| Dokumendiregister | Riigikogu |
| Viit | 1-2/26-475/1 |
| Registreeritud | 03.07.2026 |
| Sünkroonitud | 04.07.2026 |
| Liik | EL dokument |
| Funktsioon | |
| Sari | |
| Toimik | Ühisaruanne - JOIN(2026) 15 |
| Juurdepääsupiirang | Avalik |
| Adressaat | |
| Saabumis/saatmisviis | |
| Vastutaja | |
| Originaal | Ava uues aknas |
| Taotle dokumendi eemaldamist või parandamist |
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY
Brussels, 3.7.2026 JOIN(2026) 15 final
JOINT REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
on the implementation of the EU strategic approach to the Black Sea region
1. INTRODUCTION
The Joint Communication on the European Union’s strategic approach to the Black
Sea region (1) (also referred to as the ‘Black Sea Strategy’ or the ‘Strategy’) calls on
the European Commission and the High Representative / Vice-President (HR/VP) to
deliver a progress report one year into its implementation. Accordingly, this joint
report outlines the progress made since its adoption in May 2025.
In June 2025, the European Council welcomed the Joint Communication (2), which
reaffirms the Black Sea’s geostrategic role and sets out a vision for a more secure,
interconnected, prosperous, and resilient region – anchored in shared values, the rule
of law, sustainability, and effective cooperation. The EU is committed to advancing
this vision jointly with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova
(‘Moldova’), Türkiye, and Ukraine, through mutually reinforcing cooperation.
The first year of implementation of the Strategy saw intensified Russian hybrid
attacks, drone and missile warfare against military and civilian and critical
infrastructure, including ports, especially in the Odesa region. Russia’s war of
aggression against Ukraine, lasting for more than four years since 2022, continues to
severely undermine security and stability in the Black Sea region, dramatically
expanding negative consequences for the region and beyond.
Despite the war’s impact, most countries in the region maintain macroeconomic
stability and are implementing structural reforms (3). Some of them are on the path to
EU accession, and their gradual integration into EU initiatives has reinforced
cooperation, cohesion and coordinated action with the EU. The ongoing peace process
between Armenia and Azerbaijan offers a historic opportunity to consolidate cross-
border cooperation and connectivity in the South Caucasus, and to facilitate linkages
with Central Asia. Complementarities with the EU Strategy for Central Asia,
especially for cross-regional connectivity efforts, have been pursued.
In line with the objectives of the Black Sea Strategy, the current report highlights the
EU’s increased strategic engagement and coordinated actions to: (i) enhance security,
stability and resilience across the Black Sea region (Pillar 1); (ii) strengthen economic
growth and transport, energy, and digital connectivity (Pillar 2); and (iii) ensure
environmental and climate resilience and preparedness, and civil protection (Pillar 3).
Central to these efforts has been the support provided by the EU to Ukraine.
2. ADVANCING EU ENGAGEMENT AND COOPERATION IN THE BLACK SEA REGION
The EU engagement in the Black Sea region and with its partner countries reflects
new levels of ambition and significant steps taken forward to deepen political,
economic and sectoral cooperation with partner countries. The ministerial meeting on
cross-regional security and connectivity in Luxembourg on 20 October 2025 marked
a major step in fostering closer mutually beneficial partnerships and taking forward
cross-regional cooperation on security and connectivity. The meeting brought
(1) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0135
(2) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/cjtb3oep/20250626-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf
(3) https://www.ebrd.com/home/news-and-events/publications/economics/transition-reports/transition-
report-2025-26.html
2
together EU Member States and partner countries from the Black Sea region, the
South Caucasus and Central Asia (4). Discussions deepened political dialogue on
security, stability, and resilience in the region. The meeting also advanced the cross-
regional Connectivity Agenda, aimed at strengthening trade and economic growth by
better connecting the EU, Ukraine and Moldova, to the Southern Caucasus and
Central Asia via Black Sea and Türkiye. Participants reaffirmed their determination
to step up cooperation in areas of shared interest, enhance resilience and promote
more connected, secure and prosperous regions.
Ukraine has shown strong commitment to reform so as to meet EU accession
requirements (5) and to prepare for future reconstruction, despite Russian attacks
against cities and civilian and energy infrastructure continuing to escalate. The
implementation of the reforms agreed in the Ukraine Plan has been strong, with
77 reform and investment steps completed so far across key sectors, such as rule of
law, anti-corruption, energy markets, public administration, and governance of state-
owned enterprises. Ukraine has also seized the opportunities for early integration into
the EU market made available through the DCFTA and other agreements with the
EU: Ukraine joined the EU roam-like-at-home area, adopted the legislation to start
the electricity market coupling and updated its partnership with EU on critical raw
materials.
Moldova has made significant progress on its ambitious reform agenda (6) and on the
path to EU membership. Despite massive Russian interference, the Parliamentary
elections of September 2025 reaffirmed the country’s accession path. Besides
facilitating deeper EU integration, the EU’s cooperation with Moldova has included
support on energy, notably reducing dependency on Russian supplies and further
integrating with EU energy systems, as well as on cybersecurity and increasing
resilience to electoral interference.
On 15 June 2026, negotiations on Cluster 1: fundamentals were formally opened for
Ukraine and Moldova, marking an important step forward on the countries’ EU
accession paths.
The recent positive regional developments, notably the historic momentum in the
Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, opens avenues for the region’s new
transformative path. Inter-connected strategic industries, markets, transport corridors,
digital networks, and energy interconnections help building trust and binding
neighbours together. This is showcased with progress in the normalisation of relations
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including through the initialling of a bilateral peace
treaty, the 2025 Washington Political Declaration and the TRIPP (7) connectivity
project. Likewise, Armenia and Türkiye have made progress in the normalisation of
their relations, including through efforts to facilitate bilateral trade and discussions to
re-establish railway links.
(4) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/20/co-chairs-conclusions-on-
strengthening-cross-regional-security-and-connectivity/
(5) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ukraine-report-2025_en
(6) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/moldova-report-2025_en
(7) The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is a U.S.-brokered transit corridor
through Armenia's Syunik region to connect Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan.
3
The EU’s relations with Armenia reconfirmed a strong positive momentum, reflected
in the Strategic Agenda adopted in December 2025 (8), which raised the level of
ambition with short- and medium-term priorities across all sectors of cooperation. The
first EU-Armenia Summit (9), held in Yerevan on 4-5 May 2026, represented a
significant milestone in the EU-Armenia relations. With the announcement of the EU-
Armenia connectivity partnership (10), bilateral engagement was strengthened on
energy, transport and digital, which will be central to future engagement. The
EU-Armenia visa liberalisation dialogue is progressing well as Armenia initiated the
reforms necessary to move towards a visa-free regime with the EU. Recent elections
have reaffirmed the country’s commitment to the path of peace, democratic
governance, and regional normalisation. In parallel, in response to Russia’s economic
coercive measures, the EU has mobilised a comprehensive package of support aimed
at strengthening Armenia’s resilience and mitigating the economic impact of external
pressure.
The strategic importance of the EU-Azerbaijan partnership was reaffirmed at the
highest level in March 2026 (11), with a commitment to further deepening political
dialogue and practical cooperation, including in the areas of energy, transport and
digital. Building on this positive momentum, the EU and Azerbaijan are advancing
discussions on new Partnership Priorities and have recently resumed negotiations on
a comprehensive bilateral agreement, reflecting a shared interest in modernising the
bilateral relationship. Azerbaijancontinues to play a key role in regional connectivity
and remains a reliable partner in the diversification of Europe’s energy supplies and
in the expansion of the transport potential of regional links. The cooperation between
the EU and Azerbaijan reflects the shared interest of both sides and contributes to the
promotion of peace, stability, connectivity and sustainable development in the wider
Black Sea, South Caucasus and Central Asia regions.
Georgia’s geographical position makes it a natural transit corridor linking Central
Asia to Europe. The EU’s cooperation with Georgia (12) has continued to be strongly
impacted by the country’s democratic backsliding, which has resulted in a de facto
halt of the country’s EU accession process and the suspension by the EU in March
2026 of visa-free travel for holders of Georgian diplomatic, service and official
passports. Georgia’s role within this Strategy will largely depend on the authorities’
willingness to take tangible steps towards improving the situation.
The EU and Türkiye, a key partner, NATO ally, and an EU candidate country, have
exchanged views on the Black Sea Strategy and discussed its implementation on
multiple occasions over the past year, including during regular consultations on
Foreign and Security Policy. The EU Black Sea Strategy was most recently discussed
during the 2026 EU-Türkiye Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
(8) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-union-and-armenia-adopt-new-strategic-agenda-
deepen-partnership-2025-12-02_en
(9) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/05/joint-declaration-following-the-
first-armenia-eu-summit/
(10) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/da/ip_26_988
(11) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/11/joint-press-statement-by-
president-of-the-european-council-antonio-costa-and-president-of-the-republic-of-azerbaijan-ilham-
aliyev/
(12) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report-2025_en
4
consultations. Bilateral and regional cooperation on connectivity, where Türkiye
plays a central role, is of mutual interest and a pillar in EU-Türkiye relations. In
particular, both sides agreed to strengthen coordination in shaping the regional
connectivity agenda across the energy, transport, digitalisation and trade sectors to
contribute to stability, resilience and sustainable growth across Black Sea, South
Caucasus and Central Asia. Türkiye has initiated work on a Connectivity Investment
Plan with a view to developing a pipeline of projects. In parallel, Türkiye has taken
positive steps towards the normalisation of relations with Armenia, including lifting
restrictions in preparation for direct bilateral trade and the launch of preparatory work
to rehabilitate the Kars-Gyumri railway line. The normalisation process can play an
important role in promoting security, stability and resilience in the region, while also
unlocking economic and connectivity opportunities.
The relevance of the Strategy was underlined in several fora, including the Euronest
Parliamentary Assembly in Yerevan (October 2025) and the Eastern Partnership
Senior Officials’ Meeting in Brussels (March 2026). In its opinion adopted in
December 2025 (13), the European Economic and Social Committee called for
sufficient resources to be used to swiftly and decisively implement the Strategy. The
Committee of the Regions followed in March 2026 with an opinion calling for
structured and well-resourced implementation (14).
3. PILLAR 1: SECURITY, STABILITY, AND RESILIENCE
Over the past year, the security landscape of the Black Sea region continued to be
impacted by Russia’s multiple actions to destabilise it. Russia has systematically used
drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian ports and their access infrastructure.
Particularly in Odesa, Chornomorsk, and along the Danube Corridor, the strikes have
disrupted grain exports and escalated risks for commercial shipping. These attacks
also impacted neighbouring coastal states like Romania who faced multiple breaches
of its airspace and debris falling on its territory. In late May 2026, a Russian drone
incursion struck a densely populated area in Galați, Romania's largest river and sea
port on the Danube River and its second-largest port, injuring civilians. Maritime
security in the Black Sea continues to suffer as a result of Russia’s hybrid tactics –
including electronic warfare – as well as from interference of navigation systems
(spoofing and jamming). These continuous attacks increase the costs of trade and
shipping, endanger seafarers and cause major environmental damages. Moreover,
Russia’s shadow fleet has continued its efforts to evade sanctions, using deceptive
practices like sailing under a false flag. This poses additional risks of sabotage and
environmental degradation, further undermining the protection of critical maritime
infrastructure, including underwater, and energy corridors.
In response, the EU remains committed to proactively supporting regional stability
and security. The EU adopted further sanctions packages targeting Russia’s military-
industrial supply chains, energy revenues, and vessels linked to illicit activities. These
measures, combined with enhanced support for Ukraine’s defence and resilience,
(13) https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/news-media/news/eesc-calls-ambitious-and-pragmatic-implementation-
eus-strategic-approach-black-sea-region-0
(14) https://cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions/cdr-2757-2025
5
notably through the EUR 90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026-27 (15),
contribute to the operationalisation of the Strategy’s security pillar.
The EU raised security challenges in the Black Sea and responses brought by the EU
strategy during the 3rd Black Sea Security Conference under the International Crimea
Platform hosted in Chișinău, on 23 April 2026 (16) and the 3rd Odesa Black Sea
Security Forum held on 29-31 May 2026 (17). Concrete exchanges of experience were
organised to highlight the coherent approach among European sea basins in
addressing security challenges faced in the Baltic and the Black Seas – including
undermined safety of navigation, challenged maritime security, hybrid tactics,
including electronic warfare, navigation systems interference (spoofing and
jamming). More peer exchanges at expert level will enable experience sharing
between the Baltic and Black Sea basins, with a focus on civilian preparedness and
resilience (18) and on addressing Russian shadow fleet and hybrid activities.
FLAGSHIP 1: Black Sea maritime security
Since the adoption of the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea in May 2025, Bulgaria
and Romania have jointly developed a concept for the establishment of a regional Black
Sea Maritime Security Hub (also referred to as the ‘Hub’). The Hub is designed as a
regionally owned, civilian-led, inter-institutional collaborative network structure, co-
initiated and coordinated jointly by the two countries and supported by the EU. It aims to
enhance maritime situational awareness and regional resilience, to facilitate cooperation
and capacity building in maritime security, to protect critical infrastructure and counter
complex hybrid threats, enhance environmental safety and develop common threat
assessment in support of civilian crisis scenarios. The Hub will be leveraging and analysing
multiple data sources to support timely and informed decision-making by the littoral EU
Member States and the EU, while seeking further engagement of other EU Member States
and participation of key regional partners Türkiye, Ukraine and Moldova initially. Specific
attention will be paid to integrating surveillance and monitoring capabilities of the
participating states, and ensuring interoperability and links with EU networks, like the
Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) implemented by the European
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The Hub will also contribute to protecting critical
maritime infrastructure in the Black Sea region in a consistent, coordinated way and
provide better visibility and predictability in a changing security context. As a subsequent
step, close liaison and coordination will be sought with other regional platforms, mine
countermeasure groups, and structures operated by Black Sea partners, for example the
national Joint Maritime Security Centre (JMSC) in Odesa (Ukraine). The Mine
Countermeasures Black Sea initiative set up by Türkiye-Romania-Bulgaria is the primary
safeguard against drifting mines, playing thus a crucial role in maintaining open and secure
sea lines of communication, including for flows of grain transport to and from Ukraine.
15) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/23/council-finalises-90-billion-
support-loan-to-ukraine/
16) https://crimea-platform.org/en/news/third-black-sea-security-conference-of-the-international-crimea-
platform-begins-in-moldova/; https://mfa.gov.md/en/content/republic-moldova-host-third-edition-
black-sea-security-conference-under-auspices
17) https://odesaforum.org/
(18) A side-event during the Macro-Regional and Sea Basins Strategies Days (Brussels, 8-9 July 2026)
6
3.1. Cooperation on demining and maritime safety, defence and security
In support of maritime safety and security in the Black Sea, the EU Advisory Mission
(EUAM) in Ukraine has assisted in establishing the national Joint Maritime
Security Centre (JMSC) in Odesa. The JMSC aims to improve inter-agency
coordination and strengthen Ukraine’s operational capacities on maritime security
operations in the Black Sea. The first ministerial level Steering Committee meeting
on the establishment of the JMSC took place on 26 February 2026, followed by the
second meeting on 6 May 2026, during which the Steering Committee endorsed the
Concept of Operations. Hosted by EUAM, the meetings brought together Ukrainian
ministries and agencies responsible for maritime security, the International Maritime
Capability Coalition and the NATO Representation to Ukraine. The JMSC will allow
Ukraine to integrate into European cooperative frameworks.
In February 2026, the EU adopted the Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone
Security (19), which includes pilot actions to improve maritime domain awareness
and deployment of undersea sensing capacities to better protect critical maritime
infrastructure in the Black and Baltic Seas.
Following the approval in February 2026 by the Council of the financial assistance to
Romania and Bulgaria under SAFE and the signature of the loan agreements,
approximately EUR 20 billion will be made available to these Member States to close
critical capability gaps, thus supporting the security in the Black Sea region.
The Ukraine Support Loan with an allocation of EUR 90 billion, out of which
EUR 60 billion planned to cover the country’s most urgent defence industrial capacity
needs in 2026 and 2027, is an important pillar for the security in the Black Sea. In
March 2026, EU approved an allocation of approximately EUR 6 billion for drones
from Ukraine, for Ukraine.
As part of the EU support to Ukraine in the area of protection of critical
infrastructure, a workshop on Protective Security for critical infrastructure was
organised in February 2026. With the support of TAIEX, Ukraine has been working
on transposing the Directive on the resilience of critical entities. A call for proposals
under the Internal Security Fund on resilience of critical infrastructure with
15 million EUR budget was opened to Ukrainian participants.
Following the adoption of the Action Plan on Cable Security (20)in February 2025
and the publication of the’Report on Security and Resilience of EU Submarine Cable
Infrastructures’, an EU-wide mapping and coordinated risk assessment of submarine
cable infrastructures (21) has been agreed in October 2025 by the informal Expert
Group on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures. The report states the
importance of developing a coordinated approach with Türkiye in fostering and
preserving security, stability and connectivity in the Black Sea region.
(19) https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/action-plan-drone-and-counter-drone-security
(20) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0009
(21) https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/report-security-and-resilience-eu-submarine-cable-
infrastructures
7
In February 2026, the EU published the Cable Security Toolbox (22), which
recommends mitigation measures to address risk scenarios identified in the above-
mentioned report and proposes the Black Sea as a priority area for Cable Projects of
European Interest (CPEIs). The European Commission has issued an initial call of
EUR 10 million to fund regional cable hubs benefitting all sea basins around the EU,
including the Black Sea. CPEI areas will be prioritised in upcoming Connecting
Europe Facility (CEF) Digital calls (23) for proposals.
Under the 2026 European Defence Fund, the EU intends to support semi-autonomous
maritime systems as well as layered critical seabed infrastructure protection. Once
available, the capabilities developed could be leveraged in support to regional
security.
To limit the threats and risks posed by the Russian shadow fleet, including in the
Black Sea, the EU has imposed sanctions listing 632 vessels and over 60 enablers (24)
so far. The EU continues outreach to other countries to de-register such vessels and
to raise awareness on the environmental risks and costs associated with any spillovers.
In the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the EU is also active to advance
the work on regulatory frameworks, tackling substandard shipping and introducing
mandatory ship reporting and civil liability certificates.
The EU has been strengthening Europe’s capacity for maritime demining,
environmental risk mitigation and protection of critical maritime infrastructure, while
supporting future regional cooperation in post-conflict marine remediation. The 2025
European Ocean Pact comprises a flagship action for a comprehensive Unexploded
ordnance (UXO) removal strategy, starting in the Baltic and North Seas and
expanding to the Black Sea, utilising advanced detection and disposal technologies.
The Netherlands and Belgium have donated seven mine countermeasures vessels to
Bulgaria in 2025 with the aim to strengthen maritime security in the Black Sea.
The EU is scaling up technologies and methodologies for large-scale cleanup of
UXO dumped at sea. While the current efforts focus on the Baltic Sea, a similar
approach to large-scale UXO cleanup can be applied to the Black Sea, once security
conditions permit. Through EU-funded initiatives, notably the European Parliament–
supported CAMMera project, the EU is developing and testing innovative
technologies for the safe detection and remediation of submerged munitions. At a
January 2026 workshop in Sofia, experts from EU Member States, regional
organisations and research institutions evaluated the potential transfer of
technological solutions and operational lessons learned to the Black Sea and other sea
basins. The EU continued to support Ukraine in demining efforts with the handover
in February 2026 of the fifth batch of EU-trained mine detection dogs to the Ukrainian
authorities.
(22) https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/submarine-cable-security-toolbox-and-cable-projects-
european-interest
(23) https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/cef-digital
(24) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/23/russia-s-war-of-aggression-
against-ukraine-20th-round-of-stern-eu-sanctions-hits-energy-military-industrial-complex-trade-and-
financial-services-including-crypto/
8
3.2. Enhancing military mobility and dual use infrastructure
In November 2025, the Commission and the High Representative presented the
Military Mobility Package (25),consisting of a Joint Communication and Regulation
proposal aimed at ensuring the seamless movement of troops, equipment, and military
assets across the EU. Together with Member States and supported by the EU Military
Staff, the Commission identified 500 ‘hotspot’ projects for urgent investment to bring
the four priority military mobility corridors (26) in line with military requirements and
make the network more resilient. These projects include reinforcing bridges, widening
tunnels, and increasing capacity at ports and airports. The Commission coordinates
with Member States to ensure investments are implemented swiftly and coherently
along the corridors. This is also coherent with an emerging EU work strand to support
dual use industries in Ukraine.
Four of the nine TEN-T European Transport Corridors already extend into Ukraine
and one into Moldova, with a first set of important investments in dual-use
infrastructure ongoing. In parallel, preparatory works are ongoing to deploy
European nominal standard track gauge on the European Transport Corridors
connecting Moldova and Ukraine to EU Member States.
3.3. Countering hybrid threats
The security landscape of the Black Sea region is also defined by an unprecedented
surge in hybrid threats. Russia has continued to deploy multifaceted tools designed to
destabilise democratic processes, erode public trust, degrade critical infrastructure,
probe vulnerabilities and test responses.
The Union remains resolute in imposing costs on malign actors through the sanctions
regime (27) against Russia’s destabilising activities. As of April 2026, the Council has
expanded restrictive measures to include 69 individuals and 19 entities identified for
their roles in large-scale information manipulation. Additionally, the EU Cyber
Sanctions Regime (28) is rigorously enforced, with restrictive measures currently
applied to 19 individuals and 74 entities.
The EU also adapted its response mechanisms to the evolving threat landscape and to
counter hostile operations meant to undermine the electoral integrity and
democratic processes. In Moldova, the EU is supporting the country’s efforts to
protect its democratic processes from Russia’s interference. The EU has been also
actively strengthening its support to democratic and institutional resilience in
Armenia ahead of the June elections. A key achievement was the deployment of EU
Hybrid Rapid Response Teams (HRRT) in both cases, providing short-term tailored
technical and strategic advisory support to national authorities regarding
strengthening electoral integrity.
Direct support for Black Sea partner countries via Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) missions remains a primary vehicle for resilience building, while
(25) https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/military-mobility_en
(26) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/military-mobility_en
(27) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-hybrid-threats/
(28) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-cyber-attacks/
9
contributing to regional security. The EU Partnership Mission in Moldova supported
Moldovan authorities’ efforts to ensure democratic integrity during the 2025 elections
and continues to focus on long-term institutional capacity building in view of
strengthening Moldova’s resilience. Similarly, the EUAM in Ukraine is expanding its
support to Ukrainian authorities to counter hybrid threats in line with evolving needs,
including in the maritime domain through supporting the development of the Joint
Maritime Security Centre (JMSC). EUAM Ukraine provided specific expertise on
maritime cybersecurity in the Black Sea and the Danube Corridorduring the second
forum Rebuilding Ukraine in December 2025.
The EU Partnership Mission in Armenia is the newest civilian EU CSDP
mission (29), established on 21 April 2026 with the aim to enhance the country’s
democratic resilience and its ability to manage crisis in the long term. The mission
will support Armenia facing multi-layered threats such as Foreign Information
Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), cyber-attacks and illicit financial flows. (30)
The CyberEast+ regional initiative continued to strengthen cyber resilience in the
Black Sea and Eastern Partnership countries, by supporting alignment with the NIS2
Directive (31), delivering tailored training and capacity building, organising
simulation exercises and workshops to counter cyber threats, disinformation and
Foreign Information Manipulation and interference (FIMI), including in electoral
contexts.
In Armenia, the EU organised a series of workshops and TAIEX events for
representatives of state institutions and stepped up its support to local civil society
and independent media in their efforts to counter FIMI.
At the December EU-Armenia Partnership Council (32), a new regional initiative was
launched to counter FIMI and disinformation in the Eastern neighbourhood by
strengthening civil society and independent media capacities to engage in strategic
communication, promote media literacy among citizens.
A regional EU rapid response exceptional assistance measure was set up in early
2026 to support partner countries, particularly in Europe and Central Asia exposed to
hybrid threats building on successful assistance models developed for and continuing
to support Ukraine. Support is already being provided to Moldova under the new
framework. Through these and other initiatives the EU continues to develop a whole
of society approach by fostering partnerships among state institutions, civil society,
academia and media both within countries and across the region to help ensure
sustainable resilience against hybrid threats.
In Moldova, the EU has provided rapid response for cyber and internal security
(including relevant equipment). During the recent election cycles, rapid response was
instrumental to help safeguard the country’s democratic processes against hybrid
interference. Furthermore, the EU has mobilised rapid response to support
(29) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/21/armenia-eu-establishes-a-new-
civilian-mission-to-contribute-strengthening-the-country-s-resilience/
(30) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/21/armenia-eu-establishes-a-new-
civilian-mission-to-contribute-strengthening-the-country-s-resilience/
(31) Directive (EU) 2022/2555 OJ L 333 27.12.2022, p. 80, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/2022-12-27
(32) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2025/12/02/
10
independent media and continues working to strengthen Moldova’s strategic
communication capacities.
Also in Moldova, the EU is supporting the country’s efforts to protect its democratic
processes from Russia’s interference, including through the activity of a new regional
hub of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), which supports Moldova
and other countries in detecting and analysing manipulation and disinformation
campaigns, particularly Russian disinformation.
Through rapid response measures, the EU is supporting Ukraine’s resilience in the
face of Russia’s war of aggression and hybrid threats, by notably enhancing internal
and civilian security and safety as well as the country’s strategic communication
capacities.
3.4. Fighting organised crime and trafficking
The Commission, in cooperation with the United Nations Interregional Crime and
Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), provided legal and policy support on tracing,
seizing and confiscating criminal assets. It contributed to legislative reforms (notably
in Ukraine and Moldova), promoted the social reuse of confiscated criminal assets,
and enhanced practitioners’ skills through training and case-based mentoring. Under
the regional project Training and Operational Partnership Against Organised Crime
(TOPCOP II), CEPOL (33) supported structured cooperation and law enforcement
capacity through workshops and training on operational management, open-source
intelligence, migrant smuggling, and counterfeiting. The EMPACT (34) Support
Network,with experts from Europol and the European Border and Coast Guard
Agency (‘Frontex’), supported strategic intelligence development, introducing
advanced analytical approaches and new data sources such as travel intelligence. In
partnership with Europol, under the EU-funded project ‘Fight against organised crime
in the EaP countries’, the Commission continued to further integrate Eastern partners
in EMPACT, strengthening operational capacities, addressing key crime priorities
including cybercrime, and supporting war crimes investigations in Ukraine.
Through EUAM Ukraine, the EU continued to support Ukrainian authorities in
strengthening interagency cooperation and analytical capacities to counter serious
and organised crime, enhance integrated border management in line with EU
standards, improve cross-border coordination with neighbouring countries, and
address illicit firearms trafficking through targeted capacity building and strategic
advice. EUAM Ukraine supported cross-border operational coordination through
quarterly trilateral meetings between Ukrainian, Romanian and Moldovan border and
customs authorities, contributing to strengthened cooperation against cross-border
organised crime.
As part of the implementation of the EU Drugs Strategy (35), which states that the
Commission will explore cooperation with candidate countries on port security, the
Commission invited – among other third countries – Ukraine and Moldova as
(33) CEPOL is the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training.
(34) EMPACT (European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats) is a permanent EU security
initiative that brings together member states, EU agencies (like Europol), and international partners to
fight serious organised crime.
(35) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0743
11
observers to its European Ports Alliance Public-Private Partnership (PPP) expert
workshop on port security in smaller seaports and inland ports in February 2026.
Moreover, the Commission shared its insights on port security from the European
Ports Alliance PPP at an expert meeting of the Danube Commission in April 2026.
4. PILLAR 2: GROWTH AND PROSPERITY THROUGH BETTER CONNECTIVITY
The Black Sea Strategy introduced the cross-regional Connectivity Agenda as a long-
term strategic initiative to facilitate the diversification of trade routes away from high-
risk dependencies, making connectivity more integrated, cost-effective and faster. In
line with the Strategy, the Commission advanced efforts to strengthen trade,
investment, and connectivity. The flagship cross-regional Connectivity Agenda is
central to boosting the competitiveness of Black Sea countries’ economies and
deepening regional integration.
4.1. Boosting connectivity and energy security
Sustained political dialogue has yielded strong political support for the cross-regional
Connectivity Agenda among partner countries and EU Member States, aligning
stakeholders around the need to coordinate and accelerate the delivery of tangible
actions. Thanks to joint efforts, this flagship initiative progressed well in formalising
structured regional cooperation with clear priorities.
FLAGSHIP 2: Connectivity Agenda
As a gateway linking Europe to Türkiye, the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and beyond,
the Black Sea region plays a key role for European and overall global security,
international trade, energy, critical raw materials and food security. The region has
significant untapped potential for economic development and is crossed by strategic transit
routes. Strengthening regional cooperation and improving economic links would
contribute to the competitiveness of the region, and of the EU. To this end, the Connectivity
Agenda aims to leverage the full potential of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor
(TCTC) in the field of transport, including trade facilitation, and to improve energy and
digital links. Since the adoption of the Strategy, the Commission has worked to roll out
this flagship initiative. Significant progress has been made on improving and coordinating
investment planning in support of the Connectivity Agenda:
- The Commission published a meta-study in February 2026 to consolidate
recommendations on priority investments and regulatory reformsnecessary for the
operational delivery of the Connectivity Agenda. This comprehensive analysis, carried
out under the EU4Digital programme (36), reviewed multiple studies and over 200
ongoing or planned investment projects, and mapped where investment is needed to
strengthen transport, trade, energy and digital connections along the TCTC. The study
highlights key stretches where infrastructure in neighbouring countries is missing,
outdated or not fit for today’s volumes, providing a strategic baseline for setting
investment priorities with partner countries and international financial institutions
(IFIs). Practical guidance for investment and required regulatory (‘soft connectivity’)
(36) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/meta-study-advancing-cross-regional-connectivity-agenda_en
12
measures will give governments and the private sector a clear picture of where their
capital can make the biggest difference in building modern and reliable infrastructure.
- Building on the outcome of the ministerial meeting on cross-regional security and
connectivity in October 2025 (37), the Commission intensified bilateral engagement
through a series of high-level and technical missions to partner countries, including
Türkiye, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Discussions aim to enhance cooperation on regional
stability and connectivity, including priority investment.
- In consultation with partner countries, the Commission designed a coordination
platform, which will focus on the Black Sea and South Caucasus partner countries and
operate in synergy with the existing cooperation framework covering Central Asia.
Both public and private sector actors confirmed the need for such a coordination
mechanism during the TCTC and connectivity investors forum in Tashkent in
November 2025 (38). The Connectivity Agenda platform, launched on 23 June 2026,
will guide collective efforts, optimise project pipelines, and ensure efficiency across
hard and soft connectivity initiatives.
Recent multilateral agreements have bolstered connectivity and maritime security. In
December, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania established the Black Sea–Aegean
Corridor Platform (39). In March 2026, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine agreed to
continue working together on the Danube Action Plan 2.0, created under the European
Commission’s Solidarity Lanes initiative (40).This initiative optimises navigation
safety, port communication and information exchange and mitigates disruptions to
Black Sea / Danube traffic. To support the Solidarity Lanes’ functioning, the CEF)
provided additional funding in 2025 (41). Railway and road rehabilitation is facilitated
in Moldova in the framework of Global Gateway projects (42). Implementing
infrastructure projects under the extended TEN-T (43) should also help unlock the
TCTC’s full economic potential. The TEN-T Indicative Investment Action Plan was
updated in December 2025 for Moldova and Ukraine.
Several electricity interconnection projects between the EU and Ukraine and Georgia
were included in the second list of Projects of Common and Mutual Interest (44) (PMI)
(37) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2452
(38) https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/trans-caspian-transport-corridor-and-connectivity-investors-
forum-eu-advances-cross-regional-2025-11-27_en
(39) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/greece-bulgaria-and-romania-strengthen-cooperation-
key-transport-links-2025-12-04_en
(40) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/ukraine/eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes_en
(41) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/eu-support-better-transport-connections-eastern-
europe-ukraine-and-moldova-2025-11-07_en
(42) https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16415-2025-INIT/en/pdf
(43) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/infrastructure-and-investment/trans-european-transport-
network-ten-t/tentec-information-system-and-ten-t-map-library/ten-t-maps-indicative-extension-
neighbouring-countries_en
(44) PMI status gives accelerated permitting procedures, increased investor visibility, and eligibility for EU
funding under the 'Connecting Europe Facility'.
13
under the TEN-E Regulation (45). Through the Central and South-Eastern Europe
Energy Connectivity (CESEC) High-Level Group (46), the Commission continues to
promote regional energy integration, maintaining oversight of priority projects in
Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria.
In March, the 12th ministerial meeting of the Southern Gas Corridor Advisory
Council (47) and the 4th ministerial meeting of the Green Energy Advisory Council in
Baku, Azerbaijan, identified further opportunities for cooperation on clean energy and
regional energy connectivity in the South Caucasus. Representatives from partner
governments, leading energy companies, regulatory bodies and IFIs emphasised the
crucial role of the Southern Gas Corridor in the EU's efforts to diversify away from
Russian gas imports. In the margins of the ministerial meeting, the high-level EU-
Azerbaijan Green Connectivity Investment Roundtable, contributed to translating
policy into investment opportunities along the three green energy corridors, as well
as in grid infrastructure and transmission, renewables, energy efficiency and offshore
wind.
The Commission launched the third phase of the regional EU4Energy programme (48)
in January 2026, strengthening its focus on improved regional energy connectivity
and regulatory frameworks coordination. This work directly supports the Black Sea
strategy’s measures to tackle gaps in regulatory frameworks and the convergence
of regulatory frameworks and network codes.
With the adoption of the EU Ports and Industrial Maritime Strategies (49), the
Commission has provided the tools Europe’s maritime shipping and shipbuilding
sectors need to lead the clean energy transition, secure trade and defence, and remain
globally competitive. To achieve these objectives, the Commission is supporting
large-scale energy efficiency projects, for example in the port of Constanta.
Supported by the Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin programme (50), Bulgaria, Türkiye
and Georgia are cooperating to improve performance in the logistics sector. By late
2027, the recently launched BSB-LOGINET project (51) aims to have launched a
cross-border logistics information exchange portal.
As follow up to the EU-Central Asia Summit (April 2025) (52), the EU provides
support for addressing bottlenecks at Black and Caspian Sea ports and reducing transit
(45) Draft delegated act was published on 1 December 2025, with a scrutiny period of the Council of the EU
and the European Parliament running until 1 April 2026. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=PI_COM%3AC%282025 %298144&qid=1766157187792
(46) https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/infrastructure/high-level-groups/central-and-south-eastern-europe-
energy-connectivity_en
(47) https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/press-statement-dan-jorgensen-european-commissioner-energy-and-
housing-and-parviz-shahbazov-minister-2026-03-03_en
(48) https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/international-cooperation/key-partner-countries-and-
regions/neighbourhood-east_en
(49) https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/commission-unveils-eu-ports-strategy-strengthen-
competitiveness-security-and-sustainability-european-2026-03-04_en
(50) https://blacksea-cbc.net/interreg-next-bsb-2021-2027
(51) https://www.blacksea-cbc.net/interreg-next-bsb-2021-2027/projects/bsb00959
(52) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/04/04/joint-declaration-following-the-
first-european-union-central-asia-summit/
14
costs, thereby helping to increase trade volumes in line with the Black Sea strategy’s
aim to deepen cooperation on critical raw materials and secure supply chains.
Armenia currently receives support from the Critical Raw Materials (CRM)
Facility (53) co-funded by the EU. The Facility aims to strengthen global partnerships
and advance international projects to build sustainable and resilient CRM value
chains. Ukraine and Central Asian countries have signed CRM partnerships with the
EU and have access to this Facility. Diversifying import routes and securing supply
chains across the Black Sea will remain critical. At the same time, the EU is providing
support for circular economy initiatives to manage the demand side.
In line with efforts to advance digital links and create a trustworthy digital
environment, the Commission will organise a Connectivity Agenda Digital Summit
in the second half of 2026. The inaugural Summit is expected to convene ministers,
digital business leaders, and key private sector investors from across the EU and
partner countries for a high-level exchange on the future of regional digital
connectivity. It will serve as a platform to foster cooperation in emerging
technologies, cybersecurity, and trusted digital infrastructure.
4.2. Integrated development for a competitive Black Sea region
Significant steps forward were made in 2025 on implementing the Common Maritime
Agenda (CMA) for the Black Sea (54), reinforcing joint action on sustainable blue
economy development under Ukraine's coordination. Key achievements include the
operational work of the Black Sea Assistance Mechanism and national hubs in
offering practical support to meet the blue economy goals, such as uniting the regional
blue economy community at the CMA Stakeholder Conference in Constanta, boosting
funding access, exchanging good practices and supporting project development.
National events notably on maritime connectivity (Bulgaria) and sustainable
aquaculture (Türkiye) raised awareness of local actors. The technical group on
aquaculture proposed a joint aquaculture monitoring programme. The technical group
on sustainable tourism completed its first full year of operation, laying the foundations
for a long-term regional vision for sustainable tourism that would link cultural
heritage, innovation, and community-based development. Across all its activities, the
CMA promoted alignment in the Black Sea region with broader EU priorities, notably
the EU Mission Restore our Ocean and Waters and the EU Ocean Pact.
To facilitate sea basin cooperation on maritime spatial planning,the Commission
launched a call for proposals in January 2026, funded under the European Maritime,
Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (55). The objective of the call is to develop innovative
solutions for EU Member States in the Atlantic and Black Sea to tackle challenges in
implementing, monitoring and reviewing their Maritime Spatial Plans.
To ensure sustainable use of marine resources, the Commission continues to work
closely with the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (56) (GFCM),
focusing on sustainability through catch limits and management plans for key species
(53) https://crmfacility.eu/
(54) https://black-sea-maritime-agenda.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026-03/CMA%20-
%202025 %20implementation%20report%20_compressed.pdf
(55) https://black-sea-maritime-agenda.ec.europa.eu/node/755
(56) https://www.fao.org/gfcm/en/
15
like turbot and sprat. The EU plays a critical role in enforcing compliance, by
combating illegal fishing under the 2030 GFCM Strategy. A key milestone was
reached during the 2025 GFCM annual session, when the Working Group for the
Black Sea was elevated to a statutory body within the GFCM, thus recognising its
pivotal role in advising on regional fisheries management and conservation. For the
first time, the GFCM agreed to introduce a mechanism to monitor and ensure
compliance with regional fisheries measures (57). If regional measures are not
respected, the GFCM will require Mediterranean and Black Seas countries to address
the identified deficiencies.
The EU provides significant financial support for GFCM initiatives. The long-
standing BlackSea4Fish project continues to foster effective scientific collaboration
in fisheries. By sustaining an inclusive multinational operational platform bringing
together fisheries stakeholders, the project has strengthened national expertise and
scientific capacity, and is working towards ensuring a level-playing field for fisheries
management. These efforts are yielding measurable results: according to the 2025
GFCM publication ‘The State of Mediterranean and Black Sea Fisheries’ (58) the
percentage of overexploited stocks has dropped to 52 per cent, the lowest level
recorded in the time series.
The Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin programme also further contributed to
development and cohesion in the region through multi-country cooperation projects
involving organisations from Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova,
Romania, Türkiye, and Ukraine. Since the adoption of the Strategy, ten projects have
been implemented to boost sustainable aquaculture and coastal and maritime tourism,
enhancing maritime spatial planning, and strengthening cooperation with other sea
basins (see the projects in Annex I). For example, the INTERSMARTS project is
reshaping tourism in the Black Sea basin. With partners from Bulgaria, Greece,
Moldova and Türkiye, the project created a cross-border network and earned multiple
international awards for its smart tourism and blue growth innovation platform in
2025. The BlueDial project introduced the multi-country BlackBlueNET platform
that aims to strengthen maritime governance across the Black Sea region.
Moreover, through the Communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (59) adopted in February 2026,the EU strengthened its
support for the stability, prosperity, and resilience of the EU’s eastern border regions,
including along Romania and Bulgaria’s maritime border in the Black Sea, focusing
on five priorities areas. The Communication has been accompanied by the first annual
high-level political dialogue and the launch of the ‘EastInvest Facility’, a dedicated
financial platform that is estimated to provide at least EUR 28 billion in private and
public investments in those regions.
Under Horizon Europe, the European Framework Programme for Research and
Innovation, EUR 205 million were awarded to 481 grants across the Black Sea region
in the reporting period. The participation of the Black Sea countriesdemonstrates
their importance to European research and innovation. The Operational Network of
(57) https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-leads-efforts-harmonise-fishing-rules-across-
mediterranean-and-black-seas-countries-2025-11-11_en
(58) FAO. 2025. The State of Mediterranean and Black Sea Fisheries 2025. General Fisheries Commission
for the Mediterranean. Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/cd7701en
(59) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0082
16
Funders (including Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, Moldova, Türkiye and Ukraine)
steers regional cooperation in this area and ensures that the Strategic Research and
Innovation Agenda (SRIA) for the Black Sea is implemented effectively. Recent
milestones include the December 2025 launch of specific calls under the 2025-26 EU
‘Restore our Ocean and Waters by 2030’ work programme.
The ‘Black Sea Digital Twin’ platform, launched in 2025 through the EU-funded
DOORS (60) and BRIDGE-BS (61) projects and developed in cooperation with key
regional stakeholders (62), integrates real-time multi-source data with AI-enhanced
models of sea dynamics. It enables users to predict the impacts of climate change and
environmental stressors, fostering more informed and evidence-based decision-
making.
The Joint Research Centre (JRC) is a key provider of methodological guidance and
analytical support for innovation policies in the Black Sea region, notably in Ukraine,
Moldova and Türkiye. A workshop in February 2026 convening representatives from
all candidate countries’ economies was designed to turn the strategic vision of smart
specialisation into concrete cross-border cooperation actions, strengthening the
region’s innovation ecosystem and fostering economic integration with the EU.
5. PILLAR 3: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE AND
PREPAREDNESS, CIVIL PROTECTION
The EU is committed to sustainable development and preparedness in the Black Sea
region and is strengthening environmental protection, climate change resilience, and
civil protection.
FLAGSHIP 3: Preparedness of coastal communities and blue economy sectors
Black Sea coastal communities face the impacts of climate change, environmental
degradation and, in certain areas, security threats due to ongoing military activities.
Together, these pressures affect regional stability and strain local livelihoods. At the same
time, the regions’ rich natural and cultural heritage offers significant potential for
sustainable growth and innovation. To help address challenges and seize opportunities, on
10 June 2026 the Commission adopted two dedicated Strategies, one for EU islands and
one for EU coastal communities (63). Across several projects, measures to improve
preparedness are delivered on the ground.
The EU is supporting work to monitor and assess the growing environmental
damage that Russia continues to inflict as a result of its war of aggression against
Ukraine. In 2025-26, the “European Union for Environmental Monitoring in the
Black Sea” project (64) carried out sampling to document the impacts of the Kerch
(60) https://doi.org/10.3030/101000518
(61) https://doi.org/10.3030/101000240
(62) European Commission: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Connecting the DOTs – An
exploratory study of global activities and collaboration potential for Digital Ocean Twins, Kluckner,
S.(editor), 2025, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/2375732
(63) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_1318
(64) https://emblasproject.org/
17
Strait oil spill in December 2024 and the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam in
June 2023. Although sampling is difficult and limited, analysis of the data collected
offered insights into the immediate and longer-term environmental, health, and
economic effects of the war. A regional round table meeting on war-related pollution,
held in June 2025 under Ukraine’s coordination of the CMA, aimed to identify
monitoring and mitigation priorities, while fostering regional cooperation.
The EU strengthened data sharing and analysis to expand joint monitoring of the
Black Sea environment. This includes the maintenance of the Black Sea e-data
Platform (65), which covers most of the descriptors required by the EU Marine
Strategy Framework Directive and contains multiannual data series. The designation
of Moldova (66) and Ukraine (67) as cooperating countries with the European
Environment Agency in 2026 marks a further promising step in improving EU and
regional environmental cooperation. The Commission helped to leverage new
technologies to address climate and environmental challenges. In early 2026, EU
assistance enabled the delivery of advanced analytical equipment to Ukraine for water
quality and microplastics analysis. Work to deploy innovative techniques such as
environmental DNA (eDNA) analysis and modelling continued.
To further strengthen regional environmental cooperation and governance, the
Commission continued its work in relation to the Bucharest Convention for the
protection of the Black Sea. The Permanent Secretariat of the Black Sea Commission
has been actively involved in the governance of various EU-funded initiatives. The
EU’s strategic aim to acquire membership of this convention remains valid.
The Commission, in cooperation with EMSA, has continued to support Black Sea
partner countries to prevent and reduce marine pollution. In September, several
Black Sea countries participated in an oil pollution response exercise hosted by
Türkiye. EMSA mobilised its oil spill response vessel “Aktea II” and other specialised
equipment. The Ukrainian Sea Port Authority received equipment to strengthen its
emergency response capabilities. EMSA also provided support to ratify, implement
and enforce international maritime conventions and implement the EU acquis.
Overall, 34 Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin projects worth almost EUR 38 million
(about EUR 34 million of EU funding) contributing to Pillar 3 were implemented or
launched during the reporting period. Key initiatives include: AIRQUEST, which is
developing an integrated air quality monitoring system across the region, combining
satellite- and land-based monitoring; MACRO CLEAN, which has published a
methodology guide for converting marine on macroalgae into fertiliser and bioplastics
and LEARN4SEA, which helped Bulgaria and Türkiye to establish Environmental
Information Centres.
The Commission has dedicated resources to advancing joint initiatives that
improve environmental and climate change resilience, including water
(65) https://blackseadb.org/
(66) https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/newsroom/news/eea-and-eionet-welcome-moldova-as-a-cooperating-
country
(67) https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/newsroom/news/eea-and-eionet-welcome-ukraine-as-a-cooperating-
country
18
resilience. In 2025-2026, regional programmes such as EU4Climate Resilience (68)
promoted nature-based solutions for climate adaptation. The city of Cantemir and the
municipality of Ceadir-Lunga in Moldova were awarded grants for pilot actions
designed to strengthen local resilience to climate impacts. In Armenia, such grants
benefit the Gavar and Tashir municipalities. The Interreg BRIGHT project supports
local level actors in Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova and Türkiye to deliver energy and
climate action aligned with EU 2050 climate targets.
The EU Water Resilience Strategy (69) was adopted in June 2025 and has put
forward a proactive approach to restoring and protecting water cycles from source to
sea, build a water-smart economy and safeguard water security for all to ensure
sustainability and resilience. Support for policy action on water resilience is provided,
for example, through the EU4Green Recovery East (70) programme. The programme
will look at the water and climate nexus from a transboundary perspective with a focus
on the South Caucasus. Furthermore, the new Interreg Blue&Green Resilience
project, launched in March, supports Black Sea cities in addressing water scarcity and
climate risks through nature-based solutions and stronger cross-border cooperation.
The EU actively supports grassroots actions, such as clean-ups and educational
events. Examples include cetaceans monitoring activities involving Georgian pupils,
and a WaterTech Bootcamp in Azerbaijan where young innovators presented their
solutions for sustainable water management. In Ukraine, the Black Sea ‘weekend
school’ brought together children and scientists for four months in 2025, with
29 diplomas awarded on Black Sea Day.
Preparedness and disaster management have advanced in line with the
Preparedness Union Strategy (71). The fourth phase of the EU-funded regional civil
protection programme in the Eastern Partnership countries was launched in
November, to improve disaster resilience and response capacities while fostering
integration with the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). The Commission
also continued bilateral capacity-building efforts to support disaster preparedness and
prevention: in 2025, six UCPM-funded projects involving entities from Türkiye
(including one led by the national civil protection authority with a focus on an
ecosystem-based approach to strengthen knowledge-sharing and good practices
linking ecosystem restoration, nature-based solutions, and disaster risk prevention and
preparedness), two involving entities from Romania (including one led by the national
civil protection focused on strengthening capacities for search and rescue operations
in the event of aviation incidents), and one from Moldova (led by the national civil
protection authority, which developed a feasibility study for a national early warning
system) were successfully completed. Another project focused on improving floods
management in Samsun, a major Black Sea port, was ongoing during 2026. In April
2026, a new UCPM project involving Türkiye and Romania, alongside France,
Germany, Italy and Portugal, was launched to protect cultural heritage from the
impact of disasters using a whole-of-society model. In the context of the deepening
EU-Armenia partnership and ahead of the first EU-Armenia Summit in Yerevan on
5 May 2026, the EU and Armenia signed a new arrangement on civil protection
(68) https://eu4climate.eu/
(69 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0280
(70) https://www.eu4greenrecoveryeast.eu/
(71) https://commission.europa.eu/topics/preparedness_en
19
cooperation aimed at strengthening disaster resilience, preparedness and emergency
response cooperation.
Through the UCPM, the EU swiftly responded to requests for assistance from
Moldova and Ukraine. In 2026, EU assistance helped tackle oil spills in the
transboundary Dniester/Nistru River, a major source of drinking water for Moldova
which was caused by Russia’s attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine. The
river’s contamination not only jeopardises the water supply, but also the integrity of
aquatic ecosystems and overall water quality in the region. Romania, Belgium and
Luxembourg helped with absorbent materials and equipment. Absorbent material was
also provided through the EU’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments. Additionally,
the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) mobilised personal
protective equipment from its strategic rescEU stocks hosted by Germany and Poland
and activated EMSA satellite imagery services to detect and monitor oil spills. In
Ukraine, in response to sustained attacks on energy infrastructure, generators and
transformers were offered to reinforce and repair the electricity grid. The delivery of
the Vilnius Thermal Power Plant was the largest and most complex logistical
operation under the UCPM to date, providing electrical capacity to serve an estimated
one million people.
Several Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin projects have contributed to regional
cooperation on preparedness and disaster management. Under IMPACT+, a Common
Emergency Response Plan was developed to improve emergency preparedness in
rural areas and effective coordination between authorities and local communities. The
CO-RESILIENCE project provided support to develop a training centre in Çatalca
Elbasan in Türkiye, for forest firefighting experts and volunteers, which will be
pivotal to strengthening regional wildfire prevention and response capacities. Similar
investments are planned in Kameno in Bulgaria and Nestoia in Ukraine, and through
a Mobile Centre for Information and Prevention in Moldova. Additional projects
launched in 2025, including NAT-RES, BSB-BSUAND, RISCARE and ISTROS (see
Annex I), are expected to further boost regional resilience and preparedness.
The European Commission plays a key role in responding to radiological incidents
through the early warning system of theEuropean Community Urgent Radiological
Information Exchange (ECURIE) and the European Radiological Data Exchange
Platform (EURDEP). Ukraine and Türkiye currently participate in EURDEP, and
Ukraine is due to join ECURIE in 2026.
6. WAY FORWARD
During the first year of implementation, the Commission and the High Representative
have considerably advanced EU engagement with the partner countries of the Black
Sea region. This strengthened engagement focused on shared interests, both through
new initiatives, such as the Connectivity Agenda, and well-established streams of
regional cooperation, such as the CMA for the Black Sea and the SRIA for the Black
Sea.
The Black Sea region will remain a core EU priority. In response to intensifying
geopolitical pressures, the EU is committed to forge a united approach to security and
connectivity across the region.
20
The first Ministerial meeting on cross-regional security and connectivity in October
2025 fostered political resolve and a common understanding of shared interests across
a diverse region facing significant geopolitical challenges. A follow up ministerial is
planned for late 2026 to sustain the strong political momentum, review progress
achieved and agree on the subsequent priority actions.
Joint efforts under Pillar 1 ‘Security, Stability and Resilience’ will continue to address
hybrid threats, enhance maritime safety and security, and protect critical infrastructure
and trade routes, amid increasing Russian attacks against Ukraine’s civilian
infrastructure, such as energy infrastructure, and its Black Sea ports. In this context,
the EU will support Black Sea littoral states in implementing the concept of a regional
maritime security hub in coordination with EU Member States and relevant partner
countries.
Pillar 1 ensures that the EU Black Sea strategy is part of a new EU policy mix that
builds on the principle of ‘preparedness by design’, contributing to long-term
resilience across various sectors. This implementation report of the Black Sea
Strategy is placed in a context where EU action is geared and streamlined through
concrete action, shaped by initiatives such as the Action Plan on Drone and Counter
Drone Security (72), the Communication on the EU’s eastern regions bordering
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (73), or the EU Ports strategy (74). Looking ahead, the EU
will enhance its security commitments to the Black Sea region and will ensure
coherence among security and defence initiatives in the region.
The implementation of the Black Sea Strategy, notably through its Pillar 1, supports
the EU’s wider objective to integrate crisis anticipation, resilience, and coordinated
response capabilities into its policy framework. It also contributes to a more coherent
and integrated approach to action across the sea basins surrounding the EU. Looking
ahead, efforts will be made to strengthen coherence, notably by promoting the
exchange of experience and best practices between the Baltic and the Black Sea
basins. Particular attention will be given to addressing challenges posed by
substandard shadow fleet, the protection of critical maritime infrastructure, and the
countering of hybrid threats.
Under Pillar 2 ‘Growth and Prosperity’, the Strategy has set out efforts to unlock
economic potential and strengthen connectivity, particularly through the flagship
initiative on the cross-regional Connectivity Agenda and the CMA for the Black Sea.
These initiatives are central to boosting trade, investment, and sustainable growth
across the region. The Connectivity Agenda demonstrates the EU’s strategic resolve
to foster prosperity, cooperation, and stability in the Black Sea and South Caucasus
regions, as well as in Central Asia. The Commission is working closely with partner
countries and IFIs to identify and prepare priority infrastructure projects and mobilise
the investments required for their implementation. In this regard, the Connectivity
Agenda Platform, launched in June 2026, will be an instrumental coordination
mechanism, providing a coherent development platform for the entire TCTC corridor.
(72) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52026DC0081
(73) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52026DC0082
(74) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52026DC0112
21
The Commission will also support Member States in promoting private sector
engagement through the emerging project pipeline.
Priority actions will also include fostering synergies between the Black Sea and the
Danube region as a strategic link for connectivity, economic cooperation and
sustainable development.
Bulgaria has become the CMA coordinator for 2026 (75), succeeding Ukraine.
Upcoming activities and the annual stakeholder conference, planned for the second
half of 2026, will contribute to further strengthen strategic dialogue and regional
cooperation on maritime safety and security, environmental protection, innovation
and the sustainable development of the Black Sea blue economy.
Under Pillar 3 ‘Environmental Protection, Climate Change Resilience and
Preparedness, Civil Protection’, peer exchange and cooperation on environmental and
climate resilience contributed to finding rapid solutions, including to pollution
induced by Russia’s was of aggression. The EU will continue to work closely with
coastal communities and further strengthen its support to them. The Commission will
mobilise the entire array of instruments at its disposal to step up coordinated action to
safeguard the environment, strengthen climate resilience and enhance preparedness
and civil protection across the region.
The EU remains firmly committed to advancing a more secure, better connected, and
resilient Black Sea region, as a matter of strategic interest for the Union and its
partners, while fostering sustainable growth opportunities in a mutually reinforcing
and beneficial way. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war of aggression and a rapidly
evolving geopolitical context, the Strategy’s implementation will remain flexible and
adaptive, guided by continuous assessment of the conditions and challenges affecting
its delivery. Under each of the three pillars, EU Member States and partner countries
play a key role in delivering on shared goals under the Strategy. Moving forward, the
Commission and High Representative will continue to prioritise result-oriented
dialogue and joint action at all levels of cooperation, with a clear focus on strategic
impact, unity of purpose, and the delivery of tangible outcomes in the region.
(75) https://black-sea-maritime-agenda.ec.europa.eu/bulgaria-takes-lead-coordinating-common-maritime-
agenda-black-sea-2026
Annex A Major multi-country projects under implementation in the Black Sea region in 2025-2026
Project title Duration
(start – end,
month.year)
Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,
million
EUR
Project scope
BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA
PILLAR 1
Fighting against organised crime in the
Eastern Partnership region II
01.2025 -
12.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 1.8 Enhance participation in
EMPACT
Training and Operational Partnership
against Organised Crime (TOPCOP) II
07.2024 -
06.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 5.2 Strengthen cooperation to
address criminal threats
Improving cyber resilience in Eastern
Partnership countries I
12.2024 -
11.2027
■ ■ NDICI 1.7 Legislative support on NIS 2
Directive and capacity-building
Improving cyber resilience in Eastern
Partnership countries II
12.2024 -
12.2026
■ ■ NDICI 1.8 Same as above
CyberEast+: Enhanced action on
cybercrime for cyber resilience in the
Eastern Partnership States
03.2024 -
02.2027
■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 3.5 Ensure a more effective
criminal justice response to
cybercrime
Support to Eastern Partnership
Countries to Enhance Asset
Recovery II
10.2027 ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 1.00 Support asset recovery policies
and practices and facilitate
operational implementation in
the recovery of proceeds of
organised crime
EU4MD II – EU4Monitoring Drugs II 12.2027 ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 1.00 Enhance monitoring,
assessment and response
capabilities in relation to
contemporary drug issues
Resilient & Connected 12.2025 -
03.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 5.00 Countering disinformation and
FIMI, and support media
literacy
23
Project title Duration
(start – end,
month.year)
Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,
million
EUR
Project scope
BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA
Flexible Response Mechanism (FRM) 02.2026 -
07.2027
■ NDICI -
CRISIS
18 Strengthen partner countries’
capacities to respond to hybrid
threats, with a focus on
provision of critical equipment.
Currently active in MD,
available multi-country.
PILLAR 2
BLUE-GATES 09.2024 -
03.2027
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.40 Innovative tools to improve
aquaculture and safeguard
marine resources
AQUABATOR 09.2025 -
09.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.40 Incubator for sustainable
aquaculture
SUSDEST-NET 11.2025 -
05.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.42 Sustainable Destinations Black
Sea Network
SUSTAIN-2 12.2025 -
12.2027
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.09 Sustainability model for
tourism supported by artificial
intelligence
MARMAPS 06.2024 -
12.2025
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.50 Joint maritime spatial planning
and conservation of marine
ecosystems
BIOSUSTAIN 12. 2025 -
06.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.55 Sustain biodiversity through
traditional and novel
knowledge
e-AQUAF 02.2026 -
08.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.40 Smart aquafarming solutions
EfxINNOs 08.2024 -
02.2027
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.64 Marine Technology Transfer
Network for blue economy
24
Project title Duration
(start – end,
month.year)
Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,
million
EUR
Project scope
BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA
BlueDial 02.2026 -
08.2027
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.50 Support coordination and
alignment of national and
regional strategies with the
CMA for the Black Sea and a
common sustainable blue
economy vision
INTERSMARTS 06.2024 -
12.2025
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.55 Improving sustainability
performance and innovation
absorption in tourism and
services
Facility for Eastern Partnership
Investment in Connectivity (EPIC)
12.2021 –
12.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI Advisory and technical support
to improve transport
connections
EU4Energy Phase II and II+ 01.2021-
12.2025
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 13.49 Facilitate regulatory reforms
for clean energy transition and
energy market liberalisation
EU4Innovation East 04.2024 -
09.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 22.12 Develop high-performance
incubators, expand funding and
market opportunities for
startups
EU4Digital Facility 06.2022 -
09.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 16.00 Support integration into the EU
Digital Single Market
EU4Digital: Investing in Broadband
Connectivity
11.2023 –
11.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 5.00 Broadband mapping for digital
connectivity investment
planning
PILLAR 3
Black Sea SIERRA 10.2023 -
09.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ EMFAF 0.75 Preparedness in response to
civil and military pollution
25
Project title Duration
(start – end,
month.year)
Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,
million
EUR
Project scope
BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA
RESPONSE 10.2023 -
09.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ EMFAF 0.60 Training and curricula for the
monitoring, reporting,
management and mitigation of
marine pollution, focusing on
pollution caused by armed
conflicts
ANEMONE PLUS 09.2025 -
03.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.48 Assess the vulnerability of the
Black Sea marine ecosystem to
human pressures
ALGAEREVIVE 09.2024 -
03.2027
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.47 Harness algae power for
pollution reduction and blue
growth
AIRQUEST 07.2024 -
07.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.20 Mobilise communities for air
quality
IASON+ 06.2024 -
12.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.40 Invasive Alien Species
Observatory and assessment of
climate change impacts and
ecosystem services
BS-SEOS 10.2024 -
03.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.29 Black Sea Smart Marine
Environmental Outcome
System
LAP-BACK 09.2024 -
09.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.46 Strengthen local intervention
capacities for climate change
MACRO-CLEAN 09.2024 -
03.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.51 Research and pilot application
of cleaning methodologies to
manage macroalgal blooms
MicroDanger 12.2025 -
06.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.45 Public outreach to reduce
microplastic pollution
26
Project title Duration
(start – end,
month.year)
Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,
million
EUR
Project scope
BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA
HERO 12.2025 -
12.2027
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.64 Address environmental impacts
on reefs
AGRIPERMA 12.2025 -
06.2027
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.44 Exchange of good practices
and knowledge on regenerative
agriculture and permaculture
STEP2CleanPlan 07.2024 -
01.2026
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.50 Cooperation for sustainable
energy and climate actions’
planning and monitoring
SG4Y-CLIMATE 11.2025 -
05.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.55 Youth involvement in climate
action
NAT-RES 11.2025 -
11.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.64 Advanced technologies to
anticipate, mitigate and
respond to Natural Hazard
Triggering Technological
Disasters events
BSB-BSUAND 09.2025 -
03.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.50 Joint action against natural
disasters
RISCARE 09.2025 -
09.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.64 Joint procedures and training
for rapid intervention
ISTROS 09.2025 -
03.2028
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.28 Strengthen biodiversity
protection
CO-RESILIENCE 06.2024 -
08.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.48 Cooperation on capacity
building for wildfire
community resilience and early
warning systems
27
Project title Duration
(start – end,
month.year)
Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,
million
EUR
Project scope
BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA
IMPACT+ 07.2024 -
01.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.55 Improve emergency response
to natural and man-made
disasters in small communities
SPEER-A 09.2025 -
01.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.76 Strengthen earthquake
emergency response and rescue
capacity
DARE-EU 12.2025 -
12.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
2.33 Disaster assistance and
response in Moldova, Bulgaria
and Türkiye
REDA_NEXt 10.2025 -
03.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.50 Rapid Earthquake Damage
Assessment - Expanded
GREEN URBAN RESILIENCE 07.2024 -
09.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.29 Green solutions for urban areas
addressing climate change, heat
stress and thermal discomforts
LEARN4SEA 06.2024 -
08.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.82 Joint learning for
environmentally-friendly
behaviour at community level
CAGOS 06.2024 -
12.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.49 Clean areas, green and open
streets
EcosySTEM 07.2024 -
07.2026
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.63 Empower children for
environmental sustainability
through E-STEM
EcoYOU 06.2024 -
12.2025
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.43 Clean and green minds for
environmentally-friendly
behaviour
28
Project title Duration
(start – end,
month.year)
Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,
million
EUR
Project scope
BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA
UCare 08.2025 -
08.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.47 Green infrastructure for urban
climate adaptation and
recovery
DIALOGUE 09.2025 -
12.2026
Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.54 Dialogue for innovation and
better governance
easyPEST 12.2025 -
06.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.52 Establish a plant pest
monitoring system
GwB 12.2025 -
06.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.95 Decision support system for
global water balance
GreenS4BlackSea 12.2025 -
06.2027
■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
0.45 Protection of virgin forests as a
green solution for the Black
Sea
WISE-WASTE 12.2025 -
12.2027
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.48 Cooperation on waste
management and pollution
reduction
Sustain BIO&CLIMA 12.2025 -
06.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ Interreg
NEXT BSB
1.61 Enhance accessibility,
biodiversity, and climate
resilience through sustainable
practices
EU4EMBLAS 04.2021 -
06.2026
■ ■ NDICI 2.19 Monitoring surveys and
equipment, public awareness
and participation
Strengthening environmental resilience
and maritime safety for Black and
Caspian seas riparian states
(BCSEA II)
09.2026 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 4.50 Enhance maritime safety and
environmental protection
through training, improved
vessel traffic monitoring, and
pollution control
29
Project title Duration
(start – end,
month.year)
Black Sea basin countries involved in the project Instrument Budget,
million
EUR
Project scope
BG EL RO AM AZ GE MD TR UA
EU4ClimateResilience 01.2024 -
12.2027
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 19.58 Support climate policy design
and implementation
EU4Green Recovery East 01.2025 -
12.2028
■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 21.30 Support water resilience,
circular economy, legislative
alignment, transboundary
projects
Prevention, Preparedness and Response
to natural and human-induced disasters
in the Eastern Partnership countries –
phase 4 (PPRD East 4)
11.2025 -
10.2029
■ ■ ■ ■ NDICI 5.00 Strengthen Disaster Risk
Management (DRM) systems
and enhance cooperation with
the Union Civil Protection
Mechanism
*The EU funding for Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin projects amounts to 90% of the total project budget.