EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 16.7.2026 JOIN(2026) 16 final

JOINT REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences covering the period 2023-2025

{SWD(2026) 184 final} - {SWD(2026) 185 final} - {SWD(2026) 186 final} - {SWD(2026) 187 final} - {SWD(2026) 188 final} - {SWD(2026) 189 final} -

{SWD(2026) 190 final} - {SWD(2026) 191 final} - {SWD(2026) 192 final}

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1. INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS

The Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) is a key tool through which the European Union

(EU) supports low- and lower middle-income countries in their pursuit of poverty reduction,

economic growth and sustainable development. The EU unilaterally grants preferential access

to the EU market to such countries by eliminating or reducing import tariffs; least developed

countries (LDCs) benefit from duty free, quota free access. To promote sustainability, GSP

beneficiaries are required to implement their commitments to specific international

conventions and agreements on human rights, labour rights, environment and climate, and good

governance with regard to drugs control and anti-corruption.

Regular monitoring and reporting are part of GSP implementation as laid down in the GSP

Regulation1. Just as the previous edition2, this fifth report3 to the European Parliament and the

Council on the implementation of the GSP is adopted jointly by the European Commission (the

Commission) and the High Representative, given the importance of the GSP also from the

perspective of the EU’s broader foreign policy and external action. This is the last report under

the current GSP Regulation. It will mark the transition to the new GSP Regulation, which will

notably feature reinforced sustainability and transparency requirements as of 1 January 2027.

This report covers the implementation and the impact of the GSP over 2023-2025 (the

‘reporting period’) through its three arrangements: 1) Standard GSP for low- and lower-middle

income countries4; 2) the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good

governance (GSP+), available to those Standard GSP beneficiary countries that take on further

sustainability commitments5; and 3) Everything But Arms (EBA), applying to LDCs. This year

marks the 25th anniversary of the EU EBA instrument.

Currently, 65 developing countries are benefitting from the EU’s GSP, 44 of which are LDCs.

This corresponds to over 3 billion people worldwide, out of which more than 1 billion live in

LDCs. In 2024, GSP beneficiary countries benefited from preferential tariffs with an estimated

value of EUR 5 billion savings, with EBA beneficiaries accounting for more than EUR 3 billion

of this total.

The largest beneficiaries of the scheme are Bangladesh (EUR 19 billion of EU imports using

EBA preferences in 2024), India (EUR 11.7 billion of EU imports using Standard GSP

preferences), and Pakistan (EUR 7.1 billion of EU imports using GSP+ preferences). Clothing

is by far the top sector, accounting for 59 % of all trade under the GSP scheme.

Beyond its trade and economic benefits, GSP remains an attractive and effective incentive for

sustainable development in beneficiary countries in relation to social, environmental, and

climate-related issues, based on internationally recognised norms and standards. The EU’s

monitoring and engagement under GSP plays a key role: GSP+ in particular facilitates

structured engagement between EU institutions, beneficiary governments, and civil society. It

supports the advancement of international human rights, labour rights, climate and environment

commitments and helps strengthen anti-corruption and rule-of-law reforms. The scheme

continues to ensure a balance between encouraging beneficiary countries’ trade growth

potential and promoting shared values and sustainability objectives. Fostering trade with GSP

beneficiaries through duty savings also supports the EU economy and businesses, while the

scheme safeguards the EU’s economic interests and the competitiveness of sensitive sectors.

This report is accompanied by nine country specific Staff Working Documents (SWDs) for

each of the current eight GSP+ beneficiaries Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia,

Pakistan, The Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan and one for the EBA countries under

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enhanced engagement (Bangladesh, Cambodia and Myanmar). The report reflects the

Commission services’ and the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) engagement with

beneficiaries’ authorities, civil society, social partners and business communities, including

through monitoring missions to GSP+ beneficiaries and enhanced engagement with some key

EBA beneficiaries. The report also builds on and incorporates, as appropriate, the findings of

international monitoring bodies in areas relating to the GSP conditions for beneficiary

countries.

2. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD

a) Developments in implementation

The Commission adopted several legal acts relating to the implementation of the GSP

Regulation during the reporting period:

• Country graduation from GSP: Indonesia reached Upper Middle-Income status as classified

by the World Bank for three consecutive years and, therefore, will leave the GSP as of

1 January 20276. For Kenya, the EU-Kenya Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA),

which applies since 1 July 2024, will fully replace the GSP as of 1 January 20277. • Transition from EBA to Standard GSP: Bhutan graduated from LDC status on 13 December

2023 based on a UN decision. Following a three-year transition period, Bhutan will

therefore cease to benefit from EBA preferences and transition to standard GSP as of

1 January 2028.8 Likewise, São Tomé and Príncipe graduated from LDC status on

13 December 2024 and will transition to standard GSP as of 1 January 2029.9

• Vulnerability thresholds: Further to amendments to the list of beneficiary countries, the

vulnerability threshold relevant for GSP+ was reviewed10.

• Product graduation: Standard GSP tariff preferences were suspended for the years 2023 to

20251112 for several products imported from India, Indonesia, and Kenya after attaining the

relevant import thresholds and subsequently [also for the year 2026].13

• Safeguards: In 2024, following the re-opening of the investigation, general safeguards

measures for export of Indica rice from Cambodia and Myanmar were re-imposed.14 In

2025, special agricultural safeguards for imports of ethanol originating in Pakistan were

imposed.15

b) GSP after 2026

The number of GSP beneficiaries is expected to further reduce in the future. In terms of

upcoming graduations, two GSP+ beneficiaries have been qualified as Upper-Middle Income

Country by the World Bank (Cabo Verde in 2025, and Mongolia in 2024 and 2025). If they are

so qualified in three consecutive years, they will no longer benefit from the GSP. In addition,

several of the current EBA beneficiaries are scheduled to graduate from LDC status in the

coming years. These countries (see Section 4c for detail) would exit EBA following a three-

year transition period after their LDC graduation and will then likely move to the Standard GSP

arrangement unless they successfully apply for the more beneficial GSP+ status.

On 22 September 2021, the Commission tabled a legislative proposal for the EU’s new

Generalised Scheme of Preferences for the period 2024-203316. As this new EU GSP was not

yet adopted in 2023, the co-legislators extended the period of application of the current GSP

Regulation until 31 December 202717. The new GSP Regulation for 2027-2036 was adopted

on 17 June 2026 and will apply as of 1 January 2027.18

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The agreement on the new Regulation is an important milestone and ensures that the EU

continues to support developing countries in their pursuit of economic growth and sustainable

development based on a fair and predictable framework. The new Regulation safeguards the

EU’s generous approach to tariff concessions on imports from developing countries. It

maintains the main thrust of the previous legislation in order to ensure continuity and

predictability for GSP beneficiary countries and their exporters, as well as for EU importers.

The new Regulation adds five new international conventions19 to the list of GSP-relevant

instruments for GSP beneficiaries to respect (the GSP conditions, see Section 3c), and

introduces the Paris Climate Agreement, which replaces the Kyoto Protocol20. The new

Regulation introduces the possibility to withdraw the arrangement for serious and systematic

violations of the principles related to the environmental and climate and good governance

conventions, as well as for serious and systematic shortcomings related to the international

obligation to readmit a beneficiary country’s own nationals in the context of irregular

migration. The new scheme will improve monitoring, transparency, and civil society

involvement, and introduce an urgent withdrawal procedure for particularly grave violations.

It will also make the safeguards mechanisms more effective for addressing cases where a surge

in imports from a beneficiary country may harm producers in the EU.

To retain GSP+ status under the new GSP Regulation, current GSP+ beneficiaries will need to

reapply. All GSP+ applicants will have to submit a Plan of Action for the effective

implementation of the arrangement under the new rules. Current GSP+ beneficiaries will be

granted a transitional period of two years until the end of 2028, and the Commission and the

EEAS stand ready to support beneficiaries in the reapplication process.

3. IMPACT OF THE GSP

a) Trade Impacts 2022-202421

The GSP provides for three arrangements responding to beneficiaries’ levels of development

and commitment:

• Standard GSP applies to eligible low- and lower-middle-income countries that have no other

preferential trade arrangements with the EU. It grants duty reductions of 66 % of tariff lines

for imports into the EU, with 26 % of these tariff lines being duty-free. Eleven countries

currently benefit from this arrangement.22

• GSP+ is a special arrangement that offers standard GSP beneficiaries’ duty-free access on

66 % of tariff lines, contingent on the effective implementation of core international human

rights, labour, environmental, climate, and good governance conventions and agreements.

Eight countries currently benefit from this arrangement23.

• EBA is designed for LDCs and provides duty-free access for all imports into the EU, except

arms and ammunition. The EU is offering this arrangement without any expiry date. 46

countries benefit from EBA, two of which (Bhutan and São Tomé and Príncipe) have

graduated from LDC status but, according to the GSP Regulation, can still benefit of the

EBA during the transitional period.

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Figure 1: GSP beneficiaries

Note: Grey areas represent countries that are not covered by the EU GSP.

In 2024, the EU imported almost EUR 60 billion worth of goods under GSP preferences,

benefitting partner countries as well as EU importers and consumers alike. Of these, a little

more than 50 % or EUR 30 billion worth of goods were imported under the EBA arrangement,

EUR 11.5 billion from GSP+ beneficiaries, and around EUR 17 billion from standard GSP

beneficiaries.

EU imports by GSP arrangement

Figure 2. Trend in EU imports under the three GSP arrangements

Imports under the GSP were up to EUR 59 billion in 2024 from around EUR 52 billion in 2023,

but down compared with the 2022 peak, when imports using GSP preferences reached around

EUR 77 billion and compared with the pre-COVID-19 pandemic, at EUR 62 billion in 2019.

The post-COVID-19 rebound, combined with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

which triggered an energy crisis, pushed global prices and, therefore, EU import values to

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record highs in 2022. As the COVID-19 rebound softened and energy prices fell from 2023

onwards, trade figures normalised24. In addition, Viet Nam is no longer a Standard GSP

beneficiary as of 1 January 2023, following the conclusion of an FTA with the EU. This also

reduced trade under Standard GSP preferences by several billion euros.

Top product sections benefiting from GSP

Figure 3: Top sections being imported under GSP (Standard GSP, GSP+ and EBA) in 2024

(EUR billion and as share of overall imports)

In 2024, clothing (S-11b)25 was, by far, the sector that benefited most from GSP with EUR 35.1

billion imports into the EU under the scheme, accounting for 59 % of all trade under GSP. The

next largest sectors were footwear (S-12a) (EUR 3.8 billion), and fish, crustaceans and

molluscs (S-01b) (EUR 2 billion). In all years of the reporting period, clothing (S-11b) was the

largest sector. However, machinery and equipment (S-16) declined in importance (from 2nd

place in 2022 to 8th place in 2024), whereas categories such as vehicles, aviation and boats (S-

17b) and prepared Foods & Beverages (S-04b) entered the top 10 since 2022.

GSP savings from tariffs

Thanks to the GSP, beneficiary countries under the three

arrangements benefited from an estimated EUR 5 billion in tariff

reductions or exemptions in 2024, with EBA countries

accounting for more than EUR 3 billion of the total26. Duty

savings are accrued both by exporters in GSP beneficiary

countries and EU importers, and thus also benefit EU businesses

and consumers.

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Top countries using GSP

Figure 4: Top 10 countries by GSP utilisation value in 2024

The preference utilisation rate is the ratio of imports from a specific country that used the

preferences compared to the imports that were theoretically eligible for GSP preferences. On

average, the preference utilisation rate was 88.8 % for all GSP-related imports into the EU in

2024. It reaches 94.5 % on average for LDCs under EBA. Some countries achieve 100 %

utilisation rate in certain sections, such as Ethiopia in cut flowers (section S02-a). Reasons for

not using 100 % of the available tariff concessions under GSP are complex, but factors include

insufficient awareness of the system, administrative shortcomings, and coexistence of

alternative trade arrangements.

In 2024, Bangladesh recorded the highest value of exports to the EU using the GSP preferences,

amounting to EUR 19 billion, with a strong utilisation rate of 96 %. India followed, with

imports into the EU of EUR 11.7 billion using the Standard GSP arrangement, with a lower

utilisation rate of 87 %. Among GSP+ beneficiaries, Pakistan stands out with EUR 7.1 billion

worth of GSP+ imports into the EU and a preference utilisation rate of 95.1 %, while

Uzbekistan made it to the top 10 overall GSP beneficiaries since it joined the GSP+ in 2021.

Countries experiencing highest growth in GSP utilisation

Between 2022 and 2024, Benin recorded the highest growth in use of GSP preferences, with a

128 % increase, from EUR 5.1 million in 2022 to EUR 11.7 million in 2024. Malawi ranked

second in growth in GSP use, with a 19 % increase over the same period, contributing to a 13

% rise in its total exports to the EU. São Tomé and Príncipe, and Eritrea joined the countries

with the highest growth in use of GSP, which were all beneficiaries of the EBA arrangement.

The sectors driving growth varied across countries, for example, Benin saw the strongest

increases in textiles (S-11a and S11-b).

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Figure 5. Top 4 countries in growth of GSP used (2022-2024)

b) Compliance with international conventions and agreements

GSP beneficiaries continue, in general, to make progress towards sustainable development and

the respect of the international principles and standards that are part of the GSP conditionality.

Although the ratification of international conventions alone is not sufficient to uphold

international standards, it is a fundamental first step. Most GSP beneficiary countries have high

ratification rates in relation to the relevant international conventions. For instance, among EBA

beneficiary countries (which are not subject to the obligation to formally ratify the GSP-

relevant conventions), Bangladesh – the EBA beneficiary benefitting the most from the scheme

– has ratified all the 27 conventions currently listed in the GSP Regulation as well as the

additional conventions to be introduced by the new GSP Regulation.

Beneficiary countries’ ratification efforts tend to go beyond the formally established list of

relevant conventions and agreements listed in the GSP Regulation. For example, all eight GSP+

beneficiaries have ratified the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities and are

parties to the Paris Climate Agreement, which are not listed in the current GSP Regulation but

will be part of the scheme from 2027.

A large number of GSP beneficiaries have also advanced in the ratification of the newly

established fundamental International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions relating to

occupational safety and health, as well as other ILO conventions, for example on labour

inspections and tripartite consultations, which are not listed in the current GSP Regulation

either.

As further set out in section 4b) below and in the SWDs issued together with this Report, in

particular the GSP+ remains a strong and structured framework linking trade to sustainable

development, a platform for policy dialogue and reform. GSP+ also provide strong incentives

and enablers for beneficiaries to comply with internationally recognised standards they have

themselves decided to commit to.

4. THE THREE ARRANGEMENTS

a) Standard GSP

During the reporting period, Standard GSP beneficiaries continued to make up a significant

share of total GSP imports at 29.3 % in 2024. Clothing (S-11b), footwear (S-12a), and chemical

products (S06b) were the main products benefiting from the Standard GSP in 2024. Out of the

128 % growth in

EBA used

Benin

19 % growth in

EBA used

Malawi

10 % growth in

EBA used

Sao Tome and

Principle

8 % growth in

EBA used

Eritrea

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eleven current Standard GSP beneficiaries (with Vanuatu added in 2025), India and Indonesia

were the main beneficiaries, with India representing EUR 11.7 billion worth of all imports into

the EU under GSP preferences in 2024, and Indonesia following with EUR 5.56 billion.

However, this will change as, in addition to Indonesia and Kenya (see section 2), India is

expected to graduate from Standard GSP and thus exit the scheme once the bilateral trade

agreement with the EU (negotiations concluded in February 2026) enters into application and

the subsequent two-year transition period expires.

Figure 6. Trends in Standard GSP eligible imports, used imports, and utilisation

Whilst the utilisation rate under Standard GSP fluctuates at a high level, both eligible imports

and those actually claiming the GSP preferences have declined since pre-COVID levels, from

EUR 37 billion eligible and 29 billion used in 2019 to EUR 21 billion eligible and 17 billion

used in 2024. This was mainly due to countries leaving Standard GSP, in particular Viet Nam

as of January 2023, following the transition period after this formerly top beneficiary entered

into an FTA with the EU in 2020. In addition, Uzbekistan upgraded to GSP+ in April 2021.

b) GSP+

The trend for GSP+ imports is rather positive, setting aside the 2022 COVID-19 rebound and

energy price effects. GSP+ eligible imports increased from pre-COVID-19 levels of EUR 10

billion in 2019 to EUR 13 billion in 2024; consequently, imports for which preferences were

actually claimed are up to EUR 11 billion in 2024.

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Figure 7. Trend in GSP+ imports and utilisation

The preference utilisation rate for EU imports under the GSP+ arrangement increased from

86.9 % in 2022 to 87.3 % in 2024. This modest improvement followed a drop in 2023, when

the rate fell to 79.3 %. 27

Pakistan was the main GSP+ beneficiary, using preferences for EUR 7.1 billion in EU imports.

The Philippines followed with around EUR 2.3 billion in EU imports, and Sri Lanka was the

third biggest GSP+ beneficiary in value terms at EUR 1.5 billion.

In terms of compliance with the international conventions listed in the GSP Regulation during

the reporting period, all GSP+ beneficiaries have maintained full ratification of the 27 GSP-

relevant international conventions and agreements and have issued no new reservations.

This report is accompanied by eight country-specific Staff Working Documents that provide

full detail on the GSP+ beneficiaries’ commitments on human rights, labour rights,

environment and climate, and good governance – and the EU’s engagement with these partner

countries in these areas. As further detailed in those SWDs, many positive developments were

observed over the reporting period, but challenges remain.

Many current GSP+ beneficiaries strengthened human rights legislation and institutional

arrangements during the period covered by this report. For instance, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,

Sri Lanka, and Pakistan all reinforced legislation against domestic violence, while Bolivia,

Mongolia, Uzbekistan, and The Philippines adopted child protection reforms. Pakistan reduced

the scope of the death penalty and adopted implementing rules of the Anti-Torture Act, as well

as new Child Marriage Restraint Acts in Balochistan and Islamabad. Sri Lanka strengthened

domestic national human rights institutions, and The Philippines established new oversight

mechanisms and inter-ministerial coordination bodies for human rights.

Most GSP+ beneficiaries also showed progress with respect to labour rights. For example,

Mongolia pioneered a module on forced labour in the private economy in a national labour

force survey and included a section on conscript labour. There were continued efforts to

eradicate forced labour in Uzbekistan, and The Philippines produced a roadmap to advance

Freedom of Association and a strategy to reduce child labour. Pakistan ratified the ILO Protocol

to the Forced Labour Convention and started an initiative for the transition of workers from the

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informal to the formal economy to further promote decent work. Several beneficiary countries

introduced measures to reduce child labour and strengthen anti-trafficking frameworks.

Many GSP+ beneficiaries also remained committed to environmental protection, submitting

climate transparency reports under the relevant Multilateral Environmental Agreements;

strengthening biodiversity and protected-area legislation and action plans in line with the

Convention on Bio-Diversity; advancing implementation of the Montreal Protocol28; and

undertaking climate adaptation and mitigation planning linked to Nationally Determined

Contributions (NDCs) in the context of ensuring implementation of the Paris Agreement.

Governance with regard to drugs control and anti-corruptionimproved in a number of

countries. This included updated policies intended to fight corruption in Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan,

Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

However, challenges with regard to the implementation of GSP+ commitments remain.

Cross-cutting human rights concerns common to many GSP+ beneficiaries include

insufficient judicial independence and limited access to remedy and accountability for

violations and abuses, restrictions to civic space, freedom of expression and media freedom;

reports of torture, lack of accountability, and incomplete alignment of domestic frameworks

with the Anti-Torture Convention29; persistent gender-based violence (GBV), continuing with

impunity; and structural discrimination against minorities and LGBTIQ+ persons. In some

GSP+ beneficiary countries, the protection of socio-economic rights contrasted with weak anti-

poverty strategies, limited education opportunities, major gaps in social protection systems, or

lack of support for the economic empowerment of women. Data gaps also remain significant,

particularly related to GBV, torture investigations, child labour, and human trafficking

prosecutions.

Similarly, with respect to labour rights, while legislative frameworks improved,

implementation and enforcement remain uneven, and labour inspectorates often face capacity

constraints. Overall, discrimination against all vulnerable groups persist. Freedom of

association remains constrained in several jurisdictions and collective bargaining coverage is

limited in many contexts. Child labour and forced labour persist, in particular in agriculture

and the informal sector. Labour rights of female workers should still be improved. Data gaps

in all GSP+ relevant ILO conventions should be addressed without delay.

Many GSP+ beneficiaries also faced environmental protection constraints, with delays in

environmental reporting (for example under the Stockholm Convention30, CITES31, Cartagena

Protocol32 frameworks); capacity and resource limitations affecting enforcement, and

significant climate vulnerability that strains institutional systems. While commitments are

ambitious, implementation often lags behind.

Governance could be enhanced through stronger efforts to fight drug-trafficking, improved

demand-side measure in line with international human rights standards and increased anti-

corruption efforts.

In addition, economic crises (Bolivia, Sri Lanka) and natural disasters (Pakistan, the

Philippines, Sri Lanka) exacerbated structural challenges and further hampered implementation

capacity during the reporting period.

EU partnership projects can help to address some of these challenges through cooperation and

country-specific measures are outlined in the GSP+ SWDs accompanying this Report.

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c) Everything But Arms arrangement

i. Economic data

The EU GSP benefits are most substantial for EBA beneficiaries. Preferential imports from

EBA beneficiaries stood at EUR 30.6 billion in 2024, up from EUR 25.2 billion in 2019.

Figure 8. Trend in EBA imports and utilisation

Utilisation rates under the EBA arrangement only fluctuated slightly between 2022 and 2024.

The rate stood at 94.6 % in 2022, then declined to 88.4 % in 2023 and subsequently recovered

to 94.5 % in 2024. In 2022, imports under the EBA arrangement peaked due to the COVID-19

rebound and energy prices mentioned above. Looking at the trend over time, there is an increase

from pre-COVID-19 imports in 2019 (EUR 27 billion eligible imports, out of which imports

with a value of EUR 25 billion used EBA preferences) to 2024 (EUR 32 billion eligible imports,

out of which imports with a value of EUR 31 billion used EBA preferences).

Figure 9. EU imports by GSP arrangement and from EBA enhanced engagement countries

EU imports from GSP (EUR million), excluding non- preferential

share of imports from EBA countries 2022-

2024 201933 2022 2023 2024

GSP (all) 62 326 77 393 52 419 59 450

Standard GSP 28 665 27 489 15 331 17 402

GSP+ 8 496 13 662 9 896 11 476

EBA (all) 25 164 36 243 27 192 30 573

EBA (only Africa) 2 782 4 141 3 151 3 888 11.9 %

Enhanced Engagement under EBA

Bangladesh 15 366 23 134 17 064 19 019 63.0 %

Cambodia34 4 174 4 324 3 534 4 207 12.8 %

Myanmar 2 471 4 112 2 993 2 962 10.7 %

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During the reporting period and compared to pre-COVID levels, the relative importance of

EBA overall, but in particular of EBA beneficiaries on the African continent, has continued to

increase. At the same time, three of the largest EBA beneficiaries continued to be under

enhanced engagement. The report reflects further on these trends below.

ii. Beneficiaries moving up

The GSP aim is to promote economic development. It is, therefore, good news when

beneficiaries move up from their Least Developed Countries’ status, i.e. when they graduate

and subsequently exit from the EBA arrangement after a transition period. They still have the

opportunity to apply for GSP+ to retain most of their benefits.

Several upward movements are expected for the near future. Bangladesh, the Lao PDR, and

Nepal are scheduled for LDC graduation in 202635; Solomon Islands is scheduled for

graduation in 2027; and Cambodia and Senegal are scheduled for graduation in 2029.

At the UN CDP (Committee for Development Policy)’s 2024 triennial review, the Republic of

Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania were found to have met the graduation thresholds for the

first time. All three countries met two of the three criteria. These countries are scheduled to be

considered again in 2027 and, if they meet the criteria for a second time, could be recommended

for graduation.

Kiribati and Tuvalu were recommended for LDC graduation in 2018 and 2012, respectively,

but ECOSOC36 deferred a decision on their graduation. In 2024, ECOSOC, recalling its

decision in 2021 to defer the consideration of their graduation to 2024, further decided to

consider their graduation at a later date.

At the 2024 triennial review, the UN CDP decided to defer its decision on the graduation of

Myanmar and Timor-Leste to 2027.

For the current EBA beneficiaries, moving to GSP+ after their graduation would preserve a

broadly equivalent level of savings, also at approximately EUR 3.3 billion for 2024, whereas

the simple transition to standard GSP would reduce these to around EUR 0.75 billion, a

reduction of approximately 80 % (see Figure 10). Joining GSP+ can never fully compensate

for EBA status as it entails inter alia becoming subject to certain special safeguards and more

stringent rules of origin which usually reduce the preferences that can effectively be claimed.

This is particularly apparent for countries exporting garments.

In addition to the generous transition periods, the EU will continue to support countries

graduating from the EBA arrangement, notably beneficiary countries that seek to join the GSP+

arrangement thereafter; with a view to avoid any negative impacts on exporters from these

countries and on the EU companies trading with them.

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Figure 10: Estimated tariff savings/ revenue gains under EBA compared to under GSP+ or

Standard GSP for the same beneficiaries in 2024 (EUR billion)

iii. Promoting Africa’s competitiveness

Three quarters of the EBA beneficiary countries are on the African continent (33 of the 4637).

Soon, African countries will be the dominant group in EBA, given the significant number and

size of Asian beneficiaries that are set to be graduating out of the scheme. All three

arrangements under the EU’s GSP are important pillars of the EU’s support to Africa’s

economic diversification and integration into the global value chains but EBA stands out.

Preferential EU imports from African EBA beneficiaries stood at EUR 3.9 billion in 2024, up

from EUR 2.8 billion in 2019 (see also Table/Figure 9 above). The utilisation rate of the EBA

preferences was at 88.9 % in 2024, showing an increased use of the preferences by African

beneficiaries over the past years, but also potential to do more. Thanks to duty free access of

the EBA arrangement, African EBA beneficiaries were exempted from about EUR 213 million

in EU import duties in 2024. Over the 2022–2024 period, the top African EBA exporters were

Mozambique (EUR 4.2billion), Mauritania (EUR 1.2 billion), Ethiopia (EUR 975.5 million),

Tanzania (EUR 934.7 million), and Madagascar (EUR 848.1 million).

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Figure 11: Top 5 EBA beneficiaries in Africa (total EBA used imports; EUR million)

As indicated above, outside of EBA, a few African countries benefit from other GSP

arrangements. Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, and Kenya fall under standard GSP (with

Kenya graduating in 2027 due to the entry into application of the EU-Kenya Economic

Partnership Agreement on 1 July 2024), while Cabo Verde benefits from GSP+. For the period

2022-2024, aggregate EU imports using GSP preferences from these four African countries

totalled EUR 579.4 million, with Nigeria accounting for the largest share (EUR 372.4 million

with an utilisation rate 70 %), followed by Cabo Verde (EUR 172.5 million; utilisation rate 85

%), Kenya (EUR 15.7 million; utilisation rate 1 %38), and the Republic of the Congo (EUR

18.7 million; utilisation rate 58 %). Notably, Cabo Verde's GSP+ status provides significantly

greater duty waivers than Standard GSP would have done (EUR 12.0 million compared to EUR

3.9 million) representing an additional EUR 8.1 million in preferences. 39

Compared to similar schemes by which other developed countries grant unilateral preferences,

the EU’s EBA has the highest number of different products exported (53 % of total tariff lines)40

showing that EU imports from LDCs are very diversified. According to UNCTAD41, the EU

EBA offers the largest tariff savings in absolute terms, compared to the schemes of the US,

Japan, and Canada42. Unlike special regimes offered to Africa by China or the US, the EBA

arrangement stands out not only for its automatic eligibility for all LDCs, but also because it

has no expiry date. This unique feature provides long-term certainty for business and offers

significant benefits for African beneficiary countries: by removing the need for periodic

renewals typical of other countries’ GSP arrangements, the EBA fosters investor confidence,

facilitates strategic investment decisions and encourages the diversification of export

structures. This is particularly relevant in times of additional challenges for developing

countries that are facing less support and increased difficulties in accessing certain other

markets.

Thus, the EBA and its generous market access for LDCs in Africa and beyond is a proof of the

EU’s strong commitment to continue supporting growth and sustainable development in LDCs

and their further integration in the global economy through open, stable, and predictable trading

terms.

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iv. Enhanced Engagement

In parallel to the continuous monitoring with GSP+ beneficiaries, the Commission and the

EEAS also carry out enhanced engagement processes to support and incentivise individual

EBA beneficiary countries to improve their record in critical areas related to the GSP, notably

relevant core human rights and labour rights international conventions. This enhanced

engagement with Bangladesh, Cambodia43, and Myanmar is particularly relevant also in

light of their very important share of total EU imports under the EBA arrangement, as shown

in Table/Figure 9 above. At the same time, they present highly different political, economic,

and development situations, which have led to start a dedicated enhanced engagement process

following a different track and focus with each of them. The respective engagements also take

into account all EU instruments available – beyond the EBA – to address the identified issues.

More detail on the three EBA beneficiary countries under enhanced engagement are provided

in the dedicated Staff Working Documents accompanying the present Report.

5. PARTNERSHIPS AND COOPERATION/ SUPPORT FOR GSP

BENEFICIARIES

While the GSP is a comprehensive tool to support long-term sustainable development in

beneficiary countries, trade policy needs to be coupled with development policy and

cooperation to achieve the desired effectiveness44. Most EU’s Multiannual Indicative

Programmes (MIPs) for 2021-2027 defining the EU’s priority areas and specific objectives for

development cooperation include support for sustainable growth and decent jobs, with fair and

just working conditions. Work towards ratification and effective implementation of

conventions and commitments related to good governance, human rights, labour rights, and

environmental standards also have ample support from MIPs. For the eight GSP+ beneficiary

countries, all MIPs pay particular attention to GSP+ compliance and support to the relevant

areas of sustainable development.

Labour rights were a particular focus of the Trade for Decent Work project (2019-2021 and

2022-2024, EUR 6 million), co-funded by the EU and Finland and implemented by the ILO. It

promoted the implementation of ILO fundamental conventions in seven countries under the

EU GSP+ and EBA arrangements (Bangladesh, Cabo Verde, Mongolia, Madagascar,

Mozambique, Pakistan, and The Philippines).

Another strand of the EU’s support to GSP beneficiary countries, more explicitly focused on

ensuring that trade can be used as an instrument for sustainable development, is the Aid for

Trade (AfT) initiative45. Through AfT, the EU supports partner countries in creating the right

environment for trade to boost competitiveness and sustainable integration into the world

economy.

The EU, together with its Member States, has been the largest provider of AfT since the

initiative was launched. In 202346, the EU committed EUR 16.2 billion to partner countries

under AfT, many of which are GSP beneficiaries. Looking specifically at the GSP+

beneficiaries, as mentioned above, the EU supports them in meeting the requirements of this

arrangement but through AfT also helps them in making full use of the preferences provided

under this scheme. EU AfT funding for 2021-2023 to the eight GSP+ beneficiaries, a total of

1.4 billion EUR focused on areas such as building infrastructure, improving production

capacity (including investment climate reform and value chain development), trade facilitation,

implementation and compliance with standards, and much more.

16

Figure 12. EU Aid for Trade funding to GSP+ beneficiaries, total EUR 1.4 billion, 2021-2023

Finally, AfT supports the trade and investment enabling environment of the Global Gateway47,

a flagship strategy launched in 2021 to mobilise investments in priority sectors. In line with the

EU’s geopolitical ambitions and commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

Development, the Global Gateway strategy aims to boost smart, clean, and secure investments

in digital, energy and transport, and to strengthen health, education, and research systems

across the world while promoting universal values and high standards, good governance, and

transparency.

The EU also supported the provision of comprehensive, transparent, centralised information

on GSP for beneficiaries, businesses, civil society, and policy makers alike via the GSP Hub

project. The GSP Hub started in 2019 and aimed to improve awareness and transparency of the

GSP, its economic benefits and its monitoring, via a dedicated website48, written publications,

and a series of awareness events in Europe and in GSP beneficiary countries. The maintenance

and update of the website will continue under the new GSP Regulation.

6. CONCLUSIONS

During the last GSP monitoring cycle under the 2012 GSP Regulation (2023-2025), the scheme

continued to deliver on its main objectives of contributing to economic progress and sustainable

development in beneficiary countries.

The EU GSP provided generous economic benefits to partner countries as well as to EU

importers and consumers, remaining a source of stability and predictability in times of trade,

economic, and geopolitical volatility.

Almost EUR 60 billion worth of goods were imported by the EU in 2024 using GSP

preferences, benefitting EU importers and beneficiary countries alike. Total imports using the

GSP preferences in 2022-2024 fluctuated in line with broader trends, while remaining slightly

above pre-COVID-19 levels when taking into account significant beneficiaries leaving the GSP

scheme.

The largest category of beneficiaries both by number of beneficiaries and value of imports

remained LDCs under the EBA arrangement, which also have the highest utilisation rates at

17

nearly 95 %. The relative importance of the EBA will continue to increase as large Standard

GSP beneficiaries (India, and Indonesia) and GSP+ beneficiaries (The Philippines) upgrade

their trade relationships with the EU through Free Trade Agreements and graduate from GSP.

Looking ahead, most GSP beneficiary countries’ economic circumstances continue to improve,

with several on track to graduate out of UN LDC status. This reflects the success of

development efforts and the positive contribution of the EU GSP in those countries.

As a consequence, the number of countries benefitting from the EU’s unilateral preferences

scheme will continue to decline. GSP will remain important as it will accompany graduating

beneficiaries through transitional periods; and because it will continue providing EBA

preferences for remaining LDCs, notably on the African continent. Given the EU EBA’s unique

offer to African countries, the Commission and the EEAS – in headquarters as well as through

EU Delegations – will make further efforts to strengthen communication and dialogue on GSP,

to increase the visibility, awareness and up-take-up of EBA on the African continent.

Aside from EBA, the GSP+ also continues to bring significant benefits: four out of the top ten

beneficiaries of the entire GSP scheme are GSP+ beneficiaries, and nearly 20 % of all EU

imports under the GSP originate in GSP+ beneficiary countries. At the same time, GSP+

continues to deliver on its goal to incentivise sustainable development and good governance

based on internationally agreed and recognised standards. While the situation remains

challenging in many GSP+ beneficiary countries, the GSP+ detailed monitoring and dialogue

remains a unique platform for discussion and a driver for improvement over time.

The EU has extended the GSP for another decade, with the new GSP Regulation expected to

enter into application on 1 January 2027. Through the new GSP rules, the EU ensures the

continuity of its attractive unilateral trade preference offer through the three dedicated

arrangements. It confirms the EU’s long-standing commitment to supporting growth and

sustainable development in our partner countries across the globe; through generous, stable and

predictable trading-terms.

Ahead of the application of the new GSP provisions, this report and the accompanying SWDs

will serve as a solid baseline. This is in particular the case for current GSP+ beneficiaries who

will need to reapply if they wish to continue benefitting from GSP+ in the future. It applies as

well for current EBA beneficiaries who would wish to apply for GSP+ status once they have

graduated from LDC status. The EU remains committed to supporting beneficiary countries

throughout such transitions.

18

1 Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a

scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008. 2 2023 (JOIN(2023) 34 final. 3 Some elements falling under the current reporting period were already covered in the previous report 2023

(JOIN(2023) 34 final. 4 Standard GSP beneficiary countries: the Republic of the Congo, Cook Islands, India, Indonesia, Kenya,

Micronesia, Nigeria, Niue, Syria, Tajikistan and Vanuatu. 5 GSP+ beneficiary countries: Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, The Philippines, Sri Lanka

and Uzbekistan. 6 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1951 of 29 September 2025 amending Annexes II, IV and VII to

Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2025/1951/oj (hereafter: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1951 of

29 September 2025). The new Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) is expected to govern

future trade relations between the EU and Indonesia. All links provided in this document were up to date as of 28

April 2026. 7 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/214 of 28 November 2024 amending Annex II to Regulation (EU)

No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards Kenya. https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2025/214/oj. 8 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1363 of 12.3.2024 amending Annex IV to Regulation (EU) No

978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council in order to remove Bhutan from the list of beneficiary

countries of the special arrangement for the least-developed countries.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/1363/oj 9 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1951 of 29 September 2025. 10 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1951 of 29 September 2025. 11 Product graduation ensures that preferences are provided to those countries and products most in need and

avoids competitive pressure among GSP beneficiaries 12 Commission implementing Regulation 2023/2780 of 14 December 2023 amending Implementing Regulation

(EU) 2022/1039 as regards the extension of the suspension of certain tariff preferences granted to certain GSP

beneficiary countries. http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/2780/oj 13 Commission Implementing Regulation 2025/1909 of 24 September 2025 laying down rules for the application

of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the suspension for the

years 2026-2028 of certain tariff preferences granted to certain GSP beneficiary

countries.http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1909/oj 14 Commission Implementing Regulation 2024/842 of 11 March 2024 re-imposing safeguard measures with

regard to imports of Indica rice originating in Cambodia and

Myanmar/Burma.http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/842/oj 15 Commission implementing Regulation 2025/1206 of 19 June 2025 on the suspension of the GSP+ tariff

preferences with regard to imports of ethanol originating in

Pakistanhttp://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1206/oj 16https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-proposes-new-eu-generalised-scheme-preferences-

promote-sustainable-development-low-income-2021-09-22_en 17 Regulation (EU) 2023/2663 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 amending

Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences.

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2663/oj 18 Regulation (EU) 2026/1395 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2026 on applying a

generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1395/oj 19 The five new international conventions and agreements are the following: the Optional Protocol to the

Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000); the Convention

on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007); the ILO Convention on Labour Inspection No 81 (1947); the

ILO Convention on Tripartite Consultations No 144 (1976); The Paris Agreement on climate change (2015), and

the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). 20 The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998). 21 Source for all statistics: Eurostat data on nominal trade based on latest available validated full year data as of

September 2025. GSP statistics only cover goods imported into the EU market, i.e., goods released for free

circulation in the EU. The GSP statistics do not cover other EU-imports, like goods imported for the customs

19

inward processing procedure or re-imports after the customs outward processing procedure. Trade flows registered

as ’confidential’ do not appear in the GSP+ usage figures and regime 1 normal trade; but do appear in total trade

figures (regime 4). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/ext_go_agg_esms.htm#conf1537195068659. 22 Congo, Cook Islands, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Micronesia, Nigeria, Niue, Syria, Tajikistan, Vanuatu. 23 Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, The Philippines, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan. 24 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240701-1 25 Products that benefit from GSP are separated in sections according to GSP Regulation. Information on which

CN codes are included in the GSP sections can be found in Annex V of the Regulation No 978/2012. EUR-Lex -

02012R0978-20250101 - EN - EUR-Lex. 26 In addition, the EU applies 0 % tariffs in many areas, irrespective of GSP preferences. This obviously applies

also to imports from GSP beneficiary countries, allowing them to benefit from Most Favoured Nation treatment

under WTO rules, making their total duty-free imports into the EU and therefore duty savings even higher. 27 The sectors facing the highest drops in utilisation rate between 2022 and 2023 were Hides & Leather (S-08a)

from 98.8 % to 65.9%, Cork, Straw & Plaiting (S-09b) from 86.3 % to 62.2 % and Textiles (S-11a) from 97.1 %

to 83.3 %. All three sectors subsequently increased utilisation the following year (2024). 28 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 29 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 30 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs). 31 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. 32 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 33 2019 data is included as a pre-COVID reference baseline. 34 Extended cumulation was granted between Cambodia and Vietnam for bicycles in 2023: Commission Decision

(EU) 2023/1810 of 19 September 2023 on a request for extended cumulation between Cambodia and Vietnam, in

accordance with Article 56(1) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446, as regards the rules of origin used for the

purposes of the scheme of generalized tariff preferences pursuant to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 for

certain materials or parts used in the production of bicycles. http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1810/oj EBA

preferences were partially withdrawn from Cambodia through Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/550

of 12 February 2020. 35 In February 2026, Bangladesh’s Government asked formally to the UN for a three-year deferral of the country’s

graduation out of the LDC category. 36 United Nations Economic and Social Council. 37 São Tomé and Príncipe is no longer an LDC, however it will still benefit from EBA preferences until it graduates

out of the EBA on 1 January 2029. 38 Preferences granted to Kenya under the GSP regulation do not affect market access preferences provided through

other instruments such as the so-called Market Access Regulation (MAR) Regulation (EU) 2016/1076 of the

European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 applying the arrangements for products originating in

certain states which are part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States provided for in

agreements establishing, or leading to the establishment of, economic partnership agreements, OJ L 185, 8.7.2016,

p. 1–191. This is relevant in particularly for cut flowers. 39 EUROSTAT COMEXT. 40https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/COMTD/LDCW73.pdf&Open=True 41 UN Conference on Trade and Development. 42 UNCTAD, ’The Generalized System of Preferences: How much does it matter for developing countries?’,

UNCTAD/DITC/TSCE/2023/1, 2023, p.vii. 43 EBA preferences were partially withdrawn from Cambodia through Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)

2020/550 of 12 February 2020. 44 Preamble 4 of the GSP regulation states that the EU’s common commercial policy is to be consistent with and

consolidate its policy in the field of development cooperation. REGULATION (EU) No 978/2012 of 25 October

2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0978. 45 Aid for Trade is a WTO-OECD initiative from 2006, statistically part of Official Development Assistance

(ODA) covering the following main categories: technical assistance for trade policy and regulations, trade-related

infrastructure and productive capacity building. 46 The latest year with available data. 47 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_en 48 https://gsphub.eu/

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 16.7.2026 SWD(2026) 184 final

JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good

Governance (GSP+) assessment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan covering the period

2023-2025

Accompanying the document

Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council

on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences covering the period 2023-2025

{JOIN(2026) 16 final} - {SWD(2026) 185 final} - {SWD(2026) 186 final} - {SWD(2026) 187 final} - {SWD(2026) 188 final} - {SWD(2026) 189 final} -

{SWD(2026) 190 final} - {SWD(2026) 191 final} - {SWD(2026) 192 final}

1

1. Executive Summary

Pakistan has benefited from the EU’s Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable

Development and Good Governance (GSP+) since 2014, remaining its largest beneficiary with

EUR 7.5 billion in GSP+ eligible exports to the EU in 2024 (primarily textiles and clothing)

and an estimated EUR 732 million in tariff exemptions in 2024 alone. Despite this trade

success, economic fragility persisted, exacerbated by climate vulnerabilities and negative

political developments.

During the 2023-2025 monitoring period, Pakistan has been facing compliance issues with its

GSP+ obligations. It has regressed in a number of areas while positive change was limited.

Notable progress included legislation to create a National Commission for Minorities, a

reduction in the scope of the death penalty, the continuation of the de facto moratorium on

executions, and the adoption of implementing rules of the Anti-Torture Act. Other legislative

advances include a Domestic Violence Bill for Islamabad. A first marital rape conviction was

an important milestone. The National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) has become,

together with the Ministries of Law and Justice as well as Human Rights, a key actor in

Pakistan’s efforts to respect, protect and fulfil human rights obligations. Labour rights saw

progress with the ratification of ILO Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930

and expanded monitoring mechanisms, but overall enforcement remains weak. New action

plans to address child labour have been adopted, but child labour rates are only slowly

decreasing. In general, most progress is of legislative and administrative nature and needs to

be translated into real improvements on the ground.

Significant concerns remained, generally impacting the rule of law and civil society space.

Enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings increased, without accountability for

perpetrators. Freedom of expression deteriorated due to further amendments to cybercrime,

anti-terrorism and blasphemy laws, allowing for vague provisions to be used against dissidents,

human rights defenders, journalists, minorities and ordinary citizens. This includes criminal

and administrative procedures that may result in imprisonment, financial confiscation or denial

to travel abroad. Recent constitutional amendments have been criticised for further

undermining judicial independence. This compounds with issues like obstacles to fair trial and

access to justice. Forced labour continued to affect too many.

To ensure further GSP+ eligibility and compliance with international commitments, including

in view of the revised GSP rules as of 2027, key priorities for future engagement include:

ensuring accountability for human rights violations; increased efforts against torture; in-prison

and capital punishment reforms; reversing negative developments in relation to enforced

disappearances and violations of freedom of expression; effectively addressing violence

against women; securing children’s access to education; ending child marriage; effectively

implementing the newly established action plans of provinces and territories to eliminate child

labour; stepping up the enforcement of existing laws against forced labour; restraining

discrimination of minorities; strengthening the independence, impartiality, and operational

capacity of anti-corruption bodies at federal and provincial levels.

2

2. Key Developments

2.1 Political and economic developments

Pakistan’s fragile political structure, including the complex federal set-up and imbalances

between provinces, as well as the role of the military in politics and the economy, created a

significant challenge to the country’s development, as did escalating security concerns

stemming from domestic militancy, terrorism as well as conflict with neighbouring countries.

Pakistan was involved in a brief but intense military conflict with India in May 2025. Relations

with Afghanistan have been very tense since October 2025, leading to the closure of the border

between the two countries, occurrences of terrorist attacks originating from Afghan soil and

Pakistani airstrikes into Afghan territory.

Pakistan’s political landscape during the 2023-2025 monitoring cycle1 was shaped by persistent

complaints about the integrity of the 2024 electoral process, harsh measures against opposition

party leaders and supporters, and further increased military influence.

Economically, Pakistan avoided a debt default in July 2023 after facing severe pressure on

external payments, minimal foreign exchange reserves, import restrictions, record-high

inflation, and negligible growth. The World Bank estimates that 47.2 % of Pakistan’s

population lived in poverty in 20252. Devastating floods in 2022 and 2025 had negative

economic and social impact. The country is ranked on top of the Global Climate Risk Index

(2024).

2.2 GSP+ trade impact

Compared to the previous period, EU imports from Pakistan in 2022–20243 remained high,

peaking at EUR 9.4 billion in 2022, then falling to EUR 7.9 billion in 2023 and rebounding to

EUR 8.3 billion in 2024, reflecting a broader slowdown in EU demand4.

Pakistan remained the largest GSP+ beneficiary, and the EU its main export market, accounting

for 28 % of its total exports, with textiles and clothing making up roughly 70–76 % of the

country’s exports to the EU in 2024. On the import side, the EU ranks sixth among Pakistan’s

suppliers, with imports valued at EUR 2.7 billion, well behind China, which is Pakistan’s

largest supplier with imports reaching EUR 14.7 billion in 2024.

From 2022 to 2024, about 90 % of EU imports from Pakistan were GSP+-eligible, with a

utilisation rate averaging 93 % and rebounding to 95 % in 2024 after an exceptional dip in 2023

driven by supply-chain disruptions and weaker demand in clothing and home textiles. As a

result of GSP+, Pakistan benefited from around EUR 732 million in tariff exemptions in 2024.

This corresponds to around 9 % of Pakistan’s export value to the EU in 2024.

3

Figure 1. EU imports from Pakistan and GSP+ utilisation rate, 2019-2024

Indicators 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Annual

Growth

(2022-

2024) Total imports, (EUR

million) 5 917.4 5 434.0 6 534.9 9 418.0 7 860.7 8 275.0 -6.3 %

GSP+ eligible, (EUR

million) 5 268.9 4 832.4 5 878.4 8 559.4 7 036.5 7 482.0 -6.5 %

GSP+ used, (EUR million) 5 116.8 4 695.4 5 555.7 8 228.2 6 182.3 7 115.0 -7.0 % Share of GSP+ eligible in

total 89.0 % 88.9 % 90.0 % 90.9 % 89.5 % 90.4 %

GSP+ utilisation rate 97.1 % 97.2 % 94.5 % 96.1 % 87.9 % 95.1 % MFN=0 % imports, (EUR

million) 372.1 317.6 333.1 453.0 377.4 336.7 -13.8 %

Share of MFN=0 % imports 6.3 % 5.8 % 5.1 % 4.8 % 4.8 % 4.1 %

Figure 2. EU imports from Pakistan by trade regime and utilisation rates, 2019-2024

The sectors5 benefiting most from GSP+ preferences in 2024 were (in order of significance)

clothing (S-11b), textiles (S-11a), leather & fur articles (S-08b), prepared foods & beverages

(S-04b) and miscellaneous manufactures (S-20). These sectors have dominated Pakistan’s

export basket under GSP+ products to the EU and continue to underpin the country’s

comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing exports.

Clothing accounts for a large share of total exports and GSP+ preference utilisation (95.3 %),

underscoring Pakistan’s dependence on preferential market access for these products in its EU

trade. The top five export sectors to the EU all achieved preference utilisation rates of 93.6 %-

97.7 % in 2024. As Pakistan’s exports to the EU are highly concentrated, its trade performance

is exposed to sector-specific shocks (energy prices, compliance costs, demand cycles).

4

Figure 3. Top product groups benefiting from GSP+ tariff preferences for Pakistan, 2024

On 19 June 2025, due to the serious disturbance in the Union market, the Commission adopted

a safeguard measure under Article 30 of the GSP Regulation, suspending Pakistan’s GSP+

preferences for imports of non-fuel ethanol for two years, from 21 June 2025 to 20 June 20276.

3. Compliance with GSP+ obligations

Pakistan has maintained ratification of all 27 GSP+ relevant conventions and has issued no

new7 reservations. Although Pakistan was largely compliant with its reporting obligations to

the monitoring bodies during the reporting period (see Annex), it does not have a system in

place to effectively follow up on treaty bodies’ concluding observations and shows only limited

engagement with UN Special Procedures8.

This section is based on the latest UN monitoring body reports and supplemented with

information from civil society. Pakistan has continuously engaged with the EU’s GSP+

monitoring process through regular exchanges of information, including during the monitoring

mission in November-December 2025.

3.1 Human Rights

During the reporting period, Pakistan made progress in consolidating the institutional

framework for human rights. The National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR)

obtained ‘A status’ accreditation with the Global Alliance of National Human Rights

Institutions (GANHRI) in 2024. Concerns in terms of continuity of the NCHR as its mandate

came to an end without appointment of new commissioners were partially addressed by the

extension of the mandate of the current chairwoman. Besides NCHR, the National Commission

on the Rights of the Child (NCRC) and the National Commission on the Status of Women

(NCSW) remained actively engaged in addressing violations of rights and provisions thereof9,

yet delays in the confirmation of new leadership remains a concern10. The establishment of the

National Commission for Minorities under the Ministry of Human Rights, following the

approval of the relevant bill at the end of 2025, would be an important step in Pakistan’s efforts

in protecting religious minorities, although only non-Muslims are formally defined as

minorities under Pakistani legislation11.

5

During the reporting period, Pakistan also made progress in aligning some of its legislation and

policies with international human rights standards. Four crimes were taken out of the scope of

capital punishment12, moving further towards the principle of death penalty to be limited to

the ‘most serious crimes’ in line with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR). No executions have taken place since December 2019. While the revised mercy

petition procedure still does not fully meet international standards, as it excludes entire

categories of offenses and lacks procedural safeguards, the presidential clemency granted in

October 2025 was a significant first step. Important efforts have been made to reduce the

backlog of pending appeals in the Supreme Court.

Pakistan has made efforts to improve prison conditions, namely through a National Prison

Reform Action Plan and a dedicated Task Force, as well as training programmes and a

grievance helpline. Its implementation was further advanced in April 2026 through review by

the National Judicial (Policy Making) Committee and formal endorsement by justice

committees in Punjab, Sindh and the Islamabad Capital Territory. However, serious problems

of overcrowding, poor conditions, and high rates of pre-trial detention persist. Efforts to align

drug policy with human rights principles and implement evidence- and rights-based reforms

are to be pursued further.

The adoption of the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Bill for Islamabad

Capital Territory (ICT)13, completing existing legislation in the four provinces, is particularly

pertinent given the persistent high level of violence against women and girls, including

murder, rape, kidnapping, honour killings and domestic violence, as well as the insufficient

level of assistance for victims and the extremely low level of convictions for those crimes14. A

first conviction for marital rape in February 2024 in Sindh province was another important and

symbolic step in the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Other relevant initiatives include the launch of a

National Strategy on Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence, aimed at strengthening

prevention, reporting and redress mechanisms for online violence against women and

vulnerable groups.

Significant steps towards compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)

include the abolition of child marriage for Christian communities through the Christian

Marriage (Amendment) Act 2024; the legislation to criminalise child marriages in Islamabad

and in Balochistan, passed in May 2025 and in November 2025 respectively, as well as the

Punjab Child Marriage Restraint Ordinance in February 202615.

With relevance to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

Pakistan considerably expanded its social protection system over the last decade and in the

last years, providing direct benefit for many of the most vulnerable citizens. At the same time,

forced evictions in some places remain a concern. Spending on health increased at a rate

comparably lower than most other sectors. The Prime Minister announced a nationwide

education emergency in 2024 to address out-of-school rates and raise literacy rates, following

which a National Education Emergency Action Plan was approved. Provinces have reported

progress, including the reopening of previously non-functional schools, recruitment of

teachers, and expansion of education infrastructure. An enrolment campaign in the Islamabad

Capital Territory was launched, targeting the enrolment of 25 000 – 30 000 out-of-school

children16.

6

Despite these positive developments, grave concerns remain as significant systemic challenges

persistedin the implementation of human rights conventions, with a deterioration of the

situation relating in particular to enforced disappearances, minority rights17, freedom of media

and freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Impunity for human rights violations

continues to be of major concern. The European Commission has received a Single-Entry Point

(SEP) complaint in relation to Pakistan in 2025.

Reports point to a high and growing number of cases of enforced disappearances18, especially

in the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), as well as of extrajudicial

executions19. The Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances has been ineffective in

ascertaining the whereabouts of disappeared persons or ensuring accountability for

perpetrators20. There has not been any prosecution for enforced disappearances to date. The

Commission closed over 9 000 cases to date, without finding evidence for involvement of state

agents in any of them. When a case is closed because the victim is considered ‘returned home’

or dead, the Commission does not record the fate of the individuals during the time of their

disappearance. Pakistan has compensated some families of victims of enforced disappearances,

albeit without clear procedural framework to a limited extent. Pakistan indicated that it was not

planning to pass specific legislation against enforced disappearances1, arguing that existing

laws already extensively criminalise such acts.

Recent amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act and related legislation in Balochistan and

Punjab21 appear to authorise preventive, arbitrary detention without charge or trial and without

meaningful judicial review or effective remedies. Together with other legislation such as the

Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation, this risks blurring the line between legitimate law

enforcement measures and enforced disappearances, and being used in a discriminatory or

disproportionate manner against persons belonging to minority groups, political dissidents,

human rights defenders, journalists, students and family members of victims22.

The implementation rules of the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment)

Act, approved in November 2025, notwithstanding several shortcomings, including in the act

itself23, was an important step in efforts to curb the widespread practice. The government has

started training law enforcement and judicial officials. As regards complaints, investigations

and prosecution of torture cases, data provided by the government is, however, yet to show a

clear trend. Concerns also remained regarding the use of evidence obtained under torture in

court proceedings24.

Political rights are negatively affected among others by abusive judicial proceedings, and

detention of opposition supporters and leaders, including of a former Prime Minister, with

concerns in terms of fair trial and detention conditions, including in relation to access to

lawyers, visitors and medical assistance25. Military trials do not meet the requirements of

ICCPR Article 14 which stipulates the right to a fair and public trial, in a court that is

independent, impartial and competent, and to adequate and effective legal representation.

During the reporting period, limitations to the freedom of expression and access to information

remained serious and persistent.Despite the adoption of the Protection of Journalists and Media

Professionals Act, Pakistan’s media freedom deteriorated further26 with the working

environment for journalists growing increasingly hostile and dangerous, including cases of

1 Despite repeated recommendations by UN Treaty Bodies including in CAT and ICCPR reviews.

7

reported intimidation, administrative and judicial harassment and violence against journalists

covering sensitive topics. Targeted litigation (strategic lawsuits against public participation,

SLAPPs) is sometimes employed to prevent journalists and lawyers from doing their work.

Legislation such as the Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) and the criminal defamation,

blasphemy, sedition and counter-terrorism laws, contain vague concepts of hate speech,

defamation, terrorism and false news27. Without effective safeguards against abuse, the

enforcement of these laws has a significant chilling effect on dissidents, journalists, human

rights defenders and individuals belonging to ethnic or religious minorities28. Internet

connectivity was also frequently restricted, especially around the 2024 elections and in

Balochistan, as well as before and during protests29.

Pakistan’s blasphemy laws30 continued to have a negative impact on freedom of expression

and disproportionally affect individuals belonging to minority religions and faith communities.

Authorities highlighted existing legal safeguards and provincial Standard Operating

Procedures (SOPs) for case handling, and judicial oversight as measures to curb misuse of the

laws. However, these prove to be ineffective, with persistent reports of procedural delays,

intimidation, and extrajudicial violence impacting blasphemy cases. There has been no

prosecution of false accusations of blasphemy to date. Blasphemy laws are also misused for

personal gain. During the reporting period, a so-called ‘blasphemy business group’

systematised such practice by entrapping over 800 people, mainly young men, through online

scams. The network appears to be dismantled, but as of April 2026, over 300 of the falsely

accused victims were still in jail.

Pakistan approved the Policy on Interfaith Harmony and Strategy on Religious Tolerance in

February 2025 and made efforts to protect certain religious minority communities, but its

effectiveness is yet to be established as hate speech against minorities remained a widespread

challenge. The different minorities experience varying levels of discrimination, individual

attacks, mob violence31 and destruction of their places of worship. Prosecution for hate crimes

against minorities is limited, providing a sense of impunity for perpetrators and adding to the

fear among victims. Pakistan's legal system and political discourse lack a comprehensive

concept of ‘minorities’. By limiting ‘minorities’ to non-Muslims, it fails to adequately capture

discrimination and other human rights violations against members of non-majority Muslim

communities as well as ethnic or linguistic minorities.

Ahmadi Muslims were subject to particular discrimination and violence. This included

criminal cases based on discriminatory legislation preventing them from identifying with and

practicing their religion, desecration of mosques and graves - in several instances reportedly

with direct involvement or acquiescence of law enforcement and local authorities - and attacks

against individuals, including targeted killings32. A range of administrative measures had a

negative impact on Ahmadis’ civil rights33.

The rights of the child remained extremely fragile despite efforts. Pakistan also has a very

high rate of out-of-school children in international comparison, with 26 million children aged

5-16 years (38 % of the total school-age population) currently out of school34. As recalled by

the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations

(CEACR), education is key in preventing the engagement of children in child labour and efforts

should be stepped up to improve access to free basic education for all children, taking into

account the special situation of girls35. Despite the National Education Emergency announced

8

in 2024, government spending on education fell to a new low in the past year36. High numbers

of cases of violence against children as well as uneven birth registration and access to health

across regions continue to impede child rights37.

Following the initiation of the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan (IFRP) in September

2023, over 2 million Afghan nationals have returned to Afghanistan (out of which at least 10 %

were deported). As highlighted by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

(CERD), this entails risks for returning Afghan migrants, in particular for vulnerable groups,

relating to trafficking and other forms of exploitation, harassment and intimidation38. Afghan

children are at special risk, with the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) recalling

the need to respect the principle of non-refoulement and ensure unimpeded access to services

for children39. As reminded by both Committees, a legislative and institutional framework

should be established to respect and guarantee the rights of migrants, refugees and asylum

seekers, in particular the most vulnerable groups. This includes putting in place protection

safeguards, individual risk assessments, and essential services, such as documentation,

education and healthcare.

The judiciary has played a key role in contributing to progress in the implementation of

Pakistan’s international human rights commitments. Latest constitutional amendments have,

however, raised concerns about the impact of such reforms on the independence of the

judiciary, accountability of the military, and respect for the rule of law. This compounds

with lingering issues such as backlogs of pending cases at all levels of jurisdiction, and

intimidation, threats or other unlawful interference against judges and prosecutors, as

highlighted by the UN Human Rights Committee40.

Pakistani civil society, including organisations working on human rights and other sensitive

issues, continues to be vibrant, providing a crucial contribution for Pakistan to safeguard and

make progress on human rights. At the same time, space for such organisations to operate, and

to debate is increasingly restricted41. Recent policies and legislation introduced cumbersome

registration procedures and restrictive regulations on foreign funding for civil society

organisations with particularly complex approval processes in some provinces and for human

rights organisations42.

Priorities for future engagement should include consolidating and advancing reform in the

following areas: fair trial and access to justice, prison reform and the reform of the application

of the capital punishment. Enforcement of existing laws, particularly the Anti-Torture Act and

minority rights protections, should be strengthened. At the same time, robust steps are needed

to reverse negative trends in relation to enforced disappearances and violations of freedom of

expression. In this regard, laws on blasphemy, cybercrime (such as PECA), defamation,

counterterrorism and sedition should be amended or repealed. Effective measures are needed

to protect minority groups, including unequivocal measures to counter hate speech, while

discriminatory measures and practices against Ahmadis should be ended. Comprehensive

measures are needed to address violence against women, child rights and migrants/refugees

protection. Significantly higher efforts are needed to provide free, compulsory and good quality

education for all children at least until age 16. Overall, it is vital to ensure accountability for

human rights violations to counter the prevailing sense of impunity. The new National Action

Plan for Human Rights (2026-2029)43 by the Ministry of Human Rights is instrumental to

follow-up on the above priorities.

9

3.2 Labour Rights

On labour rights, the picture remains mixed.On the positive side, important steps were taken

by all provinces to formulate evidence-based action plans to address child labour. On forced

labour, significant steps included the ratification in March 2025 of ILO Protocol 29 of 2014 to

the ILO Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930) and the country-

wide establishment of district vigilance committees to better enforce the existing laws against

child labour and bonded labour44. However, significant implementation gaps continued to

undermine these advances.Forced labour persisted and child labour rates are only declining

slowly.Trade unions are still quite weak in the country, while social dialogue also remained

limited.

In relation to the child labour conventions (ILO Convention concerning Minimum Age for

Admission to Employment, No 138 (1973) and ILO Convention concerning the Prohibition

and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, No 182 (1999),

most provinces and territories in Pakistan have improved their evidence base for effective

policy making by conducting state-of-the art child labour surveys following the ILO

methodology45. All provinces and territories have also notified child labour action plansin

cooperation with United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and/or the ILO, and most of them

now forbid children under 18 years old to work in hazardous occupations or are in the process

of enacting such legislation. Also, lists of hazardous occupations are being updated.

Regarding equal remuneration and non-discrimination (ILO Convention concerning Equal

Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, No 100 (1951) and

Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, No 111

(1958), a gender pay gap study has been published and a national wage reforms action plan to

address the gap developed46. In December 2025, Pakistan launched a National Roadmap for

SME and Worker Formalization, developed with ILO support47. This should benefit female

workers in particular. The Government has developed a ratification plan which prioritises the

ratification of several ILO conventions that will contribute towards promoting an enabling

environment for women in the world of work and strengthen their access to labour protection48.

Several provinces established quotas for women in the public sector or state-owned enterprises.

For instance, the Government of Sindh increased the quota for women from 5 % to 15 % in all

public sector employment and maintained a transgender quota of 0.5 %. In Balochistan, female

workers had a quota of 5 % regarding public sector posts. However, applications by women

remained very low49, raising doubts about the practical impacts of some of these quotas.

Pakistan also maintained a 5 % job quota for minorities in federal and provincial government

positions. This quota, however, remained under-implemented, and often applied in a

discriminatory way, with roles predominantly limited to lower-grade, manual, or hazardous

jobs50.

Another positive development is the initiation by the Government of steps to better implement

the Convention concerning Labour Inspection in Industry and Commerce, No 81 (1947)51 and

the ILO Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No.

144)52.

Labour rights, however, continue to suffer from significant implementation gaps. Among key

concerns is the slow decline of child labour rates53. Numerous hazardous jobs are still

performed by children, including in domestic work. Furthermore, the vocational education and

10

training system has been expanding only slowly54, despite the still very high rate of young

people in Pakistan by international comparison who are neither in employment, nor in

education or training55, and despite the general need for better skilled workers in the economy.

Forced labour remains another very serious problem in Pakistan (in violation of ILO

Convention No 29 and its recently ratified Protocol 29). Despite legislation prohibiting forced

and bonded labour in all provinces and territories, an estimated 3 million people lived and

worked in debt bondage (mainly on tenant farms in Sindh; and in brick kilns in Punjab) in

202356. The track record of district vigilance committees in reporting and addressing cases of

bonded labour remained limited57. Also the evidence base for adequate policy-making and

enforcement remained insufficient: in 2024, CEACR noted with deep regret that, despite its

repeated indication over several years, the Government had taken no concrete measures to

undertake a statistical survey on bonded labour, strongly urging to conduct such a survey in the

near future58.

To address the root causes of bonded labour, the National Commission for Human Rights had

recommended in its 2023 report to improve access to justice for workers; to prohibit entire

families to be recruited as a ‘family unit’; to register all brick kilns and forbid children from

working in brick kilns; and to provide alternative sources of micro credits through banks in

proximity to workers, so that vulnerable workers do not need to turn to their own employers as

a key source of loans. In terms of implementation of these recommendations, activities of

provinces so far seem to have been mainly targeted at children in brick kilns and on establishing

more transparency of credit payments and related repayments. Punjab has developed a standard

contract for brick kiln workers.

The abolition of forced labour would greatly benefit from a more effective and more efficient

labour inspection system. Yet, throughout the reporting period, the labour inspectorates

continued to be under-resourced59, were provided with inadequate means of transport, lacked

equipment and training, and did not impose sufficiently deterrent fines. The CEACR also urged

strengthening the capacity of other law enforcement agencies, including in particular the police,

to address forced labour60.

Several pieces of older legislation that still violate the Convention concerning the Abolition of

Forced Labour, No. 105 (1957) would need amendment61, although the practical day-to-day

implementation of this convention did not receive major observations from the CEACR.

Another key challenge is the lack of sufficient alignment of Pakistan’s laws and practices with

the Conventions on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining (Convention

concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, No. 87 (1948) and

Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to

Bargain Collectively, No 98 (1949). Although the number of trade unions increased steadily,

the unionisation rate remained below 5 % throughout the GSP+ decade (2014-2026). Provinces

did not publish complete lists of registered unions. Female leadership in industrial trade unions

remained low. There were reports of harassment and intimidation of trade union members

during the process of registration of a union. Unions’ activities were also hindered by the

creation of employer-dominated ‘yellow unions’, and a lack of formal employment contracts.

Further, the scope of the Industrial Relations acts remains too narrow: as has been requested

by the CEACR for years, their scope should be extended to include categories of workers

currently excluded, such as agricultural and fisheries workers, informal economy workers,

11

managerial personnel, or self-employed workers62, their current exclusion preventing these

workers from engaging in collective bargaining63. Also an increasing number of ‘contractual

workers’ (hired through third party agents) found it difficult to join a trade union. The new

Labour Code of Punjab is, however, expected to address some of these issues64.

Pakistan has an industrial relations system based on trade unions at enterprise level, but the

share of workers benefitting from collective agreements remained low. Most provincial

industrial relations acts do not foresee that workers can directly join sectoral trade unions at

provincial level, which makes collective bargaining at sector level in those provinces more

difficult65. Furthermore, most of the existing industrial relation acts are permitting collective

bargaining in an enterprise only if a trade union represents at least one third of the enterprise’s

employees66. As repeatedly requested by the CEACR, relevant legislation needs to be amended

to ensure that, when no union reaches this threshold, collective bargaining rights are granted to

the existing unions67.

A further concern is the slow increase of the labour market participation rate of women,

which stood at 28.2 % in 202568, while the labour market remains very gender segmented.

Factors holding back women from participating in the labour market include difficult access to

education and training for girls and women (including vocational education and training)69,

concerns about unsafe means of transport and sexual harassment at work, as well as gaps in

available childcare70. An ILO study published in 2025 estimated the hourly gender pay gap in

Pakistan at 25 %71, with variations depending on the sector of the economy, age and education,

and even higher in the informal economy 72.

A major cross-cutting problem is the lack of promising avenues for individual workers to assert

their legally enshrined labour rights in practice, including their protection against unfair

dismissal or enforcement of their right to be paid at least the minimum wage: trade unions are

fragmented and do not have sufficient capacity to advise many workers on their rights; the

labour inspection system remains understaffed; district vigilance committees have not yet

reached high effectiveness to support the most vulnerable workers; and labour courts are

understaffed, leading to excessively long court cases73.

Priorities for future engagement are to step up implementation and enforcement of existing

laws and policies, while in some areas, further legislative alignments or a more comprehensive

strategy will also be required. The newly established action plans of provinces and territories

to eliminate child labour will need effective implementation. A ‘Forced Labour Survey’

conducted in line with ILO standard methodology covering the entire country is required to

inform more targeted policy-making in order to abolish forced labour in the future.

Implementation efforts across high-risk sectors should be strengthened through a phased action

plan. The trade union registration processes should be simplified, and social dialogue

mechanisms be strengthened, while provinces could also allow workers to directly join sectoral

trade unions. To promote equality of opportunity and treatment for women in respect of

employment and occupation, an overarching national strategy should be developed (including

improved basic education, vocational education and training, and safety of transport to the

workplaces). The capacity of labour inspectorates should be significantly ramped up through

training and ensuring high professionalism, increasing the number of inspectors (including

female ones) and aligning the frequency of inspections per establishment with ILO standards

in all sectors in all provinces. Beyond labour inspections, it would be important to establish

quick and inexpensive other avenues for individual workers to enforce their labour rights,

through the ombudsmen, courts, or similar mechanisms.

12

3.3 Environment and Climate

Pakistan experienced acute climate pressures in 2024 and 2025, including heatwaves exceeding

50° C in Sindh and Punjab, severe monsoon flooding and subsequent drought and cold spells,

affecting millions. Ranked among the five most climate-vulnerable countries globally74, it

faced water shortages, crop losses and infrastructure damage, intensifying the focus on

adaptation. It also severely suffered from smog75. Throughout the reporting period, Pakistan

maintained engagement with the environmental conventions through policy measures and

timely fulfilling its reporting obligations (see Annex).

Pakistan has complied with its reporting obligations under the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (1988) (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC

and received no requests for additional information from the Secretariat76. In September 2025,

Pakistan also submitted its updated Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris

Agreement, extending its mitigation pathway towards 2035 while retaining a similar ambition

and conditional structure. Implementation is guided by the National Climate Change Policy

and the National Adaptation Plan (2023), alongside the Recharge Pakistan programme77.

Complementary steps include adoption of the National Clean Air Policy (2023), issuance of

Carbon Market Guidelines (2024) and access to the International Monetary Fund Resilience

and Sustainability Facility, linking concessional climate finance to reforms in energy pricing,

public investment and disaster-risk management78.

With respect to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987),

Pakistan continued implementation of its Hydrochlorofluorocarbon Phase-out Management

Plans. Stage II was concluded in December 2024, and Stage III, running to 2030, targets a

67.5 % reduction by 2026 and full phase-out by 2030, supported by the United Nations

Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Industrial Development

Organization (UNIDO)79. Pakistan ratified the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol

on 31 January 2024, committing to a phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) to mitigate

global warming.

Compliance also continued under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered

Species of Wild Fauna and Flora(1973) (CITES). Following the seventy-seventh Standing

Committee meeting in November 2023, Pakistan was upgraded to Category 1, confirming that

its implementing legislation meets Convention standards80. Under the Basel Convention on

the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1989),

Pakistan adopted the Hazardous Waste (Import and Export) Rules 2024, strengthening

licensing, manifest and reporting systems81, while progressing toward a national hazardous

waste database.

Under the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), with support from the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) and the Global Environment Facility, Pakistan submitted

its 7th National Report in March 202682 and is finalising the update of its Strategy and Action

Plan, in line with the Global Biodiversity Framework, completion being expected in 202783.

Pakistan also complied with reporting under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000)84

and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001), including updates

on its polychlorinated biphenyl inventories and hazardous waste stockpiles85.

13

While reporting compliance and policy development remain broadly on track, further effort is

required to strengthen enforcement, disaster-risk reduction and provincial implementation

capacity, particularly in hazardous waste management, biodiversity protection and

operationalisation of carbon market mechanisms.

Priorities for future engagement should focus on translating policy frameworks into

measurable emission reductions and strengthened resilience on the ground. This includes

accelerating implementation of the updated Nationally Determined Contribution,

operationalising the Carbon Market Guidelines, reinforcing monitoring and verification

systems, and expanding nature-based solutions and climate-resilient infrastructure in

agriculture and urban areas. Greater investment in enforcement capacity at provincial and local

levels will be essential, alongside strengthened hazardous waste tracking, biodiversity

protection aligned with the Global Biodiversity Framework, and improved disaster-risk

management to reduce exposure to extreme weather events.

3.4 Good Governance (Anti-Corruption and Drug Control)

Pakistan has maintained compliance with reporting obligations under the three UN drug

control Conventions86(cf. Annex). Since devolution, Pakistan has also made notable strides

in updating its narcotics control framework through provincial legislation. The provinces of

Sindh87, Punjab88 and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)89 have updated their legal frameworks to

align with national and international narcotics control commitments, introducing harsher

penalties, specialised courts, and precursor chemical controls, while Balochistan’s Control of

Narcotics Substances Bill, 202690 aims to curb trafficking and promote social reforms. The

Inter-Agency Task Force on Counter Narcotics has played a role in coordinating anti-

trafficking initiatives.

Other positive developments include the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (DRAP)

strengthening pharmaceutical regulations to prevent diversion91 and the Anti-Narcotics Force

(ANF) - which leads drug control in the country - launching a digital case management system

to improve enforcement efficiency92.

Despite these advances, critical challenges persist. Pakistan remained a transit hub for opiate

trafficking93. Domestic addiction rates were among the highest in the world, fuelling a severe

public health crisis. According to International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) annual reports,

Pakistan has played a significant role in regional cannabis trafficking networks, primarily as a

transit and destination country, and has been increasingly affected by synthetic drug trafficking,

including methamphetamine, particularly as a destination market94.

To address these challenges, increased regional cooperation would be required to disrupt

trafficking networks, as well as investment in the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF)’s technological

and operational capacity95, and harmonisation of provincial and federal laws. Further, all

substances scheduled under the UN Conventions on drug control should be included into the

national list of controlled substances (as part of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs). A

balanced and human rights-based approach - combining enforcement, public health, and global

collaboration - will be essential to sustain progress in combating narcotics trafficking and

abuse. In this regard, introducing a distinction between traffickers and drug users in the law

would be key. In this context, health-based approaches and harm reduction strategies, including

youth counselling and community-based treatment, should be scaled up.

14

Pakistan has also somewhat advanced its anti-corruption framework. Under the UN

Convention against Corruption (2004) (UNCAC), Pakistan participated in the related review

mechanisms such as the 2nd cycle implementation review (2016-2021) on which the report

was released in February 202696.

Domestically, the Supreme Court endorsed amendments to the National Accountability

Ordinance in September 2024, streamlining complaint procedures to reduce frivolous cases.

The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) achieved record recoveries97, at provincial level

Sindh recruited 400 investigators98 and Punjab adopted a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy99, further

strengthening enforcement. KPK’s proposed an Anti-Corruption Force Bill100.

Despite these positive developments, concerns persist regarding the effectiveness and

independence of anti-corruption bodies. Reports from civil society and international observers

indicate that corruption remains entrenched in public administration, with limited

accountability for high-level offences. Resource constraints and a lack of impartiality

undermine the ability of these institutions to investigate and prosecute cases transparently101.

Priorities for future engagement should focus on strengthening the independence,

impartiality, preventive measures and operational coordination capacity of anti-corruption

institutions across federal and provincial bodies. Legislative reforms are required along with

appropriate budget allocations. Pakistan should update the National Anti-Corruption Strategy

incorporating the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and UNCAC,

including clear implementation mechanisms, timelines and key performance indicators. A

balanced narcotics policy, combining enforcement with public health, should be paired with

deeper regional cooperation.

4. Development cooperation in support of GSP+ objectives

The EU has committed EUR 400 million in grants and blending for its partnership with

Pakistan for 2021-2027. Priority areas include: green inclusive growth, human capital

development, and governance including rule of law and human rights. The bilateral

cooperation is complemented with global and regional projects covering Pakistan (e.g., on

migration) and thematic cooperation support civil society (e.g., women and youth

organisations). Under the Global Gateway initiative, the EU is planning to expand its support

through investments in various sectors, including water management and climate adaptation.

The EU supports a sizable number of projects that directly contribute to the UNFCCC and

the Kyoto Protocol or to preventing and mitigating the effects of climate change. This

includes post-flood rural economic recovery projects in KPK and in Balochistan; a Better

Governance and Business Environment project focused on greening small and medium size

enterprises; the revival of the Balochistan Water Resources Programme; an ‘Energy for

Climate Resilience’ project in Gilgit-Baltistan and in KPK; a Rural Development and Climate

Resilience Project in Gilgit-Baltistan; a Punjab urban water and wastewater governance and

services improvement project for Faisalabad and Lahore cities; and a poverty alleviation and

inclusive development project across rural Sindh (EUR 50 million).

In addition, the EU and Pakistan have a large number of cooperation projects to support

human rights or good governance. This includes a national project on the promotion of human

rights in Pakistan notably supporting the Federal Human Rights Ministry and the National

Commission for Human Rights and other provincial departments and statutory bodies;

15

support to parliamentary development; support to civil society in Pakistan working in

partnership with the Ministry of Economic Affairs; support to adaptive social protection in

Sindh to strengthen long-term resilience; a large education programme in Balochistan; a

comprehensive rule of law programme in KPK and Balochistan; a programme supporting

access to the labour market and decent work through technical and vocational education and

training; and a project on women participation and leadership.

16

Annex: Pakistan - Compliance with GSP ratification and reporting obligations

Convention Ratification

status /

Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to

monitoring bodies

Human Rights

1. Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

(1948)

Ratified:

12.10.1957

No reservations

No reporting obligations

2. International Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination (1965)

Ratified:

21.09.1966

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 22.08.2024

• Last report submitted: 28.10.2021

• Next report due: 24.09.2025 (not submitted)

3. International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (1966)

Ratified:

23.06.2010

Reservations on

Articles 3, 6, 7,

12, 13, 18, 19,

402

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 02.12.2024

• Last report submitted: 16.06.2022

• Next report due: 09.11.2027

4. International Covenant on Economic

Social and Cultural Rights (1966)

Ratified:

17.04.2008

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 23.06.2017

• Last report submitted: 24.5.2023

• Next periodic report due: not yet set

5. Convention on the Elimination of

All Forms of Discrimination Against

Women (1979)

Ratified:

12.03.1996

Ratification

subject to the

provisions of

the Pakistan

constitution.

Reservation on

Article 29(1) 3

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 28.02.2020

• Last report submitted: 09.10.2018

• Next report due: February 2024 (not submitted)

6. Convention Against Torture and

other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment (1984)

Ratified:

23.06.2010

Reservations on

Articles 8, 28

and 304

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: Advance unedited

version 29.04.2026

• Last report submitted: 16.06.2022

• Next report due: Follow-up report 01.05.2027,

periodic report 01.05.2030

7.Convention on the Rights of the

Child (1989)

Ratified:

12.11.1990

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 05.02.2026

• Last report submitted: 03.08.2023

• Next report due: Not yet set

Labour Rights5 6

8. Convention concerning Forced or

Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930)

Ratified:

23.12.1957

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest CEACR comments: 2024

• Last Government report submitted: 2023

2 Permitted reservation according to the monitoring body. 3 Permitted reservation according to the monitoring body. 4 Permitted reservation according to the monitoring body. 5 Following a decision taken by the ILO Governing Body to modernize the ILO reporting system, as from 2027

Governments will no longer submit separate reports for each ratified Convention, but instead, they will submit

thematic reports, grouping conventions in 15 thematic areas. As a transition year, only a limited number of reports

will be requested in 2026. See: The future of reporting on ratified conventions, https://www.ilo.org/international-

labour-standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards-overview-ilo/future-reporting-ratified-

conventions. 6 Reservations do not apply in the ILO system.

17

Convention Ratification

status /

Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to

monitoring bodies

• Next report due: not yet set

9. Convention concerning Freedom of

Association and Protection of the Right

to Organise, No 87 (1948)

Ratified:

14.02.1951

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2025

• Last Government report submitted: 2025

• Next report due: not yet set

10. Convention concerning the

Application of the Principles of the

Right to Organise and to Bargain

Collectively, No 98 (1949)

Ratified:

26.05.1952

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2025

• Last Government report submitted: 2025

• Next report due: not yet set

11. Convention concerning Equal

Remuneration of Men and Women

Workers for Work of Equal Value, No

100 (1951)

Ratified:

11.10.2001

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest CEACR comments: 2025

• Last Government report submitted: 2025

• Next report due: not yet set

12. Convention concerning the

Abolition of Forced Labour, No 105

(1957)

Ratified:

15.02.1960

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2021

• Last Government report submitted: 2023

• Next report due: not yet set

13. Convention concerning

Discrimination in Respect of

Employment and Occupation, No 111

(1958)

Ratified:

24.01.1961 Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2025

• Last Government report submitted: 2024

• Next report due: not yet set

14. Convention concerning Minimum

Age for Admission to Employment, No

138 (1973)

Ratified:

06.07.2006

Minimum age

specified: 14

years

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2023

• Last Government report submitted: 2023

• Next report: not yet set

15. Convention concerning the

Prohibition and Immediate Action for

the Elimination of the Worst Forms of

Child Labour, No 182 (1999)

Ratified:

11.10.2001

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2023

• Last Government report submitted: 2023

• Next report due: not yet set

Environment and Climate

16. Convention on International Trade

in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna

and Flora (1973)

Ratified:

20.04.1976

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations.

• Annual Trade Report for 2023 submitted

04.03.2024

• Annual Trade Report for 2024 submitted

11.03.2025

• Next Annual Trade Report due 31.10.2026

• Last Annual Illegal Trade Reports submitted for

2023, 20247

• Last Implementation Reports: 2021–20228

17. Montreal Protocol on Substances

that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987)

Ratified:

18.12.1992

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

Last report submitted:

• Article 7 data report covering 2024

Next report:

• Article 7 data report covering 2025 due

30.09.2026

18. Basel Convention on the Control of

Transboundary Movements of

Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal

(1989)

Ratified:

26.07.1994

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations.

• National Report (NR) for 2023 outstanding.

• NR for 2024 submitted 05.03.2026

• Next NR (2025) due 31.12.2026

7 Reporting mandatory but not subject to compliance procedure. 8 Ibid.

18

Convention Ratification

status /

Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to

monitoring bodies

19. Convention on Biological Diversity

(1992)

Ratified:

26.07.1994

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations.

• Seventh national report (7NR) submitted

01.03.2026.

• Latest National Biodiversity Strategy and Action

Plan (NBSAP) update: submitted 2018 (until

2030)

• Next report: 8NR due 30.06.2029

20. The United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (1992)

Ratified:

01.06.1994

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest updated Nationally Determined

Contributions (NDC 3.0) submitted 24.09.2025

• Latest National Communication (NC): NC3

submitted 30.06.2025

• First Biennial Transparency Report (BTR1):

submitted 16.06.2025

• Next report (BTR2) due 31.12.2026

21. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

(2000)

Ratified:

02.03.2009

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest National Report: 5NR submitted

27.02.2026

• Next report: Not yet set

22. Stockholm Convention on

persistent Organic Pollutants (2001)

Ratified:

17.04.2008

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest National Report: 5NR submitted

24.08.2022

• Next Report: 6NR due 31.08.2026

• Initial National Implementation Plan (NIP)

submitted 15.12.2009

• NIP updates: COP4, COP5 and COP6

amendments included

23. Kyoto Protocol to the United

Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change (1998)

Ratified:

11.01.2005

No reservations

No reporting obligations separate from United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change

Good Governance

24. United Nations Single Convention

on Narcotic Drugs (1961)

Ratified:

09.07.1965

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

2024 reporting fulfilled

Latest INCB mission in 2012

25. United Nations Convention on

Psychotropic Substances (1971)

Ratified:

09.06.1977

No reservations

26. United Nations Convention against

Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances (1988)

Ratified:

25.10.1991

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

2025 reporting fulfilled

27. United Nations Convention against

Corruption (2004)

Ratified:

31.08.2007

No reservations9

Compliant with reporting obligations

First review cycle completed in 2017

Second review cycle completed in September 2024

9 Declaration made in line with Article 66(3) of UNCAC that Pakistan does not consider itself bound by the

provisions of Article 66(2), arbitration and potential referral of cases to the International Court of Justice.

19

1 Key 2026 events at the moment of writing have been included in this Staff Working Document. All links

provided were up to date as of 28 April 2026. 2 World Bank, ‘Reclaiming Momentum Towards Prosperity: Pakistan’s Poverty, Equity, and Resilience

Assessment’, 2025.https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/21567354-9a75-4e6d-a2b2-

219a69f007a1. 3 Source for all statistics in section 2.2: Eurostat data covering 2022-2024 based on latest available validated full

year data as of September 2025. GSP statistics only cover goods imported into the EU market, i.e., goods released

for free circulation in the EU. The GSP statistics do not cover other EU-imports, like goods imported for the

customs inward processing procedure or re-imports after the customs outward processing procedure. Trade flows

registered as ‘confidential’ do not appear in the GSP+ usage figures and regime 1 normal trade; but do appear in

total trade figures (regime 4).

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/ext_go_agg_esms.htm#conf1537195068659. 4 In the same time period, EUROSTRAT EU global imports for textile and clothing in value (HS chapters 50 to

63, footwear and leather excluded) fluctuated from EUR 139bn in 2022, to EUR 116bn in 2023, and EUR 121bn

in 2024. 5 Products that benefit from GSP are separated in sections according to the GSP Regulation. Information on

which CN codes are included in the GSP sections can be found in Annex V of the Regulation No 978/2012.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/978/2025-01-01/eng/ . 6 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1206 of 19 June 2025 on the suspension of the GSP+ tariff

preferences with regard to imports of ethanol originating in Pakistan, C/2025/3866, OJ L 2025/1206, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1206/oj. 7 It has maintained a few reservations (notably under the ICCPR and CEDAW), as flagged by human rights bodies. 8 Pakistan has not issued a standing invitation to UN Special Procedures and has not responded to any requests

for country visits for a decade. The Independent Expert on Albinism visited Pakistan from 3 to 13 June 2026.

Pakistan received a high number (24 in 2024 and 2025) of UN Special Procedures communications and replied to

10 of them, with a notable increase of such responses since December 2025. 9 Both NCSW and NCRC are financially and administratively independent bodies. NCSW has had an interim

chairperson since November 2024; the new interim Chairperson was appointed on 25 March 2026. The tenure of

the current Chairperson of NCRC is still ongoing but the Members of the Commission completed their three-year

tenure on 29 April 2026.

11 Instead of a comprehensive definition of minorities that would cover all grounds of discrimination included in

the CERD, Pakistan narrowly defines minorities as non-Muslim religious groups and grants minority rights and

protection accordingly. Individuals and communities who identify as Muslims are not covered by such provisions,

even if they constitute a minority share of the overall population, e.g. the Shiah. Ethnic and racial minorities are

not covered by Pakistan’s definition. 12 The death penalty was abolished for railway sabotage (2022), narcotics crimes (2023), harbouring hijackers

(Section 402-C) and stripping a woman in public (Section 354-A of the Penal Code). The Criminal Laws

Amendment Bill was passed in July 2025. ‘The death penalty in Pakistan 2025’, National Commission for Human

Rights and Justice Project Pakistan, October, 2025. https://www.jpp.org.pk/the-death-penalty-in-pakistan-2025. 13 UN Women, ‘Statement on ICT Child Marriage Restraint Bill 2025’, 2025.

www.asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/stories/statement/2025/05/islamabad-capital-territory-child-marriage-

restraint-bill-2025-0; and Pakistan Code, ‘ICT Child Marriage Restraint Act 2025’. https://pakistancode.gov.pk. 14 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Pakistan’, 2 Dec. 2024,

para. 16. 15 The ‘Punjab Child Marriage Restraint Ordinance, 2026 (I of 2026)’, Local Government and Community

Development, Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary Issue), 11 Feb. 2026.

https://citylaws.pk/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Punjab-Child-Marriage-Restraint-Ordinance.pdf. 16 Associated Press of Pakistan, ‘Education Ministry Sets 3-Month Goal to Enrol 25,000 Out-of-School Children

in Islamabad’, 16 Mar. 2026. https://www.nation.com.pk/05-Mar-2026/union-council-wise-child-left-behind-

drive-launched-enrol-out-of-school-children-islamabad. 17 Pakistan's legal system and political discourse lack a comprehensive concept of ‘minorities’. By limiting

‘minorities’ to non-Muslims, it fails to adequately capture discrimination and other human rights violations against

members of non-majority Muslim communities as well as ethnic or linguistic minorities. 18 UN Special Procedures, ‘Communication AL PAK 1/2025’, 18 Feb. 2025. 19 The government of Pakistan reports 983 alleged criminals to be killed in police encounters in the five provinces

during which 61 police officers were killed in 2025. A report by a civil society organisation documented 670 CCD-

led encounters over the course of eight months in 2025 in Punjab, resulting in the deaths of 924 suspects, with

20

only two police officers killed during the same period. Concerns about extrajudicial killings were also raised by

UN Special Procedure, ‘UN experts urge Pakistan to address human rights violations in Balochistan’, 19 Apr.

2025. www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/un-experts-urge-pakistan-address-human-rights-violations-

balochistan and the Human Rights Committee’s Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of

Pakistan, 2 Dec. 2024. 20 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Pakistan’, 2 Dec.2024

and UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Communication of May 2025. 21 ‘The Anti-Terrorism (Balochistan Amendment) Act – Act. No. XVII of 2025. No.PAB/Legis: V (18)/2025’,

Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat, 5 Jun. 2025.

www.pabalochistan.gov.pk/storage/8266/6864df4dc7c11_The-Anti-Terrorism-(Balochistan-Amendment)-ACT-

2025.pdf. 22 OHCHR, ‘UN Special Procedures communications AL PAK 1/2025’, 18 Feb. 2025.

https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=29607; OHCHR,

‘UN Special Procedures communications AL PAK, OL PAK 12/2025’, 18 Nov. 2025.

https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30492. 23 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Pakistan’, 2 Dec. 2024. 24 National Assembly of Pakistan, ‘The Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Bill, 2025’, 2025.

https://na.gov.pk/en/index.php/uploads/uploads/documents/67ff96b6a5a10_187.pdf. While the Anti-Torture Act

bans evidence obtained through torture in court proceedings, section 21-H of the Anti-Terrorism Act makes

confessions made in police custody admissible under certain conditions, raising concerns about some of these

being made under torture. 25 UN Special Procedures communications of 10 December 2025 (Communication AL PAK 16/2025,

https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30613) and of 16

December 2025 (Communication AL PAK 15/2025:

https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30614).26 Reporters without borders, ‘Press Freedom Index 2025 – Pakistan’, 2025. www.rsf.org//en/country/pakistan.

The score dropped by 4 points from 2024 to 2025, making Pakistan rank 158 out of 180 countries. 27 OHCHR, ‘Pakistan: UN experts alarmed by the conviction of Imaan Mazari-Hazir and Hadi Ali Chattha’ Press

Release, 4 Feb. 2026. www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/pakistan-un-experts-alarmed-conviction-imaan-

mazari-hazir-and-hadi-ali. See also: UN Special Procedures on 6 May 2025 (Communication AL PAK 5/2025,

https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=29906) and 22

December 2025 (AL PAK 17/2025,

https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30615). 28 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Pakistan’, 2 Dec. 2024. 29 Amnesty International, ‘Pakistan: Shadows of Control: Censorship and mass surveillance in Pakistan’, 9 Sept.

2025. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa33/0206/2025/en/. 30 The government reported 663 individuals imprisoned for blasphemy as of September 2024 as well as 260 new

accusations of blasphemy registered in 2025. 31 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Concluding observations on the combined twenty-

fourth to twenty-sixth periodic reports of Pakistan’, 24 Sep. 2024. There were 213 cases in 2023 with less than 7

% mob violence arrest rate. 32 The persecution of Ahmadis has been raised in several UN Special Procedures communications, including, AL

PAK 4/2025 and AL PAK 2/2023. 33 Human Rights Watch, ‘Pakistan Denies Voting Rights to Religious Community’, 8 Dec. 2023.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/08/pakistan-denies-voting-rights-religious-community; Amnesty

International, ‘Pakistan: End cyclical harassment and persecution of minority Ahmadiyya community’, 5 Jun.

2025. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/06/the-ahmadis-deserve-to-practice-their-religion-and-

celebrate-eid-without-fear-for-their-safety-and-liberty/; and Voicepk.net, ‘Ahmadis face widespread restrictions

on Eid prayers, escalating persecution’, 2 Apr. 2025. https://voicepk.net/2025/04/ahmadis-face-widespread-

restrictions-on-eid-prayers-escalating-persecution/. 34 National Commission on the Rights of the Child, ‘Annual Report 2024–25’, 2025. www.ncrc.gov.pk/wp-

content/uploads/2025/07/Annual-Report-24-25.pdf; and National Commission on the Rights of the

Child/UNICEF, ‘The State of Children in Pakistan 2024’, 2024. https://www.unicef.org/pakistan/reports/state-

children-pakistan-2024. 35 International Labour Organisation (ILO), ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 182’, adopted 2023,

published 113rd ILC session, 2024.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4365945,103166.

21

36 Save the Children, ‘Education spending in Pakistan hits new low with more than one in three children out of

school’, 19 Jun. 2025. www.savethechildren.net/news/education-spending-pakistan-hits-new-low-more-one-

three-children-out-school-save-children. 37 UN Committee of the Rights of the Child, ‘Review of Pakistan’, 2026. 38 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Concluding observations on the combined twenty-

fourth to twenty-sixth periodic reports of Pakistan’, 24 Sep. 2024. 39 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding observations on the combined sixth and seventh periodic

reports of Pakistan’, DoC. CRC/C/PAK/CO/6-7, 5 Feb. 2026. 40 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Pakistan’, 2 Dec.

2024. 41 Ibid. 42 EuSEE, ‘Country Focus Report Pakistan’, July 2025. https://eusee.hivos.org/assets/2025/09/Pakistan-Final-

Country-Focus-Report_edited-with-TC.pdf. 43 While it is difficult to ascertain a definitive timeline, it is expected the National Action Plan to be officially

notified by the end of June 2026. 44 ILO, ‘ILO Helpdesk: Business and forced labour’. https://www.ilo.org/resource/other/ilo-helpdesk-business-

and-forced-labour; and ILO, ‘A global alliance against forced labour’, 2005.

https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@declaration/documents/instructional

material/wcms_099624.pdf. 45 Punjab: https://stateofchildren.com/punjab-child-labour-survey-pcls-2019-2020/; Gilgit-Baltistan:

https://www.unicef.org/pakistan/media/5241/file/Gilgit%20Baltistan%20Child%20Labour%20Survey%202018-

2019%20Report.pdf; Sindh: https://dglabour.gos.pk/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/SCLS_KFR_02.07.2025.pdf;

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: https://stateofchildren.com/kp-child-labour-survey-2022/; Balochistan:

https://stateofchildren.com/balochistan-child-labour-survey-2023-2024-report/; Islamabad Capital Territory:

https://stateofchildren.com/islamabad-capital-territory-child-labour-survey-2023-2024/. The only child labour

survey which is not yet published on the internet is the one currently being finalised by Azad Jammu and Kashmir;

only a snapshot overview of data from 2020 on Azad Jammu and Kashmir is currently publicly available in:

https://www.pndajk.gov.pk/micsajk/3-AJ&K_MICS_2020-21_SNAPSHOTS.pdf. 46 ILO news 22 July 2025. https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/pakistan-launches-gender-pay-gap-report-and-

national-action-plan-equal-pay. 47 Pakistan’s informal economy employed 72.5 % of the workforce, according to Pakistan Bureau of Statistics,

Labour Force Survey 2020-2021 (cf. also Decent Work Country Programme 2023-2027,

https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/ILO_Pakistan_DWCP%20WEB_v7_photos_FINAL_0.pdf). 48 The Decent Work Country Programme 2023-2027 mentions for instance ILO Convention No 183 on maternity

protection, Convention No 175 about part-time work and Convention No 102 about social security. 49 In Sindh, for example, only 1 female candidate applied. 50 UNDP, ‘The Future of Governance and the Social Contract’, Feb, 2026.

https://www.undp.org/pakistan/publications/future-governance-and-social-contract. 51 For example, the number of inspectors has been increased. 52 The Federal Tripartite Consultation Committee (FTCC) in May 2024 endorsed ratification of three ILO

conventions. https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/pakistan%E2%80%99s-tripartite-labour-conference-concludes-

unified-commitment. 53 For example, surveys show the following child labour rates per province or territory: Punjab (13.4 %), Gilgit-

Baltistan (13.1 %), Sindh (14.6 %), KPK (12.9 %), ICT (2.4 %). In most provinces and territories, the rate is also

very high for the sub-group of children aged 10-13 years. 54 The Decent Work Country programme 2023-2027 mentions that Technical and Vocational Education & Training

(TVET) institutions in Pakistan offer approximately 437 000 training places every year, but that this is insufficient

to meet the demands of a growing population and provide the population with market-ready skills, with

approximately 3 million young people entering the labour market each year. 55 World Bank, ‘Share of youth not in education, employment or training’, 2026.

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.NEET.ZS?locations=PK. 56 National Commission on Human Rights, ‘The issue of bonded labour in Pakistan’, Aug, 2023.

https://nchr.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Bonded-Labour-Report.pdf. 57 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 29’,adopted 2024, published 113rd ILC session, 2025.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4405672,103166:NO; The CEACR noted zero convictions of perpetrators, despite the high number of

people in bonded labour. See also National Commission for Human Rights 2023 report on bonded labour

https://nchr.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Bonded-Labour-Report.pdf.

22

58 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 29’, adopted 2024, published 113rd session,2025.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4405672,103166. 59 In total, less than 600 inspectors for the entire country enforce the labour rights of a labour force comprising

approximately 70 million persons. The number of female labour inspectors also remained very low (<10 % in

most provinces and territories). 60 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 29’, adopted 2024, published 113rd session, 2025.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4405672,103166. 61 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on C105’, adopted 2024, published 113rd ILC session,2025.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4405710,103166. 62 ILO, ‘Direct Request (CEACR) on Convention No 87’, adopted 2022, published 111st session,2023.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4320814,103166. 63 ILO, ‘Observation on Convention No 87’, adopted 2025, published in ‘Application of Labour Standards 2026’,

Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and recommendations.

https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/Report%20III%28A%29-2026-%5BNORMES-251223-001%5D-

Web-EN.pdf. 64 The new Punjab Labour Code was adopted by the Provincial Assembly of Punjab in February 2026.

https://www.adalatonline.pk/laws/punjab-labour-code-2026/. The new Sindh Labour Code has been subject to

consultation, but has not yet been adopted by the Provincial Assembly of Sindh. 65 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 87’, adopted 2025, published 114th ILC session, 2026.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4460815,103166. 66 Section 19 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, and sections 24(1) of the Industrial Relations Acts of Khyber-

Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh. 67 ILO, ‘Observation on Convention No 98’, adopted 2025, published in ‘Application of Labour Standards 2026’,

Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and recommendations,

https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/Report%20III%28A%29-2026-%5BNORMES-251223-001%5D-

Web-EN.pdf. 68 ILOSTAT with reference to the Labour Force Survey 2025; labour market participation rate for ‘Youth, adults

15 years+, female’.

https://rshiny.ilo.org/dataexplorer31/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=EAP_DWAP_SEX_AGE_RT_A. 69 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 111’, adopted 2025, published 114th session, 2026.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4460782,103166. 70 ILO, ‘Decent Work Country Programme for Pakistan (2023-27) (DWCP IV)’, 2023.

https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/ILO_Pakistan_DWCP%20WEB_v7_photos_FINAL_0.pdf. 71 ILO, ‘What lies behind the gender pay gap in Pakistan’, Policy Brief, March 2025.

https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/Policy%20Brief_GPG%20Pakistan_6%20March%202025.pdf. 72 ILO, ‘Observation on Convention No 100’, adopted 2025, published in ‘Application of Labour Standards 2026’,

Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and recommendations.

https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/Report%20III%28A%29-2026-%5BNORMES-251223-001%5D-

Web-EN.pdf. 73 The Decent Work Country Programme 2023-2027 mentions that the backlog of cases in Pakistan’s labour court

system was about 1.7 million cases in 2023. 74 Global Climate Risk Index. https://www.germanwatch.org/en/cri. 75 Pakistan ranked as the world’s smoggiest country in 2025 according to air quality monitoring IQAir.

https://www.iqair.com/pakistan. 76 Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination, Government of Pakistan, 2024 ‘Biennial

Transparency Report (BTR)’, 31 Dec. 2024.

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Pakistan%27s%20Biennial%20Transparency%20Report%20%28B

TR%29%202024.pdf; and ‘Third National Communication on Climate Change’, 30 June 2025,

unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/TNC%20Report%2027-6-25.pdf. 77 Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination, Government of Pakistan, ‘Third Nationally

Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0)’, 24 Sept. 2025. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2025-

09/Pakistan_NDC3.0_24%20Sep.pdf.

23

78 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Pakistan: First Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the

Extended Fund Facility, Requests for Modification of Performance Criteria and Request for an Arrangement

Under the Resilience and Sustainable Facility,’ May 2025.

www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2025/05/17/pakistan-first-review-under-the-extended-arrangement-

under-the-extended-fund-facility-567021. 79 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ‘Pakistan – HPMP Stage III, second tranche – project

document’; and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), ‘Pakistan – HPMP Stage III, first

tranche – project document’, 23 Jun. 2022.

https://downloads.unido.org/ot/26/96/26964670/Pakistan%20%E2%80%93%20HPMP%20Stage%20III,%20firs

t%20tranche%20%E2%80%93%20project%20document.pdf. 80 CITES Secretariat, ‘Status of Legislative Progress for Implementing CITES’, 14 Nov. 2023,

https://cites.org/sites/default/files/documents/legislation-status/legislation-status.pdf, and International Institute

for Sustainable Development, CITES Standing Committee 77 Summary Report, 6–10 Nov. 2023.

https://enb.iisd.org/cites-standing-committee-77-summary. 81 Ministry of Climate Change, ‘National Hazardous Waste Management Policy’, Government of Pakistan, Mar.

2022, www.iea.org/policies/25122-national-hazardous-waste-management-policy-2022, and Pakistan

Environmental Protection Agency, Draft Handling, Manufacture, Storage, Import of Hazardous Waste and

Hazardous Substances Rules, 2024. https://gpcgateway.com/regulatory-regions/pakistan/news-detail/pakistan-

environmental-protection-agency-publishes-draft-hazardous-substances-rules-MTE0NQ%3D%3D. 82 Business Recorder, ‘Pakistan submits 7NR on biodiversity to UN body’, 16 Mar. 2026.

https://www.brecorder.com/news/40411751/pakistan-submits-7nr-on-biodiversity-to-un-body. 83 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Umbrella Programme to Support National Biodiversity

Strategy and Action Plan Update and the 7th National Report’, Jun. 2025.

www.undp.org/pakistan/projects/umbrella-programme-support-national-biodiversity-strategy-and-action-plan-

update-and-7th-national-report.. 84 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), ‘Biosafety Clearing House, Pakistan – Fourth National Report on

the Implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’, 2020. https://bch.cbd.int/en/countries/PK. 85Updated National Implementation Plan (NIP) for Phasing Out and Elimination of POPs from Pakistan under

Stockholm Convention Article 7(a). https://chm.pops.int/Portals/0/download.aspx?d=UNEP-POPS-NIP-

Pakistan-COP4.English.pdf. 86 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and UN Convention

against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 87 Provincial Assembly of Sindh, ‘The Sindh Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2024’, Sindh Act No VIII of

2024, 28 Oct. 2024. The law introduced stricter penalties, barred bail for major offences, and established special

Anti-Narcotics Courts. The Sindh Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2024, Sindh Act No. VIII of 2024,

Provincial Assembly of Sindh, 28 Oct. 2024. 88 Provincial Assembly of the Punjab, ‘The Punjab Control of Narcotic Substances Bill, 2025’, Bill No 27 of 2025,

passed 28 Jul. 2025. 89 Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, ‘The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances

(Amendment) Act, 2025’, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Act No XII of 2025. 90 The Bill has been passed on 20 May 2026 and notified, and is named ‘The Balochistan Control of Narcotics

Substances Bill 2026’: https://pabalochistan.gov.pk/storage/9341/6a0eab44945ec_THE-BALOCHISTAN-

CONTROL-OF-NARCOTIC-SUBSTANCES-ACT,-2026.pdf. 91 Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan, ‘Rapid Alert: Presence of Unregistered Tramadol Formulations in the

Market’, 27 Feb. 2025. This includes rapid alerts in 2025 against unregistered or substandard formulations of

trastamol (a psychotropic analgesic) and contaminated ingredients:

www.dra.gov.pk/safety_info/product_recalls/recall_alerts/rapid-alert-presence-of-unregistered-tramadol-

formulations-in-the-market/; and updated rules and guidelines for pharmacies and hospitals sharpening regulatory

controls over storage, record‐keeping and quality assurance: Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan, Rules, last

updated 1 July 2025. 92 DevelopmentAid, ‘Pakistan launches UK-supported anti-narcotics platform’, 15 Sept. 2025.

www.developmentaid.org/news-stream/post/200005/pakistan-launches-uk-supported-anti-narcotics-platform/. 93 Pakistan, ‘Organized Crime Index’, https://ocindex.net/country/Pakistan, Global Initiative Against

Transnational Organized Crime and ENACT, 2025. 94 INCB, ‘Annual Report 2025’, United Nations, Feb. 2026.

https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/uploads/documents/2026-INCB/INCB_report_E.pdf, and INCB, ‘Annual Report

2024’, United Nations, 2025.

www.incb.org/incb/uploads/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2024/Annual_Report/E-INCB-2024-1-

ENG.pdf.

24

95 For example, in light of the increase in seizures and use of methamphetamine in South-West Asia, the INCB

encourages Governments to invest in more systematic forensic profiling of seized methamphetamine to determine

the chemicals from which the substance has been manufactured and thus enable informed regulatory and

enforcement action by the international community, INCB Annual Report 2024, United Nations, 2025.

www.incb.org/incb/uploads/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2024/Annual_Report/E-INCB-2024-1-

ENG.pdf. 96 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘Pakistan Country Review Report: Second Cycle –

Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption’. 16 Feb. 2026.

https://track.unodc.org/uploads/documents/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/2026_02_16_Pakistan_Cycle_II_

Country_Review_Report_EN.pdf. 97 National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Recoveries – NAB, Government of Pakistan,

https://nab.gov.pk/recoveries/. 98 bin Perwaiz, Salis. ‘Anti-corruption Dept to Introduce Legal Reforms, Train Investigators.’ The News

International, 5 Apr. 2024. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1175771-anti-corruption-dept-to-introduce-legal-

reforms-train-investigators. 99‘CM Punjab Vows to Exercise Zero Tolerance Policy Against Corruption.’ Radio Pakistan, 6 May 2024.

https://www.radio.gov.pk/06-05-2024/cm-punjab-vows-to-exercise-zero-tolerance-policy-against-corruption.

101 As per the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2025, released in February 2026,

Pakistan scored 28 out of 100 and ranked 136th out of 182 countries. This reflected only a marginal improvement

from the 2024 score of 27 (ranked 135th/180).

ET ET

EUROOPA KOMISJON

LIIDU VÄLISASJADE JA JULGEOLEKUPOLIITIKA

KÕRGE ESINDAJA

Brüssel, 16.7.2026 JOIN(2026) 16 final

ÜHISARUANNE EUROOPA PARLAMENDILE JA NÕUKOGULE

üldiste soodustuste süsteemi kohta ajavahemikul 2023–2025

{SWD(2026) 184 final} - {SWD(2026) 185 final} - {SWD(2026) 186 final} - {SWD(2026) 187 final} - {SWD(2026) 188 final} - {SWD(2026) 189 final} -

{SWD(2026) 190 final} - {SWD(2026) 191 final} - {SWD(2026) 192 final}

1

1. SISSEJUHATUS JA PÕHIPUNKTID

Üldine tariifisoodustuste kava (edaspidi „GSP“) on peamine vahend, mille kaudu Euroopa Liit

(EL) toetab väikese ja keskmisest väiksema sissetulekuga riike nende püüdlustes vähendada

vaesust ning edendada majanduskasvu ja kestlikku arengut. EL annab neile riikidele

ühepoolselt eelisjuurdepääsu ELi turule, kõrvaldades või vähendades imporditollimakse,

vähim arenenud riigid saavad aga kasu tollimaksu- ja kvoodivabast pääsust ELi turule.

Kestlikkuse edendamiseks peavad GSP raames soodustatud riigid täitma kohustusi seoses

konkreetsete rahvusvaheliste konventsioonide ja lepingutega, mis käsitlevad inimõigusi,

töötajate õigusi, keskkonna- ja kliimakaitset ning head valitsemistava seoses uimastikontrolli

ja korruptsioonivastase võitlusega.

Ühe osa GSP rakendamisest moodustavad korrapärane järelevalve ja aruandlus vastavalt GSP

määrusele1. Arvestades GSP olulisust ELi laiemas välispoliitikas ja välistegevuses, on sarnaselt

eelmise aruandega2 ka käesoleva, Euroopa Parlamendile ja nõukogule GSP rakendamise kohta

esitatava viienda aruande3 võtnud ühiselt vastu Euroopa Komisjon ja kõrge esindaja. See on

viimane praeguse GSP määruse alusel koostatav aruanne. Põhjuseks on üleminek uuele GSP

määrusele, millega eelkõige nähakse ette alates 1. jaanuarist 2027 kohaldatavad rangemad

kestlikkus- ja läbipaistvusnõuded.

Käesolev aruanne hõlmab GSP rakendamist ja mõju ajavahemikul 2023–2025 (edaspidi

„aruandlusperiood“) kolme korra raames: 1) GSP standardne kord, mida kohaldatakse väikese

ja keskmisest väiksema sissetulekuga riikide suhtes;4 2) kestlikku arengut ja head

valitsemistava stimuleeriv erikord (GSP+), mida kohaldatakse nende GSP raames soodustatud

riikide suhtes, kes võtavad kestlikkusega seotud lisakohustusi;5 3) erikord „Kõik peale relvade“

(EBA), mida kohaldatakse vähim arenenud riikide suhtes. Sel aastal täitub ELi EBA

instrumendi kehtestamisest 25 aastat.

Praegu saab GSP korra raames soodustusi 65 arenguriiki, kellest 44 on vähim arenenud riigid.

See vastab kogu maailmas enam kui kolmele miljardile inimesele, kellest üle ühe miljardi elab

vähim arenenud riikides. 2024. aastal hoidsid GSP raames soodustatud riigid tänu

soodustariifidele kokku hinnanguliselt 5 miljardit eurot, millest EBA raames soodustatud

riikide sääst moodustas üle 3 miljardi euro.

Soodustuste süsteemist suurimat kasu saavad riigid on Bangladesh (2024. aastal 19 miljardit

eurot EBA erikorra soodustuste alusel toimuvast impordist ELi), India (11,7 miljardit eurot

GSP standardse korra soodustuste kasutamise alusel toimuvast impordist ELi) ja Pakistan

(7,1 miljardit eurot GSP+ soodustuste kasutamise alusel toimuvast impordist ELi).

Ülekaalukalt on esikohal rõivasektor, mis moodustab 59 % GSP kava alusel toimuvast

kaubavahetusest.

Lisaks GSPst saadavale kaubanduslikule ja majanduslikule kasule on see kava ka mõjus ja

tõhus stiimul soodustatud riikides sotsiaalvaldkonna, keskkonna- ja kliimaküsimustega seotud

kestlikuks arenguks, mis põhineb rahvusvaheliselt tunnustatud normidel ja standarditel.

Keskne roll on ELi järelevalvel ja GSP alusel toimuval koostööl, kuna eriti GSP+ soodustab

struktureeritud koostööd ELi institutsioonide, soodustatud riikide valitsuste ja

kodanikuühiskonna vahel. Sellega toetatakse inimõiguste, töötajate õiguste ning kliima- ja

keskkonnakaitsega seotud rahvusvaheliste kohustuste täitmist ning aidatakse tõhustada

korruptsioonivastaseid ja õigusriigi põhimõtte järgimist edendavaid reforme. Kava tagab

jätkuvalt tasakaalu soodustatud riikide kaubanduse kasvupotentsiaali soodustamise, ühiste

väärtuste edendamise ja kestlikkuseesmärkide täitmise vahel. Edendades tollimaksudelt

saavutatud kokkuhoiu kaudu kaubavahetust GSP raames soodustatud riikidega, toetatakse ka

2

ELi majandust ja ettevõtjaid, samal ajal kaitseb kava ELi majanduslikke huve ja tundlike

sektorite konkurentsivõimet.

Käesolevale aruandele lisatakse komisjoni talituste üheksa riigipõhist töödokumenti: üks iga

praeguse kaheksa GSP+ raames soodustatud riigi (Boliivia, Cabo Verde, Kõrgõzstan,

Mongoolia, Pakistan, Filipiinid, Sri Lanka ja Usbekistan) kohta ja üks EBA erikorra raames

soodustatud riikide kohta, kellega tehakse tõhustatud koostööd (Bangladesh, Kambodža ja

Myanmar). Aruanne kajastab komisjoni talituste ja Euroopa välisteenistuse koostööd

soodustatud riikide ametiasutuste, kodanikuühiskonna, sotsiaalpartnerite ja äriringkondadega,

sealhulgas järelevalvemissioonid GSP+ raames soodustatud riikidesse ning tõhustatud koostöö

mõne EBA erikorra raames soodustatud riigiga. Lisaks tuginetakse aruandes rahvusvaheliste

järelevalveasutuste järeldustele valdkondades, mis on seotud soodustatud riikide suhtes

kohaldatavate GSP tingimustega, ja vajaduse korral võetakse neid ka arvesse.

2. ÕIGUSRAAMISTIKU MUUDATUSED ARUANDLUSPERIOODIL

a) Kava rakendamine

Komisjon on võtnud aruandlusperioodil vastu mitu üldist tariifisoodustuste kava käsitleva

määruse rakendamisega seotud õigusakti:

• riigid, mis on GSP alt välja arvatud: Indoneesia on kolmel järjestikusel aastal jõudnud

Maailmapanga liigituse kohaselt üle keskmise sissetulekuga riikide hulka ja lahkub kavast

1. jaanuaril 20276. Keenia suhtes hakatakse alates 1. jaanuarist 2027 GSP asemel täielikult

kohaldama ELi ja Keenia vahelist majanduspartnerluslepingut, mis jõustus 1. juulil 20247. • Üleminek EBA erikorralt GSP standardsele korrale: 13. detsembril 2023 arvati ÜRO

otsusega Bhutan vähim arenenud riikide seast välja. Seega lõpetatakse pärast kolmeaastast

üleminekuperioodi Bhutani suhtes EBA erikorra kohaldamine ja Bhutan läheb alates

1. jaanuarist 2028 üle GSP standardsele korrale8. Ka São Tomé ja Príncipe arvati

13. detsembril 2024 vähim arenenud riikide seast välja ja läheb alates 1. jaanuarist 2029

üle GSP standardsele korrale9.

• Haavatavuse künnisväärtused: kava raames soodustatud riikide loetelu täiendavaks

muutmiseks kohandati GSP+ seisukohalt asjakohast haavatavuse künnisväärtust10.

• Soodustuste järkjärguline kaotamine teatavate toodete puhul: pärast asjakohaste

impordikünniste saavutamist peatati standardse GSP tariifsed soodustused mitme Indiast,

Indoneesiast ja Keeniast imporditud toote puhul aastateks 2023–202511, 12 ja pärast seda

[ka 2026. aastaks]13.

• Kaitsemeetmed: Kambodžast ja Myanmarist pärit riisi ekspordi suhtes kehtestati

2024. aastal pärast uurimise taasalustamist uuesti kaitsemeetmed14. 2025. aastal kehtestati

konkreetsed põllumajanduslikud kaitsemeetmed Pakistanist pärit etanooli impordi suhtes15.

b) GSP pärast 2026. aastat

GSP raames soodustatud riikide arv peaks ka edaspidi vähenema. Mis puudutab eelseisvaid

väljaarvamisi, siis on Maailmapank kaks GSP+ raames soodustatud riiki liigitanud üle

keskmise sissetulekuga riikide hulka (Cabo Verde 2025. aastal ning Mongoolia 2024. ja

2025. aastal). Kui nad vastavad üle keskmise sissetulekuga riikide tingimustele kolm aastat

järjest, ei kohaldata nende suhtes enam GSP soodustusi. Lisaks arvatakse kavakohaselt vähim

arenenud riikide seast välja mitu praegust EBA erikorra raames soodustatud riiki. Pärast vähim

arenenud riikide seast väljaarvamisele järgnevat kolmeaastast üleminekuperioodi lahkuvad

3

need riigid (vt täpsemalt punkt 4c) EBA erikorrast ja lähevad üle GSP standardsele korrale, kui

nad ei taotle edukalt liitumist GSP+ erikorraga.

Komisjon esitas 22. septembril 2021 ettepaneku kehtestada uus üldine tariifisoodustuste kava

ajavahemikuks 2024–203316. Kuna ELi uus üldine tariifisoodustuste kava ei olnud 2023. aastal

veel vastu võetud, pikendasid kaasseadusandjad praeguse GSP määruse kohaldamise kestust

31. detsembrini 202717. Uus GSP määrus ajavahemikuks 2027–2036 võeti vastu 17. juunil

2026 ning seda hakatakse kohaldama alates 1. jaanuarist 202718.

Uue määruse suhtes kokkuleppele jõudmine on tähtis pöördepunkt, mis tagab, et EL toetab ka

edaspidi arenguriike nende püüdlustes saavutada majanduskasv ja kestlik areng, tuginedes

õiglasele ja prognoositavale raamistikule. Uue määrusega kaitstakse ELi soosivat

lähenemisviisi arenguriikidest pärit impordi suhtes kohaldatavatele tariifsetele soodustustele.

Selles säilitatakse varasemate õigusaktide rõhuasetus, et tagada järjepidevus ja prognoositavus

nii GSP raames soodustatud riikide ja nende eksportijate kui ka ELi importijate jaoks.

Uue määrusega lisatakse GSPga seotud dokumentide hulka, mida GSP raames soodustatud

riigid peavad järgima, viis uut rahvusvahelist konventsiooni19 (GSP tingimused, vt punkt 3c)

ning Kyoto protokolli asendav Pariisi kliimakokkulepe20. Lisaks luuakse uue määrusega

võimalus peatada soodustuste kohaldamine keskkonna- ja kliimakaitset ning head

valitsemistava käsitlevates konventsioonides sätestatud põhimõtete raske ja süstemaatilise

rikkumise korral ning juhul, kui esineb raskeid ja süstemaatilisi puudusi seoses rahvusvahelise

kohustusega võtta ebaseadusliku rände olukorras tagasi oma riigi kodanikud. Uue kavaga

parandatakse järelevalvet, läbipaistvust ja kodanikuühiskonna kaasamist ning kehtestatakse

peatamise kiirmenetlus, mida kohaldatakse eriti raskete rikkumiste korral. Lisaks muudetakse

tõhusamaks kaitsemehhanismid, millega lahendatakse olukordi, kus soodustatud riigi impordi

kasv võib kahjustada tootjaid ELis.

Uue määruse alusel GSP+ staatuse säilitamiseks peavad praegused GSP+ raames soodustatud

riigid taotlema uuesti erikorraga liitumist. Kõik GSP+ erikorraga liituda soovivad riigid peavad

esitama tegevuskava erikorra tõhusaks rakendamiseks uute normide alusel. Praegustele GSP+

raames soodustatud riikidele kehtestatakse kahe aasta pikkune üleminekuperiood, mis kestab

2028. aasta lõpuni, ning komisjon ja Euroopa välisteenistus on valmis toetama soodustatud

riike, kui nad taotlevad uuesti erikorraga liitumist.

3. GSP MÕJU

a) Mõju kaubandusele aastatel 2022–202421

Üldine tariifisoodustuste kava hõlmab kolme soodustatud riikide arengu- ja kohustuste

tasemele vastavat korda:

• GSP standardne kord, mida kohaldatakse tingimustele vastavate väikese ja keskmisest

väiksema sissetulekuga riikide suhtes, kes ei ole sõlminud ELiga muud

vabakaubanduslepingut. Selle korra alusel vähendatakse ELi suunduva impordi puhul

tollimaksu 66 %-l tariifiridadest, 26 % tariifiridadest on aga tollimaksuvabad. Standardse

GSP korra raames soodustatud riike on praegu 1122.

• GSP+ on erikord, mis annab standardse GSP raames soodustatud riikidele tollimaksuvaba

juurdepääsu 66 %-le tariifiridadest tingimusel, et riigis rakendatakse tõhusalt peamisi

rahvusvahelisi konventsioone ja lepinguid, mis käsitlevad inimõigusi, töötajate õigusi,

4

keskkonna- ja kliimakaitset ning head valitsemistava. Selle korra raames soodustatud riike

on praegu kaheksa23.

• EBA erikord on ette nähtud vähim arenenud riikide jaoks ja selle alusel saab

tollimaksuvabalt importida ELi kõiki kaupu, välja arvatud relvad ja laskemoon. EL kohaldab

seda korda tähtajatult. EBA erikorra raames saavad soodustusi 46 riiki, kellest kaks (Bhutan

ning São Tomé ja Príncipe) arvati küll vähim arenenud riikide seast välja, kuid jäävad

üleminekuperioodi vältel selle erikorra raames soodustatud riikideks.

5

Joonis 1. GSP raames soodustatud riigid

Märkus: hallid alad tähistavad riike, mida ELi GSP ei hõlma.

2024. aastal imporditi ELi üldisi tariifseid soodustusi kasutades peaaegu 60 miljardi euro

väärtuses kaupu, millest said kasu nii partnerriigid kui ka ELi importijad ja tarbijad. Sellest

veidi üle 50 % ehk 30 miljardi euro väärtuses imporditi EBA erikorra alusel, 11,5 miljardi euro

väärtuses imporditi GSP+ raames soodustatud riikidest ja ligikaudu 17 miljardi euro väärtuses

standardse GSP raames soodustatud riikidest.

ELi import GSP korra alusel

Joonis 2. Kolme GSP korra alusel toimuva ELi impordi suundumus

GSP alusel toimuv import suurenes 52 miljardilt eurolt 2023. aastal 59 miljardi euroni

2024. aastal, jäi aga alla 2022. aasta tipptasemele, mil üldise tariifisoodustuste kava alusel

toimuv import ulatus ligikaudu 77 miljardi euroni, ja oli vähenenud ka võrreldes COVID-19

pandeemia eelse ajaga (62 miljardit eurot 2019. aastal). COVID-19 kriisile järgnenud

taastumine ja Venemaa agressioonisõda Ukraina vastu, mis vallandas energiakriisi, tõstsid

maailmaturu hindu ja suurendasid ELi impordi väärtuse 2022. aastal rekordiliselt kõrgeks. Kui

COVID-19 järgne taastumine stabiliseerus ja energiahinnad hakkasid alates 2023. aastast

langema, normaliseerusid ka kaubandusnäitajad24. Lisaks ei ole pärast ELiga

62,3

52,7 56,2

77,4

52,4

59,5

25,2 21,3

22,3

36,2

27,2 30,6

28,7

23,7 24,2 27,5

15,3 17,4

8,5 7,8 9,6

13,7

9,9 11,5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

G S

P i

m p

o rt

( m

il ja

rd id

e u ro

d )

Kõik GSPd GSP EBA Standardne GSP GSP+

6

vabakaubanduslepingu sõlmimist Vietnam alates 1. jaanuarist 2023 enam standardse GSP

raames soodustatud riik. Ka see vähendas standardse GSP soodustuste alusel toimunud

kaubanduse mahtu mitme miljardi euro võrra.

Peamised tootejaotised, milles suhtes kohaldatakse GSP soodustusi

Joonis 3. GSP (standardse GSP, GSP+ ja EBA) alusel imporditud toodete peamised jaotised

2024. aastal (miljardites eurodes ja koguimpordi osakaaluna)

2024. aastal oli rõivasektor (S-11b)25 ülekaalukalt üldistest tariifsetest soodustustest kõige

enam kasu saav sektor, kus kava alusel ELi toimuva impordi maht oli 35,1 miljardit eurot ja

moodustas 59 % kogu kaubavahetusest GSP alusel. Sellele järgnesid jalanõud (S-12a)

(3,8 miljardit eurot) ning kalad, vähid ja limused (S-01b) (2 miljardit eurot). Aruandlusperioodi

igal aastal oli suurim sektor rõivad (S-11b). Masinate ja seadmete (S-16) tähtsus langes

(tähtsuselt 2. kohalt 2022. aastal 8. kohale 2024. aastal), kuid näiteks sõidukid, lennukid ja

laevad (S-17b) ning valmistoidukaubad ja joogid (S-04b) jõudsid 2022. aastal esikümnesse.

GSP raames tariifidest tulenev kokkuhoid

GSP kolme korra raames soodustatud riigid säästsid 2024. aastal

tollimaksude vähendamise või neist vabastamise tulemusena

5 miljardit eurot, EBA erikorra raames soodustatud riikide sääst

oli aga kokku 3 miljardit eurot26. Tollimaksult säästsid nii GSP

raames soodustatud riikide eksportijad kui ka ELi importijad,

seega said kasu ka ELi ettevõtjad ja tarbijad.

1,1 (1,8%)

1,3 (2,3%)

1,4 (2,3%)

1,4 (2,3%)

1,5 (2,4%)

1,8 (3,1%)

1,9 (3,2%)

2 (3,4%)

3,8 (6,5%)

35,1 (59,0%)

Tubakas (S-04c)

Mitteväärismetallid ja nendest valmistatud tooted (S-15b)

Masinad ja seadmed (S-16)

Valmistoidukaubad ja joogid (S-04b)

Sõidukid, lennukid ja laevad (S-17b)

Kautšuk (S-07b)

Keemiatooted (S-06b)

Kalad, vähid ja limused (S-01b)

Jalatsid (S-12a)

Rõivad (S-11b)

5 miljardit eurot tollimaksusoodustustena

7

Peamised GSPd kasutavad riigid

Joonis 4. Kümme peamist riiki GSP soodustuste kasutamise väärtuse alusel 2024. aastal

Soodustuste kasutamise määr on konkreetsest soodustusi kasutanud riigist pärit impordi

osakaal võrreldes impordiga, mille suhtes oleks teoreetiliselt võimalik kohaldada üldisi

tariifseid soodustusi. Keskmiselt moodustas 2024. aastal soodustuste kasutamise määr 88,8 %

GSPga seotud koguimpordist ELi. EBA erikorra raames ulatub see määr vähim arenenud

riikide puhul 94,5 %ni. Mõne riigi kasutusmäär ulatus teatavates jaotistes 100 %ni (näiteks

Etioopial lõikelillede puhul (jaotis S02-a)). Põhjused, miks GSP raames võimalikke tariifseid

soodustusi ei kasutata täielikult ära, on erinevad, kuid nende hulka kuuluvad näiteks ebapiisav

teadlikkus süsteemist, haldusega seotud puudused ja mitme alternatiivse kaubanduslepingu

samaaegne olemasolu.

2024. aastal oli GSP soodustuste alusel ELi suunatud ekspordi väärtus suurim Bangladeshil

(19 miljardi eurot), kelle soodustuste kasutamise määr oli kõrge (96 %). Järgnes India, kes

standardse GSP korra alusel importis ELi kaupu 11,7 miljardi euro väärtuses, kuid kelle

kasutusmäär oli madalam (87 %). GSP+ raames soodustatud riikidest tõuseb esile Pakistan,

kelle ELi suunatud GSP+ impordi väärtus oli 7,1 miljardit eurot ja soodustuste kasutamise

määr 95,1 %, samas kui Usbekistan on pärast GSP+ erikorraga liitumist 2021. aastal jõudnud

kümne peamise GSP raames soodustatud riigi hulka.

Riigid, kus GSP kasutamine on suurenenud kõige rohkem

Ajavahemikus 2022–2024 suurenes GSP soodustuste kasutamine kõige rohkem Beninis

(128 %), jõudes 5,1 miljonilt eurolt 2022. aastal 11,7 miljoni euroni 2024. aastal. Teisel kohal

oli Malawi, kus sama aja jooksul suurenes GSP soodustuste kasutamine 19 %, mis moodustas

13 % ELi suunatud koguekspordi kasvust. São Tomé ja Príncipe ning Eritrea jõudsid GSP

kasutamise suurima kasvuga riikide hulka, kes kõik olid EBA erikorra raames soodustatud

riigid. Kasvu vedavad sektorid erinesid riigiti, näiteks Beninis täheldati suurimat kasvu

tekstiilitööstuses (S-11a ja S11b).

19,0

11,7

7,1 5,6

4,2 3,0 2,3 1,5 1,3 0,4

96,0%

86,7%

95,1%

77,7%

92,8% 96,5%

80,4%

68,9%

96,4% 92,2%

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

0

5

10

15

20

K as

u tu

sm ää

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)

K as

u ta

tu d

G S

P (

m il

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u ro

d )

EBA GSP+ Standardne Kasutusmäär

8

Joonis 5. Neli suurima GSP kasutamise kasvuga riiki (2022–2024)

b) Rahvusvaheliste konventsioonide ja lepingute järgimine

Üldiselt teevad GSP raames soodustatud riigid jätkuvalt edusamme kestliku arengu ning

rahvusvaheliste põhimõtete ja standardite järgimise suunas, mis on osa GSPga liitumise

tingimustest.

Kuigi rahvusvaheliste standardite järgimiseks ei piisa üksnes rahvusvaheliste konventsioonide

ratifitseerimisest, on see tähtis esimene etapp. Enamik GSP raames soodustatud riikidest on

ratifitseerinud palju olulisi rahvusvahelisi konventsioone. EBA erikorra raames soodustatud

riikidest (kes ei pea ametlikult ratifitseerima GSPga seotud olulisi konventsioone) on näiteks

Bangladesh (EBA erikorra raames soodustatud riik, kes saab kavast kõige suuremat kasu)

ratifitseerinud kõik 27 GSP määruses loetletud konventsiooni, samuti täiendavad

konventsioonid, mis lisatakse uue GSP määrusega.

Mõnel juhul on soodustatud riigid ratifitseerinud ka selliseid konventsioone ja lepinguid, mida

praeguses GSP määruses ei ole nimetatud. Näiteks on kõik kaheksa GSP+ raames soodustatud

riiki ratifitseerinud puuetega inimeste õiguste konventsiooni ja Pariisi kokkuleppe, mida

praegu kohaldatav GSP määrus ei hõlma, kuid mis alates 2027. aastast on osa kavast.

Paljudes GSP raames soodustatud riikides on edenenud ka hiljuti vastu võetud Rahvusvahelise

Tööorganisatsiooni (ILO) põhiliste tööohutust ja töötervishoidu käsitlevate konventsioonide

ning muude ILO konventsioonide (näiteks töötingimuste järelevalve konventsioon ja

kolmepoolse konsulteerimise konventsioon) ratifitseerimine, mida praegu kohaldatavas GSP

määruses ei ole nimetatud.

Nagu selgitatakse lähemalt käesoleva aruande punktis 4b ja aruandele lisatud komisjoni

talituste töödokumentides, on eelkõige GSP+ endiselt tugev ja struktureeritud raamistik, mis

ühendab kaubanduse kestliku arenguga ning loob võimalusi poliitiliseks dialoogiks ja

reformideks. GSP+ pakub soodustatud riikidele ka tugevaid stiimuleid ja võimaldeid, mis

aitavad järgida rahvusvaheliselt tunnustatud standardeid, mille täitmise kohustuse nad on

otsustanud võtta.

4. GSP KOLM SOODUSKORDA

a) Standardne GSP

Aruandlusperioodi ajal moodustas standardse GSP raames soodustatud riikide import jätkuvalt

suure osa GSP impordist ja 2024. aastal oli sellise impordi osakaal 29,3 %. Peamised tooted,

EBA kasutamise

kasv 128 %

Benin

EBA kasutamise

kasv 19 %

Malawi

EBA kasutamise

kasv 10 %

São Tomé ja

Príncipe

EBA kasutamise

kasv 8 %

Eritrea

9

mille suhtes kohaldati soodustusi standardse GSP korra alusel, olid 2024. aastal rõivad (S-11b),

jalatsid (S-12a) ja keemiatooted (S06b). Üheteistkümnest praegusest standardse GSP raames

soodustatud riigist (kellest Vanuatu liitus 2025. aastal) olid suurimad kasusaajad India ja

Indoneesia: India importis 2024. aastal üldisi tariifseid soodustusi kasutades ELi kaupu

11,7 miljardi euro väärtuses, Indoneesia 5,56 miljardi euro väärtuses. Tulevikus see aga

muutub, sest lisaks Indoneesiale ja Keeniale (vt punkt 2) arvatakse eeldatavasti ka India

standardsest GSP korrast välja ning seega lahkub riik kavast pärast seda, kui hakatakse

kohaldama ELiga sõlmitud kahepoolset kaubanduslepingut (läbirääkimised lõppesid

2026. aasta veebruaris) ja lõpeb sellele järgnev üleminekuperiood.

Joonis 6. Standardse GSP tingimustele vastava impordi, kasutatud soodustustega impordi ja

soodustuste kasutamise suundumused

Kuigi standardse GSP alusel soodustuste kasutamise määr kõigub kõrgel tasemel, on COVIDi-

eelse tasemega võrreldes vähenenud nii soodustuskõlblik import kui ka import, mille puhul

tegelikult soodustusi taotletakse: 2019. aastal oli soodustuskõlbliku impordi väärtus

37 miljardit eurot ja kasutatud soodustustega impordi väärtus 29 miljardit eurot, 2024. aastal

aga vastavalt 21 miljardit eurot ja 17 miljardit eurot. See oli peamiselt tingitud riikide

lahkumisest standardsest GSP korrast, eelkõige Vietnami lahkumisest alates 1. jaanuarist 2023

pärast üleminekuperioodi, mis järgnes selle endise suurima soodustatud riigi ja ELi vahelise

vabakaubanduslepingu sõlmimisele 2020. aastal. Lisaks liitus Usbekistan 2021. aasta aprillis

GSP+ korraga.

b) GSP+

GSP+ korra alusel toimuva impordi suundumus on üsna positiivne hoolimata COVID-19

kriisile järgneva taastumise ja energiahindade mõjust. GSP+ alusel soodustuskõlblik import

kasvas 2024. aastal COVID-19 eelselt tasemelt (10 miljardit eurot 2019. aastal) 13 miljardi

euroni ja sellest tulenevalt suurenes import, mille puhul taotleti tegelikult soodustusi,

2024. aastal 11 miljardi euroni.

37,0

32,5

38,3

32,8

20,9 21,4

28,7

23,7 24,2 27,5

15,3 17,4

77,5% 72,8%

63,2%

83,7%

73,4% 81,2%

0

10

20

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40

50

60

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80

90

100

0

5

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15

20

25

30

35

40

45

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

K as

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sm ää

r (%

)

Im p

o rd

i v ää

rt u s

(m il

ja rd

id e

u ro

d )

Standardse GSP alusel kõlblik Standardse GSP alusel kasutatud

Standardse GSP kasutamise %

10

Joonis 7. GSP+ impordi ja soodustuse kasutamise suundumus

GSP+ alusel toimuva ELi impordi puhul suurenes soodustuste kasutamise määr 86,9 %-lt

2022. aastal 87,3 %-le 2024. aastal. Sellele väikesele kasvule järgnes langus: 2023. aastal oli

kasutusmäär 79,3 %27.

Peamine GSP+ raames soodustatud riik oli Pakistan, kes kasutas ELi importimise suhtes

kohaldatud soodustusi 7,1 miljardi euro väärtuses. Pakistanile järgnesid Filipiinid ELi

suunatud impordiga umbes 2,3 miljardit eurot ja kolmas suurim kasusaaja GSP+ raames oli Sri

Lanka, kelle impordi väärtus oli 1,5 miljardit eurot.

Mis puudutab aruandeperioodil GSP määruses loetletud rahvusvaheliste konventsioonide

järgimist, siis olid kõik GSP+ raames soodustatud riigid täielikult ratifitseerinud 27 GSPga

seotud rahvusvahelist konventsiooni ja lepingut ega olnud avaldanud ühtki uut reservatsiooni.

Käesolevale aruandele lisatakse kaheksa riigipõhist komisjoni talituste töödokumenti, milles

käsitletakse üksikasjalikult GSP+ raames soodustatud riikide kohustusi, mis on seotud

inimõiguste, töötajate õiguste, keskkonna- ja kliimakaitse ning hea valitsemistavaga, ning ELi

koostööd nende partnerriikidega nimetatud valdkondades. Nagu on täpsemalt kirjeldatud neis

töödokumentides, täheldati aruandlusperioodil palju positiivseid suundumusi, kuid endiselt on

ka lahendamata probleeme.

Paljud praegused GSP+ raames soodustatud riigid on käesolevas aruandes käsitletud

aruandlusperioodi jooksul tugevdanud inimõigustega seotud õigusakte ja institutsioonilist

korda. Näiteks on Kõrgõzstan, Usbekistan, Sri Lanka ja Pakistan karmistanud koduvägivalla

vastu võitlemisega seotud õigusnorme ning Boliivia, Mongoolia, Usbekistan ja Filipiinid on

rakendanud reforme lastekaitse valdkonnas. Pakistan piiras surmanuhtluse kohaldamist ja

võttis vastu piinamisvastase õigusakti rakenduseeskirjad ning lapsabielu piiravad seadused

Belutšistanis ja Islamabadis. Sri Lanka tugevdas riigisiseseid inimõiguste kaitse asutusi ning

Filipiinidel loodi seoses inimõigustega uued järelevalvemehhanismid ja

ministeeriumidevahelised koostööasutused.

Enamikus GSP+ raames soodustatud riikides tehti edusamme ka seoses töötajate õigustega.

Näiteks sisaldas Mongoolia riiklik tööjõu-uuring esmakordselt moodulit sunniviisilise töö

kohta erasektoris ja lisatud oli ka ajateenistuses tehtavat tööd käsitlev osa. Usbekistanis jätkati

jõupingutusi sunniviisilise töö kaotamiseks ning Filipiinid töötasid välja ühinemisvabaduse

edendamise tegevuskava ja lapstööjõu kasutamise vähendamise strateegia. Pakistan

ratifitseeris ILO sunniviisilise töö konventsiooni protokolli ja käivitas inimväärse töö

10,1 9,1 11,3

15,7

12,5 13,2

8,5 7,8 9,6

13,7

9,9 11,5

84,1% 85,2% 84,7% 86,9% 79,3%

87,3%

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

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5

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15

20

25

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35

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45

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ut us

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Im p

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i vä

är tu

s (m

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rd id

e ur

o d

)

GSP+ alusel kõlblik GSP+ alusel kasutatud GSP+ kasutamise %

11

edendamiseks algatuse, mille eesmärk on suurendada töötajate üleminekut mitteametlikust

ametlikku sektorisse. Mitmes soodustatud riigis võeti meetmeid, et vähendada lapstööjõu

kasutamist ja tugevdada inimkaubanduse vastu võitlemist.

Paljud GSP+ raames soodustatud riigid on jätkuvalt pühendunud keskkonnakaitsele ja

esitavad asjakohaste mitmepoolsete keskkonnalepingute alusel kliimaalaseid

läbipaistvusaruandeid, tugevdavad bioloogilist mitmekesisust ja kaitsealasid käsitlevaid

õigusakte ning tegevuskavasid kooskõlas bioloogilise mitmekesisuse konventsiooniga,

edendavad Montreali protokolli rakendamist28 ning koostavad kliimamuutustega kohanemise

ja nende leevendamise kavasid, mis on seotud riiklikult kindlaksmääratud panusega, et tagada

Pariisi kliimakokkuleppe rakendamist.

Paljudes riikides on paranenud uimastikontrolli ja korruptsioonivastase võitlusega seotud

valitsemistava. Boliivias, Kõrgõzstanis, Pakistanis ja Sri Lankas on ajakohastatud

korruptsiooni vastu võitlemise põhimõtteid.

GSP+ alusel võetud kohustuste täitmisega on aga endiselt ka probleeme.

Inimõigustega seotud valdkondadevaheliste probleemide hulka, mis on ühised paljudele GSP+

raames soodustatud riikidele, kuuluvad kohtusüsteemi ebapiisav sõltumatus, vähene

juurdepääs õiguskaitsevahenditele, ebapiisav vastutusele võtmine rikkumiste eest,

kodanikuühiskonna piiratud tegutsemisruum, väljendus- ja meediavabaduse piiramine; teated

piinamise kohta, vastutuse puudumine ja riiklike raamistike ebapiisav kooskõla

piinamisvastase konventsiooniga;29 püsiv sooline vägivald, mis jätkub karistamatult;

vähemuste ja LGBTIQ+ inimeste struktuurne diskrimineerimine. Mõnes GSP+ raames

soodustatud riigis valitses terav vastuolu sotsiaal-majanduslike õiguste kaitse ja nõrkade

vaesusevastaste strateegiate, piiratud haridusvõimaluste, sotsiaalkaitsesüsteemide suurte

puuduste või naistele majandusliku mõjuvõimu andmise vähese toetamise vahel. Endiselt

esineb märkimisväärseid andmelünki, eelkõige seoses soolise vägivalla, piinamiste uurimise,

lapstööjõu kasutamise ja inimkaubanduse eest vastutusele võtmisega.

Samasugune on olukord töötajate õigustega – kuigi õigusraamistikke on täiustatud,

rakendatakse õigusakte ja tagatakse nende täitmist ebaühtlaselt ning tööinspektsioonide

võimekus on sageli puudulik. Üldiselt esineb ikka veel haavatavate rühmade diskrimineerimist.

Ühinemisvabadus on endiselt piiratud mitmes jurisdiktsioonis ja ka kollektiivläbirääkimised

on paljudel juhtudel raskendatud. Eelkõige põllumajanduses ja erasektoris jätkub lapstööjõu

kasutamine ja esineb sunniviisilist töötamist. Ka naissoost töötajate õigusi on vaja veel

edendada. Viivitamata tuleb kõrvaldada andmelüngad seoses kõigi GSP+ suhtes asjakohaste

ILO konventsioonidega.

Paljudes GSP+ raames soodustatud riikides esineb keskkonnakaitsega seotud probleeme:

viivitused keskkonnaandmete esitamisel (näiteks Stockholmi konventsiooni,30 CITESi,31

Cartagena protokolli32 raamistike alusel), suutlikkuse ja ressursside piiratus, mis mõjutab

keskkonda, ning haavatavus kliimamuutuste suhtes, mis koormab institutsionaalseid süsteeme.

Kuigi võetud kohustused on ambitsioonikad, on sageli raskusi nende elluviimisega.

Juhtimise tõhustamiseks võiks suurendada jõupingutusi inimkaubanduse vastu võitlemisel,

täiustada nõudluspoolseid meetmeid kooskõlas rahvusvaheliste inimõigustealaste normidega

ja edendada korruptsioonivastast võitlust.

12

Pealegi süvendasid majanduskriisid (Boliivias, Sri Lankas) ja loodusõnnetused (Pakistanis,

Filipiinidel, Sri Lankas) struktuurseid probleeme ning vähendasid rakendussuutlikkust

aruandlusperioodil.

Mõnda neist probleemidest võib aidata lahendada ELi partnerlusprojektide raames tehtav

koostöö, riigipõhiseid meetmeid on aga kirjeldatud GSP+ käsitlevates komisjoni talituste

töödokumentides, mis on lisatud käesolevale aruandele.

c) Erikord „Kõik peale relvade“

i. Majandusandmed

EBA erikorra raames soodustatud riikide jaoks on kõige märkimisväärsemad ELi GSP

algatusega kaasnevad soodustused. Import soodustatud riikidest selle sooduskorra raames

suurenes 25,2 miljardilt eurolt 2019. aastal 30,6 miljardi euroni 2024. aastal.

Joonis 8. EBA erikorra raames toimunud impordi ja soodustuste kasutamise suundumus

EBA erikorra alusel soodustuste kasutamise määr kõikus ajavahemikus 2022–2024 vaid veidi.

2022. aastal oli kasutusmäär 94,6 %, 2023. aastal alanes see 88,4 %-le ja 2024. aastal tõusis

taas 94,5 %-le. Import saavutas tipptaseme 2022. aastal tänu COVID-19 kriisist taastumisele

ja energiahindade alanemisele, millele on osutatud eespool. Suundumuse analüüs näitas, et

võrreldes COVID-19 kriisile eelnenud 2019. aastaga (soodustuskõlblik import 27 miljardit

eurot, millest 25 miljardi euro puhul kasutati EBA soodustusi) oli import 2024. aastal suurem

(soodustuskõlblik import 32 miljardit eurot, millest 31 miljardi euro puhul kasutati EBA

soodustusi).

Joonis 9. ELi import GSP korra alusel ja riikidest, kellega tõhustati koostööd EBA raames

ELi import GSP alusel (miljonites eurodes), v.a soodustuseta impordi

osakaal EBA erikorra alusel soodustatud

riikidest aastatel 2022–2024

201933 2022 2023 2024

GSP (kõik) 62 326 77 393 52 419 59 450

Standardne GSP 28 665 27 489 15 331 17 402

GSP+ 8 496 13 662 9 896 11 476

EBA (kõik) 25 164 36 243 27 192 30 573

26,9

22,7 24,2

38,3

30,8 32,4

25,2

21,3 22,3

36,2

27,2 30,6

93,5% 94,1% 92,1% 94,6% 88,4%

94,5%

0

10

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50

60

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2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

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Im po

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di d

eu ro

d)

EBA alusel kõlblik EBA alusel kasutatud EBA kasutamise %

13

EBA (ainult Aafrika) 2 782 4 141 3 151 3 888 11,9 %

Tõhustatud koostöö EBA raames

Bangladesh 15 366 23 134 17 064 19 019 63,0 %

Kambodža34 4 174 4 324 3 534 4 207 12,8 %

Myanmar 2 471 4 112 2 993 2 962 10,7 %

Aruandlusperioodil ja võrreldes COVIDi-eelse tasemega on jätkuvalt suurenenud kogu EBA,

eriti aga Aafrikas asuvate EBA erikorra raames soodustatud riikide suhteline tähtsus. Samal

ajal jätkus tõhustatud koostöö kolme riigiga, kes olid suurimad EBA erikorra alusel soodustuste

saajad. Neid suundumusi käsitletakse üksikasjalikumalt allpool.

ii. Positsiooni parandavad soodustatud riigid

GSP eesmärk on soodustada majandusarengut. Seega on ainult hea, kui soodustatud riik ei

kuulu enam vähim arenenud riikide hulka, st kui ta arvatakse vähim arenenud riikide hulgast

välja ja lahkub pärast üleminekuperioodi EBA erikorrast. Sellised riigid võivad aga taotleda

ühinemist GSP+ süsteemiga, et säilitada suurem osa soodustustest.

Lähitulevikus peaks paranema mitme riigi positsioon. Bangladesh, Laose DRV ja Nepal

arvatakse kavakohaselt vähim arenenud riikide hulgast välja 2026. aastal,35 Saalomoni saared

2027. aastal ning Kambodža ja Senegal 2029. aastal.

2024. aastal otsustas ÜRO arengupoliitika komitee iga kolme aasta tagant toimuva läbivaatuse

käigus, et Rwanda Vabariik, Uganda ja Tansaania ületasid esimest korda väljaarvamise

künnise. Kõik kolm riiki vastasid kolmest kriteeriumist kahele. Kavakohaselt käsitletakse neid

riike uuesti 2027. aastal ja kui nad ka teist korda vastavad kriteeriumidele, võidakse soovitada

nende väljaarvamist.

Kiribati ja Tuvalu soovitati vähim arenenud riikide seast välja arvata vastavalt 2018. ja

2012. aastal, kuid ECOSOC36 lükkas nende väljaarvamise üle otsustamise edasi. Tuletades

meelde oma 2021. aasta otsust kaaluda riigi väljaarvamise kohta otsuse tegemist 2024. aastal,

otsustas ECOSOC ka 2024. aastal kaaluda väljaarvamist hiljem.

2024. aastal otsustas ÜRO arengupoliitika komitee iga kolme aasta tagant toimuva läbivaatuse

käigus, et Myanmari ja Timor-Leste kohta väljaarvamise otsuse tegemine lükatakse edasi

2027. aastani.

Kui praegused EBA erikorra raames soodustatud riigid liituvad pärast väljaarvamist GSP+

süsteemiga, jääks nende kokkuhoid, mis 2024. aastal oli ligikaudu 3,3 miljardit eurot,

üldjoontes samale tasemele, kuid üleminek standardsele GSP korrale vähendaks nende

kokkuhoidu umbes 0,75 miljardi euroni, mis tähendab vähenemist ligikaudu 80 % (vt

joonis 10). GSP+ süsteemiga liitumine ei kompenseeri kunagi täielikult riigi staatust EBA

erikorra raames, sest sellega kaasneks muu hulgas eriliste kaitsemeetmete ja rangemate

päritolueeskirjade kohaldamine, mis tavaliselt vähendab soodustusi, mida need riigid saaksid

tegelikult taotleda. See avaldub eriti selgelt rõivaid eksportivate riikide puhul.

Lisaks soodsatele üleminekuperioodidele toetab EL ka edaspidi riike, kes lahkuvad EBA

erikorrast, eriti neid soodustatud riike, kes esitavad pärast lahkumist taotluse GSP+ erikorraga

14

liitumiseks, et vältida igasugust negatiivset mõju selliste riikide eksportijatele ja nendega

kaubandussuhetes olevatele ELi äriühingutele.

15

Joonis 10. Soodustatud riikide hinnanguline kokkuhoid tariifidelt / tulude kasv EBA erikorra

raames võrreldes GSP+ või standardse GSP korraga 2024. aastal (miljonites eurodes)

iii. Aafrika konkurentsivõime suurendamine

Kolm neljandikku EBA erikorra raames soodustatud riikidest asuvad Aafrika mandril

(46st 3337). Arvestades nende Aasia riikide arvukust ja suurust, kes peagi kavast välja

arvatakse, moodustavad Aafrika riigid varsti EBA erikorra raames ülekaalus oleva rühma. ELi

üldise tariifisoodustuste kava kõik kolm korda on olulised tugisambad, mille kaudu ELi toetab

Aafrika majanduslikku mitmekesistamist ja integreerimist ülemaailmsetesse väärtusahelatesse,

kuid erikord EBA eristub teistest.

Selle sooduskorra alusel toimuv import Aafrikas asuvatest EBA erikorra raames soodustatud

riikidest ELi oli 2024. aastal 3,9 miljardit eurot ja suurenes võrreldes 2019. aastaga, kui

impordi väärtus oli 2,8 miljardit eurot (vt ka tabel/joonis 9). EBA soodustuste kasutamise määr

oli 2024. aastal 88,9 %, mis tähendab, et Aafrikas asuvad soodustatud riigid kasutavad

soodustusi üha rohkem, kuid neil on potentsiaali enamaks. Tänu EBA erikorra raames saadud

tollimaksuvabale juurdepääsule ulatus 2024. aastal Aafrikas asuvate soodustatud riikide

vabastus imporditollimaksudest ligikaudu 213 miljoni euroni. Ajavahemikus 2022–2024 olid

peamised EBA erikorra alusel eksportivad Aafrika riigid Mosambiik (4,2 miljardit eurot),

Mauritaania (1,2 miljardit eurot), Etioopia (975,5 miljonit eurot), Tansaania (934,7 miljonit

eurot) ja Madagaskar (848,1 miljonit eurot).

3,3 miljardit eurot 3,3 miljardit eurot

0,7 miljardit eurot

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

EBA GSP+ Standardne GSP

Ko kk

uh oid

ta rii

fid elt

(m ilja

rd id

eu ro

d)

16

Joonis 11. Viis EBA erikorra raames suurimaid soodustusi saanud Aafrika riiki (koguimport,

millele kohaldati EBA soodustusi; miljonites eurodes)

Nagu eespool öeldud, saavad mõned riigid väljaspool EBA erikorda soodustusi teiste GSP

kordade alusel. Nigeeria, Kongo Vabariik ja Keenia kuuluvad standardse GSP alla (Keenia

lahkub sellest 2027. aastal, sest alates 1. juulist 2024 kohaldatakse ELi ja Keenia vahelist

majanduspartnerluslepingut), Cabo Verde saab soodustusi erikorra GSP+ raames. Aastatel

2022–2024 ulatus impordi kogumaht neist neljast Aafrika riigist, kes kasutasid GSP soodustusi,

579,4 miljoni euroni, kusjuures suurima osakaaluga oli Nigeeria (372,4 miljonit eurot,

kasutusmäär 70 %), kellele järgnesid Cabo Verde (172,5 miljonit eurot, kasutusmäär 85 %),

Keenia (15,7 miljonit, kasutusmäär 1 %38) ja Kongo Vabariik (18,7 miljonit eurot, kasutusmäär

58 %). Cabo Verde saab erikorra GSP+ raames soodustatud riigina oluliselt suuremaid

maksuerandeid, kui ta oleks saanud standardse GSP raames (12,0 miljonit eurot võrreldes

3,9 miljoni euroga), mis tähendab lisasoodustusi 8,1 miljoni euro väärtuses39.

Võrreldes sarnaste kavadega, mille alusel teised arenenud riigid teevad ühepoolseid soodustusi,

hõlmab ELi EBA erikorra soodustust kasutav eksport kõige laiemat valikut erinevaid kaupu

(53 % kõikidest tariifiridadest),40 mis näitab, et import ELi vähim arenenud riikidest on väga

mitmekesine. UNCTADi kohaselt41 annavad ELi EBA erikorra soodustused võrreldes USA,

Jaapani ja Kanada süsteemidega absoluutarvudes suurimat kokkuhoidu tollimaksudelt42. EBA

eristub erikordadest, mida Aafrika riikidele kohaldavad Hiina ja USA, mitte ainult selle

poolest, et automaatselt loetakse soodustuskõlblikeks kõik vähim arenenud riigid, vaid ka

seetõttu, et erikorda kohaldatakse tähtajatult. Selline eripära loob ettevõtjatele pikaajalise

kindluse ja annab Aafrika soodustatud riikidele märkimisväärseid eeliseid: kuna EBA erikorra

puhul puudub perioodilise pikendamise nõue, mis on omane teiste riikide üldistele

tariifisoodustuste kavadele, suurendab EBA investorite usaldust, soodustab strateegiliste

investeerimisotsuste tegemist ja innustab mitmekesistama ekspordikanaleid. See on eriti

asjakohane siis, kui arenguriikidel, kes saavad vähem tuge ja kellel on suuri raskusi teatavatele

muudele turgudele pääsemisel, tekib lisaprobleeme.

Seega tõendavad erikord „Kõik peale relvade“ ja soodne juurdepääs turule, mis selle kaudu

antakse vähim arenenud riikidele Aafrikas ja mujal, et EL on kindlalt pühendunud vähim

arenenud riikide majanduskasvu ja kestliku arengu jätkuvale toetamisele ning nende riikide

1,9

0,4 0,3

0,3

0,1

1,0

0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3

1,3

0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

Mozambique Mauritania Ethiopia Tanzania Madagascar

GS P a

lus el

to im

uv im

po rt

(m ilja

rd ite

s e ur

od es

)

* Kokku = GSP alusel toimuv ELi koguimport, 2022-2024 (miljardites eurodes)

2022 2023 2024

Kokku = 4,2

Kokku = 1,1 Kokku = 0,98 Kokku = 0,93 Kokku = 0,85

osambiik Mauritaania Etioopi Tansaania M dagaskar

22 23 4

17

tihedamale lõimimisele ülemaailmse majandusega, kohaldades avatud, stabiilseid ja

prognoositavaid kaubandustingimusi.

iv) Tõhustatud koostöö

Lisaks jätkuvale järelevalvele koos GSP+ raames soodustatud riikidega teevad komisjon ja

Euroopa välisteenistus tõhustatud koostööd, et toetada EBA erikorra raames soodustatud riike

ja innustada neid parandama olukorda üldise tariifisoodustuste kavaga seotud kriitilise

tähtsusega valdkondades, eriti seoses peamiste rahvusvaheliste konventsioonidega, mis

käsitlevad asjakohaseid inimõigusi ja töötajate õigusi. Tõhustatud koostöö Bangladeshi,

Kambodža43 ja Myanmariga on eriti oluline, arvestades nende märkimisväärset osakaalu

EBA erikorra raames toimuvas ELi koguimpordis, nagu näitab tabel/joonis 9. Samal ajal

valitseb neis riikides väga erinev poliitiline, majanduslik ja arenguolukord, mistõttu on

alustatud sihipärast tõhustatud koostööd, mille suund ja rõhuasetus on küll iga riigi puhul

erinev. Koostöö raames võetakse kindlaks tehtud probleemide lahendamisel arvesse kõiki ELi

olemasolevaid vahendeid (lisaks EBA erikorrale). Nende kolme EBA raames soodustatud

riigiga tehtavat tõhustatud koostööd on üksikasjalikumalt kirjeldatud komisjoni talituste

töödokumentides, mis on lisatud käesolevale aruandele.

5. PARTNERLUS JA KOOSTÖÖ / TOETUS GSP RAAMES SOODUSTATUD

RIIKIDELE

Kuigi üldine tariifisoodustuste kava on terviklik vahend, millega toetatakse pikaajalist

kestlikku arengut soodustatud riikides, tuleb soovitud tõhususe saavutamiseks

kaubanduspoliitika ühendada arengupoliitika ja koostööga44. Enamik ELi mitmeaastastest

sihtprogrammidest ajavahemikuks 2021–2027, millega määratakse kindlaks ELi prioriteetsed

valdkonnad ja arengukoostöö erieesmärgid, hõlmab kestliku majanduskasvu ning heade ja

õiglaste töötingimustega inimväärsete töökohtade toetamist. Lisaks toetatakse mitmeaastaste

sihtprogrammidega hea valitsemistava, inimõiguste, töötajate õiguste ning keskkonnakaitse

standarditega seotud konventsioonide ja kohustuste ratifitseerimist ja tõhusat rakendamist.

Erikorra GSP+ raames soodustatud kaheksa riigi puhul pööratakse mitmeaastastes

sihtprogrammides erilist tähelepanu GSP+ tingimuste täitmisele ja kestliku arengu seisukohalt

oluliste valdkondade edendamisele.

Töötajate õigustele keskenduti eriti kaubanduse abil inimväärse töö edendamise projektis

(2019–2021 ja 2022–2024, 6 miljonit eurot), mida rahastasid koos EL ja Soome ning mida viis

ellu ILO. Projektiga edendati ILO põhiliste konventsioonide rakendamist seitsmes ELi

erikordade GSP+ ja EBA alusel soodustatud riigis (Bangladesh, Cabo Verde, Mongoolia,

Madagaskar, Mosambiik, Pakistan ja Filipiinid).

GSP raames soodustatud riikidele pakutava ELi abi teine suund on kaubandusabi algatus, mis

on selgelt suunatud kaubanduse kasutamisele kestliku arengu vahendina45. Kaubandusabi

andes toetab EL partnerriike õige kaubanduskeskkonna loomisel, et edendada

konkurentsivõimet ja jätkusuutlikku integreerimist maailma majandusse.

EL koos liikmesriikidega on alates algatuse käivitamisest olnud suurim kaubandusabi andja.

2023. aastal46 toetas EL kaubandusabi algatuse raames 16,2 miljardi euroga partnerriike,

kellest paljud on GSP alusel soodustatud riigid. GSP+ raames soodustatud riikidel aitab EL

täita selle erikorra nõudeid, nagu on kirjeldatud eespool, kuid samal ajal toetab EL neid ka kava

alusel pakutud soodustuste täielikul ärakasutamisel. Ajavahemikus 2021–2023 oli ELi

18

kaubandusabi kaheksale erikorra GSP+ raames soodustatud riigile (kokku 1,4 miljardit eurot)

suunatud muu hulgas sellistesse valdkondadesse nagu taristu ehitamine, tootmisvõimsuse

suurendamine (sealhulgas investeeringud kliimareformi ja väärtusahela arengusse),

kaubavahetuse hõlbustamine, standardite rakendamine ja neile vastavuse tagamine.

Joonis 12. ELi kaubandusabi GSP+ raames soodustatud riikidele aastatel 2021–2023, kokku

1,4 miljardit eurot

Kaubandusabiga toetatakse ka 2021. aastal prioriteetsetesse valdkondadesse investeeringute

kaasamiseks käivitatud juhtstrateegia „Global Gateway“47 kohase kaubandust ja

investeeringuid soodustava keskkonna loomist. Kooskõlas ELi geopoliitiliste eesmärkide ja

kohustustega täita kestliku arengu tegevuskava aastani 2030 on strateegia „Global Gateway“

eesmärk edendada arukaid, puhtaid ja turvalisi investeeringuid digi-, energia- ja

transpordivaldkonnas ning tugevdada kogu maailmas tervishoiu-, haridus- ja teadussüsteeme,

et toetada ning edendada seejuures universaalseid väärtusi ja rangeid standardeid, head

valitsemistava ja läbipaistvust.

GSP teabeplatvormi kaudu toetas EL ka põhjaliku, läbipaistva ja tsentraliseeritud teabe andmist

GSP kohta nii soodustatud riikidele, ettevõtjatele, kodanikuühiskonnale kui ka

poliitikakujundajatele. 2019. aastal alguse saanud GSP teabeplatvormi projektiga suurendati

spetsiaalse veebisaidi,48 kirjalike väljaannete ja mitme teadlikkuse suurendamise ürituse kaudu

Euroopas ja GSP raames soodustatud riikides teadlikkust üldisest tariifisoodustuste kavast,

selle majanduslikust kasust ja järelevalvest ning parandati GSP läbipaistvust. Veebisaidi

haldamine ja ajakohastamine jätkub ka uue GSP määruse alusel.

6. JÄRELDUSED

2012. aasta GSP määrusele vastava viimase GSP seiretsükli ajal (2023–2025) täitis kava

jätkuvalt oma peamisi eesmärke, milleks on aidata kaasa soodustusi saavate riikide

majanduslikele edusammudele ja kestlikule arengule.

ELi üldise tariifisoodustuste kava kaudu pakuti heldeid majanduslikke hüvesid nii

partnerriikidele kui ka ELi importijatele ja tarbijatele, kusjuures kava toimis jätkuvalt

Boliivia; 302

Cabo Verde; 22

Kõrgõzstan; 30

Mongoolia; 33

Pakistan; 598

Filipiinid; 57

Sri Lanka; 18

Usbekistan; 345

Kaubandusabi 2021-2023 (miljonites eurodes)

19

stabiilsuse ja prognoositavuse allikana kaubandusliku, majandusliku ja geopoliitilise

ebastabiilsuse ajal.

2024. aastal imporditi GSP soodustusi kasutades ELi peaaegu 60 miljardi euro väärtuses

kaupu, millest said kasu nii ELi importijad kui ka soodustatud riigid. Üldisemate

suundumustega kooskõlas oli GSP soodustuste alusel toimuv koguimport ajavahemikus 2022–

2024 kõikuv, kuid veidi kõrgemal tasemel kui enne COVID-19 kriisi, arvestades üldisest

tariifisoodustuste kavast lahkuvaid suurimaid soodustatud riike.

Soodustatud riikide arvu ja impordi väärtuste alusel kuulusid kõige suuremaid soodustusi

saavate riikide hulka endiselt EBA erikorra raames soodustatud vähim arenenud riigid, kellel

oli ka suurim kasutusmäär (peaaegu 95 %). EBA suhteline tähtsus suureneb ka edaspidi, sest

suurimad soodustatud riigid standardse GSP (India ja Indoneesia) ning GSP+ raames

(Filipiinid) uuendavad oma kaubandussuhteid ELiga vabakaubanduslepingute alusel ega osale

enam üldises tariifisoodustuste kavas. Tulevikku vaadates jätkub enamiku GSP raames

soodustusi saavate riikide majandusolukorra paranemine ja mitu neist liigub selles suunas, et

ÜRO võib nad vähim arenenud riikide hulgast välja arvata. See näitab, et arengu saavutamiseks

tehtud jõupingutused on olnud edukad ja ELi GSP panusel on neis riikides olnud positiivne

mõju.

Sellest tulenevalt väheneb ka edaspidi nende riikide arv, kes saavad soodustusi ELi ühepoolsete

soodustuste kavast. GSP jääb aga endiselt tähtsaks, sest kava kohaldatakse sellest väljuvate

riikide suhtes ka üleminekuperioodi jooksul ja EBA soodustusi pakutakse edasi teistele vähim

arenenud riikidele, eelkõige Aafrikas. Võttes arvesse ELi EBA raames pakutavat ainulaadset

tuge Aafrika riikidele, teevad komisjon ja Euroopa välisteenistus (nii peakorteri kui ka ELi

delegatsioonide kaudu) ka edaspidi jõupingutusi, et parandada GSPga seotud teabevahetust ja

dialoogi, suurendada EBA erikorra nähtavust, tundmist ja kasutuselevõttu Aafrika riikides.

Lisaks EBA erikorrale saadakse märkimisväärset kasu ka GSP+ raames: kogu GSP kava

kümnest peamisest soodustuste saajast nelja suhtes kohaldatakse erikorda GSP+ ja peaaegu

20 % GSP alusel toimuvast koguimpordist ELi pärineb GSP+ raames soodustatud riikidest.

Samal ajal täidab GSP+ jätkuvalt oma eesmärki stimuleerida kestlikku arengut ja head

valitsemistava, tuginedes rahvusvaheliselt kokku lepitud ja tunnustatud standarditele. Kuigi

paljudes GSP+ raames soodustatud riikides on olukord senini raske, jääb GSP+ tänu

igakülgsele järelevalvele ja dialoogile endiselt ainulaadseks võimaluseks pidada arutelusid ja

parandada aja jooksul olukorda.

EL on pikendanud GSP kestust veel kümneks aastaks ja uus GSP määrus peaks jõustuma

1. jaanuaril 2027. Uute GSP normidega tagab EL, et kolme sihipärase korra alusel pakutakse

atraktiivseid ühepoolseid kaubandussoodustusi ka edaspidi. Sellega kinnitab EL oma

pikaajalist pühendumust toetada majanduskasvu ja kestlikku arengut partnerriikides üle kogu

maailma, pakkudes heldeid, stabiilseid ja prognoositavaid kaubandustingimusi.

Käesolev aruanne ja sellele lisatud komisjoni talituste töödokumendid loovad tugeva aluse uute

GSP normide kohaldamisele. See kehtib eelkõige praeguste GSP+ raames soodustatud riikide

kohta, kes peavad esitama uuesti taotluse, kui nad soovivad ka edaspidi saada selle korra alusel

soodustusi. Samuti kehtib see nende EBA erikorra raames soodustatud riikide kohta, kes

soovivad taotleda GSP+ raames soodustatud riigi staatust pärast seda, kui nad arvatakse välja

vähim arenenud riikide seast. EL on jätkuvalt pühendunud soodustatud riikide toetamisele ka

selliste üleminekute ajal.

20

1 Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 25. oktoobri 2012. aasta määrus (EL) nr 978/2012 üldiste tariifsete soodustuste

kava kohaldamise ning nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 732/2008 kehtetuks tunnistamise kohta. 2 2023 (JOIN(2023) 34 final. 3 Mõnda praeguse aruandlusperioodi alla kuuluvat elementi käsitleti juba eelmises, 2023. aasta aruandes

(JOIN(2023) 34 final). 4 GSP standardse korra raames soodustatud riigid on Kongo Vabariik, Cooki saared, India, Indoneesia, Keenia,

Mikroneesia, Nigeeria, Niue, Süüria, Tadžikistan ja Vanuatu. 5 GSP+ raames soodustatud riigid on Boliivia, Cabo Verde, Kõrgõzstan, Mongoolia, Pakistan, Filipiinid, Sri Lanka

ja Usbekistan. 6 Komisjoni 29. septembri 2025. aasta delegeeritud määrus (EL) 2025/1951, millega muudetakse Euroopa

Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EL) nr 978/2012 II, IV ja VII lisa,

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2025/1951/oj (edaspidi: „komisjoni 29. septembri 2025. aasta delegeeritud

määrus (EL) 2025/1951“). ELi ja Indoneesia vahelisi kaubandussuhteid peaks edaspidi reguleerima ulatuslik

majanduspartnerlusleping. Kõik käesolevas aruandes esitatud lingid on üle kontrollitud 28. aprilli 2026. aasta

seisuga. 7 Komisjoni 28. novembri 2024. aasta delegeeritud määrus (EL) 2025/214, millega muudetakse Euroopa

Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EL) nr 978/2012 II lisa Keenia osas, https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2025/214/oj. 8 Komisjoni 12. märtsi 2024. aasta delegeeritud määrus (EL) 2024/1363, millega muudetakse Euroopa

Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EL) nr 978/2012 IV lisa ja arvatakse Bhutan vähim arenenud riikide suhtes

kohaldatava erikorra alusel soodustatud riikide loetelust välja,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/1363/oj. 9 Komisjoni 29. septembri 2025. aasta delegeeritud määrus (EL) 2025/1951. 10 Komisjoni 29. septembri 2025. aasta delegeeritud määrus (EL) 2025/1951. 11 Toodete astmestamine tagab soodustuste andmise neile riikidele ja toodetele ning aitab vältida konkurentsisurvet

GSP raames soodustatud riikide vahel. 12 Komisjoni 14. detsembri 2023. aasta rakendusmäärus 2023/2780, millega muudetakse rakendusmäärust

(EL) 2022/1039 seoses teatavatele GSP raames soodustatud riikidele antud teatavate tariifsete soodustuste

peatamise pikendamisega. http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/2780/oj. 13 Komisjoni 24. septembri 2025. aasta rakendusmäärus 2025/1909, millega sätestatakse Euroopa Parlamendi ja

nõukogu määruse (EL) nr 978/2012 rakenduseeskirjad seoses teatavatele GSP raames soodustatud riikidele antud

teatavate tariifsete soodustuste peatamisega aastatel 2026–2028,

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1909/oj. 14 Komisjoni 11. märtsi 2024. aasta rakendusmäärus 2024/842, millega taaskehtestatakse kaitsemeetmed

Kambodžast ja Myanmarist pärineva indica riisi impordi suhtes,

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/842/oj. 15 Komisjoni 19. juuni 2025. aasta rakendusmäärus 2025/1206 kestlikku arengut ja head valitsemistava

stimuleeriva erikorra (GPS+) kohaste tariifsete soodustuste peatamise kohta Pakistanist pärit etanooli impordi

suhtes,

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1206/oj. 16https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-proposes-new-eu-generalised-scheme-preferences-

promote-sustainable-development-low-income-2021-09-22_en. 17 Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 22. novembri 2023. aasta määrus (EL) 2023/2663, millega muudetakse

määrust (EL) nr 978/2012 üldiste tariifsete soodustuste kava kohaldamise kohta,

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2663/oj. 18 Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 17. juuni 2026. aasta määrus (EL) nr 2026/1395 üldiste tariifsete soodustuste

kava kohaldamise ning nõukogu määruse (EL) nr 978/2012 kehtetuks tunnistamise kohta,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1395/oj. 19 Viis rahvusvahelist konventsiooni ja lepingut on järgmised: lapse õiguste konventsiooni fakultatiivprotokoll

laste kaasamise kohta relvastatud konfliktidesse (2000); puuetega inimeste õiguste konventsioon (2007); ILO

konventsioon nr 81 töökeskkonna järelevalve kohta (1947); ILO konventsioon nr 144 kolmepoolsete

konsultatsioonide kohta (1976); kliimamuutusi käsitlev Pariisi kokkulepe (2015) ja rahvusvahelise organiseeritud

kuritegevuse vastu võitlemise Ühinenud Rahvaste Organisatsiooni konventsioon (2000). 20 ÜRO kliimamuutuste raamkonventsiooni Kyoto protokoll (1998).

21

21 Kõigi statistiliste andmete allikas: Eurostati kaubavahetusandmed nominaalväärtuses viimaste kättesaadavate

valideeritud andmete alusel täisaasta kohta 2025. aasta septembri seisuga. GSP statistika hõlmab vaid kaupu, mis

imporditi ELi turule, st ELis vabasse ringlusse lubatud kaupu. GSP statistika ei hõlma muud importi ELi, nagu

kaubad, mis imporditi seestöötlemise tolliprotseduuri alusel või imporditi uuesti pärast välistöötlemise

tolliprotseduuri. Konfidentsiaalsena registreeritud kaubavood ei ole esitatud GSP+ kasutusnäitajate ega 1. režiimi

(tavapärane kaubandus) all, kuid kajastuvad kaubanduse kogunäitajates (4. režiim),

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/ext_go_agg_esms.htm#conf1537195068659. 22 Kongo, Cooki saared, India, Indoneesia, Keenia, Mikroneesia, Nigeeria, Niue, Süüria, Tadžikistan ja Vanuatu. 23 Boliivia, Cabo Verde, Kõrgõzstan, Mongoolia, Pakistan, Filipiinid, Sri Lanka ja Usbekistan. 24 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240701-1. 25 GSP raames soodustatud tooted on liigitatud jaotistesse GSP määruse alusel. Teave selle kohta, milliseid CN-

koode GSP jaotised sisaldavad, on esitatud määruse nr 978/2012 V lisas, EUR-Lex-02012R0978-20250101-EN-

EUR-Lex. 26 Lisaks kohaldab EL olenemata üldistest tariifsetest soodustustest paljudes piirkondades nullmäära. Arusaadavalt

kehtib see ka impordi suhtes GSP raames soodustatud riikidest, mis võimaldab neil saada kasu WHO reeglite

alusel kohaldatavast enamsoodustusrežiimist, mille tulemusena suureneb nende tollimaksuvaba koguimport ELi

ja seega ka kokkuhoid tollimaksudelt veelgi. 27 Sektorid, kus kasutusmäär vähenes 2022–2023 kõige enam, olid toornahk ja nahk (S-08a) (98,8 %-lt 65,9 %-

le), kork, õletooted ja punumismaterjalid (S-09b) (86,3 %-lt 62,2 %-le) ning tekstiiltooted (S-11a) (97,1 %-lt

83,3 %-le). Kõigis neis kolmes sektoris kasvas kasutamine järgmisel, 2024. aastal. 28 Osoonikihti kahandavate ainete Montreali protokoll. 29 ÜRO piinamise ja ning muu julma, ebainimliku või inimväärikust alandava kohtlemise või karistamise vastane

konventsioon. 30 Püsivate orgaaniliste saasteainete Stockholmi konventsioon. 31 Ohustatud looduslike looma- ja taimeliikidega rahvusvahelise kauplemise konventsioon. 32 Bioloogilise mitmekesisuse konventsiooni Cartagena bioohutuse protokoll. 33 COVIDi-eelse lähteväärtusena on esitatud 2019. aasta andmed. 34 Kambodža ja Vietnami vahel lubati 2023. aastal kohaldada jalgrataste puhul laiendatud kumulatsiooni:

komisjoni 19. septembri 2023. aasta otsus (EL) 2023/1810, milles käsitletakse Kambodža ja Vietnami vahelise

laiendatud kumulatsiooni taotlust vastavalt delegeeritud määruse (EL) 2015/2446 artikli 56 lõikele 1 seoses

päritolureeglitega, mida kohaldatakse delegeeritud määruse (EL) 2015/2446 kohase üldise tariifisoodustuste kava

raames jalgrataste tootmiseks kasutatavate teatavate materjalide või osade suhtes,

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1810/oj. Kambodža suhtes peatati EBA erikorra alusel antavad soodustused

komisjoni 12. juuli 2020. aasta delegeeritud määrusega (EL) 2020/550. 35 2026. aasta veebruaris esitas Bangladeshi valitsus ÜRO-le ametliku taotluse oma riigi vähim arenenud riikide

hulgast väljaarvamise edasilükkamiseks kolme aasta võrra. 36 ÜRO Majandus- ja Sotsiaalnõukogu. 37 São Tomé ja Príncipe ei kuulu enam vähim arenenud riikide hulka, kuid talle kohaldatakse EBA soodustusi

1. jaanuarini 2029, mil riik lahkub erikorrast. 38 GSP määruse alusel Keeniale antud soodustused ei mõjuta turulepääsu eeliseid, mida võimaldavad muud

vahendid, näiteks Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 8. juuni 2016. aasta määrus (EL) 2016/1076, millega

teatavatest Aafrika, Kariibi mere ja Vaikse ookeani (AKV) piirkonna riikide rühma riikidest pärit toodetele

kohaldatakse korda, mis on sätestatud lepingutes, millega või mille tulemusel luuakse majanduspartnerlus

(ELT L 185, 8.7.2016, lk 1–191). See kehtib eriti lõikelillede kohta. 39 Eurostat, Comexti andmebaas. 40https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/COMTD/LDCW73.pdf&Open=True. 41 ÜRO kaubandus- ja arengukonverents. 42 UNCTAD, „The Generalized System of Preferences: How much does it matter for developing countries?“,

UNCTAD/DITC/TSCE/2023/1, 2023, lk vii. 43 12. veebruari 2020. aasta delegeeritud määrusega (EL) 2020/550 peatati osaliselt EBA soodustuste kohaldamine

Kambodža suhtes. 44 GSP määruse preambulis (põhjendus 4) on märgitud, et ELi ühine kaubanduspoliitika peab olema kooskõlas

arengukoostöö valdkonda hõlmava liidu poliitikaga. 25. oktoobri 2012. aasta määrus (EL) nr 978/2012 üldise

tariifisoodustuste kava kohaldamise kohta, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0978. 45 Kaubandusabi on WTO ja OECD 2006. aasta algatus, mis on statistiliselt osa ametlikust arenguabist ja hõlmab

järgmisi kategooriaid: tehniline abi kaubanduspoliitika ja reguleerimise, kaubandusega seotud taristu ja

tootmisvõimsuse suurendamise valdkonnas. 46 Viimane aasta, mille kohta on andmed kättesaadavad.

22

47 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_en. 48 https://gsphub.eu/.

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 16.7.2026 SWD(2026) 185 final

JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

EU Enhanced engagement with three Everything But Arms beneficiary countries:

Bangladesh, Cambodia and Myanmar covering the period 2023-2025

Accompanying the document

Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council

on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences covering the period 2023-2025

{JOIN(2026) 16 final} - {SWD(2026) 184 final} - {SWD(2026) 186 final} - {SWD(2026) 187 final} - {SWD(2026) 188 final} - {SWD(2026) 189 final} - {SWD(2026) 190 final} - {SWD(2026) 191 final} - {SWD(2026) 192 final}

1

1. Introduction

This is the third joint Staff Working Document (SWD)1 dedicated to the Enhanced Engagement

with three GSP beneficiary countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia and Myanmar. Enhanced

Engagement with these countries started under the Everything But Arms (EBA) arrangement

of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in 2017. So far, no other beneficiaries

have been subjected to this targeted process.

The present document covers the main developments during the reporting period of 2023 to

20252 on core human rights and labour rights international conventions that were discussed

with each of the three EBA beneficiary countries under Enhanced Engagement. Relevant

economic data are available under section 4c of the GSP report3.

2. Bangladesh

The political landscape in Bangladesh at the start of the reporting period was marked by

heightened polarisation and tensions between the ruling party and opposition forces, which

eventually led to the fall of the government that had been in power for 15 years. As from August

2024, the country was governed by an interim administration led by Chief Adviser Muhammad

Yunus which prepared the path to genuinely competitive parliamentary elections and a

referendum which took place in a peaceful atmosphere on 12 February 20264. The new

government was sworn in on 17 February 2026, in a smooth transfer of power.

The EU regularly informed5 Bangladesh of its concerns regarding the compliance with EBA

requirements. In November 2023, the Commission and the European External Action Service

(EEAS) had also conducted a monitoring mission to assess the compliance of the country with

its commitments under the EBA. The enhanced engagement process under the Yunus

administration allowed for constructive bilateral exchanges both on human and labour rights.

On human rights, several positive developments were noted. Bangladesh ratified the Optional

Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OP-CAT) in 2025, strengthening the formal

framework for torture prevention through independent visits and a National Preventive

Mechanism requirement. The interim government withdrew Bangladesh’s long-standing

reservation against CAT Article 14(1) as from 3 February 2026, enabling individual

communications and aligning with long-standing international recommendations. A

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)

periodic report was eventually submitted in 2025, restoring a key reporting channel even

though concluding observations are still pending. Legislative initiatives include the Women

and Children Repression Prevention (Amendment) Ordinance (2025). In August 2024 the

interim government acceded to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons

from Enforced Disappearance (ICPED).

Several challenges remain, however. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

(OHCHR) documented extensive violations during the unrest of July/August 2024, including

large-scale unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests, torture/ill-treatment, attacks on journalists, and

internet shutdowns, indicating severe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR) and CAT implementation failure. The Cyber Security Act (2023) is widely assessed

as retaining core flaws of prior legislation and continues to threaten the freedom of expression,

with reported misuse against journalists and human rights defenders. Under concerns relevant

for the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

2

(ICERD), Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)’s Early Warning

and Urgent Action engagement on the Chittagong Hill Tracts remains open, reflecting

unresolved issues on discrimination, militarisation impacts, and indigenous land and

participation rights. Reservations on the CEDAW remain in place and legal gaps on sexual

violence -including the restrictive scope of marital rape provisions- continue to impede gender-

equality compliance.

With respect to labour rights, the Government periodically made public the implementation

reports of the National Action Plan (NAP) on the Labour Sector 2021-20266. In parallel the

Government has been reporting under the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Article 26

mechanism on the implementation of the Roadmap on the Labour Sector in Bangladesh (2021-

2026)1, which is mutually reinforcing with the NAP. In March 2026, the ILO Governing Body

requested the Government to report on further progress made in the implementation of the

Roadmap at its 359th Session in March 2027, and deferred its decision on further action until

that session. In 2025 the Government issued an Ordinance (then adopted into law in April 2026)

amending the Bangladesh Labour Act (BLA), a comprehensive review that introduces changes

in a number of areas (amendments in relation to Freedom of Association and other fundamental

principles and rights at work, for example on ease of trade union registration, including by

modifying minimum membership requirements, allowing collective bargaining at a higher

level, and additional powers for labour inspectors as well as reinforcing critical protections by

prohibiting discrimination) for which the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of

Conventions (CEACR) had been requesting better alignment with ILO international labour

standards. While the local ILO Office has been supporting the Government on a technical level

in relation to the BLA reform, the extent to which additional April 2026 amendments align

with the conventions is yet to be assessed by the CEACR. Regarding child labour, the list of

hazardous work prohibited to children has been updated, with five new sectors included.

Bangladesh’s recent ratifications of ILO Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981

(No. 155), ILO Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 2006

(No. 187), and ILO Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190) in 2025, have been

important positive steps, which will need to be followed by effective implementation including

by tackling underlying systemic obstacles and corruption.

Significant efforts, however, are still needed to meet the country’s obligations and translate

labour commitments into measurable outcomes, particularly on Export Processing Zone (EPZ)

rights, union registration/anti-union discrimination, inspection coverage and quality (including

forced labour indicators), gaps in implementing occupational health and safety, and reductions

in child labour in informal and hazardous work. Despite some progress, important restrictions

persist on freedom of association and on registration of trade unions. Various pieces of

legislation, including the penal code, foresee imprisonment with the possibility of forced

labour. A significant number of children are still involved in hazardous work. The Government

needs to continue strengthening the capacities of the law enforcement bodies with regard to

child labour and ensure that dissuasive penalties are imposed.

1 Roadmap of actions to address all the outstanding issues mentioned in the complaint concerning non-observance

by Bangladesh of the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81), Freedom of Association and Protection of

the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87).

3

3. Cambodia

Over the reporting period, key exchanges took place at the 12th EU–Cambodia Joint

Committee in Brussels on 25 April 2024 and related sub-group meetings. Political contacts

intensified, with several high-level meetings with Prime Minister Hun Manet. Further

exchanges took place at the 13th EU–Cambodia Joint Committee in Phnom Penh and related

sub-group meetings in March 2026.

For the current reporting period, the priorities remained broadly the same as for the previous

reporting period (2020-2022)7 and as shaped by international monitoring bodies: reopening

civic and political space; ending the criminalisation of opposition figures, activists, trade

unionists and independent media; reforming restrictive laws; strengthening judicial

independence and accountability for arbitrary detention, torture and other ill-treatment;

addressing anti-union discrimination and misuse of criminal law in labour disputes; protecting

indigenous peoples’ land rights and ensuring free, prior and informed consent; adopting a

comprehensive anti-discrimination framework; reforming domestic violence legislation and

improving protection of women and human rights defenders; criminalising torture in line with

convention; and adopting a compliant Child Protection Law.

On human rights,Cambodia has maintained formal adherence to the core UN human rights

treaties and has introduced some plans and policy frameworks, particularly in relation to social

protection, violence against women, alternative care for children, and the possible creation of

anti-torture mechanisms. Initiatives such as the Decent Work Country Program (DWCP) 2024-

2028 and the National Strategy for the Development of the Informal Economy 2023-2028

represent tangible progress in economic and social rights, especially for guaranteeing the right

to work to vulnerable sectors of the informal economy.

However, critical gaps remain. Political freedoms in Cambodia have continued to be severely

curtailed. There has been no improvement in relation to political freedoms, and the democratic

space is closing even more. The opposition Candlelight Party (CLP) continues to be barred

from national elections (2023), resulting in a fully Cambodian People's Party (CPP) dominated

National Assembly. Judicial harassment of opposition figures continues. Former opposition

leader Kem Sokha, convicted of treason and held under strict house arrest for eight years, was

granted a royal pardon on 26 May 2026. However, the charges against him were not dropped

and restrictions on his political participation and his ability to leave the country remain in place.

Other figures have also been jailed on trumped-up charges (for instance Nation Power Party

leader Sun Chanthy). The bill to create a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) has been

pending for approval since the end of 2023. The rights of indigenous peoples face excessive

delays in the attribution of land ownership, and the Environment and Natural Resources Code,

in force since 2025, is exclusionary in that it restricts traditional practices and facilitates

evictions. The 1996 Nationality Law, amended in 2025, introduces the possibility of revoking

citizenship from any national, including women and minors, on grounds such as ‘treason’ or

‘collusion with foreign powers’ increasing the risk of statelessness. Very high levels of violence

against women continue.

Severe restrictions on freedom of expression and association remain in place under regulations

such as the Criminal Code and the Law on Associations and November 2025 decree on

‘Qualifications and Professional Journalism’. The last independent media, Voice of democracy

(VOD), was forced to close in 2023 and is not operational in Cambodia at the time of writing

of this report. Preventive detention is used indiscriminately. The lack of independence of judges

and courts is consolidated as a political tool. The authorities continue to rely extensively on

4

‘incitement’ and ‘plotting’ charges against students, environmental defenders, trade unionists

and independent media actors, creating a chilling effect across civil society. Disparities in

equitable access to health, education, and basic services persist, especially in rural areas. An

increasing number of human trafficking cases have been reported linked to the activities of

scam centres operating on the Cambodian territory.

On labour rights, Cambodia undertook some policy initiatives, such as the Cambodia Decent

Work Country Programme 2024-20288, in cooperation with ILO, and the National Strategy on

Development of the Informal Economy 2023-20289; and training activities such as vocational

education training and safety in agriculture practices with ILO support. The National Social

Security Fund now benefits 2.5 million workers, including informal and self-employed, with

coverage for injury, health and pensions. Cambodia is working on judicial and legal reforms

which will impact labour rights such as the Personal Data Protection Law (PDPL).

However, these steps are not matched by effective implementation measures which remain

slow and weak. Serious concerns remain regarding forced labour10 particularly in scam

operations and in the fisheries sector; child labour, including in its worst forms, such as sexual

exploitation11, violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining12, impunity

regarding attacks against trade unionists, including unresolved homicides, restriction of strikes,

which perpetuates a climate of fear, discrimination and repression of trade unionists. The

situation reveals inadequate protection of human rights defenders, trade unionists and workers

against acts of violence, discrimination, and persistent gender inequality. Disparities also

persist regarding opportunities for indigenous women and women from ethnic minorities to

access work and justice13. Significant gender inequalities continue with particular implications

for women who face intersecting forms of discrimination, such as indigenous and ethnic

minority women, those with disabilities, LGBTIQ+ persons or living in rural areas14 .

Cambodia's preferential access to the EU market remains restricted after GSP preferences were

partially withdrawn in 2020 because the government failed to address the EU's human rights

concerns15. The socioeconomic impact of the withdrawal, including the impact on workers,

was taken into account when selecting the products and deciding the scope of the withdrawal.

Cambodia continues to benefit from the preferences for those tariff lines not covered by

withdrawal. This targeted approach is complementing the continuous EU efforts towards

poverty reduction in the country.

4. Myanmar

Five years on from the 2021 military coup, condemned by the EU, Myanmar remains affected

by protracted armed conflict and a severe humanitarian crisis. Grave human rights violations

persist, including arbitrary arrests and detentions, airstrikes on civilians, and widespread

displacement. The EU has repeatedly condemned these violations, including the atrocities

against the Rohingya and other minorities, as well as the continued restrictions on fundamental

freedoms and the prevailing climate of fear. The EU has also stated that the electoral process

carried out by the military regime in December 2025 and January 2026, was neither free, fair

nor inclusive, failing to meet basic international standards. The humanitarian situation remains

critical, with over 16 million people estimated to be in urgent need of assistance. As the largest

donor responding to the crisis, the EU and its Member States remain committed to finding

effective ways to deliver much needed assistance to those affected.

5

In response to the military coup, the EU has adopted successive rounds of restrictive measures

against individuals and entities associated with the military regime and its economic interests

and stands ready to adopt further measures against those responsible for ongoing violence,

serious human rights violations and transnational crime. At the same time, the EU has sought

to ensure that its response remains proportionate and avoids unintended adverse effects on the

civilian population, in line with the ’do no harm’ principle. EU measures have been designed

to remain targeted, while preserving economic activity that supports livelihoods. This

calibrated approach has informed the EU’s continued engagement with Myanmar under the

EBA. While the EU has refrained from any formal engagement or direct contacts with the

regime, the enhanced engagement process was maintained during the reporting period through

exchanges with economic operators, civil society organisations, and democratic stakeholders.

The priority areas for enhanced engagement remain focused on supporting restoration of

democratic processes and civilian rule; responding to setbacks in women and children’s rights

and economic, social, and cultural rights; addressing systematic forced labour and violations

of freedom of association; ensuring unimpeded delivery of aid to populations affected by

conflict.

By maintaining the EBA preferences, the EU aims to ensure that the pursuit of the poverty

reduction goal continues at a time of a severe humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. This is

particularly relevant in labour-intensive sectors such as garments, which provide employment

to a significant share of the workforce, notably women and internal migrants, who otherwise

could have found themselves outside the formal labour market. Against the backdrop of the

acute humanitarian crisis, any adverse impact on the livelihoods of the civilian population, in

particular vulnerable groups, as a consequence of a potential withdrawal of EBA preferences,

should be avoided. The EBA also allows the EU to preserve leverage and sustain a responsible

economic footprint in Myanmar. Economic operators linked to EU supply chains, subject to

enhanced due diligence requirements, continue to contribute to comparatively higher labour

and social standards than their competitors.

The EU continues to regularly reassess its policy on EBA engagement with Myanmar, taking

into account developments on the ground as well as relevant international processes. These

include, inter alia, the 2025 resolution adopted under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution and

the ongoing proceedings before the International Court of Justice concerning the application of

the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. With regards to

the labour rights situation the findings and recommendations of the ILO’s Commission of

Inquiry remain the basis of our assessment16. The EU continues to support the full

implementation of the Article 33 resolution and underline the importance of continued follow-

up by all ILO constituents17. The EU remains prepared to adapt its approach towards Myanmar

under the GSP, as appropriate, in line with evolving circumstances and its overarching objective

of supporting the people of Myanmar.

5. Development cooperation in support of EBA objectives

EU development cooperation with Bangladesh and with Cambodia is implemented through

Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)—Global

Europe and in line with Global Gateway. The cooperation with Myanmar takes into account

the specificity of the country’s situation, in compliance with the Foreign Affairs Council

Conclusions of February 2021.

6

Bangladesh

Through the Global Gateway strategy, the EU and Bangladesh work together to promote Clean

Energy and Climate Action, education, Technical and Vocational Education and Training and

skills, inclusive governance, migration management, and resilience. The Multiannual

Indicative Programme (MIP) for Bangladesh with the allocation for 2021-2027 of EUR 470

million supports three priorities: 1) Human Capital Development, 2) Green Inclusive

Development, and 3) Inclusive Governance. Under the European Fund for Sustainable

Development Plus (EFSD+) the EU has also made investments in Bangladesh’s energy, railway

and water sectors. Further investments are planned to support the country’s green energy

transition and circular economy. The country also benefits from two Team Europe Initiatives

(TEIs) covering Decent Work and Green Energy Transition as well as several regional

programmes, including in the areas of disaster risk responsiveness and energy connectivity.

Bangladesh is also an EU priority country for migration. EU support of more than EUR 92

million includes the reintegration of returnees, support to the Talent Partnership between EU

and Bangladesh (legal migration) and building Rohingya refugees’ and host communities’

resilience. An action on integrated border management is planned.

Several interventions are particularly relevant for the EBA Enhanced Engagement. ’Advancing

decent work’ and ’Support to the National Social Security Strategy Reforms’ support social

protection, labour reforms and enabling environment for labour rights. ’Promoting Justice for

All: For a more inclusive and effective justice system in Bangladesh’ promotes rule of law and

human rights in Bangladesh.

Cambodia

The EU is engaging with Cambodia on the necessary reforms to achieve the SDGs and to fulfil

the conditions necessary for a possible reinstatement of full EBA preferences.

The 2021-2027 Multiannual Indicative Programme for Cambodia (EUR 235 million) supports

three priorities: 1) green growth and decent jobs; 2) education and skills development; 3)

good governance – fully aligned with Cambodia’s Pentagonal Strategy Phase 1 and the EU

Indo-Pacific Strategy. This cooperation follows a human-rights-based approach and is aligned

with core United Nations (UN) and ILO conventions relevant for the GSP. It is therefore key

to address gaps in the effective implementation and safeguard of human rights and labour rights

in the country.

EU’s support is contributing to Cambodia’s integration in Association of South East Asian

Nations (ASEAN), as well as to the strengthening of value chains, trade facilitation,

competitiveness, and compliance with international standards. The EU Global Access and

Trade Expertise (EU GATE) programme contributes to improving regulatory measures and

practices in Cambodia in support of inclusive and sustainable exports to the EU and regional

markets, with a focus on the cashew nut and pepper value chains as well as on the Garment,

Footwear and Travel Goods sector. The EU-Cambodia Partnership for Sustainable

Agriculture and Food Systems and the Partnership for Sustainable Energy Practices in

Industry programmes are also key to providing support to these crucial value chains and

improve competitiveness, environmental sustainability, and better working conditions.

Moreover, the Global Gateway flagship Partnership in Education for Green and Digital

Jobs supports Cambodia’s industrial growth and transition to an upper-middle-income country

7

by providing young Cambodians, particularly women and girls, with the skills necessary for

future employment in green and digital sectors. Notably, the EU supports the promotion and

protection of the civic space in Cambodia and the inclusive participation of the civil society.

EU-funded initiatives support Civil Society Organisations addressing a broad range of human

rights issues, including freedom of expression, labour rights, and democracy, and they

contribute to empowering vulnerable and marginalised groups by supporting their engagement

in policymaking and electoral processes.

Myanmar

EU cooperation in Myanmar is guided by the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of February

202118, adopted after the military coup. Accordingly, the EU suspended all activities that might

be perceived as supporting or legitimising the military authorities. After a careful review of the

development assistance portfolio, the EU, in consultation with its Member States, adopted a

‘back to basics’ approach. This approach focuses on providing direct support to the people of

Myanmar, particularly the most vulnerable communities, to help build their resilience in

collaboration with civil society actors, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and

international organisations. The 2021-2027 bilateral development assistance benefitting the

people of Myanmar (~EUR 290 million) is strategically organised around three main sectoral

priority areas: (1) Peace and governance, (2) Education, (3) Sustainable livelihoods and

green growth. The people of Myanmar also benefit from additional humanitarian funds as well

as regional and thematic programmes.

EU support, particularly in the area of sustainable livelihoods and green growth, aims at

reducing poverty and strengthening the resilience of Myanmar’s most vulnerable populations.

Promoting economic resilience is at the core of several EU interventions that encourage

responsible business practices, improve working conditions, safeguard decent jobs, and expand

access to skills development and employability opportunities.

These initiatives aim not only to reinforce economic resilience but also to ensure that economic

activity aligns with social and environmental standards. EU programmes in this sector are

designed to support compliance with relevant EU legislation on corporate sustainability,

including the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), the Corporate

Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), and the Forced Labour Regulation (FLR).

8

1 For years 2020-2022 see the dedicated SWD(2023) 360 final of 21.11.2023 2 Key events in 2026 at the moment of writing have been included in this Staff Working Document. All links

provided were up to date as of 28 April 2026. 3 JOIN(2026) 16. 4 Statement by the Spokesperson for EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the elections:

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/bangladesh-statement-spokesperson-elections_en 5 Key exchanges took place on the 11th EU-Bangladesh Joint Commission meeting held in Dhaka on 31 October

2024, preceded by a meeting of the Sub-group on Good Governance and Human Rights. 6 The most recent being the 8th Implementation Status of the NAP in October 2025. 7 SWD (2023)360 final of 21.11.2023 8 https://www.ilo.org/publications/cambodia-decent-work-country-programme-2024-2028 9 https://cdn.misti.gov.kh/documents/202502051007038bjzgpqRQ7Gj.pdf 10 https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/global-slavery-index-by-country 11 CEACR, 114th Session, 2026 noted deep concerns about: (1) the high level of sexual exploitation of children,

including through online sexual abuse material and in the context of prostitution, and the so-called ’sale of

virginity’ and United Nations. (2024). Summary of stakeholders' submissions on Cambodia. Human Rights

Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Forty-sixth session, 29 April-10 May 2024 (GE.24-

03361(E)), para. 70. 12 International Labour Organisation (ILO), Observation (CEACR), adopted 2024, published 113rd ILC session,

2025.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4417591,103055 13 See: https://iwgia.org/en/cambodia/4648-iw-2022-cambodia.html 14 See: https://cambodia.un.org/en/174010-gender-equality-deep-dive-

cambodia#:~:text=The%20objective%20of%20this%20%E2%80%9Cdeep,hindering%20inclusive%20and%20s

ustainable%20development . 15 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/550 of 12 February 2020. 16 Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Towards Freedom and Dignity in Myanmar, Report of the Commission

of Inquiry established in accordance with article 26 of the ILO Constitution concerning non-observance by

Myanmar of the ILO Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, No

87 (1948), and the ILO Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930), 4 October 2023. 17 International Labour Conference – 113th Session, Geneva, 2025, Resolution concerning the measures

recommended by the Governing Body under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution on the subject of Myanmar, 5 June

2025. 18 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6287-2021-INIT/en/pdf

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 16.7.2026 SWD(2026) 186 final

JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good

Governance (GSP+) assessment of the Kyrgyz Republic covering the period 2023-2025

Accompanying the document

Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council

on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences covering the period 2023-2025

{JOIN(2026) 16 final} - {SWD(2026) 184 final} - {SWD(2026) 185 final} - {SWD(2026) 187 final} - {SWD(2026) 188 final} - {SWD(2026) 189 final} - {SWD(2026) 190 final} - {SWD(2026) 191 final} - {SWD(2026) 192 final}

1

1. Executive Summary

Kyrgyzstan has benefitted from the EU’s Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable

Development and Good Governance of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+) since

2016. Thanks to GSP+, nearly all imports into the EU from Kyrgyzstan in 2024 were granted

GSP+ or MFN duty free treatment. Still, Kyrgyzstan can make better use of the potential of the

GSP+ scheme, both in terms of full use of existing preferences and of diversification. Once in

application, the EU-Kyrgyzstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA),

signed in June 2024, will complement GSP+’s market access and sustainability commitments.

During the 2023-2025 monitoring period1, which included an EU GSP+ monitoring mission in

November 2024, Kyrgyzstan has been facing compliance issues with its GSP+ obligations. The

country demonstrated progress in advancing social rights and protection, women’s rights, drug

control and anti-corruption efforts, while confronting enduring challenges in the

implementation of labour rights and human rights protection. Rapidly shrinking civil society

and media space, increasing pressure via restrictive legislation and practice, and enduring

enforcement gaps, particularly in judiciary independence, fair trials, and in torture prevention

and prosecution, are hampering Kyrgyzstan’s full alignment with its GSP+ commitments.

The new Anti-corruption Strategy and the increased liability for corruption offences are

positive developments. In the realm of labour rights, the lifting of the moratorium on

unannounced labour inspections and work on promoting women’s rights and equality represent

steps forward. Kyrgyzstan also strengthened legislation on domestic, sexual, and gender-based

violence and government action plans on child rights. Kyrgyzstan has made advances in

implementing drug control commitments, while progress in environmental and climate

legislation has been mixed.

However, serious concerns continue to overshadow these positive developments. Recent

United Nations (UN) treaty body reviews and the 2025 Universal Periodic Review (UPR)

indicate deterioration, driven by new, restrictive legislation not aligned with ratified

conventions. Prosecutions of independent journalists, bloggers, and civil society

representatives in all areas of public activity are increasing. Independent oversight remains

hampered by shrinking civic space, growing pressure on independent media and non-

governmental organisations (NGOs), and the controversial dissolution of the National Centre

for the Prevention of Torture (NCPT) in 2025. In the realm of labour rights, the effective

realisation of freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, work on ensuring

non-discrimination, and ensuring sufficient resources and empowering labour inspectors

remain crucial to further progress, including with regards to the elimination of forced labour

and child labour.

To ensure continued GSP+ eligibility and increased compliance with international

commitments, in particular in view of the revised GSP rules as of 2027, the following key

priorities for future engagement stand out: enabling space for civic space and media freedom;

torture prevention and reform of the criminal justice system; ensuring the enforcement of

labour rights through a fully empowered and well-resourced Labour Inspectorate, and

implementing anti-corruption plans, transparency, and rule of law.

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2. Key Developments

2.1 Political and economic developments

The EU and Kyrgyzstan signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA)

on 25 June 2024. The trade and economic relations aspects of the EPCA will be complementary

with the market access and sustainability commitments offered to Kyrgyzstan by the EU’s

GSP+. The EPCA is currently in the process of being ratified by Kyrgyzstan and EU member

states. When consenting to the EPCA, the European Parliament adopted an associated

resolution highlighting concerns on human rights2. The provisional application of the EPCA

will start as soon as Kyrgyzstan notifies the EU of the completion of its internal procedures.

Kyrgyzstan remains classified as a lower-middle-income country by the World Bank. The

Kyrgyz economy continues to record exceptionally high real growth rates (8 % estimate for

2025, around 9 % annually in 2022-2024) supported by a favourable external environment3.

The high growth has contributed to improving social conditions. The national poverty rate

declined from 29.8 % in 2021 to 25.7 % in 2024. However, real incomes increased at a slower

pace due to inflation pressures. Economically, the country is based on services, mining, trade,

and goods manufacturing. Nevertheless, it remains heavily dependent on remittances from

migrant workers (primarily in Russia and Kazakhstan), which accounted for nearly 16 % of

GDP in 2025.

Kyrgyzstan held early parliamentary elections on 30 November 2025, initially planned for

November 2026. They were considered efficiently run but a restrictive campaign environment

stifled candidate and voter engagement; fundamental freedoms of expression, association, and

peaceful assembly were increasingly constrained in practice; and civil society and observation

efforts were restricted4. Kyrgyzstan had overhauled its electoral system only half a year before

the snap parliamentary elections, in June 2025. The law changed the earlier mixed electoral

system to a fully majoritarian model and simplified the system by dividing the country into 30

constituencies each electing three MPs, at least one of them a woman. The reform, adopted

with little public consultation, effectively abolished the earlier open party system and has

significantly diminished the role of political parties.

Regional and global geopolitical developments continue to have a profound influence on

Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy and domestic politics, not least the multifaceted effects of Russia’s

war of aggression against Ukraine. Kyrgyzstan pursues a multi-vector foreign policy and

traditional dependencies on Russia coexist alongside a concerted push for alternative partners.

China is Kyrgyzstan’s largest trading partner by a large margin with a trade turnover (exports

plus imports) of EUR 5.1 billion in 2024, while total trade with Russia – the next in line - stood

at about EUR 3 billion, both partners presenting 56.7 % of total trade turnover in 20245.

Bishkek works increasingly in constructive tandem with its Central Asian neighbours. The

signing of the border agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (and a trilateral border

agreement including Uzbekistan) in March 2025 laid to rest a long-standing source of tension

between the two countries – a historic achievement that has provided new impetus also to the

wider project of regional stability and cooperation in Central Asia.

2.2 GSP+ trade impact

Kyrgyzstan’s GSP+ utilisation rate remained low and dropped considerably from 2022 to 20246,

standing at 61.2 % in 2022, 45.5 % in 2023, and further dropping to 29.8 % in 2024, resulting

in GSP+ imports in 2024 below pre-COVID levels. This decline was largely driven by Kyrgyz

imports of fruit and vegetables into the EU falling and not claiming GSP+ preferences. At the

3

same time, Kyrgyz imports into the EU eligible for GSP+ remained relatively high and above

pre-COVID levels, suggesting significant untapped potential. Total Kyrgyz imports entering

the EU declined by 13.1 % annually, from EUR 147.2 million in 2022 to EUR 111.1 million

in 2024, but remained above pre-Covid levels. MFN duty-free Kyrgyz imports declined by

10.4 % annually), from EUR 134 million in 2022 to EUR107.6 million in 2024, but also above

pre-COVID levels. However, the share of Kyrgyz imports entering the EU using MFN duty-

free rate rose, increasing from 91 % in 2022 to 96.9 % in 2024. As a result of GSP+, Kyrgyzstan

benefited from being exempt from an estimated EUR 234 000 in tariffs in 2024.

Figure 1. EU imports from Kyrgyzstan and GSP+ utilisation rate, 2019-2024

Indicators 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Annual Growth

(2022-2024)

Total imports, (EUR million)

104.7 75.3 73.7 147.2 114.5 111.1 -13.1 %

GSP+ eligible, (EUR million)

7.4 5.4 4.7 12.5 11.4 11.3 -5.1 %

GSP+ used, (EUR million)

4.5 3.5 3.1 7.7 5.2 3.4 -33.8 %

Share of GSP+ eligible in total

7.1 % 7.1 % 6.4 % 8.5 % 10.0 % 10.2 % -

GSP+ utilisation rate 61.0 % 65.9 % 65.3 % 61.2 % 45.5 % 29.8 % -

MFN=0 % imports,

(EUR million)7 97.2 69.9 68.7 134.0 102.6 107.6 -10.4 %

Share of MFN=0 %

imports 92.8 % 92.8 % 93.2 % 91.0 % 89.6 % 96.9 % -

Figure 2. EU imports from Kyrgyzstan by trade regime and utilisation rates, 2019-2024

In 2024, the product sectors8 benefiting most from GSP+ preferences (by EU import value)

were: Vegetables & Fruit (S-02b9), Stone, Ceramics & Glass (S-13) out of which Kyrgyzstan

primarily exports glass, Prepared Foods & Beverages (S-04b), Tobacco (S-04c), and Footwear

(S-12a). Vegetables & Fruit recorded the highest GSP+ eligible imports (EUR 3.2 million),

although their utilisation rate remained moderate at 68.8 %. By contrast, Tobacco, Prepared

Foods & Beverages, and Footwear achieved high utilisation rates (99.2 %, 90.6 % and 86.1 %

respectively), but each accounted for less than EUR 0.4 million in GSP+-eligible imports.

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Figure 3. Top product groups benefiting from GSP+ tariff preferences for Kyrgyzstan, 2024

3. Compliance with GSP+ obligations

Kyrgyzstan has maintained ratification of all 27 GSP+ relevant conventions and has issued no

new reservations. Kyrgyzstan is broadly compliant with its reporting obligations to the

monitoring bodies, with some delays in particular on labour rights (for details, see Annex).

This section is based on the latest UN monitoring body reports and supplemented with

information from civil society and GSP monitoring. Kyrgyzstan has continuously engaged with

the EU GSP+ monitoring process through regular exchanges of information, including at high

level events, and a GSP+ monitoring mission back-to-back with the most recent human rights

dialogue in November 2024.

3.1 Human Rights

In April 2025, Kyrgyzstan's human rights record was reviewed under the Universal Periodic

Review (UPR) at the UN Human Rights Council10. While the country welcomed a high number

of UPR recommendations, including on combating domestic violence and protecting children's

rights, Kyrgyzstan only took note of key recommendations on the shrinking civic space,

freedom of expression, and media freedom.

Kyrgyzstan has made some progress and efforts in child protection and women’s rights.

In the area of child protection, in April 2025, Kyrgyzstan presented an Action Plan for

implementing the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child

based on the fifth and sixth periodic reports of Kyrgyzstan on the implementation of the

Convention on the Rights of the Child for 2025-2028. According to the 2023 Multiple Indicator

Cluster Survey for the Kyrgyz Republic, mortality of children under 5 years of age decreased

in recent years and stood at 16.5 children per 1 000 live births in 202411. Stunting is moderately

high with overall 14 % of children being affected (16 % in poor households). While school

enrolment at the primary and lower secondary level is high (99 % and 98 % respectively), early

childhood education enrolment remains low (32 %). Violence against children remains a

serious problem: 37 % of children are exposed to violent physical punishment, 60 % experience

psychological aggression and 65 % experience other forms of violence, while 20 % are engaged

in child labour.

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Kyrgyzstan has also made efforts to foster gender equality and counter gender-based

violence, in line with their commitments under the Convention on the Elimination of all

Discrimination Against Women. The National Action Plans on Gender Equality (2022–2024

and 2025-2027 under endorsement)under the Gender Equality Strategy through 2030 outline

the implementation of strategic objectives for reducing gender disparities in education,

employment, and political participation, though their implementation has been uneven. The

endorsement of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (2026-2028) and the

establishment of the Gender Council under the Speaker of Parliament provide further

opportunities to strengthen women’s leadership and advance efforts towards gender equality.

However, gaps in legislative oversight and limited implementation highlight the need for scaled

up action and mobilisation. Legislative reforms, including amendments to the Criminal

Procedure Code, laws on alimony, and legal aid, reflect growing political will to protect

women’s rights and strengthen enforcement mechanisms. In August 2024, Kyrgyzstan adopted

amendments to the Criminal Code and related legislation12 with the aim to enhance protection

against domestic, sexual, and gender-based violence (GBV). The amendments eliminate the

possibility of reconciliation in cases of rape and sexual assault, increase penalties for battery,

remove eligibility for probation in case of convictions for sexual acts with children under 16,

bride kidnapping, and forced marriage, and introduce GBV risk assessment protocol. Further

legislative amendments of October 202513 introduced higher penalties for domestic violence.

Kyrgyzstan opened a ‘One Stop Service Centre for Victims of Violence’, in May 2024 with

EU and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) support that provides medical,

psychological and legal assistance to victims and survivors of domestic and gender-based

violence. Gender-based violence remains a pervasive issue, despite Kyrgyzstan’s efforts.

Systemic challenges persist in Kyrgyzstan’s human rights landscape, particularly in torture

prevention, anti-discrimination, andin terms of an increased restriction of civic and media

space.

Thedissolution of the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture (NCPT) in mid-2025and

the transfer of its mandate to the Ombudsperson14 has eliminated the only independent body

mandated to monitor places of detention and to document allegations of torture and ill-

treatment in line with the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT)15.

The UN Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture criticised this decision, which it

considers was taken by the parliament without public consultation or transparency. The NCPT

used to be considered a model for the Central Asia region, as the only independent national

human rights institution meeting international standards. Concern about the independence of

the Ombudsperson and lack of sufficient resources allocated for its functioning have been

raised during the UPR (recommendations 140.31-140.76). Accredited with ‘B’ status in 2012,

the Kyrgyz Ombudsman Institute still retains this classification and must address five key areas

identified by the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) to achieve full ‘A’ status compliance.

Kyrgyzstan’s civic and media space has faced growing restrictions in recent years, raising

concerns about shrinking freedoms and government pressure on independent voices.

Kyrgyzstan's Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression and free media.

However, several laws adopted over the last years impose substantial restrictions. Recent laws

that may negatively impact freedom of expression include the Mass Media law (August 2025)

that expands government control over independent media outlets; and the law ‘On

Amendments to the Code of Offenses’ (July 2025), which seeks to impose administrative

sanctions and fines on individuals and legal entities outlets for disseminating false information

on social media, messaging platforms, and traditional media outlets. In addition, the law on the

‘Protection from False Information’ from 2021 continues to grant the authorities the right to

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order the removal of articles and block or shut down websites containing information deemed

to be ‘false’ or ‘inaccurate’ without a court order; the law has since been used at least four

times against major media outlets16. The law on ‘Protecting children from harmful information’,

adopted in 2023, aims to curb distribution of online material that features ‘non-traditional

sexual relationships’ and undermines ‘family values’ or promotes illegal/anti-social behaviour

and substance abuse. Critics have pointed out that the law not only targets LGBTIQ+ persons

but also paves the way of possible online censorship. In 2024, the law was used to ban TikTok

in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan also introduced a state monopoly over international internet traffic

from 15 August 2025 until 14 August 2026.

State policies regarding freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of association, and

freedom of expression have significantly tightened. In February 2025, a new Law ‘On Freedom

of Religion and Religious Associations’ entered into force, alongside corresponding

amendments to the Code of Offenses, which introduce liability for violating a wide range of

restrictions on religious activity, including mandatory registration and a minimum 500 Kyrgyz

citizens requirement. In July 2025, amendments were introduced to the Criminal Code, the

Code of Offenses, and the Law ‘On Countering Extremist Activity’, establishing criminal

liability for the possession of extremist materials, carrying sentences of up to three years of

imprisonment. Consequently, any individual can now be prosecuted for possessing audio-

visual materials, even in cases where they were unaware of the unlawful nature of such

information.

Reports from local NGOs and international observers highlight increased harassment and legal

prosecution of journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society activists17. Between 2022

and 2026, OHCHR has documented 114 instances of criminal prosecutions against 112

individuals liked to freedom of expression. These criminal prosecutions systematically use

vague Criminal Code provisions, for example, Article 278 ('calls for mass unrest'), relying

almost exclusively on state-commissioned forensic linguistic and political science expertise.

Independent media outlets have faced legal intimidation, arbitrary fines, closures, and

politically motivated lawsuits and extremism labels, particularly when reporting on corruption,

human rights abuses, or government criticism. The so-called ‘Foreign Representatives’ Law,

adopted in April 2024, requires Non-Commercial Organisations and NGOs that receive foreign

funding and engage in ‘political activity’ to register as ‘foreign representatives’. The

implementation framework has yet to be finalised but the adoption of the law has already had

a chilling effect on the wider civil society community in Kyrgyzstan, forcing many

organisations to abandon their role and rights-based advocacy. Without stronger protections

for free speech and civic participation, Kyrgyzstan’s compliance with international human

rights conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),

remains at risk. Some potentially positive trends were observed in February-March 2026

following changes in the leadership of the powerful security service. However, their real impact

is yet to be seen.

There are also concerns about judicial independence18, and the problematic system of ‘pre-

investigative checks’, which allows law enforcement officials 30 days to look into a case before

registering it, as it risks violating victims’ rights to an effective and timely investigation.

Kyrgyzstan abolished the death penalty in 2007 and ratified the Second Optional Protocol to

the ICCPR, which prohibits reinstating the death penalty in 2010. However, in December 2025,

the president proposed to reinstate the death penalty despite Kyrgyzstan’s international

obligations. In its ruling of December 2025, the Kyrgyz Constitutional Court reaffirmed the

country's commitment to its constitutional and international obligations in this regard. The

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Court made it clear that reintroducing the death penalty through a constitutional amendment

would be ‘unconstitutional, impermissible and legally impossible’. It emphasised that that the

Constitution ‘requires compliance with relevant international obligations when making

decisions at the national level’ and highlighted that the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR

does not provide a denunciation mechanism. The obligation is permanent, according to the

Court.

The lack of proper definition of discrimination in the Kyrgyz Criminal code and the persistent

discrimination noted for example in 2024 by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights (CESCR) against LGBTIQ+ persons, persons with disabilities, and persons living with

HIV/AIDS continues to be of concern19. The CESCR requested that Kyrgyzstan repeal the

2023 discriminatory legislation (‘Law on protecting children from harmful information’),

which sanctions persons for disseminating information ‘contrary to traditional family and

social values and promoting non-traditional sexual relations’. It also expressed concern over

health-related legal provisions that discriminate against transgender persons, such as the law

on the protection of the health of citizens, under which the minimum age for accessing gender-

affirming care has been increased to 25. On 30 January 2026, a draft bill potentially banning

legal recognition of gender was proposed., The law, which passed its first reading on 4 June

2026, would effectively prohibit legal gender recognition and gender-affirming healthcare by

defining gender as immutable and based solely on biological characteristics at birth. In April

2026, the Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic upheld a provision of the Law on

Citizenship allowing the termination of citizenship of naturalised citizens on national security

grounds. The case raised significant human rights concerns related to the broad and vague

interpretation of ‘national security’, the lack of sufficient judicial safeguards, and the risk of

arbitrary deprivation of nationality and discriminatory treatment of naturalized citizens.

Priorities for future engagement include protecting civic space and avoiding unduly

restricting the operations of NGOs. It is also important that Kyrgyzstan respects the freedom

of expression and assembly, including the freedom of the media. Torture prevention efforts

remain necessary, as well as criminal justice system reform, including the strengthening of

independent oversight. Protections for women, children, and minorities also should be

strengthened, including through the adoption of the comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Law,

in line with international standards.

3.2 Labour Rights

While Kyrgyzstan has made some positive steps forward by lifting the moratorium on labour

inspections and implementing new legislation to work towards gender equality on the labour

market, concerns remain as regards the effective realisation of freedom of association and the

right to collective bargaining. Work on ensuring non-discrimination beyond gender equality

and ensuring sufficient resources and empowering labour inspectors remain crucial to further

progress.

Kyrgyzstan has not submitted its most recent reports due in 2024 on Conventions No. 29 and

No. 105 (concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour and the Abolition of Forced Labour) and

No. 138 and No. 182 (concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment and the

Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour)20.

The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions (CEACR) noted that the

report provided by the Government in 2024 on Convention No. 100 concerning Equal

Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value and Convention No.

111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation merely repeats the

8

information submitted in 2019. Therefore, there is no updated independent assessment from

the ILO publicly available on these crucial conventions. A new Labour Codewas adoptedin

January 202521; however, the CEACR has not yet assessed whether the Code responds to its

previous request. Its impact on the overall labour rights situation is yet to be seen.

While themoratorium on labour inspections, in place since 2020, was lifted in January 202522,

a draft presidential decree put forward in January 2026 would reintroduce the moratorium on

business inspections until the end of the year. The CEACR recalled in its 2026 report that, ‘any

moratorium placed on labour inspection is a serious violation of the Convention [no. 81

concerning Labour Inspection in Industry and Commerce] 23 ’. The International Labour

Conference’s Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) has reviewed and issued a set

of recommendations to Kyrgyzstan concerning Convention No. 81, including as regards the

moratorium, number of labour inspectors, and the powers of labour inspectors, which currently

remain severely limited. In this regard, the CEACR notes that the number of labour inspectors

remains of deep concern pending a moratorium on the hiring of new inspectors until 2026.

As regards non-discrimination, on Convention No 100 and Convention No 111, the new

Labour Code (entry into force 24 January 2025) in its Article 139 establishes a prohibition on

the employment of pregnant women and women who are breastfeeding in heavy work, work

under harmful and/or hazardous conditions, and underground work. Work is under way to

establish a list of hazardous work for pregnant and breastfeeding women, as opposed to

professions prohibited to women in general. Kyrgyzstan took a positive step by ratifying ILO

Convention No. 190 on Violence and Harassment in the World of Work. Despite these positive

steps, further work is needed on non-discrimination in general to ensure that the legislative

framework is fully in line with the two conventions. ILO has yet to formally assess whether

the longstanding CEACR requests have been addressed in the new Labour Code, including to

better reflect the principles of equal pay for work of equal value; to ensure that any restrictions

to the access of women to certain categories of work are strictly limited to the protection of

maternity; and review and amend any other gender-based discriminatory legal provisions and

address the causes of the gender pay gap; to define and prohibit sexual harassment in the

workplace. The CEACR in its direct request of 2025 also noted with regret that enforcement

gaps exist and observed that discrimination is rarely sanctioned, victims’ rights are not restored,

and there are no specialised bodies to protect victims of discrimination.

Efforts to combat forced labour and human trafficking reported by the Kyrgyz government

have included the adoption of the Programme to Combat Trafficking in Persons (2022–2025),

the establishment of regional Coordination Councils to improve inter-agency cooperation, and

the information strategy for the prevention of trafficking in persons in Kyrgyzstan for the

period 2024–202624. The 2021 Criminal Code sets out imprisonment for the use of forced

labour, maintained in the 2025 Penal Code 25 . Since October 2025, the Government is

implementing a ‘Single Window’, which aims to enable the provision of social, medical, and

legal assistance to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking, in coordination with

the relevant accommodation facilities. Kyrgyzstan has made a positive step towards working

on protecting Kyrgyz workers abroad by ratifying ILO Convention No. 181 on Private

Employment Agencies on 26 November 2025. However, information on the implementation

of the above measures is lacking.

In its 2023 direct request, the CEACR observedthat the Penal Code of 2021 (Section 200)

provides for the imposition of penalties involving compulsory labour in circumstances

defined in terms which are broad enough to give rise to questions about their conformity with

Convention No. 10526. The CEACR also stressed that the range of activities that must be

9

protected from punishment involving compulsory labour includes the right to freedom of

expression and the right to freedom of association and assembly, among others. It requested

the government to ensure that in practice persons who peacefully express certain political views

or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system are not

punished with penalties involving compulsory labour27.

Despite efforts, child labour remains widespread, with the 2023 Multiple Indicator Cluster

Survey (MICS) revealing that 20 % of children are engaged in child labour, while the National

Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic puts the share of children aged 5–17 involved in

labour activities at 26.7 % in 2023. The worst forms of child labour are concentrated in rural

areas, particularly in agriculture, and in children in the poorest quintile. The Government

intends to tackle child labour through addressing the situation of children in difficult life

situations. In 2023 the Government reported returning 354 children to attending general

education out of 403 children found outside the school system. However, information on the

implementation of the Program for the Protection of Children for 2023–26 and other measures

to tackle child labour is scarcely available. In 2023, the Committee called on the Government

to provide information on the practical steps taken to implement Conventions No. 138 and No.

182, criminalise the sexual exploitation of children, ensure adequate capacity for labour

inspectors, establish a positive list of light work permitted for children aged 14-16, and to

ensure that all employers are required to maintain a register of all persons under the age of 18

years whom they employ, among others28.

No developments have been recorded as regards the implementation of Conventions no. 87 and

no. 98 on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. There has been no

advancement on reducing the excessive thresholds for organising strikes or the severity of

sanctions in cases of taking part in unsanctioned protests or strikes. In its report of 2026,

CEACR notes a number of allegations by the International Trade Union Confederation,

including interference in the elections of the Federation of Trade Unions of Kyrgyzstan (FPK),

to which the Government has provided a reply, while the CEACR still requests further

comments29.

Priorities for future engagement include the need for Kyrgyzstan to comply with the regular

reporting obligations to the ILO and its supervisory mechanism. On substance, the Kyrgyz

authorities should further work to ensure the independence of social partners both in law and

in practice, and the effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of association and collective

bargaining, including with regards to the right to strike. Additionally, Kyrgyzstan should ensure

protection against discrimination through further work on the legal framework and its

enforcement and apply a clear definition of direct/indirect discrimination, which covers all

stages of employment and all grounds for discrimination. The country should also implement

further measures to prevent child labour, forced labour, and trafficking in human beings,

provide the necessary protection to victims, and investigate and criminally prosecute

perpetrators with deterrent penalties. It is crucial that the labour inspectorate is well-resourced

and fully empowered to effectively execute its duties.

3.3 Environment and Climate

Kyrgyzstan has ambitious environmental and climate plans, which it pursues with international

support, while compliance challenges persist.

Kyrgyzstan announced its objective to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 at CoP26 in 2021

subsequently reflecting this long-term ambition in national climate policy and new Nationally

10

Determined Contribution (NDC) submissions under the Paris Agreement and related to the

implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)30.

Work is underway to align the new State Programme on Biodiversity Conservation through

2040, serving as the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) under the

Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity

Framework 31 . A United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)-supported Ak Ilbirs

ecological corridor of about 800 000 hectares announced in 2025 will link major mountain

protected areas to maintain connectivity for snow leopards and other species32. A positive

development was the adoption on 24 January 2025 of the Law ‘On biological safety in the

Kyrgyz Republic’. The law sets out state policy principles, institutional responsibilities, and

regulatory requirements for activities involving genetically modified organisms and related

biotechnology and is intended to support implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on

Biosafety. At the same time, a 2024 World Bank gap analysis finds that biodiversity-related

legislation is broadly developed but only partly reflects concepts such as no-net-loss, critical

habitat and sustainable use and that enforcement and institutional capacity need strengthening33.

CBD and UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) assessments underline fragmented

legislation, insufficient and sometimes inefficient biodiversity finance and the absence so far

of a fully functioning NBSAP monitoring and information system34.

Kyrgyzstan overhauled its waste legislation by adopting the new Law ‘On Production and

Consumption Waste’ No 181 in August 2023, replacing the 2001 framework and setting state

policy principles, rules on hazardous-waste management, licensing, waste inventories and

extended producer responsibility 35. This effort should bring it closer to alignment with the

Basel Convention, notably regarding control of transboundary movements of hazardous waste

and environmentally sound management. It also contributes to implementation of the

Stockholm Convention and may support obligations under the Rotterdam Convention.

Kyrgyzstan made progress in the implementation of the Convention on international trade

in endangered species (CITES) during the reporting period, while its legislation remains

designated as Category 2. At CITES Standing Committee 77 (November 2023), progress on

national laws was noted, and Kyrgyzstan was removed from the list of countries for which a

formal warning on legislation had been proposed. Kyrgyzstan joined the Samarkand

Declaration and Regional Cooperation Action Plan (2025-2032) on wildlife protection at

CITES Conference of the Parties 20 (CoP20) in 2025. The Declaration aims at enhancing

enforcement coordination, information exchange, and capacity building, signalling continued

engagement in multilateral and regional wildlife protection efforts. In 2024–2025 the

authorities cooperated with TRAFFIC (The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network) and Fauna &

Flora to develop a new electronic CITES database and organised training for customs and

border officers on its use, with full hand-over of the system planned for September 202536.

Although the new electronic database is a major step, it was still being finalised and rolled out

in 2025, so its full impact on CITES reporting and controls has yet to materialise.

Despite positive measures, Kyrgyzstan revoked certain environmental protections during the

reporting period. In 2024, Kyrgyzstan revoked the 2019 ‘Prohibition of activities related to the

geological study of subsurface resources for the purpose of prospecting, exploration, and

development of uranium and thorium deposits’, which aimed to protect public health, lands,

water reservoirs, flora and fauna as well as ensure radiation and environmental safety standards.

In addition, 2024 amendments to the Law on Biosphere Territories revoked the prohibition of

geological exploration and development of mineral resources in biosphere zones including

11

Issyk Kul region. The lifting of these protections has already resulted in deforestation and

shallowing of Issyk Kul lake, and wider biosphere impacts.

Priorities for future engagement include focusing on stronger domestic implementation.

Overall, the key direction should be towards institutional strengthening, improved monitoring

and reporting systems, better inter-ministerial coordination, and mobilisation of finance to

close persistent implementation gaps and demonstrate credible progress under GSP+

environmental commitments. In the climate sphere, this means advancing Kyrgyzstan’s low-

emission pathway, clarifying its carbon-neutrality ambition, expanding renewable energy, and

strengthening adaptation in water, agriculture, and disaster-risk management. Finalising and

implementing the revised biodiversity strategy in line with the CBD framework is equally

important. Additionally, Kyrgyzstan should operationalise the 2023 waste legislation under the

Basel Convention, strengthen hazardous-waste oversight, and improve data reporting.

Enhancing CITES implementation through electronic permitting, improved non-detriment

findings, and better customs capacity also remains a priority.

3.4 Good Governance

Kyrgyzstan undertook significant legislative reforms to its drug-control framework in January

2024, adopting three new laws: ‘on Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, Their Analogues

and Precursors’37, ‘on Drug Circulation’38, and ‘on the Protection of Public Health’39. The latter

embeds measures to reduce drug and alcohol harm, anchoring prevention, treatment, and harm-

reduction in primary legislation. Together, these laws implement the Anti-Drug Programme

and Action Plan 2022–202640. However, the 2025 amendments to the Criminal Code indicate

a punitive shift overall: strengthened penalties for serious drug-related offences and eliminated

parole/statute of limitations for some of those crimes.

In 2023, authorities launched a broad crackdown on organised crime, yet drug trafficking along

the ‘Northern Route’ reportedly remains largely unaffected. Synthetic-drug manufacture and

trafficking continue to rise: according to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)

reporting in 2024 and 2025, clandestine laboratory dismantling increased from 3 in 2021 to 11

in 2022 and 12 in 202341. Because of the persistence of the illicit cultivation of cannabis,

national authorities have sustained their annual eradication campaigns in 2024 and have

continued to detect instances of clandestine outdoor cultivation42. In 2024, authorities seized

over 15 tons of drugs, nearly matching the combined total for 2021–2023 (17.3 tons). In the

same year, 1 163 drug crimes were recorded, with 961 individuals prosecuted, including 17

minors and 17 foreign nationals. The number of people registered at drug-treatment facilities

continues to decline, from 8 226 in 2021 to 7 672 in 2022 and 6 768 in 2023. As in other

countries using the same system, these figures reflect official narcological registers, which may

not capture the full extent of drug use due to stigma, fear of registration, and reporting

inconsistencies. Furthermore, users of ‘new’ drugs (synthetic and recreational) have little

incentive to register since no proper treatment is offered yet in Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan is currently undergoing the second United Nations Conventions against

Corruption (UNCAC) peer-review cycle, with the country visit conducted in July 2025; the

executive summary has not yet been published.

In June 2024, the authorities adopted a new Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025–2030 and an

accompanying Action Plan for 2025–2027, emphasising comprehensive legal and institutional

reforms. As a follow‑up, on 31 December 2024 Kyrgyzstan adopted Law No 209 ‘On

Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts in the Field of Counteracting Corruption’, introducing

12

tougher liability for corruption offences. A key change is the removal of fines as a possible

sanction for corruption crimes, which now carry mandatory imprisonment.

Despite these reform efforts, Kyrgyzstan continues to score low on most Worldwide

Governance Indicators by the World Bank, particularly on Control of Corruption, where its

score fell from 27.96 in 2019 to 24.85 in 202443. In Transparency International’s Corruption

Perceptions Index 2025, Kyrgyzstan ranked 142nd of 180 countries, with a score of 26/100,

marking a one-point improvement compared with 20244445. The November 2024 Organisation

for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) monitoring report46 of the Istanbul

Anti-Corruption Action Plan (IAP) indicates low scores in all respective areas (based on the

new peer-review methodology). Independent monitoring by Freedom House47 and CIVICUS

Monitor48 highlights that civil society and independent media in Kyrgyzstan face increasing

legal and operational pressures. UN human rights experts warn that these pressures are

discouraging civic activism, media reporting, and independent oversight, including in the field

of anti-corruption.

Priorities for future engagement include strengthening judicial independence, implementing

the anti-corruption Strategy and Action Plan, and enhancing the effectiveness of drug control

through a balanced, human-rights-centred approach, including improving the availability of

alternatives to coercive sanctions and expanding access to treatment and harm-reduction

services.

4. Development cooperation in support of GSP+ objectives

EU- Kyrgyzstan development cooperation is implemented mainly through NDICI—Global

Europe and the Global Gateway strategy, which in Central Asia focuses on four priority areas:

transport, critical raw materials, energy and water, and digital. The 2021-2027 bilateral

programme with Kyrgyzstan (~EUR 98 million) supports three priorities – governance and

digital transformation; a green and climate-resilient economy including water, energy and

uranium-legacy remediation; and human development – fully aligned with the Kyrgyz

National Development Strategy and the EU Strategy for Central Asia. This cooperation

directly underpins the implementation of core UN and ILO conventions relevant for GSP+,

by strengthening rule of law and public institutions, supporting climate and environmental

protection, and fostering a predictable, rules-based business climate and sustainable trade.

Several interventions are particularly relevant for the GSP+ context. ‘Support to Justice

Sector Reform in the Kyrgyz Republic: Advancing Probation and Integrated Criminal Justice

Information Management’ (Just4All) and its successor ‘Justice Sector Reform and

Digitalisation’ (Just4All2) support justice reform by advancing probation and criminal justice

information management, with a strong focus on the rule of law and good governance,

helping to modernise the criminal justice system and improve access to justice in line with

international standards and gender responsive, human-rights-based approaches. The ‘Support

to the National Preventive Mechanism against torture and to the Ombudsperson Institute of

the Kyrgyz Republic’ strengthens the national human-rights architecture and safeguards

against torture and ill-treatment, directly contributing to the implementation of core UN

human-rights conventions. Third, the ‘Green Economy and Sustainable Private Sector

Development in Kyrgyzstan’ programme, together with regional trade initiatives like

‘Ready4Trade Central Asia: Fostering Prosperity through the Trans-Caspian Transport

Corridor’ support greener value chains, WTO-related trade facilitation and private sector

competitiveness, thereby helping Kyrgyz exporters comply with labour and environmental

standards important for GSP+.

13

Annex: Kyrgyzstan - Compliance with GSP ratification and reporting obligations

Convention Ratification status

/ Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to

monitoring bodies

Human Rights

1. Convention on the Prevention

and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide (1948)

Ratified:

05.09.1997

No reservations

No reporting obligations

2. International Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination (1965)

Ratified:

05.09.1997

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 03.06.2025

• Last report submitted: 15.05.23

• Next report due: 05.10.2029

3. International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights (1966)

Ratified:

07.10.1994

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 09.12.2022

• Last report submitted: 25.02.2020

• Next report due: 2029

4. International Covenant on

Economic Social and Cultural

Rights (1966)

Ratified:

07.10.1994

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 11.10.2024

• Last report submitted: 20.04.2021

• Next report due: 31.10.2029

5. Convention on the Elimination of

All Forms of Discrimination

Against Women (1979)

Ratified:

10.02.1997

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 10.11.2021

• Last report submitted: 15.05.2023

• Next report due: November 2025 (not submitted)

6. Convention Against Torture and

other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment (1984)

Ratified:

05.09.1997

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 21.12.2021

• Last report submitted: 31.01.2019

• Next report due: 03.12.2025 (not submitted)

7. Convention on the Rights of the

Child (1989)

Ratified:

07.10.1994

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 28.09.2023

• Last report submitted: 12.11.2019

• Next report due: not yet set

Labour Rights12

8. Convention concerning Forced or

Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930)

Ratified:

31.03.1992

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2025

• Last Government report submitted: 2022

• Next report due: 2025 (not submitted)

9. Convention concerning Freedom

of Association and Protection of the

Right to Organise, No 87 (1948)

Ratified:

31.03.1992

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2025

• Last Government report submitted: 2024

• Next report due: 2027 (provisional schedule)

10. Convention concerning the

Application of the Principles of the

Right to Organise and to Bargain

Collectively, No 98 (1949)

Ratified:

31.03.1992

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments:2025

• Last Government report submitted: 2024

• Next report due: 2027 (provisional schedule)

11. Convention concerning Equal

Remuneration of Men and Women

Workers for Work of Equal Value,

No 100 (1951)

Ratified:

31.03.1992

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2024

• Last Government report submitted: 2023

• Next report due: 2029 (provisional schedule)

1 Following a decision taken by the ILO Governing Body in November 2025 to modernise the ILO reporting

system, as from 2027 Governments will no longer submit separate reports for each ratified Convention, but

instead, they will submit thematic reports based on a new ILO template which has grouped the conventions and

protocols into 15 thematic areas. As 2026 will be a transition year, only a limited number of reports will be

requested in 2026. See: The future of reporting on ratified conventions. https://www.ilo.org/international-labour-

standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards-overview-ilo/future-reporting-ratified-

conventions 2 Reservations do not apply in the ILO system.

14

Convention Ratification status

/ Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to

monitoring bodies

12. Convention concerning the

Abolition of Forced Labour, No 105

(1957)

Ratified:

18.02.1999

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2025

• Last Government report submitted: 2022

• Next report due: 2025 (not submitted)

13. Convention concerning

Discrimination in Respect of

Employment and Occupation, No

111 (1958)

Ratified:

31.03.1992

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2024

• Last Government report submitted: 2023

• Next report due: 2027 (provisional schedule)

14. Convention concerning

Minimum Age for Admission to

Employment, No 138 (1973)

Ratified:

31.03.1992

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2025

• Last Government report submitted: 2022

• Next report due: 2025 (not submitted)

15. Convention concerning the

Prohibition and Immediate Action

for the Elimination of the Worst

Forms of Child Labour, No 182

(1999)

Ratified:

10.05.2004

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest CEACR comments: 2025

• Latest Government report submitted: 2022

• Next report due: 2025 (not submitted)

Environment and Climate

16. Convention on International

Trade in Endangered Species of

Wild Fauna and Flora (1973)

Ratified:

02.09.2007

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Annual Trade Report for 2023 submitted 05.04.2024

• Annual Trade Report for 2024 submitted 14.01.2026

• Next Annual Trade Report due 31.10.2026

• Last Annual Illegal Trade Reports submitted for

2023, 20243

• Last Implementation Reports: 2015-2017

17. Montreal Protocol on

Substances that Deplete the Ozone

Layer (1987)

Ratified:

31.05.2000

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

Last report submitted:

• Article 7 data report covering 2024

Next report:

• Article 7 data report covering 2025 due 30.09.2026

18. Basel Convention on the

Control of Transboundary

Movements of Hazardous Wastes

and Their Disposal (1989)

Ratified:

13.08.1996

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• National report (NR) for 2023 submitted

14.01.2025

• NR for 2024 submitted 30.12.2025

• Next NR (2025) due 31.12.2026

19. Convention on Biological

Diversity (1992)

Ratified:06.08.1996

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Seventh National Report (7NR) submitted

05.03.2026.

• Latest National Biodiversity Strategy and Action

Plan (NBSAP) update: submitted 05.03.2026.

• Next report: 8NR due 30.06.2029.

20. The United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change

(1992)

Ratified:25.05.2000

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest updated Nationally Determined

Contributions (NDC 3.0) submitted 30.09.2025

• Latest National Communication (NC): NC4,

submitted 16.12.2024

• First Biennial Transparency Report (BTR1)

submitted 06.11.2025

• Next report (BTR2) due 31.12.2026

21. Cartagena Protocol on

Biosafety (2000)

Ratified:

05.10.2005

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest National Report: 5NR submitted 12.03.2026

• Next report: Not yet set

3 Reporting mandatory but not subject to compliance procedure.

15

Convention Ratification status

/ Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to

monitoring bodies

No reservations

22. Stockholm Convention on

Persistent Organic Pollutants

(2001)

Ratified:

12.12.2006

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest National Report: 4NR submitted 01.11.2018

• Next report: 5NR due 31.08.2022 (not submitted);

6th NR report due 31.08.2026

• Initial National Implementation Plan (NIP)

submitted 02.04.2009

• NIP updates: COP4 and COP5 amendments

included

23. Kyoto Protocol to the United

Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change (1998)

Ratified:

13.05.2003

No reservations

No reporting obligations separate from the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change

Good Governance

24. United Nations Single

Convention on Narcotic Drugs

(1961)

Ratified:

07.10.1994

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

2024 reporting fulfilled

Latest INCB mission in December 2022

25. United Nations Convention on

Psychotropic Substances (1971)

Ratified:

07.10.1994

No reservations

26. United Nations Convention

against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

(1988)

Ratified:

07.10.1994

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

2020-2025 reporting fulfilled with the exception of

the submission of information on illicit trade in,

legitimate uses of and requirements for substances in

Tables I and II for year 2024.

27. United Nations Convention

against Corruption (2003)

Ratified:

16.09.2005

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

First review cycle completed in 2019.

Second review cycle is at direct dialogue stage:

hybrid country visit conducted on 16-18 July 2025.

16

1 Key events in 2026 at the moment of writing have been included in this Staff Working Document. All links

provided were up to date as of 28 April 2026. 2 European Parliament, ‘Texts adopted - EU-Kyrgyz Republic Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation

Agreement (Resolution)’, Tuesday, 9 Sept. 2025. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-

0171_EN.html. 3 IMF, ‘World Economic Outlook’, Oct. 2025 Update. https://data.imf.org/en/Data-

Explorer?datasetUrn=IMF.RES:WEO(9.0.0) 4 OSCE, ‘Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary elections efficiently run but a restrictive campaign environment stifled

public engagement, international observers say’, 1 Dec. 2025. https://www.oscepa.org/en/news-a-media/press-

releases/2025/kyrgyzstans-parliamentary-elections-efficiently-run-but-a-restrictive-campaign-environment-

stifled-public-engagement-international-observers-say 5 UN Comtrade Database. https://comtradeplus.un.org/. 6 Source for all GSP statistics: Eurostat COMEXT data covering 2022-2024 based on latest available validated

full year data as of September 2025. GSP statistics only cover goods imported into the EU market, i.e., goods

released for free circulation in the EU. The GSP statistics do not cover other EU-imports, like goods imported

for the customs inward processing procedure or re-imports after the customs outward processing procedure.

Trade flows registered as ‘confidential’ do not appear in the GSP+ usage figures and regime 1 normal trade; but

do appear in total trade figures (regime

4). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/ext_go_agg_esms.htm#conf1537195068659. 7 MFN import data sourced from COMEXT on 13 February 2026. Minor discrepancies may occur, and

aggregated shares may exceed 100 % due to data revisions compared to GSP statistics extracted from COMEXT

in September 2025. 8 Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Oct. 2012 applying a

scheme of generalised tariff preferences, Annex V. 9 GSP sections are defined in the GSP Regulation and can contain multiple Common Nomenclature codes. 10 Human Rights Council, ‘Universal Periodic Review of Kyrgyzstan (4th Cycle, 49th Session), List of

recommendations’, Aug. 2025.

www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/upr/sessions/session49/upr49-kyrgyzstan-thematic-list-

of-recommendat.docx

11 UNICEF, UNFPA, USAID and Swiss Confederation, ‘Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey for the Kyrgyz

Republic 2023, Snapshot of Key Findings’, Jul. 2024, p. 7. https://www.unicef.org/kyrgyzstan/publications/mics-

kyrgyz-republic-2023 12 The law ‘On Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Kyrgyzstan in the field of protection from domestic,

sexual and gender violence’ was adopted by the Jogorku Kenesh on 26 Jun. 2024 and signed by the President in

early Aug. 2024. 13 The law ‘On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Kyrgyzstan’ signed on 16 October 2025. 14 The Constitutional Law ‘On Akyikatchy (the Ombudsperson) of the Kyrgyzstan’, adopted by Parliament on 25

Jun. 2025 and signed into law on 23 Sep. 2025. 15 Human Rights Watch, ‘Kyrgyzstan: Parliament Weakens Torture Protection, Media Freedom’, 27 Jun. 2025

www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/27/kyrgyzstan-parliament-weakens-torture-protection-media-freedom 16 Human Rights Watch, ‘Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Kyrgyzstan’, 11 Oct. 2024.

. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/10/11/submission-universal-periodic-review-kyrgyzstan 17 OHCHR, ‘Concern over prison sentences for Kyrgyz journalists’, 10 Oct. 2024.

http://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/10/concern-over-prison-sentences-kyrgyz-journalists. 18 International Partnership for Human Rights and Lawyers for Human Rights, ‘Report on the Results of the

Monitoring of the Criminal Justice Sector in the Kyrgyz Republic’, 17 Mar. 2025. https://iphronline.org/wp-

content/uploads/2025/03/eng-summary-of-analytical-report-on-the-prison-system-in-the-kyrgyz-republic.pdf 19 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of

Kyrgyzstan’, E/C.12/KGZ/CO/4, 11 Oct. 2024, p. 12. 20 Kyrgyzstan also did not submit its first report to the ILO following its ratification of the Protocol to ILO

Convention No. 29. 21CIS Legislation, https://cis-

legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=164746#:~:text=The%20Labor%20Code%20of%20the%20Kyrgyz%20Rep

ublic,forced%20labor%20*%20Prohibition%20of%20employment%20discrimination

17

22 International Labour Organization (ILO), ‘Individual Case (CAS) on Convention No 81’, Discussion: 2025,

Publication: 113th ILC session, 2025.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4438681,103529. 23 ILO, ‘Application of International Labour Standards 2026’, Report of the Committee of Experts on the

Application of Conventions and Recommendations. https://www.ilo.org/resource/conference-

paper/ilc/ilc114/application-international-labour-standards-2026. 24 Human Rights Council, ‘National report submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and

16/21, Kyrgyzstan’, para. 43. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4078855?v=pdf&ln=en. 25 The 2021 Criminal Code was amended in 2025; Art. 170 establishes imprisonment for a period of three to six

years for the use of forced labour. https://rimap.unhcr.org/node/62416. 26 ILO, ‘Direct Request (CEACR) on Convention No 105’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session, 2024. 27 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 105’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session, 2024

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P131

00_COUNTRY_ID:4357017,103529:NO 28 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Conventions No 138 and No 182’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC

session, 2024.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4327077,103529. 29 ILO, ‘Application of International Labour Standards 2026’, Report of the Committee of Experts on the

Application of Conventions and Recommendations, p.181-183. https://www.ilo.org/resource/conference-

paper/ilc/ilc114/application-international-labour-standards-2026 30 Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, ‘Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0) of the Kyrgyz

Republic’, 2025. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2025-10/NDC3.0_Kyrgyzstan_English_30-09-

2025%20%282%29.pdf. 31 Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, ‘CBD Strategy and Action Plan’. https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/kg/kg-

nbsap-v3-en.pdf. 32 UNEP, ‘Kyrgyz Republic unveils 800 000-hectare ecological corridor for biodiversity’, 23 May 2025.

. https://kyrgyzstan.un.org/en/294882-kyrgyz-republic-unveils-800000-hectare-ecological-corridor-biodiversity 33 World Bank, ‘Gap Analysis of Biodiversity Management Legal Framework of Kyrgyz Republic’,

https://2024.iaia.org/final-papers/479_Gap_Analysis_Biodiversity_Management_and_the.pdf 34 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), ‘Third Environmental Performance Review

(EPR) of Kyrgyzstan’, 2024. https://unece.org/environmental-policy/environmental-performance-

reviews/environmental-performance-reviews-kyrgyzstan. 35 FAOLEX/UNEP, Law No 181 on non-domestic and domestic waste.

https://leap.unep.org/en/countries/kg/national-legislation/law-no-181-non-domestic-and-domestic-waste. 36 TRAFFIC, ‘Digital Defenders: Kyrgyzstan Arms Law Enforcement Agencies with New Data Tool to Stop

Wildlife Smugglers’, 11 Aug. 2025. https://www.traffic.org/news/digital-defenders-kyrgyzstan-arms-law-

enforcement-agencies-with-new-data-tool-to-stop-wildlife-smugglers/ 37CIS-Legislation.com, ‘Law of the Kyrgyz Republic ”About Drug Circulation’, 12 Jan. 2024. https://www.cis-

legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=156214 38 CIS-Legislation.com, ‘Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “About Drug Circulation”’, Law of the Kyrgyz Republic

No 13 of 12 Jan. 2024, as amended 3 Nov. 2025. https://www.cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=156214 39 CIS-Legislation.com, ‘Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “About Protection of Public Health in the Kyrgyz

Republic”’, Law of the Kyrgyz Republic No 14 of 12 Jan. 2024, as amended through Jan. 2026. https://cis-

legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=156571 40 Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic, Resolution No 445 of 10 Aug. 2022 approving the Anti-Drug

Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Action Plan for its implementation for

2022-2026.https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=34436646&show_di=1 41 International Narcotics Control Board, ‘Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2024:

Implementation of the International Drug Control Conventions’, March 2025.

https://www.incb.org/incb/uploads/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2024/Annual_Report/E-INCB-

2024-1-ENG.pdf ; and International Narcotics Control Board, ‘Report of the International Narcotics Control

Board for 2023: Implementation of the International Drug Control Conventions’, Mar. 2024.

https://www.incb.org/incb/uploads/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2023/Annual_Report/E_INCB_2

023_1_eng.pdf 42 International Narcotics Control Board, ‘Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2025:

Implementation of the International Drug Control Conventions’, 2026.

https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/uploads/documents/2026-INCB/INCB_report_E.pdf

18

43 World Bank, ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators: Interactive Data Access’.

https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators/interactive-data-access 44 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2025: Kyrgyz Republic’, 10 Feb. 2026.

https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025/index/kgz 45 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2024: Kyrgyz Republic’, 11 Feb. 2025.

https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024/index/kgz 46 OECD, ‘Baseline Report of the Fifth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kyrgyzstan: The

Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan’, 19 Nov. 2024. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/11/baseline-

report-of-the-fifth-round-of-monitoring-of-anti-corruption-reforms-in-kyrgyzstan_9180017b.html 47 Freedom House, ‘Kyrgyzstan: Nations in Transit 2024’, 2024.

https://www.freedomhouse.org/country/kyrgyzstan/nations-transit/2024 48 CIVICUS Monitor, ‘UN Experts Warn of “Chilling” Impact as Assault on Media, Journalists and Activists

Intensifies’, 14 Oct. 2025.https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/un-experts-warn-of-chilling-impact-as-assault-on-

media-journalists-and-activists-intensifies/

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 16.7.2026 SWD(2026) 187 final

JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good

Governance (GSP+) assessment of the Republic of Uzbekistan covering the period 2023-

2025

Accompanying the document

Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council

on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences covering the period 2023-2025

{JOIN(2026) 16 final} - {SWD(2026) 184 final} - {SWD(2026) 185 final} - {SWD(2026) 186 final} - {SWD(2026) 188 final} - {SWD(2026) 189 final} -

{SWD(2026) 190 final} - {SWD(2026) 191 final} - {SWD(2026) 192 final}

1

1. Executive Summary

Uzbekistan has been a beneficiary of the EU’s Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable

Development and Good Governance of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+) since

2021. From an economic perspective, Uzbekistan has benefited substantially from GSP+, with

EU imports using GSP+ tariff preferences increasing almost five-fold since 2021 to EUR 448.2

million in 2024. The GSP+ utilisation rate remains high (92.2 % in 2024), indicating strong

trade integration, particularly for textiles, agricultural products, and light manufacturing. The

EU-Uzbekistan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) which entered into

provisional application on 1 March 2026, complements GSP+’s market access and

sustainability commitments.

The 2023–2025 monitoring period1 presents a complex picture. Uzbekistan received an EU

monitoring visit in March 2025 and further exchanged information with the EU as part of GSP+

monitoring. On the positive side, Uzbekistan cooperates well with the United Nations (UN)

and has advanced on social protection and healthcare, action against violence against women

and children, as well as on environmental and climate compliance and drug control. At the

same time, there has been backsliding in important areas—particularly civic and media space,

freedom of speech, independence of the judiciary, fair trials, and torture prevention and

prosecution.

Uzbekistan has advanced in several areas linked to their GSP+ commitments. Increased social

protection and legislative and practical steps to protect women and children from domestic

violence, such as the 2024 Law on Violence against Children and its strategy, as well as the re-

establishment of the Labour Inspectorate are welcome developments. The eradication of

systemic and systematic child and forced labour in cotton harvesting was maintained, as the

cotton sector continues to transition to free and compensated labour, but the lack of independent

monitors and issues raised regarding farmers’ rights remain areas of concern. The 2025 Labour

Code reform should provide for better alignment with international labour standards.

Uzbekistan has also progressed on its environmental and climate commitments, including

updated ambitious United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and

biodiversity targets, and made advances in afforestation around the Aral Sea.

Despite progress, significant political, institutional, and practical challenges hinder full

compliance with GSP+ obligations, in particular regarding civil and political rights. There are

continued and worsening limitations to media and civic space and restrictions on freedom of

association, including through intimidation and prosecution of dissenting voices, which have

severe impact on independent oversight across all four key areas: human rights, labour rights,

environment and climate, and anti-corruption. Concerns about the independence of the

judiciary and access to fair trials also pose crosscutting challenges, including on freedom of

expression, housing rights, torture, and anti-corruption. Similarly, a still weak Labour

Inspection system and restrictions on its functioning undermine monitoring of labour rights.

To ensure continued GSP+ eligibility, in particular in view of the revised GSP rules as of 2027,

and increase compliance with international commitments, the following key priorities stand

out for future engagement: ensuring civil society and media space and freedom of association;

ensuring adequate protection against torture; adopting and implementing anti-discrimination

legislation and policy; strengthening labour rights and their enforcement including the labour

inspectorate; strengthening anti-corruption bodies and their independence.

2

2. Key developments

2.1 Political and economic developments

Uzbekistan aims to reach upper-middle-income status by 20302. In the meantime, the country

remains eligible for GSP+ benefits based on the economic criteria – it is classified as lower-

middle-income country by the World Bank and meets the diversification and economic

vulnerability criteria set in the GSP Regulation.

The EU and Uzbekistan signed an EPCA in October 2025, which entered into provisional

application on 1 March 2026. The EPCA complements GSP+’s market access and sustainability

commitments. Uzbekistan aims to join the WTO during 2026, which would further align its

trade policies with international norms.

Uzbekistan’s economy has continued its robust growth trajectory, with GDP forecasted to

expand by 6.2 % in 2025 (following 6.6 % in 2024) and projected to reach 6 % in 20263. This

growth is driven by strong domestic demand, sustained structural reforms, and favourable

external conditions.

Uzbekistan continues its reform trajectory under the framework of the ’New Uzbekistan’

agenda, with a strong emphasis on economic modernisation, state-led reforms, and regional

engagement. However, some observers note a slowdown in the implementation of reforms.

While the authorities remain committed to gradual economic transformation, albeit with a

strong role for the State, political liberalisation, good governance, human rights, and the rule

of law continue to backslide. These trends intensified in 2023-2025.

2.2 GSP+ trade impact

Between 2022 and 20244, total EU imports from Uzbekistan remained broadly stable, declining

marginally from EUR 721.4 million in 2022 to EUR 716.6 million in 2024, equivalent to an

average annual change of -0.3 %. They had fallen more significantly in 2023 but then

recovered. Nonetheless, both total imports into the EU and GSP+ eligible imports have

increased more than four-fold compared to pre-COVID levels. Imports of GSP+ eligible

products from Uzbekistan to the EU fell from EUR 492.1 million in 2022 to EUR 392.5 million

in 2023, then recovered to EUR 485.9 million in 2024 – an increase of almost two times since

Uzbekistan joined GSP+ in 2021.

Figure 1. EU imports from Uzbekistan and GSP+ utilisation rate, 2019-2024

Indicators 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Annual

Growth

(2022-

2024)

Total imports, (EUR million) 172.3 174.4 383.7 721.4 668.9 716.6 -0.3 %

GSP+ eligible, (EUR million) 106.7 120.4 265.0 492.1 392.5 485.9 -0.6 %

GSP+ used, (EUR million) 93.6 108.5 239.9 458.0 330.0 448.2 -1.1 %

Share of GSP+ eligible in total 61.9 % 69.1 % 69.1 % 68.2 % 58.7 % 67.8 %

GSP+ utilisation rate 87.7 % 90.1 % 90.5 % 93.1 % 84.1 % 92.2 %

MFN=0 % imports, (EUR

million) 40.0 31.8 86.4 191.9 256.4 220.3 7.1 %

Share of MFN=0 % imports 23.2 % 18.2 % 22.5 % 26.6 % 38.3 % 30.7 %

3

In line with this, imports utilising GSP+ preferences remained relatively stable from EUR 458

million in 2022 to EUR 448.2 million in 2024. The GSP+ utilisation rate remained high in 2022

at 93.1 %, dipping to 84.1 % in 2023, and increased again to 92.2 % in 2024, indicating

continued strong use of preferences by Uzbek exporters. As a result of GSP+, Uzbekistan

benefited from an estimated EUR 26.7 million in tariff exemptions in 2024. This corresponded

to around 4 % of Uzbekistan’s export value to the EU in 2024.

Figure 2. EU imports from Uzbekistan by trade regime and utilisation rates, 2019-2024

The sectors5 benefiting the most from GSP+ preferences in 2024 were (in order of import value)

chemical products (S06-b)6, base metals and articles thereof (S-15b), textiles (S-11a), plastics

(S-07a), vegetables & fruit (S02-b), and clothing (S-11b). Chemicals accounted for the largest

share of total EU-eligible imports from Uzbekistan (EUR 120 million), with a GSP+ utilisation

rate of 98.3 %. Among the top five export sectors, textiles had the highest utilisation rate of

99.5 %. Vegetables & fruit, on the other hand, had the lowest utilisation rate of the GSP+

preferential tariff scheme among the top exporting sectors, at 82.5 %. GSP+’s potential to

support the diversification of Uzbek exports can be further exploited.

Figure 3. Top product groups benefiting from GSP+ tariff preferences for Uzbekistan, 2024

3. Compliance with GSP+ obligations

Uzbekistan has maintained ratification of all 27 GSP+ relevant conventions and has issued no

new reservations. Uzbekistan is broadly compliant with its reporting obligations to the

monitoring bodies (for details, see Annex), but its responses are often delayed or incomplete.

This section is based on the latest reports of UN monitoring bodies and supplemented with

4

information from civil society and GSP monitoring. Uzbekistan has continuously engaged with

the EU GSP+ monitoring process through regular exchanges of information, including at high

level events, and a GSP+ monitoring mission in March 2025.

3.1 Human rights

In November 2023, Uzbekistan underwent its fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR) before

the UN Human Rights Council, where ongoing concerns were highlighted in fundamental

rights areas, particularly freedom of expression, media, and civic space. The adoption of a

National Human Rights Strategy until 2030, including measures to implement UPR

recommendations, is still pending as of May 2026. An Uzbekistan citizen was elected as

member of the UN Human Rights Committee from 2025 to 2028.

Uzbekistan has made efforts and progress, in particular in the areas of social and economic

rights and gender equality, through healthcare reformand legal advancement on the protection

of women and children from violence, aiming for better alignment with international standards.

The government spending on education stands at 20 % of the state budget and pre-school

enrolment increased to 73 % in 2024 (from under 30 % in 2017); nonetheless, disparities

continue to exist between regions and between urban and rural areas7. The government has

expanded access to basic services with healthcare reforms that focus on primary healthcare,

infrastructure and digitalisation of health services and thus enhance social and economic rights.

Increased legal protections against violence against children, developed with the support of

United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), are positive and advance the implementation of the

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), including the 2024 law on Violence against

Children8, which bans corporal punishment and recognises neglect as violence, and the related

strategy for its implementation (2026-2030). The law introduces new institutions aimed at

protecting vulnerable children, details legal assistance and support services for victims, and

specifies the oversight and monitoring mechanisms. The practical impact of the law will have

to be analysed. Further positive steps on children’s rights include the National Program for

the Development of School Education (2022–2026), which sets priorities for curriculum

reform, teacher salaries and training, inclusive education measures to provide quality education

for children with disabilities, and school infrastructure9. The institutional framework was

strengthened through the Parliament’s Human Rights Commissioner for the Rights of a Child

(March 202410) the Commission on Children’s Issues (Dec. 202411) and the National Agency

for Social Protection (June 202312), tasked with consolidating and enhancing child protection

services. However, it is too early to assess the impact of these reforms as implementation

challenges persist, and only limited data is available.

As for advancements in gender-related topics and alignment with the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), legislative changes in

the gender realm since 2023 show positive impacts on gender equality and public awareness

of the issue. However, challenges remain in the implementation, including insufficient victim

support services or the lack of reliable data. Among the most important achievement is the

cancelation of the so-called reconciliation period in divorce proceedings for the victims of

domestic violence under the Family Code (Art. 40) from 2025. University quotas and

preferential loans for women and girls were also introduced in the monitoring period.

At the same time, concerns remain with regard to civil society and media space and, therefore,

compliance with commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR).The initial momentum for opening up civic space after President Mirziyoev’s first

election in 2016 appears to have stagnated and been partially reversed, with critical voices such

5

as human rights defenders, journalists (including particularly female journalists), bloggers, and

other civic activists reporting harassment offline and online and prosecution. Civic space

continues to be considered ‘not free’13. There has also been increased pressure on media

freedom, including through shutdowns of information platforms and expansion of prohibited

materials. Increasing numbers of criminal prosecutions for slander, defamation, and insult (30

000 cases in 2024 as reported by the government14), in particular of journalists and bloggers,

are a cause for concern. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found two cases in

2024 of arbitrarily detained journalists in Uzbekistan, with one of them being forcibly held in

a psychiatric hospital15.

Concerns have also been reported about the access to fair trial and judicial independence, in

particular in politically exposed cases. While there has been some positive work on access to

justice for instance through a legal aid portal for people with disabilities developed with the

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Rule of Law project, considerable

challenges remain in place, including the low number of lawyers, missing accountability

mechanisms, and the lack of independence of the Chamber of Advocates.

Independent NGOs further report interference in their work and bureaucratic obstacles: while

changes in 2023 offer theoretical improvements for NGO registration procedures (including

registration online), the Ministry of Justice is reported to frequently reject unwanted NGO

applications on purely technical grounds. The Law on Public Associations additionally restricts

access to foreign funding and grants above 3 400 USD, and a ‘national’ partner clause means

that NGOs that receive foreign funds need to work under a government-appointed supervisor16.

In addition, there remain significant gaps in establishing a fair fiscal environment for NGOs.In

August 2025, the President of Uzbekistan signed a law amending nine statutes that govern

non‑governmental and non‑commercial organisations (NNOs), which further tightens

reporting obligations, in particular regarding foreign funding, including the requirement to

notify the MoJ about upcoming trips of NNO representatives to foreign countries, and to obtain

approval for the receipt of all funds and assets from foreign states, organisations, and citizens17.

There are also increased legislative restrictions to freedom of assembly, in particular through

amendments of the Criminal Code on the offense of ‘mass unrest’ (Article 244) of December

202418. There are concerns that the amendments could be used to punish for the preparation

and participation of legitimate peaceful protests in the country, which would violate

Uzbekistan’s international human rights commitments.

While legal safeguards on torture have improved, the UN Human Rights Committee has raised

concerns that obstacles to reporting and independent monitoring persist and reports of torture

and death of detainees continue emerging19. Despite requests by the Committee against Torture,

Uzbekistan has not yet amended Article 221 of the Criminal Code to abolish arbitrary

extensions of the sentences of political prisoners. Compensation and the access of victims to

medical, psychological and socio‑economic rehabilitation, although guaranteed by law since

2022, remain inadequate. In terms of legal safeguards, Criminal Code amendments (2023)

strengthen protection against torture and provide better alignment with the UN Convention

against Torture (CAT), while Uzbekistan has not yet acceded to the Optional Protocol

(OPCAT). While the Ombudsperson’s Office carries out visits to places of deprivation of

liberty, there remain significant gaps in its ability to exercise independent oversight in this area,

including by addressing reports of torture and other ill-treatment. Most recently, in June 2025,

Uzbekistan amended legislation regarding custody procedures20, introducing a mandatory

medical examination within two hours of arrival at a detention centre and a mandatory

notification to the prosecutor in case of any injuries recorded. In August 2024, adraft law to

6

amend the Criminal Code, Article 235, and to increase penalties for torture, was submitted to

Parliament, but has not been adopted yet. The Ombudsperson’s Office, in cooperation with the

UNDP, initiated in 2025 a comprehensive review to align national legislation with the Istanbul

Protocol21.

Discrimination persists in practice – in particular regarding the continued lack of legal

protection for LGBTIQ+ persons, and consensual same-sex conduct remains criminalised

(Art. 120 of the Criminal Code), resulting in a range of serious human rights concerns. Ethnic

minorities (e.g., Tajiks, Karakalpaks, Lyulu/Roma and Mugat) report discrimination in

employment and education and exiled Karakapaks in Kazakhstan report transnational

repression, raising concerns about compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of

Racial Discrimination . While the Ombudsperson’s office has reportedly prepared a report on

the 2022 Karakalpakstan protest, where according to official sources at least 18 were killed

and 500 arrested, the document is still not publicly available. In its Concluding observations of

the combined thirteenth and fourteenth periodic reports of Uzbekistan of 29 April 2026, the

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recommended the government, inter

alia, to review its legal framework, including article 19 of the Constitution and article 141 of

the Criminal Code, with a view to bringing it into line with the Convention, explicitly

incorporating the principle of equality and the prohibition of racial discrimination on all

prohibited grounds, in line with article 1 of the Convention, as well as to expedite the adoption

of the draft Law on Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination, within a defined and short time

frame.

An increasing number of forced evictions linked to rapid urbanisation and infrastructure

projects, also in world heritage sites such as Samarkand and Bukhara, poses a new challenge22

and seems to particularly affect minorities (e.g., Roma/Lyuli communities), with no access to

effective judicial remedies, no alternative housing provided, and under severe pressure from

local authorities23. This links to the proper implementation of the International Convention on

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, rule of law, public participation, and non-

discrimination.

Priorities for future engagement include facilitating an enabling environment for civil society

and freedom of assembly and association to ensure that NGOs are able to function as provided

by international standards. Alignment with international standards and norms, especially the

ICCPR, is also required for reforms of the legal framework governing the media and the

Criminal Code, in particular with regards to the criminalisation of insult, defamation, and

dissemination of false information, as well as consensual same-sex conduct. Uzbekistan should

remove the use of forced labour as judicial punishment and ensure effective investigation and

adjudication of cases of torture and ill treatment, and strengthen oversight and conditions, in

particular in pre-trial detention and enhancing judicial independence to ensure fair trials and

access to justice. It will also be important to follow-up on the UN Special Rapporteur’s

recommendations on the right to adequate housing, including concerning forced evictions and

on the implementation of new legislation on domestic violence and violence against children,

and the rights of persons with disabilities in line with the Convention on the Rights of Persons

with Disabilities. The country should also adopt comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation.

Uzbekistan should also increase the number of state-funded shelters and rehabilitation centres

that are scarce, under-resourced, and subject to restrictive admission procedures.

7

3.2 Labour rights

Among the positive developments in the area of labour is that the State Labour Inspectorate

(SLI)24, which was re-established in 2019 alongside the ratification of ILO Convention

concerning Labour Inspection in Industry and Commerce No. 81, reportedly increased the

number of its inspectors by 66 between 2024 and 202525, to a total number of 411 in 2025.

However, despite the positive steps, the SLI still needs more capacity and training to meet the

country’s rapid economic growth, with a growing number of businesses outside the cotton

sector. The ILO has expressed deep concern about limits to the effectiveness of the SLI, such

as the lack of unannounced visits and the option for a business to refuse a restriction26. On the

positive side, the previous requirement for prior notification to the Business Ombudsperson

ahead of an inspection has been lifted as of 1 September 202527,thereby improving compliance

of the national legislation with ILO Conventions No. 81 and No. 129 (concerning Labour

Inspection in Agriculture).

A new Social Insurance Law was adopted in December 2025 (in force since January 2026)

which establishes maternity, sickness, and unemployment insurance and created the Social

Insurance Fund — a foundational institutional shift from employers’ liability to social

insurance managed at national level.

While full assessment by the ILO is pending, 2023 Labour Code amendments are expected to

improve alignment with ILO Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to

Employment, No. 138 and ILO Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, No. 29,

by further restricting child and forced labour.

Another positive development is that Uzbekistan ratified the fundamental ILO Occupational

Safety and Health Convention, No. 155 in 2024. The country has now ratified all ten ILO

fundamental Conventions and all four ILO priority conventions (a total of 25 ILO Conventions

and 1 Protocol (P29) ratified, 23 of them in force). The Government also intends to ratify ILO

Violence and Harassment Convention, No. 190, ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards)

Convention No. 102, ILO Maternity Protection Convention, No. 183, ILO Protection of

Workers' Claims (Employer's Insolvency) Convention, No. 173 and ILO Safety and Health in

Agriculture Convention, No. 184.However, enforcement gaps - particularly in eliminating

child labour from further sectors, collective bargaining, and labour inspections - remain of

significant concerns

With regards to the abolition of forced labour (ILO Convention No. 29, Protocol 29, and ILO

Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, No. 105), the elimination of forced

labour in cotton harvesting and the lifting of the Cotton campaign’s boycott in 2022 remains a

key success for Uzbekistan. The Third-Party Monitoring of the cotton harvest confirmed no

systematic forced labour and child labour in 2023, but cases of local government coercion to

fulfil cotton production targets were still reported in the cotton harvest28. As there is no recent

official information (post 2023) but rather occasional media and international organisations

reports, such cases reinforce concerns about non-availability of official data and demonstrate

the need for consistent and continuous independent monitoring.

ILO monitoring notes that the government continued to promote decent work principles in

Uzbekistan, to improve workplace environments and to strengthen the mechanisms that protect

citizens’ labour rights, particularly through the 2021–2025 Decent Work Country Programme

(DWCP) and the new ILO project, ‘RISE for Impact: Fundamental Principles and Rights at

Work in the Cotton Supply Chain (2023–2026)’29. The ILO launched a Better Work project in

Uzbekistan in 2023, focusing on the textile and clothing sector30. The ILO, however, noted an

8

increased vulnerability of farmers in the new agricultural cluster system - which could increase

the risk of forced labour31. This was also the subject of a February 2026 Human Rights Watch

and Uzbek Forum for Human Rights report, which highlighted significant vulnerabilities for

farmers created by, among other factors, state production quotas and their compliance

mechanisms, which in certain circumstances could effectively lead to unpaid involuntary

labour in the cotton sector.

The most recent available data published 2021/22 showed a country-wide child labour rate of

18 %32. In 2023, the government approved the new List of Heavy Work and Work with Harmful

or Hazardous Working Conditions in which the employment of persons under the age of 18 is

prohibited33 - this is a positive step forward.

Regarding equal remuneration and elimination of discrimination (ILO Convention

concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, No 100

and ILO Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation,

No 111), a positive development is that section 4 of the new Labour Code (202334), now

prohibits, ‘any direct or indirect restrictions or […] advantages in the sphere of employment

and occupation’, based on several grounds of discrimination. Still, the Government did not

seize the opportunity of the 2023 revision of the Labour Code, nor its subsequent amendments

in 2024 and 2025, to explicitly prohibit discrimination based on ‘colour’ and ‘political opinion’

or to include a general definition of direct and indirect discrimination in employment and

occupation.

The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations

(CEACR) noted with interest the adoption of the Uzbekistan 2030 Strategy and the Strategy to

Achieve Gender Equality in Uzbekistan Until 2030, and the creation of gender-focused

institutions such as the Gender Commission and the National Commission on Advancing

Women’s Role in Society. At the same time, the gender pay gap remains significant, standing

at 29 % in 2024, according to National Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics.

The Government indicates that this gap is largely attributable to occupational segregation, with

women concentrated in lower-paid sectors, the disproportionate burden of family

responsibilities borne by women, and gender-based discrimination. The ILO's CEACR also

pointed out that the effective assessment of the gender pay gap is hampered by the absence of

regularly published gender-disaggregated data. In this regard, the Committee welcomed the

Government’s indication that, in the framework of the Strategy to Achieve Gender Equality

Until 2030 – which identifies achieving equal pay for men and women for work of equal value

as a specific objective – a reform of the national statistical system is planned with a view to

introducing gender-disaggregated data35.

Challenges also persist when it comes to freedom of association and collective bargaining

(ILO Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise,

No. 87 and Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise

and to Bargain Collectively, No. 98). Concerns persist regarding trade union pluralism and the

ability to establish independent trade unions outside the Federation of Trade Unions of

Uzbekistan (FPU)36. The Uzbek Labour ministry indicated37 on-going legal amendments to

reduce the number of members required to form a nation-wide trade union from 3000 to 1000,

but the number is still too high according to the ILO, which recommends a number as low as

possible. In June 2026, thePresident approved amendments to the Labour Code to legally

introducethe right to strike, which represents a major milestone in advancing freedom of

association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, depending on the

interpretation and application in the future38.

9

Priorities for future engagement include guaranteeing freedom of association and collective

bargaining in the legislation and demonstrable progress in trade union pluralism, in line with

ILO Conventions No. 87 and No. 98. Uzbekistan should also expand the positive achievements

in the cotton sector to other sectors and put in place a robust monitoring system with the

unhindered participation of civil society to prevent resurgence of child and forced labour in at-

risk sectors (cotton, silk, construction, informal) and prevent child labour displacement; as well

as taking measures to address the root causes of forced labour in line with CEACR

recommendations, including effectively implementing the DWCP and protecting vulnerable

farmers in the new agricultural cluster system against the risk of forced labour. As a horizontal

matter, the authorities should strengthen the State Labour Inspectorate and empower it to

conduct inspections on all economic entities, to conduct unannounced inspections and ensure

labourinspections are excluded from any future moratoria on business inspections.

3.3 Environment and Climate

In 2025, the Ministry of Ecology, Environmental protection and Climate was transformed into

the National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change under the President, with its existing

staff structure preserved. Despite Uzbekistan facing increasing environmental challenges,

including unprecedented levels of air pollution in the winter months, some positive

commitments and increasing government ambition in biodiversity and climate targets were

observed. The ratification of the Aarhus Convention on 18 March 2025 is a hopeful step toward

greater transparency, though a gap remains between legislation and practical implementation

in sensitive and non-sensitive areas, particularly in biodiversity monitoring, climate

transparency, and hazardous waste management.

In 2025, Uzbekistan submitted its new Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0) under

the Paris Agreement, with the ambitious target of reaching a 50 % reduction in greenhouse

gas (GHG) emissions by 2035, which represents a significant increase from Uzbekistan's last

NDC which promised a 35 % reduction of GHG emissions by 203039. A 2024 presidential

resolution introduced a national transparency system for the transition to the green economy40.

The National Adaptation Plan for the Green Economy (2019–2030) remains in force, and

Uzbekistan is preparing a long-term low-carbon development strategy with support from the

World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). At COP28

in 2023, the then Ministry of Ecology announced intentions to establish a national greenhouse

gas emissions registry and to explore the introduction of a carbon pricing framework. The Law

‘On Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, adopted in 2025, provides a general legal basis for

emissions monitoring and possible market-based tools, but detailed secondary legislation and

implementation rules are still pending41.

Uzbekistan has adopted new biodiversity conservation targets, with Global Environmental

Facility (GEF-8) support for an updated National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan

(NBSAP) and seventh national report agreed with UNDP42. In efforts to advance the re-

forestation of the Aral Sea, the government has exceeded the original NBSAP target (about

1.856 million ha afforested by 2024)43. At the same time, there are major structural pressures

noted: habitat loss and degradation of desert, tugay, and other riparian ecosystems,

unsustainable irrigation and water management in the Aral Sea basin, pollution from energy

and mining sectors, and poaching and overuse of wild species. Uzbekistan’s 6th national report

under the Convention on Biological Diversity also underlines indirect drivers critical for

implementation: limited public and decision-maker awareness of biodiversity, lack of up-to-

date scientific information, and insufficient integration of biodiversity into sectoral

development planning44.

10

Uzbekistan has made moderate advancements in managing persistent organic pollutants

(POPs) and pesticides. Uzbekistan’s 2022–2024 National Action Plan under the Stockholm

Convention on POPs aimed to establish a basic POPs management system, improve safety

conditions at storage warehouses and burial sites for toxic substances, and initiate the

development of a unified national chemicals database. By the end of the plan period,

implementation appears to have been partial, with progress mainly reported on institutional

coordination, preliminary inventories and capacity-building activities, while necessary

legislative amendments to the ‘Law on Waste’, comprehensive remediation, and database

consolidation remain incomplete.

Regarding management of illegal wildlife trade and compliance with the Convention on

International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Uzbekistan’s

legislation is still classed as Category 245. The CITES Secretariat has analysed draft CITES

implementing regulations, with government comments received in February 2024, and work is

continuing on a revised version for resubmission. Uzbekistan’s hosting of CoP20 in Samarkand

in December 2025 and the signing of Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries of the

Samarkand Declaration and Action Plan on Regional Cooperation in Nature Conservation

(2026-2032)46 further demonstrate engagement with CITES. At the same time, wildlife

trafficking remains a concern, with Uzbekistan acting both as a source and a transit country for

endangered species, including saker falcons and the steppe tortoise (Testudo horsfieldii), which

was under active compliance review47. Illegal logging and unauthorised deforestation also

occur, particularly of juniper forests in mountainous regions, while there is limited evidence of

significant international trafficking in flora products, as most cases appear local and

economically driven48.

Regarding biosafety and hazardous waste, the first report under the Cartagena Protocol on

Biosafety is still pending since Uzbekistan ratified the convention in 202049. Regarding the

Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste, no

country-specific compliance decision or submission concerning Uzbekistan has been published

by the Implementation and Compliance Committee. The Uzbek Ministry of Ecology has

announced follow up plans for implementation including preparation of proposals to amend

national regulatory documents, research on plastic waste generation, and the development of

an inter-agency action plan for plastics, tyres, batteries and e-waste.

Priorities for future engagement include the timely submission of outstanding CITES illegal

trade reports and the strengthening of enforcement measures against wildlife trafficking, both

online and offline. Further efforts are needed to implement the updated NDC and the National

Adaptation Plan through concrete sectoral measures and improved monitoring systems. It is

also important to submit the first national implementation report under the Cartagena Protocol

on Biosafety to enhance transparency and demonstrate progress in biosafety governance.

3.4 Good governance

Drug control remains a priority for the government, with the institutional framework being

upgraded recently (2024 establishment of National Drug Control Centre under the President,

transformed into the Agency for Control over Narcotics and Firearms in July 2025). The 2024

International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) report50 records several positive developments,

including the 2024 national strategy for combating drug dependence and drug-related crime for

the period 2024–2028. The strategy outlines actions to strengthen drug control legislation and

improve the national monitoring system for drug-related issues, with the overarching aim of

11

safeguarding public security and protecting public health. Nevertheless, the drug policy is still

more driven by punitive measures than by public health concerns.

In June 2024, Uzbekistan adopted amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure and the

Administrative Liability Code to address increasing drug trafficking through the Internet and

other communication networks. The amendments introduce heavier penalties for distributing

or advertising materials that illegally promote narcotic drugs, their analogues, psychotropic

substances or potent substances, and for drug trafficking conducted online. They also establish

criminal and administrative liability for certain offences involving the misuse of information

technologies, including offences involving minors. There are only limited data to assess the

effect of the new policies. The 2025 INCB report51 noted that on 30 April 2025, the President

of Uzbekistan issued a decree introducing several measures to combat cybercrime,

strengthening coordination and imposing stricter penalties for cybercrime, including the

trafficking of drugs online, as well as increasing the accountability of banks and payment

operators for cybersecurity failures.

As announced by the President on multiple occasions, anti-corruption is also a priority for the

Presidential administration and relevant strategies have been developed. Nonetheless, for the

first time since 2012, Uzbekistan’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption

Perceptions Index declined in 2024 and the trend continued in 2025, declining by another point

and three positions in the ranking52. This suggests that anti-corruption reforms remain

extremely fragile and have slowed in impact.

The development of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2030 with UNDP support, which

outlines reforms in public procurement and judicial independence, is a positive development.

In April 2025, a presidential decree set out a comprehensive 2025 anti-corruption plan and

action programme for 2025-202653. Close monitoring and implementation updates will be an

important next step. A hybrid country-visit to Uzbekistan under the United Nations Convention

against Corruption (UNCAC) review cycle 2 was conducted in November 2025.

The current enforcement of anti-corruptions measures is mixed. While petty corruption is

decreasing, high-level corruption cases are rarely addressed, there are limited prosecutions of

senior officials, and whistleblower protections are weak. The institutional power of the Anti-

Corruption Agency has been strengthened, but the Agency lacks independence and serves

merely as a preventative body. Concerns about judicial independence also apply particularly in

corruption cases54.

Priorities for future engagement include strengthening anti-corruption institutions at all

levels, including prosecutorial bodies, and aligning them more closely with UNCAC, in line

with the recommendations arising from its implementation review process. They also include

enhancing judicial independence to ensure fair trials in corruption cases. In addition, priorities

include submitting overdue drug control reports in order to comply with UN drug control

conventions. Continued efforts are further needed to pursue a comprehensive and balanced

approach to drug policy, focusing on both drug supply and drug demand reduction, addressing

drug-related harms, and ensuring the full implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy

in line with the UN drug control conventions and international drug policy commitments.

4. Development cooperation in support of GSP+ objectives

EU-Uzbekistan Development Cooperation is framed by the Neighbourhood, Development and

International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe) Multi-annual

Indicative Programme 2021–2027, with EUR 76 million for 2021–2024 and EUR 43 million

12

for 2025–2027, focusing on green and inclusive growth, governance, and human development.

This is complemented by regional Central Asia programmes and European Fund for

Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) investments under Global Gateway, including support

for the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor.

Flagship projects back public administration reform including anti-corruption, digitalisation,

green agriculture, and rural development, while Team Europe initiatives prioritise sustainable

connectivity and critical raw-materials value chains. Uzbekistan participates in several EU-

funded regional initiatives aimed at strengthening drug-control capacity.

Several interventions are particularly relevant for the GSP+ context. ‘Support to anti-

corruption project’ contributes to justice reform with a strong focus on anti-corruption and

rule of law and good governance, helping to modernise the judicial system and improve access

to justice in line with international human-rights standards. The ‘World Trade Organisation

(WTO) Accession project’ aims to improve the capacity of the Uzbek government in view of

complying with all requirements linked to access to WTO. The project will continue after

Uzbekistan accession expected for this year. Third, the ‘Sustainable agri-food system’

programme, which supports the reform process and tries to address two remaining structural

constraints that limit the sector’s contribution to sustainable and inclusive growth: insecure

economic land-use rights and weak food safety governance. In addition, several regional trade

initiatives like ‘Ready4Trade Central Asia: Fostering Prosperity through the

Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor’ support greener value chains, WTO-related trade

facilitation and private-sector competitiveness, thereby helping Uzbek exporters comply with

labour and environmental standards important for GSP+.

Lastly, to help Uzbekistan businesses take full advantage of the EU GSP+ instrument, the EU

is launching a new project of 18 months duration ‘Uzbekistan: Strengthening Trade

Integration and Partnership through GSP+ and the Country Platform’. The overall

objective of this action is to support the increasing use of the EU’s instruments and the

strengthening of the EU as a trusted and reliable partner to the Government of Uzbekistan in

implementing reforms and achieving the goals of its Development Strategy.

13

Annex: Uzbekistan -Compliance with GSP ratification and reporting obligations

Convention Ratification status

/ Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to monitoring

bodies

Human Rights conventions

1. Convention on the Prevention

and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide (1948)

Ratified:

09.09.1999

No reservations

No reporting obligations.

2. International Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination (1965)

Ratified:

28.09.1995

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 03.12.2019

• Last report submitted on: 03.11.2022

• Next report due: not yet set.

3. International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights (1966)

Ratified:

28.09.1995

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 01.05.2020

• Last report submitted on: 24.11.2024 Follow-up to

Concluding Observations (FCO)

• Next report due: 2027

4. International Covenant on

Economic Social and Cultural

Rights (1966)

Ratified:

28.09.1995

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 04.03.2022

• Last report submitted on: 01.04.2024 (FCO)

• Next report due: 31.03.2027

5. Convention on the Elimination of

All Forms of Discrimination

Against Women (1979)

Ratified:

19.07.1995

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 25.02.2022

• Last report submitted on: 08.04.2024 (FCO)

• Next report due: February 2026 (not submitted)

6. Convention Against Torture and

other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment (1984)

Ratified:

28.09.1995

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 14.01.2020

• Last report submitted on: 05.01.2024

• Next report due: not yet set

7.Convention on the Rights of the

Child (1989)

Ratified:

29.06.1994

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 29.09.2022

• Last report submitted on: 03.04.2019

• Next report due: 28.07.2027

Labour rights conventions1 2

8. Convention concerning Forced or

Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930)

Ratified:

13.07.1992

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2024

• Last Government report submitted: 2023

• Next report due: 2028 (provisional schedule)

9. Convention concerning Freedom

of Association and Protection of the

Right to Organise, No 87 (1948)

Ratified:

12.12.2016

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comment: 2024

• Last Government report submitted: 2026 (out of cycle

report)

• Next report due: 2029 (provisional schedule)

10. Convention concerning the

Application of the Principles of the

Right to Organise and to Bargain

Collectively, No 98 (1949)

Ratified:

13.07.1992

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2022

• Last Government report submitted: 2026 (out of cycle

report)

• Next report due: 2029 (provisional schedule)

1 Following a decision taken by the ILO Governing Body in November 2025 to modernise the ILO reporting

system, as from 2027 Governments will no longer submit separate reports for each ratified Convention, but

instead, they will submit thematic reports based on a new ILO template which has grouped the conventions and

protocols into 15 thematic areas. As 2026 will be a transition year, only a limited number of reports will be

requested in 2026. See: The future of reporting on ratified conventions.https://www.ilo.org/international-labour-

standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards-overview-ilo/future-reporting-ratified-

conventions. 2 Reservations do not apply in the ILO system.

14

Convention Ratification status

/ Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to monitoring

bodies

11. Convention concerning Equal

Remuneration of Men and Women

Workers for Work of Equal Value,

No 100 (1951)

Ratified:

13.07.1992

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2025

• Last Government report submitted: 2024

• Next report due: 2028 (provisional schedule)

12. Convention concerning the

Abolition of Forced Labour, No 105

(1957)

Ratified:

15.12.1997

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2024

• Last Government report submitted: 2021

• Next report due: 2028 (provisional schedule)

13. Convention concerning

Discrimination in Respect of

Employment and Occupation, No

111 (1958)

Ratified:

13.07.1992

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2025

• Last Government report submitted: 2024

• Next report due: 2028 (provisional schedule)

14. Convention concerning

Minimum Age for Admission to

Employment, No 138 (1973)

Ratified:

06.03.2009

Minimum age

specified: 15 years

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2024

• Last Government report submitted:2024

• Next report due: 2028 (provisional schedule)t

15. Convention concerning the

Prohibition and Immediate Action

for the Elimination of the Worst

Forms of Child Labour, No 182

(1999)

Ratified:

24.06.2008

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments in 2024

• Last Government report submitted:

• Next report due: 2028 (provisional schedule)

Environment and Climate Conventions

16. Convention on International

Trade in Endangered Species of

Wild Fauna and Flora (1973)

Ratified:

10.07.1997

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Annual Trade Report for 2023 submitted 06.12.2024

• Annual Trade Report for 2024 submitted 09.01.2026

• Next Annual Trade Report due 31.10.2026.

• Annual Illegal Trade Reports: due for 2023,2024.3

• Last Implementation Report: submitted for 2018,2019 4

17. Montreal Protocol on

Substances that Deplete the Ozone

Layer (1987)

Ratified:

18.05.1993

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations.

• Last report submitted:

Article 7 data report covering 2024

• Next report due:

Article 7 data report covering 2025 due 30.09.26 18. Basel Convention on the

Control of Transboundary

Movements of Hazardous Wastes

and Their Disposal (1989)

Ratified:

07.02.1996

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• National Report (NR) for 2023 submitted 25.04.2025.

• NR for 2024 submitted 01.03.2026

• Next NR (2025) due 31.12.2026.

19. Convention on Biological

Diversity (1992)

Ratified:

19.07.1995

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Seventh National Report (7NR): submitted on

05.03.2026

• National Biodiversity Strategy and Action plan

(NBSAP) under revision

• Next report due: 8NR due by 30.06.2029

20. The United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change

(1992)

Ratified:

20.06.1993

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest updated Nationally Determined Contribution

(NDC 3.0) submitted 06.11.2025

• Latest National Communication (NC): NC4, submitted

14.10.2024

• First Biennial Transparency Report (BTR1) submitted

11.03.2025

• Next report due: BTR2 due 31.12.2026

21. Cartagena Protocol on

Biosafety (2000)Ratified:

25.10.2019

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• First National Report (NR) since accession due: 5NR

due 28.02.2026 (not submitted).

3 Reporting mandatory but not subject to compliance procedure. 4 Ibid.

15

Convention Ratification status

/ Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to monitoring

bodies

22. Stockholm Convention on

persistent Organic Pollutants (2001)

Ratified:

28.06.2019

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest National Report (NR): 5NR submitted

10.10.2022

• Next Report: 6NR due 31.08.2026.

• Initial National Implementation Plan (NIP):

submitted15.03.2022

• NIP updates: COP4 and COP5 amendments included 23. Kyoto Protocol to the United

Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change (1998)

Ratified:

12.10.1999

No reservations

No separate reporting obligations separate from the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change

Good Governance Conventions

24. United Nations Single

Convention on Narcotic Drugs

(1961)

Ratified:

24.08.1995

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

2024 reporting fulfilled.

First (and latest) INCB mission in March 2018

25. United Nations Convention on

Psychotropic Substances (1971)

Ratified:

12.07.1995

No reservations

26. United Nations Convention

against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

(1988)

Ratified:

24.08.1995

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

Reporting on precursors fulfilled, with the exception of

2024 report in which the information required under

article 12 of the Convention (Form D) was not provided.

Information provided in 2025 report.

27. United Nations Convention

against Corruption (2004)

Ratified:

29.07.2008

Reservation

onArticle 66 of

the Convention

Compliant with reporting obligations

First review cycle completed in 2019. Full country

review report not published.

Second review cycle started in 2020; self-assessment

checklist in March 2022; country visit conducted 17-

19.11.2025; review in progress.

16

1 Key events in 2026 at the moment of writing have been included in this Staff Working Document. All links

provided were up to date as of 28 April 2026. 2 OECD, ‘Roadmap for Sustainable Investment Policy Reforms in Uzbekistan’, OECD Investment Policy

Reviews, 26 Nov. 2025. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/roadmap-for-sustainable-investment-policy-

reforms-in-uzbekistan_20865f29-en/full-report/assessment-and-recommendations_11cf7850.html. 3 World Bank, ‘Jobs and Prosperity: Europe and Central Asia Economic Update’, Fall 2025.

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/e4463608-4160-4318-a0b1-d028fd887d89 4 Source for all statistics: Eurostat COMEXT data covering 2022-2024 based on latest available validated full year

data as of September 2025. GSP statistics only cover goods imported into the EU market, i.e., goods released for

free circulation in the EU. The GSP statistics do not cover other EU-imports, like goods imported for the customs

inward processing procedure or re-imports after the customs outward processing procedure. Trade flows registered

as ‘confidential’ do not appear in the GSP+ usage figures and regime 1 normal trade; but do appear in total trade

figures (regime 4). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/ext_go_agg_esms.htm#conf1537195068659. 5 Products that benefit from GSP are separated in sections according to the GSP Regulation. Information on which

CN codes are included in the GSP sections can be found in Annex V of the Regulation No 978/2012. EUR-Lex –

02012R0978-20250101 – EN – EUR-Lex. 6 April 2026 corrected data since the original data extraction from COMEXT in September 2025 indicates total

imports for this section were almost double at EUR 268 million. 7 United Nations Country Team, ‘UN Common Country Analysis Uzbekistan’, Nov. 2024, pp. 14-15.

https://uzbekistan.un.org/en/288273-common-country-analysis 8 Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan ‘On the protection of children from all forms of violence’, LRU-996, 14 Nov.

2024.www.lex.uz/docs/7219508 . 9 Khidirov, Abduaziz, ‘Children as the Main Priority of New Uzbekistan’, UZA O‘zbekiston Milliy axborot

agentligi, 1 Jun. 2025.https://www.uza.uz/en/posts/children-as-the-main-priority-of-new-uzbekistan_726186 10 https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2024/03/04/childrens-ombudsman/ 11 Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan ‘On measures to improve the efficiency of commissions

on children’s issues’, No UP-201, 2 Dec. 2024 https://www.xalqtaliminfo.uz/en/document-show/117 12 Presidential Decree dated June 1, 2023 on comprehensive measures to provide quality social services and

assistance to the population and to establish an effective monitoring system. National Agency for Social

Protection under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. https://ihma.uz/en/agency/social-protection. 13 Freedom House, ’Freedom in the World 2025: Uzbekistan’, 2025.

www.freedomhouse.org/country/uzbekistan/freedom-world/2025 14 ‘Freedoms under threat as Uzbekistan continues to put pressure on journalists and human rights defenders’,

Civicus Monitor Tracking Civic Space, 2025. https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/freedoms-under-threat-as-

uzbekistan-continues-to-put-pressure-on-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders/ 15 United Nations Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ‘Opinions adopted by the

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its 101st session’, Opinion No 47/2024 concerning Valijon Kalonov

(Uzbekistan), 28 Feb. 2025; and Opinion No 62/2024 concerning Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov (Uzbekistan), 10

Mar. 2025. 16 Uzbekistan, Cabinet of Ministers, ‘Нодавлат нотижорат ташкилотлари томонидан ижтимоий фойдали

дастурлар ва лойиҳалар амалга оширилишида ижтимоий шериклик ҳамда халқаро ҳамкорликни янада

қўллаб-қувватлаш чора-тадбирлари тўғрисида’, (On measures to further support social partnership and

international cooperation in implementing socially significant programs and projects by non-governmental non-

profit organizations), Resolution No. 527, Oct 10, 2023. https://lex.uz/docs/6627539 . 17 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ‘Uzbekistan: New law on amendments to NNO legislation’, Sept.

2025. www.icnl.org/resources/civic-freedom-monitor/uzbekistan 18 Civicus Monitor, ‘Freedoms under threat as Uzbekistan continues to put pressure on journalists and human

rights defenders’, Civicus Monitor Tracking Civic Space, 2025. https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/freedoms-

under-threat-as-uzbekistan-continues-to-put-pressure-on-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders/ 19 United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘Evaluation of the information on follow-up to the concluding

observations on Uzbekistan’, CCPR/C/140/2/Add.4, 18 Apr. 2024. 20 Law No O‘RQ–1072 ‘On the Procedure for Holding in Custody During Criminal Proceedings’, amended on 26

Jun. 2025. 21 UNDP, ‘Progress and Achievements in Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights Protection in

Uzbekistan’, Press release, 16 Sept. 2025. www.undp.org/uzbekistan/press-releases/progress-and-achievements-

strengthening-rule-law-and-human-rights-protection-uzbekistan.

17

22 United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component

of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context: visit to

Uzbekistan’, A/HRC/58/50/Add.1, 2 May 2025. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/50/Add.1. 23 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Uzbekistan and UNESCO must address forced evictions

at world heritage sites’, Press release, 30 Oct, 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/uzbekistan-

and-unesco-must-address-forced-evictions-world-heritage-sites 24 While ILO C81 on Labour Inspection is not a requirement of GSP+, the relevant findings are included here as

there is direct impact for the capacity to monitor and implement labour standards. 25 Better Work, ‘Uzbekistan: Our programme’. https://betterwork.org/uzbekistan/our-programme/ 26 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Conventions No 81 and No 129’, adopted 2024.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4408807,103538. 27 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Conventions No 81 and No 129’, adopted 2025, published in ‘Application of

International Labour Standards 2026’, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and

Recommendations. https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/Report%20III%28A%29-2026-

%5BNORMES-251223-001%5D-Web-EN.pdf 28 Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, ‘Cotton Harvest 2023’, 2024.

https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/UZBEK-FORUM_harvest_report_2023_FINAL_LR-

1.pdf 29 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 105’, adopted 2024, published 113th ILC session, 2025.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4418293,103538:NO . 30 Better Work, ‘Uzbekistan: Our programme’. https://betterwork.org/uzbekistan/our-programme/ 31 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 105’, adopted 2024, published 113th ILC session, 2025.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4418293,103538.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4418293,103538 32 The UNICEF/ILO database Excel sheet of July 2025 points to a MICS survey published in 2021/22 in

cooperation with UNICEF. A figure of 21 % is mentioned in case children performing household chores are

included. 33 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 182’, adopted 2024, published 113th ILC session, 2025.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4400288,103538. 34 ILO, ‘Application of International Labour Standards 2026’, Report of the Committee of Experts on the

Application of Conventions and Recommendations. https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-

02/Report%20III%28A%29-2026-%5BNORMES-251223-001%5D-Web-EN.pdf. 35 Ibid. 36 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 87’, adopted 2024, published 113th ILC session, 2025.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COMMENT_ID%2CP1310

0_COUNTRY_ID:4417536%2C103538. 37 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 87’, adopted 2024, published 113th ILC session, 2025.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COMMENT_ID%2CP1310

0_COUNTRY_ID:4417536%2C103538. 38 This development is reported nationally and the text not yet assessed by the ILO. 39 Government of Uzbekistan, ‘Updated NDC 3.0’.

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2025-11/Uzbekistan%20Third%20NDC.pdf. 40 Resolution RP-213. https://lex.uz/en/docs/7572123 41 Carbon Standard, ‘The Ministry of Ecology, Environmental Protection and Climate Change of the Republic of

Uzbekistan, in collaboration with Industrial Innovation Group, establishes the national emissions registry’.

https://carbonstandard.eco/news/the-ministry-of-ecology-environmental-protection-and-climate-change-of-the-

republic-of-uzbekistan-in-collaboration-with-industrial-innovation-group-establishes-the-national-emissions-

registry/ 42 CBD Uzbekistan country profile. https://www.cbd.int/countries/profile?country=uz; 43 UNDP, ‘A new biodiversity project agreed on the sidelines of COP16 (desertification) in Riyadh’, Press release,

13 Dec, 2024. https://www.undp.org/uzbekistan/press-releases/new-biodiversity-project-agreed-sidelines-cop16-

riyadh 44 UNDP, ‘Uzbekistan Sixth National Report 2018’. https://www.cbd.int/doc/nr/nr-06/uz-nr-06-en.pdf 45 CITES, ‘Uzbekistan country profile’. https://cites.org/eng/parties/country-profiles/uz/compliance-status

18

46 National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change of the Republic of Uzbekistan. ‘Samarkand Declaration

on the Conservation of Wildlife and Flora in Central Asia’, 24 Nov, 2025.

https://gov.uz/en/eco/news/view/104614. 47 CITES Standing Committee, ‘SC78 Doc. 35.1’, 2025. https://cites.org/sites/default/files/documents/E-SC78-

35-01.pdf 48 Global Organised Crime Index, 2025. https://ocindex.net/country/uzbekistan 49 CBD country profile for Uzbekistan. https://www.cbd.int/countries/?country=uz; 50 International Narcotics Control Board, ‘Report of the International Narcotics Control Board 2024’,

E/INCB/2024/1, United Nations, 2025.

https://www.incb.org/incb/uploads/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2024/Annual_Report/E-INCB-

2024-1-ENG.pdf. 51 International Narcotics Control Board, ‘Report of the International Narcotics Control Board 2025’,

E/INCB/2025/1, United Nations, 2026.

https://www.incb.org/incb/uploads/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2025/Annual_Report/E_INCB_2

025_1_eng.pdf. 52 Transparency International. ‘Uzbekistan Corruption Perceptions Index 2025’.

https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025/index/uzb. 53 Anti-Corruption Portal, AntiCor.World, ‘Uzbekistan Adopts 2025 Anti-Corruption Plan’, 22 May 2025.

https://anticor.world/en/main/news_page/v_uzbekistane_utverzhden_12_05_2025_en. 54 Gogidze, Lasha, ‘Corruption and Anti-Corruption Efforts in Uzbekistan’, U4 Helpdesk Answer 2023:28, U4

Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 23 Feb. 2024.

https://cdn.sanity.io/files/1f1lcoov/production/fcb13dd7e9bc6e9fa21100e17d3155517960e6f8.pdf.

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 16.7.2026 SWD(2026) 188 final

JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good

Governance (GSP+) assessment of the Plurinational State of Bolivia covering the period

2023-2025

Accompanying the document

Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council

on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences covering the period 2023-2025

{JOIN(2026) 16 final} - {SWD(2026) 184 final} - {SWD(2026) 185 final} - {SWD(2026) 186 final} - {SWD(2026) 187 final} - {SWD(2026) 189 final} -

{SWD(2026) 190 final} - {SWD(2026) 191 final} - {SWD(2026) 192 final}

1

1. Executive Summary

The Plurinational State of Bolivia (Bolivia) has benefitted from the Special Incentive

Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance of the EU’s Generalised

Scheme of Preferences (GSP+) since 2014. In 2024, imports of GSP+ eligible products from

Bolivia stood at EUR 53.8 million, with a preference utilisation rate of 91.6 %. Bolivia

benefited from an estimated EUR 766 000 in tariff exemptions in 2024.

Bolivia remains committed to the 27 international conventions monitored under the EU’s

GSP+, with full ratification and mostly aligned national legislation. During the reporting period

2023-20251, Bolivia has introduced many pieces of progressive legislation—such as reforms

on child protection, climate governance, and anti-corruption. However, weak institutional

capacity and resource constraints undermine effective compliance.

Bolivia improved the legal framework in the field of human rights, including through a

reparation law for rights violations, a law criminalising grooming and child sexual abuse

material, and the prohibition of child marriage. The Bolivian Ombudsman’s Office, the

Defensoría del Pueblo, monitored human rights conditions and intervened through legal

actions to protect individuals. The government provided training and support to reduce child

labour and trafficking, and the rate of child labour has fallen, albeit still remaining at a high

level. Bolivia developed advanced policies and legislation on biodiversity, set high targets on

renewable energy and forest protection and the 2025 climate action plan includes sectoral

targets and clear indicators. On drug policy, Bolivia supported alternative development

initiatives. The country launched a National Policy on Transparency and Anti-corruption in

2023, and increased the number of prosecuted corruption cases.

However, several challenges remain. These include the state of the judicial system, in particular

overcrowded prisons, pre-trial detention, and allegations of ill-treatment in detention facilities.

Rates of violence against women and girls remain high. The protection of human rights

defenders and mechanisms to consult indigenous peoples and guarantee free, prior and

informed consent are deficient. The independence, institutional framework and the resourcing

of the Defensoría del Pueblo needs to be ensured. Child labour and forced labour are still too

widespread. National laws’ alignment with the ILO Convention concerning Freedom of

Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, No 87 (1948) and the ILO Convention

concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain

Collectively, No 98 (1949) is insufficient. The Coca Crops Monitoring 2024 of UNODC shows

a 10 % increase in coca cultivation area compared to 2023 to an estimated 34 000 hectares.

In order to ensure continued GSP+ compliance, in particular in view of the revised GSP rules

as of 2027, the following areas are key priorities for future engagement: the reform of the

judicial system, with a particular focus on prison conditions and detention practices; continued

work on the reduction of violence against women and the elimination of child labour and forced

labour, including through an effective labour inspections system; additional measures to ensure

that the legal cultivation of coca leaves is not diverted into illicit drug markets; and the

enhanced enforcement of anti-corruption legislation and strategies, with lessened political

interference.

2

2. Key Developments

2.1 Political and economic developments

In October 2025, Bolivia elected Rodrigo Paz Pereira as president, the candidate of the

Christian Democratic Party (PDC), who pledged market-oriented policies (‘capitalism for all’),

gradual reforms and international engagement. This marks a significant shift following two

decades of state-led economic models. Since the eve of the elections, some economic indicators

have improved, e.g., the gap between official and parallel exchange rates has reduced.

Social indicators for Bolivia reflect decade-long structural improvements in inequality and

poverty reduction, extending beyond post-pandemic recovery. However, the proportion of

people living in multidimensional poverty remained stable between 2021 and 2023 (5.5 % and

5.4 % respectively)2. Bolivia remains among the region's poorest nations.

During the reporting period, Bolivia’s economy almost stagnated, with the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) estimating real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth at 0.7 % in 2024

and 0.6 % in 2025. Gas production has declined sharply, with reserves halving since 2019, and

gas exports dropping from 6.7 % of GDP in 2022 to an estimated 3.3 % in 2024 and 2.3 % in

2025, undermining fiscal revenues. The government ran large fiscal deficits, surpassing 10 %

of GDP in 2023-2024, including due to high fuel subsidies. Foreign exchange scarcity disrupted

trade and industrial activity, resulting in rising inflation and social unrest. The widening gap

between the official and parallel exchange rates undermined confidence in the currency,

complicating trade and investment flows3.

Bolivia, already a member of the Andean Community since 1969, joined the Southern Common

Market (MERCOSUR) in July 2024. This initiated a four-year adoption schedule for the bloc's

regulatory framework and Common External Tariff. Eventually, Bolivia will have the option

to join the EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement or the EU Trade Agreement with the Andean

countries Colombia, Peru and Ecuador.

2.2 GSP+ trade impact

Between 2022 and 20244, total EU imports from Bolivia declined from EUR 860 million in

2022 to EUR 666.8 million in 2024. In 2022 imports were extraordinarily high, potentially due

to Covid rebound effects, and total EU imports in 2024 were higher than pre-Covid levels in

2019 (EUR 547.5 million). Imports of GSP+ eligible products decreased from EUR 63.3

million in 2022 to EUR 40.8 million in 2023, before increasing again to EUR 53.8 million in

2024. Imports using GSP+ preferences followed a similar trend, falling from EUR 59.0 million

in 2022 to EUR 35.4 million in 2023 and then rising to EUR 49.3 million in 2024. The share

of GSP+ eligible products in total imports increased slightly from 7.3 % in 2022 to 8.1 % in

2024, but remained low, as Bolivia exports a lot of products to the EU that are already duty-

free under most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs (such as ores and tin). The GSP+ utilisation rate

remained high throughout the period, standing at 91.6 % in 2024. Bolivia benefited from an

estimated EUR 766 000 in tariff exemptions in 2024 due to GSP+.

3

Figure 1. EU imports from Bolivia and GSP+ utilisation rate, 2019-2024

Indicators 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Annual

Growth

(2022-2024)

Total imports, (EUR million) 547.5 389.5 672.7 860.9 630.3 666.8 -12.0 %

GSP+ eligible, (EUR million) 83.0 45.1 54.3 63.3 40.8 53.8 -7.8 %

GSP+ used, (EUR million) 78.2 38.1 50.3 59.0 35.4 49.3 -8.6 %

Share of GSP+ eligible in total 15.2 % 11.6 % 8.1 % 7.3 % 6.5 % 8.1 %

GSP+ utilisation rate 94.2 % 84.5 % 92.6 % 93.3 % 86.8 % 91.6 %

MFN=0 % imports, (EUR million) 457.8 333.7 627.1 783.9 563.9 575.9 -14.3 %

Share of MFN=0 % imports 83.6 % 85.7 % 93.2 % 91.1 % 89.5 % 86.4 %

Source: EUROSTAT COMEXT

Figure 2. EU imports from Bolivia by preferential trade regime and utilisation rates, 2019-2024

Source: EUROSTAT COMEXT

The sectors5 benefiting the most from GSP+ preferences in 2024 were (in order of significance)

Cereals, Flour, & Nuts (S-02d), Prepared Foods & Beverages (S-04b), Inorganic & Organic

Chemicals (S-06a), Clothing (S-11b), and Oils, Fats & Waxes (S-03). These sectors have

dominated Bolivia’s export basket under GSP+ products to the EU and continue to underpin

the country’s comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing exports. The top five

export sectors to the EU all achieved preference utilisation rates between 74.7 % to 99.7 % in

2024.

4

Figure 3. Top product groups benefiting from GSP+ tariff preferences for Bolivia, 2024

Source: EUROSTAT COMEXT

3. Compliance with GSP+ obligations

Bolivia has maintained ratification of all 27 GSP+ relevant conventions and has issued no new

reservations. Bolivia is compliant with its reporting obligations to the monitoring bodies (for

details, see Annex). The following sections are based on the latest UN monitoring body reports

and supplemented with information from civil society and GSP monitoring, including updates

by the authorities.

3.1 Human Rights

Bolivia made progress in several areas on human rights and introduced new legislation, policies

and institutional processes during the reporting period, such as a new reparation law for rights

violations and laws addressing child exploitation. At the same time, systemic weaknesses -

such as prison overcrowding, gender-based violence and impunity for femicides - persist. The

2025 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) highlighted concerns over Indigenous rights, alongside

recommendations to address shrinking civic space, access to justice, gender-based violence,

and effective protections for human rights defenders and journalists. Bolivia supported 254 of

the 275 (92 %) recommendations, an increase of 23.3 % with respect to the previous cycle.

On the institutional side, the Defensoría del Pueblo, which plays an important role in

promoting, protecting, and monitoring human rights in Bolivia, was re-accredited with ‘A’

status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions in 2024. Bolivia adopted

a Multisectoral Comprehensive Development Plan Against Racism and All Forms of

Discrimination 2021–2025, establishing an inter-institutional committee for vulnerable

indigenous groups6. In late 2024, the Defensoría del Pueblo established an Observatory on

Racism and Discrimination7, to monitor, analyse, and combat discrimination and racism, thus

addressing the major concern about the lack of accessible data.

Legislative progress on civil and political rights includes a new reparation law for rights

violations (Bill 181/2024-2025), which was promulgated in November 20258. The

Plurinational Policy of Decolonisation and Depatriarchalisation (PPDD-2023) aims to address

and transform structural aspects of the colonial and patriarchal systems that reproduce violence,

discrimination, inequality, and lack of respect for diversity.

5

On the rights of the child, Bolivia issued Decree No 4980 in July 2023, approving the

Plurinational Public Policy for the Comprehensive Development of Early Childhood, and Law

No 1636 from September 2025 criminalising grooming and child sexual abuse material9.

Importantly, Law No 1639, prohibiting child marriage and early unions, entered into force in

September 2025, aligning national legislation with international standards. It eliminates the

legal exceptions that previously allowed marriage and early unions from the age of 1610. The

Defensoría del Pueblo created nine Departmental Committees to prevent sexual violence

against children and adolescents, integrating Child and Adolescent Ombudsman offices, the

Prosecutor’s Office, courts, and civil society organisations. To improve the follow-up on the

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) recommendations, the Defensoría del Pueblo

established a System for the Periodic Monitoring and Evaluation of the Implementation of the

CRC in Bolivia (SIDENIB), as part of its Action Plan for Populations in Vulnerable Situations

2024-2028. To date, 41 Autonomous Municipality Governments approved laws on

comprehensive assistance for child victims of femicide, and in November 2025 the national

Law No 1680 on assistance for child victims of femicide was passed11.

Despite many legal advances and some progress in implementation, many structural challenges

remain in the area of human rights. There are serious deficiencies regarding torture and other

cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. During its visit in December 2024,

the UN Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture (SPT) expressed concerns regarding poor

prison conditions, overcrowding of detention facilities, high numbers of pre-trial detention,

and serious limitations in access to justice12. The National Preventive Mechanism (NPM)

mirrored these findings in its October 2025 report13. Bolivia’s prison population increased by

46 % over the past 5 years and stands at 32 035 in 2024, with over 58 % in pre-trial detention.

Latest available data of the NPM, based on 494 inspection visits of detention facilities, recorded

81 cases of torture or inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment in 202414 and 17 violent

deaths in prisons in 202515. The NPM followed up on 16 criminal proceedings related to torture

cases, with a sentence in only one case16. While the draft Comprehensive Law to Prevent,

Investigate, Punish and Redress Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment (Law No 080/2023-2024), was approved by the Bolivian Senate in October 2024,

and the Human Rights Commission of the Chamber of Deputies in September 2025, its final

approval is pending.

Some existing indices highlight ongoing restrictions on civil liberties, weakened judicial

independence, and constrained civic space; e.g., the Civicus Monitor ranks civic space in

Bolivia as ‘obstructed’. However, the Freedom in the World Index upgraded Bolivia from

‘partly free’ to ‘free’ in 2026, due to the competitive 2025 general election, which resulted in

a peaceful transfer of power. The 2025 UPR cycle and the UN Committee on Economic, Social

and Cultural Rights underlined Bolivia’s insufficient protection of human rights defenders

(HRDs), noting harassment, threats and violence, especially against journalists and indigenous

HRDs, and called for stronger implementation of indigenous consultation and free, prior, and

informed consent, in particular in mining and hydrocarbons17. Press freedom in Bolivia

continues to face challenges. The Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index

recognises some improvement in 2025 as compared to 2024, but highlights structural threats,

such as violence against journalists, legal and economic pressures, and self-censorship, ranking

the country 93rd out of 180 countries.

There is still concern about high and increasing prevalence of violence against girls, high

levels of violence in schools and the handling of some cases in rural and indigenous

jurisdictions in ways that are detrimental to child victims. The Committee on the Rights of the

Child also expressed serious concern about the minimum age of criminal responsibility, which

6

was reduced in 2014 from 16 to 14, the continued use of pre-trial detention for children, and a

lack of full alignment of the justice system with the Convention on the Right of the Child18.

Bolivia continues to show a persistently high level of violence against women: 74.7 % of

women report having experienced physical or sexual violence at least once; UN Women ranks

Bolivia as South America's second most violent country for women, with 50 325 cases of

violence recorded in 2024 and 34 412 cases between January and September 2025, according

to the Attorney General’s Office19. Eighty-four cases of femicides were registered in 2024, of

which 29 have received court sentences; by the end of 2025, there were 81 reported femicides20.

Access to justice for survivors of gender-based violence is limited by institutional weaknesses,

insufficient resources, and fragmented mandates. Abortion remains criminalised, with

exceptions only for sexual violence, fetal malformation, or to protect the pregnant woman's life

or health. While Bolivia showed progress on the implementation of a Central Register of

Violence against Women, the incorporation of comprehensive sexuality education into school

curricula and the roll-out of a pilot scheme for new contraceptive methods accompanied by

training of staff, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women highlights

a lack of information regarding access for women and girls in rural areas21. In the Global

Gender Gap Report 2025 published by the World Economic Forum, Bolivia ranked 48th out of

148 economies in terms of gender parity.

Concerns remain about discrimination, stigmatisation and violence against LGBTIQ+

persons, particularly against transgender persons. The Defensoría del Pueblo reported that 64

% of transgender persons experienced discrimination in 2025 based on their gender identity.

Bolivia’s Constitutional Court recognised civil unions for same-sex couples in March 2023,

but same-sex marriage is not legal in Bolivia and transgender persons are denied the right to

enter into civil unions, adopt children or be elected to public office22.

Priorities for future engagement should focus on the effective implementation of the legal

and policy frameworks. A central priority must be the reform and strengthening of the justice

system, including ensuring judicial independence, tackling the overcrowding of prisons,

reducing excessive pre-trial detention through the expanded use of alternative measures, and

ensuring prompt and impartial investigation of all allegations of torture and ill-treatment by

law enforcement officials. Efforts to combat violence against women and girls must be

significantly strengthened, including through nationwide availability of specialised services

and by addressing structural barriers to enhance the prevention and prosecution of gender-

based violence. A comprehensive legal and policy framework for the protection of human

rights defenders, including early-warning and protection mechanisms, risk assessments and

protocols for responding to threats, should be developed. In relation to indigenous peoples,

effective consultation mechanisms that comply with international standards and guarantee the

right to free, prior and informed consent, should be established, particularly in the context of

extractive and infrastructure projects. Given the cross-cutting role in safeguarding human

rights, the Defensoría del Pueblo must be guaranteed full functional independence in law and

practice. This includes transparent and merit-based appointment procedures, adequate and

predictable funding, and sufficient technical and human resources.

3.2 Labour Rights

There have not been many legislative developments on labour rights in Bolivia in the past three

years, and long-standing problems persist, but Bolivia has worked on improving compliance

with some ILO conventions. Some positive developments relate to the reduction of child labour

(albeit from a high level) as well as training and awareness-raising on child labour, trafficking

7

of persons, and forced labour in particular in indigenous communities. In contrast, there has

not been significant advancement in legal reforms to align national laws on Convention No 87

nor on Convention No 98.

Bolivia’s record regarding equal remuneration and non-discrimination has not given rise to

any critical Observations of the CEACR during the reporting period. For 2024, the ILO

estimated the gender pay gap to be 4.4 %, a rate that has improved since 2022. The female

labour market participation rate was 76.6 % according to the Labour Force Survey 202423. The

Supreme Decree No 4401 of 2020 provides that, ‘the State shall promote the entry of women

into employment and also the same remuneration for women and men for work of equal value’.

The CEACR welcomed the Government’s indication that qualifications are taken into account

through the notion of ‘skill’, and requested specific examples of objective ob evaluations

conducted24.

A positive development regarding the abolition of forced labour was the adoption of the Law

No 1436 of 22 June 2022 regarding the 2014 Protocol of ILO Convention No 29. However the

deposit of the instrument of ratification with the ILO by the Government is still pending. In the

context of the implementation of the Plurinational Policy against trafficking in persons, illicit

trafficking of immigrants and related offences for 2021-2025, Bolivia has organised training

measures for public servants, prevention and awareness-raising activities and established

Integrated Mobile Offices in remote areas where the presence of forced labour and of the worst

forms of child labour is suspected, including in mining areas25, though the ILO Committee of

Experts considered that more information was needed on the effectiveness of these measures

and urged the government to continue taking the necessary measures to prevent, identify and

punish forced labour on indigenous persons. Bolivia has also concluded bilateral agreements

with neighbouring countries to cooperate in the fight against trafficking of persons26. The

government launched the Information System for Girls, Boys, and Adolescents, a new system

to register and analyse data on the rights and well-being of children and adolescents, aiming to

shape and coordinate public policies.

The rate of child labour has decreased in the past years in Bolivia but continues to be high,

though available data is limited and generally outdated. According to ILO data, the rate of

children involved in child labour for children aged 12 to 14 fell from 25.1 % in 2021 to 21.5 %

in 2023, and for children aged 15 to 17 from 8.7 % in 2021 to 7.1 % in 202327. There is a clear

reduction in child labour for ages 7 to 13, especially for 7-year-old children (3.5 % in 2023)28.

According to the ILO’s Harmonised Microdata, in 2023, 126 600 children aged 12 to 14

worked in the agricultural sector, as did 133 700 children aged 15 to 17 years29. The ILO

CEACR report noted previously that over 3 800 children work in the tin, zinc, silver and gold

mines in the country30. The Government has reported that it is preparing a social protection and

prevention programme for children and young persons under 14 years engaged in work.

In some areas of core labour standards, Bolivia’s laws are not fully aligned to ILO conventions.

Some provisions in the Bolivian legislation imposing forced labour as a penalty such as

Article 282 of the Penal Code and section 2 of Legislative Decree No 2565 of 6 June 1951

(Penalties for having participated in strikes) require modifications to be aligned with ILO

conventions on forced labour. There are also doubts regarding the application in practice of

section 133 of the Penal Code (terrorism), as well as of sections 123 (sedition), 126

(conspiracy) and 134 (public disorder and disturbances) of the Penal Code, including the

number of persons convicted, the acts that gave rise to these convictions, and the penalties

imposed. The Government has reported that there are proposals for reforms regarding the

definition of ‘terrorism’31. Bolivia must also ensure that persons who peacefully express

8

political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic

system cannot be subjected to criminal penalties involving compulsory labour32. In addition,

on prosecution and application of criminal penalties, ILO has requested in its 2026 report that

the Bolivian Government takes the necessary steps to ensure that the competent bodies,

including the police, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and judicial officials, can systematically

conduct adequate investigations to prosecute those responsible for trafficking in persons33.

In relation to minimum age for work, the ILO experts report that legislative amendments are

needed to permit participation in apprenticeships only for persons above 14 years of age, i.e.,

above the minimum age of admission to employment. The legislation in Bolivia does not

require employers to keep registers of employed persons aged under 18. This is not in line with

the ILO Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, No 138

(1973)34. Also, a minimum age for admission to light work must be set and the light work that

children between the ages of 12 and 14 may perform as well as the number of hours must be

established in accordance with Article 7(3) of Convention No 13835.

Public information is not available on labour inspections36 carried out by inspectors

specialised in child labour, nor on the number of violations detected, their nature, scope and

trends of the worst forms of child labour. The Bolivian Government reports that in 2024, 480

specialised inspections aimed at the protection of boys, girls, and adolescents were carried out.

For 2025 the government reported 357 inspections. Information gaps include the specific

results achieved in protecting children in street situations from the worst forms of child labour

and on the measures adopted to prevent these children from becoming involved in situations

of debt bondage or forced labour and from being recruited to carry out hazardous work in

mines.

Bolivia also needs to further align its labour laws to the ILO conventions on Freedom of

Association. This refers, among other to the possibility of dissolving trade union organisations

by administrative authority, prohibiting and criminalising illegal strikes37, limits to agricultural

workers from the right to freedom of association, the denial of the right to organise of public

servants, the excessive requirement of 50 % of the workers in an enterprise to establish a trade

union38, the need to obtain the approval of a central union organisation to register a trade union,

the illegality of strikes in the banking sector, and the possibility of imposing compulsory

arbitration by decision of the executive authorities to bring an end to a strike. With regard to

the provisions establishing requirements for trade union leadership, as well as the power of the

authorities, in certain circumstances, to disqualify ex officio trade union leaders, the Bolivian

Government has informed that section 138 of the General Labour Act, which sets out the

requirements for leadership of trade union organisations, is currently being revised in order to

bring it into line with the principles of inclusiveness enshrined in the Constitution of 200939.

In addition, regarding the conditions required for union leaders referring to Bolivian

nationality, literacy, legal age, and permanent employee status, the Bolivian Government will

consider their adequacy to fundamental rights and international commitments, under the

revision of the General Labour Law.

On collective bargaining, the same issues apply as in the last reporting period, including the

need to increase fines for anti-union discrimination, limitations to free and voluntary

negotiations in relation to wages and the need to guarantee the right to collective bargaining

for both public servants not engaged in the administration of the state and agricultural

workers40.

9

Priorities for future engagement are continued work on prevention, elimination and

remediation of child labour (including the collection and publication of data and information

on children in work, to better target interventions); strengthening of institutions to advance

positive developments such as the creation of a centralised information system on child labour;

and maintenance of an effective labour inspection system, notably in relation to child labour

and forced labour and collection of accurate data. In addition, the legal framework regarding

freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining needs to be revised in tripartite

dialogue to ensure they align with the ILO conventions41.

3.3 Environment and Climate

Bolivia is a biologically diverse country and demonstrates strong legal commitment to

environmental and climate conventions. However, implementation is a challenge.

There have been positive developments in several of the environmental and climate areas

covered by the GSP conventions. With regard to biodiversity, at its 77th meeting in November

2023, Bolivia’s CITES-implementing legislation was classified in Category 1, meaning the

country generally meets all four core requirements for implementation and enforcement. The

country is identified as one of 17 Parties receiving International Consortium on Combating

Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) support42, and it participates in the Latin-American pilot for a jaguar

demand-reduction project43 as well as in regional cooperation to design and roll out CITES e-

permitting systems. So far, Bolivia has not been subject to any CITES compliance procedure.

Bolivia submitted its Sixth National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity in the

sixth global reporting cycle in 2024 with delay (deadline: 31 December 2018). The 7th National

Report was submitted on time in February 2026. The report assesses national implementation

of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2025 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. It shows

a wide protected-area and Ramsar sites network, while Resolution 085/2022 brings in the

International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Green List standard and three

candidate sites44.

Climate policy is framed by the ‘Mother Earth’ law and the Plurinational Climate Change

Policy, with the Plurinational Authority of Mother Earth (APMT) as a key climate institution.

APMT’s 2021–2025 strategic plan sets out integrated mitigation–adaptation actions on forests,

water, food systems and low-carbon energy. The 2023 Updated Plurinational Policy on Climate

Change targets 79 % renewable energy and 80 % deforestation reduction by 2030, heavily

relying on international cooperation for implementation45.

Bolivia submitted its first Biennial Transparency Report (BTR1) under the Paris Agreement on

31 December 2024 and its climate action plan, the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC

3.0), on 29 September 202546, which places Bolivia under the enhanced transparency

framework, providing national Greenhouse Gas (GHG) inventories and policy information in

line with Paris-system requirements. Bolivia’s third NDCs also set out sectoral targets for 2035

that integrate mitigation, adaptation, and joint commitments, with adaptation prioritised due to

Bolivia’s high vulnerability. Importantly, targets now include detailed indicators—expressed

in tCO₂eq, hectares, MWh, among others—increasing the clarity and transparency of the NDC

and enabling more robust monitoring and impact measurement47.

Bolivia established a registry for carbon projects (RENAPP) under the framework of Supreme

Decree 5264 in October 2024, after the constitutional ruling 0040/2024 from June 2024

annulled Article 32.5 of the Mother Earth Law, which prohibited the commercialisation of

environmental functions.

10

With regard to ozone-depleting substances, United Nations Industrial Development

Organisation (UNIDO) projects confirmed that Bolivia maintained compliance with

Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC) phase-out targets48. In 2024, Bolivia banned HCFC-based

equipment imports. In December 2023, Stage I of Bolivia’s Kigali hydrofluorocarbons (HFC)

Implementation Plan (KIP) for 2023–2030 was approved, including funding, control schedules,

and reporting obligations, followed by operationalisation steps in 2024–202549. The plan aims

to reduce HFC consumption by 15 % by 2029, relative to Bolivia’s HFC baseline.

Despite these positive legal developments, challenges with implementation exist. Global Forest

Watch data show Bolivia lost ~386 000 hectares of primary forest in 2022, ranking third

globally, and that by 2024 primary forest loss had increased by about 200 % to around 1.4–1.5

million hectares (≈14–15,000 km²), making Bolivia the second-largest country for tropical

primary forest loss, driven mainly by fire and agricultural expansion50. In 2024, devastating

forest fires and droughts in lowland regions destroyed thousands of hectares and displaced

families, exposing weak land management and climate adaptation policies. The events

triggered a ‘national catastrophe’ declaration51 and renewed debate over agro-industrial

expansion.

With regard to persistent organic pollutants, the Pan American Health Organisation

(PAHO) / World Health Organisation (WHO) notes that Bolivia still lacks national chemical-

risk diagnostics, faces weak inter-institutional coordination and needs updated regulations for

agrochemicals and other substances52.

Future engagement should prioritise the implementation of the various policy and regulatory

measures that Bolivia has advanced in recent years. The implementation of the measures and

targets introduced to reduce emissions under the existing and new NDC will have to be closely

scrutinised while the protection of biodiversity and the fight against deforestation remain a

particular concern.

3.4 Good Governance (Drug Control and Anti-Corruption)

Bolivia has adopted several policies and cooperation activities in the field of drug control and

anti-corruption but implementation gaps hinder progress. Judicial weaknesses and limited civil

society oversight exacerbate risks.

In the past years, Bolivia has actively worked on drug control. The International Narcotics

Control Board (INCB) records in 2024 Bolivia’s participation in INCB/United Nations Office

on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) capacity-building to comply with the three drug-control

conventions and notes ongoing alternative-development programmes in the country. As of

2024, UNODC alternative-development initiatives in Bolivia support more than 1 500 families,

and 1 900 small producers (32 % women) have received training in legal production. Bolivia's

Special Force to Fight Drug Trafficking (FELCN) seized 66 tons of cocaine and 514.5 tons of

marijuana in 2024, exceeding the 2023 seizures. In 2024, there were 3 356 people apprehended

for drug trafficking and 1 458 sentenced by the courts53. The 2025 INCB report notes that for

2024, Bolivia reported the licit production of 25 728 tons of coca leaf obtained from licit coca

bush cultivation, in accordance with the reservation to the convention made by Bolivia, and in

2023, 97 % of the drugs seized were destroyed, demonstrating good governance.

Bolivia engages in regional frameworks strengthening governance. In February 2024, La Paz

hosted the 24th EU–Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) High-

Level Meeting on Drugs which emphasised mutual accountability, data transparency, and the

exchange of best practices in judicial cooperation. On 10 July 2024, Bolivia’s Office of the

11

Prosecutor General signed a Working Arrangement with Eurojust to bolster judicial

cooperation in cross-border investigations into organised crime, including drug trafficking and

money laundering54. Nevertheless, in 2025, Bolivia was added to the Financial Action Task

Force (FATF) ‘Grey List’ and in January 2026 to the EU Anti-Money Laundering

(AML)/Counter-Terrorism Financing (CTF) List.

Despite a good drug controls strategy, Bolivia remains the world's third-largest coca

producer. Cultivation increased by 9.7 % in 2024 to approximately 34 000 hectares,

consolidating the upward trend since 2021. Data confirms cultivation exceeds the legal 22 000-

hectare ceiling, despite eradication efforts. The eradication, or ‘cultivation rationalisation’, in

Bolivia reached 10 001 ha in 2024, figures obtained through field verification by the UNODC-

Bolivia monitoring mechanism55.

Since 2023, Bolivia reinforced its framework with Supreme Decree No 4872 (2023), launching

the National Policy on Transparency and Anti-Corruption. Information on the

implementation of activities under the National Policy on Transparency and Anti-Corruption

indicates that the implementation rate for 2023 was 90 %56 and the Office of the Prosecutor

General increased the number of prosecuted corruption cases57.

Cooperation with Eurojust contributed to enhancing cross-border investigations of organised

crime and money laundering. Digitising case tracking and asset-declaration systems improved

accountability, though challenges persist in judicial independence and data publication58.

Bolivia advanced its Sistema de Contrataciones Estatales (SICOES) official electronic

platform and system used for public procurement, strengthening electronic procurement and

online contract data publication59. These reforms are designed to increase transparency and

reduce procurement-related corruption risks.

The second-cycle United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)(2004) peer review

concluded in July 2025. Unlike in the first cycle, the full country review report was approved

but not made public.60 According to UNODC records, Bolivia fulfilled its formal notification

obligations, designating the required competent authorities and focal points for mutual legal

assistance and cooperation mechanisms. The non-publication of the UNCAC review however

limits civil society monitoring, contravening Article 13 on public participation.

In 2025, Bolivia scored 28 out of 100 and ranked 136 of 182 countries in Transparency

International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)61. The score is only slightly down from 29

in 2023, but confirms a longer term trend and indicates that perceptions of corruption in the

public sector have worsened over the past years.

Priorities for future engagement on drug control continue to centre around the need to ensure

that the legal cultivation of coca leaves is not diverted into illicit drug markets, including by

creating alternatives to coca cultivation and implementing alternative development approaches.

Bolivia should also undertake annual surveys, with UNODC support, on the status of illicit

cultivation in its territory, and to publish the results of those surveys in a timely manner, thereby

enabling adequate comparative monitoring and supporting the development of evidence-based

public policies.

In the area of anti-corruption, in the future, engagement should prioritise the enhanced

enforcement and implementation of anti-corruption policies and strategies and ensuring the

independence of anti-corruption agencies and judiciary.

12

4. Cooperation

Climate change and the environment remain priority issues for the EU in Bolivia, together

with support to democracy and human rights and the fight against drug trafficking and

organised crime. These priorities are reflected in the bilateral cooperation strategy for 2021-

2027, which foresees a financial envelope of EUR 143 million. Bolivia remains the number

one recipient of EU bilateral grant assistance in South America.

For instance, in the area of democracy, justice and human rights, the European Union

supports institutional strengthening and the rule of law. Through United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP), and in partnership with Spain and Canada, the EU has

since 2020 strengthened the capacities of the Supreme Electoral Court, which has become

one of the most trusted institutions in Bolivia and whose role during the 2025 General

Election was widely praised. Support to the judicial system includes a EUR 2 million

initiative managed by the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation

(AECID) to enhance the digitalisation of judicial processes by strengthening the Information

Technology (IT) services of the Attorney General’s Office. This effort is expected to increase

transparency, accelerate case management and contribute to reducing the high rate of

preventive detention.

13

Annex: Bolivia - Compliance with GSP ratification and reporting obligations

Convention Ratification status /

Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to

monitoring bodies

Human Rights

1. Convention on the Prevention

and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide (1948)

Ratified: 14.06.2005

No reservations

No reporting obligations

2. International Convention on

the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination (1965)

Ratified: 22.09.1970

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 08.12.2023

• Last report submitted on 13.03.2019

• Next report due on 01.10. 2027

3. International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights (1966)

Ratified: 12.08.1982

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 02.06.2022

• Last report submitted on 13.12.2018

• Next report due on 31.03.2029

4. International Covenant on

Economic Social and Cultural

Rights (1966)

Ratified: 12.08.1982

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 15.10.2021

• Last report submitted on 12.03.2019

• Next report due on 31.10.2026

5. Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination Against Women

(1979)

Ratified: 08.06.1990

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 07.07.2022

• Last report submitted on 29.08.2019

• Next report due on 04.07. 2026

6. Convention Against Torture

and other Cruel, Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or

Punishment (1984)

Ratified: 12.05.1999

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 02.12.2021

• Last report submitted on 12.11.2025

• Next report due: not yet set

7.Convention on the Rights of

the Child (1989)

Ratified: 12.06.1990

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 09.02.2023

• Last report submitted on 15.04.2019.

• Next report due: not yet set

Labour Rights12

8. Convention concerning

Forced or Compulsory Labour,

No 29 (1930)

Ratified: 31.05.2005

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments in 2026

• Last Government report submitted: 2025

• Next report due: 2027

9. Convention concerning

Freedom of Association and

Protection of the Right to

Organise, No 87 (1948)

Ratified: 04.01.1965

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Lest CEACR comments in 2024

• Last Government report submitted: 2023

• Next report due: 2028

10. Convention concerning the

Application of the Principles of

the Right to Organise and to

Bargain Collectively, No 98

(1949)

Ratified: 15.11.1973

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest CEACR comments in 2024

• Last Government report submitted: 2024

• Next report due: 2028

11. Convention concerning

Equal Remuneration of Men

and Women Workers for Work

of Equal Value, No 100 (1951)

Ratified: 15.11.1973

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest CEACR comments in 2026

• Last Government report submitted: 2025

• Next report due: 2027

1 Following a decision taken by the ILO Governing Body to modernise the ILO reporting system, as from 2027

Governments will no longer submit separate reports for each ratified Convention, but instead, they will submit

thematic reports, grouping conventions in 15 thematic areas. As a transition year, only a limited number of

reports will be requested in 2026. See: The future of reporting on ratified conventions,

https://www.ilo.org/international-labour-standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards-

overview-ilo/future-reporting-ratified-conventions 2 Reservations do not apply in the ILO system.

14

Convention Ratification status /

Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to

monitoring bodies

12. Convention concerning the

Abolition of Forced Labour, No

105 (1957)

Ratified: 11.06.1990

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest CEACR comments in 2026

• Last Government report submitted: 2025

• Next report due: 2027

13. Convention concerning

Discrimination in Respect of

Employment and Occupation,

No 111 (1958)

Ratified: 31.01.1977

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest CEACR comments in 2026

• Last Government report submitted: 2025

• Next report due: 2027

14. Convention concerning

Minimum Age for Admission to

Employment, No 138 (1973)

Ratified: 11.06.1997

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest CEACR comments in 2026

• Last Government report submitted: 2025

• Next report due: 2027

15. Convention concerning the

Prohibition and Immediate

Action for the Elimination of the

Worst Forms of Child Labour,

No 182 (1999)

Ratified: 06.06.2003

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest CEACR comments in 2026

• Last Government report submitted: 2025

• Next report due: 2027

Environment and Climate

16. Convention on International

Trade in Endangered Species of

Wild Fauna and Flora (1973)

Ratified: 06.07.1979

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Annual Trade Report for 2023 submitted on

1.11.2024.

• Annual Trade Report for 2024 submitted on

24.10.2025

• Next Annual Trade Report due by:

31.10.2026.

• Annual Illegal Trade Reports for 2023 and

2024 submitted3.

• Latest Implementation Report: Submitted for

2014-20154.

17. Montreal Protocol on

Substances that Deplete the

Ozone Layer (1987)

Ratified: 03.10.1994

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last report submitted:

Article 7 data report covering 2024

• Next report:

Article 7 data report covering 2025 due

30.09.2026

18. Basel Convention on the

Control of Transboundary

Movements of Hazardous

Wastes and Their Disposal

(1989)

Ratified: 15.11.1996

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• National Report (NR) for 2023 outstanding.

• NR for 2024 submitted on 30.12.2025

• Next NR (2025) due 31.12.2026

19. Convention on Biological

Diversity (1992)

Ratified: 03.10.1994

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Seventh National Report (7NR): submitted

on 28.02.2026

• Latest National Biodiversity Strategy and

Action Plan (NBSAP) update: 2019 (until

2030)

• Updated national targets: 27.02.2026

• Next report: 8NR due by 30.06.2029

3 Reporting mandatory but not subject to compliance procedure. 4 Ibid

15

20. The United Nations

Framework Convention on

Climate Change (1992)

Ratified: 03.10.1994

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations –

• Last updated Nationally Determined

Contributions (NDC): NDC 3.0 on

29.09.2025

• Latest National Communication (NC): NC3,

submitted on 21.10.2020

• First Biennial Transparency Report (BTR1):

submitted on 31.12.2024

• Next report (BTR2) due 31.12.2026

21. Cartagena Protocol on

Biosafety (2000)

Ratified: 22.04.2002

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest National Report: 5NR submitted on

27.02.2026

• Next report: Not yet set

22. Stockholm Convention on

persistent Organic Pollutants

(2001)

Ratified: 03.06.2003

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest Report: Fifth Round Party Report

submitted on 30.08.2022

• Next Report due: 6th round due by

31.08.2026

• Initial National Implementation Plan (NIP):

19.09.2005

• NIP updates: COP 4 and COP 5

amendments included

23. Kyoto Protocol to the

United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change

(1998)

Ratified: 30.11.1999

No reservations

No reporting obligations separate from the

United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change

Good Governance

24. United Nations Single

Convention on Narcotic Drugs

(1961)

Ratified: 11.01.20135

Reservations made

related to

criminalisation of coca

leaves for personal

consumption and for the

related cultivation and

trade

Compliant with reporting obligations

• 2025 reporting fulfilled; no INCB mission

since 2016

25. United Nations Convention

on Psychotropic Substances

(1971)

Ratified: 20.03.1985

No reservations

26. United Nations Convention

against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances (1988)

Ratified: 20.08.1990

Reservation made to

Article 3(2) related to

criminalisation of coca

leaves for personal

consumption

27. United Nations Convention

against Corruption (2004)

Ratified: 05.12.2005

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• First review cycle completed in 2015 (full

report available).

• Second review cycle completed in July 2025

without publication of the full report.

• Executive summary available since

November 2020.

5 The Government of Bolivia originally deposited its instrument of accession to the Convention on 23 September

1976. On 29 June 2011, the Government notified the Secretary-General that it had decided to denounce the

Convention. In accordance with article 46(2), the denunciation took effect on 1 January 2012. Following

denunciation, Bolivia re-acceded to the Convention with a reservation.

16

1 Key events in 2026 at the moment of writing have been included in this Staff Working Document. All links

provided were up to date as of 28 April 2026. 2 World Bank, ‘World Development Indicators’, World Bank. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-

development-indicators. 3 IMF, ‘Article IV: Bolivia Country Report No. 25/116’, IMF, June, 2025. https://www.imf.org/-

/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1bolea2025002-print-pdf.pdf 4 Source for all statistics in point 2.2: Eurostat data covering 2022-2024 based on latest available validated full

year data as of September 2025. GSP statistics only cover goods imported into the EU market, i.e., goods released

for free circulation in the EU. The GSP statistics do not cover other EU-imports, like goods imported for the

customs inward processing procedure or re-imports after the customs outward processing procedure. Trade flows

registered as ‘confidential’ do not appear in the GSP+ usage figures and regime 1 normal trade; but do appear in

total trade figures (regime 4).

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/ext_go_agg_esms.htm#conf1537195068659 5 Products that benefit from GSP are separated in sections according to the GSP Regulation. Information on which

CN codes are included in the GSP sections can be found in Annex V of the Regulation No 978/2012. EUR-Lex –

02012R0978-20250101 – EN – EUR-Lex. 6 Information received from the Plurinational State of Bolivia on follow-up to the concluding observations on its

combined twenty-first to twenty-fourth periodic reports, CERD/C/BOL/FCO/21-24, 4.6.2025, p.3-4. 7 ‘Observatorio Defensorial Sobre Racismo Y Discriminación’, Defensoría del Pueblo Estado Plurinacional de

Bolivia, 2024. www.defensoria.gob.bo/contenido/observatorio-defensorial-sobre-racismo-y-discriminacion 8 ‘Ley de reparación integral para las víctimas de violaciones a derechos humanos cometidas en rupturas del orden

constitucional’, Senado del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 5 Nov, 2025. www.senado.gob.bo/area-

legislativa/leyes-promulgadas/617 . 9 ‘Ley Nº 1636’, Gaceta Oficial del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 10 Sep, 2025 10 ‘Ley Nº 1639’, Gaceta Oficial del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2 Sep, 2025 11 ‘Ley Nº 1680’, Gaceta Oficial del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 5 Nov, 2025 12 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Bolivia: Despite progress, tackling overcrowding in

prisons remains pressing’, Press Release, , 18 Nov, 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-

releases/2024/12/bolivia-despite-progress-tackling-overcrowding-prisons-remains-pressing 13 ‘Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención de la Tortura, Tercer Informe Anual 2024’. Defensoría del Pueblo del

Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia., 2025, p. 7. www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/spt-

opcat/npm/informe-anual-2024-mnp-bolivia.pdf 14 Ibid, p. 117, para. 251. 15 ‘Defensoría del Pueblo cuestiona seguridad en Palmasola tras el deceso de un privado de libertad por impactos

de arma de fuego’, Nota de prensa. Defensoría del Pueblo del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 27 Nov, 2025. 16 ‘Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención de la Tortura, Tercer Informe Anual 2024’. Defensoría del Pueblo del

Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2025, pp. 119-121. www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/spt-

opcat/npm/informe-anual-2024-mnp-bolivia.pdf 17 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Follow-up Letter to the State Party 21 Oct’,2024. 18 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports

of the Plurinational State of Bolivia’, 6 Mar, 2023, p.14, para. 47. 19 Ministerio Público, Fiscalía General del Estado, ‘Fiscal General Informa Que Bolivia Registra Más De 34 Mil

Casos De Violencia’. Ministerio Público, Fiscalía General del Estado,2 Oct, 2025.

https://www.fiscalia.gob.bo/comunicacion/noticias/fiscal-general-informa-que-bolivia-registra-mas-de-34-mil-

casos-de-violencia 20 Ministerio Público, Fiscalía General del Estado, ‘Bolivia Cierra El 2024 Con 84 Víctimas De Feminicidio’.

1 Jan, 2025. https://www.fiscalia.gob.bo/comunicacion/noticias/fiscal-general-destaca-avances-en-la-lucha-

contra-feminicidios-e-infanticidios-con-mas-del-90-de-los-responsables-identificados-en-el-2025 21 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Follow-up assessment letter’, 23 Oct, 2024. 22 Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic

Review’, 19 Mar, 2025, para. 19; para. 122.68; para 122.269; para. 122.270. 23 Profiles: Bolivia. ILO STAT. https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/country-profiles/bol/ 24 International Labour Organisation (ILO), ‘Direct Request (CEACR) – adopted 2025, published 114th ILC

session, 2026. 25 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No. 182’, adopted 2023, published 112nd ILC session.2024. 26 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No. 29’, adopted 2025, published in, ‘Application of International

Labour Standards 2026’, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and

Recommendations.

17

27 https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/Report%20III%28A%29-2026-%5BNORMES-251223-

001%5D-Web-EN.pdf, p.506 28 Studies from the Universidad Católica Boliviana. https://iisec.ucb.edu.bo/indicador/ninos-ninas-y-

adolescentes-nna-que-trabajan-377 29 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No. 138’, adopted 2025, published in, “Application of International

Labour Standards 2026”, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and

Recommendations. https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/Report%20III%28A%29-2026-

%5BNORMES-251223-001%5D-Web-EN.pdf 30 ILO, ‘(CEACR) Application of International Labour Standards’, 2024, p. 454. 31 Ibid. 32 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No. 105’, adopted 2025, published in, “Application of

International Labour Standards 2026”, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and

Recommendations;

ILO, ‘Direct request (CEACR) on C182’, adopted in 2023, published 112nd ILC session, 2024., 34 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No. 138’, adopted 2025, published in, “Application of International

Labour Standards 2026”’, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and

Recommendations. 35 Ibid. 36 A CEACR Direct Request mentions a decrease of inspectors in Bolivia over the last decade: ‘[…] the Committee

notes the Government’s indication that in 2021–22 there was a total of 99 inspectors […]. However, the Committee

observes that in May 2016 the inspection services had 107 inspectors. The Committee requests the Government

to provide information on the reason for the decrease in the number of inspectors and whether it is planned to

increase their number’. Direct Request (CEACR), adopted 2023, published 112nd ILC session,2024. 37 Need to repeal sections 1 and 2 of Legislative Decree No. 2565 of June 1951. 38 In its replies of November 2024, Bolivia reported that this provision is not applied in practice. However

alignment of the legal framework would be still necessary. ILO 2025 CEAR Report states that Ministerial

Resolution No. 123/06 of 2006 does not address the prohibition on the establishment of trade unions where less

than 50 % of the employees are trade union members, in the case of industrial trade unions. 39 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No. 87’, adopted 2023, published 112nd ILC session,2024.40 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No. 98’, adopted 2023, published 112nd ILC session,2024. 41 Bolivia has not yet ratified the ILO Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976

(No. 144) which is one of the additional conventions under the new GSP Regulation. 42 CITES National Legislation Project, ‘Legislative Status Table’, October,2020.

https://cites.org/sites/default/files/projects/NLP/Legislative_status_table_October_2020.pdf

CITES, 2024, CoP20 Doc. 16.4: ‘International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC)’.

https://cites.org/sites/default/files/documents/E-CoP20-016-04_0.pdf

CITES, 2024. CoP20 Doc. 31: Demand-reduction. https://cites.org/sites/default/files/documents/E-CoP20-

031.pdf 43 CITES, CoP20 Doc. 16.4: ‘International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC)’, 2022.

https://cites.org/sites/default/files/documents/E-CoP20-016-04_0.pdf 44 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), ’Sixth National Report of Bolivia’, 2019. 45 Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Política Nacional de Cambio Climático – Revisión 7, 2023.

https://web.madretierra.gob.bo 46 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ‘Party-Authored Reports: Bolivia’.

https://unfccc.int/reports?f%5B0%5D=corporate_author%3A150#:~:text=Show%20me,English%20PDF%201.

21%20MB 47 UNFCCC, ‘Bolivia – Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0)’.

https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/Party.aspx?party=BOL 48 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO),. ‘COMPASS Results Monitoring Platform’.

UNIDO. https://compass.unido.org/?year=2026;

Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, ‘Multilateral Fund Project Database’,

https://www.multilateralfund.org; 49 Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol,‘Project Summary: Bolivia’,

https://www.multilateralfund.org/api/drupal-documents/download/file/77a8c94d-4fc8-4679-ac5a-

0dd897300719?filename=93PMS_summary.pdf 50 World Resources Institute, Global Forest Reviews, ‘Fires Drove Record-breaking Tropical Forest Loss in 2024’,

2025. Fires Drove Record-breaking Tropical Forest Loss in 2024 | World Resources Institute Research 51 Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Supreme Decree No. 5219: National Emergency and National Disaster

Declaration, 8 Sept. 2024.

18

52Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), ‘Bolivia Avanza Hacia Estrategia Nacional para Frenar Riesgos

Químicos en Salud’. PAHO, 20 Aug, 2025. https://www.paho.org/es/noticias/20-8-2025-bolivia-avanza-hacia-

estrategia-nacional-para-frenar-riesgos-quimicos-salud. 53 Ministerio de Gobierno (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia), ‘Boletín de Estadísticas de Lucha contra el

Narcotráfico N.º 2’. Observatorio Boliviano de Seguridad Ciudadana y Lucha Contra las Drogas, Feb, 2025.

https://obscd.mingobierno.gob.bo/sites/default/files/2025-02/BOLETIN_NARCOTRAFICO_2_V5_0.pdf. 54 Eurojust, ‘An Important Step against Organised Crime: Eurojust Signs Working Arrangements with Five Latin

American Countries’,.10 July,2024., www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/important-step-against-organised-crime-

eurojust-signs-working-arrangements-five-latin-american 55 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘Coca Cultivation Monitoring Report: Plurinational

State of Bolivia – Fact Sheet and Executive Summary 2024’, Dec. 2025. www.unodc.org/documents/crop-

monitoring/Bolivia/Fact_Sheet_Executive_summary_Bolivia_coca_survey_2024.pdf 56 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘Public Integrity Indicators: Bolivia –

Country Fact Sheet 2025’, OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, Paris, 2025.

www.oecd.org/governance/public-integrity-indicators/bolivia-country-fact-sheet.pdf. 57 Organización de Estados Americanos (OAS), Informe de Avance Nacional – Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia

(visita país 14 mar. 2022–31 ene. 2023), Mecanismo de Seguimiento de la Implementación de la Convención

Interamericana contra la Corrupción (MESICIC), OAS/Ser.L./SG/MESICIC/doc.201/16, 10 Jan, 2023. 58 Viceministerio de Transparencia Institucional y Lucha contra la Corrupción (VTILCC),‘Memoria Institucional

2024’, Ministerio de Justicia y Transparencia Institucional, La Paz, 2025, p. 132. 59 Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas, Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, ‘Manual de Operaciones del

SICOES’, June, 2024.

https://economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/sites/default/files/2024-06/23-10-23ManualOperaciones.pdf 60 UNODC, ‘Country Profile: Bolivia (Plurinational State of)’, Corruption Country Profiles.

www.unodc.org/corruption/en/country-profiles/data/BOL.html. 61 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’, Transparency International.

www.transparency.org/en/cpi/.

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 16.7.2026 SWD(2026) 189 final

JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good

Governance (GSP+) assessment of the Republic of Cabo Verde covering the period

2023-2025

Accompanying the document

Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council

on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences covering the period 2023-2025

{JOIN(2026) 16 final} - {SWD(2026) 184 final} - {SWD(2026) 185 final} - {SWD(2026) 186 final} - {SWD(2026) 187 final} - {SWD(2026) 188 final} -

{SWD(2026) 190 final} - {SWD(2026) 191 final} - {SWD(2026) 192 final}

1

1. Executive Summary

Cabo Verde and the European Union have been linked by a Special Partnership since 2007.

Based on shared values, this partnership facilitates regular, high-level political dialogue. It is

complemented, since 2012, by the EU’s Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable

Development and Good Governance (GSP+). The EU is the main export destination of Cabo

Verde, accounting for a third of its exports (33 %). With EUR 63.8 million in GSP+ eligible

exports to the EU (primarily fish preparations) and EUR 11 million in duties saved in 2024,

Cabo Verde is among the smaller beneficiaries of the GSP+ scheme. In 2025, the country has

moved from lower- to upper-middle income status.

During the reporting period 2023-20251, Cabo Verde maintains high compliance with core

human rights, labour, environmental, and governance obligations. Positive developments

include the adoption of progressive legal frameworks and improvements in access to justice,

press freedom, gender equality, poverty reduction, declining child labour rates2, advancement

of climate objectives, anti-corruption standards and strengthened investigative, judicial, and

financial response capability to drug trafficking. Important efforts have been made in

combating violence against women and children abuses and certain types of worst forms of

child labour, as well as in promoting equal pay, addressing discrimination at work and against

migrant workers, and improving prison overcrowding.

Cabo Verde is lagging behind in its reporting obligations on several international instruments

relevant for GSP+. Further progress on substance is needed in some areas, including the

adoption of an anti-discrimination law. Overall, implementation has advanced but remains

uneven particulary in the areas of environment and climate, with key legal frameworks still

requiring updating or completion, with institutional capacity remaining limited. Drug

trafficking and rising domestic consumption of cocaine also remain a challenge.

Priorities for future engagement, also in view of the new GSP+ framework in place as from

2027, should focus on accelerating the adoption of pending anti-discrimination legislation;

fostering social dialogue, establishing effective trade unions, enforcing equal pay and child

labour protections; ensuring effective and timely implementation of environmental and climate

conventions, including through improvement of reporting and monitoring systems; bolstering

anti-drug trafficking efforts through regional cooperation and intelligence-sharing, while

stepping up drug prevention; strengthening operational capacity of Cabo Verde’s Corruption

Prevention Council and finalising accession to the African Union Convention on Preventing

and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) to reinforce anti-corruption mechanisms.

2

2. Key developments

2.1 Political and economic developments

Cabo Verde’s political and economic landscape has been marked by stability and growth during

the reporting period. The country has consolidated its democratic institutions while navigating

post-pandemic recovery with notable economic resilience. It is approaching presidential

elections in November 2026 after having elected a new parliament in May. Real GDP growth

is projected at 5.5 % in 2025, from 7.2 % in 2024, and 4.8 % in 2023, driven by robust tourism

income and private consumption3. GDP per capita rose to USD 5 671 in 2025, while inflation

declined sharply from 7.9 % in 2022 to 1-2 % in 2024-2025, attributed to effective monetary

policy adjustments by the Banco de Cabo Verde. Fiscal performance also improved, with the

overall deficit narrowing from 4.3 % of GDP in 2022 to 1.1 % in 2025, despite higher capital

spending and social programs. External debt distress was assessed as moderate and declining,

signalling progress toward debt sustainability4. Reflecting recent economic progress, the World

Bank first classified Cabo Verde as an Upper-Middle-Income Country (UMIC) in July 20255.

After securing this status for another two consecutive years the country would be on track to

graduate from the GSP.

2.2 GSP+ trade impact

During the reporting period6, the EU continued to run a trade surplus with Cabo Verde, which

reached almost EUR 690 million in 2024. Imports from Cabo Verde into the EU remained

relatively low between 2022 and 2024, declining from EUR 69.6 million to EUR 66.4 million.

The EU remained Cabo Verde’s main export destination, accounting for a third (33 %) of its

exports, as well as its main import source, with imports reaching EUR 755 million, well ahead

of Angola and China, its second and third largest suppliers, which accounted for 10 % and 5 %

of its imports in 2024, respectively.

Cabo Verde’s exports of GSP+ eligible products to the EU remained broadly stable over the

reporting period, amounting to EUR 65.1 million in 2022, increasing to EUR 74.7 million in

2023, and then decreasing to EUR 63.8 million in 2024. The GSP+ utilisation rate remained

high, at 82.3 %7. As a result of GSP+, Cabo Verde benefited from around EUR 11 million in

tariff savings in 2024. This corresponds to around 16 % of Cabo Verde’s export value to the

EU in 2024.

3

Figure 1. EU imports from Cabo Verde and GSP+ utilisation rate, 2019-2024

Indicators 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Annual

Growth

(2022-2024)

Total imports, (EUR million) 84.5 71.8 82.6 69.6 77.9 66.4 -2.3 %

GSP+ eligible, (EUR million) 68.0 57.7 62.5 65.1 74.7 63.8 -1.0 %

GSP+ used, (EUR million) 61.2 53.8 56.4 59.9 60.1 52.5 -6.4 %

Share of GSP+ eligible in total 80.5

% 80.4

% 75.7

% 93.6

% 95.8

% 96.0

%

GSP+ utilisation rate 90.0

% 93.2

% 90.2

% 92.0

% 80.6

% 82.3

%

MFN=0 % imports, (EUR million) 17.6 14.1 20.2 4.4 3.2 2.5 -24.6 %

Share of MFN=0 % imports 20.8

% 19.6

% 24.4

% 6.3 % 4.1 % 3.8 %

Figure 2: EU imports from Cabo Verde by trade regime and utilisation rates, 2019-2024

The sectors8 benefiting most from GSP+ preferences in 2024 were (in order of significance)

Meat & Fish Preparations (S-04a) (82 % of total EU imports from Cabo Verde9), Apparel &

Clothing (S-11b), Footwear (S-12a), Miscellaneous manufactures (S-20), and Fish,

Crustaceans & Molluscs (S-01b).

4

Figure 3. Top product groups benefiting from GSP+ tariff preferences for Cabo Verde, 2024

3. Compliance with GSP+ obligations

The following sections are based on the latest UN monitoring body reports and supplemented

with information from civil society and GSP monitoring, including updates by the authorities.

Cabo Verde has maintained ratification of all 27 GSP+ relevant conventions and has issued no

incompatible reservations. With a few exceptions, mainly in the area of environment and

climate, but also relating to human rights and narcotics, Cabo Verde is broadly compliant with

its reporting obligations to the monitoring bodies (see Annex). Cabo Verde has actively

engaged in the EU GSP+ monitoring process through exchanges of information.

3.1 Human Rights

Over the monitoring period, Cabo Verde continued to make tangible progress in strengthening

access to justice, advancing gender equality, improving child welfare, and reducing poverty.

At the same time, persistent challenges remain, notably relating to gender-based violence,

violence against children, prison overcrowding, as well as outstanding reporting and legislative

gaps that would need to be addressed to ensure full compliance with international obligations.

In areas relevant to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Cabo

Verde pursued measures aimed at improving the efficiency and accessibility of the justice

system. Legislative reforms on judicial organisation provided for additional judicial capacity,

including through the establishment of a new district court for São Miguel10 and a specialised

criminal investigation court in Praia11, intended to reduce bottlenecks and strengthen adherence

to fair trial standards. Transparency in governance was further enhanced with the launch of the

Boletim Oficial Eletrónico (BOE) in January 202512, improving public access to legislation and

official acts.

Freedom of expression and media freedom remain comparatively strong. In the 2025 World

Press Freedom Index, Cabo Verde ranked 30th out of 180 countries, improving from a 41st

place in 202413. In Freedom House’s ‘Freedom in the World’ 2025 assessment, Cabo Verde

maintained its ‘Free’ status with an overall score of 92 out of 100, including 38 out of 40 for

Political Rights and 54 out of 60 for Civil Liberties, unchanged from 202414.

5

In an effort to protect vulnerable groups and promote inclusivity, Cabo Verde adopted the

Statute of the Elderly Person15, which aims to promote the rights and protection of the elderly

and ensure their effective integration and participation in society, and a new Citizenship Law,

expanding access to Cabo Verdean nationality for descendants born abroad, including children,

grandchildren, and great-grandchildren16.

With relevance to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

(ICESCR), Cabo Verde continued to make progress in poverty reduction and access to basic

services. According to World Bank projections, the national poverty rate (measured at the

upper-middle-income poverty line) is expected to decline from 55.7 % in 2023 to 51.2 % in

2025 (equivalent to around 20 000 Cabo Verdeans lifted out of poverty)17. Implementation of

the National Strategy to Eradicate Extreme Poverty (ENEPE 2022-2026) and strengthened use

of the Unified Social Registry to identify vulnerable households18 have contributed to more

targeted social support. Recent policy advancements have enabled Cabo Verde to significantly

expand social protection coverage, which now reaches around 67 % of the population, up from

approximately 44 % in 201619. This reflects sustained efforts to strengthen inclusive social

policies and extend protection to vulnerable groups.

Cabo Verde also advanced gender equality, particularly in women’s political and economic

participation. In the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index 2025, the country rose

from 41st to 30th place20, with notable gains in political empowerment. Women currently hold

45.8 % of parliamentary seats21. Moreover, as noted by the Committee on the Elimination of

All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Basic Law on Public

Employment, adopted in March 2023, reinforced the principle of equal pay and prohibited

workplace harassment22, further strengthening gender equity in the labour market.

In the field of children’s rights, Cabo Verde was recognised in the Kids Rights Index 202523 as

providing one of the most enabling environments in West and Central Africa for the

implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Progress has been

recorded in education and child health, with 94.2 % net attendance in 2023 following the

COVID-19 pandemic, and child mortality declining, supported by high immunisation

coverage24. Malnutrition among children under 5 years of age has declined to 5 % in 202425,

while continued efforts are underway to ensure more equitable access to education, particularly

for children from low-income households and children with disabilities26. Also, efforts have

been made to strengthen the Cabo Verdean Institute for Children and Adolescents (ICCA) - the

state entity responsible for implementing the CRC - including through a review of its statutes,

a gradual increase in resources over recent years, and measures to improve staff retention so

that the ICCA can fulfil its mandate more effectively. Over 80 % of social protection spending

is directed towards programmes benefiting children and adolescents, with support from

UNICEF and other donors. The National Commission for Human Rights and Citizenship

(CNDHC) has also provided training to government officials to promote a child-rights

approach in planning and budgeting processes27.

Furthermore, in 2025, CNDHC, which also serves as the National Preventive Mechanism

(NPM) under the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment (CAT), strengthened cooperation with the National Institute of Legal

Medicine and Forensic Sciences to reinforce investigations into allegations of torture and ill-

treatment. It also continues to monitor detention facilities and prison conditions to assess

compliance with human rights standards.

6

Despite these advancements, several concerns persist.Violence against women and children

remains a significant challenge, with reports indicating continued high levels of gender-based

violence and child sexual abuse. Comprehensive and disaggregated statistical data are

limited28, including on investigations, prosecutions and convictions under the 2020 Law on

Crimes of Sexual Aggression and Abuse and Sexual Exploitation of Children and Adolescents.

Although programmes have been introduced to prevent gender-based violence and support

survivors, information on their effectiveness and impact remains insufficient.

Legislative gaps also persist: a comprehensive anti-discrimination law has remained under

consideration since 2022 and has not yet been adopted29, despite recommendations made in the

context of Cabo Verde’s most recent Universal Periodic Review (2023)30.

Conditions in places of detention also remain a matter of concern, with reports of severe

overcrowding, insecurity and inadequate separation of detainees in Cabo Verde’s prisons.

These issues are compounded by a shortage of prison guards and specialised personnel required

to effectively implement the National Plan for Social Reintegration31. On average, the CNDHC

reports receiving 13 complaints per year, alleging torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading

treatment by prison officers; while publicly available information on subsequent investigations,

prosecutions and sentences remains limited, weakening accountability and deterrence.

Cabo Verde’s reporting obligations under certain treaty bodies show some delay. Reports under

the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) are overdue

since 2006, and follow-up to the List of Issues adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social

and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in March 2025 has not yet been provided within the indicated

timeframe.

Priorities for future engagement include the adoption of comprehensive anti-discrimination

legislation and strengthening prevention, protection and access to justice for victims of gender-

based violence and child abuse, in line with CEDAW recommendations. Enhanced capacity-

building for police, prosecutors and judges across all islands, together with adequate funding

for victim and survivor support services, will be essential to improve accountability.

Addressing prison overcrowding and staffing shortages also remains urgent. More broadly,

strengthening data collection and public reporting on human rights violations, including

investigations, prosecutions, and sentencing, is necessary to enhance transparency, evidence-

based policymaking and effective compliance with international human rights obligations32.

3.2 Labour Rights

Cabo Verde has ratified all eight fundamental labour conventions of the current GSP+ scheme

and works continuously towards their full implementation. It has advanced compliance with

several ILO conventions through legislative reforms, national action plans, and institutional

initiatives. Progress has been made in areas such as the protection of children. Concerns remain

mainly regarding the protection of children against hazardous work, discrimination in

employment and the definition of minimum services in the event of a strike.

With relevance to the ILO Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to

Employment, No 138 (1973) and ILO Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate

Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, No 182 (1999), Cabo Verde

made further efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labour. The National Committee for

the Prevention and Eradication of Child Labour evaluated the effectiveness of existing national

child labour tools, and collaborated with several Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

and public and private institutions33. Cabo Verde reported that it largely implemented the

7

National Action Plan to Eliminate Child Labour (PANPETI) and it participated in the 2021-

2025 CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries') Action Plan against Child

Labour34. Under the EU’s ’Trade for Decent work’ (T4DW) project35, it undertook awareness

campaigns on child labour prevention and organised tripartite workshops to identify gaps in

relation to the informal sector in fishing, agriculture, and domestic work, as well as workshops

to strengthen inspection capacity. National child labour statistics were published in February

2024 based on an ad hoc survey carried out in 2024. According to the National Institute for

Statistics (INE) the child labour rate stood at 4.2 %, among which 2.5 % in hazardous work,

which displays progress made over the years. The government also implemented the National

Plan to Prevent and Combat Sexual Violence Against Children and Adolescents (2022-‘24),

which aims at preventing and eliminating sexual exploitation of children. Further, Cabo Verde

adhered to the ILO Multinational Enterprises Declaration36 and is promoting the

implementation of decent work excluding child work in value chains through national tripartite

focal points.

With regards to equal remuneration (ILO Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of

Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, No 100 (1951),the country saw

advancement through the new Basic Law on Public Service37, introducing a unified pay scale

to address public sector wage disparities38. In order to better align with Convention No 100,

the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations

(CEACR) requested to amend the labour code to explicitly include the principle of equal pay

for work of equal value39.

With regards to discrimination relating to Employment and Occupation (ILO Convention

concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, No 111 (1958), the

Government developed a guide for domestic workers together with the Cape Verdean Institute

for Gender Equality and Equity (ICIEG) and social partners40. Further, the Decent Work

Country Programme (2023–2027) prioritises strengthening social protection and the

formalisation of the domestic work sector41. The female employment rate was 50.5 %42 (male

63.4 %) in 2025 and the number of seats held by women in the national parliament is high in

international comparison (currently at 45.8 %)43 However, gender disparities in the labour

market persisted, and although women often achieved higher levels of education than men,

they tend to be employed in lower-skill occupations. the hourly gender wage gap has been

estimated at between 13.9 and 14.4 %44. Women still face barriers in accessing formal

employment, limiting their economic empowerment, despite positive initiatives45.

Under the Convention No 138 the capacity and reach of the Labour Inspectorate services need

to be expanded to adequately monitor and detect cases of child labour in the country, including

in the informal economy, the labour inspectorate services not having detected any case of child

labour so far. Under the Convention No 182, concerns relate to the lack of effective

enforcement of existing legislation, manifested in the low investigation and conviction rates

for child prostitution and pornography, limited victim support, and the Government’s persistent

failure to provide data on enforcement of legislation on trafficking, child prostitution and

pornography, including the absence of disaggregated information on investigations,

prosecutions, convictions and sanctions. In addition, Cabo Verde has not yet introduced a ban

on hazardous work for 16-18 year old adolescents, as required by the Convention46.

Regarding forced labour (ILO Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, No

29 (1930) and ILO Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, No 105 (1957)

Cabo Verde has not received any observations from the CEACR on Convention No 105 for

many years, suggesting satisfactory implementation. On Convention No 29, the CEACR noted

8

the establishment of the National Observatory on Human Trafficking and the adoption of the

National Strategy and Action Plan against trafficking in Persons 2023-202647. However, in

particular migrant workers in agriculture and fishing remain subject to extremely poor working

conditions and vulnerable to forced labour48.

Regarding freedom of association and protection of the right to organise (ILO Convention

concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, No 87 (1948),

despite already expected in 2016, no effective independent tripartite committee has yet been

set up to determine minimum service in the event of a strike, and alleged gaps in the application

of national laws are reported, including barriers to the establishment of trade unions and non-

compliance with deadlines and procedures for granting legal personality to trade unions49.

Further, with regard to the right to organise and collective bargaining (ILO Convention

concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain

Collectively, No 98 (1949), insufficient action is taken to promote collective bargaining and it

remains unclear whether the National Committee for the Promotion of Collective Bargaining

is in operation50.

In terms of discrimination in employment (ILO Convention No 111) a draft anti-

discrimination law remains pending since 2022, leaving gaps in protection against indirect

discrimination and discrimination based on national extraction51. Further, there are concerns

about discriminatory and exploitative domestic work52 conditions and considerably lower pay

for children, women and migrant workers, particularly in the agricultural and fishing sectors53.

The Labour Code provides for sanctions for sexual harassment only when harassment is

committed by employers (not by other employees or persons related to work). Current reporting

mechanisms relating to sexual harassment also appear insufficient despite the prohibition

established in Law No. 7/X/2022 of 16 May 202254.

As a cross-cutting issue, the current number of labour inspectors of 15 is gravely inadequate

for a labour force of roughly 200 000 people, especially in view of the huge informal sector of

around 50 %.55

Priorities for future engagement should include establishing an independent tripartite

committee for determining minimum services during strikes, as well as effective reactivation

of the National Committee for Collective Bargaining. To combat discrimination, a

comprehensive anti-discrimination law should be adopted. Increasing the number of labour

inspectors and strengthening their capacities is key for the effective implementation of labour

rights. Workplace harassment protection should be extended to all employees and measurable

anti-discrimination targets defined. The ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ principle should

be incorporated in legislation and its full implementation ensured. Hazardous work should be

prohibited for all children under 18 and inspections stepped up. Finally, the country should

strengthen enforcement capacities of child protection laws, undertake better data collection,

and enhance police and judicial training alongside social protection programmes to address

poverty. Cabo Verde could also consider becoming a ‘pathfinder’ country under ‘Alliance 8.7’56

in order to help it effectively address child labour and the trafficking of children.

3.3 Environment and Climate

Cabo Verde has ratified the main environmental and climate conventions and remains formally

engaged with the relevant conventions’ frameworks, including through the submission of some

reports and participation in regional capacity-building initiatives under the Convention on

International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973) (CITES)

enforcement programmes, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Africa

9

Network of National Ozone Officers, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC) transparency as well as monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) support

initiatives, and technical workshops organised by the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm

Conventions regional centres. Implementation is, however, uneven, with reporting delays and

implementation gaps persisting under several relevant conventions, limiting the availability of

updated information on progress (see Annex).

Progress has been made in climate commitments, with the UNFCCC Secretariatregistering

Cabo Verde’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0) in the Paris Agreement

NDC registry in March 202557. The country also remains compliant with the Montreal

Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) and timely submitted annual

ozone-depleting substances (ODS) data58. No new data were available for review under the

Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC.

Cabo Verde has demonstrated formal commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity

(1992) with the adoption of a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan covering

ecosystem protection, marine conservation, invasive species control, and climate resilience59.

However, enforcement capacity, institutional coordination, and biodiversity data collection

remain constrained. Likewise, Cabo Verde currently protects only about 6 % of its marine area,

still far from the 30 % target by 2030 under Target 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity.

Monitoring systems and ecological indicators are not yet fully developed, limiting effective

implementation. Overall, while Cabo Verde has established a legal and policy framework for

biodiversity conservation, implementation and the timely submission of national reports under

the Convention on Biological Diversity continue to present challenges. Under CITES Cabo

Verde remained engaged with the Secretariat in 2024 and 2025, including receiving legislative

guidance in April 2025. However, it continues to be classified as a Category 3 Party under the

CITES National Legislation Project, as its national legislation does not yet fully meet the

Convention’s core implementation criteria60.

Under the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous

Wastes and Their Disposal (1989), Cabo Verde has strengthened its legal and policy framework,

including through the Water and Sanitation Code, the general waste-management regime,

specific rules on construction and demolition waste, hospital-waste and waste-transport

licensing61. Cabo Verde also deposited its instrument of ratification of the Basel Ban

Amendment on 27.08.2025; the amendment entered into force for Cabo Verde on 17.01.202662.

Implementation gaps nevertheless persist. The current (2022-2026) Strategic Note for Water

and Sanitation sets 2026 targets to reach 90 % of the population with proper solid-waste

disposal and 54 % of the population covered by a waste-treatment system, indicating that

treatment coverage remains incomplete63. The World Bank’s Cabo Verde Circular Economy

Diagnostic identifies gaps in key infrastructure systems, including materials, waste, energy and

water, and points to the need for circular-economy solutions adapted to Cabo Verde’s island

context64. E-waste management is also still being developed: in April 2025, Special Projects

Management Unit (UGPE), the National Statistics Institute (INE), and the National Water and

Sanitation Agency (ANAS) signed a tripartite memorandum on sustainable management of

electrical and electronic waste, and INE launched a household survey to estimate electrical and

electronic equipment and related waste65.

Under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, previously identified implementation gaps

appear to persist66. While information remains scarce as Cabo Verde is delayed in meeting its

reporting requirements, the latest national report (dating back to 202067), points to capacity

10

constraints in risk assessment, monitoring and enforcement, as well as limitations in technical

infrastructure and institutional staffing68. Publicly available Biosafety Clearing-House records

also do not indicate the adoption of new national procedures or decisions relating to the

handling, inspection or movement of living modified organisms (LMOs)69. In the absence of

updated reporting or regulatory notifications, these constraints are understood to remain

relevant during the review period.

Cabo Verde has adopted a National Implementation Plan under the Stockholm Convention

on Persistent Organic Pollutants in 2010, but no updated plan reflecting substances added to

the Convention in recent amendment cycles has been identified during the review period70.

Moreover, implementation gaps persist in national inventories of POPs stockpiles, as well as

in relation to contaminated sites and unintentional releases71.

Priorities for future engagement include Cabo Verde swiftly fulfilling all pending and

upcoming reporting obligations72 and adopting legislation to fulfil its international

obligations73. Cabo Verde is also encouraged to update its national inventories under the Kyoto

Protocol and the Stockholm Convention and to establish such inventory under the Basel

Convention. Overall, measurement, reporting and verification systems should be strengthened,

as well as of analytical, institutional and operational capacity, in particular relating to

biodiversity, biosafety and the Stockholm Convention. Also, inter-agency coordination should

be strengthened, in particular for enforcement of CITES and for the Basel Convention.

3.4 Good Governance (Anti-Corruption and Drug Control)

Cabo Verde largely complies with its reporting duties under the UN Narcotic Drugs

Conventions74. During the monitoring period, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

(UNODC), the EU, individual countries and regional bodies such as the Inter-Governmental

Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) and the Financial Action

Task Force (FATF) have provided training and support, strengthening Cabo Verde’s

investigative, judicial, and financial response to drug trafficking and money laundering while

promoting a ‘follow the money’ strategy, with major seizures in 2023 and 2024 through

international cooperation75.

Nevertheless, with limited ability to effectively patrol its vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

in an area prone to the presence of drug traffickers and illegal fishing vessels, Cabo Verde

remains a key transit hub for cocaine trafficking from Latin America to Europe and Africa, with

cocaine supply and treatment admissions in Cabo Verde rising76. The strengthening of the

cooperation with FRONTEX in late 2025 and the adoption of an assistance measure under the

European Peace Facility (EFP) in July 2025 are, however, helping the country to better monitor

its large EEZ.

In terms of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), Cabo Verde remains one of

the top performers in Africa in the Transparency International 2025 Corruption Perceptions

Index77, ranking 35th out of 182 countries. Nevertheless, it is critical to further strengthen

Cabo Verde’s Corruption Prevention Council (Conselho de Prevenção da Corrupção, CPC) to

address persistent systemic vulnerabilities and further enhance independent monitoring and

public sector integrity. Cabo Verde launched a new National Strategy for Preventing and

Combating Corruption (2026–2029) for public consultations in March 202678, and it

remains to be adopted.

Priorities for future engagement under the Drug Conventions should focus on enhancing in

particular maritime interdiction capabilities as well as other patrolling capacity in the country,

11

updating the national drug strategy, improved intelligence-sharing with international partners,

expanding drug prevention education and capacity-building for law enforcement and judicial

cooperation. With relevance to UNCAC, the operation capacity of Cabo Verde’s Corruption

Prevention Council should be strengthened.

4. Cooperation in support of GSP+ objectives

The EU has committed EUR 44 million in grants (budget support + technical assistance) to

its partnership with Cabo Verde for 2021–2027, complementing broader multi-country EU

programmes. Under the Global Gateway initiative, the EU is expanding investments in

renewable energy, ports, and digital infrastructure to accelerate Cabo Verde’s green and

digital transitions, energy independence, and regional connectivity. At the October 2025

Global Gateway Forum, the European Commission and Team Europe pledged over EUR 200

million in new funding, aligning with Cabo Verde’s Ambition 2030 development strategy. To

date, Global Gateway investments mobilised for Cabo Verde amount to approximately EUR

400 million. These investments support sustainable growth, focusing on renewable energy—

targeting 50 % by 2030—the blue economy, digitalisation, and sustainable tourism.

The EU’s cooperation also prioritises human rights and social inclusion, including the

expansion of social protection coverage and cash transfer schemes for the most vulnerable,

the progressive alignment and extension of social security contribution, child rights

protection by combating abuse, exploitation, and child labour, and improved public services,

such as water and sanitation access in Praia’s disadvantaged areas. The EU also supports the

expansion of the social energy tariff to ensure access to affordable electricity for the most

vulnerable households. The Djunta Mon project, funded by the EU, works to prevent child

sexual abuse and support victims by fostering collaboration between government bodies,

civil society, and local municipalities to strengthen child protection policies. In parallel, the

EU supports improved waste management, including through the CITRES project on the

island of Maio, a biosphere reserve, to ensure adequate treatment of solid waste. Additional

actions financed under Interreg programmes address plastic waste and fishing gear residues

in coastal areas in partnership with local NGOs. A new call for civil society organisations

will further reinforce these efforts.

Additionally, the Trade for Decent Work (T4DW) project, launched in 2019 and funded by

the EU and Finland, is implemented by the ILO to enhance labour standards in Cabo Verde’s

tourism and fish processing sectors. Running until 2025, it supported the EU’s GSP+ trade

scheme by promoting ILO conventions, with key focus areas including eliminating child

labour, ensuring equal pay, and advancing labour rights. An independent evaluation of Phase

1 (2019–2024) was conducted in July 2025, though results remain unpublished. This

partnership underscores the EU’s dedication to sustainable development, social equity, and

economic resilience in Cabo Verde.

12

Annex: Cabo Verde - Compliance with GSP ratification and reporting obligations

Convention Ratification

status /

Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to

monitoring bodies

Human Rights

1. Convention on the Prevention

and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide (1948)

Ratified:

10.10.2011

No reservations

No reporting obligations

2. International Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination (1965)

Ratified:

03.10.1979

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report:10.12.2003

• Last report submitted: 05.08.2002

• Next report due: 02.11.2006 (not submitted)

3. International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights (1966)

Ratified:

06.08.1993

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 03.12.2019

• Last report submitted: 09.02.2018

• Next report due: 31.10.2026

4. International Covenant on

Economic Social and Cultural

Rights (1966)

Ratified:

06.08.1993

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 12.10.2018

• Last report submitted: 31.10.2023

• Next report due: not yet set

5. Convention on the Elimination of

All Forms of Discrimination

Against Women (1979)

Ratified:

05.12.1980

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 19.07.2019

• Last report submitted: 28.07.2023

• Next report due: not set yet

6. Convention Against Torture and

other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment (1984)

Ratified:

04.06.1992

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 07.12.2016

• Last report submitted: No report submitted.

• Next report due: 07.12.2020 (not submitted)

7.Convention on the Rights of the

Child (1989)

Ratified:

04.06.1992

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last Committee report: 31.05.2019

• Last report submitted: 03.07.2024

• Next report due: not yet set

Labour Rights1 2

8. Convention concerning Forced or

Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930)

Ratified:

03.04.1979

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2022

• Last Government report submitted: 2024

• Next report due: not yet set

9. Convention concerning Freedom

of Association and Protection of the

Right to Organise, No 87 (1948)

Ratified:

01.02.1999

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2023

• Last Government report submitted: 2022

• Next report due: not yet set

10. Convention concerning the

Application of the Principles of the

Right to Organise and to Bargain

Collectively, No 98 (1949)

Ratified:

03.04.1979

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2023

• Last Government report submitted: 2022

• Next report due: not yet set

11. Convention concerning Equal

Remuneration of Men and Women

Workers for Work of Equal Value,

No 100 (1951)

Ratified:

16.10.1979

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2023

• Last Government report submitted: 2025

• Next report due: not yet set

1 Following a decision taken by the ILO Governing Body to modernise the ILO reporting system, as from 2027

Governments will no longer submit separate reports for each ratified Convention, but instead, they will submit

thematic reports, grouping conventions in 15 thematic areas. As a transition year, only a limited number of reports

will be requested in 2026. See: The future of reporting on ratified conventions. https://www.ilo.org/international-

labour-standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards-overview-ilo/future-reporting-ratified-

conventions. 2 Reservations do not apply in the ILO system.

13

Convention Ratification

status /

Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to

monitoring bodies

12. Convention concerning the

Abolition of Forced Labour, No 105

(1957)

Ratified:

03.04.1979

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 1990

• Last Government report submitted: 2024

• Next report due: not yet set

13. Convention concerning

Discrimination in Respect of

Employment and Occupation, No

111 (1958)

Ratified:

03.04.1979

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2023

• Last Government report submitted: 2025

• Next report due: not yet set

14. Convention concerning

Minimum Age for Admission to

Employment, No 138 (1973)

Ratified:

07.02.2011

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2022

• Last Government report submitted: 2024

• Next report due: not yet set

15. Convention concerning the

Prohibition and Immediate Action

for the Elimination of the Worst

Forms of Child Labour, No 182

(1999)

Ratified:

23.10.2001

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Last CEACR comments: 2022

• Last Government report submitted: 2024

• Next report due: not yet set

Environment and Climate

16. Convention on International

Trade in Endangered Species of

Wild Fauna and Flora (1973)

Ratified:

10.08.2005

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Annual Trade Report for 2023 submitted 15.01.2024

• Annual Trade Report for 2024 submitted 17.12.2025

• Next Annual Trade Report due 31.10.2026

• Annual Illegal Trade Reports for 2023 and 2024 not

submitted3

• Last Implementation Reports: 2018-20204

17. Montreal Protocol on

Substances that Deplete the Ozone

Layer (1987)

Ratified:

31.07.2001

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

Last report submitted:

• Article 7 data report covering 2024

Next report:

• Article 7 data report covering 2025 due 30.09.2026

18. Basel Convention on the

Control of Transboundary

Movements of Hazardous Wastes

and Their Disposal (1989)

Ratified:

02.07.1999

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• National Report (NR) for 2023 not submitted

• NR for 2024 missing

• Next NR (2025) due 31.12.2026

19. Convention on Biological

Diversity (1992)

Ratified:

29.03.1995

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Seventh National Report (7NR) due 28.02.206 (not

submitted)

• Latest National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan

(NBSAP) update: submitted 19.08.2016 (until 2030)

• Next report: 8NR due 30.06.2029

20. The United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change

(1992)

Ratified:

29.03.1995

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest updated Nationally Determined Contributions

(NDC 3.0) submitted 01.11.2025

• Latest National Communication (NC3) submitted

05.10.2018

• First Biennial Transparency Report (BTR1) not

submitted

• Next report (BTR2) due 31.12.2026

21. Cartagena Protocol on

Biosafety (2000)

Ratified:

01.11.2005

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Fourth National Report (4NR) submitted 26.02.2024.

• Fifth National Report (5NR) due 28.02.2026 (not

submitted)

Next report: Not yet set

3 Reporting mandatory but not subject to compliance procedure. 4 Ibid.

14

Convention Ratification

status /

Reservations

Compliance with reporting obligations to

monitoring bodies

22. Stockholm Convention on

persistent Organic Pollutants (2001)

Ratified:

01.03.2006

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

• Latest National Report: none submitted

• Next report: 6NR due 31.08.2026

• Initial National Implementation Plan (NIP) submitted

12.08.2013

• NIP updates: COP4, COP5 and COP6 amendments

included

23. Kyoto Protocol to the United

Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change (1998)

Ratified:

10.02.2006

No reservations

No reporting obligations separate from the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Good Governance

24. United Nations Single

Convention on Narcotic Drugs

(1961)

Ratified:

24.05.1990

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

2024 reporting fulfilled

Latest INCB mission in September 2005

25. United Nations Convention on

Psychotropic Substances (1971)

Ratified:

24.05.1990

No reservations

26. United Nations Convention

against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

(1988)

Ratified:

08.05.1995

No reservations

Not compliant with reporting obligations

Reporting on precursors not fulfilled in 2019-2024

27. United Nations Convention

against Corruption (2004)

Ratified:

23.04.2008

No reservations

Compliant with reporting obligations

First review cycle: ongoing, executive summary

available (27.07.2016)

Second review cycle completed in 2018

15

1 Key events in 2026 at the moment of writing have been included in this Staff Working Document. All links

provided were up to date as of 28 April 2026. 2 The child labour rate was 4.2 % according to a study published by the national statistical institute of Cabo Verde

in 2024. 3 IMF, ‘World Economic Outlook Database’, IMF, October 2025 update.

https://data.imf.org/en/Datasets#t=coveo117bcfc4&sort=%40idata_publication_date%20descending. 4 IMF, ‘Staff Reports: Cabo Verde Country Report’ No. 25/274, IMF, Sept. 2025.

https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2025/09/19/cabo-verde-sixth-review-under-the-extended-credit-

facility-arrangement-request-for-570560. 5 World Bank, ‘Cabo Verde Macro-poverty outlook’, October 2025.

https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/bae48ff2fefc5a869546775b3f010735-0500062021/related/mpo-cpv.pdf. 6 Source for all statistics in section 2.2: Eurostat COMEXT data based on latest available validated full year data

as of September 2025. GSP statistics only cover goods imported into the EU market, i.e., goods released for free

circulation in the EU. The GSP statistics do not cover other EU-imports, like goods imported for the customs

inward processing procedure or re-imports after the customs outward processing procedure. Trade flows registered

as ‘confidential’ do not appear in the GSP+ usage figures and regime 1 normal trade; but do appear in total trade

figures (regime 4). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/ext_go_agg_esms.htm#conf1537195068659. 7 While the EUROSTAT COMEXT data, as published by Eurostat in September 2025, used for this report appear

to show a decline over time, from 92.8 % in 2022 to 82.3 % in 2024, more recent corrected data for 2024 (as of 1

April 2026) show a continuous, very high, preference utilisation rate of 91.9 %. 8 Products that benefit from GSP are separated in sections according to GSP Regulation. Information on which

CN codes are included in the GSP sections can be found in Annex V of the GSP Regulation No 978/2012. EUR-

Lex - 02012R0978-20250101 - EN - EUR-Lex. 9 Last on 6 March 2026 the EU granted Cabo Verde an extension of the temporary derogation of the EU rules on

preferential origin in respect of certain types of prepared or preserved tuna and mackerel, allowing those fish

products to be considered as originating in Cabo Verde, and thus to benefit from GSP+ preferences. Commission

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/507 of 6 March 2026 granting Cabo Verde a temporary derogation from the

rules on preferential origin laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446, in respect of prepared or preserved

fillets of tuna and tuna loins (raw, cooked and frozen), prepared or preserved mackerel fillets and prepared or

preserved frigate tuna or frigate mackerel fillets, OJ L 9.03.2026, p. 1. 10 ‘Law No. 61/X/2025 establishes the general principles of the administration of justice and regulates the

organisation, composition, jurisdiction, and functioning of the judicial courts and the tax and customs courts’,

Assembleia Nacional, Boletím Oficial Electrónico, 21 Aug. 2025. https://boe.incv.cv/Bulletins/View/86987. 11 International IDEA, ‘Global State of Democracy, Cabo Verde 2025’, 1 Oct. 2025.

www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/cabo-verde. 12 Boletím Oficial Electrónico, Governo de Cabo Verde, 2025. https://boe.incv.cv. 13 Reporters without Borders, ‘Country Profile Cabo Verde Index 2025’, 2025. www.rsf.org/en/country/cabo-

verde. 14 Freedom House, ‘Cabo Verde: Freedom in the World 2025 - Country Report’, 2025.

www.freedomhouse.org/country/cabo-verde/freedom-world/2025. 15 Law No. 26/X/2023, establishing the Statute of the Elderly Person, Assembleia Nacional, Boletím Oficial

Electrónico, 8 May 2023. www.rssn.cv/index.php/doc/institucionais/summary/14-boletins-oficiais/129-lei-n-26-

x-2023-estabelece-estatuto-da-pessoa-idosa. 16 Law No. 33/X/2023 Defining the conditions for granting, acquisition, loss, and reacquisition of Cape Verdean

nationality, Assembleia Nacional, Boletím Oficial Electrónico, 22 Aug. 2023.

https://boe.incv.cv/Bulletins/View/60602. 17 World Bank, ‘Macro Poverty Outlook Cabo Verde’, October 2025.

https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/bae48ff2fefc5a869546775b3f010735-0500062021/related/mpo-cpv.pdf. 18 UNICEF, ‘Annual Report 2024 on Cabo Verde’, Feb. 2025, p.4, Children between 0 and 15 years old are still

disproportionately affected by poverty (37 %), as are households headed by women (85 %). 19 IMF, ‘Cabo Verde Country Report No. 26/53’, Feb. 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/-

/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1cpvea2026001-source-pdf.pdf 20 World Economic Forum, ‘Global Gender Gap Index 2025 – Cabo Verde’, 2025.

https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2025.pdf. 21 UN Women Data Hub, ‘Country Fact Sheet Cabo Verde’, 2025. www.data.unwomen.org/country/cabo-verde;

‘National Assembly Cabo Verde’, IPU Parline Global Data on National Parliaments.

16

https://data.ipu.org/parliament/CV/CV-LC01/data-on-women/. 22 Law No. 20/X/2023, of 24 March 2023, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Tenth

periodic report submitted by Cabo Verde under article 18 of the Convention, 28 Jul. 2023.

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4037789?v=pdf. 23 Erasmus Institute of Social Studies, ‘Kids Rights Index 2025’, 2025. https://files.kidsrights.org/wp-

content/uploads/2025/06/10223817/KidsRights-Index-2025-Report.pdf. 24 UNICEF, ‘Annual Report 2025 on Cabo Verde’, Feb. 2026.

https://open.unicef.org/country/Cabo%20Verde?cid=6820. 25 UNICEF, ‘Child Nutrition Report 2025’, Sept. 2025.

https://www.unicef.org/media/174086/file/CNR%202025%20-%20Feeding%20Profit%20-%20Data%20Tables-

%20English%20-%20FINAL.pdf.pdf. 26 UNICEF, ‘Annual Report 2025 on Cabo Verde’, Feb. 2026.

https://open.unicef.org/country/Cabo%20Verde?cid=6820. 27 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Third national report submitted by Cabo Verde under article 44 of the

Convention’, CRC/C/CPV/3-7, 3 Jul. 2024.

https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FCPV%2F

3-7&Lang=en. 28 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘List of issues and questions in relation to the

tenth periodic report of Cabo Verde’, 5 Nov. 2024. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4067908?v=pdf. 29 Balai Cabo Verde, ‘ONU em Cabo Verde reforça urgência da lei antidiscriminação e acesso universal a direitos’,

23 Jul. 2025. 30 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Cabo Verde’, 20 Dec.

2023. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/cv-index. 31 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Summary of stakeholders’ submissions on Cabo Verde’,

A/HRC/WG.6/44/CPV/3, 23 Aug. 2023. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/WG.6/44/CPV/3. 32 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Cabo Verde’, 20 Dec.

2023, paras. 15, 41, 116, 125.81, 125.82 and 125.151. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4035240?v=pdf ; and

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘List of issues and questions in relation to the

tenth periodic report of Cabo Verde’, 5 Nov. 2024. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4067908?v=pdf. 33 Government of Cabo Verde, Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity, ‘National Action Plan for the Prevention

and Eradication of Child Labour (2023–2027)’, Praia, ICCA. https://icca.cv/. 34 ILO, ‘CPRP Cooperation’.

https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@exrel/documents/publication/wcms_

882566.pdf. 35 ILO, ‘Trade for Decent Work: Cabo Verde’. https://tradefordecentwork.ilo.org/country/cape-verde/. 36 ILO, ‘Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy’.

https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/@multi/documents/publicati

on/wcms_094386.pdf. 37 Basic Law on Public Service No. 20/X/2023 of 24 March 2023, Boletim Oficial n.° 20.

https://boe.incv.cv/Bulletins/View/58522. 38 ILO, ‘Direct Request (CEACR) on Convention No 100’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session,

2024.https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID

,P13100_COUNTRY_ID:4347800,103096:NO. 39 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 100’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session,

2024.https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_C

OUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4347803,103096,Cabo%20Verde,202

3 40 ILO, ‘Direct Request (CEACR) on Convention No 111’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session,

2024.https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_C

OUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4347794,103096,Cabo%20Verde,202

3. 41 ILO, ‘Programme Pays pour le travail décent Cabo Verde 2023-2027’.

https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/PPTD%20Cabo%20Verde-%20Verde%202023-2027__0.pdf. 42 World Bank, ‘Unlocking Women’s Economic Potential’, Cabo Verde Economic Update, Spring 2025.

https://genderdata.worldbank.org/en/economies/cabo-verde. 43 UN Women Data Hub, ‘Country Fact Sheet Cabo Verde’, 2025. www.data.unwomen.org/country/cabo-verde;

IPU Parline Global Data on National Parliaments, ‘National Assembly Cabo Verde’,

https://data.ipu.org/parliament/CV/CV-LC01/data-on-women/

17

44 World Bak, ‘Unlocking Women’s Economic Potential’, Cabo Verde Economic Update, Spring 2025.

https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099061925092539202/pdf/P507238-cfebe556-b8ee-4b5f-98ed-

07dcd7e53d53.pdf. 45 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 100’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session, 2024.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4347803,103096. 46 Committee on Migrant Workers, ‘Concluding observations on the combined initial to third periodic reports of

Cabo Verde’, CMW/C/CPV/CO/1-3. https://docs.un.org/en/CMW/C/CPV/CO/1-3; and ILO, ‘Observation

(CEACR) on Convention No 111’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session, 2024.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNT

RY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4347797,103096,Cabo%20Verde,2023. 47 ILO, ‘Direct Request (CEACR) on Convention No 29’, adopted 2025, published 114th ILC session, 2026.

.https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COMMENT_ID%2CP1111

0_COUNTRY_ID%2CP11110_COUNTRY_NAME%2CP11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4472321%2C103096%2

CCabo+Verde%2C2025. 48 As highlighted by the UN Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), https://docs.un.org/en/CMW/C/CPV/CO/1-

3, referred at by CEACR in Observation (CEACR),adopted 2023, published 112nd ILC session (2024), on

discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No 111) – Cabo Verde.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNT

RY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4347797,103096,Cabo%20Verde,2023. 49 ILO, ‘Direct Request (CEACR) on Convention No 87’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session, 2024.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4364611,103096. 50 ILO, ‘Direct Request (CEACR) on Convention No 98’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session, 2024.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNT

RY_ID:4359657,103096. 51 ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR) on Convention No 111’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session,

2024.https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_C

OUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4347797,103096,Cabo%20Verde,202

3. 52 ILO, ‘Direct Request (CEACR) on Convention No 111’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session,

2024.https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_C

OUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4347794,103096,Cabo%20Verde,202

3. 53 Committee on Migrant Workers, ‘Concluding observations on the combined initial to third periodic reports of

Cabo Verde’, CMW/C/CPV/CO/1-3. https://docs.un.org/en/CMW/C/CPV/CO/1-3; ILO, ‘Observation (CEACR)

on Convention No 111’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session, 2024.

https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNT

RY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4347797,103096,Cabo%20Verde,2023 ; and

ILO, ‘Direct Request (CEACR) on Convention No 111’, adopted 2023, published 112th ILC session, 2024.