EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 14.7.2026 COM(2026) 368 final

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND

THE COUNCIL

on the implementation and enforcement of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of 14 December

2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, in accordance with Article

52(2) thereof

{SWD(2026) 183 final}

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1. INTRODUCTION

Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of

14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (1) (the ‘FSR’) was

adopted to address distortions to the internal market caused by subsidies granted by third

countries to undertakings engaging in economic activities in the European Union (the

‘Union’). The FSR seeks to ensure a level playing field in the internal market by enabling

the European Commission (the ‘Commission’) to identify, assess, and, where necessary,

redress distortive foreign subsidies.

Before the adoption of the FSR, undertakings active in the Union were able to finance

economic activities in the internal market with subsidies granted by third countries. This

concerned any sector of the economy and included, inter alia, participation in public

procurement procedures, acquisition of undertakings, or engaging in any other economic

activities in the Union. Such foreign subsidies were not subject to Union State aid rules.

The Union legal framework contained no mechanism to tackle distortions caused by these

foreign subsidies to the internal market, as the traditional trade defence mechanisms apply

only to imports of traded goods. The FSR was conceived as a horizontal instrument

complementing existing Union merger, antitrust, State aid, public procurement and trade

policy rules, with the objective of preserving fair competition and the integrity of the

internal market.

The FSR is based on non-discriminatory principles and objective criteria. It covers all

sectors and economic activities and targets distortions caused by any foreign subsidy in the

internal market. The FSR applies in full respect of international obligations. While the

Commission remains committed to constructive dialogue and cooperation with third

country authorities and economic operators, it will continue to use all investigative and

procedural tools available under the FSR to ensure its effective application and safeguard

the level playing field in the internal market.

The purpose of this Report is to present the findings of the first review of the FSR to the

European Parliament and the Council.

This Report is prepared pursuant to Article 52(2) FSR, which requires the Commission to

review how it implements and enforces the FSR, especially the application of Articles 4,

5, 6 and 9, and the notification thresholds set out in Article 20(3), and Article 28(1) and

(2) FSR. In the context of its review, the Commission should also report on developments

in international relations involving third countries’ subsidy control systems.

The FSR entered into force on 13 January 2023 and became applicable from 13 July 2023.

The ex ante notification obligation for concentrations, pursuant to Article 21 FSR and

public procurement procedures, pursuant to Article 28 FSR, became applicable from

13 October 2023. This Report, therefore, covers the initial three-year period in the FSR

implementation and enforcement.

The FSR is enforced exclusively by the Commission. DG Competition (DG COMP) is

responsible for applying the FSR in relation to concentrations and for the general use of

the ex officio investigative mechanism. DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship

and SMEs (DG GROW) is responsible for applying the FSR in relation to public

procurement procedures and for the use of ex officio investigative mechanism linked to

public procurement procedures and similar forms of public spending. This division of

(1) Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022

on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, pp. 1–45,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj

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responsibilities reflects the respective experiences of the services in competition

enforcement and public procurement and supports the coherent application of the FSR.

The Commission’s review of the early days of FSR implementation and enforcement is

based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence, including information

obtained through the FSR Review Study, conducted by an external contractor (2). The

review also takes into account the submissions to the public consultation exercise

conducted by the Commission (a targeted public consultation, a public questionnaire

seeking specific feedback in relation to the FSR implementation, and a call for

evidence) (3) as well as the Commission’s internal review of its practice.

Overall, the early days of FSR implementation and enforcement show that the instrument

is fit for purpose and contributes to its objective of preserving the level playing field in the

internal market. On the side of ex ante notifications for concentrations and the public

procurements, the Commission has already launched several in-depth FSR investigations,

some of which were concluded with commitments offered by the parties to address the

identified distortions to the internal market caused by foreign subsidies. On the ex officio

side, the Commission has launched several in-depth investigations, which are ongoing at

time of publication, and it has also used its inspection as well as call-in powers. The

objectives of the FSR are widely acknowledged and supported in the feedback from

stakeholders. Stakeholders also claimed that the FSR creates disproportionate costs,

especially in the context of the ex ante notifications procedures. They have called for

simplification of the rules and higher legal certainty concerning certain FSR concepts.

The accompanying Staff Working Document contains further details from the review.

2. FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW

2.1. Early FSR implementation and actions of the Commission to provide

guidance to stakeholders

2.1.1. Actions of the Commission

On 10 July 2023, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1441 on

detailed arrangements for the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to

the FSR (‘FSIR’). The FSIR also sets out accompanying forms for the FSR ex ante

notifications to the Commission (4). The FSIR and the accompanying forms made it

possible to put the notification-based enforcement procedures into practice quickly.

Since the entry into force of the FSR, the Commission has taken multiple steps to provide

more transparency and guidance to stakeholders, as set out in specific terms below.

(2) Multiple Mixed Framework Contract for the Provision of Expert Consultancy Services and Studies

in the Context of Investigations and Enforcement Related to Foreign Subsidies

(COMP/2023/OP/0017).

(3) Summary report on the Public Consultation on the FSR Review Report, available at Have your say

porta at Foreign Subsidies Review Report - public consultation .

(4) Annex I to the FSIR concerns the Form FS-CO relating to the notification of a concentration

pursuant to the FSR and Annex II to the FSIR concerns the Form FS-PP relating to the notification

in the context of public procurement procedures pursuant to the FSR. The FSIR also concerned the

rules on access to file and treatment of confidential information, transparency requirements, rules

for calculating time limits, and the Commission’s investigation process, including procedural details

for proposing commitments by the undertaking under investigation.

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In July 2024, a year after the FSR started applying, a Staff Working Document offering

initial clarifications on key concepts under the FSR was published (5). Features of the

document included initial indications on the interpretation of substantive FSR concepts

and, in particular, factors to be considered in assessing whether a distortion exists, and the

methodology applied in the balancing test.

The Commission services regularly update a set of dedicated FSR questions and answers

(‘FSR Q&As’) on the Commission website (6). These updates address recurring issues

arising in practice. They provide additional guidance on a range of topics, including

procedural and jurisdictional aspects (such as notification obligations, exceptions under

the FSIR, threshold calculations, and foreign financial contributions).

In January 2026, the Commission published the FSR Guidelines, marking a key milestone

in enhancing predictability and transparency for stakeholders (7). The FSR Guidelines

include guidance to stakeholders on the assessment of distortion to the internal market

caused by foreign subsidies, the balancing test, and the call-in powers of the Commission

for concentrations or public procurement procedures falling below the established

thresholds.

Finally, the Commission regularly publishes information on cases, non-confidential

versions of its decisions concluding in-depth FSR investigations (as well as summary of

the decisions to open in-depth investigations) and dedicated FSR briefs on specific policy

developments (such as the first 100 days of FSR enforcement (8), the FSR Guidelines (9))

and its case practice (such as the brief on the first final decision with commitments adopted

under the concentration chapter of the FSR in case FS.100011) (10). In addition, for

concentration proceedings, DG COMP has a dedicated FSR Registry, which enhances

transparency, and informs the public about ongoing FSR concentration cases, following

their formal notification (11).

The Commission services also engage with Member States through a dedicated network

of national contact points and Commission expert groups, as well as with stakeholders such

as legal practitioners and business associations through conferences on various FSR-

related issues, bringing further clarity on its practice.

2.1.2. Results of the review

The actions of the Commission to provide further guidance on the FSR were welcomed

and seen as positive. The review, however, highlights areas in which stakeholders consider

that higher legal certainty is needed, in particular for a number of substantive FSR concepts

(5) Commission Staff Working Document – Initial clarifications on the application of Article 4(1),

Article 6 and Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal

market, SWD(2024) 201 final.

(6) DG COMP website – FSR Q&As.

DG GROW website – FSR Q&As.

(7) Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on the application of certain provisions of

Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies

distorting the internal market, C(2026) 42 final.

(8) Competition FSR brief (Issue 1, February 2024) – The Foreign Subsidies Regulation – 100 days

since the start of the notification obligation for concentrations.

(9) Competition FSR brief (Issue 1, March 2026) – Guidelines on the implementation of the Foreign

Subsidies Regulation (‘FSR Guidelines') – Shedding light on key concepts.

(10) Competition FSR brief (Issue 1, December 2025) – The e&/PPF Telecom case – Interference on the

foreign subsidies line to the EU.

(11) DG GROW is currently exploring possibilities to increase transparency of proceedings for public

procurement while ensuring the confidentiality of national public procurement procedures.

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and the application of the analytical framework in individual cases. Below are some

specific examples.

Regarding the concept of foreign financial contributions (‘FFCs’) from third country

authorities under Article 3 FSR, stakeholders acknowledge the need for a broad definition

of FFCs, which could encompass a wide range of measures to detect potentially distortive

subsidies. The feedback, however, also indicates that the broad FFC concept poses a

challenge when undertakings need to collect the relevant FFC information across multiple

jurisdictions and determine the scope of their reportability for the purpose of their ex ante

notifications under the FSR.

Regarding the assessment of distortion under Article 4 FSR, stakeholders report

difficulties in predicting how the concept is applied in individual cases. The limited body

of Commission decisional practice at the time of the consultation activities in preparation

of the Report is cited as a factor contributing to this uncertainty.

Regarding the foreign subsidies most likely to distort the internal market, underArticle 5

FSR, stakeholders note that although these are seen as a useful indicator, there remains

some uncertainty about the subsidies that ‘directly facilitate a concentration’ or enable the

submission of ‘unduly advantageous tenders’.

Regarding the balancing test under Article 6 FSR, the stakeholders welcome the possibility

to have this exercise under the FSR. However, its practical relevance is deemed limited

since there are not yet examples of how the Commission would apply the test in practice.

2.2. Early FSR enforcement shows that the instrument is fit for purpose

The Commission enforces the FSR through three main procedures:

a) A suspensory ex ante notification for concentrations in which at least one of the

merging undertakings, the acquired undertaking or the joint venture is established

in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 500

million and the aggregate FFCs received by the parties to the concentration was

more than EUR 50 million in the three years preceding the conclusion of the

agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling

interest;

b) A suspensory ex ante notification for public procurement procedures in which

the estimated contract value is at least EUR 250 million – or EUR 125 million for

lot-based public procurements, and the combined FFCs of the bidding party and its

main subcontractors or suppliers were at least EUR 4 million in the three years

before the notification. In cases in which the parties to the public procurement are

below the EUR 4 million FFC threshold, the parties must still file a declaration.

c) An ex officio procedure to investigate all other market situations, where the

Commission can start an investigation on its own initiative.

Overall, the review of early FSR enforcement shows that the instrument is fit for purpose

and is working well in practice. The Regulation is recognised as an effective tool that

addresses the regulatory gap that existed before its adoption. In addition, the objective of

ensuring a level playing field in the internal market is considered legitimate and

proportionate. The FSR enforcement has progressed steadily since the start of its

application, with the Commission gaining valuable experience in applying its substantive

and procedural provisions.

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2.2.1. FSR ex officio investigations

2.2.1.1. Information on cases

The Commission continuously assesses whether there is sufficient evidence to merit the

launch of ex officio investigation, based on its own analysis, information received from

stakeholders and investigations of market information, as applicable.

In two cases, at time of publication, the Commission opened in-depth investigations,

pursuant to Article 10(3) FSR:

a) Case FS.100068 – Nuctech – on 11 December 2025, the Commission opened an

in-depth investigation, to assess whether the activities of Nuctech in the production

and sale of threat detection systems and the provision of related services in the

Union benefitted from foreign subsidies that could distort the internal market. The

possible foreign subsidies take the form of grants and preferential tax measures and

financing, which may have improved Nuctech’s competitive position in the internal

market and may have negatively affected competition (12). The case was initiated

in April 2024 with the adoption of a decision requiring Nuctech to submit to

inspections pursuant to Article 14(3) FSR (the ‘Inspection Decision’).

b) Case FS.100143 – Goldwind – on 3 February 2026, the Commission opened an

in-depth investigation to assess the activities of Goldwind in the production and

sale of wind turbines and the provision of related services within the EU. The

possible foreign subsidies include grants, preferential tax measures, and

preferential financing in the form of loans. The Commission has preliminary

concerns that these foreign subsidies may have improved Goldwind’s competitive

position in the internal market and may negatively affect competition (13).

2.2.1.2. Review by the Union Courts

In the context of ex officio investigations, some investigative acts of the Commission have

been subject to review by the Union Courts:

a) Case T-284/24 – Nuctech – in May 2024, Nuctech brought an action for annulment

before the General Court challenging the Commission’s Inspection Decision (14).

At the same time, Nuctech also applied for interim measures, seeking suspension

of the Commission’s Inspection Decision pending the outcome of the main

proceedings (15). In August 2024, the President of the General Court rejected the

application for interim measures (16), consequently confirmed on appeal by the

Vice-President of the Court of Justice in March 2025 (17). At time of publication of

this Report, the proceedings related to the action for annulment of the Inspection

Decision remain pending before the General Court.

(12) Summary Notice concerning the initiation of an in-depth investigation in Case FS.100068 –

NUCTECH pursuant to Article 10(3)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560, OJEU C/2026/545.

(13) Summary Notice concerning the initiation of an in-depth investigation in Case FS.100143 –

Goldwind, pursuant to Article 10(3)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560, OJEU C/2026/1120.

(14) Case T-284/24, Nuctech Warsaw and Nuctech Netherlands v Commission, OJ C, C/2024/4107,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4107/oj.

(15) Case T-284/24 R, Nuctech Warsaw Company Limited Sp. z o.o. and Nuctech Netherlands BV v

Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2024:564.

(16) Case T-284/24 R, Order of the President of the General Court of 12 August 2024, OJ C,

C/2024/5824, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5824/oj.

(17) Case C-720/24 P(R), Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 21 March 2025,

ECLI:EU:C:2025:205.

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b) Case T-335/26 – Goldwind – in May 2026, Goldwind brought an action for

annulment before the General Court challenging the Commission’s request for

information (18) and requested interim measures for its suspension (19). The request

for information was sent as part of the in-depth investigation into Goldwind’s

activities in the EU wind sector in Case FS.100143. At time of publication, the

proceedings related to both applications remain pending before the General Court.

2.2.1.3. Results of the review

The ex officio procedure allows the Commission to assess and address potentially

distortive foreign subsidies affecting any market situation and economic activity in the

internal market. The results of the review indicate that the ex officio investigation

mechanism functions as intended and that the relevant provisions provide an effective

framework to pursue the FSR’s objective of ensuring a level playing field in the internal

market.

While the ongoing investigations do not prejudge their outcomes, the FSR has allowed the

Commission to act on the basis of sufficient indications of foreign subsidies distorting the

internal market. In the absence of the FSR, the Commission would not have been able to

conduct these investigations and assess whether distortions on the internal market were

caused by foreign subsidies. The feedback from stakeholders indicates uncertainty when it

comes to the duration of ex officio investigations. The initial FSR enforcement experience,

however, indicates that the duration varies, and takes longer, in particular in cases where

the undertakings under investigation take longer to provide the requested information. In

some cases, the timeline is also impacted by the actions brought before the EU Courts.

2.2.2. FSR notification of concentrations

2.2.2.1. Information on cases

The obligation for ex ante notification of concentrations began on 13 October 2023 and by

31 May 2026, the Commission had received 273 formal notifications. Of those cases, 247

were closed after the preliminary review, four cases were withdrawn during the

preliminary review phase, and for 19 cases, the preliminary review was still ongoing.

In three cases, the Commission initiated in-depth-investigations:

a) Case FS.100011 – e& / PPF Telecom: This case involved the acquisition of PPF

Telecom Group (excluding its Czech business), a telecommunication operator in

Czechia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia and Slovakia, by Emirates

Telecommunications Group (e&), a United Arab Emirates-based operator. The

Commission identified foreign subsidies in the form of an unlimited state

guarantee, grants, and loans, which were found be able to distort competition at the

level of the merged entity, post-transaction. To address these concerns, the parties

committed to removing the state guarantee and implementing hold-separate

obligations between e& and the target’s EU activities. The final non-confidential

version of the decision with commitments is published on DG COMP website (20).

(18) Case T-335/26, Goldwind Science & Technology v Commission, main proceedings, application

lodged on 29 May 2026.

(19) Case T-335/26 R, Goldwind Science & Technology v Commission, application for interim relief,

lodged on 29 May 2026.

(20) Commission decision of 24.9.2024 finding that, with the binding commitments, the foreign

subsidies in the concentration do not distort the internal market (Case FS.100011 – e&/PPF Telecom

Group), C(2024) 6745 final.

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b) Case FS.100156 – ADNOC / Covestro: This case involved the acquisition of

Covestro, a German chemicals producer, by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company

(ADNOC). The Commission found that foreign subsidies, including an unlimited

state guarantee to ADNOC and a capital increase to Covestro, created distortions

both in the acquisition process and the post-acquisition activities. The parties

committed to amending ADNOC’s articles of association to remove the state

guarantee and to license certain Covestro patents to market participants. A

provisional non-confidential version of the decision with commitments is published

on DG COMP website (21).

c) FS.100253 – JD.COM / CECONOMY: This case involves the acquisition of

CECONOMY AG, a German retailer specialised in the field of consumer

electronics and home appliances, by JD.com, a company that belongs to a China-

based group operating a retail business and an online e-commerce marketplace in

China. During the preliminary investigation, the Commission found sufficient

indications of foreign subsidies distorting the EU internal market and on 28 May

2026, it opened an in-depth investigation. At time of publication the in-depth

investigation was ongoing.

During the review period, the Commission has not exercised its powers under Article 21(5)

FSR to call-in concentrations below the jurisdictional thresholds.

2.2.2.2. Results of the review

The early experience with the FSR notification procedure for concentrations reveals that

the instrument is fit for purpose. The main takeaways from the review are set out below.

The number of notifications (around 100 per year) has exceeded the Commission’s initial

projections (30-40 per year, as estimated in the impact assessment that accompanied the

proposal for the FSR (22)). The Commission closed around 97% of notified concentrations

after preliminary review, without opening an in-depth investigation. This share is

consistent with the outcome of cases reviewed and cleared in Phase I under Regulation

(EC) 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings

(the ‘EUMR’) (23).

At the time of publication, the Commission had launched three in-depth investigations into

concentrations, two of which were conditionally approved after accepting commitments

from the notifying parties to address potential market distortions caused by foreign

subsidies. The in-depth investigation in one concentration was still ongoing.

The FSR has allowed the Commission to scrutinise concentrations, identify if there are

foreign subsidies in the concentrations which could actually or potentially cause distortions

in the internal market and address them through the regulatory FSR process. The two

finalised cases with commitments illustrate the importance of the FSR in maintaining the

level playing field and signal to acquirers that while the Union remains open to investment,

(21) Provisional non-confidential version of Commission decision of 14.11.2025 on finding that, with

the binding commitments the foreign subsidies in the concentration do not distort the internal market

(Case FS.100156 – ADNOC/COVESTRO), C(2025) 7800 final/2.

(22) Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the

internal market

(23) The proportion of cases found compatible in accordance with Article 6(1)(b) EUMR without

commitments in the first phase of the EUMR investigation in the last 5 years ranges between 93%

to 99% on an annual basis according to official statistics published on the Commission’s website.

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such investments will be scrutinised for the presence of foreign subsidies to ensure they

are not distorting the internal market.

Stakeholders consider the EU-wide turnover threshold as a clear and appropriate measure

for identifying the relevant transactions. They also welcomed the FSR’s approach to joint

ventures, where turnover is calculated based on the turnover of the joint venture itself

rather than those of its parent companies (24), which has led to a reduction of notifiable

transactions compared with the EUMR.

Early enforcement highlights the value of pre-notification engagements with the

Commission case teams, which notifying parties widely use and support. Stakeholders

have commended case teams for their responsiveness, improving clarity and efficiency in

the notification process. Stakeholders also welcomed the exceptions available from the

reporting obligations under the FSIR and the possibility of requesting waivers for certain

information from the Commission.

The results of the review also highlight two main concerns for stakeholders. The first

relates to FFC data collection that undertakings need to undertake before a notification,

which is seen as resource intensive by stakeholders and capturing information that, in their

view, may not be relevant to identifying a risk of distortion. The second concern relates to

a perceived uncertainty about the Commission’s call-in powers, which is seen as

potentially disruptive for transaction planning and risk assessments, notwithstanding the

legitimate goal of the call-in power to capture below-threshold concentrations that could

involve distortive foreign subsidies.

2.2.3. FSR submissions in public procurement procedures

2.2.3.1. Information on cases

Under Chapter 4 FSR, economic operators are required to notify or declare FFCs when

participating in large public tenders, specifically where the estimated contract value

exceeds EUR 250 million or 125 million for lot-based public procurements and the

economic operator has received aggregate FFCs of at least EUR 4 million per third country

in the preceding three years.

Since the start of the notification obligation on 13 October 2023 and until 31 May 2026,

the Commission received 5 150 submissions from economic operators across 863 public

procurement procedures, including 4 293 declarations, 733 notifications and 124 pre-

notifications. Of these cases, the Commission opened four in-depth investigations, one of

which resulted to a final decision with commitments, while three cases were closed

following the withdrawal of the economic operators from the public procurement

procedures.

a) Case FSP.100147 – Supply of railway rolling stock in Bulgaria – The

Commission opened an in-depth investigation on 16 February 2024 to assess if

CRRC Qingdao Sifang part of the CRRC group, a Chinese state-owned enterprise,

received foreign subsidies that enabled it to submit an unduly advantageous tender

for a Bulgarian railway project. On 26 March 2024, the case was closed without

adopting a final decision pursuant to Article 31 FSR after the economic operator

withdrew from the procurement procedure.

(24) The turnover of the joint venture itself is considered as better proxy for self-standing economic

activity, and not just auxiliary operations.

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b) Cases FSP.100151 and FSP.100154 – Design, construction and operation of a

photovoltaic park in Romania – The Commission opened two in-depth

investigations on 3 April 2025 to assess if (i) Shanghai Electric UK Ltd. and

Shanghai Electric Hong Kong International Engineering Company, and

(ii) ENEVO Group – LONGi Solar Technologie Consortium had received

potentially distortive subsidies in the open public procurement procedure for the

design, construction and operation of a photovoltaic park in Romania. On 7 June

2024, both cases were closed without adopting a final decision pursuant to

Article 31 FSR following the withdrawal of the economic operators from the public

procurement procedure.

c) Case FSP.103117 – Design and construction, acquisition of vehicles and

maintenance services of the Violet Line of the Lisbon Metro in Portugal - The

tender of the consortium led by Mota-Engil Engenharia e Construção, S.A. (‘Mota-

Engil’) was conditionally cleared on 21 April 2026. The procedure concerned the

open public procurement procedure for the ‘Design and Construction, Acquisition

of Vehicles, and Maintenance Services for the Violet Line of the Lisbon Metro’, to

be awarded by Metropolitano de Lisboa, E.P.E. The tender submitted by Mota-

Engil relied on Portugal CRRC, an undertaking belonging to the CRRC group, as

a main subcontractor for the supply of rolling stock and related services. The

Commission found evidence of the presence of foreign subsidies in the form of

government grants, tax measures and compensation from public contracts which

exceeds the turnover which would have been achieved in a competitive, transparent

and non-discriminatory procedure, which enabled Portugal CRRC to submit an

advantageous offer to the consortium led by Mota-Engil and subsequently, enabled

the consortium to submit an unduly advantageous tender, thus distorting

competition in the public procurement procedure. To address these concerns, Mota-

Engil committed to replace Portugal CRRC by the Polish Pojazdy Szynowe PESA

Bydgoszcz Spółka Akcyjna (‘PESA’) for the entire duration of the contract

performance period. At time of publication the final non-confidential version of the

decision with commitments was not yet published.

In addition to these in-depth investigations, the Commission declared two tenders irregular

due to incomplete submissions.

a) Cases FSP.101606 and FSP.101626 – Decisions declaring a tender irregular –

The decisions concerned Case FSP.101606, which involved an offer for the

construction of a long-distance tunnel in a tender in Poland, and case FSP.101626,

which involved an offer for the supply of computers and workstations in a tender

in France. In both cases, the Commission issued a decision declaring the

submissions of the respective economic operators incomplete and requiring them

to submit a complete notification within 10 working days. As the notifications in

both cases were not completed within the deadline, in March 2025 the Commission

issued decisions declaring both tenders irregular. Ultimately, the contracting

authorities rejected the irregular tenders and both economic operators were

excluded from the public procurement procedures.

The Commission also has the power to request the prior notification of FFCs in a public

procurement procedure that does not meet the relevant thresholds, pursuant to Article 29(8)

FSR. During the review period, the Commission has, for the first time, exercised its power.

a) Case FSP.103175 – Request for prior notification – This request was issued in

November 2025 and covered two public procurement procedures launched for the

construction of various sections of a motorway in Croatia. As the economic

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operator that was required to submit a prior notification did not comply with the

reporting obligation, the relevant contracting authority issued a request to the

economic operator concerned to submit a missing notification pursuant to

Article 29(3) FSR. Ultimately, the contracting authority considered the tender

“inadmissible, inappropriate, and technically unacceptable”, and excluded the

economic operator from the procedure.

2.2.3.2. Results of the review

The Commission’s early enforcement of the FSR demonstrates that the framework is fit

for purpose and fulfils its objectives, while further refinement would be useful.

The system has proven efficient, handling more submissions than anticipated while

pursuing in-depth review in only a limited number of cases. In addition to in-depth

investigations, irregularity cases and one request for prior notification, the FSR’s deterrent

effect is demonstrated in cases where economic operators, reluctant to share information

on FFCs received, withdrew from public procurement procedures, thereby fostering fairer

competition.

The Commission has met tight deadlines and completed preliminary reviews within 20

working days despite the complexity of the procedural framework. This has been positively

received by stakeholders, as it has strengthened legal certainty for businesses and

supported the smooth conduct of procurement procedures. Furthermore, the Commission’s

consistent guidance to Member States and regular and constructive engagement with

stakeholders have been widely welcomed, fostering greater clarity and cooperation in the

implementation of the framework.

However, challenges remain, particularly around awareness gaps among contracting

authorities and non-notification by economic operators. The comparison between large

procurement procedures published in Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) (25) and those with

at least one FSR submission suggests a decreasing compliance trend over time. Following

a significant rise in FSR notifications from 40% to 70% during the first two years of

enforcement, compliance fell to 45% in late 2025.

Furthermore, key concerns raised by stakeholders include the administrative burden on

economic operators, driven by, in their views, broad reporting obligations, complex

reporting thresholds and submission forms. Difficulties in identifying and reporting FFCs

often lead to incomplete filings, requiring the Commission to gather missing data during

the preliminary review. Tight deadlines compounded by the lack of a ‘stop-the-clock’

mechanism strain assessments, especially in complex cases.

While progress has been made in providing guidance and improving transparency,

stakeholders continue to explain that targeted improvement and simplification of the

current framework is needed, as well as enhanced transparency to support a more

consistent enforcement and greater predictability.

2.3. Developments in third countries’ subsidy control systems

Pursuant to Article 52(2) FSR, in the context of its review, the Commission is bound to

report on developments in international relations involving third countries’ subsidy control

systems.

(25) TED - EU Tenders, the Supplement to the Official Journal - TED.

11

The FSR Review Study therefore also assessed the developments in international relations

regarding third countries’ subsidy control systems. The findings on the issue are presented

in more detail in the accompanying Staff Working Document.

In sum, the review of these developments indicates that there have been no material

developments in third countries’ subsidy control systems since the adoption of the FSR.

As a result, the FSR remains relevant to address the distortions in the internal market

caused by foreign subsidies, which are not caught by the traditional trade defence

mechanisms of the Union.

Continued monitoring of these developments, however, remains important, especially in

light of evolving industrial policies of third countries and potential future reforms at

international level.

3. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FSR

Based on the review’s findings, the overall objective of the FSR remains valid and it is

widely acknowledged that the FSR contributes positively to the preservation of the level

playing field in the internal market.

In terms of substantive FSR concepts, stakeholders reported a need for higher legal

certainty and clarity, which is typically associated with the implementation of a new legal

framework. In this regard, the Commission undertakes a number of initiatives to clarify

the FSR concepts, including the recent publication of the FSR Guidelines, the publication

of the non-confidential versions of the adopted final decisions concluding its in-depth

investigations, regular updates to the FSR Q&As and the publication of FSR briefs. The

Commission will remain committed to these practices going forward. The Commission

also expects that the accumulation of FSR case practice will bring more clarity to

stakeholders and contribute to a better understanding of the specific FSR concepts.

The Commission will also continue to engage with stakeholders and Member States

authorities on the FSR.

Based on the review’s findings, the FSR does not merit structural changes.

In line with the Commission’s 2024–2029 priorities, the review also looked at

administrative burdens on businesses, including small and medium-sized enterprises, in

the implementation process.

3.1. In relation to the FSR ex officio procedure

Based on the review, the role and objective of the ex officio procedure under the FSR is

widely acknowledged.

The recent advancement of two ex officio cases to in-depth review, pursuant to

Article 10(3) FSR, offers further insight into the Commission’s approach when assessing

potentially distortive foreign subsidies.

In terms of the concerns expressed by stakeholders with respect to the length of ex officio

investigations, the Commission notes that this can largely be explained by the level of

complexity in individual cases, additional challenges brought before the Union Courts as

well as the degree of cooperation of the undertakings under investigation.

In light of the above, the Commission considers that no immediate steps concerning the ex

officio procedure are needed. The Commission remains committed to make full use of such

procedures whenever necessary to ensure that the internal market, EU competitiveness and

economic security are not undermined by distortive foreign subsidies. The Commission

12

will continue with its efforts to increase transparency and provide further insights in its

approach for ex officio cases, in line with the practices outlined in this Report and the

accompanying Staff Working Document.

3.2. In relation to the FSR notifications for concentrations

As confirmed by the review, the ex ante notification procedure for concentrations remains

an important enforcement tool of the FSR, which allows the Commission to identify and

address distortive foreign subsidies in the context of concentrations and prior to their

implementation.

At the same time, the Commission takes note of the stakeholders’ feedback concerning the

administrative burden associated with FFC data collection for the purpose of notifications

of concentrations under the FSR. In order to address this feedback, the Commission may

consider possible adjustments to the procedural set up to reduce administrative burden and

facilitate compliance, while maintaining the FSR’s effectiveness.

In addition, the Commission will remain committed to ensure transparency concerning the

FSR enforcement, including updates to the Q&As, additional FSR briefs on key topics,

and the timely publication of case-related information.

3.3. In relation to notifications in public procurement procedures

As confirmed by the review, the ex ante notification procedure for public procurement is

an important component of the FSR framework, enabling the Commission to identify and

address potentially distortive foreign subsidies also in high-value public procurement

procedures. At the same time, early enforcement experience together with stakeholders’

feedback seem to indicate that the filing requirements related to the reporting of FFCs, in

particular the preparation of Form FS-PP and the underlying process of gathering

information, may generate a disproportionate burden for economic operators.

To address these concerns, while preserving the effectiveness of the FSR, the Commission

may consider possible adjustments to the procedural set-up to reduce the administrative

burden on businesses and facilitate compliance.

In parallel, the Commission will continue its efforts to strengthen awareness and

compliance and to enhance the transparency of its enforcement practice, including outreach

activities for contracting authorities, economic operators and practitioners. It will also

further deepen its dialogue with Member States through regular exchanges with the

national contact points and the dedicated FSR Public Procurement Expert Group with the

aim of ensuring a consistent understanding of FSR obligations across the Union.

4. CONCLUSION

The FSR plays a fundamental and key role in the Union’s efforts to address distortions in

the internal market caused by foreign subsidies. The overall objective of the FSR, which

is to prevent distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies, is widely

acknowledged and remains very relevant. The findings of the review highlight the

importance of the FSR and confirm that the Regulation has been successful in capturing

high-risk concentrations and public procurements, as demonstrated by the Commission’s

case practice and the adopted final decisions with commitments under Chapters 3 and 4

FSR as well as its ongoing, at time of publication, investigations under the ex officio

procedure.

13

In light of the stakeholders’ feedback, the Commission may consider possible adjustments

to the FSR procedural set up to reduce the administrative burden on businesses and

facilitate compliance, while maintaining the FSR’s effectiveness.

The Commission remains committed to enforce the FSR whenever necessary to ensure a

level playing field and protect the internal market from distortive foreign subsidies.

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 14.7.2026 SWD(2026) 183 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Accompanying the document

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council

on the implementation and enforcement of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of 14 December

2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, in accordance with Article

52(2) thereof

{COM(2026) 368 final}

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 6

1.1. Context: the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and its objective ................ 6

1.2. Legal basis and purpose of the Report .................................................. 7

2. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND .................................................................. 7

3. CURRENT SET UP UNDER THE FSR ........................................................ 9

3.1. Substantive concepts ............................................................................. 9

3.1.1. Foreign financial contributions and foreign subsidies ............. 9

3.1.2. Distortion of the internal market ............................................. 9

3.1.3. Balancing test ........................................................................ 10

3.2. Enforcement procedures ...................................................................... 10

3.2.1. Ex officio review (Article 9 FSR) ......................................... 11

3.2.2. Ex ante notification of concentrations (Chapter 3 FSR)........ 11

3.2.3. Ex ante notification in public procurement procedures (Chapter

4 FSR) .................................................................................... 12

3.2.4. Possibility to request prior notification ................................. 14

3.2.5. Sources of information and market investigations ................ 14

3.3. Division of responsibilities between DG COMP and DG GROW ...... 14

3.4. Interactions with other instruments ..................................................... 15

3.4.1. Interaction with the EUMR ................................................... 15

3.4.2. Interaction with the framework set up by the FDI Screening

Regulation .............................................................................. 16

3.4.3. Interaction with the Public Procurement Directives .............. 16

4. PREPARATION OF THE REPORT ............................................................ 17

4.1. Sources of information and workstreams ............................................ 17

4.2. Scope and methodology of the review ................................................ 17

4.2.1. The FSR Review Study ......................................................... 17

4.2.2. The FSR Review Public Consultation ................................... 18

4.2.3. Commission’s internal FSR review ....................................... 19

4.3. Objectives sought with the Report ...................................................... 19

4.3.1. Transparency ......................................................................... 19

4.3.2. Simplification ........................................................................ 21

4.3.3. Optimisation of work ............................................................. 21

2

4.3.4. Observation on international obligations ............................... 21

5. FINDINGS .................................................................................................... 22

5.1. Status of implementation ..................................................................... 22

5.2. Status of enforcement .......................................................................... 22

5.2.1. Relevance, clarity and appropriateness of substantive

provisions .............................................................................. 23

5.2.1.1. Feedback from stakeholders .................................. 23

5.2.1.2. The Commission services’ assessment .................. 25

5.2.2. Ex officio investigations ........................................................ 25

5.2.2.1. Information on cases.............................................. 25

5.2.2.2. Review by the EU Courts ...................................... 26

5.2.2.3. Feedback from stakeholders .................................. 27

5.2.2.4. The Commission services’ assessment .................. 27

5.2.3. Notification of concentrations ............................................... 28

5.2.3.1. Information on cases.............................................. 28

5.2.3.2. Detailed analysis of Commission practice ............ 29

5.2.3.3. Feedback from stakeholders .................................. 39

5.2.3.4. The FSR Review Study ......................................... 40

5.2.3.5. The Commission services’ assessment .................. 40

5.2.4. Submissions in public procurement procedures .................... 42

5.2.4.1. Information on cases.............................................. 42

5.2.4.2. Detailed analysis of the Commission’s practice .... 44

5.2.4.3. Enhanced legal guidance and procedural support . 53

5.2.4.4. Engagement of Member States in FSR enforcement

............................................................................... 54

5.2.4.5. Feedback from stakeholders .................................. 54

5.2.4.6. The FSR Review Study ......................................... 56

5.2.4.7. The Commission’s assessment .............................. 57

5.3. Developments in third countries’ subsidy control systems ................. 59

5.3.1. Introduction ........................................................................... 59

5.3.2. Analysis ................................................................................. 60

5.3.3. Conclusion ............................................................................. 61

6. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FSR ........................ 61

6.1. FSR in general and policy objectives .................................................. 61

6.2. In relation to the ex officio procedure ................................................. 62

6.3. In relation to the notification procedure for concentrations ................ 62

3

6.4. In relation to notifications in public procurement procedures ............. 63

7. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 63

4

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Context: the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and its objective

Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of

14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (1) (the ‘FSR’) was

adopted to address distortions in the internal market caused by subsidies granted by third

countries. The FSR seeks to ensure a level playing field in the internal market by enabling

the European Commission (the ‘Commission’) to identify, assess, and, where necessary,

redress distortive foreign subsidies.

Before the adoption of the FSR, the Union legal framework contained a structural

regulatory gap. While Union State aid rules ensure that the subsidies granted by Member

States do not unduly distort competition within the internal market, Regulation (EC)

139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the

‘EUMR’) assesses whether concentrations may lead to a significant impediment to

effective competition, and Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union (‘TFEU’) assess the presence of anti-competitive agreements and abuse

of dominant position, none of these instruments allowed for a systematic assessment of

subsidies granted by third countries to undertakings operating in the Union. In addition,

traditional EU trade defence instruments, are limited to subsidised imports of goods and

do not capture distortions arising from subsidised investments, services or financial flows.

As a result, foreign subsidies could distort any sector of the economy such as, inter alia,

participation in public procurement procedures or acquisition of undertakings or engaging

in any other economic activities in the Union, without being subject to scrutiny comparable

to that applicable to State aid. The FSR was therefore conceived as a horizontal instrument

complementing existing Union merger, antitrust, State aid, public procurement and trade

policy rules, with the objective of preserving fair competition and the integrity of the

internal market.

The FSR is based on non-discriminatory principles and objective criteria. It covers all

sectors and economic activities in the internal market, targeting distortions caused by any

foreign subsidy to the internal market. The FSR applies in full respect of international

obligations. While the Commission remains committed to constructive dialogue and

cooperation with third-country authorities and economic operators, it will continue to use

all investigative and procedural tools available under the FSR to ensure its effective

application and safeguard the level playing field in the internal market.

At international level, the Union has consistently expressed preference for addressing

subsidy-related distortions through multilateral instruments, notably within the framework

of the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’). However, existing WTO rules, in particular the

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘ASCM’), are limited in scope, for

reasons such as their focus on trade in goods, and face some challenges in view of

transparency shortcomings and enforcement constraints. In the absence of comprehensive

and effective multilateral rules capable of addressing the full range of distortions observed

in the internal market, the EU considered it necessary to equip itself with an autonomous

instrument to address distortions caused by foreign subsidies, while remaining open to

future multilateral solutions (2).

(1) Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022

on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, pp. 1–45.

(2) See Recital 6 FSR.

5

1.2. Legal basis and purpose of the Report

Article 52(2) FSR requires the Commission to review how it implements and enforces the

FSR and report on its functioning to the European Parliament and Council every three

years, with the first report due by 14 July 2026 (the ‘Report’). The Report, therefore,

assesses the early implementation and enforcement of the FSR as well as the experience

gained by the Commission in its initial period of application.

The scope of the Report covers the application of the key substantive and procedural

provisions of the FSR, especially the application of Articles 4, 5, 6 and 9, and the

notification thresholds set out in Article20(3), Article 28(1) and (2) FSR (3). In the context

of its review, the Commission should also report on developments in international relations

involving third countries’ subsidy control systems.

This Staff Working Document complements the Report in providing more detailed

analysis.

The review under Article 52 FSR is intended to ensure that the FSR remains proportionate,

effective and consistent with its stated objective and the Union’s international obligations,

while allowing for possible adjustments if warranted by enforcement experience (4).

This Staff Working Document accompanies the Report to provide more comprehensive

overview of the FSR legislative background, the current FSR set up and its enforcement

procedures and the experience gained by the Commission in its initial period of application.

2. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

On 17 June 2020, the Commission adopted a White Paper on levelling the playing field as

regards foreign subsidies (the ‘White Paper’) (5). The White Paper launched the public

debate on the topic of distortive foreign subsidies in the internal market, from 17 June 2020

until 23 September 2020, during which, the Commission received 150 contributions from

interested stakeholders (6). Following a gap analysis of existing EU and international

instruments, the White Paper concluded that while some tools already existed, they were

insufficient to adequately address the issue of foreign subsidies distorting the internal

market. The White Paper proposed solutions and called for new tools to address the

identified regulatory gap for tackling distortive foreign subsidies in the internal market.

On 5 May 2021, following additional consultation activities (7), the Commission adopted

a proposal for a Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market ( 8 ),

(3) See Article 52 FSR.

(4) Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Regulation (EU)

2022/2560.

(5) White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies, COM(2020) 253 final.

(6) The results from the public consultation on the White Paper on foreign subsidies is available at

Have your say portal (White Paper on Foreign Subsidies).

(7) On 6 October 2020, the Commission published an Inception impact assessment, which was open

for feedback until 29 October 2020 and 22 interested stakeholders provided feedback. The Inception

impact assessment presented policy options that could be combined and announced the assessment

of the different impacts. In the context of the consultation activities with stakeholders, between

October 2020 and January 2021, the Commission gathered targeted feedback from business and

industry groups active in sectors that appear to be affected by foreign subsidies as well as expert

groups, public authorities, representatives of SMEs, consumers as well as third-country

stakeholders.

(8) See Commission Proposal for a Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market.

6

accompanied by an Impact Assessment Report (9). This proposal for a Regulation initiated

the legislative procedure with the Council and the European Parliament. (10)

On 30 June 2022, the Council and the European Parliament reached a political agreement

on the Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (11). The final text of

the FSR was adopted on 10 November 2022 by the European Parliament (12) and on

28 November 2022 by the Council (13).

Following the adoption of the FSR and its entry into force on 13 January 2023, the

Commission invited stakeholders to give feedback on the draft Foreign Subsidies

Implementing Regulation (‘FSIR’) on 6 February 2023. Interested stakeholders were

invited to submit their comments by 6 March 2023 via the ‘Have Your Say’ portal and 74

of them submitted feedback, which was taken into account in the final FSIR (14). The

Commission also carried out targeted consultations with selected stakeholders and the draft

FSIR was approved by the Foreign Subsidies Advisory Committee, in line with Article 48

FSR (15).

On 10 July 2023, the Commission adopted the FSIR laying down the procedures for

notifying and content of notifications of concentrations and of public procurement bids

involving foreign financial contributions ( 16 ), rules on disclosure, access to file and

confidential information, transparency requirements, rules for calculating time limits, and

the Commission’s investigation process, including procedural details for proposing

commitments by the undertaking under investigation. On 12 July 2023, the Commission

also adopted the Communication C(2023)4749 on transmitting documents to the

Commission in the context of the FSR (17). The FSIR entered into force on 13 July 2023.

The FSR started to apply from 13 July 2023 and as of that date, the Commission could

initiate ex officio investigations. By way of derogation, the notification obligation, for

concentrations under Article 21 FSR and for foreign financial contributions in public

procurement procedures under Article 29 FSR, started to apply from 13 October 2023. The

rules on the provision of assistance by Member States in the context of inspections under

(9) See Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the

internal market.

(10) The FSR legislative background and the Commission’s presentations to the members of the Council

Working Party on Competition in a series of meetings from May to December 2021 is documented

at FSR legislative background.

(11) Commission press release of 30 June 2022 on Foreign Subsidies: Commission welcomes political

agreement on Regulation on distortive foreign subsidies.

(12) European Parliament press release of 10 November 2022 on Parliament approves new tool to ensure

fair competition on the single market.

(13) Council press release of 28 November 2022 on Council gives final approval to tackling distortive

foreign subsidies on the internal market.

(14) See the FSR draft Implementing Regulation and the feedback received on the Commission Have

your say portal (Distortive foreign subsidies – procedural rules for assessing them).

(15) On 30 June 2023, following two previous meetings in February and May 2023, the Foreign

Subsidies Advisory Committee approved the draft FSIR. The documentation is available on the

Commission Comitology Register for the Foreign Subsidies Advisory Committee.

(16) Annex I to the FSIR concerns the Form FS-CO relating to the notification of a concentration

pursuant to the FSR and Annex II to the FSIR concerns the Form FS-PP relating to the notification

of financial contributions in the context of public procurement procedures pursuant to the FSR.

(17) Communication from the Commission – Communication pursuant to Articles 4(2), 8(1), 15, 17(2)

and 25 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1441 on detailed arrangements for the conduct of

proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament

and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, C/2023/4749, OJ C 246,

13.7.2023, pp. 2–5.

7

the FSR entered into force on 13 January 2024 (18) to allow Member States sufficient time

to prepare the necessary national administrative framework for such assistance.

3. CURRENT SET UP UNDER THE FSR

3.1. Substantive concepts

This section outlines the main substantive concepts underpinning the FSR application, its

enforcement procedures and the division of responsibilities between DG Competition (DG

COMP) and DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW),

both in charge of the FSR implementation, as well as the interaction of the FSR with the

other legal instruments of the Union.

3.1.1. Foreign financial contributions and foreign subsidies

The FSR relies on the concept of foreign financial contributions (‘FFCs’) as a starting point

for its enforcement framework. Article 3(2) FSR defines the notion of FFCs to include any

financial exchange with a third country government or entity whose actions can be

attributed to a third country, such as direct transfers of funds or liabilities, the foregoing of

revenue otherwise due, and the provision or purchase of goods or services. The notion of

FFCs serves as a basis for the jurisdictional threshold for the purposes of ex ante

notification procedures under the FSR and underlying reporting obligations under

Articles 21 and 29 FSR.

The FFCs itself, however, is not sufficient to conclude on the existence of a foreign

subsidy. Under Article 3(1) FSR, an FFC granted directly or indirectly by a third country

will be a foreign subsidy if it (i) confers a benefit on an undertaking engaging in an

economic activity in the internal market, and (ii) is limited, in law or in fact, to one or more

undertakings or industries. The distinction between FFCs and foreign subsidies is therefore

central to the structure of the FSR.

When the Commission has sufficient indications on the presence of foreign subsidies

distorting the internal market, it shall open an in-depth investigation under the FSR.

3.1.2. Distortion of the internal market

Once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established, the Commission should assess if the

foreign subsidy is distortive to the internal market.

Articles 4 and 5 FSR set out the framework for assessing whether a foreign subsidy distorts

the internal market. Article 4 FSR establishes the general concept of distortion, focusing

on two cumulative criteria: (i) whether a foreign subsidy improves the competitive position

of an undertaking in the internal market and, in doing so, (ii) actually or potentially

negatively affects competition. Article 5 FSR identifies certain categories of foreign

subsidies that are considered most likely to distort the internal market. By contrast,

Article 4(2) FSR establishes a rebuttable presumption that certain foreign subsidies are

unlikely to distort the internal market, while Article 4(3) provides that foreign subsidies

below the de minimis threshold are deemed not to distort the internal market.

The approach taken by the Commission in assessing distortions under the FSR has been

developed in detail in the Guidelines on the application of certain provisions of Regulation

(EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies

(18) Article 54(3) FSR indicates that by way of derogation, Article 14(5), (6) and (7) FSR shall apply

from 13 January 2024.

8

distorting the internal market (‘FSR Guidelines’), published on 9 January 2026 (19). In

particular, the FSR Guidelines provide insight on the assessment of the two cumulative

conditions included in Article 4 FSR – improvement of competitive position of the

undertaking and the actual or potential negative effect on competition in the internal

market.

3.1.3. Balancing test

Once the distortion of the foreign subsidy to the internal market is identified, the parties

can bring forward arguments if there are positive effects of the foreign subsidies that can

outweigh the negative effects through the so-called balancing test, under Article 6 FSR.

Article 6 FSR envisages that the Commission may, on the basis of information received,

conduct a balancing test to take into account the potential positive effects of a foreign

subsidy on the development of the subsidised economic activity when assessing its overall

impact on the internal market. This test forms part of the substantive assessment framework

and may influence the outcome of an investigation where both negative and positive effects

are identified in terms of the type of decision to be adopted and the appropriateness of

remedial measures intended to address the identified distortion. In all cases, the outcome

after conducting a balancing test should not be less favourable to the undertaking under

investigation than if no balancing had taken place.

The FSR Guidelines provide more information about the way the Commission performs

the balancing test, clarifying in particular the situations in which positive effects may be

assessed, the types of positive effects that can be taken into account, and the conditions

that need to be met for those positive effects to be taken into account.

3.2. Enforcement procedures

The FSR is structured around three enforcement procedures that allow the Commission to

address distortions caused by foreign subsidies (20). While these procedures are based on

partially distinct frameworks, they rely on a common set of substantive concepts and

investigative powers, and may in certain cases overlap in their application. In particular,

the ex officio tool may also be used to examine economic activities including

concentrations and public procurement procedures or other forms of public spending,

which do not fall under the ex ante notification obligation, pursuant to Articles 21 and 29

FSR.

Under all three enforcement procedures, the FSR investigations have a two-phase

structure, consisting of: (i) a preliminary review, as set out in Article 10 FSR and, where

appropriate, (ii) an in-depth investigation, as set out in Article 11 FSR. These phases

determine the procedural steps and timelines of the Commission’s assessment.

(19) Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on the application of certain provisions of

Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies

distorting the internal market, C/2026/42. See Commission press release of 9 January 2026 –

Commission publishes Foreign Subsidies Regulation Guidelines.

(20) In addition to the three enforcement procedures against specific undertakings, Article 36 FSR lays

down the possibility of the Commission conducting a market investigation into a particular sector,

a particular type of economic activity or into the use of a particular subsidy instrument in case the

information available to the Commission substantiates a reasonable suspicion that foreign subsidies

in the particular sector, for the particular type of economic activity or based on the particular subsidy

instrument may distort the internal market.

9

3.2.1. Ex officio review (Article 9 FSR)

Article 9 FSR empowers the Commission to examine, on its own initiative, information

from any source indicating the possible existence of a foreign subsidy distorting the

internal market. This ex officio mechanism is not subject to notification obligations or

quantitative thresholds.

Where the Commission considers that the information referred to in Article 9 FSR

indicates the possibility that a foreign subsidy distorting the internal market exists, it carries

out a preliminary review pursuant to Article 10(1) FSR. For the purposes of this

preliminary review, the Commission seeks all information it considers necessary to

determine, on a preliminary basis, whether the FFC under examination constitutes a foreign

subsidy and whether it distorts the internal market. To that end, the Commission may

request information in accordance with Article 13 FSR and conduct inspections within or

outside the Union pursuant to Articles 14 and 15 FSR respectively. The FSR does not lay

down a fixed statutory deadline for the completion of the preliminary review in ex officio

cases.

Where, following the preliminary review in an ex officio case, the Commission considers

that there are sufficient indications that a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market, it

opens an in-depth investigation in accordance with Article 10(3) FSR. In accordance with

Article 11 FSR, during the in-depth investigation, the Commission further assesses the

foreign subsidies and their distortive effects identified in the opening decision and will

seek all additional information necessary by making use of the investigative tools in

Articles 13, 14 and 15 FSR. Article 11(5) FSR provides that the Commission will

endeavour to conclude the in-depth investigation within 18 months of it being opened.

3.2.2. Ex ante notification of concentrations (Chapter 3 FSR)

Chapter 3 FSR introduces an ex ante notification system for concentrations.

In accordance with Article 20(3) FSR, a concentration must be notified to the Commission

prior to its implementation, when:

• the acquired undertaking, at least one of the merging undertakings, or the joint

venture is established in the Union and generates an aggregate EU turnover of at

least EUR 500 million, and

• the parties to the concentration concerned have received combined FFCs exceeding

EUR 50 million in the three years preceding the conclusion of the agreement, the

announcement of the public bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest.

The notification form for concentrations (‘Form FS-CO’), adopted as Annex I to the FSIR,

obliges notifying parties to disclose certain information required to assess potential

distortive foreign subsidies in the concentration. This information includes details about

the parties to, type of, and rationale of the transaction, its financing, and FFCs received by

the parties, in the three years prior to the concentration (that is preceding the conclusion of

the agreement, the announcement of the public bid or the acquisition of a controlling

interest).

The Form FS-CO adopts a two-limb structure for the reporting of FFCs, depending on the

nature of the FFCs received:

• FFCs liable to constitute foreign subsidies most likely to distort the internal market

(in accordance with the definition in Article 5 FSR), which will trigger: (i) detailed

reporting concerning any FFCs exceeding EUR 1 million granted to the notifying

party / parties or the target; and (ii) explanation if the FFC constitutes a foreign

10

subsidy (i.e., if it confers benefit and is limited in fact or law to specific (group of)

undertakings.

• Other FFCs, which need to be reported if the aggregate amount of FFCs received

from a third country exceeds EUR 45 million in the three years prior to the

concentration, with certain exceptions. For these FFCs, no line-by-line disclosure

is required. Instead, the Form FS-CO requires a description of the categories of

FFCs received and an indicative range of the amount of FFCs per third country.

Pursuant to the FSIR, the below FFCs do not require reporting in the Form FS-CO:

• deferrals of payment of taxes or of social security contributions, tax amnesties and

tax holidays as well as normal depreciation and loss-carry forward rules that are of

general application. If these measures are limited, for example, to certain sectors,

regions or (types of) undertakings, they have to be included;

• application of tax reliefs for avoidance of double taxation in line with the provisions

of bilateral or multilateral agreements for avoidance of double taxation, as well as

unilateral tax reliefs for avoidance of double taxation applied under national tax

legislation to the extent they follow the same logic and conditions as the provisions

of bilateral or multilateral agreements;

• provision / purchase of goods or services (except financial services) at market terms

in the ordinary course of business, for example the provision / purchase of goods

or services carried out following a competitive, transparent and non-discriminatory

tender procedure;

• individual FFCs below EUR 1 million; and

• specific exceptions related to transactions involving private equity or investment

fund acquirers, subject to defined conditions.

The FSIR also allows for the possibility of requesting a waiver to disclose certain

information in the Form FS-CO where:

• the information is not reasonably available; or

• the information is not necessary for the Commission’s assessment under the FSR.

Upon receipt of a complete notification, in accordance with Article 24(1)(a) FSR, the

Commission carries out a preliminary review within 25 working days. Where the

Commission has found sufficient indications of the presence of distortive foreign subsidies

in the concentration, it may open an in-depth investigation, which, in accordance with

Article 24(1)(b) FSR, must be concluded within 90 working days, subject to extensions or

suspensions as provided for in the FSR.

3.2.3. Ex ante notification in public procurement procedures (Chapter 4 FSR)

Chapter 4 FSR establishes an ex-ante notification system for public procurement

procedures. Economic operators are required to notify FFCs where:

• the estimated value of the public procurement contract or framework agreement is

at least EUR 250 million (or the value of the individual lot, or the combined value

of all lots bid on, is at least EUR 125 million), and

• the economic operator concerned, including its main subcontractors and suppliers

where applicable, has received aggregate FFCs of at least EUR 4 million per third

country in the three years preceding the notification.

11

Where these two thresholds are met, economic operators are required to submit a

notification. Where only the first threshold is met (i.e., no notifiable FFCs have been

granted to the notifying party/parties (21) in the last three years preceding the notification),

economic operators are required to submit a declaration. In both cases, economic operators

have to use Form FS-PP, adopted as Annex II to the FSIR.

For declarations, Form FS-PP obliges the notifying parties to disclose certain information

that may be relevant for the assessment of each public procurement bid in the context of

the FSR. This information includes details about the public procurement and the notifying

parties. Moreover, the Form FS-PP for declarations requires:

• Individual reporting of all non-notifiable FFCs in the last three years preceding the

declaration, above EUR 1 million;

• Aggregate reporting in Table 2 of FFCs the value of which is between

EUR 1 million and the de minimis threshold (22);

• No reporting of FFCs the value of which is below the de minimis threshold.

For notifications, Form FS-PP obliges notifying parties to disclose certain information,

necessary for the assessment of potential distortive foreign subsidies in the public

procurement procedure. This information includes details about the public procurement,

the notifying parties, the type of FFCs received, any justifications regarding the fact that

the FFCs did not allow the notifying parties to submit an unduly advantageous tender, as

well as information about potential positive effects.

Form FS-PP for notifications distinguishes the reporting requirements depending on the

nature of the FFCs received:

• FFCs liable to constitute foreign subsidies most likely to distort the internal

market (in accordance with the definition in Article 5 FSR), which will trigger

(i) detailed reporting, including supporting documents, is required in respect of

any FFC exceeding EUR 1 million granted to each of the notifying parties

individually; and (ii) explanation if the FFC constitutes a foreign subsidy (i.e.,

if it confers benefit and is limited in fact or law to specific (group of)

undertakings.

• Other FFCs, for which disclosure in Table 1 is required in respect of any FFC

exceeding EUR 1 million granted to the notifying parties. For these FFCs no

line-by-line disclosure is required. The Form FS-PP requests a description of the

categories of FFCs received and an indicative range of the amount of FFCs per

third country.

• Pursuant to the FSIR, the following FFCs are subject to exception from reporting

in the Form FS-PP:

o deferrals of payment of taxes or of social security contributions, tax

amnesties and tax holidays as well as normal depreciation and loss-carry

forward rules that are of general application. If these measures are limited,

for example, to certain sectors, regions or (types of) undertakings, they have

to be included;

(21) Under Article 2(3) FSR, ‘notifying parties’ for the purpose of notifications and declarations

regarding foreign financial contributions in public procurement’ means all economic operators,

groups of economic operators, main subcontractors and main suppliers covered by the notification

obligation in accordance with Article 29(5) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560.

(22) As defined in Article 3(2), first subparagraph, of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013.

12

o application of tax reliefs for avoidance of double taxation in line with the

provisions of bilateral or multilateral agreements for avoidance of double

taxation, as well as unilateral tax reliefs for avoidance of double taxation

applied under national tax legislation to the extent they follow the same

logic and conditions as the provisions of bilateral or multilateral

agreements;

o provision / purchase of goods or services (except financial services) at

market terms in the ordinary course of business, for example the provision /

purchase of goods or services carried out following a competitive,

transparent and non-discriminatory tender procedure;

o FFCs below the individual amount of EUR 1 million.

The FSIR also allows for the possibility of requesting a waiver to disclose certain

information in the Form FS-PP, during the pre-notification contacts, where:

• the information is not reasonably available; or

• the information is not necessary for the Commission’s assessment under the

FSR.

Following the notification or declaration, the Commission conducts a preliminary review

within 20 working days. Where the Commission considers that a foreign subsidy could

distort the internal market, it may open an in-depth investigation, which must be concluded

within 110 working days, subject to extensions or suspensions as provided for in the

Regulation.

3.2.4. Possibility to request prior notification

In addition to the three enforcement procedures described above in subsections 3.2.1, 3.2.2.

and 3.2.3, the Regulation allows the Commission to examine cases below the notification

thresholds through the use of ‘call-in powers’, where there are suspicions that there are

foreign subsidies granted in the particular concentration or public procurement procedure.

These call-in mechanisms complement the notification-based system and can be relied

upon to request notifications for both concentrations and public procurement procedures

below the notification thresholds.

The FSR Guidelines provide further clarity on the conditions necessary for the

Commission to be able to request prior notification and shed light on the types of

considerations it can take into account when deciding in which situations a prior

notification may be appropriate.

3.2.5. Sources of information and market investigations

Market information on potentially distortive foreign subsidies plays a central role in the

Commission’s enforcement of the FSR. This is particularly relevant for the effective

functioning of the ex officio procedure and the exercise of call-in powers. For its

enforcement of the FSR, the Commission may rely on information from any source,

including Member States, contracting authorities, competitors, market participants and

other sources, as well as on market investigations conducted under Article 36 FSR, which

constitute a horizontal information-gathering tool applicable across the three enforcement

procedures.

3.3. Division of responsibilities between DG COMP and DG GROW

The FSR is enforced exclusively by the Commission.

13

DG COMP is responsible for applying the FSR in relation to concentrations and for the

general use of the ex officio investigative mechanism.

DG GROW is responsible for applying the FSR in relation to public procurement

procedures and for the use of ex officio investigative mechanism linked to public

procurement procedures and similar forms of public spending.

This division of responsibilities reflects the respective experience of the services in

competition enforcement and public procurement and supports the coherent application of

the FSR. Any enforcement activities under the FSR benefit from coordination of actions

between the responsible services to ensure alignment in interpretation and enforcement of

the Regulation. In addition, final decisions under the FSR are adopted in accordance with

the principle of collegiality in decision-making.

3.4. Interactions with other instruments

The FSR operates alongside a number of existing EU instruments that pursue distinct

objectives and rely on different legal tests and procedural frameworks. In practice,

behaviours and procedures subject to review under the FSR may also fall within the scope

of other EU regimes, which may give rise to parallel proceedings.

3.4.1. Interaction with the EUMR

A high number of concentrations notified under the FSR also fall within the scope of the

EUMR. Based on enforcementexperience to date ( 23 ), approximately 80% of the

concentrations notified under the FSR were also notifiable under the EUMR. This is not

surprising, considering that both regimes are triggered by the same economic event,

namely a concentration, and both use turnover as a jurisdictional threshold. In addition, the

FSR’s turnover threshold is set at a higher level than the corresponding per-undertaking

EU turnover threshold under the EUMR. The result is that concentrations that meet the

FSR threshold will in most cases also fall within the scope of the EUMR (24).

Even if the same transaction may be subject to review under both instruments, the

objectives and substantive assessments differ. The EUMR assesses whether a

concentration would significantly impede effective competition as a result of changes in

market structure and, therefore, economic power. By contrast, the FSR examines whether

foreign subsidies confer an undue advantage that distorts competition in the internal

market, either during the acquisition process or in the activities of the combined entity post

transaction. The outcome of the assessment under one instrument is therefore not

determinative for the outcome under the other.

While the substantive assessments and overall objectives of the two instruments differ, in

an effort to enhance legal certainty and ensure consistency in the interpretation of shared

concepts, many of the concepts in the concentration procedure of the FSR have been

aligned with the concepts under the EUMR. Most notably, the FSR relies on the same

notions of concentration and of control that are applicable under the EUMR. In practice,

this has resulted in alignment between parts of the information required under the two

notification forms, with Sections 1 to 3 of Form FS-CO following the same logic and

(23) Unless specifically stated otherwise, the Report includes information on the enforcement activities

under the FSR until 31 May 2026.

(24) Under Article 20(3)(a) FSR, at least one of the undertaking concerned must be established in the

Union and generate an aggregate Union turnover of at least EUR 500 million. Under Article 1(2)

EUMR, the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned must exceed

EUR 5 000 million and the Union- wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings

concerned must exceed EUR 250 million.

14

structure as the initial sections of the notification form used for procedures under the

EUMR.

3.4.2. Interaction with the framework set up by the FDI Screening Regulation

Certain transactions reviewed under the FSR are also subject to national foreign direct

investment (‘FDI’) screening mechanisms and may be communicated to the Commission

under Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the

screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. Approximately 28% of FSR

concentration cases were also subject to at least one FDI screening procedure notified by

a Member State to the Commission.

The FSR includes specific information obligations in relation to such cases. In particular,

Article 10(2) and (4) FSR provide for the exchange of information with the respective

Member State authorities which have informed the Commission about a concurrent

national FDI procedure.

While FDI screening focuses on risks to public security and public order, the FSR

addresses distortions of competition in the internal market. The two frameworks therefore

operate in parallel with distinct objectives.

3.4.3. Interaction with the Public Procurement Directives

The interaction between the EU public procurement directives (Directives 2014/23/EU,

2014/24/EU, and 2014/25/EU) and the FSR creates a ‘parallel track’ system where a single

public procurement procedure is governed by two distinct legal frameworks. While EU

public procurement rules govern the procedural conduct of the tender (selection,

evaluation, and award) by the relevant contracting authority, the FSR introduces a

mandatory screening mechanism for distortive FFCs that is managed exclusively by the

Commission. Under this interaction, for large public procurement procedures, the

contracting authority acts as a gateway, receiving submissions of FFCs from economic

operators and sending them to the Commission. Furthermore, the FSR imposes a ‘standstill

obligation’: while the contracting authority can proceed with evaluating bids and

identifying the ‘most economically advantageous tender’ under EU public procurement

rules, the actual award of the contract is legally prohibited until the Commission has

cleared the submission of an economic operator under the FSR. This creates a procedural

dependency where the contract award can be vetoed by an FSR finding of a ‘distortive

subsidy’, effectively making FSR clearance a new condition for contract award in the EU

internal market.

Despite the procedural overlap, the substantive assessments performed by contracting

authorities and the Commission are distinct. The closest point of convergence lies in the

Commission’s scrutiny of an ‘unduly advantageous tender’ and the contracting authority’s

evaluation of an ‘abnormally low tender’ (under Article 69 of Directive 2014/24/EU).

However, even these are governed by a different internal logic: the contracting authority

focuses on operational viability, seeking to determine if a price is so low that the economic

operator will be unable to execute the contract technically or financially. In contrast, the

Commission’s assessment focuses on determining if a foreign subsidy enabled the

economic operator to submit an offer that is ‘unduly advantageous’ (25).

The considerations discussed in relation to the interaction between FSR and the public

procurement directives apply also to the interaction between the FSR and the Regulation

(25) See 2.5.1 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on the application of certain

provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign

subsidies distorting the internal market, C/2026/42.

15

(EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September

2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) (the

‘Financial Regulation’). This results from Article 143(e) of the Financial Regulation,

which extends the application of FSR to public procurement procedures initiated by entities

falling under the Financial Regulation the estimated value of which reaches EUR 250

million.

4. PREPARATION OF THE REPORT

4.1. Sources of information and workstreams

To gather the evidence required for the Report, multiple and complementary sources of

information and parallel workstreams have been considered:

First, the Commission commissioned an expert study from an external contractor under a

Framework Contract for the provision of expert consultancy services and studies

(COMP/2023/OP/0017) (the ‘FSR Review Study’) (26).

Second, the Commission collected input from external stakeholders through a public

consultation, comprising a call for evidence, and an EU Survey questionnaire (the ‘FSR

Review ‘public consultation’).

Third, the Commission services conducted an internal review of their own practice,

collecting feedback from case teams engaged in the enforcement of the FSR and analysing

collected data and experience on its enforcement practice, drawing on artificial intelligence

tools and a manual review of case files (the ‘Commission’s internal FSR review’).

4.2. Scope and methodology of the review

The FSR Review Study provided an independent, evidence-based assessment of the

functioning of the FSR, including an analytical perspective on its enforcement. The public

consultation allowed the Commission to gather a broad range of views and factual

information from stakeholders affected by the FSR, while targeted interviews allowed for

a more in-depth examination of specific issues and practical experiences. Based on the

design and questions in the public consultation and the targeted interviews, the

stakeholders’ views provided evidence regarding the main FSR concepts, thresholds for

notifications and the scope of information to be reported in FSR notifications, among

others. The internal review offered operational insights into the day-to-day enforcement of

the FSR, including challenges encountered in practice and potential areas for improvement

or simplification. In parallel, the analysis of enforcement data supported a systematic

assessment of trends, procedural aspects and outcomes across cases.

Taken together, these sources allowed the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review

of the scope, effectiveness and practical implementation of the FSR, ensuring that the

conclusions and options presented in this SWD and the Report are grounded in a robust

and balanced evidentiary basis.

4.2.1. The FSR Review Study

The FSR Review Study was prepared by London Economics (‘LE’) Europe, a specialist

economics and policy consultancy, together with data+law and Associated-Professor

(26) Multiple Mixed Framework Contract for the Provision of Expert Consultancy Services and Studies

in the Context of Investigations and Enforcement Related to Foreign Subsidies

(COMP/2023/OP/0017).

16

Dr Lena Hornkohl. The study started in June 2025 and lasted for six months. It covers the

period from October 2023 to June 2025. The FSR Review Study is included in Annex I.

The analysis carried out in the FSR Review Study consists of three main sections: (i) a

survey of legal practitioners and contracting authorities on their experience with the FSR

and potential simplification measures; (ii) an analysis of the Commission’s case practice;

and (iii) a review of developments in international relations concerning third countries’

subsidy control systems.

i. Survey of legal practitioners and contracting authorities

This section examines stakeholders’ experience with the application of the FSR, drawing

on surveys of legal practitioners (the ‘FSR Practitioners’ Survey’) and contracting

authorities of EU Member States. It assesses how the FSR operates in practice, identifies

compliance frictions, and explores possible avenues for simplification.

The Practitioners’ Survey was addressed to both practitioners with FSR experience in the

concentration or the public procurement procedures across a wide range of sectors.

ii. Analysis of the Commission’s case practice

This section examines how the Commission has implemented and enforced the FSR in

concentration and public procurement cases. It analyses enforcement practice between

October 2023 and June 2025 and assesses the overall approach adopted by the Commission

and identifies patterns in its assessment practice, in particular with regards to the

application of Articles 4, 5, 6, 9, 20(3) and 28(1) and (2) FSR.

iii. Review of developments in third countries’ subsidy control systems

This section reports on developments in international relations involving third countries’

subsidy control systems, as referred to in Article 52 FSR.

The analysis focuses on Canada, China, Japan, Switzerland, Türkiye, the United Arab

Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States. Other jurisdictions with which the

Union has bilateral trade or investment agreements are addressed at an overview and

aggregate level. The study also covers international developments in subsidy control, in

particular in relation to jurisdictions that have recently entered into Free Trade Agreements

with the Union.

4.2.2. The FSR Review Public Consultation

In August 2025, the Commission launched the FSR Review public consultation, which ran

until 18 November 2025. The FSR Review public consultation contained two components:

first, a call for evidence invited general feedback from all interested parties on the main

objectives of the Report, as well as on its scope and context; and second, a public

consultation questionnaire aimed to gather views on specific aspects of the implementation

and enforcement of the FSR from a broad range of stakeholders, including companies, law

firms, Member States, business associations, individuals and the research community. All

interested parties were able to submit their views on the call for evidence and respond to

the questionnaire in any official EU language. Additional input was obtained through

targeted interviews with selected stakeholders.

The public consultation generated a high level of participation, including respectively

49 responses to the call for evidence and 54 responses to the public consultation

17

questionnaire (27). This input was subsequently complemented by targeted interviews with

selected stakeholders and meetings with Member States.

4.2.3. Commission’s internal FSR review

In the first half of 2026, the Commission services conducted an internal review among case

teams engaged in enforcing the FSR, seeking feedback on the experience with enforcement

and analysed data related to the enforcement practice.

The data analysed for DG COMP focused on FSR concentration cases notified between

October 2023 and January 2026, reflecting the availability of data and practical experience

in this area ( 28 ). The internal review assessed cases across several characteristics,

including: (i) characteristics of the notifying parties; (ii) the amount and type of reported

FFCs; (iii) the economic activities of the parties to the concentration (identified by NACE

codes); (iv) the reported EU turnover of the target, (v) consideration paid for the

transaction; and (vi) experience with pre-notification discussions.

To assess the application of the FSR’s public procurement procedure, the Commission

services used data on submissions received between 13 October 2023 and 31 January 2026.

The data examined covers in particular the number of notified public procurement

procedures, the number of pre-notification contacts, the number of notification and the

distributions of submissions per sector. Additionally, an analysis of global ultimate

ownership (29) (i.e. country where the ultimate parent company is registered), carried out

in the context of the review of the EU public procurement directives, has been included in

this Staff Working Document, covering the period between 13 October 2023 and

31 December 2025, a slightly narrower timespan than the submissions’ dataset. The

differences in timespan do not represent a material difference for the current analysis.

4.3. Objectives sought with the Report

The objectives set out in this section are grounded in the broader policy framework of the

Commission and the legal framework governing the implementation of the FSR. In

particular, the objectives of transparency, simplification, and optimisation of work are

closely aligned with the Commission’s overarching priorities, as reflected in the Political

Guidelines and the Commission Work Programme, which emphasise the importance of

enhancing clarity, reducing administrative burdens, and ensuring the efficient use of

resources in the application of EU rules (30).

At the same time, the Commission remains fully committed to its international obligations

as set out in Article 44(9) FSR and the compliance of the implementation and enforcement

of the Regulation with the Union’s obligations under international law.

4.3.1. Transparency

Enhancing transparency is a key objective of the Report. Transparency is essential to

ensure predictability, facilitate compliance, and strengthen stakeholders’ understanding of

the application of the FSR. In this context, the Report and this SWD aim to provide further

(27) See the European Commission’s public consultation on the Commission Have your say portal, and

the Call for Evidence, available on the same Have your say portal.

(28) With a particular focus on cases administratively closed after the preliminary review phase.

(29) i.e. country where the ultimate parent company is registered. See Section 5.4.2.1. (f) of the present

document.

(30) Ursula von der Leyen, Political Guidelines For The Next European Commission 2024−2029.

Communication from the Commission – Commission Work Programme 2025. Moving forward

together: A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union, COM(2025) 45 final.

18

insight into the Commission’s implementation and enforcement of the Regulation during

the initial phase of its application.

This objective builds on steps already taken by the Commission to ensure transparency.

Since the entry into force of the FSR, the Commission has progressively expanded the

information it makes available about its enforcement practice. Notably, DG COMP

publishes on its website key details of all notified cases, including case number, parties

involved, procedural timeline, and economic activities concerned (31).

In addition, the Commission services has taken measures to clarify the substantive

framework for assessment under the FSR. While gaining experience in applying the

Regulation, it has provided increasing guidance to stakeholders, thereby contributing to

greater legal certainty. Notably, DG GROW provides online guidance to economic

operators on whether to submit a notification or declaration and on how to complete the

sections of the Form FS-PP on the notification of FFCs in the context of public

procurement procedures.

In July 2024, a Staff Working Document was published, offering initial clarifications on

key concepts under the FSR (32). Features of the document included initial indications on

how the Commission interprets substantive FSR concepts and, in particular, factors to be

considered in assessing whether a distortion exists, and the methodology it would apply in

the balancing test. Furthermore, the Commission services regularly update a set of

dedicated FSR questions and answers (‘FSR ‘Q&As’’) on the Commission website (33).

These updates address recurring issues arising in practice and provide additional guidance

on a range of topics, including procedural and jurisdictional aspects (such as notification

obligations, threshold calculations, and FFCs). The Commission also publishes dedicated

FSR briefs on specific policy developments (such as the first 100 days of enforcement of

the FSR (34) and on FSR Guidelines and on case practice (such as the brief on the first final

decision with commitments adopted in case FS.100011) ( 35 ). Additionally, the

Commission maintains a rigorous communication strategy on its in-depth investigations

via press releases and daily news bulletins to provide stakeholders with timely updates on

critical procedural milestones. This practice enhances administrative transparency and

procedural predictability.

Finally, as already mentioned in Section 3.1.2, the FSR Guidelines, published in January

2026, represent a key milestone in enhancing predictability and transparency for

companies. They clarify, inter alia, how the Commission determines whether a foreign

subsidy distorts competition, how it balances any negative effects against potential positive

effects, and how it may exercise its power to require prior notification of concentrations or

public procurement procedures falling below the established thresholds.

(31) DG GROW is currently exploring possibilities to increase transparency of proceedings for public

procurement while ensuring the confidentiality of national public procurement procedures.

(32) Commission Staff Working Document – Initial clarifications on the application of Article 4(1),

Article 6 and Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal

market, SWD(2024) 201 final.

(33) DG COMP website – FSR Q&As.

DG GROW website – FSR Q&As.

(34) Competition FSR brief (Issue 1, February 2024) – The Foreign Subsidies Regulation – 100 days

since the start of the notification obligation for concentrations

(35) Competition FSR brief (Issue 1, December 2025) – The e&/PPF Telecom case – Interference on the

foreign subsidies line to the EU.

19

4.3.2. Simplification

Assessing the need and scope for potential simplification is another key element of the

Report.

Assessing the need and possibility for simplification is aligned with the Commission’s

current policy priorities. Speed, coherence, and simplification are central principles

guiding the Commission’s work. The Political Guidelines and the Commission Work

Programme 2025 emphasise that simplifying EU policies and legislation, as well as

improving their implementation, is crucial to making it easier and faster to do business in

Europe. These efforts are also at the core of the Commission’s strategy to strengthen

Union’s competitiveness, as developed in the Commission's Competitiveness

Compass (36).

4.3.3. Optimisation of work

Consistent with the above, based on the findings outlined in the Report, further

optimisation of the enforcement of the FSR and an efficient use of available resources

should be ensured by enabling a focus on cases and sectors where the risk of distortion

caused by foreign subsidies is most prominent.

In the initial phase of implementation, the application of the Regulation required the

establishment of new processes and the allocation of administrative resources. To enable

effective implementation, the Commission has allocated dedicated resources for the

enforcement of the FSR, including a dedicated directorate within DG COMP, and a

dedicated unit within DG GROW. Drawing on experience with the enforcement of other

competition instruments and public procurement practices, relevant procedures have been

implemented to enable the efficient review of cases (37).

4.3.4. Observation on international obligations

Ensuring consistency with the Union’s international obligations constitutes an overarching

objective of the Report. Any recommendations put forward in pursuit of greater

transparency, simplification, and optimisation must remain aligned with the EU’s

obligations under international agreements.

The Regulation operates in a global economic context and interacts with existing

international frameworks, including those governing subsidies and trade. It is therefore

essential that its implementation respects the Union’s obligations under, inter alia, the

World Trade Organisation framework.

Maintaining such consistency contributes to legal certainty and supports a rules-based

international system.

(36) Communication from the Commission – A Competitiveness Compass for the EU, COM(2025) 30

final.

(37) This included the provision of practical information and templates for supporting documents on the

Commission’s website, the creation of a dedicated FSR Registry to handle correspondence by

notifying parties, the introduction of internal procedures, aiming to ensure timely response to

submissions, and proper staffing of cases with combined legal and economic expertise and

exploring possibilities to increase transparency of proceedings for public procurement while

ensuring the confidentiality of national public procurement procedures.

20

5. FINDINGS

5.1. Status of implementation

The FSIR and notification forms for the two ex ante notification procedures of the FSR

were adopted on 10 July 2023, within the timelines set out in Article 47(4) FSR. That

allowed for the timely operationalisation of the notification-based enforcement procedures.

The Commission has continuously requested Member States to report on their progress in

implementing, in their respective jurisdictions, measures allowing them to assist the

Commission in inspections in accordance with Article 14(5), (6) and (7) FSR, which

became applicable as from 12 January 2024.

Figure 1 provides an overview of the current state of play on the national implementation

of provisions enabling Member States’ cooperation with the Commission in FSR

inspections:

• Member States that have confirmed the adoption of implementing provisions

include Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania,

Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.

• Member States that have introduced legislative proposals which are pending

adoption include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia and Germany.

• Member States that have not confirmed yet their legislative proposals include

Croatia, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Sweden.

Figure 1 – Implementation of domestic legislation for cooperation under the FSR

Source: Information provided by Member States.

In addition, the adoption of supplementary guidance, discussed in Section 4.3.1 above,

contributed to a more consistent understanding of the Commission’s approach to the

application of key substantive notions under the FSR, particularly during the initial phase

of enforcement.

5.2. Status of enforcement

This section presents an overview of the enforcement of the FSR to date. It first examines

whether the substantive provisions of the Regulation are understood and considered

15

6

6

Implementation of domestic legislation for cooperation under

the FSR, in particular Article 14(5)-(7) FSR

Adopted Non-adopted Pending application

21

appropriate in light of the early enforcement experience. It then turns to the application of

the FSR through its main enforcement tools, namely ex officio investigations and

notification-based review of concentrations and public procurement procedures. The

analysis distinguishes between feedback received from stakeholders and the Commission

services’ assessment in line with the sources of information identified in Section 4.

Before addressing each subsection, the following considerations should be made:

First, the FSR is still in the very early stages of its enforcement. This has resulted in a

necessary learning period for both the Commission and the undertakings involved in

procedures under the FSR, as well as the contracting authorities, with notable differences

between early cases and more recent ones, and with a clear tendency towards quicker and

more efficient processes in most recent cases.

Second, it is important to highlight that the Stakeholders’ Consultations and the

conclusions that can be drawn from them predate several significant developments in the

enforcement of the FSR, namely the adoption of the final decisions in concentration case

FS.100156 ADNOC/Covestro and in public procurement case FSP.103117 – Design and

construction, acquisition of vehicles and maintenance services of the Violet Line of the

Lisbon Metro in Portugal, the adoption of the decisions to open ex officio in-depth

investigation in cases FS.100068 Nuctech and FS.100143 Goldwind, the adoption of the

decision to open an in-depth investigation in concentration case FS.100253

JD.COM/CECONOMY as well as the adoption of the FSR Guidelines on 9 January 2026.

The findings from the stakeholder consultations therefore do not take into account the

additional clarifications and insights into the FSR enforcement brought by those

developments. This is the case in particular with respect to the FSR Guidelines, which

provide additional clarity and transparency into the approach taken by the Commission in

its assessment under the FSR.

Third, case practice has varied significantly depending on the enforcement procedure, with

a smaller number of cases reviewed under the ex officio procedure, followed by a moderate

number of cases reviewed under the notification procedure for concentrations, and a higher

number of submissions under the notification procedure for public procurement. Yet, in

many instances, the feedback received does not clearly distinguish between procedures,

which makes it more difficult to draw self-standing conclusions for each procedure (38).

5.2.1. Relevance, clarity and appropriateness of substantive provisions

5.2.1.1. Feedback from stakeholders

The stakeholder feedback presented in this Section is based on the results of the public

consultation conducted by the Commission in the context of the review of the Regulation

pursuant to Article 52 FSR (39) as well as on the Practitioners’ Survey and the targeted

consultations with selected stakeholders (together the ‘Stakeholders’ Consultations’).

Respondents to the Stakeholders’ Consultations broadly acknowledge the relevance and

necessity of the FSR. A large majority recognises that the FSR addresses a regulatory gap

that existed prior to its adoption and consider the objective of ensuring a level playing field

in the internal market undistorted by foreign subsidies to be legitimate and appropriate.

Concerns raised in the consultations focus primarily on the practical application of the

(38) This is the case in particular with regards to the two ex ante notification procedures

(39) The contributions to the call for evidence are available on the Commission Have your say portal,

along with the contributions to the public consultation and a factual summary of the replies (Have

your say portal).

22

rules and the administrative burden associated with enforcement, rather than on the

underlying policy choice to introduce the FSR.

Addressing Article 3 FSR, and the concepts of foreign subsidies and FFCs, respondents

to the Stakeholders’ Consultations generally acknowledge the need for a broad definition

of FFCs in order to ensure effective detection of potentially distortive support. However,

the feedback also indicates that the concept of FFCs, while understood as intentional,

generates some uncertainty when determining the scope of reportable contributions. The

most salient aspect identified was the broad scope of the definition, which encompasses a

wide range of measures, as emerged from the Practitioner’s Survey, where 72% of

respondents rated the broad scope of the definition as a significant challenge. This results

in a burden for companies which often have to collect information on FFCs across multiple

jurisdictions for the purposes of their reporting obligations under Chapters 3 and 4 FSR,

as detailed Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 respectively.

Other concepts within Article 3 FSR were considered to be clearer, such as the definition

of a ‘third country’. In addition, most legal practitioners who participated in the survey

indicated that the definitions of benefit and specificity raised some difficulties when they

had to be applied for particular cases.

As regards the assessment of distortion under Article 4 FSR, respondents to the public

consultation express mixed views. While 10 stakeholders out of the 54 submissions

consider the provision sufficiently clear, 28 stakeholders report difficulties in predicting

how the concept of distortion will be applied in individual cases. The limited body of

Commission decisional practice at the time of the survey responses is cited by

3 stakeholders as a factor contributing to this uncertainty. In the Practitioners’ Survey,

respondents also identified the limited guidance on determining when a foreign subsidy is

distortive as a challenge. Respondents mention the lack of benchmarks or concrete

examples illustrating how the indicators under Article 4 FSR are used and how

improvements in an undertaking’s competitive position translate into a finding of distortion

in the internal market. According to the results of the Practitioners’ Survey, the guidance

on categories of non-distortive subsidies (Articles 4(3) and 4(4) FSR) was considered

sufficiently clear. In particular, guidance for subsidies unlikely to be distortive when the

subsidy does not exceed EUR 4 million over any consecutive period of three years, was

viewed positively.

Stakeholders generally view Article 5 FSR as a useful indicator of the Commission’s

priorities in enforcing the FSR, as it identifies categories of foreign subsidies that are more

likely to distort the internal market. However, around half of the respondents to the public

consultation raise concerns about the breadth of certain categories listed in Article 5 FSR

and the clarity of their scope. In particular, 18 respondents point to some uncertainty

surrounding the criterion of subsidies that ‘directly facilitate a concentration’ or enabling

the submission of ‘unduly advantageous tenders’. Similarly, in the Practitioners’ Survey,

views on the categories of likely distortive subsidies set out in Article 5 FSR were mixed.

Specific concerns were raised about the ‘unduly advantageous tender’ criterion in public

procurement, as well as the limited guidance in Article 5 FSR on how to apply the

‘enabling to submit’ criterion. Respondents with procurement experience reported

difficulties in assessing whether a tender is ‘advantageous’, determining when such an

advantage becomes ‘undue’, and substantiating these assessments with appropriate

evidence, including identifying factors that may justify the advantageous nature of a tender.

Assessing the impact of foreign subsidies on concentrations was rated a moderate

challenge by a majority of respondents with concentration experience, due to the need to

evaluate counterfactual scenarios.

23

As regards Article 6 FSR, stakeholders welcome the existence of the balancing test.

However, a large number of respondents consider that the practical relevance of the

balancing test remains limited at this stage. In the public consultation, 23 stakeholders out

of the 54 submissions report a lack of clarity about the types of positive effects that may

be taken into account, the evidentiary standards applicable, and the methodology of

weighing positive and negative effects. As a result, respondents indicate uncertainty as to

when and how the balancing test can be meaningfully invoked in practice. Similarly, the

Practitioners’ Survey identified concerns regarding the clarity and application of the

balancing test, despite most respondents having limited practical experience with it, as

their cases did not involve distortive subsidies.

Overall, the stakeholders’ feedback highlights areas in which legal predictability could be

improved, in particular as regards the practical application of certain substantive notions

and the application of the analytical framework in individual cases.

5.2.1.2. The Commission services’ assessment

With respect to the Stakeholders’ Consultation, stakeholders express their understanding

of the overall objective of the FSR and they acknowledge the relevance of the FSR.

Stakeholders’ feedback nonetheless highlights areas where legal predictability could be

improved, in particular as regards the practical application of certain substantive notions

and the application of the analytical framework in individual cases.

Indeed, some of the reported uncertainties are expected to diminish as decisional practice

and potential related jurisprudence develops, and stakeholders gain more experience with

the application of the Regulation. In a similar vein, the efforts undertaken to publish

information in a timely manner on cases, including non-confidential versions of the

Commission’s final decisions, also contribute to a better understanding on how the

substantive notions have been applied in practice in specific cases. In parallel, further

clarification through guidance (notably via the published Q&As) and consistent

administrative practice contribute to a better stakeholder understanding of the key

concepts. The Commission services also frequently appear in conferences and engage with

legal practitioners on various FSR-related issues, bringing further clarity on the

Commission’s practice.

Based on the obtained feedback, the Report already identifies certain areas for

consideration, which could be streamlined and lead to lower the administrative burden on

businesses, while preserving the objectives of the Regulation. These issues are examined

further in Section 6 below, notably in relation to the functioning of the notification systems

for concentrations and public procurement procedures.

5.2.2. Ex officio investigations

5.2.2.1. Information on cases

The Commission continuously assesses whether there is sufficient evidence to merit the

launch of new ex officio investigations, based on its own analysis, information received

from stakeholders and investigations of market information, as applicable.

In two cases, the Commission has opened in-depth investigations.

During its in-depth investigations, the Commission assesses whether the preliminary

findings are confirmed. The opening of an in-depth investigation does not prejudge the

outcome of the investigation. In accordance with Article 11 FSR, at the end of its in-depth

investigation, the Commission may (i) accept commitments proposed by the undertaking

24

under investigation if they fully and effectively remedy the distortion, (ii) impose

redressive measures, or (iii) issue a no objection decision.

a. Case FS.100068 - NUCTECH

In the Nuctech case, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation on 11 December

2025 to assess the activities of Nuctech in the production and sale of threat detection

systems and the provision of related services within the EU (40).

The case was initiated in April 2024 by conducting on-site inspections in the EU premises

of Nuctech in Poland and the Netherlands following the adoption of a decision requiring

Nuctech to submit to inspections pursuant to Article 14(3) FSR (the ‘Inspection Decision’).

Following the assessment of the collected information during the preliminary review phase

of the investigation, the Commission found sufficient indications that Nuctech may have

been granted foreign subsidies from China supporting the EU activities of the company

(such as grants, loans, and tax measures) that could distort the EU internal market. As

regards distortion, the Commission also found indications that the possible foreign

subsidies may improve Nuctech’s competitive position in the internal market and may

negatively affect competition by allowing Nuctech to offer customers lower prices or better

commercial conditions than competitors.

b. Case FS. 100143 - GOLDWIND

In the Goldwind case, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation on 3 February

2026 to assess the activities of Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (‘Goldwind’) in

the production and sale of wind turbines and the provision of related services within the

EU (41). The case was initiated ex officio by the sending of requests for information in

April 2024.

The Commission found sufficient indications that foreign subsidies which may have been

granted by China in the form of grants, loans and tax measures could distort competition

in the internal market, by unduly supporting Goldwind, at the expense of its competitors.

In particular, the Commission found indications that foreign subsidies may enable

Goldwind to offer lower prices than its competitors, thereby winning more wind project

tenders in the EU than it would have done in the absence of those foreign subsidies.

5.2.2.2. Review by the EU Courts

In the context of ex officio investigations, some investigative acts of the Commission have

been subject to review by the Union Courts:

a) Case T-284/24 – Nuctech – in May 2024, Nuctech brought an action for annulment

before the General Court challenging the Commission’s Inspection Decision (42).

At the same time, Nuctech also applied for interim measures, seeking suspension

of the Commission’s Inspection Decision pending the outcome of the main

proceedings (43). In August 2024, the President of the General Court rejected the

application for interim measures (44), consequently confirmed on appeal by the

(40) Summary Notice concerning the initiation of an in-depth investigation in case FS.100068 –

NUCTECH pursuant to Article 10(3)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560, OJEU C/2026/545.

(41) Summary Notice concerning the initiation of an in-depth investigation in case FS.100143 –

Goldwind, pursuant to Article 10(3)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560, OJEU C/2026/1120.

(42) Case T-284/24, Nuctech Warsaw and Nuctech Netherlands v Commission, OJ C, C/2024/4107.

(43) Case T-284/24 R, Nuctech Warsaw Company Limited Sp. z o.o. and Nuctech Netherlands BV v

Commission, EU:T:2024:564.

(44) Case T-284/24 R, Order of the President of the General Court of 12 August 2024, OJ C,

C/2024/5824.

25

Vice-President of the Court of Justice in March 2025 (45). At time of publication of

this Report, the proceedings related to the action for annulment of the Inspection

Decision remain pending before the General Court.

b) Case T-335/26 – Goldwind – in May 2026, Goldwind brought an action for

annulment before the General Court challenging the Commission’s request for

information (46) and requested interim measures for its suspension (47). The request

for information was sent as part of the in-depth investigation into Goldwind’s

activities in the EU wind sector in Case FS.100143. At time of publication, the

proceedings related to both applications remain pending before the General Court.

5.2.2.3. Feedback from stakeholders

Stakeholders generally recognise the ex-officio investigation mechanism as a central

element to ensuring a level playing field in the internal market as it is reported by 25

stakeholders out of the 54 submissions in the public consultation. Respondents to the

Stakeholders’ Consultations widely acknowledge that the ability for the Commission to act

on its own initiative is necessary to address potentially distortive foreign subsidies. At the

same time, respondents to the public consultation note that there remain some uncertainties

in relation to the duration of investigations. In addition, several respondents flag the lack

of transparency and guidance for circumstances in which ex officio investigations are

initiated and how prioritisation decisions are taken.

5.2.2.4. The Commission services’ assessment

Based on the Commission practice to date and the feedback in the Stakeholders’

Consultations, the Commission services consider that the ex-officio investigation

mechanism functions as intended and that the relevant provisions of the FSR provide an

effective framework to pursue the Regulation’s objective of ensuring a level playing field

in the internal market. In particular, the ex officio review powers enable the Commission

to address potentially distortive foreign subsidies in any economic activity.

Some of the early stakeholders’ feedback indicates a possible lack of predictability on the

duration of ex officio investigations which may create uncertainty for businesses.

However, experience shows that the duration of these proceedings is often also impacted

by the level of cooperation of the undertaking under investigation and the provision of

relevant information to the Commission for assessment as well as actions brought before

the EU Courts. Furthermore, it is noted that in current investigations, the 18-months periods

referenced in Article 11(5) FSR have not expired.

In accordance with Article 10(3) FSR, the opening decisions in these cases have been

accompanied by summary notices published in the Official Journal of the EU, which

provide a short overview of the Commission’s preliminary assessment of the presence of

distortive foreign subsidies in those cases which servers to raise awareness and to invite

comments from any other interested party.

(45) Case C-720/24 P(R), Order of the Vice-President of the Court of 21 March 2025,

ECLI:EU:C:2025:205.

(46) Case T-335/26, Goldwind Science & Technology v Commission, main proceedings, application

lodged on 29 May 2026.

(47) Case T-335/26 R, Goldwind Science & Technology v Commission, application for interim relief,

lodged on 29 May 2026.

26

Similarly to notified cases, a timely publication of the outcome of in-depth investigations

in ex officio cases will be ensured, once the assessment has been finalised and a final

decision has been adopted.

All of these efforts provide further clarity and transparency of the Commission's

enforcement practice with respect to the use of its ex officio powers.

5.2.3. Notification of concentrations

5.2.3.1. Information on cases

From the start of the notification obligation until 31 May 2026, the Commission has

received 272 formal notifications under the concentration notification procedure, as

follows:

• 11 were notified in 2023 (from October 2023 until end of 2023);

• 102 were notified in 2024;

• 99 were notified in 2025;

• 60 were notified between 1 January and 31 May 2026.

Of all the above cases, 247 were closed after the assessment in the preliminary review did

not result in sufficient indications about the presence of distortive foreign subsidies. Four

cases were withdrawn during the preliminary review phase, and for 18 cases the

preliminary review was still ongoing.

In three cases, the Commission initiated in-depth-investigations.

Until the same date, the Commission has not made use of its power to request the prior

notification of any concentrations in accordance with Article 21(5) FSR.

a. Case FS.100011 - EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP / PPF

TELECOM GROUP

The Emirates Telecommunications Group Company PJSC (‘e&’) / PPF Telecom Group

B.V transaction was conditionally approved on 24 September 2024. It concerned the

acquisition by e&, the incumbent national telecommunications operator in the United Arab

Emirates (‘UAE’), of PPF’s telecommunication operations in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia

and Serbia.

The Commission found evidence of the presence of foreign subsidies in the form of an

unlimited guarantee, grants and loans. The Commission did not find a distortion in the

acquisition process but found distortions in the activities of the merged entity post-

transaction (in the form of possibly distorted investments).

In order to address the distortion detected, the Commission accepted commitments

proposed by the notifying parties, which involved (i) ensuring that e&’s Articles of

Association do not deviate from ordinary UAE bankruptcy law, thereby removing the

unlimited State guarantee, and (ii) hold-separate obligations between e& and the target's

activities in the EU internal market.

The final non-confidential version of the decision with commitments is published on DG

COMP website (48).

(48) Commission decision of 24.9.2024 finding that, with the binding commitments, the foreign

subsidies in the concentration do not distort the internal market (Case FS.100011 – e&/PPF Telecom

Group), C(2024) 6745 final.

27

b. Case FS.100156 - ADNOC / COVESTRO

The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (‘ADNOC’) / Covestro transaction was

conditionally approved on 14 November 2025. It concerned the acquisition by ADNOC, a

state-owned oil and gas producer and the national oil company of Abu Dhabi, of Covestro

AG, a chemicals producer established in Germany.

The Commission found evidence of the presence of foreign subsidies granted by the UAE

to both the acquirer and the target, including an unlimited guarantee to ADNOC, and a

capital increase to Covestro. This was found to lead to distortion both in the acquisition

process and in the activities of the merged entity post-acquisition.

In order to address the distortions detected, the Commission accepted commitments

proposed by the notifying party, which involved (i) a change of Articles of Association for

ADNOC so that they do not deviate from ordinary UAE bankruptcy law, thereby removing

the unlimited State guarantee, and (ii) the obligation to licence certain of Covestro’s

patents with market participants.

A provisional non-confidential version of the decision with commitments is published on

DG COMP website (49).

c. Case FS.100253 – JD.COM / CECONOMY

This case involves the acquisition of CECONOMY AG, a German retailer specialised in

the field of consumer electronics and home appliances, by JD.com, a company that belongs

to a China-based group operating a retail business and an online e-commerce marketplace

in China.

On 28 May 2026, the Commission opened in-depth investigation into the transaction. In

the preliminary review phase, the Commission found indications of foreign subsidies

distorting the EU internal market. These include preferential financing, tax incentives and

grants provided by entities whose actions are possibly attributable to the People’s Republic

of China.

At time of publication, the in-depth investigation was ongoing. In accordance with

Article 25(3) FSR, at the end of its in-depth investigation of a concentration case, the

Commission may (i) accept commitments proposed by the undertaking under investigation

if they fully and effectively remedy the distortion, (ii) prohibit the concentration, or

(iii) issue a no objection decision.

5.2.3.2. Detailed analysis of Commission practice

This section presents statistical data compiled as part of the internal data analysis for the

purposes of the Report. The data analysed for concentration cases was focussed on cases

notified between October 2023 and January 2026 ( 50 ) and summarises data on

(i) characteristics of the notifying parties; (ii) the amount and type of reported FFCs;

(iii) the economic activities of the parties to the concentration (identified by NACE codes);

(iv) the reported EU turnover of the target; (v) consideration paid for the transaction; and

(vi) experience with pre-notification discussions.

(49) Provisional non-confidential version of Commission decision of 14.11.2025 on finding that, with

the binding commitments the foreign subsidies in the concentration do not distort the internal market

(Case FS.100156 – ADNOC/COVESTRO), C(2025) 7800 final/2.

(50) With a particular focus on cases closed after the preliminary review phase. The period for this more

detailed part of the analysis of the Commission’s practice is the same for any conclusions reached

in the present Section.

28

Some statistical data derived from the FSR Review Study was also included in the

analysis (51). These statistics are presented in comparison with the internal statistics of the

Commission. In instances where statistical data is available only from the FSR Review

Study and not from the Commission’s internal data analysis, such data is presented as novel

evidence contributing to the overall assessment (52).

a. Characteristics of notifying parties

The internal analysis of cases shows that 32% of all notified cases, which were closed after

the preliminary review phase of investigation, involved an investment fund / private equity

fund as an acquirer. This figure is overall consistent with the findings of the FSR Review

Study, where the corresponding proportion was higher at 43%. This difference can be

explained by the use of different samples underlying the respective analyses (53).

In addition, Table 1 below provides information on the distribution of cases, based on the

reported country of incorporation of the parties involved in the transactions:

Table 1: Cross border element (in % of all preliminary review concentration cases)

Cross-border nature of concentration % of all

preliminary

review

concentrations

Intra-EU concentrations (cross-border) 19%

Intra-EU concentrations (same Member State) 20%

EU - non EU concentrations 39%

non EU - non EU concentrations (different non-EU country) 12%

non EU - non EU concentrations (same non-EU country) 10%

Source: Commission services.

The data presented in Table 1 are closely aligned with the data presented in the FSR

Review Study (54).

b. Amount and type of reported FFCs

With regards the amount and type of reported FFCs, the internal analysis of case data

showed the following distribution of FFCs that do not fall under Article 5 FSR:

(51) The analysis carried out in the FSR Review Study is based on a sample of cases selected to be

representative, as explained in Section 4.2 of the FSR Review Study.

(52) This is the case specifically in the following sections: point e ‘Concentration types’ and point i

‘Duration of pre-notification discussions’.

(53) Please see Section 4.2, page 121 of the FSR Review Study (Annex X).

(54) Please see Section 4.2, Table 66 of the FSR Review Study (Annex X).

29

Table 2: Concentrations classified according to the size of reported FFCs that do not

fall under Article 5 FSR

Concentrations classified to ranges of

FFCS that are not Article 5

% of all

preliminary

review

concentrations

EUR > 1000 million 49%

EUR 500-1000 EUR million 10%

EUR 100-500 EUR million 15%

EUR 45-100 EUR million 6%

Cases with no reported FFCs 20%

Source: Commission services.

As can be seen from Table 2, under the reporting obligations in Form FS-CO, in 20% of

cases closed after a preliminary review phase, notifying parties did not report any such

FFCs, even if they reached the required FFC threshold of EUR 50 million included in

Article 20(3)(b) FSR, which had triggered their notification obligation. Such cases arose

predominantly in situations where the FFCs granted were in the form of one of the

categories of FFCs which are benefited from an exception from the reporting obligation,

most often in the form of provision or purchase of goods or services (except financial

services) at market terms in the ordinary course of business. Those cases were found to not

raise concerns under the FSR and only necessitated limited confirmation of information

during pre-notification discussions with notifying parties.

In addition, in 6% of cases closed after the preliminary review, the total amount of reported

FFCs that do not fall under Article 5 FSR in the Form FS-CO did not exceed

EUR 100 million. Those cases were also generally found to not raise concerns and were

subject to streamlined pre-notification discussions.

Figure 2 provides an overview of the types of reported FFCs that do not fall under Article 5

FSR (55). Among those types of FFCs, the most recurrent reported FFCs included tax

advantages (32%), followed by capital commitments (18%) and credit facilities (15%). For

completeness, information about cases where no FFCs were reported has also been

included.

(55) The analysed information on reported FFCs has been provisionally compiled in five broad

categories (capital commitments, tax advantages, credit facilities, licence payments and R&D

funding) to enable a streamlined presentation. This categorisation does not directly reflect all types

of FFCs as self-assessed and reported by notifying parties.

30

Figure 2

(56)

Source: Commission services.

c. Type of reported FFCs in investment funds/ private equity cases

Within the subset of cases with investment fund / private equity acquirer, the most common

type of FFCs reported were contributions by Limited Partners (57) (‘LP contributions’),

attributable to third countries. Such LP contributions were found to be provided on similar

terms and to confer similar rights to those associated with LP contributions by partners

non-attributable to third countries. This type of FFCs was found to not give rise to

distortive foreign subsidies in the assessed cases. In some cases, there were also reported

FFCs to the portfolio controlled by the same fund. In general, the assessment showed that

there were limited possibilities for cross-subsidisation of the transaction (both at

acquisition level and activity post-transaction). As a result, cases with investment fund /

private equity acquirers with reported FFCs limited to the above two categories were found

to not raise concerns under the FSR and only necessitated confirmation of some facts

during the pre-notification discussions with notifying parties.

The FSR Review Study found that, among the cases analysed in which the acquirer was a

fund, 69% involved potentially Article 5 FSR foreign subsidies – those most likely to

distort the internal market. All of them, fell under Article 5(1)(d) FSR - namely, those that

could directly facilitate the transaction and arose from capital commitments made by

(56) Data from cases after mid 2025.

(57) While there is no legal definition of the term ‘Limited Partners’ in the FSR legal framework, this

term is understood to mean passive investors who contribute capital to a partnership (fund) but are

strictly prohibited from participating in the management of the fund, lest they forfeit their limited

liability status. If justified, the Commission may request more information from the notifying party

as to whether LPs can influence the fund’s broader mandate through the Limited Partnership

Agreement or have negotiated excusal rights via side letters to avoid specific sectors.

No FFCs reported

18%

Capital commitment

17%

Tax advantage

32%

Credit facilities

15%

Licence payments

6%

R&D funding

12%

Distribution of cases per Type of FFC

31

Limited Partners investing in the fund, which were potentially attributable to foreign

countries, in particular, sovereign wealth funds or pension funds. In two cases,

Article 5(1)(d) FFCs also took the form of loans granted to the acquiring fund for the

purpose of financing the transaction. In the remaining 31% of cases, no Article 5 FFCs

were reported.

However, across all cases in which the FFCs consisted of capital contributions, these

investments were deemed to be made on ‘pari passu’ terms, equivalent to those of private

investors. Therefore, no benefit was conferred so the FFC did not constitute a foreign

subsidy (58).

d. Economic activities of the target in the concentration

The analysis of the economic activities of the parties to the concentration (based on

identified NACE codes) of notified cases is presented in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Economic activities of target in the concentration (59)

Source: Commission services.

It follows that around 28% of cases concern manufacturing activities, followed by 19% of

wholesale and retail activities and 13% of financial and insurance activities.

e. Concentration types

The FSR Review Study performed an analysis of the types of concentration among the

notified cases. The most common type was the acquisition of sole control over an entire

company, accounting for 41% of cases. This was followed by acquisitions of joint control,

which represented 14% of cases and mergers which represented 1% of cases (60).

(58) For more information, please see Section 4.7.1 of the FSR Review Study (Annex X).

(59) The data are largely consistent with those presented in the FSR Review Study. Any slight

differences are explained by differences in the samples on which the respective analyses are based.

See Section 4.2, Table 64, of the FSR Review Study (Annex X).

(60) See Section 4.2, Table 65, of the FSR Review Study (Annex X).

1%

1%

28%

8%

1%

4%

19%

7%

2%

3%

3%

13%

3%

2%

3%

2%

1%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

A - AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING

B - MINING AND QUARRYING

C - MANUFACTURING

D - ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR…

E - WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE…

F - CONSTRUCTION

G - WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE

H - TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE

I - ACCOMMODATION AND FOOD SERVICE…

J - PUBLISHING, BROADCASTING, AND…

K - TELECOMMUNICATION, COMPUTER…

L - FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE ACTIVITIES

M - REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES

N - PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND…

O - ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT…

R - HUMAN HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK…

S - ARTS, SPORTS AND RECREATION

Nace Code Total %

32

Table 3: Concentration Type

Count of Concentration Type (%)

Acquisition of joint control of part of a company 1%

Acquisition of joint control of the whole company 11%

Acquisition of joint control through a joint venture 2%

Acquisition of sole control of part of a company 7%

Acquisition of sole control of previously reduced or enlarged companies 1%

Acquisition of sole control of the whole company 41%

Acquisition of sole control through a subsidiary of a group 3%

Merger 1%

N\A 32%

Total 100%

Source: Commission services.

f. Reported EU turnover of the target

The internal analysis of cases shows that the median of the reported EU turnover of the

target across all cases closed after preliminary review was around EUR 1 billion (i.e., for

50% of those cases the target had a turnover of around EUR 1 billion or less).

The distribution of turnover across all cases closed after preliminary review is represented

in Figure 4 below.

33

Figure 4: Distribution of target turnover across all concentration cases closed after

preliminary review

Source: Commission services.

In addition, internal analysis of the same data indicated that 15% of notified cases involved

a transaction where the reported EU turnover of the target fell between EUR 500 million

and EUR 600 million. There has not been any observed pattern of concentration of certain

types of cases (in terms of economic activities) in the lower turnover segment of cases.

Cases involving economic activities in general have been equally distributed regardless of

the turnover of the target.

In particular, Figure 5 below presents the ratio of cases with turnover between

EUR 500 million and EUR 600 million across all economic activities. As noted above, the

results are broadly comparable to the whole sample.

Similarly, the FSR Review Study showed that, if the threshold were at EUR 600 million,

a reduction of 16% in cases notified to the Commission would have occurred (61).

The analysis on presence of specific patterns was performed also taking in account of

several acts of EU secondary law (62), to verify any patterns in the presence of the specific

activities identified in those legislative acts and the reported turnover of the target in

notified concentration cases under the FSR. For each legislation assessed, the distribution

of cases with such activities, which concerned a target with reported EU turnover below

EUR 600 million, does not differ materially from the overall distribution of cases in these

(61) See Section 4.4 of the FSR Review Study (Annex X).

(62) The assessment included comparison with the sectors identified as priority sectors in line with the

broader policy objectives of the Union in Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament

and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable

investment, proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the

screening of foreign investments in the Union and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the

European Parliament and of the Council; and Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European

Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for

strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem

34

activities across all notified cases. It therefore seems that an increase of the turnover

threshold would not limit in a disproportionate way the Commission’s ability to detect and,

if necessary, address distortive foreign subsidies with respect to these economic activities.

Figure 5: Economic activities of target in the concentration, for cases where the

Turnover of the target was below EUR 600 million

Source: Commission services.

g. Consideration paid for the concentration

The internal analysis of cases shows that the median of the consideration paid over all

analysed cases was around EUR 900 million (i.e., 50% of those cases the total

consideration paid was EUR 900 million or less). This distribution of reported

consideration is presented in Figure 6 (63):

(63) This includes cases closed after the preliminary review phase, cases in which a decision to open in-

depth investigation was adopted, as well as cases withdrawn after notification. Several cases were

excluded, where the reported consideration did not have a cash equivalent.

2%

0%

24%

7%

0%

2%

20%

17%

0%

2%

5%

12%

2%

2%

0%

2%

0%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

A - AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING

B - MINING AND QUARRYING

C - MANUFACTURING

D - ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR…

E - WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE…

F - CONSTRUCTION

G - WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE

H - TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE

I - ACCOMMODATION AND FOOD SERVICE…

J - PUBLISHING, BROADCASTING, AND…

K - TELECOMMUNICATION, COMPUTER…

L - FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE ACTIVITIES

M - REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES

N - PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND…

O - ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT…

R - HUMAN HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK…

S - ARTS, SPORTS AND RECREATION

TOTAL of <600 per NACE CODE %

35

Figure 6: Consideration paid for the concentration

Source: Commission services.

h. Experience with pre-notification discussions (waivers and duration)

The FSR Review Study analysed the duration of pre-notification discussions (64).

Since the mandatory standstill period in the preliminary review phase always lasts 25

working days in cases where the Commission does not initiate an in-depth investigation,

only the number of days between the submission of the first draft notification form and the

filing of the complete notification is variable and can be affected by the notifying parties

and / or the Commission.

The median number of working days in this pre-notification phase fell from 36 working

days for cases notified between September 2023 and March 2024 to 24 working days for

cases notified between October 2024 and April 2025, a notable reduction of around 33%.

This suggests that the Commission services, the notifying parties, or both have become

more familiar and efficient with the (pre-) notification process and analysis.

(64) See Section 4.3 of the FSR Review Study (Annex X).

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

0 50 100 150 200 250

C o

n si

d er

at io

n (

E U

R M

)

Cases

Consideration (EUR M)

Consideration (EUR M)

36

Table 4: Average number of working days from draft notification to legal deadline

(by period)

Draft

notification

period

Number of

cases

notified

Average

working days

from draft

notification to

end of

standstill

period

Median

working days

from draft

notification to

end of

standstill

period

Median

working days

from draft

notification to

receipt of

complete

notification

September 2023

- March 2024

36 67 61 36

April 2024 -

September 2024

29 64 58 33

October 2024 -

April 2025

25 60 49 24

Total reduction 10% 20% 33%

Source: FSR Review Study.

In 79 cases the parties made a waiver request, which represents around 39% of all

cases (65). Figure 7 provides information on broad types of waivers requested during pre-

notification discussions.

Figure 7: Types of waivers requested during pre-notification discussions

Source: Commission services.

Figure 7 shows that the most common type of waiver requested was on the disclosure of

FFCs considered not necessary for the Commission’s analysis (27.9%), followed by

information not being readily available (21.3%) and no link to the transaction, and sensitive

information/confidentiality waiver (each accounting for 9.8%).

(65) Assessed on a sample of 201 cases.

37

5.2.3.3. Feedback from stakeholders

Stakeholders generally recognise the added value of the notification system for

concentrations in enabling the Commission to address potentially distortive foreign

subsidies in the context of concentrations. At the same time, respondents emphasise that

the current notification reporting generates administrative burden for economic operators

that is partly perceived as disproportionate to the risk of distortion identified in the internal

market at the time of the survey responses.

a) Positive aspects identified by stakeholders

In the context of the Practitioners’ Survey, a broad range of stakeholders express positive

views on the functioning of the notification procedure in practice, in particular as regards

the conduct of pre-notification contacts, with 46% of the 37 respondents finding pre-

notification contacts helpful compared to 24% that found them unhelpful. Stakeholders

consistently highlight the accessibility and responsiveness of Commission case teams, as

well as the usefulness of pre-notification discussions in clarifying the scope of reportable

FFCs and the level of detail expected in the notification. Respondents also approved that

the statutory deadline of 25 working days for the preliminary review phase which allows

a degree of predictability once a complete notification has been submitted. Overall,

communication with the Commission services was viewed positively in engagement with

the Commission case teams and the Commission’s responsiveness. Feedback on the clarity

of the Commission services’ guidance during the notification process was also positive.

Regarding the notification thresholds, the notification threshold based on EU turnover,

prescribed by Article 20(3)(a) FSR, was largely viewed positively (66). An overwhelming

majority (95% out of the 37 respondents to the Practitioners’ Survey) found it clear and

easy to apply, and 47% of the respondents viewed turnover as an appropriate proxy for

prioritising cases, suggesting the threshold is a relevant.

b) Challenges raised by stakeholders

A significant number of respondents to the Stakeholders’ Consultations identify challenges

associated with the notification obligation for concentrations. A recurrent concern relates

to the identification, collection and reporting of FFCs. More concretely, half of the

respondents to the public consultation, primarily businesses and business associations,

consider that the reporting of foreign financial contributions is too broad. Respondents

report that the breadth of the concept and reporting obligation for FFCs often require

internal data-gathering exercises across multiple entities, jurisdictions and time periods.

The feedback received indicates that the scope of the reporting obligation is perceived as

cumbersome because the concept of FFCs used in Article 3 FSR is based on an open-ended

list, with a few exhaustive reporting exceptions. The feedback highlights in particular the

difficulties with the FFCs in the form of contracts for the provision of goods or services or

purchase of goods or services. Currently, an exception from the reporting obligation for

such FFCs applies to provisions or purchases made at market terms on the ordinary course

of business, except for financial services. Respondents point out that in order to benefit

from this exception, they still need to collect information to assess whether they are

conducted on market terms.

Stakeholders also raise concerns about the scope and level of detail required by the

Commission case teams in response to the first submitted notification forms and additional

(66) Pursuant to Article 20(3) FSR, a concentration is notifiable when two thresholds are met. The first

is the turnover threshold, which is satisfied where at least one of the merging undertakings, the

acquired undertaking, or the joint venture is established in the Union and generates an aggregate

turnover in the Union of at least EUR 500 million. The second threshold concerns FFC of more than

EUR 50 million received by the parties.

38

requests for information during the Commission review. Finally, 24 respondents out of 54

in the public consultation note that the concentrations subject to notification under the FSR

are often also reviewed under other EU or national instruments, in particular the EUMR

and national FDI screening mechanisms. While stakeholders acknowledge the distinct

objectives of these frameworks, they underline the cumulative administrative burden

associated with parallel procedures and information requests.

In the Practitioners’ Survey, respondents indicated that the notification process imposes a

not insignificant burden in terms of time and resources. As a result, companies, in the vast

majority of cases, engage external legal counsel to prepare their notifications. The most

challenging aspect identified relates to the FFC threshold both for notification and

reporting purposes. A majority of respondents noted that increasing these thresholds would

reduce the administrative burden. As regards the value of the turnover threshold, 44% of

the 37 respondents to the Practitioners’ Survey considered that raising the turnover

threshold would significantly decrease the overall level of burden in the notifications of

concentration, compared to 31% of the respondents who disagreed with such statement. In

a similar manner, a majority of respondents (62%) stated that raising the FFC thresholds

would significantly reduce the overall burden created. In particular, with respect to the

reporting thresholds set out in the FSIR – EUR 45 million per third country and

EUR 1 million per individual FFC – most respondents considered both thresholds to be too

low, with particular concern expressed about the EUR 1 million threshold.

5.2.3.4. The FSR Review Study

This section presents the conclusions of the FSR Review Study based on the analysis of

case practice, following the methodology described in Section 4.2.1 above.

Overall, the analysis indicates that the FSR is functioning effectively. The study concludes

that the Commission consistently meets procedural deadlines and has improved efficiency

over time. The notification thresholds (EUR 500 million turnover and EUR 50 million in

FFCs) appear to appropriately capture transactions with the highest risk of distortion.

At the same time, the FSR Review Study identifies areas for improvement. A significant

number of cases raising no concerns, closed after preliminary review, particularly

involving investment fund acquirers, continue to be notified. It should be pointed out that

the feedback received in the FSR Review Study does not include the recent guidance

(notably Question 26 of the DG COMP Q&A), which has alleviated this burden. In this

regard, the FSR Review Study concludes that further refinements may be beneficial, such

as extending the list of exempted FFCs to include FFCs in the form of LP contributions

and FFCs to portfolio companies that cannot cross-subsidise the acquiring funds.

In addition, the FSR Review Study notes that some uncertainty remains over the treatment

of specific types of FFCs, such as tax measures, where further clarification would be

useful.

In conclusion, the FSR Review Study found that the FSR was broadly achieving its

objectives by targeting distortive subsidies without imposing disproportionate burdens on

undertakings. Nonetheless, targeted adjustments considering the points outlined in this

section could enhance its effectiveness and reduce administrative burden for both

companies and the Commission.

5.2.3.5. The Commission services’ assessment

Early enforcement experience under the concentration notification procedure provides a

solid basis for assessing the functioning of FSR as a new enforcement instrument. While

the number of notified cases has been higher than initially anticipated in the Impact

39

Assessment which accompanied the proposal for the Regulation (67), this experience has

offered valuable insight into both the strengths of the framework and areas where further

calibration may be warranted. In particular, experience to date indicates that, the

Commission closed around 97% of notified concentrations after preliminary review,

without opening an in-depth investigation (68). This proportion does not differ significantly

from the proportion of compatible cases reviewed in Phase I under the EUMR (69). In this

regard, part of the perceived administrative burden reflected in the Stakeholders’

Consultations also reflects the learning curve associated with a new regulatory framework,

both for notifying parties and for the Commission.

Key elements of the notification framework for concentrations are considered to function

effectively. In particular, the turnover threshold for notified concentrations is generally

perceived as an appropriate proxy for the system to capture transactions with a meaningful

economic nexus to the EU. In addition, it should also be noted that under Chapter 3 FSR,

in cases, which result in the creation of joint ventures, the turnover threshold is calculated

with reference to the joint venture itself, and not to the undertakings creating the joint

venture. This limits the obligation to notify only to cases where the joint venture itself has

realised a significant EU turnover, in contrast to the practice under the EUMR, which

contributes, among others, to a lower number of notifications under the FSR compared to

the EUMR. For any case below the threshold, the Commission may still use its powers to

request prior notification in accordance with Article 21(5) FSR, which provides further

reassurance that potential distortive foreign subsidies may be caught by the enforcement

efforts of the Commission.

The high number of FSR notifications confirm the relevance of the Regulation and its

stated objective of addressing distortions in the internal market caused by foreign

subsidies. In particular, the volume of notifications indicates that a significant number of

transactions in the internal market involve parties that have received a significant number

of FFCs, which could constitute potentially distortive foreign subsidies demonstrating the

practical importance of the FSR as a framework to assess whether such contributions may

give rise to distortive effects. That said, the feedback received from stakeholders also

highlights the need for the Commission to continue to carefully observe its practice and to

identify ways to simplify the compliance process for businesses, while not undermining

the effectiveness of the FSR. Early enforcement experience also confirms the importance

of pre-notification contacts, which are widely used and broadly supported by notifying

parties. The swiftness and accessibility of communication with Commission case teams

during the pre-notification phase facilitate early clarification of reporting obligations and

contribute to more efficient handling of cases.

A progressive reduction was observed in the overall length of the review process, as

experience with the FSR system increases. In addition, the statutory 25 working day

deadline for preliminary review phase provides procedural predictability once a complete

notification has been submitted. The availability of exceptions and the granting of waivers

for certain information is generally viewed favourably and has proven useful in reducing

(67) The estimated number of concentrations was set at 30-40 per year, whereas in reality, the

Commission has received around 100 formal notification per year during the first three years since

the start of the notification obligation in October 2023.

(68) The number includes cases closed after preliminary review and cases withdrawn during the

preliminary review phase.

(69) The proportion of cases found compatible in accordance with Article 6(1)(b) EUMR in the first

phase of the mergers investigation in the last five years ranges between 93% to 99% on an annual

basis according to official statistics published on the Commission’s website.

40

reporting obligations. However, experience suggests that further clarification on the scope

and application of exceptions may enhance their effectiveness.

At the same time, early enforcement experience highlights a few challenges that contribute

to the administrative burden for notifying parties. Two main areas can be identified.

First, the identification, collection and reporting of FFCs is perceived as resource intensive.

The breadth of the concept of FFC, combined with the volume of information required,

necessitate internal data gathering exercises. Related to that, the scope and level of detail

of information required by notification forms and subsequent information requests can

place a not insignificant burden on notifying parties.

Second, uncertainty linked to the possibility of call-in below notification thresholds is said

to affect transaction planning and risk assessment. While call-in powers are an important

safeguard, their breadth is claimed to have a deterrent effect in certain situations, which

underscore the importance of transparency and predictability in the criteria used for their

application.

With respect to the last point, it should be recalled that the recently adopted FSR Guidelines

provide additional clarity and transparency about the legal requirements and considerations

taken by the Commission when assessing whether to request prior notification. In addition,

the future exercise of the call-in powers in specific cases will also provide more clarity and

reduce legal uncertainty with respect to those powers.

With respect to the FFC reporting thresholds set out in the FSIR, the two-limbed approach

to reporting should be preserved, as it appropriately distinguishes between the more

detailed information required for FFCs that may fall under Article 5 FSR and the more

aggregate reporting of other FFCs. However, the experience gathered so far suggests that

the current reporting thresholds – EUR 1 million per individual FFC and EUR 45 million

per third country – might capture a significant volume of information that, in most cases,

has not proven particularly relevant to identifying a risk of distortion.

5.2.4. Submissions in public procurement procedures

Between 13 October 2023, when Article 29 FSR started to apply, and 31 May 2026, in the

public procurement module of the FSR, the Commission received 5 150 submissions from

economic operators. These submissions originated from 863 public procurement

procedures, representing a total value of over EUR 712 billion.

The submissions received by the Commission can be broken down to:

• 4 293 declarations (83.4% of the cases),

• 733 notifications (14.2% of the cases), and

• 124 pre-notifications (2.4% of the cases).

5.2.4.1. Information on cases

Out of the 5 150 submissions received, the Commission initiated and subsequently closed

four in-depth-investigations – three of them were closed following the withdrawal of the

economic operators from the public procurement procedure and in one case the

Commission took a final decision.

41

During that period, the Commission had, for the first time, exercised its power to request

the prior notification of FFC in a public procurement procedure pursuant to

Article 29(8) FSR.

a) Case FSP.100147 – Supply of railway rolling stock in Bulgaria

The Commission opened an in-depth investigation on 16 February 2024 to assess

potentially distortive subsidies in an open public procurement procedure for the project

related to the provision of several electric ‘push-pull’ trains as well as related maintenance

and staff training services launched by the Ministry of Transport and Communications of

Bulgaria.

The in-depth investigation was initiated following a preliminary review in which the

Commission found sufficient indications that China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation

Qingdao Sifang Locomotive Co., Ltd., (‘CRRC Qingdao Sifang’) owned by CRRC

Corporation Limited (‘CRRC’), had received various foreign subsidies from the People’s

Republic of China (‘the PRC’). These subsidies took the form of public contracts

potentially awarded on non-market terms and of government grants.

On 26 March 2024, shortly after the opening of its in-depth investigation, the Commission

announced the closure of the case following the legally binding withdrawal of CRRC

Qingdao Sifang, from the public procurement. As a result, the Commission closed the case

without adopting a final decision pursuant to Article 31 FSR.

b) Cases FSP.100151 and FSP.100154 – Design, construction and operation of a

photovoltaic park in Romania

The Commission opened two in-depth investigations on 3 April 2025 to assess potentially

distortive subsidies in the open public procurement procedure for the design, construction

and operation of a photovoltaic park in Romania launched from Societatea Parc Fotovoltaic

Rovinari Est S.A.

During the preliminary review, the Commission found sufficient indications that two

economic operators were granted foreign subsidies by the PRC, in the form of provision

of government grants, tax measures, financing and in the form of public contracts awarded

potentially on non-market terms that distorted competition in the internal market.

Therefore, the Commission found indications that foreign subsidies may have enabled the

two economic operators, (i) Shanghai Electric UK Ltd. and Shanghai Electric Hong Kong

International Engineering Company, and (ii) ENEVO Group – LONGi Solar Technologie

Consortium to offer lower prices than their competitors, thereby enabling them to submit

a tender that was unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services

concerned.

On 7 June 2024, the Commission announced the closure of both in-depth investigations,

following the legally binding withdrawal of both economic operators from the public

procurement procedure. As a result, the Commission closed the case without adopting a

final decision pursuant to Article 31 FSR.

c) Case FSP.103117 – Design and construction, acquisition of vehicles and

maintenance services of the Violet Line of the Lisbon Metro in Portugal

The tender of the consortium led by Mota-Engil Engenharia e Construção, S.A. (‘Mota-

Engil’) was conditionally cleared on 21 April 2026. The procedure concerned the open

public procurement procedure for the ‘Design and construction, acquisition of vehicles,

and maintenance services for the Violet Line of the Lisbon Metro’, to be awarded by

Metropolitano de Lisboa, E.P.E. The tender submitted by Mota-Engil relied on a main

42

subcontractor for the supply of rolling stock and related services, i.e. Portugal CRRC, an

undertaking belonging to the CRRC group.

The Commission found evidence of the presence of foreign subsidies in the form of

government grants, tax measures and turnover from public contracts which exceeds the

turnover which would have been achieved in a competitive, transparent and non-

discriminatory procedure, which enabled Portugal CRRC to submit an advantageous offer

to the consortium led by Mota-Engil and subsequently, enabled the consortium to submit

an unduly advantageous tender, thus distorting competition in the public procurement

procedure.

In order to address the detected distortion, the Commission accepted commitments

proposed by Mota-Engil on behalf of the consortium, in which it committed to replace

Portugal CRRC by the Polish Pojazdy Szynowe PESA Bydgoszcz Spółka Akcyjna

('PESA') for the entire duration of the contract performance period.

At the time of publication, the final non-confidential version of the decision with

commitments was not yet available for publication.

d) Cases FSP.101606 and FSP.101626 – Decisions declaring a tender irregular –

Article 29(4) FSR

During the reference period, the Commission issued two decisions on incompleteness in

the context of public procurement procedures. Case FSP.101606 concerned an economic

operator that submitted an offer for the construction of a long-distance tunnel in a tender

in Poland. Case FSP.101626 concerned an economic operator that submitted an offer for

the supply of computers and workstations in a tender in France. In both cases, a decision

was issued declaring the submissions of the respective economic operators incomplete and

requiring them to submit a complete notification within 10 working days. As the

notifications in both cases were not completed within the deadline, in March 2025 the

Commission issued decisions declaring both tenders irregular. Ultimately, the contracting

authorities rejected the irregular tenders and both economic operators were excluded from

the public procurement procedures.

e) Case FSP.103175 – Request for prior notification – Article 29(8) FSR

During the reference period, the Commission requested one economic operator to submit

prior notification pursuant to Article 29(8) FSR. This request was issued in November

2025 and covered two public procurement procedures launched for the construction of

various sections of a motorway in Croatia. As the economic operator that was required to

submit a prior notification did not comply with the reporting obligation, the relevant

contracting authority issued a request to the economic operator concerned to submit a

missing notification pursuant to Article 29(3) FSR. Ultimately, the contracting authority

considered the tender inadmissible, inappropriate, and technically unacceptable, and

excluded the economic operator from the procedure.

5.2.4.2. Detailed analysis of the Commission’s practice

This section presents statistical data compiled as part of the Commission’s internal analysis

conducted for the purposes of the Report. The data analysed for public procurement cases

was focussed on cases notified between October 2023 and January 2026 ( 70 ) and

summarises the data collected in the sections below.

(70) With a particular focus on preliminary review cases, as there were only three in-depth investigation

cases, see above. The period for this more detailed part of the analysis of the Commission’s practice

will remain untouched.

43

Some statistical data derived from the FSR Review Study were included as well in the

analysis. These statistics are presented in comparison with the internal statistics developed

by the Commission. In instances where statistical data is available only from the FSR

Review Study and not from the Commission’s internal data analysis, such data is presented

as evidence contributing to the overall assessment.

5.2.4.2.1. Quantitative analysis of the Commission’s case practice

a) Submissions by sector

The Commission services identified the industrial sectors in which submissions were most

frequently received in large public procurement procedures. To determine the sector to

which a submission belongs, the Commission services use the main Common Procurement

Vocabulary (CPV) codes (71) indicated by the contracting authority (72) in the contract

notice published in Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) (73). As contracting authorities use

CPV codes with varying degrees of granularity, specific codes were grouped into their

broader parent categories for consistency. These are then classified under six main

categories: construction, energy, health, information and communication technology

(ICT), transport and other.

Figure 8: Submissions per sector in public procurement

Source: Commission services.

As outlined above, the most common sectors identified through submissions are

construction (26.1 % of the number of submissions), energy (9.5 %), health (10.0 %), ICT

(23.6 %) and transport (13.4 %).

b) Procedures and submissions per Member State

First, concerning the number of public procurement procedures of an estimated value of at

least EUR 250 million net of VAT for which the Commission received a submission (74),

(71) The CPV has a single classification system for public procurement aimed at standardising the

references used by contracting authorities and entities to describe the subject of procurement

contracts. CPV codes consist of eight digits indicating increasing level of detail (main category (first

two digits), sub-category (third digit), class (fourth digit), category (fifth digit) and specific

refinements (sixth to eighth digit). CPV - Common Procurement Vocabulary - TED

(72) Reference to ‘contracting authorities’ should be understood as to include both ‘contracting

authorities’ and ‘contracting entities’.

(73) TED - EU Tenders, the Supplement to the Official Journal - TED

(74) This number includes procurements divided into lots, where the estimated contract value net of

VAT exceeded EUR 250 million and the value of the lot or the aggregate value of all the lots to

Construction

26%

Energy

9%

Health

10%

ICT

24%

Transport

12%

Not filled-in by

contracting

authorities

6%

Other

13%

Submissions per sector

44

in total there were 730 public procurement procedures. The three Member States where

the number of such public procurement procedures was the highest accounted for 53% of

the total number of procedures (in total 389 public procurement procedures). These three

Member States are Germany, France and Italy. At the same time, there are five Member

States that have not yet transferred any submission in a public procurement procedure that

would fall under the FSR, which may be justified if a Member State has not initiated any

public procurement procedure meeting that threshold. This demonstrates a significant

difference between the number of public procurement procedures that reach the value of

EUR 250 million among Member States. This variation across Member States may reflect

differences in the size of public projects, in the organisation of procurement procedures

(carried out by central purchasing bodies or individually per contracting authority). At the

same time, it may also underscore a fragmented understanding of the FSR reporting

obligation, as well as the potential lack of sufficient administrative capacity.

Figure 9: Total number of notified procedures per Member State (October 2023 –

January 2026)

Source: Commission services.

Second, according to the analysis of internal data, contracting authorities from Germany,

France and Italy transferred the highest number of submissions to the Commission. At the

same time, several Member States have not forwarded any submission in a public

procurement procedure that would fall under the FSR – similarly to the above, in some

cases, this may be justified by the lack of public procurement procedures reaching the FSR

jurisdictional threshold. The number of submissions indicates the number of economic

operators in a public procurement procedure. Based on Commission data, the number of

economic operators exceeds by more than five times the number of public procurement

procedures in which the Commission received submissions, indicating on average five

economic operators per procedure. The number of economic operators per procedure varies

significantly – with procedures reaching up to 20-50 or at times over 100 submissions in

one single procedure. The variation between the number of submissions may depend on

the tender, the level of competition in a Member State, the type of procedure or other

factors.

which the tenderer applied was equal or greater than EUR 125 million, in accordance with Article

28(2) FSR.

17 13 5 0 17

134

40

1 14 12

131

0 4 7 14

124

0 0 4 0

39 39

2

63 38

2 10

0

50

100

150

AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK

Number of procedures notified by Member State (October 2023 - January

2026)

45

Figure 10: Total number of submissions in notified procedures per Member State

(October 2023-January 2026)

Source: Commission services.

c) Comparison of published public procurement procedures with and without FSR

submission

To approximate the level of compliance with the FSR the Commission services may

(i) compare the number of public procurement procedures in which it received at least one

submission with the number of contract notices published in TED database with a value of

at least EUR 250 million net of VAT; and (ii) compare the number of submissions received

per public procurement procedure with the actual number of tenders submitted to the

contracting authority in a given procedure.

For the purposes of the Report, the Commission services conducted a comparison of the

list of public procurement procedures that met the jurisdictional threshold for application

of the FSR published in TED, with the list of procedures in which at least one FSR

submission was submitted (75). At the same time, the Commission services decided not to

cross-check the number of submissions transferred to it against the number of tenders

submitted to the contracting authority, in order to minimise the administrative burden on

the contracting authority.

As a result of the data analysed, during the first year of application of the FSR – between

1 October 2023 and 30 September 2024 – in 40 % of all published public procurement

procedures of at least EUR 250 million, the Commission received at least one submission.

During the second year between October 2024 to September 2025, this figure rose to 70 %,

however the rate has dropped significantly to 45% between October 2025 and January

2026. While this data does not provide conclusive evidence on the level of compliance of

economic operators with their FSR obligation, it suggests a decreasing trend in compliance

rate.

(75) TED data has been used for illustrative purposes and is not a final assessment of compliance. The

analysis represents an approximation. The TED data used was obtained from publicly available

sources rather than official records provided by the competent national authorities. The Commission

processed the data to ensure that each tender carrying several notices is counted as one (please note

that the identification of a unique tender in the TED dataset does not definitively confirm a legal

obligation to notify). It was not possible to account for several factors that may affect the exactness

of TED data, such as (i) situations where a contracting authority did not insert an estimated contract

value, (ii) situations where the contracting authority reported an individual lot’s value rather than

the entire contract’s, (iii) such registrations of framework agreements or dynamic purchasing

systems that reflect annual estimates rather than the contract values for the entire duration of the

contract or (iv) situations in which a tendering procedure was discontinued. The time difference

between the date of publication of a contract notice and the date of filing a notification may have

underestimated the number of submissions compared to the number of published contract notices.

94 77 13 0 41

656

214 5 86 41

961

0 11 43 58

717

0 0 165

0

279199 2

184266

6 30 0

500

1000

1500

AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK

Number of submissions in public procurement procedures per Member State (October 2023 - January 2026)

46

Figure 11: Compliance rate with FSR reporting obligations (number of procedures).

Source: Commission services, TED.

Furthermore, limited awareness among contracting authorities, combined with inconsistent

application of the FSR, may reduce predictability for stakeholders and may undermine the

FSR objectives. Based on available evidence, contracting authorities sometimes fail to

require the submission of FSR notifications or send them to the Commission at a late stage

of the procedure, in exceptional cases after the award of the contract. In addition,

notifications are not always submitted using a standard Form FS-PP. These formats often

lack the prescribed formal and substantive requirements or impose additional reporting

requirements that go beyond those of Form FS-PP.

d) Recurring submissions

The analysis of internal data collected from the start of the FSR reporting obligation until

31 January 2026 has shown that there are several economic operators or entities belonging

to the same corporate group, that repeatedly participated in public procurement procedures

that meet the jurisdictional threshold for the application of the FSR, resulting in multiple

FSR submissions during the reference period. During this period, the 40 economic

operators that submitted Forms FS-PP the most frequently account for 16% of all

submissions (672 in total). During the reference period, the highest number of FS-PP

forms, 51 in total, was submitted by an economic operator active across key sectors. This

was followed by two economic operators in the construction sector, which submitted 43

and 36 FS-PP forms respectively.

e) Distribution of cases per contract value

The FSR Review Study assessed how submissions are distributed across public

procurement procedures according to estimated contract values. This analysis covers the

period from October 2023 until June 2025, and did not include those in which specific

value was not available, i.e. because the contracting authority did not publish the estimated

contract values. The Commission services’ own data derived from submissions covering

the same period shows that this was the case for 7 % of the notified procedures (50 out of

737). In a further 1% of cases (eight out of 737) contracting authorities reported ranges

40 %

70 %

45 %

0

100

200

300

400

500

10/2023 - 10/2024 10/2024 - 10/2025 10/2025 - 01/2026

N u m

b er

o f

ca se

s

Time frame

Compliance with FSR reporting obligations

Number of notified FSR procedures Number of TED procedures Compliance rate

47

instead of estimated contract values (e.g. more than EUR 250 million, more than EUR 700

million). It is possible that for some procedures contracting authorities did not estimate the

contract value and did not notify the Commission. Furthermore, the Commission services

data does not allow conclusions on the number of such public procurement procedures to

be drawn. According to the FSR Review Study, approximately 40% of all submissions

were made in public procurement procedures with an estimated value net of VAT between

EUR 250 million and EUR 500 million. The remaining 60% of all submissions represented

bids for amounts superior to EUR 500 million.

Figure 12: Hypothetical distribution of cases if the jurisdictional threshold were

raised

Source: FSR Review Study.

The diagram above shows the hypothetical distribution of cases if the jurisdictional

threshold were raised. This leads to the following conclusions: first, an increase of 20% of

the jurisdictional threshold (to EUR 300 million) would achieve a reduction of

approximately 15% in the number of submissions; second, a significant increase of the

jurisdictional threshold to EUR 500 million would achieve a decrease in the number of

cases by more than 55%; finally a significant share of 25% of all cases reach a value of

EUR 1 billion.

f) Global Ultimate Ownership of Economic Operators

The Commission services systematically review the place of establishment of the

economic operator and that of its global ultimate owner (‘GUO’) (76). This constitutes an

integral part of the Commission’s assessment. To define the GUO, the Commission

services follow the controlling shareholding line of the economic operator up until the last

entity that holds directly or indirectly the majority of the shares of the economic operator.

For the purposes of the current analysis, covering the period between October 2023 and

December 2025, the Commission services matched the name of the economic operator, or

(76) For the purposes of the Report, Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) - i.e. top owner worldwide – is to

be understood as the individual or entity at the top of the corporate ownership chain and represents

the final point of control within a group structure. This concept is not defined under EU law and

differs from that of the Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO) as set out in Directive (EU) 2015/849 (4

Anti Money Laundering Directive, AMLD).

48

in case of a consortium, the name of individual members of a consortium with the Orbis

database. Thus, the number of companies listed in the submissions increased to 5 745.

In its analysis, the Commission services identified the GUO for 4 339 out of 5 745

companies listed in FSR submissions and found that for 3 310 (58%) companies listed in

submissions, the GUO was established in the EU, 1 029 companies listed in submissions

(18%) had their GUO based in a third country. For the remaining 1 406 (24%) companies

listed in submissions identifying the GUO was not possible, as the data was not retrievable

in the Orbis database.

For GUOs from third countries, 235 companies listed in submissions had their GUO

established in the United States (4.1 % of the total), 146 in the United Kingdom (2.5 %),

106 in Switzerland (1.9 %), 86 in Japan (1.5 %), 83 in Türkiye (1.4 %) 54 in China (0.9 %),

48 in India (0.8%), 45 in Norway (0.7%), 21 in Canada and in South Korea (0.3%).

5.2.4.2.2. Qualitative assessment of the Commission’s case practice

This section describes the practical experience of the Commission services in handling

FSR submissions in the context of public procurement procedures with the aim of assessing

the effectiveness of predefined FSR concepts and practices.

a) Compliance with the reporting obligation

The FSR sets out a framework to notify FFCs received by economic operators under

specific conditions when participating in large public procurement procedures. These

conditions clarify the temporal and personal scope of the reporting obligation. The

collection of data on FFCs is the responsibility of economic operators which relies on self-

assessment, as economic operators are required to screen their own finances to identify

FFCs listed by way of example in Article 3(2) FSR and to consider whether these fall under

any of the exceptions listed in Section B (6) of Form FS-PP.

On the basis of the above, the following findings can be made:

First, on the temporal scope of the reporting obligation, stakeholder feedback to the public

consultation and the Practitioners’ Survey indicates that economic operators often find it

difficult to report on FFCs that were granted in the current financial year as consolidated

data is often unavailable.

Second, stakeholder feedback to the public consultation and the Practitioners’ Survey also

notes challenges stemming from the scope of the reporting obligation, which covers the

economic operator itself, its holding companies, and subsidiary companies without

commercial autonomy, but excludes ‘sister companies’. In practice, companies usually

publish consolidated financial statements at the level of the parent company, covering the

entire corporate group, including entities that fall outside the specific scope of the reporting

obligation. As a result, economic operators may not have immediate access to FFC data at

the level of individual entities. Extracting entity-specific financial information can

therefore be challenging, particularly under time constraints at the time of the notification.

In addition, the exclusion of sister companies may create data gaps and reduce the overall

representativeness of the collected information. It may also require economic operators to

provide additional justification for ringfenced FFCs (77).

(77) Section 2.5.1 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on the application of certain

provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign

subsidies distorting the internal market, C/2026/42.

49

Third, according to the FSR Review Study, self-assessment by economic operators

exposed significant deficiencies in the completeness and quality of notifications. Based on

the Commission services’ experience, submissions appeared frequently incomplete,

provided in non-standardised formats, or omitted essential information, including

ownership structures, financial statement, or appropriate description of FFCs granted to

holding companies or subsidiary companies without commercial autonomy.

Fourth, in terms of reporting obligation, stakeholder feedback to the public consultation

and the Practitioners’ Survey also indicated that economic operators – including SMEs and

economic operators that are active only locally – are often required by Form FS-PP to

provide detailed information, even where such information has limited relevance to the

substantive assessment, creating a compliance burden for these economic operators that,

in turn, generates administrative work for the Commission services.

Finally, while the FSIR allows for the possibility of requesting a waiver to submit certain

information required by Form FS-PP (78), this option is available only during the pre-

notification phase. The FSR Review Study indicates that, due to time constraints, economic

operators often do not have the possibility to engage in pre-notification contacts, therefore

limiting their practical effectiveness in reducing unnecessary reporting.

b) Origin, type and amounts of FFCs

Commission services’ experience and the FSR Review Study findings revealed limited

insights into FFCs based on FS-PP forms. The main reasons for this are limited awareness

and limited level of compliance of economic operators with the reporting obligation. As

described in Section a), submitted FS-PP forms often lack minimum information required

and do not capture all notifiable FFCs, declarations often do not contain any FFCs, and

economic operators often submit declarations when a notification should have been

submitted (79). Furthermore, Table 1 of Form FS-PP – which is the most used form to

declare notifiable FFCs – requires submission of information on FFCs by third country

within set ranges (80). According to the Commission services’ analysis, this allows neither

the quantification of individual FFCs, nor the possibility of making average calculations

in a conclusive manner by FFC type, because the indicated ranges are too broad in both

cases.

Despite limited overall information, the FSR Review Study analysed a sample of 30 cases

with a total of 42 submissions (nine notifications and 33 declarations) to gain a more

granular insight. Only a minority of submissions clearly indicated that the included FFC

information was granted to the notifying party (or parties), to their holding companies and

subsidiaries. In most submissions, FFCs granted to group entities other than the notifying

party within the scope of Article 28(1)(b) FSR were missing.

(78) See recital 6 of the Introduction to the Form FS-PP of FSIR

(79) According to Article 29(1) FSR, ‘Where the conditions for the notification of financial contributions

in accordance with Article 28(1) and (2) are met, economic operators participating in a public

procurement procedure, shall notify the contracting authority or contracting entity of all foreign

financial contributions as defined in Article 28(1), point (b). In all other cases, economic operators

shall list in a declaration all foreign financial contributions received and confirm that the foreign

financial contributions received are not notifiable in accordance with Article 28(1), point (b)’.

(80) Table 1 of the Form FS-PP requires economic operators to list the FFCs using the following ranges:

‘EUR 45-100 million’, ‘ EUR > 100-500 million ’, ‘ EUR > 500-1 000 million ’, ‘ more than

EUR 1 000 million.

50

Furthermore, none of the nine notifications reported FFCs that could fall under

Article 5(1), points (a) to (c) and (e) FSR (81). All nine forms included FFCs that do not

fall into Article 5 FSR. Eight of those nine submissions contained FFC details in Table 1

in Form FS-PP. In the remaining submission, Table 1 was intentionally left blank, because

the contributions were considered exempt under Section B (6) of Form FS-PP (82).

In the eight cases where Table 1 was completed, economic operators notified having

received on average 11.4 different FFCs from 2.8 countries. The third countries which

provided those FFCs included Benin, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, India, Iraq, Japan, Libya,

North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore,

Switzerland, Taiwan, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the

United States (including Puerto Rico). The types of FFCs in these tables included tax

advantages, fiscal incentives, purchase of goods and services, grants, financing

instruments, overdraft facilities, automatic direct debit systems, guarantees and loans.

Aggregate estimated value ranges per country were also provided in tables.

c) The Commission’s RfI practice

Based on the FSR Review Study, the Commission services often use requests for

information (‘RfIs’) during the preliminary review. Due to continued lack of awareness of

economic operators about their own reporting obligation, these RfIs serve to clarify various

aspects of Form FS-PP or to request information that appears to be missing, e.g.

information known from publicly available sources that should have been included in Form

FS-PP. In this regard, the Commission services’ case practice shows limited use of pre-

notification contacts prior to submission.

According to the analysis of the FSR Review Study, focusing on a limited sample of 30

cases, an average of 1.75 RfIs were issued per case under the public procurement procedure

of the FSR. Each RfI included on average three questions, although with significant

variation ranging from one to ten questions. In cases where multiple RfIs were issued, later

requests followed up on unresolved issues from previous ones and added new questions.

The average deadline was four working days after the date of request, and the median was

four working days as well, with a range from two to eight working days.

The data on replies to RfIs and response timing assessed by the FSR Review Study showed

considerable differences in compliance. In some cases, the replies were complete and

addressed the questions raised in the RfIs. In others, key information was missing, which

triggered a follow-up RfI.

The main topics covered in the RfIs concerned the ownership structure of groups, details

of FFCs, potentially notifiable FFCs not reported, financial statements or yearly reports or

most recent FFCs.

d) Procedural timelines

The FSR Review Study notes that the 20-working-day deadline for the preliminary review

under Article 30(2) FSR is often challenging, particularly in cases where the Commission

envisages adopting a decision on incompleteness, on opening an in-depth investigation or

on the imposition of fines. Because of formal and substantive shortcomings of submissions

the Commission services often spend a significant part of the preliminary review on

gathering data that should have been included in the initial notification. In practice, this

requires sending RfIs with deadlines of typically 3–5 working days. For large corporations

(81) Article 5(1) FSR provides for the categories of foreign subsidies that are more likely to distort the

internal market.

(82) Section B (6) of Form FS-PP provides a list of FFCs types that do not need to be included in Table

1 and are therefore exempted from the reporting obligation.

51

with worldwide holdings and subsidiaries, providing the requested information within such

a timeframe is challenging. These difficulties are further compounded when RfIs target

entities that are established in third countries, with differing time zones, working practices,

and legal frameworks that render coordination operationally time-consuming for both

economic operators and the Commission services.

Similarly, as the FSR Review Study indicates, the tight timeline for in-depth investigations

limits the time for substantive analysis. In particular, the 110-day period pursuant to

Article 30(5) FSR for such investigations is operationally challenging.

5.2.4.3. Enhanced legal guidance and procedural support

The Commission services is actively refining and deploying a coherent set of

administrative measures and tools to ensure their effective and timely handling. This

includes the establishment of a dedicated notification and registration system, which

supports streamlined processing and improved traceability.

Over the past three years, the Commission services have focused mainly on strengthening

procedural and legal guidance for stakeholders, and on developing IT systems tailored to

the FSR.

The Commission services have stepped up its efforts to make it easier for stakeholders to

navigate the FSR and to clarify their legal obligations and the applicable procedures. This

has brought a dual result: (i) reducing the volume of queries received, and (ii) facilitating

more efficient and streamlined interactions between Commission services and

stakeholders.

Through a dedicated functional mailbox, the Commission receives queries both from

contracting authorities as well as from economic operators: on average 20 queries per

month about legal interpretation and approximately 45 per month on procedural aspects.

An average response time of 24 hours is maintained for procedural queries to ensure timely

and reliable guidance. Response time to substantive queries about legal interpretation

varies on the complexity of the question, not exceeding a maximum 15 working day

response time.

As the primary entry point for stakeholders, the official website of DG GROW on FSR is

continuously updated to provide information and guidance that is clear, comprehensive

and accessible (83).

Building on the experience gained during the FSR implementation, the dedicated

webpages for contracting authorities (84) and economic operators (85) now offer more

detailed legal guidance (e.g. on the timing for submitting Forms FS-PP in relation to the

public procurement procedure at stake). The online ‘Practical Information’ section has

been expanded since the beginning of this year to address recurring stakeholders’

questions.

In order to facilitate submissions, the Commission services developed a standardised

online Form FS-PP that became available in all EU languages. It enables economic

operators to fill out Form FS-PP online that respect all formal requirements while

maintaining confidentiality of sensitive financial information.

(83) DG GROW website – Foreign subsidies regulation.

(84) DG GROW website – Guidance for contracting authorities - Internal Market, Industry,

Entrepreneurship and SMEs.

(85) DG GROW website – Guidance for economic operators - Internal Market, Industry,

Entrepreneurship and SMEs.

52

Furthermore, the Commission services has developed integrated and secure IT systems for

case handling, while minimising the risk of data breaches. Case@EC (a comprehensive

case management case management platform) and EU SEND (a secure messaging system

for stakeholder communication) are designed to support smooth administrative handling.

Both systems implement robust access controls, role-based permissions, and secure data

storage protocols, reinforcing the integrity, reliability, and security of the Commission

services’ operations.

Taken together, these measures enhance transparency, facilitate compliance, reduce

uncertainty, and enable contracting authorities and companies to manage procedures more

efficiently while fulfilling their obligations under the Regulation.

5.2.4.4. Engagement of Member States in FSR enforcement

While the Commission is solely responsible for enforcing the FSR, it fostered a network

of national contact points (‘NCPs’) to facilitate dialogue with Member States, in line with

Recital 58 FSR. NCPs act as the primary interface between the Commission and

contracting authorities, serving both as multipliers of information and as channels for

feedback to the Commission.

Member States appointed NCPs in 2023. DG GROW and DG COMP convened two joint

online meetings, on 24 January 2024 and on 16 December 2024, ensuring coordinated

expertise across the public procurement and concentrations modules.

Building on cooperation with the NCPs and with a view to further consolidating

coordination on FSR-public procurement, the Commission went on to set up a dedicated

Expert Group (86) in December 2025. Bringing together these NCPs, this forum underpins

the primary role of Member States to provide guidance and expertise in the Regulation’s

implementation, while keeping them regularly informed, fostering a shared understanding

of the legal framework, and facilitating dialogue on enforcement.The Expert Group also

functions as a platform to harmonise different practices, by offering practical insights and

identifying gaps or areas in need of clarification. It contributes to enhancing compliance

by embedding the FSR in national procurement practices, as well as raising awareness

among public bodies.

To draw on the expertise of the Expert Group on FSR-Public Procurement, the

Commission holds two meetings per year, one in person and one online six months later.

The first one took place on 19 January 2026, and the second one is scheduled for June

2026.

5.2.4.5. Feedback from stakeholders

In the context of the public consultation, stakeholders generally agree with the importance

of the notification system for public procurement procedures, noting that it enables the

Commission services to effectively identify and address potentially distortive foreign

subsidies in the context of large public procurement procedures. At the same time,

respondents emphasise that the current notification and declaration reporting system

generates an administrative burden for bidding economic operators that is perceived as

disproportionate vis-à-vis the risk of distortion identified so far in the internal market.

(86) European Commission’s Register of Commission Expert Groups and Other Similar Entities –

Informal Commission Expert Group on Foreign Subsidies Regulation – Public Procurement

(E04021).

53

(a) Positive aspects identified by stakeholders

Stakeholders from the international trade in services sector, emphasised the value of

regular interaction, viewing it as an important link between the Commission and the private

sector. Within the industrial landscape, several trade associations have been particularly

positive about the overall objectives of the public procurement module of FSR, describing

it as a ‘key tool’ for ensuring a level playing field within the EU procurement market.

These associations acknowledged the legitimacy and clarity of the public procurement

module and commended the Commission’s efficiency.

In particular, the Commission services’ ability to provide fast, accurate replies and to close

preliminary reviews within 20 working days has been noted by stakeholders as a significant

procedural strength that enhances legal certainty for economic operators.

In addition, in the public consultation (87), respondents were asked how appropriate of the

thresholds are, including both the jurisdictional threshold of a turnover of EUR 250 million

and the notification threshold for FFCs. Overall, 48% of the respondents did not advocate

for an increase or decrease in the thresholds, indicating a broad level of acceptance of the

current framework.

Source: Commission services.

Finally, in terms of effects on participation into public procurement procedures, only 26%

of respondents to the public consultation observed a reduction in participation by both EU-

and non-EU-based companies. At the same time, 41% of respondents had no firm view on

the FSR’s effect on the participation of third-country economic operators, and a further

26% considered it too early to assess the FSR’s impact in this respect. While some

respondents suggested that perceived reductions in participation may be linked to

administrative burdens associated with the FSIR reporting obligations or to concerns

relating to potential scrutiny under the regime, the overall distribution of responses

indicates that a majority of stakeholders either do have not observed such effects or are not

yet in a position to assess them.

(b) Challenges raised by stakeholders

Conversely, the practical application of the FSR has revealed substantial bottlenecks,

primarily concerning the administrative burden of the Regulation. Trade associations have

largely characterised reporting obligations as ‘administratively burdensome’ and overly

complex, questioning the proportionality of the system given the high volume of

submissions compared to the relatively low number of in-depth investigations initiated so

(87) See the European Commission’s public consultation on the Commission Have your say portal.

Figure 13: Respondents' views on threshold appropriateness of thresholds

Support

increasing

thresholds; 20;

37%

No opinion; 16;

30%

Support

current

thresholds;

10;

18%

Support

decreasing

thresholds;

8;

15%

54

far. A majority of stakeholders (57%) find the reporting obligations unclear. Form FS-PP

is also widely criticised for its complexity, with 37% of respondents calling for

simplification and 22% describing it as difficult to understand. To mitigate this,

associations have proposed narrowing the definition of FFCs and simplifying reporting for

consortia, which are required to aggregate the amounts of FFCs received by each member

undertaking.

Furthermore, there is a noted lack of awareness among contracting authorities about their

duties, leading trade associations to call for a more comprehensive Q&A to bridge this

knowledge gap. International trade associations also pointed to a lack of guidance at

national level, which has led to inconsistent practices among various contracting

authorities across the EU. This was also reflected in the public consultation, where a large

majority of respondents (61%) highlighted the need for a clearer and more precise text of

the FSR and the FSIR to enable contracting authorities to understand their obligations.

The feedback by chambers of commerce representing third-country businesses has been

relatively critical, citing high compliance costs and a lack of transparency that forces

frequent, burdensome internal due diligence exercises to collect FFC data on a rolling

basis. These stakeholders have suggested various changes both to the FSR and the FSIR,

including increasing the FFC thresholds, excluding certain types of FFCs relating to

turnover – such as that from the sale of goods and services without alternative sources of

supply – and limiting the geographical scope of reporting to specific countries, providing

clearer guidance on waivers and minimising administrative burden on SMEs and on

economic operators that do not engage in any economic activity in third countries.

Finally, specific concerns were raised by other trade associations about the ‘systematic

risk’ of operators continuing to bid for new contracts while under an active in-depth

investigation, leading to calls for stricter monitoring obligations to prevent ongoing market

distortion during the investigative process.

5.2.4.6. The FSR Review Study

The FSR Review Study, in addition to the statistical overview of all cases, reviewed the

Commission’s practice through its three in-depth investigations, two irregularity decisions

as well as a sample of 30 cases for which no decision was required. The assessment

provides conclusions on Articles 3, 4 and 5 FSR interpreted in the light of Chapter 4 FSR

on public procurement procedures (88).

The FSR Review Study found that the Commission services applied in a consistent and

structured manner the concepts underArticle 3 FSR, which identifies a list of FFCs,

including grants, loans, guarantees, tax measures, public contracts and intra-group

transactions and assessed benefit, specificity and attribution to a third country. The FSR

Review Study found, for in-depth cases specifically that incomplete information meant

that the Commission services had to make cautious inferences, applying the ‘best evidence

available’ approach under Article 16 FSR on non-cooperation.

An assessment of how Article 4 FSRis applied to detecting distortion revealed that the

Commission services applied Article 4(1) FSR indicators consistently across all decisions,

following the procedure set out by the FSR Guidelines. This also applies to cases where

incomplete information submitted by the economic operators resulted in reliance on

Article 16 FSR.

(88) The assessment pursuant to Article 3, 4 and 27 FSR did not take place in the cases that resulted in

a decision declaring a tender irregular, as these cases focus on the completing of missing

information on FFCs, rather than a substantive assessment of the FFCs notified.

55

The findings of the FSR Review Study on the notification thresholds set out in

Article 28(1) and (2) FSR are summarised together with the Commission services’ findings

in Section (e). Economic operators displayed significant and recurring misunderstandings

of Article 28(1)(b) FSR relating to the FFC threshold, including confusion about the

calculation of the aggregate amount of FFCs received (89). In this context, the requirements

of Table 1 of Form FS-PP were often not met by economic operators and some economic

operators refused to provide replies to RfIs. The main issues were linked to the lack of

evidence on the ring-fencing of FFCs (i.e. their clear segregation across entities) and,

consequently, to insufficient information on FFCs provided to entities outside of the

vertical line of control of the economic operator, as well as to the incorrect application of

the exceptions and misunderstandings about the relevant date for reporting.

The FSR Review Study found that on the basis of the sampled cases, the Commission’s

practice on procedural rules timelines pursuant to Article 29 and 30 FSR was consistent,

that its assessment respected 20 working days for preliminary review in open procedures,

and that it suspended the preliminary review in case of multi-stage procedures. Further to

that, the FSR Review Study did not assess the Commission’s practice in extending the

timeline of the preliminary review or in-depth investigation, as the first deadline extension

in an in-depth investigation took place after conclusion of the FSR Review Study.

Overall, the FSR Review Study found that early public procurement case practice

demonstrates that the Commission services have applied the FSR in a structured, coherent

and cautious manner. As the FSR Review Study concludes, the main operational

challenges arise from incomplete or incorrect submissions by economic operators.

Therefore, potential targeted streamlining of the reporting obligation and additional

guidance and awareness raising both on substantive and technical aspects of the

notifications under the public procurement module of FSR may further enhance its

effectiveness.

5.2.4.7. The Commission’s assessment

The Commission’s early enforcement of the FSR public procurement module offers

valuable insights into its effectiveness to address distortive foreign subsidies and safeguard

fair competition in the internal market. Overall, early practice indicates that the framework

is operational and achieving its core objectives, while also revealing areas where further

refinement would be useful.

First, as regards efficiency, while the number of submissions received has significantly

exceeded initial expectations (90), only a limited proportion of cases have required further

scrutiny. To date, the Commission has opened four in-depth investigations, one of which

resulted in a decision with commitments, while three closed following the withdrawal of

the economic operators. In addition, the Commission has declared two tender’s irregular,

(89) Pursuant to Article 28(1)(b) FSR, the FSR notification threshold is met when the economic operator,

including its subsidiary companies without commercial autonomy, its holding companies, and,

where applicable, its main subcontractors and suppliers involved in the same tender was granted

aggregate FFCs of at least EUR 4 million per third country in the three years preceding the

notification.

(90) See Commission Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment. Accompanying the Proposal for

a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the

internal market, SWD(2021) 99 final: indicating that for a threshold of EUR 250 million, there may

be up to 36 cases per year, for a threshold of EUR 500 million up to 13 cases. This is due to various

reasons, which include the lack of reliable data due to the shortcomings of the TED database at the

time of the impact assessment, as well as several years of continuously high inflation that

substantially increased the price of public projects.

56

opened one ex-officio investigation that is currently in preliminary review stage and issued

one request for prior notification (call-in).

Although these figures may raise questions about the FSR’s proportionality, it is important

to interpret them in light of its deterrent effect. Early enforcement suggests that the FSR is

already influencing market behaviour as in several cases the Commission services have

observed that economic operators may choose to bid only in procedures below the

EUR 250 million threshold, refrain from participating in certain tenders, participate only

as subcontractors or suppliers rather than as consortium members or withdraw from

ongoing procurement procedures, often in the face of potential scrutiny. This appears to

reflect a reluctance on the part of certain economic operators to subject themselves to FSR

review, rather than a response to the administrative burden of the FSR. Withdrawals seem

to suggest that FSR may be functioning as a targeted filter for economic operators that are

reluctant to disclose information on received FFCs. Such effects indicate that the FSR is

capable of achieving its purpose in fostering fairer competition not only through direct

enforcement, but also indirectly without formal intervention.

Second, the Commission’s ability to conclude preliminary reviews within the 20-working-

day deadline and deliver accurate assessments despite the high volume of submissions has

been widely recognised as an important procedural success, enhancing legal certainty for

economic operators and stakeholders, while ensuring timely progress for contracting

authorities in their public procurement procedures. In parallel, early case practice shows

that the Commission services have applied the FSR in a carefully calibrated manner,

notwithstanding the novelty and, in some respects, the complexity of the legal framework.

This consistent approach has been further reinforced through the Commission services’

growing understanding of market dynamics across critical sectors. In particular, based on

the CPV categorisation and the notifications submitted by economic operators, the

Commission has progressively built a robust knowledge base on market developments and

on the sectors most prone to the presence of FFCs. The recurring appearance of similar

companies and similar types of FFCs within each sector has in turn enabled the

Commission services to develop a sector-based approach to cases, thereby further

strengthening consistency in case handling.

Third, the Commission services have made sustained efforts to enhance clarity and

cooperation with stakeholders. Through the establishment of NCPs, the creation of a

dedicated Expert Group, and the continuous strengthening of procedural and legal

guidance, the Commission services have sought to facilitate compliance and foster a shared

understanding of the framework. These efforts are particularly important in light of the

identified issue of the contracting authorities potentially lacking awareness of FSR

obligations and the non-notification by economic operators. Furthermore, strengthening

the digital dimension of case-handling tools reflects a clear commitment to greater

transparency and more efficient case management.

At the same time, early practice has highlighted several challenges that affect the overall

efficiency, proportionality and clarity of the system. Lack of clarity can give rise to a

degree of legal uncertainty for economic operators and may add complexity to the

Commission’s assessment, potentially lengthening the process if it is required to request

missing information. A major concern relates to the administrative burden imposed on

economic operators. Stakeholders frequently point to the broad scope of the reporting

obligation, the perceived inadequacy of thresholds, and the complexity and lack of clarity

of the FS-PP forms, which can result in disproportionate reporting requirements, including

57

for companies that may not be the primary targets of the FSR. These difficulties are

compounded by practical challenges in identifying, collecting and reporting FFCs. Since

the collection of data on FFCs is based on the self-assessment of economic operators, they

are required to screen their own finances to identify FFCs and consider whether these fall

under any of the exceptions listed in Section B (6) of Form FS-PP. As a result, submissions

are often initially incorrect or incomplete and thereby insufficient for a proper assessment.

These considerations have direct implications for the effectiveness of the FSR. The

Commission services are frequently required to devote significant time during the

preliminary review phase to gathering missing information. As a result of the lack of

practical use of pre-notification contacts shortcomings linked to submissions can only be

addressed during the preliminary review, which strains the Commission’s assessment.

Furthermore, the absence of a ‘stop-the-clock’ mechanism, combined with tight timelines

for both preliminary reviews and in-depth investigations, further constrains the ability of

the Commission to carry out thorough substantive assessments, particularly in more

complex cases.

In addition, the Commission services note that economic operators that are subject to the

FSR reporting obligation on a recurrent basis face an additional administrative burden. In

this context, the 40 economic operators that submitted the most FS-PP forms submitted on

average 16.8 submissions during the reference period (approximately two years from

October 2023 until January 2026), that is on average 8.4 submissions per year. In this

regard, the Commission services note that introducing a single submission that would be

updated twice a year (instead of individual submissions), or systematically using waivers

for this purpose could have resulted in 160 submissions in total instead of 672, which

would lead to a decrease of approximately 76% in the number of submissions among the

40 economic operators submitting the highest number of notifications.

Moreover, while progress has been made in enhancing transparency and providing

guidance, stakeholders continue to call for further clarification of key FSR legal concepts

and more comprehensive support. Such improvements are considered necessary to address

inconsistencies in implementation and to enhance overall predictability and legal certainty

in the Commission’s practice.

In conclusion, early enforcement demonstrates that the FSR is already contributing to

safeguarding fair competition in public procurement by enabling the detection and scrutiny

of potentially distortive foreign subsidies. Nevertheless, the experience gained so far

underscores the need to consider targeted improvements, especially streamline reporting

obligations, enhance the quality and completeness of submissions, increase transparency

and further strengthen guidance and cooperation with contracting authorities and economic

operators. Addressing these challenges will be essential to ensure that the FSR operates in

a proportionate, predictable and fully effective manner.

5.3. Developments in third countries’ subsidy control systems

5.3.1. Introduction

This chapter examines developments in third countries’ subsidy control systems, as

referred to in Article 52 FSR. The aim of this analysis is to ensure that the way in which

the FSR is applied remains responsive to evolving global economic and legal conditions.

In this context, the Commission is required to monitor and assess developments in subsidy

control frameworks outside the Union, as they may affect the effectiveness and

proportionality of the FSR. Such monitoring enables the Commission to determine whether

58

the assumptions underlying the FSR continue to hold true and whether adjustments may

be necessary to preserve a level playing field within the internal market.

This chapter has been developed drawing mostly on the research and analysis carried out

in the FSR Review Study.

5.3.2. Analysis

This section reviews developments in a number of key jurisdictions: Canada, PRC, Japan,

Switzerland, Türkiye, UAE, the United Kingdom and the United States. These jurisdictions

have been selected due to their significant economic engagement with the Union, including

trade, investment flows, mergers and acquisitions, and participation in public procurement.

As such, their subsidy practices are particularly relevant for assessing potential distortions

of competition within the EU internal market.

A central finding of this review is that the EU remains unique in operating a comprehensive

and cross-sectoral State aid control system. The EU framework combines both ex ante and

ex post elements: it allows for the prior screening of potentially distortive subsidies before

they are granted, while also providing mechanisms to address subsidies that may escape

initial scrutiny. This dual structure ensures a high level of oversight and legal certainty.

The frameworks in EEA countries and EU accession candidates, while often aligned or

influenced by the EU model, are generally less extensive or not as fully integrated.

By contrast, none of the other jurisdictions examined has put in place a similarly

comprehensive system based on independent ex ante control. While certain countries have

taken steps toward greater regulation of subsidies, these efforts remain limited in scope or

fragmented in design.

The United Kingdom represents, amongst the countries analysed, the closest

approximation to the EU model. Its subsidy control regime, introduced following its

withdrawal from the EU, incorporates a set of substantive principles and provides for

oversight mechanisms. However, it does not replicate the EU system of prior notification

and approval and therefore lacks an equivalent level of ex ante control.

In other jurisdictions, developments have been more partial or sector specific. Switzerland,

for example, has introduced forms of subsidy screening in particular areas such as aviation,

but does not operate a unified, cross-sectoral regime. Türkiye has explored the introduction

of a subsidy control framework through legislative initiatives, yet a fully functioning

notification, assessment, or recovery system comparable to the EU’s has not been

implemented to date.

Elsewhere, subsidy control continues to be addressed through alternative or indirect means.

The United States does not operate, nor has taken steps to implement, at either the federal

or sub-federal level, a subsidy control regime comparable to the EU State aid framework.

China does not operate, nor has taken steps to implement a subsidy control system

comparable to the EU’s. In addition to not taking measures to place an independent

mechanism for the systematic oversight of subsidies, public sources indicate that China

continues to pursue an active industrial policy with large-scale subsidisation representing

one of its core components (91). Canada and Japan also lack centralised ex ante screening

systems, instead addressing subsidies through more limited or ad hoc tools, for instance

within the context of sectoral regulation or public finance and administrative control

measures.

At the international level, both bilateral and multilateral developments remain relatively

modest. The EU has included subsidy-related provisions in several free trade agreements

(91) OECD (2026), OECD MAGIC Database of Industrial Subsidies, OECD Publishing, Paris.

59

with these jurisdictions, although these provisions vary in scope and enforceability.

Agreements such as the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement

(CETA) and the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) primarily emphasise

transparency and cooperation, with limited binding constraints. The EU–United Kingdom

Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) goes further by setting up a dedicated subsidy

control framework, yet it does not include an EU-style ex ante approval mechanisms.

At the multilateral level, discussions within the WTO have not resulted in significant new

disciplines on subsidies since the adoption of the FSR in 2022. Progress has been largely

confined to specific sectors, such as fisheries, and has not addressed the broader issue of

distortive subsidies across the global economy.

5.3.3. Conclusion

Overall, the analysis indicates that there has been no fundamental change in third countries’

subsidy control systems since the adoption of the FSR. Developments have generally been

gradual and limited in scope, whether in the context of bilateral agreements or multilateral

negotiations. In other words, risks related to possible distortive foreign subsidies appear

largely unchanged.

As such, these findings suggest that the assumptions underlying the FSR remain valid.

Continued monitoring remains important, especially in light of evolving industrial policies

and potential future reforms.

On this basis, the FSR can be considered as still fit for purpose in addressing foreign

subsidies that risk distorting competition within the EU internal market.

6. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FSR

6.1. FSR in general and policy objectives

In view of the findings outlined above, the overall objective of the FSR remains valid and

this instrument contributes positively to the preservation of the level playing field in the

internal market. Moreover, in the absence of material developments at international level,

which can contribute to the effective tackling of distortive foreign subsidies, which are not

caught by the traditional trade defence mechanisms of the Union, the FSR remains

necessary to preserve the level playing field in the internal market.

In terms of substantive concepts, while some questions remain, which is only to be

expected when a new legal framework begins to be enforced, it appears premature to

consider undertaking structural changes of the FSR. The recent publication of the FSR

Guidelines has provided further clarity and predictability on the approach taken by the

Commission when applying these key assessment concepts, including assessing

distortions, conducting the balancing test and exploring the possibility to call-in

notifications. These guidelines come in addition to other initiatives such as the publication

of the non-confidential versions of the adopted final decisions under the FSR, regular

updates to the Q&As published on the Commission’s website (in the sections for

‘Competition’ and ‘Internal Market’, respectively), and the publication of FSR briefs,

where the Commission’s approach on specific cases or policy development is further

explained. Those efforts, together with the accumulation of more case practice, are positive

steps that will continue to contribute to the better understanding of notions specific to the

FSR.

60

Nevertheless, efforts will be continued to increase transparency, legal certainty and

predictability, by engaging with stakeholders and by continuing the practices outlined in

Section 4.3.1.

6.2. In relation to the ex officio procedure

Based on the findings above, the role and objective of the ex officio procedure of the FSR

is perceived as positive and its importance, as part of the FSR investigative powers, is

widely acknowledged.

The recent advancement of two ex officio cases to in-depth investigation will help bring

more transparency and better understanding of the approach taken by the Commission

when assessing potentially distortive foreign subsidies.

In reply to the concerns expressed with respect to the length of investigations under the ex

officio procedure, it should be noted that the length depends on the level of complexity in

individual cases, the degree of cooperation by the undertakings under investigation and, in

some instances, by the actions brought by the EU Courts.

Efforts will be continued to increase transparency and provide further insights into the

approach to ex officio cases in line with the practices outlined in Section 4.3.1.

6.3. In relation to the notification procedure for concentrations

As confirmed by the review, the notification procedure for concentrations remains an

important element of the FSR regulatory set up, allowing the Commission to identify and

address distortive foreign subsidies in the context of acquisitions.

At the same time, a significant portion of the feedback received in the context of the

Stakeholders’ Consultation focused on the administrative burden associated with the

notification system for concentrations.

The Commission services have also carefully screened the enforcement practice to date to

determine whether it is possible to further streamline the reporting obligation while still

preserving the possibility for it to meaningfully review and assess notified concentrations

for the presence of distortive foreign subsidies.

As identified in Section 5.2.3.5, stakeholders have raised concerns related to (a) the

perceived burden associated with the identification, collection and reporting of FFC and

the scope of information required by notification forms and (b) the perceived uncertainty

linked to possibility of call-in and deterrent effect of wide-ranging provisions:

(a) Perceived burden associated with the identification, collection and reporting

of FFCs and with the scope of information required

In order to address this concern, it may be appropriate to consider possible adjustments to

the FSR procedural set up. Such adjustments would lead to a reduction in the overall

number of notifications and a more streamlined reporting for certain categories of cases or

types of FFCs, which could be considered less likely to raise concern, in line with feedback

received from stakeholders.

Alongside any possible changes to the procedural set-up, the Commission will continue its

effort to enhance the transparency and predictability of its enforcement practice including

outreach activities for stakeholders.

61

(b) Uncertainty linked to possibility of call-in and deterrent effect of wide-

ranging provisions

With regards to the perceived uncertainty linked to the Commission’s call-in powers and

the potential deterrent effect of this provision on investment incentives into the EU, it

should be noted that the publication of the FSR Guidelines, combined with the evolving

case practice, decrease the perceived uncertainty, without need for further targeted

measures at this stage.

6.4. In relation to notifications in public procurement procedures

As confirmed by the review, the ex ante notification procedure for public procurement is

an important component of the FSR framework, enabling the Commission to identify and

address potentially distortive foreign subsidies in high-value public procurement

procedures.

At the same time, a large proportion of stakeholders’ feedback focused on the

administrative burden associated with the FSR filing requirements in the context of public

procurement procedures.

The Commission services have also carefully reviewed its enforcement practice, with a

view to identifying possible actions to simplify the reporting of FFCs, while preserving the

ability to carry out a meaningful assessment of those contributions and safeguarding the

effectiveness of the FSR public procurement procedure.

As set out in Section 5.2.4.5, stakeholders have raised concerns related to (a) the perceived

burden associated with the identification, collection and reporting of FFCs and the scope

of information required by Form FS-PP; and (b) the perceived lack of awareness and clarity

concerning FSR obligations, together with the need for greater transparency in the

enforcement practice.

a) Perceived burden associated with the identification, collection, reporting of FFCs

and with the scope of information required

To address these concerns, the Commission may consider possible adjustments to the FSR

procedural framework informed by implementation experience and stakeholder feedback.

Such adjustments could help focus scrutiny on cases that are most likely to involve

distortive foreign subsidies, while alleviating burdens in less critical situations.

b) Perceived lack of awareness, clarity and transparency

Alongside any possible amendments to the procedural framework, efforts are continued to

enhance the transparency of the enforcement practice. Strengthening awareness and

capacity-building also continue, including through outreach activities for contracting

authorities, economic operators and practitioners. In parallel, the dialogue with Member

States is further deepened through regular exchanges with the NCPs and the dedicated FSR

Public Procurement Expert Group, with the aim of ensuring a consistent understanding of

FSR obligations across the Union.

Overall, these initiatives aim to bridge the gap between the regulatory framework and its

practical implementation, ultimately ensuring higher compliance and greater legal

certainty.

7. CONCLUSION

The FSR plays a fundamental and key role in the Union’s efforts to address distortions in

the internal market caused by foreign subsidies. The overall objective of the FSR, which

62

is to prevent distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies, is widely

acknowledged and remains very relevant. The findings of the review highlight the

importance of the FSR and confirm that the Regulation has been successful in capturing

high-risk concentrations and public procurements, as demonstrated by the Commission’s

case practice and the adopted final decisions with commitments under Chapters 3 and 4

FSR as well as its ongoing, at time of publication, investigations under the ex officio

procedure.

In light of the stakeholders’ feedback, the Commission may consider possible adjustments

to the FSR procedural set up to reduce the administrative burden on businesses and

facilitate compliance, while maintaining the FSR’s effectiveness.

ET ET

EUROOPA KOMISJON

Brüssel, 14.7.2026 COM(2026) 368 final

KOMISJONI ARUANNE EUROOPA PARLAMENDILE JA NÕUKOGULE

Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 14. detsembri 2022. aasta määruse (EL) 2022/2560

(mis käsitleb siseturgu moonutavaid välisriigi subsiidiume) rakendamise ja täitmise

tagamise kohta kooskõlas määruse artikli 52 lõikega 2

{SWD(2026) 183 final}

1

1. SISSEJUHATUS

Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 14. detsembri 2022. aasta määrus (EL) 2022/2560, mis

käsitleb siseturgu moonutavaid välisriigi subsiidiume1 (edaspidi „määrus“), võeti vastu

selleks, et käsitleda siseturu moonutusi, mida põhjustavad subsiidiumid, mida kolmandad

riigid on andnud Euroopa Liidus (edaspidi „liit“) majandustegevusega tegelevatele

ettevõtjatele. Määruse eesmärk on tagada siseturul võrdsed tingimused, võimaldades

Euroopa Komisjonil (edaspidi „komisjon“) moonutusi põhjustavad välisriigi subsiidiumid

kindlaks teha, neid hinnata ja vajaduse korral neid tasakaalustada.

Enne määruse vastuvõtmist oli liidus tegutsevatel ettevõtjatel võimalik rahastada siseturul

toimuvat majandustegevust kolmandatelt riikidelt saadud subsiidiumidega. See puudutas

kõiki majandussektoreid ja hõlmas osalemist riigihankemenetlustes, ettevõtjate

omandamist ja mis tahes muud majandustegevust liidus. Välisriigi subsiidiumide suhtes ei

kohaldatud liidu riigiabi eeskirju. Liidu õigusraamistik ei sisaldanud ühtki mehhanismi

tegelemaks moonutustega, mida välisriigi subsiidiumid põhjustavad siseturul, kuna

tavapäraseid kaubanduse kaitsemehhanisme kohaldatakse üksnes kaubeldavate kaupade

impordi suhtes. Määrus töötati välja horisontaalse vahendina, mis täiendab liidu kehtivaid

ühinemis-, konkurentsi-, riigiabi, riigihanke- ja kaubanduspoliitika eeskirju, et säilitada aus

konkurents ja siseturu terviklikkus.

Määrus põhineb mittediskrimineerivatel põhimõtetel ja objektiivsetel kriteeriumidel. See

hõlmab kõiki sektoreid ja igasugust majandustegevust ning selles keskendutakse

moonutustele, mida põhjustab siseturul ükskõik milline välisriigi subsiidium. Määruse

kohaldamisel järgitakse igati rahvusvahelisi kohustusi. Kuigi komisjon on jätkuvalt

pühendunud konstruktiivsele dialoogile ja koostööle kolmandate riikide ametiasutuste ja

ettevõtjatega, jätkab ta kõigi määruse alusel kättesaadavate uurimis- ja menetlusvahendite

kasutamist, et tagada määruse tõhus kohaldamine ja kindlustada siseturul võrdsed

tingimused.

Käesoleva aruande eesmärk on esitada Euroopa Parlamendile ja nõukogule määruse

esimese läbivaatamise järeldused.

Aruanne on koostatud kooskõlas määruse artikli 52 lõikega 2, mille kohaselt peab

komisjon vaatama läbi oma määruse rakendamise ja täitmise tagamise praktika, eelkõige

artiklite 4, 5, 6 ja 9 kohaldamise ning artikli 20 lõikes 3 ja artikli 28 lõigetes 1 ja 2

sätestatud teatamiskünniste osas. Läbivaatamise käigus peaks komisjon esitama ka

aruande, mis käsitleb kolmandate riikide subsiidiumikontrolli süsteemidega seotud

suundumusi rahvusvahelistes suhetes.

Määrus jõustus 13. jaanuaril 2023 ja seda hakati kohaldama 13. juulil 2023. Eelneva

teatamise kohustust koondumiste puhul, mis on sätestatud määruse artiklis 21, ja

riigihankemenetluste puhul, mis on sätestatud määruse artiklis 28, kohaldatakse alates

13. oktoobrist 2023. Seega hõlmab käesolev aruanne kolme esimest määruse rakendamise

ja täitmise tagamise aastat.

Määruse täitmise tagab üksnes komisjon. Määruse kohaldamine seoses koondumistega ja

ex officio uurimise mehhanismi üldine kasutamine kuulub konkurentsi peadirektoraadi

vastutusalasse. Määruse kohaldamine seoses riigihankemenetlustega ning

riigihankemenetluste ja sarnaste avaliku sektori kulutustega seotud ex officio uurimise

mehhanismi kasutamine jääb siseturu, tööstuse, ettevõtluse ja VKEde peadirektoraadi

1 Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 14. detsembri 2022. aasta määrus (EL) 2022/2560, mis käsitleb

siseturgu moonutavaid välisriigi subsiidiume (ELT L 330, 23.12.2022, lk 1–45,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj).

2

vastutusalasse. Selline vastutuse jaotus kajastab talituste kogemusi konkurentsieeskirjade

täitmise tagamisel ja riigihangetes ning toetab määruse ühtset kohaldamist.

Hinnates määruse rakendamist ja täitmise tagamist esimestel aastatel, tugines komisjon

kvalitatiivsetele ja kvantitatiivsetele tõenditele, sealhulgas teabele, mis saadi seoses

määruse läbivaatamisega välistöövõtjalt tellitud uuringu käigus2 . Läbivaatamisel võeti

arvesse ka teavet, mis laekus komisjoni korraldatud konsultatsioonide käigus

(sihtotstarbeline avalik konsultatsioon, avalik küsimustik, kus küsiti konkreetset

tagasisidet määruse rakendamise kohta, ja tagasisidekorje), 3 ning komisjoni praktika

sisehindamist.

Kokkuvõttes on määruse rakendamise ja täitmise tagamise esimestest aastatest näha, et

määrus täidab oma eesmärki ja aitab saavutada seatud eesmärki säilitada siseturul võrdsed

tingimused. Koondumiste ja riigihangete puhul esitatud eelteatistega seoses on komisjon

juba algatanud mitu määrusekohast põhjalikku uurimist, millest mõni on lõpetatud, kuna

pooled on võtnud kohustusi välisriigi subsiidiumide põhjustatud siseturu moonutuste

kõrvaldamiseks. Komisjon on algatanud ka mitu põhjalikku ex officio uurimist, mis on

käesoleva aruande avaldamise ajal alles pooleli, ning on samuti kasutanud oma kontrolli-

ja sekkumisvolitusi. Sidusrühmade tagasisides leidsid määruse eesmärgid laialdast

tunnustust ja toetust. Samas väitsid sidusrühmad, et määrus, eelkõige eelneva teatamise

kord, põhjustab ebaproportsionaalseid kulusid. Nad kutsusid üles lihtsustama norme ja

suurendama õiguskindlust määruse teatavate mõistete osas.

Lisateavet läbivaatamise kohta leiab aruandele lisatud komisjoni talituste töödokumendist.

2. LÄBIVAATAMISE JÄRELDUSED

2.1. Esimesed määruse rakendamise aastad ja komisjoni tegevus sidusrühmadele

suuniste andmiseks

2.1.1. Komisjoni tegevus

10. juulil 2023 võttis komisjon vastu rakendusmääruse (EL) 2023/1441 üksikasjaliku

korra kohta, mille alusel komisjon korraldab menetlusi vastavalt välisriigi subsiidiumide

määrusele (edaspidi „rakendusmäärus“). Rakendusmääruses on sätestatud vormid

välisriigi subsiidiumide määruse kohaste eelteatiste esitamiseks komisjonile 4 .

Rakendusmäärus ja seonduvad vormid võimaldasid võtta kiiresti kasutusele

teavitamispõhise täitmise tagamise korra.

Komisjon on astunud alates määruse jõustumisest mitmeid samme, et tagada

sidusrühmadele suurem läbipaistvus ja suunised, nagu on kirjeldatud täpsemalt allpool.

2 Multiple Mixed Framework Contract for the Provision of Expert Consultancy Services and Studies

in the Context of Investigations and Enforcement Related to Foreign Subsidies (Mitmekordne

kombineeritud struktuuriga leping ekspertide nõustamisteenuste osutamiseks ja uuringute

tegemiseks seoses välisriigi subsiidiumidega seotud uurimiste ja täitemeetmetega)

(COMP/2023/OP/0017). 3 Määruse läbivaatamisega seoses korraldatud avaliku konsultatsiooni „Välisriigi subsiidiumid –

läbivaatamisaruanne“ kokkuvõttev aruanne portaalis „Avaldage arvamust!“. 4 Rakendusmääruse I lisa sisaldab vormi FS-CO koondumisest teatamiseks vastavalt määrusele ja

II lisa vormi FS-PP riigihankemenetluse raames teatamiseks vastavalt määrusele. Rakendusmäärus

hõlmab ka norme toimikule juurdepääsu ja konfidentsiaalse teabe kohta, läbipaistvusnõudeid ja

norme tähtaegade arvutamiseks, samuti komisjoni algatatavaid uurimismenetlusi, sealhulgas

uurimisaluse ettevõtja poolse kohustuste pakkumise menetluslikke üksikasju.

3

2024. aasta juulis, aasta pärast määruse kohaldamise algust, avaldati komisjoni talituste

töödokument, 5 milles esitati esialgsed selgitused määruse põhimõistete kohta.

Töödokument sisaldab määruse oluliste mõistete esialgseid tõlgendusi ja eelkõige

tegureid, mida tuleb arvesse võtta moonutuse olemasolu hindamisel, ning tasakaalu

hindamisel kohaldatavat metoodikat.

Komisjoni talitused ajakohastavad korrapäraselt määrust puudutavate küsimuste ja

vastuste rubriiki komisjoni veebisaidil6. Ajakohastamisel vaadeldakse praktikas korduvalt

esile kerkinud probleeme. Vastustes antakse mitmesugustel teemadel lisasuuniseid,

sealhulgas menetluslike ja jurisdiktsiooniga seotud aspektide kohta (nagu

teatamiskohustused, rakendusmääruse kohased erandid, künnise arvutamine ja välisriigi

rahalised toetused).

2026. aasta jaanuaris avaldas komisjon määrust käsitlevad suunised, mis on oluline

verstapost sidusrühmade jaoks prognoositavuse ja läbipaistvuse suurendamisel 7 . Neis

sidusrühmadele mõeldud suunistes käsitletakse välisriigi subsiidiumide põhjustatud

siseturu moonutuste hindamist, tasakaalu hindamist ja komisjoni sekkumisvolitusi selliste

koondumiste või riigihankemenetluste puhul, mis jäävad allapoole kehtestatud künniseid.

Peale selle avaldab komisjon korrapäraselt teavet juhtumite kohta, määrusekohaste

põhjalike uurimiste lõpetamisel tehtud otsuste mittekonfidentsiaalseid versioone (ja

põhjalike uurimiste algatamise otsuste kokkuvõtteid) ning ülevaateid, mis käsitlevad

määrusega seotud poliitilist arengut (nt lühiülevaade määruse täitmise tagamise esimesest

100 päevast, 8 määrust käsitlevad suunised 9 ) ja komisjoni praktikat (nt lühiülevaade

esimesest lõplikust kohustuste võtmise otsusest, mis võeti vastu määruse koondumisi

käsitleva peatüki alusel seoses juhtumiga FS.100011 10 ). Lisaks on konkurentsi

peadirektoraadil koondumismenetluste jaoks spetsiaalne välisriigi subsiidiumide määruse

register, mis suurendab läbipaistvust ja mille kaudu teavitatakse üldsust pooleliolevatest

koondumisjuhtumitest, mida menetletakse määruse alusel, pärast seda, kui nendest on

ametlikult teatatud11.

Komisjoni talitused suhtlevad spetsiaalse riiklike kontaktpunktide võrgustiku ja komisjoni

eksperdirühmade kaudu ka liikmesriikidega ning mitmesugustel määrusega seotud

5 Komisjoni talituste töödokument „Initial clarifications on the application of Article 4(1), Article 6

and Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market

(Esialgsed selgitused siseturgu moonutavaid välisriigi subsiidiume käsitleva määruse

(EL) 2022/2560 artikli 4 lõike 1, artikli 6 ja artikli 27 lõike 1 kohaldamise kohta),

SWD(2024) 201 final. 6 Konkurentsi peadirektoraadi veebisait, küsimused ja vastused välisriigi subsiidiumide määruse

kohta.

Siseturu, tööstuse, ettevõtluse ja VKEde peadirektoraadi veebisait, küsimused ja vastused välisriigi

subsiidiumide määruse kohta. 7 Komisjoni teatis „Suunised Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EL) 2022/2560 (mis käsitleb

siseturgu moonutavaid välisriigi subsiidiume) teatavate sätete kohaldamise kohta“,

C(2026) 42 final. 8 „The Foreign Subsidies Regulation – 100 days since the start of the notification obligation for

concentrations“ (Välisriigi subsiidiumide määrus – 100 päeva pärast koondumisest teatamise

kohustuse algust), Competition FSR brief, nr 1, veebruar 2024. 9 „Guidelines on the implementation of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation („FSR Guidelines“) –

Shedding light on key concepts“ (Suunised välisriigi subsiidiumide määruse rakendamise kohta –

põhimõistete selgitused), Competition FSR brief, nr 1, märts 2026. 10 „The e&/PPF Telecom case – Interference on the foreign subsidies line to the EU“ (Juhtum

e& / PPF Telecom – sekkumine seoses ELi suunatud välisriigi subsiidiumidega), Competition FSR

brief, nr 1, detsember 2025. 11 Siseturu, tööstuse, ettevõtluse ja VKEde peadirektoraat uurib praegu võimalusi suurendada

riigihankemenetluste läbipaistvust, tagades samal ajal riiklike riigihankemenetluste

konfidentsiaalsuse.

4

teemadel korraldatavatel konverentsidel ka sidusrühmadega, nagu õiguspraktikud ja

ettevõtjate ühendused, millega suurendatakse veelgi selgust komisjoni praktika osas.

2.1.2. Läbivaatamise tulemused

Komisjoni tegevus määruse kohta lisasuuniste andmisel kiideti heaks ja sellesse suhtutakse

soosivalt. Ometi selgusid läbivaatamise käigus valdkonnad – eelkõige mitu määruse

põhimõistet ja analüütilise raamistiku kohaldamine üksikjuhtudel –, kus sidusrühmade

meelest on vaja suuremat õiguskindlust. Allpool on esitatud mõned näited.

Seoses kolmanda riigi ametiasutuselt saadava välisriigi rahalise toetuse mõistega määruse

artiklis 3 tunnistavad sidusrühmad, et see mõiste tuleb määratleda laialt, et hõlmata

mitmesugused meetmed potentsiaalselt moonutavate subsiidiumide avastamiseks.

Tagasisidest on siiski näha ka seda, et selle mõiste lai määratlus on probleemiks, kui

ettevõtjad peavad koguma välisriigi rahalise toetuse kohta teavet mitmes jurisdiktsioonis

ja otsustama, kas sellest tuleb seoses määrusekohase eelneva teatamisega aru anda.

Mis puudutab moonutuste hindamist määruse artikli 4 alusel, siis sidusrühmade sõnul on

raske prognoosida, kuidas seda kontseptsiooni konkreetsetel juhtudel kohaldatakse. Seda

ebakindlust süvendas väidetavalt asjaolu, et komisjoni otsustuspraktika oli aruande

koostamisega seoses korraldatud konsultatsioonide ajal piiratud.

Kõige tõenäolisemalt siseturgu moonutavate välisriigi subsiidiumide kohta, millele on

osutatud määruse artiklis 5, märkisid sidusrühmad, et ehkki tegemist on kasulike

näitajatega, püsib teatav ebakindlus seoses subsiidiumidega, mis „otseselt hõlbustavad

koondumist“ või võimaldavad esitada „põhjendamatult soodsaid pakkumusi“.

Mis puudutab määruse artikli 6 kohast tasakaalu hindamist, siis sidusrühmadel on hea

meel, et seda on võimalik määruse alusel teha. Selle praktilist tähtsust peetakse siiski

piiratuks, kuna näiteid selle kohta, kuidas komisjon tasakaalu hindamist praktikas

kohaldab, veel ei ole.

2.2. Määruse täitmise tagamise esimestest aastatest on näha, et määrus täidab

oma eesmärki

Komisjon tagab määruse täitmise kolme peamise menetluse kaudu:

a) tingimuslik eelteatamine koondumiste puhul, kus vähemalt üks ühinevatest

ettevõtjatest, omandatav ettevõtja või ühisettevõte on asutatud liidus ja selle

kogukäive liidus on vähemalt 500 miljonit eurot ning koondumise osalised on

saanud kokkuleppe sõlmimisele, avaliku pakkumise väljakuulutamisele või

aktsiate kontrollpaki omandamisele eelnenud kolme aasta jooksul välisriigi rahalist

toetust kokku üle 50 miljoni euro;

b) tingimuslik eelteatamine riigihankemenetluste puhul, kus lepingu hinnanguline

maksumus on vähemalt 250 miljonit eurot – või vähemalt 125 miljonit eurot, kui

tegemist on osadeks jagatud riigihankega – ning pakkuja ja tema peamised

alltöövõtjad või tarnijad on saanud teatamisele eelnenud kolme aasta jooksul

välisriigi rahalist toetust kokku vähemalt 4 miljonit eurot. Kui riigihankes osalejad

on saanud välisriigi rahalist toetust vähem kui 4 miljonit eurot, tuleb siiski esitada

deklaratsioon;

c) ex officio menetlus kõigi muude turuolukordade jaoks, mille puhul komisjon võib

alustada uurimist omal algatusel.

5

Kokkuvõttes on määruse täitmise tagamise esimestest aastatest näha, et määrus täidab oma

eesmärki ja toimib praktikas hästi. Määrust peetakse tõhusaks vahendiks, millega on

kaotatud enne määruse vastuvõtmist eksisteerinud õiguslik lünk. Lisaks leitakse, et

eesmärk tagada siseturul võrdsed tingimused on õiguspärane ja proportsionaalne. Määruse

täitmise tagamine on alates määruse kohaldamise algusest pidevalt paranenud ning

komisjon on saanud määruse sisuliste ja menetlussätete kohaldamisel väärtuslikke

kogemusi.

2.2.1. Ex officio uurimised

2.2.1.1. Teave juhtumite kohta

Komisjon hindab pidevalt, kas on piisavalt tõendeid, et algatada ex officio uurimine,

tuginedes oma analüüsile, sidusrühmadelt saadud teabele ja/või turuteabe analüüsile.

Käesoleva aruande avaldamise ajaks oli komisjon algatanud kooskõlas määruse artikli 10

lõikega 3 põhjaliku uurimise seoses kahe juhtumiga:

a) Juhtum FS.100068 – Nuctech. Komisjon algatas 11. detsembril 2025 põhjaliku

uurimise, et hinnata, kas Nuctech saab ohutuvastussüsteemide tootmisel ja

müümisel ning seonduvate teenuste osutamisel liidus kasu välisriigi

subsiidiumidest, mis võivad moonutada siseturgu. Võimalikud välisriigi

subsiidiumid hõlmasid toetusi ning maksusoodustusi ja soodusrahastamist, mis

võisid parandada Nuctechi konkurentsiseisundit siseturul ja mõjutada negatiivselt

konkurentsi12. Juhtum algatati 2024. aasta aprillis, kui võeti vastu otsus, milles

nõuti, et Nuctech alluks määruse artikli 14 lõike 3 kohastele kontrollidele (edaspidi

„kontrolliotsus“).

b) Juhtum FS.100143 – Goldwind. Komisjon algatas 3. veebruaril 2026 põhjaliku

uurimise, et hinnata Goldwindi tegevust tuuleturbiinide tootmisel ja müümisel ning

seonduvate teenuste osutamisel ELis. Võimalikud välisriigi subsiidiumid hõlmasid

toetusi, maksusoodustusi ja laenude vormis soodusrahastamist. Komisjonil on

esialgne kahtlus, et need välisriigi subsiidiumid võisid parandada Goldwindi

konkurentsiseisundit siseturul ja mõjutada negatiivselt konkurentsi13.

2.2.1.2. Läbivaatamine liidu kohtutes

Ex officio uurimiste raames on liidu kohtutel palutud mõni komisjoni uurimistoiming läbi

vaadata:

a) Kohtuasi T-284/24 – Nuctech. Nuctech esitas 2024. aasta mais Üldkohtule hagi

komisjoni kontrolliotsuse tühistamiseks 14 . Samal ajal taotles Nuctech ajutiste

meetmete võtmist, et peatada komisjoni kontrolliotsuse kohaldamine kuni

põhimenetluse tulemuse selgumiseni 15 . Üldkohtu president lükkas 2024. aasta

augustis ajutiste meetmete taotluse tagasi, 16 mida Euroopa Kohtu asepresident

12 Kokkuvõtlik teade põhjaliku uurimise algatamise kohta juhtumis FS.100068 – NUCTECH

vastavalt määruse (EL) 2022/2560 artikli 10 lõike 3 punktile d (ELT C, C/2026/545). 13 Kokkuvõtlik teade põhjaliku uurimise algatamise kohta juhtumis FS.100143 – Goldwind vastavalt

määruse (EL) 2022/2560 artikli 10 lõike 3 punktile d (ELT C, C/2026/1120). 14 Kohtuasi T-284/24, Nuctech Warsaw ja Nuctech Netherlands vs. komisjon, ELT C, C/2024/4107,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4107/oj. 15 Kohtuasi T-284/24 R, Nuctech Warsaw Company Limited Sp. z o.o. ja Nuctech Netherlands BV

vs. komisjon, ECLI:EU:T:2024:564. 16 Kohtuasi T-284/24 R, Üldkohtu presidendi 12. augusti 2024. aasta määrus, ELT C, C/2024/5824,

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5824/oj.

6

kinnitas 2025. aasta märtsis apellatsiooniastmes17. Käesoleva aruande koostamise

ajal oli kontrolliotsuse tühistamise hagi menetlemine Üldkohtus veel pooleli.

b) Kohtuasi T-335/26 – Goldwind. 2026. aasta mais esitas Goldwind Üldkohtule

tühistamishagi, vaidlustades komisjoni teabenõude,18 ja taotles ajutiste meetmete

võtmist, et peatada selle kohaldamine19. Teabenõue oli osa põhjalikust uurimisest,

mis oli algatatud seoses Goldwindi tegevusega ELi tuuleenergiasektoris

juhtumi FS.100143 raames. Käesoleva aruande koostamise ajal oli mõlema

taotluse menetlemine Üldkohtus veel pooleli.

2.2.1.3. Läbivaatamise tulemused

Ex officio menetlus võimaldab komisjonil hinnata ja käsitleda potentsiaalselt moonutavaid

välisriigi subsiidiume, mis mõjutavad mis tahes turuolukorda ja majandustegevust

siseturul. Läbivaatamise tulemused osutavad sellele, et ex officio uurimise mehhanism

toimib nagu ette nähtud ja et asjaomaste sätetega on loodud tõhus raamistik, et taotleda

määruse eesmärki tagada siseturul võrdsed tingimused.

Ehkki käimasolevate uurimiste tulemused ei ole veel teada, on määrus võimaldanud

komisjonil tegutseda, tuginedes piisavatele tõenditele siseturgu moonutavate välisriigi

subsiidiumide kohta. Määruse puudumisel ei oleks komisjon saanud neid uurimisi

korraldada ega hinnata, kas moonutused siseturul olid tingitud välisriigi subsiidiumidest.

Sidusrühmadelt saadud tagasiside osutab ebakindlusele ex officio uurimiste kestuse osas.

Määruse täitmise tagamise esimestel aastatel saadud kogemused näitavad, et uurimiste

kestus varieerub ja et uurimine kestab kauem eelkõige neil juhtudel, kui uurimise all

olevatel ettevõtjatel kulub nõutud teabe esitamiseks rohkem aega. Mõnel juhul mõjutavad

uurimise kestust ka ELi kohtutele esitatud hagid.

2.2.2. Teatamine koondumistest

2.2.2.1. Teave juhtumite kohta

Koondumisest eelneva teatamise kohustus hakkas kehtima 13. oktoobril 2023 ja 31. maiks

2026 oli komisjon saanud 273 ametlikku teatist. Neist juhtumitest 247 lõpetati pärast

esialgset läbivaatamist, neli võeti esialgse läbivaatamise etapis tagasi ja 19 puhul on

esialgne läbivaatamine alles pooleli.

Kolme juhtumi puhul algatas komisjon põhjaliku uurimise:

a) Juhtum FS.100011 – e& / PPF Telecom. See juhtum hõlmas Tšehhis,

Bulgaarias, Ungaris, Serbias ja Slovakkias tegutseva

telekommunikatsioonioperaatori PPF Telecom Groupi (v.a tegevus Tšehhis)

omandamist Araabia Ühendemiraatides asuva operaatori Emirates

Telecommunications Group (e&) poolt. Komisjon tegi kindlaks piiramatu

riigigarantii, toetuste ja laenude vormis antud välisriigi subsiidiumid ja leidis, et

need võivad pärast tehingut ühinenud üksuse tasandil konkurentsi moonutada.

Selle mure lahendamiseks kohustusid pooled kaotama riigigarantii ning hoidma e&

ja sihtettevõtja tegevuse ELis lahus.. Kohustuste võtmise otsuse lõplik

17 Kohtuasi C-720/24 P(R), Euroopa Kohtu asepresidendi 21. märtsi 2025. aasta määrus,

ECLI:EU:C:2025:205. 18 Kohtuasi T-335/26, Goldwind Science & Technology vs. komisjon, põhikohtuasi, 29. mail 2026

esitatud hagiavaldus. 19 Kohtuasi T-335/26 R, Goldwind Science & Technology vs. komisjon, ajutiste meetmete taotlus,

esitatud 29. mail 2026.

7

mittekonfidentsiaalne versioon on avaldatud konkurentsi peadirektoraadi

veebisaidil20.

b) Juhtum FS.100156 – ADNOC/Covestro. See juhtum hõlmas Saksamaa

kemikaalitootja Covestro omandamist Abu Dhabi National Oil Company

(ADNOC) poolt. Komisjon leidis, et välisriigi subsiidiumid, sealhulgas piiramatu

riigigarantii ADNOCile ja Covestro kapitali suurendamine, tekitasid moonutusi nii

omandamisprotsessis kui ka omandamisjärgses tegevuses. Pooled kohustusid

muutma ADNOCi põhikirja, et kaotada riigigarantii ja litsentsida turuosalistele

teatavaid Covestro patente. Kohustuste võtmise otsuse esialgne

mittekonfidentsiaalne versioon on avaldatud konkurentsi peadirektoraadi

veebisaidil21.

c) Juhtum FS.100253 – JD.COM/CECONOMY. See juhtum hõlmab

tarbeelektroonikale ja kodumasinatele spetsialiseerunud Saksa jaemüüja

Ceconomy AG omandamist äriühingu JD.com poolt, mis kuulub Hiina kontserni,

kes tegutseb Hiinas jaemüügisektoris ja e-kaubanduse platvormi operaatorina.

Komisjon leidis esialgse läbivaatamise käigus piisavalt märke välisriigi

subsiidiumidest, mis moonutavad ELi siseturgu, ning algatas 28. mail 2026

põhjaliku uurimise. Käesoleva aruande koostamise ajal oli põhjalik uurimine alles

pooleli.

Komisjon ei kasutanud läbivaatamisperioodil oma määruse artikli 21 lõike 5 kohast õigust

nõuda eelnevat teatamist koondumisest, mis jääb allapoole õiguslikke künniseid.

2.2.2.2. Läbivaatamise tulemused

Määruses sätestatud koondumistest teatamise korra rakendamise esimestel aastatel saadud

kogemused näitavad, et määrus täidab oma eesmärki. Läbivaatamise peamised tulemused

on esitatud allpool.

Teatiste arv (ligikaudu 100 teatist aastas) ületas komisjoni esialgseid prognoose (määruse

ettepanekule lisatud mõjuhinnangus22 prognoositi 30–40 teatist aastas). Komisjon lõpetas

pärast esialgset läbivaatamist ligikaudu 97 % teatatud koondumiste käsitlemise,

algatamata põhjalikku uurimist. See osakaal on kooskõlas nõukogu 20. jaanuari

2004. aasta määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (kontrolli kehtestamise kohta ettevõtjate

koondumiste üle) (edaspidi „ühinemismäärus“) alusel läbi vaadatud ja esimeses etapis

heaks kiidetud juhtumite osakaaluga23.

20 Komisjoni 24. septembri 2024. aasta otsus, milles järeldatakse, et tänu siduvatele kohustustele ei

moonuta koondumisel esinevad välisriigi subsiidiumid siseturgu (juhtum FS.100011 –

e& / PPF Telecom Group), C(2024) 6745 final. 21 Provisional non-confidential version of Commission decision of 14.11.2025 on finding that, with

the binding commitments the foreign subsidies in the concentration do not distort the internal market

(Case FS.100156 – ADNOC/COVESTRO) (Komisjoni 14. novembri 2025. aasta otsus, millega

järeldatakse, et tänu siduvatele kohustustele ei moonuta koondumisel esinevad välisriigi

subsiidiumid siseturgu (juhtum FS.100156 – ADNOC/COVESTRO) (esialgne

mittekonfidentsiaalne versioon)), C(2025) 7800 final/2. 22 Komisjoni talituste töödokument „Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation

of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market“

(Mõjuhinnang, mis on lisatud ettepanekule võtta vastu Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määrus

siseturgu moonutavate välisriigi subsiidiumide kohta). 23 Komisjoni veebisaidil avaldatud ametliku statistika kohaselt on selliste juhtumite osakaal, mis

tunnistati ühinemismääruse kohase uurimise esimeses etapis kooskõlas selle määruse artikli 6

lõike 1 punktiga b ilma kohustusteta siseturuga kokkusobivaks, jäänud viimasel viiel aastal igal

aastal vahemikku 93–99 %.

8

Käesoleva aruande avaldamise ajaks oli komisjon algatanud põhjaliku uurimise kolme

koondumise puhul. Kaks neist kiideti tingimuslikult heaks pärast seda, kui teatise esitajad

olid nõustunud võtma kohustusi, et kõrvaldada välisriigi subsiidiumide põhjustatavad

võimalikud turumoonutused. Ühe koondumise põhjalik uurimine oli veel pooleli.

Määrus on võimaldanud komisjonil kontrollida koondumisi, teha kindlaks, kas

koondumiste puhul esineb välisriigi subsiidiume, mis põhjustavad või võivad põhjustada

siseturul moonutusi, ning tegeleda nendega, rakendades määruses sätestatud regulatiivset

protsessi. Kaks juhtumit, mis lõpetati kohustuste võtmisel, osutavad määruse tähtsusele

võrdsete tingimuste säilitamisel ja annavad omandajatele märku, et kuigi liit on jätkuvalt

avatud investeeringutele, kontrollitakse investeeringute puhul välisriigi subsiidiumide

olemasolu, tagamaks, et need ei moonuta siseturgu.

Sidusrühmad leiavad, et ELis saadava käibe künnis on selge ja asjakohane meede

asjaomaste tehingute kindlaksmääramiseks. Samuti kiitsid nad heaks määruses

ühisettevõtete suhtes rakendatava lähenemisviisi, kus käive arvutatakse ühisettevõtte enda,

mitte selle emaettevõtjate käibe alusel, 24 mis on kaasa toonud teatamisele kuuluvate

tehingute arvu vähenemise võrreldes ühinemismäärusega.

Täitmise tagamise esimestest aastatest on selgelt näha, kui väärtuslik on teatamiseelne

suhtlemine juhtumeid menetlevate komisjoni töörühmadega, mida teatise esitajad

laialdaselt teevad ja toetavad. Sidusrühmad on kiitnud nende töörühmade

reageerimisvõimet, mis suurendab teatamisprotsessi selgust ja tõhusust. Samuti

valmistavad sidusrühmadele heameelt rakendusmääruse alusel aruandluskohustustest

tehtavad erandid ja võimalus taotleda komisjonilt teatava teabe puhul vabastust.

Läbivaatamise tulemustest on näha ka kaks peamist sidusrühmadele muret valmistavat

küsimust. Esimene on seotud välisriigi rahalist toetust käsitlevate andmete kogumisega,

mida ettevõtjad peavad tegema enne teatamist. Sidusrühmade meelest on see

ressursimahukas ja kogutav teave ei pruugi olla moonutuste ohu kindlakstegemisel

asjakohane. Teine mure on seotud ebakindlusega, mida tajutakse seoses komisjoni

sekkumisvolitustega, mida peetakse tehingute planeerimisel ja riskihindamisel

potentsiaalselt häirivaks, olenemata nende õiguspärasest eesmärgist hõlmata künnisest

allapoole jäävad koondumised, mille puhul võib esineda moonutavaid välisriigi

subsiidiume.

2.2.3. Teabe esitamine riigihankemenetlustes

2.2.3.1. Teave juhtumite kohta

Määruse 4. peatüki kohaselt peavad ettevõtjad esitama teatise või deklaratsiooni välisriigi

rahalise toetuse kohta, kui nad osalevad suures riigihankes, eriti kui lepingu hinnanguline

maksumus ületab 250 miljonit eurot – või 125 miljonit eurot, kui tegemist on osadeks

jagatud riigihankega – ja ettevõtja on eelneva kolme aasta jooksul saanud välisriigi rahalist

toetust kokku vähemalt 4 miljonit eurot kolmanda riigi kohta.

Alates teatamiskohustuse algusest 13. oktoobril 2023 kuni 31. maini 2026 sai komisjon

ettevõtjatelt 863 riigihankemenetluse raames 5 150 esildist, sealhulgas

4 293 deklaratsiooni, 733 teatist ja 124 eelteatist. Komisjon algatas nende juhtumitega

seoses neli põhjalikku uurimist, millest üks lõppes lõpliku kohustuste võtmise otsusega ja

kolm lõpetati pärast seda, kui ettevõtjad olid riigihankemenetlusest loobunud:

24 Ühisettevõtte enda käivet peetakse paremaks iseseisva majandustegevuse (ja mitte üksnes

abitegevuse) näitajaks.

9

a) Juhtum FSP.100147 – raudteeveeremi tarnimine Bulgaarias. Komisjon algatas

16. veebruaril 2024 põhjaliku uurimise, et hinnata, kas ettevõtja CRRC Qingdao

Sifang, mis kuulub Hiina riigile kuuluvasse kontserni CRRC, sai välisriigi

subsiidiume, mis võimaldasid tal esitada Bulgaaria raudteeprojekti jaoks

põhjendamatult soodsa pakkumuse. 26. märtsil 2024, pärast seda, kui ettevõtja oli

hankemenetlusest loobunud, lõpetati juhtum ilma määruse artikli 31 kohast

lõplikku otsust vastu võtmata.

b) Juhtumid FSP.100151 ja FSP.100154 – päikeseelektripargi projekteerimine,

ehitamine ja käitamine Rumeenias. Komisjon algatas 3. aprillil 2025 kaks

põhjalikku uurimist, et hinnata, kas i) Shanghai Electric UK Ltd. ja Shanghai

Electric Hong Kong International Engineering Company ning ii) kontserni

ENEVO liige LONGi Solar Technologie Consortium olid saanud

päikeseelektripargi projekteerimiseks, ehitamiseks ja käitamiseks Rumeenias

algatatud avatud riigihankemenetluses potentsiaalselt moonutavaid subsiidiume.

7. juunil 2024, pärast seda, kui ettevõtjad olid hankemenetlusest loobunud, lõpetati

mõlemad juhtumid ilma määruse artikli 31 kohast lõplikku otsust vastu võtmata.

c) Juhtum FSP.103117 – Portugali Lissaboni metroo lilla liini projekteerimine ja

ehitamine, vagunite hankimine ja hooldusteenused.21. aprillil 2026 kiideti

tingimuslikult heaks ettevõtja Mota-Engil Engenharia e Construção, S.A. (edaspidi

„Mota-Engil“) juhitud konsortsiumi esitatud pakkumus. Menetlus puudutas

Metropolitano de Lisboa E.P.E. avatud riigihankemenetlust „Lissaboni metroo lilla

liini projekteerimine ja ehitamine, vagunite hankimine ja hooldusteenused“. Mota-

Engili pakkumuses tugineti kontserni CRRC kuuluvale ettevõtjale Portugal CRRC

kui peamisele alltöövõtjale veeremi tarnimisel ja sellega seotud teenuste

osutamisel. Komisjon leidis tõendeid selle kohta, et valitsuse toetuste,

maksumeetmete ja riigihankelepingute alusel makstud hüvitiste vormis oli saadud

välisriigi subsiidiume, mis ületasid käivet, mis oleks saadud konkurentsipõhise,

läbipaistva ja mittediskrimineeriva menetluse käigus, ja mis võimaldasid ettevõtjal

Portugal CRRC esitada Mota-Engili juhitud konsortsiumile soodsa pakkumuse ja

seejärel konsortsiumil esitada põhjendamatult soodsa pakkumuse, mistõttu need

subsiidiumid moonutasid konkurentsi riigihankemenetluses. Probleemi

lahendamiseks kohustus Mota-Engil asendama ettevõtja Portugal CRRC kogu

lepingu täitmise perioodiks Poola ettevõtjaga Pojazdy Szynowe PESA Bydgoszcz

Spółka Akcyjna. Käesoleva aruande avaldamise ajaks ei olnud kohustuste võtmise

otsuse lõplikku mittekonfidentsiaalset versiooni veel avaldatud.

Lisaks nendele põhjalikele uurimistele tunnistas komisjon kaks pakkumust nõuetele

mittevastavaks, kuna esitatud teave oli mittetäielik:

a) Juhtumid FSP.101606 ja FSP.101626 – otsused, millega kuulutatakse

pakkumus nõuetele mittevastavaks. Otsused puudutasid juhtumit FSP.101606,

mis hõlmas pakkumust pikamaatunneli ehitamiseks Poolas, ja

juhtumit FSP.101626, mis hõlmas pakkumust arvutite ja tööjaamade tarnimiseks

Prantsusmaal. Mõlema juhtumi puhul tegi komisjon otsuse, millega kuulutati

asjaomaste ettevõtjate esitatud teave mittetäielikuks ja nõuti, et nad esitaksid

kümne tööpäeva jooksul täieliku teatise. Kuna kummalgi juhul teatist ettenähtud

tähtajaks ei täiendatud, tegi komisjon 2025. aasta märtsis otsused, millega

tunnistati mõlemad pakkumused nõuetele mittevastavaks. Avaliku sektori hankijad

lükkasid nõuetele mittevastavad pakkumused tagasi ja mõlemad ettevõtjad jäeti

riigihankemenetlusest välja.

10

Komisjonil on määruse artikli 29 lõike 8 kohaselt õigus nõuda riigihankemenetluses

eelteatist välisriigi rahalise toetuse kohta ka juhul, kui asjaomased künnised ei ole ületatud.

Komisjon kasutas läbivaatamisperioodil seda õigust esimest korda:

a) Juhtum FSP.103175 – eelteatise taotlus. Taotlus esitati 2025. aasta novembris ja

see hõlmas kaht riigihankemenetlust, mis olid algatatud mitme kiirteelõigu

ehitamiseks Horvaatias. Kuna ettevõtja, kes oleks pidanud esitama eelteatise, ei

olnud oma aruandekohustust täitnud, nõudis asjaomane avaliku sektori hankija

kooskõlas määruse artikli 29 lõikega 3, et ettevõtja esitaks puuduva teatise. Lõpuks

tunnistas avaliku sektori hankija pakkumuse „vastuvõetamatuks, sobimatuks ja

tehniliselt kõlbmatuks“ ning jättis ettevõtja menetlusest kõrvale.

2.2.3.2. Läbivaatamise tulemused

Määruse täitmise tagamise esimestest aastatest on näha, et raamistik täidab oma eesmärki,

kuid kasulik oleks seda edasi täiustada.

Süsteem on osutunud tõhusaks: selles on käsitletud oodatust rohkem esildisi, ent tehtud

põhjalik läbivaatamine ainult piiratud arvul juhtudel. Põhjalike uurimiste, nõuetele

mittevastavuse juhtumite ja ühe eelteatise esitamise taotluse kõrval oli määrusel heidutav

mõju, mis väljendus selles, et ettevõtjad, kes ei soovinud saadud välisriigi rahalise toetuse

kohta teavet jagada, loobusid riigihankemenetlustest, mis edendas õiglasemat konkurentsi.

Hoolimata menetlusraamistiku keerukusest on komisjon pidanud kinni lühikestest

tähtaegadest ja viinud esialgsed läbivaatamised lõpule 20 tööpäeva jooksul. Sidusrühmad

on selle üle rõõmustanud, kuna see on tugevdanud ettevõtjate õiguskindlust ja toetanud

hankemenetluste sujuvat läbiviimist. Peale selle on leidnud laialdast heakskiitu komisjoni

järjekindlad suunised liikmesriikidele ning korrapärane ja konstruktiivne suhtlemine

sidusrühmadega, mis suurendab selgust ja edendab koostööd raamistiku rakendamisel.

Siiski on veel probleeme, eelkõige seoses lünkadega avaliku sektori hankijate teadlikkuses

ja sellega, et ettevõtjad ei täida oma teatamiskohustust. Võrreldes andmebaasis Tenders

Electronic Daily (TED) 25 avaldatud suuri hankemenetlusi ja hankemenetlusi, mis

hõlmavad vähemalt üht määruse kohaldamisalasse jäävat pakkumust, on näha, et nõuete

täitmine aja jooksul väheneb. Pärast määrusekohase teavitamise märkimisväärset

suurenemist 40 %-lt 70 %-le kahel esimesel määruse täitmise tagamise aastal vähenes

nõuete täitmine 2025. aasta lõpus 45 %-le.

Lisaks kuulub sidusrühmade tõstatatud peamiste probleemide hulka ettevõtjate

halduskoormus, mis on sidusrühmade sõnul tingitud ulatuslikest aruandluskohustustest,

keerukatest aruandluskünnistest ja esitamisvormidest. Raskuste tõttu välisriigi rahalise

toetuse kindlaksmääramisel ja sellest teatamisel on esitatud teave sageli ebatäielik,

mistõttu komisjon peab koguma puuduvad andmed esialgse läbivaatamise käigus.

Lühikesed tähtajad, mille järgimist raskendab tähtaja peatamise mehhanismi puudumine,

muudavad hindamise pingeliseks, eriti keerukate juhtumite puhul.

Kuigi suuniste andmisel ja läbipaistvuse suurendamisel on tehtud edusamme, märgivad

sidusrühmad jätkuvalt, et on vaja sihipäraselt parandada ja lihtsustada praegust raamistikku

ning edendada läbipaistvust, et toetada järjepidevamat täitmise tagamist ja suuremat

prognoositavust.

25 TED – ELi hanked, Euroopa Liidu teataja kaasanne.

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2.3. Kolmandate riikide subsiidiumikontrolli süsteemidega seotud suundumused

Vastavalt määruse artikli 52 lõikele 2 peab komisjon läbivaatamise raames esitama

aruande, mis käsitleb kolmandate riikide subsiidiumikontrolli süsteemidega seotud

suundumusi rahvusvahelistes suhetes.

Seepärast hinnati neid suundumusi määruse läbivaatamisega seoses tehtud uuringu käigus.

Hindamise tulemused on üksikasjalikumalt esitatud aruandele lisatud komisjoni talituste

töödokumendis.

Kokkuvõttes selgus kõnealuste suundumuste läbivaatamisel, et kolmandate riikide

subsiidiumikontrolli süsteemides ei ole pärast määruse vastuvõtmist olulist arengut

toimunud. Seetõttu on määrus jätkuvalt asjakohane, et kõrvaldada välisriigi subsiidiumide

põhjustatud siseturu moonutused, mille eest liidu tavapärased kaubanduse

kaitsemehhanismid ei kaitse.

Siiski on endiselt oluline neid suundumusi pidevalt jälgida, eriti pidades silmas kolmandate

riikide arenevat tööstuspoliitikat ja võimalikke tulevasi reforme rahvusvahelisel tasandil.

3. MÄÄRUSE TÕHUSUSE HINDAMINE

Läbivaatamise tulemused osutavad sellele, et määruse üldeesmärk on endiselt asjakohane,

ja laialdaselt on teada, et määrus aitab kaasa võrdsete tingimuste säilitamisele siseturul.

Sidusrühmad teatasid vajadusest suurendada õiguskindlust ja selgust määruse sisuliste

mõistete osas, mida tavaliselt seostatakse uue õigusraamistiku rakendamisega. Komisjon

kasutab määruse mõistete selgitamiseks mitut viisi, näiteks avaldas ta hiljuti määrust

käsitlevad suunised, ent ta avaldab ka põhjalike uurimiste lõpetamisel tehtavate lõplike

otsuste mittekonfidentsiaalsed versioonid, ajakohastab korrapäraselt määrust käsitlevaid

küsimusi ja vastuseid ning avaldab määrust käsitlevaid lühiülevaateid. Komisjon

pühendub sellele tööle ka tulevikus. Komisjon eeldab, et määrusega hõlmatud juhtumite

käsitlemise praktika täienemine toob sidusrühmadele rohkem selgust ja aitab paremini

mõista määruse konkreetseid mõisteid.

Komisjon jätkab ka määruseteemalist suhtlust sidusrühmade ja liikmesriikide

ametiasutustega.

Läbivaatamise tulemuste põhjal ei vaja määrus struktuurseid muutusi.

Kooskõlas komisjoni prioriteetidega aastateks 2024–2029 analüüsiti läbivaatamisel ka

rakendamisprotsessiga kaasnevat halduskoormust ettevõtjatele, sealhulgas väikestele ja

keskmise suurusega ettevõtjatele.

3.1. Ex officio menetlus

Läbivaatamine näitas, et määrusekohase ex officio menetluse rolli ja eesmärki

tunnustatakse laialdaselt.

Hiljutine põhjaliku uurimise algatamine kahe ex officio juhtumi puhul kooskõlas määruse

artikli 10 lõikega 3 võimaldab saada lisateavet lähenemisviisi kohta, mida komisjon

rakendab potentsiaalselt moonutavate välisriigi subsiidiumide hindamisel.

Seoses sidusrühmade väljendatud murega ex officio uurimiste kestuse pärast märgib

komisjon, et uurimiste kestus sõltub suuresti juhtumite keerukusest, täiendavate kaebuste

esitamisest liidu kohtutele ja uurimise all olevate ettevõtjate koostöö tasemest.

Seda arvesse võttes leiab komisjon, et ex officio menetlusega seoses ei ole vaja astuda ühtki

viivitamatut sammu. Komisjon jätkab pühendunult selle menetluse täielikku kasutamist,

kui see on vajalik tagamaks, et moonutavad välisriigi subsiidiumid ei kahjusta siseturgu,

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ELi konkurentsivõimet ega majandusjulgeolekut. Komisjon jätkab jõupingutusi, et

suurendada läbipaistvust ja anda lisateavet ex officio juhtumite puhul rakendatava

lähenemisviisi kohta kooskõlas käesolevas aruandes ja sellele lisatud komisjoni talituste

töödokumendis kirjeldatud tavadega.

3.2. Teatised koondumiste puhul

Nagu läbivaatamine kinnitas, on koondumiste puhul rakendatav eelneva teatamise kord

endiselt oluline määruse täitmise tagamise vahend, mis võimaldab komisjonil teha

kindlaks ja käsitleda moonutavaid välisriigi subsiidiume koondumiste kontekstis ja enne

nende rakendamist.

Samal ajal võtab komisjon teadmiseks sidusrühmade tagasiside halduskoormuse kohta,

mis tuleneb välisriigi rahalist toetust käsitlevate andmete kogumisest määrusekohase

koondumistest teatamise jaoks. Selle tagasiside arvessevõtmiseks võib komisjon kaaluda

menetluskorra kohandamist, et vähendada halduskoormust ja hõlbustada nõuete täitmist,

säilitades samal ajal määruse tõhususe.

Lisaks pühendub komisjon ka edaspidi määruse täitmise tagamise läbipaistvuse

kindlustamisele, sealhulgas küsimuste ja vastuste ajakohastamisele, määruse põhiteemasid

käsitlevate täiendavate lühiülevaadete avaldamisele ja juhtumitega seotud teabe

õigeaegsele avaldamisele.

3.3. Teatised riigihankemenetlustes

Nagu läbivaatamine kinnitas, on riigihangete puhul rakendatav eelneva teatamise kord

määruse oluline osa, mis võimaldab komisjonil teha kindlaks ja käsitleda potentsiaalselt

moonutavaid välisriigi subsiidiume ka suure maksumusega riigihankemenetlustes. Samal

ajal tunduvad täitmise tagamise esimestel aastatel saadud kogemused ja sidusrühmade

tagasiside osutavat sellele, et välisriigi rahalisest toetusest teatamisega seotud

aruandlusnõuded, eelkõige vormi FS-PP koostamine ja selle jaoks teabe kogumine, võivad

põhjustada ettevõtjatele ebaproportsionaalset koormust.

Nende probleemide lahendamiseks võib komisjon kaaluda menetluskorra kohandamist, et

vähendada ettevõtjate halduskoormust ja hõlbustada nõuete täitmist, säilitades samal ajal

määruse tõhususe.

Samal ajal jätkab komisjon jõupingutusi, et parandada teadlikkust ja nõuete täitmist ning

edendada oma täitmise tagamise alase tegevuse läbipaistvust, sealhulgas avaliku sektori

hankijatele, ettevõtjatele ja praktikutele suunatud teavitustegevust. Samuti süvendab

komisjon veelgi dialoogi liikmesriikidega, vahetades korrapäraselt teavet riiklike

kontaktpunktidega ja määruse riigihangete eksperdirühmaga, et tagada kogu liidus ühtne

arusaam määrusest tulenevatest kohustustest.

4. KOKKUVÕTE

Määrusel on oluline roll liidu jõupingutustes tegeleda siseturu moonutustega, mida

põhjustavad välisriigi subsiidiumid. Määruse üldeesmärki need moonutused ära hoida on

laialdaselt tunnustatud ja see on endiselt väga asjakohane. Läbivaatamise järeldustes

tõstetakse esile määruse tähtsust ning kinnitatakse, et määrus on võimaldanud edukalt

käsitleda suure riskiga koondumisi ja riigihankeid, nagu on näha komisjoni praktikast

juhtumite käsitlemisel ning määruse 3. ja 4. peatüki alusel vastu võetud lõplikest

kohustuste võtmise otsustest, aga ka käesoleva aruande avaldamise ajal alles pooleli olnud

uurimistest ex officio menetluse alusel.

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Võttes arvesse sidusrühmade tagasisidet, võib komisjon kaaluda määruse menetluskorra

kohandamist, et vähendada ettevõtjate halduskoormust ja hõlbustada nõuete täitmist,

säilitades samal ajal määruse tõhususe.

Komisjon jätkab pühendunult määruse täitmise tagamist, kui see on vajalik, et tagada

võrdsed tingimused ja kaitsta siseturgu moonutavate välisriigi subsiidiumide eest.