EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 1.10.2026 COM(2026) 528 final

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE

COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE

COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

Interim Evaluation of the implementation of the Council Decision (Euratom) 2021/281

amending Decision 2007/198/Euratom establishing the European Joint Undertaking for

ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it

{SWD(2026) 289 final}

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I. INTRODUCTION

ITER is an international scientific collaboration project aiming to demonstrate the scientific

and technological feasibility of fusion energy for peaceful purposes. The ITER Agreement,

signed in 2006 between Euratom1 (represented by the European Commission), the United

States, Japan, Korea, China, Russia, and India, has set up the ITER Organisation (IO) as an

international organisation for the construction, operation, exploitation, and deactivation of the

ITER2 facilities in Cadarache, France, and provide for its decommissioning. The ITER

Agreement binds each Party to provide contributions in-kind (components necessary for the

construction of the ITER device) and in-cash (financial funds for IO operations).

Each Party to the Agreement must set up a Domestic Agency (DA) as an entity for coordinated

interaction with IO and supply of contributions on behalf of the Party. Euratom’s Domestic

Agency is the “European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy”

(Fusion for Energy – F4E), which was established by Council Decision 2007/198/Euratom3 in

March 2007. The Decision sets F4E’s tasks as follows:

- to provide Euratom’s contribution to the ITER Organisation4,

- to provide Euratom’s contribution to Broader Approach activities with Japan5,

- to prepare and coordinate the preparation of the construction of a demonstration fusion

reactor (DEMO) and related facilities.

F4E's members at present are Euratom (represented by the Commission), the EU Member

States of Euratom6 and Switzerland. Third countries may become members of F4E under

conditions specified in the Council Decision 2007/198/Euratom establishing F4E. The budget

of F4E is 80% funded from the EU budget. France as the ITER host country funds almost 20%.

The remainder is covered by membership fees of other F4E members.

The Council Decision (Euratom) 2021/2817 amending the Council Decision 2007/198/Euratom

requires the Commission to carry out an interim evaluation of the implementation of the

Decision. The Commission has prepared this interim evaluation with the support of an external

contractor8 to assess Euratom’s participation in ITER through F4E in line with Better

Regulation principles. The evaluation is meant to:

1. inform on the status of the “ITER Programme”.

1 Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community) is an entity legally distinct from the EU but with the same

membership. 2 ITER is an international scientific collaboration project aiming to demonstrate the scientific and technological

feasibility of fusion energy for peaceful purposes. 3 2007/198/Euratom: Council Decision of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER

and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it 4 During the construction phase, Euratom’s contribution represents around 45% of the construction cost of ITER.

The other ITER Members’ shares are around 9% each. 5 In parallel to the ITER Agreement, Euratom entered into a separate bilateral agreement with Japan (the “Broader

Approach" Agreement (BA)) to further facilitate and coordinate fusion-related activities with Japan. 6 This included the UK up the entry into force of the Withdrawal Agreement (31 January 2020), 7 Council Decision (Euratom) 2021/281 of 22 February 2021 amending Decision 2007/198/Euratom establishing

the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon

it. (see in particular, Article 5c) 8 The Commission has published the report by the contractor selected to provide external input to the interim

evaluation:https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e8d31d19-f590-11ef-b7db-

01aa75ed71a1/language-

en?WT.mc_id=Searchresult&WT.ria_c=153343&WT.ria_f=8810&WT.ria_ev=search&WT.URL=https%3A%2

F%2Fenergy.ec.europa.eu%2F

2

2. provide elements for the improvement of Euratom’s ITER Programme and the working

of F4E in the period 2025-2027.

The evaluation is primarily focused on the European participation in the ITER Project

through Fusion for Energy during the first part of the current Multiannual Financial

Framework (MFF), namely the period 2021-2024.

It assesses the performance of the ITER project and F4E against the project baseline (defining

scope, schedule and budget) approved for the ITER project for that period (Baseline 2016) and

F4E planning documents derived on its basis9. A new baseline was presented by the IO in June

2024 at the request of the ITER Council, and its execution is therefore out of the scope of the

present evaluation.

II. WHAT WERE THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION

IN THE ITER PROJECT THROUGH F4E IN THE PERIOD REVIEWED?

a) Overview of F4E performance in a nutshell

The evaluation of Euratom’s participation in the ITER project through F4E as required by

Council Decision 2021/281 looks at the progress that F4E has been able to achieve on the three

strategic objectives defined in that Decision. The members of the F4E Governing Board gave

in a survey conducted in 2024 an overall positive assessment of F4E’s performance. To the

question “to what extent are the original objectives of F4E met?”,most considered that

F4E fulfilled its objectives and activities defined in the statutes of F4E (as per Art. 2 and

Art. 3 of the Annex of Council Decision 2007/198/Euratom)10.

A more thorough assessment of F4E performance needs to distinguish between the different

areas of F4E activities as presented below.

For ITER: Over the period under review, F4E has delivered a significant part of its expected

contributions to ITER. It has signed 24 major engineering and construction contracts

representing a total committed value of EUR 3 bn11. F4E has delivered a major part of the

buildings on ITER’s site in France and the European parts of the ITER magnet system (which

is the largest and most integrated superconducting magnet system ever built). These major

achievements were further complemented in October 2024 by the delivery of the first European

sector of the Vacuum Vessel12, to be followed by the other sectors until mid-2026.

While these achievements are undeniable, progress was not always in line with the 2016

Baseline. By the end of 2023, the budgetary execution and achievement of key milestones

defined by the ITER Council (IC) and F4E Governing Board (GB) were below expectations:

9 Following the approval of the 2016 Baseline, F4E set a new timetable and recalculated the related estimated cost

at completion (EAC) of the F4E contribution to the project construction phase until the achievement of the First

Plasma milestone projected for 2025. The EAC combines past actual costs and future estimated costs (including

the likely impact of future risks) for the completion of F4E’s ITER responsibilities until the end of 2035. 10 Figures provided in the supporting study available at : https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-

/publication/e8d31d19-f590-11ef-b7db-01aa75ed71a1/language-

en?WT.mc_id=Searchresult&WT.ria_c=153343&WT.ria_f=8810&WT.ria_ev=search&WT.URL=https%3A%2

F%2Fenergy.ec.europa.eu%2F; see page 326 – question 1- sum of the answers “to a large extent” and “to a certain

extent”. 11 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTc83Ql8djA&t=31s (ITER Construction, October 2024)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NRaFSpd7cwA (ITER Construction, October 2023) 12 https://fusionforenergy.europa.eu/news/europes-first-iter-vacuum-vessel-sector-ready/

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F4E had collected 65% of its ITER credits13, 14 percentage points lower than planned in the

2016 Baseline. The milestones, which are defined by IO governance (IC Milestones) and F4E

governance (Governing Board milestones) to monitor progress of the ITER project, are also

delayed by 32 months on average compared to the Baseline 2016.

Figure 1. ITER credits compared to 2016Baseline in kIUA14

The EU budgetary authority allocated in MFF documents EUR 5.6 bn for the funding of F4E

in the period 2021-2027. The slower execution of the project has generated significant

underspending resulting in an accumulation of unused appropriations in F4E over the period

2021-2024. The Governing Board and the Commission have acted to adapt the annual budgets

of F4E according to its needs. Based on the principle of sound financial management of EU

resources, EUR 1 bn out of EUR 5.6 bn have been returned in the current MFF to the general

EU budget to align the annual budgetary decisions on commitment appropriations to the actual

needs of the project.

Table 1. Euratom commitments for ITER in the multiannual financial frameworks

2007-2013 2014-2020 2021-2027

European contributions in commitment appropriations (MEUR)

3 273 2 915 4 562

For Broader Approach (BA): The BA programme consists of three major projects: i) Satellite

Tokamak Programme (JT-60SA)15, ii) the Engineering Validation and Engineering Design

Activities for the International Fusion Materials Irradiation Facility (IFMIF/EVEDA), and iii)

the International Fusion Energy Research Centre (IFERC)16. Euratom’s contributions to BA

activities have been delivered by F4E globally in line with the agreed timeline. Over the period

13 The ITER credits are the units used by ITER to define a value of in-kind components which DAs have to deliver

and have agreed in Procurement Arrangements (PAs). Each of them represents specific work to be performed and

delivered by the DAs to IO. Each PA specifies milestones agreed between IO and the DA concerned and used to

mark the progress in the execution of the PA. The achievement of each milestone corresponds to a certain release

of credits denominated in ITER unit of account (IUA). A similar system exists for the BA programme, whose unit

of account is the BAUA. 14 The units used by ITER or BA. For the ITER project, the in-kind contributions to IO are organised through

Procurement Arrangements (PAs) representing specific work to be performed and delivered to IO. When a PA is

developed by IO, the milestones agreed to mark the execution of the project correspond to a certain release of

credits denominated in ITER unit of account (IUA). 15 To build and operate the most powerful fusion machine in the world, JT-60SA, until the completion of ITER

construction. 16 A project that carries out different sub-projects in fusion science using supercomputing equipment.

-

200

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1 200

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Baseline credit Achieved credit Forecast credit

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2021-2023, Euratom through F4E devoted EUR 72 million for the BA activities. Important

achievements in the evaluation period include the inauguration of the JT-60 SA in late 2023.

This inauguration was followed by a period of maintenance and repairs and will resume shortly

with the start of the first experimental campaigns. JT-60SA is currently the largest and most

advanced fusion research device in operation worldwide, and its performance will provide

critical insights for the construction and operation of ITER.

To maximise the return on the EU’s investment – and to ensure that Europe remains at the

forefront of the global race to make fusion a viable energy source – it is essential that European

scientists take the privileged opportunity to access JT-60SA, participating in, and learning

from, the operation and exploitation activities.

For DEMO: F4E invested limited resources in the preparation for the construction of the

DEMO reactor mainly because the delays and challenges encountered in ITER implementation

required more F4E resources to address them. According to Council Decision

2007/198/Euratom, F4E is “to prepare and coordinate a programme of activities in preparation

for the construction of a demonstration fusion reactor (DEMO)”. The overall delays in ITER

also implied that the key fusion technologies have reached a lower level of maturity than would

be needed for industrial activities in preparation for DEMO. F4E's involvement in DEMO

activities was, therefore, primarily channelled through specific projects under the BA

Agreement and collaborations with EUROfusion, which manages European fusion research

activities funded through the Euratom Research and Training Programme.

b) Analysis of the cost overruns and delays in ITER construction

The ITER project has experienced major delays and cost overruns during the period under

review mainly due to:

i) Overly ambitious Baseline 2016 adopted by the ITER Council. The Baseline

2016 was based on the best technically achievable schedule and excluded any type

of contingencies (in schedule and costs) which has deprived the project of the

flexibility needed for coping with First-Of-A-Kind issues and added a degree of

difficulty to its overall management.

ii) Design readiness and First-Of-A-Kind nature: The programme faced significant

cost overruns due to the numerous design changes and sometimes unnecessarily

complex technical requirements. These repeated changes (particularly for

buildings) led to claims lodged by the F4E contractors and contributed to cost

increases. Several components that F4E had to deliver also posed technical

challenges, often underestimated by the IO and F4E, and took longer to manufacture

than agreed or expected. The Estimate Cost At Completion (EAC)17 for F4E

increased by EUR 1 205 million between September 2020 and December 2024.

iii) Quality issues. The IO detected in 2022 quality problems on key components

(vacuum vessel sectors and cryostat thermal shields) delivered to the site18. These

components had to be repaired. The repairs required two years to be executed. The

IO optimised the machine assembly works to mitigate the impact of the repairs on

the overall project schedule.

17 The EAC combines past actual costs and future estimated costs (including the likely impact of future risks) for

the completion of F4E’s ITER responsibilities until the end of 2035.

18 First, several thermal shields, designed to keep ITER’s liquid helium refrigerant cold and protect the walls of the machine, corroded and cracked because of the way the welds interacted with an acid used to wash the metal. Secondly, certain components of the vacuum vessel, intended to interlock with extreme precision, were found to lack the required manufacturing accuracy. (Source: F4E (2023). Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2022).

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iv) COVID-19 pandemic and the consequences of the War in Ukraine. The COVID

crisis added delays to the situation. The COVID-19 pandemic explained most of the

delays in 2020 and 2021. The restrictions of circulation, travel and work attendance

imposed during the pandemic slowed the manufacturing, shipping and installation

of critical components.

The manufacturing cost increased significantly across all EU components due to the

inflationary pressures triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent

geopolitical events, most notably Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These events drove

up the prices of raw materials such as steel, which are integral to the construction

of ITER components.

v) Regulatory challenges. The technical documentation and answers provided by the

IO on several licensing issues (such as neutronic fluence, radiation maps, seismic

calculations and welding of the Vacuum Vessel) were not mature enough at the time

of their initial submission to the Nuclear Safety Authority of France – currently

referred to as the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Authority (ASNR). In

consequence, the ASNR informed the IO in January 2022 that the Tokamak

Assembly Hold Point, a key regulatory milestone would not be lifted at the time

assumed by IO. This led to the suspension of all “irreversible” assembly activities19

until IO provides information sufficient for the ASNR to proceed to the re-

examination of these licensing files.

While not having been able to meet its commitments from one year to the next over the

period of the interim evaluation, F4E has recently improved the preparation and

execution of its work plans. Before 2023, F4E's milestone completion rate was in the 50-60%

range, reflecting a lack of reliability in its own forecasts, resulting in cumulative delays year

after year. In 2024, F4E reported a significant improvement, with 84% of the milestones

achieved.

III. MEASURES TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE Of THE ITER

PROJECT

At the level of the IO: Since taking up his post in September 2022, the new Director General

of the ITER Organisation (IO DG) has worked on the re-baselining of the project and on a

series of management reforms to get the project back on track. In particular, the IO DG

thoroughly changed the organisation, putting a project matrix structure in place, and

streamlined the decision-making process. In addition, he eliminated one layer of management

and completely reorganised the management team in which he gradually introduced a system

of delegations20. The IO has also identified ways of repairing key components supplied by

some Members (Vacuum Vessel sectors and thermal shields) and has improved the interaction

with the French Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (ASNR). Although many challenges

remain, a noticeable improvement was recognised by the ITER Council in 202421.

At the level of F4E: F4E underwent a thorough reorganisation to implement the reforms

deemed necessary by the F4E Governing Board after a suicide case, which occurred in May

2021 and led to a strike by F4E staff. The events revealed a culture of overwork, stress and

unacceptable management practices. It led to the dismissal of the F4E Director in June 2022.

19 Irreversible activities include for instance the welding of Vacuum Vessel Sectors together. 20 Source: IC-32/10 Director-General's Letter (DG/2023/OUT/0114 (94EGSL) – paragraph “reorganisation”. 21 Minutes of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of the ITER Council (IC-35), November 2024

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Necessary measures were taken to safeguard the psychological welfare of all staff members

and improve the distribution of workload within the organisation.

A new Director was recruited in May 2023 and received the mandate i) to ensure a closer

integration between F4E and the IO; ii) to create a modern, diverse, and flexible organisation;

iii) to accelerate the delivery of the European contribution to ITER according to the agreed

schedule, budget and quality; iv) to work collaboratively and transparently with the Governing

Board; v) to implement a sound financial management and improve budget planning and

reporting; and vi) to renew the engagement with scientific and industrial stakeholders and the

long-term perspective of F4E. On 1 July 2024, a new matrix organisation chart came into effect

in F4E to streamline its management and improve interaction with IO.

The Commission took the lead in F4E governance to ensure that F4E management put in place

the urgent measures requested by the Governing Board to preserve the staff well-being, for the

selection of the new Director and to ensure that F4E focuses on its core mission and delivers

its key components to ITER, for instance the Vacuum Vessel sectors. Commission Services

representing Euratom in F4E governance revised their Supervision Strategy to particularly

strengthen i) the monitoring of the progress of critical projects and of the performance

objectives, ii) the identification of risk and mitigation measures, and iii) the preservation of the

EU interests in the way F4E implements its mission.

Integration of IO and F4E: IO identified the integration of its activities with those of the

Domestic Agencies as an area for improving the efficiency of the project. As a result, IO and

F4E have been exploring ways to better integrate their activities and exploit the potential

synergies and complementarities between the two organisations. Since September 2023, a

major effort has been undertaken by F4E and IO to identify the most relevant activities and

functions to be integrated, as well as to set up integrated teams that share schedules, tools (IT,

databases, indicators) and information in the medium term and work more efficiently towards

common objectives.

The expected outcomes of the integration are efficiency gains and potential savings, as the IO

and F4E could jointly identify optimisations in the way components are designed, procured

and delivered. This will be particularly relevant for the early design of components and systems

(Hot Cell Facility, diagnostics, heating, in-vessel) that are yet to be delivered by F4E. In

addition, integration offers new career prospects for F4E staff and will allow the retention of

qualified staff, even after the delivery of the components. The conditions for the secondment

of the F4E staff to the IO (IO and F4E staff statutes are different) have been clarified in an

administrative agreement signed in 2024.

Baseline revision: In June 2024, the ITER Organisation (IO) presented a revision of the project

Baseline (scope, schedule and cost), to mitigate key assembly and commissioning risks, define

contingencies for schedule and cost, while incorporating lessons learned from previous first-

of-a-kind activities. The new schedule introduced significant changes in the sequencing of the

assembly of the ITER machine. As a result, the revised timeline now foresees the “Start of

Research Operation”, with the first nuclear deuterium-deuterium (DD) operation in 2035 for

which there is no delay compared to the previous schedule. The start of fusion power in the

deuterium-tritium (DT) phase is now expected in 2039. This new Baseline is underpinned by a

phased licensing approach according to which IO will manage the safety demonstrations

required by the French nuclear safety regulator (ASNR) by phases, building on previous phases

to reduce risks in subsequent ones.

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IV. WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN

ITER THROUGH F4E?

EU participation in ITER through F4E has had an important economic, social and

technological impact. Since its creation, F4E has awarded a total of EUR 7.6 bn in public

procurements and EUR 114 million in grants. This expenditure has benefited a wide range

of European companies which have been able to demonstrate their excellence, develop new

skills and technologies, and sometimes export their know-how22.

The macro-economic impact analysis in the assessment covering the period 2018-202423

indicates that compared with a situation where F4E-related spending did not occur and funds

were instead saved, the approximately EUR 5.62 billion (in 2024 prices) spent by F4E is

estimated to have generated about EUR 5.95 billion in additional Gross Value Added and

supported around 39,000 job-years.

Turning to firm-level impacts, companies that supplied goods or services to F4E between 2018

and 2024 reported significant learning effects, strengthening both technical and organisational

capabilities. F4E collaboration has generated meaningful knowledge and innovation impacts.

Around half of surveyed firms reported product or process improvements, often through

technological adaptation, while more advanced outcomes such as patents, spin-offs, or cutting-

edge technologies were concentrated among a smaller set of suppliers.

In the context of the present interim evaluation, a survey of F4E contractors conducted in 2024

confirmed that contracts with F4E had significantly improved their technical and

organisational expertise. Working on ITER construction has also contributed to scientific

innovation and the development of new technologies as demonstrated by the 39 concrete

applications24. These applications are concrete cases of successful transfers of know-how

gained through F4E contracts to industrial activities either in the nuclear field or in other sectors

(hydrogen, tire industry, mobile machinery, etc.). On the other hand, while underlining

numerous advantages to participate in the procedures for ITER (e.g., knowledge, gain in

credibility, international development of collaboration), companies mentioned that their

participation was not always synonymous with profitability and benefits. Importantly, several

contractors indicated the need to capitalise on the knowledge developed, and ensure that

projects complementary to ITER are pursued. If not, companies run the risk of losing the

skills they have acquired with these contracts.

Other studies25 highlight the spin-off effects of ITER. For example, the development of

superconducting electromagnets for ITER by ASG superconductors has advanced technologies

applicable beyond fusion26, including medical diagnostics, semiconductors, electronics, and

defence.

The European participation in ITER has enabled the emergence of a domestic EU supply

chain offering European high-tech industries and SMEs valuable opportunities to

innovate and develop ‘spin-off’ products for exploitation outside fusion. F4E has placed

22 For an example of knowledge transfer see https://www.axios.com/pro/climate-

deals/2024/05/01/commonwealth-fusion-progress 23 13th ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF FUSION FOR ENERGY, Final study report, 2025.

24 https://fusion-technology-transfer.europa.eu/fusion-technology-portfolio/ 25 Such as the LGI and IHS Markit study (2020): Follow up study on the economic benefits of ITER and BA

projects to EU industry - Publications Office of the EU (europa.eu) 26 Follow up study on the economic benefits of ITER and BA projects to EU industry - Publications Office of the

EU

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the development and the constitution of a European nuclear fusion supply chain at the heart of

its industrial policy. Recent initiatives show that the sector is beginning to structure itself in

Europe: several startup’s have been created and received significant funding27. In addition,

three nuclear fusion trade associations have been set-up in Europe in 2024, with the aim of

federating the interests of start-ups and industries in the sector (European Fusion Association,

Fusion Europe, and an EU branch of the Fusion Industry Association). This is a new trend:

before 2024, there were no such associations in Europe specifically devoted to industrial

nuclear fusion and only one in the US, the Fusion Industry Association, which reported

progress in fusion mainly in the US and in Europe.

European involvement in ITER is also expected to make a positive contribution to the

EU climate objectives in the long-term. That is why the Commission considers that 100% of

the ITER-related expenditure for the 2021-2027 period contributes to the climate effort of the

EU budget. The financial amounts spent on European participation in ITER are expected to

contribute to the Commission’s long-term climate goals, in particular, to “become the first

climate-neutral continent by becoming a modern, resource-efficient economy”. Although ITER

is not expected to produce electricity, it is a key project for developing fusion energy, which

has the potential to provide a new source of emission-free energy in the future. Participation in

ITER therefore contributes to the long-term effort of the European Union to “ensure access to

affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all”.

Finally, as an example of a global partnership involving seven international partners (Euratom,

the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia, and India) representing more than half

of the world’s population, the ITER project contributes to the goal to “Strengthen the

means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable

Development”28.

V. IS EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN ITER THROUGH F4E STILL

RELEVANT FOR THE FUTURE?

a) Should European involvement in ITER be further pursued despite the

challenging context?

The ITER Agreement stipulates that the Host Party, i.e., Euratom, may not withdraw from

the Agreement and thus the project. Euratom is, therefore, the Party with the greatest interest

in making ITER a success. It is also necessary to ensure that ITER remains relevant to justify

the need for continued EU intervention.

Several fusion initiatives in the world have recently reported significant breakthroughs29

and the rhythm of announcements has increased since 202130. Some countries – such as the

27 Global Investment in the fusion private sector, Report from the F4E Fusion Observatory, 2nd Edition, 2025.

28 Sustainable Development Goal 17 29 Foresight study on the worldwide developments in advancing fusion energy, including the small scale private

initiatives: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/83bc3ecd-b19c-11ed-8912-

01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-292762830 30 1) The National Ignition Facility (NIF) in the US is the largest Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) initiative

globally and in 2021 NIF facility achieved a world first burning plasma state ‘ignition’ in which the plasma is

predominantly self-heated by fusion reactions in the plasma. In December 2022, a new experiment at NIF achieved

“target gain,” producing more energy from nuclear fusion (3.15 MJ) than the amount of laser energy delivered to

the fusion target (2.05 MJ)—a metric for achieving a robustly ignited fusion plasma. Four additional ignition shots

9

United States, China, Korea, Germany, and the United Kingdom – have also developed their

own fusion programmes and increased their financial support to public laboratories and/or

private companies. At least 45 companies around the world are working to commercialise

fusion energy. Some of the recently created private companies – which have been able to attract

a growing amount of private funding – have set extremely ambitious targets to demonstrate

commercial fusion energy production (i.e., in the next decade).

Various parties, including some within the fusion community, have begun to suggest that the

commercialization of fusion energy may be imminent. While this optimism provides

motivation and attracts investment, it can also obscure the scale of the technical and financial

challenges still lying ahead. Unrealistic expectations risk not only disappointment but also

erosion of public and political confidence, which could in turn slow the very progress that

ITER aims to accelerate. While extraordinary efforts have been made to incorporate within

ITER as many reactor-relevant technologies as possible — including superconducting

magnets, actively cooled plasma-facing components, tritium handling, and

remote maintenance systems — its mission remains fundamentally experimental.

ITER’s objective is to explore and master the physics of long-pulse burning plasma operation,

not to close all technological gaps required for a commercial fusion power plant. Several key

technology gaps will remain beyond ITER’s scope and will need to be addressed through

complementary research and development. Cost remains one of the most significant barriers to

fusion’s long-term success. Public and political expectations should remain aligned with

technical and physical reality, avoiding the risks posed by overpromising.

The Draghi report underlines that “Nuclear fusion is a disruptive technology that holds the

potential to revolutionise the energy landscape in the second half of this century. […]. It could

play a pivotal role as a low-carbon, climate-friendly, affordable and safe energy solution

based on an abundant and accessible supply of fuel material. The ITER project […] has

propelled the EU to the forefront of global fusion research, investing billions of euros in the

industry’s supply chain and research. Despite notable progress in global fusion research, its

practical deployment remains several decades away, necessitating further concerted effort

and investment to bring this revolutionary energy source to market”. Therefore, for the

EU, the investment in ITER - and in fusion in general - continues to be fully aligned with its

priorities,31 which are to build aprosperous Europe capable of bolstering its competitiveness

and ensure its transition to a decarbonized economy.

Despite the emergence of public and private fusion initiatives that complement or pursue

alternative paths than ITER, different stakeholders (including companies and laboratories)

consider that ITER is today a unique project capable of addressing all the technological

followed the December experiment. The experiment made in February 2024 produced an estimated 5.2 MJ —

more than doubling the input energy of 2.2 MJ. Fusion records in temperatures and sustained plasmas have also

been set by the KSTAR (Korea) and EAST (China) tokamaks.

2) The JT-60SA tokamak in Japan, an EU-Japan collaboration under the Broader Approach agreement, reached

first plasma late 2023.

3) Last 20 January 2025, China’s Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak (EAST), located in Hefei,

has set a new world record by sustaining steady-state, high-confinement plasma for 1,066 seconds. That's

nearly triple the previous world record of 403 seconds, which was also set by EAST, back in 2023. Chinese

"Artificial Sun" Achieves New Record in a Significant Milestone Toward Fusion Power Generation----Hefei

Institutes of Physical Science, The Chinese Academy of Sciences 31 https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/eu-priorities/european-union-priorities-2024-2029_en

10

challenges of fusion (including tritium breeding and plasma confinement) in an

integrated manner.

ITER thus remains the single most important project currently underway to accelerate fusion

development in the EU.

b) Should European involvement in ITER continue through F4E?

The views of the Members of F4E Governing Board (GB) collected during the preparation of

this review also touched on the suitability of F4E for implementing Euratom’s participation in

ITER. In particular, over 90% considered that F4E delivered good quality components,

equipment, materials, and other resources to the IO. However, the governance Members were

less satisfied with F4E’s capacity to coordinate its activities with IO (around 55% satisfaction).

The Members of the GB identified some factors that impaired the management of the project.32

Among these factors are: the lack of maturity of the design provided by and agreed with the

IO, the overly ambitious baseline for First-of-A-Kind components, and the lack of flexibility

to react to unforeseen circumstances. For them, the numerous F4E internal organisation

changes, as well as the insufficient collaboration with IO, were detrimental to the ITER project.

They do not consider a revision of the mandate of F4E is necessary, but 51% think that

some overlaps exist in the missions of F4E and IO.

For its part, Euratom considers that a better integration between the IO and F4E is an

indispensable improvement measure which has to be achieved for F4E to remain fit for its

purpose, i.e., effective and efficient delivery of Euratom contributions to the ITER project, as

well as other relevant programmes (notably BA and preparations for DEMO) in accordance

with its mandate. Integration between IO and F4E must be achieved in particular on key

upcoming technological projects (such as the Hot Cells). Actions are ongoing to this end, and

their effectiveness will need to be monitored systematically.

c) Can F4E deliveries of technologies and innovative components to ITER

contribute to the EU’s global competitiveness in key fusion technologies for

future fusion power plants?

Despite the significant technological advantages associated with ITER in the EU, China and

the US are moving fast, building on ITER progress and other initiatives, stimulated by an

impressive increase in funding for start-ups and ambitious national programmes. Over the last

decades, the EU share of patents has declined, and China, with its massive investments, has

taken the lead in the race to the patents. China has recently stepped up its effort and could now

“be spending $1.5 bn each year on fusion, almost double what the US government allocated

32 Figures provided in the supporting study available at https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-

/publication/e8d31d19-f590-11ef-b7db-01aa75ed71a1/language-

en?WT.mc_id=Searchresult&WT.ria_c=153343&WT.ria_f=8810&WT.ria_ev=search&WT.URL=https%3A%2

F%2Fenergy.ec.europa.eu%2F; see page 326 – question 6a and 6b - sum of the answers “neutral”, “negative” and

“not at all”.

11

this year for this research”33. China also launched a national consortium in January 2024 to

build a nuclear fusion reactor by 203534.

Figure 2. Shares of nuclear fusion patents35

F4E has already put some efforts into monitoring whether the components delivered generate

patents and support the EU’s global lead in fusion technologies. This helps to assess whether

the EU is strategically benefiting from its investments. As part of its mission36, F4E GB adopted

rules on industrial policy proposed by the F4E Director. This policy should serve the interests

of European enterprises. By managing public procurement procedures, F4E is also building a

network of companies that are likely to collaborate in the development of a commercialised

fusion project. The need to create an efficient industry policy goes beyond its primary mission

to deliver the components to ITER.

There is a growing risk that the benefits of ITER will be eroded by its ever-increasing cost and

delayed implementation. The ongoing efforts by IO and F4E to optimise schedule and costs

through re-baselining, reorganisation, and integration appear to be more important than ever.

In parallel, efforts should be made to provide European high-tech industries and small and

medium-sized enterprises with opportunities to innovate and develop components valuable and

well suited to future commercial fusion reactors.

The EU should also support European enterprises to develop know-how and tackle the

identified technological gaps in the path to achieving commercial fusion. In this respect, the

Commission will consolidate of a strong EU supply chain and support a dynamic fusion start-

up sector. It will encourage industry and research to collaborate to overcome technological

33 Inside China’s race to lead the world in nuclear fusion (nature.com): https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-

024-02759-

x?utm_campaign=nature&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter&mc_cid=fc9d5a2010#Echobox=172485

496 34 https://www.ans.org/news/article-5668/china-launches-fusion-consortium-to-build-artificial-sun/ 35 Note: "European patent offices" include the patent offices of individual Member States plus the European Patent

Organisation, which includes all EU Member and other European countries such as Turkey, and the UK. The

Patent Cooperation Treaty accounted for an average of 10% of patents. Japan and Korea also hold important

shares (typically §-12% each) 36 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02007D0198-20210101 – Annex –

Articles 6 and 9

11% 10%

12%

21%

14%

12%

10% 9%

15%

13%

12%

11%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

2009-2011 2012-2014 2015-2017 2018-2020

S h a re

o v e r

to ta

l p a te

n ts

( %

)

China European patent offices United States

12

bottlenecks, enabling the construction of key enabling facilities for a first-of-a-kind fusion

power plant.

The Commission is preparing a Public-Private Partnership in fusion in the form of a co-

programmed partnership to involve the private sector not anymore as supplier, but as partners.

The Commission will also enhance bottom-up support for the emergence and growth of fusion

start-ups, by increasing Euratom co-funding under the Fusion EIC Challenge.

d) Can the EU participation in ITER through F4E be integrated more deeply in

the wider fusion development?

The fierce global competition and the constantly evolving energy technologies environment

require adjustments in policies and practices to guide the efforts of both the EU institutions and

Member States. The contractor’s support study points to the broad stakeholder consensus that

European public policy intervention in fusion development should move away from a

sequential approach to ITER and other initiatives (i.e., first build ITER, then other initiatives

like DEMO) and that the EU should propose an overall strategy for the fusion sector.

The Draghi Report (2024) echoed this idea, calling for “an overarching EU innovation

strategy for nuclear fusion energy and support the creation of a public-private partnership

to promote its rapid, economically viable commercialisation. The partnership should aim to

create a stable and predictable ecosystem for industrial innovation, leveraging the ITER

project, while ensuring a clear technology development roadmap. The deployment of fusion

energy will require public and private investment to act in synergy.”

The Commission set up at the end of 2023 an expert group to assist in ensuring the coherence

of Euratom activities on ITER and fusion research. This Fusion Expert Group (FEG),

composed of 25 members nominated by EU Member States (Cyprus and Luxembourg not

represented by their own decision) and observers coming from F4E and EUROfusion,

formulated their views in a FEG Opinion Paper.

The Commission is currently developing a comprehensive strategy for further

development of fusion in Europe, taking into account a wide range of inputs, including the

FEG views as well as the results of further consultations of experts and of the public.

It is clear that public policy intervention at the EU level will be necessary beyond

participation in ITER to help the development of fusion in Europe. This public intervention

will be key for the construction of new research and technology infrastructures that will address

remaining technology gaps in support of fusion. Such projects may offer opportunities for

further involvement of F4E in wider fusion development.

The already ongoing construction of a European facility to test and qualify materials well-

suited to fusion is a case in point. Following research projects carried out with EUROfusion,

which demonstrated the relevance of the project, Spain and Croatia invested in IFMIF-

DONES37. Other countries, such as Italy and Japan, recently announced their contributions. In

July 2025, the F4E GB decided on a contribution from Europe through F4E.

The experience gained through F4E is also highly relevant for further consideration of

ways to strengthen and diversify the source of financing of fusion in Europe. While US

companies have already attracted massive investments and other countries (notably China, UK)

have significantly invested in fusion programmes, Europe too needs to develop instruments

37 https://ifmif-dones.es

13

capable of financing innovative projects within the sector of fusion and seek to de-risk them

by combining sources of funding coming from European, as well as national, sources.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation focused on the European participation in the ITER Project through Fusion for

Energy during the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2021-2024.

The European intervention has generally achieved its objectives.

While external factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the inflationary context have had

a serious impact on the project during the period under review, the main source of the

difficulties has been structural: an overly ambitious Baseline 2016 with no contingency,

frequent design changes, underestimation of project risks and complexity.

F4E and the IO did not meet all the objectives over the period of the interim evaluation.

However, both organisations have recently improved the execution rate of the project.

Despite delays, ITER remains central to demonstrating the feasibility of fusion and to meeting

the challenges of key enabling technologies. The project has created positive economic,

industrial, and social impacts.

The macro-economic impact analysis in the assessment covering the period 2018-2024

indicates that compared with a situation where F4E-related spending did not occur and funds

were instead saved, the approximately EUR 5.62 billion (in 2024 prices) spent by F4E is

estimated to have generated about EUR 5.95 billion in additional Gross Value Added and

supported around 39,000 job-years.

F4E has built a unique know-how in Europe in the development of components necessary for

a fusion device. It has contributed to and developed a strong European fusion supply chain.

ITER’s objective is to explore and master the physics of long-pulse burning plasma operation,

not to close all technological gaps required for a commercial fusion power plant. Several key

technology gaps will remain beyond ITER’s scope and will need to be addressed through

complementary research and development. A comprehensive strategy to advance fusion in the

EU is under development. It will build on ITER and proposes measures to close the remaining

gaps.

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 1.10.2026 SWD(2026) 289 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

EVALUATION

Accompanying the document

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE

COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE

COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

Interim Evaluation of the implementation of the Council Decision (Euratom) 2021/281

amending Decision 2007/198/Euratom establishing the European Joint Undertaking for

ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it

{COM(2026) 528 final}

Table of contents

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1

2. WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? ....................................... 5

2.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION AND ITS OBJECTIVES ............................................... 5

2.2 POINT(S) OF COMPARISON. ............................................................................................................ 6

3 HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD? ......................... 7

3.1 PROGRESS WITH RESPECT TO THE 2016 ITER BASELINE ....................................................... 7

3.2 ANALYSIS OF THE DEVIATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE 2016 BASELINE FOR

ITER .................................................................................................................................................... 11

3.2.1 ANALYSIS OF THE DEVIATIONS IN TERMS OF DELAYS ........................................................ 11

3.2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE DEVIATIONS IN TERMS OF COSTS ........................................................... 12

3.3 A LOWER CAPACITY TO ABSORB THE BUDGET DUE TO THE DELAYS OF THE

ITER PROGRAMME ......................................................................................................................... 14

3.3.1 COMMITMENTS ............................................................................................................................... 14

3.3.2 USE OF THE COMMITMENTS ........................................................................................................ 15

3.4 MEASURES TAKEN TO PUT THE ITER PROJECT BACK ON TRACK ..................................... 19

3.5 F4E ACHIEVEMENTS FOR THE OTHER PROGRAMMES (BA, DEMO) ................................... 21

4 EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) ....................................................................... 26

4.1 TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE INTERVENTION SUCCESSFUL AND WHY? .......................... 26

4.2 HOW DID THE EU INTERVENTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE AND TO WHOM? .................... 30

4.3 IS THE INTERVENTION STILL COHERENT WITH EU POLICIES AND RELEVANT? ........... 37

5 WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED? ................................................. 39

ANNEX I: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ........................................................................................... 41

ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED ................................................... 43

ANNEX III. EVALUATION MATRIX (BY CRITERION) ....................................................................... 46

ANNEX IV. OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS [AND, WHERE RELEVANT, TABLE

ON SIMPLIFICATION AND BURDEN REDUCTION] .................................................................. 55

ANNEX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT ............................................. 57

Glossary

Term or acronym Meaning or definition

BA Broader Approach

DA Domestic Agency

DEMO Demonstration fusion reactor

EVEDA Engineering Validation and Engineering Design Activities

F4E Fusion for Energy

GB Governing Board of F4E

IFMIF International Fusion Materials Irradiation Facility

IFERC International Fusion Energy Research Centre

IO ITER Organization

ILO Industrial Liaison Officers

PA Procurement Arrangement

TB Tender Batch

VV Vacuum Vessel

1

1. INTRODUCTION

The ITER project is a unique case of international scientific collaboration between seven

Parties, which are the European Union (represented by Euratom), Russia, United States,

China, Korea, Japan, and India. It aims to “demonstrate the scientific and technological

feasibility of fusion energy for peaceful purposes, an essential feature of which would be

achieving sustained fusion power generation”.

The ITER Agreement was signed in 20061 and has set-up the ITER Organisation (IO) as

an international organisation, which has the overall responsibility for the construction,

operation, exploitation, and de-activation of the ITER facilities, and provide for its

decommissioning. The ITER Agreement binds each Party to provide in-kind

(components necessary for the construction of the ITER device) and in-cash

contributions (financial contribution). Each Party to the Agreement must set-up a

Domestic Agency as an entity for coordinated interaction with IO and provision of

contribution on behalf of the Party. Euratom’s Domestic Agency is the “European Joint

Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy” (Fusion for Energy –

F4E).

Euratom through F4E is responsible for contributing ca 45% of the construction cost of

ITER, of “which 80% is funded from the EU budget and 20% by France as the ITER host

country (the other ITER Members share is around 9% each)”2. The contribution finances

not only cash funding to IO but also in-kind contributions – delivery of buildings and

related site infrastructure and also the delivery of high-tech components such as the

Magnets, the Vacuum Vessel, heating systems, first wall components and diagnostics

(see Figure 1 and Figure 2).

In parallel to the ITER Agreement, Euratom entered into a separate bilateral agreement

with Japan (the “Broader Approach" Agreement (BA)) to further facilitate and coordinate

fusion-related activities with Japan. Several F4E Members contribute also on a voluntary

basis to the BA activities, which consist of three collaborative projects located in Japan:

IFERC (International Fusion Energy Research Centre), JT-60SA, and IFMIF-EVEDA

(International Fusion Materials Irradiation Facility, Engineering Validation and

Engineering Design Activities).

To discharge Euratom's obligations regarding the ITER project and to carry out other

ITER-related activities, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision

2007/198/Euratom establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the

Development of Fusion Energy (F4E)3 in March 2007. F4E's members are Euratom, the

Member States of the European Union and third countries that have associated their

research programmes in fusion to the Euratom research programme4.

The Council Decision (Euratom) 2021/2815 amending the Council Decision 2007/198

requires the Commission to carry out an interim evaluation of the implementation of the

1 Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community) participates as an entity legally distinct from the EU but with the same membership. The other Parties to the ITER Agreement are Russia, United States, China, Korea, Japan, and India 2 COM(2017) 319 final: EU contribution to a reformed ITER project 3 2007/198/Euratom: Council Decision of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it 4 Currently there is none, but discussions are ongoing with Switzerland. 5 Council Decision (Euratom) 2021/281 of 22 February 2021 amending Decision 2007/198/Euratom establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it. (see in particular, Article 5c)

2

Decision once sufficient information about its implementation during the period 2021-

2027 is available, and at the latest by 2024. The intervention assessed is the

implementation of this Decision and how F4E achieves its mission. It aims to assess to

which extent the Euratom participation to ITER programme through F4E brings results to

the EU. The results of the evaluation are used to:

1. inform on the status of the “ITER Programme”.

2. provide elements for the improvement of Euratom’s ITER Programme and the

working of F4E in the period 2025-2027.

The evaluation carried out is in line with the applicable evaluation standards6, which

require an evidenced-based assessment of the relevance and effectiveness, coherence,

efficiency and EU added value of the EU intervention. The contractor’s study, which

contributes to the preparation of the present Staff Working Document, focuses primarily

on the evaluation of the European participation in the ITER Project through Fusion

for Energy during the current MFF and, in particular, for the period 2021-2023. It

has assessed the progress made by the project to date and, especially, compared its

current achievements with the 2016 baseline7, which defines its scope, schedule and

budget. It has assessed the quality and adequacy of the results/outputs in terms of EU

policies, priorities, and interests. It has also assessed, inter alia, the efficiency of F4E’s

governance and the management of its collaboration with the ITER Organization.

Limitations: The assessment of the impact of the new baseline on the Euratom

contribution and its feasibility was beyond the scope of this interim evaluation (review up

to 2023). Indeed, after years of steady progress, serious challenges have contributed to

slow-down the implementation of the project: The Covid-19 pandemic, quality problems

with some key components and difficulties in complying with the regulatory

environment have delayed deliveries and assembly activities.

Methodology: The contractor’s study was based on a review of publicly available

literature and documentation provided by the European Commission, F4E and the IO and

on stakeholder consultations. Annex 1 lists the documents referred to in this evaluation.

Annex 5 provides information on the consultation process.

6 Better Regulation Guidelines (2021) 7 Source: ITER Organisation https://www.iter.org/newsline/-/2588

3

Figure 1. Cross-section of the ITER tokamak, with labels briefly explaining the functions of the main systems

Source: F4E 2022 Highlight report. Copyright: IO

Figure 2. Diagram of the tokamak showing broadly which Parties are responsible for which components of the

machine

Source:

ITER Organisation’s website8

8https://www.iter.org/doc/www/content/com/Lists/list_items/Attachments/661/A1_ITER_FUSION_MACHINEv2.pdf

4

Figure 3. Diagram of the governance structure of the ITER project (Source: F4E)

Figure 4.1. Top level ITER project schedule according to the new proposed baseline (Source IO)

Figure 4.2. Comparison of the 2016 baseline and 2024 baseline (Source: data provided by ITER Organisation)

5

2. WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION?

2.1 Description of the intervention and its objectives

Objectives of the ITER project: In accordance with the ITER Agreement and the

implementing provisions agreed between the ITER Parties, the objective of ITER project

is to construct and operate an experimental fusion reactor to explore and demonstrate the

scientific and technological feasibility of sustainable fusion power generation. The

successful realisation of ITER would determine whether fusion can become a major

sustainable energy source contributing to the EU's strategy for the long-term security in

the supply of energy. Fusion offers the prospect of a potentially abundant source of safe,

clean and CO2 free energy. It is likely to play a major role in the decarbonisation of our

economies.

The construction of ITER, which began in 2009, is technically extremely challenging

because of its scale and the unprecedented nature of the components to be built. For

Europe, the project is seen as an opportunity “to take a leading role at the global level in

science and technology”9. In addition of the scientific dimension, the ITER project has a

strong industrial dimension, since one of the expected results is the creation of a strong

European fusion industry.

The ITER reactor is currently being built in Saint-Paul-lez-Durance in the south of

France. The ultimate goal of ITER is to demonstrate steady-state net power generation

from a self-sustaining nuclear fusion reaction in a magnetically confined plasma of

deuterium and tritium, which would represent a major scientific and technological

breakthrough. The objectives of ITER, as stated on the IO website10 are to pave the way

for the construction of a demonstration power plant (DEMO). This would aim to

demonstrate the commercial viability of fusion by delivering fusion power to the grid.

The roles of the ITER Organisation (IO) and F4E are distinct and complementary:

the IO, an international organisation based in France, has the overall responsibility for the

construction, operation, exploitation, and de-activation of the ITER facilities. While

remaining the nuclear operator, the IO should also promote the use of the ITER facilities

with laboratories or other institutions participating in the fusion energy research and

development programme and promote public understanding and acceptance of fusion

energy.

Fusion for Energy (F4E), which was set up as the Euratom Domestic Agency by a

Council Decision (Council Decision 2007/198/Euratom11) on 27 March 2007 for a

period of 35 years, has its headquarters in Barcelona, Spain. Its tasks are:

1. To provide the contribution of the European Atomic Energy Community

(Euratom) to the ITER Organization for the ITER project, under the terms of the

International ITER Agreement.

2. To provide the contribution of Euratom to Broader Approach (BA) activities with

Japan for the rapid realisation of fusion energy, entailing at present three

collaborative projects located in Japan.

9 COM(2010) 226 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ITER status and possible way forward {SEC(2010) 571} 10 https://www.iter.org/proj/inafewlines#1 11 And further amended by Council Decision 2013/791/Euratom of 13 December 2013 and Council Decision (Euratom) 2015/224 of 10 February 2015.

6

3. To prepare and coordinate a programme of activities in preparation for the

construction of a demonstration fusion reactor (DEMO) and related facilities

including the International Fusion Materials Irradiation Facility (IFMIF).

In order to fulfil its obligations related to ITER, F4E provides the Euratom’s direct

financial contribution (“in-cash”) to the IO’s costs, as well as its “in-kind” contributions,

which take the form of buildings, site infrastructure and components. With regard to

these in-kind contributions, F4E organises procurement procedures with a view to

concluding contracts, primarily with European manufacturers. F4E then oversees the

execution of these contracts, ensuring that work is carried out in accordance with the

agreed scope, schedule and cost, as outlined in the project documentation approved by

the IO. In addition, F4E issues calls for proposals for research and other pre-fabrication

activities, with the aim of concluding grant agreements. These grants primarily support

European research centres and laboratories. Figure 3 provides an illustration of ITER's

governance structure, with a particular focus on the European perspective.

2.2 Point(s) of comparison.

The progress of the implementation of Council Decision (Euratom) 2021/281 are

measured under three units:

1. The credits, which are the units used by ITER or BA. For the ITER project, the

in-kind contributions to IO are organised through Procurement Arrangements

(PAs). Each of them represents specific work to be performed and delivered to

IO. When a PA is developed by IO, the milestones agreed to mark the execution

of the project correspond to a certain release of credits denominated in ITER unit

of account (IUA). A similar system exists for the BA programme, whose unit is

the BAUA.

2. The milestones, which are predefined by IO (IC Milestones) and F4E (Governing

Board milestones) to measure progress of the ITER project, and

3. The budget, which gives indication on the resources made available to F4E to

achieve its mission. This includes the number of staff.

The milestones are still expressed in the 2016 baseline, which is under review since

2021. The implementation of the baseline has been delayed by a number of factors,

including significant disruption to the supply chain during the pandemic and the war in

Ukraine, the need to repair components already installed, and the difficulty in complying

with the regulatory requirements defined by the Nuclear Safety Authority of the host

state. The new baseline is expected to address the issues identified in the current one,

which did not include any kind of contingency and which assumed that all risks could

have been mitigated. The experts committee, which reviewed the baseline before its

endorsement by the ITER Council, acknowledged the lack of a contingency as unusual

for such a large project as ITER. The committee underlined that this absence contributed

to adding uncertainty to its overall management.

Benchmark: ITER is an international cooperation programme. This pioneering initiative

seeks to demonstrate that shared technological solutions may solve scientific challenges.

Given the magnitude of the investments to be made in research and the international

collaboration, ITER has a limited number of points of comparison. In the framework of

this study, ITER has been compared, when relevant, to the CERN, the European

Organisation for Nuclear Research, which is probing the fundamental structure of the

universe. The two institutions pursue equally ambitious research goals in an international

context. The contractor mandated to carry out the study has made, when relevant, a

7

comparison of the practices in term of public procurement, the organisation, and the

management of some transversal processes.

3 HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD?

3.1 Progress with respect to the 2016 ITER Baseline

The ITER project has encountered delays in its progress, as illustrated by the evolution of its

credits in relation to the 2016 baseline. From 2017 to the beginning of 2023, the credits

achieved remained consistently below the 2016 baseline, with the gap widening

progressively from 2020 onwards.

Figure 5. ITER credits compared to 2016 baseline (ITER credits are in kIUA)

F4E achievements of the milestones and deliveries of the in-kind contribution to ITER:

By the end of 2023, the F4E progress in ITER was below expectations in terms of budgetary

expenditure and achievement of key milestones defined by the ITER Council (IC) and

Governing Board (GB). F4E had indeed allocated 65% of the ITER credits outlined in the

2016 baseline, which was 14 percentage points lower than expected at that time. The IC and

GB milestones are underachieved and delayed by 32 months compared to the 2016 baseline,

highlighting a significant deviation from planned contributions, with specific components

like the vacuum vessel and the buildings experiencing major delays. A detailed analysis of

deviations from the plans in terms of costs is provided in section 3.2.

F4E has delivered a significant part of its expected contributions to ITER. Notable

achievements include the delivery of magnets12, the completion of a significant number of

buildings out of 39 to be built (including the Tokamak building that houses the ITER reactor)

and the finalisation of the first sector of the Vacuum Vessel (Sector 5) in October 2024. The

remaining four sectors are scheduled for delivery to ITER before Mid- 2026.

12 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7r7Hyg22zCg

-

200

400

600

800

1 000

1 200

Baseline credit Achieved credit Forecast credit

8

Table 1. F4E schedule performance of European components

Component Brief description of the schedule performance

Magnets All Poloidal Fields and Toroidal Fields Coils have been delivered to IO ahead of their need dates (expressed in 2016

baseline), despite of the complexity of the project.

Vacuum Vessel

The European Vacuum Vessel manufacturing has suffered several setbacks during 2022, with severe cleanliness issues

and an elevated number of defects detected resulting in the need for huge repair efforts and big impacts on the critical

path. In 2023, the European Vacuum Vessel manufacturing has been able to progress, except for Sector 4, for which the

contractor is struggling and has accumulated very significant delays beyond the original assumptions. A significant

improvement of the situation has been observed in 2024 thanks to an efficient reallocation of the tasks between the

contractors, the definition of a test and verifications programme. F4E has been able to deliver the first sector in

September 2024 and should deliver the other sectors by Mid-2026.

Site, buildings and

power

supplies

39 buildings and areas will house the systems necessary for the operation of ITER. Most of the buildings are already

delivered or in a phase of finalisation. A couple of new buildings remain to be built to host components (neutral beam

and hot cell) not yet under preparation or for activities that are necessary after the commissioning of ITER. As the

project is located in Europe, the construction works were mainly undertaken by European Companies. F4E launched 24

contracts for a sum of EUR 3bn.

The Buildings Programme has been affected by the numerous changes introduced to the design, delay in receipt of input

data and the interpretation of nuclear safety requirements and their transcription into technical requirements leading to

increased complexity, and sometimes slow learning curve from contractors. Input data delays and changes have led to an

extended construction phase with resultant high levels of coactivity of works on site and concurrent delays.

In-Vessel

The schedule performance of the in-vessel components has been mainly impacted by the potential change of First Wall

armour material. As these components are not for First Plasma but due for the second assembly phase, some milestones

were postponed because of the delayed activities at the manufacturing site.

Remote handling

The project is behind schedule. Issues arise from commercial as well as from the technical ground, due to concurrent

design of other systems sharing the same space, or because of challenging requirements (like fire loads and seismic

loads). A big part of the delay has been due to long commercial/technical negotiations with the suppliers and new

contract preparation. The sometimes poor supplier performance by providing low quality of deliverables and slow pace

in execution of technical activities, together with prototyping difficulties due to test failures that required re-design and

re-manufacturing, had an impact on schedule performance.

Cryoplant & fuel cycle Some components needed for first plasma have suffered delay due to design issues, negotiations with suppliers and

changes or late availability of input data.

Heating & current

system

The main delays on the delivery of components come from the update of the schedule as a result on manufacturing

lessons learned, delays on the PA signature due to internal and external factors, and delays due to buildings and

interfaces availability and introduction of risks buffers to increase schedule realism.

Diagnostics

The deliveries are still in line with ITER Project need dates for first plasma components and systems (2016 baseline).

For non-first plasma components, the introduction of risk buffers and the schedule review based on the current status and

gates passed, has affected significantly the delivery dates for some the non-first plasma components. However, there is

an ongoing collaboration defining the dates in conjunction with IO.

Source: From F4E Booklets completed by other source of information13

13 In particular: Booklet on status of F4E Programmes for GB60 and Booklet on status of F4E Programmes for GB57

9

Figure 6. State of play of the buildings14

Table 2 below summarises the progress per action of achieved credits in ITER credits called

ITER unit of account (IUA). The credits do not correspond to the actual costs in EUR borne

by F4E for the procurement of that component but to the values of each Procurement

Arrangement (PA) as agreed between IO and its Members.

Table 2. Progress per action in terms of achieved credits in kIUA (period: 2010-2030)

Project Team Unit

Forecasted

total credits to be

achieved between

2010-2030 (kIUA)

Achieved credits as

of April 2024

(kIUA)

Share of

achieved credit

(%)

MAGNETS 185.9 183.5 99%

VACUUM VESSEL 86.3 70.6 82%

IN VESSEL 70.3 4.2 6%

REMOTE HANDLING 39.9 5.5 14%

CRYOPLANT & FUEL CYCLE 42.0 31.6 75%

HEATING & CURRENT DRIVE 95.7 50.2 52%

DIAGNOSTICS 29.6 6.6 22%

SITE, BUILDINGS AND POWER SUPPLIES 518.8 352.9 68%

Note: * according to 2016 baseline

142023 ITER annual activity report: https://www.iter.org/sites/default/files/media/2024-

10/2023_iter_annual_report_compressed_1.pdf

10

Table 3. Progress per action in terms of achieved credits in kIUA (period: 2021-2023)

Project Team Unit

Forecasted total credits

to be achieved during

2021-2023

* (kIUA)

Achieved credits as

of April 2024 (kIUA)

Share of achieved

credit (%)

MAGNETS 46.8 44.8 96%

VACUUM VESSEL 5.5 1.8 32%

IN VESSEL 1.1 1.0 90%

REMOTE HANDLING 11.2 0.8 7%

CRYOPLANT & FUEL CYCLE 12.7 3.5 27%

HEATING & CURRENT DRIVE 20.4 11.9 58%

DIAGNOSTICS 7.5 3.2 43%

SITE, BUILDINGS AND POWER

SUPPLIES 97.7 56.0 57%

Note: * according to 2016 baseline.

As outlined in Table 3, all milestones due up between 2021 and the end of 2023 were

reviewed. F4E successfully delivered several technically complex components of the ITER

tokamak. The table shows that 6 of the 19 IC-GB milestones planned for the 2021-2023

period were achieved within the forecasted timeframe, 3 IC-GB milestones were achieved

with some delay, and 10 IC-GB milestones remain to be achieved.

Table 4. Milestones achieved, delayed and not achieved as compared to plans (2021-2023)

2021 2022 2023

F4E achieved

IC-GB

milestones

Magnets: Delivery of the 7th Toroidal

Field Coil

Buildings: Making the Building B71

North Ready for IO Installation

Cryogenics & Fuel Cycle: Delivery of Torus and

Cryostat Front-End Cryopump Distribution

System and Cryojumpers 5-8 (4 no.) Batch 2 by

EU-DA to Site

In-Vessel: Completion of the qualification phase

prior to start of Blanket First Wall series

production

Diagnostics: Electronics and Software for

Magnetics Delivered to ITER Site

Heating and current drive: Manufacturing of the

1st batch of Diamond Disks for EC Upper

Launcher 1 finished

F4E achieved

IC-GB

milestones with

some delay

Buildings: Construction of the

Cryoplant Compressor Building

Buildings: Construction of the Cryoline

Bridge available for installation of

systems

Remote Handling: Signing the task

order for Manufacturing for the Cask

and Plug Remote Handling System

(CPRHS)

F4E not

achieved IC-GB

milestones

VV: Delivery of Sector 9 by EU-

DA to ITER Site

Magnets: Complete FAT for PA

work scope for 18 TF Coils

Buildings: Medium Voltage distribution

LC1A Ready for Equipment

Buildings: Busbar Bridge available for

installation of systems

Cryogenics & Fuel Cycle: Delivery of First Torus

& Cryostat

Buildings: Construction of Cryoplant Coldbox

Building

Commissioning: Delivery of Cryostat Leak

Detection System to site

Cryogenics & Fuel Cycle: Delivery of Primary

(VV)Leak Detection and Localisation by EU-DA

to ITER Site for 1st Plasma

Remote Handling: Equatorial Port Plug First

Assembly Cask Delivered to ITER Site

Remote Handling: Upper Port Plug First

Assembly Cask Delivered to ITER Site

Source: CSIL-GAC elaboration based on F4E data

11

3.2 Analysis of the deviations with respect to the 2016 Baseline for ITER

3.2.1 Analysis of the deviations in terms of delays

The delays can be attributed to the following factors: i) An overly optimistic 2016 baseline;

ii) The impact of the COVID-19 crisis and its consequences on the supply chain; iii) The

quality of some components and conformity issues with the French Nuclear Safety

Authority; iv) The late delivery of some contractors.

With regard to the unrealistic baseline, it should be noted that the ITER project is currently

experiencing its third revision. Initially, the construction of ITER’, which began in 2009, was

expected to last ten years. However, following the revelation of multiple weaknesses and

shortcomings in 2013, the baseline was deemed unrealistic. One of the key drivers of the

delays and extra costs was already the immaturity of the design, which resulted in frequent

changes of the first-of-a-kind components. The second revision of the project was presented

in 2015 and adopted in 201615 after a review by an independent committee16, which

confirmed that the 2025 First Plasma milestone was the earliest technically feasible date. The

Committee emphasised that the baseline did not include any contingency, assuming that all

risks could be mitigated, which was considered unusual for a project of ITER's size and

complexity and introduced a level of uncertainty to its overall management.

In 2020, the COVID crisis added delays to a situation, where ITER was implemented slower

than expected. Indeed, the assembly of the reactor itself planned originally to begin in 2018

started finally in 202017, when the two major pieces18, which composed it, were finally

delivered. In November 2021, IO internal estimates showed the project, as a whole, was 17

months behind schedule and in June 2022, this number amounted to 35 months of delays.

The COVID-19 pandemic and related supply-chain disorganisation explained most of the

delay in 2020 and 2021. Restrictions on work attendance and travel in most EU Member

States, long shutdowns of factories making ITER components and extension of the shipping

duration for some components expected from Korea19 adversely impacted the deliveries of

the components and the assembly work.

Quality and compliance issues: In addition, in 2022, the IO identified quality issues on two

key components delivered on the site by the Korean Domestic Agency20. It decided to halt

the assembly of the vacuum vessel and to remove the already installed segment to facilitate

repairs21. In parallel of the repairs (+2 years delay), IO worked on the machine’s assembly to

tackle the late arrival of some components and supply chain issues (+ 3 years delay) and

avoid that these extra delays became additive. Finally, in January 2022 a letter from the

French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) postponed the long-awaited green light to proceed

with the tokamak assembly subject to conditions to comply with.

Management of the performance of contractors: F4E had to manage severe delays caused by

its suppliers for the VV and for the buildings. In both cases, F4E decided to transfer a part of

15 Source: ITER Organisation https://www.iter.org/newsline/-/2588 16 ITER Council Review Group (ICRG), “ITER Council Working Group on the Independent Review of the Updated Long-Term

Schedule and Human Resources - Report”, 15 April 2016. The report can be found at http://www.firefusionpower.org/ITER_ICRG_Report_2016.pdf

17 European Parliament (2023). ITER financing by the EU budget - state-of-play. Published in November 2023 18 A massive magnetic coil to wrap around the tokamak (EU/JAP) and a large section of the vacuum vessel (KO) that makes up the tokamak’s walls. 19Press release available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/iter-nuclear-fusion-reactor-hit-by-covid-delay-rising- costs/ 20 F4E (2023). Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2022. First, several thermal shields, designed to keep ITER’s liquid helium refrigerant cold and protect the walls of the machine, corroded and cracked because of the way the welds interacted with an acid used to wash the metal. Secondly, certain components of the vacuum vessel, intended to interlock with extreme precision, were found to lack the required manufacturing accuracy 21 Press release available at: https://www.iter.org/newsline/-/3818 /

12

the original contract from one supplier to one another. In the case of the VV, it had also to

finance the construction of an additional assembly frame to avoid any overlap in the

assembly of the sectors. Concerning the buildings, a significant restructuring of one major

Procurement Arrangement, called TB04, which aimed to deliver “main Mechanical and

Electrical Services for Tokamak Complex and Auxiliary Building”22 was decided.

Significant parts of the TB04 initial contract were transferred to other tender batches and an

important work was done in parallel to clean the huge number of claims received early 2024

following the IO change requests.23 After the change of contractor, good progress in

delivering the auxiliary buildings was already achieved by the end of 2021 and continued

during 2022, in line with the target to get all buildings taken over in 2023.

Over the last three years, F4E's milestone achievement was around 60 - 65% showing a lack

of reliability of its own forecasts, which translates into cumulative delays year after year.

When analysing the root-causes of delays in 2022, the contractor reported that 71% was due

to causes internal to F4E (including supplier performance) while 29% to external causes

(such as IO or international situation). Delays are also explained by the frequent IO's change

requests, which often occur late in the delivery process. These requests impact the due date

of the deliverables and costs, and the technological challenges linked to the project’s first-of-

a-kind nature. They are also linked to the need to manage the claims from suppliers (who

request compensation for the extra demands), the need to address quality issues of the

deliverables (indeed, a significant number of Non-Conformity Reports had to be cleared) and

the need to coordinate between different manufacturing locations to produce a first-of-a-kind

component.

3.2.2 Analysis of the deviations in terms of costs

To monitor projects against their budgets, F4E calculates every month the Estimate at

Completion (EAC) by using three elements: (a) the actual costs already incurred, (b) the

estimate of future costs, (c) the estimate of likely impact of future risks. EAC combines

past actual costs and future estimated costs for the construction, operational and

decommissioning phases of the project (including the likely impact of future risks) for

the completion of F4E’s ITER responsibilities until the end of 2035. The EAC for the

end of deliveries obligation from F4E is currently around EUR 15 bn24. This has

increased by EUR 751 million over the 2020-2023 period.

22 Source June F4E booklet: TB04 = Installation in Tokamak Complex was novated to IO in 2018, whereas design and procurement

remained with EU DA. The TB04 initial contract has been partially transferred to TB11, TB12, Engage and TB21 due to TB04 scope

restructuring following huge claims received early 2021. End : Jun-2024 23 F4E (2023) Booklet on status of F4E Programmes for GB60. 24 F4E source (IRS – End of August 2024).

13

Figure 7. Estimate At Completion (EAC) of ITER in-kind contribution (Sep 2020 vs. Sep 2023)

Source: csil-gac report

The major external factors at the origin of the cost increases were the COVID-19

pandemic and, the inflation in raw material prices. Indeed, the estimated financial impact

of COVID-19 was respectively of EUR 57 million and of EUR 45 million (in 2008

current value) in 2020 and in 2021. During 2021-2022, F4E activities also experienced

significant inflationary effects. From 2020 to 2021, these effects were induced by supply

chain issues following the COVID-19 outbreak, and from February 2022, they became

more pronounced due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The estimated impact of

inflation on the total F4E Estimated At Completion (EAC) amounts to EUR 144 million

per the latest analysis available as of the end of 2022. Additional expenditures pertaining

to raw material increase should materialise in the years 2023-2026 for existing contracts

and new tenders to launch. To mitigate the extra costs caused initially by COVID-19 and

later by inflation, F4E established specific task forces and works to facilitate the

implementation of mitigation measures to be put in place by the contractors.

Another important source of cost increase pertained to the continuous design changes by

the IO and F4E project management put in place. This was particularly true for the

Buildings programme (BIPS), which represented 47% of the total ITER in-kind

contribution (according to 2016 baseline). The 11th annual assessment report prepared by

independent experts identified the lack of maturity of IO’s design as a key factor of the

EAC increase for BIPS. The prolonged pressure on IO to comply with its own timetable

over the period of 2010-2020 has resulted in Procurement Arrangements (PAs) with

immature design requirements that were constantly changed or upgraded during the

contract execution. This had significant time and cost consequences on F4E, which

assumed the responsibility to achieve design maturity for “tender purposes” and

consequently had to deal with numerous claims raised by contractors.

From 2021 to 2023, F4E requested reimbursement from IO for a total of 103 Project

Change Requests (PCR). Some of these requests were accepted, allowing F4E to receive

EUR 109 million from IO. This accounts for around 10% of F4E's expenditure for in-

kind contributions to ITER over the same period (2021-2023). However, these figures

underestimate the actual costs incurred by F4E (for the design changes requested by IO).

In fact, the IO Reserve Fund, created by IO in 2015 to deal with DAs additional cost

overruns arising from design changes, compensates (with many exceptions and

constraints) only the direct costs of Project Change Requests (PCR) approved by IO.

Indirect costs related to design changes, such as prolongation costs, are not eligible for

reimbursement. Furthermore, the management of the PCR and claims mobilise F4E

resources that could be mobilised on other productive tasks.

3277

587

242 225 386 318

785 819

3775

644

320 287 430 357

786 798

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

BUILDINGS,

INFRASTRUCTURES

& POWER SUPPLIES

HEATING &

CURRENT DRIVE

UNIT

REMOTE HANDLING

UNIT

DIAGNOSTICS UNIT VACUUM VESSEL

UNIT

CRYOPLANT & FUEL

CYCLE UNIT

IN VESSEL UNIT MAGNETS UNIT

M il li o n E

U R

September 2020 September 2023+ 498

+ 57

+ 78 + 62 + 44 + 39

+ 1 - 21

14

Moreover, the assessors of the 11th annual assessment report pointed the inefficient BIPS

project management. IO, F4E, the Engineer, two consortiums of engineers25 and architect

engineers26 and the contractors are the parties involved in BIPS. Complex circuits were

put in place to review the design of the project, without following up the issues of the

costs (cost control and estimation). Until October 2023, the BIPS team did not have its

own decision-making authority and budget responsibility. In October 2023, BIPS was

replaced by Building and Site Management. Since then, the decision-making process has

been simplified (shorter circuits, improved communication between F4E and IO) and

objectives further aligned. The change is judged positively by both IO and F4E, but it is

too early to evaluate objectively its benefits.

Finally, the delays of DAs in delivering their components, including those of F4E,

affect the cost overrun of the entire ITER project. Delays contribute to cost increase

by mobilising human resources over longer periods and by generating contract

suspensions or extensions. They can also impact on logistics (For example, due to long-

term onsite storage of delivered components pending assembly).

3.3 A lower capacity to absorb the budget due to the delays of the ITER programme

3.3.1 Commitments

The EU Council conclusions adopted on 7 July 201027 approved EUR 6.6 bn (in 2008

values) for the F4E Joint Undertaking’s contribution to the ITER construction phase of

the project, with completion initially planned for 2020 under the 2010 baseline.

Following the approval of the 2016 baseline, F4E set the new timetable and recalculated

the estimated cost at completion (EAC)28 of the F4E contribution to the project

construction phase until the achievement of the First Plasma milestone in 2025. Thus,

Europe budgeted an additional EUR 5.6 bn for the period 2021-2027.

Over the period 2021-2023, the slower execution of the project has generated significant

underspending resulting in an accumulation of unused appropriations in F4E. The

Governing Board and the Commission have acted to adapt the budget of F4E according

to its needs. Based on the sound financial management principle of the EU resources,

EUR 1 bn out of EUR 5.6 bn of the current MFF have been back to the general budget to

align the commitment profile over the 2024–2027 on the needs of the project known at

this date.

Table 5. Euratom commitments for ITER in the multiannual financial frameworks

2007-2013 2014-2020 2021-2027

European contributions in commitment

appropriations (bnEUR) 3.3 2.9 4.6

Since the start of the ITER programme, Euratom has committed EUR 8.3 bn and paid

EUR 6.8 bn. The F4E revenues are further supplemented by the ITER host country

25 Engage SNC is a joint company formed by four European engineering companies for the Architect Engineer contract with F4E. The Architect Engineer assists F4E during the entire construction process, from the detailed design plans to project completion and sign-off, as regards the ITER buildings, the site infrastructures and power supply distribution. 26 Energhia Consortium is formed by three companies. They provide F4E with support services in the day-to-day management of works related to construction of the ITER buildings, site infrastructure and power supply. 27 Council of the European Union. Draft Council conclusions on ITER status and possible way forward. of 7 July 2010 (Ref.

11902/10). 28 Estimate at Completion (EAC) combines past actual costs and future estimated costs (including the likely impact of future risks) for the completion of F4E’s ITER responsibilities until the end of 2035.

15

(France), the IO contributions to the reserve fund29 and other revenues from other

Member States willing to associate to ITER30 (Switzerland until 2020).

Figure 8. Cumulative sums of commitment appropriations and payment appropriations 2006-2023 (current

value in EUR million)

3.3.2 Use of the commitments

Table 6. Breakdown of F4E expenditure in commitment appropriations over 2021-2023 (EUR million)

2021 2022 2023

Total over

2021-2023

Operational expenditure 910 583 499 1,991

ITER construction 874 524 436 1,835

ITER in kind 572 300 281 1,152

Cash to IO 264 224 156 644

Cash to Japan 39 0 0 39

Technology for ITER, BA, DEMO15 20 37 72

Other operational expenditure 20 38 26 84

Administrative expenditure 61 77 73 211

Activities linked to ITER Organisation 5 24 14 43

Source: Csil-Gac report

The most important part of the commitments received by F4E serves to finance the in-

kind contribution, which amounted to EUR 1.152 bn over 2021-23. Over the same

period, F4E has transferred EUR 644 million of commitment to IO for the in-cash

contribution, too. IO has received a cumulated amount of EUR 2 bn since 2008, to

finance its management, research and development, and the participation in the ITER

fund.

29 Since the establishment of F4E, as of 31 December 2023, F4E has received a total of EUR 179 mn in commitment appropriations and EUR 150 mn in payment appropriations (both in current values) from IO. 30 Since the establishment of F4E, as of 31 December 2023, F4E has received a total of EUR 76 mn in commitment appropriations and payment appropriations (both in current values) from Membership Contributions.

8 345 €

6 770 €

10 438 €

8 528 €

0 €

2 000 €

4 000 €

6 000 €

8 000 €

10 000 €

12 000 €

M il li o n s

EU budget (committment appropriations) EU budget (payment appropriations)

F4E revenues (committment appropriations) F4E revenues (payment appropriations)

16

Figure 9. In-cash contribution and expenditure for in-kind contribution (current value in EUR million)

The IO cash-contribution paid through F4E tended to fluctuate between 2021 and 2023.

As can been seen from the figure below, which shows the annual cash contribution paid

to IO up to 2023, the contributions increased significantly in 2021, when assembly and

installation works started after delivery of in-kind contributions from all the DAs. The in-

cash contribution to the IO was reduced in 2022 and 2023 compared to the previous years

due to the temporary halt of assembly activities (see section 3.2.1) and the need to

allocate resources to the revision of baseline (scope, schedule and cost) that started in

2021.

Figure 10. EU cash contribution to IO (current value in EUR million)

To provide in-kind contributions, F4E uses a combination of contracts and grants with

external parties. Since the creation of F4E, as of March 2024, F4E has signed

procurement procedures with a total current value of EUR 7.7 bn (Figure 9 below).

Potential discrepancies between the value of signed contracts and the amount actually

paid may arise because contract values may change after signature due to amendments,

renegotiations, and other possible adjustments. The money spent has gone to hundreds of

different contractors and many more subcontractors inside (and sometimes outside) the

EU. This has generated growth and employment in the EU economy (see section 4.2).

The two following figures below show respectively the cumulative current value of

0 €

100 €

200 €

300 €

400 €

500 €

600 €

700 €

800 €

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

M il li o n s

Expenditure for ITER in-kind contribution In-cash contribution to IO

- €

500 €

1,000 €

1,500 €

2,000 €

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

M ill

io n s

Yearly Actual Payments Cumulative Actual Payments

17

procurement and grants and the number and cumulative current value of procurement

procedures for the period 2008 – March 2024.

Figure 11. Cumulative current value of procurement and grants (M EUR)

Figure 12. Number and cumulative value of procurement procedures 2008 – March 2024

In terms of grants, F4E issues calls for proposals, mainly for research and other pre-

production activities. These grants are signed mainly with European research centres and

laboratories. Since the creation of F4E, as of March 2024, F4E has signed grants for a

total current value of EUR 114 million. On the other hand, F4E organises public

procurement procedures to conclude the contracts. F4E then supervises the

implementation of these contracts and ensures that the work is carried out in accordance

with the agreed scope, schedule and cost. While F4E is responsible for procurement and

0 €

1,000 €

2,000 €

3,000 €

4,000 €

5,000 €

6,000 €

7,000 €

8,000 €

9,000 €

M il li o n s

Cumulative current value of grants

Cumulative current value of procurement procedures

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

0 €

1 000 €

2 000 €

3 000 €

4 000 €

5 000 €

6 000 €

7 000 €

8 000 €

9 000 €

M il li o n s

Cumulative current value of procurement procedures

Number of procurement procedures

18

contracting, the industry delivers directly to the IO, which performs acceptance31. In

addition to the operational expenditures, administrative expenditures are made up of

Staff expenditure (salaries) and infrastructure and operating expenditure. An increase in

administrative costs has been observed over the 2021-2023 period, mainly due to an

increase in the staff expenditure category in 2022. According to the 2022 F4E final

account report, the three main reasons for this increase are:

- The increase in salaries due to the high indexation of salaries in 2022.

- The increased use of interim staff, mainly due to a higher-than-expected impact of

sickness and maternity leave in 2022.

Figure 13. Staff and infrastructure and operating expenditure over the years (current value in EUR million)

31 European Commission (2018). The European Contribution to Iter: Achievements and Challenges

0 €

10 €

20 €

30 €

40 €

50 €

60 €

70 €

80 €

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

M il li o n s

Staff expenditure Infrastructure and operating expenditure

19

Figure 14. Staff expenditure 2019-2023 (in EUR million)32

Figure 15. Annual number of statutory staff and ESP, 2019 – 2023

32 Other staff related expenditure includes minor expenses such as Expenditure relating to Staff recruitment, Mission expenses, Socio-

medical infrastructure, Training, External Services, Receptions, events and representation, Social welfare, Other Staff related

expenditure.

0 €

10 €

20 €

30 €

40 €

50 €

60 €

70 €

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

M il li o n s

Other Staff related expenditure

External Staff Expenditure

Staff Expenditure In The Establishment Plan

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

External Service Providers (ESPs) Temporary Agents

Contract Agents EU Officials

Seconded National Experts

20

3.4 Measures taken to put the ITER project back on track

At the level of the IO: In November 2021, the ITER Council asked the IO to redefine a

New Baseline and to call for a deep change of its management. Since his entry in

function in September 2022, the new Director General of the ITER Organization worked

on the preparation of a new baseline and undertook a series of reforms to put the project

on track. In particular, the IO has been thoroughly reorganised, and a project matrix

structure has been put in place. In addition, to streamline the decision-making process, a

layer of management was eliminated, and a system of delegation was gradually

introduced33. It has identified ways to repair key components delivered by some

Members of the consortium (Sector of the Vacuum Vessel delivered by Korea) and has

reset its interaction with the French Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (ASN), which

became more positive. In order to address past deficiencies, the IO is reinforcing its

culture of quality management and has adopted new measures to ensure a more positive

dialogue with the ASN. Although some problems remain, a noticeable improvement was

reported by the Chair and other authorities at the last Iter Council34. As recently pointed

out by experts35, IO needs to progress further on the implementation of the propagation

of simplification changes in safety requirements stemming from the newly adopted

phased licensing approach. Otherwise, this may have impacts on the overall project

performance.

At the level of F4E: For one year, F4E underwent a thorough reorganisation to

implement the reforms deemed necessary by the F4E Governing Board after the internal

crisis36. The new Director recruited in May 2023 received the mandate37 to i) ensure a

closer integration between F4E and the IO; ii) create a modern, diverse, and flexible

organisation; iii) speed-up the delivery of the European contribution to the ITER project

according to the timing, budget and quality agreed; iv) work collaboratively and in a

transparent manner with the Governing Board; v) set-up a sound financial resources

management and a better budget planning and reporting; vi) renew engagement with

scientific and industrial stakeholders and F4E’s long-term perspective.

On 1st July 2024, a new matrix organisation chart entered into force in F4E to streamline

its management and reduce the number of its departments and potential overlaps in the

management of the programmes. A new culture in the management of the ITER is

emerging to ensure that the remaining components are delivered in line with the new

baseline proposed by IO. The reorganisation had a major impact on F4E staff. A

preliminary analysis of this change shows that 25 Heads of Units or Departments have

been impacted by the entities either disappearing or being merged; some 30-selection

process would need to be kicked off (3 Departments, 11 Units and 16 Groups); in total

approximatively 430 out of 460 staff have seen a change in their department or unit

allocation. The recruitment of the managers is expected to be finalised by the end of

2024.38

Integration of IO and F4E: The IO has identified the integration of its activities with

the Domestic Agencies as an axis for improving the ITER management culture.

Therefore, the IO and F4E have been exploring ways to better integrate their activities

33 Source: IC-32/10 Director-General's Letter (DG/2023/OUT/0114 (94EGSL) – paragraph “reorganisation”. 34 Draft minutes of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of the ITER Council (IC-35), November 2024 35 Follow-up of the 2022 Management Report performed in 2024 36 EU nuclear fusion project under fire for work stress after employee’s suicide – POLITICO 37 Mission letter for the Director of Fusion for Energy approved by the Governing Board on 9 February 2023 38 See the contractor study (p 78).

21

and exploit potential synergies and complementarities between the two organisations.

Since September 2023, an important effort has been made to identify the most relevant

activities39 and functions40 to be integrated, and to identify teams that should be able to

share schedules, tools (IT, databases, indicators) and information in the medium term and

work on a more efficiently.

The expected outcome of the integration continues to be efficiency gains and potential

savings, as the Integrated Project Teams (IPT), composed of representatives from IO and

F4E, could identify optimisations in the way components are designed and procured.

This will be particularly true for the preparation of the components (diagnostics, heating,

in vessel) that are still to be delivered, including during the next MFF. Besides, the

integration offers new career prospects for F4E staff and the possibility of retaining

qualified personnel, especially after the component on they have worked on has been

delivered. An administrative agreement has been signed between IO and F4E, whose

staff regulations are different and has clarified the conditions of secondment of the staff.

The integration needs now to be implemented: responsibilities should be assigned and a

modus operandi between the teams for the different programmes (Vacuum Vessel, Hot

cells…) needs to be defined. The proposed IPT structure remains complex due to the

challenges of fully integrating functions specific to two different legal entities (such as

contract signing and personnel service orders). This dual organisational setup requires the

IPT to maintain a split chain of command, separating operational and human resources

management functions. The success of the integration between F4E and IO remains

uncertain and is expected to vary from programme to programme.

Previous integration efforts have shown that, integration can deliver value under certain

conditions. These include a strong management impetus, followed by an adequate

delegation to empowered people; close monitoring of progress (including appropriate

adjustments where necessary); translation of integration into processes and development

of common tools; and an achievable project management plan. A full commitment of the

staff is also a prerequisite.

The efforts of both IO and F4E are fully supported by Euratom, which actively

participated in the launch of the exercise during 2023 and 2024. Regular reporting on the

state of implementation is requested during the F4E governing bodies. While not solving

all the problem of the project (immaturity of the design, unrealistic baseline…), the

integration should be instrumental in the coming years to prepare the revision of the costs

of the new baseline and to establish a calendar of deliverables achievable by both parts.

Revision of the baseline: Contrary to the 2016 one, the new baseline foresees the

consolidation of the assembly states of the device before the start of the first phase of test

(Start of Research Operation (SRO)) scheduled for 2034, during which a first plasma will

take place. The 2016 baseline aimed to achieve a First Plasma in 2025 followed by four

stages of assembly and construction, before reaching full plasma in 2033. The revised

objective is to have a more complete machine by 2033 with pre-assembly tests having

already taken place in order to move from the SRO phase to more meaningful scientific

results from the operational phase. The new baseline is intrinsically structured to reduce

operational risks and increase scientific output through phased installations and a multi-

stage commissioning process. It is based on the assumptions that the IO will manage the

safety demonstrations required by the French nuclear safety regulator (ASN). The

39 Candidate projects identified by F4E for the integration Buildings, remote handling, cryoplant and fuel cycle, diagnostics 40 In particular, quality assurance, project control and risk management, engineering…

22

regulatory procedures and requirements can have a significant impact on the critical path

of the project. In full transparency and cooperation with the ASN, the IO has submitted a

new Master Plan in 2024, which includes the planning for various permits and requests

relaxations of some regulatory requirements, if necessary.

The achievement of full magnetic energy is delayed by about 3 years compared to the

previous baseline, from 2033 to 2036 (see Figure 4.1). Deuterium-deuterium fusion

operation is targeted for 2035, about the same time as in the previous baseline. The Start

of Deuterium-Tritium Operating Phase is postponed from 2035 to 2039. Figure 4.2

compares the new baseline with the 2016 baseline.

3.5 F4E achievements for the other programmes (BA, DEMO)

The Broader Approach (BA) activities support the ITER project. The BA consists of

three major projects: i) Satellite Tokamak Programme (JT-60SA), ii) the International

Fusion Materials Irradiation Facility / Engineering Validation and Engineering Design

Activities (IFMIF/EVEDA), which is a prototype facility for fusion materials testing

and iii) the International Fusion Energy Research Centre (IFERC), which is a project

that carries out different sub-projects, including collaborative activities41 in testing and

development of materials for future Tritium breeding blankets of the tokamak.

The resources allocated to the BA programme is rather limited compared to the resources

allocated to ITER construction. Over the period 2021-2023, Euratom through F4E

devoted EUR 72 million for the BA and transferred EUR 39 million to Japan for the

construction of the JT-60 SA in 2020 (i.e. respectively 3.6% and 1.95% of the

operational expenditures mentioned in table 6). The Euratom resources for the

implementation of the BA are provided 90% voluntarily by several participating

European states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and, in the past, Switzerland).

The JT-60 SA project undertaken under the BA programme aims to accelerate the

development of fusion energy by supporting the exploitation of ITER and advancing

research towards DEMO. It consists of designing, constructing, and operating a device

capable of more performance in plasma physics, including ensuring its confinement, its

stability and its duration (performance).

The JT-60SA tokamak42, which was inaugurated in December 2023, is the “largest fusion

device using magnetic confinement, until ITER becomes operational. It sustains plasmas

of up to 200 million °C for up to 100 seconds at a time, offering insight as to how to keep

the plasma hot and stable as well as how to handle the power produced. SA stands for

“super-advanced” since the experiment will have superconducting coils and study

advanced modes of plasma operation.. Europe has contributed to the Toroidal Field (TF)

magnets and all coil current leads, the cryoplant, most of the cryostat, and magnet and

heating power supplies”43.

The first phase of progress was completed by March 2020, with the assembly of the

facility in Naka (Japan). The second phase started with the first operations of the JT-

41 The collaborative activities cover among other testing and development of materials for future breeder blankets, joint work on pre- conceptual DEMO design, and the preparation of hardware and software for the Remote Experimentation Centre in Rokkasho, Japan Until May 2017, the Helios supercomputer performed large-scale simulation activities at IFERC, including ITER operation scenarios and contributions to DEMO design. 42 https://www.jt60sa.org/wp/ 43 F4E website: More Projects - Fusion for Energy (europa.eu)

23

60SA but was interrupted after an incident occurred during the final energisation test of

the equilibrium field coil. Most of the activities in the year 2022 and beginning 2023

were devoted to repair and address the reinforcement of magnets insulation. After the

repair, a tokamak plasma was achieved for the first time in October 2023 (whereas it was

planned originally for 2016) before being inaugurated44 by Commissioner Simson and

Mr Moriyama, the Japanese Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and

Technology (MEXT). Both sides reaffirmed “their long-standing and strong cooperation

in the field of fusion energy”. They “reasserted their willingness to support the technical

upgrades and operation of JT-60SA to produce ground-breaking research results, useful

for ITER and for designing and constructing the fusion reactors of the future”.

Between 2021 and 2023, the expenditure for the BA in commitment and payment

appropriations amounted to EUR 60 million and EUR 36 million, respectively45.

44 The inauguration was covered by tenths of media in Japan and in Europe (e.g. articles in Nikkei, Les Echos, Spiegel, The

Guardian). 45 Single Programming Document 2024-2028.

24

Figure 16. Achieved and planned EU BAUA for signed PAs in the Satellite Tokamak Programme (JT-60SA

project) over the period 2020-2023

The IFMIF/EVEDA project aims at constructing a prototype neutron-producing

accelerator for fusion materials testing. The accelerator in Rokkasho has completed an

operational phase where a maximum duty cycle of 8.75% was reached. Duty cycle is

limited by technical concerns on overheating components, which are being addressed in

co-operation with CERN.

The implementation of the goals46 set out in the 2020 agreement47 between Japan and

Euratom are globally on track. Despite challenges such as travel restrictions due to

COVID-19 pandemic, proactive measures were taken to address technical issues and

ensure continuation of essential activities48. The project is progressing according to plan,

but there are concerns on the availability of qualified staff in Rokkasho.

46 Complement the engineering design of the IFMIF-like fusion neutron source, complement the Lithium Target Facility engineering

validation and continue the commissioning of the LIPAc (phases B+, C and D) 47 IFMIF/EVEDA Project: Achievements and Outlooks beyond 2020 48 Single Programming Document 2024-2028.

25

Figure 17. Achieved and planned EU BAUA for signed PAs in the IFMIF/EVEDA Project

The IFERC project comprises the following sub-projects:

• DEMO Design and R&D Coordination Centre in Rokkasho plays an important

role in co-ordinating scientific and technological activities necessary for DEMO

including design activities and technology R&D on key issues of common

interest. The objective includes the assessment of pre-conceptual design options

for DEMO, reflecting the outcome of R&D activities. The DEMO R&D Building

in Rokkasho has been completed recently as a radioisotope (RI) handling facility,

which consists of an RI experimental room, beryllium handling room,

microstructure analysis room, and material test room.

• Computational Simulation Centre (CSC) provides a state-of-the-art

supercomputer to exploit simulations to analyse experimental data on fusion

plasmas, prepare scenarios for ITER operation, predict the performance of ITER,

and contribute to the DEMO design. The “Helios” supercomputer was installed at

the end of 2011 and at the time was one of the top 10 most powerful computers in

the world. The 5th cycle of simulation projects in JFRS-1 is well underway from

April 2024 thanks to the extension of Japen Host contributions.

• The Remote Experiment Centre (REC), which continuously implements the

collaborations with ITER, IFMIF/EVEDA and with STP projects. This includes

the preliminary JT-60SA remote participation system which enables Remote

Computer Access to JT-60SA Analysis Server in Naka and the remote backup of

JT-60SA data in Rokkasho.

26

Figure 18. Achieved and planned EU BAUA for signed PAs in in the IFERC Project

DEMO: According to the Council Decision 2007/198/Euratom, F4E has to “prepare and

coordinate a programme of activities in preparation for the construction of a

demonstration fusion reactor (DEMO)”. F4E has not so far devoted significant resources

to prepare a programme of activities for DEMO. F4E's involvement in DEMO was

primarily channelled through specific projects and collaborations with EUROfusion, the

‘Co-funded European Partnership on Fusion Research’ with the European Commission,

which manages and funds European fusion research activities on behalf of Euratom. It

was not deemed relevant for F4E to have a more substantial involvement on the design of

the future demonstration reactor, given the delays encountered on ITER implementation

and the insufficient level of maturity of key technologies.

EUROfusion has a significant DEMO programme funded through the Euratom Research

and Training Programme. Part of this programme is used by F4E to discharge its

obligations under the BA agreement as defined in the BA IFERC project.

27

4 EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART)

4.1 To what extent was the intervention successful and why?

The intervention assessed in the evaluation is the implementation of the Council

Decision (Euratom) 2021/281 amending the Council Decision 2007/198 establishing the

European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and

conferring advantages upon it. Therefore, the success of the intervention is measured by

the extent to which F4E has been able to achieve its three strategic objectives (ITER, BA,

DEMO/IFMIF preparation) as defined in this Decision, in accordance with the applicable

baseline. It is also measured by the way in which the intervention has achieved its

objectives in terms of research and development of fusion industry, which will be

discussed in more detail in the section 4.2 on the added value of the EU intervention. As

explained in section 3, the F4E capacity to achieve its three strategic objectives varied

from programme to programme:

- ITER: F4E has already been able to deliver a significant part of its expected

contributions to ITER, but in most cases the pace of progress has not been in line

with the expectations of the 2016 baseline, as in the case of the VV sectors.

- BA: A more positive picture emerged for BA activities, where contributions were

delivered globally in line with the agreed schedule and important achievements

have been obtained, such as the inauguration of the JT-60 SA, the most powerful

tokamak in the world.

- DEMO: F4E has invested limited resources in preparing for the construction of

DEMO, mainly because of the delays in the implementation of ITER and the

immaturity of key technologies (Tritium breeding, materials qualification).

For ITER, the reasons for costs slippage and delays have been analysed in the previous

section. Some factors beyond the control of F4E have had a negative impact on its

capacity to deliver on time and at the planned cost, in particular, an over-optimistic 2016

baseline, the constant changes in the design and its insufficient maturity level, as well as

the impact of the global crisis (COVID 19 and Ukraine war). It remains that F4E should

improve its capacity to prepare its work plan and to deliver from one year to another.

This should avoid under-execution of its budget and work programme and the need to

postpone deliverables. During the September 2024 Bureau, F4E reported an

improvement of its M-SPI49, a schedule performance index that expresses in percentage

terms the progress made by F4E in achieving the milestones planned for a given year.

This M-SPI stood at 94% compared to 57% in 2021 and 67% in 2022.

The capacity of F4E to meet its objectives should be measured against an updated

baseline. The adoption of the new baseline resolves scheduling issues and provide a

more credible roadmap for the IO and the DAs.

As noted above, while it cannot solve the long-standing problems that have hampered

project implementation, better integration of the IO and F4E should improve ITER

management and replicate the best practices established for the BA programme. For the

BA, one of the success factors was related to the fact that F4E and the Japanese

Implementing Agency50 shared design and budget management. For the JT-60SA, a

single ‘Integrated Project Team’ (IPT) coordinates and implements the project as defined

49 [Number of milestones with status = completed] / [Number of milestones with reference date ≤ Current month] 50 National Institutes for Quantum and Radiological Science and Technology (QST) equivalent to 2 Domestic Agencies

28

at an early stage. QST, F4E and all other European stakeholders (EU Voluntary

Contributors (EUVCs) and EUROfusion) work very closely together. IPT provides with

strategies to mitigate delays, to control costs, select low-risk and less time-consuming

technical solutions, and focus on activities with the highest added-value.

On top of the measures that should be taken to ensure that the ITER project as a whole is

managed more efficiently, some potential adjustments have been identified to improve

the oversight of the project at the F4E level. In addition to the reorganisations that have

taken place in IO and F4E over the past years (the success of which stilldepends on

consensus building and adequate implementation after a long period of internal tensions

occurred), F4E should continue its efforts to streamline its staff structure and

reporting system.

Between 2021-2023, the number of resources working for F4E across the four different

sites51 fell slightly from 441 to 426 (-15) but this was offset by the recruitment of

external service providers, who - although not all working on a full-time equivalent –

amount to 498 by the end of 2023 (+141). The increased reliance on external staff was

not a deliberate choice made by F4E, which faces challenges in attracting and retaining

qualified staff, particularly following the suicide case in May 2021, which revealed a

deteriorated working environment linked to high workloads and pressure to deliver52. In

2021, F4E received 10 additional statutory staff out of 34 posts requested under the

2021-27 strategic resource plan. Audits on human resources carried out by the Internal

Audit Service and the Court of Auditors revealed several weaknesses, such as the lack of

a comprehensive human resource strategy and of an established methodology for

assessing its HR needs53. When planning its overall staffing needs (including those for

external staff), F4E does not take into account an adequate assessment of the workload or

of the skills and competences required to carry out the activities for which it is

responsible. F4E, which has recently adopted a human resources strategy, has also taken

a number of measures to ensure that decisions on the use of external staff are always

adequately justified and address the challenges associated with their assimilation and the

retention of competences. The Governing Board regularly monitors the evolution of the

number of ESPs and the situation of staff in general (well-being, recruitments,

absenteeism…). In 2024 it has regularly asked to reduce the dependence on external

staff.

51 Barcelona, Cadarache, Garching within the Institute for Plasma Physics (Germany), and the BA site in Rokkasho (Japan) 52 EU nuclear fusion project under fire for work stress after employee’s suicide – POLITICO 53 European Commission (2024). Final audit on human resources management and ethics in the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion for Energy.

29

Figure 19. Geographical distribution of F4E statutory staff over 2021-2023.

As shown in figure 20 below, the workforce is very diverse (EU officials, temporary

agents, contract agents, externals, interims, seconded national experts and trainees).

According to the experts selected for the 10th F4E Annual Assessment Report, the

unbalance in the workforce has an impact on F4E’s ability to deliver results on time and

on budget, as it encourages competition between categories of staff and group thinking

rather than fostering a cooperative atmosphere.

Figure 20. F4E population and its evolution (over 2019-2023) by staff categories

Furthermore, the current resources may be diverted from productive tasks given the high

number of reporting to prepare54 and audits carried out55. This excessive burden,

54 Reports prepared for the governing bodies and for the Commission (e.g.: Annual Activity Report, Single Programming Document) but also. Just to illustrate, some past reports quoted in the study mentioned that: “the 2021 “Corporate Governance Audit Report”, that focused on the activities of the main governing bodies of F4E between 2007 and 2014/15, found that during the considered 7-8 years,

332 329 322

80 77 74

18 20 17

8 8 11

3 3 2

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

2021 2022 2023

Barcelona Cadarache Garching Japan Other

439 435 441 437 426

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Temporary Agents Contract Agents EU Officials Seconded National Experts Total

30

highlighted in many assessment reports and interviews, is due to requests from different

actors involved in F4E governance and to a lack of coordination between proposed audit

improvements. The recommendations of the 10th annual assessment report, which has

been identified by the European Court of Auditors, include the review of roles and the

consolidation of audit responsibilities in order to minimise redundancy and to filter

external requests more effectively, to improve operational efficiency and to reduce the

administrative burden that currently hampers the performance of F4E. Work is underway

at the F4E level to streamline the reporting.

In terms of performance indicators, the mid-term evaluation report noted that different

KPIs had been introduced to monitor the progress of the project by F4E and IO

(schedule, cost and quality). While these KPIs are adequate and well supported by IT

tools for data handling and reporting, the frequent changes in the methodology

undermine their long-term effectiveness for external monitoring; in particular, it is not

always easy to compare the data provided over the time.

Procurement procedures are at the core of F4E activities. While some efficiency

gains are reported (see table below) and contractor are generally satisfied with the

procurement process56, F4E could explore new ways to improve its management,

especially for the highly innovative components.

Table 7. Efficiency gains in procurement process

Indicator (days) before

2017

end 2020 end 2021 end 2022 end 2023 Efficiency gains

(2023/before 2017)

Time to recruit 152 110 109 113 117 23%

Time to procure 287 189 183 184 185 36%

Time to sign a contract 41 11 14 13 27 34%

Time to prepare technical assessment report

of the supplier deliverables related to a

payment

16 12 8 11 7 56%

Time to pay before 30 days 23 15 13 19 16 30%

Time to perform a contractual deviation 90 36 49 49 46 49%

As highlighted in the previous section, the lack of a stable design at the start of the public

procurement procedures makes it difficult for industrial actors, such as those working on

the vacuum vessel, to estimate costs and organise their work. As F4E tends to prioritise

price over quality and innovation (in order to comply with its Financial Regulation), F4E

faces additional challenges when design adaptations are required, which may highlight

weaknesses in the selected consortium.

For highly specific components, greater flexibility in public procurement is essential.

Many ITER components are not currently available on the market, making their

procurement very challenging. If there is only one qualified supplier worldwide, or none

at all, public procurement is often not appropriate. F4E could benefit from a more

frequent “pre” procurement phase (rather than relying solely on competitive procedures),

involving contractors early in the process to discuss the draft terms of reference before

the actual procurement starts, especially when the design is not yet mature: consultations

with contractors could help identify the main challenges and better align the procurement

process with the technical feasibility, potentially reducing overall costs. Currently, 95%

3754 documents were presented and 5583 conclusions for action were taken. In terms of hours, it was estimated that approximately 380 hours per AMC member and 1800 hours per GB member were devoted each year to F4E reports.” 55 According to the contractor of the study, “a recent overview of only the ECA, IAS and IAC recommendations for improvement actions in 2015 till 2021 shows a total portfolio of 2084 actions to take (about 300 per year during the last seven years).” 56 In the contractors survey, the contractors expressed positive assessments ranging from 91% for the procurement e-submission tool to 57% for managing compensations in cases of deviations from technical specifications.

31

of F4E bids are open to competition, and F4E does not engage with companies and

academics during the pre-procurement phase to discuss draft terms of reference. An even

more transformative approach to procurement could be a form of alliance contracting,

which has been mentioned by some stakeholders and discussed with F4E. Alliance

contracting is highly developed in the United Kingdom. Project teams between

contractors and owners of the contract make decisions about what is best for the project

within a joint governance framework, and the risks of the project are shared equally to

promote a ‘no blame’ culture57. With regard to integrated working methods, one

participant mentioned that a stakeholder had previously suggested the creation of a joint

engineering platform between the F4E engineering team and the IO team to work on a

specific topic. Although this idea was considered to offer significant benefits, it could not

be implemented due to legal constraints in the procurement processes.

F4E has specific actions to increase the participation of SMEs in the public procurement.

Medium-sized companies are typically the beneficiaries of F4E procurement activities.

Large companies do not prioritise ITER because of the uncertainties about the scale of

future fusion-related activities. However, smaller SMEs have been less involved so far

for technical reasons, which F4E has tried to address following the recommendations of

the Industrial Policy working group. Measures have been taken or need to be taken to

reduce financial barriers to entry for SMEs, to further improve the acceptance of

financial guarantees (beyond bank guarantees), to improve price review clauses, while

reducing unnecessary complexity and administrative requirements. One of the main

challenges for these companies remains the lack of similar contracts from the public or

private sector and the risk that the knowledge/know-how gained through ITER will

disappear.

4.2 How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom?

According to all the stakeholders interviewed in the framework of the surveys carried out

by the contractor, the EU intervention has been crucial for ITER. Due to its high costs

and its complexity, the project requires resources that cannot be provided by a single

Member State, especially at a time of constrained public finances. The project requires

significant technical expertise as well as highly skilled manufacturers. An intervention at

EU level is seen as much more efficient than what could be achieved with the

uncoordinated contributions from individual Member States. It avoids duplication of

effort and pools resources, skills and competences, knowledge by awarding contracts to

the best contractors or grants to the best laboratories. To this end, the EU’s participation

in ITER must be pursued, alongside with other initiatives supported by some Member

States. Indeed, some Member States (DE and IT58) are pursuing work on fusion

independently through national funds for fusion research, which sometimes complement,

but can also challenge, the programmes managed or coordinated at EU-level by Euratom.

These national programmes allow countries to tailor their research priorities and

strategies, to address specific challenges or to explore novel fusion concepts. This is the

case with Germany’s fusion research programme: In 2023, the German government has

decided to invest more than one billion euros in fusion research to create a German

57 Shaw, Edward (2021). Alliance contracting in the UK infrastructure industry: An Australian perspective. https://www.dlapiper.com/en/insights/publications/2021/03/alliance-contracting-in-the-uk-infrastructure-industry 58 The Italian national advanced energy agency, ENEA is leading a consortium composed of Italian research institutions, the energy company ENI, government and regional partners and international stakeholders to conceive the Divertor Tokamak Test (DTT) project. The consortium established in 2019 has raised nearly EUR 500 mn to construct the facility. The facility is based in Frascati (Rome) and aims to conduct scaled experiments to explore and test the physics and technology of divertor concepts for the exhaust of the plasma thermal power which could be used in a fusion power plant, testing different technologies for the building of such device.

32

collaborative "fusion ecosystem with industry". This financial support is primarily

intended to support ongoing activities at national institutes (Max Planck Institute, the

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, and the Research Centre Jülich) until 2028. The

German fusion strategy aims to diversify investments to further develop new

technological approaches (in particular, to support laser fusion, while ITER is focused on

magnetic confinement).

The direct beneficiaries of ITER include all the private companies that have won

contracts and developed specific knowledge and skills that they can eventually be

exported, as wells as the laboratories which have received support and have been able to

develop their research programmes. In the longer-term perspective, citizens could also

benefit from having an abundant source of clean energy capable of decarbonising the EU

economy if ITER demonstrates the feasibility of the fusion and if the technology to

produce electricity is developed. This would be a huge competitive advantage for Europe

to be able to produce its own electricity.

Since its creation, F4E has awarded a total of EUR 7.7 bn in public contracts and EUR

114 million in grants (see figures 7 and 8). This expenditure has led to significant

learning benefits, improving the capabilities of European companies. According to a

study on the impact of the ITER activities carried out in 2018, ITER has been able to

create a significant number of jobs in the EU over the period 2008-2017, mainly in

construction, industry, non-business services and business services. In the same key

sectors, a cumulative total of EUR 4.8 bn in additional Gross Value Added (GVA) was

generated between 2008 and 2017, compared to a scenario with no spending. A precise

figure for the period 2020-2023 is not available but a study has been launched by F4E to

assess the economic and social impact of ITER over this period.

Figure 20. Dashboard impact indicators for Gross Value Added (GVA) and employment – gross impacts

(compared to no alternative spending) only59

Other studies, such as the LGI and IHS Market study (2020) 60, highlight the spill-over

effects of ITER: For example, the development of superconducting electromagnets by

ASG superconductors for ITER has significantly advanced technologies applicable

beyond fusion, including medical diagnostics, semiconductors, electronics, and defence.

In the context of the mid-term evaluation, respondents confirmed that the F4E contracts

59 Study on the impact of the ITER activities in the EU - Trinomics 60 Follow up study on the economic benefits of ITER and BA projects to EU industry - Publications Office of the EU (europa.eu)

33

had significantly enhanced their technical and organisational expertise. Working on ITER

has also contributed to scientific innovation, the development of new technologies and, to

a lesser extent, patenting. In the period 2020-2024, some European enterprises that have

developed an expertise through their participation in ITER have been able to conquer

new markets such as one of the suppliers of the vacuum vessel, which won a contract

with the most advanced fusion start-up in the US, the Commonwealth Fusion Systems61.

39 concrete applications,62 describing some successful capitalisations of the activities

carried out either in the nuclear field or in other sectors (hydrogen, tire industry, mobile

machinery, etc.) and resulting from the participation of the European companies in ITER

have been listed by F4E and EUROfusion. The aim of this list is to promote the portfolio

of technologies developed by F4E by making them it widely available and commercially

viable. Although it is difficult to estimate the exact economic impact of these examples,

it is expected that the scientific and economic benefits will be more important in the

future.

Most of the companies that responded to the survey launched by the contractors

confirmed the positive impact of their participation in F4E-managed procurement on

their know-how and skills. This participation has even helped them to retain staff (Figure

21.1), gain in credibility or establish new international collaborations (Figure 21.2) but

has not been as conclusive in terms of profitability and economic benefits (Figure 21.3).

This point deserves attention and F4E should adapt the conditions under which it

operates. Procurements should continue to attract EU suppliers who need to maintain an

appetite for fusion.

61 Commonwealth Fusion Systems reaches tech milestone (axios.com) 62 https://fusion-technology-transfer.europa.eu/fusion-technology-portfolio/

34

Figure 21.1- Question from contractor survey - LEARNING BENEFITS. To what extent do you agree with the

following statements? Thanks to the engagement with F4E, my organisation was able to… (respondents=53;

organisations=45)

35

Figure 21.2- Q12. OPPORTUNITIES. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Thanks to

the engagement with F4E, my organisation was able to… (respondents=53; organisations=45)

Figure 21.3- Q11. ECONOMIC BENEFITS. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Thanks to the engagement with F4E, my organisation was able to… (respondents=47; organisations=40)

To ensure that ITER continues to bring benefits to the EU, it is necessary to ensure

the development of an effective supply chain and an efficient management of

technology development. This will be done not only by improving access to and

exploitation of intellectual property, but also through technology transfer and the

technology development programme.

The EU supply chain: Thanks to the ITER project, an EU industrial fusion ecosystem

has gradually emerged. F4E has been able to develop an extensive knowledge of the

actors in the EU fusion supply chain by mapping its contractors, when preparing its

procurement procedures. As the new F4E Director has placed the development and

consolidation of a European fusion supply chain at the heart of the revised industrial

policy, F4E should continue its efforts to map all relevant actors and their respective

36

capabilities and encourage the development of clusters, as this is the case in other sectors

such as the aerospace and the microelectronics

It is noteworthy that the EU ecosystem has only recently started to structure itself: three

dedicated European associations were created in June 2024, aiming to play a role similar

to that of the Fusion Industry Association (US), which remains the only global

association to date, representing members from different countries (including European

start-ups) and providing information on the sector (fundings, challenges…). The

European associations differ in their objectives and nature: The European Fusion

Business Association (EFBA), made up of representatives of the F4E Member States, the

Industrial Liaison Officers, 63 - who raise awareness of funding schemes and ways to get

involved in the ITER project - has called for an open meeting with all interested

companies to discuss the role and representation of the European industry in the future

European fusion framework. The association is industry-led and works in

close collaboration with all stakeholders in the fusion landscape. The European Fusion

Association (EFA)64 founded by leading companies aims to accelerate the

industrialisation of fusion energy by moving from the laboratory to track. Finally, Pro-

Fusion65 is the central body representing German industry in the field of commercial

fusion energy and will address challenges of shaping public opinion, engaging political

stakeholders and adapting regulatory frameworks.

To further complete the European supply chain landscape, it would be desirable to

identify or to make emerged one or more stakeholder(s), who would act as an integrator

of the whole supply chain, capable of coordinating the construction and operation of a

future tokamak and/or reactor. According to many stakeholders involved in the

contractor’s study (e.g. F4E, survey, focus group), it is key to identify an industrial

partner in the short term for DEMO, the prototype fusion nuclear power plant project and

for the construction of fusion reactors in Europe in the long term.

The development of a supply chain is intrinsically linked to knowledge sharing,

which raises the issue of the reciprocity principle with non-EU parties. F4E is

currently the gateway to access knowledge generated by EU companies within the ITER

project. Without being able to guarantee that the access will be granted, F4E provides a

link between the owners of Intellectual Property (IP) and the entities that may request

access to it. As with the other DAs, F4E contractors are in most cases IP owners but they

grant F4E certain rights over the technology (to use, to authorise the use, etc.). So far,

F4E only has access to IP from its own contracts (and not from IO and other DA

contracts). The ITER agreement's Intellectual Property framework requires reciprocal-

access to IP by all parties, but the DAs decided to assign IP ownership to their

contractors. This has led to the under-reporting of IP generated in relation to ITER: the

IO intellectual property database, which was intended to centralise background

declarations, generated IP declarations, publications, and licences by all DAs, has not

functioned as originally defined.

The development of a supply chain also depends on the technology transfer, which is

necessary to secure the socio-economic benefits of the project. The Technology Transfer

Programme implemented by F4E seeks to lay the foundations for a structured and

63 https://fusionforenergy.europa.eu/get-involved/ 64 Alsymex (France), ASG (Italy), Assystem (France), Bruker EAS (Germany), Demaco (Netherlands), Gauss Fusion (Europe), IDOM (Spain), Simic (Italy), Subra (Denmark), Thales (France), Trumpf (Germany). https://www.assystem.com/en/news/establishment-of-a-european-fusion-association/ 65 https://www.bilfinger.com/en/news/press-releases/details/german-fusion-industry-positions-itself-for-fusion-pro-fusion- association-founded/ The founding board members are Heike Freund (Marvel Fusion), Markus Kind (Rolf Kind), Ulli Kraft (FILO), Ulf Thiele (Thiele Techn. & Mgmt.), Hannes Vogel (Proxima Fusion) and Wolfgang Walter (Bilfinger).

37

sustainable innovation ecosystem by promoting the creation of new businesses based on

the commercial exploitation of fusion breakthroughs in new markets. The cross-

fertilisation between fusion and non-fusion environments will thus be translated into

innovative products and/or manufacturing processes. For the period 2020-2023, the

cooperation with EUROfusion is based on the will of both Parties to share information

and support each other. However, both the F4E’s and EUROfusion’s Technology

Transfer66 Programmes have been managed independently, although with the same

objectives. The alignment of technology transfer activities between the two parties

should continue until the end of the next MFF and beyond.

While this information shows that F4E has undertaken a strong action to support

technology transfer and the creation of new products, services and spin-offs based on the

contracts and grants funded, the economic impact of these actions is difficult to assess in

the context of this evaluation due to the lack of data on economic indicators (e.g.

turnover generated).

International competition is characterised by the race for patents and funding:

Supporting research and its early collaboration with industry is important to continue the

competition with other international countries (mainly the US and China). The aim is to

keep the promise of demonstrating the feasibility of fusion in the perspective of

potentially producing an abundant source of clean energy capable of decarbonising the

EU economy. Despite the significant technological advantages associated with ITER in

the EU, China and the US are moving ahead faster, building on ITER progress and other

initiatives, stimulated by an impressive increase in funding for the start-ups and

ambitious national programmes. According to the Fusion Industry Association, the fusion

industry (consisting mainly of US companies) has attracted more than $7.1 billion in

investment by mid-202467 (mainly private) and a growing number of private companies

declared that they think the first fusion plant will deliver electricity to the grid before

2035. Over the last decades, the EU share of patents has declined and China, with its

massive investments, has taken the lead in the race for patents. The fact that the EU has

funded ITER components that typically do not generate patents (such as the buildings)

explains to some extent why the EU has lost ground to these competitors. It remains to be

seen how the next components to be delivered can generate more patents and

technologies and whether the EU is still strategically positioned in its investments. It

appears that the EU no longer has a clear technological lead in fusion. In addition, China

has recently stepped up its efforts and could now “be spending $1.5 bn each year on

fusion, almost double what the US government allocated this year for this research”68.

China also launched a national consortium in January 2024 to build a nuclear fusion

reactor by 203569. This programme raises questions about the expected articulation with

ITER and the cooperation with other partners such as the EU.

Figure 22. Nuclear fusion patents’ shares70

66 http://techtransfer.euro-fusion.eu/ 67 https://www.fusionindustryassociation.org/fia-launches-2024-global-fusion-industry-report/ 68Inside China’s race to lead the world in nuclear fusion (nature.com): https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-02759- x?utm_campaign=nature&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter&mc_cid=fc9d5a2010#Echobox=172485496 69 https://www.ans.org/news/article-5668/china-launches-fusion-consortium-to-build-artificial-sun/ 70 Note: "European patent offices" include the patent offices of individual Member States plus the European Patent Organisation, which includes all EU Member and other European countries such as Turkey, and the UK. The Patent Cooperation Treaty accounted for an average of 10% of patents. Japan and Korea also hold important shares (typically §-12% each)

38

Source: CSIL-GAC elaboration based on OECD PATSTAT data. Data corresponds to the offices granting the patents.

The contractor's study confirms the need to maintain the skills acquired in the design,

development and construction of the ITER project in the EU by ensuring a competitive

and sustainable European industrial participation in the future fusion market. To achieve

this, it is essential to maintain the commitment and interest of both industrial and

academic players in the fusion sector, to sustain their activities and to support the

capitalisation of knowledge. Indeed, it seems particularly difficult for companies to cope

with periods of inactivity between contracts and to maintain their knowledge of the

fusion sector if their resources are not rapidly mobilised. In addition, the way in which

procurement contracts are structured affects the attractiveness of the fusion sector, as

economic actors may consider exiting the fusion sector in order to reallocate resources to

more growth-oriented technology sectors, especially in a context characterised by

renewed investment in the fission sector (which is a more mature technology than

fission). The absence of a dedicated fusion education programme was also identified as a

major risk to the long-term development of the sector. Dedicated education and training

programmes should be established to continue to attract the next generation and sustain

the fusion value chain. A well-prepared workforce (including in the industrial sector:

welding...) is essential to deal effectively with the various aspects of fusion work.

In conclusion, there appears to be a growing risk that the benefits of ITER will be eroded

by its ever-increasing costs and delayed implementation. The ongoing efforts of the IO

and F4E to optimise costs through re-baselining, reorganisation and integration appear to

be more important than ever. In parallel, efforts should be made to provide European

high-tech industries and small and medium-sized enterprises with a valuable opportunity

to innovate and develop "spin-off" products for exploitation outside fusion, and to ensure

continued EU leadership in the project.

4.3 Is the intervention still coherent with EU policies and relevant?

ITER remains fully aligned and coherent with the long-term objectives of the

Commission, in particular the objective to “become the first climate-neutral continent by

becoming a modern, resource-efficient economy”. Given its multi-dimensional ambition,

ITER actively supports the achievement of five Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 7,

11% 10%

12%

21%

14%

12%

10% 9%

15%

13%

12%

11%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

2009-2011 2012-2014 2015-2017 2018-2020

S h a re

o v e r

to ta

l p a te

n ts

( %

)

China European patent offices United States

39

SDG8, SDG9, SDG 13, SDG 17)71: First, ITER is a key project for developing fusion

energy, which has the potential to provide a virtually limitless source of clean energy. It

contributes to “ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for

all” (SDG7). Thanks to the number of qualified jobs it creates, it supports“the

development of a skilled workforce and promotes sustained, inclusive and sustainable

economic growth” (SDG8). Falling under the category of Research and innovation, ITER

helps to “Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable

industrialisation and foster innovation” (SDG 9). As ITER contributes to a clean energy

transition while boosting jobs and growth in energy and climate, it participates to “Take

urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts” (SDG 13). For this MFF, the

Commission has considered that 100% of the ITER-related expenditure contributes to the

climate effort of the EU budget. ITER contributes indirectly to the implementation of the

Net Zero Industry Act, which aims to enhance European manufacturing capacity for net-

zero technologies and their key components, addressing barriers to scaling up production

in Europe. Finally, ITER is an example of a global partnership involving seven

international partners (Euratom, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United

States) representing more than half of the world’s population. It contributes to

“Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for

Sustainable Development” (SDG 17).

On the relevance of EU intervention: The Fusion Foresight Study carried out by DG

Energy72 has mapped the most prominent fusion initiatives in the world73 and drawn up

scenarios for future fusion development. In all scenarios, the ITER experiment remains

central to further fusion research and initiatives, as it is the only project capable of

addressing all technological challenges of fusion in a sustainable way. The new private

initiatives expect to demonstrate the possibility of achieving some, but not all, of the

conditions. This is the fundamental difference between them and ITER and t explains

why the international partners remain committed to sharing the effort to design and build

this unique machine. The mid-term evaluation report confirms the interest in and

relevance of ITER.

However, ITER seems to be increasingly challenged: leading public fusion initiatives

have recently reported significant breakthroughs74 in fusion. Some countries (US, KO,

China, DE, UK) have developed their own fusion programmes and increased their

financial support to public laboratories and/or private companies. Some of the recently

created private companies – which have attracted a growing number of private funds -

have set ambitious goals to demonstrate rapidly that fusion is a possible commercial

energy source. The changed environment necessitates adjustments in policies and

practices to guide the efforts of both EU institutions and Member States. There is a

consensus, captured in particular in the interviews and events organised by the

Commission in 2024, that the approach should move away from considering ITER and

other initiatives in a sequential way (i.e. ITER first, then other initiatives) and that the EU

should propose an overall strategy for the fusion sector. This point of view is also echoed

in the Draghi Report (2024), which states the need to “develop an overarching EU

71 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/performance-and-reporting/programme-performance-statements/iter- performance_en#contribution-to-horizontal-priorities 72 Foresight study on the worldwide developments in advancing fusion energy, including the small scale private initiatives - Publications Office of the EU (europa.eu) 73 Including the collaboration between the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Commonwealth Fusion Systems start-up, and other initiatives in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. 74 Foresight study on the worldwide developments in advancing fusion energy, including the small scale private initiatives:https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/83bc3ecd-b19c-11ed-8912-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format- PDF/source-292762830

40

innovation strategy for nuclear fusion energy and support the creation of a public-private

partnership to promote its rapid, economically viable commercialisation. The partnership

should aim to create a stable and predictable ecosystem for industrial innovation,

leveraging the ITER project, while ensuring a clear technology development roadmap.

The deployment of fusion energy will require public and private investment to act in

synergy”. Such strategy is in preparation.

The strategy is prepared on the basis of the conclusions of the ‘Fusion Expert Group’

(FEG), created late 2023, and which was established to support the Commission in

ensuring coherence of the Euratom activities for ITER and fusion research. Composed of

25 Members nominated by EU Member States (Cyprus and Luxembourg not

represented), and observers coming from F4E and EUROfusion, the FEG is chaired by

the Commission.

5 WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED?

The mid-term evaluation, conducted in line with the principles of better regulation,

focused on the European contribution to ITER for the period 2020-2023. It has confirmed

that the ITER project remains an important part of the EU's energy and innovation

policies and can play a decisive role in decarbonising the energy landscape after 2050.

Despite delays and the emergence of new initiatives, ITER is central to demonstrating the

feasibility of fusion and to meeting the challenges of key enabling technologies (tritium

breeding, qualification of materials...) that still need to be developed. The project has

already had a positive economic, industrial and social impact and benefits from a positive

image among citizens who are aware of it (see Annex 1).

While external factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the inflationary context have

had a serious impact on the project during the period under review, the main source of

difficulties has been structural: An overly ambitious 2016 schedule with no contingency,

frequent design changes, underestimation of project risks, unnecessarily complex

technical requirements, as well as poor quality control of components that led to a

temporary halt in assembly, explain a significant part of the delays and cost overruns. As

far as F4E is concerned, some improvements are needed in the management of large

industrial contracts and in the cooperation with IOs. The current baseline review should

provide an opportunity to put the programme on a sounder footing and ensure that past

mistakes are not repeated.

Several measures to improve operational efficiency were identified, such as streamline

the reporting to limit administrative burden, and streamline F4E’s staff structure. For

highly specific components, greater flexibility in procurement is also essential. Many

ITER components are not currently available on the market, making their procurement

very challenging, especially using standard public procurements.

Although it was not possible to assess the impact of the new baseline on F4E activities

(and for the next Multi-annual Financial Framework) in the context of the mid-term

review, the measures taken by IO and F4E to get the project back on track, in particular

the integration and reorganisation of IO and F4E, should be pursued to ensure that they

bear fruit. Without expecting to solve all ITER's problems, integration could help to limit

cost overruns by identifying optimisations in the design and scheduling of components.

However, the operational integration of staff belonging to different legal entities remains

completely unusual for a mega-project such as ITER. Although a secondment agreement

has been signed between the IO and F4E to allow the transfer of staff between the

41

organisations, the fact that the teams are working on two sites with different statutes may

contribute to hampering integration in the long term.

It has to be underlined that F4E has a multi-faceted role that other DAs have not: in

particular, it has the responsibility to provide a contribution to Broader Approach

activities with Japan and to other programmes like DONES which will contribute to the

qualification of the materials to be used for ITER. All these involvements multiply the

fronts under which F4E operates. One could say that this could lead to a dispersion of

resources. It has also allowed F4E to demonstrate its ability to work under different

organisational configurations and to contribute to the diversification of its knowledge.

For example, for BA, F4E developed solutions in collaboration with the Japanese

company in charge of the programme. This collaboration has led to a major technological

achievement with the inauguration of the world's most powerful tokamak in December

2023 (with some delays compared to the baseline).

Through its involvement in various projects, F4E has built a unique know-how in Europe

in the development of components necessary for a fusion device. It has contributed to and

developed a European supply chain. This competence should be better exploited in the

pursuit of fusion as a viable future energy source. With IO, F4E should also stimulate its

efforts in terms of technology transfer. The issue of technology transfer is essential for

the development of the fusion sector in Europe, which has clearly asked the European

Commission to develop a strategy that reflects the conclusions of the Draghi report on

competitiveness.

For the future, Europe should seek to build components within the ITER project that are

much more strategic to the development of fusion than those that have been built so far.

This could help Europe to make the most of its contribution to ITER (45% of the cost). In

order to stay in the race for patents and research and development, Europe should also

invest amounts equivalent to those of its main competitors (China and the USA).

As ITER is facing delays, it is important that Europe diversifies its strategy by offering

development opportunities to all actors capable of developing relevant technologies and

know-how. In order to further complete the European supply chain landscape, it would

be desirable to see the rising of one or more realities acting as an integrator of the whole

supply chain, capable of coordinating the construction and operation of a future tokamak

and/or reactor, as well as promoting the progress of a prototype fusion power plant. A

regulatory framework would enhance the attractiveness of fusion in Europe. The

European Commission is therefore working on the preparation of a well-coordinated

strategy.

42

ANNEX I: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION

− Lead DG: DG Energy (ENER)

− Exceptions to the Better Regulation guidelines: None

− Organisation and timing:

This evaluation has been steered by DG Energy since December 2023 under the scrutiny of an inter-service steering group (ISSG) consisting of

representatives of SG, BUDG, GROW, JRC RTD, and the SJ. In 2024, ISSG meetings took place on 13 March (inception report), 14 June (interim

report), and 17 September (Draft final report). The ISG was consulted on the draft report from August to end of September and on the SWD and the

report to the European Parliament

− Evidence used and sources of information:

The Contractor has based its conclusion on information coming from difference sources of documents and tools. These tools are complementary and

allowed to collect, process and analyse qualitative and quantitative data for addressing the evaluation questions. The Commission has also launched in

parallel a Call for Evidence whose results have been integrated to the contractor’s study.

43

Figure 23. Tasks and activities by task

Data collection: Four main sources of information and data have been used for this report:

Documentary review (including data provided by F4E)

Semi-structured interviews with four different groups of stakeholders (EC, F4E staff, IO staff and other external stakeholders)

Two surveys

Two online focus groups

One call for evidence launched in parallel by the Commission.

The evidence from all these sources have been triangulated to generate findings conveyed into this report. During this triangulation phase, the team has

also considered insights collected from two events organised respectively by DG RTD and DG ENER and attended by the evaluation team: the High-

Level Roundtable on Fusion Innovation held on March 14 and the EU blueprint for fusion energy held on April 23.

Desk research:

Desk research is a central method to collect information for the purposes of evaluation. The desk research involved the systematic assessment and

organisation of information pre-existing to the contractor’s study.

A wide range of documents of different types were consulted; policy and legal documents, documents internal to F4E and ITER operations, reports,

academic literature, and data and documents not available to the public supplied by IO and F4E.

The consultation process (interviews, surveys, focus groups, call for evidence) is described in Annex V.

44

ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED

The contractor’s study presents the results of the implementation of European participation in ITER and Broader Approach through F4E in line with the

requirements of Article 5b of Decision of the Council of the EU establishing F4E. The study has been carried out in accordance with the principles of

Better Regulation. The results of the analysis are structured around six evaluation criteria: Relevance, Effectiveness, EU Added Value, Efficiency,

Acceptability and Coherence.

Annex 1 details the methodology of the evaluation supporting the study. Annex 3 presents the related evaluation matrix. The methodology defined during

the kick-off meeting with the contractor has been respected. The contractor has applied standard practices in terms of triangulation of the information

collected from many sources. This has allowed to corroborate the findings.

It remains that the assessment to be performed in the framework of this study was challenging, given the unique nature of ITER. ITER is a scientific

experiment linked to an international agreement. This adds complexity to the implementation of the expectations initially defined. While it is customary

to assess the effects produced by the intervention against a baseline in an evaluation, it appears that in the present case, the 2016 baseline taken to assess

the achievements of F4E over the period 2020-2023 appeared as obsolete and overly ambitious. The achievements of ITER project need to be assessed

over a very long duration (several decades). Besides, even when one considers only its ITER-related activities, F4E is only one cog in the large, complex

machine that is the ITER project. It is therefore difficult to evaluate F4E's performance using ITER's progress as a metric, because the project's progress

depends on many organisations of which F4E is only one. F4E's BA-related activities are simpler to analyse as there are only two Parties (Euratom and

Japan), but it must be kept in mind that the results seen in the construction and operation of the facilities are not solely under the control of F4E or the

EU.

The study could not cover the assessment of the impact of the new baseline for IO and F4E. Indeed, the new baseline was unveiled by IO in June 2024

and the works of the contractors were finalised late July. Additional investigations on the technical feasibility of the baseline and the reliability of the

costs are on-going. These works will help Euratom to forge its opinion on the baseline proposed by ITER Organisation and may lead Euratom to ask

further amendments of the baseline prior its endorsement at the ITER Council.

Regarding the results of the Call for Evidence, there was an important bias in the respondents (see Annex V). 45 out of the 51 respondents were German

citizens and expressed a strong scepticism on the ITER project (security/economic issues, technical and physical challenges) calling for its

discontinuation. These opinions are not considered as representative of the public opinion, which has been deeply analysed in a cross-national survey

conducted by Oltra et al. in 2019 on a sample of 19970 citizens. As larger, this survey has been used to state in this report that ITER remains acceptable

for the public opinion. Indeed, this survey indicates that a majority of the surveyed public was favourable to nuclear fusion technology, with some

45

heterogeneity between countries. Overall, 36% of respondents considered fusion energy as “important” or “very important”, and 40% as “somewhat

important”, with the highest levels of support for fusion energy in Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Finland (around 80%), and the lowest levels of

support in Austria and Belgium (54%). The study also found that support for public investments in the nuclear fusion research programme was also

relatively high, with 52% of respondents supporting public investments on fusion in their own country and 61% supporting public investments at the EU

level. Support for investments at the national level ranged from 33% in Austria to 68% in Romania. Support for investments in fusion at the EU level

ranged from 38% in Austria to 77% in Bulgaria.

Figure 25. Acceptance of fusion energy (left) and Support for fusion energy research (right) in %, total sample, n=19970)

Source: Oltra, C., Prades, A., Jones, C., Delicado, A., Schmidt, L, Turcanu, C. (2019). Informed Public Attitudes towards Fusion Energy in Europe. EUROFUSION Report, Germany.

Regarding the support to investments in ITER specifically, Oltra et al. (2019) show that the majority of respondents was neutral to positive about the

topic. Around 40% of respondents reported a neutral position about investments in ITER, whilst 34% considered themselves somewhat in favour of

investments in ITER and 12% totally in favour. Support to investments in ITER ranged from 31% in Belgium to 66% in Bulgaria. Results on the support

to ITER are in line with attitudes towards fusion in general.

46

Figure 26. Support investments in ITER (in %, total sample, n=19970)

Finally, the ITER Agreement mentions that as the Host Party, Euratom may not withdraw from the project. This renders some areas of evaluation, such as

the value of continued EU involvement, rather hypothetical. However, the answers to these questions are still valuable as they justify and support other

areas of evaluation.

An important verification effort of the quality of the analytical results presented in the evaluation has been undertaken. The study has been extensively

reviewed by Euratom, F4E and the representatives of the ISSG. Discussions took place between the contractors and the reviewers in case a statement

raised questions. This has led from time to time to corrections on the factual data or wording to be reflect facts more accurately. The work has been done

in a very collaborative manner between the different parties involved without impairing the independence of the contractor, who kept its right to accept or

not the modifications suggested.

Strongly oppose

Somewhat oppose

Neutral

Somewhat favor

Strongly favor

47

ANNEX III. EVALUATION MATRIX (BY CRITERION)

EFFECTIVENESS

Sub-questions Indicators / Descriptors Judgement criteria Methodological tools

EQ 1. To what extent have the objectives of the European participation to ITER as stated in Article (2) of F4E's Statutes been achieved so far?

EQ 1.1 To what extent has F4E delivered its

contribution to ITER organisation in

accordance with ITER agreement?

▪Objectives of European participation to ITER as stated in

Article 2 of F4E's Statutes

▪Activities achieved in relation to what is stated in Article

3 (1) of F4E's Statutes

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ assessment of progress

made in relation to the objectives ad activities stated in

the Statutes

▪Activities are achieved according to (yearly)

targets set in the work programmes

▪The majority of independent

bodies/stakeholders assess progress positively

▪Desk research (Statutes, F4E Annual Activity reports, work

programmes)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of the EC, IO,

F4E and EUROfusion)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB and other F4E bodies

EQ 1.2 To what extent has F4E contributed to

the implementation of broader approach

activities with

Japan for the rapid realisation of fusion energy?

▪Objectives of European participation to ITER as stated in

Article 2 of F4E's Statutes

▪Activities achieved in relation to what is stated in Article

3 (2) of F4E's Statutes

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ assessment of progress

made in relation to the objectives ad activities stated in

the Statutes

▪Activities are achieved according to (yearly)

targets set in the work programmes

▪The majority of independent

bodies/stakeholders assess progress positively

▪Desk research (Statutes, F4E Annual Activity reports, work

programmes)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of the EC, IO,

F4E and EUROfusion)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB and other F4E bodies

EQ 1.2 To what extent has F4E contributed to

the programme of activities in preparation for

the construction of a demonstration fusion

reactor and related facilities?

▪Objectives of European participation to ITER as stated in

Article 2 of F4E's Statutes

▪Activities achieved in relation to what is stated in Article

3 (3) of F4E's Statutes

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ assessment of progress

made in relation to the objectives ad activities stated in

the Statutes

▪Activities are achieved according to (yearly)

targets set in the work programmes

▪The majority of independent

bodies/stakeholders assess progress positively

▪Desk research (Statutes, F4E Annual Activity reports, work

programmes)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of the EC, IO,

F4E and EUROfusion)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB and other F4E bodies

EQ 2. To what extent the intended milestones of the baseline and other targets foreseen have been met?

EQ 2.1 To what extent the IC and Governing

Board milestones set in the F4E’s Single

Programming Documents (SPDs) have been

achieved?

▪Number of achieved milestones as stated in the SPDs, by

type

o ITER Council (IC) milestones

o Governing Board (GB) milestones

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ assessment of progress

made in relation to the milestones stated in the SPDs

▪Milestones are achieved according to (yearly)

targets set in the single programming

documents

▪Key performance indicators are achieved as

stated in the F4E dashboard

▪The majority of independent

bodies/stakeholders assess progress positively

▪Desk research (SPDs, work programmes, F4E dashboard, F4E

Annual Activity reports)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of F4E)

▪Statistical Analysis

EQ 2.2 To what extent additional technical

milestones set in the F4E’s Single

Programming Documents have been achieved?

▪Number of achieved milestones as stated in the SPDs by

actions

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ assessment of progress

made in relation to the milestones stated in the SPDs

▪Milestones are achieved according to (yearly)

targets set in the single programming

documents

▪Key performance indicators are achieved as

stated in the F4E dashboard

▪The majority of independent

bodies/stakeholders assess progress positively

▪Desk research (SPDs, work programmes, F4E dashboard, F4E

Annual Activity reports)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of F4E)

▪Statistical Analysis

EQ 3. What were the main causes of the deviations observed in term of costs, delays, and quality for the delivery of some key components of ITER (e.g.: Buildings, Vacuum Vessels, Magnets or Test Blanket Modules)?

48

EQ 3.1 What were the main causes of

deviations in terms of costs? ▪Planned costs versus actual costs and reasons for

deviation

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ opinion of causes for

deviation

▪The actual costs are consistent with the initial

estimates or deviations were justified

▪Issues that caused cost overrun are solved and

will not occur anymore because of their nature

▪Issues that caused cost overrun are not solved

but some mitigations actions are ongoing/still

possible

▪Issues that caused cost overrun are not

solved/solved but they can occur again in the

future

▪Desk research (Budget and its amendments, F4E Annual

financial accounts, Work Programmes, Annual Activity

reports, Project plans, report by the Commission's Internal

Audit Service, European Court of Auditors observations)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of F4E)

▪Statistical Analysis (deviation from target)

EQ 3.2 What were the main causes of

deviations in terms of time plan? ▪Project schedule (planned vs actual)

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ opinion of causes for

deviation

▪The actual schedule is consistent with the initial

one or deviations were justified

▪Issues that caused delays are solved and will

not occur anymore because of their nature

▪Issues that caused delays are not solved but

some mitigations actions are ongoing/still

possible

▪Issues that caused delays are not solved/solved

but they can occur again in the future

▪Desk research (Work Programmes, F4E Annual Activity

reports, Project plans, report by the Commission's Internal

Audit Service, European Court of Auditors observations)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of F4E)

▪Statistical Analysis (deviation from target)

EQ 3.3 What were the main causes of

deviations in terms of quality? ▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ opinion of causes for

deviation

▪Deviations in terms of quality were justified

▪Issues that caused quality for the delivery of

some key components are solved and will not

occur anymore because of their nature

▪Issues that caused quality for the delivery of

some key components are not solved but some

mitigations actions are ongoing/still possible

▪Issues that caused quality for the delivery of

some key components are not solved/solved but

they can occur again in the future

▪Desk research (Work Programmes, Annual Activity reports,

Project plans, report by the Commission's Internal Audit

Service, European Court of Auditors observations)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of F4E)

EQ 4. How could the planning and scheduling prepared by the IO be improved to ensure a better implementation by the Domestic Agencies (and notably by F4E)?

EQ 4.1 How could the planning and scheduling

prepared by the IO be improved to ensure a

better implementation by the Domestic

Agencies (and notably by F4E)?

▪Main challenges associated to the planning and

scheduling prepared by the IO and link to the deviations

(EQ 3)

▪Description of possible measures/strategy to improve

planning and scheduling activities as from similar

complex projects

▪Independent bodies/ stakeholders suggestions on how to

improve planning and scheduling activities

▪Evidence of decision-making processes (planning and

schedule procedures) adopted by a similar complex

organisation

▪The planning and scheduling activities are

adequate to ensure a better implementation by

the Domestic Agencies (and notably by F4E)

▪Desk research (ITER Organisation Annual reports)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EC DGs, IO

and F4E)

▪Benchmark analysis with a similar complex organisation

EQ 5. Is the performance, monitoring and reporting framework put in place by F4E and the IO relevant and effective for managing European participation in the project?

EQ 5.1 To what extent is the performance,

monitoring and reporting framework relevant

and effective for managing European

participation in the project?

▪Extent to which KPIs are available when needed

▪Extent to which KPIs are used to steer the European

participation to the project

▪Extent to which the Earned Value Management and

▪Integrated Reporting System provides timely

results which are easily accessible

▪Key Performance Indicators reflect effectively

how key objectives are being attained

▪Desk research (Integrated Reporting System, Integrated

Management System, EVM Dashboard, F4E Annual Activity

Reports)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EC DGs, IO

49

Estimated Cost at Completion indicators are useful

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ assessment of

transparency and update of the performance, monitoring

and reporting framework

▪Earned Value Management provides relevant

and effective information for managing the EU

participation in the project

and F4E)

EQ 5.2 How could this framework be improved

to ensure a better achievement of the goals of

the ITER project (costs, schedule, quality)?

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ suggestions on how the

performance, monitoring and reporting framework could

be improved

▪Measures adopted by a similar complex organisation to

guarantee that activities adhere to specified timelines,

plans, and standards

▪The framework is found relevant and effective

for this purpose.

▪The framework is designed in a similar manner

as compared to other complex projects

▪Desk research (F4E Annual Activity Reports)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EC DGs, IO

and F4E)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB and other F4E bodies

▪Benchmark analysis with a similar complex organisation

EQ 6. How should the development of the new project baseline contribute to ensuring that F4E is able to achieve its mission?

EQ 6.1 How should the development of the new

project baseline (scope, cost and schedule)

contribute to ensuring that F4E is able to

achieve its mission?

▪Expected effects of a new project baseline

▪Observed effects of the project baseline adopted in 2016

on the basis of Staged Approach

▪The new project baseline is found to have a

positive effect on the achievement of F4E’

mission.

▪Desk Research (Commission communications, ICRG report

2016, mid-term progress report 2019, press release)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EC DGs, IO

and F4E)

EFFICIENCY AND PROPORTIONALITY

Sub-questions Indicators / Descriptors Judgement criteria Methodological tools

EQ 7. How efficiently the European contribution to ITER through F4E (in kind and in cash) has been managed so far?

EQ 7.1 To what extent the European in cash

contribution to ITER has been managed

efficiently through F4E?

▪Planned vs actual in cash contribution vis a vis planned vs

actual milestones

▪Description of procedures (e.g. decision processes,

procurements, coordination, etc.) in place to manage EU

in cash contribution

▪Qualitative assessment (perception) of stakeholders

regarding the efficient use of EU contribution, in terms of

timely delivery and distribution amongst project’s

priorities

▪Evidence of how in cash contribution are managed by a

similar complex organisation

▪The implemented procedures lead to the

timely and on budget provision of in-cash

contribution

▪The implemented procedures lead in case

of deviation to an efficient allocation

based on effective needs

▪Desk Research (F4E annual financial statement and budget, annual

activity reports)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of the EC DGs, other

EU institutions, F4E)

▪Statistical Analysis

▪Benchmark analysis with a similar complex organisation

EQ 7.2 To what extent the European in-kind

contribution to ITER has been efficiently

managed through F4E?

▪Planned vs actual in-kind contribution vis a vis planned

vs actual milestones

▪Description of procedures (e.g. decision processes,

procurements, coordination, etc.) in place to manage EU

in-kind contribution

▪Qualitative assessment (perception) of stakeholders

regarding the efficient use of in-kind EU contribution

▪Evidence of how in kind contribution are managed by a

similar complex organisation

▪The implemented procedures lead to the

timely and on budget provision of in-kind

contribution

▪The implemented procedures lead in case

of deviation to an efficient allocation

based on effective needs

▪Desk Research (F4E annual financial statement and budget, annual

activity reports)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of the EC DGs, other

EU institutions, F4E)

▪Focus group

▪Statistical Analysis

▪Benchmark analysis with a similar complex organisation

EQ 7.3 Which factors have influenced the

efficient management of the EU contribution? ▪Investigate both on internal (e.g. change in the

organisation, responsibilities, etc.) and external (e.g.

change in legislation, safety regulations, technical

requirements, standards and specifications etc) factors

▪The organisational changes have

positively affected the management of EU

contribution

▪No external factors have negatively

affected the management of the EU

contribution

▪Desk Research (F4E Annual Activity Reports, mid-term progress

report 2019, press release)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of the EC DGs, other

EU institutions, F4E)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB and other F4E bodies

50

EQ 7.4 How can the financial management of

F4E and its decision-making process been

improved?

▪Qualitative assessment of any inefficiencies/obstacles

faced in the financial management and decision making

process

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ opinion regarding how

the financial management can be improved

▪Evidence of decision-making processes (planning and

schedule procedures as well as financial structure)

adopted by a similar complex organisation

▪The implemented procedures are the most

effective way to manage resources

▪Desk research (F4E Annual Activity Reports, mid-term progress

report 2019)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of the EC DGs, F4E)

▪Benchmark analysis with a similar complex organisation

EQ 7.5 Is the mechanism of procurements and

grants efficiently implemented considering the

ITER objectives?

▪Description of the use of grants until today (number,

volume and geographical distribution)

▪Review of procurement and grant processes and

procedures

▪Evidence of procurement procedures adopted by similar

complex organisations (e.g. CERN, ESO)

▪Evidence of collaborations with industries and research

organisations fostered by a similar complex organisation

▪The grants mechanism is sufficiently and

appropriately used

▪Desk research

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of the EC DGs, F4E)

▪Focus group

▪Statistical Analysis

▪Targeted consultation with ITER contractors

▪Benchmark analysis with a similar complex organisation

EQ 8. How efficiently does F4E use the European contribution to ITER to deliver its results?

EQ 8.1 Can a cost-benefit ratio be assessed or

estimated? ▪Quantitative assessment of resources (financial and in-

kind) deployed to ITER

▪Quantitative and qualitative assessment of the benefits

(e.g. scientific benefits, technological benefits, human

resource benefits, outreach benefits). A monetisation of

benefits will be attempted for at least a set of benefits

▪The benefits are found to exceed the costs

▪The costs are lower than alternative means

of attaining the same benefits

▪The costs are found to be proportionate to

the benefits

▪Desk Research (F4E annual financial statement and budget, annual

activity reports)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EUROfusion,

public authorities, associations, NGOs)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies and ITER

contractors

▪Statistical Analysis

▪Cost-Benefit Analysis

EQ 9. Are the resources (human resources, budget, place of work) entrusted to F4E adequate for achieving its objectives

EQ 9.1 To what extent are the resources

entrusted to F4E adequate to achieve its

objectives?

▪Resources allocated to F4E in terms of number of people,

budget, facilities and their effective allocation (action and

related objectives).

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ opinion regarding the

adequacy of the resources allocated to F4E for the

achievement of its objective

▪The resources allocated to F4E are

adequate to achieve its objectives

▪Desk Research (F4E annual financial statement and budget, annual

activity reports)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of the EC DGs, other

institutions, F4E)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB and other F4E bodies

▪Statistical analysis

EQ 9.2 How could the performance in the use of

the resources been improved? ▪Description of possible measures/strategy to improve the

use of resources as from similar complex projects

▪Independent bodies/ stakeholders suggestions on how the

use of resources could be improved

▪Measures adopted by a similar complex organisation to

manage resources (externa versus internal) and ensure

they are properly used

▪The use of resources is effectively

managed

▪Interviews with stakeholders Interviews with stakeholders

(representatives of EC DGs, other institutions, F4E)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB and other F4E bodies

▪Benchmark analysis with a similar complex organisation

EQ 10. To what extent does the integration strategy between the F4E and the IO under development support a better implementation of the ITER programme and the resources made available?

EQ 10.1 Is the allocation of responsibilities

between F4E and the IO adequate in the whole

lifecycle of the components delivery (e.g.:

design, procurement, manufacturing, installation

and assembly)?

▪Description of responsibilities entrusted to F4E, IO and

domestic agencies

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ opinion regarding the

adequacy of the allocation of responsibilities between IO

▪The allocation of responsibilities is

adequate to ensure a proper

implementation of the ITER programme

and an efficient use of resources

▪Desk research (ITER agreement, Council Decision

2007/198/Euratom)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of IO and F4E)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB and other F4E bodies

51

and F4E

EQ 10.2 How could the collaboration between

F4E and the IO be improved to ensure a more

cost-effective implementation of the

Programme?

▪Evidence from EQ 11.1

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ opinion regarding how

this collaboration can be improved to ensure a more cost-

effective implementation of the Programme

▪Evidence of measures adopted by a similar complex

organisations (e.g. CERN, ESO) to foster internal

collaboration and coordination (amongst bodies

responsible for different tasks within the organisation)

▪There is room for improving the

collaboration between F4E and the IO ▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of IO and F4E)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E governing board

▪Benchmark analysis with a similar complex organisation

EQ 10.3 To what extent does the integration

strategy being developed between F4E and the

IO enable improved collaboration to ensure a

more cost-effective implementation of the

Program?

▪Evidence from EQ 10.2

▪Independent bodies/stakeholders’ opinion regarding the

integration strategy underdevelopment

▪The integration strategy should improve

the collaboration between F4E and the IO ▪Desk research (integration strategy)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of IO and F4E)

RELEVANCE

Sub-questions Indicators / Descriptors Judgement criteria Methodological tools

EQ 11. To what extent do the original objectives of F4E and the ITER project still correspond to the needs and policies of the EU?

EQ 11.1 To what extent do the (original)

objectives mentioned in F4E's Statutes (still)

correspond to the needs and policies of the EU?

▪Objectives of ITER mentioned in F4E’s statutes

▪Main current needs and policies (in the area of energy in

the EU, as well as other relevant areas)

▪Number of stakeholders agreeing that the objectives are

relevant to the needs and policies of the EU

▪The objectives of F4E match the identified

current needs and policies of the EU

A majority of stakeholders agrees that the objectives are

relevant to the needs and policies of the EU

▪Desk research (F4E’s statutes)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EC DGs and other

institutions)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and ITER

contractors

EQ 11.2 To what extent are the objectives of

ITER relevant to the needs of EU and its

policies?

▪Objectives of ITER (other than those mentioned in

F4E’s statutes)

▪Main current needs and policies (in the area of energy in

the EU, as well as other relevant areas)

▪Number of stakeholders agreeing that the objectives are

relevant to the needs and policies of the EU

▪The objectives of ITER match the identified

current needs and policies of the EU

▪A majority of stakeholders agrees that the

objectives are relevant to the needs and

policies of the EU

▪Desk research (F4E’s statutes, Council Decision 2007/198 and its

amendments until Council Decision (Euratom) 2021/281, EU

legislation and policies on energy, environment, climate, innovation)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EC DGs and other

institutions)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and ITER

contractors

EQ 12. Does the European participation in the ITER project guarantee an adequate industrial, technological and scientific return to maintain European leadership and competitiveness in nuclear fusion?

EQ 12.1 To what extent the European

participation in the ITER project guarantee an

adequate industrial, technological and scientific

return to maintain European leadership and

competitiveness in nuclear fusion? (linked to

EQ19)

▪Evolution of European fusion ecosystem (number of

research organisation, companies, clusters)

▪Evolution of the number of publications, patents, major

conferences related to nuclear fusion

▪Assessment of the impact of ITER on the technology

leadership and ecosystem development (through

contracts, grants, in-kind contribution, Education and

training)

▪Assessment of whether the European contribution

ensure that measures are adopted to guarantee an

adequate industrial, technological and scientific return

to maintain European leadership and competitiveness in

▪ITER support the technology leadership of

European Research organisation and

companies

▪Measures are taken to ensure an adequate

industrial, technological and scientific return

to maintain European leadership and

competitiveness in nuclear fusion

▪Desk research (commission communication and other policy

documents)

▪Statistical Analysis

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EC DGs and other

institutions)

▪Thematic focus groups

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and ITER

contractors

52

nuclear fusion

EQ 13. To what extent does the Euratom’s participation in the ITER project continue to be relevant?

EQ 13.1 To what extent does the Euratom’s

participation in the ITER project continue to be

relevant?

▪Assessment of whether the European contribution is

still deemed to be relevant and for what

The outputs/results of the European contribution to ITER

are found to match current technological and scientific

advances

▪Desk research (commission communication and other policy

documents)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EC DGs and other

institutions)

▪Focus group

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and ITER

contractors

COHERENCE

Sub-questions Indicators / Descriptors Judgement criteria Methodological tools

EQ 14. To what extent is the European contribution to and participation in the ITER project coherent with other Commission policies (energy, innovation, climate, environment)?

EQ 14.1 To what extent is the European

contribution to and participation in the ITER

project coherent with other Commission policies

(energy, innovation, climate, environment)?

▪Assessing the extent to which overlaps, gaps, contradictions

or discrepancies exist with other Commission initiatives

▪Mapping of Commission’s initiatives

a) contributing initiatives such as the Roadmap to Fusion

Electricity, EUROfusion, Euratom Research and Training

Programme, Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan,

Strategic Transport Research and Innovation Agenda

(STRIA), REPowerUE and National energy and climate

plans (NECPs)

b) initiatives with a potentially contradictable focus such us

support of renewable energies and energy efficiency,

decentralisation of power sources

▪Absence of evidence of

overlaps, gaps,

contradictions or

discrepancies with other

Commission initiatives

▪Policy and legal documents that are the basis for the studied Commission

initiatives

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EC DGs and other institutions)

EQ 15. To what extent do the actors involved in fusion and in the ITER project (Commission, F4E, Eurofusion, Member States and the IO) act to avoid duplication of efforts?

EQ 15.1 To what extent do the actors involved

in fusion and in the ITER project (Commission,

F4E, Eurofusion, Member States and the IO) act

to avoid duplication of efforts?

▪Mapping of the key actors involved in fusion and in the

ITER project and their type of action / responsibilities

▪Assessing the extent to which ITER project overlaps or

duplicate efforts with other actors involved in the fusion area

▪Qualitative assessment of the measures put in place to ensure

communication and synergies amongst the actors involved

▪Absence of duplication of

efforts amongst the actors

involved

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives EC DGs, IO, F4E, EUROfusion)

▪Targeted stakeholder consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and ITER

contractors

EQ 16 What is the scope for collaboration between the IO/F4E and the fusion initiatives recently launched (private and public) in the EU Member States?

EQ 16.1 What is the scope for collaboration

between the IO/F4E and the fusion initiatives

recently launched (private and public) in the EU

Member States?

▪Mapping of the fusion initiatives recently launched (private

and public) in the EU Member States

▪Number of stakeholders recognising that there is scope for

collaboration between IO/F4E and other national initiatives.

▪A majority of stakeholders

recognises that there is

scope for collaboration

between IO/F4E and other

national initiatives.

▪Desk Research (e.g Eurofusion website and newsletters, previous studies e.g.,

European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, Foresight study on the

worldwide developments in advancing fusion energy, including the small scale

private initiatives)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives EC DGs, IO, F4E, EUROfusion,

associations)

▪Focus group

▪Targeted stakeholder consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and ITER

contractors

EU ADDED VALUE

53

Sub-questions Indicators / Descriptors Judgement criteria Methodological tools

EQ 17. What is the additional value of the EU’s intervention (Euratom participation in the ITER project) compared to what could have been achieved by Members States at national level?

EQ 17.1 What is the additional value of the

EU’s intervention (Euratom participation in the

ITER project) compared to what could have

been achieved by Members States at national

level?

▪Number of stakeholders recognising the EU added value

of the Euratom participation in ITER in terms of higher

achievements compared to a scenario in which each MS is

a single party

▪Number of stakeholders recognising the EU added value

of the Euratom participation in ITER in terms of lower

cost and complexity compared to a scenario in which each

MS is a single party

▪Oher sources of additional value that has resulted from the

EU intervention

▪A majority of stakeholders recognise the EU

added value of the Euratom participation in

ITER in terms of higher achievements

▪A majority of stakeholders in the IO recognise

the EU added value of the Euratom participation

in ITER in terms of lower complexity

▪Other sources of added value are identified

▪Desk Research (mid-term progress report 2019)

▪Mapping of national initiatives (if any)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EC DGs, other

institutions, EUROfusion, public authorities, associations,

NGOs)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and

ITER contractors

EQ 18. What would be the most likely consequences of reducing, deferring, or stopping the existing level of EU participation?

EQ 18.1 What would be the most likely

consequences of reducing, deferring, or stopping

the existing level of EU participation?

▪Stakeholders’ opinion on the main consequences of

reducing, deferring or stopping EU contribution as from

stakeholders’ opinion

▪A majority of stakeholders recognise that there

would be negative consequences in reducing,

deferring or sopping EU contribution to ITER

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of EUROfusion,

associations, NGOs)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and

ITER contractors

EQ 19 To what extent the ITER Programme (including the way the F4E managed the public procurement procedures) contributed to the maximisation of socio-economic benefits (growth, jobs, innovation, enterprises, SME, skills, industrial policy) to

the creation as well as the retention of know-how in Europe?

EQ 19.1 How did the ITER programme and the

way it is managed contribute to the

maximisation of socio-economic benefits in

Europe?

▪Capitalisation on the EQ12 on the technology leadership

▪Definition of impact pathways

▪Possibly analyse of the impacts on three scopes: 1 - Impact

of ITER fundings (grants, procurement) in terms of CA

and jobs, 2- impacts through the exploitation of the

technologies, 3- impacts through knowledge and skills

capitalisation and dissemination

▪Stakeholders opinion on the contribution of ITER

programme and its management to the maximisation of

socio-economic benefits

▪A majority of stakeholders recognise that ITER

programme and the way it is managed

contribute to maximise socio-economic benefits

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of IO,

EUROfusion, public authorities, associations, NGOs)

▪Thematic focus groups

▪Statistical Analysis

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and

ITER contractors

EQ 19.2 How did the ITER programme and the

way it is managed contribute to the creation and

retention of know-how in Europe?

▪Skills and know-how related actions engaged directly

through ITER (type, number, beneficiaries)

▪Articulation between ITER actions and other stakeholders

(EUROfusion in particular) to enhance skills and know-

how on nuclear fusion

▪Stakeholders opinion on the contribution of ITER

programme and its management to the creation and

retention of know-how in Europe

▪A majority of stakeholders recognise that ITER

programme and the way it is managed

contribute to the creation and retention of know-

how in Europe

▪Interviews with stakeholders (representatives of IO,

EUROfusion, public authorities, associations, NGOs)

▪Thematic focus groups

▪Statistical Analysis

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and

ITER contractors

ACCEPTABILITY

Sub-questions Indicators / Descriptors Judgement criteria Methodological tools

EQ 20. To what extent can we observe changes in the perception of Euratom's participation in ITER (positive or negative) by the stakeholders (e.g.: Member States, F4E, IO) and by the general public?

EQ 20.1 To what extent can we observe changes ▪Extent to which there is change in the perception of ▪There is evidence that the perception of ▪Sentiment Analysis

54

in the perception of Euratom's participation in

ITER (positive or negative) by the targeted

stakeholders and by the general public?

Euratom's participation in ITER among the

institutional stakeholders (MS, F4E, IO)

▪Extent to which we can observe changes in the

perception of the general public, including civil

society organisations regarding Euratom’s

participation in ITER

institutional stakeholders has changed

▪There is evidence that the perception of civil

society organisations has change

▪There is evidence that the perception of general

public has change

▪Interviews with stakeholders (IO, F4E, EUROfusion, associations,

NGOs)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and ITER

contractors

EQ 20.2 Which actions/measures could be taken

to improve the awareness of the general public? ▪Description of possible measures/strategy (e.g.

open door events, online campaigns, etc.) to

improve the awareness of general publics from

similar complex projects

▪Evidence of communication activities/strategy

adopted by a similar complex organisation to

inform the general public regarding its activities

and achievements as well as to foster acceptability

by local community

▪There is evidence that the outreach strategy of the

ITER programme can be improved. ▪Benchmark analysis with similar complex projects

▪Desk research (e.g. previous assessment studies, for instance

Trinomic 2018)

▪Interviews with stakeholders (IO, F4E, EUROfusion, associations,

NGOs)

▪Targeted consultation with F4E GB, other F4E bodies, and ITER

contractors

▪Benchmark analysis with a similar complex organisation

EQ 21. What would be the impact (e.g.: on financial resources, on deadlines and on the quality of the components to deliver), in case of a change of scope and nature of F4E’s mission?

EQ 21.1 What would be the impact (e.g.: on

financial resources, on deadlines and on the

quality of the components to deliver), in case of

a change of scope and nature of F4E’s mission?

▪Stakeholders opinion on the impact of the ITER

programme – in terms of costs, deadlines quality of

components to deliver - in case of a change of

scope and nature of F4’s mission

▪A majority of stakeholders recognise that there

will be a positive impact in case of a change of

scope and nature of F4E’s mission

▪A majority of stakeholders recognise that the

proposed change of scope and nature of F4E’s

mission will positively affect the perception of

Euratom's participation in ITER by the general

public

▪Interviews with stakeholders (IO, F4E, EUROfusion, associations,

NGOs)

ANNEX IV. OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS [AND, WHERE RELEVANT, TABLE ON SIMPLIFICATION AND BURDEN REDUCTION]

55

75 Where there is a prior impact assessment, the table should contain as a minimum the costs/benefits identified in the IA with the information gathered on the actual cost/benefit. As available, the table

should include the monetisation (€) of the costs/benefits based on any quantitative translation of the data (time taken, person days, number of records/equipment/staff etc. affected or involved

represented in monetary value – see Standard cost model, for example). For all information presented, it should be included in the comments section whether it relates to all Member States or is drawn

from a subset. An indication of the robustness of the data should be provided in Annex II on Methodology and analytical models used.

Table 1. Overview of costs and benefits identified in the evaluation75

Citizens/Consumers Businesses Administrations European Commission

Quantitative Comment Quantitative Comment Quantitative Comment Quantitative Comment

[Cost or Benefit description]:

Costs:

Direct compliance costs (adjustment costs, administrative costs,

regulatory charges) Enforcement costs: (costs

associated with activities linked to the

implementation of an initiative such as monitoring, inspections and

adjudication/litigation)

Indirect costs (indirect compliance

costs or other indirect costs such as transaction costs)

Benefits:

Direct benefits (such as improved

well being: changes in pollution levels,

safety, health, employment; market

efficiency) Indirect benefits (such as wider

economic benefits, macroeconomic

benefits, social impacts, environmental impacts)

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

ITER programme

is a research

programme and does not imply

any costs for the

citizens and consumers

On a long term,

the citizens may

benefit from a decarbonised

source of energy

and scientific progress brought

by the fusion

research.

Not Applicable

Not applicable

ITER is a

research

programme and does not imply

any costs for the

businesses.

Industrial

companies may apply for the

public

procurements for the construction

of ITER. They

develop technologies and

know-how that

they can resell to other markets.

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

ITER is a research

programme and

does not imply any costs/benefits for

the national

administrations as Euratom ensures the

management of the

ITER programme through its

contribution to F4E,

the European agency.

The Commission has

made a huge financial

effort to support the implementation of the

ITER project. The

financial envelope dedicated to the

programme for the

current MFF amounts to EUR 4.6 bn.

ITER has significant contribution to growth

as it has created

qualified jobs (29700 between 2007 and

2017) and

EUR 6164 mn

was paid to European

companies involved in ITER between 2014

and 2022.

The contribution of ITER to EU policies is

multiple (innovation,

growth climate change).

56

ANNEX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT

Interviews: A total of 32 in-depth interviews involving 41 individuals were conducted with different types of stakeholders, as summarised in the table

below. Each interview lasted for about one hour (or one hour and half) and was of a semi-structured nature. The interviews followed list of questions,

adapted for the type of stakeholder, yet allowed for exploration of topics outside the list if considered relevant during the interview.

76 Each simplification/saving should be included on a separate line. 77 This assessment is without prejudice to a possible future Impact Assessment.

TABLE 2: Simplification and burden reduction (savings already achieved)

Report any simplification, burden reduction and cost savings achieved already by the intervention evaluated, including the points of comparison/ where available (e.g. REFIT savings

predicted in the IA or other sources).

Citizens/Consumers/Workers Businesses Administrations [Other…] _ specify

Quantitative Comment Quantitative Comment Quantitative Comment Quantitative Comment

Title76 [Select among: (i) direct compliance cost savings (for example adjustment cost savings, administrative cost savings, savings from regulatory charges); (ii) enforcement cost

savings (for example cost savings associated with activities linked to the implementation of an initiative such as monitoring, inspections and adjudication/litigation); (iii) indirect cost

savings (if possible - for example indirect compliance cost savings or other indirect cost savings such as transaction cost savings).

Type: One-off / recurrent (select)

Not applicable

PART II: II Potential simplification and burden reduction (savings)

Identify further potential simplification and savings that could be achieved with a view to make the initiative more effective and efficient without prejudice to its policy objectives77.

Citizens/Consumers/WorkersBusinessesAdministrations[Other…] _ specify

Quantitative CommentQuantitative CommentQuantitativeComment QuantitativeComment

Description:…

Type: One-off / recurrent (select)

Not applicable

57

Stakeholder group Number of interviews Number of interviewees

EC officials 4 7

F4E representatives 10 10

IO representatives 9 12

Other stakeholders (incl. EUROfusion,

CEA, EUP, CERN) 9 11

Surveys: A survey was conducted among members of the F4E Governing Board (GB), Technical Advisory Panel and Committees (Administration and

Management Committee, Procurement and Contracts Committee, Audit Committee). Another survey was conducted among the enterprises and research

organisations that have been involved in Euratom’s in-kind contributions via F4E. The contacts for the two surveys were provided by F4E.

The surveys were launched on Monday, 18th March 2024 and closed on 17th June 2024. The two surveys received a response rate of 46% from members

of F4E bodies and 16% from contractors.

The survey for members of F4E bodies achieved a good level of geographic coverage. Responses came from 19 out of 27 countries, resulting in a

coverage rate of 70%. The survey for the contractors achieved good geographic representativeness, with responses from organisations in 14 out of 20

countries, resulting in a 70% coverage rate. The geographic distribution aligns with the actual distribution of grants and contracts, with the highest

number of responses from French companies (22%), followed by Italy and Spain (18% each), and Germany (13%). Public and private research

organisations, universities, and NGOs were also consulted during this survey and constituted 29% of respondents (compared to 18% of the total

organisations in the survey sample).

Focus groups: The focus groups were organised to help validate or further elaborate on research findings already partially identified. For this evaluation,

two focus groups were organised, each of them involving different stakeholder groups and targeting specific topics, which are briefly presented in the

following table. Specifically, 14 people attended the focus group “Building a European leadership in fusion technologies” and 9 attended the focus group

“Being involved in ITER: challenges and benefits”.

SECTION PARTICIPANTS KEY TOPICS

Being involved

in ITER:

challenges and

benefits

▪ Industrial and other private companies

that have received grants or procurement

contracts from F4E

▪ Research organisations that have

received grants or procurements.

▪ Key benefits from receiving ITER grants or

procurements;

▪ Difficulties in maximising the socio-economic

returns from participating in ITER

▪ Management of grants and procurement

58

▪ Comments and suggestions on how to create a

European fusion industrial value chain

▪ Interest to maintain the ITER project (what

happens if ITER is closed, what if maintained).

Building a

European

leadership in

fusion

technologies

▪ ILOs

▪ Members of the F4E governing board

▪ European nuclear fusion projects

▪ Leading research organisation and

clusters in the field of nuclear Fusion

▪ Identify key strengths/features for an EU

leadership in fusion (including skills and

competences).

▪ Benefits from ITER for the European fusion

ecosystem and perspectives for the future of

European fusion (technologies, skills and

competences, etc.)

▪ Contribution of ITER in relation with the other

key European initiatives on nuclear fusion and

identification of the needs for a further

international collaboration.

▪ Explore synergies/complementarities between

the actions of the key institutions supporting

fusion at a European and MS level)

Call for evidence: The European Commission conducted a public call for evidence to gather feedback on EU's contribution to the ITER project. The

consultation was open from 29th July 2024 to 6th September 2024 and attracted 51 responses from a broad range of stakeholders. Responses are available

to the public on the Commission's website78. These included 42 individual citizens, 4 non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 4 companies, and 1 trade

union. Most of the responses were submitted by individuals and organisations based in Germany (45), additional feedback come from Italy (3), France

(1), Greece (1), and Slovakia (1).

78 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14307-Fusion-for-Energy-joint-undertaking-interim-evaluation_en

59

Figure 24: Number of respondents by user type and country of residence

1

4

1

39

3

3

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Trade Union

NGO

Company

EU Citizen

German Other

2% 2% 2%

6%

88%

Greece

France

Slovakia

Italy

Germany

60

ET ET

EUROOPA KOMISJON

Brüssel, 1.10.2026 COM(2026) 528 final

KOMISJONI ARUANNE EUROOPA PARLAMENDILE, NÕUKOGULE, EUROOPA

MAJANDUS- JA SOTSIAALKOMITEELE NING REGIOONIDE KOMITEELE

Nõukogu otsuse (Euratom) 2021/281 (millega muudetakse otsust 2007/198/Euratom,

millega luuakse ITERi ja tuumasünteesienergeetika arendamise Euroopa ühisettevõte

ning antakse sellele eelised) rakendamise vahehindamine

{SWD(2026) 289 final}

1

I. SISSEJUHATUS

ITER on rahvusvaheline teaduskoostöö projekt, mille eesmärk on tõendada

tuumasünteesienergia rahuotstarbelise kasutamise teaduslikku ja tehnoloogilist teostatavust.

ITERi lepinguga, mille sõlmisid 2006. aastal Euratom1 (mida esindas Euroopa Komisjon),

Ameerika Ühendriigid, Jaapan, Korea, Hiina, Venemaa ja India, loodi ITERi organisatsioon

kui rahvusvaheline organisatsioon ITERi2 rajatiste ehitamiseks, käitamiseks, kasutamiseks ja

deaktiveerimiseks Prantsusmaal Cadarache’is ning nähti ette nende dekomissioneerimine.

ITERi leping kohustab iga lepinguosalist andma mitterahalist toetust (ITERi seadme

ehitamiseks vajalikud komponendid) ja rahalist toetust (rahalised vahendid ITERi

organisatsiooni tegevuseks).

Iga lepinguosaline peab looma kohaliku asutuse, mis tegeleb koordineeritud suhtlusega ITERi

organisatsiooniga ja lepinguosalise nimel panuste andmisega. Euratomi kohalik asutus on

ITERi ja tuumasünteesienergeetika arendamise Euroopa ühisettevõte (Fusion for Energy –

F4E), mis loodi 2007. aasta märtsis nõukogu otsusega 2007/198/Euratom3. Otsuses on kindlaks

määratud järgmised F4E ülesanded:

- anda Euratomi panus ITERi organisatsiooni;4

- anda Euratomi panus koos Jaapaniga elluviidavatesse laiema lähenemisviisi

meetmetesse;5

- valmistada ette ja koordineerida tuumasünteesi näidisreaktori ja sellega seotud rajatiste

ehituse ettevalmistamist.

F4E liikmed on praegu Euratom (mida esindab komisjon), Euratomi ELi liikmesriigid6 ja

Šveits. Kolmandad riigid võivad saada F4E liikmeks tingimustel, mis on sätestatud nõukogu

otsuses 2007/198/Euratom, millega luuakse F4E. F4E eelarvet rahastatakse 80 % ulatuses ELi

eelarvest. Prantsusmaa kui ITERi asukohariik rahastab peaaegu 20 %. Ülejäänu kaetakse F4E

teiste liikmete liikmemaksudest.

Nõukogu otsuses (Euratom) 2021/281,7 millega muudetakse nõukogu otsust

2007/198/Euratom, on nõutud, et komisjon teeks otsuse rakendamise vahehindamise.

Komisjon on teinud välistöövõtja abiga kõnesoleva vahehindamise,8 et hinnata Euratomi

osalemist ITERis ühisettevõtte F4E kaudu kooskõlas parema õigusloome põhimõtetega.

Hindamiseesmärgid on järgmised:

1. anda teavet ITERi programmi seisu kohta;

1 Euratom (Euroopa Aatomienergiaühendus) on EList õiguslikult eraldiseisev, kuid sama liikmeskonnaga üksus. 2 ITER on rahvusvaheline teaduskoostöö projekt, mille eesmärk on tõendada tuumasünteesienergia

rahuotstarbelise kasutamise teaduslikku ja tehnoloogilist teostatavust. 3 2007/198/Euratom: nõukogu 27. märtsi 2007. aasta otsus, millega luuakse ITERi ja tuumasünteesienergeetika

arendamise Euroopa ühisettevõte ning antakse sellele eelised 4 Ehitusetapis on Euratomi panus ligikaudu 45 % ITERi ehituskuludest. Teiste ITERi liikmete panus on igaühel

ligikaudu 9 %. 5 ITERi lepinguga samal ajal sõlmis Euratom eraldi kahepoolse lepingu Jaapaniga (laiema lähenemisviisi leping),

et veelgi hõlbustada ja koordineerida Jaapaniga tehtavat tuumasünteesialast koostööd. 6 Kuni väljaastumislepingu jõustumiseni (31. jaanuar 2020) kuulus nende hulka Ühendkuningriik. 7 Nõukogu 22. veebruari 2021. aasta otsus (Euratom) 2021/281, millega muudetakse otsust 2007/198/Euratom,

millega luuakse ITERi ja tuumasünteesienergeetika arendamise Euroopa ühisettevõte ning antakse sellele eelised

(vt eelkõige artikkel 5c). 8 Komisjon on avaldanud vahehindamiseks välist sisendit andma valitud töövõtja aruande:

https://op.europa.eu/et/publication-detail/-/publication/e8d31d19-f590-11ef-b7db-01aa75ed71a1/language-

et?WT.mc_id=Searchresult&WT.ria_c=153343&WT.ria_f=8810&WT.ria_ev=search&WT.URL=https%3A%2

F%2Fenergy.ec.europa.eu%2F.

2

2. pakkuda ideid Euratomi ITERi programmi ja F4E töö parandamiseks ajavahemikul

2025–2027.

Hindamisel keskendutakse peamiselt Euroopa osalemisele ITERi projektis ühisettevõtte

Fusion for Energy kaudu praeguse mitmeaastase finantsraamistiku esimese osa kehtivuse

ajal, nimelt aastatel 2021–2024.

Hinnatakse ITERi projekti ja F4E tulemuslikkust, võttes aluseks kõnealuseks ajavahemikuks

heakskiidetud ITERi projektikirjelduse (milles on kindlaks määratud ulatus, ajakava ja eelarve;

2016. aasta projektikirjeldus) ja selle põhjal koostatud F4E planeerimisdokumendid9. ITERi

organisatsioon esitas ITERi nõukogu taotlusel 2024. aasta juunis uue projektikirjelduse ja

seega selle elluviimist kõnealuse hindamise käigus ei hinnata.

II. MIDA EUROOPA OSALEMISEGA ITERI PROJEKTIS F4E KAUDU

VAATLUSALUSEL PERIOODIL SAAVUTATI?

a) F4E tulemuslikkuse lühiülevaade

Hinnates Euratomi osalemist ITERi projektis F4E kaudu, nagu on nõutud nõukogu otsuses

2021/281, vaadeldakse F4E edusamme kõnealuses otsuses kindlaks määratud kolme

strateegilise eesmärgi saavutamisel. F4E juhatuse liikmed andsid 2024. aastal korraldatud

küsitluses F4E tulemuslikkusele üldiselt positiivse hinnangu. Küsimusele mil määral on F4E

algsed eesmärgid saavutatud? vastas enamik, et F4E on viinud ellu oma põhikirjas

kindlaks määratud eesmärgid ja tegevuse (vastavalt nõukogu otsuse 2007/198/Euratom

lisa artiklitele 2 ja 3)10.

F4E tulemuslikkuse põhjalikumal hindamisel tuleb eristada F4E eri tegevusvaldkondi, nagu on

esitatud allpool.

ITER. Vaatlusalusel perioodil on F4E andnud märkimisväärse osa oma eeldatavast panusest

ITERisse. F4E on sõlminud 24 suurt tsiviilehitus- ja üldehitustööde lepingut, mille koguväärtus

on 3 miljardit eurot11. Ta on taganud suurema osa hoonetest ITERi asukohas Prantsusmaal ja

ITERi magnetsüsteemi (kõigi aegade suurim ja integreerituim ülijuhtiv magnetsüsteem)

Euroopa osad. Need olulised saavutused täienesid 2024. aasta oktoobris veelgi vaakumkambri

esimese Euroopa osa üleandmisega,12 millele järgnevad kuni 2026. aasta keskpaigani teised

osad.

Kuigi need saavutused on vaieldamatud, ei ole edusammud olnud alati kooskõlas 2016. aasta

projektikirjeldusega. 2023. aasta lõpuks ei vastanud eelarve täitmine ning ITERi nõukogu ja

F4E juhatuse kindlaks määratud peamiste vahe-eesmärkide saavutamine ootustele: F4E oli

9 Pärast 2016. aasta projektikirjelduse heakskiitmist kehtestas F4E uue ajakava ja arvutas ümber F4E eeldatava

panuse projekti ehitusetapi valmimisse (eeldatavad lõppkulud) kuni 2025. aastaks kavandatud vahe-eesmärgi –

esimese plasma – saavutamiseni. Eeldatavad lõppkulud koosnevad varasematest tegelikest kuludest ja tulevastest

eeldatavatest kuludest (sealhulgas tulevaste riskide tõenäoline mõju) F4E ITERiga seotud kohustuste täitmiseks

kuni 2035. aasta lõpuni. 10 Andmed on esitatud toetavas uuringus, mis on kättesaadav aadressil https://op.europa.eu/et/publication-detail/-

/publication/e8d31d19-f590-11ef-b7db-01aa75ed71a1/language-

et?WT.mc_id=Searchresult&WT.ria_c=153343&WT.ria_f=8810&WT.ria_ev=search&WT.URL=https%3A%2

F%2Fenergy.ec.europa.eu%2F; vt lk 326 – 1. küsimus – vastuste „suurel määral“ ja „teatud määral“ summa. 11 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTc83Ql8djA&t=31s (ITERi ehitus, oktoober 2024);

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NRaFSpd7cwA (ITERi ehitus, oktoober 2023). 12 https://fusionforenergy.europa.eu/news/europes-first-iter-vacuum-vessel-sector-ready/

3

kogunud 65 % oma ITERi krediidist,13 mis on 14 protsendipunkti vähem kui 2016. aasta

projektikirjelduses kavandatud. Nende vahe-eesmärkide saavutamine, mille on ITERi projekti

edusammude jälgimiseks kindlaks määranud ITERi organisatsiooni nõukogu (ITERi nõukogu

vahe-eesmärgid) ja F4E juhatus (juhatuse vahe-eesmärgid), on võrreldes 2016. aasta

projektikirjeldusega samuti keskmiselt 32 kuud edasi lükkunud.

Joonis 1. ITERi krediidid võrreldes 2016. aasta projektikirjeldusega (kIUAdes14)

ELi eelarvepädevad institutsioonid eraldasid mitmeaastase finantsraamistiku dokumentides

5,6 miljardit eurot F4E rahastamiseks ajavahemikul 2021–2027. Projekti aeglasem

elluviimine on tinginud vahendite märkimisväärse alakasutuse, mille tõttu on F4E kasutamata

assigneeringud ajavahemikul 2021–2024 kuhjunud. Juhatus ja komisjon on võtnud meetmeid,

et kohandada F4E aastaeelarveid vastavalt F4E vajadustele. ELi vahendite usaldusväärse

finantsjuhtimise põhimõtte kohaselt on praeguses mitmeaastases finantsraamistikus 1 miljard

eurot 5,6 miljardist eurost tagastatud ELi üldeelarvesse, et viia kulukohustuste

assigneeringuid käsitlevad iga-aastased eelarveotsused kooskõlla projekti tegelike vajadustega.

Tabel 1. Euratomi ITERiga seotud kohustused mitmeaastastes finantsraamistikes

2007–2013 2014–2020 2021–2027

Euroopa panus kulukohustuste assigneeringutes (miljonites

eurodes)

3 273 2 915 4 562

Laiem lähenemisviis. Laiema lähenemisviisi programm koosneb kolmest suurest projektist: i)

satelliit-tokamaki programm (JT-60SA),15 ii) rahvusvahelise tuumasünteesimaterjalide

13 ITERi krediidid on ühikud, mida ITER kasutab, et määrata kindlaks hankelepingutes kokku lepitud ja kohalike

asutuste tagatavate mitterahaliste komponentide väärtus. Igaüks neist hõlmab konkreetset tööd, mida kohalikud

asutused peavad tegema ja ITERi organisatsioonile üle andma. Igas hankelepingus täpsustatakse ITERi

organisatsiooni ja asjaomase kohaliku asutuse kokku lepitud vahe-eesmärgid, mida kasutatakse hankelepingu

täitmisel tehtavate edusammude mõõtmiseks. Iga vahe-eesmärgi saavutamine vastab ITERi arvestusühikutes

(IUA) väljendatud krediidi teatavas koguses vabastamisele. Sarnane süsteem on olemas laiema lähenemisviisi

programmi puhul, mille arvestusühik on BAUA. 14 ITERi või laiema lähenemisviisi rakendamisel kasutatavad ühikud. ITERi projekti puhul korraldatakse ITERI

organisatsioonile antavaid mitterahalisi panuseid hankelepingute kaudu, mis hõlmavad tehtavaid ja ITERi

organisatsioonile üleantavaid konkreetseid töid. Kui ITERi organisatsioon koostab hankelepingu, vastavad

projekti elluviimise mõõtmiseks kokku lepitud vahe-eesmärgid ITERi arvestusühikutes (IUA) väljendatud

krediidi teatavas koguses vabastamisele. 15 Et ehitada kuni ITERi ehitusetapi lõpuleviimiseni valmis maailma võimsaim tuumasünteesimasin – JT-60SA –

ja seda käitada.

-

200

400

600

800

1 000

1 200

2 0 1 4

2 0 1 5

2 0 1 6

2 0 1 7

2 0 1 8

2 0 1 9

2 0 2 0

2 0 2 1

2 0 2 2

2 0 2 3

2 0 2 4

2 0 2 5

2 0 2 6

2 0 2 7

2 0 2 8

2 0 2 9

2 0 3 0

2 0 3 1

2 0 3 2

2 0 3 3

2 0 3 4

2 0 3 5

2 0 3 6

2 0 3 7

2 0 3 8

2 0 3 9

Baseline credit Achieved credit Forecast credit

4

kiiritusrajatise tehnilise projekteerimise valideerimise ja tehnilise projekteerimise meetmed

(IFMIF/EVEDA) ning iii) rahvusvaheline tuumasünteesienergeetika alaste teadusuuringute

keskus (IFERC)16. F4E on andnud Euratomi panuse laiema lähenemisviisi tegevusse üldiselt

kooskõlas kokkulepitud ajakavaga. Ajavahemikul 2021–2023 eraldas Euratom F4E kaudu

laiema lähenemisviisi meetmete tarvis 72 miljonit eurot. Hinnatava perioodi oluliste saavutuste

hulka kuulub JT-60SA kasutuselevõtt 2023. aasta lõpus. Selle kasutuselevõtule järgnes

hooldus- ja remondiperiood ning kasutamine jätkub varsti esimeste katsekampaaniate

algusega. JT-60SA on praegu maailma suurim ja arenenuim tuumasünteesialaste

teadusuuringute seade ning selle toimimine annab kasulikku teavet ITERi ehitamiseks ja

käitamiseks.

Selleks et maksimeerida ELi investeeringute tasuvust ja tagada, et Euroopa püsiks

ülemaailmses tuumasünteesi elujõuliseks energiaallikaks muutmise võidujooksus esirinnas, on

tähtis, et Euroopa teadlased kasutaksid ära seda ainulaadset võimalust pääseda ligi JT-60SA-

le, osaledes selle käitamises ja kasutamises ning sellest õppides.

Tuumasünteesi näidisreaktor. F4E investeeris tuumasünteesi näidisreaktori ehituse

ettevalmistamisse vähe raha peamiselt seetõttu, et ITERi rakendamisel tekkinud viivituste ja

probleemide lahendamine nõudis rohkem F4E raha. Nõukogu otsuse 2007/198/Euratom

kohaselt tuleb F4E-l „koostada tegevusprogramm tuumasünteesi näidisreaktori [...] ehituse

ettevalmistamiseks ja koordineerida selle rakendamist“. ITERiga seotud üldised viivitused

tähendasid ka, et peamised tuumasünteesitehnoloogiad ei ole nii valmis, kui oleks

tuumasünteesi näidisreaktorit ettevalmistavaks tööstustegevuseks vaja. F4E osales

tuumasünteesi näidisreaktoriga seotud tegevuses seega peamiselt laiema lähenemisviisi

lepingu kohaste eriprojektide kaudu ja koostöös EUROfusioniga, mis juhib Euratomi teadus-

ja koolitusprogrammi kaudu rahastatavaid Euroopa tuumasünteesialaseid teadusuuringuid.

b) ITERi ehitusega seotud ülekulude ja viivituste analüüs

ITERi projekti elluviimisel on vaatlusalusel perioodil esinenud suuri viivitusi ja ülekulusid,

mis on peamiselt tingitud järgmisest.

i) ITERi nõukogu võttis vastu liiga ambitsioonika 2016. aasta projektikirjelduse.

2016. aasta projektikirjeldus põhines tehniliselt kõige realistlikumal ajakaval ning

selles ei arvestatud ühtki ettenägematut olukorda (ettenägematud muutused

ajakavas ja kuludes), mis on jätnud projekti ilma paindlikkusest, mida on vaja

esmakordsete probleemide lahendamiseks, ja raskendanud projekti üldist juhtimist.

ii) Tehnilise projekti valmidus ja esmakordsus. Programmi elluviimisel tekkisid

märkimisväärsed ülekulud, mis tulenesid arvukatest tehnilise projekti muudatustest

ja mõnikord tarbetult keerulistest tehnilistest nõuetest. Need korduvad muudatused

(eelkõige hoonete puhul) tõid kaasa nõuded F4E töövõtjatelt ja suurendasid kulusid.

Mitu komponenti, mille F4E pidi tarnima, tekitasid ka tehnilisi probleeme, mida

ITERi organisatsioon ja F4E sageli alahindasid, ning nende tootmine võttis

kokkulepitust või eeldatust kauem aega. Eeldatavad lõppkulud17 kasvasid F4E jaoks

2020. aasta septembrist kuni 2024. aasta detsembrini 1 205 miljoni euro võrra.

16 Projekt, mille raames viiakse ellu erinevaid tuumasünteesiteaduse allprojekte, kasutades

superandmetöötlusseadmeid. 17 Eeldatavad lõppkulud koosnevad varasematest tegelikest kuludest ja tulevastest eeldatavatest kuludest

(sealhulgas tulevaste riskide tõenäoline mõju) F4E ITERiga seotud kohustuste täitmiseks kuni 2035. aasta

lõpuni.

5

iii) Kvaliteediprobleemid. 2022. aastal avastas ITERi organisatsioon tegevuskohta

tarnitud põhikomponentide (vaakumkambri osad ja krüostaadi termokilbid)

kvaliteediprobleemid18. Need komponendid tuli parandada. Parandustöödeks kulus

kaks aastat. ITERi organisatsioon optimeeris seadmekoostetöid, et leevendada

parandustööde mõju projekti üldisele ajakavale.

iv) COVID-19 pandeemia ja Ukraina sõja tagajärjed. COVIDi kriisi tõttu viibis

projekt veelgi. Enamik 2020. ja 2021. aasta viivitusi oli tingitud COVID-19

pandeemiast. Pandeemia ajal kehtestatud liikumis-, reisi- ja töölkäimise piirangud

aeglustasid kriitilise tähtsusega komponentide tootmist, tarnimist ja paigaldamist.

Kõigi ELi komponentide tootmiskulud suurenesid märkimisväärselt

inflatsioonisurve tõttu, mille tingisid COVID-19 pandeemia ja sellele järgnenud

geopoliitilised sündmused, eelkõige Venemaa sissetung Ukrainasse. Need

sündmused tõstsid ITERi komponentide valmistamiseks oluliste toorainete, näiteks

terase hinda.

v) Regulatiivsed probleemid. Tehniline dokumentatsioon ja ITERi organisatsiooni

selgitused mitmele loa andmisega seotud probleemile (nt neutronvoog,

kiirguskaardid, seismilised arvutused ja vaakumkambri keevitamine) olid

puudulikud, kui neid algselt Prantsusmaa tuumaohutusametile (praegu

tuumaohutuse ja kiirguskaitse amet (ASNR)) esitleti. Selle tulemusena teatas ASNR

2022. aasta jaanuaris ITERi organisatsioonile, et olulist regulatiivset vahe-

eesmärki, tokamaki koostetööde pausilepanekut ei tühistata ITERi organisatsiooni

eeldatud ajal. Seetõttu peatati kõik pöördumatud koostetegevused19 seniks, kuni

ITERi organisatsioon esitab piisavalt teavet, et ASNR saaks need loatoimikud

uuesti üle vaadata.

Kuigi F4E ei ole suutnud oma iga-aastaseid kohustusi vahehindamisega hõlmatud

perioodil täita, on ta viimasel ajal parandanud oma töökavade koostamist ja elluviimist.

Enne 2023. aastat oli F4E vahe-eesmärkide saavutamise määr 50–60 %, mis kajastab tema enda

prognooside ebausaldusväärsust, mis põhjustas aasta-aastalt kumulatiivseid viivitusi. 2024.

aastal teatas F4E märkimisväärsest paranemisest, kuna saavutas 84 % vahe-eesmärkidest.

III. ITERI PROJEKTI TULEMUSLIKKUSE PARANDAMISEKS VÕETUD

MEETMED

ITERi organisatsiooni tasandil. Alates ametisse asumisest 2022. aasta septembris on ITERi

organisatsiooni uus peadirektor tegelenud projektikirjelduse muutmise ja mitme

juhtimisreformi elluviimisega, et projektiga järje peale saada. Eelkõige muutis ITERi

organisatsiooni peadirektor põhjalikult organisatsiooni korraldust, võttes kasutusele projekti

maatriksstruktuuri ja lihtsustades otsustusprotsessi. Lisaks kaotas ta ühe juhtimistasandi ja

korraldas juhtkonna täielikult ümber, võttes järk-järgult kasutusele delegeerimissüsteemi20.

ITERi organisatsioon on kindlaks teinud ka mõne liikme tarnitud põhikomponentide

(vaakumkambri osad ja termokilbid) parandamise võimalused ning parandanud suhtlust

18 Esiteks korrodeerusid ja pragunesid mitu ITERi külmaaineks oleva vedela heeliumi külmana hoidmiseks ja seadme seinte kaitsmiseks ette nähtud termokilpi, sest keevisõmblused reageerisid metalli pesemiseks kasutatud happega. Teiseks selgus, et teatavatel vaakumkambri osadel, mis peaksid ülitäpselt ühenduma, puudub nõutav tootmistäpsus (allikas: F4E, 2022. aasta konsolideeritud tegevusaruanne, 2023). 19 Pöördumatute tegevuste hulka kuulub näiteks vaakumkambri osade kokkukeevitamine. 20 Allikas: IC-32/10 peadirektori kiri (DG/2023/OUT/0114 (94EGSL) – ümberkorraldamist käsitlev punkt.

6

Prantsusmaa tuumaohutust reguleeriva asutusega (ASNR). Kuigi paljud probleemid on endiselt

lahendamata, tunnistas ITERi nõukogu 2024. aastal olukorra märgatavat paranemist21.

F4E tasandil. F4E korraldati põhjalikult ümber, et viia ellu reformid, mida F4E juhatus pidas

vajalikuks pärast 2021. aasta mais aset leidnud enesetapujuhtumit, mis kutsus esile F4E

töötajate streigi. Need sündmused tõid ilmsiks ületöötamise, stressi ja vastuvõetamatute

juhtimistavadega töökultuuri. Seetõttu vabastati F4E direktor 2022. aasta juunis ametist. Võeti

vajalikud meetmed, et tagada kõigi töötajate psühholoogiline heaolu ja parandada töökoormuse

jaotust organisatsioonis.

2023. aasta mais võeti tööle uus direktor, kellele anti volitused i) tagada F4E ja ITERi

organisatsiooni suurem integreeritus; ii) luua nüüdisaegne, mitmekesine ja paindlik

organisatsioon; iii) kiirendada Euroopa panuse andmist ITERisse vastavalt kokkulepitud

ajakavale, eelarvele ja kvaliteedile; iv) teha juhatusega läbipaistvalt koostööd; v) rakendada

usaldusväärset finantsjuhtimist ning parandada eelarve planeerimist ja aruandlust ning vi)

uuendada koostööd teadus- ja tööstusvaldkonna sidusrühmadega ning F4E pikaajalist

perspektiivi. 1. juulil 2024 jõustus F4Es uus maatriksorganisatsiooni struktuur, et lihtsustada

selle juhtimist ja parandada suhtlust ITERi organisatsiooniga.

Komisjon võttis F4E juhtimises juhtrolli tagamaks, et F4E juhtkond kehtestab juhatuse nõutud

kiireloomulised meetmed töötajate heaolu säilitamiseks, uue direktori valimiseks ja selleks, et

F4E keskenduks oma põhiülesandele ja tarniks ITERile selle põhikomponendid, näiteks

vaakumkambri osad. Komisjoni talitused, mis esindavad Euratomi F4E juhtimises, vaatasid üle

oma järelevalvestrateegia, et tugevdada eelkõige i) kriitilise tähtsusega projektide edusammude

ja tulemuseesmärkide saavutamise jälgimist, ii) riski- ja leevendusmeetmete

kindlaksmääramist ning iii) ELi huvide kaitset F4E ülesannete täitmisel.

ITERi organisatsiooni ja F4E integreerimine. ITERi organisatsioon tegi kindlaks, et oma

tegevuse integreerimine kohalike asutuste omaga on üks võimalus projekti tõhusust

suurendada. Selle tulemusena on ITERi organisatsioon ja F4E otsinud viise, kuidas oma

tegevust paremini integreerida ning nende kahe organisatsiooni vahelist võimalikku koostoimet

ja vastastikust täiendavust ära kasutada. Alates 2023. aasta septembrist on F4E ja ITERi

organisatsioon teinud suuri jõupingutusi, et kindlaks teha integreerimiseks kõige

asjakohasemad tegevused ja funktsioonid ning luua integreeritud meeskonnad, mis jagavad

keskpikas perspektiivis ajakavasid, töövahendeid (IT, andmebaasid, näitajad) ja teavet ning

töötavad tõhusamalt ühiste eesmärkide saavutamise nimel.

Integreerimise eeldatavad tulemused on tõhususe kasv ja võimalik kokkuhoid, sest ITERi

organisatsioon ja F4E saaksid ühiselt leida võimalusi komponentide projekteerimise,

hankimise ja tarnimise optimeerimiseks. See on eriti oluline F4E poolt veel tarnimata

komponentide ja süsteemide (kuumkamber, diagnostika, küte, kambrisisesed) varaseks

projekteerimiseks. Lisaks pakub tegevuse integreerimine F4E töötajatele uusi

karjäärivõimalusi ja võimaldab säilitada kvalifitseeritud töötajaid isegi pärast komponentide

tarnimist. F4E töötajate ITERi organisatsiooni lähetamise tingimusi (ITERi organisatsiooni ja

F4E personalieeskirjad on erinevad) on selgitatud 2024. aastal sõlmitud halduskokkuleppes.

Projektikirjelduse ülevaatamine. 2024. aasta juunis tutvustas ITERi organisatsioon

muudetud projektikirjeldust (ulatus, ajakava ja kulud), millega sooviti maandada koostetööde

ja kasutuselevõtuga seotud põhiriske ning määrata kindlaks ajakava ja kuludega seotud

ettenägematud olukorrad, võttes seejuures arvesse varasemast esmakordsest sedalaadi

tegevusest saadud kogemusi. Uue ajakavaga tehti olulisi muudatusi ITERi

21 ITERi nõukogu 35. koosoleku (IC-35) protokoll, november 2024.

7

seadmekoostejärjestuses. Selle tulemusena on muudetud ajakavas nüüd ette nähtud

teadusuuringute alustamine, kusjuures esimene deuteerium-deuteerium tuumareaktsioon

toimub 2035. aastal, st eelmise ajakavaga võrreldes viivituseta. Tuumasünteesienergia

tootmine deuteeriumi-triitiumi etapis peaks nüüd algama 2039. aastal. See uus projektikirjeldus

põhineb etapilisel lähenemisviisil lubade andmisele, mille kohaselt korraldab ITERi

organisatsioon Prantsusmaa tuumaohutust reguleeriva asutuse (ASNR) nõutud ohutuse

tõendamist etapikaupa, tuginedes varasematele etappidele, et vähendada järgmistes etappides

esinevaid riske.

IV. MILLIST MÕJU AVALDAS EUROOPA OSALEMINE ITERIS F4E

KAUDU?

ELi osalemisel ITERis F4E kaudu on olnud tähtis majanduslik, sotsiaalne ja

tehnoloogiline mõju. F4E on asutamisest alates eraldanud kokku 7,6 miljardit eurot

riigihangeteks ja 114 miljonit eurot toetusteks. Need kulutused on toonud kasu paljudele

Euroopa ettevõtjatele, kes on saanud näidata oma tipptaset, arendada uusi oskusi ja

tehnoloogiaid ning mõnikord eksportida oma oskusteavet22.

Ajavahemiku 2018–2024 kohta koostatud hinnangus23 sisalduv makromajandusliku mõju

analüüs näitab, et võrreldes olukorraga, kus F4Ega seotud kulutusi ei oleks tehtud ja raha oleks

kokku hoitud, on ligikaudu 5,62 miljardit F4E kulutatud eurot (2024. aasta hindades) andnud

hinnangute järgi ligikaudu 5,95 miljardit eurot täiendavat kogulisandväärtust ja toetanud

ligikaudu 39 000 tööaastat.

Mis puudutab ettevõtjatele avalduvat mõju, siis ettevõtjad, kes tarnisid F4E-le 2018.–2024.

aastal kaupu või osutasid teenuseid, teatasid märkimisväärsest kogemuste omandamisest, mis

tugevdas nii tehnilist kui ka organisatsioonilist suutlikkust. F4E koostöö on avaldanud

märgatavat mõju teadmistele ja innovatsioonile. Ligikaudu pooled küsitletud ettevõtjatest

teatasid toodete või protsesside täiustamisest, sageli tehnoloogilise kohandamise kaudu, samas

kui kaugeleulatuvamad tulemused, nagu patendid, jagufirmad või tipptehnoloogiad, koondusid

väiksema hulga tarnijate kätte.

Käesoleva vahehindamise raames 2024. aastal F4E töövõtjate seas tehtud uuring kinnitas, et

lepingud F4Ega olid märkimisväärselt parandanud nende tehnilist ja korralduslikku

asjatundlikkust. ITERi ehitamisega seotud töö on aidanud kaasa ka teaduslikule

innovatsioonile ja uute tehnoloogiate väljatöötamisele, nagu tõendavad 39 konkreetset

rakendust24. Need rakendused on konkreetsed näited F4E lepingute kaudu saadud oskusteabe

eduka siirde kohta kas tuumatööstusesse või muudesse tööstusharudesse (vesinik, rehvitööstus,

liikurmasinad jm). Teisest küljest rõhutasid ettevõtjad ITERi menetlustes osalemise arvukaid

eeliseid (nt teadmised, usaldusväärsuse kasv, koostöö rahvusvaheline arendamine), kuid

märkisid, et nende osalemine ei tähenda alati kasumlikkust ja kasu. Tähtis on see, et mitu

töövõtjat osutasid vajadusele kasutada ära kogutud teadmisi ja tagada ITERit täiendavate

projektide elluviimine.Vastasel juhul on oht, et ettevõtjad kaotavad nende lepingutega

omandatud oskused.

22 Teadmussiirde näide: https://www.axios.com/pro/climate-deals/2024/05/01/commonwealth-fusion-progress 23 FUSION FOR ENERGY 13. IGA-AASTANE HINDAMINE, uuringu lõpparuanne, 2025.

24 https://fusion-technology-transfer.europa.eu/fusion-technology-portfolio/

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Teistes uuringutes25 on esile toodud ITERi kõrvalmõjusid. Näiteks on ASG Superconductorsi

poolne ülijuhtivate elektromagnetite väljatöötamine ITERi jaoks aidanud arendada

tehnoloogiaid, mida saab rakendada ka väljaspool tuumasünteesivaldkonda,26 sealhulgas

meditsiinidiagnostikas, pooljuhtide puhul, elektroonikas ja kaitsevaldkonnas.

Euroopa osalemine ITERis on võimaldanud tekkida ELi-sisesel tarneahelal, mis pakub

Euroopa kõrgtehnoloogiatööstusele ja VKEdele väärtuslikke võimalusi uuendusteks ja

väljaspool tuumasünteesivaldkonda kasutatavate kõrvaltoodete väljatöötamiseks. F4E on

seadnud oma tööstuspoliitika keskmesse Euroopa tuumasünteesi tarneahela arendamise ja

loomise. Hiljutised algatused näitavad, et sektor on hakanud end Euroopas struktureerima:

loodud on mitu idufirmat, mis on saanud märkimisväärseid rahalisi vahendeid27. Lisaks loodi

2024. aastal Euroopas kolm tuumasünteesivaldkonna ettevõtjate ühendust, mille eesmärk on

ühendada sektori idufirmade ja tööstusettevõtjate huvid (European Fusion Association

(Euroopa tuumasünteesi ühendus), Fusion Europe ja Fusion Industry Association’i

(tuumasünteesitööstuse kiit) ELi haru). See on uus suundumus: enne 2024. aastat ei olnud

Euroopas ühtegi spetsiaalselt tööstusliku tuumasünteesi valdkonna esindajaid koondavat

ühendust ja USAs oli ainult üks selline – Fusion Industry Association, mis teatas

tuumasünteesivaldkonna edusammudest peamiselt USAs ja Euroopas.

Euroopa osalemine ITERis peaks pikas perspektiivis andma positiivse panuse ka ELi

kliimaeesmärkide saavutamisse. Seepärast leiab komisjon, et kõik ITERiga seotud kulutused

ajavahemikul 2021–2027 aitavad kaasa ELi eelarve kliimaalastele jõupingutustele. Raha, mis

kulutatakse Euroopa osalemisele ITERis, peaks aitama saavutada komisjoni pikaajalisi

kliimaeesmärke, eelkõige saada „esimeseks kliimaneutraalseks maailmajaoks, kujundades

välja nüüdisaegse ja ressursitõhusa majanduse“. Kuigi ITERi raames ei hakata eeldatavasti

elektrit tootma, on see oluline tuumasünteesienergeetika arendamise projekt, millel on

potentsiaal pakkuda tulevikus uut heitevaba energia allikat. ITERis osalemine aitab seega kaasa

Euroopa Liidu pikaajalistele jõupingutustele „tagada kõigile taskukohane, kindel, kestlik ja

kaasaegne energia“.

Näitena ülemaailmse partnerluse kohta, mis koondab seitset rahvusvahelist partnerit (Euratom,

Ameerika Ühendriigid, Jaapan, Lõuna-Korea, Hiina, Venemaa ja India), kes esindavad rohkem

kui poolt maailma elanikkonnast, aitab ITERi projekt saavutada eesmärki „tugevdada

tegevuskava rakendamise meetodeid ja elavdada ülemaailmset partnerlust kestliku arengu

heaks“28.

V. KAS EUROOPA OSALEMINE ITERIS F4E KAUDU ON TULEVIKUS

ENDISELT ASJAKOHANE?

a) Kas Euroopa peaks ITERis keerulisest olukorrast hoolimata edasi osalema?

ITERi lepingus on sätestatud, et võõrustav lepinguosaline, st Euratom, ei või lepingust ja

seega ka projektist taganeda. Euratom on seega lepinguosaline, kes on ITERi edust kõige

25 Näiteks LGI ja IHS Markiti uuring (2020): järeluuring ITERi ja laiema lähenemisviisi projektide majandusliku

kasu kohta ELi tööstusele – Euroopa Liidu Väljaannete Talitus (europa.eu). 26 Järeluuring ITERi ja laiema lähenemisviisi projektide majandusliku kasu kohta ELi tööstusele – Euroopa Liidu

Väljaannete Talitus 27 „Global Investment in the fusion private sector“, F4E Fusion Observatory aruanne, 2. väljaanne, 2025.

28 Kestliku arengu eesmärk nr 17.

9

rohkem huvitatud. Samuti on vaja tagada, et ITER säilitaks oma tähtsuse, et õigustada ELi

jätkuva sekkumise vajadust.

Mitmes maailma tuumasünteesialgatuses on hiljuti teatatud märkimisväärsetest

läbimurretest29 ja alates 2021. aastast on sellised teated sagenenud30. Mõned riigid, nagu

Ameerika Ühendriigid, Hiina, Korea, Saksamaa ja Ühendkuningriik, on välja töötanud ka oma

tuumasünteesiprogrammid ning suurendanud oma rahalist toetust riiklikele laboritele ja/või

eraettevõtjatele. Vähemalt 45 ettevõtjat üle maailma tegelevad tuumasünteesienergia

turuletoomisega. Mõned hiljuti asutatud eraettevõtjad, kes on suutnud ligi meelitada üha

rohkem erasektori investeeringuid, on seadnud endale äärmiselt ambitsioonikad eesmärgid, et

demonstreerida tuumasünteesienergia äriotstarbelist tootmist (järgmisel kümnendil).

Eri asjaosalised, sealhulgas mõned tuumasünteesikogukonna liikmed, väidavad, et

tuumasünteesienergia võib peatselt turule jõuda. Kuigi see optimism motiveerib ja meelitab

ligi investeeringuid, võib see ka varjata eesseisvate tehniliste ja rahaliste raskuste

ulatust. Ebarealistlikud ootused võivad peale pettumuse kaasnemisele õõnestada ka üldsuse ja

poliitikute usaldust, mis võib omakorda aeglustada edusamme, mida ITER püüab

kiirendada. Kuigi ITERi puhul on tehtud erakordseid jõupingutusi, et kaasata sellesse

võimalikult palju reaktoriga seotud tehnoloogiaid, sealhulgas ülijuhtivad magnetid, plasmaga

kokkupuutuvad aktiivjahutusega komponendid, triitiumi käitlemine ja kaughooldussüsteemid,

on selle ülesanne endiselt põhimõtteliselt eksperimentaalne. ITERi eesmärk on uurida ja õppida

hästi tundma pika impulsiga põleva plasma toimimise füüsikat, mitte kõrvaldada kõiki

tehnoloogilisi lünki ärilise termotuumaelektrijaama ehituses. Mitu suurt tehnoloogialünka jääb

ITERi ulatusest välja ning nendega tuleb tegeleda täiendava teadus- ja arendustegevuse

kaudu. Kulud on endiselt üks peamisi tuumasünteesi pikaajalist edu takistavaid

tegureid. Üldsuse ja poliitilised ootused peaksid jääma kooskõlla tehnilise ja füüsilise

reaalsusega, vältides liiga suurtest lubadustest tulenevaid riske.

Draghi aruandes rõhutatakse: „Tuumasüntees on murranguline tehnoloogia, mis võib

käesoleva sajandi teisel poolel energiamaastikul revolutsiooni teha. […]. Sellel võib olla

pöördeline roll vähese süsinikuheitega, kliimasõbraliku, taskukohase ja ohutu

energialahendusena, mis põhineb rohkel ja juurdepääsetaval tuumakütusel. ITERi projekt

29 Foresight study on the worldwide developments in advancing fusion energy, including the small scale private

initiatives (tuleviku-uuring ülemaailmsete arengusuundumuste kohta tuumasünteesienergeetika edendamisel,

sealhulgas väikeste eraalgatuste kohta): https://op.europa.eu/et/publication-detail/-/publication/83bc3ecd-b19c-

11ed-8912-01aa75ed71a1/language-et/format-PDF/source-292762830. 30 1) USA riiklik süüterajatis (National Ignition Facility, NIF) on maailma suurim inertsiaalvangistusel põhineva

tuumasünteesi algatus ja 2021. aastal saavutati NIFis maailma esimese plasma põleva olekuga süttimine, mille

korral plasma kuumeneb peamiselt iseeneslikult plasmas toimuvate tuumasünteesireaktsioonide tulemusel. 2022.

aasta detsembris saavutati NIFi uue eksperimendiga energia juurdekasv, tootes tuumasünteesiga rohkem energiat

(3,15 MJ) kui tuumasünteesi märklauale rakendatud laserenergia kogus (2,05 MJ) – tugevasti süttinud

tuumasünteesi plasma saavutamiseks vajalik hulk. Detsembris tehtud eksperimendile järgnes veel neli süütekatset.

2024. aasta veebruaris toimunud eksperimendi käigus toodeti umbes 5,2 MJ energiat, mida on üle kahe korra

rohkem kui sisendenergiat 2,2 MJ. Tuumasünteesi temperatuuride ja plasma püsivuse rekordeid on püstitatud ka

KSTARi (Korea) ja EASTi (Hiina) tokamakkides.

2) Jaapanis asuv JT-60SA tokamak, mis on ELi ja Jaapani koostööprojekt, mida viiakse ellu laiema lähenemisviisi

lepingu alusel, jõudis esimese plasmani 2023. aasta lõpus.

3) Kõigele lisaks püstitas Hefeis asuv Hiina eksperimentaalne kõrgtehnoloogiline ülijuhtiv tokamak

(Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak, EAST) 20. jaanuaril 2025 uue maailmarekordi, säilitades

püsivas olekus ülivangistatud plasma 1 066 sekundi jooksul. See on peaaegu kolm korda pikem aeg kui

eelmine maailmarekord (403 sekundit), mille püstitas 2023. aastal samuti EAST. „Chinese „Artificial Sun“

Achieves New Record in a Significant Milestone Toward Fusion Power Generation“, Hefei Institutes of Physical

Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences

10

[…] on viinud ELi ülemaailmsete tuumasünteesialaste teadusuuringute esirinda – selle raames

investeeritakse miljardeid eurosid tööstuse tarneahelasse ja teadusuuringutesse. Hoolimata

märkimisväärsetest edusammudest ülemaailmsetes tuumasünteesialastes teadusuuringutes, on

tuumasünteesi praktiline kasutuselevõtt endiselt mitme aastakümne kaugusel, mistõttu on vaja

teha edasisi ühiseid jõupingutusi ja investeeringuid, et see revolutsiooniline energiaallikas

turule tuua.“ Seetõttu on ELi investeeringud ITERisse – ja tuumasünteesi üldiselt – endiselt

täielikult kooskõlas tema prioriteediga31 ehitada üles jõukas Euroopa, mis suudab tugevdada

oma konkurentsivõimet ja tagada ülemineku vähendatud süsinikuheitega majandusele.

Hoolimata avaliku ja erasektori tuumasünteesialgatustest, mis täiendavad ITERit või järgivad

alternatiivseid teid, leiavad eri sidusrühmad (sealhulgas ettevõtjad ja laborid), et ITER on

praegu ainulaadne projekt, mis võimaldab integreeritud viisil kõrvaldada kõik

tuumasünteesiga seotud tehnoloogilised probleemid (sealhulgas triitiumi tootmine ja

plasma vangistamine).

ITER on seega endiselt kõige tähtsam käimasolev projekt, mille eesmärk on kiirendada

tuumasünteesi arendamist ELis.

b) Kas Euroopa peaks ITERis osalemist F4E kaudu jätkama?

Käesoleva ülevaate koostamise käigus F4E juhatuse liikmetelt kogutud seisukohad puudutasid

ka F4E sobivust Euratomi osalemiseks ITERis. Üle 90 % neist leidis eelkõige, et F4E tarnis

ITERi organisatsioonile kvaliteetseid komponente, seadmeid, materjale ja muid ressursse.

Juhatuse liikmed olid aga vähem rahul F4E suutlikkusega oma tegevust ITERi organisatsiooni

tegevusega koordineerida (ligikaudu 55 %-ne rahulolu).

Juhatuse liikmed nimetasid mõned tegurid, mis halvendasid projekti juhtimist32. Need tegurid

on muu hulgas järgmised: ITERi organisatsiooni esitatud ja temaga kokku lepitud tehnilise

projekti ebaküpsus, esimeste omataoliste komponentide liiga ambitsioonikas kirjeldus ja

paindlikkuse puudumine ettenägematutele olukordadele reageerimiseks. Nende arvates

kahjustasid F4E sisemise korralduse arvukad muudatused ja ebapiisav koostöö ITERi

organisatsiooniga ITERi projekti elluviimist. Nad ei pea F4E volituste ülevaatamist

vajalikuks, kuid 51 % arvates mõned F4E ja ITERi organisatsiooni ülesanded kattuvad.

Euratom on seisukohal, et ITERi organisatsiooni ja F4E tegevuse parem integreerimine on

hädavajalik parandusmeede, mis tuleb ellu viia, et F4E suudaks endiselt saavutada oma

eesmärki anda oma volituste piires tõhusalt ja tulemuslikult Euratomi panus ITERi projekti ja

muudesse asjakohastesse programmidesse (eelkõige laiem lähenemisviis ja tuumasünteesi

näidisreaktori ettevalmistused). ITERi organisatsiooni ja F4E tegevuse integreeritus tuleb

saavutada eelkõige oluliste eelseisvate tehnoloogiaprojektide puhul (nt kuumkambrid). Selleks

võetakse meetmeid ja nende tulemuslikkust tuleb süstemaatiliselt jälgida.

c) Kas F4E tehnoloogia ja uuenduslike komponentide tarned ITERisse võivad

toetada ELi ülemaailmset konkurentsivõimet tulevaste

31 https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/eu-priorities/european-union-priorities-2024-2029_et 32 Andmed on esitatud toetavas uuringus, mis on kättesaadav aadressil https://op.europa.eu/et/publication-detail/-

/publication/e8d31d19-f590-11ef-b7db-01aa75ed71a1/language-

et?WT.mc_id=Searchresult&WT.ria_c=153343&WT.ria_f=8810&WT.ria_ev=search&WT.URL=https%3A%2

F%2Fenergy.ec.europa.eu%2F; vt lk 326 – küsimused 6a ja 6b – vastuste „neutraalselt“, „negatiivselt“ ja „üldse

mitte“ summa.

11

termotuumaelektrijaamade peamiste tuumasünteesitehnoloogiate

valdkonnas?

Hoolimata ITERiga seotud märkimisväärsetest tehnoloogilistest eelistest ELis, arenevad Hiina

ja USA kiiresti, tuginedes ITERi edusammudele ja muudele algatustele, mida stimuleerivad

idufirmade rahastamise muljetavaldav suurenemine ja ambitsioonikad riiklikud programmid.

Viimastel aastakümnetel on ELi patentide osakaal vähenenud ja Hiina oma tohutute

investeeringutega on läinud seda patentide nimel toimuvat võidujooksu juhtima. Hiina on

viimasel ajal oma jõupingutusi suurendanud ja võib nüüd „kulutada tuumasünteesile igal aastal

1,5 miljardit USA dollarit, mida on peaaegu kaks korda rohkem kui USA valitsuse poolt

käesoleval aastal nendeks teadusuuringuteks eraldatud summa“33. Hiina asutas 2024. aasta

jaanuaris ka riikliku konsortsiumi, et ehitada 2035. aastaks tuumasünteesireaktor34.

Joonis 2. Tuumasünteesi patentide osakaal35

F4E on juba teinud mõningaid jõupingutusi, et jälgida, kas tarnitud komponentide abil saadakse

patente ja toetatakse ELi ülemaailmset juhtpositsiooni tuumasünteesitehnoloogiate

valdkonnas. See aitab hinnata, kas EL saab oma investeeringutest strateegilist kasu. F4E

juhatus võttis osana oma ülesannetest36 vastu F4E direktori esitatud tööstuspoliitika eeskirjad.

See poliitika peaks teenima Euroopa ettevõtjate huve. Riigihankemenetluste haldamise kaudu

loob F4E ka selliste ettevõtjate võrgustiku, kes tõenäoliselt teevad koostööd kaubandusliku

tuumasünteesiprojekti väljatöötamisel. Vajadus luua tõhus tööstuspoliitika läheb kaugemale

F4E peamisest ülesandest tarnida ITERile komponente.

Suureneb oht, et üha kasvavad kulud ja hilinenud rakendamine vähendavad ITERist saadavat

kasu. ITERi organisatsiooni ja F4E jätkuvad jõupingutused ajakava ja kulude optimeerimiseks

33 „Inside China’s race to lead the world in nuclear fusion“ (nature.com): https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-

024-02759-

x?utm_campaign=nature&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter&mc_cid=fc9d5a2010#Echobox=172485

496 34 https://www.ans.org/news/article-5668/china-launches-fusion-consortium-to-build-artificial-sun/ 35 Märkus. Euroopa patendiametite all mõeldakse liikmesriikide patendiameteid ja Euroopa

Patendiorganisatsiooni, kuhu kuuluvad kõik ELi liikmesriigid ja teised Euroopa riigid, nagu Türgi ja

Ühendkuningriik. Patendikoostöölepinguga on hõlmatud keskmiselt 10 % patentidest. Jaapanil ja Koreal on

samuti oluline osakaal (kummalgi tavaliselt 6–12 %). 36 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ET/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02007D0198-20210101 –lisa – artiklid 6

ja 9.

12

projektikirjelduse muutmise, ümberkorralduste ja tegevuse integreerimise kaudu näivad

tähtsamad kui kunagi varem. Samal ajal tuleks teha jõupingutusi, et pakkuda Euroopa

kõrgtehnoloogiatööstusele ning väikestele ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtjatele võimalusi

uuendada ja arendada komponente, mis on väärtuslikud ja sobivad hästi tulevastele

äriotstarbelistele tuumasünteesireaktoritele.

EL peaks toetama ka Euroopa ettevõtjaid oskusteabe arendamisel ja tuvastatud tehnoloogiliste

lünkade kõrvaldamisel tuumasünteesi turuletoomise teelt. Sellega seoses tugevdab komisjon

ELi tarneahelat veelgi ja toetab dünaamilist tuumasünteesi idufirmade sektorit. Ta julgustab

tööstust ja teaduskogukonda tegema koostööd tehnoloogiliste probleemide lahendamiseks, et

saaks ehitada esimese termotuumaelektrijaama jaoks vajalikke tähtsaid rajatisi.

Komisjon valmistab ette avaliku ja erasektori partnerlust tuumasünteesi valdkonnas ühiselt

kavandatud partnerluse vormis, et kaasata erasektor mitte enam tarnija, vaid partnerina.

Komisjon suurendab ka alt-üles toetust tuumasünteesiga tegelevate idufirmade tekkele ja

kasvule, suurendades Euratomi kaasrahastamist Euroopa Innovatsiooninõukogu

rahastamisvahendi „Accelerator“ tuumasünteesi väljakutse raames.

d) Kas ELi osalemist ITERis F4E kaudu saab veelgi rohkem tuumasünteesi

laiemasse arendamisse integreerida?

Tihe ülemaailmne konkurents ja pidevalt arenev energiatehnoloogiakeskkond nõuavad

poliitika ja tavade kohandamist, et suunata nii ELi institutsioonide kui ka liikmesriikide

jõupingutusi. Töövõtja toetavas uuringus osutatakse sidusrühmade üksmeelsele arvamusele, et

Euroopa avaliku sektori sekkumisel tuumasünteesi arendamisse tuleks loobuda järjestikusest

lähenemisviisist ITERile ja muudele algatustele (s.o kõigepealt ITERi ehitamine ja seejärel

muud algatused, nagu tuumasünteesi näidisreaktor) ning et EL peaks esitama

tuumasünteesisektori üldstrateegia.

Draghi aruandes (2024) korrati seda ideed, kutsudes üles koostama „ELi üldist

tuumasünteesienergia innovatsioonistrateegiat ning toetama avaliku ja erasektori

partnerluse loomist, et edendada selle kiiret ja majanduslikult elujõulist turuletoomist.

Partnerluse eesmärk peaks olema luua stabiilne ja prognoositav tööstusinnovatsiooni süsteem,

kasutades ära ITERi projekti ja tagades samal ajal selge tehnoloogiaarenduse tegevuskava.

Tuumasünteesienergia kasutuselevõtt eeldab avaliku ja erasektori investeeringute koostoimet.“

Komisjon moodustas 2023. aasta lõpus eksperdirühma, et aidata tagada Euratomi tegevuse

ühtsust ITERi ja tuumasünteesialaste teadusuuringute valdkonnas. See tuumasünteesi

eksperdirühm, mis koosneb 25st ELi liikmesriikide nimetatud liikmest (Küpros ja Luksemburg

ei ole omal soovil esindatud) ning F4Est ja EUROfusionist pärit vaatlejatest, sõnastas oma

seisukohad tuumasünteesi eksperdirühma arvamuses.

Komisjon töötab praegu välja terviklikku strateegiat tuumasünteesi edasiseks

arendamiseks Euroopas, võttes arvesse mitmesugust teavet, sealhulgas tuumasünteesi

eksperdirühma seisukohti ning ekspertide ja üldsusega peetud täiendavate konsultatsioonide

tulemusi.

On selge, et tuumasünteesi arendamise toetamiseks Euroopas on peale ITERis osalemise

vaja avaliku sektori poliitilist sekkumist ELi tasandil. See avaliku sektori sekkumine on

määrava tähtsusega uue teadus- ja tehnoloogiataristu ehitamisel, mis aitab kõrvaldada

allesjäänud tehnoloogilisi lünki, et toetada tuumasünteesi. Sellised projektid võivad pakkuda

võimalusi F4E edasiseks kaasamiseks tuumasünteesi laiemasse arendamisse.

Heaks näiteks on juba käimasolev Euroopa rajatise ehitamine tuumasünteesiks sobivate

materjalide katsetamiseks ja kvalifitseerimiseks. Pärast koos EUROfusioniga ellu viidud

13

teadusprojekte, mis tõendasid projekti asjakohasust, investeerisid Hispaania ja Horvaatia

projekti IFMIF-DONES37. Oma panusest teatasid hiljuti ka teised riigid, nagu Itaalia ja Jaapan.

2025. aasta juulis tegi F4E juhatus otsuse anda F4E kaudu Euroopa panus.

F4E kaudu saadud kogemused on väga olulised ka selleks, et kaaluda võimalusi

tuumasünteesi rahastamisallikate tugevdamiseks ja mitmekesistamiseks Euroopas.

Samal ajal kui USA ettevõtjad on juba kaasanud väga suuri investeeringuid ja teised riigid

(eelkõige Hiina, Ühendkuningriik) on tuumasünteesiprogrammidesse märkimisväärselt

investeerinud, peab ka Euroopa välja töötama tuumasünteesisektori uuenduslike projektide

rahastamise vahendid ning püüdma vähendada nendega seotud riske, kombineerides nii

Euroopa kui ka riiklikke rahastamisallikaid.

VI. KOKKUVÕTE

Hindamisel keskenduti Euroopa osalemisele ITERi projektis ühisettevõtte Fusion for Energy

kaudu praeguse mitmeaastase finantsraamistiku (2021–2024) kehtivuse ajal. Euroopa

sekkumise eesmärgid on üldiselt saavutatud.

Kuigi välised tegurid, nagu COVID-19 pandeemia ja inflatsioon, on projektile vaatlusalusel

perioodil suurt mõju avaldanud, on probleemide peamine põhjus struktuurne: liiga

ambitsioonikas 2016. aasta projektikirjeldus, milles ei ole arvestatud ettenägematute

olukordadega, tehnilise projekti sagedased muudatused ning projektiga kaasnevate riskide ja

keerukuse alahindamine.

F4E ja ITERI organisatsioon ei saavutanud vahehindamisega hõlmatud perioodil kõiki seatud

eesmärke. Mõlemad organisatsioonid on siiski projekti täitmise määra hiljuti parandanud.

Hoolimata viivitustest on ITER endiselt kesksel kohal tuumasünteesi võimalikkuse

tõendamisel ja peamiste seda võimaldavate tehnoloogiatega seotud probleemide lahendamisel.

Projekt on avaldanud majandusele, tööstusharule ja ühiskonnale positiivset mõju.

Ajavahemiku 2018–2024 kohta koostatud hinnangus sisalduv makromajandusliku mõju

analüüs näitab, et võrreldes olukorraga, kus F4Ega seotud kulutusi ei oleks tehtud ja raha oleks

kokku hoitud, on ligikaudu 5,62 miljardit F4E kulutatud eurot (2024. aasta hindades) andnud

hinnangute järgi ligikaudu 5,95 miljardit eurot täiendavat kogulisandväärtust ja toetanud

ligikaudu 39 000 tööaastat.

F4E on loonud Euroopas ainulaadse oskusteabe tuumasünteesiseadme jaoks vajalike

komponentide väljatöötamise valdkonnas. See on aidanud luua ja arendada tugevat Euroopa

tuumasünteesi tarneahelat.

ITERi eesmärk on uurida ja õppida tundma pika impulsiga põleva plasma toimimise füüsikat,

mitte kõrvaldada kõiki tehnoloogilisi lünki äriotstarbelise termotuumaelektrijaama ehituses.

Mitu suurt tehnoloogialünka jääb ITERi ulatusest välja ning nendega tuleb tegeleda täiendava

teadus- ja arendustegevuse kaudu. Väljatöötamisel on terviklik strateegia tuumasünteesi

edendamiseks ELis. Selles tuginetakse ITERi projektile ja pakutakse välja meetmed

allesjäänud lünkade kõrvaldamiseks.

37 https://ifmif-dones.es