EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 3.7.2026 JOIN(2026) 15 final

JOINT REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

on the implementation of the EU strategic approach to the Black Sea region

1. INTRODUCTION

The Joint Communication on the European Union’s strategic approach to the Black

Sea region (1) (also referred to as the ‘Black Sea Strategy’ or the ‘Strategy’) calls on

the European Commission and the High Representative / Vice-President (HR/VP) to

deliver a progress report one year into its implementation. Accordingly, this joint

report outlines the progress made since its adoption in May 2025.

In June 2025, the European Council welcomed the Joint Communication (2), which

reaffirms the Black Sea’s geostrategic role and sets out a vision for a more secure,

interconnected, prosperous, and resilient region – anchored in shared values, the rule

of law, sustainability, and effective cooperation. The EU is committed to advancing

this vision jointly with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova

(‘Moldova’), Türkiye, and Ukraine, through mutually reinforcing cooperation.

The first year of implementation of the Strategy saw intensified Russian hybrid

attacks, drone and missile warfare against military and civilian and critical

infrastructure, including ports, especially in the Odesa region. Russia’s war of

aggression against Ukraine, lasting for more than four years since 2022, continues to

severely undermine security and stability in the Black Sea region, dramatically

expanding negative consequences for the region and beyond.

Despite the war’s impact, most countries in the region maintain macroeconomic

stability and are implementing structural reforms (3). Some of them are on the path to

EU accession, and their gradual integration into EU initiatives has reinforced

cooperation, cohesion and coordinated action with the EU. The ongoing peace process

between Armenia and Azerbaijan offers a historic opportunity to consolidate cross-

border cooperation and connectivity in the South Caucasus, and to facilitate linkages

with Central Asia. Complementarities with the EU Strategy for Central Asia,

especially for cross-regional connectivity efforts, have been pursued.

In line with the objectives of the Black Sea Strategy, the current report highlights the

EU’s increased strategic engagement and coordinated actions to: (i) enhance security,

stability and resilience across the Black Sea region (Pillar 1); (ii) strengthen economic

growth and transport, energy, and digital connectivity (Pillar 2); and (iii) ensure

environmental and climate resilience and preparedness, and civil protection (Pillar 3).

Central to these efforts has been the support provided by the EU to Ukraine.

2. ADVANCING EU ENGAGEMENT AND COOPERATION IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

The EU engagement in the Black Sea region and with its partner countries reflects

new levels of ambition and significant steps taken forward to deepen political,

economic and sectoral cooperation with partner countries. The ministerial meeting on

cross-regional security and connectivity in Luxembourg on 20 October 2025 marked

a major step in fostering closer mutually beneficial partnerships and taking forward

cross-regional cooperation on security and connectivity. The meeting brought

(1) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0135

(2) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/cjtb3oep/20250626-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf

(3) https://www.ebrd.com/home/news-and-events/publications/economics/transition-reports/transition-

report-2025-26.html

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together EU Member States and partner countries from the Black Sea region, the

South Caucasus and Central Asia (4). Discussions deepened political dialogue on

security, stability, and resilience in the region. The meeting also advanced the cross-

regional Connectivity Agenda, aimed at strengthening trade and economic growth by

better connecting the EU, Ukraine and Moldova, to the Southern Caucasus and

Central Asia via Black Sea and Türkiye. Participants reaffirmed their determination

to step up cooperation in areas of shared interest, enhance resilience and promote

more connected, secure and prosperous regions.

Ukraine has shown strong commitment to reform so as to meet EU accession

requirements (5) and to prepare for future reconstruction, despite Russian attacks

against cities and civilian and energy infrastructure continuing to escalate. The

implementation of the reforms agreed in the Ukraine Plan has been strong, with

77 reform and investment steps completed so far across key sectors, such as rule of

law, anti-corruption, energy markets, public administration, and governance of state-

owned enterprises. Ukraine has also seized the opportunities for early integration into

the EU market made available through the DCFTA and other agreements with the

EU: Ukraine joined the EU roam-like-at-home area, adopted the legislation to start

the electricity market coupling and updated its partnership with EU on critical raw

materials.

Moldova has made significant progress on its ambitious reform agenda (6) and on the

path to EU membership. Despite massive Russian interference, the Parliamentary

elections of September 2025 reaffirmed the country’s accession path. Besides

facilitating deeper EU integration, the EU’s cooperation with Moldova has included

support on energy, notably reducing dependency on Russian supplies and further

integrating with EU energy systems, as well as on cybersecurity and increasing

resilience to electoral interference.

On 15 June 2026, negotiations on Cluster 1: fundamentals were formally opened for

Ukraine and Moldova, marking an important step forward on the countries’ EU

accession paths.

The recent positive regional developments, notably the historic momentum in the

Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, opens avenues for the region’s new

transformative path. Inter-connected strategic industries, markets, transport corridors,

digital networks, and energy interconnections help building trust and binding

neighbours together. This is showcased with progress in the normalisation of relations

between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including through the initialling of a bilateral peace

treaty, the 2025 Washington Political Declaration and the TRIPP (7) connectivity

project. Likewise, Armenia and Türkiye have made progress in the normalisation of

their relations, including through efforts to facilitate bilateral trade and discussions to

re-establish railway links.

(4) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/20/co-chairs-conclusions-on-

strengthening-cross-regional-security-and-connectivity/

(5) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ukraine-report-2025_en

(6) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/moldova-report-2025_en

(7) The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is a U.S.-brokered transit corridor

through Armenia's Syunik region to connect Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan.

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The EU’s relations with Armenia reconfirmed a strong positive momentum, reflected

in the Strategic Agenda adopted in December 2025 (8), which raised the level of

ambition with short- and medium-term priorities across all sectors of cooperation. The

first EU-Armenia Summit (9), held in Yerevan on 4-5 May 2026, represented a

significant milestone in the EU-Armenia relations. With the announcement of the EU-

Armenia connectivity partnership (10), bilateral engagement was strengthened on

energy, transport and digital, which will be central to future engagement. The

EU-Armenia visa liberalisation dialogue is progressing well as Armenia initiated the

reforms necessary to move towards a visa-free regime with the EU. Recent elections

have reaffirmed the country’s commitment to the path of peace, democratic

governance, and regional normalisation. In parallel, in response to Russia’s economic

coercive measures, the EU has mobilised a comprehensive package of support aimed

at strengthening Armenia’s resilience and mitigating the economic impact of external

pressure.

The strategic importance of the EU-Azerbaijan partnership was reaffirmed at the

highest level in March 2026 (11), with a commitment to further deepening political

dialogue and practical cooperation, including in the areas of energy, transport and

digital. Building on this positive momentum, the EU and Azerbaijan are advancing

discussions on new Partnership Priorities and have recently resumed negotiations on

a comprehensive bilateral agreement, reflecting a shared interest in modernising the

bilateral relationship. Azerbaijancontinues to play a key role in regional connectivity

and remains a reliable partner in the diversification of Europe’s energy supplies and

in the expansion of the transport potential of regional links. The cooperation between

the EU and Azerbaijan reflects the shared interest of both sides and contributes to the

promotion of peace, stability, connectivity and sustainable development in the wider

Black Sea, South Caucasus and Central Asia regions.

Georgia’s geographical position makes it a natural transit corridor linking Central

Asia to Europe. The EU’s cooperation with Georgia (12) has continued to be strongly

impacted by the country’s democratic backsliding, which has resulted in a de facto

halt of the country’s EU accession process and the suspension by the EU in March

2026 of visa-free travel for holders of Georgian diplomatic, service and official

passports. Georgia’s role within this Strategy will largely depend on the authorities’

willingness to take tangible steps towards improving the situation.

The EU and Türkiye, a key partner, NATO ally, and an EU candidate country, have

exchanged views on the Black Sea Strategy and discussed its implementation on

multiple occasions over the past year, including during regular consultations on

Foreign and Security Policy. The EU Black Sea Strategy was most recently discussed

during the 2026 EU-Türkiye Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

(8) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-union-and-armenia-adopt-new-strategic-agenda-

deepen-partnership-2025-12-02_en

(9) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/05/joint-declaration-following-the-

first-armenia-eu-summit/

(10) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/da/ip_26_988

(11) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/11/joint-press-statement-by-

president-of-the-european-council-antonio-costa-and-president-of-the-republic-of-azerbaijan-ilham-

aliyev/

(12) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report-2025_en

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consultations. Bilateral and regional cooperation on connectivity, where Türkiye

plays a central role, is of mutual interest and a pillar in EU-Türkiye relations. In

particular, both sides agreed to strengthen coordination in shaping the regional

connectivity agenda across the energy, transport, digitalisation and trade sectors to

contribute to stability, resilience and sustainable growth across Black Sea, South

Caucasus and Central Asia. Türkiye has initiated work on a Connectivity Investment

Plan with a view to developing a pipeline of projects. In parallel, Türkiye has taken

positive steps towards the normalisation of relations with Armenia, including lifting

restrictions in preparation for direct bilateral trade and the launch of preparatory work

to rehabilitate the Kars-Gyumri railway line. The normalisation process can play an

important role in promoting security, stability and resilience in the region, while also

unlocking economic and connectivity opportunities.

The relevance of the Strategy was underlined in several fora, including the Euronest

Parliamentary Assembly in Yerevan (October 2025) and the Eastern Partnership

Senior Officials’ Meeting in Brussels (March 2026). In its opinion adopted in

December 2025 (13), the European Economic and Social Committee called for

sufficient resources to be used to swiftly and decisively implement the Strategy. The

Committee of the Regions followed in March 2026 with an opinion calling for

structured and well-resourced implementation (14).

3. PILLAR 1: SECURITY, STABILITY, AND RESILIENCE

Over the past year, the security landscape of the Black Sea region continued to be

impacted by Russia’s multiple actions to destabilise it. Russia has systematically used

drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian ports and their access infrastructure.

Particularly in Odesa, Chornomorsk, and along the Danube Corridor, the strikes have

disrupted grain exports and escalated risks for commercial shipping. These attacks

also impacted neighbouring coastal states like Romania who faced multiple breaches

of its airspace and debris falling on its territory. In late May 2026, a Russian drone

incursion struck a densely populated area in Galați, Romania's largest river and sea

port on the Danube River and its second-largest port, injuring civilians. Maritime

security in the Black Sea continues to suffer as a result of Russia’s hybrid tactics –

including electronic warfare – as well as from interference of navigation systems

(spoofing and jamming). These continuous attacks increase the costs of trade and

shipping, endanger seafarers and cause major environmental damages. Moreover,

Russia’s shadow fleet has continued its efforts to evade sanctions, using deceptive

practices like sailing under a false flag. This poses additional risks of sabotage and

environmental degradation, further undermining the protection of critical maritime

infrastructure, including underwater, and energy corridors.

In response, the EU remains committed to proactively supporting regional stability

and security. The EU adopted further sanctions packages targeting Russia’s military-

industrial supply chains, energy revenues, and vessels linked to illicit activities. These

measures, combined with enhanced support for Ukraine’s defence and resilience,

(13) https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/news-media/news/eesc-calls-ambitious-and-pragmatic-implementation-

eus-strategic-approach-black-sea-region-0

(14) https://cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions/cdr-2757-2025

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notably through the EUR 90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026-27 (15),

contribute to the operationalisation of the Strategy’s security pillar.

The EU raised security challenges in the Black Sea and responses brought by the EU

strategy during the 3rd Black Sea Security Conference under the International Crimea

Platform hosted in Chișinău, on 23 April 2026 (16) and the 3rd Odesa Black Sea

Security Forum held on 29-31 May 2026 (17). Concrete exchanges of experience were

organised to highlight the coherent approach among European sea basins in

addressing security challenges faced in the Baltic and the Black Seas – including

undermined safety of navigation, challenged maritime security, hybrid tactics,

including electronic warfare, navigation systems interference (spoofing and

jamming). More peer exchanges at expert level will enable experience sharing

between the Baltic and Black Sea basins, with a focus on civilian preparedness and

resilience (18) and on addressing Russian shadow fleet and hybrid activities.

FLAGSHIP 1: Black Sea maritime security

Since the adoption of the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea in May 2025, Bulgaria

and Romania have jointly developed a concept for the establishment of a regional Black

Sea Maritime Security Hub (also referred to as the ‘Hub’). The Hub is designed as a

regionally owned, civilian-led, inter-institutional collaborative network structure, co-

initiated and coordinated jointly by the two countries and supported by the EU. It aims to

enhance maritime situational awareness and regional resilience, to facilitate cooperation

and capacity building in maritime security, to protect critical infrastructure and counter

complex hybrid threats, enhance environmental safety and develop common threat

assessment in support of civilian crisis scenarios. The Hub will be leveraging and analysing

multiple data sources to support timely and informed decision-making by the littoral EU

Member States and the EU, while seeking further engagement of other EU Member States

and participation of key regional partners Türkiye, Ukraine and Moldova initially. Specific

attention will be paid to integrating surveillance and monitoring capabilities of the

participating states, and ensuring interoperability and links with EU networks, like the

Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) implemented by the European

Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The Hub will also contribute to protecting critical

maritime infrastructure in the Black Sea region in a consistent, coordinated way and

provide better visibility and predictability in a changing security context. As a subsequent

step, close liaison and coordination will be sought with other regional platforms, mine

countermeasure groups, and structures operated by Black Sea partners, for example the

national Joint Maritime Security Centre (JMSC) in Odesa (Ukraine). The Mine

Countermeasures Black Sea initiative set up by Türkiye-Romania-Bulgaria is the primary

safeguard against drifting mines, playing thus a crucial role in maintaining open and secure

sea lines of communication, including for flows of grain transport to and from Ukraine.

15) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/23/council-finalises-90-billion-

support-loan-to-ukraine/

16) https://crimea-platform.org/en/news/third-black-sea-security-conference-of-the-international-crimea-

platform-begins-in-moldova/; https://mfa.gov.md/en/content/republic-moldova-host-third-edition-

black-sea-security-conference-under-auspices

17) https://odesaforum.org/

(18) A side-event during the Macro-Regional and Sea Basins Strategies Days (Brussels, 8-9 July 2026)

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3.1. Cooperation on demining and maritime safety, defence and security

In support of maritime safety and security in the Black Sea, the EU Advisory Mission

(EUAM) in Ukraine has assisted in establishing the national Joint Maritime

Security Centre (JMSC) in Odesa. The JMSC aims to improve inter-agency

coordination and strengthen Ukraine’s operational capacities on maritime security

operations in the Black Sea. The first ministerial level Steering Committee meeting

on the establishment of the JMSC took place on 26 February 2026, followed by the

second meeting on 6 May 2026, during which the Steering Committee endorsed the

Concept of Operations. Hosted by EUAM, the meetings brought together Ukrainian

ministries and agencies responsible for maritime security, the International Maritime

Capability Coalition and the NATO Representation to Ukraine. The JMSC will allow

Ukraine to integrate into European cooperative frameworks.

In February 2026, the EU adopted the Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone

Security (19), which includes pilot actions to improve maritime domain awareness

and deployment of undersea sensing capacities to better protect critical maritime

infrastructure in the Black and Baltic Seas.

Following the approval in February 2026 by the Council of the financial assistance to

Romania and Bulgaria under SAFE and the signature of the loan agreements,

approximately EUR 20 billion will be made available to these Member States to close

critical capability gaps, thus supporting the security in the Black Sea region.

The Ukraine Support Loan with an allocation of EUR 90 billion, out of which

EUR 60 billion planned to cover the country’s most urgent defence industrial capacity

needs in 2026 and 2027, is an important pillar for the security in the Black Sea. In

March 2026, EU approved an allocation of approximately EUR 6 billion for drones

from Ukraine, for Ukraine.

As part of the EU support to Ukraine in the area of protection of critical

infrastructure, a workshop on Protective Security for critical infrastructure was

organised in February 2026. With the support of TAIEX, Ukraine has been working

on transposing the Directive on the resilience of critical entities. A call for proposals

under the Internal Security Fund on resilience of critical infrastructure with

15 million EUR budget was opened to Ukrainian participants.

Following the adoption of the Action Plan on Cable Security (20)in February 2025

and the publication of the’Report on Security and Resilience of EU Submarine Cable

Infrastructures’, an EU-wide mapping and coordinated risk assessment of submarine

cable infrastructures (21) has been agreed in October 2025 by the informal Expert

Group on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures. The report states the

importance of developing a coordinated approach with Türkiye in fostering and

preserving security, stability and connectivity in the Black Sea region.

(19) https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/action-plan-drone-and-counter-drone-security

(20) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0009

(21) https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/report-security-and-resilience-eu-submarine-cable-

infrastructures

7

In February 2026, the EU published the Cable Security Toolbox (22), which

recommends mitigation measures to address risk scenarios identified in the above-

mentioned report and proposes the Black Sea as a priority area for Cable Projects of

European Interest (CPEIs). The European Commission has issued an initial call of

EUR 10 million to fund regional cable hubs benefitting all sea basins around the EU,

including the Black Sea. CPEI areas will be prioritised in upcoming Connecting

Europe Facility (CEF) Digital calls (23) for proposals.

Under the 2026 European Defence Fund, the EU intends to support semi-autonomous

maritime systems as well as layered critical seabed infrastructure protection. Once

available, the capabilities developed could be leveraged in support to regional

security.

To limit the threats and risks posed by the Russian shadow fleet, including in the

Black Sea, the EU has imposed sanctions listing 632 vessels and over 60 enablers (24)

so far. The EU continues outreach to other countries to de-register such vessels and

to raise awareness on the environmental risks and costs associated with any spillovers.

In the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the EU is also active to advance

the work on regulatory frameworks, tackling substandard shipping and introducing

mandatory ship reporting and civil liability certificates.

The EU has been strengthening Europe’s capacity for maritime demining,

environmental risk mitigation and protection of critical maritime infrastructure, while

supporting future regional cooperation in post-conflict marine remediation. The 2025

European Ocean Pact comprises a flagship action for a comprehensive Unexploded

ordnance (UXO) removal strategy, starting in the Baltic and North Seas and

expanding to the Black Sea, utilising advanced detection and disposal technologies.

The Netherlands and Belgium have donated seven mine countermeasures vessels to

Bulgaria in 2025 with the aim to strengthen maritime security in the Black Sea.

The EU is scaling up technologies and methodologies for large-scale cleanup of

UXO dumped at sea. While the current efforts focus on the Baltic Sea, a similar

approach to large-scale UXO cleanup can be applied to the Black Sea, once security

conditions permit. Through EU-funded initiatives, notably the European Parliament–

supported CAMMera project, the EU is developing and testing innovative

technologies for the safe detection and remediation of submerged munitions. At a

January 2026 workshop in Sofia, experts from EU Member States, regional

organisations and research institutions evaluated the potential transfer of

technological solutions and operational lessons learned to the Black Sea and other sea

basins. The EU continued to support Ukraine in demining efforts with the handover

in February 2026 of the fifth batch of EU-trained mine detection dogs to the Ukrainian

authorities.

(22) https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/submarine-cable-security-toolbox-and-cable-projects-

european-interest

(23) https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/cef-digital

(24) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/23/russia-s-war-of-aggression-

against-ukraine-20th-round-of-stern-eu-sanctions-hits-energy-military-industrial-complex-trade-and-

financial-services-including-crypto/

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3.2. Enhancing military mobility and dual use infrastructure

In November 2025, the Commission and the High Representative presented the

Military Mobility Package (25),consisting of a Joint Communication and Regulation

proposal aimed at ensuring the seamless movement of troops, equipment, and military

assets across the EU. Together with Member States and supported by the EU Military

Staff, the Commission identified 500 ‘hotspot’ projects for urgent investment to bring

the four priority military mobility corridors (26) in line with military requirements and

make the network more resilient. These projects include reinforcing bridges, widening

tunnels, and increasing capacity at ports and airports. The Commission coordinates

with Member States to ensure investments are implemented swiftly and coherently

along the corridors. This is also coherent with an emerging EU work strand to support

dual use industries in Ukraine.

Four of the nine TEN-T European Transport Corridors already extend into Ukraine

and one into Moldova, with a first set of important investments in dual-use

infrastructure ongoing. In parallel, preparatory works are ongoing to deploy

European nominal standard track gauge on the European Transport Corridors

connecting Moldova and Ukraine to EU Member States.

3.3. Countering hybrid threats

The security landscape of the Black Sea region is also defined by an unprecedented

surge in hybrid threats. Russia has continued to deploy multifaceted tools designed to

destabilise democratic processes, erode public trust, degrade critical infrastructure,

probe vulnerabilities and test responses.

The Union remains resolute in imposing costs on malign actors through the sanctions

regime (27) against Russia’s destabilising activities. As of April 2026, the Council has

expanded restrictive measures to include 69 individuals and 19 entities identified for

their roles in large-scale information manipulation. Additionally, the EU Cyber

Sanctions Regime (28) is rigorously enforced, with restrictive measures currently

applied to 19 individuals and 74 entities.

The EU also adapted its response mechanisms to the evolving threat landscape and to

counter hostile operations meant to undermine the electoral integrity and

democratic processes. In Moldova, the EU is supporting the country’s efforts to

protect its democratic processes from Russia’s interference. The EU has been also

actively strengthening its support to democratic and institutional resilience in

Armenia ahead of the June elections. A key achievement was the deployment of EU

Hybrid Rapid Response Teams (HRRT) in both cases, providing short-term tailored

technical and strategic advisory support to national authorities regarding

strengthening electoral integrity.

Direct support for Black Sea partner countries via Common Security and Defence

Policy (CSDP) missions remains a primary vehicle for resilience building, while

(25) https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/military-mobility_en

(26) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/military-mobility_en

(27) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-hybrid-threats/

(28) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-cyber-attacks/

9

contributing to regional security. The EU Partnership Mission in Moldova supported

Moldovan authorities’ efforts to ensure democratic integrity during the 2025 elections

and continues to focus on long-term institutional capacity building in view of

strengthening Moldova’s resilience. Similarly, the EUAM in Ukraine is expanding its

support to Ukrainian authorities to counter hybrid threats in line with evolving needs,

including in the maritime domain through supporting the development of the Joint

Maritime Security Centre (JMSC). EUAM Ukraine provided specific expertise on

maritime cybersecurity in the Black Sea and the Danube Corridorduring the second

forum Rebuilding Ukraine in December 2025.

The EU Partnership Mission in Armenia is the newest civilian EU CSDP

mission (29), established on 21 April 2026 with the aim to enhance the country’s

democratic resilience and its ability to manage crisis in the long term. The mission

will support Armenia facing multi-layered threats such as Foreign Information

Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), cyber-attacks and illicit financial flows. (30)

The CyberEast+ regional initiative continued to strengthen cyber resilience in the

Black Sea and Eastern Partnership countries, by supporting alignment with the NIS2

Directive (31), delivering tailored training and capacity building, organising

simulation exercises and workshops to counter cyber threats, disinformation and

Foreign Information Manipulation and interference (FIMI), including in electoral

contexts.

In Armenia, the EU organised a series of workshops and TAIEX events for

representatives of state institutions and stepped up its support to local civil society

and independent media in their efforts to counter FIMI.

At the December EU-Armenia Partnership Council (32), a new regional initiative was

launched to counter FIMI and disinformation in the Eastern neighbourhood by

strengthening civil society and independent media capacities to engage in strategic

communication, promote media literacy among citizens.

A regional EU rapid response exceptional assistance measure was set up in early

2026 to support partner countries, particularly in Europe and Central Asia exposed to

hybrid threats building on successful assistance models developed for and continuing

to support Ukraine. Support is already being provided to Moldova under the new

framework. Through these and other initiatives the EU continues to develop a whole

of society approach by fostering partnerships among state institutions, civil society,

academia and media both within countries and across the region to help ensure

sustainable resilience against hybrid threats.

In Moldova, the EU has provided rapid response for cyber and internal security

(including relevant equipment). During the recent election cycles, rapid response was

instrumental to help safeguard the country’s democratic processes against hybrid

interference. Furthermore, the EU has mobilised rapid response to support

(29) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/21/armenia-eu-establishes-a-new-

civilian-mission-to-contribute-strengthening-the-country-s-resilience/

(30) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/21/armenia-eu-establishes-a-new-

civilian-mission-to-contribute-strengthening-the-country-s-resilience/

(31) Directive (EU) 2022/2555 OJ L 333 27.12.2022, p. 80, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/2022-12-27

(32) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2025/12/02/

10

independent media and continues working to strengthen Moldova’s strategic

communication capacities.

Also in Moldova, the EU is supporting the country’s efforts to protect its democratic

processes from Russia’s interference, including through the activity of a new regional

hub of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), which supports Moldova

and other countries in detecting and analysing manipulation and disinformation

campaigns, particularly Russian disinformation.

Through rapid response measures, the EU is supporting Ukraine’s resilience in the

face of Russia’s war of aggression and hybrid threats, by notably enhancing internal

and civilian security and safety as well as the country’s strategic communication

capacities.

3.4. Fighting organised crime and trafficking

The Commission, in cooperation with the United Nations Interregional Crime and

Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), provided legal and policy support on tracing,

seizing and confiscating criminal assets. It contributed to legislative reforms (notably

in Ukraine and Moldova), promoted the social reuse of confiscated criminal assets,

and enhanced practitioners’ skills through training and case-based mentoring. Under

the regional project Training and Operational Partnership Against Organised Crime

(TOPCOP II), CEPOL (33) supported structured cooperation and law enforcement

capacity through workshops and training on operational management, open-source

intelligence, migrant smuggling, and counterfeiting. The EMPACT (34) Support

Network,with experts from Europol and the European Border and Coast Guard

Agency (‘Frontex’), supported strategic intelligence development, introducing

advanced analytical approaches and new data sources such as travel intelligence. In

partnership with Europol, under the EU-funded project ‘Fight against organised crime

in the EaP countries’, the Commission continued to further integrate Eastern partners

in EMPACT, strengthening operational capacities, addressing key crime priorities

including cybercrime, and supporting war crimes investigations in Ukraine.

Through EUAM Ukraine, the EU continued to support Ukrainian authorities in

strengthening interagency cooperation and analytical capacities to counter serious

and organised crime, enhance integrated border management in line with EU

standards, improve cross-border coordination with neighbouring countries, and

address illicit firearms trafficking through targeted capacity building and strategic

advice. EUAM Ukraine supported cross-border operational coordination through

quarterly trilateral meetings between Ukrainian, Romanian and Moldovan border and

customs authorities, contributing to strengthened cooperation against cross-border

organised crime.

As part of the implementation of the EU Drugs Strategy (35), which states that the

Commission will explore cooperation with candidate countries on port security, the

Commission invited – among other third countries – Ukraine and Moldova as

(33) CEPOL is the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training.

(34) EMPACT (European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats) is a permanent EU security

initiative that brings together member states, EU agencies (like Europol), and international partners to

fight serious organised crime.

(35) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0743

11

observers to its European Ports Alliance Public-Private Partnership (PPP) expert

workshop on port security in smaller seaports and inland ports in February 2026.

Moreover, the Commission shared its insights on port security from the European

Ports Alliance PPP at an expert meeting of the Danube Commission in April 2026.

4. PILLAR 2: GROWTH AND PROSPERITY THROUGH BETTER CONNECTIVITY

The Black Sea Strategy introduced the cross-regional Connectivity Agenda as a long-

term strategic initiative to facilitate the diversification of trade routes away from high-

risk dependencies, making connectivity more integrated, cost-effective and faster. In

line with the Strategy, the Commission advanced efforts to strengthen trade,

investment, and connectivity. The flagship cross-regional Connectivity Agenda is

central to boosting the competitiveness of Black Sea countries’ economies and

deepening regional integration.

4.1. Boosting connectivity and energy security

Sustained political dialogue has yielded strong political support for the cross-regional

Connectivity Agenda among partner countries and EU Member States, aligning

stakeholders around the need to coordinate and accelerate the delivery of tangible

actions. Thanks to joint efforts, this flagship initiative progressed well in formalising

structured regional cooperation with clear priorities.

FLAGSHIP 2: Connectivity Agenda

As a gateway linking Europe to Türkiye, the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and beyond,

the Black Sea region plays a key role for European and overall global security,

international trade, energy, critical raw materials and food security. The region has

significant untapped potential for economic development and is crossed by strategic transit

routes. Strengthening regional cooperation and improving economic links would

contribute to the competitiveness of the region, and of the EU. To this end, the Connectivity

Agenda aims to leverage the full potential of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor

(TCTC) in the field of transport, including trade facilitation, and to improve energy and

digital links. Since the adoption of the Strategy, the Commission has worked to roll out

this flagship initiative. Significant progress has been made on improving and coordinating

investment planning in support of the Connectivity Agenda:

- The Commission published a meta-study in February 2026 to consolidate

recommendations on priority investments and regulatory reformsnecessary for the

operational delivery of the Connectivity Agenda. This comprehensive analysis, carried

out under the EU4Digital programme (36), reviewed multiple studies and over 200

ongoing or planned investment projects, and mapped where investment is needed to

strengthen transport, trade, energy and digital connections along the TCTC. The study

highlights key stretches where infrastructure in neighbouring countries is missing,

outdated or not fit for today’s volumes, providing a strategic baseline for setting

investment priorities with partner countries and international financial institutions

(IFIs). Practical guidance for investment and required regulatory (‘soft connectivity’)

(36) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/meta-study-advancing-cross-regional-connectivity-agenda_en

12

measures will give governments and the private sector a clear picture of where their

capital can make the biggest difference in building modern and reliable infrastructure.

- Building on the outcome of the ministerial meeting on cross-regional security and

connectivity in October 2025 (37), the Commission intensified bilateral engagement

through a series of high-level and technical missions to partner countries, including

Türkiye, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Discussions aim to enhance cooperation on regional

stability and connectivity, including priority investment.

- In consultation with partner countries, the Commission designed a coordination

platform, which will focus on the Black Sea and South Caucasus partner countries and

operate in synergy with the existing cooperation framework covering Central Asia.

Both public and private sector actors confirmed the need for such a coordination

mechanism during the TCTC and connectivity investors forum in Tashkent in

November 2025 (38). The Connectivity Agenda platform, launched on 23 June 2026,

will guide collective efforts, optimise project pipelines, and ensure efficiency across

hard and soft connectivity initiatives.

Recent multilateral agreements have bolstered connectivity and maritime security. In

December, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania established the Black Sea–Aegean

Corridor Platform (39). In March 2026, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine agreed to

continue working together on the Danube Action Plan 2.0, created under the European

Commission’s Solidarity Lanes initiative (40).This initiative optimises navigation

safety, port communication and information exchange and mitigates disruptions to

Black Sea / Danube traffic. To support the Solidarity Lanes’ functioning, the CEF)

provided additional funding in 2025 (41). Railway and road rehabilitation is facilitated

in Moldova in the framework of Global Gateway projects (42). Implementing

infrastructure projects under the extended TEN-T (43) should also help unlock the

TCTC’s full economic potential. The TEN-T Indicative Investment Action Plan was

updated in December 2025 for Moldova and Ukraine.

Several electricity interconnection projects between the EU and Ukraine and Georgia

were included in the second list of Projects of Common and Mutual Interest (44) (PMI)

(37) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2452

(38) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/trans-caspian-transport-corridor-and-connectivity-investors-

forum-eu-advances-cross-regional-2025-11-27_en

(39) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/greece-bulgaria-and-romania-strengthen-cooperation-

key-transport-links-2025-12-04_en

(40) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/ukraine/eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes_en

(41) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/eu-support-better-transport-connections-eastern-

europe-ukraine-and-moldova-2025-11-07_en

(42) https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16415-2025-INIT/en/pdf

(43) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/infrastructure-and-investment/trans-european-transport-

network-ten-t/tentec-information-system-and-ten-t-map-library/ten-t-maps-indicative-extension-

neighbouring-countries_en

(44) PMI status gives accelerated permitting procedures, increased investor visibility, and eligibility for EU

funding under the 'Connecting Europe Facility'.

13

under the TEN-E Regulation (45). Through the Central and South-Eastern Europe

Energy Connectivity (CESEC) High-Level Group (46), the Commission continues to

promote regional energy integration, maintaining oversight of priority projects in

Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria.

In March, the 12th ministerial meeting of the Southern Gas Corridor Advisory

Council (47) and the 4th ministerial meeting of the Green Energy Advisory Council in

Baku, Azerbaijan, identified further opportunities for cooperation on clean energy and

regional energy connectivity in the South Caucasus. Representatives from partner

governments, leading energy companies, regulatory bodies and IFIs emphasised the

crucial role of the Southern Gas Corridor in the EU's efforts to diversify away from

Russian gas imports. In the margins of the ministerial meeting, the high-level EU-

Azerbaijan Green Connectivity Investment Roundtable, contributed to translating

policy into investment opportunities along the three green energy corridors, as well

as in grid infrastructure and transmission, renewables, energy efficiency and offshore

wind.

The Commission launched the third phase of the regional EU4Energy programme (48)

in January 2026, strengthening its focus on improved regional energy connectivity

and regulatory frameworks coordination. This work directly supports the Black Sea

strategy’s measures to tackle gaps in regulatory frameworks and the convergence

of regulatory frameworks and network codes.

With the adoption of the EU Ports and Industrial Maritime Strategies (49), the

Commission has provided the tools Europe’s maritime shipping and shipbuilding

sectors need to lead the clean energy transition, secure trade and defence, and remain

globally competitive. To achieve these objectives, the Commission is supporting

large-scale energy efficiency projects, for example in the port of Constanta.

Supported by the Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin programme (50), Bulgaria, Türkiye

and Georgia are cooperating to improve performance in the logistics sector. By late

2027, the recently launched BSB-LOGINET project (51) aims to have launched a

cross-border logistics information exchange portal.

As follow up to the EU-Central Asia Summit (April 2025) (52), the EU provides

support for addressing bottlenecks at Black and Caspian Sea ports and reducing transit

(45) Draft delegated act was published on 1 December 2025, with a scrutiny period of the Council of the EU

and the European Parliament running until 1 April 2026. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/?uri=PI_COM%3AC%282025 %298144&qid=1766157187792

(46) https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/infrastructure/high-level-groups/central-and-south-eastern-europe-

energy-connectivity_en

(47) https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/press-statement-dan-jorgensen-european-commissioner-energy-and-

housing-and-parviz-shahbazov-minister-2026-03-03_en

(48) https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/international-cooperation/key-partner-countries-and-

regions/neighbourhood-east_en

(49) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/commission-unveils-eu-ports-strategy-strengthen-

competitiveness-security-and-sustainability-european-2026-03-04_en

(50) https://blacksea-cbc.net/interreg-next-bsb-2021-2027

(51) https://www.blacksea-cbc.net/interreg-next-bsb-2021-2027/projects/bsb00959

(52) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/04/04/joint-declaration-following-the-

first-european-union-central-asia-summit/

14

costs, thereby helping to increase trade volumes in line with the Black Sea strategy’s

aim to deepen cooperation on critical raw materials and secure supply chains.

Armenia currently receives support from the Critical Raw Materials (CRM)

Facility (53) co-funded by the EU. The Facility aims to strengthen global partnerships

and advance international projects to build sustainable and resilient CRM value

chains. Ukraine and Central Asian countries have signed CRM partnerships with the

EU and have access to this Facility. Diversifying import routes and securing supply

chains across the Black Sea will remain critical. At the same time, the EU is providing

support for circular economy initiatives to manage the demand side.

In line with efforts to advance digital links and create a trustworthy digital

environment, the Commission will organise a Connectivity Agenda Digital Summit

in the second half of 2026. The inaugural Summit is expected to convene ministers,

digital business leaders, and key private sector investors from across the EU and

partner countries for a high-level exchange on the future of regional digital

connectivity. It will serve as a platform to foster cooperation in emerging

technologies, cybersecurity, and trusted digital infrastructure.

4.2. Integrated development for a competitive Black Sea region

Significant steps forward were made in 2025 on implementing the Common Maritime

Agenda (CMA) for the Black Sea (54), reinforcing joint action on sustainable blue

economy development under Ukraine's coordination. Key achievements include the

operational work of the Black Sea Assistance Mechanism and national hubs in

offering practical support to meet the blue economy goals, such as uniting the regional

blue economy community at the CMA Stakeholder Conference in Constanta, boosting

funding access, exchanging good practices and supporting project development.

National events notably on maritime connectivity (Bulgaria) and sustainable

aquaculture (Türkiye) raised awareness of local actors. The technical group on

aquaculture proposed a joint aquaculture monitoring programme. The technical group

on sustainable tourism completed its first full year of operation, laying the foundations

for a long-term regional vision for sustainable tourism that would link cultural

heritage, innovation, and community-based development. Across all its activities, the

CMA promoted alignment in the Black Sea region with broader EU priorities, notably

the EU Mission Restore our Ocean and Waters and the EU Ocean Pact.

To facilitate sea basin cooperation on maritime spatial planning,the Commission

launched a call for proposals in January 2026, funded under the European Maritime,

Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (55). The objective of the call is to develop innovative

solutions for EU Member States in the Atlantic and Black Sea to tackle challenges in

implementing, monitoring and reviewing their Maritime Spatial Plans.

To ensure sustainable use of marine resources, the Commission continues to work

closely with the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (56) (GFCM),

focusing on sustainability through catch limits and management plans for key species

(53) https://crmfacility.eu/

(54) https://black-sea-maritime-agenda.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026-03/CMA%20-

%202025 %20implementation%20report%20_compressed.pdf

(55) https://black-sea-maritime-agenda.ec.europa.eu/node/755

(56) https://www.fao.org/gfcm/en/

15

like turbot and sprat. The EU plays a critical role in enforcing compliance, by

combating illegal fishing under the 2030 GFCM Strategy. A key milestone was

reached during the 2025 GFCM annual session, when the Working Group for the

Black Sea was elevated to a statutory body within the GFCM, thus recognising its

pivotal role in advising on regional fisheries management and conservation. For the

first time, the GFCM agreed to introduce a mechanism to monitor and ensure

compliance with regional fisheries measures (57). If regional measures are not

respected, the GFCM will require Mediterranean and Black Seas countries to address

the identified deficiencies.

The EU provides significant financial support for GFCM initiatives. The long-

standing BlackSea4Fish project continues to foster effective scientific collaboration

in fisheries. By sustaining an inclusive multinational operational platform bringing

together fisheries stakeholders, the project has strengthened national expertise and

scientific capacity, and is working towards ensuring a level-playing field for fisheries

management. These efforts are yielding measurable results: according to the 2025

GFCM publication ‘The State of Mediterranean and Black Sea Fisheries’ (58) the

percentage of overexploited stocks has dropped to 52 per cent, the lowest level

recorded in the time series.

The Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin programme also further contributed to

development and cohesion in the region through multi-country cooperation projects

involving organisations from Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova,

Romania, Türkiye, and Ukraine. Since the adoption of the Strategy, ten projects have

been implemented to boost sustainable aquaculture and coastal and maritime tourism,

enhancing maritime spatial planning, and strengthening cooperation with other sea

basins (see the projects in Annex I). For example, the INTERSMARTS project is

reshaping tourism in the Black Sea basin. With partners from Bulgaria, Greece,

Moldova and Türkiye, the project created a cross-border network and earned multiple

international awards for its smart tourism and blue growth innovation platform in

2025. The BlueDial project introduced the multi-country BlackBlueNET platform

that aims to strengthen maritime governance across the Black Sea region.

Moreover, through the Communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering

Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (59) adopted in February 2026,the EU strengthened its

support for the stability, prosperity, and resilience of the EU’s eastern border regions,

including along Romania and Bulgaria’s maritime border in the Black Sea, focusing

on five priorities areas. The Communication has been accompanied by the first annual

high-level political dialogue and the launch of the ‘EastInvest Facility’, a dedicated

financial platform that is estimated to provide at least EUR 28 billion in private and

public investments in those regions.

Under Horizon Europe, the European Framework Programme for Research and

Innovation, EUR 205 million were awarded to 481 grants across the Black Sea region

in the reporting period. The participation of the Black Sea countriesdemonstrates

their importance to European research and innovation. The Operational Network of

(57) https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-leads-efforts-harmonise-fishing-rules-across-

mediterranean-and-black-seas-countries-2025-11-11_en

(58) FAO. 2025. The State of Mediterranean and Black Sea Fisheries 2025. General Fisheries Commission

for the Mediterranean. Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/cd7701en

(59) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0082

16

Funders (including Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, Moldova, Türkiye and Ukraine)

steers regional cooperation in this area and ensures that the Strategic Research and

Innovation Agenda (SRIA) for the Black Sea is implemented effectively. Recent

milestones include the December 2025 launch of specific calls under the 2025-26 EU

‘Restore our Ocean and Waters by 2030’ work programme.

The ‘Black Sea Digital Twin’ platform, launched in 2025 through the EU-funded

DOORS (60) and BRIDGE-BS (61) projects and developed in cooperation with key

regional stakeholders (62), integrates real-time multi-source data with AI-enhanced

models of sea dynamics. It enables users to predict the impacts of climate change and

environmental stressors, fostering more informed and evidence-based decision-

making.

The Joint Research Centre (JRC) is a key provider of methodological guidance and

analytical support for innovation policies in the Black Sea region, notably in Ukraine,

Moldova and Türkiye. A workshop in February 2026 convening representatives from

all candidate countries’ economies was designed to turn the strategic vision of smart

specialisation into concrete cross-border cooperation actions, strengthening the

region’s innovation ecosystem and fostering economic integration with the EU.

5. PILLAR 3: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE AND

PREPAREDNESS, CIVIL PROTECTION

The EU is committed to sustainable development and preparedness in the Black Sea

region and is strengthening environmental protection, climate change resilience, and

civil protection.

FLAGSHIP 3: Preparedness of coastal communities and blue economy sectors

Black Sea coastal communities face the impacts of climate change, environmental

degradation and, in certain areas, security threats due to ongoing military activities.

Together, these pressures affect regional stability and strain local livelihoods. At the same

time, the regions’ rich natural and cultural heritage offers significant potential for

sustainable growth and innovation. To help address challenges and seize opportunities, on

10 June 2026 the Commission adopted two dedicated Strategies, one for EU islands and

one for EU coastal communities (63). Across several projects, measures to improve

preparedness are delivered on the ground.

The EU is supporting work to monitor and assess the growing environmental

damage that Russia continues to inflict as a result of its war of aggression against

Ukraine. In 2025-26, the “European Union for Environmental Monitoring in the

Black Sea” project (64) carried out sampling to document the impacts of the Kerch

(60) https://doi.org/10.3030/101000518

(61) https://doi.org/10.3030/101000240

(62) European Commission: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Connecting the DOTs – An

exploratory study of global activities and collaboration potential for Digital Ocean Twins, Kluckner,

S.(editor), 2025, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/2375732

(63) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_1318

(64) https://emblasproject.org/

17

Strait oil spill in December 2024 and the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam in

June 2023. Although sampling is difficult and limited, analysis of the data collected

offered insights into the immediate and longer-term environmental, health, and

economic effects of the war. A regional round table meeting on war-related pollution,

held in June 2025 under Ukraine’s coordination of the CMA, aimed to identify

monitoring and mitigation priorities, while fostering regional cooperation.

The EU strengthened data sharing and analysis to expand joint monitoring of the

Black Sea environment. This includes the maintenance of the Black Sea e-data

Platform (65), which covers most of the descriptors required by the EU Marine

Strategy Framework Directive and contains multiannual data series. The designation

of Moldova (66) and Ukraine (67) as cooperating countries with the European

Environment Agency in 2026 marks a further promising step in improving EU and

regional environmental cooperation. The Commission helped to leverage new

technologies to address climate and environmental challenges. In early 2026, EU

assistance enabled the delivery of advanced analytical equipment to Ukraine for water

quality and microplastics analysis. Work to deploy innovative techniques such as

environmental DNA (eDNA) analysis and modelling continued.

To further strengthen regional environmental cooperation and governance, the

Commission continued its work in relation to the Bucharest Convention for the

protection of the Black Sea. The Permanent Secretariat of the Black Sea Commission

has been actively involved in the governance of various EU-funded initiatives. The

EU’s strategic aim to acquire membership of this convention remains valid.

The Commission, in cooperation with EMSA, has continued to support Black Sea

partner countries to prevent and reduce marine pollution. In September, several

Black Sea countries participated in an oil pollution response exercise hosted by

Türkiye. EMSA mobilised its oil spill response vessel “Aktea II” and other specialised

equipment. The Ukrainian Sea Port Authority received equipment to strengthen its

emergency response capabilities. EMSA also provided support to ratify, implement

and enforce international maritime conventions and implement the EU acquis.

Overall, 34 Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin projects worth almost EUR 38 million

(about EUR 34 million of EU funding) contributing to Pillar 3 were implemented or

launched during the reporting period. Key initiatives include: AIRQUEST, which is

developing an integrated air quality monitoring system across the region, combining

satellite- and land-based monitoring; MACRO CLEAN, which has published a

methodology guide for converting marine on macroalgae into fertiliser and bioplastics

and LEARN4SEA, which helped Bulgaria and Türkiye to establish Environmental

Information Centres.

The Commission has dedicated resources to advancing joint initiatives that

improve environmental and climate change resilience, including water

(65) https://blackseadb.org/

(66) https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/newsroom/news/eea-and-eionet-welcome-moldova-as-a-cooperating-

country

(67) https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/newsroom/news/eea-and-eionet-welcome-ukraine-as-a-cooperating-

country

18

resilience. In 2025-2026, regional programmes such as EU4Climate Resilience (68)

promoted nature-based solutions for climate adaptation. The city of Cantemir and the

municipality of Ceadir-Lunga in Moldova were awarded grants for pilot actions

designed to strengthen local resilience to climate impacts. In Armenia, such grants

benefit the Gavar and Tashir municipalities. The Interreg BRIGHT project supports

local level actors in Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova and Türkiye to deliver energy and

climate action aligned with EU 2050 climate targets.

The EU Water Resilience Strategy (69) was adopted in June 2025 and has put

forward a proactive approach to restoring and protecting water cycles from source to

sea, build a water-smart economy and safeguard water security for all to ensure

sustainability and resilience. Support for policy action on water resilience is provided,

for example, through the EU4Green Recovery East (70) programme. The programme

will look at the water and climate nexus from a transboundary perspective with a focus

on the South Caucasus. Furthermore, the new Interreg Blue&Green Resilience

project, launched in March, supports Black Sea cities in addressing water scarcity and

climate risks through nature-based solutions and stronger cross-border cooperation.

The EU actively supports grassroots actions, such as clean-ups and educational

events. Examples include cetaceans monitoring activities involving Georgian pupils,

and a WaterTech Bootcamp in Azerbaijan where young innovators presented their

solutions for sustainable water management. In Ukraine, the Black Sea ‘weekend

school’ brought together children and scientists for four months in 2025, with

29 diplomas awarded on Black Sea Day.

Preparedness and disaster management have advanced in line with the

Preparedness Union Strategy (71). The fourth phase of the EU-funded regional civil

protection programme in the Eastern Partnership countries was launched in

November, to improve disaster resilience and response capacities while fostering

integration with the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). The Commission

also continued bilateral capacity-building efforts to support disaster preparedness and

prevention: in 2025, six UCPM-funded projects involving entities from Türkiye

(including one led by the national civil protection authority with a focus on an

ecosystem-based approach to strengthen knowledge-sharing and good practices

linking ecosystem restoration, nature-based solutions, and disaster risk prevention and

preparedness), two involving entities from Romania (including one led by the national

civil protection focused on strengthening capacities for search and rescue operations

in the event of aviation incidents), and one from Moldova (led by the national civil

protection authority, which developed a feasibility study for a national early warning

system) were successfully completed. Another project focused on improving floods

management in Samsun, a major Black Sea port, was ongoing during 2026. In April

2026, a new UCPM project involving Türkiye and Romania, alongside France,

Germany, Italy and Portugal, was launched to protect cultural heritage from the

impact of disasters using a whole-of-society model. In the context of the deepening

EU-Armenia partnership and ahead of the first EU-Armenia Summit in Yerevan on

5 May 2026, the EU and Armenia signed a new arrangement on civil protection

(68) https://eu4climate.eu/

(69 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0280

(70) https://www.eu4greenrecoveryeast.eu/

(71) https://commission.europa.eu/topics/preparedness_en

19

cooperation aimed at strengthening disaster resilience, preparedness and emergency

response cooperation.

Through the UCPM, the EU swiftly responded to requests for assistance from

Moldova and Ukraine. In 2026, EU assistance helped tackle oil spills in the

transboundary Dniester/Nistru River, a major source of drinking water for Moldova

which was caused by Russia’s attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine. The

river’s contamination not only jeopardises the water supply, but also the integrity of

aquatic ecosystems and overall water quality in the region. Romania, Belgium and

Luxembourg helped with absorbent materials and equipment. Absorbent material was

also provided through the EU’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments. Additionally,

the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) mobilised personal

protective equipment from its strategic rescEU stocks hosted by Germany and Poland

and activated EMSA satellite imagery services to detect and monitor oil spills. In

Ukraine, in response to sustained attacks on energy infrastructure, generators and

transformers were offered to reinforce and repair the electricity grid. The delivery of

the Vilnius Thermal Power Plant was the largest and most complex logistical

operation under the UCPM to date, providing electrical capacity to serve an estimated

one million people.

Several Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin projects have contributed to regional

cooperation on preparedness and disaster management. Under IMPACT+, a Common

Emergency Response Plan was developed to improve emergency preparedness in

rural areas and effective coordination between authorities and local communities. The

CO-RESILIENCE project provided support to develop a training centre in Çatalca

Elbasan in Türkiye, for forest firefighting experts and volunteers, which will be

pivotal to strengthening regional wildfire prevention and response capacities. Similar

investments are planned in Kameno in Bulgaria and Nestoia in Ukraine, and through

a Mobile Centre for Information and Prevention in Moldova. Additional projects

launched in 2025, including NAT-RES, BSB-BSUAND, RISCARE and ISTROS (see

Annex I), are expected to further boost regional resilience and preparedness.

The European Commission plays a key role in responding to radiological incidents

through the early warning system of theEuropean Community Urgent Radiological

Information Exchange (ECURIE) and the European Radiological Data Exchange

Platform (EURDEP). Ukraine and Türkiye currently participate in EURDEP, and

Ukraine is due to join ECURIE in 2026.

6. WAY FORWARD

During the first year of implementation, the Commission and the High Representative

have considerably advanced EU engagement with the partner countries of the Black

Sea region. This strengthened engagement focused on shared interests, both through

new initiatives, such as the Connectivity Agenda, and well-established streams of

regional cooperation, such as the CMA for the Black Sea and the SRIA for the Black

Sea.

The Black Sea region will remain a core EU priority. In response to intensifying

geopolitical pressures, the EU is committed to forge a united approach to security and

connectivity across the region.

20

The first Ministerial meeting on cross-regional security and connectivity in October

2025 fostered political resolve and a common understanding of shared interests across

a diverse region facing significant geopolitical challenges. A follow up ministerial is

planned for late 2026 to sustain the strong political momentum, review progress

achieved and agree on the subsequent priority actions.

Joint efforts under Pillar 1 ‘Security, Stability and Resilience’ will continue to address

hybrid threats, enhance maritime safety and security, and protect critical infrastructure

and trade routes, amid increasing Russian attacks against Ukraine’s civilian

infrastructure, such as energy infrastructure, and its Black Sea ports. In this context,

the EU will support Black Sea littoral states in implementing the concept of a regional

maritime security hub in coordination with EU Member States and relevant partner

countries.

Pillar 1 ensures that the EU Black Sea strategy is part of a new EU policy mix that

builds on the principle of ‘preparedness by design’, contributing to long-term

resilience across various sectors. This implementation report of the Black Sea

Strategy is placed in a context where EU action is geared and streamlined through

concrete action, shaped by initiatives such as the Action Plan on Drone and Counter

Drone Security (72), the Communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering

Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (73), or the EU Ports strategy (74). Looking ahead, the EU

will enhance its security commitments to the Black Sea region and will ensure

coherence among security and defence initiatives in the region.

The implementation of the Black Sea Strategy, notably through its Pillar 1, supports

the EU’s wider objective to integrate crisis anticipation, resilience, and coordinated

response capabilities into its policy framework. It also contributes to a more coherent

and integrated approach to action across the sea basins surrounding the EU. Looking

ahead, efforts will be made to strengthen coherence, notably by promoting the

exchange of experience and best practices between the Baltic and the Black Sea

basins. Particular attention will be given to addressing challenges posed by

substandard shadow fleet, the protection of critical maritime infrastructure, and the

countering of hybrid threats.

Under Pillar 2 ‘Growth and Prosperity’, the Strategy has set out efforts to unlock

economic potential and strengthen connectivity, particularly through the flagship

initiative on the cross-regional Connectivity Agenda and the CMA for the Black Sea.

These initiatives are central to boosting trade, investment, and sustainable growth

across the region. The Connectivity Agenda demonstrates the EU’s strategic resolve

to foster prosperity, cooperation, and stability in the Black Sea and South Caucasus

regions, as well as in Central Asia. The Commission is working closely with partner

countries and IFIs to identify and prepare priority infrastructure projects and mobilise

the investments required for their implementation. In this regard, the Connectivity

Agenda Platform, launched in June 2026, will be an instrumental coordination

mechanism, providing a coherent development platform for the entire TCTC corridor.

(72) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52026DC0081

(73) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52026DC0082

(74) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52026DC0112

21

The Commission will also support Member States in promoting private sector

engagement through the emerging project pipeline.

Priority actions will also include fostering synergies between the Black Sea and the

Danube region as a strategic link for connectivity, economic cooperation and

sustainable development.

Bulgaria has become the CMA coordinator for 2026 (75), succeeding Ukraine.

Upcoming activities and the annual stakeholder conference, planned for the second

half of 2026, will contribute to further strengthen strategic dialogue and regional

cooperation on maritime safety and security, environmental protection, innovation

and the sustainable development of the Black Sea blue economy.

Under Pillar 3 ‘Environmental Protection, Climate Change Resilience and

Preparedness, Civil Protection’, peer exchange and cooperation on environmental and

climate resilience contributed to finding rapid solutions, including to pollution

induced by Russia’s was of aggression. The EU will continue to work closely with

coastal communities and further strengthen its support to them. The Commission will

mobilise the entire array of instruments at its disposal to step up coordinated action to

safeguard the environment, strengthen climate resilience and enhance preparedness

and civil protection across the region.

The EU remains firmly committed to advancing a more secure, better connected, and

resilient Black Sea region, as a matter of strategic interest for the Union and its

partners, while fostering sustainable growth opportunities in a mutually reinforcing

and beneficial way. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war of aggression and a rapidly

evolving geopolitical context, the Strategy’s implementation will remain flexible and

adaptive, guided by continuous assessment of the conditions and challenges affecting

its delivery. Under each of the three pillars, EU Member States and partner countries

play a key role in delivering on shared goals under the Strategy. Moving forward, the

Commission and High Representative will continue to prioritise result-oriented

dialogue and joint action at all levels of cooperation, with a clear focus on strategic

impact, unity of purpose, and the delivery of tangible outcomes in the region.

(75) https://black-sea-maritime-agenda.ec.europa.eu/bulgaria-takes-lead-coordinating-common-maritime-

agenda-black-sea-2026

Annex A Major multi-country projects under implementation in the Black Sea region in 2025-2026

Project title Duration

(start – end,

month.year)

Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,

million

EUR

Project scope

BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA

PILLAR 1

Fighting against organised crime in the

Eastern Partnership region II

01.2025 -

12.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 1.8 Enhance participation in

EMPACT

Training and Operational Partnership

against Organised Crime (TOPCOP) II

07.2024 -

06.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 5.2 Strengthen cooperation to

address criminal threats

Improving cyber resilience in Eastern

Partnership countries I

12.2024 -

11.2027

■ ■ NDICI 1.7 Legislative support on NIS 2

Directive and capacity-building

Improving cyber resilience in Eastern

Partnership countries II

12.2024 -

12.2026

■ ■ NDICI 1.8 Same as above

CyberEast+: Enhanced action on

cybercrime for cyber resilience in the

Eastern Partnership States

03.2024 -

02.2027

■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 3.5 Ensure a more effective

criminal justice response to

cybercrime

Support to Eastern Partnership

Countries to Enhance Asset

Recovery II

10.2027 ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 1.00 Support asset recovery policies

and practices and facilitate

operational implementation in

the recovery of proceeds of

organised crime

EU4MD II – EU4Monitoring Drugs II 12.2027 ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 1.00 Enhance monitoring,

assessment and response

capabilities in relation to

contemporary drug issues

Resilient & Connected 12.2025 -

03.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 5.00 Countering disinformation and

FIMI, and support media

literacy

23

Project title Duration

(start – end,

month.year)

Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,

million

EUR

Project scope

BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA

Flexible Response Mechanism (FRM) 02.2026 -

07.2027

■ NDICI -

CRISIS

18 Strengthen partner countries’

capacities to respond to hybrid

threats, with a focus on

provision of critical equipment.

Currently active in MD,

available multi-country.

PILLAR 2

BLUE-GATES 09.2024 -

03.2027

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.40 Innovative tools to improve

aquaculture and safeguard

marine resources

AQUABATOR 09.2025 -

09.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.40 Incubator for sustainable

aquaculture

SUSDEST-NET 11.2025 -

05.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.42 Sustainable Destinations Black

Sea Network

SUSTAIN-2 12.2025 -

12.2027

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.09 Sustainability model for

tourism supported by artificial

intelligence

MARMAPS 06.2024 -

12.2025

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.50 Joint maritime spatial planning

and conservation of marine

ecosystems

BIOSUSTAIN 12. 2025 -

06.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.55 Sustain biodiversity through

traditional and novel

knowledge

e-AQUAF 02.2026 -

08.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.40 Smart aquafarming solutions

EfxINNOs 08.2024 -

02.2027

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.64 Marine Technology Transfer

Network for blue economy

24

Project title Duration

(start – end,

month.year)

Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,

million

EUR

Project scope

BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA

BlueDial 02.2026 -

08.2027

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.50 Support coordination and

alignment of national and

regional strategies with the

CMA for the Black Sea and a

common sustainable blue

economy vision

INTERSMARTS 06.2024 -

12.2025

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.55 Improving sustainability

performance and innovation

absorption in tourism and

services

Facility for Eastern Partnership

Investment in Connectivity (EPIC)

12.2021 –

12.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI Advisory and technical support

to improve transport

connections

EU4Energy Phase II and II+ 01.2021-

12.2025

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 13.49 Facilitate regulatory reforms

for clean energy transition and

energy market liberalisation

EU4Innovation East 04.2024 -

09.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 22.12 Develop high-performance

incubators, expand funding and

market opportunities for

startups

EU4Digital Facility 06.2022 -

09.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 16.00 Support integration into the EU

Digital Single Market

EU4Digital: Investing in Broadband

Connectivity

11.2023 –

11.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 5.00 Broadband mapping for digital

connectivity investment

planning

PILLAR 3

Black Sea SIERRA 10.2023 -

09.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ EMFAF 0.75 Preparedness in response to

civil and military pollution

25

Project title Duration

(start – end,

month.year)

Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,

million

EUR

Project scope

BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA

RESPONSE 10.2023 -

09.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ EMFAF 0.60 Training and curricula for the

monitoring, reporting,

management and mitigation of

marine pollution, focusing on

pollution caused by armed

conflicts

ANEMONE PLUS 09.2025 -

03.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.48 Assess the vulnerability of the

Black Sea marine ecosystem to

human pressures

ALGAEREVIVE 09.2024 -

03.2027

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.47 Harness algae power for

pollution reduction and blue

growth

AIRQUEST 07.2024 -

07.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.20 Mobilise communities for air

quality

IASON+ 06.2024 -

12.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.40 Invasive Alien Species

Observatory and assessment of

climate change impacts and

ecosystem services

BS-SEOS 10.2024 -

03.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.29 Black Sea Smart Marine

Environmental Outcome

System

LAP-BACK 09.2024 -

09.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.46 Strengthen local intervention

capacities for climate change

MACRO-CLEAN 09.2024 -

03.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.51 Research and pilot application

of cleaning methodologies to

manage macroalgal blooms

MicroDanger 12.2025 -

06.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.45 Public outreach to reduce

microplastic pollution

26

Project title Duration

(start – end,

month.year)

Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,

million

EUR

Project scope

BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA

HERO 12.2025 -

12.2027

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.64 Address environmental impacts

on reefs

AGRIPERMA 12.2025 -

06.2027

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.44 Exchange of good practices

and knowledge on regenerative

agriculture and permaculture

STEP2CleanPlan 07.2024 -

01.2026

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.50 Cooperation for sustainable

energy and climate actions’

planning and monitoring

SG4Y-CLIMATE 11.2025 -

05.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.55 Youth involvement in climate

action

NAT-RES 11.2025 -

11.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.64 Advanced technologies to

anticipate, mitigate and

respond to Natural Hazard

Triggering Technological

Disasters events

BSB-BSUAND 09.2025 -

03.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.50 Joint action against natural

disasters

RISCARE 09.2025 -

09.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.64 Joint procedures and training

for rapid intervention

ISTROS 09.2025 -

03.2028

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.28 Strengthen biodiversity

protection

CO-RESILIENCE 06.2024 -

08.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.48 Cooperation on capacity

building for wildfire

community resilience and early

warning systems

27

Project title Duration

(start – end,

month.year)

Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,

million

EUR

Project scope

BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA

IMPACT+ 07.2024 -

01.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.55 Improve emergency response

to natural and man-made

disasters in small communities

SPEER-A 09.2025 -

01.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.76 Strengthen earthquake

emergency response and rescue

capacity

DARE-EU 12.2025 -

12.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

2.33 Disaster assistance and

response in Moldova, Bulgaria

and Türkiye

REDA_NEXt 10.2025 -

03.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.50 Rapid Earthquake Damage

Assessment - Expanded

GREEN URBAN RESILIENCE 07.2024 -

09.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.29 Green solutions for urban areas

addressing climate change, heat

stress and thermal discomforts

LEARN4SEA 06.2024 -

08.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.82 Joint learning for

environmentally-friendly

behaviour at community level

CAGOS 06.2024 -

12.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.49 Clean areas, green and open

streets

EcosySTEM 07.2024 -

07.2026

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.63 Empower children for

environmental sustainability

through E-STEM

EcoYOU 06.2024 -

12.2025

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.43 Clean and green minds for

environmentally-friendly

behaviour

28

Project title Duration

(start – end,

month.year)

Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,

million

EUR

Project scope

BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA

UCare 08.2025 -

08.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.47 Green infrastructure for urban

climate adaptation and

recovery

DIALOGUE 09.2025 -

12.2026

Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.54 Dialogue for innovation and

better governance

easyPEST 12.2025 -

06.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.52 Establish a plant pest

monitoring system

GwB 12.2025 -

06.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.95 Decision support system for

global water balance

GreenS4BlackSea 12.2025 -

06.2027

■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

0.45 Protection of virgin forests as a

green solution for the Black

Sea

WISE-WASTE 12.2025 -

12.2027

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.48 Cooperation on waste

management and pollution

reduction

Sustain BIO&CLIMA 12.2025 -

06.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg

NEXT BSB

1.61 Enhance accessibility,

biodiversity, and climate

resilience through sustainable

practices

EU4EMBLAS 04.2021 -

06.2026

■ ■ NDICI 2.19 Monitoring surveys and

equipment, public awareness

and participation

Strengthening environmental resilience

and maritime safety for Black and

Caspian seas riparian states

(BCSEA II)

09.2026 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 4.50 Enhance maritime safety and

environmental protection

through training, improved

vessel traffic monitoring, and

pollution control

29

Project title Duration

(start – end,

month.year)

Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,

million

EUR

Project scope

BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA

EU4ClimateResilience 01.2024 -

12.2027

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 19.58 Support climate policy design

and implementation

EU4Green Recovery East 01.2025 -

12.2028

■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 21.30 Support water resilience,

circular economy, legislative

alignment, transboundary

projects

Prevention, Preparedness and Response

to natural and human-induced disasters

in the Eastern Partnership countries –

phase 4 (PPRD East 4)

11.2025 -

10.2029

■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 5.00 Strengthen Disaster Risk

Management (DRM) systems

and enhance cooperation with

the Union Civil Protection

Mechanism

*The EU funding for Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin projects amounts to 90% of the total project budget.