMs will retain extensive collective decision-making
powers, and the EB’s role will remain comparatively limited. As a result, the current
practices e.g. escalation of decisions to collective bodies, sustains lengthy deliberative
processes are likely to continue, diverting NMs’ time from operations.
89 Evaluation study, page 30. 90 I.a., by delegating certain decisions to the EB or AD, and revising working practices in the College; and implementing
training programmes. 91 Article 5(1) EJR.
15
2.3.2. External interaction and cooperation
The external problems are also likely to persist without external intervention, as they stem
from structural and legal factors across the EU justice architecture. While “hit/no-hit”
mechanisms exist between certain agencies and bodies, their effectiveness is constrained
by technical, procedural, and legal limitations. Without significant improvement towards
a more automated and interoperable system, administrative burdens will remain high and
operational returns can only be improved incrementally.
Constraints on data-sharing with international partners and associated delays in
cases will likely also persist in the absence of external intervention. These are expected
to be addressed in the context of the revised EUDPR. Where necessary, the Commission,
together with Eurojust and the European Data Protection Service (EDPS), may develop
explanatory guidance to clarify the application of the new provisions.
The current cooperation with Eurojust’s closest JHA partners – particularly Europol
and the EPPO – will also continue to be underused without external intervention.
Cooperation with Europol is unlikely to improve fundamentally without mutually binding
obligations to better share information or otherwise cooperate, and without a revised and
modernised working arrangement. Eurojust’s planned actions e.g. to establish a single
point of contact at Eurojust for all non-case related information coming from Europol, and
to enhance joint initiatives such as the Joint Operational Platform (JOP), should improve
cooperation. However, they are unlikely to bring about a true law enforcement-judicial
continuum at EU-level as foreseen in the Treaties. In the absence of clearer institutionalised
operational sequencing, intelligence products may continue to feed into judicial
coordination only at a late stage.
Likewise, cooperation with the EPPO is challenging dues to the high confidentiality of the
information it processes for the purpose of investigation and prosecution, which may
restrict flexible information exchange and operational collaboration with Eurojust. The
structural constraints facing Eurojust and its cooperation with other actors, including
in the JHA domain have also emerged in the parallel review of the EU’s anti-fraud
architecture (AFA). Without legislative fixes to streamline inter-agency collaboration and
enhance data sharing, the AFA review’s goal of strengthening the fight against cross-
border fraud risks being undermined by persisting gaps.
On the international dimension, Eurojust proposes to introduce a monitoring tool for the
implementation of the Eurojust strategy on cooperation with international partners, and to
investigate further any need to use LMs. While useful for performance evaluation
purposes, this alone does not address cooperation gaps. New international agreements will
be concluded, but always at a slow pace.
3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?
3.1. Legal basis
The legal basis of the initiative is Article 85 TFEU, which stipulates that Eurojust’s
mission is to support and strengthen coordination and cooperation between national
investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime affecting two or more
Member States or requiring prosecution on a common basis, relying on operations
conducted and information supplied by the Member States’ authorities and Europol. It sets
out that Eurojust shall be governed by a regulation adopted under the ordinary legislative
procedure.
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3.2. Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action
Eurojust’s functions (coordination, cooperation facilitation, and operational support)
are transnational by nature and cannot be performed effectively by any single Member
State. Its EU-level structure enables it to adopt an EU-level perspective across
jurisdictions, facilitate multilateral cooperation in parallel, and ensure that no Member
State is placed at a disadvantage. Scale and complexity of cross-border crime
investigations render EU-level coordination indispensable. Eurojust is acting strictly where
EU-level action delivers superior results.
Under the EU legal order, criminal law and criminal procedure remain to a large extent
within national competence. Member States are primarily responsible for conducting
investigations and criminal prosecutions for which they have jurisdiction.
The transnational nature of serious cross-border crime demands EU-level cooperation,
as national measures alone are insufficient. Member States thus coordinate judicial
responses, share procedural solutions, and pool EU resources.
Evolving criminal threats, fuelled by digital transformation, demand effective EU-level
support for national judicial authorities. Given Member States’ varied approaches to
combating crime, their judicial authorities can strategically leverage Eurojust’s assistance
and select joint initiatives tailored to their needs.
To counter these evolving criminal threats and keep pace with law enforcement needs, the
EU must strengthen support for Member States in tackling serious and cross-border
crime.
3.3. Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action
The problems outlined above call for EU-level support for Member States to be dealt with
effectively.
As the EU agency for supporting and strengthening coordination and cooperation between
national authorities in the field of criminal justice, Eurojust is well positioned to provide
this EU-level support.
The recent support study for the evaluation of the implementation and impact of the
EJR highlighted very high satisfaction scores regarding support for Member States: for
2020-2023, the average level of satisfaction of Consultative Forum participants on
logistical support and content set by Eurojust was above the 80% target, i.e. 3.2 out of 4
(self-reported on a scale of 1-4 following the meeting).
Action by Eurojust does not replace that of national authorities but enhances it. EU-
level action and Eurojust’s services support and reinforce the work of national
investigating and prosecuting authorities (such as public prosecutors' offices and,
depending on national systems, investigation judges), helping them in cross-border
criminal investigations and prosecutions. Differences in the legal systems and traditions of
the Member States, as acknowledged by the Treaties,92 are unaffected by this EU-level
support.
There are clear economies of scale and efficiency gains from having a structurally
improved and more efficient executive agency at EU level rather than relying solely on
individual national systems or bilateral cooperation.
In addition, Eurojust contributes to the functioning of the internal market and the EU
as a whole. By strengthening trust, ensuring consistent enforcement of criminal law, and
92 Article 67(1) TFEU.
17
reducing the risk of cross-border criminal exploitation of jurisdictional fragmentation,
Eurojust contributes to the Union’s internal security and helps underpin the internal market
and general rule of law foundations on which European integration depends93.
Overall, Eurojust provides clear EU-level added value by combating cross-border crime
and thereby reinforcing the rule of law and mutual trust that sustain the single market and
free movement. Without Eurojust (or a similar EU-level mechanism), national efforts,
despite the presence of bilateral cooperation and the efficiency of EU judicial cooperation
instruments (such as the EAW, EIO, etc.), would struggle to address the scale, complexity
and transnational nature of serious organised crime.
4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED?
4.1. General objective
The revision of Eurojust seeks to better attain the goals set out in the Treaties:
• for Eurojust to support and strengthen coordination and cooperation between
national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime
affecting two or more Member States or requiring a prosecution on common bases,
on the basis of operations conducted and information supplied by the Member States'
authorities and by Europol;94
• to ensure a high level of security through measures aimed at preventing and
combating crime by fostering coordination and cooperation between competent
national authorities of Member States..95
This general objective but also converges with the existing framework of European public
policies, strategies and roadmaps in the area of criminal justice and the fight against
serious, cross-border and organised crime.
4.2. Specific objectives
The general objective is articulated into two interrelated specific objectives, addressing the
structural and functional limitations that currently hinder Eurojust’s capacity to maximise
quantity and quality of its output.
The first objective seeks to remove internal structural and operational constraints,
while the second addresses cooperation challenges, focusing on Eurojust’s interaction
with EU bodies, agencies, and international partners. These two objectives are mutually
reinforcing and derive directly from the general objective, providing a structured and
balanced response to the problems identified.
• Specific Objective 1 – To make Eurojust’s support and coordination action more
efficient, timely, and strategically focused across the full lifecycle of serious cross-
border criminal cases.
This first specific objective aims to make Eurojust’s internal procedures and decision-
making processes more streamlined, so that fewer resources are absorbed by administrative
work and more capacity can be redirected towards operational casework. Over the
implementation period, this should translate into a measurable reduction in the share of
93 Eurojust plays a notable role in the following actions: the loss of “safe havens” for criminals, the building of confidence
for individuals and businesses to operate across borders, the improvement of judicial cooperation for crimes affecting
EU financial interests or cross-border economic crime, the facilitation of movement and social/economic integration. 94 Article 85(1) TFEU. 95 Article 67(3) TFEU.
18
time that National Members and operational staff spend on administrative tasks, as well as
faster and clearer internal decision-making.
The objective also aims to focus Eurojust’s operational support on cases where EU-level
judicial coordination brings the greatest added value. This should be reflected in an
increase in own-initiative cases opened by Eurojust, earlier involvement in complex cross-
border investigations, and a reduction in bilateral and lower-complexity cases handled
directly by Eurojust where they can be effectively redirected to other cooperation channels.
Finally, the objective is to keep Eurojust’s support and coordination fit for purpose in light
of evolving forms of serious cross-border crime and new areas of judicial cooperation. This
requires Eurojust to be able to support national authorities and judicial practitioners across
the full lifecycle of serious cross-border criminal cases, from investigation through
prosecution and trial, including by collecting, structuring and analysing judicial data to
identify links between cases and support judicial follow-up.
Success indicators for SO1: Indicators of success for this objective would be a reduction
in the share of time spent by National Members on administrative tasks, an increase in the
number of own-initiative cases, and a reduction in the share of bilateral and lower-
complexity cases handled by Eurojust (see chapter 9 for further details on these success
indicators and targets proposed).
• Specific Objective 2 – To achieve more institutionalised cooperation and more
timely information exchanges between Eurojust and EU and international partners.
This specific objective aims to make cooperation between Eurojust and EU and
international partners more structured, efficient and timely. Over the implementation
period, this should translate into a measurable increase in operational information
exchanges with partners, meaningful interactions with third-country authorities, and
Eurojust cases involving third countries. It should also reduce delays between requests for
information, replies and operational follow-up, ensuring that relevant information reaches
Eurojust and its partners early enough to identify links between cases and opportunities for
cross-border investigation or prosecution.
To this end, the objective seeks to ensure that Eurojust has stable, well-defined and
responsive cooperation channels with EU bodies, offices and agencies, international
partners and third-country authorities, including through liaison officers and established
cooperation frameworks. These channels should support more predictable exchanges,
clearer responsibilities and more consistent operational follow-up in cases involving
several jurisdictions.
Success indicators for SO2: While improvements in cooperation with third countries are
difficult to assess on the basis of quantitative data alone, as they depend on a range of
external factors and political contingencies, one indicator of stronger cooperation with
partners would be a higher number of follow-ups to system “hits”, pointing to more
effective, timely and operational information exchanges. A follow-up to a “hit” means that,
once relevant information has been identified in a partner’s database, that information is
extracted and transmitted to the requester (cf chapter 9 on further indicator details/target).
5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS?
This chapter sets out the available policy options, which include the baseline as well as
several options requiring regulatory or non-regulatory interventions. A number of policy
options, which were discarded at an early stage, are also described.
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5.1. What is the baseline from which the options are assessed?
The baseline scenario projects how the situation is expected to evolve from 2026 to 2035
in the absence of further EU intervention, without amendments to the EJR and no
additional resources allocated. Eurojust would continue operating under its current
mandate, implementing only incremental adaptations. This scenario accounts for
endogenous factors (existing legislation, ongoing initiatives) and exogenous drivers
(geopolitical instability, technological developments, crime trends), assuming no structural
reforms.
The rapid evolution of criminal threats and technological change is expected to
outpace Eurojust’s ability to adapt within its existing framework.96 Without
intervention, the challenges identified in the evaluation are likely to persist or worsen over
time.
Serious and organised crime is becoming increasingly digital, poly-criminal,
international, and geopolitically entangled. While recent estimates imply that levels of
organised crime remain relatively stable in continental Europe, the ratings for different EU
Member states vary and Europe is noted as a “global hotspot for cyber-dependent crimes”.
Also financial crimes, presented as “inherently transregional”, appear to “pose the greatest
threat to the security and integrity of the continent’s economic market”.97 Nearly all major
crime areas now have a digital component, while the use of AI will further enhance
criminal sophistication.
The economic cost of crime is difficult to quantify, but recent estimates place the value in
the range between EUR 139-200 + billion annually in the EU. Other sources estimate the
value of laundered money at 3-5% of global GDP, which in Europe would equate to EUR
359-EUR 897 billion, with regional variations.98 Both these estimates demonstrate very
clearly that the economic cost alone of such crime is significant, with broader additional
societal and fundamental rights impacts that are harder to quantify. For example, according
to the support study, in 2024 Eurojust contributed to the arrest of over 1,200 suspects and
an estimated EUR 20 billion of seized drugs.99 Given the impact of serious organised
crime, any initiatives that can improve Eurojust ability to contribute to the fight against
serious and organised crime will bring substantial benefits to European citizens and
businesses.
Based on Eurojust estimates, case growth is predicted to be moderate, at around 8%
annually (down from 14-17,5%). This reduction reflects the expected prioritisation of
complex investigations. Expanded third country cooperation through new contact points
and LPs will further increase caseloads. The EU institutional landscape will evolve with
new bodies (AMLA, EU Customs Authority), Europol’s expanded operational role, and
digital tools such as JUDEX. However, challenges in inter-agency data exchange,
particularly with Europol, would persist. If Eurojust’s mandate does not evolve
accordingly, this would risk aggravating its capacity strain without corresponding legal
empowerment or resource stabilisation.
96 The Agency has already recognised this imbalance in its programming documents, where it has consistently requested
additional resources, and discussed ways of improving efficiency in two “Eurojust 2035” workshops, held in Autumn
2025, for internal reflection. The Eurojust Vision 2035 was also discussed at the 20th CF, and will be included in the next
MAS. 97 Global Organized Crime Index 2025, Crime at a crossroads, Europe, pp. 1-4, 7. 98 Support study, p. 39, based on EU reports. 99 Support study, pp. 46.
20
Internally, the new CMS planned for 2026 should improve link detection, user experience,
and operational efficiency, but additional responsibilities (e.g. ECRIS-TCN requests from
third countries, potentially around 20 000 annually from the UK alone,100 and CICED) will
generate workload pressures. The budget is projected to remain stable and only keep
pace with inflation, reaching approximately EUR 87 million/year by 2035.
The baseline scenario acknowledges that economic metrics alone fail to capture crime’s
societal and fundamental rights implications. This risks a widening gap between
expectations placed on the Agency and the resources available to fulfil them. A relevant
illustration would be the hosting of new judicial networks created by the Council in the
forthcoming considered period.
Eurojust’s data protection framework will remain robust and rights-protective but
increasingly resource-intensive, as a higher volume of data is expected to be processed in
compliance with the EJR and the EUDPR, under the supervision of the EDPS. Meanwhile,
existing but underused mechanisms for international transfers of personal data (notably
self-assessments and derogations) are expected to be utilised more widely, helping to
broaden and diversify international cooperation.
Without rearrangement and delineation of roles, governance inefficiencies and high
administrative burdens will likely persist, preventing NMs from focusing on operational
casework and effectively addressing the aforementioned developments in the criminal
threat.
Challenges in EU inter-agency cooperation are likely to remain unresolved, despite
deeper cooperation with EU agencies and bodies like Europol, OLAF and the EPPO, which
would remain limited by fragmented mandates, uneven data access and procedural
complexity. As other agencies’ mandates expand, Eurojust will face growing demands for
networks hosting, analytical and coordination support without a corresponding increase in
its own resources.
Data-exchange constraints with Europol – including asymmetries in access, handling
code restrictions, – will continue under the current framework. Without regulatory
clarification, structural or institutional issues between judicial and law enforcement actors
may continue to impede timely and balanced information sharing.
Eurojust’s operational and analytical support will stay essential but face increasing
strain from uneven Member State participation, mandate limitations and legal
fragmentation. In particular, engagement in JITs is expected to remain uneven, resulting
in a two-speed operational landscape and limiting Eurojust’s ability to provide cohesive
cross-border judicial support.
In terms of capacities and skills, Eurojust is recognised for its high-quality investigative
and MLA support. Under the baseline, however, the College’s national desks will remain
structurally constrained: rising volumes and complexity of support requests, ICT
limitations and staff shortages will further require difficult prioritisation choices, leaving
some operational needs unmet. Legal and procedural requirements will slow the
deployment of automation, AI tools, and innovative techniques, leaving many solutions
confined to pilot stages.
Eurojust would continue to deliver significant societal value – enhancing public safety,
protecting victims’ rights, supporting economic stability, and combating impunity for
100 Support Study, p. 44.
21
international crimes. Yet, without mandate reform, escalating operational and capacity
pressures would go unaddressed.
In case the EJR will not be revised, these cumulative pressures risk gradually eroding
Eurojust’s operational effectiveness, strategic positioning within the EU security
architecture, and the Agency’s ability to respond effectively to an increasingly complex
criminal threat environment and keep pace with digitalised information exchanges.
5.2. Description of the policy options per specific objective
This impact assessment evaluates policy options spanning from non-legislative to
regulatory interventions. Each policy option consists of a set of measures (numbered i, ii,
iii, etc.), selected based on their ability to address a given problem (or its driver), and
screened for effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. Some options and measures were
discarded at an early stage (see chapter 5.3).
For each of the six intervention areas (A-F), three policy options have been developed,
structured according to their degree of intervention:
- Policy Option 1 (PO1) presents the lightest set of measures, which can be adopted
and implemented with relative ease and at limited cost. However, their structural
impact is expected to be limited.
- Policy Option 2 (PO2) introduces moderately more incisive measures, which may
require legislative amendments, seeking to balance stronger impact with manageable
implementation costs.
- Policy Option 3 (PO3) proposes the most far-reaching set of measures, necessitating
more substantive legislative changes. While this option may deliver the greatest
impact, it may raise more complex institutional and political considerations.
The policy options to address Specific Objective 1 (areas A-C) are summarised in Table 2
and those to address Specific Objective 2 (areas D-F) are in Table 4. A twostep process
was then followed. First a comparison of policy options was conducted within each area
of intervention and the ‘winning’ option for each area was then combined to identify the
preferred package. This combination is further analysed and tested in a second and final
step to confirm the preferred option.
While most of the proposed measures are expected to be implemented through legislative
actions some can be implemented by non-legislative action. In these cases, the measure is
labelled with ‘a’ to indicate non-legislative means, or ‘b’ if the proposed amendment has
a legislative nature. For example, option A.PO1 is made up of non-legislative measures
i.a, ii.a, iii.a; option A.PO2 transforms measures i, ii and iii into legislative measures (i.b,
ii.b, iii.b) and then includes an additional legislative measures, iv.
In addition to these six sets of policy options, targeted amendments may be needed to
update the EJR in terms of links to other legal instruments, without affecting their
substantive content.101
101 Accordingly, in line with Regulation (EU) 2023/969 on the JITs Collaboration Platform (particularly Article 9),
Eurojust is entrusted with ensuring platform connectivity and supporting practitioners. Its mandate must therefore duly
reflect this role in facilitating secure, structured data exchange and communication with JIT members and participants.
The Regulation may also: Amend provisions relating to the new CMS, in alignment with CICED; cover Eurojust’s role
in the context of JUDEX, the JUstice Digital EXchange System, which connects national authorities for secure
operational data exchange (cf Regulation 2023/2844/EU); designate Eurojust as the ECRIS-TCN “contact point” for
third countries and international organisations (as required by Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2019/816 on ECRIS-
TCN, see Annex, including reference to the EDPS supervisory opinion).
22
One such measures addresses the need to update the framework for the processing and
protection of personal data. In view of the parallel revision of the overall EU legislative
framework applicable in this area (EUDPR), the measures envisaged concerning Eurojust
are limited. The need for derogations from the EUDPR has not been demonstrated and was
discarded at an early stage. The measures addressing problem driver #6 – from the EJR
angle – are therefore limited, involving either a streamlining of the EJR (retaining only the
most important provisions, with the other rules being referred to the EUDPR) or a more
detailed clarification of the rules, in full compliance with the general framework.
5.2.1. Specific Objective 1: Strengthen Eurojust’s Internal Functioning,
Governance and Operational Performance
Table 2: Policy options and measures under Specific Objective 1
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 1 (INTERNAL):
STRENGTHEN EUROJUST’S INTERNAL FUNCTIONING, GOVERNANCE AND OPERATIONAL
PERFORMANCE
Options
Light
change Moderate
change Substantial
change
A. Extending the scope of material competences to face the new judicial landscape
Addressing problem driver(s):
#2 Insufficient competences and associated toolset A.PO1 A.PO2 A.PO3
i. Enhancing Eurojust’s support in EU policy-making and strategic cycles – through working
arrangements with IBOAs (i.a) or by introducing a dedicated provision in the EJR (i.b) i.a i.b i.b
ii. Entrusting Eurojust with new operational functions (in the areas of e-evidence, victims’ rights
support to asset recovery) – through non-binding guidelines (ii.a) or by introducing a dedicated
provision in the EJR (ii.b)
ii.a ii.b ii.b
iii. Introducing semi-permanent operational platforms to support JITs – through operational
arrangements (iii.a) or by introducing a reference in the EJR (iii.b) iii.a iii.b iii.b
iv. Extending Eurojust’s material competence to new crimes (VURM, cybercrime, GBV) iv iv
v. Expanding Eurojust’s analytical function to key crime areas (organised crime and accessory crimes) v
B. Harmonising Member State implementation of the EJR, including on allocation of cases
Addressing problem driver(s):
#1 Inadequate model to select and prioritise cases;
#3 Divergent Member State engagement and implementation of the EJR
B.PO1 B.PO2 B.PO3
i. Introduce a Eurojust-EJN case-allocation system – through non-binding guidelines (i.a) or by
introducing a EJR provision defining a ‘Eurojust case’ (i.b) i.a i.b i.b
ii. Reinforce the status of National Members to give them full operational powers – through advocacy
and political push (ii.a) or by amending the relevant EJR provisions (ii.b) ii.a ii.b ii.b
iii. Entrusting National Members with new competences (subject to their attributions under national
law): issuing freezing orders (or immediate action), European Production and Preservation Orders (e-
evidence), and signing JIT agreements
iii iii
iv. Grant National Members the authority to open Eurojust cases iv
C. Establishing a streamlined, coherent and role-clear governance system that accelerates decision-making
Addressing problem driver(s):
#4 Lack of clear separation between operational and administrative responsibilities
#5Complex governance structure and outdated legacy organisational culture
C.PO1 C.PO2 C.PO3
i. Revision of the allocation of responsibilities between governance bodies i i i
ii. Reform of the Executive Board ii ii
iii. Introduction of a Management Board iii
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5.2.1.1 Area of intervention A. Extending the scope of material competences to
face the new judicial landscape
Eurojust must evolve to face new criminal threats and preserve its key role in the field of
European judicial cooperation. The policy options presented aim at updating the Eurojust
tasks and competences to face new judicial challenges (#2).
A.PO1: Under this option, Eurojust would not be formally given new competences or
attributions, but arrangements at technical and operational level would reinforce Eurojust’s
action in areas where its contribution would provide added value. Such measures would
include:
(i.a) Concluding working arrangements with IBOAs, or updating them when already
concluded, providing for a more structured involvement of Eurojust in policymaking and
strategic cycles related to the administration of EU criminal justice and judicial
cooperation, allowing policymakers to draw from Eurojust’s expertise.
(ii.a) Setting up guidelines and operational arrangements to: make Eurojust more effective
in assisting Member States in handling e-evidence (further supporting the SIRIUS
project102), provide services and assistance to victims of serious and cross-border crime
support the actions of the national AROs.
(iii.a) Strengthening Eurojust’s support to JITs by establishing, at operational level, semi-
permanent platforms enabling the temporary secondment of JIT members to Eurojust, who
would provide logistical and coordination support.
A.PO2: This option would introduce targeted amendments to the EJR in order to formally
attribute new tasks and competences to the Agency, entrusting it with the connected
powers. Such measures would include:
(i.b), (ii.b), (iii.b) Implementing the measures outlined under A.PO1, but giving them a
legal basis within the Regulation.
(iv) In addition, extending Eurojust’s material competence to new or emerging crimes,
such as violating EU restrictive measures,103 cybercrime (beyond the currently envisaged
computer crimes) and gender-based violence. This extension requires amending Annex I
to the EJR which lists crimes for which Eurojust is competent.
A.PO3: This policy option includes a bundle of legislative measures which, as a whole,
would fundamentally shift the scope of the Eurojust activities, structurally embedding in
its legal framework not only its contribution to policymaking, but also a broadened and
enhanced analytical capacity. Measures would include:
(i.b), (ii.b), (iii.b), (iv) Implementing the measures outlined under A.PO2 by introducing
specific amendments to the EJR.
(v) In addition, expanding Eurojust’s analytical competence and capacity. Building on the
success of CICED (Regulation (EU) 2022/838) and CTR (Regulation (EU) 2023/2131),
Eurojust would receive the mandate to collect, store and analyse judicial data related to
102 Created in 2017, the SIRIUS project is co-implemented by Europol and Eurojust. the SIRIUS Project has emerged as
a central hub for knowledge sharing on cross-border access to electronic evidence in the EU and became the first-ranked
source of information for EU law enforcement seeking assistance to prepare direct requests for data from foreign-based
service providers. In this framework, the two agencies provide a knowledge base, training, a collaborative platform and
an operational support. 103 To align with Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the
definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures.
24
organised crime – with the aim to provide consistent sets of evidence to national
authorities, contributing to case-building and facilitating cross-border cooperation.
5.2.1.2 Area of intervention B. Harmonising Member State implementation of the
EJR, including on allocation of cases
Eurojust faces challenges in distributing and prioritising the intake of requests received
from Member States, with the consequence that resources are diverted to deal with lower-
complexity cases, which could be handled through different channels. Uneven
implementation of the EJR across Member States amplifies this issue and constrains
Eurojust’s capacity to deploy its full potential. The presented policy options aim to
harmonise implementation of the EJR and streamline the allocation of cases (#1, #3).
B.PO1: Under this policy option, the objective of improving the allocation of cases and
aligning powers of NMs would be pursued through the adoption of guidelines and political
incentive addressed to Member States. The envisaged measures would include:
(i.a) Adopting non-binding guidelines providing for the definition of a “Eurojust case”,
which must be dealt with by the Agency. Cases which do not fall within the scope of the
definition would have to be dealt with by the EJN or through bilateral cooperation. Such
requests addressed at Eurojust should therefore be declined or redirected as appropriate.
(ii.a) Under the current framework, NMs must have the status of a prosecutor, a judge or a
representative of a judicial authority with equivalent competences under national law, and
Member States must grant them at least the powers laid down in the Regulation.
Through advocacy and political incentives, Member States could be encouraged to ensure
that NMs are vested, under national law, with additional powers and competences allowing
them to fully exercise the operational possibilities provided for in the EJR.
B.PO2: Under this policy option, allocation of cases and NMs’ powers, competences, and
eligibility requirements would be codified into the EJR, leaving no legal margin for
diverging practices. Proposed measures would include:
(i.b), (ii.b) Introducing amendments to the EJR defining the concept of “Eurojust case” and
laying down strict eligibility criteria for the appointment of NMs – requiring that they be
endowed with specific judicial powers under national law.
(iii) In addition, NMs will be, under their national law, empowered to act as issuing (or,
where relevant, as executing) authorities for the purposes of EU judicial cooperation
instruments based on mutual recognition, including freezing orders (or immediate action
preserving the property until a freezing order has been issued), relevant orders on e-
evidence104, and to sign JIT agreements. This would help address the current uneven
landscape across Member States by establishing a common minimum level of operational
powers for all NMs, while respecting the relevant requirements of the judicial cooperation
instrument concerned.
B.PO3: This policy option entails the most far-reaching changes to the powers and
competences of NMs, exploiting to the full extent the legal basis set out in Article 85
TFEU, boosting the Agency’s proactivity. Envisaged measures include:
104 European Production Order under Article 4(1) and European Preservation Order under Article 4(3) of Regulation
(EU) 2023/1543.
25
(i.b), (ii.b), (iii) Introducing all the amendments to the EJR outlined above, codifying the
definition of a “Eurojust case”, eligibility requirements and harmonising the powers and
competences of NMs.
(iv) In addition, NMs would be endowed with the authority to open cases on serious cross-
border crimes, subject to follow up by national authorities. While the competent national
authorities would remain in charge of the investigations (retaining the power to close the
case opened by Eurojust if they do not find grounds to pursue it), this would enable
Eurojust to trigger a file and flag situations of particular relevance.
5.2.1.3 Area of intervention C. Establishing a streamlined, coherent and role-clear
governance system that accelerates decision-making
Table 3: Governance reforms
While Eurojust carries out operational work effectively, its overall efficiency could be
improved. The promptness of Eurojust’s response to new phenomena and emerging threats
is constrained by unclear processes resulting in duplication of work and slow decision-
making. These policy options propose different levels of reshaping of the Eurojust’s
governance aimed at distributing responsibilities more clearly and enhancing efficient
strategic steering (#4, #5).
Each policy option describes a different governance model. Under C.PO1, the existing
governance remains unchanged, while measures are taken to facilitate swift processes and
steering, C.PO2 and C.PO3 describe two degrees of changes to the governance models,
26
also entailing a degree of review of the allocation of responsibilities (i) and the change of
composition of the EB (ii).
C.PO1: (i) The governance structure remains unchanged, based on the assumption that it
is only concrete implementation which needs to be improved. This option comprises soft-
law measures aimed at improving the governance of the agency by focusing on three main
areas:
- reducing the administrative aspect of the College's work by focusing its non-
operational activities more on major managerial decisions, leaving less important
managerial decisions to the EB;
- similarly, ensuring that the agendas of the College and the EB do not overlap, in
order to avoid wasting time and unnecessary duplication;
- finally, encouraging, by guidelines or recommendations, the competent authorities
of the Member States to improve the selection of NMs in terms of managerial skills
(in addition to operational skills) so that they can fully play their role when
administrative decisions need to be taken in the EB and in the College.
The abolition of the working groups in the College is also a measure to be considered, as
they can duplicate the work of the Administration, with negative repercussions on the
alignment with objectives, overall planning and efficiency.105
C.PO2: (i) (ii) This option changes the composition, competences and responsibilities of
the EB and the College, leaving the overarching architecture of the governance model
unchanged.
The College would be maintained as the main body responsible for the operational support
and coordination tasks that are at the heart of Eurojust’s activities. The College would
retain managerial powers when it comes to strategic decisions: selecting priorities,
determining multiannual and annual programmes, approving the agency's budget and
overseeing financial governance, and approving the annual activity report.
Alternatively, decisions on annual and multiannual strategy, budget and work programme
could be entrusted to the Consultative Forum of Prosecutors General and Directors of
Public Prosecutions (CF) of the Member States, hosted yearly by Eurojust.
The EB would be in charge of all administrative decision, encompassing both day-to-day
administration and high-level administrative decisions (with the College remaining
involved only on strategic decisions bearing an impact on operations). The composition of
the EB would remain unchanged: Eurojust President, two Vice-Presidents, the
Commission representative and two NMs. However, a system of appointment would
replace the current rotation mechanism. The College would be required to choose and
appoint the two NMs.
The Administrative Director (AD) would remain responsible for preparing and
implementing the decisions taken by the College and the EB (in addition to powers of day-
to-day management of the agency, oversight of staff, finances, internal procedures, and
service delivery, legal representation of the agency). The AD would be given the right to
participate to the EB in an advisory capacity, remaining an observer without voting rights,
in line with the Common Approach.
105 Eurojust Evaluation, p. 31; Support study, p. 59.
27
C.PO3: This option entails an institutional paradigm shift, moving towards a new
governance model aligning with the Common Approach applicable to decentralised
agencies.106
The College would be focused on operational tasks only and thus excluded from
management and administrative decision making.
A Management Board (MB) would be introduced as the top decision-making body –
composed of representatives of Member States, the Eurojust President, a Commission
representative and Eurojust’s AD. It would decide on budget, strategic priorities, annual
and multiannual programmes, and the annual activity report.
The MB would be vested with appointing authority powers, part of which it may delegate
to the AD, and entrusted with decisions liable to impact staff and the organisation of the
Agency, including the organisation of judicial networks’ secretariats. While the current
EJR provides that the secretariats of all networks involved in judicial cooperation in
criminal matters, including newly established ones, operate as separate units, decisions
concerning their organisation would be entrusted to the MB.
The EB would be retained for the day-to-day management and administrative decision of
the Agency, and as a lighter collegial body to prepare and inform the meetings of the MB.
It would be composed of the Eurojust President, a Commission representative, and three
members of the MB (chair-person and deputies).
The AD would be appointed by, and be accountable to, the MB, with more autonomy in
making executive decisions and retaining responsibility for the implementation of
management decisions and administrative oversight. The AD would participate as observer
and adviser to the EB and MB meetings.
The AD would remain the legal representative of the Agency, while it would be the
President to formally participate on behalf of Eurojust in political and institutional fora.
The Commission’s relevance in the governance would be increased through a veto right
on some specific matters or an early warning mechanism.107 In this second case, the
Commission representative would be entitled to reject a deliberation requesting a second
vote with a qualified majority (two thirds) in the event of decisions raising serious concerns
of compliance with the Agency’s mandate. A veto power would be introduced for certain
decisions on budget and human resources.
Finally, the role and responsibilities of National Desks Assistants would be revised,
streamlined and rationalised, providing them a clear definition of their role and
competences.
5.2.2. Specific Objective 2: Achieve optimal operational integration with Member
States, EU partners and third countries
A critical challenge for Eurojust lies in optimising operational integration with its key
partners at EU level, in particular Europol and the EPPO, but also OLAF, as well as with
third countries and other international actors.
At present, fragmented data-sharing mechanisms hinder a more efficient cooperation. For
the purpose of this impact assessment, focus is being laid on the interaction with Europol
106 Common approachon decentralised agencies decided by the 19 July 2012 Joint Statement of the European Parliament,
the Council of the EU and the European Commission. 107 Article 102(4) of European Union Aviation Safety Agency Regulation (2018/1139/EU).
28
and EPPO, however, improvements in this area, and in particular regarding the hit/no-hit
system, could also be useful for other actors, for example OLAF. Indeed, the new
cooperation frameworks designed to combat certain forms of serious crime make it
necessary to strengthen inter-institutional relations. The incoming review of the AFA
highlights this imperative need.
Table 4: Policy options and measures under Specific Objective 2
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 2 (EXTERNAL):
ACHIEVE OPTIMAL ALIGNMENT AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION WITH EU PARTNERS AND THIRD
COUNTRIES
Options
Light
changes
Moderate
changes
Substantive
changes
D. Fostering and strengthening structured operational cooperation with Europol
Addressing problem driver(s):
#8 Absence of a structurally embedded cooperation with Europol D.PO1 D.PO2 D.PO3
i. Automating and optimising Eurojust-Europol’s system for indirect access to the respective databases
(interagency hit/no-hit system) – through technical measures only (i.a) or through technical measures
linked to new legal obligations (i.b)
i.a i.b i.b
ii. Revising the 2010 Eurojust-Europol Working Arrangements – through a political push for its
renegotiation (ii.a) or by introducing in the EJR a legal obligation of periodic review in consultation
with the Commission (ii.b)
ii.a ii.b ii.b
iii. Creating a dedicated cooperation channel for systematic follow up on SIRIUS referrals iii iii
iv. Granting participation in College meetings to Europol representatives iv iv
v. Codifying cooperation modalities between Eurojust and Europol (e.g., notification to Eurojust upon
reaching of “judicial threshold”, creation of JOPs or task forces) v
E. Promoting fully developed cooperation with the EPPO
Addressing problem driver(s):
#9 Constrained cooperation with the EPPO E.PO1 E.PO2 E.PO3
i. Automating and optimising Eurojust-EPPO’s system for indirect access to the respective databases
(interagency hit/no-hit system) – through technical measures only (i.a) or through technical measures
linked to new legal obligations (i.b)
i.a i.b i.b
ii. Establishing an explicit mandate for Eurojust to provide reinforced support in EPPO cases (JITs,
CMs, Action Days) ii ii
iii. Granting participation in College meetings to EPPO representatives iii iii
iv. Setting up a Eurojust-EPPO clearing-house mechanism for case allocation iv
F. Consolidating cooperation with third countries and international organisations
Addressing problem driver(s):
#10 Cumbersome process for establishing relations with international actors F.PO1 F.PO2 F.PO3
i. Introducing cooperation obligations in agreements with third countries with financial implications –
as a cross cutting non-legislative measure i i i
ii. Clarifying the legal framework governing Liaison Magistrates ii ii
iii. Institutionalising Resident Contact Points for priority countries iii iii
iv. Granting participation in College meetings to Liaison Prosecutors iv iv
v. Entrusting Eurojust with an explicit capacity building mandate in external action v
5.2.2.1 Area of intervention D. Fostering and strengthening structured operational
cooperation with Europol
Eurojust’s cooperation with partners is presently assessed as overall effective, on a case-
by-case basis, but it lacks a structural dimension, resulting in suboptimal coordination and
29
missed opportunities. While pursuing the broader objective of strengthening cross-agency
cooperation, these options focus specifically on Eurojust’s relationship with Europol, its
key partner and counterpart along the investigative continuum between law enforcement
action and judicial follow-up. They aim to address the current lack of sufficiently
structured cooperation with Europol (#8).
D.PO1: This option seeks to improve relations, information exchange, and operational
cooperation through working arrangements, common guidelines, and shared practices. The
objective is to promote a common operational culture and a shared understanding of needs,
challenges, and opportunities for synergy. It would include the following combined
measures:
(i.a) Automating and optimising the Eurojust-Europol hit/no-hit system to facilitate link
detection. Under the current system, Eurojust must submit a request to Europol regarding
a suspect or case; Europol then manually verifies the information in its database,
communicates the “hit”, and subsequently follows up manually to provide the information
requested. An automated system would instead allow Eurojust to determine immediately
– through automated matching – whether relevant information exists in Europol’s
databases.
(ii.b) Revising the 2010 Eurojust-Europol Working Arrangement through political
incentives. The Commission and the Council would encourage both agencies to update
their cooperation framework so that it reflects current operational realities, expertise and
needs as well as emerging tools such as JOPs bringing together law enforcement and
judicial expertise.
D.PO2: This option aims at structuring and institutionalising cooperation with Europol
through targeted legislative amendments. While maintaining the operational flexibility that
characterises current cooperation, this option reduces reliance on informal practice and
voluntary coordination by embedding key cooperation modalities within the legal
framework governing the two agencies, creating greater predictability and ensuring
continuity of cooperation across operational contexts. Proposed measures would include:
(i.b) Automating and optimising the system of information exchange with the
establishment of an improved cross-checking systems across JHA agencies and bodies
(automated hit/no-hit system) paired with the introduction of legal obligations to cooperate
and share, where appropriate, specific categories of relevant data, taking into account the
specific mandates of each agency in compliance with data protection requirements.
(ii.b) Revising the 2010 Eurojust-Europol Working Arrangement, along with the
introduction in the EJR of a legal obligation to periodically review the revised
arrangement, in consultation with the Commission. Embedding revision cycles in the
founding Regulations of both agencies would ensure that the cooperation framework
remains aligned with evolving crime patterns and incorporates the most up-to-date
operational practices.
(iii) In addition, establishing a dedicated cooperation channel for systematic SIRIUS
follow-up. This mechanism would integrate judicial coordination into digital evidence
workflows, ensuring continuity between the law-enforcement identification of electronic
evidence and subsequent cross-border judicial action. Rather than relying on ad hoc
escalation once jurisdictional or admissibility issues arise, the channel would facilitate
structured interaction between Europol and Eurojust throughout the process.
30
(iv) Enhancing mutual involvement in partners’ activities through the introduction of a
legal obligation requiring that Europol liaison officers participate in meetings of the
Eurojust College when matters of common interest are discussed.
D.PO3: This option represents a qualitative step beyond structured cooperation by
integrating operational processes between Eurojust and Europol in a more systematic and
legally codified manner. Cooperation would move from structured interaction to partially
integrated operational processes (“continuum”), supported by clearly defined reciprocal
rights and duties regarding expertise, information sharing, and respective operational
activities. The package would include the following measures:
(i.b), (ii.b), (iii), (iv) Implementing an automated hit/no-hit system, revise the 2010
Eurojust-Europol Working Arrangement along with a leal obligation to periodically review
the revised arrangement, creating a dedicated cooperation channel for SIRIUS referrals
and granting participation in College meeting to Europol representatives as outlined under
D.PO2.
(v) In addition, further codifying cooperation modalities in the Europol and EJR. This
would include modalities for sharing information when Europol-supported Operational
Task Forces reach a defined “judicial threshold”.108 Reference would be made to the
possibility of creating JOPs, which could be exploited as a tool for enhanced cooperation.
Analytical support to Eurojust would also be further defined.
5.2.2.2 Area of intervention E. Promoting fully developed cooperation with the
EPPO
Cooperation between Eurojust and the EPPO has remained largely underdeveloped due to
legal and structural constraints. This results in a missed opportunity to fully exploit
Eurojust’s support in the area of crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, often
linked with the most serious manifestations of cross-border crime, such as organised crime.
These options, within the broader objective of strengthening cooperation with partner
agencies and bodies, focus specifically on relations with the EPPO (#9).
E.PO1: Under this option, cooperation with the EPPO would be strengthened primarily
through structured practice, working arrangements, political encouragement, and building
operational practices. Envisaged measures include:
(i.a) Automatising and optimising the Eurojust-EPPO hit/no-hit system to facilitate link
detection (as for Europol, under D.PO1, i.a).
E.PO2: This option seeks to reinforce and structure cooperation between Eurojust and the
EPPO through targeted legislative clarification. Rather than relying on practice alone, this
option would provide a clearer legal basis for Eurojust’s supportive role in EPPO-related
cases, ensuring greater predictability and operational continuity while fully preserving the
EPPO’s prosecutorial independence. The proposed measures include:
(i.b) Automating and optimising the system of information exchange with the
establishment of an improved cross-checking system across JHA agencies and bodies
paired with the introduction of legal obligations to cooperate and share specific categories
of relevant data taking into account the specific mandates of each agency in compliance
with data protection requirements.
108 When a situation becomes of judicial interest because sufficient evidence has been collected to open a judicial
investigation or based on the need for a judicial follow-up, i.e. the adoption of a coercive measure. In particular, Eurojust
shall be proactively notified in case of identified opportunity for asset-freezing.
31
(ii) Introducing an explicit mandate for reinforced Eurojust support in EPPO cases. This
provision would clarify Eurojust’s role in facilitating JITs, CMs, and Action Days in EPPO
cases presenting a judicial interest beyond the EPPO’s territorial or material competence.
The measure would strengthen operational interaction while maintaining the EPPO’s
autonomy in prosecutorial decision-making.
(iii) Enhancing mutual involvement in partners’ activities through the introduction of a
legal obligation requiring that EPPO liaison officers are regularly invited to meetings of
the Eurojust College when matters of common interest are discussed.
E.PO3: This option represents a further step towards a more integrated framework for
Eurojust-EPPO cooperation, moving beyond structured interaction to establish more
systematic operational linkages supported by clearly defined reciprocal rights and duties
regarding information exchange and coordination. The following cumulative measures are
envisaged:
(i.b), (ii), (iii) Implementing an automated hit/no-hit system, entrusting Eurojust with a
specific mandate for reinforced support to the EPPO in the area of judicial cooperation and
granting participation in College meetings to the EPPO representatives as outlined under
E.PO2.
(iv) In addition, establishing an EPPO-Eurojust clearing-house mechanism, providing a
structured platform to identify overlaps, allocate coordination roles, and manage spill-over
effects. This mechanism would help reduce duplication, clarify responsibilities, and
address legal or procedural uncertainties arising in complex cross-border cases.
5.2.2.3 Area of intervention F. Consolidating cooperation with third countries and
international organisations
The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements between the EU and third
countries or international organisations on the judicial cooperation with Eurojust is
inherently complex and time-consuming. By its nature, this process may struggle to keep
pace with the evolving dynamics of transnational criminal phenomena (#10). The proposed
measures therefore aim to enable Eurojust to cooperate as effectively as possible with
priority partner countries pending the conclusion of formal international agreements.
F.PO1: This option aims at fostering stronger and more reliable cooperation through non-
legislative means, encouraging operational interaction with third country partners. It would
promote convergence in legal frameworks, institutional practices, and operational
standards, thereby reducing practical barriers to cooperation. This option includes the
following measure – which constitutes a minimum measure common to F.PO2 and F.PO3:
(i) Mainstreaming the inclusion of cooperation commitments in international agreements
and other relevant instruments with third countries. Third countries would be encouraged
to engage more actively with Eurojust, align their practices with EU standards, and make
effective use of available cooperation tools by means of political and economic incentives.
F.PO2: Under this option, the range of cooperation tools available to Eurojust would be
expanded through amendments to the EJR. These would clarify and streamline existing
provisions while codifying operational practices that have already proven effective but
currently lack a clear legislative basis. The package would include the following measures:
(i) Introducing cooperation commitments in international agreements as outlined under
F.PO1.
(ii) in addition, clarifying the legal framework governing LMs. The EJR provides for the
posting of LMs to third countries in order to facilitate judicial cooperation with local
32
authorities. However, their tasks and powers are defined only in broad terms. In practice,
uncertainty regarding the interpretation and scope of this provision has contributed to the
underutilisation of LMs. A clearer definition of their role, competences, and operational
scope would enhance their effectiveness and practical added value.
(iii) Institutionalising the role of resident contact points for priority third countries.
Resident contact points are third country magistrates or officials seconded to Eurojust to
facilitate contacts with national authorities and assist the Agency in navigating domestic
procedural frameworks. Unlike LPs, they do not have access to Eurojust’s CMS and
operate under a more limited mandate. Nonetheless, the presence of a resident contact point
at Eurojust could have tangible benefits, in particular when cooperation is hampered by
procedural or coordination issues with the partner country. Their role is currently based on
working arrangements with the relevant third country rather than on a legislative basis.
Introducing an explicit reference to resident contact points in the Regulation would provide
legal clarity and establish clear rules concerning their appointment, functions, and
operational limitations.
(iv) Providing for the formal participation of LPs in the Eurojust College. Structured
participation of LPs posted from third countries would allow them to contribute to the
strategic discussions of the College, bringing operational insight into developments in key
partner jurisdictions. Their involvement would support better-informed strategic
prioritisation of Eurojust’s external engagement, ensuring that the Agency’s operational
and cooperation strategies adequately reflect the evolving needs, risks, and priorities
associated with third country cooperation.
F.PO3: This option would strengthen Eurojust’s external dimension through more far-
reaching legislative amendments, expanding the Agency’s capacity to engage with third
country partners in a structured and strategic manner. The proposed measures include:
(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Introducing cooperation commitments in international agreements,
clarifying the legal framework for LMs, institutionalising resident contact points and
granting participation in College to LPs as outlined under F.PO2.
(v) In addition, granting Eurojust an explicit capacity-building mandate vis-à-vis third
countries. This mandate would allow Eurojust to design and implement capacity-building
initiatives aimed at strengthening the judicial cooperation capabilities of partner countries.
Such activities would contribute to promote best practices in judicial cooperation, foster
mutual trust, and enhance the effectiveness of operational collaboration.
5.3. Measures discarded at an early stage
Several options and measures that might have seemed interesting to address drivers and to
achieve certain budget savings were discarded at an early stage, taking into account in
particular operational views expressed by stakeholders as well as political and legal
considerations. The multi-criteria analysis (developed in chapter 7) based on
effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence also underlined that these policy measures were
not worth considering any further.
• Removing the College and replacing it with national units (Europol model)
While it could have created efficiencies, this measure was discarded for reasons of political
feasibility in light of clear feedback from stakeholders who underlined that Eurojust’s
added value lies precisely in its collegial structure, which ensures judicial coordination
based on equality between Member States’ judicial authorities.
Unlike Europol, which is a police cooperation body, Eurojust operates in a judicial context
where mutual trust, national sovereignty, and procedural autonomy are paramount.
33
Replacing the College with national units would have risked fragmenting operational
decision-making, weakening collective ownership of cases, and undermining Eurojust’s
role as a neutral EU-level coordination platform: the effectiveness and (both internal and
external) efficiency would be very low. Such a shift may also risk blurring the institutional
distinction between police and judicial cooperation enshrined in the Treaties.
• Fully integrating the networks currently hosted by Eurojust into the agency’s
structure
The judicial networks hosted by Eurojust (e.g. EJN, Genocide Network, etc.) are designed
to remain flexible, practitioner-driven, and relatively autonomous. Full integration into
Eurojust’s structure could compromise their informal, peer-to-peer nature and reduce
Member States’ sense of ownership. It could also create governance and accountability
complexities, as these networks often serve broader or different mandates than Eurojust
itself. The efficiency would be low. Maintaining a hosting model preserves operational
flexibility while avoiding institutional overreach and the external coherence of the agency
In addition, legal reasons may prevent substantive changes to the EJN (provided by Article
85 TFEU)
• Enabling Eurojust to provide a binding decision in case of conflict of jurisdiction
Although Article 85(1) TFEU allows for the creation of binding decision-making powers
for Eurojust in relation to the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction (going beyond the sole
opinion provided for in Article 4(4) of the EJR), there seems to be no pressing need to
entrust such power to the Agency.
Several EU instruments already regulate the matter. Council Framework Decision
2009/948/JHA provides a mechanism for consultation aimed at preventing parallel
proceedings, with most cases resolved by cooperation between authorities and via the
application of the ne bis in idem principle, as interpreted by the caselaw. In situations
where the competent authorities cannot reach agreement, the matter is, where appropriate,
referred to Eurojust.109 Regulation (EU) 2024/3011 on the transfer of proceedings in
criminal matters pursues similar objectives.110 Furthermore, Eurojust has always been
conceived as a coordinating actor and not as a binding arbiter of national competences.111
When information relating to these conflicts of jurisdiction is brought to the attention of
Eurojust, it can exert influence at the level of the national desks concerned to ensure that a
solution is found.112 There is thus no need to enhance the effectiveness in this area.
Ultimately, the procedural and legal consequences of such binding powers would be
significant, particularly in terms of legal remedies,113 and could unnecessarily complicate
the current system. The efficiency score would be low.
109 Article 12 Council Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009. 110 Recital 19. 111 HLF report, p. 12. 112 Article 21(6) of the Eurojust Regulation: “The competent national authorities shall inform their national members of:
(a) cases in which conflicts of jurisdiction have arisen or are likely to arise”. 113 Such a measure would have considerable consequences on fundamental rights. As a legally binding measure, it would
affect procedural rules at national level that are applied by national prosecutors, thereby indirectly impacting the right to
liberty (Article 6 of the Charter), the right to fair trial and the principle of legality and proportionality of penalties (Articles
47 and 48 of the Charter). Vesting Eurojust with a binding legal power on conflict of jurisdiction would need to be
mirrored by a corresponding expansion of the relevant judicial remedies, for example with regard to the possibility of
individuals to challenge such a decision.
34
• Provide for specific rules (lex specialis) regarding data processing, transfer and
protection
The revision of Chapter IX of the EUDPR, in parallel with that of the Eurojust mandate, is
intended to establish comprehensive, up-to-date, and directly applicable rules on data
transfers for all EU JHA bodies and agencies. It provides an opportunity to bring all rules
on the processing of personal data under the same umbrella, addressing the current
fragmentation where part of the rules is included in the individual founding Regulations
and with some differences between them.
The EUDPR constitutes the “lex generalis” making additional Eurojust-specific rules only
justified by an imperative need to deviate from this global framework. This necessity to go
beyond these horizontal rules, in compliance with the key principles laid down by the
EUDPR, has not been identified from an operational perspective. In addition, creating a
“lex specialis” in the EJR could reinforce the fragmentation and the legal uncertainty of
data processing and protection rules.
6. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE POLICY OPTIONS?
This chapter assesses all policy options identified in chapter 5.2. against the baseline
presented in chapter 5.1. Given that the baseline scenario is unsuited to address the
problems identified, this impact assessment will not assess the baseline scenario any
further.
Given Eurojust’s mission is to support national authorities in the fight against serious and
organised crime, the (general) effectiveness of the policy options assessed in this chapter
is assessed by their expected impact on the fight against crime and the wider implications
for EU citizens’ security and well-being as well as against the specific objectives.
6.1. Specific Objective 1
The following policy options would contribute to delivering Specific Objective 1, which
aims to strengthen the internal functioning and the operational performance of the agency.
They should address problem drivers #1 to #5.
• Options in intervention area A
A.PO1: This bundle of non-legislative measures would have only a limited impact to
Eurojust’s overall effectiveness and coherence. Although the Agency’s mandate would
remain unchanged, certain tasks and tools would be reinforced. In terms of EU
policymaking involvement (i.a), the policy option would build on Eurojust’s existing
contributions to various studies and reports. Regarding new operational functions (ii.a),
the limits would be the clear mandate of the College and national desks: working groups
already deal with some of these issues but without any truly effective legal levers. Lastly,
a push to create a semi-permanent operational platform to support JITs (iii.a), based on the
ICPA model, would only have a moderate positive impact due to the lack of a legal basis
and would be subject to the prioritisation of other projects. Overall, the effectiveness of
this option to improve the support to national authorities will deliver small benefits, with
associated small costs related to supporting actions.
A.PO2:This package entails the adoption of legislative amendments to clearly set the
competence for Eurojust to contribute to EU policy and legislation (i.b). In practice, its
impacts would depend on the evolution of the number of requests for Eurojust’s input, with
the expectation that increased contributions increase stakeholders’ awareness of the
agency’s role and expertise, and a subsequent increase in requests (a virtuous circle). To
deliver more evidence-based strategic contributions, additional resources would be
35
required for tools (including AI-based) and staff to select, analyse and compare large
amounts of information.114
The exact impact of adding new material competences (Annex I) on violation of restrictive
measures, cybercrime related to cryptocurrencies and artificial intelligence, and finally,
gender-based violence, particularly online (iv), depends on the future development of these
crime types and also varies according to the nature of each area of crime (seriousness and
volume of committed offences). For example, an explicit competence for victims’ rights
in the EJR may help better define Eurojust’s role in exceptional cases of mass crime or
disasters involving multiple casualties of different nationalities (e.g., terrorist attacks,
online fraud).115 Coordinated support to victims would also be coherent with the new EU
strategy (and the recently provisionally agreed revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive).
Additional staff would be needed but their costs should be minor/moderate compared to
the potential positive impact.
The introduction of semi-operational platforms through a legislative measure (iii.b) would
establishing a clear mandate for Eurojust to support JITs in a structured way. JITS are
already one of the Agency’s most effective tools,116 so further improvements are expected
to have a positive impact firstly on operations, and hence on the overall fight against crime.
The expected benefits are expected to at least cover the associated staff and IT costs.
Lastly, the uniform conferral by Member States, under national law, of powers relating to
the issuance of European Orders addressed to service providers in accordance with the e-
evidence framework, is likely to generate operational added value. Ensuring that NMs are
empowered to act as issuing or executing authorities for freezing orders (or immediate
action preserving the property until a freezing order has been issued) could be of added
value in time-critical and high-value cases, where swift cross-border coordination and
action is paramount. Further impacts of this measure would depend on whether such role
would entail any other supporting duties of NMs, as it is likely to increase the workload of
national desks in issuing the orders. The positive reduction of fragmentation of
competences, would also help reducing reliance on bilateral follow-up.
A.PO3: The most far-reaching option builds on A.PO2. It includes an additional measure
(iv) to transform Eurojust into a fully-fledged analytical hub for judicial case-building. The
extension the CICED and CTR models to cover information and evidence related to
organised crime would require the addition of a new competence under Article 21 of the
EJR. This new role would be consistent with the current trends of EU public policies in
this area (e.g. SOCTA, road map on organised crime etc.). With regard to Eurojust’s
material competence117 and considering the evolving nature of cross-border serious and
organised crime, the impact would be very high because in practice the main material scope
of Eurojust’s mandate would be covered. Nevertheless, the efficiency could be limited due
to high costs, including to deal with the increased volume of operational data to be
processed, and constraints related to data entry capacity. This individual measure is
potentially one of the highest cost measures proposed, reflecting the need for additional
resources such as the recruitment of analysts and lawyers with experience in organised
crime.118. However, this is more than offset by the expected high positive long-term
114 Support study, p. 48. 115 Support Study, p. 79. 116 Eurojust Evaluation, p. 35. 117Art. 85 TFEU and Annex I to the EJR. 118 Estimated at 16 FTEs and a further EUR 2 million in system costs p.a., Annex III.
36
impact. Overall, this measure is judged to be very efficient and should also deliver
moderate internal and high external coherence benefits.
The efficiency could be impacted by the risk of duplication of work with Europol, which
already perform analytical tasks. To mitigate this risk, clear separation must be established
between the analytical work of Europol, which deals with operational intelligence, and
Eurojust, which works with judicial evidence. In addition, Member States would continue
to submit the data. Therefore, the impact on national authorities would not be neutral in
terms of administrative burden. Taken together, these constraints suggest that while the
option is a promising idea that would positively add value for combatting serious and
organised crime, its impact could be limited without substantial investment and careful
coordination.
Table 5: Impacts of policy option in intervention area A
A. Extending the scope of material
competences to face the new judicial
landscape
Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence Total criteria
score
Addresses problem driver(s):#2 Insufficient
competences and associated toolset SO1 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO1+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
A.PO1 (i.a, ii.a, iii.a) 0.50 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.58 0.38
A.PO2 (i.b, ii.b, iii.b, iv) 1.25 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.13 1.06 1.09
A.PO 3 (i.b, ii.b, iii.b, iv, v) 1.20 0.80 1.00 1.60 1.00 1.30 1.15 1.21
• Options in intervention area B
B.PO1: This policy option includes (i.a) the introduction of a case allocation system based
on non-binding guidelines; and (ii.a) a political encouragement and guidelines to Member
States to appoint NMs with ‘full operational powers’.
Since internal guidance on case allocation already exists within Eurojust but is not
consistently followed in practice (refer to study/problem analysis), the introduction of
additional guidance (i.a), even if formulated in a clearer and more authoritative manner, is
therefore expected to generate at best a small positive impact on operations. 119
The impact of measure ii.a, encouraging Member States to appoint NMs with full
operational powers would depend entirely on voluntary compliance and the willingness of
Member States to adjust existing national practices.120 This measure could lead to a small
improvement in internal coherence, although the impact is likely to be limited as several
Member States have already expressed reservations regarding the feasibility of such
adjustments in light of their national legal frameworks.121
Overall, the two measures in this policy option would have only a small positive impact
on Eurojust operations (including on the time taken to process cases),the impact on
Eurojust’s capacity to support national authorities and on the overall fight against
crime and on the protection of citizens (depending on the extent to which Member States
follow the proposed guidance). The related costs of this option are minor, involving
possibly some one-off costs related to advocacy.
119 Support study, pp. 84-85. 120 Support study, p. 87. 121 Interviews with Member State authorities and practitioners, Annex II, p. 13.
37
B.PO2: The legislative measures envisaged under (i.b) and (ii.b), together with the
capacity for NMs to issue judicial cooperation instruments (iii), are expected to generate a
moderate positive impact on Eurojust operations.
Establishing a legislative framework for the allocation of cases would contribute to greater
consistency and predictability in determining which cases should be handled by the
Agency. However, introducing a legally defined notion of a “Eurojust case” may result in
some rigidity. As a result, the assessment of whether its impact would ultimately be
positive or negative remains to be confirmed in practice.
Aligning the powers of NMs and granting them uniform operational capabilities would
generate a higher positive impact on operations, particularly in the context of time-
sensitive serious crime cases. NMs would be able to act more promptly by issuing the
necessary judicial instruments directly, without relying exclusively on national authorities.
These improvements would generate a stronger positive impact on Eurojust’s capacity
to support national authorities and on the fight against crime. Expanding the range of
operational tools available to NMs would increase the added value of Eurojust
interventions by broadening the set of responses available in complex cross-border
investigations.
Reducing the fragmentation in the powers and competences of NMs across Member States
would also generate a moderate positive impact on simplification by creating a more
consistent operational framework.
These measures should be achievable at limited costs, although the increased operational
role of NMs may entail a limited impact on Eurojust resources, as broader powers and
responsibilities could generate additional workload for the Agency and for the respective
national desks.122 No impact is expected in other areas. The expected improvements in
consistency and reduction of fragmentation should also have a positive impact on
coherence both within the Agency and to a certain extent externally.
B.PO3: This policy option would build on the measures and associated impacts envisaged
under B.PO2. In addition to measures (i.b), (ii.b) and (iii), it would empower NMs to open
cases on their own initiative (iv).
By granting NMs the authority to open cases where appropriate, this option would further
strengthen Eurojust’s operational role in identifying and addressing cross-border criminal
activities. The measure is expected to generate a moderate positive impact on operations,
particularly with regard to the time taken to process cases, and a small to moderate
positive impact on the number of cases initiated on Eurojust’s own initiative.
The possibility for NMs to initiate investigations would also generate a moderate positive
impact on Eurojust’s capacity to support national authorities, enabling more
consistent and proactive coordination between Member States.
This option would generate a moderate positive impact on the fight against crime, as it
would reduce the risk that opportunities to initiate relevant cross-border investigations are
missed. By enabling more proactive identification and handling of cases, the measure
would also generate a positive impact on the protection of citizens.
At the same time, the greater operational proactivity associated with this option would
entail a minor to moderate negative impact on Eurojust resources, as NMs would need
122 Support study, pp. 84-88.
38
to balance their time between responding to requests from Member States and acting on
their own initiative.
The increase in cases resulting from investigations opened on Eurojust’s initiative could
also generate a small to moderate negative impact on Member States’ resources,
particularly in terms of the workload of national prosecution services responsible for
pursuing such cases.123 No impact is expected in other areas.
Balancing all these impacts, the overall efficiency and of this option is expected to be
slightly better than for B.PO2 with similar coherency improvements.
Table 6: Impacts of policy option in intervention area B
B. Harmonising Member State
implementation of the EJR, including on
allocation of cases
Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 2
Addressing problem driver(s):
#1 Inadequate model to select and
prioritise cases;
#3 Divergent Member State engagement and
implementation of the EJR
SO1 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO1+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
B.PO1 (i.a, ii.a) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.38 0.28
B.PO2 (i.b, ii.b, iii) 1.00 0.67 0.83 1.17 1.67 0.83 1.25 1.02
B.PO3 (i.b, ii.b, iii, iv) 1.13 0.88 1.00 1.38 1.63 0.88 1.25 1.16
• Options in intervention area C
C.PO1: The scale of the impacts of this non legislative option to revise the allocation of
responsibilities between governance bodies would not notably differ from those already
being taken under the baseline scenario. The institutional framework would remain the
same and the focus would mainly be to encourage the reduction of the College’s
administrative work and to select NMs with better managerial skills. The positive impact
on the effectiveness of the Agency would consequently be rather low. The working culture
of the agency, especially members of national desks coming from national judiciary, is
unlikely to change significantly with soft rules and guidelines, but again a minor
improvement to coherence could be anticipated. 124
Nevertheless, some targeted measures would lead to positive effects, i.e. the deletion of
the College working groups – which create redundancies and duplication with the work of
the Eurojust staff – would impact positively the agency’s efficiency.
C.PO2: This option would not introduce any new governance bodies, but would clarify
and rebalance the roles and responsibilities of the College and the EB, as well as the
position of the AD.
By ensuring that the tasks taken on by each body are clear and adequately reflect the
respective purposes of each body and the skills, knowledge and experience of their
members, repetitive discussions between bodies should be reduced and the effectiveness
and efficiency of decision-making should improve. The AD should take on responsibilities
for which they are best placed. The new role of the EB should lead to reductions in the
time spent by NMs dealing with administrative matters in the College, thereby allowing
them to reallocate their time to higher-value operational activities.
123 Support study, pp. 87-88. 124 Support study, p. 87.
39
By removing overlaps in administrative tasks between the College and the EB through the
definition of a clear division of responsibilities in this area, it is estimated that the FTE per
NM associated with preparing for and participating in College meetings will reduce by
30%. This time saving for operational matters and the reduction of overlaps in activities is
expected to provide a positive impact on efficiency. More broadly, the global effectiveness
of the governance model will be improved.125
Regarding the composition of the EB, abolishing the rotation system126 for the selection of
NMs should lead to the selection of NMs with appropriate skills and higher level of
engagement, resulting in a more effective and efficient EB. Lastly, the shifting of
responsibilities, related to defining strategic priorities, from the CF would increase the
NMs working time devoted to operational tasks. With a moderate cost impact, the
efficiency and coherence of this mechanism will be positive.
C.PO3: The significant change in the governance and decision-making structures of
Eurojust is expected to have a major impact. This paradigm shift will increase alignment
with the governance models of other EU agencies, leading to stronger coherence. The
working time that the College will be able to devote to operational task will increase
substantially (around +40%) and will consequently have a significant impact on the
effectiveness in terms of the contribution to activities at the heart of the mandate of the
agency: supporting national authorities to combat serious and cross-border crime. In
addition, the two vice-presidents and the two NMs (appointed by a rotation system)
currently sitting in the EB would fully work on operational matters.
The introduction of a MB would introduce new moderate costs and time commitments and
a new layer in the institutional framework could create and burden: nevertheless, the
associated efficiency gain expected (1.46 FTE p.a.) is high due to the time saved for the
EB and the College. In addition, the better involvement of Member States, with specific
supervisory skills from representatives, will improve oversight and the qualitative
functioning of the agency.127
Table 7: Impacts of policy option in intervention area C
C. Establishing a streamlined, coherent and
role-clear governance system that
accelerates decision-making
Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 2
Addressing problem driver(s):
#4 Lack of clear separation between
operational and administrative responsibilities
#5 Complex governance structure
and outdated legacy organisational culture
SO1 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO1+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
C.PO1 (i) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
C.PO2 (i and ii) 1.50 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.13
C.PO3 (i, ii and iii) 3.00 2.50 2.75 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.53
6.2. Specific Objective 2
The following policy options would contribute to Specific Objective 2 which aims at an
optimal alignment, implementation and operational integration with Member States, EU
partners and third countries, and would address the problem drivers #8 to #10.
125 Support study, p. 94. 126 Article 16(4) EJR. 127 Support study, p. 96.
40
• Options in intervention area D
D.PO1: This package of technical measures and working arrangements represents the
minimum option proposed to strengthen cooperation between Eurojust and Europol. It
could be implemented at low cost, although it would still require a certain commitment of
material, human and time resources, notably to update the hit/no-hit system and negotiate
the revision of the existing working arrangements.
The automation of the hit/no-hit system (i.a) would reduce the risk of human error and
accelerate follow-up actions. Moreover, the effectiveness of revised working arrangements
(ii.a) would largely depend on the substance of the changes introduced and on their
effective implementation, with a risk that they remain largely ineffective in practice.128
Overall, this option is expected to generate only a very limited impact on the support
provided to national authorities. At the same time, its implementation could constitute a
first step towards the development of a more integrated digital cooperation framework.129
D.PO2: This option introduces legal obligations for the two agencies to step up their
cooperation (i.b, ii.b), producing effects similar but higher to those envisaged under D.PO1
as there is a greater likelihood of higher level of reciprocal engagement and cooperation.
It also provides for more structured coordination in relation to SIRIUS referrals (iii), which
would have a positive impact on the support provided to national authorities, and further
coordination and improved coherence through involvement of Europol liaison officers in
the College (iv).
The increased level of coordination would improve operational output, notably by enabling
the identification of a higher number of connected cases. At the same time, the larger
number of identified cases may generate additional resource needs for Member States, both
at the level of national desks and within prosecution authorities.130
The effectiveness of this option would depend on adequate inter-agency coordination, such
as introducing corresponding provisions in the Europol Regulation.
Overall, this option is expected to have a moderately positive impact on the fight against
crime and on digitalisation, while entailing moderately higher transactional costs.131
D.PO3: This option envisages the highest level of structured working arrangements
between Europol and Eurojust. In addition to the measures under D.PO2, it introduces the
codification of a series of operational modalities governing their cooperation (v).
These measures would structure the early involvement of Eurojust in investigations and
are expected to further strengthen cooperation and coherence by fostering greater mutual
understanding and more systematic institutional coordination. They would also clarify the
respective roles of the two agencies, helping to avoid duplication of work while increasing
the number of operational links detected and potential connected cases identified,
ultimately ensuring operational continuity between their actions.
As a result, this option would have a positive impact on the fight against crime and on the
protection of citizens. At the same time, the increased number of identified cases may
128 Support study, p. 9. 129 Support study, p. 99. 130 Support study, p. 100. 131 Support study, p. 101.
41
create additional resource needs for Member States, particularly in relation to
investigations and prosecutions.132
Overall, this option is expected to generate the strongest positive impact among the
available policy options. However, it would entail higher feasibility costs, as it would
require amendments to the Europol and Eurojust Regulations, as well as sustained
operational engagement from Europol and Eurojust and the mobilisation of additional
resources.133
Table 8: Impacts of policy option in intervention area D
D. Fostering and strengthening structured
operational cooperation with Europol Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 2
Addressing problem driver(s):
#8 Absence of a structurally embedded
cooperation with Europol
SO2 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO2+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
D.PO1 (i.a, ii.a) 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.43
D.PO2 (i.b, ii.b, iii, iv) 1.13 0.88 1.00 1.38 1.25 1.88 1.56 1.23
D.PO3 (i.b, ii.b, iii, iv, v) 1.50 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.40 1.90 1.65 1.48
• Options in intervention area E
E.PO1: This option introduces a minimum set of measures, notably the further automation
of the hit/no-hit system (i.a), mirroring the approach envisaged for Europol under D.PO1.
These technical adjustments could be implemented at relatively low cost and would
streamline existing processes.
While the automation of the system would reduce the risk of human error and improve the
efficiency of follow-up actions, it is not expected to significantly increase the number of
queries or hits. Nevertheless, the optimisation of the current system could represent an
important building block for the future development of a more integrated digital
cooperation tool.
Overall, this option is expected to generate a limited impact on digitalisation and a very
limited impact on operational effectiveness, while entailing relatively low implementation
costs.
E.PO2: In addition to the measures envisaged under E.PO1, this option introduces a cross-
agency information exchange and link detection mechanism (inter-agency hit/no hit
mechanism) (i.b). It also envisages granting Eurojust an explicit mandate to provide
reinforced support to the EPPO (ii) and enabling EPPO liaison officers to participate in the
Eurojust College (iii).
These measures would enhance operational cooperation between Eurojust and the EPPO,
notably by strengthening digital information exchange and fostering greater mutual
engagement, understanding and operational alignment between the two bodies. The
reinforced mandate for Eurojust to support EPPO cases would also contribute positively to
the fight against cross-border crime, particularly by increasing the capacity to detect
offences affecting the financial interests of the Union and related criminal activities, such
as organised crime, thereby potentially leading to the opening of additional cases at
Eurojust. While the material competence of the EPPO remains limited to crimes affecting
132 Support study, pp. 101-102. 133 Support study, p. 102.
42
the Union’s financial interests, Eurojust’s involvement in EPPO cases could facilitate the
identification of additional linked criminal conduct beyond the EPPO’s core mandate, in
particular in the area of organised crime. At the same time, deeper engagement with the
EPPO would require the allocation of additional human, financial and time resources.
Overall, this option is expected to generate a significantly positive impact on the fight
against crime and on operational cooperation, with costs primarily linked to the additional
resources that Eurojust would need to mobilise to fulfil these tasks.
E.PO3: Building on the measures under E.PO2, this option introduces the establishment
of a Eurojust-EPPO clearing-house mechanism for case allocation (iv).
In addition to the impacts described above, this mechanism would be expected to improve
operational efficiency by providing greater clarity on the respective spheres of competence
of Eurojust and the EPPO. A more structured allocation of cases would facilitate
coordination between the two bodies and help ensure that cases are handled by the
authority best placed to act. At the same time, the establishment and maintenance of a
clearing-house mechanism would entail comparatively higher costs, notably in terms of
the human and financial resources required to operate and sustain the mechanism. It would
also require the adoption of mirroring provision in the EPPO Regulation.
This option would generate a strong positive impact on operational coordination and
efficiency, while involving higher implementation and resource costs.
Table 9: Impacts of policy option in intervention area E
E. Promoting fully developed cooperation
with the EPPO Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 2
Addressing problem driver(s):
#9 Constrained cooperation with the EPPO SO2 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO2+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
E.PO1 (i.a) 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50
E.PO2 (i.b, ii, iii) 1.33 0.83 1.08 1.50 1.67 1.00 1.33 1.26
E.PO3 (i.b, ii, iii, iv) 1.38 0.75 1.06 1.31 1.63 1.00 1.31 1.19
• Options in intervention area F
F.PO1: Options presented are expected to facilitate the process for establishing relations
with international actors (#10). F.PO1 aims to mitigate this driver by introducing
cooperation commitments in agreements with third countries with political and economic
implications as a cross-cutting non-legislative measure. The impact of this measure is
difficult to assess: it could potentially incentivise third countries towards a stronger
convergence with EU standards but would depend on the interests at stake, as well as
political willingness, assuming that EU data protection standards, and fundamental rights,
are respected.134 Despite these limitations, the inclusion of obligations related to judicial
cooperation could especially facilitate specific cases where third countries have a keen
interest in financial support from the EU and would thus have a positive impact compared
to the current situation.135 This is confirmed by a survey conducted by the contractor and
included in the Support study, in which respondents were of the opinion that the inclusion
of these conditionalities would contribute to expand third country engagement to at least a
134 Support Study, p. 105. 135 Support Study, pp. 106-107.
43
moderate extent (54.3%, n=101 out of 186). Ultimately, this measure would contribute to
improving the investigation of crimes, also in cooperation with third countries, and would
therefore have a positive impact.
F.PO2: This policy option includes the first non-legislative measure on the cooperation
obligations but adds further substantive measures: clarifying the legal framework
governing LMs (ii), institutionalising Resident Contact Points for priority countries (iii)
and granting participation in College meetings to LPs (iv).
The expected impact of the first of these additional measures (ii) would be a strengthened
cooperation with third countries that would increase exchanges and case numbers.136
Together with the measure of institutionalising resident Contact Points (iii) this policy
option would present significant administrative, financial and operational burdens for
Eurojust.137 Moreover, there is the risk that LMs would function merely as contact points
due to limited expertise in diverse national legal systems.
Despite the challenges, the LMs and resident Contact Points are a strategic and necessary
evolution in Eurojust’s capacity to strengthen judicial cooperation with third countries.
Their deployment in key regions (e.g., Africa, Middle East) would provide reliable
channels for judicial cooperation, reducing delays for critical requests. This could be
especially valuable for Member States with limited diplomatic networks and besides,
enhance Eurojust’s visibility and credibility as a central hub for international criminal
justice cooperation. Similarly, Resident Contact Points would ease cooperation with
countries where formal agreements are difficult to negotiate, offering a pragmatic and
flexible alternative. Case volumes would increase.
Clear rules on LMs and Resident Contact points would also enhance overall coherence.
With the formal participation of LPs in the College (iv) it would be ensured that discussions
are grounded in up-to-date and field-based intelligence, improving the Agency’s ability to
anticipate and respond to evolving transnational trends and would have a positive impact
on reaching Specific Objective 2. Member States’ interests would be safeguarded by the
fact that LPs retain their national practitioner status.
In terms of efficiency, it would be ensured the resources are allocated better since the direct
involvement of the LPs would reduce redundant consultations with third country
authorities. Moreover, since they are already deployed, their formal integration into the
College would require only minor additional funding.
Coherence with the existing framework would be ensured.
F.PO3: The third policy option in that area builds on the previous by adding one additional
measure: entrusting Eurojust with an explicit capacity building mandate in external action
(v). This would further align with the specific objective and improve third countries’ ability
to align with EU standards and reaching trust and operational compatibility. However,
effectiveness in that regard would depend on third countries’ political will.
Funding would be streamlined (e.g., form ICPA-FPI, DG INTPA) under Eurojust’s budget
and reduce administrative fragmentation or duplication. On the cost side additional staff
(FTEs) would be needed and there is a risk of overstretching, diverting resource from
Eurojust’s operational work.
136 Support Study, pp. 111-113. 137 Quantitative assessments on this can be found in Annex II.
44
This policy option would be coherent with EU policies. As the policy option of highest
intensity, particular legal clarity in the EJR amendment would be needed to avoid conflicts
with other EU actors.
Table 10: Impacts of policy option in intervention area F
F. Consolidating cooperation with third
countries and international organisations Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 2
Addressing problem driver(s):
#10 Cumbersome process
for establishing relations with international
actors
SO2 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO2+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
F.PO1(i) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50
F.PO2 (i, ii, iii, iv) 1.50 0.88 1.19 0.88 0.63 0.75 0.69 0.99
F.PO3 (i, ii, iii, iv, v) 1.40 0.80 1.10 0.80 0.60 0.80 0.70 0.93
7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?
To compare the policy options, a multi-criteria analysis (MCA) was used, which took
into account the effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of all policy options. This
analysis is based on two components: the gradual assessment of each policy option and
the weighting assigned to each impact representing its relative importance. A score was
given to each policy option on a scale from -3 to +3 (as further explained in Annex IV)
based on the analysis of quantitative and qualitative evidence. Effectiveness, efficiency,
and coherence were each weighed at 50%, 30% and 20% respectively138.
The assessment was performed separately for the two specific objectives, each with its
own set of policy options: Specific Objective 1 (Internal) - Streamlining Eurojust's
operational capacity, Member State implementation and internal governance; Specific
Objective 2 (External) - Achieve optimal alignment and operational integration with
Member States, EU partners and third countries. The policy options under these two
separate objectives are assessed independently of one another and have no mutual
interdependencies (the objectives addressing clearly distinct themes and goals). Under
each Specific Objective, three thematic areas (A, B, C for SO1; D, E, F for SO2) were
examined. Within each thematic area, three policy options – differing in scope (PO1:
light change, PO2: moderate change, PO3: substantial change) – were presented
alongside their respective impacts. The resulting nine policy options under each
Specific Objective were then compared against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency,
and coherence. Effectiveness was graded based on the extent to which each policy
option achieved its respective specific objective and contributed to the general
objective. Efficiency was assessed through a cost-benefit analysis, with the overall
efficiency score reflecting the net effect of benefits minus costs (where 3 = highest
benefit at lowest cost). Coherence was evaluated globally, taking into account internal
coherence (alignment with the EJR) and external coherence (consistency with other EU
legal acts and policies).
The results of the MCA show that policy options A.PO3, B.PO3, C.PO3, D.PO3, E.PO2,
F.PO2 rank highest under all three criteria. The table below summarises the results of the
assessment of all policy options described in chapter 6.
138 Only this is presented above, but sensitivity analyses were also carried out with equal weights and with effectiveness
and efficiency both at 40%, all of which produced the same ranking.
45
Table 11: Impacts of policy options in intervention areas A, B, C, D, E and F
Area of intervention Policy
options Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence
Total = 0.5*Effectiveness +
0.3*Efficiency + 0.2*Coherence
A. Extending the scope of material
competences to face the new judicial
landscape
A.PO1 0.33 0.33 0.58 0.38
A.PO2 1.00 1.25 1.06 1.09
A.PO3 1.00 1.60 1.15 1.21
B. Harmonising Member State
implementation of the EJR, including on
allocation of cases
B.PO1 0.25 0.25 0.38 0.28
B.PO2 0.83 1.17 1.25 1.02
B.PO3 1.00 1.38 1.25 1.16
C. Establishing a streamlined, coherent and
role-clear governance system that
accelerates decision-making
C.PO1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
C.PO2 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.13
C.PO3 2.75 2.50 2.00 2.53
D. Fostering and strengthening structured
operational cooperation with Europol
D.PO1 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.43
D.PO2 1.00 1.38 1.56 1.23
D.PO3 1.40 1.50 1.65 1.48
E. Promoting fully developed cooperation
with the EPPO
E.PO1 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.50
E.PO2 1.08 1.50 1.33 1.26
E.PO3 1.06 1.31 1.31 1.19
F. Consolidating cooperation with third
countries and international organisations
F.PO1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
F.PO2 1.19 0.88 0.69 0.99
F.PO3 1.10 0.80 0.70 0.93
8. PREFERRED OPTION
Based on the impacts assessed (chapter 6) and comparison of policy options (chapter 7),
the preferred option is the package of preferred policy options under each intervention area.
All policy options retained are complementary and reflect the evidence collected (i.e.
stakeholders’ views). They scored highest in terms of their effectiveness (towards their
specific objective and the general objective), efficiency and coherence mix:
46
Table 12: Preferred Option
PREFERRED OPTION
A. Extending the scope of material competences to face the new judicial landscape
Addressing problem driver(s): #2 Insufficient competences and associated toolset A.PO3
i.b Enhancing Eurojust’s involvement in EU policy-making and strategic cycles by introducing a dedicated EJR provision
ii.b Formally entrusting Eurojust with new operational functions (e-evidence, victims’ rights)
iii.b Introducing semi-permanent operational platforms to support JITs by introducing a reference in the EJR
iv. Extending Eurojust’s material competence to new crimes (VURM, cybercrime, GBV)
v. Expanding Eurojust’s analytical function to key crime areas (organised crime and accessory crimes)
B. Harmonising Member State implementation of the EJR, including on allocation of cases
Addressing problem driver(s): #1 Inadequate model to select and prioritise cases; #3 Divergent
Member State engagement and implementation of the EJR
B.PO3
i.b Introducing a Eurojust-EJN case-allocation system by defining in EJR what’s a ‘Eurojust case’
Ii.b Reinforce the status of National Members to give them full operational powers by amending EJR provisions
iii. Entrusting National Members with new capabilities (issuing freezing orders (or immediate action), e-evidence orders, signing JIT
agreements)
iv. Granting National Members the authority to open cases
C. Establishing a streamlined governance system that accelerates decision-making
Addressing problem driver(s): #4 Lack of clear separation between operational and administrative
responsibilities; #5 Complex governance structure and outdated legacy organisational culture
C.PO3
i. Revision of the allocation of responsibilities between governance bodies
ii. Reform of the Executive Board
iii. Introduction of a Management Board
D. Fostering and strengthening structured operational cooperation with Europol
Addressing problem driver(s): #8 Absence of a structurally embedded cooperation with Europol D.PO3
i.b Optimising Eurojust-Europol’s hit/no-hit system through technical measures linked to new legal obligations
ii.b Revising the 2010 Eurojust-Europol Working Arrangement and introducing an obligation of periodic review
iii. Creating a dedicated cooperation channel for systematic follow up on SIRIUS referrals
iv. Granting participation in College meetings to Europol representatives
v. Codifying cooperation modalities between Eurojust and Europol
E. Promoting fully developed cooperation with the EPPO
Addressing problem driver(s): #9 Constrained cooperation with the EPPO E.PO2
i.b Optimising Eurojust-EPPO’s hit/no-hit system through technical measures linked to new legal obligations
ii. Establishing an explicit mandate for Eurojust to provide reinforced support in EPPO cases
iii. Granting participation in College meetings to EPPO representatives
F. Consolidating cooperation with third countries and international organisations
Addressing problem driver(s): #10 Complex process for establishing relations with international actors F.PO2
i. Introducing cooperation commitments in agreements with third countries with financial implications
ii. Clarifying the legal framework governing Liaison Magistrates
iii. Institutionalising Resident Contact Points for priority third countries
iv. Granting participation in the College meetings to LPs
8.1. Presentation of the cumulative impact of the preferred option
The preferred option is a package that generates cumulative impact by combining measures
that address different but interrelated drivers of the problem. Taken together, these
measures form a coherent and mutually reinforcing revision of the Eurojust mandate:
47
theystrengthen Eurojust’s ability to support Member States to combat serious and cross-
border crime more effectively than any individual measure alone.
First, several mutually reinforcing legislative measures would formally codify and expand
Eurojust’s mandate and operational competences. The Regulation would provide the
legal basis for operational practices already envisaged under earlier policy options, while
extending Eurojust’s material competence to emerging crime areas through amendments
to Annex I. In parallel, Eurojust’s analytical capacity would be strengthened by granting
the Agency the mandate to collect, store and analyse judicial data related to organised
crime, supporting national authorities in evidence-building and strategic case development.
Second, complementary measures would reinforce operational coordination and legal
certainty within Eurojust. Once again, a legislative amendment is required. The concept
of a “Eurojust case”, and the eligibility requirements for NMs, would be better defined,
ensuring consistent practices across Member States. NMs’ operational powers would be
enhanced, enabling them to issue or facilitate key judicial cooperation instruments (such
as freezing and investigation orders, and e-evidence production or preservation orders)
while remaining subject to a conferral of powers under national law. In the preferred
option, NMs would be empowered to open cases concerning serious cross-border crime.
These measures align Eurojust’s operational tools with clearer institutional rules,
strengthening the Agency’s ability to act proactively while preserving national authorities’
investigative primacy.
Third, the reform measures would modernise Eurojust’s governance and internal
management structure in line with the Common Approach for decentralised agencies.
This governance reform complements the operational measures by ensuring that
strengthened operational tasks and competences are supported by a more efficient and
clearly structured decision-making framework. This will ensure that NMs can focus on
operational work and that independent oversight is allocated to an external MB. As already
explained in Chapter 2 regarding the presentation of the problem driver #5, Governance
inefficiencies are rooted in a legacy culture but also due to legal uncertainties in the
division of tasks and accountabilities. While Eurojust had been encouraged to evolve its
working practices towards greater efficiency, the trend observed in practice has been the
opposite, as highlighted in the evaluation study. The preferred option would reposition the
College towards a more operationally focused function, while ensuring that management
and administrative decisions are taken by the bodies best placed and competent to handle
them efficiently. These structural changes require a legislative intervention (best score on
C.PO3).
Fourth, certain measures would enhance data protection and data management
capabilities, specifying the application of the EU data protection regime within the EJR
and allowing longer retention of operational personal data for analytical and strategic
purposes. These provisions are consistent with the expansion of Eurojust’s analytical role
and ensure that enhanced data processing capacities operate within a clear and robust legal
framework. This new, more harmonised and improved legal framework will maintain a
high level of data protection whilst supporting the operational needs for the transfer of
information. Finally, the package would strengthen cooperation with key partners, at
EU (in particular Europol and the EPPO) and external (third countries) level. Legislative
amendments would structure information exchange, reinforce the relevance of dedicated
cooperation channels, embed coordination obligations, and institutionalise operational
practices such as JOPs or task forces and resident contact points.
Taken together, the different measures form a consistent and mutually reinforcing
reform package: internal governance reforms support stronger operational competences;
48
expanded analytical and data capacities underpin the Agency’s broader mandate; and
structured cooperation mechanisms ensure that Eurojust’s enhanced role is effectively
integrated within the EU’s broader security and justice architecture and beyond.
8.2. Impact of the preferred option
8.2.1. Effectiveness139
The cumulative impact of the preferred package is highly effective because it satisfies the
goals of the two specific objectives while also addressing the problem drivers. By
combining legislative, governance, and operational measures, the package creates
mutually reinforcing effects. Expanded material competences enable Eurojust to support
national authorities in new crime areas, while harmonised Member State implementation
ensures these competences are evenly applied. Streamlined governance reduces
administrative bottlenecks, allowing Eurojust to focus on operational priorities, such as
third country cooperation. The package aligns with stakeholders demands and EU strategic
priorities, ensuring political feasibility and operational relevance. It enhances Eurojust’s
proactivity, transforming it from a reactive coordination body to a strategic, agile and
analytical hub for cross-border judicial cooperation.
o Specific Objective 1
In detail, using the criterion of effectiveness A.PO3 (i.b, ii.b, iii.b, iv, v), B.PO3 (i.b, ii.b,
iii, iv) and C.PO3 (i, ii, iii) are the most effective because they collectively strengthen the
EU’s ability to detect, coordinate and prosecute serious and cross-border crime. Their
effectiveness stems from reinforcing Eurojust’s role as a central hub for judicial
cooperation while improving coordination between national authorities and enabling faster
operational responses.
First, these options significantly enhance the EU’s capacity to respond to increasingly
complex and transnational criminal activities. By reinforcing Eurojust’s operational role
and expanding its capacity to support national authorities, the EU’s judicial cooperation
framework becomes better equipped to address sophisticated criminal structures that
exploit legal and procedural differences between Member States. New operational tasks,
in particular related to electronic evidence and victims’ rights, improve coordination in key
investigative areas. The establishment of semi-permanent operational platforms supporting
JITs facilitates sustained cooperation in complex cases. A.PO3 improves the prioritisation
and management of cross-border criminal cases which allows Eurojust to focus more
complex investigations. This ensures that judicial coordination tools are used where they
generate the greatest added value. Extending Eurojust’s competence to emerging crime
areas alongside expanded analytical capacity enables the Agency to detect patterns and
better support prosecutions in cross-border cases.
Second, the preferred option increases the speed and relevance of operational coordination.
Serious cross-border investigations often require rapid information exchange, swift
judicial decisions and coordinated prosecutorial strategies across multiple jurisdictions. By
reducing procedural fragmentation and improving coordination mechanisms, these options
allow authorities to react more quickly and effectively to emerging criminal threats. B.PO3
further improves effectiveness by harmonising how Member States implement the EJR.
The introduction of a Eurojust–EJN case allocation system and a clearer definition of a
“Eurojust case” helps focus the agency’s work on the most complex cross-border
139 On total effectiveness impacts, as measured by the success indicators and targets defined for the two sets of specific
objectives, see chapter 9.
49
investigations. Granting NMs full operational powers reduces procedural delays and
strengthens coordination between national authorities.
Third, the options improve organisational efficiency and strategic coordination, enabling
Eurojust to support Member States more effectively in dismantling organised criminal
networks. A clearer institutional framework facilitates faster decision-making and allows
resources to be directed towards operational priorities in the fight against serious crime.
C.PO3 enhances effectiveness by simplifying Eurojust’s governance structure. The
creation of a MB separates administrative and operational responsibilities, streamlines
decision-making and enables faster responses to complex investigations.
Together, these options reinforce Eurojust’s role as a central hub for judicial cooperation,
improve prioritisation of cross-border cases, accelerate operational coordination and
strengthen the EU’s ability to detect, coordinate and prosecute complex transnational
criminal activities.
o Specific objective 2
The package of preferred policy options appears the most effective because they directly
reinforce the operational judicial ecosystem in which Eurojust supports complex
transnational investigations and prosecutions.Indeed, D.PO3 (i.b, ii.b, iii, iv, v), E.PO2
(i.b, ii, iii) and F.PO2 (i, ii, iii, iv) increase significantly the relationship between Eurojust
and all its external partners, by improving information exchange, strengthening
institutional cooperation and extending operational coordination at EU level and beyond
EU borders (third countries and international organisations).
D.PO3 significantly strengthens the EU’s capacity to tackle serious crime by ensuring
structured operational cooperation between Eurojust and Europol, in both terms of data
exchange but also operational synergies, helping establish a police-justice continuum.
Indeed, the combination of Europol’s criminal intelligence and Eurojust’s judicial
coordination allows authorities to detect cross-border criminal patterns more quickly and
to translate intelligence into timely and well-coordinated judicial investigations and
prosecutions.
In the same way, E.PO2 enhances the effectiveness of EU action against complex financial
crime and other cross-border offences by ensuring closer cooperation between Eurojust
and the EPPO. Stronger coordination between the two bodies helps avoid parallel
proceedings, facilitates cooperation with non-participating Member States and third
countries, and supports comprehensive case handling in investigations with a cross-border
dimension.
Finally, F.PO2 increases effectiveness by reinforcing operational cooperation with third
countries and international partners, which is essential given the global dimension of many
organised crime activities. Introducing cooperation obligations in agreements with third
countries, clarifying the legal framework for LMs, institutionalising Resident Contact
Points for priority partners, and enabling the participation of LPs in College meetings
create more stable operational channels. All these measures proposed in this policy option
enhance a more structured external cooperation, especially by the means of interpersonal
contacts between practitioners.
8.2.2. Efficiency
The preferred package of policy options includes a majority of options corresponding to
the highest level of intervention (PO3). These introduce more significant changes to the
current operational and institutional framework of Eurojust than the alternatives providing
only minimal or moderate changes. As a result, the preferred package is expected to
50
generate substantial operational benefits, while also requiring a greater mobilisation of
resources and organisational adjustments.
In particular, the implementation of the preferred package will require Eurojust, its partner
agencies and bodies, and especially Member States, to adapt their working methods,
cooperation practices and established operational routines. Such adjustments may entail
transitional costs and require time and effort to be fully absorbed by the different actors
involved. The transition to new working arrangements may therefore initially encounter
certain practical difficulties, including the need to move away from well-established
practices and cooperation patterns. In some cases, this may also require changes to national
legal frameworks and institutional relations within Member States, as well as the gradual
adoption of a new working culture within Eurojust.
Once these initial adjustments are absorbed, however, the new framework is expected to
generate considerable efficiency gains in several areas. Most notably, the governance
reform (C.PO3) will allow the College to focus fully on the handling of cases, which
should improve both the speed and the quality of the operational support provided to
Member States. At the same time, the new overall management reorganisation (creation of
a MB and new tasks and composition for the EB) is expected to improve the allocation of
time and responsibilities within the Agency.
Similarly, the strengthened involvement of liaison officers and representatives of partner
bodies in the work of the College, including liaison officers from Europol and the EPPO,
as well as LPs from third countries, is expected to add value to operational discussions by
bringing additional expertise and information to case-related deliberations. At the same
time, the participation of a broader range of actors may slightly increase the time required
for discussions and coordination, as additional perspectives and institutional positions will
need to be taken into account.
More broadly, the preferred package places strong emphasis on improving cooperation
with other EU agencies and bodies (D.PO3, E.PO2). The streamlining of cooperation
mechanisms and the clarification of respective roles are expected to reduce duplication of
work and overlapping activities, thereby generating efficiency gains and improving the
quality of operational outcomes through increased availability of information and
expertise. However, closer cooperation also entails coordination costs, including the need
for additional meetings, exchanges and increased operational engagement.
The preferred package also strengthens the operational role and proactivity of Eurojust and
of NMs, while extending the range of tasks for which the Agency is competent (A.PO3,
B.PO3). As a result, the number of cases handled by the Agency may increase. Assuming
unchanged resource levels, this may initially place additional pressure on Eurojust’s
operational capacity and require adjustments in the prioritisation of activities. However,
this effect is expected to be at least mitigated by the governance reforms. These will free
up additional time for NMs to focus on operational work by reducing their involvement in
administrative tasks, and by a clearer understanding of what constitutes a “Eurojust case”.
In addition, extending Eurojust’s tasks with regard to the storage and analysis of evidence
is expected to have a significant impact on data storage costs and will require additional
resources to be devoted to strengthening the Agency’s analytical capacity. Nevertheless,
the positive impact of having evidence databases and analysed datasets readily available
to support case-building is considered to far outweigh the costs associated with
establishing and maintaining this function.
The increase in Eurojust’s capacity to detect and open cases may also lead to a higher
number of investigations and prosecutions at national level. National authorities may
51
therefore need to allocate additional resources to their prosecution services in order to
handle the increased caseload generated by the strengthened operational role of the
Agency.
Finally, the preferred package strengthens cooperation with international partners
(F.PO2), including through the institutionalisation of mechanisms such as Resident
Contact Points. These arrangements are expected to facilitate operational cooperation with
third countries by providing reliable channels for judicial exchanges and reducing delays
in handling requests. At the same time, the deployment and integration of such actors
within Eurojust will require specific organisational arrangements; these include office
space, IT infrastructure, and data protection and information security safeguards to prevent
the disclosure of sensitive information in the absence of formal cooperation agreements.
These requirements may therefore entail additional operational costs for the Agency.
The preferred package is expected to entail certain implementation and coordination costs,
reflecting the more structural changes introduced by the reform. Nevertheless, these costs
are considered proportionate in light of the substantial operational benefits expected from
the strengthened role of Eurojust and the increased focus on case handling. The one-off
costs are estimated between EUR 4.4 million – 5.6 million and the recurrent costs p.a.
would amount to EUR 9.3 million – 9.4 million on average over the course of the
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034 for the implementation of the revised
mandate (additional staffing and set up/operating infrastructures). In addition, the
progressive use of new capabilities is expected to generate operational expenditure for
around EUR 1.7 million on average per year over the course of the next MFF. Overall, this
will amount to estimated needs of extra EUR 83 million for Eurojust from 2028 to 2034.
Detailed estimations of the financial needs of the reformed Agency are included in Annex
III. Taken together, the measures included in the preferred package are therefore expected
to generate a positive overall impact on efficiency, by enabling the Agency to operate in
a more structured, coordinated and operationally focused manner.
8.2.3. Coherence
o Internal coherence
Overall, the preferred policy options are broadly consistent with the structure and
objectives of the EJR (EU) 2018/1727, although some measures raise institutional balance
considerations.
A.PO3 (extension of competences) shows moderate-high internal coherence, as it builds
on Eurojust’s coordination role, particularly regarding support to JITs and operational
cooperation. However, expanding operational or analytical functions (e.g. in e-evidence,
asset recovery or strategic analysis) may blur the boundary between coordination and
operational powers. In addition, A.PO3 is fully coherent with other EU legislation (e.g.,
Directives on gender based violences, victims’ rights, etc.) and strategies (SOCTA etc.)
regarding new material competences. Moreover, it strengthens alignment of Eurojust’s
judicial role with EU strategic cycles. No issues are expected in terms of internal coherence
concerning the new dedicated hub for organised crime in addition to the already established
and valued CICED and CTR. On the contrary, an analytical competence in this crime area,
which is the top priority of criminal justice policies at national and EU level (including
organised drug trafficking) is therefore entirely consistent.
B.PO3 (harmonising Member State implementation) demonstrates good internal
coherence because clarifying the notion of a “Eurojust case”, strengthening the powers of
NMs, and enabling them to open cases, directly address divergences in the application of
52
the EJR. However, in practice, the consistency and added value will depend on Member
States’ compliance and the practices of national desks with the requirement to appoint
NMs; their reluctance to do so may significantly hinder the aimed reduction of
fragmentation. Harmonisation of NMs’ status increases the coherence of this policy option
because it is inconsistent to have fragmented profiles, in particular in the case of an
emergency. In the same way, conferring operational capabilities on each NM, in
accordance with their national system, is highly coherent with the current EU judicial
landscape (e.g. importance of JITs, mutual recognition tools, etc.) and recent developments
such as the e-evidence framework. Lastly, the proactivity permitted by the possibility for
NMs to trigger a case at Eurojust level is coherent with the operational support for national
authorities in some specific circumstances, in accordance with the legal basis of the
agency.
C.PO3 (governance reform) presents a high degree ofinternal coherence due to the aim of
enhancing the performance of decision making. The significant change in the governance
and decision-making structures of Eurojust is expected to align with the need to clearly
focus the College on operations and leave the administrative tasks to other bodies (EB and
MB). The College itself is preserved for operational matters, in coherence with the
singularity of this agency in dealing with judicial cases and interacting, with mutual trust,
with national authorities.
D.PO3, E.PO2, and F.PO2 (external cooperation) display high internal coherence, as
strengthening cooperation with partner bodies, the EPPO, and third countries builds on
existing cooperation mechanisms already foreseen in the EJR. In particular, all synergies
proposed between Europol and Eurojust are totally coherent with the mission of this
Agency, which must operate “on the basis of operations conducted and information
supplied (…) by Europol”:140 option D.PO3 aims to enhance this continuum (in particular
via this “judicial threshold”). Participation of Europol and EPPO representatives in the
College is fully coherent with the current legal framework, which provides that members
of the College can “be assisted by advisers and experts”.141
o External coherence
Externally, the options are largely consistent with the EU’s broader framework for judicial
and law enforcement cooperation as well as with the recent developments in the ongoing
review of the AFA. The direct link with current reflections led at Council level, the
ProtectEU Internal Security Strategy and the Commission White Paper that launched the
review of the AFA reinforces this coherence.142 This coherence is high regarding
ongoing legislative and policy initiatives in the fields of JHA and AFA. Indeed, on the
one hand, the integration of the agency’s operational and analytical capabilities into a
broader ecosystem designed to tackle new forms of crime in a cross-cutting manner, in
collaboration with other active partners (notably Europol), is fully in line with current
paradigm on how agencies and bodies specialising in the fight against crime should
operate. On the other hand, the AFA review seeks to enhance effectiveness by, avoiding
overlaps between EU agencies and bodies active in the fight against crimes affecting the
Union’s financial interests, including by enhancing the hit/no-hit system. The AFA review
also aims to make better use of financial and human resources whilst addressing new
140 Article 85 TFEU. 141 Article 10(4) EJR. 142 Council Conclusions on strengthening judicial cooperation with third countries in the fight against organised crime
(18 June 2024). Both ProtectEU and the White Paper acknowledge Eurojust’s key role in facilitating the coordination
among national judicial authorities and its contribution to the overall JHA architecture and EU’s AFA, which could be
further improved (White Paper for the Anti-fraud Architecture Review, COM(2025) 546 final, 16.7.2025).
53
challenges, such as the increased involvement of cross-border and organised crime groups
targeting EU funds or the use of advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence
tools. In this context, the Commission is finalising its evaluation of the EPPO and OLAF
Regulations and, based on their findings, will propose a revision of both Regulations,
which will also likely encompass proposals to revamp the relations between Eurojust and
the EPPO and OLAF.
A.PO3 highlights a moderate external coherence: extending competences to emerging
crime areas (e.g. cybercrime) aligns with EU policy priorities, but expanding analytical or
operational roles may risk overlap with the mandate of Europol. Concerning the new
analytical competence of judicial data on the field of organised crime, overlaps and/or
duplication of work may occur with Europol’s role. Even if minor practical coherence
issues could arise, depending on the implementation by Member States in terms of transfer
of data, this analytical competence is fully consistent with the new tools to combat
organised crime.
B.PO3 underlines a consequent external coherence, as it reinforces EU judicial
cooperation mechanisms.
C.PO3 is also externally coherent because aligning governance with common EU agency
models reflects broader administrative practice. In particular, the creation of a MB will
strongly improve alignment with the common approach of decentralised agencies.
D.PO3 (Europol) and E.PO2 (EPPO) demonstrate superior external coherence, as
codifying cooperation with Europol and strengthening operational coordination with the
EPPO supports the integrated functioning of the EU criminal justice architecture and the
AFA, and is consistent with the mission of the EPPO. Once again, the reinforcement of
data exchange via IT connections and new automated systems is entirely coherent with
new operational requirements to better fight against organised crime as well as with the
needs already emerged in the ongoing review of the AFA143. Lastly, this option would
increase transversal coherence by ensuring very high levels of alignment with other actors
involved in the planned review of the AFA.
F.PO2 also provides a correct external coherence, as clarifying the role of LMs and
institutionalising contact points supports the EU’s external judicial cooperation policy and
partnerships with third countries and international organisations. Some possible challenges
in the internal coherence between the role of contact points towards LMs and prosecutors
might emerge, but these can be addressed by clarifying the differences between the roles,
powers and responsibilities to avoid duplications and overlaps. This policy option has the
potential to increase coherence by ensuring higher levels of alignment with other JHA and
AFA actors in terms of international data transfer regime, while retaining the possibility
for Eurojust-specific rules.
8.2.4. Impacts on Fundamental Rights
The preferred option complies with principles provided for in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (the Charter) and the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), particularly in areas where Eurojust’s expanded mandate would intersect
with criminal procedural safeguards and data protection144.
143 ‘… a semi-automated hit/no-hit system tailored for the EPPO, Eurojust, Europol, and OLAF … could improve early
detection of cross-border criminal patterns and facilitate cooperation’ (White Paper for the Anti-fraud Architecture
Review, p. 12). 144 See also Annex 7 to this Impact Assessment
54
Protection of personal data
The preferred policy option, particularly the measures enhancing data exchange with
Europol, the EPPO, and third countries (such as D.PO3, E.PO2, and F.PO2), will
increase the volume and scope of personal data processing. While this strengthens
operational cooperation, it also introduces risks that must be carefully managed.
To mitigate these risks, strict legal bases for data exchange will be established, ensuring
that shared data is limited to what is necessary and proportionate for judicial cooperation.
Purpose limitation safeguards will prevent the use of data for unintended objectives,
while oversight by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) will ensure
compliance with EU standards, particularly for transfers to third countries. A revision of
the EJR will also align with the parallel revision of Chapter IX of the EUDPR, which
will provide harmonised rules for all JHA agencies, further reinforcing data protection.
As previously explained, data protection rules and processing envisaged will not be “lex
specialis” and will comply with the horizontal framework and the safeguards it provides
for all JHA agencies and bodies of the EU. The explanatory memorandum of the draft
proposal on the revision of Chapter IX of the EUDPR states that the targeted nature of the
changes ensures that existing level of data protection is maintained, while providing
improvements as regards consistency of applicable rules and further harmonisation. The
proposal will thus target specific provisions of the EUDPR and will not alter the overall
framework: the changes do not involve new policy options, and are expected to have
minimal, non-quantifiable impact on fundamental rights. At the same time, no new legal
obstacles are created with regard to the implementation of Eurojust’s tasks, which are
streamlined by a more rationalised legal framework.
Procedural Safeguards in Criminal Proceedings
The preferred option aims to strengthen Eurojust’s operational role (e.g., through
A.PO3 and B.PO3) without compromising core principles of criminal justice such as the
procedural safeguards of suspects and accused persons which depend largely on national
judicial systems, which form the procedural framework upon which Eurojust relies in the
context of its operational support. The impact of Eurojust’s intervention is therefore
intended to be at least neutral or positive (e.g. preventing a breach of the ne bis in idem
principle through enhanced coordination mechanisms).
Key safeguards will ensure that Eurojust’s role remains supportive and coordinative,
avoiding any interference with national judicial independence. Transparency and legal
remedies will be embedded in operational procedures, providing clear avenues for
individuals to challenge data processing or operational decisions that might affect their
rights.
8.3. REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) and ‘one in, one out’ approach
In line with the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT),
revisions of EU legislation aim to simplify rules and reduce unnecessary administrative
burden. The revision of the EJR complies with this approach as it seeks to streamline the
Agency’s decision-making process and more generally to improve efficient cross-border
coordination.
This initiative does not impose administrative costs on businesses and therefore does
not trigger the ‘one in, one out’ adjustment mechanism. The measures concern an EU entity
and public authorities involved in judicial cooperation and do not introduce new regulatory
obligations for the private sector. The initiative is expected to generate significant public
benefits by strengthening the Union’s capacity to combat serious cross-border crime,
55
thereby reinforcing public trust and supporting the proper functioning of the internal
market.
9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?
Putting in place a structured framework for monitoring and evaluation will help ensure that
the strengthened mandate under the preferred policy option translates into measurable
operational, strategic and systemic benefits. Monitoring arrangements will build on the
mechanisms already established under Article 69 of the EJR (subject to potential
renumbering without changing its substance), which foresees periodic evaluations of
Eurojust’s impact, effectiveness and efficiency. These mechanisms will be complemented
by a refined indicator framework aligned with the specific and operational objectives of
the preferred option.
9.1. Measurable indicators of success and proposed targets
As regards the SMART145 objectives specified in chapter 4.2, a successful implementation
of the package is expected to deliver the following results, in terms of the following
RACER146 indicators (including baseline when known, quantified targets and milestones):
1. Reduced administrative workload of NMs: from a current baseline of ca 40% of
their overall workload, this share is expected to decrease to around 20-25% within two
years from the entry into application of the revised Regulation (taking into account a
transitional adjustment period) and to reach a steady-state level of 10-15% within five
years. Progress against this indicator will be monitored through the Commission’s
involvement in the EB and MB, and assessed in the context of the next evaluation of the
Regulation and Agency.
2. Increased Eurojust proactivity, as reflected in a higher number of own-initiative
cases opened and handled: following an initial adjustment phase, a gradual increase is
expected, with the annual average number of own-initiative cases opened increasing by
10-15% within five years. To avoid distortions resulting from the normal year-on-year
fluctuations in Eurojust casework, the baseline will be calculated on the basis of the
average annual number of own-initiative cases opened during the five years preceding the
entry into application of the revised Regulation. Progress will be assessed against that
baseline by reference to the corresponding annual average over the five years following its
entry into application, using the data reported in Eurojust’s CAARs.147
3. A progressive reduction in the share of ‘simple’ cases handled by Eurojust:
bilateral and lower-complexity cases are currently estimated at around 80% of Eurojust’s
total annual case intake. While a residual share of 20-25% is expected to remain, reflecting
cases that initially appear complex or are escalated from the EJN, a gradual reduction is
expected to reach around 60% within two years, down to 40% within five years, then 20-
25% within ten years. The baseline will be determined by reference to the share of simple
cases in the total number of cases opened in the year preceding the entry into application
145 SMART means that objectives are Specific, Measurable, Assignable, Realistic and Time-bound. 146 RACER means that indicators are both Relevant, Accepted, Credible, Easy to monitor and Robust. 147 Data on the number and type of cases handled by Eurojust are published annually in Eurojust’s Annual Reports and
CAARs. Between 2020 and 2025, Eurojust opened 64 own initiative cases, Eurojust Annual Report 2025, pp. 46-47.
56
of the revised Regulation. Progress will be monitored on the basis of the statistics and KPIs
regularly reported by Eurojust in its CAARs.148
4. Finally, improving information exchange with EU partners, in particular Europol,
is expected, notably through an increase in follow-ups to “hits” identified in
information systems, reflecting enhanced timeliness and relevance. The baseline will be
determined by reference to the number of follow-ups to hits recorded in the year preceding
the entry into application of the revised Regulation. An increase of up to 50% may be
expected within five years. Progress will be monitored on the basis of the data reported in
Eurojust’s CAARs, cross-checked against corresponding data reported in Europol’s
CAARs.
9.2. Operational objectives and related indicators proposed
Further to the above measurable success indicators, the use of some operational
objectives is also proposed, to facilitate closer monitoring and subsequent evaluation. This
will focus on outputs (e.g. volume and quality of information exchange, operational
support delivered, studies and reports produced, etc.), concrete results (e.g. number of
JITs involving Eurojust and the new JOP, number of mutual recognition and judicial
cooperation requests facilitated or issued, number of action days, of working and
cooperation agreements signed, of contact points/LPs appointed, etc.), and broader
impacts (e.g. strengthened EU-level situational awareness, reduced fragmentation in
operational coordination). Attention will be given to monitoring data-protection
compliance, proportionality and fundamental rights safeguards but also the proactivity of
the agency.
Core indicators will be drawn from a range of sources, including Eurojust’s existing
reporting instruments as the CAAR. The exploitation of the CMS will be used as well as
the data based on Articles 21 and 21b (CTR) of the EJR reporting on Member State
information contributions; also, Article 80 of the EJR regarding the volume of stored and
analysed evidence (CICED); EDPS supervisory findings and data protection reporting; and
EB/MB performance indicators.
The Commission will monitor implementation through its representation in the EB and
MB, structured exchanges with Member States (including NMs) and Eurojust staff, and
consultation with oversight bodies, including the EDPS. Data will also be drawn from
SOCTA cycles, EMPACT performance reporting and, where appropriate, targeted
stakeholder surveys.
Monitoring will begin from the entry into application of the revised Regulation. Overall
progress will be checked some four years after entry into application, so as to allow for
operational maturation before a fully-fledged evaluation can be launched (no earlier than
5 years after entry into application). Where relevant, interim reviews may assess
implementation bottlenecks, including technical interoperability and compliance burdens.
148 In 2025, following discussions in the EB and the College in which the Commission was involved, Eurojust
adopted dedicated KPIs on case-complexity. On this basis, simple cases are identified as bilateral cases which
entail a single judicial cooperation instrument or two of the same instruments, and do not require the setting
up of CMs/CCs or JITs, nor sustained coordination involving operational or legal complexities.
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 24.6.2026
SWD(2026) 570 final
PART 2/2
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT
ANNEXES 1-7
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and
repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1727
{COM(2026) 570 final} - {SEC(2026) 570 final} - {SWD(2026) 571 final} -
{SWD(2026) 572 final} - {SWD(2026) 573 final}
1
Table of Contents
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................... 2
1. LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES .................................................................... 2
2. ORGANISATION AND TIMING ........................................................................................................ 2
3. CONSULTATION OF THE RSB ......................................................................................................... 3
4. EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY ........................................................................................... 7
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) ................................................... 9
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 9
2. CONSULTATION STRATEGY ........................................................................................................... 9
3. CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES .......................................................................................................... 9
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVE AND HOW? ...................................................... 20
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 20
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ...................................................................................................... 54
1. GENERAL APPROACH..................................................................................................................... 54
2. SUPPORT STUDY.............................................................................................................................. 54
2.1. Study requirements and timeline ..................................................................... 54
2.2. Approach and data collection .......................................................................... 55
2.3. Challenges and limitations............................................................................... 55
3. IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ................................................................. 56
3.1. Identification of impacts .................................................................................. 56
3.2. Assessing impacts ............................................................................................ 56
3.3. Scores per measure .......................................................................................... 60
3.4. Aggregated scores per option .......................................................................... 66
ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK ................................................................................................. 68
ANNEX 6: SME CHECK ............................................................................................................................. 69
ANNEX 7: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUPPORTING THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT .................. 70
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 70
2. EVOLUTION OF THE BROADER EUROPEAN JUDICIAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK .................. 70
3. PRESENTATION OF THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK (REGULATION (EU)
2018/1727 ON EUROJUST) ............................................................................................................... 72
4. ENSURING FULL COMPLIANCE WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS .......................................... 75
5. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND STRATEGIES INCLUDING A ROLE FOR EUROJUST ............. 77
2
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION
1. LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES
This Impact Assessment Report was prepared by Directorate A “Justice policies” of the
Directorate General “Justice and Consumers” (DG JUST).
The Decide Planning reference is PLAN/2023/2880 and the Decide fiche was validated on
2 July 2025.
The initiative on revising the Eurojust’s mandate was included in the 2026 Commission
Work Programme published on 21 October 2025 and had been announced by European
Internal Security Strategy ("ProtectEU Strategy") presented on 1 April 2025.
2. ORGANISATION AND TIMING
Chronology of the impact assessment:
September to November 2025: informal/internal brainstorming (JUST, HOME, LS, BUDG,
SG, Eurojust’s College and staff)
The work on the impact assessment began with a call for evidence, lasting from 28 October
2025 to 3 December 2025. In total, 42 responses were received.
On 2 December 2025, the open public consultation was launched. The consultation lasted
until 24 February 2026. In total, 20 responses were received.
Three Inter-Service Steering Group (ISSG) meetings were held in 2025 and 2026. The ISSG
consisted of representatives from various Directorates-General of the Commission: HOME,
ECFIN, BUDG, OLAF, INPA, DIGIT, MENA, EEAS, JRC, ENEST, HR, DGT and SJ. The
ISSG met on 13 November 2025, 9 January 2026 and on 23 March 2026. The meetings were
chaired by DG JUST (the last one co-chaired with SG).
The contributions of the members of the Steering Group have been taken into account in the
content and shape of this impact assessment.
The first draft of the Impact Assessment was sent to the ISG on 17 March 2026 (on 11 March
regarding chapters 1 to 5).
A consultation meeting took place on 22 October 2025 with the Criminal Law Expert Group.
The support study on the cost and benefits of the assessed policy options was launched on 9
December 2025 (Kick off meeting with the external contractor).
The revision has been presented and discussed at both technical and political levels with the
Council, the European Parliament and national parliaments.
− With experts and representatives of Member States - at the COPEN General Matters
of 15 September 2025, at the end of which 7 Member States sent a written
contribution. A second time, in the COPEN General Matters of 15 December 2025.
− In addition, the Danish Presidency of the EU Council organised a first policy debate
at the Council of Ministers of Justice on 13 October 2025. A state of play has been
presented in AOB at the Council on 6 March 2026, under the Cypriot Presidency.
3
− A non-paper has been diffused on 2 February 2026 by 4 Member States (FR, DE, BE
and AT). Bilateral meetings at ministerial and technical levels have been led with
many countries.
− The project has also been discussed with the European Parliament and Members from
national Parliaments (at the ICM - Inter Parliamentary Committee Meeting – on the
evaluation of Eurojust activities on 20 November 2025).
3. CONSULTATION OF THE RSB
3.1. First meeting - upstream
An“upstream meeting” with the RSB was organized on 24 November 2025.
The main questions raised by the RSB were the following:
• With the Ukraine War being identified as a new challenge, are there any additional
new general challenges to be considered?
• What is the root cause concerning the poor filtering of cases and the varied
implementation of the regulation by Member States?
• What is the data gap concerning the problems of Eurojust’s governance and decision-
making, and can it be compensated?
• What is additionally needed to tackle the current phenomenon of more sophisticated
crimes?
• Are there significant issues stemming from interoperability and might that be the
cause of systems not being compatible? Does this cause a lack of cooperation?
The main points that were raised during the meeting were:
• Objectives and measures should be made smarter/further operationalized;
• The new needs of Member States should be clearly identified to boost proactivity;
• Type of information shared with other JHA Cooperations should be identified;
• The needs for improvement about the international cooperation should be thoroughly
assessed;
• Problem drivers and root problems should be distinguished more carefully;
• The first consequence in the table should be the societal problem at hand;
• Evidence is key for the identification of the problem;
• There needs to be a mixture of measures of varying intensity. This will shed light on
the trade-offs that are inherent to different options, which should all be assessed
technically and politically;
• The need to assess whether the intervention effectively addresses crime-solving, the
current situation must be clarified further, particularly by identifying gaps at the
Member State level;
4
• The need to specify the precise sources that are backing up the support study and
evaluation;
• The need to avoid adding “straw options”, unless it is useful and feasible;
• The substantive element regarding current criminal phenomena should be justified in
a fact-based, and opinion-based manner.
3.2. Second meeting – Examination of the draft impact assessment
On 1 April 2026, the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers submitted the draft
impact assessment to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), including its annexes. The
executive summary and the minutes and elements of follow up of the ISSG meeting of 23
March were also sent to the RSB.
The RSB examined the draft impact assessment on 29 April 2026. The overall opinion of
the Regulatory Scrutiny Board was positive with reservations. These reservations were of
two kinds:
- clarity of the concepts and options presented. - clarity of the evaluation
methodology used.
The responses to these comments are set out in the two tables below:
RSB comments – Key issues How RSB comments have been addressed in
the IA
The identification of the problems
and their drivers is not sufficiently
clear on issues arising from legal
obstacles despite recent
amendments, and from
implementation problems.
In chapter 2 of the IA, further details have been
provided on the problems and their drivers,
clarifying in particular that many of the problems
stemmed simultaneously from a lack of clarity in
the Regulation and from differing types of
interpretation and/or implementation among
Member States (some of which may be linked to
external problem drivers, such as differences in
the judicial systems/cultures of Member States).
Hence addressing problems stemming from these
two types of drivers requires a balance between
further specifying concepts/dispelling ambiguities
where possible in the Regulation, and keeping in
it the flexibility required due to external drivers
related to differences in the judicial
systems/cultures of Member States, or to allow for
some changes of focus in future (e.g. to adapt to
new/fast emerging needs or to possible changing
priorities).
The problems and their drivers, as well as the
specific objectives that had been defined in
5
The specific and operational
objectives are not defined in a
SMART manner to allow measuring
success through a comprehensive set
of key performance indicators.
response, were initially too detailed to enable the
IA analysis to fit into just 40 to 50 pages.
It has been decided to regroup the problems and
their drivers into just two main problem sets (with
distinct sets of drivers), and so the specific
objectives were also regrouped into two sets of
objectives. These objectives have been made
SMARTer by defining for each of the two specific
objectives a set of related (RACER) success
criteria (generally reflecting lower-level specific
objectives that had been originally defined), with
actual targets and timing ambitions.
These indicators were previously detailed within
chapter 8 (as part of the impacts expected from the
full set of the preferred options in each problem
area addressed), where they had low visibility.
They finally have been moved to chapter 9 (where
they rightfully belong) and now appear in further
detail as a comprehensive set of key performance
indicators (to help measure success), together with
a proposed set of operational indicators (and the
related RACER criteria) to allow for periodic
monitor and assess global progress after 4 years of
implementation, as well as facilitate a subsequent
full scale evaluation.
The analysis of the coherence of measures with
recent or ongoing initiatives was enhanced by
referring to the follow-up the the ProtectEU and
the revision of the Europol mandate as well as the
discussions currently held in the context of the
AFA review and the upcoming revision of the
EPPO and OLAF Regulations (see Changes in
chapter 8).
The impact of the initiative on
fundamental rights (use of personal
data) is not sufficiently analysed.
Within Annex 7 (on additional IA information),
impacts of the preferred option on fundamental
rights were documented in further details, as part
of section 7.3 “Ensuring full compliance with
Fundamental Rights”, particularly as regards
criminal procedural safeguards and data
protection.
Related information was also added to the core IA
text in section 8.2.4.
6
RSB comments – Ways of
improvements
How RSB comments have been addressed in
the IA
Better presentation of the current
situation of the agency and
clarification/illustration of some
key elements such as the complex
cases and their prioritisation of
versus simple files.
The current internal functioning of the agency
has been more explained, in the main report as in
annex 7. The complex case, supposed to fall
under the competence of Eurojust, has also been
described more in detail and compared to a
simple case (EJN competence).
A typical example of a complex case – the
famous “Encrochat file” – has been added to
illustrate the demonstration.
Better use of the 2025 evaluation, by
including concrete findings and
examples in the analysis of the
relevant problems and their
drivers. Clarification of the
problem definition underlining why
the amendments of the Eurojust
Regulation since 2022 have not been
sufficient for Eurojust to address
the challenges. Better develop issues
related to governance and
organisational culture and why
addressing them requires legislative
changes.
The nature of the problem driver, whether legal
or empirical/practical, has been described for
each of them. In addition, further details have
been provided on the limited, targeted and
circumstantial nature of the three previous
revisions of Eurojust’s mandate.
Based in particular on the 2025 evaluation report,
it has been further demonstrated that the issues
regarding the effectiveness of the agency’s
governance stem from problems of
administrative culture (implementation of the
current legal framework) as well as a lack of
clarity in the regulation: ultimately, it is
explained that a legislative amendment to the
institutional framework is the preferred option.
Make specific and operational
objectives SMARTer with related
key performance indicators
adjusted accordingly, fully taking
into account digital solutions.
Chapter 9 on indicators and monitoring has been
redrafted to better present and describe, on the
one hand, the measurable indicators of success
and the proposed targets and, on the other hand,
the operational objectives and related indicators
proposed.
The RACER indicators are closely linked with
the SMART objectives specified in chapter 4.2.
(cf previous reply for key issues).
Better explain some measure, such
as the ones expanding Eurojust’s
competences to new emerging
crimes and enhance the assessment
The contextual and legal grounds for expanding
Eurojust’s operational powers were set out in
Chapter 1 and, in greater detail, in Chapter 5 and
subsequent chapters, particularly with regard to
7
of the policy options, notably as
regards fundamental rights, in
particular data protection (analysis
of the associated risks and
safeguards envisaged to mitigate
them).
the analytical and financial aspects of criminal
investigations, in order to address new trends in
crime.
As previously explained (cf previous reply for
key issues), impacts of the preferred option on
fundamental rights, in particular data protection,
were more documented along with the solutions
found to eliminate and reduce the risks.
Strengthen the analysis of the
coherence of the measures with
recent or ongoing initiatives related
to AFA and EU JHA bodies as well
as in relation to the EU external
policies.
The link between the ongoing revision of
Eurojust and the incoming AFA review has been
better explained. In addition to the presentation
of the relevant drivers, policy options and
measures related to specific objective 2 have
been more deeply analysed through the MCA
(multi-criteria assessment) and in particular the
consistency with other EU public policies and the
external coherence of the EU action.
Improve the accessibility of the
report to non-experts, while
keeping it to a reasonable size.
The glossary has been updated and all the
concepts and references contained in the report
(e.g. SIRIUS project, JIT…) have been defined
in a summarized and simple way.
The final report respects the Better Regulation
guidelines related to the average number of pages
of an IA (around 50).
4. EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY
A number of inputs and sources of data were used in the preparation of this impact
assessment, including the following:
• The Evaluation Report on the implementation of the current Regulation published on
2 July 2025;
• a Call for Evidence closed on 25 November 2025 (42 contributions received);
• a Public Consultation published on 2 December and running until 24 February 2026
(20 contributions received);
• EU case law (especially about power of national judicial authorities to issue MLA
requests such as EAW1).
1 I.e. Joined Cases C-566/19 PPU and C-626/19 PPU 12 December 2019; Joined Cases C-508/18 and C.
509/18.CJUE, 27 May 2019.
8
• Informal brainstorming led at the internal level of the Commission (DG JUST, DG
HOME, SG, LS…), but also with Eurojust staff and College.
• Specific Eurojust’s College meeting on 16 September 2025 and two technical
workshops organised on 17 October and 28 November 2025 (vision 2035).
• Works of the Consultative forum of the Prosecutors General and Directors of
Public Prosecutions of the EU Member States (19th on 2 October 2025 and 20th on
19 and 20 March 2026) have been mainly focused on the incoming revision of
Eurojust.
• Various studies and reports (SOCTA, Road map on drug trafficking etc.) as
mentioned in Chapter 1.1
• Targeted surveys and consultations of practitioners and national authorities by the
contractor from end of January; 429 replies have been received.
The data sources are thus essentially public authorities in the EU and its Member States. The
quality of this data is therefore high, with the proviso that it covers essentially the activity of
judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance.
9
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT)
1. INTRODUCTION
This annex presents the results of the consultation activities carried out in the context of the
impact assessment support study for the Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. The report has been
prepared in accordance with the requirements set out in the European Commission Better
Regulation Toolbox.
Its purpose is to provide a qualitative and quantitative analytical overview of the input
received from stakeholders through the various consultation tools employed, notably the call
for evidence, interviews, the online survey, and the public consultation.
2. CONSULTATION STRATEGY
The consultation strategy was designed to ensure that the supporting study captured the
perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders, both internal and external to Eurojust. These
included Eurojust staff, national desks, national authorities and practitioners, as well as
international organisations. In order to assess the potential impact of measures under Special
Objective 4, particular attention was also given to stakeholders from third countries,
including Liaison Prosecutors and national authorities.
The consultation strategy built also on information already gathered during the evaluation of
the Regulation (EU) 2018/1727, notably in view of possible further legislative
developments. The consultations pursued two main objectives: (1) to collect stakeholders’
views on possible options to address the problems identified in the evaluation, including
feedback on the recommendations stemming from that exercise; and (2) to gather
information on additional issues that may not have been identified in the evaluation of the
Eurojust Regulation.
3. CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES
Stakeholders were reached through a combination of direct invitations and openly accessible
consultations. This section provides an overview of the consultation activities undertaken as
part of the study.
3.1. Public consultation
The Commission launched a public consultation in all 24 official EU languages. The
consultation was questionnaire-based. The consultation period was twelve weeks (3
December 2025 to 24 February 2026) with 20 replies received. Out of these responses, 8
were received from public authorities, 9 from stakeholders from EU Member States and
three from third countries (Bosnia Herzegovina, North Macedonia and the United States).
Most responses were received from Belgian and French stakeholders, with four submissions
from each country. The outcome of the open public consultation was analysed by an external
contractor. The main points raised by the respondents were the following:
• It found that almost all respondents believed Eurojust’s role in addressing serious and
organised cross-border crime in the EU to be important, 50% to be very important.
• Some participants stressed the need to better consider the perspective of victims
and witnesses and to clarify case allocation between Eurojust and the EJN.
10
• Criminal use of the digital space, AI and new technology was, almost unanimously,
seen as one of the main challenges that criminal investigations and prosecutions in
Europe will face in the coming years.
3.2. Call for evidence
Call for Evidence was launched by the Commission and made available on the “Have Your
Say” website from 28 October 2025 until 3 December 2025, with 42 replies received.
Responses were submitted by members of the general public covering 21 EU countries, of
which the majority were stakeholders representing public authorities (22), followed by EU
citizens (9). Other respondents included academic/research institutions (3),
companies/businesses (3), one environmental organisation, and two NGOs. The main points
raised by the stakeholders concerned the European Judicial Network (EJN), Eurojust’s
mandate, and governance-related issues.
• Eurojust and EJN
Several stakeholders emphasised that, rather than competing, the EJN and Eurojust
complement each other and have distinct roles and highlighted the strengths and added
value of the EJN. It was therefore advocated to maintain the EJN’s autonomy,
independence, and practitioner-driven nature.
However, a recurring issue was the allocation of cases between EJN and Eurojust.
While one respondent suggested to not solve this issue by a revision of the Regulation,
but instead to just accept, that, unless a case is complicated or a coordination meeting
is required, the EJN should handle the case, others were in favour of complementarity
and clearer definitions, reflected in the revised Regulation.
• Eurojust’s mandate
With Eurojust being an essential and effective actor in the fight against cross-border
crime, some respondents argued that its mandate should be strengthened by giving
it more operational roles. One advocated for equipping Eurojust with criminal
analytical capacity, which could contribute to the early detection of crimes.
On the other hand, it was argued that Eurojust should remain focused on coordinating
and facilitating judicial cooperation and should not become more proactive or given
“executive powers”.
• Prevention of crimes and Governance
It was recommended to have a database to prevent crimes, where alerts could be sent
by anyone, and for Eurojust to better utilise its existing information. A more
standardised crime analysis at the European level was also suggested.
Regarding the enhancement of governance and decision-making processes,
respondents proposed that the Executive Board should comprise solely elected
members of the College. Under this model, the Board would report its activities to
the College, while the College would retain the right to decide on certain matters or
review the Board’s actions.
• Third country cooperation and evolving nature of crime
The importance of prioritising cooperation with third countries and increasing the
number of working arrangements was also emphasised. Eurojust should have
sufficient resources and make use of technological tools in order to match the evolving
11
nature of crime. It should also invest in training and advanced technologies to counter
new forms of crime.
3.3. Online survey
An Online survey was conducted until 4 March 2026, targeting a range of stakeholder types,
including practitioners, the Eurojust administration and national desks, and public officials.
Several non-EU and EU countries were represented, with the most responses submitted from
Germany, followed by Spain. Serbia, North Macedonia, Iceland, United Kingdom, Albania
and Norway are the non-EU countries represented in this survey. Practitioners from EU
Member States accounted for nearly half of all responses (48%), making them the most
prominent stakeholder group in this survey, followed by members of the Eurojust
administration.
The following tables shows the online survey participants per Member State and
participating stakeholder groups.
12
The main points raised by the stakeholders were the following:
• Regarding Eurojust’s governance, decision-making and management structures,
the majority of the stakeholders agreed that its governance is currently fragmented
due to the coexistence and current roles and responsibilities of the College and its
Working Groups, the Executive Board, and the Administration. They therefore
stressed the need to review Eurojust’s decision-making processes, highlighting
inefficiencies within the College and the unclear division of tasks. The definitions of
‘operational’ and ‘administrative’ responsibilities were not clear.
13
In terms of operational activities and impact, most stakeholders also agreed that the status
and powers of National Members vary across Member States. The status and role of
Eurojust in EU policymaking and strategic cycles is unclear and not provided for
systematically.
14
Concerning the cooperation with EU IBOAs the majority of stakeholders found that
structural weaknesses exist in the relationship between Eurojust and Europol that hinder
effective cooperation. This hindered cooperation between Eurojust and EU partners is seen
to be caused by uncertainty about application of rules on data protection. On the other
hand, the framework for Eurojust cooperation with OLAF was not considered to be
fragmented and insufficiently codified.
15
• Regarding Eurojust’s cooperation with third countries and international
organisations, most strongly agreed or agreed that the expansion of externally
funded projects increases the administrative burden of the agency. The application
of data protection rules and the process to negotiate third country cooperation
agreements were found to hinder cooperation by 50%.
• Looking at the future of Eurojust, an increasing demand for cross-border judicial
coordination and evolutions in serious cross-border crime were both deemed very
important. As were digitalisation and resource pressures. Geopolitical instability
and global shifts to reliance on multilateral mechanisms was considered very
important or somewhat important by the majority.
16
3.4. Interviews
In total, interviews were conducted with 115 stakeholders.
Total
Eurojust 63
External 52
Total 115
These interviews cover representatives of the Eurojust administration, national desks and
liaison prosecutors, EU IBOAs, EU and third country national-level stakeholders (authorities
and practitioners), and international organisations. They include in-person consultation with
Eurojust personnel during the site visit, as well as online interviews with a range of
stakeholders.
17
The number of interviews conducted per country is as follows:
Country Number of interviews
Austria 2
Belgium 2
Croatia 1
Czechia 1
Estonia 1
EU-level 13
Finland 2
France 5
Germany 2
Greece 1
Ireland 2
Italy 3
Latvia 1
Lithuania 1
Malta 2
Netherlands 1
Poland 1
Portugal 1
Slovakia 1
Slovenia 1
Spain 1
Brazil 1
Chile 1
Kosovo 1
18
Lebanon 1
North Macedonia 1
International organisations (Latin
America) 2
The table below shows the interviews per stakeholder group:
Stakeholder type Total Contacted Completed
Eurojust – Administration 41 41
Eurojust – National desks & DK 18 18
Eurojust – Liaison Prosecutors 4 4
EU IBOAs 24 13
Independent expert 2 0
International organisation 3 2
National authority - EU 30 10
National practitioner - 3rd country 8 5
National practitioner - EU 66 22
Total 196 115
Consultations were held with third country practitioners and international
organisations. They recognised the importance of Eurojust However, these discussions also
highlighted opportunities to improve cooperation, with many participants advocating for
measures such as establishing resident contact points and appointing Liaison Magistrates.
Issues concerning data transfer and capacity were also explored.
Interviews with national practitioners often highlighted the current lack of harmonisation
of the roles of National Members, whether crime areas should be added to Annex 1, and
the effectiveness of international cooperation from a practitioner perspective.
• Eurojust administration and national desks identified outdated tools, limited
cooperation with OLAF, and the advantages of competence over e-evidence orders as
current issues. They indicated that, without an amendment of te Eurojust Regulation,
in the next 10 years Eurojust’s ability to improve the consistency of its support and
impact across Member States would worsen.
19
• Member State authorities and practitioners
Regarding the varying roles of National Members across Member States, a more
harmonised approach is welcomed. However, they warn that there may be constraints
due to national legal frameworks. In terms of adding new crime areas to Annex 1, some
stakeholders noted that it is crucial to avoid overlaps, while others thought that the key
areas are already included.
• EU IBOAs
Concerning third-country cooperation, the level of engagement with Eurojust appears
to vary. For instance, certain measures, such as conditionality clauses, may prove more
effective in EU candidate countries.
20
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVE AND HOW?
1. INTRODUCTION
This Annex outlines the benefits of all provisions, as well as those specific to each action.
The same applies to the overview of costs. It also includes a table detailing contributions to
administrative burden reduction targets, alongside an overview of the relevant Sustainable
Development Goals.
Overview expected impacts preferred option (more detail below under I. Overview of
benefits)
# SO Administrative
reduction costs
Reduction of
fraud and crime
Benefits to citizen
and business
Increased number of
complex EJ cases
1.A.i(b) + + N/A N/A +
1.A.ii(b) + N/A + ++
1.A.iii(b) + + 0 N/A
1.A.iv ++ N/A ++ N/A
1.A.v +++ N/A +++ N/A
1.B.i(b) + + + N/A +
1.B.ii(b) + + + N/A
1.B.iii + N/A N/A N/A
1.B.iv + ++ ++ N/A
1.C.iii + ++ + N/A +
2.D.i(b) + N/A + + +
2.D.ii(b) + N/A N/A
2.D.iii ++ N/A +
2.D.iv ++ N/A N/A
2.D.v +++ N/A +
2.E.i(b) + N/A + + +
2.E.ii + N/A +
2.E.iii + N/A N/A
21
2.F.i + N/A N/A + +
2.F.ii + N/A +
2.F.iii + N/A +
2.F.iv + N/A N/A
Overview budgetary impact of implementation preferred option (more detail below
under: II. Overview of costs – Preferred option)
One off costs Recurrent costs (per annuam)
1.A.i(b) N/A EUR 582 000 (staff)
+
EUR 500 000 (mission)
1.A.ii(b) N/A EUR 1 552 000 (EJ)
+
EUR 2 916 000 (SNEs) staff
1.A.iii(b) EUR 2.5-3.7 million (over MFF) EUR 388 000 staff
+
EUR 1.5 million (non-staff)
1.A.iv N/A N/A
1.A.v N/A EUR 3 298 000
+
EUR 2 million (non-staff)
1.B.i(b) N/A N/A
1.B.ii(b) N/A N/A
1.B.iii N/A N/A
1.B.iv N/A N/A
1.C.i, ii,
iii
none EUR 200 000
22
2.D.i(b) N/A EUR 630 000
+
EUR 1.7 to 2.4 million
2.D.ii(b) EUR 808 000 N/A
2.D.iii N/A Low
2.D.iv N/A Low
2.D.v N/A none
2.E.i(b) EUR 105 000 EUR 81 500
2.E.ii
2.E.iii Low Low
2.E.iv EUR 105 000 Low
2.F.i N/A N/A
2.F.ii Low EUR 582 000 + EUR 105 000 + 404 000 staff,
plus LM costs of EUR 188 500 per country +
EUR 50 000 related costs
2.F.iii N/A EUR 776 000 + EUR 420 000 staff
2.F.iv N/A EUR 20 000 per RCP
2.F.v N/A N/A
Total Total one-off costs of between EUR
4.4 million and EUR 5.6 million for
the implementation of the new
measures
Total recurrent costs between EUR 9.3
million and EUR 9.4 million on average per
annum over the course of the next MFF for
the implementation of the new measures
Additional operational expenditure of EUR
1.7 million on average per annum over the
course of the next MFF
23
I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option
Description Amount Comments
Direct benefits
Strengthen Eurojust’s internal
functioning, governance and
operational performance
(Specific Objective 1)
Positioning Eurojust as a key evidence-based contributor to EU legislation would sharpen its strategic focus,
helping to align EU priorities (including SOCTA and EMPACT) with actual prosecutorial needs, and generally
improving how the strategic response to challenges experienced by judicial professionals. Expanding Eurojust’s
operational functions will boost judicial coordination, improve case resolution efficiency, and enhance support
for Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) through semi-permanent platforms and temporary secondments.
Broadening Eurojust’s mandate ensures continued relevance in new crime areas. Extending the CICED concept
to other crime areas will help Eurojust connect cases and leverage data more effectively.
A unified approach to case definition will reduce fragmentation, enabling a greater focus on complex cases
without deterring submissions of simple bilateral matters. Harmonising national member mandates and enhancing
capabilities will increase operational efficiency, facilitate urgent cross-border actions, and strengthen procedural
support.
Introducing an additional path for opening cases lets Eurojust take a proactive stance, connecting fragmented
evidence across countries. Allowing national members to concentrate solely on operations, while Member State
authorities direct strategy via the Management Board, clarifies governance, separates strategic, operational, and
daily management roles. In total, this is likely to free up more time for National Members to work on operational
activities (between 20% to 40%).
Achieve optimal alignment
and operational integration
with EU partners and Third
countries (Specific Objective
2)
Automated indirect access to Europol and EPPO databases, though a step toward judicial digitalisation, is unlikely
to significantly change the operational use of the hit/no hit system (for any party, not just Eurojust) due to
persistent limits on information exchange. Eurojust stresses the need for an updated Cooperation Agreement with
Europol to reflect current realities and enhance adaptability, even if its impact may be limited.
Updating the collaboration between the EPPO and national jurisdictions would improve coordination on cases
spanning broader criminal operations, clarify Eurojust’s role, reduce legal uncertainty, and improve its
24
I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option
relationship with EPPO. Integrating SIRIUS referrals directly into workflows would promote seamless judicial
oversight from detection through investigation.
Formal participation of Europol and EPPO in Eurojust College meetings would institutionalise ongoing
partnerships and foster cooperation. Making relevant Europol database information accessible to Eurojust for new
case openings would support stronger trust and ensure evidence is admissible in court by introducing judicial
oversight.
Overall, these measures are expected to improve information flow, data sharing, and case detection across
agencies. Aligning third-country standards with EU practices would yield modest benefits, especially where
resources are limited. Clarifying the role and status of Liaison Magistrates (LMs) and establishing Resident
Contact Points (RCPs) would boost cooperation with third countries, with smaller Member States gaining the
most. Involving liaison partners in College meetings would embed external perspectives in Eurojust’s strategies.
Overall, the number of relevant complex cases taken by Eurojust, opened by Member States, National Members
or by Eurojust on its own initiative is likely to increase, helping to increase the share of cases for which Eurojust
has a real added value.
Administrative reduction
costs
Taken together, the measures under the preferred option would formalise the "invisible" strategic tasks currently
performed on an ad hoc basis. This formalisation ensures that such work is supported by reliable resource
allocation, rather than requiring staff to be diverted from their core casework. Additionally, formalising the tasks
undertaken by the Eurojust administration—even those not explicitly outlined in the Eurojust Regulation (EJR)—
would facilitate better planning of resources.
Increased coordination under this option should result in slight administrative gains, contributing to more efficient
operations and resource management within Eurojust.
The overall shift towards cases where Eurojust adds significant value, as opposed to straightforward cases, is
expected to yield a low positive impact. This targeted approach ensures that resources are focused on more
complex matters where Eurojust’s involvement is most beneficial.
25
I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option
At the same time, all National Members (NMs) would possess full competence, with operational work being
appropriately focused. This measure is also anticipated to have a low positive impact, reflecting greater clarity
and efficiency in task allocation.
By reducing the need to navigate national authorities, Eurojust's capability to support cross-border cases would
be moderately enhanced. This improvement is likely to streamline processes and bolster the agency’s
effectiveness in handling cases that span multiple jurisdictions.
Reduction of fraud and crime
(General objective)
Identifying more, especially complex, cases is expected to increase prosecution rates and reduce the time required
for prosecution, reduce crime and fraud, and strengthen deterrence against criminal organisations operating across
borders. Improved evidence sharing and continuous information exchange will positively influence investigations
and enhance cooperation. New Eurojust functions could moderately improve its impact on reducing losses from
crime and fraud, though some benefits may be limited.
Enhanced detection and analytical capabilities would support proactive investigations, leading to increased
identification and prosecution of criminal networks. Focusing on high-value cases and responding to urgent
requests promptly would reinforce asset freezing and crime reduction efforts. Greater capacity for National
Members, Liaison Magistrates, and Regional Contact Points will facilitate cross-border cooperation and
prosecutions, particularly in cases involving third countries.
Measures supporting the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) are likely to identify more complex cases,
raising prosecution rates and further deterring cross-border criminal organisations. These actions will help tackle
crimes affecting the EU’s financial interests and broader organised crime, ultimately boosting prosecution rates
and reducing crime and fraud.
Benefits to citizen and
business
Collectively, the preferred option is expected to enhance the ability of national judicial authorities to successfully
prosecute large criminal enterprises, particularly those with a third country dimension. This improvement acts as
a deterrent to future criminal activity, increases legal certainty, and reduces crime levels, thus ultimately
benefiting citizens and businesses alike.
26
I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option
Indirect benefits
Increased number of complex
EJ cases
The preferred option is expected to lead to an increase in the share of complex cases tackled through Eurojust by
promoting a shift in culture towards EJ tackling more complex cases, the ability of the Agency to act on its own
initiative, and increased detection in links. Whilst monetising the benefits of Eurojust’s work is hazardous, as
every case is different, the evaluation pointed to metrics that could indicate the size of the potential benefits from
Eurojust and partners acting together. Table 9 of the Evaluation shows that in the period 2020 – 2023 the monetary
impact of Eurojust’s role in supporting JITs was a minimum of EUR 1 billion in a year. Separately Eurojust also
contributed to at least another EUR 3 billion through its role in asset freezing and drug seizures.
Given the size of the cost of crime in the EU (approximately EUR 200 billion per annum), even a small
contribution from the Agency to the reduction of crime is expected to be high in monetary terms. To illustrate
this, should the proposed improvements to Eurojust contribute to addressing a mere 0.05%, this would result
overall in a EUR 100 million reduction to the cost of crime.
27
Ia. Overview of Benefits (Action A - Extending the scope of material competences to face the new judicial landscape) – Preferred
Option
Description Amount Comments
Direct benefits
Strengthen Eurojust’s internal
functioning, governance and
operational performance
(Specific Objective 1)
i. (b) This option would establish Eurojust as an important evidence-based contributor to EU legislation strategic
focus. It would help ensure that EU-wide strategic priorities (including SOCTA, EMPACT) are better aligned
with prosecutorial and judicial reality.
ii. (b) The evolution of the operational functions of Eurojust would contribute to reducing delays in judicial
coordination. As such, it would contribute to increasing Eurojust’s operational capacity.
iii. (b) Strengthening Eurojust’s support to Joint Investigation Teams by establishing, at operational level, semi-
permanent platforms enabling the temporary secondment of JIT members to Eurojust would lead to seamless
operations between Eurojust and national practitioners, allowing for greater coordination, especially in long,
complex cases.
iv. This measure would have high benefits. Extending the mandate of the Agency to new crimes would ensure it
remains relevant to fulfil its role of supporting coordination and cooperation between national investigating and
prosecuting authorities.
v. Expanding the CICED concept to other crime areas is expected to have very high benefits in the ability of the
Agency to identify links between cases and information, making full use of the potential of the data and evidence
collected.
Benefits per stakeholder group
EJ administration: benefit from reliable planning,
28
Ia. Overview of Benefits (Action A - Extending the scope of material competences to face the new judicial landscape) – Preferred
Option
National Members + National desks: increased ability to undertake tasks, better collaboration tools
MS: benefit from evidence-based output, better collaboration tools
EU policymakers benefit from evidence-based output
Administrative reduction
costs
i. (b) This option would formalise "invisible" strategic work currently done on an ad hoc basis, ensuring it is
supported by reliable resource allocation rather than diverting staff from core casework. Any formalisation of
tasks undertaken by the EJ administration, without being formally set out in the EJR would also help in planning
the use of resources.
ii. (b) N/A
iii. (b) Increased coordination may lead to slight administrative gains.
iv. N/A
v. N/A
Reduction of fraud and crime
i. (b) N/A
ii. (b) New operational functions of EJ could lead to a moderate positive impact on EJ's ability to reduce lost
expenditure from fraud and crime
iii. (b) limited benefits in ability to tackle crime
iv. Depending on changes being implemented elsewhere, moderate to high impact on detection of additional cases
29
Ia. Overview of Benefits (Action A - Extending the scope of material competences to face the new judicial landscape) – Preferred
Option
v. This option would have very high benefits. The analytical function would allow EJ to develop analysis on other
types of crimes. It would help enhance the proactivity of investigations, leading to increased identification (and
ultimately prosecution) of criminal networks and large-scale criminal enterprises.
Benefits to citizen and
business
i. (b) N/A
ii. (b) This measure would have moderate – high positive impact for formalisation of EJ's role in victims' rights
in normal cases, but also in mass-casualty crimes or disasters, ensuring they receive coordinated information and
support regardless of nationality
iii. (b) N/A
iv. N/A
v. N/A
Indirect benefits
Increased number of complex
EJ cases
Taken together, these measures are likely to lead to the increase in the share of complex cases tackled through
Eurojust by promoting a shift in culture towards EJ tackling more complex cases, the ability of the Agency to act
on its own initiative, and increased detection in links, leading to a greater number of relevant complex cases being
tackled.
30
Ib. Overview of Benefits (Action B - Harmonizing Member State implementation of the EJR, including on allocation of cases) –
Preferred Option
Description Amount Comments
Direct benefits
Strengthen Eurojust’s internal
functioning, governance and
operational performance
(Specific Objective 1)
i. (b) This measure would reduce fragmentation by establishing a unified approach to case definition across
national desks. While it may play a role in ensuring the Agency focuses on relevant complex cases rather than
simple bilateral matters, it is unlikely to stop completely the national desks using Eurojust for simple cases.
ii. (b) This measure would eliminate functional imbalances and structural constraints within the College caused
by the heterogeneous mandates of national members. It would ensure that all NMs have the operational tools to
perform their functions equally within their mandate.
iii. New capabilities for NMs could increase their efficiency to undertake a number of operational tasks, which
may positively affect the setting up of Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) and increase support to the full procedural
lifecycle, including asset recovery. It would also ensure that urgent cross-border actions are taken without waiting
for national-level requests.
iv. This measure would add an additional path for opening cases, promoting a shift in the Agency’s role from a
purely reactive to MS demands to a more proactive, strategically curated case intake. It would allow for NMs to
identify and connect fragmented evidence across multiple countries that national authorities might miss while
ensuring the reactivity and ownership of a case.
Benefits per stakeholder group
EJ administration: benefit from better resource allocation,
31
Ib. Overview of Benefits (Action B - Harmonizing Member State implementation of the EJR, including on allocation of cases) –
Preferred Option
National Members + National desks: increased ability to undertake tasks though the whole procedural lifecycle,
more focus on operational and relevant complex cases
MS: benefit from predictable and consistent support
Reduction of fraud and crime
i. (b) Any move to support the increased focus of EJ on cases where it can really add value is expected to increase
the impact of the Agency on the reduction of fraud and crime.
ii. (b)and iii. The measure should increase the effectiveness of the Agency in reacting in a timely manner to urgent
requests. By strengthening of ‘follow the money’ concept, it would also increase the level of successful asset
freezing. Overall, this would have a positive impact on reduction of crime due to additional capabilities for EJ;
ability for EJ to reduce lost revenue to fraud/crime.
iv. By increasing the ability to identify and open new cases and links between investigations, particularly in areas
like organized crime and terrorism, this measure is likely to have a small positive impact. On the reduction of
crimes and fraud.
Administrative reduction
costs
i. (b) Low positive impact due to (limited) shift to cases where EJ adds value (rather than simple cases)
ii. (b) Low positive impact as all NMs will have full competence and operational work is focused on
iii. N/A
iv. Moderate positive impact: would reduce having to go around national authorities; would increase EJ's
capability to support cross-border cases in a timely manner
32
Ib. Overview of Benefits (Action B - Harmonizing Member State implementation of the EJR, including on allocation of cases) –
Preferred Option
Indirect benefits
Increased number of complex
EJ cases
Taken together, these measures are likely to lead to an increase in the share of complex cases tackled through
Eurojust by promoting a shift in culture and role.
Ic. Overview of Benefits (Action C - Establishing a streamlined governance system that accelerates decision-making) – Preferred
Option
Description Amount Comments
Direct benefits
Strengthen Eurojust’s internal
functioning, governance and
operational performance
(Specific Objective 1)
iii. This measure would free National Members to focus exclusively on operational matters, removing the
distraction of purely administrative tasks for which they have not been selected and some of whom are not trained.
It would allow Member State authorities to contribute directly to the agency's strategic direction through the
Management Board, rather than indirectly through National Members. It would also contribute to clarifying the
Agency’s governance system by separating high-level strategy (Management Board) from operational casework
(College) and daily management (Executive Board).
Benefits per stakeholder group
National Members: Ability to focus more on operational tasks
33
Ic. Overview of Benefits (Action C - Establishing a streamlined governance system that accelerates decision-making) – Preferred
Option
Administrative reduction
costs 1.46 FTE per year iii. Reduction in NM time commitment on College meetings when acting as MB
Reduction of fraud and crime
iii. The increased capacity for NM freed up by the creation of a MB to work on operational matters is likely to
have a small positive impact on the Agency’s capacity to support the cooperation and coordination of
investigations and prosecutions, thus having a small positive impact on the reduction of fraud and crime.
Indirect benefits
Increased number of complex
EJ cases
iii. Over the long term, a potential positive impact linked to a cultural shift towards EJ tackling more complex
cases.
Id. Overview of Benefits (Action D - Fostering and strengthening structured operational cooperation with Europol) – Preferred
Option
Description Amount Comments
Direct benefits
Achieve optimal alignment
and operational integration
with EU partners and Third
countries (Specific Objective
2)
i. (b) This measure would enable automated indirect access to Europol’s database, within the existing constraint
of the use of handling codes. While this would represent a significant step toward the digitalisation of the EU
judicial area, the measure alone is unlikely to significantly change the operational use of the hit/no hit system, as
the root causes of the lack of information exchange lies elsewhere.
ii. (b) Eurojust has long argued that the increasing operational role played by Europol requires the Cooperation
Agreement between the two agencies to be updated. By forcing the two Agencies to enter discussions to update
34
Id. Overview of Benefits (Action D - Fostering and strengthening structured operational cooperation with Europol) – Preferred
Option
the agreement, it would ensure that the cooperation framework remains aligned with operational realities and
institutionalises adaptability. Alone, this measure may not have much impact, but as a necessary building block
for the measures under this action area, the final impact is likely to be much greater.
iii. A dedicated cooperation channel for SIRIUS referrals would embed judicial coordination directly within
existing workflows, ensuring continuity between law enforcement detection and cross-border judicial action,
while providing a consistent level of judicial oversight through the whole investigative phase of a case.
iv. The participation of Europol in Eurojust College meetings, would formalise a continuous institutional
partnership between the two Agencies, and may ultimately play a positive role in developing a culture of
cooperation between the Agencies.
v. This measure is likely to have the highest level of benefit as it would ensure that the relevant information in
Europol’s database can be used by Eurojust to open new relevant cases (through national desk, or on its own
initiative). A second benefit is that it would help ensure that the evidence collected through OTFs is admissible
in court by introducing an appropriate level of judicial oversight and significantly reduce the risk of evidence
being deemed inadmissible. Finally, it would also foster greater cooperation and trust between Europol and
Eurojust.
Taken together, the measures under this action area are likely to increase the information flow between the two
Agencies, ensure better sharing of information, and ultimately detection of relevant cases. Over time, it is also
likely to improve the culture of collaboration between Europol and Eurojust.
Benefits per stakeholder group
EJ administration: benefit from better resource allocation, greater cooperation, frustration removal
National Members + National desks: increase early situational awareness
MS: Benefit from better identification of cases and coherence between Europol and Eurojust support
35
Id. Overview of Benefits (Action D - Fostering and strengthening structured operational cooperation with Europol) – Preferred
Option
Other (Europol): benefit from better cooperation
Reduction of fraud and crime
i. (a) The identification of more (and more complex cases) taken together is likely to lead to higher prosecution
rates by Member States in complex cases, which is likely to have some positive impact on the levels of crime and
fraud, and ultimately increase the deterrence effect of criminal organisation set up their operations across borders.
ii. (b) N/A.
iii. The increased ability to share to time-sensitive evidence in cross-border cases, would have a positive impact
on the levels of crime and fraud, and ultimately increase the deterrence effect of criminal organisation set up their
operations across borders.
iv. N/A.
v. The shift toward ongoing and continuous information sharing and operational cooperation is likely to have
some positive impact on the levels of crime and fraud, and ultimately increase the deterrence effect of criminal
organisation set up their operations across borders.
Benefits to citizen and
business
Taken together these measures (i(b), ii(b), iii, iv, and v) are likely to improve the ability of national judicial
authorities to successfully prosecute large criminal enterprises, which serves as a deterrent to future criminal
activity, increase legal certainty ,reduce levels of crime thus ultimately having a positive impact on citizens and
business.
Indirect benefits
Increased number of complex
EJ cases
Taken together these measures (i(b), ii(b), iii, iv, and v) are likely to increase the number of relevant complex
Eurojust cases taken on by National Desks or through Eurojust’s ability to open cases on its own initiative. This
is likely to result in an increase in the workload for national desks, EJ administration as well as the national
judicial systems.
36
Ie. Overview of Benefits (Action E - Promoting fully developed cooperation with the EPPO ) – Preferred Option
Description Amount Comments
Direct benefits
Achieve optimal alignment
and operational integration
with EU partners and Third
countries (Specific Objective
2)
i. (b) This measure would enable automated indirect access to the EPPO’s database, within the existing constraint
of existing data protection rules. While this would represent a significant step toward the digitalisation of the EU
judicial area, the measure alone is unlikely to significantly change the operational use of the hit/no hit system.
ii. Given the EPPO has a strictly defined mandate, this measure would help bridge the gap between cases where
the EPPO is competent and national jurisdictions, ensuring better cooperation when EPPO investigations and
prosecutions spill over into wider criminal operations. It would also clarify Eurojust’s added value in EPPO cases,
which would reduce coordination overlaps and legal uncertainty during complex, multi-state operations. It would
also help define the relationship between the EPPO and Eurojust. As a prosecution authority, the EPPO sees itself
as a service user of Eurojust, rather than partner, which is the standard arrangement for all JHA agencies and
bodies.
iii. The participation of the EPPO in Eurojust College meetings would formalise a continuous institutional
partnership between the two organisations and may ultimately play a positive role in developing a culture of
cooperation between them.
v Setting up a clearing-house as a structured platform for identifying overlaps and synergies between cases
handled by the EPPO and Eurojust would support the alignment and operationalisation of cooperation between
the EPPO and Eurojust.
Benefits per stakeholder group
EJ administration: benefit from better resource allocation,
37
Ie. Overview of Benefits (Action E - Promoting fully developed cooperation with the EPPO ) – Preferred Option
National Members + National desks: increased early situational awareness
MS: Benefit from better identification of cases and coherence between Europol and EPPO support
Other (EPPO): benefit from better cooperation
Reduction of fraud and crime
i. (b) Given the nature of the EPPO’s mandate, it is likely that the cases identified through this measure will lead
to the identification of more (and more complex cases). This is likely to lead to higher prosecution rates by
Member States in complex cases, which is likely to have some positive impact on the levels of crime and fraud,
and ultimately increase the deterrence effect of criminal organisation set up their operations across borders.
ii. This measure would have benefits in helping Member States investigate and prosecute cases where crimes
affecting the EU’s financial interest (PIF) intersect with wider organised crime areas such as drug trafficking or
money laundering. Ultimately, it would lead to higher prosecution rates by Member States in complex cases,
which is likely to have some positive impact on the levels of crime and fraud, and ultimately increase the
deterrence effect of criminal organisation set up their operations across borders.
iii. N/A
iv. The clearing house mechanism is expected to result in positive impacts on the reduction of fraud and crime,
especially those linked to PIF-related cases, where the EPPO has the competence to prosecute crimes under its
mandate, but not beyond. By providing a structure for follow-up, of PIF related crimes, it will ensure that
investigations into EU budget fraud consistently prompt judicial follow-up on related criminal activities such as
money laundering or drug trafficking.
Benefits to citizen and
business
Taken together these measures (i(b), ii, iii and iv.) are likely to improve the ability of national judicial authorities
to successfully prosecute large criminal enterprises, which serves as a deterrent to future criminal activity,
increase legal certainty, reduce levels of crime thus ultimately having a positive impact on citizens and business.
Indirect benefits
38
Ie. Overview of Benefits (Action E - Promoting fully developed cooperation with the EPPO ) – Preferred Option
Increased number of complex
EJ cases
Taken together these measures (i(b), ii, iii and iv.) are likely to increase the number of relevant complex Eurojust
cases taken on by National Desks or through Eurojust’s ability to open cases on its own initiative. This is likely
to result in an increase in the workload for national desks, EJ administration as well as the national judicial
systems.
If. Overview of Benefits (Action F - Consolidating cooperation with third countries and international organisations) – Preferred
Option
Description Amount Comments
Direct benefits
Achieve optimal alignment
and operational integration
with EU partners and Third
countries (Specific Objective
2)
i. This measure would have a small positive impact towards convergence of third-country standards and practices
with those applied within the EU and Eurojust. While the effect would be mitigated by the political will of third
countries to amend their frameworks (especially regarding data protection). It is likely to have more of an impact
with third countries suffering from lack of resources and therefore more likely to be swayed by the conditionality
argument.
ii. Liaison Magistrates (LM) are one of the provisions of the EJR not currently used. One issue is the lack of
clarity as to what the role and status of the LMs should be (should they be national magistrates, what powers, if
any should they have?). By clarifying the status and role of LMs, this measure would likely allow for the posting
of LMs in third countries, thus increasing cooperation. The benefit is likely to be greater for MS with fewer
resources, as larger ones may already have LMs posted in certain countries.
iii. Similarly to LM, the benefits of resident contact points (RCP) would be to increase cooperation with third
countries. RCPs would have the benefit of being located in house at Eurojust’s premises and therefore to be part
of the wider day-to-day Eurojust working ecosystem, being a source of information for all members of national
39
If. Overview of Benefits (Action F - Consolidating cooperation with third countries and international organisations) – Preferred
Option
desks and the EJ administration about the legal system and very practical and operational issues they may face
when cooperating with a given third country.
iv. The participation of LPs in College meetings would further embed the external dimension of Eurojust’s
awareness by ensuring that the operation and cooperation strategies of the Agency reflect the needs and
operational realities stemming from third countries.
v. This measure would contribute to the development of a common understanding of judicial cooperation
standards with international partners, build long-lasting, continuous dialogue with priority regions. Some
coordination savings possible.
Benefits per stakeholder group
EJ administration: benefit from better resource allocation,
National Members + National desks: increased ability to work on complex cases
MS: Benefit from better identification of cases with a third country dimension
Other (Third countries): benefit from better cooperation with Eurojust.
Reduction of fraud and crime
i. N/A
ii. and iii. LM and RCPs are likely to lead to an increase in the effectiveness of investigations and prosecution in
cases linked to third countries and lead to an increased number of relevant cases for Eurojust.
iv. N/A
40
If. Overview of Benefits (Action F - Consolidating cooperation with third countries and international organisations) – Preferred
Option
v. The measure would lead to the strengthening the judicial systems of third countries directly improves the
effectiveness of operational cooperation, leading to more successful investigations and prosecutions of globally
relevant cases.
Benefits to citizen and
business
Taken together these measures (i, ii, iii, iv and v.) are likely to improve the ability of national judicial authorities
to successfully prosecute large criminal enterprises with a third country dimension, which serves as a deterrent to
future criminal activity, increase legal certainty, reduce levels of crime thus ultimately having a positive impact
on citizens and business.
Indirect benefits
Increased number of complex
EJ cases
Taken together these measures (i, ii, iii, iv and v.) are likely to increase the number of relevant complex Eurojust
cases with a third country dimension taken on by National Desks. This is likely to result in an increase in the
workload for national desks, EJ administration as well as the national judicial systems.
41
II. Overview of costs – Preferred option
Citizens/cons
umers Businesses Administrations
OO R OO R One-off Recurrent
TOTAL for all action areas
Total one-off costs of between
EUR 4.4 million and EUR 5.6
million for the
implementation of the new
measures based on:
- EUR 1.9 million in staff costs
(noting that all one-off costs
relate to one year of FTE, except
measure F(iii) where four years
of onboarding are anticipated
plus
- between EUR 2.5 and 3.7
million over the period of the
MFF (i.e. between EUR
360 000 and EUR 530 000 per
annum).
Total recurrent costs ubetween EUR 9.3 million and
EUR 9.4 million on average per annum over the course
of the next MFF for the implementation of the new
measures, based on:
- EUR 6.8 million in staff costs (with additional costs
if the number of LM, RCP and capacity building
projects under action area F are increased),
- EUR 2 million in non-staff costs linked to extending
CICED to other crime areas (A;v).
- Between EUR 3.2 million and EUR 3.9 million over
the next MFF (between EUR 460 000 and EUR
560 000 per annum) linked to the IT infrastructure
elements included in this IA.
In addition, the progressive use of the new capabilities is
expected to generate additional operational expenditure
(missions, coordination meetings, JITs related support,
cooperation) at around EUR 1.7 million on average per
annum over the course of the next MFF.
42
II. Overview of costs – Preferred option
Citizens/co
nsumers Businesses Administrations
OO R OO OO R OO
Action A -
Extending the
scope of material
competences to
face the new
judicial landscape
Direct
adjustment
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Direct
administrative
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A
i (b) N/A
ii (b) N/A
iii(b) EUR 2.5-3.7 million (over
MFF)
iv. N/A
v. N/A
EJ:
i(b) EJ estimates and addition 14 FTEs are needed. On the
basis of the existing 19 + 2 FTEs2, and taking into account
not only a quantitative increase in workload but also the
additional complexity of the tasks performed, the
implementation of this measure would require 3 additional
FTEs (TA-AD/AST – legal and policy officer/assistant.
3 x EUR 194 000 = EUR 582 000
In addition, EJ estimates the need for 110 missions
annually for a non-staff total of EUR 500 000
ii(b) In 2025, the total number of resources dedicated to
tasks in relation to support in individual cases amounts to
53 FTEs. Assuming a 15% increase in workload, reflecting
both the expected rise in the number of cases and the more
resource-intensive nature of the support to be provided, this
2 19 FTEs working on retaining knowledge from cases, provide deliverables prioritised by the College in JCI and crime areas; strategic activities of the College working groups;
provide input to COSI, COPEN, other Council working parties and EU agencies – source: EJ ACT 2025 + 2 FTEs to cover EJ’s role in the EU policy cycle.
43
would amount to 8 additional FTEs (TA-AD – legal and
policy officer/assistant)
8 x EUR 194 000 = EUR 1 552 000
In addition, each national desk would have to be reinforced
with one additional SNE, in order to absorb the expected
increase in casework and ensure that the additional
operational workload can be handled directly and swiftly
at desk level
27 x EUR 108 000 = EUR 2 916 000
iii(b) EJ estimates the introduction of the semi-permanent
operational platform to support JITs to require 2 additional
FTEs (TA-AD ICT officer)
(2 x EUR 194 000 = EUR 388 000), plus non-staff costs of
EUR 1.5 million over the period of the MFF for the digital
infrastructures.3
iv. N/A – Costs have been provided by Eurojust, however
these related to the alignment of the EJR to existing
requirements (JUDEX, ECRIS-TCN etc.). As such the
costs are not included.
v. On the basis of the resources made available and used
for the design, use and maintenance of CICED (16 FTEs +
€2million per annum), the expected cost of developing and
3 The existing underlying architecture is based on outdated technologies, which are increasingly costly and complex to maintain. In addition, the current systems operate largely
in isolation, as they are not integrated with the Eurojust Case Management System, leading to manual processes, data duplication, and reduced operational efficiency. Following
the recommendations of the DCJ study, Eurojust plans to modernise and redevelop the JIT IT ecosystem in order to streamline the support provided to JITs. This initiative will
include the development of new integrated systems supporting the full lifecycle of JIT activities, including funding management, claims processing, evaluation and reporting,
integration with the new Case Management System (nCMS) and improved interoperability with the JITs Collaboration Platform
44
using a similar type of architecture for other types of crime
is expected to be similar: 16 FTEs (TA-AD ICT officer,
legal and policy officer, data analyst). In addition, given the
expected expansion of data-related operational tools,
hit/no-hit system and CICED-typed architectures, Eurojust
would need to be equipped with a dedicated fundamental
rights officer (with advisory functions to the DPO and the
College) to ensure that the development and use of these
systems is accompanied by adequate fundamental rights
standards: 1 FTE (TA-AD fundamental rights officer)
17 x EUR 194 000 = EUR 3 298 000
+ EUR 2 million of non-staff costs per annum
Overall measure v. is expected to cost EUR 5 million per
annum
The extension of competences is expected to generate more
casework, missions, coordination meetings, JIT-related
support amounting to around EUR 750 000 per annum of
operational expenditure.
Direct
regulatory fees
and charges
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Direct
enforcement
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Indirect costs N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Low-moderate costs, more staff and budget needed if
operational missions increase
45
Action B -
Harmonizing
Member State
implementation of
the EJR, including
on allocation of
cases
Direct
adjustment
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Direct
administrative
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A
i. (b): N/A
ii. (b): N/A
iii.: N/A
iv.: N/A
i. (b): N/A
ii. (b): N/A
iii.: N/A
iv.: N/A
Direct
regulatory fees
and charges
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Direct
enforcement
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Indirect costs N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
EJ + MS:
Low resulting from increase in operational work of
national desks and support provided by EJ
Action C -
Establishing a
streamlined
governance system
that accelerates
decision-making
Direct
adjustment
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Direct
administrative
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A
iii. none
MS:
iii. Assuming two meetings per year (one on site and one
external): EUR 200 000 per annum (EUR 80 000 for
meeting at EJ; EUR 120 000 for external meeting) for
46
Low – based on the need to
select MB representative
setting up meetings. Could vary depending on frequency
and location of meetings
MS:
Low - Cost of sending one person to each MB
Direct
regulatory fees
and charges
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Direct
enforcement
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Indirect costs N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A EJ: Increase in needed support to new cases taken on by
NMs
Action D -
Fostering and
strengthening
structured
operational
cooperation with
Europol
Direct
adjustment
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Direct
administrative
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A
i. (b) N/A
ii. (b) Cost of renegotiating the
working arrangement with
Europol: 2 FTEs (TA AD/AST
legal and policy
officer/assistant/interinstitution
al relations).
i. (b) Cost of setting up optimised systems for indirect
access to databases: taking into account the set-up phase,
testing, maintenance, user support and progressive scaling-
up of functionalities, this would require 6 FTEs (CA ICT
officer)
6 x EUR 105 000 = EUR 630 000
+ non-staff costs between EUR 1.7 million and EUR 2.4.
million depending on the functionalities.
47
2 x EUR 194 000 = EUR
388 000
iii. N/A
iv. N/A
v. N/A
ii. (b). Eurojust would also require additional support to
operate the renovated systems for the exchange of
information, manage the increased cooperation flows,
ensure technical and operational follow-up, and implement
the new working arrangement once concluded: 4 FTEs (CA
ICT officer).
4 x EUR 105 000 = EUR 420 000
iii. low as the system already exists and the costs would be
linked to (indirect) additional cases
iv. low (linked to additional circulation of preparation
documents, etc).
v. Not direct impact from the measure in itself, but indirect
costs linked to expected increase in the number of cases.
The measures are expected to generate more follow-up of
Europol requests, coordination meetings and case-
preparation work, leading to additional operational
expenditure of EUR 250 000 per annum.
48
Direct
regulatory fees
and charges
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Direct
enforcement
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Indirect costs N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
EJ
Potentially high increase in number of relevant complex
cases
Action E -
Promoting fully
developed
cooperation with
the EPPO
Direct
adjustment
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Direct
administrative
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A
i. (b) and ii. – together these
measures may require revising
the EPPO-Eurojust working
arrangement to broaden its
scope and establish clear
workflows. This would require
approximately 1 FTE (CA legal
and policy
officer/interinstitutional
relations)
1 x EUR 105 000 until the
working arrangement has been
revised and new practices are
stably implemented.
i. (b) and ii. Taken together, these measures are likely to
increase the support provided by Eurojust to the EPPO
through reinforced support to setting-up of JITs and JIT
funding, enhanced assistance for coordination in relevant
cases etc. This support can be expected to represent 1 FTE
(CA IT officer/legal officer) = EUR 105 000
iii. low (linked to additional circulation of preparation
documents, etc).
iv. low maintenance costs (can be absorbed as part of wider
ICT maintenance)
The measures are expected to generate more coordination
meetings, JIT support in EPPO cases, and case-preparation
49
iii. Low set up costs as the
EPPO can already participate in
COL meetings
iv. Costs of set- up of the
mechanism would remain
limited, as the number of cases
is not expected to be large and
the architecture not very
complex. However, given the
need to design, test and
implement the mechanism, and
ensure coordination with the
relevant services, this should be
rounded to 1 FTE (CA legal and
policy officer/interinstitutional
relations)
1 x EUR 105 000 until the
systems has been established
and new practices are stably
implemented.
work, for an additional operational expenditure of EUR
150 000 per annum.
Other IBOAs (EPPO)
Low recurrent costs linked to travel costs of participation
in COL (remote participation not possible currently)
Direct
regulatory fees
and charges
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Direct
enforcement
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Indirect costs N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A EJ
50
Potentially low-medium increase in number of relevant
complex cases
Action F -
Consolidating
cooperation with
third countries and
international
organisations
Direct
adjustment
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Direct
administrative
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A
i. N/A
ii. cost of selecting LM (low)
iv. N/A
v. N/A
i. N/A
ii. Administrative support to Liaison Magistrates is
estimated at 1 FTE (TA-AD/AST international affairs
officer) per area/region covered (Africa, Central and South
America, Middle East). In addition, Eurojust would require
1 FTE (CA international affairs officer) for implementation
support linked to the scaling-up of cooperation, operational
workflows and project-related reporting.
3 x EUR 194 000 = EUR 582 000
1 x EUR 105 000
Eurojust would also require 3 FTEs (TA-AD, CA
international affairs officer) for the overall coordination
and management of projects, including planning, reporting,
implementation follow-up and liaison with the relevant
partners.
1 x EUR 194 000
2 x EUR 210 000
51
+ costs of LM = EUR 188 500 per country4+ related costs
(travel, meetings etc) = EUR 50 000
iii. Resident Contact Point: preparation and negotiation of
working arrangements require approximately 0.6 FTE per
negotiation/country. Assuming a mandate to cover 13
countries, Eurojust estimates to be able to onboard resident
contact points and support their work with additional
resources corresponding to 8 FTEs (TA-AD and CA
international affairs officer)
4 x EUR 194 000 = EUR 776 000
4 x EUR 105 000 = EUR 420 000
iii. Cost for the use of services and premises EUR 20 000
per RCP
iv. N/A – no additional costs given LP are already located
in the Hague and participate in relevant agenda of the
College.
Enhanced cooperation with third countries and IOs is
expected to generate more missions, operational support to
liaison magistrates, liaison prosecutors, resident contact
points and capacity building work for around EUR 550 000
per annum of operational expenditure.
Direct
regulatory fees
and charges
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4 Assuming LMs wages are purely paid from EJ’s budget and they are located in the EU delegation’s premises.
52
Direct
enforcement
costs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Indirect costs N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Potential increase in operational work through increase of
(complex) cases. The number of cases involving third
countries would increase by a higher rate than the current
one (+12% between 2019 and 2023).
53
As a demand-driven Agency, savings relating to administrative burden reduction are likely
to translate into increased operational capacity, rather than have any contribution to OIOO.
III. Contribution to the administrative burden reduction targets – Preferred
option(s)
Administrative
costs [M€]
New
recurrent
costs (INs)
(nominal
values per
year)
Removed
recurrent
costs (OUTs)
(nominal
values per
year)
Net cost (INs
– OUTs)
(nominal
values per
year)
New one-off
costs (INs)
(annualised
total net
present value
over the
relevant
period)
Removed
one-off costs
(OUTs)
(annualised
total net
present value
over the
relevant
period)
All businesses
- in which SMEs
Public
administrations
Citizens
IV. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s)
Relevant SDG Expected progress towards the Goal Comments
SDG 16, Promote
just, peaceful and
inclusive societies
Expected progress towards :
- 16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of
violence and related death rates everywhere
- 16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit
financial and arms flows, strengthen the
recovery and return of stolen assets and
combat all forms of organized crime, and
- 16.A Strengthen relevant national
institutions, including through international
cooperation, for building capacity at all
levels, in particular in developing countries,
to prevent violence and combat terrorism
and crime
The expected progress towards
SDG 16 is covered in the benefits
tables above.
54
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS
1. GENERAL APPROACH
This Impact Assessment has been prepared by the Commission services in accordance with
the Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox. The analytical framework structures the
assessment of problems, objectives, policy options and impacts in a consistent and traceable
manner.
2. SUPPORT STUDY
2.1. Study requirements and timeline
An external study was commissioned to provide the Commission with evidence and analysis
for use in developing the impact assessment. Whilst the study specifications included a
request for assistance to the Commission in refining and collecting additional evidence for
the problem definition and intervention logic, the main tasks related to:
• identifying, and to the extent possible quantifying, the baseline scenario.
• analysing and comparing the impacts of possible policy options including through
sensitivity analysis.
• identifying elements of a related future monitoring framework, including suitable
indicators.
The contractor is also expected to provide technical support in relation to the evidence,
methodological or analytical issues that might arise before the submission of the draft Impact
Assessment Report to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and to any potential revision following
the remarks and recommendations of the Board.
Due to the tight timeline for the revision, the study specifications required the contractors to
provide an interim report in time to feed findings into the Commission’s impact assessment
before submission to the RSB. Drafting and acceptance of the final report is only expected
after the RSB meeting, allowing the report to reflect any changes and updates due to the
scrutiny process. Hence, and in line with the planning, all references in the draft impact
assessment submitted on 1 April 2026 refer to a draft report. Moreover, whilst the content
and analysis are the same, the draft report has been written following a more complex
intervention logic (seven problem areas with 18 associated drivers, four specific objectives
and four sets of policy options) based on detailed inputs provided by DG JUST at the start
of the contract. During the preparation of the impact assessment, this was simplified
significantly (two problem areas with 10 associated drivers, two specific objectives and
seven sets of policy options, or intervention areas), to facilitate wider understanding and
address the key issues, and also to be compatible with the IA length limit. These ‘structural’
changes, between the draft study report and the impact assessment, reflect the changes and
developments happening in parallel. They were fully explained to the steering group in the
slides presented at the meeting before the impact assessment.
55
2.2. Approach and data collection
The study has followed a mixed-methods approach aligned to the BR Guidelines and
Toolbox. Evidence was gathered through a range of data collection activities, summarised
as follows:
• Documentation and data review: Relevant publicly available and confidential
Eurojust documents and data sources were identified and reviewed. In particular,
Eurojust provided detailed written responses to targeted requests for quantitative
estimates to support the development of the baseline scenario and the assessment of
the impacts of the policy options.
• Interview programme and site visit: A comprehensive interview programme
targeting all relevant stakeholder groups as undertaken. During a site visit to the Hague
on 3-4 February 2026, 52 Eurojust stakeholders were consulted (representatives of the
national desks, Denmark and the administration, as well as liaison prosecutors) using
a mix of 1-1 interviews and five thematic group discussions. 11 follow-up interviews
were then conducted with Eurojust stakeholders. 35 interviews have been conducted
with other stakeholders, including representatives of the European Commission (DG
JUST.C.3, DG BUDG, DG ENEST, DG INTPA), the European Parliament (LIBE
Committee), as well as national authorities and practitioners from EU Member States
(AT, BE, HR, EE, FI, FR, IT, LT, MT, NL, PL, PT, SK, ES) and third countries (Brazil,
Chile, Kosovo, North Macedonia). Consultations have also taken place with EU
IBOAs and international organisations (interview with the EPPO and Europol).
• Targeted online survey of national (EU and third country) authorities and
practitioners: The survey received 430 responses covering representatives of Eurojust
national desks (28, 6.5%), the Eurojust administration (84, 19.5%), liaison prosecutors
(4, 0.9%), EU-based practitioners (208, 48.4%), third country-based practitioners (14,
3.3%), Member State public officials (58, 13.5%) and third country public officials (8,
1.9%). All 27 EU Member States and eight third countries (Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Iceland, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, the UK) are
represented.
• Call for evidence (CfE) and public consultation: The Commission launched a
related CfE (42 responses) and public consultation (20 responses).
For more information on the consultations carried out for this IA, see Annex 2.
2.3. Challenges and limitations
The study faced significant challenges due to the limited time available to organise and
conduct the consultations and then process and analyse the evidence collected. The
consultations took place over five weeks. Many activities were undertaken in parallel and at
an early stage, when options were still being defined. This has a particular impact on the
detail and provision that stakeholders can provided in their replies.
Equally, whilst significant effort was made to gather quantitative and monetary estimates
e.g. via the targeted request to Eurojust, the survey and the interviews, stakeholders have
found it challenging to estimate the impact of the different policy options. This often reflects
the lack of existing data on outcomes and costs in Member States, as well as the complexity
and significant variation from case to case. As a result, the main quantitative/monetary data
provided in this impact assessment relates to the internal costs and benefits to Eurojust e.g.
in terms of full-time equivalent staff, time savings, costs of missions.
56
3. IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS
3.1. Identification of impacts
All the impacts which could potentially be associated with the policy options analysed in
this Impact Assessment were identified after considering the key impacts set out in the
‘Better Regulation Toolbox’ Tool #18.
In the study specifications a wide range of impacts - positive and negative, direct and
indirect, intended and unintended, and short- and long-term - were considered. Drawing on
the evidence gathered during consultation activities with stakeholders, through literature
review and on expert assessment, the identified impacts concentrate were summarised under
the headings:
• Ability to reduce fraud and crime (links to general objective), often expressed in
relation to the number of Eurojust cases and rates of deterrence. There are likely to be
further (indirect) benefits to society, the environment and the economy from reducing
the occurrence and severity of serious and organised crime. However, these cannot be
estimated, as they vary from case to case.
• Ability to strengthen internal functioning, governance and operational performance of
Eurojust (links to specific objective 1). Typically, this involves increasing time and
resources available to operational work, removing overlaps or duplication.
• Ability to achieve optimal alignment and operational integration with EU partners and
Third countries (links to specific objective 2). Expected impacts include improvements
due to quicker communication and information exchange, better understanding of legal
systems and practices, greater continuity, removing overlaps and duplication.
• Wider impacts on citizen and business are noted, related to an overall reduction to
crime but not considered in detail.
• The qualitative impacts on administrative costs and simplification are also considered.
Given the nature of the work undertaken by Eurojust, and the fact that the review
relates to the Regulation for an Agency, the focus and simplification benefits from
most of the measures (particularly the ones related to governance) will be to simplify
and streamline procedures leading to efficiency gains.
3.2. Assessing impacts
A long list of possible measures was identified to address the different problem drivers and
deliver progress against the set objectives. A preliminary screening was conducted to ensure
that the measures under consideration were relevant, able to address the identified problems
and likely to improve the situation at reasonable cost/effort (effectiveness and efficiency) in
a proportionate and coherent manner. The retained the measures were then grouped
according to the different intervention areas identified for each specific objective (areas A-
C for specific objective 1; areas D-F for specific objective 2). Three policy options were then
developed for each intervention area by ‘bundling’ the relevant measures. The options are
structured according to their degree of intervention:
- Policy Option 1 (PO1) presents the lightest set of measures, which can be adopted
and implemented with relative ease and at limited cost. However, their structural
impact is expected to be limited.
57
- Policy Option 2 (PO2) introduces moderately more incisive measures, which may
require legislative amendments, seeking to balance stronger impact with manageable
implementation costs.
- Policy Option 3 (PO3) proposes the most far-reaching set of measures, necessitating
more substantive legislative changes. While this option may deliver the greatest
impact, it may raise more complex institutional and political considerations.
The assessment of the measures and associated policy options is based on a mixed methods
approach in which the effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the measures are graded on
a scoring system that summarises the different information sources available. This approach
reflects the wide range and differing nature of the measures considered for this impact
assessment, plus the mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence and opinion collected.
How the three key criteria were scored:
Effectiveness: the score per measure reflects the potential ‘global’ impact on progress
towards the relevant specific objective and the general objective. A total effectiveness score
was then calculated. Hence for
a) Specific objective 1 impacts related to strengthening Eurojust’s Internal Functioning,
Governance and Operational Performance were considered e.g. more time available
for relevant complex cases, less time taken to reach decisions, improving resources
available for operational tasks, greater legal clarity etc.
b) Specific objective 2 impacts related to strengthening Eurojust’s External Cooperation
and Integration with EU-level and international partners e.g. quicker and better
arrangements for cooperation, better identification of relevant complex cases, removal
of duplication, improving resources available etc.
c) The general objective, impacts related to enhancing Eurojust’s capacity to deliver
efficient, effective, and strategically prioritised judicial coordination and support,
thereby improving the EU’s overall response to serious cross-border crime and
contributing to the EU’s internal and external security e.g. involvement and
contribution to resolving complex cases, reducing crime with a subsequent impact on
deterring crime, and hence providing wider, indirect economic, environmental and
social benefits.
Efficiency: each measure was scored based on an assessment of the expected (qualitative
and quantitative) costs, categorised where possible as one off or recurring against the
expected (qualitative and quantitative) benefits.
Coherence: each measure was scored for internal coherence e.g. coherence within the EJR
and related measures in a bundle and external coherence e.g. coherence of the measure with
other related policies, agencies and JHA actors. Again, a total coherence score was then
calculated.
Scoring approach
The original scoring was done using a -3 to 0 to +3 scale, where 0 represents no change
against the baseline. The main sources underpinning the scores are the evaluation report, the
impact assessment support study and its associated consultations and literature review,
inputs from Eurojust and the expert opinion of the team drafting the impact assessment.
58
-3 – The measure has a strong negative impact
-2 – The measure has a moderate negative contribution impact
-1 – The measure has a minor negative contribution impact
0 – The measure makes no difference (stays at baseline)
1 – The measure has a minor positive contribution impact
2 – The measure has a moderate positive contribution impact
3 – The measure has a strong positive impact.
The following process was then followed:
i. Each measure was scored separately by the two teams (contractor team, Commission
team) and the results were compared. Scores which differed by more than 0.5 were
discussed in depth, leading to a single set of scores for all the measures.
ii. For each measure, a total score for effectiveness and coherence was calculated. After
some consideration and testing of different approaches (such as setting as global score
the maximum score of its components - which did not result in sufficient
differentiation between measures), it was decided to give equal weight to the impacts
related to the specific objective addressed and to the general objective (i.e. to use the
average of their scores), and to use also the average of internal and external coherence.
Hence for a given measure, total effectiveness =0.5 * (GO score + SO score); total
coherence = 0.5 (internal + external coherence). The tables of scores per measure are
presented in Section 3.3.
iii. The scores per criterion were then aggregated for the various measures in each policy
option. Different methods of aggregation were tested including total (unweighted)
score of all component measures, average score (equal weights per measure), total
score based on the maximum score in a bundle. But because there are different
numbers of measures in each option, a normalising approach (returning the score to
the original -3 to 0 to +3 scale) was required, so the total score approach was quickly
rejected. Finally, the average score was selected( since taking instead the maximum
score across a bundle ignores both the impact of any additional measures in an option
where they have smaller values than the ones already included in a previous option,
and the possibility of negative scores). The tables of (average) scores per option
together with the results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Section 3.4.
iv. To compare the policy options in their relative impacts, we have performed a Multi-
Criteria Analysis (MCA) using different weights to calculate the total score per option.
The weights assigned to each criterion represent the relative importance assigned to
them. To ensure robustness, we have conducted sensitivity analysis, using three
different sets of weights:
Total 1 = 1/3 Effectiveness + 1/3 Efficiency + 1/3 Coherence
Total 2 = 1/2 Effectiveness + 3/10 Efficiency + 1/5 Coherence
Total 3 = 2/5 Effectiveness + 2/5 Efficiency + 1/5 Coherence.
59
Effectiveness: all retained policy options contribute positively to the achievement of
the core objectives of the initiative. Differences between options mainly concern the
degree rather than the presence or absence of an effect. Since effectiveness plays a
decisive role in differentiating between policy options (with respect to the specific
objective pursued in the intervention area addressed, as well as with respect to the
general objective), effectiveness always has the equal highest or highest weight.
Efficiency: relates to the differences between retained policy options as regards the
magnitude and distribution of costs and benefits for companies, citizens and public
authorities, whether direct (including any benefits from simplification) or indirect (as
impacts on the economy, society, environment etc). Note that the study sought to
quantify and monetise the direct costs or savings of individual policy measures which
could then be aggregated to option level. The more indirect benefits of measures
could only be assessed qualitatively. Note that the degree to which a measure was
deemed to contribution to simplification was also assessed as a possibly third
component of efficiency. Efficiency was given the same weight as effectiveness in
two tests, and a lower weight in one.
Coherence was assigned a lower weight in two of the sensitivity tests, reflecting that
all retained policy options are broadly coherent with existing EU law and changes
planned in the JHA. Differences between options in terms of coherence are limited
and mainly relate to the degree of alignment with existing instruments and
frameworks, rather than to fundamental inconsistencies. Coherence is therefore
included to ensure overall policy consistency but does not drive the ranking of
options.
v. The total weighed score for each policy option is calculated as the sum of that policy
option’s score for a given criterion multiplied by the associated weight assigned to
that criterion.
The sensitivity analysis showed that within each intervention area, the ranking was robust,
since it was not affected by the different sets of weights assigned to the 3 criteria.
Note: In the inevitable iterations of developing and reviewing the measures and options, and
as a result of discussions with the interservice steering group, several measures were
amended. Hence the final scoring only uses the positive scale of 0 to +3.
60
3.3. Scores per measure
A. Extending the scope of material
competences to face the new judicial landscape
Addresses problem driver(s):
#2 Insufficient competences and associated
toolset
i. Enhancing Eurojust’s support in EU policy-making
and strategic cycles through:
a) working arrangements with IBOAs (A.PO1) 0.50 0.50 0.50
Minor costs; more resources may be required if EJ input is
required for more policy making deliverables. Costs
foreseen in putting together WAs.
Limited impact; enhanced involvement in policy making will
provide some impact on crime. n 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
b) introducing a dedicated provision in the EJR
(A.PO2, A.PO3) 1.00 0.50 0.75
Low-moderate costs, more staff and budget needed if
operational missions increase.
EJ estimates:
+2 FTE +EUR 500k
Moderate impact; some impact on crime if EJ has a
formalised involvement in policymaking, but depends on
extent that it's used.
n 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
ii. Entrusting Eurojust with new operational
functions (in the areas of e-evidence, victims’ rights,
asset recovery) through:
a) non-binding guidelines (A.PO1) 0.50 0.00 0.25
Minor costs; may require a one-off cost at EU level to
draft non-binding guidelines; depends on extent of EJ input
to continue contributing to EU policymaking deliverables.
Limited impact; limited reduction in crime; limited impact
on citizens and young people considering increased uptake
of digital technologies; limited impact on digitalisation,
depending on whether measures are taken up.
Limited,
depends on
extent of
uptake.
1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75
b) introducing a dedicated provision in the EJR
(A.PO2, A.PO3) 3.00 1.50 2.25
Minor-moderate costs; SIRIUS depends on whether
Eurojust’s role is expanded - if expanded, higher costs;
victims’ rights: same as SIRIUS - if expanded, higher
costs.
(EJ 5 FTE + 0.25 SNE per national desk = 6.5 FTE)
High impact; high positive impact on EJ's capabilities;
moderate positive impact on EJ's ability to reduce lost
expenditure from fraud and crime; moderate positive
impact for formalisation of EJ's role in victims' rights;
moderate positive impact for children and young people
with expanding digital technologies impacting them.
y (over a longer
period) 1.50 1.50 2.00 1.75
iii. Introducing semi-permanent operational
platforms to support JITs through
a) operational arrangements (A.PO1) 0.50 0.00 0.25 low - very low costs (TBD) very limited imapct n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
b) introducing a reference in the EJR
(A.PO2, A.PO3) 1.00 0.00 0.50 2 FTEs + non-staff costs of EUR 1.5 million over MFF potentially larger (but limited) impacts n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
iv. Extending Eurojust’s material competence to
new crimes (VURM, cybercrime, GBV, FIMI)
(A.PO2, A.PO3)
0.00 1.00 0.50 No immediate direct costs (digitalisation costs not included
in IA).
Medium impact to high over time and based on alignement
of other actors)
y (over a longer
period) 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
v. Expanding Eurojust’s analytical function to key
crime areas (organised crime and accessory crimes)
(A.PO3)
1.00 1.00 1.00
High costs: short-term costs for set-up, long-term costs for
maintenance and management; complex implementation
envisaged which may translate to high costs.
16 FTE + EUR 2 million p.a. for costs of system
High-impact; analytical function would allow EJ to develop
analysis in organised crime; positive impact in long-term
related to reducing lost revenue from organised crime,;
positive impact on citizens and young people by improving
response to organised crime; moderate impact for
digitalisation due to varying standards at MS level; impact
on MS depends on willingness to amend data and adapt
procedures.
y (lowering
casework
burden for
complex files in
long-term)
3.00 1.00 2.00 1.50
Specific objective 1:
Strengthen Eurojust’s internal functioning,
governance and operational performance
CoherenceEffectiveness
SO1 GO
Efficiency
score Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal +
External
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO1+GO
Costs (accompanying text identifies cost to MS,
Com, other)
text (OF=one off cost, R= recurring)
Benefits (accompanying text identifies benefit to
Crime/citizens, MS, other)
text
Simplification
(y/n)
Efficiency
61
Specific objective 1:
Strengthen Eurojust’s internal functioning,
governance and operational performance
B. Harmonizing Member State
implementation of the EJR, including on
allocation of cases
Addressing problem driver(s):
#1 Inadequate model to select and
prioritise cases;
#3 Divergent Member State engagement and
implementation of the EJR
i. Introduce a Eurojust-EJN case-allocation
system – through
a) non-binding guidelines (B.PO1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 FTE No imapct given existence of guidelines n 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.25
b) by introducing a EJR provision defining a
‘Eurojust case’ (B.PO2, B.PO3) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 FTE
Limoited impacts (only felt over time) given culture change
and mindset would have to evovle n 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ii. Require Member States to appoint National
Members with full operational powers through:
a) advocacy and political nudging (B.PO1) 0.50 0.50 0.50 Minor costs; may require a one-off cost at EU level to
advocate and nudge the MS.
Limited impact; may reduce time taken to process certain
cases if implemented by MS; low administrative burden as
voluntary.
n 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50
b) amending the relevant EJR provisions (B.PO2,
B.PO3) 1.50 1.00 1.25
Minor; may reduce costs on MS in long-term and for EJ by
supporting prioritisation of workload.
High impact; will ensure that all NMs have full competence
and operational work is focused on; may have some limited
burden while being implemented by MS.
y 2.00 2.00 0.00 1.00
iii. Entrusting National Members with new
capabilities (subject to their attributions under
national law): issuing freezing orders, European
Production and Preservation Orders (e-evidence),
European Arrest Warrants, and signing JIT
agreements (B.PO2, B.PO3)
1.00 0.50 0.75
Low costs, resulting from increase in operational work and
support provided, thus, expected need for increased
resources at national desks and caseload units.
Moderate impact; reduction of delays linked to related
orders in some case; positve reduction of crime due to
additional capabilities for EJ; ability for EJ to reduce lost
revenue to fraud/crime. Likely impact on MS if they need
to align national frameworks to new powers for NMs.
y (in long term) 0.50 2.00 1.50 1.75
iv. Grant National Members the authority to open
cases (B.PO3) 1.50 1.50 1.50
Minor-moderate impact, extent depends on if it's well-
implemented, may increase case load, thus, requiring more
staff.
Moderate impact, depends on whether NMs have capacity
to - would reduce having to go around national authorities;
would increase EJ's capability to spport cross-border
cases; could be helpful for combatting crime in MS if EJ
opens cases.
y (if caseload
permits) 2.00 1.50 1.00 1.25
SO1 GO
Efficiency
score Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal +
External
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO1+GO
Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence
Costs (accompanying text identifies cost to MS,
Com, other)
text (OF=one off cost, R= recurring)
Benefits (accompanying text identifies benefit to
Crime/citizens, MS, other)
text
Simplification
(y/n)
62
Specific objective 1:
Strengthen Eurojust’s internal functioning,
governance and operational performance
C. Establishing a streamlined, coherent and
role-clear governance system that accelerates
decision-making
Addressing problem driver(s):
#4 Lack of clear separation between
operational and administrative responsibilities
#5 Complex governance structure
and outdated legacy organisational culture
i. Revision of the allocation of responsibilities
between governance bodies (C.PO1, C.PO2,
C.PO3)
0.50 0.50 0.50 No cost changes compared to dynamic baseline Minimal incremental benefits compared to dynamic
baseline; greater certainty / sustainability of allocation y 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
ii. Reform of the Executive Board (C.PO2, C.PO3) 0.50 0.50 0.50 Minor cost; increased operational work --> increased
administration support to operational work (R)
0.1-0.5 FTE cost saving per year (reduction in NM time
commitment)
1-5 FTEs over 10 years
y 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75
i+ii Revision + Reform (=C.PO2) 1.50 1.00 1.25 (assumed sum of i and ii - TBC) (assumed sum of i and ii - TBC) y 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
iii. Introduction of a Management Board (C.PO3) 2.50 2.00 2.25
Moderate cost; significant increases in operational work --
> increases in administration support to operational work
(R); cost to EJ (R) for organising MB meetings (€80k for
meeting at EJ; €120k for external meeting); cost (OF) to
national authorities for selecting representative
1.46 FTE cost saving per year (reduction in NM time
commitment)
14.6 over 10 years
y 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.00
i+ii+iii Revision, Reform + MB (=C.PO3) 3.00 2.50 2.75 (assumed sum of i, ii and iii - TBC) (assumed sum of i, ii and iii - TBC) y 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.00
SO1 GO
Efficiency
score Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal +
External
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO1+GO
Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence
Costs (accompanying text identifies cost to MS,
Com, other)
text (OF=one off cost, R= recurring)
Benefits (accompanying text identifies benefit to
Crime/citizens, MS, other)
text
Simplification
(y/n)
63
Specific objective 2: Achieve optimal
alignment and operational integration with EU
partners and Third countries
D. Fostering and strengthening structured
operational cooperation with Europol
Addressing problem driver(s):
#8 Absence of a structurally embedded cooperation
with Europol
i. Automating and optimising Eurojust-Europol’s
system for indirect access to the respective
databases (interagency hit/no-hit system) through:
a) technical measures only (D.PO1) 0.50 0.00 0.25 3.5 FTE (ICT) + EUR 1.7- 2.4 million small y 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00
b) technical measures linked to new legal
obligations (D.PO2, D.PO3) 1.50 1.50 1.50
At least same as above, (depending on new legal
obligations) General gearter effectiveness leading to efficineices y 2.50 2.00 3.00 2.50
ii. Revising the 2010 Eurojust-Europol Cooperation
Agreement through:
a) a poligical push for its renegotiation (D.PO1) 0.50 0.00 0.25 unlikely to take place unlikely to take place n 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
b) introducing in the EJR a legal obligation of
periodic review in consultation with the Commission
(D.PO2, D.PO3)
1.00 0.50 0.75 2 FTEs for negotiations (2 years) OF potentatial building block for increasing coopeation with
EPOL n 0.50 1.00 2.00 1.50
iii. Creating a dedicated cooperation channel for
systematic follow up on SIRIUS referrals (D.PO2,
D.PO3)
1.00 1.00 1.00 low low if other improvements not implemented n 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.25
iv. Granting participation in College meetings to
Europol representatives (D.PO2, D.PO3) 1.00 0.50 0.75 low (crossing the road)
potentioal building block in alternig cooperation - also
depends on work of COL n 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00
v. Codifying cooperation modalities between
Eurojust and Europol (e.g. notification to Eurojust
upon reaching of “judicial threshold”, creation of
Joint Operational Platforms or task forces)
(D.PO3)
3.00 3.00 3.00 potentially high given increased resources at EPOL Potentially very high increase in EJ cases n 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
SO2 GO
Efficiency
score Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal +
External
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO2+GO
Costs (accompanying text identifies cost to MS,
Com, other)
text (OF=one off cost, R= recurring)
Benefits (accompanying text identifies benefit to
Crime/citizens, MS, other)
text
Simplification
(y/n)
Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence
64
Specific objective 2: Achieve optimal
alignment and operational integration with EU
partners and Third countries
E. Promoting fully developed cooperation with
the EPPO
Addressing problem driver(s):
#9 Constrained cooperation with the EPPO
i. Automating and optimising Eurojust-EPPO’s
system for indirect access to the respective
databases (interagency hit/no-hit system) through:
a) technical measures only (E.PO1) 0.50 0.00 0.25 Cost of set up (OF) ,but likely low low n 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75
b) technical measures linked to new legal obligations
(E.PO2, E.PO3) 1.00 0.50 0.75 Cost of set up (OF), but likely low and covered in ii potential increae in cases n 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.50
ii. Establishing an explicit mandate for Eurojust to
provide reinforced support in EPPO cases (JITs,
coordination meetings, Action Days)
(E.PO2, E.PO3)
2.00 1.50 1.75
Depending on support provided and potential increase in
cases
1 FTE to support negotiations (OF)
0.5 FTE p.a for enhanced assistance/coordination
potential for identification of more complex links n 1.50 2.00 1.00 1.50
iii. Granting participation in College meetings to
EPPO representatives (E.PO2, E.PO3) 1.00 0.50 0.75 low (travel costs)
unlikely to change given ECP is already able to join
(relevant) COL meetings n 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
iv. Setting up a Eurojust-EPPO clearing-house
mechanism for case allocation (E.PO3) 1.50 0.50 1.00
depends on number of cases, but they are not expected to
be high. Limited costs to set up mechanism 0.5 FTE and
low maintenance costs (probably absorbed into wider ICT
maintenance)
Better coordination, better identification of cases. Positive
impact on fraud and crime cases, especially those linked to
PIF.
y 0.75 1.50 1.00 1.25
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO2+GO
Simplification
(y/n)
Benefits (accompanying text identifies benefit to
Crime/citizens, MS, other)
text
Costs (accompanying text identifies cost to MS,
Com, other)
text (OF=one off cost, R= recurring)
SO2 GO
Efficiency
score Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal +
External
Effectiveness CoherenceEfficiency
65
Specific objective 2: Achieve optimal
alignment and operational integration with EU
partners and Third countries
F. Consolidating cooperation with third
countries and international organisations
Addressing problem driver(s):
#10 Cumbersome process
for establishing relations with international
actors
i. Introducing cooperation conditionalities in
agreements with third countries with financial
implications – as a cross cutting non-legislative
measure (F.PO1, F.PO2, F.PO3)
0.50 0.50 0.50
Minor impact - depending on the financial envelope
available for conditionalities as it could lead to increased
number of projects with third countries
Expected minor impact as measure is not binding and
conditionalities might not be enough to enhance cooperation
if third countries are not willing
n 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50
ii. Clarifying the legal framework governing the
figure of Liaison Magistrates (F.PO2, F.PO3) 2.00 1.00 1.50
Moderate cost; significant increases in operational work --
> administration support (R) to the preparation and the
work of LMs (1 FTE per area/region covered); cost to
Eurojust (R) for the posting of LMs (€50k per LM and
location); cost (OF) to Eurojust for selecting
representative. Additional costs if LMs are members of
Eurojust (1 FTE per LM)
Expected moderate to great impact as LMs currently
underused. Improved information flow and exchanges with
third countries, both for national desks and (especially)
national prosecutors. Benefits may be greater for smaller
MS as larger ones may have LMs posted in some
countries.
n 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
iii. Institutionalising Resident Contact Points for
priority countries (F.PO2, F.PO3) 2.50 1.50 2.00
Moderate cost; significant increases in operational work --
> administration support (OF) to the preparation and
negotiations (0.6 FTE per negotiation/country); cost to
Eurojust (R) for the use of services and premises (at least
€20k per CP) and some cost (R) for Eurojust related to
overall coordination and monitoring
Similar to LMs. RCPs expected moderate to great impact
for information flow and exchanges with third countries,
both for national desks and (especially) national
prosecutors.
n 1.00 1.50 1.00 1.25
iv. Granting participation in College meetings to
Liaison Prosecutors (F.PO2, F.PO3) 1.00 0.50 0.75 no/low cost
Further embed external dimension of EJ awareness by
ensureing operation and cooperation strategies reflect
needs and operational realities of third countries.
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
v. Entrusting Eurojust with an explicit capacity
building mandate in external action (F.PO3) 1.00 0.50 0.75
1 FTE for overall coordination of all Eurojust projects
0.5 FTEs for coordination and management of each
specific project
Potential savings for Eurojust in the coordination of projects
with third countries.
y (for internal
coordination of
projects)
0.50 0.50 1.00 0.75
SO2 GO
Efficiency
score Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal +
External
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO2+GO
Effectiveness Efficiency Coherence
Costs (accompanying text identifies cost to MS,
Com, other)
text (OF=one off cost, R= recurring)
Benefits (accompanying text identifies benefit to
Crime/citizens, MS, other)
text
Simplification
(y/n)
66
3.4. Aggregated scores per option
A. Extending the scope of material
competences to face the new judicial
landscape
Efficiency
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 1
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 2
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 3
Addresses problem driver(s):
#2 Insufficient competences and
associated toolset
SO1 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO1+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness =
0.33
Efficiency = 0.33
Coherence = 0.33
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
Effectiveness = 0.4
Efficiency = 0.4
Coherence = 0.2
A.PO1 (i.a, ii.a, iii.a) 0.50 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.58 0.42 0.38 0.38
A.PO2 (i.b, ii.b, iii.b, iv) 1.25 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.13 1.06 1.10 1.09 1.11
A.PO3 (i.b, ii.b, iii.b, iv, v) 1.20 0.80 1.00 1.60 1.00 1.30 1.15 1.25 1.21 1.27
B. Harmonizing Member State
implementation of the EJR, including
on allocation of cases
Efficiency
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 1
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 2
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 3
Addressing problem driver(s):
#1 Inadequate model to select and
prioritise cases;
#3 Divergent Member State engagement
and implementation of the EJR
SO1 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO1+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness =
0.33
Efficiency = 0.33
Coherence = 0.33
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
B.PO1 (i.a, ii.a) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.38 0.29 0.28 0.28
B.PO2 (i.b, ii.b, iii) 1.00 0.67 0.83 1.17 1.67 0.83 1.25 1.08 1.02 1.05
B.PO3 (i.b, ii.b, iii, iv) 1.13 0.88 1.00 1.38 1.63 0.88 1.25 1.21 1.16 1.20
C. Establishing a
streamlined, coherent and role-clear
governance system that accelerates
decision-making
Efficiency
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 1
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 2
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 3
Addressing problem driver(s):
#4 Lack of clear separation between
operational and administrative
responsibilities
#5 Complex governance structure
and outdated legacy organisational
culture
SO1 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO1+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness =
0.33
Efficiency = 0.33
Coherence = 0.33
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
C.PO1 (i) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
C.PO2 (i and ii) 1.50 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.13 1.10
C.PO3 (i, ii and iii) 3.00 2.50 2.75 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.42 2.53 2.50
Effectiveness Coherence
Coherence
CoherenceEffectiveness
Effectiveness
67
D. Fostering and strengthening
structured operational cooperation
with Europol
Efficiency
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 1
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 2
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 3
Addressing problem driver(s):
#8 Absence of a structurally embedded
cooperation with Europol
SO2 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO2+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness =
0.33
Efficiency = 0.33
Coherence = 0.33
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
D.PO1 (i.a, ii.a) 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.43 0.45
D.PO2 (i.b, ii.b, iii, iv) 1.13 0.88 1.00 1.38 1.25 1.88 1.56 1.31 1.23 1.26
D.PO3 (i.b, ii.b, iii, iv, v) 1.50 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.40 1.90 1.65 1.52 1.48 1.49
E. Promoting fully developed
cooperation with the EPPO Efficiency
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 1
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 2
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 3
Addressing problem driver(s):
#9 Constrained cooperation with the
EPPO
SO2 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO2+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness =
0.33
Efficiency = 0.33
Coherence = 0.33
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
E.PO1 (i.a) 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.58 0.50 0.55
E.PO2 (i.b, ii, iii) 1.33 0.83 1.08 1.50 1.67 1.00 1.33 1.31 1.26 1.30
E.PO3 (i.b, ii, iii, iv) 1.38 0.75 1.06 1.31 1.63 1.00 1.31 1.23 1.19 1.21
F. Consolidating cooperation with
third countries and international
organisations
Efficiency
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 1
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 2
Total criteria
score
Sensitivity 3
Addressing problem driver(s):
#10 Cumbersome process
for establishing relations with
international actors
SO2 GO
Effectiveness
score
= average
SO2+GO
Internal External
Coherence
score
= average
Internal+
External
Effectiveness =
0.33
Efficiency = 0.33
Coherence = 0.33
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
Effectiveness = 0.5
Efficiency = 0.3
Coherence = 0.2
F.PO1 (i) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
F.PO2 (i, ii, iii, iv) 1.50 0.88 1.19 0.88 0.63 0.75 0.69 0.92 0.99 0.96
F.PO3 (i, ii, iii, iv, v) 1.40 0.80 1.10 0.80 0.60 0.80 0.70 0.87 0.93 0.90
CoherenceEffectiveness
CoherenceEffectiveness
Effectiveness Coherence
68
ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK
There are no direct impact on competitiveness (of any type). Positive (indirect) impact
on competitiveness is likely through more level playing field for businesses operating in
the EU and reductions in crime affecting businesses. Magnitude of this indirect impact is
very hard to assess. Indirect impact is anticipated to be general - i.e not differentiated by
type of stakeholder or competitiveness dimension (e.g. cost and price, international, SME,
capacity to innovate).
69
ANNEX 6: SME CHECK
The measures proposed cannot be not categorised as either ‘relevant’ or ‘highly relevant’
for SMEs. They would be subject to the same indirect benefits as all businesses, with no
additional costs.
Whilst the initiative is not directly relevant for SMEs, like all businesses they can be
expected to benefit indirectly and (reflecting their limited resources) may actually benefit
to a higher degree than larger companies, which possess greater means to defend
themselves against criminal and fraudulent behaviours.
70
ANNEX 7: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUPPORTING THE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT
1. INTRODUCTION
This annex provides additional information that could not be accommodated within the
main Impact Assessment. It examines the evolution of the broader European judicial legal
framework, as well as Eurojust’s compliance with Fundamental Rights. It furthermore lists
all legal instruments and strategies that include a role for Eurojust.
2. EVOLUTION OF THE BROADER EUROPEAN JUDICIAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The broader European criminal justice landscape has undergone a profound transformation
over the past two decades, evolving from a predominantly intergovernmental framework
into a coherent, multilayered architecture that acts across borders to enhance criminal
justice cooperation and ensure mutual recognition. Eurojust’s development has taken place
against this backdrop of further integration, gradual harmonisation of procedural standards,
and the creation of new instruments enabling judicial authorities to cooperate efficiently in
the fight against serious cross-border crime. These reforms have progressively shaped the
environment in which Eurojust operates, expanding its responsibilities and expectations
while strengthening the overall European criminal justice ecosystem.
A series of legal and operational instruments have significantly expanded the tools
available to judicial authorities. The introduction of the European Arrest Warrant (2002)20
marked a foundational shift from traditional extradition to mutual recognition, followed
later by the European Investigation Order (2014)21, which also provided a streamlined
mechanism for gathering evidence across borders. The development of Joint Investigation
Teams (JITs) has likewise been a major milestone in European judicial cooperation. While
established through the 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters22 and
the later 2002 Framework Decision23, the practical operation of JITs has been
progressively strengthened, supported by Eurojust’s operational, legal and financial
assistance. The creation of the incoming JITs platform24, an EU-level digital environment
that facilitates the management, exchange and secure communication of JIT-related
information, represents an advancement in the way digitalisation supports operational
cooperation.
Asset recovery constitutes another domain in which the European legal framework has
evolved rapidly and significantly. In 2018, the Regulation on mutual recognition of
freezing and confiscation orders25 introduced mandatory timelines, clearer safeguards and
smoother cross-border execution of asset recovery decisions. In 2024 this was reinforced
by the new Directive on asset recovery and confiscation26, which strengthens national
Asset Recovery Offices, enhances tracing capacities, and introduces more robust
confiscation regimes - including non-conviction-based confiscation in specific cases. The
Union has moved toward a more coherent approach, recognising that depriving criminal
networks of illicit proceeds is essential to dismantling their operations. Eurojust’s ability
to coordinate judicial action in freezing and confiscation cases, provide case-law
consistency, and support parallel financial investigations has become increasingly
important within this framework, also supported by more structured links between
Eurojust’s casework and Europol.
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Beyond these legal instruments, the broader European criminal justice architecture has
been shaped by a range of additional legal and policy developments. One can for instance
point towards Eurojust’s growing number of third-country cooperation agreements and
liaison prosecutors. These are essential in tackling cases involving global links and non-
EU jurisdictions and underline the increased cooperation with judicial authorities outside
of the EU.27
Moreover, the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO)28 in 2017
has redefined the European prosecution landscape. A cornerstone of this evolution is the
shift toward a more integrated framework for protecting the Union’s financial interests.
The recent White Paper for the Anti-fraud Architecture Review29 laid out the strategic
blueprint for a modernised, interconnected system involving OLAF, Eurojust, the EPPO
and national authorities. It emphasised the need for complementary mandates, seamless
information flow, and operational synergies, particularly in complex PIF-related
investigations involving multiple jurisdictions. Eurojust’s role as a judicial coordination
hub is closely linked to this architecture due to the corresponding need to ensure
complementarity, information exchange and de-confliction between Eurojust and the
EPPO.
Another dimension of this evolving landscape concerns the consolidation of information-
sharing frameworks, which underpin nearly all aspects of cross-border judicial
cooperation. The Law Enforcement Directive (LED)30 has established a harmonised data-
protection regime for the processing of personal data in criminal matters, ensuring that
exchanges between national authorities, Eurojust, and other EU bodies take place within a
robust fundamental-rights framework. Complementing this, the Data Protection
Regulation for EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (EUDPR)31 sets the
overarching data-protection standards that apply directly to Eurojust and other agencies.
While distinct from the LED, it ensures that Eurojust’s internal processing operations, its
Case Management System and its information-exchange channels operate under a
coherent, EU-wide regime that guarantees high levels of security, accountability and data-
subject protection. For Eurojust, these developments are central: the agency’s coordinating
role increasingly depends on timely access to accurate, high-quality data that can be safely
shared among competent authorities. By aligning its operational systems with the LED’s
safeguards and by preparing to function within the future EUDPR infrastructure, Eurojust
strengthens both the legality and the efficiency of information flows. Information-
exchange between judicial authority has also been reinforced through measures such as the
ECRIS-TCN Regulation32, which enables more efficient identification of criminal records
of third-country nationals.
In parallel, following the 2009 Stockholm Programme33 and a Council Roadmap34 to
strengthen procedural rights in criminal proceedings, the EU adopted on the basis of
Articles 82(2), a series of minimum standards directives aimed at enhancing mutual trust
and facilitating mutual recognition. In this regard, the harmonisation of procedural
safeguards through directives on victims’ rights35 and suspects’ and accused persons’
rights36 further ensures that judicial cooperation operates within a rights-protective,
legally consistent environment across Member States. In the same way, under Article 83
the EU has adopted minimum rules defining certain criminal offences and sanctions in
areas with a serious cross-border dimension (“EUcrimes”). Indeed, the rationale for
minimum harmonisation of procedural and substantial criminal law is closely tied to the
principle of mutual trust: the assumption that all Member States respect fundamental rights
and the rule of law such that judicial decisions can be recognised and enforced across
borders without re-examination of merits. Harmonised procedural rights and defined “EU
72
crimes” help build a common baseline of protections and reduce legitimate obstacles to
mutual recognition.
Additionally, practitioner networks have also played a decisive role in shaping the
functioning of the judicial legal framework. Networks such as the European Judicial
Network (EJN), the Genocide Network, the Network of National Experts on Joint
Investigation Teams, and practitioner communities focused on fields such as cybercrime,
trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling, environmental crime and financial crime
have contributed to building a common operational culture. These networks facilitate
mutual understanding of legal systems, disseminate best practices, and provide platforms
for rapid consultation - elements that directly enhance the effectiveness of Eurojust’s
coordination function.37
The broader E-evidence framework, to become fully operational in 202638, also
constitutes a next major step in the European judicial continuum. It provides judicial
authorities in all Member States with a harmonised system for obtaining digital evidence
directly from service providers - an essential capability given the prevalence of encrypted
communication, cloud-based storage, and digital anonymity in contemporary criminal
activity. Eurojust plays a central role in supporting the judicial application of these
instruments. This digital transformation is accompanied by parallel developments such as
the modernisation of Eurojust’s Case Management System, which strengthens the agency’s
capacity to manage fast-moving, data-heavy criminal investigations.
Overall, it can be said that the European judicial legal framework in which Eurojust
operates has become more sophisticated, integrated and digitally enabled. Eurojust sits at
the centre of this environment, acting as the operational engine that transforms these legal
instruments into concrete, coordinated judicial action capable of tackling the increasingly
complex and cross-border nature of serious crime in the European Union.
3. PRESENTATION OF THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK (REGULATION (EU)
2018/1727 ON EUROJUST)
Eurojust’s mandate, structure and operational framework are laid down in Regulation
(EU) 2018/1727 on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation.
The Regulation establishes Eurojust as a Union agency with legal personality, replacing
the former intergovernmental predecessor while ensuring continuity of functions and
expertise. It aligns Eurojust with the post-Lisbon framework for judicial cooperation in
criminal matters and embeds the Agency within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
under the community method.5
The Regulation defines Eurojust’s core mission as supporting and strengthening
coordination and cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting
authorities in relation to serious crime, in particular where such crime affects two or
more Member States or requires prosecution on common bases, on the basis of operations
conducted and information supplied by the Member States’ authorities, by Europol, by the
EPPO and by OLAF.6 Eurojust’s role is explicitly supportive and complementary: it does
not replace national authorities but facilitates their ability to act coherently in cross-border
cases by providing a permanent coordination hub at Union level. Eurojust’s material
competence covers serious forms of crime listed in Annex I of the Regulation, together
5 Recitals 1-4; Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 6 Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727.
73
with related offences, ensuring legal clarity while allowing operational flexibility. The
Regulation also clarifies the conditions under which Eurojust may act in cases involving a
single Member State where the interests of the Union or the effectiveness of judicial
cooperation so require, subject to consultation with the concerned national authorities.7
A central element of the legal context is the delineation of Eurojust’s relationship with
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Regulation establishes a principle of
complementarity, whereby Eurojust does not exercise competence for offences falling
within the EPPO’s remit once the EPPO has decided to act, while still preserving
Eurojust’s coordinating role for cases involving non-participating Member States or
requiring broader multilateral judicial coordination.8 This legal design aims to avoid
duplication while ensuring continuity of cooperation across the Union’s prosecution
landscape.
The Regulation translates Eurojust’s mandate into a set of clearly defined operational
tasks. These include facilitating the exchange of information between national authorities,
assisting in the coordination of investigations and prosecutions, supporting the resolution
of conflicts of jurisdiction, and enhancing judicial cooperation through instruments such
as Joint Investigation Teams. Eurojust is also tasked with assisting national authorities in
the execution of mutual legal assistance and mutual recognition instruments, thereby
supporting the practical application of Union law in criminal matters.9
While Eurojust does not exercise prosecutorial powers itself, the Regulation equips it with
structured coordination tools that go beyond informal facilitation. Eurojust may
request competent national authorities to initiate or coordinate investigations or
prosecutions, to accept that one authority may be better placed to prosecute, to set up a
Joint Investigation Team, or to take other measures necessary for effective judicial
cooperation. Where coordination difficulties persist, Eurojust may issue reasoned written
opinions. National authorities are required to respond without undue delay, subject to
limited and explicitly defined refusal grounds.10
In practice, operational tasks are carried out primarily through the national members,
acting individually or jointly as the College, reflecting the Agency’s role as a facilitator
of national judicial action rather than an autonomous prosecutorial body. This reinforces
the principle that operational ownership of cases remains with Member States, while
Eurojust provides the institutional framework, continuity and coordination necessary to
align national actions in complex cross-border proceedings.11 The Regulation, after its
targeted amendment in 2022, also empowers Eurojust to establish and manage the Core
International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED), enabling the secure storage and
preservation of evidence relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.12
Eurojust’s operational architecture is thus built around the national member model. Each
Member State is represented by a national member, supported by deputies and assistants,
who are in principle experienced prosecutors, judges or equivalent officials. This structure
7 Article 3; Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 8 Recitals 5, 7-8; Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 9 Recitals 12-15; Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 10 Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 11 Recital 12; Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 12 Article 4(j) Regulation (EU) 2018/1727.
74
ensures that Eurojust’s actions and exercise of powers are grounded in national legal
systems while enabling rapid coordination across jurisdictions.13 The Regulation therefore
requires Member States to grant national members the powers necessary to fulfil
Eurojust’s tasks, in accordance with national law. These powers may include the ability
to issue, execute or transmit judicial cooperation requests, and to take urgent measures in
exceptional circumstances.14 This legal framework seeks to reduce delays caused by
fragmented competences while preserving constitutional and procedural safeguards at
national level.
Next to the College - which ischaired by the President of Eurojust, who is also a National
Member - the Regulation also establishes an Executive Board and an Administrative
Director, introducing an agency-style governance framework aimed at improving strategic
planning, internal efficiency and accountability.15
A cornerstone of the Regulation is the establishment of structured information-exchange
obligations. Member States are required to provide Eurojust with the information
necessary for the performance of its tasks, and the Regulation specifies categories of cases
and situations that should be transmitted, such as those involving multiple Member States,
potential conflicts of jurisdiction, or repeated difficulties in executing cooperation
requests. This moves judicial cooperation from a largely voluntary model toward a more
predictable and systematic exchange of information.16 To support this obligation at
national level, the Regulation requires each Member State to establish a Eurojust national
coordination system (ENCS), bringing together national correspondents, contact points
and relevant networks, including the European Judicial Network. To ensure operational
continuity, the Regulation also establishes an on-call coordination mechanism, requiring
Member States to ensure round-the-clock availability of national representatives capable
of responding to urgent cross-border judicial cooperation needs.17 For terrorism-related
cases, the Regulation after the 2023 amendment also introduces reinforced and
standardised information-sharing obligations, stipulating the particular importance of early
identification of cross-border links between proceedings in this area.18
The Regulation furthermore provides the legal basis for Eurojust’s Case Management
System (CMS) and for digital communication between Eurojust and national
authorities. It foresees the use of interoperable IT systems to support efficient, secure and
timely exchange of judicial information, thereby underpinning Eurojust’s ability to manage
growing volumes of complex case data.19 Given the sensitivity of judicial cooperation data,
the Regulation establishes specific rules governing the processing of operational
personal data by Eurojust and situates Eurojust within the overarching data
protection frameworks, especially for European agencies and law enforcement-data.
It defines the categories of data that may be processed, limits access within the Agency,
and subjects Eurojust to internal data protection safeguards and external supervision by the
European Data Protection Supervisor.20
13 Articles 7-9 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 14 Article 8-9 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 15 Recitals 16-21; Articles 10-18 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 16 Recital 27; Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 17 Recital 25; Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 18 Recital 26; Articles 20 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 19 Articles 22-25 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727. 20 Recitals 28-53; Chapter IV of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727.
75
Finally, the Regulation explicitly places Eurojust within the broader EU judicial
cooperation ecosystem. It provides a framework for cooperation with Europol, the
European Judicial Network (EJN), OLAF, the EPPO and third countries - including
through liaison prosecutors and coordination of multilateral judicial requests.21
Taken together, the Eurojust Regulation establishes a comprehensive legal architecture
that defines Eurojust’s mandate, tasks and powers; structures its operational and
governance model; and equips it with modern information-exchange and data-processing
capacities. This framework underpins Eurojust’s role as the central hub for judicial
coordination in the Union, while ensuring safeguards, accountability and
complementarity within the evolving European criminal justice system.
4. ENSURING FULL COMPLIANCE WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
A revised Eurojust Regulation will fully observe the principles in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) as recognised in the TEU, as well
as the general principles of EU law derived from the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). This is particularly
important in areas where Eurojust’s expanded mandate would intersect with criminal
procedural safeguards and data protection.
The current EJR reflects a strong commitment to the Charter and the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), in particular human
dignity (Article 1 of the Charter), the right to integrity (Article 3 of the Charter), the right
to liberty and security (Article 6 of the Charter), respect for private and family life (Article
7 of the Charter), the protection of personal data (Article 8 of the Charter), non-
discrimination (Article 21 of the Charter), the rights of the child (Article 24 of the Charter),
the presumption of innocence and right of defence (Article 48 of the Charter), the
principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties (Article 49 of
the Charter), and the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the
same offence (Article 50 of the Charter).
Given the importance of the access to personal data in Eurojust’s support for the work of
judicial authorities and of the processing, this impact assessment focuses specifically on
ensuring full compliance with the rights to the protection of personal data (Article 8 of
the Charter) and to respect for private life (Article 7 of the Charter).
Rights to the protection of personal data and to respect for private life
Strengthening the possibility of exchanging personal information between Eurojust and
other JHA IBOAs, especially Europol, as well as third-country authorities, raises
fundamental rights consideration. These considerations primarily concern the right to the
protection of personal data under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. These issues are
particularly important concerning the transfer of data to the national competent authorities
of third countries for which only data strictly necessary for judicial cooperation should be
shared, in compliance with the EU data protection framework, in particular the Chapter
21 Recitals 54-60; Chapter V of Regulation (EU) 2018/1727.
76
IX of the EUDPR. Enhanced data-sharing, while operationally valuable for combating
crime, introduces certain risks that must be carefully managed.
A more frequent exchange of personal data, including sensitive data such as biometric or
criminal records, increases the number of actors with access to this information and
eventually a longer retention and broader reuse of data may occur. Such interference must
therefore meet strict necessity and proportionality requirements. Stronger data
exchange may risk blurring the boundary between intelligence and judicial use, a reuse of
data for purposes not originally envisaged and a potential reliance on unverified or
analytical data in judicial proceedings. Moreover, this threatens the purpose limitation
principle that is a core data-protection safeguard.
To mitigate these risks, enhanced exchange must be clearly defined in the legal basis
(which is EU secondary legislation), strictly limited to specific categories of data and
finally linked to precise objectives in accordance with the principle of proportionality.
Lastly, effective protection will require an oversight by the European Data Protection
Supervisor (EDPS).
This is why this impact assessment thoroughly takes into consideration these issues of data
protection and privacy and any consequences of the proposed amendments to the current
legal framework for the processing and sharing of personal data by Eurojust with its
European institutional partners (IBOAs or Member States) and third countries.
The preferred policy option, particularly the measures enhancing data exchange with
Europol, the EPPO, and third countries (such as D.PO3, E.PO2, and F.PO2), will
increase the volume and scope of personal data processing. While this strengthens
operational cooperation, it also introduces risks that must be carefully managed.
A more frequent exchange of personal data, including sensitive information such as
biometric or criminal records, raises concerns about expanded access by a broader range
of actors, potentially leading to longer retention periods and reuse of data beyond its
original purpose. Additionally, there is a risk of blurring the boundary between
intelligence and judicial use, where data collected for law enforcement purposes (e.g., by
Europol) might be repurposed for judicial proceedings without sufficient safeguards.
Furthermore, transfers to third countries pose challenges, as data protection standards in
those jurisdictions may not fully align with EU requirements, particularly under Chapter
IX of the EU Data Protection Regulation (EUDPR).
To mitigate these risks, strict legal bases for data exchange will be established, ensuring
that shared data is limited to what is necessary and proportionate for judicial cooperation.
Purpose limitation of safeguards will prevent the reuse of data for unintended objectives,
while oversight by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) will ensure
compliance with EU standards, particularly for transfers to third countries. A revision of
the EJR will also align with the parallel revision of the EUDPR, which will provide
harmonised rules for all Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies, further reinforcing data
protection.
Procedural Safeguards in Criminal Proceedings
The preferred option aims to strengthen Eurojust’s operational role (e.g., through
A.PO3 and B.PO3) without compromising core principles of criminal justice. The
presumption of innocence and the right of defense (Article 48 of the Charter) must be
upheld, particularly in relation to Eurojust’s expanded analytical functions, such as
evidence databases for organised crime, which must avoid prejudicing ongoing
77
investigations or trials. The principle of ne bis in idem (Article 50 of the Charter) will be
safeguarded through enhanced coordination mechanisms, which reduce the risk of parallel
proceedings.
The legality and proportionality of penalties (Article 49 of the Charter) must also be
respected, particularly where Eurojust is granted new competences, such as issuing
freezing orders. These competences must align with national procedural autonomy and
EU-wide standards.
Key safeguards will ensure that Eurojust’s role remains supportive and coordinative,
avoiding any interference with national judicial independence. Transparency and legal
remedies will be embedded in operational procedures, providing clear avenues for
individuals to challenge data processing or operational decisions that may affect their
rights.
Non-Discrimination and Rights of Vulnerable Groups (Articles 21 and 24 of the
Charter)
The expansion of Eurojust’s mandate to include gender-based violence and victims’
rights (under A.PO3) must ensure non-discriminatory application and the protection
of victims, particularly in cross-border cases. Where cases involve minors, data processing
must fully comply with Article 24 of the Charter, which protects the rights of the child,
ensuring that procedures are child-sensitive and respectful of their specific needs.]
The preferred option minimises negative impacts on fundamental rights while
enhancing Eurojust’s operational effectiveness. The net effect is expected to be neutral
or positive, particularly through measures that:
• Reduce risks of jurisdictional conflicts, for example by implementing B.PO3’s
case allocation system, which ensures clearer and more consistent case handling.
• Improve coherence with EU data protection frameworks, particularly through
alignment with the revision of the EUDPR, which will establish harmonised rules
for data processing across JHA agencies.
• Embed procedural safeguards in operational tools, such as analytical databases,
ensuring that fundamental rights are protected throughout judicial cooperation
processes.
5. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND STRATEGIES INCLUDING A ROLE FOR EUROJUST
● European Arrest Warrant (EAW): Framework Decision 2002/584 of 13.06.2002,
Articles 16, 17. Eurojust can provide advice in the case of competing EAWs;
Eurojust shall be notified when Member states cannot comply with the time limits
set out in the Framework Decision.
● Transfer of proceedings: Regulation 2024/3011 of 27.11.2024, Articles 18, 24, 26,
27. Eurojust shall assist the authorities involved at any stage of the procedure, in
particular supporting (preliminary) consultations between the authorities, facilitating
an agreement on the concentration of the proceedings in one Member State, facilitate
the transmission of all communication between the authorities involved.
● Conflicts of jurisdiction: Framework Decision 2009/948 of 30.11.2009, Article 12
and several recitals. Eurojust may facilitate consultations between the authorities, the
national authorities shall refer the case to Eurojust where they cannot reach a
consensus on how to solve a conflict of jurisdiction. Directive 2017/541 of
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15.03.2017 on combating terrorism, Article 19 refers to the role of Eurojust in
conflicts of jurisdiction in terrorism cases.
● European Protection Order: Directive 2011/99 of 13.12.2011, Article 8. Eurojust
can support in the transmission phase and with obtaining the necessary information.
● European Investigation Order: Directive 2014/41 of 3.4.2014, recital 13. Eurojust
can support with a view to ensuring the transmission of the EIO to the competent
authority of the executing State.
● Asset tracing: Directive 2024/1260 of 24.4.2024, Article 30(2). Asset recovery
offices and asset management offices shall cooperate with Eurojust for the purposes
of facilitating the identification of assets to be frozen or confiscated in the course of
proceedings in criminal matters, to facilitate the management of frozen and
confiscated assets.
● Freezing and confiscation: Regulation 2018/1805 of 14.11.2018, Article 31 and
Recital 24, 27, 43, 44. Eurojust may facilitate consultations on the sharing of the
costs, facilitate the transmission of freezing and confiscation orders, coordinate
freezing/confiscation orders issued to several Member States to avoid excessive
confiscations, provide assistance in relation to the procedures for the execution of a
freezing/confiscation order given that they may be very different in the two Member
States involved, facilitate coordination for the simultaneous execution of
freezing/confiscation orders in several Member States.
● European Production and Preservation Order (e-Evidence): Regulation
2023/1543 of 12.07.2023, Article 5(10). Issuing authorities may seek clarification
via Eurojust before issuing a European Production Order, including by consulting
the competent authorities of the enforcing State, if the issuing authority has reasons
to believe that the data requested are protected by immunities or privileges or are
subject to rules on determination and limitation of criminal liability relating to
freedom of the press or freedom of expression in other media.
● Sanctions evasion: Directive 2024/1226 of 24.04.2024 defining criminal offences
and penalties for the violation of EU restrictive measures - Violation of EU restrictive
measures/sanctions evasions is now a crime EU-wide and should be explicitly
reflected in Annex I EJR. Eurojust has been supporting a growing number of such
operational cases. Violation of EU restrictive measures/ sanctions evasions is now a
predicate offence to money laundering. Directive on combating money laundering
by criminal law has been amended (Article 2(1) (w), by virtue of the Directive on
restrictive measures. The scope of Directive 2024/1260 on asset recovery and
confiscation has been extended to encompass violation of EU restrictive
measures/sanctions violations.
● Support to EU Seize Freeze and Task Force: the EU ‘Freeze and Seize’ Task Force
does not have an operational mandate and cannot interfere with the conduct of
individual administrative or judicial procedures. This is one of the reasons why
Eurojust and Europol have been invited to support the Task Force, within the
framework of their respective mandates. At the JHA Council meeting of 4 March
2022 referred to above, Eurojust was invited to exercise its coordination role with
regard to both the EU “Freeze and Seize” Task Force and the investigation of core
international crimes allegedly committed in Ukraine further to Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine.
● Victims’ rights:
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o EU Strategy on Victims’ rights 2020-2025, on page 20 whereby Eurojust, in
coordination with other EU agencies/networks, “should report on how to
improve the cooperation and exchange of information and good practices
between the competent authorities in cross-border cases”.
o Directive 2024/1385 of 14.05.2024 against domestic violence and violence
against women, recital 87 (exchanging best practices and consulting in
individual cases), Article 43(b) (whereby MS are invited to “consult each other
in individual cases, including through Eurojust and the European Judicial
Network in criminal matters, within their respective mandates”).
o Amendments to Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the
rights, support and protection of victims of crime (amendments adopted on 10
December 2025 being finalised but not yet published. Expected reference to
Eurojust in Article 17(4) in a supporting role to national authorities in cases
involving victims).
● Joint investigation teams (JITs): Regulation 2023/969 of 10 May 2023 establishing
a collaboration platform to support the functioning of joint investigation teams and
amending Regulation 2018/1726, Articles 9-10. The tasks are for JITs Network
Secretariat explicitly, as well as for Eurojust regarding the technical arrangement to
enable the use of the JITs CP and connection with IT tool managed by Eurojust, in
particular JIT Funding.
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 24.6.2026
SWD(2026) 573 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and
repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1727
{COM(2026) 570 final} - {SEC(2026) 570 final} - {SWD(2026) 570 final} -
{SWD(2026) 571 final} - {SWD(2026) 572 final}
1
Factual Summary Report
Cross-border judicial cooperation – Revision of Eurojust Regulation (impact assessment)
A. Objective and Methodology
The objective of the public consultation was to obtain the views of citizens, Member States and other
relevant stakeholders on Eurojust and the Eurojust Regulation, thereby contributing to the upcoming
impact assessment of a possible revision of the Eurojust Regulation. Eurojust is the EU agency for
criminal justice cooperation,supporting national authorities in combating serious cross-border crime
by strengthening coordination between national authorities. The consultation followed an evaluation
of Eurojust1, published on 2 July 2025, which had already pointed to some problems related to the
agency and its legal framework.
The public consultation took the form of an online survey, with a mix of closed and open questions.
The questionnaire was published in all 24 EU official languages. Participants to the questionnaire could
reply in any of these languages. Contributions were possible from 3 December 2025 to 24 February
2026.
Beyond an introductory part about the person of the respondent, the survey was composed of 10 closed
questions about Eurojust and its activities. In some instances, such as when respondents chose the
answer option “Other”, they were invited to elaborate further in free-text boxes.
This report summarises the results of the open public consultation.
B. Key findings
The main points raised by the respondents in the survey were the following:
• It found that almost all respondents believed Eurojust’s role in addressing serious and
organised cross-border crime in the EU to be important, 50% to be very important.
• Some participants stressed the need to better consider the perspective of victims and
witnesses and to clarify case allocation between Eurojust and the European Judicial
Network (EJN).
1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/evaluation-eurojust_en.
Disclaimer: This document should be regarded solely as a summary of the contributions made by
stakeholders in the open consultation on the revision of the Eurojust Regulation (EU) 2018/1727.
It cannot in any circumstances be regarded as the official position of the European Commission or
its services. Responses to the consultation activities cannot be considered as a representative
sample of the views of the EU population.
2
• Criminal use of the digital space, AI and new technology was, almost unanimously, seen as
one of the main challenges that criminal investigations and prosecutions in Europe will face in
the coming years.
C. Overview of Respondents
20 stakeholders responded to the public consultation. Respondents represented the following
geographic distribution: 17 responses originated from 9 Member States. The largest shares came from
Belgium (4; 20%), France (4; 20%). 3 responses were submitted from outside the EU (Bosnia
Herzegovina, North Macedonia and the United States).
Figure 1: Geographical distribution of respondents
The highest proportion of responses were submitted by public authorities (8; 40%), followed by EU
citizens (4; 20%), companies/businesses (3; 15%), non-EU citizens (2; 10%), non-governmental
organisation (NGO) (1; 5%), business association (1; 5%) and other (1; 5%). When asked about the
size of organisation, 10 participants (50%) identified as large (250 employees or more), 1 (5%) as
medium (50 to 249 employees), 2 (10%) as small (10 to 9 employees), 1 (5%) as micro (1 to 9
employees) and 6 (30%) did not provide an answer.
D. Past Evaluation and Role of Eurojust
When asked to self-assess their familiarity with Eurojust (Q1), respondents selected a value on a
scale from 1 to 4, where: where 1 corresponds to ‘I have never heard of Eurojust’ and 4 corresponds
3
to ‘I have in-depth knowledge of Eurojust, including its structure and Regulation’). A majority of
respondents (11; 55%) reported the highest level of familiarity with Eurojust (level 4). Another
significant group (6; 30%) indicated a level of knowledge corresponding to the second-highest
category (level 3), while three respondents (15%) selected familiarity level 2. None of the participants
chose level 1.
Half of the respondents (10; 50%) considered Eurojust’s role in addressing serious and organised
cross-border crime within the EU to be ‘very important – Eurojust is essential in ensuring effective
cross-border judicial cooperation’ (Q2). A further 45% (9 respondents) viewed it as important –
Eurojust provides clear added value by facilitating coordination, while only one participant (5%)
selected no opinion/don’t know. The options Moderately important - Eurojust adds some value, but
effective national coordination would largely be possible without it and Not important - national
authorities can coordinate effectively on their own without a specialised agency were not selected by
the respondents.
Respondents were asked whether they agreed with the findings of the European Commission’s
evaluation of Eurojust2(Q3), conducted to inform potential revisions to the Eurojust Regulation.
The evaluation concluded that while Eurojust effectively supports EU Member States in combating
crime, its operations could be more efficient. Key findings included:
• Eurojust does indeed support EU Member States in the fight against crime, but it could do so
more efficiently.
• Eurojust’s scope of work is broad and not always clearly defined. The Agency often becomes
involved in lower-complexity cases that could be dealt with through different cooperation
channels (bilateral cooperation or EJN).
• The Agency’s internal organisation and decision-making is complex, with an unclear division
of responsibilities. This can result in slow procedures and duplication of work.
• Cooperation with other EU bodies works for individual cases, but coordination at a more
general level is still weak.
• The expansion of cooperation with non-EU countries is held back by lengthy and cumbersome
procedures to conclude international agreements.
When asked to select the response that best reflected their view, respondents replied as follows:
• 12 (60%) agreed with the findings,
• 5 (25%) partially agreed,
• 0 (0%) disagreed, and
• 3 (15%) selected no opinion/don’t know.
If partially agreeing or disagreeing, participants were invited to explain which findings they disagree
with or to add anything they consider missing.
2 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/evaluation-eurojust_en.
4
Some of the issues raised there were: a preference towards cautious and fine-tuned revisions of the
internal decision-making process, more attention to victims and witnesses engaged with Eurojust,
improved case allocation between Eurojust and the EJN and scepticism as to whether there is a need
to improve cooperation/coordination with other EU bodies at the legislative level.
E. Future Challenges and Prioritisation
Participants of the consultation were asked which – in their view – would be the main challenges that
criminal investigations and prosecutions in Europe will face in the upcoming years (Q4). The
respondents could choose from a list (Criminal use of the digital space (19 replies), artificial
intelligence and new technologies, Globalisation of organised crime networks (10 replies), Blurring
of the lines between organised crime and security threats (terrorism, hybrid threats) (5 replies),
Greater financial sophistication of criminal groups (cryptocurrencies, money laundering) (7 replies),
Deeper infiltration of crime into legal economies and business structures (8 replies), Increase in the
use of violence by organised crime groups (1 reply), Rising volume and complexity of cross-border
cases) (7 replies), or provide their own suggestions if they clicked on ‘Other’ (1 reply). The replies can
be visualised as follows:
Figure 2: Challenges. Responses in %.
One respondent added “Cooperation between states” as other challenge.
When asked, which areas of crimes should be prioritised by Eurojust (Q5), the following results were
gathered. The complete list of options given was:
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Terrorism (13 replies), Organised crime (15 replies), Drug trafficking and illicit trafficking in
hormonal substances and growth promoters (7 replies), Financial crimes (e.g. fraud, money
laundering) and corruption (8 replies), Crimes involving nuclear or radioactive materials (2 replies),
Migrant smuggling (2 replies), Trafficking in human beings and trade in human organs (8 replies),
Violent crime (murder, bodily injury, kidnapping, hostage taking) (1 reply), Hate crime (racism and
xenophobia), Property crime (robbery, aggravated theft, racketeering, extortion), Illicit trafficking in
cultural goods (antiquities, works of art), Counterfeiting and forgery (1 reply), Cybercrime and hybrid
attacks (12 replies), Arms trafficking (weapons, ammunition, explosives) (1 reply), Environmental
crime (including trafficking in endangered species), Sexual abuse and exploitation (including child
sexual abuse material) (3 replies), Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (3 replies),
Other (3 replies), No answer (1 reply).
Figure 3: Prioritisation of areas of crime. Answers in %.
When they chose “Other”, participants were invited to specify which area of crimes they had in mind.
They replied with: Crimes against states, such as espionage; the implementation of fast online court
orders; the prioritisation of the forms crimes listed in Annex I falls under the responsibility of the
College of Eurojust.
The public consultation also asked about which of its tasks Eurojust should prioritise in order to fight
serious and organised cross-border crime more effectively (Q5). The tasks listed were the following:
Facilitating and coordinating joint investigation teams of authorities from different countries (10
replies), Assisting in the exchange of evidence and information between national authorities (7
replies), Supporting the coordination of prosecutions in cases where multiple jurisdictions are involved
(8 replies), Providing advice to national authorities in complex cross-border cases (5 replies),
Developing and maintaining standard procedures and best practices for cross-border investigations
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(6 replies), Acting as a central hub for cross-border case analysis and trends at judicial level (5
replies), Strengthening cooperation with non-EU countries and international organisations to
facilitate global cooperation against serious and organised cross-border crime (8 replies),
Strengthening cooperation with other EU agencies and bodies (e.g. Europol, the European Anti-Fraud
Office (OLAF) the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), Frontex) (4 replies), Storing,
analysing and making available evidence of serious cross-border crime (1 reply), Other (1 reply), No
answer (1 reply).
Figure 4: Prioritisation of tasks. Answers in %.
As other task, one respondent mentioned the systematic early-stage coordination in complex cross-
border investigations.
The consultation also went one step further and asked about additional activities that Eurojust could
carry out to improve its support to national authorities. A list was provided suggesting the following
tasks, as well as allowing for additional suggestions under the category “Other”:
Providing support to national prosecutors and judges in the use of new innovative tools, including the
collection of digital evidence (11 replies), Hosting and supporting judicial networks, bringing together
practitioners working in specific areas (e.g. the European Judicial Organised Crime Network, the
Genocide Prosecution Network, the Network of National Experts on Joint Investigation Teams) (9
replies), Raising awareness among the public and stakeholders about cross-border crime and EU
judicial cooperation (6 replies), Monitoring and reporting on the effectiveness of cooperation by
national investigation and prosecution authorities in cross-border cases (3 replies), Providing training
programmes for national prosecutors and investigators on cross-border legal and operational issues
(7 replies), Operating a think tank or research unit, developing strategies and policies in the field of
judicial cooperation (5 replies), Ensuring that victim protection and human rights considerations are
taken into account during the coordination of prosecution in cross-border cases (4 replies), Acting as
an information hub on procedural matters for national authorities and stakeholders (6 replies)
Improving outreach and visibility (3 replies), Other (1 reply).
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Figure 5: Additional tasks. Answers in %.
F. Proactiveness
The survey also inquired whether the respondents thought that Eurojust should act more on its own
initiative (“In your view, should Eurojust act more on its own initiative? Generally, Eurojust supports
national authorities when they request its assistance. It may proactively coordinate cases, for instance
by involving EU Member States that might have not been included in the case and by discovering links
between cases based on information it receives from Europol, OLAF, EPPO and national authorities.
However, it cannot require national authorities to open investigations, establish a joint investigation
team, or transfer proceedings on its own initiative. (Please select the answer that best reflects your
view”). The following picture evolved: The majority of respondents were in favour of more
proactive role of Eurojust (13 replies; 65%), either whenever national authorities cannot react
promptly in urgent situation, or entirely on its own initiative. None of the respondents voted for the
most restrictive option of Eurojust not acting unless requested by an EU Member State.
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Figure 6: Own initiative of Eurojust.
Asked about Eurojust’s role in supporting victims of crime (“Do you think Eurojust should have a
specific role in supporting victims of crime? Currently, Eurojust supports victims of crime indirectly
by assisting national authorities in the investigation and prosecution of cross-border crimes. However,
the Eurojust Regulation does not provide it with specific competences regarding the protection and
support of victims. (Please select the answer that best reflects your view”). Respondents gave the
following answers:
Figure 7: Role in supporting victims of crime.
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G. Additional Feedback, Stakeholder Recommendations
In response to the last question (Q10), which invited respondents to provide additional comments,
opinions, suggestions or further explanation of their earlier answers or proposals for change, several
key themes emerged regarding Eurojust’s future role and operations:
One respondent stressed that Eurojust should remain focused on coordinating and facilitating judicial
cooperation, such as supporting joint investigation teams, rather than assuming executive powers like
initiating prosecutions, and called for adequate financial resources to strengthen national desks by
increasing seconded national experts.
Another highlighted the need for special provisions to protect child victims, including child-friendly
procedures, legal counselling, and psychosocial support, in line with EU and Council of Europe
guidelines.
A detailed submission argued that Eurojust’s international cooperation is hindered by the lack of
adequacy decisions and cooperation agreements with non-EU countries, proposing a more flexible,
risk-based approach to data exchange under the Law Enforcement Directive to better reflect criminal
justice realities.
One respondent cautioned against major reforms, advocating instead for targeted adjustments to
Eurojust’s mandate, while another stressed the importance of clearer cooperation frameworks to
benefit non-EU partners and strengthen institutional capacity.
Additional comments included the suggestion that Eurojust should evolve into a more proactive,
intelligence-led agency while respecting national sovereignty, and that it could play a critical role in
implementing the e-Evidence Regulation through training and coordination.
Finally, a respondent noted that Eurojust should remain an operational tool focused on its core mission
of supporting Member States’ judicial authorities.
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 24.6.2026
SWD(2026) 571 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and
repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1727
{COM(2026) 570 final} - {SEC(2026) 570 final} - {SWD(2026) 570 final} -
{SWD(2026) 572 final} - {SWD(2026) 573 final}
1
Executive summary sheet
Impact assessment for the review of the Eurojust Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2018/1727)
A. Need for action
What is the problem and why is it a problem at EU level?
This impact assessment follows the evaluation of the Eurojust Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 on the
European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, EJR or the Regulation) published on 2 July 2025. The
EJR established Eurojust as an EU agency with legal personality, laying down its mandate, structure and operational
framework. The Regulation defines Eurojust’s core mission as supporting and strengthening coordination and
cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime, particularly in
cases affecting multiple Member States, based on information supplied by Member States’ authorities, Europol, the
European Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO) and OLAF. Eurojust’s material competence covers serious forms of
crime listed in Annex I of the Regulation, together with related offences, ensuring legal clarity while allowing
operational flexibility.
The evaluation’s findings strongly support the case of reforming Eurojust’s mandate, particularly in areas such as
efficiency and cooperation with EU partners and third countries. Optimisation of internal processes and interactions
with the broader criminal justice ecosystem would enable Eurojust to fully realise its potential in the fight against
serious and organised cross-border crime.
For the purpose of the impact assessment two sets of problems have been identified:
- Problem 1: Suboptimal efficiency of Eurojust’s internal organisation and processes, and
- Problem 2: Limitations in Eurojust’s interaction with partners.
Concretely, problem 1 involves an increasing demand for services across Member States while struggling to filter
out lower-complexity cases, which could be more efficiently handled through bilateral cooperation or the European
Judicial Network (EJN), thereby diverting resources from complex cases, where Eurojust generates its greatest
added value. Due to an expanding mandate and growing caseload tensions have arisen between workload and staff
allocation, leading to reduced support capacity and delays in responding to Member States. This problem can
partially be explained with the absence of a clearly defined mandate and operating mostly reactively to Member
States requests. Another part of the problem lies in the current governance practices of the agency where decisions
that could be taken at lower level are often escalated to collective governance bodies, increasing procedural burden.
Eurojust’s current governance structure is overly complex, with oftentimes unclear separation between operational
and administrative responsibilities. Administrative work tends to deflect a significant share of Eurojust’s National
Members’ attention away from casework. Criteria on what qualifies as a “Eurojust case” and how to select or
prioritise cases are lacking. The status, powers and skills of Eurojust’s National Members (prosecutors, judges,
representatives of a judicial authority) vary across member states, leading to an uneven distribution of Eurojust’s
added value across Member States.
Problem 2 describes the shortcomings in Eurojust’s interaction with partners at EU (especially with Europol, the
EPPO and OLAF) and international level (cooperation with third countries). Interaction with EU bodies and
agencies still lacks structure and institutionalisation and is prone to procedural complexity and duplication.
Information exchange could be improved: as system of indirect mutual access to data bases (“hit/no-hit” system) is
in place only bilaterally in relation to Europol, EPPO and OLAF and cumbersome requiring manual follow-ups. On
the international level, existing arrangements may not be sufficiently robust or evenly implemented. New
international agreements cannot be concluded by Eurojust but require the involvement of the European Commission,
Council and Parliament which made the process time-consuming. Further issues in this area surround the conclusion
of working arrangements (in the absence of international agreements), legally underdefined activities in capacity-
building, or the underusage of so-called Liaison Magistrates (Eurojust officials posted in third countries) and Liaison
2
Prosecutors (third-country officials posted at Eurojust on the basis of international agreements).
These problems are genuinely rooted at EU level, since Eurojust is an EU decentralised agency and can therefore
only be solved at EU level. The cross-border nature of the crimes dealt with by Eurojust demand a joint European
response implementing Eurojust’s mission in line with Article 85 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU). Without EU intervention, the problems are likely to persist as they relate to Eurjust’s legal
framework, governance design, legacy organisational culture, dependence on Member States, and the broader
dynamics in the EU justice architecture.
What should be achieved?
General objective: The revision of the EJR seeks to better attain the goals set out in the Treaties, namely to support
and strengthen coordination and cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities and to
ensure a high level of security through measures that prevent and combat crime and measures that foster
coordination and cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities.
Two specific objectives were identified:
1. Strengthen Eurojust’s internal functioning, governance and operational performance
2. Strengthen Eurojust’s external cooperation and integration with EU-level and international partners
What is the added value of action at EU level (subsidiarity)?
Eurojust’s functions (coordination, cooperation facilitation, and operational support) are transnational by nature and
cannot be performed effectively solely on Member State level. The agency provides a neutral EU-level perspective
across juristdictions, facilitates multilateral cooperation in parallel, and ensures that no Member State is placed at a
disadvantage. Scale and complexity of cross-border investigations render EU-level coordination indispensable for
national prosecutorial and judicial authorities, calling for EU-level action and thus adhering to the subsidiarity
principle. Eurojust offers operational, legal, and strategic value that improve the functioning of national systems and
the coherence of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Action by Eurojust does not replace that of
national authorities but enhances it through supporting services. There are clear ecomonies of scale and efficiency
gains by further improving Eurojust, enabling it to bring together expertise from national practicioners in one
agency, coordinate fast and more efficiently in the fight against transnational crime, avoiding duplication and
conflicting investigations.
B. Solutions
What are the various options to achieve the objectives? Is there a preferred option or not? If not, why?
The impact assessment evaluates policy options spanning from non-legislative to regulatory interventions. Each
policy option consists of a set of measures (numbered i, ii, iii, etc.), selected based on their ability to address a given
problem (or its driver), and screened for effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. For each of seven intervention
areas (A-F), three policy options have been developed, varying in intensity (PO1 being the lightest set of measures,
PO2 moderate, and PO3 the most far-reaching set of measures).
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 1 (INTERNAL):
STRENGTHEN EUROJUST’S INTERNAL FUNCTIONING, GOVERNANCE AND OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Options
Light
change Moderate
change Substantial
change
A. Extending the scope of material competences to face the new judicial landscape
Addressing problem driver(s):
#2 Insufficient competences and associated toolset A.PO1 A.PO2 A .PO3
i. Enhancing Eurojust’s support in EU policy-making and strategic cycles – through working arrangements with
IBOAs (i.a) or by introducing a dedicated provision in the EJR (i.b) i.a i.b i.b
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ii. Entrusting Eurojust with new operational functions (in the areas of e-evidence, victims’ rights support to asset
recovery) – through non-binding guidelines (ii.a) or by introducing a dedicated provision in the EJR (ii.b) ii.a
ii.b ii.b
iii. Introducing semi-permanent operational platforms to support JITs – through operational arrangements (iii.a)
or by introducing a reference in the EJR (iii.b) iii.a iii.b iii.b
iv. Extending Eurojust’s material competence to new crimes (VURM, cybercrime, GBV) iv iv
v. Expanding Eurojust’s analytical function to key crime areas (organised crime and accessory crimes) v
B. Harmonising Member State implementation of the EJR, including on allocation of cases
Addressing problem driver(s):
#1 Inadequate model to select and prioritise cases;
#3 Divergent Member State engagement and implementation of the EJR
B.PO1 B.PO2 B.PO3
i. Introduce a Eurojust-EJN case-allocation system – through non-binding guidelines (i.a) or by introducing a
EJR provision defining a ‘Eurojust case’ (i.b) i.a i.b i.b
ii. Reinforce the status of National Members to give them full operational powers – through advocacy and
political push (ii.a) or by amending the relevant EJR provisions (ii.b) ii.a ii.b ii.b
iii. Entrusting National Members with new competences (subject to their attributions under national law):
issuing freezing orders (or immediate action), European Production and Preservation Orders (e-evidence), and
signing JIT agreements
iii iii
iv. Grant National Members the authority to open Eurojust cases iv
C. Establishing a streamlined, coherent and role-clear governance system that accelerates decision-making
Addressing problem driver(s):
#4 Lack of clear separation between operational and administrative responsibilities
#5Complex governance structure and outdated legacy organisational culture
C.PO1 C.PO2 C.PO3
i. Revision of the allocation of responsibilities between governance bodies i i i
ii. Reform of the Executive Board ii ii
iii. Introduction of a Management Board iii
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 2 (EXTERNAL):
ACHIEVE OPTIMAL ALIGNMENT AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION WITH EU PARTNERS AND THIRD COUNTRIES
Options
Light
changes
Moderate
changes
Substantive
changes
D. Fostering and strengthening structured operational cooperation with Europol
Addressing problem driver(s):
#8 Absence of a structurally embedded cooperation with Europol D.PO1 D.PO2 D.PO3
i. Automating and optimising Eurojust-Europol’s system for indirect access to the respective databases
(interagency hit/no-hit system) – through technical measures only (i.a) or through technical measures linked to
new legal obligations (i.b)
i.a i.b i.b
ii. Revising the 2010 Eurojust-Europol Working Arrangements – through a political push for its renegotiation
(ii.a) or by introducing in the EJR a legal obligation of periodic review in consultation with the Commission
(ii.b)
ii.a ii.b ii.b
iii. Creating a dedicated cooperation channel for systematic follow up on SIRIUS referrals iii iii
iv. Granting participation in College meetings to Europol representatives iv iv
v. Codifying cooperation modalities between Eurojust and Europol (e.g., notification to Eurojust upon reaching
of “judicial threshold”, creation of Joint Operational Platforms or task forces) v
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E. Promoting fully developed cooperation with the EPPO
Addressing problem driver(s):
#9 Constrained cooperation with the EPPO E.PO1
E.PO2 E.PO3
i. Automating and optimising Eurojust-EPPO’s system for indirect access to the respective databases
(interagency hit/no-hit system) – through technical measures only (i.a) or through technical measures linked to
new legal obligations (i.b)
i.a i.b i.b
ii. Establishing an explicit mandate for Eurojust to provide reinforced support in EPPO cases (JITs, coordination
meetings, Action Days) ii ii
iii. Granting participation in College meetings to EPPO representatives iii iii
iv. Setting up a Eurojust-EPPO clearing-house mechanism for case allocation iv
F. Consolidating cooperation with third countries and international organisations
Addressing problem driver(s):
#10 Cumbersome process for establishing relations with international actors F.PO1
F.PO2 F.PO3
i. Introducing cooperation obligations in agreements with third countries with financial implications – as a cross
cutting non-legislative measure (i) i i i
ii. Clarifying the legal framework governing Liaison Magistrates ii ii
iii. Institutionalising Resident Contact Points for priority countries iii iii
iv. Granting participation in College meetings to Liaison Prosecutors iv iv
v. Entrusting Eurojust with an explicit capacity building mandate in external action v
According to the analysis and the assessment, the preferred option consists of a package of the policy options
under each area of intervention: A.PO3, B.PO3, C.PO3, D.PO3, E.PO2, F.PO2. These policy options are
complementary and score highest regarding their impact on the three evaluation criteria effectiveness, efficiency and
coherence.
What are different stakeholders’ views?
Consultations with stakeholders have shown that there is very broad support for reforming Eurojust.
In particular, stakeholders like Eurojust’s administration were in favour of the proposed governance reform as it
would, in their view, address inefficiencies experienced, reducing not only National Members’ time spent in
meetings but also time required to take decisions. National Members, however, pointed to the downsides of taking
certain decision-making powers away from them and transferring them to a Management Board that might not be as
familiar with Eurojust and might still ask to be briefed.
Across all areas of intervention surveys illustrated stakeholder support for measures like giving Eurojust a support
role vis-à-vis e-evidence and relations with service providers and strengthen the ability of Eurojust National
Members to issue e-evidence orders (50,3%; area A), encouraging Member States to select National Members with
strong operational powers and qualifications (64,9%; area B), adopting a more standard governance model by
introducing a full Management Board (72,3%; area C), improving the hit/no-hit system between Eurojust and
Europol and the EPPO by having an automated process (48,9%; area D and E), allowing the participation of Liaison
Prosecutors in the College on cases involving third countries (59,1%; area F). According to the respondents these
measures would contribute to achieving the envisaged objectives to a moderate or large extent.
C. Impact of the preferred option
What are the benefits of the preferred option (if any, otherwise of main ones)?
The preferred option is a package that generates cumulative impacts by combining measures that address different
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but interrelated drivers of the problem. Taken together, these measures form a coherent and mutually reinforcing
revision of the Eurojust mandate: they strengthen Eurojust’s ability to support Member States to combat serious and
cross-border crime more effectively than any individual measure alone. The two specific objectives would be
reached and the package aligns with stakeholder demands and EU strategic priorities, ensuring political feasibility
and operational relevance. Eurojust’s proactivity would be improved, transforming it from a reactive coordination
body to a strategic and analytical hub for cross-border judicial cooperation. In detail, the measures would:
- codify and expand Eurojust’s mandate and operational competences to emerging crime areas through
amendments of Annex I. In parallel, Eurojust’s analytical capacity would be strengthened by providing a
mandate to use judicial data, supporting national authorities in evidence-building and strategic case
development.
- reinforce operational coordination and legal certainty within Eurojust by spelling out the concept of a
“Eurojust case”, the eligiblity requirements for National Members and their powers to issue mutual legal
assistance requests and investigative orders.
- modernise Eurojust’s governance, decision making and internal management structure.
- enhance data protection and data management capabilities, specifying the application of the EU data
protection regime within the EJR.
- strengthen cooperation with key partners at EU (in particular Europol and the EPPO) and international
levels (notably strategic third countries).