| Dokumendiregister | Justiits- ja Digiministeerium |
| Viit | 7-3/7018 |
| Registreeritud | 28.09.2026 |
| Sünkroonitud | 29.09.2026 |
| Liik | Sissetulev kiri |
| Funktsioon | 7 EL otsustusprotsessis osalemine ja rahvusvaheline koostöö |
| Sari | 7-3 Euroopa Kohtu kohtuasjad |
| Toimik | 7-3/2026 |
| Juurdepääsupiirang | Avalik |
| Adressaat | Riigikantselei |
| Saabumis/saatmisviis | Riigikantselei |
| Vastutaja | Kristiina Krause (Justiits- ja Digiministeerium, Kantsleri vastutusvaldkond, Üldosakond, Kommunikatsiooni ja väliskoostöö talitus) |
| Originaal | Ava uues aknas |
| Taotle dokumendi eemaldamist või parandamist |
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 9.9.2026 COM(2026) 567 final
2026/0264 (COD)
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
establishing a framework of measures for strengthening the Union innovation ecosystem
and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (European Innovation Act)
{SEC(2026) 567 final} - {SWD(2026) 567 final} - {SWD(2026) 568 final}
(Text with EEA relevance)
EN 1 EN
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
The European Union (EU) is a global leader in scientific research, producing a significant
share of the world’s high-quality scientific output. However, this strength does not translate
into a commensurate level of innovation performance and commercial success within the
Single Market and worldwide. Innovative ideas developed in Europe too often fail to reach
the market, scale across borders, or generate new growth sectors. As a result, the Union
captures only a limited share of the economic and societal value generated by its scientific and
technological strengths, constraining the emergence of globally competitive firms, weakening
Europe’s capacity to secure critical technologies and value chains and long-term productivity
growth.
Enhancing the conditions for the development, commercialisation, and scale-up of
innovative solutions has become a central priority of the Commission’s policy agenda for
2024–2029, which places research and innovation at the core of Europe’s competitiveness and
sustainable prosperity. It is also essential for strengthening the Union’s resilience, economic
security, and strategic autonomy in an increasingly contested geopolitical environment. In this
context, the proposed Regulation contributes to the implementation of the EU Startup and
Scaleup Strategy1 and responds to the mandate set out in the Mission Letter of Commissioner
Zaharieva develop a framework facilitating the testing, financing and scaling of innovative
solutions in the EU.
Over the past two decades, the EU’s economic growth has lagged that of other major
economies, notably the United States (US) and China, with a widening difference in GDP
levels. A key driver of this divergence is weaker productivity growth in the EU. As research
and innovation account for a substantial share of productivity gains, the Union’s ability to
translate knowledge into marketable innovations is a critical determinant of its long-term
competitiveness and prosperity. It is equally a determinant of the Union’s ability to reduce
excessive strategic dependencies, preserve its freedom of action, and ensure secure access to
critical technologies, products and industrial capabilities.
The underlying challenge lies in structural barriers along the innovation lifecycle. While the
EU performs strongly in early-stage research, it faces persistent difficulties in the transition
from research results to market-ready products and scalable businesses. Innovative firms
encounter two critical bottlenecks: a pre-commercialisation gap, where projects remain too
risky or fragmented to attract private investment, and a scaling gap, where firms struggle to
expand due to financial, regulatory and market constraints. These bottlenecks reduce
incentives for investment and limit the emergence of new innovative firms and sectors.
Over the past years, the Union has taken significant steps to address these challenges. EU
funding programmes, such as Horizon Europe, the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the
Innovation Fund, the Digital Europe Programme, and InvestEU, as well as initiatives aimed at
deepening capital markets and strengthening the European Research Area, have contributed to
improving framework conditions for innovation. These efforts also support the Union’s
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The EU Startup And Scaleup
Strategy Choose Europe To Start And Scale, COM/2025/270final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0270
EN 2 EN
broader objective of reinforcing resilience, preparedness and technological capacity in sectors
of strategic importance.
However, despite this progress, important barriers and disparities between Member
States persist, particularly in the transition from research to market deployment. These
barriers not only undermine innovation performance but also delay the deployment at scale of
technologies that are essential for Europe’s security, resilience and economic sovereignty.
First, markets for R&D procurement, including pre-commercial procurement, remain
underdeveloped because of the lack of a clear legal framework. The EU Public
Procurement Directives cover R&D services only where both of the following conditions are
met:
• the benefits accrue exclusively to the public buyer for use in its own affairs; and
• the public buyer wholly remunerates the service.
As a result, a substantial share of R&D procurement, including pre-commercial procurement,
falls outside their scope. Since the Commission clarified the concept of pre-commercial
procurement in 2007 in its Communication2, there has been an increase in these types of R&D
procurements and success cases show that strategic use of this instrument enables the EU to
regain leadership and strategic autonomy in high-tech markets. However, overall, across the
EU, the progress in raising investment levels is still too slow and fragmented. Key reasons are
that the absence of harmonised rules has contributed to divergent practices across Member
States, legal uncertainty, and limited use of joint cross-border R&D procurement, which is
often necessary to achieve the financial critical mass required for the development of
innovative technologies. This is particularly problematic in strategic sectors where fragmented
demand, duplicated national approaches, and dependence on non-EU suppliers can expose the
Union to vulnerabilities and supply risks. Moreover, the proposed revision of the EU public
procurement framework, the Public Procurement Act, proposes to exclude all forms of R&D
procurement.
Such public procurements of R&D are vital to create innovative solutions that can improve
the quality and efficiency of public services, address societal challenges and build sufficient
industrial capacity for innovative solutions and technologies in the EU to safeguard EU
economic security and strategic autonomy. They are also a key instrument for accelerating
market development in critical technologies, strengthening the European industrial and
technological base, improving security of supply, and ensuring that strategically relevant
capabilities are developed and deployed within the Union. Other leading economies in the
world are investing 5 to 8 times more in public procurement of R&D than the EU3. Raising
public investments in R&D procurement in the EU from 0,6% to 3% of total public
procurement or from €17,28Bn to €86,4Bn, would help the EU raise public R&D investments
with around 0,5% of GDP. Given that this could raise an equal additional amount of private
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Pre-commercial Procurement:
Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high quality public services in Europe’, 14.12.2007,
COM(2007) 799 final 3 The EU spends 0,6% of public procurement on R&D, the US 3,5% and South Korea 5%. Raising
investments in the EU to 3% of total public procurement on R&D would generate additional public
R&D investments equalling 0,5% of GDP - EU wide benchmarking of innovation procurement policy
frameworks and investments
EN 3 EN
investments in R&D, total investments in R&D in the EU could thus rise from 2,2% to 3% of
GDP4.
Second, insufficient clarity and comparability in the valuation and monetisation of
intellectual property (IP) continue to hinder the commercialisation of research and
innovation results. Innovation is now largely driven by intangible assets, with over 90% of
corporate value in certain leading firms coming from intellectual property. Yet in the EU,IP
is still rarely used as collateral in financing. Because financial institutions in the EU still focus
mostly on tangible assets and traditional accounting, IP-rich companies struggle to secure
financing. As a result, EU startups raise around 50% less capital than US peers by their tenth
year. This mismatch has created a major growth financing gap for asset-light, innovative
firms, estimated at up to EUR 18 billion per year.5 One of the key reasons explaining the lack
of IP-back financing in the EU is the absence of a harmonised methodology for valuing
intellectual property assets. This created divergent conditions across Member States for the
use of such assets in company financing, including as collateral for debt financing and for
their consideration in equity investment and other financing decisions. Other key reasons are
the lack of a mature EU-wide secondary market for intangible assets and a lack of skills
regarding IP-backed financing among financial institutions and innovative startups. This
undermines companies' access to capital within the Single Market, impeding their cross-
border growth and investment. This makes EU companies less successful at scaling and
commercialising innovation, especially in deep tech and breakthrough sectors than those from
other jurisdictions such as the US, China and South Korea.
Addressing these two barriers through this proposal could thus have a sizeable impact on
improving the functioning of the Single Market for R&D investments and commercialising IP
assets, thereby supporting Europe’s independence and competitiveness. It would also help
ensure that Europe retains finances and scales critical technologies and related IP assets in
line with its security, resilience and strategic autonomy objectives. Against this background,
this proposal delivers on President von der Leyen’s 2024-2027 Commission Political
Guidelines that set priorities to put research and innovation at the heart of our economy. The
European Innovation Act was announced in the EU Startup and Scaleup Strategy and in the
Competitiveness Compass for the EU as one of the key initiatives to strengthen the EU’s
innovation ecosystem and enhance its ability to compete globally.
The general objective of this initiative is to improve the functioning of the Single Market for
innovation by reducing structural barriers to bring innovative solutions to the market, thereby
speeding up their commercialisation in the EU. This objective contributes directly to the
Union’s broader priorities of strengthening competitiveness, fostering sustainable economic
growth, and enhancing technological sovereignty, while also reinforcing economic security,
resilience and the Union’s capacity to act autonomously in strategically important areas.
To achieve this, the proposal pursues a set of specific objectives. These include strengthening
the role of public procurement as a driver of innovation and enhancing the valuation,
commercialisation and use of IP.
The European Innovation Act aims to achieve these objectives by:
4 In 2023, public and private investments into R&D was 2,2% of GDP in the EU, compared to 3,3% in
Japan, 3,46% in the US, 4,93% in South Korea - Science, Research and Innovation Performance (SRIP)
report, 2024 edition, European Commission 5 European Investment Bank. (2025). Investment Report 2024/2025: Innovation, integration and simplification in
Europe
EN 4 EN
• creating a harmonised framework at Union level for R&D procurement, including
pre-commercial procurement; and
• mandating the creation of a competence centre on IP-backed finance at Union level
as part of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), an Union-wide
framework for IP valuation and a Union-wide IP marketplace for commercialising
IP.
By addressing these challenges in a coherent and targeted manner, the proposed Regulation
seeks to ensure that innovative ideas developed in Europe can more effectively progress from
research to market, scale across borders, and contribute to the Union’s long-term
competitiveness and prosperity, as well as to its resilience, economic security and strategic
autonomy.
1.2. Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
There is currently no comprehensive Union legislative framework specifically addressing the
cross-cutting barriers affecting the development, testing and scale-up of innovative solutions
across the Single Market. Existing Union policies in the area of research and innovation
primarily focus on supporting knowledge creation, fostering collaboration and providing
funding for research and innovation activities, while only partially addressing the framework
conditions governing the transition from research to market.
The proposed Regulation complements these existing initiatives by targeting the remaining
bottlenecks along the innovation lifecycle, in particular those related to the use of R&D
procurement, and commercialisation and use of IP in financing of innovative companies.
In this context, the most relevant Union policy provisions in the field of research and
innovation include:
The European Research Area (ERA) incentivises and structurally support cross-border
research and development (R&D) collaboration and researcher mobility, primarily targeting
the early stages of the research and innovation lifecycle. It is implemented in part through
Union programmes such as Horizon Europe, which provide funding for collaborative
research, mobility schemes and research infrastructures. In parallel, the ERA Forum serves as
a soft coordination tool through which Member States align national research policies,
priorities and reforms.
Union funding programmes provide substantial financial support to research and innovation
activities across the different stages of the innovation lifecycle. In particular, programmes
such as Horizon Europe, including the European Innovation Council, as well as InvestEU,
Digital Europe Programme, the European Defence Fund, the Cohesion Policy Funds and the
Innovation Fund support the development, demonstration and, to some extent, the scale-up of
innovative solutions through grants, blended finance, risk-sharing mechanisms and via
support for R&D procurements. Without prejudging the next Multiannual Financial
Framework (MFF) and the implementation of future EU funding programmes, the next MFF
may strengthen this financial support by enhancing the Union’s capacity to mobilise public
and private investment in innovation and strategic technologies. The proposed Regulation is
consistent with these Union programmes as it does not propose any funding measures but will
reinforce the legal framework conditions for innovation across the Member States, which can
complement and contribute to improve the impact of these Union funding programmes in a
number of ways:
• Several of these Union funding programmes provide support to public buyers to
conduct R&D procurement. These experiences have also highlighted a remaining
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lack of confidence of public buyers in starting pre-commercial procurements due to
the absence of a clear EU wide legal framework for pre-commercial procurements,
and they have also highlighted the extra effort and time it takes for public buyers to
setup joint cross-border pre-commercial procurements due to fragmentation of
national procurement rules across Member States. The proposed Regulation helps
address this issue by establishing common rules for implementing R&D
procurement, including pre-commercial procurement, and a harmonised framework
for joint cross-border R&D procurement, including pre-commercial procurement.
• Some of these Union funding programmes support innovators in trying to
commercialise their IP or to use their intellectual property rights as collateral to
obtain financial investments. These experiences have highlighted that innovators face
issues in finding the right parties that are interested in buying or licensing their IP
and getting good value out of their IP for obtaining financial investments due to a
knowledge gap and the lack of a Union-wide accepted valuation framework and the
lack of a Union-wide marketplace for IP rights. The proposed Regulation helps
address this issue by extending the mandate of the European Union Intellectual
Property Office to establish a competence centre for IP-backed finance, a common
framework for the valuation of IP and a Union-wide marketplace for the
commercialisation of IP rights.
It follows that the proposed Regulation is consistent with existing Union policy provisions in
the field of research and innovation by complementing existing funding programmes with a
coherent framework for R&D procurement and with new tasks for European Union
Intellectual Property Office that will help innovators obtain IP-backed finance.
1.3. Consistency with other Union policies
The proposed Regulation is a cross-sector initiative aiming to deliver a Union-wide level
playing field for innovators across all sectors, rather than focusing on specific application
sectors, technology fields or industries. Its measures are horizontal by design and address
structural barriers across Member States that affect innovation-intensive activities.
The proposed Regulation complements the forthcoming 28th Regime corporate legal
framework – EU Inc., which provides a optional harmonised corporateu framework for
companies operating across the Union. The proposal also complements the reforms under the
Savings and Investments Union, which aim to deepen the Union capital markets and channel
more private savings into equity, venture capital and scale-up financing, thereby improving
access to finance for innovative firms. Despite the expected progress in regulatory
harmonisation under the European Commission’s EU Inc. proposal, significant fragmentation
is expected to persist in how companies can navigate the innovation lifecycle. This
fragmentation risks hampering companies to bring innovative solutions to the market which
could limit the growth potential of innovative companies, including those that are set up under
the harmonised EU Inc. framework. In other words, while the EU Inc. proposal aims to
facilitate setting up and operating a business across the Union and help companies attract
investment, the proposed Regulation is designed to address further bottlenecks in the
innovation lifecycle, ensuring that companies can develop and market their innovations more
easily across the Single Market.
Similarly, despite the expected progress under the Savings and Investments Union in
deepening the Union capital markets and mobilising private investment, significant
constraints persist in other parts of the innovation lifecycle. In particular, barriers related to
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the development, testing, valuation and early adoption of innovative solutions continue to
limit the pipeline of investment-ready projects. As a result, while the Savings and Investments
Union aims to improve access to finance and support the scale-up of innovative companies,
the proposed Regulation removes bottlenecks that hamper innovative ideas to attract IP-
backed finance and helps innovators fully benefit from improved capital market integration.
The proposed Regulation also builds on the forthcoming European Business Wallets, which
streamline cross-border procurement procedures and digital interactions between economic
operators and public sector bodies. The European Business Wallets will establish a digital
identity for economic operators and allow for secure data exchange in the form of electronic
attestations of attributes and by means of a secure communication channel. This will simplify
licencing, registrations, tax filings and procurement authorisations, and economic operators
will no longer need to duplicate information across portals, thereby reducing administrative
burden and compliance costs. Consequently, the proposed Regulation foresees that R&D
procurement procedures shall be carried out exclusively in digital form, and where possible
by means of the European Business Wallets or by alternative electronic means that that are
interoperable with the European Business Wallets.
The proposed Regulation also complements sectoral initiatives, such as the existing Critical
Medicines Act, the Cloud and AI Development Act, the Biotech I Act and the forthcoming
Advanced Materials Act, Biotech II Act and Ocean Act, targeting strategic sectors or
technologies and aim to strengthen the Union’s position as a high-tech powerhouse. While
these initiatives provide tailored, sector-specific approaches where needed, the European
Innovation Act addresses the cross-cutting gaps affecting innovation across sectors and across
different technology fields. It does so without prejudging or interfering with sector-specific
frameworks, thereby ensuring coherence across the overall Union innovation policy
landscape.
The proposed Regulation also complements the EU Public Procurement Directives and their
proposed revision through the Public Procurement Act (PPA). The EU Public Procurement
Directives exclude pre-commercial procurement, while certain R&D service procurements
still fall within their scope and the procurement of R&D is a mandatory element of the
innovation partnership procedure. By contrast, the PPA proposal excludes all forms of R&D
services procurement and removes also the procurement of R&D as a mandatory component
from the current innovation partnership procedure by replacing this with a new innovation
challenge procedure having as mandatory elements a testing phase and a phase for procuring
commercial deployment, which can include volumes of innovative solutions.
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
2.1. Legal basis
The legal basis for the proposed Regulation is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, which allows the Union to adopt harmonisation measures to ensure the
proper functioning of the internal market. This is needed to remove cross-border regulatory
and structural barriers that hinder the proper functioning of the Single Market. Diverging
national rules on R&D procurement, including pre-commercial procurement, constitute
barriers that prevent companies from participating in and offering their services to public
buyers in different Member States. Similarly, different approaches to the valuation and
commercialisation of IP constitute barriers for innovators to attract IP-backed finance and
scaleup their businesses across the Union. These fragmented approaches to R&D procurement
and to the valuation and commercialisation of intellectual property impede cross-border
movement of goods, services and capital within the Single Market.
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2.2. Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)
The proposed Regulation is in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity as provided for in
Article 5(3) of the Treaty on the European Union.
Strengthening the Union’s capacity to develop, commercialise, and scale innovative solutions
is of high relevance for reinforcing the Union’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy.
Innovation ecosystems and markets for innovative companies are increasingly cross-border in
nature, while regulatory and framework conditions in the Union are fragmented along national
lines. In the absence of Union level measures, the competitiveness challenges currently facing
industry are likely to prompt Member States to implement even more unilateral measures.
While such efforts may be justified, leaving national measures uncoordinated and the cross-
border challenges that are not tackled in national measures unaddressed risks negatively
impacting the functioning and increasing the fragmentation of the Single Market, making the
Union more vulnerable and overdependent on innovative solutions and technologies from
third countries and unable to leverage the assets of the Single Market to deliver benefits to
national and European ecosystems.
In particular, the scale required to support the transition from research to market and to ensure
effective diffusion of innovation exceeds what individual Member States can achieve in
isolation. Divergent national approaches to the valuation and commercialisation of intellectual
property, to attract IP-backed finance, and to R&D procurement create legal uncertainty,
increase costs and limit cross-border activities for innovative firms. These divergencies have a
direct and demonstrable impact on the functioning of the Single Market, impeding cross-
border movement of goods, services and capital within the Union.
By contrast, action at Union level can establish common framework conditions and ensure
coordination across Member States, thereby enabling innovators to develop innovation, attract
IP-backed financing and scale across the Single Market. Union-level action allows for the
creation of a level playing field, reduces fragmentation and duplication, and facilitates
efficient allocation of resources across the Union.
No single Member State alone is capable of effectively addressing these issues due to the
integrated nature of the challenge and the need for proper functioning of the Internal market
for developing, testing, commercialising and scaling of innovative solutions across the Union.
A harmonised Union-level approach is therefore necessary to ensure the well-functioning of
the Single Market and to address the challenges of reinforcing the Union’s competitiveness
and strategic autonomy. The measures included in this initiative would not be as effective if
implemented by Member States acting alone, as the challenges they address concern the
Single Market. They are not limited to individual Member States or to a subset of Member
States, but they relate to the Union’s industrial base and Union-wide value chains. In addition,
measures implemented at Member States’ level are unlikely to adequately meet the needs of
closely interconnected supply chains within the Single Market and could lead to further
market fragmentation, innovation leakage and industrial relocation to other parts of the world
and overall weakening of the Union’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy.
Innovation is a trans-boundary challenge that requires Union-level action to effectively
complement and reinforce measures taken at regional, national and local levels. The cost of
inaction is pan-European. Without further Union action, the status quo is likely to persist,
increasing the risk of the Union losing strategic industrial capacities and capabilities, of the
Single Market to be further fragmented, and of the Union becoming critically dependent on
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third countries for green, digital, defence, and economic security objectives. This in turn could
have negative implications on the Union’s economic security, defence, social and territorial
cohesion, primarily through impacts on employment, regional development, and equitable
access to industrial opportunities.
The proposed measures therefore focus on areas where there is clear added value in acting at
Union level due to the scale, speed and scope of the efforts needed. Actions aim at improving
the business case for innovators to bring innovations to the market by facilitating the
valuation, commercialisation and use of IP to obtain financing, and at making it easier to find
first customers through R&D procurement, including pre-commercial procurement. It
enhances efficiency by enabling better cross-border cooperation, ensures fairer access to
opportunities for innovative companies irrespective of their location, and strengthens the
Union’s capacity to compete globally. The proposed measures also enable to improve the
Union’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy, while respecting the Union’s international
commitments towards its trade partners.
2.3. Proportionality
The proposed Regulation is proportionate to its objective of improving the functioning of the
Single Market for innovation. Each of its components targets a specific objective and is
limited to what is appropriate and necessary to achieve that objective, without going beyond
what is required to address the identified barriers and without imposing disproportionate
burdens on Member States and affected entities in Member States that are excessive compared
to the benefits expected.
Firstly, common rules for R&D procurement, including pre-commercial procurement, will
create significant time and cost savings for public buyers to conduct such procedures,
enabling public buyers to modernise public services faster. and companies to accelerate
business growth across the Single Market. A harmonised framework for joint cross-border
R&D procurement enables public buyers to form the critical mass required to trigger industry
to develop better value for money solutions and to enable companies to grow their business
faster across the Single Market. The made in EU requirements for R&D procurement are
proportionate to the European R&D capacities and designed as to not place significant
financial burdens on administrative budgets. Establishing lead markets is pivotal to increasing
EU competitiveness of across sectors and technologies, thereby strengthening the Union’s
industrial base and ensuring the Union’s strategic autonomy. This combination of measures
on R&D procurement is necessary to provide legal certainty, reinforce the Union’s
competitiveness and ensure effective implementation of the Treaty principles and the Union’s
international public procurement commitments. They are proportionate as they are limited to
what is needed to achieve those objectives, designed not to place additional burden on
Member States and public buyers, build on existing and widely used practices, and allow
flexibility in their practical implementation.
Secondly, entrusting the European Union Intellectual Property Office with the establishment
of a competence centre for IP-backed finance, as well as the development of a Union-wide IP
valuation framework and a digital IP marketplace enables innovators, companies, universities
and financial investors to lower valuation costs and increase the licensing and transfer of
intellectual property rights in the Union. This is pivotal for increasing the commercialisation
of research and innovation results across the Union. Building on the European Union
Intellectual Property Office’s existing mandate, expertise and resources ensures efficient
implementation of these measures. Ensuring that the valuation framework is based on best
practices for different types of IP rights and that the digital IP marketplace is designed to
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complement existing ones while offering the additional EU added value, ensures that these
measures are proportionate, as they leverage existing structures, thereby reducing additional
burden on Member States, and limit EU intervention to what is necessary to improve
transparency, comparability and access in IP-related transactions.
2.4. Choice of the instrument
Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union gives the legislator the
possibility to adopt regulations and directives. For the present proposal, a regulation is
considered the most appropriate instrument as it is immediately applicable and makes it
possible to set requirements that apply directly to all the public and private actors targeted by
the proposed measures. This will help ensure that the requirements are implemented in a
timely and harmonised way, leading to greater legal certainty. It will ensure a consistent and
coherent framework across the Union and to prevent divergences between national rules that
hamper the development, testing and scale-up of innovation within the Single Market. A
regulation is necessary to establish uniform framework conditions, reduce legal uncertainty
and ensure a level playing field for innovators and innovative companies operating across
borders. A directive would not be sufficient to reach the envisaged objectives, as it would
require a time for transposition and may give rise to divergent transposition and
implementation across Member States, thereby perpetuating fragmentation in the framework
conditions for innovation.
A regulation is also a needed and appropriate legal instrument to amend Regulation (EU)
2017/1011 to enlarge the mandate of the European Union Intellectual Property Office and to
ensure the effective application of the Union’s exclusive competence in line with Article 207
of TFEU for those measures related to the access of economic operators from third countries
to R&D procurement procedures.
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
3.1. Stakeholder consultations
This proposal is based on extensive stakeholder consultations carried out in line with the
Commission’s Better Regulation principles and minimum standards. The Commission started
consulting stakeholders on the barriers for innovation addressed by the European Innovation
Act already in the context of the EU Startup and Scaleup Strategy. The Call for Evidence on
the EU Startup and Scaleup Strategy was published on 17 February 2025 and closed on 17
March 2025. It gathered input from a broad range of stakeholders, including companies,
business associations, research organisations, public authorities and individual respondents.
The attracted 589 responses from stakeholders across 36 countries. The main barriers
identified by stakeholders included difficulties for innovative companies to access
procurements and underinvestment in innovation procurement in the EU, barriers to the
commercialisation of research and innovation results and to the valuation of intellectual
property, difficulties for innovative companies to access research and technology
infrastructures, lack of experimentation possibilities in legislation across the EU and
insufficient coordination between national and EU innovation policies and programmes. The
EU Startup and Scaleup Strategy that was adopted on 28 May 2025 set out a comprehensive
strategy to combine non-legislative as well as legislative measures to remove the identified
barriers to innovation, the latter to be addressed through the European Innovation Act.
In preparation of this proposal, the Commission then carried out a dedicated Call for
Evidence and Open Public Consultation to collect feedback on specific issues and to identify
possible solutions for the legal barriers that were previously identified in the EU Startup and
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Scaleup Strategy. This Call for Evidence and Open Public Consultation were published on 8
July 2025 and closed on 3 October 2025. They gathered inputs from a broad range of
stakeholders, including companies, business associations, research organisations, public
authorities and individual respondents. In total, 336 responses were received to the Call for
Evidence, including 193 position papers. The Open Public Consultation received 202
responses, complemented by 54 additional supporting documents.
Responses to the public consultation on the European Innovation Act were well distributed
across stakeholder groups. Companies and businesses accounted for 27% of replies (55
responses), followed by business associations (23%, 47 responses) and academic and research
institutions (16%, 33 responses). Other contributions were received from EU citizens (8%, 17
responses), non-governmental organisations (8%, 17 responses), public authorities (4%, 8
responses), trade unions (2%, 4 responses), non-EU citizens (1%, 3 responses), and other
stakeholders (9%, 18 responses). Among participating companies, micro-enterprises (1-9
employees) represented the largest group (33%, 18 responses), followed by large companies
(29%, 16 responses), small companies (20%, 11 responses) and medium-sized companies
(18%, 10 responses).
The results of the Open Public Consultation and the corresponding synopsis report on the
European Innovation Act were published on 4 December 2025 and are available online.6
In addition, a targeted consultation on the European Innovation Act was carried out between
October and November 2025 to support the assessment of the expected costs and benefits of
the proposed measures. This consultation combined 18 semi-structured interviews with
selected stakeholders from the different sectors above, 55 responses to a targeted online
survey, and three online focus groups held on 24, 26 and 27 November 2025. The focus
groups were primarily aimed at validating the findings of the cost-benefit analysis.
Finally, a targeted consultation on the European Innovation Act was carried out with
representatives responsible for research and innovation policies and programmes in Member
States and Horizon Europe associate countries that participate in the EIC Forum. The EIC
Forum members adopted a joint Position paper and wish list for the European Innovation Act
in November 2025.7
In total, 1210 responses were collected across these different rounds and types of
consultations that helped prepare this proposal for the European Innovation Act. Overall,
stakeholders expressed broad support for EU action to address the identified barriers to
innovation. A large majority of respondents confirmed both the existence of the problems
identified and the relevance of the measures proposed for the European Innovation Act that
are aimed at improving the development, testing and scale-up of innovative solutions across
the Single Market.
3.2. Collection and use of expertise
The preparation of this proposal draws on a broad evidence base, including analytical work,
literature review, stakeholder input and expert advice.
6 Results of the Open Public Consultation and its Synopsis Report, 4 December 2025,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14593-European-Innovation-
Act/public-consultation_en 7 Position paper and wishlist for the European Innovation Act, EIC Forum, November 2025,
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b690e2af-d0bd-11f0-8da2-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en
EN 11 EN
The Commission carried out desk research and reviewed relevant academic literature, policy
reports and data sources to support the analysis of the problems and policy options. This
included, among others, data from Eurostat, the European Innovation Scoreboard, the
Community Innovation Survey, the European benchmarking of national policy frameworks
and investments in innovation procurement and the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), as well as reports from international organisations such as the OECD and the
European Patent Office (EPO), and peer-reviewed academic literature.
Inputs from the EIC Forum working groups and expert inputs were also used, including the
report8 of group of experts from 33 countries appointed by the Commission that formulated
recommendations for the EU and EIC Forum member countries on how to overcome legal
barriers that hamper wider implementation of innovation procurement, including R&D
procurement, in the Union compared to other leading economies in the world.
An external contractor supported the Commission in carrying out additional desk research,
analysing the results of the open public consultation and targeted consultations, organising
focus groups and stakeholder interviews, and contributing to the cost-benefit assessment of
the proposed measures.
The Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) provided further analytical support, including
the analysis of the Call for Evidence and macroeconomic modelling to assess the potential
impacts of the initiative.
3.3. Impact assessment
In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines, this regulatory proposal is supported by
an impact assessment analysing the need to accelerate the commercialisation and uptake of
innovative solutions and to create an innovation-friendly level playing field for innovative
companies to scale up across the EU Single Market, in a context of growing global
competitiveness challenges. The impact assessment identifies policy options to address the
underlying problem drivers and assesses their likely impacts. It was developed in close
consultation with the Commission’s Inter-Service Steering Group on the European Innovation
Act.
The draft impact assessment was submitted to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (‘the
Board’) on 23 December 2025. A meeting with the Board took place on 28 January 2026 and
was followed by a negative opinion. Following a substantial revision to address the Board’s
comments, the impact assessment was resubmitted on 20 February 2026. In the second
submission the Board acknowledged significant improvements, in particular regarding the
reduced range of the proposed measures, the clarification of the context and scope of the
initiative, and the overall presentation of the report. However, some substantive comments, in
particular those related to the avoiding overlap with the upcoming revision of the EU Public
Procurement Directives remained difficult to address, as the public consultation on the
revision of these Directives had not completed yet and the planned measures and impact
assessment of the revision of these Directives were not available yet at that time. The Board
therefore maintained a negative opinion on 27 February 2026 and identified three main areas
requiring further improvement in the Impact Assessment report for the European Innovation
Act, namely to:
(1) Ensure better coherence of the European Innovation Act’s public procurement
measures with the upcoming revision of the EU Public Procurement Directives and
8 Independent expert report, ‘Overcoming legal barriers for the uptake of innovation procurement in the
EU’, May 2026, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/4586624
EN 12 EN
further assess the proportionality and subsidiarity of the procurement measures,
particularly regarding mandatory innovation procurement targets and the inclusion of
public procurement below the financial thresholds established under the EU
framework.
(29) Ensure a more complete impact analysis by extending the assessment of the
European Innovation Act measures beyond the estimated population of innovative
companies, as the proposed measures are not legally limited to a specific category of
firms. Also requesting to address the absence of a legal definition of innovative
companies within the European Innovation Act.
(30) Provide a more in-depth assessment of the costs and benefits of some European
Innovation Act measures, with particular emphasis on:
• stronger estimation of the economic costs associated with mandatory
innovation procurement targets and the introduction of an EU preference in
public procurement;
• assessing the risk that too narrow definitions and principles for regulatory
sandboxes could exclude potentially beneficial experimentation opportunities.
Following the Board’s second negative opinion, the Impact Assessment was further
substantially revised to address the identified shortcomings. The above-mentioned points
were fully considered through a strengthened analysis and, where necessary, by adjusting the
scope of the proposal. In particular, the comments of the Board were addressed in the
following way:
• The procurement measures on innovation-friendly procurement procedures and
EU preference were narrowed down to focus exclusively on R&D procurement
carried out by public buyers. The innovation-friendly procurement techniques
applicable to other forms of public procurement more broadly, were removed from
the scope of the European Innovation Act. In addition, an EU financial threshold of
EUR 216 000 (corresponding to the EU financial threshold used in the main public
procurement Directive for sub-central authorities) was introduced, ensuring
compliance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.
• The mandatory target for Member States to increase overall innovation
procurement spending was removed from the scope of the European Innovation
Act.
• Explanation on definitions of innovative companies, startups and scaleups was
added. The Impact Assessment clarifies that, following the adoption of the EU
Recommendation on definitions of innovative companies, innovative startups and
innovative scaleups, the European Innovation Act no longer includes these
definitions as part of the proposal. At the same time, it explains that, in line with the
Better Regulation Guidelines, costs and benefits are estimated on the economically
affected population (in particular innovative enterprises) rather than on all legally
eligible entities. It clarified the difference between legally eligible and economically
affected firms and explains more in depth how the number of affected entities was
estimated.
• Quantitative estimates were added. The Impact Assessment provided additional
cost and benefit analysis so that all measures included both Standard Cost Model and
elasticity-based quantitative estimations of costs and benefits. In particular, it added
the economic risk-related costs of procurement measures, refined the estimations for
EN 13 EN
IP valuation and included dedicated sections explaining more in-depth the
assumptions underlying each estimation.
• The definitions and principles for regulatory sandboxes were removed from the
scope of the European Innovation Act and moved to a proposal for a Council
Recommendation on regulatory sandboxes.
The Board’s opinions as well as the final impact assessment and its executive summary are
published together with this proposal.
The Commission carried out the impact assessment at the level of individual measures, with
up to four variants considered for each measure as alternative policy options. This approach
allowed for the identification of the most appropriate intervention for each specific problem
area.
Finally, the preferred policy option for the European Innovation Act is defined as a composite
package, combining the most effective variants of each of the nine measures assessed. For
each measure, the selected variant is the one that performs best in terms of effectiveness,
efficiency, coherence and proportionality. The preferred option therefore reflects a coherent
combination of the strongest-performing elements across all measures, rather than a single
predefined policy package.
The preferred policy option consists of the following measures.
First measure: the establishment, through the European Union Intellectual Property Office
(EUIPO), of a competence centre for IP-backed finance, as well as the development of a
Union-wide IP valuation framework and a digital marketplace. This measure is expected to
increase IP transfer and licensing activity and the ability of innovators to attract IP-backed
financing. It would entail administrative costs for EUIPO estimated at approximately EUR
712 000 and adjustment costs for EUIPO of around EUR 2.5 million, which will be covered
by EUIPO’s own resources, with no contribution from the Union budget. At the same time,
this measure is expected to generate administrative cost savings for companies of
approximately EUR 35 million. It is also estimated that the measure will generate
additional IP-backed venture capital and debit of EUR 10.2 billion every year for
companies.
Second measure: the introduction of a harmonised procedure for R&D procurement and for
joint cross-border R&D procurement. This measure is expected to generate EUR 1 billion
per year in cost saving for affected public buyers, as well as additional EUR 25.92 bn in
firm profit every year.
Third measure: the establishment of the EU preference for R&D procurement with opt-out
clauses that allow procurement from non-covered suppliers where no suitable alternative from
covered suppliers exists or where there are disproportionate cost differences between covered
and non-covered suppliers9. This measure is expected to contribute to strengthening the
EU’s open strategic autonomy, in particular for critical technologies and strategic
infrastructures, by reducing dependency risks and supporting the development of EU-based
supply chains. The opt-out clauses are also estimated to minimise the negative macro-
economic effects of the EU preference, estimated to be around EUR 464 million.
9 Covered suppliers are here suppliers from EU Member States and third countries that have concluded
international agreements with the Union and in which the Union has commitments to open R&D services
procurements to those third countries.
EN 14 EN
The combination of measures ensures coherence across the innovation lifecycle, addressing
both supply- and demand-side barriers. By jointly improving framework conditions, access to
resources and market opportunities, the preferred option maximises the effectiveness of
individual measures and generates cumulative impacts beyond their standalone effects.
Overall, macroeconomic simulation using the mentioned input costs and benefits estimate
translated into an EU GDP increase of 0.25-0.42% over a ten-year horizon relative to a
baseline scenario without the European Innovation Act, corresponding to up to 507,000 new
jobs created across the EU over this ten-year horizon.
3.4. Regulatory fitness and simplification
The proposal is in line with the Commission’s simplification objectives. By establishing more
harmonised approaches across the Union for carrying out R&D procurement and tasking
European Union Intellectual Property Office to establish a common framework for IP
valuation, an EU wide marketplace for commercialising IP and a competence centre for IP-
backed finance, it reduces duplication of costs, information asymmetries, and search and
transaction costs for innovators.
Where new activities are introduced, the proposal builds on existing frameworks and
processes, thereby limiting additional administrative burden.
For public authorities limited additional adjustment costs (EUR 45 million) are expected due
to the need for increased training to implement R&D procurement techniques and EU
preference. With the EU public sector expected to face adjustment cost (EUR 2.4 million) to
develop the EU IP valuation framework, IP centre, and matchmaking platform. However,
these additional administrative costs are offset by significant net administrative cost savings.
For firms and public buyers no additional administrative costs are expected as the proposed
regulation does not impose additional obligations on them. On the contrary, additional
administrative cost savings are expected for companies:
• EUR 1 billion per year for public buyers that aim to conduct R&D procurements, due
to a harmonised framework for R&D procurement, including for joint cross-border
R&D procurements;
• EUR 35 million per year for IP-rich firms, due to more harmonised approaches to IP
valuation and easier IP licensing and transfer via the IP marketplace;
Overall, the preferred policy option is therefore expected to generate yearly net annual
cost savings (administrative and adjustment costs combined) of approximately EUR 1.1
billion from the first year onwards, compared to the baseline, across both public and private
stakeholders. Net savings are expected to increase further in subsequent years, as one-off
adjustment costs are phased out and only recurring administrative costs remain.
4. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The proposed Regulation is based on a non-discriminatory approach and promotes
transparency and equal treatment. It is not expected to significantly impact the fundamental
rights protected under the Union Treaties and the Charter on Fundamental Rights.
5. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for
illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial Framework.
EN 15 EN
The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period
remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and
thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary procedure. All appropriations and
staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative. The proposal has budgetary implications for the
Commission. Specifically, it will require approximately 3 full-time equivalents per year to
implement. The budget implications are mainly to carry out the work foreseen to support and
monitor the implementation of the Regulation, including to prepare delegated and
implementing acts foreseen in the Regulation. The budget implications required for human
resources and other expenditure of an administrative nature will be met by appropriations
from the DG that are already assigned to management of the action and/or have been
redeployed within the DG, together, if necessary, with any additional allocation which may be
granted to the managing DG under the annual allocation procedure and in the light of
budgetary constraints.
6. OTHER ELEMENTS
• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
Not Applicable
• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
The proposal consists of three Chapters. It is structured as follows:
Chapter I contains the general provisions setting out the subject matter and the scope of the
proposed Regulation, as well as lays down the definitions applicable to the proposed
Regulation. It clarifies that Chapter I of the Regulation only applies to R&D services
procurements that fall outside of the scope of Directive (EU) 2014/23, Directive (EU)
2014/24 and Directive (EU) 2014/25 and it clarifies that Chapter III of the Regulation only
applies to the European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Chapter II sets out common rules for implementing R&D procurement procedures, including
joint R&D procurement.
Chapter III sets out tasks entrusted by this Regulation to the European Union Intellectual
Property Office to establish a common framework for intellectual property (IP) valuation, an
EU wide marketplace for commercialising IP and a competence centre for helping innovators
access IP-backed finance.
EN 16 EN
2026/0264 (COD)
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
establishing a framework of measures for strengthening the Union innovation ecosystem
and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (European Innovation Act)
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular
Article 114 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee(1),
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions(2),
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,
Whereas:
(1) Important barriers remain, hindering access of innovations to the market and scaling of
innovative enterprises in the Union. Innovators face lack of opportunities to bring
innovative ideas to the Union-wide public procurement market due to the lack of a
common legal framework for procurement of research and development services
(‘R&D procurement’) and an underdeveloped internal market for intellectual property
(IP) backed finance. National measures aimed at tackling such complex barriers that
transcend national borders are fragmented and risk undermining the functioning of the
internal market. This fragmentation creates obstacles to cross-border trade within the
Union and distortions in the internal market. It is therefore necessary to establish
harmonised measures to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.
(2) The European Court of Auditors10 has called on the Commission to address the low
level of competition for public procurement in the Union. With the increasing
digitalisation of the Union economy and the growing demand from public buyers
across the Union for innovative solutions made in the Union, there is an increased
cross-border interest from economic operators to participate in R&D procurement
carried out by public buyers from other Member States. While Directives
(1) OJ C [...], [...], p. [...] (2) OJ C [...], [...], p. [...] 10 Special Report 28/2023: Public procurement in the EU, European Court of Auditors, December 2023,
https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2023-28/SR-2023-28_EN.pdf
EN 17 EN
2014/23/EU11, 2014/24/EU12, and 2014/25/EU13 of the European Parliament and of the
Council harmonise procedures for public procurements falling within their scope,
procedures for procurements falling outside their scope are currently primarily
governed by fragmented national rules or are exempt from national public
procurement rules and are only subject to the fundamental principles under the
Treaties as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union. This concerns
the majority of R&D procurements, in particular those that fall outside the scope of
those Directives because the benefits resulting from the R&D services procured do not
accrue exclusively to the public buyer for its use in the conduct of its own affairs, as is
the case in pre-commercial procurement, or because the R&D services procured are
not wholly remunerated by the public buyer14. However, the application of those
principles alone does not provide sufficient legal clarity to public buyers, address
cross-border fragmentation in the implementation of R&D procurement or address
structural barriers for public buyers to engage in joint cross-border R&D procurement.
For that reason, for R&D procurements above a certain value, common rules should be
adopted to ensure that those principles are given practical effect to ensure the proper
functioning of the internal market.
(3) For R&D procurement procedures to which Article 25 of Directive 2014/23/EU,
Article 14 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 32 of Directive 2014/25/EU do not
apply, public buyers should be required to apply the provisions of this Regulation.
However, the particular characteristics of defence procurement makes the procurement
of R&D in that field especially sensitive, often requiring a high level of confidentiality
and greater flexibility for Member States. Public buyers should therefore not be
required to apply the provisions of this Regulation to R&D procurement falling under
exemptions for R&D procurements laid down in Directive 2009/81/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council15.
(4) The digitalisation of R&D procurement procedures is essential for the proper
functioning of the internal market, as it can significantly reduce administrative
burdens, increase efficiency, and enhance transparency. Therefore, all R&D
procurement procedures falling within the scope of this Regulation should be
conducted where possible through the European Business Wallets or by alternative
electronic means that that are interoperable with the European Business Wallets.
11 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award
of concession contracts (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, pp. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/23/oj). 12 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, pp. 65, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj). 13 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on
procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and
repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, pp. 243, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/25/oj). 14 By virtue of Article 25 of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 14 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 32 of
Directive 2014/25/EU, those Directives only apply to R&D services procurements when the benefits
accrue exclusively to the public buyer for its use in the conduct of its own affairs, and the service
provided is wholly remunerated by the public buyer, 15 Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the
coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service
contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending
Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, pp. 76–136,,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/81/oj).
EN 18 EN
(5) To enhance access to business opportunities in R&D procurement and increase
competition for the award of R&D procurement contracts, the participation of groups
of economic operators should be further facilitated. This is of particular importance for
SMEs, innovative startups and innovative scaleup, which often face difficulties in
accessing larger R&D procurement opportunities. Therefore, the rules governing the
participation of groups of economic operators and the use of combined capacities
should be clarified and simplified, while ensuring that only requirements necessary for
the proper performance of the R&D procurement contract are imposed.
(6) Subcontracting parts of an R&D procurement contract remains a practical and
powerful tool of collaboration between economic operators. The rules for
subcontracting in this Regulation should preserve contractual freedom and facilitate
access for SMEs, innovative startups and innovative scaleup, enabling them to
participate effectively in R&D procurement and related supply chains. Subcontracting
the entirety of a R&D procurement contract should however not be allowed under this
Regulation, in particular in order to avoid that subcontracting is misused especially in
sectors which may be more vulnerable to labour exploitation owing to cost pressures
and complex subcontracting chains. Where a specific input, component or service that
is essential for the conduct of the R&D in the public interest is available only from an
economic operator established in country that does not have access to the R&D
procurement, the public buyer should be able to permit the use of that input,
component or service, including by way of subcontracting.
(7) Without consulting the market, public buyers risk launching R&D procurement
procedures on the basis of tender specifications that are insufficiently adapted to the
actual capabilities of market operators, that favour established solutions, or that do not
provide sufficient scope for innovative solutions. Common rules should therefore be
established to ensure that preliminary market consultations are conducted in a
transparent and publicly accessible manner in preparation for such procedures.
(8) Negotiations, with the possibility for negotiation in stages, can enable public buyers to
improve the quality, efficiency and overall value of the procured R&D services and
their intended results, especially where the subject matter requires adaptation of
procurement documents to operational and innovation needs or the balancing of other
strategic considerations. Such optional flexibility should be provided to public buyers
allowing them to decide to leave certain elements of the procurement documents open
for negotiation, including the payment schedule or the dispute resolution mechanism,
thereby lifting one of the major burdens for SME participation in public procurement.
(9) In accordance with the international and EU legal framework for public procurement,
R&D procurement, including pre-commercial procurement, may include limited
production and supply of prototypes or first products, services or works in order to
incorporate the results of field testing and to demonstrate that the product, service or
work is suitable for production or supply in quantity to acceptable quality standards,
and public buyers may obtain ownership of this limited set of prototypes or first
products, services or works that were developed at the public buyer’s request in the
course of and for that particular R&D services procurement contract. During an R&D
services procurement, public buyers cannot obtain ownership of prototypes of first
products, services or works that were not developed at their own request or that were
developed for other contracts. To ensure transparency to economic operators, common
rules shall ensure that public buyers specify in the procurement documents of an R&D
procurement whether they include the possibility to obtain the ownership of this
limited set of developed prototypes or first products, services or works.
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(10) For certain products, services or works that need to be procured after an R&D
procurement for safeguarding security or public safety interests of the Union or its
Member States, including to avoid shortages of supply for critical technologies, public
buyers should be able to ensure when they start an R&D procurement that they will be
able to purchase, via a separate procurement procedure, the necessary amounts of
products, services or works resulting from the R&D procurement. Therefore, common
provisions should enable public buyers to include in the R&D procurement contracts
provisions providing them with a priority right to purchase a predefined volume or
value of such products, services or works, before these are offered to other potential
buyers. Including a priority right to purchase in R&D procurement contracts does not
give public buyers the right to favour contractors that participated in the R&D
procurement in later purchases of those products, services or works. Any such
purchases need to be conducted in accordance with applicable Union public
procurement rules.
(11) As clarified by the case law of the Court of Justice, the rights derived from Union
public procurement law do not extend to economic operators having their origin in
third countries with which the Union has not concluded trade agreements opening its
public procurement market. To ensure the effective application of this case law and
reinforce the Union’s strategic autonomy, common provisions should be adopted that
open the access to R&D procurements, generally, only to economic operators having
their origin in third countries with which the Union has concluded trade agreements
opening is R&D procurement market. Where this would result in a lack of tenders or
disproportionate costs, public buyers should be allowed to open R&D procurement
also to economic operators having their origin in third countries with which the Union
has concluded international agreements that open its public procurement market
without commitments for opening its R&D procurement market. Where candidate
countries have concluded an agreement with the Union providing for access to public
procurement, economic operators originating from those countries should be regarded
as economic operators falling under Article 11, paragraph 4 of this Regulation, in
accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the relevant agreement. This
approach reflects the perspective of enlargement and the gradual integration of
candidate countries into the Union's internal market, and is intended to support closer
economic integration, encourage regulatory alignment, and strengthen the application
of the Union's rules and standards in its immediate neighbourhood. Where justified by
security and public safety interests of the Union or its Member States, public buyers
should be able to further restrict access to R&D procurements only to economic
operators that have their origin in Member States and that are not subject to control of
a third country. Where an R&D procurement procedure is supported by the Union
under Union programmes and instruments, including pilot projects or preparatory
actions, it should be clarified that public buyers must ensure compliance with
conditions attached to the Union support also in cases where these conditions
complement or derogate from rules established under this Regulation
(12) Clear and uniform rules on the determination of origin are necessary to ensure the
effective and consistent application of international coverage and the access to R&D
procurement provisions across all R&D procurement procedures. This Regulation
should therefore establish rules of origin for the application of the rules on access to
R&D procurement procedures set out herein.
(13) Economic operators should be excluded from participation in R&D procurement
procedures where they have been convicted by final judgment for serious offences
EN 20 EN
defined in Union legislation. Self-cleaning measures should not be permitted for
mandatory exclusion grounds, while for optional exclusion grounds, which are related
to the reliability of the economic operators, those operators should be able to
demonstrate their reliability by means of self-cleaning measures. In that context, due
account should be taken of any cooperation with the investigating authorities aimed at
clarifying the relevant facts and circumstances. Member States should not add other
grounds for exclusion based on criteria relating to the professional situation of the
tenderer: however, this should not prevent Member States from adding other
legitimate grounds for exclusion, such as those aiming at preventing or addressing
threats to national security.
(14) To ensure equal opportunities for all economic operators across the Union, it is
necessary to lay down common rules which provide that public buyers do not use
exclusion grounds, selection criteria and financial guarantee requirements in R&D
procurement procedures that are disproportionate to the scope and nature of the R&D
procurement contract. Where the use of mandatory exclusion grounds is required, the
use of selection criteria and financial guarantee requirements should remain optional
and should not be used where not needed to ensure good outcomes for the R&D
procurement. Public buyers should not require prior experience in R&D procurement
contracts as such, unless this is strictly justified by the nature of the R&D services
concerned, and should also avoid excessive administrative and financial requirements
which can unnecessarily exclude innovative enterprises from R&D procurement
opportunities. Where minimum financial capacity requirements are needed, innovative
startups or scaleups that do not have a track record of turnover or financial statements
but that are technically and financially viable as they possess other financial resources
such as venture capital investments or valuable intellectual property assets should not
be disqualified. Where financial guarantees are needed, they should be lowered for
innovative startups, scaleups and SMEs, and public buyers should timely reduce or
release financial guarantees once they are no longer justified.
(15) To ensure that innovation contributes to improving the quality of public services and
reinforcing strategic autonomy, in R&D procurement, public buyers should apply
award criteria and contract performance monitoring criteria based on the quality and
innovation impact of the tender rather than on price alone. Common rules should
therefore be established on how such criteria should be formulated in order to take
into account the added value of the tender for the internal market. R&D procurement
contracts should be awarded on the basis of the best price-quality ratio method. This
Regulation should therefore provide for a minimum weighting of 50% for quality
criteria and a minimum weighting of 15% for innovation-related award criteria in the
award phase.
(16) Excessively detailed requirements often contribute to unnecessarily reducing the
participation of economic operators and can hamper innovation. To facilitate
competitive R&D procurement markets, the characteristics of the R&D services that
are subject of the R&D procurement should, as a general rule be drafted by giving
preference to functional requirements and where needed performance requirements
instead of by designing prescriptive requirements. This could include specifying which
functionalities the testing shall have at minimum, such as either, neither or both load
testing and stress testing. It could also include which performance the intended results
of the testing shall have, for example what shall be the required accuracy level of the
test data to be produced by the testing.
EN 21 EN
(17) Allowing contractors to retain the ownership of their IP, attracts more and better-
quality offers to R&D procurements and saves public buyers IP registration,
maintenance and litigation costs. It also enables contractors to commercialise their
R&D results and sell developed products and services to the market through
economies of scale. Public buyers should be able to maintain their freedom to operate
and prevent supplier lock-in by obtaining appropriate rights to use the R&D results for
themselves and for their other contractors. Where contractors fail to commercialise
R&D results or abuse R&D results contrary to the public interest, public buyers should
be able to resort to licensing or transfer of R&D results of contractors, however this
should only be done in compliance with applicable national and Union law and other
international obligations on IP in order not to unduly deprive contractors from their IP
rights. Common rules should therefore be established to encourage that in R&D
procurement the risks and benefits related to the results and the IP rights are shared
between public buyers and contractors under market conditions. R&D procurements
that are not pre-commercial procurements should be able to derogate from risk-benefit
sharing under market conditions enabling public buyers to procure the ownership of IP
rights generated by contractors, in duly justified cases of overriding public interests.
(18) It is necessary to clarify certain aspects related to contract performance that have a
close link with the R&D procurement procedure itself, including payments,
termination of contracts, and contract modifications. Timely payments, appropriate use
of advance payments are important to minimise negatively affecting liquidity and
complicating the financial management of economic operators. Obligations to
terminate ongoing contracts should be defined to prevent infringements of Treaty
obligations or exclusion grounds. In addition to continuing to allow public buyers to
modify R&D procurement contracts for situations that were provided for from the
outset, it should be clarified how R&D procurement contracts can be modified in
unforeseen conditions. Those provisions should allow for better application in
situations justifying a modification without launching a new R&D procurement
procedure. The value of the modifications compared to the original R&D procurement
contract should however be considered only as threshold for ex ante publication and
potential review to combat potential misuse.
(19) It is necessary to provide legal certainty on how public buyers can correctly conduct
value engineering in R&D procurement, as this generates significant cost savings and
quality improvements for public buyers16by allowing the flexibility to modify R&D
procurement contracts in order to incorporate innovations emerging during the
performance of the contract. Common rules should therefore be established to foster
the use of value engineering in R&D procurement, particularly in large value R&D
procurement contracts where the potential impact on cost or quality improvements is
most significant.
(20) Multiple sourcing in R&D procurement facilitates market entry for new entrants and
enables public buyers to reduce the costs of the R&D and its intended results by
introducing competition in development (‘Competitive development’). It also helps
public buyers to retain a competitive supply chain after the R&D procurement and
reduce overdependencies on individual economic operators. Common rules for
multiple sourcing in R&D procurement should be therefore established. As regards
R&D procurements that are not pre-commercial procurements, public buyers should
16 Independent expert report, ‘Overcoming legal barriers for the uptake of innovation procurement in the
EU’, May 2026, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/4586624
EN 22 EN
be able to derogate from using multiple sourcing, in duly justified cases of overriding
public interests.
(21) Organising competitive development in phases also enables public buyers to reduce
the number of contractors after each R&D phase, which reduces the R&D and
investment risks for public buyers. A phased approach also enables contractors to
grow their business along the growing tasks and contract sizes of successive R&D
phases, which further eases market entry for smaller enterprises and new entrants. A
phased approach can also help to improve support for industrial research and
experimental development, in order to close the persistent gap between scientific
excellence and industrial deployment in the Union. Common rules for competitive
development in phases in R&D procurement should be therefore established. As
regards R&D procurements that are not pre-commercial procurements, public buyers
should be able to derogate from using competitive development in phases, in duly
justified cases of overriding public interests.
(22) Insufficient protection of confidential information and personal data in R&D
procurement can damage the contractor’s business growth, the safety of public
services and fundamental rights of third parties that participate in R&D activities.
Therefor, neither public buyers nor contractors should disclose confidential
information provided to them in the context of a R&D procurement. To ensure a
consistent and high level of protection of natural persons, public buyers may also
restrict the localisation of and access to the personal data that is processed in R&D
procurements to the Union, in accordance with limitations on the transfer of personal
data outside the Union set out in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European
Parliament and of the Council 17 and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council 18.
(23) Security and public safety considerations may arise in a wide range of R&D
procurement procedures, including outside defence and sensitive security sectors.
Common rules should be established for public buyers on assessing and addressing
such risks in the design and conduct of R&D procurement procedures and in contract
performance.
(24) There is an increased interest from public buyers in different Member States to
cooperate in organising their R&D procurement procedures. Common rules for joint
procurement should therefore be established to overcome the hurdles that public
buyers face today due to fragmented national rules to organise R&D procurement
collaboratively, whether through central purchasing bodies or through joint
procurement, including across borders. There is also an increased interest of public
buyers in Member States to collaborate with Union entities on R&D procurement. As
many of the new provisions in this Regulation are also useful for Union entities but
Union entities are not subject to this Regulation, future revisions of the EU Financial
Regulation will aim to improve the provisions enabling Union institutions, bodies or
17 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016,
pp. 1–88, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng. 18 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/58/oj)..
EN 23 EN
agencies to carry out R&D procurement, including pre-commercial procurement, for
themselves, jointly with or on behalf of other Union entities and jointly with or on
behalf of public buyers in Member States.
(25) Economic operators face difficulties in leveraging IP assets to obtain growth financing
due to the lack of consistent and reliable approaches to the valuation of intangible
assets, of structured secondary markets for intangible assets and of skills on IP backed
finance. A Competence Centre to support IP-backed finance and commercialisation of
IP should therefore be established within the European Union Intellectual Property
Office (‘the Office’) to develop a voluntary Union framework for the valuation and
disclosure of IP rights, to set up and maintain a Union-wide, multi-lingual, digital
match-making platform19 that facilitates transparent and efficient IP transactions
between investors and IP holders, and to support the financial community in designing
and implementing financial instruments that are tailored to IP assets through advisory
support, helpdesk services and skills development programmes. Access to the services
provided by the Competence Centre should be voluntary. The Competence Centre
should, where possible, make use of European Business Wallets and enable economic
operators to interact fully digitally, securely and efficiently by means of European
Business Wallets, or by alternative electronic means that meet the requirements of this
Regulation and that shall be interoperable with the European Business Wallets,
thereby enabling fully digital procedures.
(26) The Office should be able to levy charges for specific services provided through the
Competence Centre for the individual benefit of users, in accordance with Article 178
of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council20. Such
charges should be transparent, non-discriminatory and limited to the cost of the service
provided. Certain services, including access to the voluntary valuation framework,
basic access to the digital match-making platform and the Union-level helpdesk,
should remain free of charge.
(27) The effective use of the voluntary Union valuation framework requires assessments by
qualified, independent and trustworthy professionals. The Office should therefore
establish and administer a Union certification scheme for valuators of intellectual
property assets.
(28) The lack of accessible, consistent information across the Union on transactions in
which IP rights are used as collateral hinders evidence-based policymaking and the
development of new financial solutions. To that end, the Office should, through the
Competence Centre, cooperate with Member States and relevant public and private
stakeholders to collect and analyse Union-wide data on IP-collateralised transactions,
while ensuring appropriate safeguards for trade secrets and personal data.
(29) The tasks conferred on the Office by this Regulation should be reflected in a separate
section of its multiannual strategic programme and annual work programme, setting
out the relevant objectives, activities, expected results, performance indicators and
19 IT development and procurement strategy choices will be subject to pre-approval by the European
Commission Information Technology and Cybersecurity Board. 20 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the
European Union trade mark (OJ L 154, 16.6.2017, pp. 1,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1001/oj).
EN 24 EN
estimated resources. The annual activity report should contain a corresponding
assessment of implementation, resources used and revenue from charges.
(30) Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 establishes the Office and lays down its tasks. That
Regulation should therefore be amended to reflect the new tasks entrusted to the
Office.
(31) In order to take account of technological development and maintain an efficient
framework of measures for strengthening the innovation ecosystem at Union level, the
power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of:
supplementing this Regulation by excluding tenders having their origin in a third-
country that failed to provide national treatment related to Union economic operators
in R&D procurement contrary to its commitments on public procurement in an
international agreement with the Union; amending the list of cases in which public
buyers can decide not to apply risk-benefit sharing, not to apply multiple sourcing or
not to apply competitive development in phases supplement this Regulation by
establishing mandatory technical specifications, selection criteria, award criteria or
contract performance clauses to address an identified specific security and public
safety interest of the Union for specific categories of R&D procurement services or
their intended results.. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out
appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and
that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in
the Inter-institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 201621. In
particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the
European Parliament and the Council should receive all documents at the same time as
Member States’ experts, and their experts should systematically have access to
meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.
(32) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation,
implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission for the adoption of
technical specifications for the uniform application of the voluntary Union framework
for the valuation and disclosure of IP rights; common technical standards,
interoperability requirements and operational specifications of a digital match-making
platform; and detailed conditions for the implementation of the certification scheme of
intellectual property valuators. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with
Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
(33) Where the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the
Treaty is delegated to the Commission under this Regulation, it is of particular
importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations during its
preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted
in accordance with the principles laid down in the Inter-institutional Agreement on
Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the
preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council should receive
all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts should
systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the
preparation of delegated acts.
(34) Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union
21 OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1, http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2016/512/oj.
EN 25 EN
level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of
proportionality, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. Furthermore,
in accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this
Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
(35) This Regulation should not affect the application of State aid and competition rules, in
particular Articles 101, 102 and 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. The measures provided for in this Regulation should not be used to restrict or
distort competition in a manner contrary to the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Chapter 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
Subject matter
This Regulation lays down common rules for carrying out procurement of research and
development services (‘R&D procurement’) including a Union harmonised framework for
joint R&D procurement.
This Regulation also establishes a Competence Centre at the European Union Intellectual
Property Office and lays down the tasks of the European Union Intellectual Property Office in
relation to intellectual property-backed finance and commercialisation of intellectual property.
Article 2
Scope
1. Subject to paragraph 3, Chapter 2 of this Regulation applies to procurement of
research and development services by public buyers with a value net of value added
tax (VAT) estimated to be equal to or greater than the amount set out in Article 4(c)
of Directive 2014/24/EU.
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, and subject to paragraph 3, Chapter 2 of this
Regulation applies to procurement of research and development services by public
buyers, who are innovation agencies, with a value net of value added tax (VAT)
estimated to be equal to or greater than the amount set out in Article 15(a) of
Directive 2014/25/EU, provided that:
(a) the innovation agency acts on its own mandate and not merely on behalf of
another public buyer;
(b) the procurement of research and development services respects the principles
of transparency, non-discrimination and equal treatment.
3. Chapter 2 of this Regulation does not apply to:
(a) public procurement that falls within the scope of Directives 2014/23/EU,
2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU;
(b) public procurement that falls within the scope of Directive 2009/81/EC;
(c) public procurement that is excluded from Directive 2009/81/EC by virtue of the
provisions of that Directive.
EN 26 EN
4. Chapter 3 applies to the European Union Intellectual Property Office.
Article 3
Definitions
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) ‘procurement of research and development services (‘R&D procurement’)
means the procurement of fundamental research, industrial research and
experimental development up to original development, where
(a) original development of a first product, service or work may include limited
production or supply in order to incorporate the results of field testing and to
demonstrate that the product, service or work concerned is suitable for
production or supply in quantity to acceptable quality standards, but shall not
include quantity production or supply to establish commercial viability or to
recover research and development costs.
(b) procurement of research and development services may include obtaining the
ownership of prototypes or first products, services or works that are developed
at the public buyer’s request in the course of and for a particular R&D
procurement contract, but shall not include the commercial deployment of end-
products, services or works;
(2) ‘pre-commercial procurement means the procurement of research and
development services that involves risk-benefit sharing under market conditions, and
competitive development in phases.
(3) ‘public buyer’ means a contracting authority as defined in Article 6(1) of Directive
2014/23/EU, in Article 2(1), point (1), of Directive 2014/24/EU, in Article 3(1) of
Directive 2014/25/EU, or a contracting entity as defined in Article 7(1) of Directive
2014/23/EU and within the meaning of Article 4(1)of Directive (EU) 2014/25;
(4) ‘innovation agency’ means a specialised agency whose principal statutory task is the
financing or procurement of research and development;
(5) ‘R&D procurement contract’ means a contract concluded in writing between one
or more economic operators and one or more public buyers and having as its subject-
matter the provision of research and development services falling within the scope of
this Regulation;
(6) ‘tenderer’ means an economic operator that has submitted a tender;
(7) ‘contractor’ means an economic operator that has been awarded an R&D
procurement contract;
(8) ‘CPV codes for research and development services’ means the codes under
Division 73 of the Common Procurement Vocabulary laid down by Commission
Regulation (EC) No 213/200822.
22 Commission Regulation (EU) 213/2008 of 28 November 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No
2195/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) and
Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement
procedures, as regards the revision of the CPV (O L 74, 15.3.2008, pp. 1,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/213/oj).
EN 27 EN
(9) ‘economic operator’ means any natural or legal person, or public entity or group of
such persons and/or entities, including any temporary association of undertakings,
which offers the execution of works and/or a work, the supply of products or the
provision of services on the market;
(10) ‘procurement document’ means any document produced or referred to by the
public buyer to describe or determine elements of the procurement or the procedure,
including the contract notice, the prior information notice where it is used as a means
of calling for competition, the technical specifications, the descriptive document,
proposed conditions of contract, formats for the presentation of documents by
tenderers, information on generally applicable obligations and any additional
documents;;
(11) ‘multiple sourcing’ means an R&D procurement whereby one or more public
buyers award multiple R&D procurement contracts in parallel to multiple economic
operators and entrust them with the execution of identical or quasi-identical R&D
services to be performed in parallel;
(12) ‘minor informality or irregularity of a tender’ means an objectively identifiable
defect in a tender that is purely formal in nature and does not concern an essential
element of the tender, the correction or clarification of which does not result in a
modification of the tender, does not amount to the submission of a new tender, and
does not distort competition or infringe the principles of equal treatment and
transparency;
(13) ‘innovation’ means the implementation of a new or significantly improved product,
service, work or process, marketing method, or organisational method in business
practices, workplace organisation or external relations;
(14) ‘SME’ means a micro, small or medium-sized enterprise as defined in the Annex to
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC23;
(15) ‘innovative startup’ means, for the purposes of this Act and without making such
definition binding for other purposes, an enterprise that fulfils the criteria of an
innovative startup set out in point 3 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation
(EU) 2026/72024;
(16) ‘innovative scaleup’ means, for the purposes of this Act and without making such
definition binding for other purposes, an enterprise that fulfils the criteria of an
innovative scaleup set out in point 4 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation
(EU) 2026/720;
(17) ‘innovative enterprise’ means, for the purposes of this Act and without making such
definition binding for other purposes, an enterprise that fulfils the criteria of an
innovative enterprise set out in point 2.1 of the Annex to Commission
Recommendation (EU) 2026/720;
(18) ‘emergency situation’ means a sudden, unexpected, and severe disruption to
economic operations, involving shortages of critical products, works or services,
23 Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2003/361/oj). 24 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2026/720 of 18 March 2026 on the definition of innovative
enterprises, innovative startups and innovative scaleups, (OJ L, 2026/720, 24.03.2026, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2026/720/oj).
EN 28 EN
extreme price volatility, or supply chain breakdowns that necessitates immediate
action to prevent further harm to the economy, businesses, or consumers in the
Union;
(19) ‘functional requirement’ means a requirement that describes the functions to be
performed, without prescribing the specific technical means, design, solution or
methods by which those functions are to be achieved;
(20) ‘performance requirement’ means a requirement that defines the performance or
outcomes to be achieved, including criteria for verifying compliance, without
prescribing the specific technical means, design, solution or methods by which those
outcomes are to be achieved;
(21) ‘design requirement’ means a requirement that defines in detail technical
characteristics that prescribe how the products, services or works that are developed
at the public buyer’s request in the course of and for a particular R&D procurement
contract shall be designed, including materials, dimensions, and solutions, methods
or processes that are to be used;
(22) ‘results’ means any tangible or intangible outcomes of research, development and
innovation activities, such as data, knowledge or knowhow, whatever its form or
nature, whether or not it can be protected, as well as any rights attached to such
outcomes, including intellectual property rights, that are generated, in whole or in
part, through activities performed under the R&D procurement contract;
(23) ‘value engineering’ means a technique used by public buyers to require or allow
contractors to innovate during the performance of R&D procurement contract to
create additional value for the public buyer that improves the performance, quality,
cost or characteristics of the awarded research and development services and any
prototypes, first products, services or works that are developed in the course of and
for a particular R&D procurement contract, and to share any agreed resulting savings
between the public buyer and the contractor;
(24) ‘value engineering change proposal’ means a proposal submitted by contractors
during the performance of the R&D procurement contract to improve the awarded
research and development services and any prototypes, first goods, services or works
that are developed in the course of and for a particular R&D procurement contract or
to replace those research and development services or prototypes, first goods,
services or works by others that incorporate technological advances or innovations,
and which may involve replacing or adding a new consortium partner or
subcontractor;
(25) ‘value engineering clause’ means a contract clause in an R&D procurement contract
that defines the rights and oblig30ations of the buyer, contractors and subcontractors
regarding how value engineering shall be applied under that contract;
(26) ‘critical technologies’ means the technologies in the critical technology areas listed
in the Annex to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/211325;
(27) ‘critical raw material’ means a raw material listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU)
2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council26;
25 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the
EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (OJ L, 2023/2113, 11.10.2023,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2113/oj)
EN 29 EN
(28) ‘public and private entities in the fields of finance and insurance’ means public
authorities, public sector bodies, public undertakings and other natural or legal
persons active in the provision, financing, regulation, supervision or intermediation
of financial services, as defined in of Article 2, point (120 of Directive 2011/83/EU
of the European Parliament and of the Council27.
Chapter 2
PROCUREMENT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SERVICES
SECTION 1
R&D PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE AND CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
Article 4
General principles
1. Public buyers shall carry out R&D procurement in accordance with the rules laid
down in this Regulation. Public buyers and economic operators shall not circumvent
or attempt to circumvent the obligations laid down in this Regulation.
2. Public buyers shall treat economic operators equally and without discrimination and
shall act in a transparent and proportionate manner. The R&D procurement shall not
be designed with the intention of excluding it from the scope of this Regulation or of
artificially narrowing competition. Competition shall be considered to be artificially
narrowed where the design of the R&D procurement is made with the intention of
unduly favouring or disadvantaging certain economic operators.
3. Public buyers may draw up the procurement documents and carry out R&D
procurement, including the market consultation, tendering and contract performance
activities, in any of the official languages of the Union and they may allow economic
operators to submit market consultation feedback, tenders, deliverables and any other
communication exchanges throughout the procurement in any of the official
languages of the Union.
4. Public buyers shall by electronic means ensure that economic operators that have
access to the procurement procedure have unrestricted and full direct access free of
charge to any electronic communication and to the procurement documents,
including documents prepared by public buyers for a market consultation, until three
years after the award of the R&D procurementcontract. Where for certain parts of
these documents access by electronic means cannot be provided, public buyers shall
26 Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024
establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and
amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (OJ L,
2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj) 27 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer
rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/83/oj)
EN 30 EN
indicate how these parts of the documents will be made available by other than
electronic means. Public buyers shall carry out all direct communication for R&D
procurement where possible by means of the European Business Wallets or by
alternative electronic means that that are interoperable with the European Business
Wallets.
5. In R&D procurement procedures requiring publication in the Official Journal of the
European Union, public buyers shall use the applicable standard forms for notices
laid down in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/178028.
6. Public buyers shall take appropriate measures to ensure that, in the performance of
R&D procurement contracts, economic operators comply with applicable obligations
relating to the strategic priorities of the Union set out in the second subparagraph of
this paragraph, as established by Union law, national law, or collective agreements
and by the international environmental, social and labour law.
In cases where there are obligations as referred to in subparagraph 1, public buyers
shall design and execute their R&D procurement in a manner that takes into account
the strategic priorities of the Union, in particular:
(a) boosting the Union’s competitiveness through a thriving internal market,
closing the innovation gap and reinforcing the Union’s manufacturing and
industrial base;
(b) the achievement of climate and environmental objectives of the Union;
(c) the pursuit of a fair and inclusive society;
(d) the Union's economic safety, security, resilience and economic security,
including through strategic independence.
Article 5
Economic operators
1. Public buyers shall not require economic operators to have a specific legal form in
order to participate in the R&D procurement procedure.
2. Economic operators that, under the law of the Member State in which they are
established, are entitled to provide the relevant R&D services, shall not be rejected
solely on the ground that, under the law of the Member State in which the contract
will be awarded, the economic operator would have been required to be either a
natural or legal person.
3. Public buyers may, in the case of R&D services, works or siting and installation
operations, require legal persons to indicate before the start of the execution of the
tasks concerned, the names and relevant qualifications of the staff responsible for the
performance of the contract in question.
28 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1780 of 23 September 2019 establishing standard
forms for the publication of notices in the field of public procurement and repealing Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2015/1986 (eForms) (OJ L 272, 25.10.2019, p. 7, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1780/oj).
EN 31 EN
Article 6
Groups of economic operators
4. Public buyers shall not define selection criteria pursuant to Article 15 for groups of
economic operators that differ from those for individual economic operators unless
otherwise laid down in this Article.
Groups of economic operators shall be deemed to fulfil a selection criterion where:
(a) one economic operator in the group possesses the necessary technical and
professional ability or economic and financial standing; or,
(b) where such ability or standing can be established by combining the relevant
technical and professional ability or economic and financial standing from two
or several members of the group, unless such combination will not achieve the
same level of ability or standing.
5. When justified by the nature of the contract and in accordance with the principle of
proportionality, public buyers may
(a) derogate from paragraph 1, second subparagraph, point (a) or (b) for selection
criteria relevant for certain critical tasks;
(b) require that certain critical tasks be performed directly by the member of the
group that fulfils the selection criterion relevant for that task.
Public buyers shall identify the critical tasks and related, requirements, clearly
indicating them and their justification in the procurement documents.
6. Conditions for the performance of the R&D procurement contract by groups may be
permitted to differ from those imposed on individual economic operators,
only where justified by objective reasons, which are proportionate and clearly
indicated in the procurement documents.
7. Without prejudice to Member States’ competence to organise their social security
systems, public buyers shall not require groups of economic operators to assume a
specific legal form once they have been awarded the R&D procurement contract.
8. Public buyers shall give particular consideration not to create unjustified or
disproportionate barriers related to the size of the economic operators participating in
a group, in particular for SMEs, innovative startups and innovative scaleups.
Article 7
Reliance on the capacity of other entities
1. With regard to selection criteria as set out pursuant to Article 15, economic operators
may rely on the capacities of other entities, regardless of the legal nature of the links
which it has with them.
2. The public buyer shall verify whether the entities on whose capacity the economic
operator intends to rely on fulfil the relevant selection criteria and whether there are
grounds for their exclusion.
3. The public buyer shall require the economic operator to replace an entity which does
not meet the relevant selection criteria, or in respect of which there are mandatory
grounds for exclusion. The public buyer may require the economic operator to
replace an entity in respect of which there are optional grounds for exclusion.
EN 32 EN
4. Public buyers may request in the procurement documents that the economic operator
proves that it will have the relevant resources of the entity it intends to rely on at its
disposal throughout the period of execution of the R&D procurement contract, for
example by a statement to that effect by those entities.
5. Where an economic operator relies on the capacities of other entities with regard to
criteria relating to economic and financial standing, the public buyer may require that
the economic operator and those entities be jointly liable to the public buyer for the
execution of the R&D procurement contract.
6. Where an economic operator relies on the capacities of other entities to prove
technical and professional ability, the public buyer may require in the procurement
documents that such other entity will perform the works or services for which these
capacities are required.
Article 8
Subcontracting
1. Parts of an R&D procurement contract may be subcontracted. A R&D procurement
contract awarded to an economic operator shall not be subcontracted in its entirety,
nor be further subcontracted in its entirety.
2. Public buyers shall require economic operators to indicate in their tender any share of
the R&D procurement contract that they envisage to subcontract to third parties, and
any proposed subcontractors.
Public buyers shall require the main contractor to inform them after the award of the
contract and before the start of the contract performance of the tasks and activities its
intends to subcontract. Public buyers shall also require information about the identity
of any subcontractors. The public buyer shall require the main contractor to notify
the public buyer as soon as possible of any changes to this information during the
course of the R&D procurement contract.
3. The public buyer shall require the economic operator to replace a subcontractor in
respect of which there are mandatory grounds for exclusion pursuant to Article 13.
The public buyer may require the economic operator to replace a subcontractor in
respect of which there are optional grounds for exclusion pursuant to Article 14.
4. When justified by the nature of the R&D procurement contract and in accordance
with the principle of proportionality, public buyers may require that certain critical
tasks be performed directly by the main contractor. Public buyers shall identify the
critical tasks and related requirements, clearly indicating them and their justification
in the procurement documents.
5. Subcontracting under the provisions in this Article shall be without prejudice to the
main contractor’s liability.
6. Observance of the obligations referred to in Article 4(6) by subcontractors is ensured
through appropriate action by the competent national authorities acting within the
scope of their responsibility and remit. Member States may adopt or retain additional
proportionate measures limiting subcontracting where they have identified a duly
substantiated higher risk of non-compliance with social and labour law obligations.
EN 33 EN
Article 9
Market consultation
1. Prior to launching the R&D procurement call for tenders referred to in Article 23,
public buyers shall conduct a market consultation to inform economic operators of
the forthcoming R&D procurement call for tenders, and gain market knowledge,
including about the availability of, or potential of developing, innovative solutions,
and about their views on the proposed scope, value, and modalities of the
implementation of the R&D procurement.
2. Prior to starting the market consultation, public buyers shall announce the market
consultation by means of a prior information notice. The notice shall:
(a) be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and, after that, be
published on the national public procurement portal of the Member State of the
public buyer;
(b) include references to the relevant CPV codes for research and development
services, indicate that the market consultation is conducted for a R&D
procurement and relates to innovation by marking the field ‘innovation’ in the
prior information notice and by including, where applicable the words ‘Pre-
Commercial Procurement’ in the field ‘title of the procurement’.
(c) include the format chosen by the public buyer for conducting the market
consultation, such as online questionnaires, online webinars or physical
meetings, and any relevant links or contacts where further information about
the conduct of the R&D procurement can be obtained.
3. Public buyers shall consult the market widely. To this effect, after announcing the
market consultation by means of a prior information notice, public buyers may
publish and promote the announcement of the market consultations through any
widely available media.
4. By way of derogation from paragraph 2 and 3 of this Article, where necessary and
justified for ensuring the protection of the security or public safety interests of the
Union or one or several of its Member States withing the meaning of Article 28(2),
public buyers shall publish and promote to the media the prior information notice
omitting all sensitive information and requesting economic operators to express their
interest to participate in the market consultation. Sensitive information shall be sent
only to economic operators who have expressed interest, meet the qualification
criteria and do not pose a security risk within the meaning of Article 28(4), point (d).
5. By way of derogation from paragraphs 2, 3 and 9 of this Article, where the
publication and promotion in the media of a prior information notice and the
publication of documents that explain the background and the logistical details for
organising the market consultation would be contrary to the security or public safety
interests of the Union or one or several of its Member States withing the meaning of
Article 28(2), the public buyer shall not announce the market consultation pursuant
to paragraph 2, 3 and 9 of this Article but shall send an invitation to participate in the
market consultation to potentially suitable economic operators identified through a
market research and share the market consultation documents only with those who
express an interest, meet the qualification criteria and do not pose a security risk
within the meaning of Article 28(4), point (d).
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6. Public buyers shall not exclude any economic operators having their origin in
countries referred to in Article 11(1), from participation in the market consultation.
By way of derogation from the first subparagraph of this paragraph, where necessary
and justified for protecting security and public safety interests of the Union or one or
several of its Member States within the meaning of Article 28(2), public buyers may
restrict market consultation only to economic operators that have their origin in
Member States.
7. Public buyers shall ensure equal access to information during the market
consultation. They shall share any information on the R&D procurement provided to
one economic operator participating in the market consultation with all other
economic operators participating in the same market consultation.
8. During the market consultation, public buyers may seek or accept information and
advice from the general public, independent experts, public authorities, market
participants or other relevant parties. The market consultation may take the form of
written or verbal exchanges, online questionnaires, webinar of physical meetings, site
visits or demonstrations, or other suitable objective formats. Information and advice
sought or accepted may be used in the planning and conduct of the R&D
procurement, respecting the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination, fair
competition and transparency.
9. Unless contrary to the security or public safety interests of the Union or one or
several of its Member States withing the meaning of Article 28(2), public buyers
shall publish on their website any documents related to the market consultation,
including any documents that explain the background and the logistical details for
organising the market consultation, questions posed by economic operators together
with the replies to those questions by the public buyer and where available a
summary on the outcome of the market consultation or written minutes, or a video or
audio recording of any market consultation meetings.
10. The participation of an economic operator in a market consultation shall not prejudge
its eligibility to participate in a subsequent call for tenders for the R&D procurement.
11. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the obligation to conduct a market
consultation pursuant to this Article shall not apply to R&D procurement procedures
which have as their only subject the procurement of research and development
consultancy services as covered by CPV codes 73200000-4,73210000-7 and
73220000-0.
Article 10
Procurement documents
1. Public buyers shall specify in the procurement documents at least the following
elements:
(a) the R&D procurement need in accordance with paragraph 4;
(b) the estimated value of the R&D procurement established in accordance with
the methodology laid down in paragraph 5, and any cash or in-kind
contributions that public buyers intend or may make available to contractors
during the R&D procurement;
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(c) the information on the conduct and the outcome of the market consultation
made available in accordance with Article 9(7) and Article 9(9);
(d) the conditions for access to the R&D procurement, in accordance with the
obligations laid down in Articles 11;
(e) the applicable exclusion grounds, selection criteria and financial guarantees in
accordance with the obligations laid down in Articles 13, 14, 15 and 16;
(f) the minimum requirements to be met by all tenderers;
(g) the innovation-related award criteria, including their respective weightings, to
be applied in the evaluation of tenders, in accordance with the obligations laid
down in Article 17;
(h) the division of the rights and obligations related to intellectual property rights
and the ownership of results, in accordance with the obligations laid down in
Article 19;
(i) the provisions for contract modifications and, where applicable, for value
engineering, in accordance with the obligations laid down in Articles 20 to 21;
(j) the provisions for the call for tenders, including applicable provisions on
negotiation laid down in paragraphs 2 to 3 of this Article and the minimum
number of contractors that are to be selected where lots and multiple sourcing
are used, in accordance with the provisions on the use for multiple sourcing
laid down in Article 22 and with the provisions for the launch of the call for
tenders laid down in Article 23;
(k) where applicable, the number of R&D phases over which the R&D activities
are split and whether the public buyer includes the option to make use of the
possibility to invite economic operators that have not participated in previous
phases of the R&D procurement to participate in later phases of the R&D
procurement, in accordance with the obligations for competitive development
in phases laid down in Article 24;
(l) whether and how the public buyer intends to obtain the ownership of results of
the R&D procurement, including any prototypes or first products, services or
works developed as a part of the R&D procurement;
(m) the innovation-related key performance indicators defined, to the maximum
extent practicable as performance requirements, and the method for assessing
them, to monitor the contract performance throughout the R&D procurement,
in accordance with the obligations laid down in Article 24(5);
(n) the provisions for payments, in accordance with the obligations laid down in
Article 25;
(o) the applicable confidentiality and data protection obligations, in accordance
with the obligations laid down in Article 26;
(p) where applicable, any requirements for contractors to contribute to
standardisation, certification or publication of results, including by making
them available as open data or open source, without prejudice to confidentiality
and data protection obligations referred to in Article 26 and to the obligations
in respect of the protection of intellectual property rights laid down in Article
19;
EN 36 EN
(q) the provisions on the termination of R&D procurement contracts, in
accordance with the obligations laid down in Articles 27 and 29;
(r) the applicable security and public safety obligations, in accordance with the
obligations laid down in Article 28, 29 and 30;
(s) where applicable, the provisions for conducting the procedure as a joint R&D
procurement, in accordance with the obligations laid down in Article 31;
(t) that the provisions of this Regulation apply to the R&D procurement.
2. Public buyers shall indicate in the procurement documents that the essential
conditions of the R&D procurement contract are not subject to negotiation. Public
buyers shall not substantially alter the subject matter of the R&D procurement
contract as a result of the negotiations. Negotiations may concern all characteristics
of the research and development activities and of the intended results to be developed
for the public buyer during those research and development activities as part of the
R&D procurement, including quality, quantities as well as social, environmental and
innovative aspects, may be subject to negotiation, provided that those characteristics
do not constitute minimum requirements.
3. Public buyers shall, in the procurement documents, indicate any specific elements
not listed in paragraph 1 for which they invite tenderers to indicate, in their tender,
their preferred approach, leaving the finalisation of those elements subject to
negotiation.
4. Public buyers shall draft the procurement documents for the R&D procurement
taking into account the findings of the market consultation and any market research
that the public buyer conducted on the state of the art of any ongoing research and
development and product planning roadmaps of economic operators. Public buyers
shall formulate the R&D procurement need referred to paragraph 1, point (a), of this
Article as a problem that needs to be solved without unduly restricting possible
approaches to solve the problem. Public buyers shall give preference to use
functional requirements or performance requirements in accordance with Article 18
to formulate the requirements for addressing the R&D procurement need. The
information provided in the procurement documents shall be sufficiently precise to
enable economic operators to identify the nature and scope of the R&D procurement
and to decide whether to submit a tender.
5. Public buyers shall calculate the estimated value of the R&D procurement procedure
based on the maximum estimated value net of VAT of the research and development
services to be provided in the context of the R&D procurement contract or contracts
that are expected to be awarded as part of the R&D procurement procedure,
including any lots, options or renewals. The calculation of the estimated value shall
take into account the estimated value of all types of research and development related
expenses, irrespective of their share in the total estimated value, including the value
of labour, materials, components and tools that are needed to deliver the expected
results, including, where relevant, research and development that was performed
before the start of the R&D procurement procedure. Where public buyers intend to
obtain the exclusive ownership of intellectual property rights to results generated by
contractors, the estimated value shall include the estimated value of those intellectual
property rights. The estimated value shall not include any cash or in-kind
contributions that public buyers intend or may make available to contractors during
the R&D procurement.
EN 37 EN
6. As regards products, services or works that result from the research and development
services procured and that are needed to safeguard security and public safety
interests of the Union or one or several of its Member States within the meaning of
Article 28(2), including to avoid security of supply issues, public buyers may, in the
procurement documents, specify that public buyers have a priority right to purchase a
predefined volume or value of those products, services or works before these are
offered to other potential buyers. In such case, public buyers shall set out the priority
right to purchase as a contractual obligation in the R&D procurement contract.
Article 11
Conditions for access to R&D procurement procedures and place of performance
requirements
1. Public buyers shall open the participation in R&D procurement only to:
(a) economic operators having their origin in Member States;
(b) economic operators having their origin in countries that have concluded an
international agreement with the Union, provided that R&D procurement falls
within the scope of the Union’s public procurement commitments in that
agreement.
2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 39
to supplement this Regulation by excluding, in whole or in part, subject to the
Union’s international obligations, a third country from the scope of paragraph 1,
point (b) based on any of the following criteria:
(a) that third country has failed to provide national treatment related to Union
R&D services or entities under the agreements referred to in paragraph 1, first
subparagraph, point (b);
(b) such exclusion is justified to avoid dependencies or any other developments
that may threaten the security of supply in the Union of the relevant products,
works or services in question;
(c) such restriction is justified under any other exception under the applicable
agreement.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of this Article, where necessary and justified
for ensuring the protection of the security interests of the Union or one or several of
its Member States within the meaning of article 28(2), public buyers may restrict
participation in R&D procurement only to economic operators that have their origin
in Member States and that are not subject to control of a third country or of a legal
entity that is subject to control of a third country.
4. By way of derogation from paragraph 1 point (b), public buyers may open the access
to the R&D procurement also only to economic operators that have their origin in
countries that have concluded an international agreement with the Union in which
the Union has made public procurement commitments but not for R&D
procurements, only in one of the following cases where:
(d) through a market research that includes an extensive, widely disseminated
market consultation, the public buyer can determine that the required R&D
services cannot be provided by economic operators in the countries listed in
paragraph 1, and no reasonable alternative or substitute exists;
EN 38 EN
(e) no suitable tenders or requests to participate have been submitted, including in
response to a similar R&D procurement procedure launched by any public
buyer in the countries listed in paragraph 1 in the two years preceding the
launch of the planned new R&D procurement procedure; or
(f) limiting the access to the R&D procurement procedures in accordance with
paragraph 1 would entail that the public buyer would have to procure the R&D
services at disproportionate costs.
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (b), an estimated difference of more
than 20 % between the estimated cost of an offer from an economic operator having
their origin in a country referred to in paragraph 1 and that from an economic
operator having their origin in a country that has concluded an international
agreement with the Union in which the Union has made public procurement
commitments but not for R&D procurements on the basis of on objective and
transparent data, may be presumed by public buyers to be disproportionate.
5. Subcontracting shall not be used with the intent or effect to circumvent the rules on
access to R&D procurement. The conditions for access to R&D procurement shall
not apply to entities on whose capacity the tenderer relies or to subcontractors, unless
public buyers limit subcontracting:
(a) where paragraph 1 or 4 applies, to subcontractors that have their origin in the
countries listed in paragraph 1; or
(b) where paragraph 3 applies and where necessary and justified for ensuring the
protection of the security and public safety interests of the Union or one or
several of its Member State within the meaning of Article 28(2), to
subcontractors that have their origin in Member States and that are not subject
to control of a third country or of a legal entity that is subject to control of a
third country.
6. Where paragraph 4 applies, public buyers may reserve a number of R&D
procurement contracts within the same R&D procurement procedure:
(a) for economic operators that have their origin in the countries referred to in
paragraph 1, first subparagraph points (a) and (b); or
(b) where necessary and justified for protecting the security or public safety
interests of the Union or one or several of its Member States within the
meaning of article 28(2), for economic operators that have their origin in
Member States and that are not subject to control of a third country or of a
legal entity that is subject to control of a third country.
7. Unless contrary to security or public safety interest of the Union or one or several of
its Member States within the meaning of Article 28(2) for reasons justified in the
procurement documents, public buyers shall require that contractors perform at least
50% of the research and development activities under the R&D procurement contract
in the countries referred to in paragraph 1, including the work of principal research
and development staff with scientific responsibility for the R&D procurement
contract.
8. Where necessary and justified for protecting the security or public safety interests of
the Union or one or several of its Member States within the meaning of Article 28(2),
public buyers may require, in addition to the measure in paragraph 7 of this Article,
contractors to perform all research and development activities relating to new
EN 39 EN
security components of the intended results in the Union, including the work of
principal research and development staff with scientific responsibility for the R&D
procurement contract.
9. Where an economic operator fails to provide information or documentation requested
by the public buyer related to the verification of the place of performance conditions
referred in paragraphs 7 and 8 without any reasonable explanation and thereby
prevents the verification of the economic operator’s compliance with the place of
performance conditions by public buyers or makes such a verification practically
impossible or very difficult, that economic operator shall be excluded from
participation in the R&D procurement procedure.
10. In addition to, or by derogation from any rules set out under this Regulation,
including or by derogation from the list of countries referred to in paragraph 1 and
paragraph 4, for the award and execution of R&D procurement contracts supported
by a Union programme or instrument, public buyers shall apply any conditions
necessary to comply with requirements for Union support in all management modes
established in Article 62 of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) 2024/250929.
11. The Commission shall establish and make available free of charge a publicly
accessible online tool, which sets out, in a comprehensive and up-to-date manner, the
Union’s public procurement commitments, including the R&D procurement
commitments, in international agreements.
Public buyers shall determine, for the purposes of a given R&D procurement
procedure, the countries referred to in paragraph 1, point (b), and paragraph 4 on the
basis of the applicable international agreements as reflected in the online tool
referred to in subparagraph 1 of this paragraph.
12. Public buyers shall determine, for the purposes of a given procurement procedure, on
the basis of the applicable international agreements as reflected in the online tool
referred to in paragraph 1 for the parameters entered, including the public buyer
concerned, the subject-matter and the estimated value of the contract in relation to
the applicable thresholds.
13. Public buyers shall:
(a) restrict participation in R&D procurement procedures in the case of groups of
economic operators referred to in Article 6, to groups which are composed
solely of economic operators having their origin incountries referred to in
paragraphs 1 to 4 in this Article;
(b) reject a tender in the course of a R&D procurement procedure where it is not
submitted by economic operators having their origin incountries referred to in
paragraphs 1 to 4 in this Article or groups thereof as referred to in point (a).
Article 12
Determination of origin
1. The origin of an economic operator shall be deemed to be:
29 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September
2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.09.2024,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).
EN 40 EN
(a) in the case of a natural person, the country of which the person is a national or
where that person has a right of permanent residence;
(b) in the case of a legal person, either of the following:
(i) the country under the laws of which the legal person is constituted or
otherwise organised and in the territory of which the legal person is engaged in
substantive business operations;
(ii) if the legal person is not engaged in substantive business operations in the
territory of the country in which it is constituted or otherwise organised, the
origin of the legal person is to be that of the person or persons who may
exercise, directly or indirectly, a dominant influence on the legal person by
virtue of their ownership of that legal person, their financial participation
therein, or the rules which govern that legal person.
2. For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (b)(ii), that person or persons shall
be presumed to have a dominant influence on the legal person in any of the following
cases in which they, directly or indirectly:
(a) by holding the majority of the legal person’s subscribed capital;
(b) by controlling the majority of the votes attaching to shares issued by the legal
person; or
(c) by being able to appoint more than half of the legal person’s administrative,
management or supervisory body.
3. Public buyers may, at any time during a R&D procurement procedure, request the
economic operator to submit, supplement, clarify or complete the information or
documentation related to the verification of the economic operator’s origin within an
appropriate time limit, provided that such requests are made in compliance with the
principles of equal treatment and transparency. Where the economic operator fails to
provide such information or documentation without any reasonable explanation and
thereby prevents the verification of the economic operator’s origin by public buyers
or makes such a verification practically impossible or very difficult, that economic
operator shall be excluded from participation in the R&D procurement procedure
concerned.
Article 13
Mandatory exclusion grounds
1. Public buyers shall at any time exclude an economic operator, including individual
members of a group of economic operators, from participation in a R&D
procurement procedure where that economic operator, or a key person in the
functioning of a legal person as defined in the second subparagraph, has been the
subject, in any Member State, of a conviction by final judgment, for any of the
offences listed in this subparagraph, or, regarding Member States not bound by the
relevant Union legal act, offences as defined in equivalent national legislation:
EN 41 EN
(a) participation in a criminal organisation, as defined in Article 1, point 1, of
Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA30;
(b) corruption offences, within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2026/102131;
(c) fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests within the meaning of Article 1
of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial
interests and criminal offences referred to in Article 3, 4 and 5 under Directive
(EU) 2017/137132;
(d) terrorist offences and offences related to a terrorist group, as well as offences
related to terrorist activities, as defined in Articles 3 to 12 of Directive (EU)
2017/54133;
(e) Money laundering within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive
2018/1673/EU34;
(f) trafficking in human beings within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive (EU)
2011/3635;
(g) criminal offences concerning the employment of illegally staying third-country
nationals, as referred to in Articles 2, 3 and 9 of Directive 2009/52/EC36;
(h) environmental criminal offences as referred to in Articles 3 and 4 of Directive
(EU) 2024/120337;
(i) criminal offences concerning the violation of Union Restrictive Measures as
referred to in Article 3 and 4 of Directive (EU) 2024/122638;
30 Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime
(OJ L 300, 11.11.2008, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2008/841/oj). 31 Directive (EU) 2026/1021 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2026 on
combatting corruption, replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on
the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member
States of the European Union and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and
of the Council (OJ L, 2026/1021, 11.5.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2026/1021/oj). 32 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight
against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj). 33 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on
combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council
Decision 2005/671/JHA (OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/541/oj). 34 Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on
combating money laundering by criminal law (OJ L 284, 12.11.2018, p. 22, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1673/oj). 35 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework
Decision 2002/629/JHA (OJ L 101, 15.4.2011, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/36/oj). 36 Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the
protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and
2009/123/EC (OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1203/oj). 37 Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the
protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and
2009/123/EC (OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1203/oj). 38 Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the
definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and
amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673 (OJ L, 2024/1226, 29.4.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1226/oj).
EN 42 EN
(j) fraudulent use of non-cash payment instruments as referred to in Articles 3 to 8
of Directive 2019/713/EU39
(k) offences in the area of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and
child sexual abuse material as referred to in Article 3 to 9 of Directive
2011/93/EU40;
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, a key person in the functioning of a legal
person means a person having a leading position within the legal person, based on
any of the following:
(a) a power of representation of the legal person;
(b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; or
(c) an authority to exercise control within the legal person.
2. The exclusion grounds set out in this Article shall apply for five years from the date
of the delivery of the final judgment, except where the period of exclusion has been
set by the final judgment, meaning that no exclusion decision shall be taken after the
expiry of the periods referred to in this sentence.
3. Public buyers shall at any time during the R&D procurement procedure exclude an
economic operator from participation in a R&D procurement procedure where it
becomes aware that the economic operator or contractor is in breach of its
obligations relating to the payment of taxes or social security contributions and this
has been established by final judicial or administrative decision, except if by that
moment in time, the economic operator has concluded a binding arrangement on
paying the taxes or social security contributions due, including, where applicable,
any interest accrued or fines.
Public buyers may derogate from the mandatory exclusion provided for in the first
subparagraph where an exclusion would be clearly disproportionate, in particular
where only minor amounts are unpaid.
4. Public buyers may decide to derogate from the mandatory exclusion provided for in
this Article, on an exceptional basis, for overriding reasons relating to the public
interest such as public health or protection of the environment. Any decision to
derogate and the justification therefore shall be documented in the individual
documentation of the R&D procurement procedures.
Article 14
Optional exclusion grounds
39 Directive (EU) 2019/713 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on combating
fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment and replacing Council Framework Decision
2001/413/JHA (OJ L 123, 10.5.2019, p. 18, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/713/oj). 40 Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on
combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing
Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (OJ L 335, 17.12.2011, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/93/oj.
EN 43 EN
1. Public buyers may at any time during the R&D procurement procedure exclude an
economic operator, including individual members of groups of economic operators,
from participation in a R&D procurement procedure, where:
(a) the public buyer can demonstrate by any appropriate means that the economic
operator has breached applicable obligations under relevant Union legislation,
as referred to in Article 4(6);
(b) the economic operator is bankrupt or is the subject of insolvency or winding-up
proceedings or a comparable situation;
(c) the public buyer can demonstrate by appropriate means grave professional
misconduct by the economic operator, which renders its integrity or reliability
questionable;
(d) the public buyer has sufficiently plausible indications to conclude that the
economic operator has entered into agreements with other economic operators
aimed at distorting competition;
(e) the economic operator has shown significant or persistent deficiencies in the
performance of a substantive requirement under a prior public contract, which
led to early termination of that prior contract, damages or other comparable
sanctions by the public buyer;
(f) the economic operator, in the context of the concerned R&D procurement
procedure, has been found accountable of serious misrepresentation with
regard to the information required for the verification of the absence of grounds
for exclusion or the fulfilment of the selection criteria; or has otherwise
undertaken to unduly obtain advantages in the R&D procurement procedure;
(g) the public buyer can demonstrate by any appropriate means, including but not
limited to classified information or non-publicly disclosable, assessments
provided by competent national authorities, that the economic operator does
not possess sufficient reliability to exclude risks to the security and public
safety interests of the Union or of one or more Member States.
(h) the economic operator has benefitted from foreign subsidies distorting the
internal market, established by an implementing act adopted by the
Commission pursuant to Article 31 (2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/256041, in the
three years preceding the public procurement procedure, and the public buyer
has sufficiently plausible indications to conclude that the foreign subsidies
concerned are likely to have an impact on the tender of the economic operator.
2. Any economic operator subject to an exclusion pursuant to paragraph1 may provide
evidence to rebut the existence of the exclusion ground or to demonstrate that it has
taken sufficient measures to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence of the
exclusion ground.
For this purpose, the economic operator shall, in particular, prove that it has
(a) paid or undertaken to pay compensation in respect of any damage caused by
the misconduct;
41 Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on
foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj).
EN 44 EN
(b) clarified the facts and circumstances in a comprehensive manner by actively
cooperating with the investigating authorities; and
(c) taken concrete technical, organisational and personnel measures that are
appropriate to prevent further misconduct.
If the public buyer considers the evidence provided as sufficient, the economic
operator concerned shall not be excluded from the R&D procurement procedure.
The measures taken by the economic operators shall be evaluated taking into account
the gravity and particular circumstances of the misconduct. In assessing the measures
taken by the economic operator public buyers shall take into account the nature,
extent and timing of the cooperation with the relevant investigating authorities.
Where the measures are considered to be insufficient, the economic operator shall
receive a statement of the reasons thereto.
An economic operator which has been excluded by final judgment in any Member
State from participating in procurement procedures shall not be entitled to make use
of the possibility provided for under this paragraph during the period of exclusion
resulting from that judgment.
3. Member States may designate a national authority competent to evaluate the
evidence and decide whether it is sufficient for the purposes of this paragraph. Public
buyers shall rely on a positive decision of the national competent authority for the
purpose of their procurement procedures.
4. Where no measures as specified in paragraph 2 are taken and where the period of
exclusion has not been set by final judgment, public buyers may exclude economic
operators pursuant to this Article during a period of five years from the date of the
conduct giving rise to exclusion or, in the case of continued or repeated acts, the date
on which the conduct ceases, but not after that maximum period.
5. Where a public buyer excludes an economic operator on the basis of paragraph 1,
point (h), it shall inform the Commission thereof.
Article 15
Selection criteria
1. Where public buyers decide to make use of selection criteria as requirements for
participation in R&D procurement procedures, they shall lay down such criteria in
accordance with the conditions in this Article.
2. Selection criteria for R&D procurement procedures shall only relate to:
(a) suitability to pursue the professional activity within the meaning of paragraph
4;
(b) technical and professional ability within the meaning of paragraph 5;
(c) economic and financial standing within the meaning of paragraphs 6, 7 and 8.
3. Public buyers shall limit any requirements for selection criteria to those that are
appropriate to ensure that an economic operator has the required capacities and
abilities to perform the R&D procurement contract. All requirements for selection
criteria shall be related and proportionate to the complexity of and the risks
associated with the subject-matter of the R&D procurement contract and comply
with the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality.
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Each reference to be provided as means of proof of compliance with any of the
selection criteria shall be accompanied by the words ‘or equivalent’ to allow
tenderers to provide any type of alternative evidence of compliance.
4. In R&D procurement procedures, in so far as economic operators are required to
hold a particular authorisation or to be members of a particular organisation in order
to be able to perform the research and development activities concerned in the
country where the economic operator conducts its main activity, the public buyer
may require such economic operators to prove that they hold such authorisation or
membership.
Certified registration on official lists held by the competent bodies or a certificate
issued by the certification body shall constitute a presumption of compliance with
regard to the requirements laid down in the first and second subparagraphs.
5. Public buyers may impose requirements ensuring that economic operators possess
the necessary human and technical resources and experience to perform the R&D
procurement contract to an appropriate quality standard.
Unless justified by the complexity of the R&D procurement contract or the nature of
the subject-matter, public buyers shall not require prior experience in other
contracts as a condition for participation in an R&D procurement procedure.
A public buyer may assume that an economic operator does not possess the required
professional abilities in either of the following cases where:
(a) the public buyer has established by any means that the economic operator has
conflicting interests which may negatively affect the performance of the that
contract;
(b) the public buyer has been made aware by any means that the economic
operator presents a security concern for a Member State or the Union as a
whole.
Public buyers shall not require prior experience in other contracts without requiring
that contractors possess the necessary human and technical resources to perform the
R&D procurement contract. Public buyers shall not deem economic operators non-
compliant with the requirements on technical and professional ability solely due to
lack of prior experience in other contracts.
Any references to qualifications or qualification levels included in selection criteria
shall mention the European Qualifications Framework levels set out in Annex II to
Council Recommendation of 22 May 201742.
6. Where public buyers require economic operators to have minimum economic and
financial standing, they may require economic operators to have one or both of the
following:
(a) a certain minimum financial capacity;
(b) an appropriate level of professional risk indemnity insurance.
42 Council recommendation of 22 May 2017 on the European Qualifications Framework for lifelong
learning and repealing the recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April
2008 on the establishment of the European Qualifications Framework for lifelong learning (OJ C 189,
15.6.2017, p.15).
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7. Where public buyers require economic operators to provide proof of minimum
economic and financial standing, public buyers shall allow economic operators to
provide such proof by any appropriate means, including any of the following:
(a) statements from banks or, where appropriate, evidence of relevant professional
risk indemnity insurance;
(b) financial statements or extracts from financial statements, where publication of
financial statements is required under the law of the country in which the
economic operator is established;
(c) a statement of the economic operator’s turnover for a maximum of the last
three financial years available, depending on the date on which the economic
operator was set up or started trading, as far as the information on such
turnovers is available;
(d) a business plan supported by statements or other evidence of the economic
operator’s tangible and intangible financial assets, including its intellectual
property assets, financial contributions from financial investors or funding
bodies, or evidence of own capital invested in the economic operator.
Where a minimum financial capacity is required, it shall not exceed 50% of the
estimated value of the R&D procurement contract, except in duly justified cases such
as relating to the special risks attached to the nature of the procured research and
development services. R&D procurement contract. The public buyer shall specify the
main reasons for such a requirement in the procurement documents.
In assessing the minimum financial and economic standing, public buyers may
consider information from the annual accounts of the economic operator only where
the public buyer has specified the methods and criteria for such consideration in the
procurement documents. Such methods and criteria shall be transparent, objective
and non-discriminatory.
Where public buyers impose economic and financial standing selection criteria in
accordance with paragraph 6, public buyers shall enable tenderers to provide the
proof referred to in this paragraph, first subparagraph, point (d), between the date
that the public buyer notifies tenderers about the decision to award the R&D
procurement contract and the date of signature of that contract.
8. Where public buyers require professional risk indemnity insurance, they shall ensure
and shall provide justification in the procurement documents that the required
liability coverage is proportionate to the reasonably foreseeable amount of loss or
damage that contractors and subcontractors may cause during or as a result of the
performance of the R&D procurement contract.
9. Where the R&D procurement procedure applied by the public buyer does not include
a preselection of economic operators on the basis of exclusion grounds or selection
criteria, the public buyer shall request full documentary evidence proving compliance
with applicable exclusion grounds and selection criteria only from the winning
tenders that ranked highest based on the award criteria. Information that can be
determined from existing national databases established by a public body, or from
the registration on official lists or certifications shall not be questioned without
sufficient justification.
10. Where information or documentation submitted by economic operators is or appears
to be incomplete or erroneous or where specific documents are missing, public
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buyers, in compliance with the principles of equal treatment and transparency, shall
provide the economic operators concerned with the opportunity to submit,
supplement, clarify or complete the relevant information or documentation within an
appropriate time limit to remedy any deficiency resulting from a minor informality or
irregularity of a tender that does not put into question the decision to award R&D
procurement contracts.
Article 10
Financial guarantees
1. Public buyers may require tenderers to provide tender guarantees, performance
guarantees or retention guarantees provided that all of the following conditions are
met:
(a) the amount of the tender guarantees does not exceed 2% of the total estimated
R&D procurement contract value, with a maximum amount of the tender
guarantee of EUR 500 000 for R&D procurement contracts with an estimated
value above EUR 5 000 000 and EUR 100 000 for contracts with an estimated
value below EUR 5 000 000.
(b) for R&D procurement contracts with an estimated contract value above EUR
500000, the amount of the performance and retention guarantees does not
exceed 5% of the specific contract price, which may be increased to 10% for
highly complex or risky R&D procurement contracts when justified by a risk
analysis.
(c) For R&D procurement contracts with an estimated contract value below EUR
500000, no performance or retention guarantees shall be required.
2. The values of tender, performance and retention guarantees that public buyers
require from tenderers shall be reduced by 50% for SMEs, innovative startups and
innovative scaleups.
3. Public buyers shall ensure the timely reduction or release of financial guarantees
once they are no longer justified.
Article 17
Innovation-related award criteria
1. Public buyers shall award the contract to the economic operator that offers the best
quality for money. To that effect, public buyers shall evaluate the tenders received
according to the best price-quality ratio method. To determine the best price-quality
ratio, public buyers shall evaluate the tenders through a comparison of their price,
and quality, the latter based on quality criteria linked to the subject matter of the
R&D procurement contract. Costs can also be taken into account when determining
the best price-quality ratio. When evaluating the tenders based on the best price-
quality method, the combined weight of all quality award criteria shall represent at
least 50% of the total weighting of all award criteria. The price criterion shall only
relate to the price of the tender. The weighting given to criteria related to the total
cost of ownership shall be counted within the respective percentage share.
2. Quality criteria shall refer to any criteria used to assess the degree to which a tender
proposes beneficial, efficient or sustainable outcomes in relation to the subject-matter
of the R&D procurement contract.
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The quality of the tender may, for instance, relate to the following aspects:
(a) technical merit, aesthetic and functional characteristics, accessibility, design
for all users, research and development methods;
(b) environmental, climate-related, social and innovation objectives in accordance
with Article 4(6), security and public safety interests in accordance with Article
28, or European preference requirements where a public buyer applies those
requirements in the form of an allocation of award points;
(c) quality of the staff assigned that can significantly impact the level of
performance of the contract, such as the organisation, qualification and
experience of the staff assigned to performing the R&D procurement contract;
(d) quality of the organisation of the work, quality of the allocation of resources
assigned to performing the R&D procurement contract;
3. Award criteria shall be non-discriminatory, proportionate, specific, objective and
measurable; they shall be evaluated in a process containing sufficient safeguards
against irregularities. They shall allow the public buyer to effectively compare the
strengths and weaknesses of the offered R&D services and shall not have the effect
of conferring an unrestricted freedom of choice on the public buyer.
4. In R&D procurement procedures, public buyers shall apply, as part of the quality
award criteria referred to in paragraph 2, specific quality award criteria designed to
measure the potential impact of the tenders on innovation and on creating added
value for the Union. Such innovation-related quality award criteria, as referred to in
paragraph 2(e) of this Article, shall include the following:
(a) the degree of innovativeness of the tender and the extent to which this degree
of innovativeness contributes to the overall quality of the proposal that is to be
researched, developed or tested during the R&D procurement, where possible
by using quality criteria that are specific to the intended results of the R&D
procurement;
(b) the total cost of ownership and long-term benefits of the tender, including the
impact of any value engineering approach that is proposed in the tender on
those costs and benefits;
(c) the impact of the tender on reinforcing the technology supply chain and
developing an innovation ecosystem in the Union, including for critical
technologies;
(d) the share of the value of the activities that are proposed to be carried out in the
Union as a part of the R&D procurement contract;
(e) where applicable, the extent to which the tender proposes to integrate
technologies developed in the Union, including research and development
results stemming from publicly funded research and development programmes
in the internal market and makes use of tools, such as standards, specifications,
software or models or other technology developed in the Union.
5. Public buyers may apply other innovation-related award criteria in addition to those
laid down in the paragraph 4. The combined weight of all innovation-related award
criteria shall be at least 15% of the total weight of all award criteria, and the
combined weight of the innovation-related award criteria referred to in paragraph 1,
points (c), (d) and (e) shall not exceed 15% of the total weight of all award criteria.
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The innovation-related award criteria are part of the quality award criteria referred to
in paragraph 2.
6. By way of derogation from paragraph 4 and 5, the obligation to apply innovation-
related award criteria pursuant to this Article shall not apply to R&D procurement
procedures which have as their only subject the procurement of research and
development consultancy services as covered by CPV codes 73200000-4, 73210000-
7 and 73220000-0.
Article 18
Formulating requirements for the characteristics of the procured R&D services
1. Public buyers shall formulate the requirements for the characteristics of the research
and development services to be procured and of their intended results in the
procurement documents in the following order of precedence:
(a) requirements mandated by law;
(b) functional requirements;
(c) performance requirements;
(d) design requirements;
Public buyers shall apply the order of preference set out in the first subparagraph to
each characteristic individually.
Unless otherwise provided in applicable Union or national law, public buyers shall
draft all requirements referred to in this paragraph in a manner that allows the
tenderer to prove compliance by means of any alternative equivalent evidence.
2. Public buyers shall only formulate a requirement as a performance requirement, or
design requirement, where it is impracticable to draft such requirement as a
functional requirement.
3. Where for a specific characteristic there is no requirement mandated by law and
where a specific characteristic cannot be sufficiently described through the
requirements in paragraph 1, the requirements for that characteristic may be
formulated in any of the following ways by reference, in order of precedence, to:
(a) harmonised standards , as well as standards and standardisation deliverables
the references of which have been published for the purpose of this paragraph
in the Official Journal of the European Union or by any other means as
provided in accordance with Union legislation and common specifications,
understood as a technical specification other than a standard and adopted by the
Commission, and the conformity with which provides for a presumption of
conformity with the requirements set out in the relevant Union legislation;
(b) European standards as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012,
including national standards transposing European standards;
(c) European Assessments Documents;
(d) international standards;
(e) other standardisation deliverables established by a European standardisation
organisation as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012;
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(f) where any of the references listed in points (a) to (f) does not exist, national
standards, national technical approvals or national technical specifications.
Each reference shall be accompanied by the words ‘or equivalent’ unless the
reference is made to mandatory harmonised technical specifications.
4. Public buyers shall ensure that the procurement documents do not refer to a specific
make, brand name or source, or a particular process which characterises the products,
services or works provided by a specific economic operator, or to trademarks,
patents, types or a specific origin or production with the effect of favouring or
eliminating certain economic operators or products, services or works.
By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, such references shall only be
allowed where a sufficiently precise and intelligible description of the subject-matter
of the R&D procurement contract pursuant to paragraph 1, 2 and 3 is not possible.
Public buyers shall not derogate from this obligation unless justified by the subject
matter of the R&D procurement contract, and in that case, the reference shall be
accompanied by the words ‘or equivalent’.
Article 19
Risk benefit sharing under market conditions
1. Public buyers shall ensure that intellectual property rights to the results generated by
a contractor in the performance of an R&D procurement contract do not accrue
exclusively to the public buyer for its use in the conduct of its own affairs but that the
public buyer shares with the contractor under market conditions the risks and
benefits related to those intellectual property rights. To meet this requirement, public
buyers and contractors shall fulfil the obligations set out in paragraphs 2 to 9:
2. Contractors shall have the right to retain ownership of the intellectual property rights
to the results they generated in the performance of an R&D procurement contract.
The R&D procurement contract shall provide this right to contractors subject to an
obligation on contractors to protect their results, to use their best efforts to
commercialise their results and not to use the results contrary to the public interest.
3. Contractors shall notify public buyers as soon as possible of any results that can be
exploited within a maximum period from the generation of the results specified in the
R&D procurement contract. This notification shall include the contractor’s decision
to protect and commercialise these results. Where contractors decide not to protect or
commercialise results as defined in the R&D procurement contract the public buyer
shall, by way of derogation from paragraph 2 and without any prejudice to the moral
rights of authors, have the right:
(a) to grant, in agreement with the contractor, to the staff of the contractor the right
to protect those results and obtain ownership of the intellectual property rights
to those results; or
(b) to protect itself those results, obtain itself ownership of the intellectual property
rights to those results, and to transfer or license the results under fair and
reasonable conditions and in a non-discriminatory way.
4. Public buyers shall obtain at least free access to the results generated by the
contractors in the context of a R&D procurement contract for their own use and for
use by their current and future contractors in the performance of any contracts
awarded by those public buyers. Public buyers may also require that such free access
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includes in addition to usage rights other access rights such as rights to modify and
maintain the results.
5. In emergency situations where contractors are unable to satisfy subsequent demand
for the results of the R&D procurement contract on the Union market, public buyers
shall have the right to grant licences or to require contractors to grant licences to
third parties to commercially use the results of the R&D procurement contract on a
non-exclusive basis, without any right to sublicense, and under fair and reasonable
conditions.
6. Where contractors fail to commercialise their results within a reasonable period as
provided for in the R&D procurement contract but provide legitimate reasons for that
failure, public buyers shall:
(a) verify with the contractors whether they are able and willing to commercialise
the results if given a reasonable amount of additional time;
(b) only in case it is verified that the contractors are unable or unwilling to
commercialise the results, or fail to commercialise the results within the
additional time referred to in point (a), have the right to:
(i) grant licences or to require contractors to grant licences to third parties,
under fair and reasonable conditions, to commercially use the results of
the R&D procurement contract on a non-exclusive basis, without any
right to sublicense; or
(ii) only in case that a licensing action as referred to in point (i) is not
sufficient to achieve the commercialisation required by the R&D
procurement contract, require the contractor to transfer ownership of
those results to the public buyers, under fair and reasonable conditions,
without any prejudice to the moral rights of authors.
7. Where contractors fail to commercialise their results within a reasonable period
provided for in the R&D procurement contract and fail to justify this with legitimate
reasons or where contractors use those results in a manner contrary to the public
interest, and where efforts undertaken by public buyers to obtain within a reasonable
amount of time authorisation from the contractors to license the results on fair and
reasonable conditions have failed, public buyers shall have the right to:
(a) grant licences or to require contractors to grant licences to third parties to
commercially use the results of the R&D procurement contract on a non-
exclusive basis, without any right to sublicense without providing financial
compensation to the contractors; or
(b) in case that the action in point (a) is not sufficient to prevent the use of the
results in a manner contrary to the public interest or achieve the
commercialisation required by the R&D procurement contract, require the
contractor to transfer ownership without of those results to the public buyers,
without providing financial compensation to the contractors, without any
prejudice to the moral rights of authors.
8. For the purpose of paragraphs 6 and 7, legitimate reasons include where the
contractor demonstrates that it used its best efforts to commercialise the results and
to avoid abuse of the results in a manner that is contrary to the public interest.
9. Contractors shall notify public buyers in advance of any intention to undertake
exclusive licensing or transfer of ownership of R&D procurement results. Public
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buyers shall have the right to object to exclusive licensing or transfer of ownership of
R&D procurement results by contractors in any of the following cases:
(a) where such licensing or transfer would negatively impact the access of the
public buyer to the results or the commercial exploitation of the results;
(b) where such licensing or transfer would be contrary to the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to the socio-economic or technological development
of the Union or of the Member States of the public buyers;
(c) where those results would become subject to control or other restrictions by a
country other than those referred to in Article 11(1), in a way that would
negatively impact the access of the public buyer to or the commercialisation of
the results, as referred to in point (a) of this paragraph, or in a way that would
be contrary to the public interest, as referred to in point (b) of this paragraph.
10. For R&D procurements that are not pre-commercial procurements, by way of
derogation from paragraphs 1 to 9, where justified by any of the following overriding
reasons of public interest which shall be specified in the procurement documents,
public buyers may obtain the ownership of the intellectual property rights to the
results generated by contractors in the context of an R&D procurement contract:
(a) where necessary and justified for ensuring the protection of the security and
public safety interests of the Union or one or several of its Member State
within the meaning of Article 28(2);
(b) where necessary to prevent abuse of the results by contractors or other third
parties and there is no other effective way to prevent such abuse.
(c) where the public buyer intends to have exclusive rights to exploit the
intellectual property rights to the results generated by contractors;
Where public buyers obtain ownership of intellectual property rights in accordance
with the first subparagraph:
(a) if they fail to exploit intellectual property rights obtained under point (c) of
paragraph 10 within a period of four years from the date of obtaining the
ownership of the intellectual property rights, they shall offer to transfer the
ownership of those intellectual property rights or licence them under fair and
reasonable conditions and in a non-discriminatory manner;
(b) if they decide to transfer the ownership of these intellectual property rights or
licence them, they shall do so under fair and reasonable conditions and in a
non-discriminatory manner;
(c) they shall ensure that all results which do not give rise to intellectual property
rights may be widely disseminated, without prejudice to confidentiality and
data protection obligations a referred to in Article 26.
The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 39
to amend the list of cases set out in the first subparagraph of this paragraph, taking
into account the following criteria:
(a) the impact on increasing the commercialisation of R&D results;
(b) the impact on improving the access of innovative enterprises, including in
particular innovative startups and scaleups, and new entrants to the market;
(c) the impact on socio-economic or technological development in the Union;
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(d) the impact on the Union’s strategic autonomy and economic security;
(e) the impact on protecting public interests;
11. Public buyers shall:
(a) require contractors to stipulate in subcontracting agreements, that
subcontractors are bound by the same intellectual property rights and
obligations as those applicable to contractors under the R&D procurement
contract, in particular that in any transfer or licensing agreement the
contractor’s obligations under the R&D procurement contract are passed on to
the new owner or licensee and that the new owner or licensee has the
obligation to pass them on in any subsequent transfer or licensing.
(b) when drawing up and implementing obligations affecting the protection of
intellectual property rights in the context of R&D procurement contracts,
comply with the applicable Union law on intellectual property, the TRIPS
Agreement43 and other international obligations of the Union or the Member
States concerned.
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (b), where participation in the
R&D procurement is not restricted to economic operators that have their origin
in Member States, public buyers shall treat economic operators having their
origin in other WTO Member countries no less favourable than economic
operators that have their origin in the public buyer’s own country with regard
to the protection of intellectual property, except where otherwise provided for
in the TRIPS Agreement.
Article 20
Contract modifications
1. Public buyers may modify awarded R&D procurement contracts during their term
without a new R&D procurement procedure where that possibility, irrespective of the
modifications’ monetary value, has been provided for in the initial procurement
documents in clear, precise and unequivocal review clauses, which may include price
revision clauses or options. Such clauses shall state the scope and nature of possible
modifications or options as well as the conditions under which they may be used.
Such clauses shall not provide for modifications or options that would alter the
overall nature of the R&D procurement contract.
2. Public buyers may also modify awarded R&D procurement contracts during their
term without a new R&D procurement procedure provided that both the following
conditions are fulfilled:
(a) the modification is not substantial within the meaning of paragraph 3 or where
the modification is substantial but falls within any of the cases listed in
paragraph 4;
(b) the modification responds to objective needs arising during the performance of
the R&D procurement contract, is limited to what is necessary and appropriate
43 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), set out in Annex 1C to
the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p. 214, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1994/800(16)/oj.
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for ensuring its performance and continuity and not alter the initial economic
balance of the contract in favour of the contractor in a manner which was not
provided for in the original contract.
3. A modification shall be considered substantial in one or more of the following cases:
(a) the modification introduces conditions which, had they been part of the initial
procurement procedure, would have allowed for the admission of other
candidates than those initially selected or for the acceptance of a tender other
than that originally accepted or would have attracted additional participants in
the procurement procedure;
(b) where it changes essential terms or conditions of the contract, such as
(c) a change in the economic balance of the R&D procurement contract in favour
of the contractor in a manner which was not provided for in the original
contract as a consequence of either;
(i) a considerable extension of the scope of the R&D procurement contract;
(ii) the identity of the contractor in other cases than those provided for under
paragraph 4, point (c).
4. Provided that they do not alter the initial economic balance of the R&D procurement
contract in favour of the contractor in a manner which was not provided for in the
initial R&D procurement contract, substantial modifications shall be permissible
within the meaning of paragraph 2 only in the following cases:
(a) where additional services, or supplies have become necessary during
performance of the R&D procurement contract, provided that a change of
contractor is not technically or economically feasible, including due to
interdependence with existing works or services or substantial increase of
costs;
(b) where the modification is necessary due to circumstances which could not
reasonably be anticipated by a diligent public buyer at the time of the launch of
the R&D procurement procedure, and which significantly affect the
performance or feasibility of the contract, including:
(i) substantial changes in the applicable regulatory or legal framework;
(ii) major technological developments;
(iii) severe disruptions, emergencies or crises with significant economic,
societal or operational impact;
(c) where the original contractor is replaced by another entity in one of the
following cases:
(i) following a merger, takeover, acquisition, insolvency or other corporate
restructuring, another economic operator succeeds, wholly or partly, to
the rights and obligations of the original contractor, provided that the
new entity fulfils the original qualitative selection criteria, that no other
substantial modifications are made to the R&D procurement contract and
that the replacement is intended to circumventing the application of this
Regulation; or
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(ii) in the event that the public buyer itself assumes the main contractor’s
obligations towards its subcontractors where this possibility is provided
for under national law.
5. Modification, the value of which does not exceed 15 % of the value of the initial
R&D procurement contract shall be considered non-substantial and may be made
without a new procurement procedure, provided that the modification does not alter
the initial economic balance of the R&D procurement contract in favour of the
contractor in a manner which was not provided for in the initial R&D procurement
contract.
Where several successive modifications are made, the thresholds shall be assessed on
the basis of the net cumulative value of the successive modifications.
6. Before modifying the R&D procurement contract, the public buyer shall establish, on
the basis of objective and verifiable elements, that the conditions set out in paragraph
2 are satisfied. Public buyers shall maintain detailed written records of the essential
elements of the modification, including its justification, its necessity or
appropriateness, and its impact on the economic balance of the contract, in particular
on the allocation of risks and economic advantages, to justify decisions to modify the
R&D procurement contract and to enable verification of compliance with this Article
by competent supervisory, audit and review bodies.
7. Before any modification of a R&D procurement contract that exceeds 50 % of the
initial estimated value of the contract, the public buyers shall publish a contract
modification notice to that effect. Such notice shall contain the justification for the
modification without a new procurement procedure. Consecutive modifications shall
not be aimed at circumventing this Regulation.
8. Where public buyers substantially modify an R&D procurement contract in
accordance with paragraph 4, and the modification does not exceed 50 % of the
initial estimated value of the contract, they shall publish a contract modification
notice within 20 calendar days from the date on which the modification was made.
9. Modifications of an R&D procurement contract shall not be used to remedy
deficiencies of the contractor’s performance that are not justified by circumstances
beyond its control.
Article 21
Value engineering
1. Public buyers shall insert a value engineering clause in all R&D procurement
contracts subject to this Regulation with an estimated value net of VAT exceeding:
(a) EUR 10 million from… [OP please insert date 1 year from the date of entry
into force of this Regulation];
(b) EUR 9 million from… [OP please insert date 2 years from the date of entry
into force of this Regulation];
(c) EUR 8 million from… [OP please insert date 3 years from the date of entry
into force of this Regulation];
(d) EUR 7 million from… [OP please insert date 3 years from the date of entry
into force of this Regulation];
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(e) EUR 6 million from… [OP please insert date 4 years from the date of entry
into force of this Regulation];
(f) EUR 5 million from… [OP please insert date 5 years from the date of entry
into force of this Regulation].
Public buyers may include a value engineering clause in R&D procurement contracts
with a lower estimated value.
2. Public buyers shall include in the R&D procurement contract:
(a) value engineering clauses that encourage contractors to submit value
engineering change proposals throughout the performance of the R&D
procurement contract (‘voluntary value engineering clauses’); or
(b) value engineering clauses that require contractors to submit to the public buyer
value engineering change proposals at regular intervals throughout the
performance of the R&D procurement contract (‘mandatory value engineering
clauses’).
Public buyers may use the mandatory value engineering referred to in the first
subparagraph, point (b), for the entire R&D procurement contract or only for parts of
the R&D procurement contract.
Where public buyers use mandatory value engineering for parts of the R&D
procurement contract, they shall formulate, in the procurement documents, the
requirements related to those parts as functional or performance requirements.
Contractors shall include corresponding mandatory or voluntary value engineering
clauses in any subcontracting agreement exceeding the values referred to in
paragraph 1 on the date of conclusion of the subcontracting agreement. They may
include corresponding mandatory or voluntary value engineering clauses in
subcontracting agreements below those values.
3. Where contractors submit value engineering change proposals as referred to in the
first subparagraph of paragraph 2, they shall include in those proposals:
(a) all the proposed changes to any of the research and development services
procured as a part of the R&D procurement
(b) a description of any impacts that the proposed changes referred to in point (a) of
this paragraph may have on the rights and obligations of the parties to the R&D
procurement contract, including on the price of different parts of the R&D
procurement contract as referred to in paragraph 2, second subparagraph, or on
the tasks of the contractor;
(c) an evidence-based analysis of the expected cost and benefit of the proposed
changes;
(d) in the case of subcontracting, any value engineering change proposals from their
subcontractors, which are necessary for implementing the contractor’s value
engineering change proposal
4. Public buyers shall not accept value engineering change proposals that:
(a) alter the subject matter of the R&D procurement contract;
(b) impair essential functions or characteristics of the R&D services procured or
their intended results as described in the functional or performance
requirements;
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(c) involve a change in deliverable quantities of the procured R&D services and
their intended results only;
(d) involve a change in research and development end items or research and
development test quantities that result solely from previous testing under the
R&D procurement contract.
5. Public buyers shall specify in the procurement documents that they may approve
amendments that may decrease or increase the price of the R&D procurement
contract following a value engineering change proposal from the contractor. The
procurement documents shall specify the limits of allowed increases in the price of
the R&D procurement contract due to contract amendments applying a value
engineering change proposal. Any such contract amendments for value engineering
shall be carried out in accordance with Article 20.
6. Public buyers shall set out in the procurement documents incentive sharing rates that
share between public buyers and contractors any net cost savings realised for public
buyers from accepted value engineering change proposals on the ongoing R&D
procurement contract. Where a value engineering change proposal creates net cost
savings for public buyers on potential future R&D procurement contracts, the
procurement documents shall specify whether the public buyer will pay the
contractor’s share of contract savings as a single payment or as a series of payments
over time as future R&D procurement contracts are awarded. Public buyers shall
ensure that the contractor’s share of cost savings that it pays to the contractor as part
of the R&D procurement does not equal to or exceed the cost of research and
development services performed as part of the R&D procurement contract.
7. Public buyers may unilaterally accept or reject any value engineering change
proposal, in whole or in part. If the public buyer does not accept a value engineering
change proposal, the public buyer shall notify the contractor in writing, explaining
the reasons for the rejection. The contractor may withdraw any value engineering
change proposal, in whole or in part, at any time before it is accepted by the public
buyer. Until a contract amendment applies a value engineering change proposal to
the ongoing R&D procurement contract, the contractor shall continue performing in
accordance with the existing R&D procurement contract.
Article 22
Multiple sourcing
1. Public buyers shall apply multiple sourcing in R&D procurement procedures and
shall award multiple R&D procurement contracts to multiple contractors.
2. Public buyers shall indicate in the procurement documents the minimum number of
R&D procurement contracts that are expected to be awarded in accordance with
paragraph 1.
3. R&D procurement contracts under multiple sourcing shall be awarded and signed in
the order of the ranked list of tenders from the highest to the lowest score based on
their evaluation in accordance with Article 11 unless there are duly justified reasons
to proceed otherwise, in full compliance with the principles of equal treatment and
transparency. All R&D procurement contracts shall be awarded within the same
R&D procurement procedure.
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4. To determine the number of R&D procurement contracts to be awarded in
accordance with paragraph 1, public buyers shall take into account the benefits that
multiple sourcing can generate to:
(a) avoid the over-reliance on a single or a limited number of contractors for
products, works or services that are essential to the public buyer’ internal or
external operations, or for products, works or services that are based on critical
technologies or critical raw materials;
(b) reduce technology or innovation risks including by stimulating the development,
testing or integration of alternative results from different contractors;
(c) tackle situations where there is not sufficient competition on the market or
prevent or reduce supplier lock-in by stimulating more competition on the
market;
(d) mitigate service disruptions and single point of failure by ensuring technical
redundancy in the public buyer’s infrastructure, network or service delivery
system;
(e) where necessary and justified for protection of the security and public safety
interests of the Union or one or several of its Member States within the meaning
of Article 28(2), reserve a minimum number of R&D procurement contracts for
economic operators originating in Member States in accordance with Article
11(6).
5. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, where justified by any of the following
reasons, which shall be specified in the procurement documents, public buyers may
award a single R&D procurement contract without applying multiple sourcing in
accordance with this Article:
(a) R&D procurement procedures which have as their only subject the
procurement of research and development consultancy services covered by
CPV codes 73200000-4, 73210000-7 and 73220000-0;
(b) in R&D procurements that are not pre-commercial procurements, where any of
the following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) the results of the outcomes of the market consultation referred to in
Article 9 and market research indicate that the market is too small for
multiple contractors to participate in the R&D procurement procedure;
(ii) the long-term benefits of multiple sourcing as listed in paragraph 4 of this
Article do not outweigh the extra costs for the public buyer applying
multiple sourcing;
(iii) the award of a single R&D procurement contract is necessary and
justified for ensuring the protection of the security and public safety
interests of the Union or one or several of its Member States within the
meaning of Article 28(2);
The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 39
to amend the list of cases set out in the first subparagraph of this paragraph taking
into account the following criteria:
(a) the impact on increasing the commercialisation of R&D results;
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(b) the impact on improving the access of innovative enterprises, including in
particular innovative startups and scaleups, and new entrants to the market;
(c) the impact on socio-economic or technological development in the Union;
(d) the impact on the Union’s strategic autonomy and economic security;
(e) the impact on protecting public interests;
Article 23
R&D procurement call for tenders
1. Public buyers shall announce the launch of the call for tenders for the R&D
procurement by means of a contract notice. That notice shall:
(a) be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and, after that, be
published also on the national procurement portal of the Member State of the
public buyer;
(b) contain the following elements:
(i) references to the relevant CPV codes for research and development
services
(ii) an indication, where relevant, that the call for tenders relates to
innovation by marking the field ‘innovation’ in the contract notice and by
including, where applicable, the words ‘Pre-Commercial Procurement’ in
the field ‘title of the procurement’;
(iii) the estimated value of the R&D procurement calculated pursuant to the
methodology laid down in Article 10(5).
2. Public buyers shall widely promote the launch of the R&D procurement call for
tenders to the market. To this effect, after announcing the launch of the call for
tenders by means of a contract notice, public buyers may publish and promote the
launch of the call for tenders through any widely available media.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article, where necessary and
justified for ensuring the protection of the security or public safety interests of the
Union or one or several of its Member States within the meaning of Article 28(2),
public buyers shall publish and promote the contract notice omitting all sensitive
information and requesting economic operators to express their interest to submit
tenders for the R&D procurement. Sensitive information shall be sent only to
economic operators who have expressed an interest, meet the selection criteria and
do not pose a security risk within the meaning of Article 28(4), point (d).
4. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, where the publication
of a contract notice referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and the
publication of other elements in the procurement documents referred to in Article 10
would be contrary to the security and public safety interests of the Union or one or
several of its Member States within the meaning of Article 28(2), public buyers shall
invite to tender and share the procurement documents only with potentially suitable
economic operators who have been identified during the market consultation
referred to in Article 9 and during market research, meet the qualification criteria and
do not pose a security risk within the meaning of Article 28(4), point (d).
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5. The minimum time limit for receipt of tenders shall be one month from the date on
which the contract notice was sent for publication in the Official Journal of the
European Union. This minimum time limit can be shortened by the public buyer
where an emergency mode has been activated pursuant Regulation (EU)
2024/274744, the emergency framework has been activated pursuant Council
Regulation (EU) 2022/237245, serious cross-border threats to health pursuant to
Regulation (EU) 2022/237146 exist, or the Commission has declared a crisis or a state
of emergency. The maximum time limit for public buyers to complete the evaluation
of the tenders and notify tenderers of the award decision shall be 60 calendar days
from the deadline for the reception of the tenders.
6. Public buyers shall verify, based on the information in the tender, which tenderers
have access to the R&D procurement in accordance with the conditions laid down in
Article 11.
7. Without prejudice to Article 15(9), public buyers shall evaluate all tenders submitted
by tenderers that have access to the R&D procurement on the basis of objective and
non-discriminatory criteria by applying the applicable exclusion grounds and
selection criteria laid down in Articles 13, 14 and 15, the minimum requirements to
be met by all tenderers and the applicable award criteria referred to in Article 17,
including the innovation-related award criteria, and they shall draft a ranked list of
evaluated tenders.
8. After the submission of the initial tenders, public buyers may conduct interviews
with the economic operators and may conduct negotiations in one or several rounds.
Public shall ensure that in any given round of negotiations the number of solutions
discussed allows for genuine competition. After each round, and depending on the
outcome of the negotiations, the economic operators participating in the negotiations
shall be invited to submit a revised tender and public buyers may decide to reduce
the number of participants based on the award criteria set in accordance with Article
17. Public buyers shall inform economic operators when a new round of negotiations
will start and whether or not they will be invited. Public buyers shall inform all
tenderers, whose tenders have not been eliminated, of any changes to the
specifications or changes to other parts of the procurement detail as a result of the
negotiations. Public buyers shall provide sufficient time for tenderers to modify and
re-submit amended tenders, as appropriate. Economic operators may submit revised
tenders depending on the outcome of the negotiations. Where a public buyer has
decided to conclude the negotiations and proceed to the award of the R&D
procurement contract, it shall invite the remaining economic operators to submit a
final tender.
44 Regulation (EU) 2024/2747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2024
establishing a framework of measures related to an internal market emergency and to the resilience of
the internal market and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (Internal Market Emergency
and Resilience Act) (OJ L, 2024/2747, 8.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2747/oj). 45 Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2372 of 24 October 2022 on a framework of measures for ensuring the
supply of crisis-relevant medical countermeasures in the event of a public health emergency at Union
level (OJ L 314, 6.12.2022, p. 64, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2372/oj). 46 Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 on
serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU (OJ L 314, 6.12.2022,
p. 26, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2371/oj).
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9. Not later than 30 days after the conclusion of the R&D procurement contract, public
buyers shall publish a contract award notice in the Official Journal of the European
Union and, after that,alsoon their national procurement portal, except where the
publication would be contrary to the security or public safety interests of the Union
or one or several of its Member States within the meaning of Article 28(2).
The contract award notice shall indicate that the procedure concerns an R&D
procurement and relates to innovation. The public buyer shall include, where
applicable, the words ‘pre-commercial procurement’ in the field ‘title of the
procurement’ and shall mark the field ‘innovation’ in the contract award notice.
The contract award notice shall include information on the value of the awarded
contract or contracts and any awarded lots.
Article 24
Competitive development in phases and assessment of contract performance
1. Public buyers shall procure the R&D in multiple successive research and
development phases that may include any combination of fundamental research,
industrial research and experimental development activities.
2. Public buyers may organise fast-track R&D procurement that combine any of the
phases related to development and testing that are part of industrial research and
experimental development into a single phase.
3. Public buyers shall organise the R&D phases in a way to ensure that the minimum
number of contracts planned for each phase of the R&D procurement allows for
genuine competition in R&D (‘Competitive Development’) between economic
operators.
4. During each R&D phase, public buyers shall assess any value engineering change
proposals and, where needed, amend ongoing R&D procurement contracts
accordingly in accordance with the provisions on value engineering laid down in
Article 21.
5. At the end of each R&D phase of the R&D procurement, public buyers shall assess
the performance of contractors on the basis of the innovation-related key
performance indicators referred to in Article 24(13) .
6. The assessment shall determine whether the contractor has successfully completed
the specific research and development phase based on whether the results of that
specific phase are innovative, capable of meeting the requirements and commercially
viable.
7. Where the assessment determines that the contractor has not successfully completed
a specific phase, the public buyer may terminate the R&D procurement contract with
that contractor. However, where such contractor has satisfactorily performed all the
requested tasks and submitted all the requested deliverables, that contractor shall be
eligible for the payment applicable for the specific phase as agreed in the R&D
procurement contract.
8. Where under an R&D procurement contract, contractors have implemented value
engineering change proposals that have resulted in net cost savings for the public
buyer, the public buyer shall pay the contractor its share of those savings in
accordance with the agreed value engineering payment method.
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9. By terminating R&D procurement contracts at the end of a phase as referred to in
paragraph 7 and by selecting the best offers for the next phase, the public buyer may
reduce the number of contractors after the completion of each phase.
10. Where despite best efforts of the public buyer to ensure competitive development
across all phases referred to in paragraph 3, the public buyer terminated an R&D
procurement contract at the end of a phase as referred to in paragraph 7 or receives
insufficient good quality offers to allow for the selection of more than one contractor
for the next phase, the public buyer may allow economic operators who have not
participated in previous phases and who have not participated in the initial R&D
procurement procedure to submit tenders only for the remaining phase or phases with
a view to concluding specific contracts. Where the public buyer wants to make use of
this option, the public buyer shall keep the possibility for economic operators that
have not participated in previous phases to express their interest to participate in later
phases of the R&D procurement, up to the moment of selection of contractors for the
last R&D phase. Any such economic operators shall be selected based on the same
exclusion grounds, selection criteria, minimum requirements and award criteria as
other contractors that participated in previous phases.
11. Where despite best efforts of the public buyer to ensure competitive development
across all phases referred to in paragraphs 3 and 10, the public buyer terminated an
R&D procurement contract at the end of a phase as referred to in paragraph 7 or
receives insufficient good quality offers to allow for the selection of multiple
contractors for the next phase, the public buyer may proceed to the next phase with
only one contractor.
12. By way of derogation from paragraph 1 to 11, where justified by any of the
following reasons which shall be specified in the procurement documents, public
buyers may decide not to organise the R&D procurement procedure in multiple
successive research and development phases in the following cases:
(a) for R&D procurement procedures which have as their only subject the
procurement of research and development consultancy services covered by
CPV codes 73200000-4, 73210000-7 and 73220000-0;
(b) for R&D procurements that are not pre-commercial procurements, whose
subject matter concerns R&D services that are limited to one technology
readiness level and those R&D services are too narrow in scope to split the
R&D over multiple phases.
The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 39
to amend the list of cases set out in the first subparagraph of this paragraph taking
into account the following criteria:
(a) the impact on increasing the commercialisation of R&D results;
(b) the impact on improving the access of innovative enterprises, including in
particular innovative startups and scaleups, and new entrants to the market;
(c) the impact on socio-economic or technological development in the Union;
(d) the impact on the Union’s strategic autonomy and economic security;
(e) the impact on protecting public interests;
13. Public buyers shall:
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(a) regularly assess the performance of contractors on the basis of innovation-
related key performance indicators that include keeping to the time schedule,
keeping the costs under control and delivering the expected quality in terms of
achievement of the minimum requirements referred to in Article 10(1), point
(f), the functional requirements or performance requirements referred to in
Article 18, and the award criteria, including the innovation-related award
criteria, referred to in Article 17;
(b) where, following the assessment referred to in point (a), it concludes that
contract performance does not comply with the innovation-related key
performance indicators, request the contractors to take corrective action to
reach the contract performance agreed in the R&D procurement contract;
where a contractor does not take the necessary corrective actions, public buyers
may terminate the R&D procurement contract with that contractor;
(c) where value engineering is used to improve contract performance throughout
the R&D procurement pursuant to Article 21, take accepted value engineering
proposals into account when assessing contract performance and when paying
the contractor its share of cost savings that result from accepted value
engineering proposals.
Article 25
Payments
1. Without prejudice to their obligations under Directive 2011/7/EU47 of the European
Parliament and of the Council, public buyers shall ensure the timely payment of
contractors and, where applicable, subcontractors.
2. As part of the conditions for the performance of the R&D procurement contract,
public buyers may provide that the contractors pass through the supply chain
equivalent payment terms. as laid down in the relevant provisions of Directive
2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council.
3. Unless justified by an overriding interest of the public buyer, the public buyer shall
provide for an appropriate advance payment to the contractor.
4. At the request of a subcontractor and where the nature of the R&D procurement
contract so allows, the public buyer shall transfer due payments directly to the
subcontractor for R&D services, supplies or works provided to the main contractor.
Such measures may include appropriate mechanisms permitting the main contractor
to object to undue payments. The arrangements concerning that mode of payment
shall be set out in the procurement documents.
Article 26
Confidentiality and data protection
1. Without prejudice to the applicable Union and national law, public buyers shall not
disclose without prior written agreement information provided to them by economic
operators in market consultations, by tenderers during or after the call for tenders, by
47 Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating
late payment in commercial transactions (recast) (OJ L 48, 23.2.2011, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/7/oj).
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contractors during contract performance or by former contractors after the end of the
R&D procurement, which such economic operators have designated as confidential,
including technical or trade secrets and the confidential aspects of tenders. Tenderers,
contractors or former contactors shall also not disclose without prior written
agreement information provided to them by public buyers, which public buyers have
designated as confidential. The prior written agreement shall not take the form of a
general waiver but shall be given with reference to the intended communication of
the specific confidential information.
2. Public buyers shall ensure compliance with the personal data protection rules laid
down in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, and in applicable
national law in all exchanges and publication of information during the market
consultation, call for tenders, contract performance and after completion of the R&D
procurement.
3. Public buyers shall specify in the procurement documents referred to in Article 10
any requirements on the localisation of and access to the personal data processed by
the contractor. Such requirements may include that:
(a) the personal data shall only be processed within the territory of those countries
referred to in Article 11(1) and shall not be removed from not that territory;
(b) the data shall only be held in data centres located with the territory of those
countries referred to in Article 11(1);
(c) no access shall be given to such data outside of the countries referred to in
Article 11(1);
(d) the contractor may not change the location of data processing without the prior
written authorisation of the public buyer;
(e) any transfer of personal data under the R&D procurement contract to third
countries or international organisations shall comply fully with the requirements
laid down in Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
Article 27
Termination of R&D procurement contracts
Without prejudice to any other grounds for termination provided for in this Act or under
applicable national law, public buyers shall terminate the R&D procurement contract where:
(a) the economic operator becomes subject of a final conviction for one of the
mandatory exclusion grounds referred to in Article 13, except where the public buyer
establishes that such termination is not warranted for reasons of overriding public
interest and the final judgment does not preclude this;
(b) the R&D procurement contract or its modification should not have been awarded to
the contractor in view of a serious infringement of the obligations under the Treaties
and this Regulation that has been declared by the Court of Justice of the European
Union in a procedure pursuant to Article 258 of the Treaty.
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SECTION 2
SECURITY
Article 28
Security considerations in R&D procurement
1. Public buyers shall take appropriate measures, in addition to measures required or
imposed by virtue of other Union legislation, where relevant, at any stage of the
R&D procurement procedure, from planning and market consultation to contract
award and contract performance, to ensure the protection of the security and public
safety interests of the Union or one or more Member States for any R&D
procurement procedure identified as presenting or including a risk for security or
public safety. This Chapter is without prejudice to other requirements under relevant
Union legislation.
2. Security and public safety interests of the Union or a Member State relevant for a
given R&D procurement contract may include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) protection of critical infrastructure, strategic dual-use infrastructure, identified
by Member States in accordance with [Article 33 of the Military Mobility
Regulation], especially for those located on a military mobility corridor,
essential services, critical supply chains, critical technologies, resilience
against physical, cyber, or hybrid threats, and prevention across and protection
against risks of any disruption including due to harmful strategic dependencies
on third-country suppliers;
(b) prevention of espionage, sabotage or technology leakage;
(c) crisis preparedness, including business continuity and contingency planning for
disruptions in case of natural disasters or geopolitical instability, pandemics or
cyberattacks;
(d) the prevention of other harmful interference, including third-country and third-
country State-controlled influence;
(e) the cybersecurity of systems, networks, and data processed;
(f) the protection of classified information, sensitive data, research, or intellectual
property from unauthorised access or transfer;
(g) ensuring public health, including crisis-prepared and self-sufficient health
services; or
(h) protection of the environment and resilience to climate-related disruptions.
3. Risks for security and public safety in a R&D procurement contract may arise in
particular from:
(a) the subject matter of the R&D procurement contract, including:
(i) sensitivity of the assets involved or to be developed in its
implementation;
(ii) access to and handling sensitive data;
(iii) critical dependency or risk of critical dependency on a limited number of
third-country suppliers, goods, services or technologies;
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(iv) risks associated with access to critical infrastructure, strategic dual-use
infrastructure identified by Member States in accordance with [Article 33
of the Military Mobility Regulation], research facilities, IT systems, or
critical materials;
(v) dual-use nature of the results of research and development services
procured;
(vi) the nature of the public interests attached to it and the potential
consequences of a malfunction or malperformance, such as harm to
public safety, national security, economic stability, health security or
fundamental rights.
(b) the characteristics of economic operators, including:
(i) ownership, control, or financing structure bearing risks of undue
interference or influence over the economic operator;
(ii) security track record, including past breaches, non-compliance with
security standards, or exclusion from other procurement procedures on
security grounds;
(iii) capacity to meet applicable security clearance, personnel vetting, or
information security requirements;
(iv) exposure to third-country legislation that may compel disclosure of
sensitive information or interference with contract performance.
4. Public buyers shall, to the extent possible specify in the procurement documents in a
clear and sufficiently detailed manner appropriate measures that are proportionate to
the risks referred to in paragraph 3 and non-discriminatory. Such measures may be
implemented, in particular through:
(a) specifications and market consultation documents, including mandatory
security standards, certifications, personnel vetting or security clearance
obligations, or risk management and assurance requirements;
(b) award criteria, such as evaluating bidders’ security management systems,
security compliance standards, incident response capabilities, supply chain
security;
(c) conditions for the performance of contracts, including clauses enabling security
oversight of suppliers through audits, inspections, or documentation reviews
and implementation of corrective measures in the case of breaches, as well as
provisions on subcontracting, ownership change notification, and the protection
of classified or sensitive information;
(d) selection criteria, where justified, such as possessing security clearances or
otherwise requiring tenderers to establish that they do not present risks for
security or public safety pursuant to paragraph 3, point (b) of this Article. This
shall be without prejudice to Article 14.
(e) invite to submit a tender only those economic operators who meet specific
objective and non-discriminatory security-related requirements, provided that
the public buyer has indicated its intention to do so, and the security-related
requirements it intends to apply, in the contract notice for the R&D
procurement in question.
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Public buyers may also indicate in the procurement documents which security
measures they intend to implement where risks for security or public safety arise
during the R&D procurement procedure.
5. Public buyers shall at any time during an R&D procurement procedure exclude an
economic operator from participation in a R&D procurement procedure where the
operator has been identified as a high-risk supplier pursuant to Regulation (EU)
XXXX/XXX [Cyber Security Act 2] in relation to the provision of ICT components
or components that include ICT components to be used in key ICT assets.
6. Where there is evidence that disparities in measures affect the functioning of the
internal market, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance
with Article 39 in order to supplement this Regulation by establishing mandatory
technical specifications, selection criteria, award criteria or contract performance
clauses, for specific categories of R&D procurement services or their intended results
where such elements address an identified specific security and public safety interest
of the Union.
Article 29
Security measures during contract implementation
1. Without prejudice to contract law of the Member States, the public buyer may
terminate a R&D procurement contract in whole or in part where it determines that
the contractor has failed to comply with measures or obligations aiming at preventing
or mitigating risks for security and public safety, or a risk to security or public safety
has materialised or is likely to materialise. Under the same conditions, they may
exclude certain economic operators during contract implementation.
2. Termination and exclusion pursuant to this Article shall be proportionate in relation
to the risk for security or public safety. Before terminating a R&D procurement
contract or excluding an economic operator, the public buyer shall conduct a written
assessment. The public buyer shall take into account in particular:
(a) the severity of the risk for security or public safety;
(b) the impact of termination or exclusion on the delivery of public services;
(c) alternative mitigation measures such as contract amendments or enhanced
monitoring.
3. Unless justified by the severity of the risks involved, the imminence of the threat or
where notification may aggravate the risk, the public buyer shall notify the contractor
in writing of its intent to terminate or exclude, specifying:
(a) the grounds for termination or exclusion;
(b) the facts and evidence supporting the decision, with the exception of classified
information;
(c) the proposed date of termination or exclusion.
4. The contractor shall have an appropriate time, determined by the public buyer, which
shall not be shorter than at least 10 calendar days, to submit observations on the
grounds for termination and propose remedial actions. The public buyer may shorten
the deadline in case of emergency.
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5. The contractor shall cooperate with the public buyer to secure or transfer data,
documents, or assets related to the R&D procurement contract and ensure continuity
of critical services until the termination or exclusion takes effect.
Article 30
Cybersecurity
1. For all products with digital elements used and developed as part of the research and
development services procured that fall within the scope of Regulation (EU)
2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council48, public buyers shall
ensure compliance with the essential cybersecurity requirements set out in Annex I to
that Regulation, including the manufacturers’ ability to handle vulnerabilities
effectively are taken into consideration in the R&D procurement process.
2. This Regulation shall not prevent public buyers from subjecting products with digital
elements referred to in paragraph 1 to additional cybersecurity requirements for the
R&D procurement or use of those products for specific purposes, including where
those products developed, obtained or used for national security or defence purposes,
provided that such requirements are consistent with Member States’ obligations laid
down in Union law and that they are necessary and proportionate for the achievement
of those purposes.
3. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, and without prejudice to Directive (EU)
2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council49 where applicable, public
buyers may specify in the procurement documents requirements relating to
cybersecurity for the research and development services procured and their intended
results. To that end, they may include specifications, selection criteria, exclusion
criteria, award criteria or conditions for the performance of contracts. Such
requirements shall be linked to the subject-matter of the R&D procurement contract
and comply with the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and
proportionality.
4. Public buyers shall at any time during an R&D procurement procedure exclude an
economic operator from participation in an R&D procurement procedure where the
operator has been identified as a high-risk supplier in relation to the provision of ICT
components or components that include ICT components to be used in key ICT
assets.
48 Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on
horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations
(EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act) (OJ L,
2024/2847, 20.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj). 49 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on
measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No
910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)
(OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).
EN 69 EN
SECTION 3
JOINT PROCUREMENT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES
Article 31
Common rules on joint R&D procurement
1. Public buyers carrying out joint R&D procurement shall comply with the rules laid
down in this Regulation.
2. Public buyers may organise joint R&D procurement with two or more public buyers
from one or more Member States. Public buyers. Where two or more public buyers
from one or more Member States wish to conduct a joint R&D procurement, they
shall conclude a joint procurement agreement establishing a buyers’ group and
appointing the lead buyer. That agreement shall specify at least the following:
(a) the financial commitments provided by each public buyer in the buyers’ group
for the joint R&D procurement;
(b) the division of roles and responsibilities between the lead buyer and the public
buyers that are members of the buyers’ group regarding the R&D procurement
procedure, contract performance and post-contract interactions with former
contractors as referred to in Chapter 2, Section 1 and 2;
(c) the applicable Union or national law related to dispute resolution, related to
any procedures or approvals needed for testing prototypes or first products,
services or works developed during the R&D procurement and any other
aspects of the conduct of the joint R&D procurement that are not governed by
this Regulation;
(d) the mechanism for the allocation and exploitation of the results of the joint
R&D procurement.
In addition to the elements listed in Article 10, the procurement documents for joint
R&D procurement shall include the information referred to in the first subparagraph,
points (b), (c) and (d), of this paragraph.
3. The members of the buyers’ group shall jointly provide the financial commitments
for the R&D procurement and jointly conduct the market consultation, draft
procurement documents for their common R&D procurement need, and carry out the
evaluation of tenders.
4. The lead buyer shall launch the joint R&D procurement procedure and award the
R&D procurement contracts in the name and on behalf of all public buyers that are
members of the buyers’ group. Public buyers that conduct joint R&D procurement
may do so in any of the official languages of the Union and they may allow tenderers
to submit tenders in any of those official languages.
5. Public buyers may organise joint R&D procurement through central purchasing
bodies of one or more Member States.
6. For the purpose of this Regulation, central purchasing bodies shall be any public
buyer that carries out the following R&D procurement related activities:
(a) acting as a wholesaler by buying and re-selling R&D services procured on the
market or results of those R&D services;
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(b) acting as an intermediary, by publishing notices and awarding R&D
procurement contracts for public buyers;
Central purchasing bodies may also, in addition to the activities set out above, carry
out or take part in joint R&D procurement activities or provide ancillary R&D
related procurement support services to public buyers, including infrastructure,
advice or technical assistance, including the preparation and management of R&D
procurement procedures on behalf and for the account of the public buyer concerned.
Public buyers shall indicate in the notices referred to in Article 4(5) when they are
acting as a central purchasing body.
Any public buyer may procure R&D services and obtain their intended results from
or through any central purchasing body established in the Union offering centralised
purchasing activities. A public buyer shall be deemed to fulfil its obligations
pursuant to this Regulation when it procures research and development services from
or through a central purchasing body which for that R&D procurement was obliged
to and has applied this Regulation. Central purchasing bodies that are not themselves
a public buyer shall conduct R&D procurement procedures in accordance with this
Regulation.
7. Union institutions, bodies or agencies may carry out R&D procurement, including
pre-commercial procurement, for themselves, jointly with or on behalf of other
Union entities and jointly with or on behalf of public buyers in Member States
according to the rules set out in Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the
European Parliament and of the Council.
Chapter 3
COMMERCIALISATION OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
RESULTS
Article 32
Union Competence Centre for intellectual property-backed finance and
commercialisation of intellectual property assets
1. The European Union Intellectual Property Office (‘the Office’) shall establish a
Competence Centre to support and promote intellectual property-backed finance and
commercialisation of intellectual property, including intellectual property resulting
from research and innovation and regulatory exclusivities for pharmaceuticals (‘the
Competence Centre’)
2. The Competence Centre shall support the following entities through its tasks:
(a) researchers established in a Member State;
(b) innovative enterprises established in a Member State, including innovative
startups, innovative scaleups and spin-offs, whose innovative and competitive
performance is driven by the ownership or use and commercialisation of
intellectual property rights;
(c) other public and private entities established in a Member State that have an
interest in the commercialisation of intellectual property assets;
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(d) entities whose function is to support any of the entities referred to in points (a),
(b) and (c).
3. To improve access to finance for the entities referred to in paragraph 2, the Office
through the Competence Centre shall:
(a) by… [OP please insert date 4 years from the date of entry into force of this
Regulation], develop a voluntary Union framework for the valuation and
disclosure of intellectual property assets based on all types of intellectual
property rights and regulatory exclusivities for pharmaceuticals and designed
to facilitate its use across different sectors and its uptake by financial
stakeholders, where possible making use of the European Business Wallets,
established in accordance with [Regulation XXX of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the establishment of European Business Wallets], or
alternative electronic means that that are interoperable with the European
Business Wallets, including by:
(i) setting up and maintaining digital processes and services related to the
disclosure, screening and valuation of intellectual property assets;
(ii) identifying and compiling best practices to support the development of
the voluntary valuation framework;
(iii) establishing, as an integral part of the framework, a voluntary disclosure
arrangements enabling undertakings to present information on their
intellectual property assets in a comparable and structured manner for
financing purposes.
(b) by… [OP please insert date 4 years from the date of entry into force of this
Regulation], establish and maintain, in close cooperation with the Commission,
a Union-wide digital match-making platform, where possible making use of the
European Business Wallets or alternative electronic means that that are
interoperable with the European Business Wallets, to facilitate, on a voluntary
basis, the licensing and transfer of intellectual property rights protected in the
Union.
(c) facilitate the development of a secondary market to support the disposal of
intellectual property assets held by the entities referred to in paragraph 2;
(d) support the relevant public and private financial stakeholders, including Union
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, as well as financial institutions and
commercial banks, in defining and implementing new public and private
financial instruments backed by intellectual property, including the provision
of sound evidence on market needs, the analysis of data stemming from the
implementation of such financial instruments and the provision of IP-related
technical advisory services;
(e) establish and implement skill development programmes across the innovation
ecosystem in relation to intellectual property-backed finance and
commercialisation of intellectual property assets;
(f) raise awareness about intellectual property rights as a driver for the Union’s
innovation, growth and competitiveness and about intellectual property-backed
finance;
(g) support the progressive development of an evidence database on intellectual
property-backed financing, including by collecting on a voluntary basis and
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analysing anonymised or other non-personal data from intellectual property-
backed financing transactions and, where appropriate, by establishing
mechanisms to facilitate the availability and use of such data, including, where
possible, through the use of European Business Wallets or alternative
electronic means that that are interoperable with the European Business
Wallets;
(h) provide support to the persons and entities referred to in paragraph 2 in the
valorisation and commercialisation of intellectual property resulting from
publicly funded research and innovation, including through awareness raising
and capacity building in management of intellectual property, providing
assistance in defining intellectual property management and commercialisation
strategies;
(i) coordinate a Union-level helpdesk offering information and support services
related to intellectual property-backed financing to entities listed in paragraph
2.
The Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, lay down the technical
specifications necessary for the uniform implementation of the voluntary Union
framework referred to in the first subparagraph, point (a), of this paragraph,
including the specifications concerning the content, comparability and
interoperability of disclosures. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in
accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 38(2). The Office
shall, in accordance with the technical specifications laid down pursuant to the
second subparagraph, develop, maintain and, where necessary, update the templates
and related operational tools for the implementation of the voluntary Union
framework
The Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, lay down common technical
standards, interoperability requirements and operational specifications for the digital
match-making platform referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), of this Article.
Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination
procedure referred to in Article 38(2).
4. Subject to the availability of an accumulated budgetary surplus and of the approval
of the Office’s Budget Committee, the Office may conclude contribution agreements
with the Commission for the implementation of clearly defined Union activities
falling within the scope of the tasks entrusted to the Office under this Regulation and
relating to intellectual property-backed finance and the commercialisation of
intellectual property assets. Such contribution agreements shall specify the respective
responsibilities and financial contributions of the parties, the activities and
deliverables to be financed, the eligible costs, implementation arrangements,
reporting obligations, internal control measures, audit rights and the treatment of any
unused amounts.
5. Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 shall apply to the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to the
Office under this Article. The Competence Centre shall form part of the Office and
shall not have separate legal personality, financial autonomy or decision-making
powers. All activities carried out through the Competence Centre shall remain
subject to the governance, programming, budgetary, accounting, internal control and
reporting framework applicable to the Office.
EN 73 EN
6. The set-up costs of the Competence Centre and the running costs arising from the
tasks entrusted to the Office by this Regulation shall be covered by its operational
budget. The set-up costs may include, at least, the costs related to the development of
the IT support systems and the setting up of the corresponding administrative
infrastructure, as well as the time-limited preparation or setting up of new initiatives.
The Office’s Budget Committee may authorise the use of the accumulated budgetary
surplus of the Office for necessary, clearly defined, non-recurrent and time-limited
set-up costs.
7. The Executive Director of the Office may introduce charges for specific services
referred to in this Article provided to the entities referred to in paragraph 2 of this
Article in accordance with Article 178 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001. Such charges
shall be transparent, non-discriminatory and limited to the cost of the specific
service.
Access to the voluntary valuation framework developed in accordance with
paragraph 3, first subparagraph, point (a), access to the digital match-making
platform developed in accordance with paragraph 3, first subparagraph, point (b),
support services referred to in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, point (d) provided to
public stakeholders, including the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies,
and access to the Union-level helpdesk referred to in paragraph 3, first subparagraph,
point (i) shall not be subject to fees or charges.
Article 33
Data collection
1. With a view to supporting the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to the Office under
Article 32, and in particular those relating to the development of an evidence base,
the analysis of data and the support to improved access to finance for the entities
referred to in Article 32(2), the Office shall collect and analyse anonymised or other
non-personal data, provided on a voluntary basis, relating to transactions in which
intellectual property rights are used as collateral for credit or insurance purposes or
as in-kind contribution in equity investment scenarios, without prejudice to
applicable rules on classified information.
2. When collecting and analysing data in accordance with this Article, the Office shall,
in accordance with Union law, cooperate with Union institutions, bodies and
agencies, the competent public authorities of the Member States, national and
regional intellectual property offices, and relevant public and private stakeholders in
the fields of finance and insurance, with a view to facilitating the availability,
comparability and reuse of existing data, as well as to exploring, on the basis of
existing data sources and practices, possible approaches for improving transparency
and interoperability across the Union.
3. The data collected and analysed by the Office in accordance with this Article may
include, where available and appropriate, information originating from intellectual
property registers, business registers, registers of pledges or other rights in rem over
intellectual property and similar sources, as well as other relevant information made
available by public authorities or private sector actors, including information on how
intellectual property used as collateral for credit or insurance purposes or as in-kind
contribution in equity investment scenarios has been evaluated, on the size and
characteristics of the corresponding transaction, on the type of intellectual property
EN 74 EN
right concerned, and on relevant indicators such as equity valuation, collateralisation,
or loan-to-value ratios.
4. The Office shall, in cooperation with the stakeholders concerned, promote the
development of common standards and practices relating to data quality, formats and
access conditions, including differentiated and proportionate access modalities, and
shall provide guidance and support measures aimed at enabling innovative
enterprises, innovative startups, innovative scaleups and SMEs to benefit from the
improved evidence base and analytical outputs.
5. Where justified by experience gained through the activities referred to in this Article,
the Office may consider, in cooperation with the stakeholders concerned, the
development of digital tools or structured data systems to further support the
fulfilment of the tasks of the Competence Centre set out in Article 32, including by
investigating the feasibility of a Union-wide register of pledges over intellectual
property assets.
6. The Office shall put in place guidance and support measures to ensure that
innovative enterprises, innovative startups, innovative scaleups and SMEs can
effectively benefit from the data collected in accordance with this Article.
Article 34
Intellectual property valuators
1. The persons and entities referred to in Article 32(2) and relevant public and private
entities in the fields of finance and insurance may request an assessment of the value
of the intellectual property rights under the voluntary Union framework in
accordance with Article 32(3), first subparagraph, point (a). Such assessment may be
carried out by an intellectual property valuator certified in accordance with Article
35.
2. Where the assessment is commissioned in connection with a financing transaction,
the information necessary for the assessment shall be provided in accordance with
the arrangements agreed between the parties concerned and subject to applicable
rules on confidentiality and the protection of trade secrets.
3. When carrying out an assessment, the intellectual property valuator shall act
independently and shall avoid any conflict of interest with the persons or entities
concerned by the assessment.
4. The fees and other costs relating to an assessment shall be borne by the person or
entity commissioning the assessment, unless otherwise agreed between the parties.
They shall be transparent, reasonable and proportionate to the nature, scope and
complexity of the assessment.
Article 35
Certification of intellectual property valuators
1. The Office shall establish and administer a Union certification scheme for
intellectual property valuators. The certification shall attest that a valuator has
acquired the knowledge and professional competence necessary to carry out
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valuations under the voluntary Union framework referred to in Article 32(3), first
subparagraph, point (a).
2. Certification under this Article shall be voluntary and shall attest competence in
applying the Union valuation framework. It shall not constitute a professional licence
or confer a right to exercise a regulated profession, nor shall it be a prerequisite for
carrying out intellectual property valuations under Union or national law. It shall be
without prejudice to national rules governing regulated professions, professional
qualifications and the provision of valuation services.
3. Certification by the Office shall not make the Office responsible for individual
valuations carried out by a certified valuer and shall not confer binding or
presumptive legal effect on such valuations.
4. To be eligible for certification, the prospective valuator shall:
(a) possess an appropriate educational or professional background and relevant
professional experience, and technical competence in the valuation of
intellectual property assets;
(b) successfully complete specialised training on the application of the voluntary
Union framework referred to in Article 32(3), first subparagraph, point (a), and
an assessment demonstrating sufficient knowledge and practical ability to
apply that framework;
(c) demonstrate objectivity, integrity and adherence to appropriate professional
standards or codes of conduct.
The training and assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, points (b) and (c)
shall be organised by the Office. The Office may develop and provide such training
and assessment in cooperation with national intellectual property offices and relevant
European or international professional organisations and valuation bodies.
5. The Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, lay down the following
detailed conditions for the implementation of the certification scheme established by
this Article:
(a) the minimum educational or professional background and professional
experience required for admission to the certification scheme and the evidence
to be submitted for that purpose;
(b) the minimum content, learning outcomes and practical components of the
specialised training referred to in paragraph 4, first subparagraph point (b),
including any requirements concerning attendance;
(c) the form, content, assessment methodology and minimum pass requirements
for the assessment referred to in paragraph 4, first subparagraph, point (c);
(d) the application procedure, including the documents and evidence to be
submitted and the arrangements for verifying compliance with the conditions
laid down in paragraph 4;
(e) the period of validity of the certification and the conditions and procedure for
its renewal, including requirements relating to continuing professional
development;
EN 76 EN
(f) the grounds and procedure for suspension and withdrawal of certification,
including appropriate procedural safeguards and the right of the person
concerned to be heard;
(g) the conditions governing the use, presentation and communication of the Union
certification and certified status, including rules intended to prevent any
misleading representation as to the scope or legal effects of the certification;
and
(h) the information concerning certified valuators to be included in the database
referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article.
Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure
referred to in Article 38(2).
6. The Office, through the Competence Centre, shall grant, renew, suspend or withdraw
certification in accordance with this Article.
7. The Office, through the Competence Centre, shall establish and maintain a publicly
accessible Union database of intellectual property valuators certified in accordance
with this Article.
8. The Executive Director may introduce charges for the certification, assessment and
renewal services provided under this Article in accordance with Article 178 of
Regulation (EU) 2017/1001. Such charges shall be transparent, non-discriminatory
and shall not exceed the cost of the specific services concerned
Article 36
Programming and reporting
1. The Office shall reflect the activities necessary for the performance of the tasks
entrusted to the Office in accordance with this Regulation in a separate section of the
multiannual strategic programme and the annual work programme of the Office
referred to in Article 153(1), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001.
2. The separate section referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall set out the
objectives, activities, expected results, performance indicators and estimated human
and financial resources relating to those tasks, taking into account the relevant Union
policies and priorities. The preparation, adoption, implementation and amendment of
the multiannual strategic programme and the annual work programme shall be
governed by Regulation (EU) 2017/1001.
3. The Office shall include in the annual report on the activities of the Office referred to
in Article 153(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 a specific section on the
tasks entrusted to the Office under this Article. That specific section shall contain all
of the following:
(a) a review of the main activities carried out during the preceding year;
(b) the results achieved in relation to the objectives and performance indicators set
out in the annual work programme;
(c) an overall assessment of the fulfilment of those tasks, including the financial and
staff resources used, any revenue obtained from charges and any material effect
on the performance of the other statutory tasks of the Office;
(d) an overview of the activities planned for the following years.
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Article 37
Amendment to Regulation (EU) 2017/1001
In Article 151(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, the following point (f) is added:
‘(f) the tasks entrusted to it under Regulation (EU) 202X/XXXX of the European Parliament
and of the Council. *+’
_________________________
* Regulation (EU) 202X/XXXX of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ…,
ELI…).’.
Chapter 4
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 38
Committee procedure
1. The Commission shall be assisted by the Committee on Implementation Rules
established by Regulation (EU) 2017/1001. That committee shall be a committee
within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No
182/2011 shall apply.
Article 39
Exercise of the delegation
1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the
conditions laid down in this Article.
2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 11(2), Article19(10), Article
22(5), Article 24(12), Article 28(5) and Article 31(8) shall be conferred on the
Commission for a period of five years from the entry into force of this Regulation.
The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not
later than nine months before the end of the five-year period. The delegation of
power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the
European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three
months before the end of each period.
3. The delegation of power referred to in Article 7(2), Article 19(11), Article 22(5),
Article 24(12), Article 28(5) and Article 31(8) may be revoked at any time by the
European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the
delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect on the day
following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European
+ OJ: Please insert in the text the number, date, title and OJ reference of the present Regulation (European
Innovation Act) in the footnote.
EN 78 EN
Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any
delegated acts already in force.
4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by
each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the
Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making.
5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to
the European Parliament and to the Council.
6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 11(2), Article 19(10), Article 22(5),
Article 24(12), Article 28(5) and Article 31(8) shall enter into force only if no
objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council
within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament
and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and
the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That
period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament
or of the Council.
Article 40
Evaluation
By [OP please insert date four years from the date of entry into force of this Regulation] and
every five years thereafter, the Commission shall carry out an evaluation of this Regulation in
light of the objectives that it pursues, in particular on strengthening the role of public
procurement as a driver of innovation and enhancing the valuation, commercialisation and use
of IP, and shall present a report thereon to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the
European Economic and Social Committee. Where appropriate, this evaluation shall be
accompanied by a proposal for amendments to or a repeal of this Regulation.
Article 41
Entry into force
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in
the Official Journal of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels,
For the European Parliament For the Council
The President The President
[...] [...]
EN 1 EN
LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL STATEMENT
Contents
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL ............................................................................... 1
1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal .................................................................. 1
1.2. Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area ................................... 4
1.3. Consistency with other Union policies ........................................................................ 5
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY ............................... 6
2.1. Legal basis .................................................................................................................... 6
2.2. Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)............................................................... 7
2.3. Proportionality ............................................................................................................. 8
2.4. Choice of the instrument .............................................................................................. 9
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS
AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS ................................................................................ 9
3.1. Stakeholder consultations ............................................................................................ 9
3.2. Collection and use of expertise .................................................................................. 10
3.3. Impact assessment ...................................................................................................... 11
3.4. Regulatory fitness and simplification ........................................................................ 14
4. Fundamental rights ..................................................................................................... 14
5. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS .............................................................................. 14
6. OTHER ELEMENTS ................................................................................................ 15
• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements ........ 15
• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal ................................ 15
1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE ................................................. 4
1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative ...................................................................................... 4
1.2. Policy area(s) concerned .............................................................................................. 4
1.3. Objective(s) .................................................................................................................. 4
1.3.1. General objective(s) ..................................................................................................... 4
1.3.2. Specific objective(s) ..................................................................................................... 4
1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact ...................................................................................... 4
1.3.4. Indicators of performance ............................................................................................ 6
1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to: ................................................................................. 6
1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative .............................................................................. 6
1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for
roll-out of the implementation of the initiative ............................................................ 6
1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g.
coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). ....... 7
EN 2 EN
1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past .................................................. 7
1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with
other appropriate instruments ....................................................................................... 8
1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for
redeployment ................................................................................................................ 8
1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact .................................... 9
1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned ............................................................. 9
2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES................................................................................. 10
2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules .................................................................................. 10
2.2. Management and control system(s) ........................................................................... 10
2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation
mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed ................ 10
2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up
to mitigate them.......................................................................................................... 10
2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between
the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the
expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure) ......................................... 10
2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities .............................................................. 11
3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE ............ 12
3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s)
affected ....................................................................................................................... 12
3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations ................................... 13
3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations.................................... 13
3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget ............................................................................. 13
3.2.3. Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations ............................... 15
3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget .............................................................................. 15
3.2.4. Estimated requirements of human resources.............................................................. 15
3.2.4.1. Financed from voted budget....................................................................................... 15
3.2.5. Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments ................ 17
3.2.6. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework.............................. 17
3.2.7. Third-party contributions ........................................................................................... 18
3.2.8. Estimated human resources and the use of appropriations required in a
decentralised agency .................................................................................................. 18
3.3. Estimated impact on revenue ..................................................................................... 20
4. DIGITAL DIMENSIONS .......................................................................................... 20
4.1. Requirements of digital relevance .............................................................................. 20
4.2. Data ............................................................................................................................ 22
4.3. Digital solutions ......................................................................................................... 24
EN 3 EN
4.4. Interoperability assessment ........................................................................................ 24
4.5. Measures to support digital implementation .............................................................. 25
EN 4 EN
1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s innovation
ecosystem (European Innovation Act)
1.2. Policy area(s) concerned
Single market, competitiveness, research and innovation
1.3. Objective(s)
1.3.1. General objective(s)
The general objective of the initiative is to improve the functioning of the Single
Market for innovation by reducing barriers to the development, testing and scale-up
of innovative solutions, thereby speeding up their commercialisation in the Union.
1.3.2. Specific objective(s)
Specific objective No 1
Lower valuation costs and increase licensing and transfer of IPs in the EU in the next
4 years.
Specific objective No 2
Increase spending on procurement of R&D services in the next 5 years.
Specific objective No 3
Increase the procurement of EU-based R&D solutions in the next 5 years.
1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact
Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted.
Economic benefits
The introduction of a harmonised EU-wide IP valuation framework,
complemented by an EU IP Training Centre and an IP matchmaking platform,
is expected to reduce the costs and complexity associated with the valuation,
management, and monetisation of intellectual property assets. By providing
standardised valuation methodologies, specialised expertise, and improved market
infrastructure, these measures would reduce information asymmetries between firms
and external financiers regarding the economic value of IP assets.
Improved transparency and credibility in IP valuation are expected to facilitate the
use of patents and other IP assets as collateral, thereby increasing access to both debt
and equity financing. In particular, standardised valuation systems can strengthen the
collateral function of IP for banks and the signalling function of IP for venture
capital investors, contributing to greater volumes of IP-backed finance. As firms
become better able to capture and communicate the economic value of their
intellectual property, the expected returns from patenting are likely to increase,
creating stronger incentives to invest in innovation and seek formal IP protection.
The literature suggests that this relationship may generate a virtuous cycle between
patenting and financing. Stronger IP portfolios facilitate access to external finance,
EN 5 EN
while improved financing conditions support additional R&D investments and
innovation activities, leading to further patent generation. Beyond increasing the
quantity of patent applications, more reliable valuation mechanisms may also
improve patent quality by encouraging firms to focus on inventions with greater
technological and commercial potential.
Several strands of evidence support this mechanism. From a real-options perspective,
credible valuation systems and secondary IP markets increase the reversibility of
patent-related investments by transforming patents into tradable assets rather than
purely legal instruments. This reduces the effective risk of patenting and encourages
firms to file patents that can subsequently be licensed, sold, or used to support
financing transactions. Evidence from the United States shows that exposure to
secondary patent markets increases patenting activity, particularly under conditions
of economic uncertainty, while also encouraging firms to patent inventions that
would otherwise be kept as trade secrets.
The introduction of a harmonised EU-level framework for R&D procurement is
expected to significantly reduce the legal uncertainty and procedural complexity
currently associated with R&D procurement across Member States. This is expected
to facilitate the implementation of cross-border R&D procurement projects, enabling
public buyers to pool demand and achieve greater critical mass, thereby unlocking
the full potential of the Single Market for innovation procurement.
Embedding proven innovation-oriented procurement practices within a common
framework would also improve the effectiveness and efficiency of R&D
procurement processes, increasing the return on public investment in innovation.
Clearer procedures would enhance public buyers' capacity to design and manage
R&D procurement projects, while lowering participation costs and barriers for
suppliers. This is expected to encourage a larger number of firms, including those
from different Member States, to participate in R&D procurement call for tenders,
thereby increasing competition, improving the quality of proposed solutions, and
broadening access to innovative technologies.
Furthermore, the introduction of an EU preference within R&D procurement
procedures would increase the likelihood that significant economic and technological
benefits generated through publicly funded R&D procurement remain within the
European Union. Strengthening demand for innovative solutions developed by EU-
based firms would support private R&D investment, foster the growth of European
innovation ecosystems, and contribute to the creation of high-value jobs. In doing so,
it would reinforce the EU's strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty in
critical technologies and sectors.
Overall, the European Innovation Act is estimated to increase EU GDP by between
0.25% and 0.42% over a ten-year horizon relative to a baseline scenario without the
European Innovation Act.
Beyond its effects on GDP and employment, the European Innovation Act is
expected to generate broader societal benefits by strengthening the translation of
research and innovation into marketable solutions. A substantial body of empirical
evidence shows that sustained public and private investment in research and
innovation accelerates the development, diffusion, and cost reduction of clean
technologies, contributing to lower greenhouse gas emissions, improved energy
efficiency, and more sustainable production processes. These benefits are likely to
EN 6 EN
generate positive environmental and social externalities that are only partially
captured by conventional macroeconomic indicators such as GDP.
1.3.4. Indicators of performance
Specify the indicators for monitoring progress and achievements.
Progress towards the specific objective of reducing IP valuation costs and increasing
the licensing, transfer, and financial utilisation of intellectual property rights (IP
rights) in the EU will be monitored through several indicators. These include the
number of Member States integrating the European Union Intellectual Property
Office valuation standards into their national valuation practices, the number of
transactions applying the EU IP valuation methodology, the average IP valuation
costs borne by firms, and the number of companies using IP assets as collateral or in
financing transactions.
Progress towards the specific objective of increasing expenditure on the procurement
of R&D services will be measured by the share of R&D expenditure in total public
procurement and the number and value of cross-border R&D procurement contracts.
Progress towards the specific objective of increasing the procurement of EU-based
R&D solutions will be monitored through the number and value of R&D
procurement contracts awarded to EU-based suppliers and solutions.
1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to:
a new action
a new action following a pilot project / preparatory action50
the extension of an existing action
a merger or redirection of one or more actions towards another/a new action
1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative
1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for
roll-out of the implementation of the initiative
The proposal responds to the need to address the existing fragmentations in the
Single Market in the field of R&D procurement by establishing a harmonised
procedure for R&D procurements and joint cross-border R&D procurements to be
implemented by public buyers in all Member States in accordance with this
Regulation once it enters into force.
Furthermore, the entrusts new tasks to the European Union Intellectual Property
Office, including the establishment of a European Union Competence Centre for
intellectual property-backed finance and commercialisation of intellectual
property once the Regulation enters into force. Once established within the
European Union Intellectual Property Office, the Competence Centre will start
discharging the tasks conferred upon it by the Regulation including providing
support to various stakeholders in the fields of intellectual property-backed financing
and commercialisation of intellectual property assets. Finally, by 1 September 2028
(to be intended as tentative date, as IT development require time), the European
Union Intellectual Property Office, through the Competence Centre, will develop a
valuation framework for all intangible assets and establish a digital matchmaking
50 As referred to in Article 58(2), point (a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation.
EN 7 EN
platform to facilitate the licensing and transfer of all types of intellectual property
rights protected at Union level.
1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g.
coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities).
For the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting from
EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by Member
States alone.
Reasons for action at EU level (ex-ante)
The proposed measures focus on areas where there is clear added value in acting at
Union level due to the scale, speed and scope of the efforts needed. Actions aim at
improving the business case for innovators to bring innovations to the market by
facilitating the valuation, commercialisation and use of IP rights as a collateral to
obtain IP-backed finance and by making it easier to find first customers through
R&D procurement. It enhances efficiency by enabling better cross-border
cooperation, ensures fairer access to opportunities for innovative companies
irrespective of their location, and strengthens the Union’s capacity to compete
globally.
Expected generated EU added value (ex-post)
EU intervention will generate lasting benefits through economies of scale, lower
transaction costs, and improved legal certainty for public buyers, companies and
investors. It will strengthen Europe’s capacity to place innovative solutions on the
market and to commercialise intellectual property assets and leverage them in
company financing. Harmonised and digitalised procedures for R&D procurement
will reduce transaction costs and administrative burden for public buyers and
companies participating in R&D procurements, while providing uniform market
conditions across Member States. Establishment of the Competence Centre within
the European Union Intellectual Property Office will increase the uptake of
intellectual property-backed financing in Europe, increasing financing opportunities
for innovative companies.
1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past
The European Union Intellectual Property Office has gathered a significant expertise
in the field of IP rights through its tasks related to the protection of EU trademarks,
designs and geographic indications, as well as monitoring infringements of all types
of intellectual property rights through the European Observatory on Infringements of
Intellectual Property Rights. Taking into account this experience, the proposal builds
on European Union Intellectual Property Office’s expertise by entrusting to it
additional tasks related to valuation and commercialisation of IP.
The Innovation Partnership procedure, which was introduced in the 2014 EU public
procurement directives, is used only to a very limited extent. The evaluation of the
2014 EU public procurement directives concluded that in the ongoing revision of the
EU public procurement directives the obligation that this procedure must involve the
procurement of R&D should be removed, because public buyers do not like buying
R&D as part of a procedure that buys commercial volumes of solutions and that is
open to providers from all third countries with who the Union has an international
agreement on public procurement. Taking into account this experience, the European
the proposal aims to provide a procedure for R&D procurement for buying R&D
EN 8 EN
services that does not involve the procurement of commercial volumes of solutions
and that can be open only to providers from Member States, EEA countries and
Western Balkan countries.
1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with
other appropriate instruments
The proposal is fully consistent with the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial
Framework and will be implemented through existing Union programmes without
creating new spending envelopes or financial obligations beyond existing resources.
Should the co-legislators approve the proposal and decide that the EUIPO sets up,
runs the Center and contributes funds (either from the operational or the surplus), it
should be noted that this EUIPO contribution would not come from the EU budget (it
is not EU contribution) but from the EUIPO’s budget and therefore, it does not
depend on the MFF.
In that sense, the decision on the specific budgetary elements would be subject to the
decision and approval of the Management Board and Budgetary Committee (MBBC)
of the EUIPO.
1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for
redeployment
All financing will be ensured through redeployments from programmes. Without
prejudice to the outcome of negotiations on the next MFF, the appropriations
foreseen from 2028 onwards are strictly indicative.
EN 9 EN
1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact
limited duration
– in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY
– financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations and
from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.
unlimited duration
– Implementation with a start-up period from YYYY to YYYY,
– followed by full-scale operation.
1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned51
Direct management by the Commission
– by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;
– by the executive agencies
Shared management with the Member States
Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to:
– third countries or the bodies they have designated
– international organisations and their agencies (to be specified)
– the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund
– bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation
– public law bodies
– bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that
they are provided with adequate financial guarantees
– bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with
the implementation of a public-private partnership and that are provided with
adequate financial guarantees
– bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the
common foreign and security policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on
European Union, and identified in the relevant basic act
– bodies established in a Member State, governed by the private law of a
Member State or Union law and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance with
sector-specific rules, with the implementation of Union funds or budgetary
guarantees, to the extent that such bodies are controlled by public law bodies or
by bodies governed by private law with a public service mission, and are provided
with adequate financial guarantees in the form of joint and several liability by the
controlling bodies or equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for each
action, limited to the maximum amount of the Union support.
51 Details of budget implementation methods and references to the Financial Regulation may be found on
the BUDGpedia site: https://myintracomm.ec.europa.eu/corp/budget/financial-rules/budget-
implementation/Pages/implementation-methods.aspx.
EN 10 EN
2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES
2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules
This Statement includes staff expenditures. Standard rules for this type of
expenditure apply. The Commission will evaluate the output, results and impact of
this proposal every three years after the date on which it becomes applicable. The
evaluation will assess the contribution of this Regulation to the functioning of the
single market, including the objectives specified in in this Regulation.
2.2. Management and control system(s)
2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation
mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed
The management mode for the initiative is direct management by the Commission.
This is the most appropriate approach given the limited scope of Union expenditure,
which is confined to standard administrative and monitoring-related costs. Using
established internal procedures ensures effective and efficient controls, low error
rates, fast processing of transactions and minimal control costs
2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up
to mitigate them
Overall, the initiative requires staff expenditure. Standard rules for this type of
expenditure apply. Most aspects of the initiative follow established procedures for
monitoring the implementation of this Regulation.
The main operational risk is insufficient administrative capacity to monitor the
implementation of the obligations laid down in the Regulation. This proposal is
accompanied by an impact assessment report, which provides the analytics
underpinning the chosen policy approach. The preparation of the initiative also drew
on a public consultation as well as targeted consultations with industry stakeholders,
Member States and trade associations, which ensured the collection of relevant data,
information and feedback. Nonetheless, unintentional consequences or unforeseen
impacts may still occur during implementation. These will be identified through the
monitoring procedures set out in the Regulation, allowing the Commission to address
them in an appropriate and timely manner.
2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between
the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the
expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure)
The initiative involves limited administrative expenditure. Standard Commission
control procedures apply. As no funding programmes or multi-layered delivery
mechanisms are created, control activities remain straightforward and cost-effective.
Controls are carried out entirely under direct management, using standard ex-post
audits under the Commission’s internal control framework. This ensures an
appropriate balance between control effort and the limited value of funds managed.
Given the simplified set-up and the absence of high-risk financial operations, the
expected error rate at payment and at closure is low and comfortably below the
materiality threshold. The control system therefore provides a high level of assurance
at proportionate cost.
EN 11 EN
2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities
The initiative does not establish funding programmes or financial support schemes. It
therefore relies on the Commission’s existing internal control framework and Anti-
Fraud Strategy. Standard preventive and detective measures apply, including risk-
based internal controls, segregation of duties and established workflows for
administrative expenditure.
The Office shall ensure, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 and the
financial rules applicable to the Office, that appropriate measures are in place to
protect the financial interests of the Union in the performance of the tasks entrusted
to it under this Regulation, including measures to prevent, detect and address fraud,
corruption, conflicts of interest and other irregularities. The Commission shall
exercise the oversight and monitoring functions conferred on it under the applicable
governance framework.
As with all Commission-managed activities, the European Anti-Fraud Office
(OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) may exercise their
powers in accordance with their respective legal bases to investigate fraud,
corruption or other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests. The
European Court of Auditors retains its standard audit rights over Commission
expenditure.
EN 12 EN
3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for
illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial
Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the
post-2027 period remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on
the MFF 2028-2034 and thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary
procedure. All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative. As
regards the EUIPO budget, the figures are indicative and subject to approval by the
EUIPO governing bodies in accordance with the EUTMR.
3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget
line(s) affected
• Existing budget lines
In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.
Heading of
multiannual
financial
framework
Budget line Type of
expenditure Contribution
Number
Diff./Non-
diff.52
from
EFTA
countries 53
from
candidate
countries
and
potential
candidates 54
From
other
third
countries
other assigned
revenue
02 01 01 01 01
Non-diff. YES YES NO NO
• New budget lines requested
In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.
Heading of
multiannual
financial
framework
Budget line Type of
expenditure Contribution
Number
Diff./Non-
diff.
from
EFTA
countries
from
candidate
countries
and
potential
candidates
from
other
third
countries
other assigned
revenue
N/A
52 Diff. = Differentiated appropriations / Non-diff. = Non-differentiated appropriations. 53 EFTA: European Free Trade Association. 54 Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential candidates from the Western Balkans.
EN 13 EN
3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations
3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations
– The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations
– The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below
3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget
EUR million (to three decimal places)
Heading of multiannual financial framework Number 02
DG: RTD Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
TOTAL MFF 2028-2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Operational appropriations
Budget line Commitments (1a) 0
Payments (2a) 0
Budget line Commitments (1b) 0
Payments (2b) 0
Appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope of specific programmes55
Budget line 01 01 01 01 (3) 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 4.074
TOTAL appropriations Commitments =1a+1b+3 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 4.074
for DG RTD Payments =2a+2b+3 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 4.074
55 Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former ‘BA’ lines), indirect research, direct research.
EN 14 EN
EUR million (to three decimal places)
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL
MFF 2028-
2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
TOTAL
appropriations under
HEADINGS 1 to 4
Commitments 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 4.074
of the multiannual
financial framework Payments 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 4.074
EN 15 EN
3.2.3. Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations
– The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an
administrative nature
– The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative
nature, as explained below
3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget
VOTED APPROPRIATIONS Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL
2028 -
2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
HEADING 4
Human resources 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000.0000.000 0.000
Other administrative expenditure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000.0000.000 0.000
Subtotal HEADING 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Outside HEADING 4
Human resources 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.5820.5820.582 4.074
Other expenditure of an administrative
nature 0
0 0 0 000 0
Subtotal outside HEADING 4 0.5820.5820.5820.5820.5820.5820.582 4.074
TOTAL 0.5820.5820.5820.5820.5820.5820.582 4.074
The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for illustrative
purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The source of
financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period remain subject to the
outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and thereafter shall be determined
through the annual budgetary procedure. All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are
indicative.
3.2.4. Estimated requirements of human resources
– The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources
– The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained
below
3.2.4.1. Financed from voted budget
Estimate to be expressed in full-time equivalent units (FTEs)56
VOTED APPROPRIATIONS Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff)
20 01 02 01 (Headquarters and Commission’s Representation
Offices)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 01 02 03 (EU Delegations) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Indirect research) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
(Direct research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
56 Please specify below the table how many FTEs within the number indicated are already assigned to the
management of the action and/or can be redeployed within your DG and what are your net needs.
EN 16 EN
Other budget lines (specify) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
• External staff (in FTEs)
20 02 01 (AC, END from the
‘global envelope’) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 02 03 (AC, AL, END and JPD
in the EU Delegations) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Admin. Support
line
• at Headquart ers
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[XX.01.YY.YY] • in EU
Delegations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(AC, END - Indirect research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(AC, END - Direct research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines (specify) -
Heading 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines (specify) -
Outside Heading 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The staff required to implement the proposal (in FTEs):
To be covered by
current staff
available in the
Commission services
Exceptional additional staff*
To be financed
under Heading
4 or Research
To be financed
from BA line
To be financed
from fees
Establishment
plan posts
3
[N.B. Considering the
overall strained
situation in Heading 4,
in terms of both
staffing and the level
of appropriations, the
human resources
required will be met by
staff from the DG who
are already assigned to
the management of the
action and/or have
been redeployed within
the DG or other
Commission services]
N/A
External staff
(CA, SNEs, INT)
Description of tasks to be carried out by:
Officials and temporary staff 3 FTEs are needed to monitor the implementation and enforcement of
the Regulation.
EN 17 EN
External staff
3.2.5. Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments
Compulsory: the best estimate of the digital technology-related investments entailed
by the proposal/initiative should be included in the table below.
Exceptionally, when required for the implementation of the proposal/initiative, the
appropriations under Heading 4 should be presented in the designated line.
The appropriations under Headings 1-3 should be reflected as “Policy IT expenditure
on operational programmes”. This expenditure refers to the operational budget to be
used to re-use/ buy/ develop IT platforms/ tools directly linked to the implementation
of the initiative and their associated investments (e.g. licences, studies, data storage
etc). The information provided in this table should be consistent with details
presented under Section 4 “Digital dimensions”.
TOTAL Digital
and IT
appropriations
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL
MFF
2028 -
2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
HEADING 4
IT expenditure (corporate)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal
HEADING 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Outside HEADING 4
Policy IT expenditure on operational programmes
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal outside
HEADING 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.2.6. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework
The proposal/initiative:
– can be fully financed through redeployment within the relevant heading of the
multiannual financial framework (MFF)
– requires use of the unallocated margin under the relevant heading of the MFF
and/or use of the special instruments as defined in the MFF Regulation
– requires a revision of the MFF
3.2.7. Third-party contributions
The proposal/initiative:
– does not provide for co-financing by third parties
EN 18 EN
– provides for the co-financing by third parties estimated below:
Appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places)
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
Total 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Specify the co-
financing body
TOTAL
appropriations
co-financed
3.2.8. Estimated human resources and the use of appropriations required in a decentralised
agency
The Competence Centre would provide support in areas such as IP exploitation,
commercialisation and access to finance. The implementation of these activities is estimated
to require 10 FTEs per year during the implementation phase, assuming a two-year
development period. If the Act enters into force in 2028, this phase would therefore cover
2028 and 2029. Once the Competence Centre becomes fully operational, the estimated
staffing requirement would decrease to 8 FTEs per year.
Staff requirements (full-time equivalent units)
Agency: EUIPO Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
Temporary agents
(AD Grades) 6 6 4 4 4 4 4
Temporary agents
(AST grades) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Temporary agents
(AD+AST) subtotal 6 6 4 4 4 4 4
Contract agents 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Seconded national
experts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Contract agents and
seconded national
experts subtotal
4 4 4 4 4 4 4
EN 19 EN
TOTAL staff 10 10 8 8 8 8 8
Overview/summary of human resources and appropriations (in EUR million) required by the
proposal/initiative in a decentralised agency
Agency: EUIPO Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
Temporary agents
(AD+AST) 6 6 4 4 4 4 4
Contract agents 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Seconded national experts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total staff 10 10 8 8 8 8 8
Appropriations covered by
the EU budget 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appropriations covered by
fees
(if applicable)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appropriations covered by
EUIPO operative budget /
surplus
(as applicable)
0.746 1.523 1.173 1.196 1.220 1.245 1.269
Appropriations co-
financed
(if applicable)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOTAL appropriations 0.746 1.523 1.173 1.196 1.220 1.245 1.269
The Office reserves its position as regards the calculation of the revenue derivable from the
relevant EIA provision.
3.3. Estimated impact on revenue
– The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue.
– The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact:
EN 20 EN
– on own resources
– on other revenue
– please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines
EUR million (to three decimal places)
Budget revenue line:
Appropriations
available for
the current
financial year
Impact of the proposal/initiative57
Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
Article ………….
For assigned revenue, specify the budget expenditure line(s) affected.
Other remarks (e.g. method/formula used for calculating the impact on revenue or
any other information).
4. DIGITAL DIMENSIONS
4.1. Requirements of digital relevance
Reference to
the
requirement
Requirement
description
Actor(s)
affected or
concerned by
the
requirement
High-level
Processes
Categories
Article 4(4) R&D
procurements
to be carried
out through the
TED platform
(digital
interface to
upload
procurement
notices in the
Official Journal
of the European
Union)
Public buyers
Economic
operators
R&D
procurement
Data
Digital Solution
Digital Public
Service
Process
digitalisation and
automation
Interoperability
Articles 4(4) Requirement to
use electronic
format for
Public buyers
Economic
R&D
procurement
Data
Digital Solution
57 In the case of traditional own resources (customs duties, sugar levies), the amounts indicated must be
net amounts, i.e. gross amounts after deduction of 10 % for collection costs, as proposed in
COM(2025)574.
EN 21 EN
procurement
documents
operators Digital Public
Service
Process
digitalisation and
automation
Interoperability
Article 10 Requirement on
public buyers to
specify
requirements
on contractors
to contribute to
publication of
results, where
appropriate, as
open data or
open source
Public buyers
Economic
operators
R&D
procurement
Data
Digital Solution
Digital Public
Service
Process
digitalisation and
automation
Article 26 Requirement to
respect data
protection
rules, including
those for
electronic
communication
Public buyers
Economic
operators
R&D
procurement
Data
Digital Solution
Digital Public
Service
Process
digitalisation and
automation
Article 32(3)(a) European
Union
Intellectual
Property Office
to develop a
valuation
framework for
valuation of
intangible
assets and
related digital
processes and
services related
to the
disclosure,
screening and
valuation of IP
Economic
operators
Member States
Union entities
IP valuation Data
Digital Solution
Digital Public
Service
Process
digitalisation and
automation
Article 32(3)(b) European
Union
Intellectual
Property Office
Union entities
Economic
operators
Facilitation of
IP licensing and
transfer
Data
Digital Solution
Digital Public
EN 22 EN
to establish and
maintain a
digital match-
making
platform to
facilitate the
licensing and
transfer of all
types of IP
rights protected
at Union level.
Service
Article 32(3)(g)
and Article 35
Development
of an evidence
database on IP-
backed
financing
Member States
Competent
authorities
Economic
operators
Union entities
Data processing
and analysis
Data
4.2. Data
Type of data Reference to
requirement(s)
Standard and/or specification (if
applicable)
Data related to R&D
procurement procedures on
the scope of the
procurement, on public
buyers and on
tenderers/contractors
Articles 4(4), 6, 16 and
17
Standards and specifications used
in the EU public procurment portal
(eForms, OASIS UBL, TED APIs,
eProcurement ontology)
Data related to IP-backed
financing, including
information on how
intellectual property used
as collateral for credit or
insurance purposes or as
in-kind contribution in
equity investment
scenarios has been
evaluated, on the size and
characteristics of the
corresponding transaction,
on the type of intellectual
property right concerned,
and on relevant indicators
such as equity valuation,
collateralisation, or loan to
value ratios.
Article 32(3)g) and
Article 33
Standards and specifications to be
defined by the European Union
Intellectual Property Office
Competence Centre for IP-backed
finance, in cooperation with the
Commission, covering:
harmonised data requirements for
IP asset type, collateral structure,
transaction size, and loan
outcomes; data sharing and access
protocols consistent with
applicable data protection rules;
interoperability requirements
enabling linkage between IP
registries, commercial registries,
and public instrument records; and
standards for the anonymisation
and aggregation of transaction-
EN 23 EN
level data collected through EU-
supported IP-backed finance
instruments.
Alignment with the European Data Strategy
Explain how the requirement(s) are aligned with the European Data Strategy
• The proposal promotes the use of digital tools for R&D procurement procedures and
for valuation and commercialisation of IP, which is in line with the European Data
Strategy's objective of promoting digitalization and data-driven innovation.
• The proposal builds on the existing digital tools for public procurement, including the
national procurement portals. This is consistent with the European Data Strategy's goal
of improving data sharing and interoperability.
• The proposal promotes transparency while respecting data protection and data
confidentiality rules, the protection of intellectual property rights and the safeguarding
of trade secrets. This is in line with the European Data Strategy's objective of
promoting transparency and trust in data-driven ecosystems.
• The proposal aims to create a favorable environment for startups and scaleups, which
is consistent with the European Data Strategy's goal of promoting innovation and
entrepreneurship through data-driven technologies.
Explanation of how newly created data is findable, accessible, interoperable and reusable, and
meets high-quality standards
The accessibility, findability, interoperability and reusability of data and the data-quality
requirements related to R&D procurements is currently defined in the rules for
publication of and access to data on the TED portal
Data collected under the Act will be managed by European Union Intellectual Property
Office. The European Union Intellectual Property Office Competence Centre will
maintain a structured repository with defined metadata standards to support discoverability
and reuse. The Office is the legal entity that will maintain the repository. Access will be
governed by clear protocols, distinguishing between publicly available data and data
accessible only to authorised bodies. Interoperability with existing IP registries and
commercial registers will be pursued through common data formats and shared identifiers.
Data quality standards, including validation rules and reporting obligations for participating
entities, will be defined by the Competence Centre in cooperation with the Commission.
Data flows
High-level description of the data flows
Type of data Reference(s)
to the
requirement(s)
Actor who
provides the
data
Actor
who
receives
the data
Trigger for
the data
exchange
Frequency
(if
applicable)
Procurement
documents
and notices
Articles 4(4),
6, 16 and 17
Public buyer Tenderers Publication of
notices and
link to
procurement
EN 24 EN
documents
IP valuation
tools
Article
32(3)(a)
EUIPO Economic
operators
Public
bodies
IP valuation
request
IP
matchmaking
information
Article
32(3)(b)
EUIPO Economic
operators
Public
bodies
Matchmaking
request
IP-based
finance
related
evidence
Article
32(3)(g)
National
guarantee
institutions
Financial
intermediaries
EUIPO Request for
collection of
evidence
4.3. Digital solutions
4.4. Interoperability assessment
Under this proposal, R&D procurements will be carried out through the digital solutions
used in the TED portal.
Under this proposal, European Union Intellectual Property Office is tasked with developing
the following digital solutions:
• digital tools supporting the disclosure, screening and indicative valuation of IP
assets, accessible to economic operators and financial institutions
• an IP licensing and transfer platform facilitating the licensing and transfer of IP
rights protected at Union level
• IP-backed finance evidence database collecting transaction-level data on IP-backed
finance instruments
All three solutions will be operated by European Union Intellectual Property Office and
will comply with applicable cybersecurity requirements and relevant Union digital rules.
Where AI-assisted tools are used, in particular for screening and indicative valuation,
compliance with rules applicable to use of AI will be ensured and the relevant risk
classification will be assessed at design stage.
The digital solutions mandated by the Act require interaction across Member State borders
and involve multiple EU entities and public sector bodies, satisfying both conditions for an
interoperability assessment.
Currently the TED portal provides an interoperable way for public buyers to upload R&D
procurements notices that were published on national public procurement portals also on
the TED portal. In the future, the EU digital market place for public procurements is
expected to further improve interoperability between different national and EU public
procurement portals and databases, enabling economic operators from one Member State to
participate more easily in a R&D procurement procedure of a public buyer in another
EN 25 EN
4.5. Measures to support digital implementation
58 Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 laying
down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union (Interoperable Europe
Act) (OJ L, 2024/903, 22.03.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/903/oj).
Member State, and simplifying the process for public buyers from two or more Member
States to carry out R&D procurement procedures jointly. The TED portal will remain the
interface for public buyers to launch R&D procurement procedures and for economic
operators to find R&D procurement business opportunities. Therefore, the interactions
between national and EU public procurement portals and databases are not part of this
interoperability assessment.
The European Union Intellectual Property Office valuation tools and matchmaking platform
will be accessible to economic operators and public bodies across all Member States,
requiring semantic interoperability with national IP registries and commercial registers. The
IP-backed finance evidence database will aggregate data from national guarantee
institutions and financial intermediaries, requiring harmonised data formats and shared
identifiers. Relevant interoperability solutions available at EU level will be assessed for
reuse during the design and implementation phase. Key remaining barriers include
divergent national IP registry formats and the absence of a central EU-level IP pledge
register.
Since this proposal introduces new binding requirements for cross-border digital public
services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and
of the Council58, an interoperability assessment has been carried out, and the resulting
report is to be published on the Interoperable Europe Portal.
The following implementation measures are planned to support the implementation of the
digital solutions under this proposal:
For R&D procurement:
• the use of existing features for launching R&D procurement procedures through the
TED portal, and the integration of new digital features for launching R&D
procurement procedures through the EU digital market place for public
procurements
• capacity building activities targeting Member States, public buyers and economic
operators to support wide and correct use of launching R&D procurements through
the TED portal
For the European Union Intellectual Property Office activities:
• the establishment and operationalisation of the European Union Intellectual
Property Office Competence Centre for IP-backed finance, responsible for the
digital tools, the matchmaking platform, and the evidence database.
• capacity building programme targeting financial institutions, developed jointly by
European Union Intellectual Property Office and the Commission, to support uptake
of the valuation framework and digital tools.
• pilot phase for the evidence database involving selected national guarantee
institutions and financial intermediaries, enabling iterative refinement before full
EN 26 EN
deployment.
Resolutsiooni liik: Riigikantselei resolutsioon Viide: Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium / / ; Riigikantselei / / 2-5/26-01890
Resolutsiooni teema: Regulatiivsete liivakastide ühised põhimõtted innovatsiooni toetamiseks ja tulevikukindla õigusraamistiku kujundamiseks
Adressaat: Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium Ülesanne: Tulenevalt Riigikogu kodu- ja töökorra seaduse § 152` lg 1 p 2 ning Vabariigi Valitsuse reglemendi § 3 lg 4 palun valmistada ette Vabariigi Valitsuse seisukohtade ja otsuste eelnõud järgmiste algatuste kohta, kaasates seejuures olulisi huvigruppe ja osapooli:
-Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a framework of measures for strengthening the Union innovation ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (European Innovation Act),
-Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on common principles on regulatory sandboxes to support innovation and a future proof regulatory framework, COM(2026)568
EISi toimiku nr: 26-0392 Tähtaeg: 06.11.2026
Adressaat: Haridus- ja Teadusministeerium, Justiits- ja Digiministeerium, Kliimaministeerium, Rahandusministeerium, Regionaal- ja Põllumajandusministeerium, Sotsiaalministeerium Ülesanne: Palun esitada oma sisend Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeeriumile seisukohtade kujundamiseks antud eelnõu kohta (eelnõude infosüsteemi (EIS) kaudu). Tähtaeg: 12.10.2026
Lisainfo: Eelnõusid on kavas arutada valitsuse 19.11.2026. aasta istungil ning Vabariigi Valitsuse reglemendi § 6 lg 6 kohaselt sellele eelneval nädalal (11.11.2026) EL koordinatsioonikogus. Esialgsed materjalid EL koordinatsioonikoguks palume esitada hiljemalt 06.11.2026.
Kinnitaja: Merli Vahar, Euroopa Liidu asjade direktori asetäitja Kinnitamise kuupäev: 28.09.2026 Resolutsiooni koostaja: Sandra Metste [email protected],
.
Eelnõude infosüsteemis (EIS) on antud täitmiseks ülesanne. Eelnõu toimik: 13.1/26-0392 - COM(2026) 567 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a framework of measures for strengthening the Union innovation ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (European Innovation Act) Arvamuse andmine eelnõude kohta Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeeriumile vastavalt Riigikantselei 28.09.2026 resolutsioonile Osapooled: Haridus- ja Teadusministeerium; Justiits- ja Digiministeerium; Regionaal- ja Põllumajandusministeerium; Rahandusministeerium; Sotsiaalministeerium; Kliimaministeerium Tähtaeg: 12.10.2026 23:59 Link eelnõu toimiku vaatele: https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main/mount/docList/76c770ee-fca2-4e2d-b72c-0f70db3184d4 Link menetlusetapile: https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main/mount/docList/76c770ee-fca2-4e2d-b72c-0f70db3184d4?activity=2 Eelnõude infosüsteem (EIS) https://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main