| Dokumendiregister | Riigikogu |
| Viit | 1-2/26-600/1 |
| Registreeritud | 18.09.2026 |
| Sünkroonitud | 11.10.2026 |
| Liik | EL dokument |
| Funktsioon | |
| Sari | |
| Toimik | Ettepanek - SEC(2026) 590, SWD(2026) 590, SWD(2026) 591, SWD(2026) 592, COM(2026) 590 |
| Juurdepääsupiirang | Avalik |
| Adressaat | |
| Saabumis/saatmisviis | |
| Vastutaja | |
| Originaal | Ava uues aknas |
| Taotle dokumendi eemaldamist või parandamist |
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 9.9.2026 COM(2026) 590 final
2026/0265 (COD)
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on public contracts and concessions, repealing Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and
2014/25/EU, and amending Regulations (EC) No 1370/2007, (EU) 2023/1542, (EU)
2024/1157, (EU) 2024/1252, (EU) 2024/1735, (EU) 2024/1781, (EU) 2024/2847, (EU)
2024/3110 and (EU) 2025/40, and Directives 2008/98/EC, (EU) 2019/882, (EU) 2022/2381,
(EU) 2023/1791 and (EU) 2024/1760 (Public Procurement Act)
{SEC(2026) 590 final} - {SWD(2026) 590 final} - {SWD(2026) 591 final} - {SWD(2026) 592 final}
(Text with EEA relevance)
EN 1 EN
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
This explanatory memorandum accompanies the proposal for a Regulation on Public
Procurement, revising the Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts,
Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by
entities operating in the water, energy, transport, and postal services sectors and amending
various sectoral acts with regard to provisions on public procurement therein.
Every day, across the European Union, public authorities award contracts for goods, services
and works that shape the daily lives of citizens, whether it be the roads they travel on, the
energy that powers their homes or the school buildings that shape their childrens’ futures.
With public procurement accounting for around 15% of the EU's GDP, public procurement is
a powerful policy lever at the Union's disposal. For public buyers, it is the means to ensure
efficient investments into public infrastructure and services. For citizens, it maximises value
for taxpayers’ money by ensuring that public funds are spent efficiently and effectively. For
businesses, a well-designed procurement framework opens new opportunities, including
across borders. For all, public procurement should be transparent, fair and open, to build and
reinforce public trust.
The central role of public procurement has been forcefully underlined by Mario Draghi and
Enrico Letta in their reports on the future of European competitiveness1 and on the Single
Market2. Both highlight procurement not only as a mechanism for public spending, but also as
a strategic investment tool to strengthen the Union’s clean industrial base, support innovation,
advance the clean and digital transitions, and reinforce economic security and strategic
autonomy. The Clean Industrial Deal3 and the Competitiveness Compass4 have similarly
emphasised the responsibility of public buyers in translating strategic orientations into
concrete purchasing decisions. In a geopolitical context marked by intensifying competition,
supply-chain vulnerabilities and the exploitation of economic dependencies, the way public
buyers spend money has become a matter of strategic relevance.
The European Court of Auditors5 highlighted a number of shortcomings of the European
procurement practice. It found that competition for public contracts had decreased over the
past decade, that the participation of SMEs and cross-border bidders remained limited, and
that single-bid procedures had become increasingly common. It is against this background
that the Council, in its Conclusions of May 20246, invited the Commission to bring forward a
comprehensive action plan to address the shortcomings in public procurement legislation and
practice and to simplify the regulatory framework. The European Parliament adopted a
resolution on public procurement7 calling for a more strategic, simplified and competitive
framework. The Committee of the Regions8 and the European Economic and Social
1 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/draghi-report_en. 2 consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/competitiveness-compass_en. 5 2023 Special Report on public procurement in the EU
https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications?ref=SR-2023-28. 6 consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/24/council-adopts-conclusions-on-the-court-of-
auditors-report-on-public-procurement/pdf/. 7 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0174_EN.pdf. 8 https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2863/0379789.
EN 2 EN
Committee9 adopted opinions underlining the importance of public procurement as a driver of
local development, social progress and industrial resilience.
The European Commission's in-depth evaluation of the 2014 Directives confirmed that
today’s public procurement rules know significant shortcomings. It found that their
complexity and lack of flexibility creates significant legal uncertainty for both public buyers
and economic operators. Price-only awards remain prevalent and the uptake of social,
environmental and innovation requirements continue to be limited. Rules on market access for
non-EU companies lack clarity and no longer respond effectively to today's geopolitical
realities. Fragmented eProcurement systems prevent proper transparency and efficient
monitoring and oversight and despite improvements in transparency, data gaps and quality
issues at both EU and national level hamper effective governance, strategic decision-making
and the prevention of corruption.
The proposal for a Public Procurement Act seeks to address these challenges.
Simplifying and increasing the flexibility and coherence of procurement rules
The proposal replaces the three 2014 Directives with a single, directly applicable Regulation.
Consolidating the rules applicable to public contracts, utilities procurement and concessions
into a single legal instrument removes the complexity and inconsistency resulting from the
coexistence of separate legislative acts and divergent national transposition choices.
• Two new main procedures are proposed, both possible with or without selection
criteria, and with or without negotiations: an open procedure where economic operators
submit (first) tenders from the outset, and a dynamic procedure in which economic operators
first join and are later on invited to tender or negotiate for individual procurement
opportunities arising during the validity of the procedure. These two procedures are
complemented by an innovation procedure for the development and acquisition of innovative
solutions that the public buyers wishes to have developed by an economic operator to best
meet its needs.
• Market consultations are clarified and encouraged as a standard preparatory tool.
• Selection criteria are limited to what is necessary and proportionate, excessive
turnover requirements are curtailed, and unjustified demands for prior public-sector
experience are restricted.
Procurement rules continue to apply to entities in water, energy, transport and postal
services. In addition to specific exemptions, utilities may also be exempt where the relevant
activity is directly exposed to competition on markets with unrestricted access.
To further simplify the overall legislative framework, the rules on concessions are
incorporated in this Regulation. The revised procedural rules will apply both to public
contracts and concessions, complemented by adapted rules for concessions where needed to
take account of certain specific characteristics of concessions.
Increasing the uptake of strategic procurement
This Regulation establishes a coherent architecture for integrating strategic policy
objectives into procurement design, award and contract performance. The proposal reinforces
the quality dimension of award decisions. Contracts will as a rule be awarded on the basis of
the best price-quality ratio, with minimum quality weighting requirements, including higher
weighting for labour-intensive contracts.
9 https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/review-european-
public-procurement-legal-framework.
EN 3 EN
• On environmental procurement, the proposal provides clearer legal bases for the use
of environmental requirements throughout the procurement cycle. It strengthens the
contribution of procurement to circularity, recycled and refurbished content, waste recovery
and energy efficiency, and creates a framework for mandatory green procurement
requirements for certain product categories where divergent application of requirement risks
creating market fragmentation.
• On socially responsible procurement, the proposal highlights a number of important
societal objectives, including social inclusion, labour market integration, accessibility for
persons with disabilities, improved working conditions, up-skilling and re-skilling of the
workforce, gender equality and human rights in supply chains. It emphasises accessibility
obligations for persons with disabilities and preserves targeted instruments such as reserved
contracts and tailored rules for social, health and educational services.
• On innovation procurement, the new innovation procedure allows public buyers to
formulate societal challenges rather than fixed technical specifications, assess proposals
through a value assessment framework, test and validate approaches, and then procure the
resulting solutions.
Improving EU economic security and strategic autonomy
The proposal responds to the growing geopolitical significance of public procurement.
• Public buyers are enabled, and in certain contexts required, to address risks related to
security and public safety interests of the Union or Member States, linked to critical
infrastructure, sensitive information, cybersecurity, harmful critical dependencies, supply
disruption, and undue third-country influence.
• Without prejudice to acts covering specific products or services, new provisions on
resilience and security of supply apply in particular to contracts involving essential or
important entities and critical infrastructures.
• The proposal also modernises and clarifies the treatment of third-country participation,
in full respect of the Union’s international commitments:
• It clarifies the distinction between operators, and works, services or supplies that are
covered by the Union's international procurement commitments and those that are not and
establishes a common framework, supported by a Commission online tool (the
Access2Markets web portal developed by the European Commission to assist businesses with
international trade), to determine coverage. The Commission may restrict such coverage
where a market access analysis establishes that a third country has failed to provide national
treatment to Union operators contrary to its commitments, or where restriction is necessary to
protect essential Union interests.
• Public buyers may apply European preference requirements, including by
restricting participation, requiring minimum Union or covered origin, or granting evaluation
preferences. Where the Union's strategic interests so require, the Commission may close
specific procedures to non-covered operators, products or services.
This Regulation serves as a horizontal framework for European preference requirements and
has been designed so as not to conflict with the body of Union legislation which are sector-
specific, and which establish mechanisms for preference or restriction based on the origin of
economic operators or the specific goods or services offered in the context of public
procurement. This applies to rules that have already been adopted, such as Regulation (EU)
2024/2803 on the implementation of the Single European Sky, or more recent proposals such
as the Industrial Accelerator Act (COM 2026/0068) which are currently in the legislative
EN 4 EN
process. Therefore, the general rules of this Regulation apply unless the sector-specific act
provides otherwise, including regarding the determination of origin.
Moreover, in order to avoid excessive fragmentation of the legislative framework and to
ensure a coherent set of rules on public procurement, this Regulation also serves as a model
and a basis for future Union legislative acts establishing preference mechanisms based on
origin. This concerns compatibility with international agreements that include a public
procurement dimension, the way in which the origin of economic operators, goods, services
and works is defined. Any future European preference rules relating to public procurement
should be based as a starting point on the rules regarding the actual preference requirements
set out in this Regulation, and only adapted where necessary on account of the specific sectors
they will cover.
Facilitating access to procurement information, data and digital tools
The evaluation of the current Directives found that the digital ecosystem for procurement
remains fragmented, non-interoperable and insufficiently data driven. The proposal addresses
this through a substantially more integrated approach.
• It establishes a common digital ecosystem based on an interoperability network,
harmonised semantic standards and common specifications, enabling public buyers and
economic operators using different eProcurement systems to communicate through
interoperable digital services. A key innovation is the creation of an electronic eligibility
service built around digital business credentials and digital company profiles, implementing
the once-only principle.
• The proposal establishes National Public Procurement Data Spaces and a Union-
level Public Procurement Data Space, designed to support structured access to procurement
and contract lifecycle data. Publication obligations are expanded and rationalised across the
full procurement lifecycle.
The effective operation of the system will require an update of the Common Procurement
Vocabulary (CPV), established under Regulation (EC) No 213/2008.
Governance
The proposal strengthens governance, monitoring and professionalisation. Integrity
governance is reinforced through measures addressing fraud, collusion, corruption,
favouritism and conflicts of interest, ensuring that the simplification and strategic ambitions
of this Regulation are matched by stronger implementation capacity on the ground.
• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
The Commission’s evaluation highlights the concerns regarding the fragmentation of public
procurement rules within the EU legal framework. Contracting authorities and economic
operators must currently comply with a multitude of overlapping and, in some cases,
incoherent provisions across more than fifty sector-specific legal instruments. This a source of
legal uncertainty, disproportionate administrative burdens, and procedural inefficiencies in the
conduct of public procurement for both.
The Commission’s Communication ‘A Simpler, Clearer and Better Enforced EU Rulebook’10
mandates a ‘regulatory deep cleaning’ of public procurement rules to eliminate redundancies,
streamline procedures, and enhance legal clarity. The proposed Public Procurement
Regulation therefore undertakes a comprehensive coherence exercise, focusing on
consolidating into the Public Procurement Act sectoral rules relating to public procurement
10 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/simpler-clearer-and-better-enforced-eu-rulebook_en.
EN 5 EN
procedural rules, horizontal requirements, and empowerment provisions, fully preserving the
policy objectives of sectoral acts.
Exclusion grounds
Currently, grounds for exclusion from the participation in a procurement procedure of
economic operators are fragmented across several sectoral acts, creating legal uncertainty and
unequal treatment. The proposal consolidates these rules into a single, coherent framework by
rationalising existing grounds for exclusion from the participation in a procurement procedure
as follows:
• 7 mandatory exclusion grounds from sectoral acts based on Title V of the TFEU that
are linked to serious criminal offences, including human trafficking, corruption, and terrorism,
and are intrinsic and inseparable elements of the acts in which they are laid down, are
maintained in those acts, but mirrored as well in this Regulation.
• 2 exclusion grounds originating from legal acts based on other legal bases are
removed from those acts and reflected in this Regulation. This concerns the exclusion grounds
so far enshrined the Shipments of Waste Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1157), and the
Eco-Design Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1781), which are deleted from these acts.
Rather than disappearing entirely, however, breaches of these instruments are absorbed into
existing exclusion grounds in this Regulation.
Horizontal requirements
In addition to procedural rules, the current public procurement framework is further
complicated by the multiplication of horizontal requirements in legislation on procurement
decisions. To address this, the present proposal transfers relevant horizontal ‘what to buy’
provisions into dedicated chapters of the Act, structured around the Union’s strategic
procurement priorities (green, social, security, and resilience), streamlining where needed to
ensure consistency in the application of these requirements.
Empowerments
Finally, five sectoral instruments contain separate and uncoordinated empowerments for
establishing green public procurement requirements in certain areas. To remedy these
inefficiencies, the present proposal repeals those sectoral empowerments for the adoption of
procurement-related delegated or implementing acts, and replaces them with a single,
horizontal empowerment allowing the Commission to make certain environmental
requirements mandatory for public buyers under certain circumstances.
This proposal includes targeted amendments to the sectoral instruments concerned which
are strictly necessary to achieve the proposal's objective of legal coherence. Further possible
modifications of those sectoral instruments are entirely outside the scope of the present
proposal. The need for any such modifications may be assessed, as appropriate, in the context
of the review of each of the sectoral instruments concerned, in accordance with their
respective review clauses and policy cycles. The Commission will constructively engage
with the co-legislators to ensure that the legislative process on the present proposal fully
preserves its essential object.
Beyond the existing acquis, several legislative initiatives currently under negotiation or
pending publication also contain, or are expected to contain, public procurement-related
provisions. This is the case, for example, of the proposal for a Cyber Security Act 2.0 (COM
2026/001), the proposal for a Cloud and AI Development Act (COM 2026/0138), the proposal
for an Industrial Accelerator Act (2026/0068) and the proposal for a Chips Act 2.0 (COM
2026/0139). The coherence exercise carried out by the present proposal can only deliver its
EN 6 EN
full added value if these ongoing initiatives are themselves aligned with the horizontal
framework established by the Public Procurement Regulation, while maintaining sector-
specific rules on What to buy in those acts The Commission has worked to ensure such
coherence internally when preparing these texts and it is essential that the co-legislators also
take into consideration the need for coherence and consistency with the Public Procurement
Regulation. Particular attention should be paid to provisions relating to European preference
requirements as divergent sectoral approaches would be especially detrimental to legal
certainty, equal treatment of economic operators and proper functioning of the internal
market. The Commission will engage constructively with the European Parliament and the
Council throughout the negotiations of these parallel files.
• Consistency with other Union policies
The proposed Regulation also interacts with a distinct category of Union policies, which use
public procurement as a tool to pursue specific objectives without, however, relying on or
modifying the horizontal procurement framework. They establish autonomous regimes that
operate alongside the general rules and respond to their own policy rationale.
The proposal does not interfere with the procurement regimes established in the defence and
security sectors, which fall outside its scope and under Directive 2009/81/EC. It is without
prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 (SAFE) and Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 (EDIRPA)
on cooperative defence procurement and leaves unaffected the joint procurement mechanisms
under Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2372 on health crises. It
is similarly consistent with the resilience-oriented obligations of Regulation (EU) 2024/2747
(IMERA).
Public procurement is increasingly used as a lever to defend the Union's strategic interests
in its external economic relations and to ensure a level playing field for European economic
operators. The European preference measures are fully compatible with the international
framework to which the Union is a party, in particular the WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA). The proposal operates without prejudice to Union trade policy
instruments containing procurement-specific provisions, notably Regulation (EU) 2022/2560
on foreign subsidies, as well as measures under the Union's trade defence and restrictive
measures toolbox, such as Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 (Anti-Coercion Instrument) and
Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning Russia. Regarding Regulation (EU)
2022/1031 on the International Procurement Instrument, Chapter 5 of the proposed
Regulation explicitly incorporates, including through cross-references, the principles and
concepts of this Regulation concerning the origin of economic operators and goods.
In parallel to this Regulation, the Commission is proposing a European Innovation Act which
proposes a specific regime for the procurement of research and development services,
meaning the procurement of fundamental research, industrial research and experimental
development up to original development. Research and development service contracts,
including pre-commercial procurement are thus excluded from the scope of this Regulation.
Contrary to the specific regime proposed in the European Innovation Act, the Public
Procurement Act also covers the purchase of the commercial end-product.
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
• Legal basis
Article 114 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“the Treaty”) is the appropriate
legal basis for this initiative, as its primary objective is to establish a simpler and more
efficient harmonised public procurement framework across the Member States, thereby
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improving the functioning of the internal market in line with Article 26 of the Treaty. While
the initiative also touches upon matters related to the objectives pursued under Articles 173
and 207 TFEU, these aspects are clearly ancillary to its primary aim of harmonising public
procurement rules and therefore do not justify reliance on those provisions as legal bases.
• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)
Under Article 5 TEU, the principle of subsidiarity is respected as it balances contracting
authorities’ discretion with harmonisation measures and elements necessary to achieve the
objectives of this initiative, which cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States alone.
Public procurement is a key component of the EU single market, enabling cross-border
competition and broader access to markets for contracting authorities. However,
fragmentation in implementation undermines its effectiveness as an internal market
instrument. This calls for further EU-level action to ensure coherence and simplification and
to fully unlock the potential of an EU-wide procurement market for businesses and
contracting authorities alike.
In line with recent CJEU rulings11, the treatment of third-country economic operators in
public procurement falls within the common commercial policy, an exclusive competence
of the Union, and can therefore be regulated only at EU level. Only the Union, and not the
Member States acting individually, is competent to establish a coherent and uniform
framework governing the participation of third-country bidders. Action at EU level is
therefore both justified and necessary to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field across
the internal market.
• Proportionality
The proposed revision respects the principle of proportionality, as set out in Article 5 TEU
and follows what is adapted and necessary to achieve the objectives of ensuring a more
efficient, transparent and coherent EU public procurement framework, completing the
Union’s strategic objectives.
The establishment of the EU digital ecosystem is necessary to reduce fragmentation,
administrative burden and costs by mandating the interconnection of Member States’
eProcurement systems into a single integrated EU public procurement marketplace, thereby
also reducing compliance costs and facilitating cross-border participation and enhancing
overall market efficiency.
The European preference provisions in sector-specific acts are necessary to respond to the
new geopolitical imperatives, while fully respecting the Union’s international commitments.
They are designed in a proportionate manner so as not to impose disproportionate financial
burdens on contracting authorities’ budgets. They aim to limit administrative burden for
public buyers, notably through implementation support and the use of digital tools within the
procurement marketplace.
Determining at Union level the Best Price-Quality Ratio (“BPQR”) as the standard award
method with a “comply or explain” mechanism is necessary to achieve common social,
environmental and innovation policy objectives of the Union. While the impact on fraud and
irregularity risks depends on administrative capacity, several safeguards reduce such risks,
notably the requirement that all quality criteria remain linked to the subject-matter of the
contract, limiting potential distortions of competition.
11 Case C-652/22, Kolin İnşaat Turizm Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v State Commission for the Supervision of
Public Procurement Procedures; Case C-266/22, CRRC Qingdao Sifang Co. Ltd and Astra Vagoane
Călători SA v Autoritatea pentru Reformă Feroviară and Alstom Ferroviaria SpA.
EN 8 EN
• Choice of the instrument
The proposed regulatory changes address the shortcomings identified in the evaluation of
the 2014 Directives by enhancing coherence and legal clarity through the merger of the three
Directives into a single Regulation and the streamlining of the procedural architecture. This
responds to persistent fragmentation and insufficient harmonisation across several EU
instruments, which has increased complexity, legal uncertainty and compliance costs. By
establishing a directly applicable Regulation, the framework creates a single set of rules at
Union level, improving consistency of application, reducing fragmentation and avoiding
divergent national implementation (“gold-plating”), while preserving necessary flexibility. In
line with the European Council’s “One Europe, One Market” mandate and the Letta Report’s
recommendation, this ensures greater legal certainty and a more level playing field across all
Member States.
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
• Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation
The evaluation aimed to assess the effects between 2016 and 2024 of the 2014 Directives on
public procurement. The evaluation provided an evidence-based assessment of the
effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and relevance of those Directives, and its findings
informed both the drafting process and the accompanying Impact Assessment.
The evaluation established that the objective of creating greater legal clarity and certainty
with respect to scope and coverage has not been achieved, and that the remaining objectives
have been only partially achieved: namely the simplification, streamlining and increased
flexibility of procurement procedures; the use of public procurement to support other policy
objectives such as social, environmental and innovation policy; the opening of markets to
greater cross-border competition and the facilitation of SME participation; and the
strengthening of the governance framework to prevent irregularities. While confirming that all
these objectives remain highly relevant today, the evaluation also found that the Directives are
not fit for purpose to ensure economic security and to respond to supply chain disruptions and
dependencies.
• Stakeholder consultations
In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines, the Commission conducted an ambitious and
inclusive consultation process designed to gather reliable evidence from the full range of
public procurement actors.
A combined call for evidence and public consultation ran from 3 November 2025 to 26
January 2026, generating 745 and 1 037 responses respectively, from business associations,
companies, public authorities, trade unions, NGOs and citizens, overwhelmingly from EU and
EEA countries. The open public consultation was structured around three thematic sections:
efficiency and transparency, the balance between green, social, innovation and other
objectives, and economic security and strategic autonomy.
These public consultations were complemented by dedicated engagement with Member States
and experts through the Expert Group on Public Procurement (EXPP), the Expert Group on
Electronic Public Procurement (EXEP) and the Stakeholder Expert Group on Public
Procurement (SEGPP), as well as targeted hearings with social partners and NGOs. Particular
attention was paid to the participation of SMEs, who were consulted specifically through the
Network of SME Envoys and a dedicated SME panel gathering 108 responses.
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• Collection and use of expertise
The results of these consultations, and in particular of the open public consultation, were
carefully taken into consideration in the preparation of the proposal. Respondents broadly
agreed on the need to move beyond the lowest-cost paradigm, increase procedural flexibility
and reduce administrative burden through full digitalisation, while strong support (exceeding
80% across all EU and EEA respondent groups) was expressed for prioritising European
goods and services in strategic sectors, notably through the expansion of non-price criteria
and the introduction of "European preference" mechanisms. SMEs identified simplification,
digitalisation and improved data availability as key priorities and pointed to the difficulties
caused by divergent national implementation. Their input directly informed measures aimed
at facilitating SME access.
• Impact assessment
In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines, this proposal is based on an impact assessment
that analyses the problem and sub-problems related to revision of the Public Procurement
Directives, in a global context of competitiveness challenges. The impact assessment
identifies possible policy options to address problem-drivers and assesses their likely impacts.
The impact assessment was structured to reflect the open public consultation, the call for
evidence, and the various consultations.
The impact assessment initially received a negative opinion from the Regulatory Scrutiny
Board on 17 April 2026. The Board cited several shortcomings that had to be addressed,
including insufficient analysis of coherence between the intervention and the sectoral acts
containing public procurement provisions, and inadequate assessment of the scale of problems
related to environmental, social, and innovation objectives. The Regulatory Scrutiny Board
also pointed out a need for better specifying and justifying the preferred policy options,
particularly regarding how quality would be defined under BPQR procurement, and for better
evaluating the costs, benefits, and proportionality of the preferred option, including its effects
on competition and prices. Finally, the Board highlighted that the report lacked a thorough
assessment of the combined impacts and unintended consequences of the preferred option,
notably the risks of simultaneously introducing more negotiations and greater reliance on
BPQR principles.
The above-mentioned points were addressed in a revised impact assessment submitted to the
Board, which issued a positive opinion with reservations on 8 June 2026. The Board
requested to provide further detail on the new open procedure with possible negotiations and
on BPQR and its “comply or explain” approach, and more clarity on the cost-benefit analysis.
These clarifications were provided.
The impact assessment is built around a set of 4 specific objectives that tackle the problem
drivers identified. It sets out two or three policy options for each specific objective (Flexibility
[FLX]; Environmental, Social and Innovation [ESI]; Buy European [BEU], and digital
marketplace [MPL]).
• FLX – [FLX.1] Maintains the existing procurement architecture while introducing
targeted flexibility, allowing the choice of procedure, permitting material corrections in
tenders where they do not alter the procurement's substance, improving guidance on
preliminary market consultations, and clarifying concepts such as "crisis" and concession risk.
It also aligns rules across directives and cross-references exclusion grounds with sectoral
legislation. [FLX.2] is merging the three existing directives into a single act and restructuring
procedures into an open procedure with possible negotiation, a dynamic procedure, an
innovation procedure, and contracts requiring only publication of public summary of result
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such as in emergencies. It also integrates exclusion grounds from existing sectorial acts and
where possible deletes them from the sectoral acts. It promotes pre-procurement
consultations, standardises negotiation phases with stronger transparency safeguards, and
strengthens anti-fraud and traceability requirements while removing sectoral duplication.
• ESI – [ESI.1] incentivises quality-based procurement by making the Best Price-
Quality Ratio the default award method under a "comply or explain" logic, with minimum
quality weightings. It promotes ecolabels, life cycle costing and performance standards,
frames innovation procurement, limits full subcontracting, and clarifies the link between
working conditions and the contract subject-matter. [ESI.2] builds on this by integrating
relevant horizontal provisions from other Union acts, harmonising definitions and centralising
enabling provisions for delegated and implementing acts. [ESI.3] makes the BPQR with
minimum quality weights compulsory with no opt-out, introduces binding Member State
targets and reporting obligations, makes EU Ecolabel use mandatory where applicable, further
restricts subcontracting chains, and integrates sector-specific requirements into the general
framework.
• BEU – [BEU.1] would introduce a voluntary European preference by codifying
existing CJEU case law and allowing contracting authorities to restrict participation to
EU/EEA and other internationally covered economic operators or goods (GPA and relevant
FTAs). It provides practical tools for verifying eligible countries and guidance on rules of
origin. [BEU.2] offers a framework for coherent European preference in selected sectors in
future acts, through a toolbox of mechanisms to public buyers, while standardising
definitions, origin rules and documentation and integrating these tools into the EU digital
procurement infrastructure. [BEU.3] makes European preference mandatory by requiring the
exclusion of non-EU/EEA or non-covered third-country economic operators, subject only to
limited safeguards such as lack of competition or excessive cost.
• MPL – [MPL.1] establishes a decentralised network of interconnected national
eProcurement platforms linked through an EU interoperability layer. It introduces a digital
business credential tool for verified company identity and eligibility data, a common
procurement eligibility service, and a unified data management framework, strengthening
transparency and anti-fraud capabilities through systematic data exchange, risk analysis tools
and mandatory reporting. [MPL.2] instead replaces national systems with a single EU-level
eProcurement platform for all procedures under the act, fully centralising procurement
processes, data management, monitoring and compliance tools at Union level.
On the basis of the data that are available, the proposal is expected to deliver significant net
cost savings, principally through the creation of the public procurement digital ecosystem. For
economic operators, the new requirements entail recurring costs of EUR 477 million, which
are more than offset by recurring savings of EUR 1 billion from the digital ecosystem and
other simplifications. For contracting authorities, the new recurring costs amount to
EUR 141 million, while the digital ecosystem yields annual savings of EUR 220 million. On a
per procedure basis, the average contracting authority saves approximately 4.4 %, whereas the
average economic operator saves around 8.9 %. Overall, the proposal therefore results in
substantial net savings for both economic operators and contracting authorities.
• Regulatory fitness and simplification
The proposal simplifies the legal framework by replacing the three existing Directives with a
single directly applicable Regulation. This reduces fragmentation, removes divergences
resulting from national transposition, and provides a more coherent and accessible set of rules
for public buyers and economic operators. It also streamlines the procedural framework by
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reducing the number of procedures and establishing more flexible and operational tools
adapted to different purchasing needs.
The proposal is also the product of a comprehensive regulatory deep cleaning exercise. The
consolidation into a single reference legislation, this Regulation, of provisions on exclusion
grounds, horizontal “what to buy” provisions and empowerments for green public
procurement that are currently scattered across sectoral legal acts will greatly simplify the
application of these rules in practice and enhance their readability and legal certainty.
Further simplification is achieved through greater use of digital solutions and structured data,
including interoperable digital tools, an electronic eligibility service based on the once-only
principle, and harmonised publication and data requirements, reducing repetitive
administrative formalities and improving efficiency. The proposal also reduces burdens for
economic operators, in particular SMEs, by limiting disproportionate selection requirements
and facilitating cross-border participation. At the same time, the proposal preserves the core
guarantees of transparency, equal treatment, competition and accountability required by
Union public procurement law.
• Fundamental rights
The proposal does not impact the Charter of Fundamental Rights
4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
The proposed initiative is expected to have a total financial implication for seven years of
about EUR 163.5 million, including a yearly 2% inflation rate.12 This budget covers around
EUR 142.2 million for operational appropriations and about EUR 21.3 million for human
resources. As stated in the LFDS, the annual breakdown foreseen is around EUR 22.0 million
in 2028, EUR 22.4 million in 2029, EUR 22.9 million in 2030, EUR 23.3 million in 2031,
EUR 23.8 million in 2032, EUR 24.3 million in 2032 and EUR 24.8 million in 2034.
The budget is expected to be financed under the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-
2034. The estimated budgetary impact does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial
Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-
2027 period remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-
2034 and thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary procedure.
5. OTHER ELEMENTS
• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
To ensure effective implementation, this Regulation provides for a phased approach for those
elements that require technical development or institutional adaptation, notably the digital
ecosystem including the electronic eligibility service, and the National Public Procurement
Data Spaces and Public Procurement Data Space. The Commission will support
implementation through delegated and implementing acts, guidance, technical specifications,
standardisation work, and, where appropriate, operational tools and digital services.
Member States will be required to designate a national coordinating authority and to put in
place the governance arrangements necessary to ensure effective coordination between the
12 The difference in costs presented in the legislative financial statement and in the impact assessment
arises because the legislative financial statement includes all costs, whereas the impact assessment
accounts only for the additional costs introduced by the policy measures on top of the so-called
business-as-usual costs. There are also slight differences in cost classification and presentation
stemming from the requirements of the financial regulation.
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authorities and bodies involved in the application of this Regulation. They will also be
required to support the professionalisation of procurement, including through national
strategies and appropriate support structures, and to ensure that the relevant actors have the
capacity to apply the new framework effectively.
This Regulation establishes a reinforced monitoring framework based on structured
procurement data. Each Member State will be required to establish or designate a National
Public Procurement Data Space as the central national access point for procurement and
contract lifecycle data. Those national data spaces will feed into a Union-level Public
Procurement Data Space managed by the Commission. This will enable more systematic
monitoring of procurement markets, strategic procurement outcomes, competition, cross-
border participation, SME access, and risks affecting integrity, resilience and security of
supply.
Member States will be required to establish an evidence-based framework to monitor the
functioning of their public procurement systems and markets and to make the results of that
monitoring publicly available at least once a year. Member States will report to the
Commission on the results of those analyses and on measures taken or envisaged to address
structural shortcomings where identified.
The Commission will continuously monitor the functioning of public procurement in the
Union on the basis of the data available in the Public Procurement Data Space. It will provide,
every three years, an analysis of the public procurement system across the Union.
In addition, this Regulation requires the Commission to carry out an evaluation seven years
after its entry into force and every seven years thereafter.
• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
Part I sets out the general provisions on subject-matter, scope, in particular the relevant
thresholds and the mechanisms for updating them, principles and definitions. This Regulation
requires public buyers to treat Union and covered economic operators equally and without
discrimination, act transparently and proportionately, and ensure the integrity of public
procurement procedures. Public contracts must ensure best quality for money, avoid undue
restrictions on competition, and aim at contributing to the achievement of the Union’s broader
policy objectives).
Part II defines relevant actors who participate in public procurement. Title I starts by
defining the public buyers covered by the rules, then covers utilities, listing the sectors
concerned and allowing exemptions where activities are directly exposed to competition and
setting out the procedure for requesting an exemption from the Commission. Title II concerns
economic operators, including groups, the use of third-party capacities, and subcontracting,
with well-calibrated rules framing the use of this instrument to avoid abuses. This title
furthermore sets out mandatory exclusion grounds, relating to serious offences such as
corruption, fraud, terrorism, trafficking, environmental crime, and child exploitation, and
optional exclusion grounds that relate to situations casting doubts on the reliability or integrity
of the economic operator concerned. The provisions on selection criteria set out clear rules on
the financial, technical and professional capacities of economic operators that public buyers
can require, if they wish to use selection criteria in their procurement procedures.
Part III lays down rules on procedures. Title I deals with public procurement procedures and
integrates provisions on planning, market consultations, choice of procedures, estimation of
the contract value, and the conduct of negotiations, which are allowed in all procedures, with
the appropriate safeguards for transparency and non-discrimination. The procedures include
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the open procedure, the dynamic procedure, the innovation procedure, and contracts requiring
only publication of public summary of result such as in emergencies and crises.
Title II deals with the strategic design and execution of public procurement, streamlining the
relevant definitions and provisions for taking into account considerations relating to the
Union’s broader policy objectives:
• Chapter 1 concerns green public procurement. It includes a definition of green public
procurement and enshrines obligations relating to fostering the circular economy, resource
efficiency, energy efficiency, and green public procurement requirements for certain products.
• Chapter 2 covers socially responsible public procurement, including accessibility,
reserved contracts for organisations whose main aim is the social and professional integration
of persons with disabilities or disadvantaged persons, and contracts for social, health and
educational services.
• Chapter 3 concerns public procurement of innovation. It clarifies innovation objectives
in public procurement, procurement of innovation, and intellectual property rights.
• Chapter 4 deals with security and resilience and clarifies how security considerations
are to be considered in public procurement. It provides a non-exhaustive list of the security
and public safety interests to be considered, and it regulates the termination of contracts and
the exclusion of operators during contract implementation for security reasons. It also seeks to
ensure compliance with cybersecurity requirements and defines resilience and security of
supply for critical entities and infrastructures.
• Chapter 5 clarifies the concept of European preference by defining covered economic
operators, goods, services and works: where they originate from a third country party to the
WTO Government Procurement Agreement or from a third country that has concluded a
bilateral or multilateral trade agreement with the Union. It sets out European preference
requirements, including the possibility to restrict or reject certain economic operators and
tenders. It also provides a framework for mandatory European preference in sector-specific
EU legal acts, while laying down exceptions where public buyers may decide not to apply
European preference.
Title III lays down horizontal provisions covering key aspects of the procurement process,
including excluded and mixed contracts, among them defence and security contracts, but also
various services not subject to procurement disciplines such as legal services, arbitration and
conciliation services, employment contracts etc. This Regulation clarifies the important
concept of subject-matter link and establishes clear provisions on technical specifications,
including the use of standards and labels, and on award criteria, in particular the use of quality
criteria through the BPQR. Title III further regulates other aspects of the conduct of
procedures, including confidentiality, conflicts of interest, prior involvement of operators,
deadlines, procurement documents, division into lots, abnormally low tenders, corrections and
cancellations, and framework agreements. Finally, it addresses contract execution, including
modification and termination of contracts, adjustment mechanisms, payments, and publication
and documentation requirements.
Part IV regulates concessions, specifies exclusions, and lays down rules on preparation,
design, and award procedures, including structured risk assessment. It also covers concession
duration and contract management (such as modifications and termination).
Part V defines the framework for the digital ecosystem sustaining the implementation of this
regulation. It creates interoperability rules for a secure public procurement data-exchange
network. This enables electronic communication between public buyers and economic
operators through different eProcurement service providers. It also sets obligations for the
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Commission to help providers with the eligibility check (exclusion grounds, selection criteria,
requirements of origin).
Part VI covers transparency and governance. The rules on data spaces (Title I) regulate the
setting up and functions of national public procurement data spaces on the one hand, and on
the other hand of the Public Procurement Data Space established by the Commission, a
central repository of procurement information originating from all NPPDS for the monitoring
of public procurement procedures and contracts at Union level. Title II sets out different
governance tools and mechanisms allowing for regular monitoring of the procurement system
to assess performance and support improvements; this includes the designation of a national
coordinating authority to oversee and coordinate implementation; and appropriate measures to
strengthen the professionalisation of public procurement as long term and strategic elements
of public governance.
Part VII sets final provisions, determining the exercise of delegation and giving power to the
Commission to adopt delegated acts. This Regulation repeals Directives 2014/23/EU,
Directive 2014/24/EU, Directive 2014/25/EU, and amends the horizontal public procurement
provisions included in Regulation (EU) 2014/1781, Regulation (EU) 2024/1735, Regulation
(EU) 2023/1542, Regulation (EU) 2024/3110, Regulation (EU) 2025/40, Directive
2023/1791, Directive 2008/98/EC, Regulation (EU) 2024/1252, Directive 2019/882, Directive
2022/2381, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Directive (EU) 2024/1760, Regulation (EU)
2024/1157; it also amends Regulation 1370/2007. Finally, it sets a review target seven years
after adoption and a deferred entry into application of two years.
EN 15 EN
2026/0265 (COD)
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on public contracts and concessions, repealing Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and
2014/25/EU, and amending Regulations (EC) No 1370/2007, (EU) 2023/1542, (EU)
2024/1157, (EU) 2024/1252, (EU) 2024/1735, (EU) 2024/1781, (EU) 2024/2847, (EU)
2024/3110 and (EU) 2025/40, and Directives 2008/98/EC, (EU) 2019/882, (EU) 2022/2381,
(EU) 2023/1791 and (EU) 2024/1760 (Public Procurement Act)
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular
Article 114 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,
Whereas:
(1) The award of public contracts and concessions by or on behalf of Member States’
authorities has to comply with the principles laid down in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (the Treaty), and in particular the free movement
of goods, freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, as well as the
principles deriving therefrom, such as equal treatment, non-discrimination, mutual
recognition, proportionality and transparency. For procurement procedures for public
contracts and concessions above a certain monetary value, it is necessary to establish
harmonised rules for procurement procedures so as to eliminate obstacles to the
functioning of the internal market and prevent the emergence of new ones in the form
of regulatory divergences between Member States, including as regards the pursuit of
strategic policy objectives. The evaluation of the current existing Directives
2014/23/EU1, 2014/24/EU2 and 2014/25/EU3 of the Parliament and the Council of the
2014 Directives confirmed that today’s public procurement rules know significant
1 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the
award of concession contracts (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/23/oj). 2 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj). 3 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on
procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and
repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 243, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/25/oj).
EN 16 EN
shortcomings. It found that their complexity and lack of flexibility creates significant
legal uncertainty for both public buyers and economic operators. Price-only awards
remain prevalent and the uptake of social, environmental and innovation requirements
continue to be limited. Rules on market access for non-EU companies lack clarity and
no longer respond effectively to today's geopolitical realities. Fragmented
eProcurement systems prevent proper transparency and efficient monitoring and
oversight and despite improvements in transparency, data gaps and quality issues at
both EU and national level hamper effective governance, strategic decision-making
and the prevention of corruption. This Regulation seeks to address these challenges
and is expected to ensure that public procurement is further opened to competition and
will at the same time serve as a tool for efficient public investments in line with the
EU’s broader policy objectives. Obligations under other Union legislation continue to
apply and remain unaffected.
(2) This Regulation is to lay down rules for procurement procedures for public contracts
and concessions above certain thresholds. As regards contracts that are not covered by
this Regulation, Member States remain free to regulate the award of such contracts
subject to ensuring respect of any applicable Union legislation, including Treaty
principles in case of cross-border interest. This Regulation establishes procedural rules
for awarding the contracts and concessions covered, as well as the procurement related
aspects of the planning and the execution of those contracts, sets out how to take into
account broader policy objectives and establishes a framework for a common digital
ecosystem to be used in their planning, award and implementation of as well as
mechanisms and requirements to ensure efficiency and accountability of public
purchasing. By contrast, this Regulation should not regulate the overall administrative
environment in which those public procurement procedures take place. Hence,
national rules on the functioning and organisation of public administration in general,
in particular those relating to budgetary and financial controls, and to decision-making
structures inside public administration, remain unaffected. National civil law and
general rules on contractual relationships, which form part of the broader national
legal framework in which the rules laid down in this Regulation will operate, also
remain unaffected.
(3) It should be recalled that nothing in this Regulation obliges Member States to contract
out or externalise the provision of services that they wish to provide themselves or to
organise by means other than public contracts within the meaning of this Regulation.
The provision of services based on laws, regulations or employment contracts should
not be covered. In some Member States, this might be the case for certain
administrative and government services such as executive and legislative services, the
provision of certain services to the community, such as foreign affairs services or
justice services or compulsory social security services.
(4) This Regulation should not affect the social security legislation of the Member States,
nor should it deal with the liberalisation of services of general economic interest,
reserved to public or private entities, or with the privatisation of public entities
providing services. Member States are free to organise the provision of compulsory
social services or of other services either as services of general economic interest or as
non-economic services of general interest or as a mixture thereof. Non-economic
services of general interest should not fall within the scope of this Regulation.
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(5) Council Decision 94/800/EC4 approved among other things, the conclusion of the
World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement (the ‘GPA’) on
behalf of the Union. The GPA establishes a multilateral framework of balanced rights
and obligations relating to public contracts with a view to achieving the liberalisation
and expansion of world trade. For contracts covered by Annexes 1, 2, 4 and 5 and the
General Notes to the Union’s Appendix I to the GPA, as well as by other relevant
international agreements by which the Union is bound, public buyers should, in order
to comply with the obligations under those agreements apply this Regulation to
economic operators of third countries that are Parties to the agreements. All new
elements introduced in this Regulation have been designed with a view to ensuring full
alignment with the Union’s obligations under the GPA.
(6) The thresholds established by this Regulation should serve to determine the contracts
and concessions to which the full set of Union procurement rules applies. Those
thresholds should continue to reflect the Union’s international commitments under the
GPA, while ensuring legal certainty, and administrative practicability. In order to
ensure consistency with the Union’s international obligations under the GPA, the
thresholds applicable to public procurement should be aligned with those expressed in
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as defined by the International Monetary Fund, and
therefore should be periodically revised, based on the average value of the euro against
SDR. Apart from those periodic mathematical adjustments, the Commission will
explore with GPA partners the question of an increase in the thresholds set in the
GPA.
(7) In order to ensure the proper functioning of the Union’s internal market in public
procurement, public procurement should be guided by the principle of best quality for
public money, thereby serving the objective of efficient public spending and
investment, and public buyers should treat economic operators that originates from the
Union, a third-country that is party to the GPA or a third-party that has concluded a
bilateral or multilateral trade agreement with the Union, under the conditions laid
down in that agreement, equally and without discrimination, acting in a transparent
and proportionate manner. Public buyers should also take appropriate measures to
safeguard the integrity, impartiality and fairness of the procurement process, and
should not design their procurement to exclude it from the scope of this Regulation or
to unduly restrict competition. Respect for these principles is essential to guarantee
effective competition, lift and prevent barriers to market access and help ensure
efficient public investments.
(8) Public procurement constitutes a key instrument for advancing the Union’s strategic
policy objectives. It is necessary to regulate the strategic use of public procurement to
avoid that diverging practices by public buyers throughout the Union create obstacles
to the internal market. Public procurement procedures should be guided by the Union
policy objectives, including strengthening the competitiveness of the internal market,
supporting innovation and the clean industrial base, achieving climate and
environmental targets, a fair and inclusive society, in particular fair working
conditions, including as fostered by social dialogue, and enhancing the Union’s safety,
security, resilience and economic security, including through strategic independence.
Taking into account the diversity of national systems and respecting the autonomy of
4 Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the
European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the
Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) (OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1994/800/oj).
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social partners, public buyers can use socially responsible public procurement to
support high-quality jobs and social fairness, including through acknowledging the
role of collective bargaining.
(9) It is appropriate to maintain rules on procurement by entities operating in the utility
sectors of water, energy, including gas, understood as natural gas or any other gas,
transport and postal services, since national authorities continue to be able to steer the
behaviour of those entities and/or the existence of special or exclusive rights.
Contracting entities should be exempted from this Regulation when the activities they
carry out are directly exposed to competition on markets to which access is not
restricted. Whether a given sector, or parts thereof, is directly exposed to competition
should be assessed in respect of the specific area in which the activity, or the parts
thereof concerned, are carried out. The so-called ‘relevant geographical market’ is
either the territory of a Member State or parts of it. The notion of ‘relevant
geographical market’ should be based on similar criteria set out in other Union
legislation.
(10) Direct exposure to competition should be assessed by the Commission upon request of
a Member State or a contracting entity. In order to render easily accessible, the
procedure for establishing that this Regulation does not apply to a certain activity, it
should be clarified that an exemption decision can already be taken in the preparatory
phase before the actual submission of a formal request, in situations where the
information already available to the Commission allows it to conclude that the
conditions for exempting the activity are met. Furthermore, to facilitate the
Commission’s assessment in the formal phase, it is preferable that requests for
exemption are accompanied by, or incorporate, a reasoned and substantiated recent
position on the competitive situation in the sector concerned, adopted by an
independent national authority that is competent in relation to the activity concerned or
for the application of competition rules, or both. Where the circumstances which are
the basis of an implementing act establishing that this Regulation does not apply to a
certain activity substantially change, such implementing act may be modified
corrected or revoked.
(11) To enhance access to business opportunities in public procurement and increase
competition for the award of contracts, the participation of groups of economic
operators should be further facilitated. This is of particular importance for micro, small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which often face difficulties in accessing larger
procurement opportunities. Therefore, the rules governing economic operators
participating jointly in a procurement procedure should be clear and simple, while
ensuring that only requirements that are necessary and proportionate for the proper
performance of the contract are imposed.
(12) Subcontracting parts of a contract remains a practical and powerful tool of
collaboration between economic operators. The rules for subcontracting set out in this
Regulation should preserve contractual freedom and facilitate access for SMEs,
enabling them to participate effectively in public procurement and related supply
chains. Subcontracting the entirety of a contract should however not be allowed under
this Regulation, in particular in order to avoid that subcontracting is misused
especially in sectors which may be more vulnerable to labour exploitation owing to
cost pressures and complex subcontracting chains. To ensure better transparency of
subcontracting, public buyers should require tenderers to indicate any intended share
of subcontracting and any proposed subcontractors. Where provided for by national
law, public buyers should be able to require the main contractor, after award and
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before performance, to inform them of the tasks to be subcontracted and of the identity
of the subcontractors beyond the cases provided for under this Regulation. The rules
for subcontracting in this Regulation leave unaffected the existing rules in the field of
employment and social protection applicable at Union and national level, in particular
as regards the duties, responsibilities and liability of employers throughout the
subcontracting chain.
(13) Economic operators should be excluded from participation in procedures where they
have been convicted by final judgment for certain serious offences. So-called self-
cleaning measures should not be permitted for mandatory exclusions, while for
optional exclusions, which are related to the reliability of the economic operators, they
should be able to rebut the existence of the exclusion ground, which preserves their
rights to be heard, or demonstrate their reliability by means of self-cleaning measures.
In that context, due account should be taken of any cooperation with the investigating
authorities aimed at clarifying the relevant facts and circumstances. For example, in
cases involving violations of competition rules, such cooperation may take the form of
participation in a leniency programme or settlement procedure before the Commission
or a national competition authority. In particular, the granting of immunity from fines
under a leniency programme should, in principle, constitute strong evidence
demonstrating the reliability of the economic operator despite the existence of the
exclusion ground. Member States should not add other grounds for exclusion based on
criteria relating to professional situation of the tenderer.
(14) Selection criteria should remain limited to what is necessary to ensure that the
economic operator has the technical, professional, legal and financial capacity to
perform the contract, so as to ensure the widest possible access to public procurement,
in particular for SMEs. Public buyers should not require prior experience in public
contracts as such, unless this is strictly justified by the complexity of the contract or
the nature of the subject-matter concerned, and should also avoid excessive financial
requirements which can unnecessarily exclude SMEs and newer market entrants from
procurement opportunities.
(15) In order to simplify and modernise the verification of the eligibility of economic
operators in public procurement procedures, the electronic eligibility service should
constitute the principal means of proof for the absence of exclusion grounds,
compliance with selection criteria and, where relevant, fulfilment of origin-related
requirements. The digital business credential tool used in this context should enable
the retrieval of structured evidence from relevant national and Union databases, which
should be interconnected to the electronic eligibility service to allow for the use of
automated verifications, where possible. Where verifications are based on personal
data, national and Union law should include suitable safeguards to mitigate the risks to
individuals, including rules on who can access and view the data as well as the
limitation of access only to such data as is necessary to access within the scope of this
Regulation. Individuals should also have the possibility to review the outcome of the
verification before it is provided to the public buyer.
(16) Public buyers should be encouraged to carry out market consultations before
launching procurement procedures in order to improve their understanding of available
market solutions, of the maturity and structure of supply markets, and of potential
strategic or operational constraints.
(17) Negotiations can enable public buyers to improve the quality, efficiency and overall
value of the procured solution, especially where the subject-matter requires adaptation
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to operational needs or the balancing of strategic considerations. The possibility to
negotiate solutions with a successive reduction of the number of economic operators in
the procedure aims at achieving broad access to competition with the possibility for
the public buyer to refine solutions and contractual terms through negotiation where
that is conducive to achieving best quality for money. At the same time, it is necessary
to clarify that the conduct of negotiations should remain subject to safeguards ensuring
equal treatment, proportionality and the protection of commercially sensitive
information. Therefore, negotiations should only concern non-essential characteristics
of the works, services and supplies to be purchased; and public buyers should clearly
indicate all non-negotiable elements which, in turn should include the essential
conditions of the contract that are determinative for economic operators’ decision to
participate in the procedure.
(18) A new simple and flexible open procedure should be established, which allows any
interested economic operator to express interest and submit a tender, and where the
use of negotiations and of selection criteria remaining optional for the public buyer.
The open procedure should ensure that public buyers can decide not to apply selection
criteria where not needed to ensure good procurement outcomes, thereby lifting one of
the major burdens for SME participation in public procurement.
(19) A new dynamic procedure should be established to provide public buyers with an
easy-to use, quick and agile tool to procure from a pre-constituted supplier base,
through reaching out, ahead of the individual contracts to be awarded, to all interested
economic operators available to perform the contract throughout its validity.
Negotiations and the use of selection criteria should be optional for public buyers, as
in the open procedure. Economic operators should be able to express their interest in a
simple and straight-forward way, simply by sharing their eligibility profile with the
public buyer through the electronic eligibility service. In view of the potentially large
number of economic operators interested in dynamic procedures, and in order to
ensure administrative efficiency and to guarantee fairness, public buyers should be
able, where the number of interested suppliers exceeds a certain level, to invite only a
limited number of suppliers. Selection of economic operators invited to tender or to
negotiate should take place by means of a random indiscriminate algorithmic
determination or, in cases where admission to the procedure in the first place is done
on the basis of selection criteria, either without further selection, or on the basis of
objective, non-discriminatory criteria indicated in the competition public summary.
(20) Public authorities are increasingly confronted with complex societal challenges that
require innovative and collaborative approaches extending beyond traditional
procurement practices. Public buyers should be allowed to co-create innovative
solutions that address public needs more effectively, through a competitive procedure
in which economic operators are invited to develop solutions based on societal
challenges identified by the public buyer. The development of those solutions should
take place in different phases, including market consultation, selection of innovative
solution proposals, testing and validation, and assessment of the proposals, and
commercial purchase of the solution which public buyers should be allowed to
purchase directly from the same economic operator.
(21) This procedure allows public buyers to purchase a yet-to-be developed solution,
covering within the same procedure the research and development of that solution as
well as all steps leading up to and including the commercial purchase. The innovation
procedure covers the full cycle of innovation procurement, possibly from very early
stages of research, the subject-matter of the procurement being the purchase of the yet
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to-be-developed solution. It is therefore markedly different from R&D services
procurement, which include pre-commercial procurement, whose subject-matter is not
the purchase of the final solution but of research and development services. Unlike the
innovation procedure, R&D services procurement therefore does not include the
commercial deployment of the yet to-be developed end product. Research and
development services, including pre-commercial procurement, are regulated in the
[European Innovation Act], and they should be excluded from the scope of this
Regulation to avoid overlaps. This exclusion of research and development service
contracts covers research and development service contracts as such and does not
extend to the research and development elements that are part of the new innovation
procedure.
(22) The award of public contracts without prior competition should remain strictly
exceptional and justifiable only where competition is objectively impossible or
manifestly inappropriate and where additional flexibility is not used to circumvent the
general principles of transparency, equal treatment and sound competition. In
situations of emergency, crisis or serious cross-border threats, public buyers may need
to procure rapidly in order to ensure continuity of essential services, respond to urgent
public needs, or safeguard public health and safety. Public buyers should therefore be
allowed to have recourse to a simplified direct procurement mechanism, without
prejudice to other Union instruments governing joint procurement or crisis response.
(23) Article 11 of the Treaty requires that environmental protection requirements be
integrated into the elaboration and implementation of Union policies and activities.
Union policies should therefore be developed with a view to promoting, in particular,
the objectives of climate change mitigation and adaptation including emission
reductions, the sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources, the
transition to a circular economy, pollution prevention and control, and the protection
and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems. Green public procurement should also
contribute to the development of lead markets for sustainable bio-based products and
solutions, in line with the Bioeconomy Strategy. It is necessary to clarify how public
buyers can contribute to such objectives, whilst ensuring that they obtain the best
quality for money and any conditions remain linked to the subject-matter of the
contract. Horizontal environmental sustainability requirements that have been
previously provided for in sectoral legislation, in particular on energy efficiency and
the transition to a more circular economy, should be established as requirements for
green public procurement in this Regulation, while preserving the core substance of
the requirements that have been previously provided for in the sectoral legislation. To
reduce administrative burden and facilitate the use of Green Public Procurement,
public buyers should be able to use existing environmental requirements and criteria
developed at Union level, such as the technical screening criteria set out in Regulation
(EU) 2020/852 or EU Green Public Procurement voluntary criteria developed by the
Commission.
(24) In view of the crucial role of resilient food systems in ensuring food security and
protecting public health, this Regulation recognises the importance of economic,
climate, environmental and social sustainability considerations in the procurement of
food. These food-specific considerations may include, to the extent that they are linked
to the subject matter of the contract, fairness and transparency in food supply chains,
organic production methods, quality schemes, nutritional value and health effects,
freshness and seasonality, organisation of food supply chains or animal welfare. This
can play an important role in bringing consumers, particularly in settings such as
EN 22 EN
schools and hospitals, closer to sustainable food production. Given its very limited
cross-border dimension, procurement of services related to food distribution such as
canteen services, catering services, school meal services, restaurant services and
meals-on-wheels services is subject to a direct award procedure under which public
buyers have wide leeway to take into account and accommodate food-specific
considerations.
(25) For certain products or product families, for which Union legislation establishes
environmental requirements, and contains empowerments for the Commission to
enshrine specific rules for public buyers in this regard, it is appropriate to consolidate
these empowerments in this Regulation, which should therefore provide for a
horizontal empowerment covering the products in question. Following the logic of the
sectoral legislation, this empowerment should allow the Commission to set specific
requirements for green public procurement for the products covered where necessary
to avoid fragmentation of the internal market and foster the demand for certain
products. This empowerment should enable the Commission to adopt delegated acts
where necessary to maintain fully the substance of provisions previously enshrined in
sectoral legislation, like energy efficiency of tyres.
(26) To facilitate and enable public buyers to take social considerations into account, where
relevant to the subject-matter of the contract and in compliance with the principles
governing public procurement, this Regulation brings together, in a dedicated social
chapter, EU social objectives of a horizontal nature. These objectives include social
inclusion, high-quality jobs and decent working conditions, accessibility for persons
with disabilities, gender equality and non-discrimination, training, the promotion of
the social economy, as referred to in Council Recommendation C/2023/13445, and
effective human rights protection in relevant supply chains. It is to be stressed that the
Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, taking into
account the diversity of national systems. Accessibility requirements should continue
to be of a mandatory nature for the public procurement of goods, services and works
intended for use by natural persons.
(27) By using public purchasing power for the fast market uptake and expansion of
innovative solutions, public authorities can help bridge the innovation gap and
facilitate the transition from a limited first production for testing and validation to
commercialisation. Such an approach can contribute to increased productivity,
improve market access for SMEs such as innovative startups and scaleups.
(28) In construction, which accounts for roughly 30 % of the value of public contracts
awarded, innovation is supported through the use of Building Information Modelling
(BIM) as a standard approach in public procurement and project delivery. Using open
BIM digital technologies reduces project risks and enables more efficient design and
construction processes, while continuously increasing impact on sustainability
objectives. Accordingly, public buyers should in principle use it for the
implementation of high-value contracts.
(29) Security and public safety risks may arise in a wide range of procurement procedures,
including outside defence and sensitive security sectors in the strict sense. Public
buyers should be aware of, assess and address such risks in the design and conduct of
procurement procedures and in performance of contracts.
5 Council Recommendation of 27 November 2023 on developing social economy framework conditions
(OJ C, C/2023/1344, 29.11.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1344/oj).
EN 23 EN
(30) Public procurement in sectors critical to the functioning of society and the Union
economy including energy, transport, health, digital infrastructure, water, food and
agriculture and financial market infrastructure, can create or compound strategic
vulnerabilities where supply chains are concentrated, opaque, or excessively
dependent on a limited number of operators or third-country sources. Where a public
contract is intended to be performed by a critical entity, in these sectors, public buyers
should, where relevant, include in their public contracts measures relating to security
of supply and resilience, without prejudice to applicable sectorial Union legislation.
(31) This Regulation is without prejudice to the application of State aid and competition
rules, in particular Articles 101, 102 and 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. The measures provided for in this Regulation should not be used to
restrict or distort competition in a manner contrary to the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union.
(32) The Union has concluded international agreements that provide for access to its public
procurement markets to third-country economic operators and goods, services or
works, in particular the GPA and a number of free trade agreements with procurement
commitments. The existence of market access granted depends on the type of
procurement procedure, the nature of the public buyer, the subject-matter of the
contract, the applicable thresholds, and the specific carve-outs or horizontal
exemptions negotiated in each agreement. To give effect to this graduated and
procedure-specific coverage, this Regulation introduces the concepts of 'covered
economic operator' and 'covered goods, services or works', which are determined
separately for each procurement procedure on the basis of the Union's international
commitments applicable to each individual procurement. The Commission should be
empowered to adopt delegated acts on this matter, in accordance with the relevant
international agreements, where warranted for the reasons laid down in this
Regulation. Where candidate countries have concluded an agreement with the Union
providing for access to public procurement, economic operators, goods, services and
works originating from those countries should be regarded as 'covered economic
operators' and 'covered goods, services or works' for the purposes of this Regulation,
in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the relevant agreement. This
approach reflects the perspective of enlargement and the gradual integration of
candidate countries into the Union's internal market, and is intended to support closer
economic integration, encourage regulatory alignment, and strengthen the application
of the Union's rules and standards in its immediate neighbourhood.
(33) In line with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in particular its
judgments in Case C-652/22 (Kolin)6 and Case C-266/22 (Qingdao)7, the rights and
principles derived from Union public procurement law do not extend to economic
operators, goods, services or works originating in third countries that are not covered
by such international commitments. The same principle should apply also to goods,
including components of products procured, services or works originating in such
countries. Building on this principle, this Regulation enables public buyers to apply
European preference requirements, in line with the Union’s international obligations.
(34) The Commission should be empowered to close specific procurements to non-covered
economic operators or non-covered goods, services or works on the condition that
such closure is in the interest of the Union. The interest of the Union to close certain
6 Case C-652/22, Kolin Inşaat Turizm Sanayi ve Ticaret, EU:C:2025:178. 7 Case C-266/22, CRRC Qingdao Sifang and Others, EU:C:2024:910.
EN 24 EN
procurements should be assessed based on an appreciation of all relevant interests
taken as a whole, in particular economic, geopolitical and societal interests of the
Union, its Member States and its citizens. The relevance of such Union interest is
illustrated by sectors such as railways and shipbuilding which, as manufacturing
sectors of a dual-use nature, rely on infrastructure, mobile assets and information and
communication technology (ICT) and traffic management systems that must be
resilient and are critical to military mobility, security, and the Union's strategic
autonomy objectives. Their strategic importance has been underlined by recent Union
initiatives including the EU Economic Security Strategy, the EU High-Speed Rail
Plan, and the EU Maritime Industrial Strategy. The Joint Communication on
strengthening EU economic security also emphasised the risks related to involvement
of high-risk entities in sensitive sectors and supply chains.
(35) Clear and uniform rules on the determination of origin are necessary to ensure the
effective and consistent application of international coverage and European preference
provisions across all procurement procedures. This Regulation should therefore
establish rules of origin for the application of the European Preference requirements
set out herein. Where Union legislation applicable to specific sectors introduces
European preference requirements, those rules should prevail as lex specialis. This is
the case, in particular, for critical medicinal products, where Article [18(2)] of
Regulation (EU) …/… [reference to be added after adoption of c.f.
COM(2025)102final] establishes mandatory rules for favouring the suppliers of
critical medicinal products and their active substances manufactured in the Union,
which exhaustively regulates the application of European preference with regard to the
critical medicinal products falling within its scope. At the same time, where the
sectoral legislation does not provide the modalities for the application of those
requirements, public buyers should rely on the horizontal rules set out in this
Regulation.
(36) Certain contracts and the concessions awarded for the provision of public service
transport within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 1370/20078 are excluded from the
scope of this Regulation. However, the provisions of Chapter 4 on “Security and
Resilience” and Chapter 5 on “European Preference” of this Regulation should be
applicable to all contracts and concessions subject to Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007
in order to ensure a coherence regarding the application of those provisions to all
contracts and concessions whether or not are subject to the provisions of public
procurement established by this Regulation. Therefore Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007
should be amended accordingly.
(37) Horizontal rules applicable to all procurement procedures under this Regulation should
build on well-known concepts from Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and
2014/25/EU of the Parliament and the Council, and the case-law by the Court of
Justice of the European Union, modernising and clarifying them where needed, to
better achieve the objectives set out in this Regulation, including in particular the
integrity and non-discriminatory competitiveness of the procurement procedure.
(38) The existing exclusions from scope for certain types of contracts awarded by public
buyers to legal persons controlled by them or within public-public cooperation
arrangements should be maintained. As the contracts referred to in these two
8 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on
public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos
1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2007/1370/oj).
EN 25 EN
exclusions are out of the scope of this Regulation, Member States remain free to
enshrine stricter rules or open these contracts to competition in their national law.
Cooperation exclusively between local and regional authorities, as it is less likely to
entail risks of distorting competition with economic operators, should be excluded
from the scope of this Regulation under less stringent conditions. Finally, the existing
possibility for contracting entities to rely on established structural links with affiliated
undertakings or joint ventures to perform specific activities should also be maintained.
(39) Excessively detailed specifications often contribute to unnecessarily reducing the
participation of economic operators and hamper innovation. In order to facilitate
competitive procurement markets, the specifications defining the characteristics of the
works, supplies or services that are subject of the procurement should, as a general
rule be drafted in terms of functional requirements. Variants should be used more in
public procurement procedures in view that they can contribute to enhancing
competition and fostering innovative and cost-effective solutions. By allowing
economic operators to propose alternative approaches, public buyers could benefit
from a wider range of tenders better tailored to their needs. Such approach could also
benefit SMEs, enabling them to put forward flexible, innovative or more specialised
solutions that may differ from standard specifications and better reflect their specific
expertise or business models.
(40) In order to ensure non-discriminatory access to procurement it is of crucial importance
that any criteria and conditions applied in procurement procedures remain directly or
indirectly linked to the subject-matter of the contract, relating to the material substance
of the goods, services and works procured, or, without relating to the material
substance, directly impacting those goods, services and works. As the notion of
subject-matter link has been subject to prejudicial diverging interpretations, the notion
should be clarified in this Regulation. Examples of considerations that are linked to the
subject-matter of a given contract could include that the manufacturing of the
purchased products did not involve toxic chemicals, the purchased services are
provided using energy-efficient machines or energy-efficient production methods, the
product concerned is of fair-trade origin, including the requirement to pay a minimum
price and price premium to producers, fair wages are ensured for workers involved in
the execution of the contract in question. The condition of a direct or indirect link to
the subject-matter of the contract excludes criteria and conditions relating to general
corporate policy.
(41) Labels are valuable means of proof that help public buyers to integrate environmental,
social, or other strategic considerations in public procurement. Public buyers that wish
to purchase products, services or works with specific environmental, social or other
characteristics should be able to refer to particular labels provided that their
requirements are linked to the subject-matter of the contract and compliant with
certain label quality requirements. When public buyers decide to request an ecolabel,
they should request life cycle, third-party verified ecolabel with a high level of
ambition and, when EU Ecolabel criteria have been adopted for a product, a service or
work, they should require in the first place the EU Ecolabel, which is the official EU
voluntary scheme for environmental excellence of goods and services.
(42) To make public spending a more efficient investment tool in line with the Union’s
strategic policy objectives, greater emphasis should be placed on long-term public
benefit rather than focusing only on the lowest upfront cost. Putting quality at the
centre of public purchasing will allow public buyers to acquire works, supplies and
services that provide better guarantees for meeting their needs in a longer term
EN 26 EN
perspective, at the same time serving overall societal objectives. Therefore, public
contracts should, as a general rule, be awarded on the basis of the best price-quality
ratio, allowing public buyers to compare tenders not only on price, but also on quality
criteria linked to the subject-matter of the contract, including environmental, social,
innovation, European preference, security and resilience aspects where relevant, as
well as life-cycle costing. The evaluation of such award criteria should be framed with
sufficient safeguards for the fairness of the evaluation process, such as separating price
and quality assessments and securing the “four eyes principle”, but could also include
other measures such as conducting individual evaluations prior to collective
deliberation, maintaining a documented audit trail and publication of all scoring
justifications for high-value contracts. A minimum weighting of 30%, and 50% for by
their nature labour-intensive contracts whereby the 50% should include significant
social considerations, should therefore be provided for quality criteria in the award
phase, while allowing public buyers to derogate from this requirement, where the
quality of the procured works, supplies or services can be sufficiently ensured through
specifications, conditions for performance of contracts, or a combination of any of
those instruments with award criteria.
(43) SMEs play a crucial role in the Union’s economy. Therefore, procurement procedures
should be designed in a proportionate manner, avoiding unnecessary administrative
and financial burdens, to facilitate the access of SMEs to public procurement,
including as single direct contractors or as members of groups of economic operators.
Conducting procurement through the new digital ecosystem is expected to
significantly reduce procedural and administrative barriers for SMEs, including
documentation and registration requirements. The division of contracts into
meaningful lots remains one of the main tools to facilitate participation of SMEs in
public procurement and diversify the supplier base. Therefore, public buyers should
actively consider division into lots as part of the procurement design process. In view
of the existence of stricter national regimes in a number of Member States which
Member States should be able to maintain, Member States should be allowed to
impose stricter rules of division into lots. Prompt payment, including through the
supply chain further contribute to securing and strengthening the financial standing of
SMEs, as do advance payments which should therefore be encouraged.
(44) To ensure sound procurement procedures which yield best quality for money, public
buyers should reject tenders where abnormally low prices cannot be properly
explained. The circumstances under which tenders appear abnormally low and which
conditions tenderers can refer to explain their prices and price elements should be
clarified.
(45) It is also necessary to have clearer rules regarding certain aspects related to the
contract execution phase, including payments, due to its close link with the
procurement procedure itself. It should be clarified how public buyers can apply
adjustment mechanisms during the performance of contracts, and how contracts can be
modified, particularly in unforeseen circumstances. A clear and transparent adjustment
mechanism should be introduced to enable public buyers to modify contract terms in a
predictable and proportionate manner. The provisions on modifications of contract
should be streamlined to allow for better application in situations justifying a
modification without new competitive procedure. Robust safeguards are required to
ensure that any substantial modification of the contract, in particular to the scope and
content of the mutual rights and obligations of the parties, is subject to adequate
justification, where appropriate, prior publication and potential review to combat
EN 27 EN
potential misuse. Where modifications exceed 50% of the initial estimated value of the
contract, there is an increased risk that such modification would alter the economic
balance of the contract, such modifications should therefore be subject to increased
transparency obligations.
(46) Rules should be laid down to ensure traceability of decisions taken throughout the
procurement procedures. Documentation of the individual procurement procedure
remains key to validate the proper application of this Regulation. It should be
automated to the extent possible in the electronic procurement platforms.
Transparency of procurement opportunities is the cornerstone of ensuring equal access
of all economic operators throughout the Union to procurement Union-wide. Proper
publication of such opportunities should therefore be guaranteed through rules on the
information to be published. To allow for a data-focused approach, general categories
of information should be provided in this Regulation. Categories of information are
grouped, allowing the establishment of a comprehensive view from procurement
planning to contract completion, yielding collections of relevant data points, instead of
a more static paper-based focus on forms, supporting the lowering of administrative
burdens. Publication deadlines and modalities, including at national level, should also
be laid down in this Regulation.
(47) Concessions and public contracts share the same core objective of enabling public
buyers to meet public needs through works or services. They differ primarily in their
remuneration structures rather than their essential purpose. Given their similarities,
including their reliance on competitive selection procedures, the pursuit of horizontal
policy objectives and the potential use of public assets, it is appropriate to harmonize
their legal frameworks to the extent possible, to enhance clarity, reduce complexity,
and ensure consistent implementation of Union priorities. This approach, supported by
flexible procedural rules, provides clearer guidance for public buyers while
maintaining necessary distinctions.
(48) In order to address the conceptual uncertainties arising from the definition of
concessions under Directive 2014/23/EU, and to distinguish it from other types of
contracts such as land-leases agreements, it is necessary to clarify the definition of
concession and the concept of operating risk, which constitutes the determining
criterion for the qualification of a contract as a concession. The definitional elements
set out in this Regulation should be understood as remaining limited to defining the
scope of this Regulation, without impacting definitions of operating risks for purposes
of other policy areas. The new definition should focus directly on the concessionaire’s
exposure to uncertain economic outcomes that may affect the recovery of investments
and operating costs under normal market conditions, rather than relying on rigid
overly prescriptive categories of risk. This approach ensures that factors such as
demand, supply, availability, lifecycle, or performance risks are not treated as
standalone legal criteria but are instead regarded as illustration of the underlying
economic exposure that characterises the transfer of operating risk. Regulatory
mechanism under which operators are remunerated pursuant to statutory or regulated
tariffs that fully compensate for their investment and operating costs, thereby
eliminating genuine operating risk, do not constitute concessions within the meaning
of this Regulation. Regulatory measures whose principal purpose is to grant financial
support, or other incentives should not, as such, be considered concessions merely
because they are allocated through a competitive procedure and impose certain
requirements on beneficiaries. Rights of way relating to the construction and operation
EN 28 EN
of fixed lines or networks should also not be considered concessions where they do not
entail an obligation of supply or an acquisition of services by the public authority.
(49) To ensure effective management of concessions from preparation to implementation,
this Regulation introduces structured contract management elements, including prior
risk assessment to verify that real and economically meaningful operating risk is
transferred to the concessionaire. This prior structured risk assessment should identify
the principal categories of risk and determine, on the basis of objective elements, the
allocation of those risks between the parties. For those purposes regard should be had
to the parties’ respective ability to control or influence the occurrence or consequences
of the relevant risks, without thereby relieving the concessionaire of exposure to
potential losses, even where the public buyer bears part of the risk or where the overall
exposure to potential losses is limited. The duration of concessions should be
proportionate not only to the time required for the concessionaire to recoup
investments but also to foreseeable sectoral developments, such as technological,
environmental, climatic, or societal changes, that could affect the concession’s
performance. Excessively long durations may increase the need for substantial
modifications, thereby undermining the initial risk allocation and competitive
conditions. Contracts should enable adaptation to evolving requirements relating to
sustainability, technological advancement, security, innovation, and resilience,
ensuring concessions remain fit for purpose throughout their lifecycle.
(50) The rules on modifications of concessions have proven difficult to apply in practice.
This Regulation, while retaining the existing framework’s exceptions to modification
prohibitions, therefore introduces clearer limits better reflecting concessions’
economic realities, namely requiring the economic balance to be preserved and
forbidding changes to essential competitive elements. For enhanced transparency on
contract modification this Regulation introduces an ex-ante publication obligation for
major modifications (exceeding 50%) that should acts as a safeguard against abuses.
(51) eProcurement service providers, whether public or private, play an important role in
public procurement in facilitating secure electronic communication. It is therefore
necessary to lay down place certain requirements on them, to ensure the functioning of
the interoperable exchange of information as well as the resilience of the
interoperability network. To provide easy access to cross-border procurement
procedures for economic operators, the Commission should establish and operate an
eProcurement platform that contains the basic functions necessary for the access to
and the conduct of procurement procedures.
(52) To improve cross-border access to procurement procedures, a European standard for
procurement procedures should be established which allows economic operators to
submit electronic communication such as tenders to public buyers that are using other
services. Additionally, a European standard for procurement details should also be
requested to be developed by a European standardisation organisation. It should also
be clarified that the electronic communication directly within the eProcurement
platform chosen by the public buyer remains permitted where it complies with the
rules for electronic communication.
(53) An important element of the simplification of procurement procedures is to lower the
administrative burden contained in the check of the eligibility of the economic
operator. To this end, the Commission should set up an electronic eligibility service,
which provides information from the up-to-date digital business credential tool of the
economic operator as well as any consortium member or subcontractor participating in
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the individual procurement procedure. Through the connection from the tool to
national databases, public buyers may receive current information on the eligibility of
the economic operator.
(54) Procurement-related data, including contract data, has many important uses and
purposes: it can provide indications on the functioning of the internal market and help
with the detection of fraud, corruption, collusion and misconduct. Where there is more
flexibility provided for public buyers in the conduct of procurement procedures, it is
important to have better quality of data overall to improve monitoring. Member States
should therefore set up National Public Procurement Data Spaces. While the access to
procurement data is highly relevant, it is not necessary to require the duplication of
data in different sources, as that comes with increased costs without discernible
benefit. That is why the national data spaces should provide access to data, including
data which may be stored in other databases, only storing or retrieving information
when necessary. When there are pre-existing procurement databases, they should form
the basis of national public procurement data spaces. The Public Procurement Data
Space was set up by the Commission to contain and share information about public
procurement and should receive procurement information from the National Public
Procurement Data Spaces.
(55) eProcurement platforms constitute critical infrastructure underpinning public
procurement across the Union. The information processed through such systems is of a
highly sensitive nature. The concentration of such data within platforms that are
subject to third-country ownership, control, or undue influence poses significant risks
to the security and public safety interests of the Union or one or more of its Member
States. Such risks include unauthorised access to sensitive procurement data,
interference with the integrity or availability of procurement platforms, exposure to
cyberattacks or espionage facilitated by foreign state actors, and the potential
exploitation of procurement information for economic or strategic purposes adverse to
the Union. Ensuring that eProcurement service providers as well as National Public
Procurement Data Spaces remain free from ownership structures or control
arrangements that bear risks of undue interference is therefore essential to
safeguarding the security and resilience of public procurement infrastructure.
(56) The effectiveness of this Regulation depends not only on clear rules but also on strong
governance arrangements at national level. Member States should therefore ensure
structured and evidence-based monitoring frameworks for the functioning of their
procurement systems, based on the data available in their National Public Procurement
Data Spaces, in order to identify shortcomings, assess performance and competition,
detect systemic risks and evaluate progress towards the objectives of this Regulation.
Such monitoring should support the continuous improvement of national procurement
systems and should cover, inter alia, barriers to competition and market access,
including for SMEs, vulnerabilities to corruption and fraud, supply-chain
dependencies, and the uptake of sustainability, innovation and digitalisation. The
results of that monitoring should be made public on a regular basis and should feed
into periodic reporting to the Commission.
(57) Member States should also designate a national coordinating authority to ensure
effective coordination among the relevant national authorities, facilitate cooperation
and the exchange of information between those authorities and act as a single contact
point for the Commission, the competent authorities of other Member States and
relevant stakeholders.
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(58) Professionalisation is a key factor in ensuring effective, efficient and integrity-based
public procurement. It requires a long-term and strategic approach to develop and
maintain the skills and competencies of public buyers throughout the whole public
procurement cycle. The national strategy should provide a coherent framework for
setting priorities, coordinating measures, monitoring progress and adapting
professionalisation efforts over time. Professionalisation measures should take into
account the different needs of public buyers at each level of governance, with
particular attention to those with limited administrative capacity. Such measures
should also facilitate the participation of economic operators, in particular SMEs, and
support other actors contributing to the functioning of the public procurement system.
Appropriate support structures, such as competence centres, training bodies, advisory
services or helpdesks, play an important role in strengthening the professionalisation
of public buyers and improving the overall performance of the public procurement
system.
(59) Fraud, favouritism, collusion, corruption and conflicts of interest continue to pose
significant risks to the integrity and effectiveness of public procurement. Therefore, in
order to avoid any distortion of competition and ensure equal treatment of all
economic operators, including in the contract implementation. Public buyers should be
required to take appropriate, proportionate and effective measures to prevent, identify
and remedy such risks throughout the preparation, award and execution of contracts.
Member States should support those efforts through appropriate tools, including data-
based risk analysis instruments such as Arachne+ which is the Commission’s
corporate data-mining and risk-scoring tool designed to help detect and prevent fraud,
conflicts of interest, and irregularities affecting the EU budget. The new digital
ecosystem for procurement in the Union aims at ensuring transparency and
accountability, thereby contributing to diminishing risks to the integrity of the
procedures.
(60) In order to adapt to rapid technical, economic and regulatory developments, the power
to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the
Commission in respect of a number of non-essential elements of this Regulation:
amending the public procurement thresholds every two years to account for variations
in SDR equivalences, imposing environmental requirements for procurement of
certain products, amending the list of Union legislation introducing product or
technology sustainability requirements, where necessary following the adoption on
new relevant Union legal acts, amending the threshold for the use of BIM in public
procurement, adopting mandatory specifications and other public procurement criteria
where those elements address identified security and public safety interests of the
Union, or where strategic dependencies or risks are identified, amending the definition
of covered economic operators, goods, services or works, or supplementing this
Regulation by requiring public buyers to apply any of the voluntary restrictive
measures set out in this Regulation, amending or extending the required procurement
information, designating or establishing the interoperability network, and setting up
the rules for the management of the electronic eligibility system and designating the
digital business credential tool and the related network. It is of particular importance
that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work,
including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with
the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better
Law-Making9. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of
9 OJ L 123, 12.05.2016, p. 1, http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2016/512/oj.
EN 31 EN
delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the
same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to
meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts
(61) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation,
implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission for the adoption of
decisions regarding the competition levels in certain markets and the feasibility of
exempting certain types of public buyers from public procurement rules; to specify
what type of specific information should be contained in each public summary and to
establish the connection of public summaries and the sequencing of specific
information contained in multiple public summaries, as well as related requirements
for public buyers and eProcurement service providers to reuse information; the
implementation arrangements for the interoperability network, the electronic eligibility
service and the data exchange; to establish common specifications covering
requirements for the semantic data model of the procurement procedures; and, to
determine the procurement information that should be made available to the National
Public Procurement Data Space (NPPDS) and Public Procurement Data Space
(PPDS), its designation as publicly available, the publication terms such as the date of
publication for not initially publicly available information, and the source of the
technical validation requirements. Those powers should be exercised in accordance
with Regulation (EU) No 182/201110 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
(62) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the harmonisation of rules for public
procurement procedures, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can
rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union
may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in
Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of
proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is
necessary in order to achieve that objective.
(63) This Regulation undertakes a regulatory deep cleaning, consolidating relevant rules on
public procurement from sectoral legislation into a single reference legislation, this
Regulation. It provides a general framework for public procurement rules of more than
sector-specific relevance, and will thereby greatly simplify the application of these
rules in practice. In order to delete and integrate into this Regulation relevant rules on
public procurement which apply regardless of the type of product concerned, it is
therefore necessary to amend Regulations (EU) 2023/154211, (EU) 2024/115712, (EU)
2024/125213, (EU) 2024/173514, (EU) 2024/178115, (EU) 2024/284716, (EU)
10 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011
laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of
the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj). 11 Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 concerning
batteries and waste batteries, amending Directive 2008/98/EC and Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and
repealing Directive 2006/66/EC (OJ L 191, 28.7.2023, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1542/2025-07-31). 12 Regulation (EU) 2024/1157 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on
shipments of waste, amending Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) 2020/1056 and repealing
Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 (OJ L, 2024/1157, 30.4.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1157/oj). 13 Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024
establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and
amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (OJ L,
2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj).
EN 32 EN
2024/311017 and (EU) 2025/4018, and Directives 2008/98/EC19, (EU) 2019/88220, (EU)
2022/238121, (EU) 2023/179122 and (EU) 2024/176023. Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 should be amended, in order to make applicable for that Regulation the
rules provided for in this Regulation on security, security of supply and European
preference.
(64) Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU should be repealed.
(65) In view of the scale and novelty of the reforms introduced by this Regulation,
including the establishment of a common digital ecosystem and data spaces, the
strengthening of strategic procurement rules, and the new governance and monitoring
requirements, the application of this Regulation should be deferred by two years.
(66) The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with
Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/172524 and delivered its opinion on [INSERT],
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
14 Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on
establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing
ecosystem and amending Regulation (OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj). 15 Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 establishing
a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for sustainable products, amending Directive
(EU) 2020/1828 and Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 and repealing Directive 2009/125/EC (OJ L,
2024/1781, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1781/oj). 16 Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on
horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations
(EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act) (OJ L,
2024/2847, 20.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj). 17 Regulation (EU) 2024/3110 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024
laying down harmonised rules for the marketing of construction products and repealing Regulation
(EU) No 305/2011 (OJ L, 2024/3110, 18.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3110/oj). 18 Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on
establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing
ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj). 19 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste
and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/98/oj). 20 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj). 21 Directive (EU) 2022/2381 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 on
improving the gender balance among directors of listed companies and related measures (OJ L 315,
7.12.2022, p. 44, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2381/oj). 22 Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on
energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (recast) (OJ L 231, 20.9.2023, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/1791/oj). 23 Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate
sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859,
(OJ L, 2024/1760, 5.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1760/oj). 24 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No
45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj).
EN 33 EN
Part I
General provisions
Title I
Subject-matter and scope
Article 1
Subject-matter and scope
1. This Regulation establishes rules on public contracts for works, supplies or services
and concessions for works or services procured by one or more public buyers from
one or more economic operators, the value of which is equal to or greater than the
thresholds established in Article 2.
2. This Regulation lays down the procedural rules that apply to the award of public
contracts and concessions as well as the procurement-related aspects of the planning
and the execution of such contracts and concessions, sets out strategic objectives to
be taken into account and establishes a framework for a common digital ecosystem to
be used in their planning, award and implementation as well as mechanisms to
ensure efficiency and accountability of public procurement.
3. This Regulation does not regulate matters pertaining to general administrative or
contract law in the Member States beyond the matters referred to in paragraphs 1 and
2. It does not affect the way in which the Member States organise their public
administration, including financial and budgetary control of public spending, or the
organisation of their social security systems.
4. The application of this Regulation is subject to Article 346 of the Treaty. This
Regulation does not preclude the adoption or enforcement of national measures
necessary for the protection of Member States’ national security in accordance with
the Treaty.
5. This Regulation does not affect the freedom of Member States under Article 4 of the
Treaty to establish, in conformity with Union law, services of general economic
interest, and how those services are organised and financed, provided that they are in
compliance with State aid rules, and the specific obligations to which they are
subject. Furthermore, this Regulation does not affect any decision of public
authorities as to whether, how and to what extent they wish to perform public
functions themselves pursuant to Article 14 of the Treaty and Protocol No. 26 of the
Treaty.
6. Agreements, decisions or other legal instruments that organise the transfer of powers
and responsibilities for the performance of public tasks between public buyers and
that do not provide for remuneration to be given for contractual performance are
considered to be a matter of internal organisation of the Member State concerned
and, as such, are not affected in any way by this Regulation.
Article 2
Thresholds
EN 34 EN
1. This Regulation applies to public contracts and concessions with a value net of
value-added tax (VAT) estimated to be equal to or greater than the following
thresholds:
(a) EUR 5 404 000 for public works contracts and for concessions;
(b) EUR 140 000 for public supply contracts and public service contracts awarded
by the central government authorities listed in Annex I;
(c) EUR 216 000 for public supply contracts and public service contracts awarded
by sub-central contracting authorities;
(d) EUR 432 000 for public supply contracts and public service contracts awarded
by contracting entities operating in the sectors covered by Part II, Title I,
Chapter 2;
(e) EUR 750 000 for contracts for social, health and educational services awarded
pursuant to Article 58.
2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with
Article 141, or, in cases of urgency, with Article 142, amending the thresholds set
out in paragraph 1 of this Article in accordance with the conditions set out in Article
3.
Article 3
Revision of thresholds
1. Every two years from … [OP please insert the date = the last day of the month of
August after the date of entry into force of this Regulation], the Commission shall
verify that the thresholds set out in Article 2(1) correspond to the thresholds
established in the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA) and shall, where necessary, revise those thresholds in
accordance with this Article.
2. The Commission shall revise the thresholds set out in Article 2 in accordance with
the calculation method set out in the GPA. The Commission shall calculate the value
of these thresholds on the basis of the average daily value of the euro in terms of the
special drawing rights (SDRs), over a 24-month period terminating on 31 August
preceding the revision with effect from 1 January. The value of the revised
thresholds shall, where necessary, be rounded down to the nearest thousand euros to
ensure that the thresholds in force provided for by the GPA, expressed in SDRs, are
observed.
3. From 1 January 202X [OP please insert year after the year of entry into force of this
Regulation], and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall determine the
values, in the national currencies of the Member States whose currency is not the
euro, of the thresholds set out in Article 2 of this Regulation.
4. In accordance with the calculation method set out in the GPA, the Commission shall
determine the values referred to in paragraph 3 on the basis of the average daily
values of those currencies corresponding to the applicable threshold expressed in
euros over the 24-month period terminating on 31 August preceding the revision
with effect from 1 January of the following year.
EN 35 EN
5. The Commission shall publish the revised thresholds, and their corresponding values
in the national currencies of the Member States whose currency is not the euro, in the
Official Journal of the European Union at the beginning of the month of November
following their revision.
6. Where it is necessary to revise the thresholds set out in Article 3 and where
imperative grounds of urgency prevent the use of the procedure laid down in
Article 141 and therefore imperative grounds of urgency so require, the procedure
referred to in Article 142 shall apply to delegated acts adopted pursuant to
Article 2(2).
Title II
Principles, policy objectives and definitions
Article 4
Principles of procurement
1. Procurement shall be guided by the principle of best quality for public money,
thereby serving the objective of efficient public spending and investment.
2. Public buyers shall treat economic operators originating from the Union and
economic operators which are covered economic operators in accordance with
Article 70(1) equally and without discrimination, giving full effect to the free
movement of persons, goods and services and the freedom of establishment in the
Union's internal market. They shall act in a transparent and proportionate manner.
3. Public buyers shall take appropriate measures to ensure the integrity of the
procurement process and to prevent circumstances that may compromise its
impartiality and fairness.
Public buyers shall not design their procurement in such a way as to exclude it from
the scope of this Regulation or to unduly restrict competition.
4. Public buyers shall take appropriate measures to ensure that, in the performance of
public contracts, economic operators comply with applicable obligations relating to
the policy objectives set out in Article 5, including applicable obligations in the
fields of environmental, social and labour law as established by Union law, national
law, collective agreements, or by the international environmental, social and labour
law conventions listed in Annex II.
Article 5
Policy objectives
Public procurement shall be guided by the strategic policy objectives of the Union, in
particular:
(a) boosting the Union’s competitiveness through a thriving internal market, advancing
innovation and reinforcing the Union’s manufacturing and clean industrial base;
(b) the achievement of environmental and climate objectives of the Union;
(c) the pursuit of social justice, fair working conditions and an inclusive society,
including as fostered by social dialogue;
EN 36 EN
(d) the Union's safety, security, resilience and economic security, including through
strategic independence.
Article 6
Definitions
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:
(1) ‘classified information’ means any information or material, regardless of the form,
nature or mode of transmission thereof, to which a certain level of security
classification or protection has been attributed, and which, in the interests of national
security and in accordance with the laws, regulations or administrative provisions in
force in the Member State concerned, requires protection against any
misappropriation, destruction, removal, disclosure, loss or access by any
unauthorised individual, or any other type of compromise;
(2) ‘day’ means calendar day;
(3) ‘digital business credential tool’ means a digital tool allowing for the verification,
exchange and storage of evidence related to the exclusion grounds, selection criteria,
origin and other requirements set out pursuant to this Regulation in the procurement
procedure and available through the tool;
(4) ‘economic operator’ means any natural or legal person, or public entity or group of
such persons and/or entities, such as joint ventures, consortia or other including any
temporary associations without legal personality, which offers the execution of a
work or works, the supply of products or the provision of services on the market;
(5) ‘eligibility profile’ means a compiled document generated by the electronic
eligibility service referred to in Article 133 which contains information about the
economic operator, including information regarding its compliance with exclusion
grounds, selection criteria and origin;
(6) ‘eProcurement platform’ means a digital tool which allows for the electronic
communication between public buyers and economic operators through the
interoperability network;
(7) ‘eProcurement service provider’ means an economic operator that provides an
eProcurement platform;
(8) ‘functional requirement’ means a requirement that describes the performance,
desired function, capability, outcome or result that works, products or services are
intended to achieve, without referring to specific technical means, design, or methods
by which those functions or outcomes are achieved;
(9) ‘harmonised standard’ means a harmonised standard as defined in Article 2,
point (1)(c), of Regulation (EU) No 1025/201225;
25 Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on
European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives
94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and
2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision
87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 316,
14.11.2012, p. 12, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/1025/oj).
EN 37 EN
(10) ‘labour-intensive contract’ means a contract with a subject-matter for which the cost
of labour normally accounts for at least 50 % of the total contract value;
(11) ‘life-cycle’ means all possible consecutive or interlinked stages, or both, including
research and development to be carried out, production, trading and its conditions,
transport, use and maintenance, throughout the existence of the product, works or
services, from the acquisition of raw materials or the generation of resources, to
disposal, clearance and end of service or use;
(12) ‘micro, small or medium-sized enterprise’ (SME) means a micro, small or medium-
sized enterprise as defined in the Annex to Commission
Recommendation 2003/361/EC26;
(13) ‘pre-commercial procurement’ means the procurement of research and development
services that involves risk-benefit sharing under market conditions and competitive
development in phases;
(14) ‘procurement detail’ means any information produced or referred to by the public
buyer to describe elements of the procurement before the award, including public
summaries, technical specifications, the draft contract, templates for the presentation
of information by economic operators, information on generally applicable
obligations and any additional information;
(15) ‘procurement information’ means any data provided by the public buyer covering the
full procurement life cycle including before and after the award of the contract;
(16) ‘procurement of research and development services’ (‘R&D procurement’) means
the procurement of fundamental research, industrial research and experimental
development up to original development. Original development of a first product,
service or work may include limited production or supply in order to incorporate the
results of field testing and to demonstrate that the product, service or work concerned
is suitable for production or supply in quantity to acceptable quality standards, but
shall not include quantity production or supply to establish commercial viability or to
recover research and development costs. R&D procurement may include obtaining
the ownership of prototypes or first products, services or works that are developed at
the public buyer’s request in the course of and for a particular research and
development services procurement contract, but shall not include the commercial
deployment of end-products, services or works.
(17) ‘public buyer’ means a contracting authority in accordance with Article 7 or a
contracting entity in accordance with Article 8;
(18) ‘public contract’ means a contract, for pecuniary interest, concluded in writing
between one or more economic operators and one or more public buyers and having
as its object the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of
services;
(19) ‘public service contracts’ means a public contract having as its object the provision
of services other than those referred to in point (22);
(20) ‘public summary’ means an overview of the procurement at a given time published
by the public buyer;
26 Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises (notified under document number C (2003) 1422), (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2003/361/oj)
EN 38 EN
(21) ‘public supply contract’ means a public contract having as its object the purchase,
lease, rental or hire-purchase, with or without an option to buy, of products. Products
may be new, used, refurbished, remanufactured and product-as-service. A public
supply contract may include, as an incidental matter, siting and installation
operations;
(22) ‘public works contract’ means a public contract having as its object one of the
following:
(a) the execution, or both the design and execution, of works related to one of the
activities within the meaning of Annex V;
(b) the execution, or both the design and execution, of a work;
(c) the realisation, by whatever means, of a work corresponding to the
requirements specified by the contracting authority exercising a decisive
influence on the type or design of the work;
(23) ‘societal challenge’ means a development or situation that has implications for the
effective and efficient delivery of public tasks, impacting the functioning of the
public buyer or buyers concerned, or the persons who rely on those services;
(24) ‘innovative solution proposal’ means a proposal from an economic operator outlining
their innovative approach to address a societal challenge, including the risks
involved, the potential impact and benefits, and their vision for developing, testing
and implementing the innovative solution in cooperation with the public buyer;
(25) ‘subcontractor’ means an economic operator that acquires through contractual means
the responsibility to perform a part of the public contract – excluding the mere
provision of goods or parts that are necessary for the provision of a work or service –
from an economic operator that has been awarded such public contract;
(26) ‘subject-matter of the contract’ means the works, services or supplies that the public
buyer intends to acquire through the procurement with a view to meeting its needs;
(27) ‘work’ means the outcome of building or civil engineering works taken as a whole
which is sufficient in itself to fulfil an economic or technical function.
EN 39 EN
Part II
Relevant actors
Title I
Public buyers
Chapter 1
Identification of public buyers
Article 7
Contracting authorities
1. For the purpose of this Regulation, contracting authorities shall be the central
government authorities, sub-central government authorities, bodies governed by
public law, or associations formed by one or more such contracting authorities,
irrespective of whether the procurement procedure is conducted by one or more
specific administrative units within them.
2. For the purposes of this Regulation, central government authorities shall be the
authorities listed in Annex I and, in so far as corrections or amendments have been
made at national level, those authorities’ successor entities.
Where corrections or amendments are made at national level, Member States shall
notify the Commission thereof within three months.
3. Sub-central government authorities shall mean any of the following:
(a) State, regional or local authorities other than those listed in Annex I;
(b) central purchasing bodies who are not themselves central government
authorities;
(c) bodies governed by public law as described in paragraph 4.
4. For the purpose of this Regulation, bodies governed by public law shall be bodies
that meet all the following conditions:
(a) they have the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, and not
having an industrial or commercial character;
(b) they have legal personality;
(c) they are financed, for more than 50 % by the State, regional or local
authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law; or are subject to the
management and supervision by those authorities or bodies; or have an
administrative, managerial or supervisory board where more than half of their
members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities or by other
bodies governed by public law.
5. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article
141 to amend Annex I by updating the list of central government authorities based on
the notifications received from Member States pursuant to paragraph 2 of this
Article.
EN 40 EN
Article 8
Contracting entities
1. For the purpose of this Regulation, contracting entities shall be contracting
authorities, public undertakings, and entities that operate on the basis of special or
exclusive rights, and which carry out one or more of the activities referred to in
Articles 12 to 18 or any combination thereof, unless the activity is directly exposed
to competition on markets to which access is not restricted within the meaning of
Article 19.
2. A public undertaking shall be any undertaking over which one or more contracting
authorities may exercise, directly or indirectly, a dominant influence by virtue of
their ownership of it, their financial participation therein, or the rules which govern
it.
Contracting authorities shall be presumed to exercise a dominant influence in any of
the following cases in which they, directly or indirectly:
(a) hold the majority of the undertaking's subscribed capital;
(b) control the majority of the votes attaching to shares issued by the undertaking;
(c) can appoint more than half of the undertaking's administrative, management or
supervisory body.
3. For the purpose of this Regulation, special or exclusive rights shall be rights granted
by a competent authority of a Member State by way of any legislative, regulatory or
administrative provision the effect of which is to limit the exercise of the activities
referred to in Articles 12 to 18 to one or more entities, and which substantially
affects the ability of other entities to carry out such activity.
Rights which have been granted by means of a procedure in which adequate publicity
has been ensured and where the granting of those rights was based on objective
criteria shall not constitute special or exclusive rights within the meaning of the first
subparagraph.
The procedures referred to in the second subparagraph shall include, but are not
limited to:
(a) procurement procedures with a prior call for competition in conformity with
Directive 2009/81/EC27 or a public summary of competition pursuant to this
Regulation;
(b) procedures pursuant to other legal acts of the Union that ensure adequate prior
transparency for granting authorisations on the basis of objective criteria,
including but not limited to the procedures under the Union legal acts listed in
Annex III.
27 Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the
coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service
contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending
Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, p. 76, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/81/oj).
EN 41 EN
Article 9
Central purchasing bodies
1. Public buyers may organise their procurement activities through the creation and use
of central purchasing bodies in accordance with the rules set out in this Article.
2. For the purpose of this Regulation, central purchasing bodies shall be any public
buyer carrying out the following activities:
(a) acting as a wholesaler by buying and re-selling solutions purchased on the
market for public buyers;
(b) acting as an intermediary by publishing summaries and awarding contracts for
public buyers;
Central purchasing bodies may also, in addition to the activities set out above, carry
out or take part in joint procurement activities, or provide ancillary purchasing
support services to public buyers, including technical assistance, technical
infrastructure or advice.
3. Public buyers shall indicate in the public summaries pursuant to Article 110 when
they are acting as a central purchasing body.
4. Any public buyer may acquire solutions from or through any central purchasing body
established in the Union without applying the procedures laid down in this
Regulation for the provision of the services of the central purchasing body.
5. A public buyer acquiring a solution from or through a central purchasing body,
which for that solution was obliged to and has applied this Regulation, shall be
deemed to comply with this Regulation in respect of the procurement for that
solution.
6. A public buyer acquiring a solution from or through a Union institution, body, office
or agency which carries out joint procurement, acts on behalf of the Member States
or acts as a central purchasing body pursuant to Regulation (EU, Euratom)
2024/250928 or other Union legal acts other than this Regulation which provide for
carrying out joint procurement or acting on behalf of the Member States or as central
purchasing body, shall be deemed to comply with this Regulation in respect of the
procurement for that solution.
Article 10
Joint procurement
1. Two or more public buyers, including those from different Member States, may act
jointly in the award of certain specific public contracts.
2. The joint procurement procedure shall be regulated by an agreement between the
parties, determining, among other things:
28 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September
2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509,
26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).
EN 42 EN
(a) the respective responsibilities of the concerned parties, the responsibility for
the management of the joint procedure, the distribution of the works, supplies
or services to be jointly procured or rights to be transferred; and
(b) where the public buyers are from different Member States, the legal system
governing the procedure and, consequently, the legislation applicable to
disputes, the competent review body and applicable jurisdiction, and the law
governing the resulting public contracts.
The allocation of responsibilities and the applicable national law shall be referred to
in the procurement detail for the jointly procured public contracts.
3. This Article is without prejudice to Articles 9(6) and 69(3), point (f), of this
Regulation and Article 168(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 or
other Union legal acts.
Chapter 2
Activities in the field of utilities
SECTION 1
COVERED ACTIVITIES
Article 11
Common provisions
1. For the purposes of Articles 12, 13 and 14, ‘supply’ shall include generation or
production, wholesale and retail sale.
2. The production of gas in the form of extraction shall fall within the scope of Article
18.
Article 12
Gas and heat
1. In relation to gas and heat, this Regulation applies to the following activities:
(a) the provision or operation of fixed networks intended to provide a service to
the public in connection with the production, transport or distribution of gas or
heat;
(b) the supply of gas or heat to the networks referred to in point (a).
2. The supply by a contracting entity other than a contracting authority of gas or heat to
fixed networks which provide a service to the public shall not constitute a relevant
activity within the meaning of paragraph 1 of this Article where both of the
following conditions are met:
(a) the production of gas or heat by that contracting entity is the unavoidable
consequence of carrying out activities other than those referred to in paragraph
1 of this Article or in Articles 13, 14 or 15;
(b) the supply to the public network is aimed only at the economic exploitation of
such production and amounts to not more than 20 % of the contracting entity's
EN 43 EN
turnover on the basis of the average for the three years preceding the one in
which the supply is made.
Article 13
Electricity
1. In relation to electricity, this Regulation applies to the following activities:
(a) the provision or operation of fixed networks intended to provide a service to
the public in connection with the production, transport or distribution of
electricity;
(b) the supply of electricity to the networks referred to in point (a).
2. The supply by a contracting entity other than a contracting authority of electricity to
fixed networks which provide a service to the public shall not be considered to be a
relevant activity within the meaning of paragraph 1 of this Article where both of the
following conditions are met:
(a) the production of electricity by that contracting entity takes place because its
own consumption is necessary for carrying out activities other than those
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article or in Articles 12, 14 or 15;
(b) the supply to the public network depends only on that contracting entity's own
consumption and has not exceeded 30 % of that contracting entity's total
production of energy, on the basis of the average for the three years preceding
the one in which the supply is made.
Article 14
Water
1. In relation to water, this Regulation applies to the following activities:
(a) the provision or operation of fixed networks intended to provide a service to
the public in connection with the production, transport or distribution of
drinking water;
(b) the supply of drinking water to the networks referred to in point (a).
2. This Regulation shall also apply to contracts awarded by contracting entities which
pursue an activity referred to in paragraph 1 and which are connected with one of the
following activities:
(a) hydraulic engineering projects, irrigation or land drainage, provided that the
volume of water to be used for the supply of drinking water represents more
than 20 % of the total volume of water made available by such projects or
irrigation or drainage installations;
(b) the disposal or treatment of sewage.
3. The supply by a contracting entity other than a contracting authority of drinking
water to fixed networks which provide a service to the public shall not be considered
to be a relevant activity within the meaning of paragraph 1 of this Article where both
of the following conditions are met:
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(a) the production of drinking water by that contracting entity takes place because
its consumption by that contracting entity is necessary for carrying out an
activity other than those referred to in Articles 14 to 17;
(b) the supply to the public network depends only on that contracting entity's own
consumption and has not exceeded 30 % of that contracting entity's total
production of drinking water, on the basis of the average for the three years
preceding the one in which the supply is made.
Article 15
Transport Services
1. This Regulation applies to the provision or operation of networks providing a service
to the public in the field of transport by railway, automated systems, tramway, trolley
bus, bus or cable.
2. As regards transport services, a network shall be considered to exist where the
service is provided under operating conditions laid down by a competent authority of
a Member State, such as conditions on the routes to be served, the capacity to be
made available or the frequency of the service.
Article 16
Ports and airports
This Regulation applies to the exploitation of a geographical area for the purpose of providing
airports and maritime or inland ports or other terminal facilities to carriers by air, sea or inland
waterway.
Article 17
Postal services
1. This Regulation applies to activities relating to the provision of the following
services:
(a) postal services;
(b) services other than postal services, on condition that such services are provided
by an entity which also provides postal services as defined in paragraph 2,
point (b), of this Article and provided that the conditions set out in Article 19
are not satisfied in respect of those services.
2. For the purpose of this Article and without prejudice to Directive 97/67/EC29 of the
European Parliament and of the Council:
(a) ‘postal item’ means an item addressed in the final form in which it is to be
carried, irrespective of weight. In addition to items of correspondence, such
items also include for instance, books, catalogues, newspapers, periodicals and
29 Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common
rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of
quality of service (OJ L 15, 21.1.1998, p. 14, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1997/67/oj).
EN 45 EN
postal packages containing merchandise with or without commercial value,
irrespective of weight;
(b) ‘postal services’ means services consisting of the clearance, sorting, routing
and delivery of postal items, including services falling both within and outside
the scope of the universal service obligation provided for in Article 3 of
Directive 97/67/EC;
(c) ‘services other than postal services’ means services provided in the following
areas:
(i) mail service management services both preceding and subsequent to
despatch, including mailroom management services;
(ii) services concerning postal items not included in point (a), such as direct
mail bearing no address.
Article 18
Energy sources extraction and exploration
This Regulation applies to the exploitation of a geographical area for the purpose of:
(a) extracting oil or gas;
(b) exploring for, or extracting, coal or other solid fuels.
SECTION 2
EXEMPTING PARTICULAR UTILITY ACTIVITIES
Article 19
Activities directly exposed to competition
1. This Regulation does not apply to contracts for the pursuit of activities listed in
Articles 12 to 18, with regard to a given geographical area if the activity is directly
exposed to competition on markets to which access is not restricted in that
geographical area, where that is established by an implementing act adopted pursuant
to Article 20(4).
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the question of whether an activity is directly
exposed to competition shall be decided on the basis of criteria that are in conformity
with the provisions on competition of the Treaty, and without prejudice to the
application of competition law to the situation subject to the decision. Those criteria
may include the following:
(a) the characteristics of the products or services concerned;
(b) the existence of alternative products or services considered to be substitutable
on the supply side or demand side;
(c) the prices; and
(d) the actual or potential presence of more than one supplier of the products or
provider of the services in question on the relevant market.
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The activity concerned may form part of a larger sector or be exercised only in
certain parts of the territory of the Union, including certain parts of Member States.
3. The geographical area on the basis of which direct exposure to competition is
assessed shall consist of an area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in
the supply of and demand for products or services, in which the conditions of
competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from
neighbouring areas because, in particular, the conditions of competition are
appreciably different in those areas. That assessment shall primarily take into
account appreciable differences in the undertakings’ market shares and the existence
of market entry barriers or consumer preferences. It shall also take into account
factors such as the nature and characteristics of the products or services concerned
and any substantial price differences between the area concerned and neighbouring
areas. The territorial scope of the area on the basis of which exposure to competition
is assessed shall be limited to the territory of the Member State.
4. For the purposes of paragraph 1, access to a market is deemed not to be restricted if
the Member State has implemented and applied the Union legal acts listed in Annex
IV. Otherwise, it shall be established that access to the market in question is free in
law and in fact.
Article 20
Exemption procedure
1. Where a Member State or a contracting entity considers that a given activity is
directly exposed to competition on markets to which access is not restricted, it may
submit to the Commission, as a preparatory step to a possible formal exemption
request, a preliminary question on the applicability of Article 19 pursuant to
paragraph 2 of this Article, or, directly, a formal exemption request pursuant to
paragraph 3 of this Article, to establish that the activity in question is not covered by
this Regulation.
2. During the optional preparatory phase following the submission of a preliminary
question, the Commission, in a spirit of loyal cooperation, shall carry out an initial
assessment of the conditions set out in Article 19. Such assessment shall be based on
all information relevant to that activity already in the possession of or available to the
Commission. To complement the information already in its possession, the
Commission may request additional information from the contracting entity or
Member State concerned, or any other party competent in relation to the activity and
market concerned. The Commission may invite the contracting entity, Member State
and other concerned parties to further written or oral exchanges to explore whether
the conditions for granting an exemption are met, including as regards clarification of
missing facts, data or reasoning.
The Commission shall provide a reply to the preliminary assessment question within
180 calendar days after the submission. If the information collected in assessing the
preliminary question is sufficient to conclude that the conditions set out in Article 19
are met, the Commission shall end the preparatory phase, waive the submission of a
formal exemption request and adopt an implementing act declaring that the relevant
activity was exempted pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article.
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The Member State or contracting entity concerned may submit a formal request at
any time before the end of the period referred to in the second subparagraph.
If the information collected in assessing the preliminary question is not sufficient to
conclude that the conditions set out in Article 19 are met, the Commission shall
inform the Member State or the contracting entity concerned, after which the
Member State or the contracting entity may decide to submit a formal exemption
request pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article.
3. Following the submission of a formal exemption request, either directly or following
an inconclusive, negative or partially negative outcome of the preparatory phase, the
Commission shall carry out a full assessment of the conditions set out in Article 19.
The formal exemption request shall include all relevant facts, and in particular
information on any law, regulation, administrative provision or agreement
concerning compliance with these conditions. It may include a position adopted by
an independent national authority that is competent in relation to the activity
concerned. Form, content and other details of the exemption request shall follow the
requirements in the implementing act based on paragraph 10 of this Article.
4. Following its assessment of the information submitted, the Commission shall, by
means of implementing acts adopted within the periods set out in the second
subparagraph of this paragraph, establish whether an activity is directly exposed to
competition on the basis of the criteria set out in Article 19. Those implementing acts
shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 143(2).
The activity shall cease to be subject to this Regulation when:
(a) the Commission has adopted an implementing act establishing that the activity
is directly exposed to competition within the period provided for in point (b);
(b) the Commission has not adopted the implementing act within the following
periods:
(i) in case the exemption request is not accompanied by a position adopted by
an independent national authority:
(1) 90 days;
(2) 120 days where the Commission exceptionally informs the
contracting entity and Member State concerned that the degree of
complexity of the request for exemption requires more time to
analyse the competitive situation on the relevant market or activity;
(ii) in case the exemption request is accompanied by a position adopted by an
independent national authority:
(1) 60 days;
(2) exceptionally 80 days, where the Commission informs the
contracting entity and Member State concerned that the degree of
complexity of the request for exemption requires more time to
analyse the competitive situation on the relevant market or activity.
Those deadlines shall commence on the first working day following the date on
which the Commission receives the exemption request or, where the information to
be supplied with the exemption request is incomplete, on the working day following
the receipt of the complete information.
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The periods set out in point (b) may be extended by the Commission with the
agreement of the Member State or of the contracting entity concerned.
The Commission may request from the Member State or the contracting entity
concerned or the independent national authority or any other competent national
authority information that it considers necessary to carry out its assessment,
including related additional information or clarifications to information already
provided. The periods set out in point (b) shall be suspended until the receipt of the
complete and correct information.
5. After the submission of an exemption request, the Member State or the contracting
entity concerned may, with the Commission's agreement, substantially modify its
exemption request, in particular as regards the activities or the geographical areas
concerned. In such case, a new period for the adoption of the implementing act shall
apply, which is to be calculated in accordance with paragraph 4, point (b), unless a
shorter period is agreed on by the Commission and the Member State or contracting
entity concerned.
6. If, in the context of an exemption request, the Commission issues a request for
information to the Member State or the contracting entity concerned which remains
unanswered for 180 days, the exemption request shall be deemed to be withdrawn.
7. Where an activity in a given Member State is already the subject of a procedure
under paragraphs 1 and 5, further exemption requests concerning the same activity in
the same Member State before the expiry of the period opened in respect of the first
exemption request shall not be considered as new procedures but shall be treated in
the context and period of the first exemption request.
8. The Commission may, ex officio, carry out a new analysis of the conditions for
granting an exemption, including following information from a third party, or in case
of a formal request from a Member State.
9. Information on the applicability of Article 19(1) to covered activities for a given
market and activity shall be made available by the Commission, including the fact of
the submission of an exemption request, the applicable periods for its assessment and
any prolongations or suspensions thereof. The Commission shall also publish
information on preliminary questions and new analyses carried out pursuant to
paragraph 8.
10. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts establishing detailed
rules for the application of paragraphs 1 to 9, including at least rules relating to:
(a) implementing provisions concerning the form, content and other details of
preliminary questions and exemption requests pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3;
(b) publication pursuant to paragraph 9.
That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure
referred to in Article 143(2).
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Title II
Economic operators
Chapter 1
General provisions
Article 21
Economic operators
1. Public buyers shall not require economic operators to have a specific legal form in
order to participate in the procurement procedure.
2. Economic operators that, under the law of the Member State in which they are
established, are entitled to provide the relevant supplies, works or services, shall not
be rejected solely on the ground that, under the law of the Member State in which the
contract is to be awarded, the economic operator would have been required to be
either a natural or legal person.
3. Public buyers may, in the case of services, works or siting and installation
operations, require legal persons to indicate before the start of the execution of the
tasks concerned, the names and relevant qualifications of the staff responsible for the
performance of the contract in question.
Article 22
Groups of economic operators
1. Public buyers shall not set out selection criteria pursuant to Article 27 for groups of
economic operators that differ from those for other economic operators, unless
otherwise laid down in this Article.
A group of economic operators shall be deemed to fulfil a selection criterion where:
(a) one economic operator in the group possesses the necessary technical and
professional ability or economic and financial standing; or
(b) where such ability or standing can be established by combining the relevant
technical and professional ability or economic and financial standing from two
or several members of the group, unless such combination would not achieve
the same level of ability or standing.
2. When justified by the nature of the contract and in accordance with the principle of
proportionality, public buyers may:
(a) derogate from paragraph 1, second subparagraph, point (a) or (b), for selection
criteria relevant for certain critical tasks;
(b) require that certain critical tasks be performed directly by the member of the
group that fulfils the selection criterion relevant for that task.
Public buyers shall identify the critical tasks and related, requirements, clearly
indicating them and their justification in the procurement detail.
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3. Conditions for the performance of the contract by groups of economic operators may
be permitted to differ from those imposed on other economic operators only where
justified by objective reasons, which are proportionate and clearly indicated in the
procurement detail.
4. Without prejudice to Member States’ competence to organise their social security
systems, public buyers shall not require a group of economic operators to assume a
specific legal form, including once they have been awarded the contract.
5. Public buyers shall give particular consideration not to create unjustified or
disproportionate barriers related to the size of the economic operators participating in
a group, in particular for SMEs.
Article 23
Reliance on the capacity of other entities
1. With regard to selection criteria set by the public buyer pursuant to Article 27,
economic operators may rely on the capacities of other entities, regardless of the
legal nature of the links which it has with them or of their legal form.
2. The public buyer shall verify whether the entities, whose capacity the economic
operator intends to rely on regarding one or more selection criteria fulfil the relevant
selection criteria and whether there are grounds for their exclusion. The public buyer
shall require that the economic operator replace an entity which does not meet a
relevant selection criterion, or in respect of which there are mandatory grounds for
exclusion. The public buyer may require that the economic operator substitute an
entity in respect of which there are optional grounds for exclusion.
3. Public buyers may request in the procurement detail that the economic operator
proves that it will have the relevant resources of the entity it intends to rely on at its
disposal throughout the period of execution of the contract, for example by a
statement to that effect by those entities.
4. Where an economic operator relies on the capacities of other entities with regard to
criteria relating to economic and financial standing, the public buyer may require that
the economic operator and those entities be jointly liable to the public buyer for the
execution of the contract.
5. Where an economic operator relies on the capacities of other entities to prove
technical and professional ability, the public buyer may require in the procurement
detail that such other entity will perform the works or services for which these
capacities are required.
Article 24
Subcontracting
1. Parts of the public contract may be subcontracted. A contract awarded to an
economic operator shall not be subcontracted in its entirety, nor be further
subcontracted in its entirety.
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2. Public buyers shall require economic operators to indicate in their tender any share of
the contract that they envisage to subcontract to third parties, and any proposed
subcontractors.
They may require the main contractor to inform them after the award of the contract
and before the start of the contract performance of the tasks and activities it intends
to subcontract. They may also require information about the identity of any
subcontractors.
Public buyers shall require the main contractor to provide the information referred to
in the second subparagraph in the following cases:
(a) public works contracts;
(b) services to be provided at a facility under the direct oversight of the public
buyer;
(c) contracts identified as presenting or including a risk for security or public
safety set out in Article 66;
(d) contracts making use of the European preference requirements referred to in
Article 73.
The public buyer shall require the main contractor to notify the public buyer as soon
as possible of any changes to the information provided pursuant to the third
subparagraph during the course of the contract.
3. The public buyer shall require the economic operator to replace a subcontractor in
respect of which there are mandatory grounds for exclusion pursuant to Article 25.
The public buyer may require the economic operator to replace a subcontractor in
respect of which there are optional grounds for exclusion under Article 26.
4. Where the public buyer has made use of any of the European preference
requirements referred to in Article 73 or has included security measures in
accordance with Article 66, the economic operator may introduce or replace a
subcontractor only provided that the subcontractor complies with the European
preference requirements or security measures established by the public buyer.
5. When justified by the nature of the contract and in accordance with the principle of
proportionality, public buyers may require that certain critical tasks be performed
directly by the main contractor. Public buyers shall identify the critical tasks and
related requirements, clearly indicating them and their justification in the
procurement detail.
6. Subcontracting under the provisions in this Article is without prejudice to the main
contractor’s liability.
7. Observance of the obligations referred to in Article 4(4) by subcontractors is ensured
through appropriate action by the competent national authorities acting within the
scope of their responsibility and remit. Member States may adopt or retain additional
proportionate measures limiting subcontracting where they have identified a duly
substantiated higher risk of non-compliance with social and labour law obligations.
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Chapter 2
Exclusion grounds and selection criteria
Article 25
Mandatory exclusions
1. Public buyers shall at any time during the procedure exclude an economic operator,
including individual members of a group of economic operators, from participation
in a procurement procedure where that economic operator, or a key person in the
functioning of a legal person as defined in the second subparagraph, has been the
subject, in any Member State, of a conviction by final judgment for any of the
offences listed in this subparagraph, or, regarding Member States not bound by the
relevant Union legal act, offences as laid down in equivalent national legislation:
(a) participation in a criminal organisation, as defined in Article 1, point 1, of
Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA30;
(b) corruption offences, within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2026/102131;
(c) fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests within the meaning of Article 1
of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial
interests and criminal offences referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Directive
(EU) 2017/137132;
(d) terrorist offences and offences related to a terrorist group, as well as offences
related to terrorist activities, as referred to in Articles 3 to 12 of Directive (EU)
2017/54133;
(e) money laundering withing the meaning of Article 3 of Directive (EU)
2018/167334;
(f) trafficking in human beings within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive (EU)
2011/3635;
(g) criminal offences concerning the employment of illegally staying third-country
nationals, as referred to in Articles 2, 3 and 9 of Directive 2009/52/EC36;
30 Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime
(OJ L 300, 11.11.2008, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2008/841/oj). 31 Directive (EU) 2026/1021 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2026 on
combatting corruption, replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on
the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member
States of the European Union and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and
of the Council (OJ L, 2026/1021, 11.5.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2026/1021/oj). 32 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight
against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj). 33 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on
combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council
Decision 2005/671/JHA (OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/541/oj). 34 Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on
combating money laundering by criminal law (OJ L 284, 12.11.2018, p. 22, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1673/oj). 35 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework
Decision 2002/629/JHA (OJ L 101, 15.4.2011, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/36/oj).
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(h) environmental criminal offences as referred to in Articles 3 and 4 of Directive
(EU) 2024/120337;
(i) criminal offences concerning the violation of Union restrictive measures as
referred to in Articles 3 and 4 of Directive (EU) 2024/122638;
(j) fraudulent use of non-cash payment instruments as referred to in Articles 3 to 8
of Directive 2019/713/EU39;
(k) offences in the area of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children as
referred to in Articles 3 to 9 of Directive (EU) 2011/9340.
A key person in the functioning of a legal person means a personhaving a leading
position within the legal person, based on any of the following:
(a) a power of representation of the legal person;
(b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person;
(c) an authority to exercise control within the legal person.
2. The exclusion grounds set out in this Article shall apply for five years from the date
of the delivery of the final judgment, except where the period of exclusion has been
set by the final judgment, meaning that no exclusion decision shall be taken after the
expiry of the periods referred to in this sentence.
3. Public buyers shall at any time during the procedure exclude an economic operator
from participation in a procurement procedure when it becomes aware that the
economic operator or contractor is in breach of its obligations relating to the payment
of taxes or social security contributions and this has been established by final judicial
or administrative decision, except if by that moment in time, the economic operator
has concluded a binding arrangement on paying the taxes or social security
contributions due, including, where applicable, any interest accrued or fines.
Public buyers may derogate from the mandatory exclusion provided for in
subparagraph 1 where an exclusion would be clearly disproportionate, in particular
where only minor amounts are unpaid.
4. Public buyers may decide to derogate from the mandatory exclusion provided for in
this Article on an exceptional basis, for overriding reasons relating to the public
interest such as public health or protection of the environment Any decision to
36 Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the
protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and
2009/123/EC (OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1203/oj). 37 Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the
protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and
2009/123/EC (OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1203/oj). 38 Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the
definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and
amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673 (OJ L, 2024/1226, 29.4.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1226/oj). 39 Directive (EU) 2019/713 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on combating
fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment and replacing Council Framework Decision
2001/413/JHA (OJ L 123, 10.5.2019, p. 18, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/713/oj). 40 Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on
combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing
Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (OJ L 335, 17.12.2011, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/93/oj.
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derogate and the justification therefore shall be documented in the individual
documentation pursuant to Article 109.
Article 26
Optional exclusion grounds
1. Public buyers may at any time during the procedure exclude an economic operator,
including individual members of groups of economic operators, from participation in
a procurement procedure, where:
(a) the public buyer can demonstrate by any appropriate means that the economic
operator has breached applicable obligations under relevant Union legislation,
as referred to in Article 4(4);
(b) the economic operator is bankrupt or is the subject of insolvency or winding-up
proceedings or a comparable situation;
(c) the public buyer can demonstrate by appropriate means grave professional
misconduct by the economic operator, which renders its integrity or reliability
questionable;
(d) the public buyer has sufficiently plausible indications to conclude that the
economic operator has entered into agreements with other economic operators
aimed at distorting competition;
(e) the economic operator has shown significant or persistent deficiencies in the
performance of a substantive requirement under a prior public contract, which
led to early termination of that prior contract, damages or other comparable
sanctions by the public buyer;
(f) the economic operator, in the context of the concerned procedure, has been
found accountable of serious misrepresentation with regard to the information
required for the verification of the absence of grounds for exclusion or the
fulfilment of the selection criteria; or has otherwise undertaken to unduly
obtain advantages in the public procurement procedure;
(g) the public buyer can demonstrate by any appropriate means including but not
limited to classified information or non-publicly disclosable assessments
provided by competent national authorities, that the economic operator does
not possess sufficient reliability to exclude risks to the security and public
safety interests of the Union or of one or more Member States;
(h) the economic operator has benefitted from foreign subsidies distorting the
internal market, established by an implementing act adopted by the
Commission pursuant to Article 31 (2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/256041, in the
three years preceding the public procurement procedure, and the public buyer
has sufficiently plausible indications to conclude that the foreign subsidies
concerned are likely to have an impact on the tender of the economic operator.
2. Any economic operator subject to an exclusion pursuant to paragraph 1 may provide
evidence to rebut the existence of the exclusion ground or to demonstrate that it has
41 Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on
foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj).
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taken sufficient measures to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence of the
exclusion ground.
For this purpose, the economic operator shall, in particular, prove that it has
(a) paid or undertaken to pay compensation in respect of any damage caused by
the misconduct;
(b) clarified the facts and circumstances in a comprehensive manner by actively
cooperating with the investigating authorities; and
(c) taken concrete technical, organisational and personnel measures that are
appropriate to prevent further misconduct.
If the public buyer considers the evidence provided as sufficient, the economic
operator concerned shall not be excluded from the procurement procedure.
The measures taken by the economic operators shall be evaluated taking into account
the gravity and particular circumstances of the misconduct. In assessing the measures
taken by the economic operator public buyers shall take into account the nature,
extent and timing of the cooperation with the relevant investigating authorities.
Where the measures are considered to be insufficient, the economic operator shall
receive a statement of the reasons thereto.
An economic operator which has been excluded by final judgment in any Member
State from participating in procurement procedures shall not be entitled to make use
of the possibility provided for under this paragraph during the period of exclusion
resulting from that judgment.
Member States may designate a national authority competent to evaluate the
evidence and decide whether it is sufficient for the purposes of this paragraph. Public
buyers shall rely on a positive decision of the national competent authority for the
purpose of their procurement procedures.
3. Where no measures as specified in paragraph 2 are taken and where the period of
exclusion has not been set by final judgment, public buyers may exclude economic
operators pursuant to this Article during a period of five years from the date of the
conduct giving rise to exclusion or, in the case of continued or repeated acts, the date
on which the conduct ceases, but not after that maximum period.
4. Where a public buyer excludes an economic operator on the basis of paragraph 1,
point (h), it shall inform the Commission thereof.
Article 27
Selection criteria
1. Where public buyers decide to make use of selection criteria, they shall lay down
such criteria in accordance with the conditions in this Article.
2. Selection criteria shall only relate to:
(a) technical and professional ability within the meaning of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6;
(b) legal, economic and financial standing within the meaning of paragraph 7.
3. Public buyers shall limit any requirements to those that are appropriate to ensure that
an economic operator has the legal, economic and financial capacities and the
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technical and professional abilities to perform the contract to be awarded. All
requirements shall be related and proportionate to the complexity of and the risks
associated with the subject-matter of the contract.
4. When justified by the subject-matter of the contract, public buyers may require
economic operators to be enrolled in one of the professional or trade registers
established in the country where the economic operator conducts its main activity.
In procurement procedures for services, insofar as economic operators are required to
hold a particular authorisation or to be members of a particular organisation in order
to be able to perform in their country of origin the service concerned, the public
buyer may require them to prove that they hold such authorisation or membership.
Certified registration on official lists by the competent bodies or a certificate issued
by the certification body shall constitute a presumption of compliance with regard to
the requirements set out pursuant to this paragraph.
5. Any references to qualifications or qualification levels included in selection criteria
shall mention the European Qualifications Framework levels set out in Annex II to
Council Recommendation of 22 May 201742.
6. Public buyers may impose requirements ensuring that economic operators possess
the necessary human and technical resources and experience to perform the contract
to an appropriate quality standard.
Unless justified due to the complexity of the contract or the nature of the subject-
matter, public buyers shall not require prior experience in public contracts as a
condition for participation in the procurement procedure.
A public buyer may assume that an economic operator does not possess the required
professional abilities where:
(a) the public buyer has established by appropriate means that the economic
operator has conflicting interests which may negatively affect the performance
of the contract; or
(b) the public buyer has been made aware by appropriate means that the economic
operator presents a security concern for a Member State or the Union as a
whole.
7. Public buyers may require economic operators to satisfy any of the following
criteria:
(a) to have an appropriate minimum yearly overall turnover;
(b) to have an appropriate minimum turnover in the area covered by the contract;
(c) to provide information on their annual accounts, including on the ratios
between assets and liabilities;
(d) to have an appropriate level of professional indemnity insurance.
The minimum turnovers referred to in the first subparagraph shall not exceed 50 %
of the estimated annual contract value, except in duly justified cases such as relating
to the special risks attached to the nature of the works, services or supplies.
42 Council recommendation of 22 May 2017 on the European Qualifications Framework for lifelong
learning and repealing the recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April
2008 on the establishment of the European Qualifications Framework for lifelong learning (OJ C 189,
15.6.2017, p.15).
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The public buyer shall indicate the main reasons for such a requirement in the
procurement detail.
Information from the annual accounts may be taken into consideration only where
the public buyer has specified the methods and criteria for such consideration in the
procurement detail. Such methods and criteria shall be transparent, objective and
non-discriminatory.
8. Information that can be determined from existing national databases established by a
public body, or from the registration on official lists or certifications shall not be
questioned without sufficient justification.
Chapter 3
Means of proof of eligibility and database access
Article 28
Means of proof of the eligibility of economic operators
1. Public buyers shall require economic operators to use the electronic eligibility
service established pursuant to Article 133 as the means of proof for the following:
(a) absence of exclusion grounds pursuant to Articles 25 and 26;
(b) compliance with selection criteria pursuant to Article 27.
Where the economic operator relies on the capacities of other entities pursuant to
Article 23 or proposes to make use of subcontractors in the execution of the contract
pursuant to Article 24, the economic operator shall also provide the information
referred to in the first subparagraph for those entities through the electronic
eligibility service.
2. Where the electronic eligibility service provides for an automated verification of the
existence of an exclusion ground or compliance with a selection criterion, public
buyers shall use that verification for their decision on eligibility.
3. Economic operators shall use the digital business credential tool as provided for in
Article 133. Where an economic operator does not have access to that tool or where
the relevant evidence is not available through that tool, the economic operator shall
declare, through the electronic eligibility service, whether it complies with the
requirements set out for exclusion grounds and the selection criteria and whether it
would be able to submit the required evidence (self-declaration).
In that case, the public buyer may, at any time during the procedure, require evidence
that is not available through the electronic eligibility service where it is necessary for
the assessment of the public buyer’s requirements.
4. Economic operators shall indicate their country of origin, in accordance with Article
74, in the electronic eligibility service referred to in Article 133.
If required for applying requirements under Article 73(2), economic operators shall
indicate the country of origin of the goods that compose their tender, incorporating it,
where applicable, into the digital product passport of the goods pursuant to
Regulation (EU) 2024/1781.
Where public buyers conduct a procurement procedure by applying one or more
measures set out in Part III, Title II, Chapter 5, they may, at any time during the
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public procurement procedure, request the economic operator to supplement, clarify
or complete information or documentation related to the verification of the origin of
the economic operator, or the goods, services or works offered, provided that such
requests comply with the principles of equal treatment and transparency.
Where the economic operator fails to provide the information or documentation
referred to in the third subparagraph, without reasonable explanation, and thereby
prevents the verification of the origin by a public buyer or makes such verification
practically impossible or very difficult, the economic operator, or the tender it has
submitted, may be excluded from participating in the public procurement procedure
concerned.
Article 29
Connection of databases to the electronic eligibility service
1. Member States shall, by 15 June 2029, provide free of charge access for the digital
business credential tool pursuant to Article 133 to the national databases in which:
(a) final judgements for the offences referred to in Article 25(1) are recorded, in
particular to the national criminal registers for legal and those for natural
persons;
(b) information on key persons pursuant to Article 25(1), second subparagraph, is
recorded, in particular in the national professional or trade registers;
(c) evidence regarding the outstanding payment of taxes or social security
contributions pursuant to Article 25(2) is recorded, in particular in the national
professional or trade registers and in taxation databases and social security
databases;
(d) evidence regarding bankruptcy, insolvency and restructuring pursuant to
Article 25(4) point (b), is recorded, in particular in the national professional or
trade registers and the national registers of bankruptcy, insolvency and
reorganisations, including court registers;
(e) evidence regarding the compliance with selection criteria set pursuant to
Article 27 of this Regulation and for the assessment of origin pursuant to
Article 74 of this Regulation is stored, in particular in national professional or
trade registers and the beneficial ownership registers established pursuant to
Article 12 of Directive (EU) 2024/1640;
(f) any other structured evidence relevant within the scope of this Regulation is
recorded, such as labels, specifications including security requirements or
means of proof for product requirements pursuant to Article 92.
2. Access pursuant to paragraph 1 shall, where possible, be provided in such a manner
that the electronic eligibility service may automate the verification as set out in
Article 28(2). An automated verification shall in particular be provided for national
criminal registers, taxation databases and social security databases, as well as
national registers of bankruptcy, insolvency and reorganisations. Such verification
shall be subject to suitable measures to safeguard the rights of freedoms of data
subjects pursuant Articles 10 and 22 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. The personal data
shall only be used for the purpose of ensuring that the economic operator meets the
requirements of this Regulation.
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3. Member States shall inform the Commission of any newly established national
databases capable of providing means of proof through use of the digital business
credential tool and shall provide free of charge access for the digital business
credential tool to such national databases.
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Part III
Procedures for public contracts
Title I
Public procurement procedures
Chapter 1
Preliminary steps and general provisions
Article 30
Market consultations
1. Public buyers may conduct market consultations to prepare their procurement and
gain market knowledge, including about the availability of, or potential of
developing, innovative solutions.
2. Where public buyers conduct market consultations pursuant to paragraph 1 of this
Article, they shall announce those consultations in accordance with Article 110.
3. During the market consultations, public buyers may seek or accept information and
advice from the general public, independent experts, public authorities, market
participants or other relevant parties. The information and advice may take the form
of written or verbal exchanges, demonstration of prototypes, live demonstrations, or
other suitable objective formats. Such information and advice may be used in the
planning and conduct of the procurement procedures, respecting the principles of
equal treatment, non-discrimination, fair competition and transparency.
4. The participation of an economic operator in a market consultation does not prejudge
its eligibility for the procurement procedure.
Article 31
Choice of procedures
1. Public buyers may use the open procedure set out in Article 34 and the dynamic
procedure set out in Article 36 irrespective of the type of works, supplies or services
needed.
2. Public buyers may use the innovation procedure to address a societal challenge for
which they have not identified an existing appropriate or desirable solution, which is
to be developed by the successful tenderer(s) in the course of the innovation
procedure.
3. Public buyers may use the special procedure described in Article 46 only in the
specific cases and circumstances laid down in Articles 47 and 48.
Article 32
Estimation of the value of the contract
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1. Public buyers intending to award a contract shall estimate the value of the contract
based on the estimated costs of the solution that meets the needs of the public buyer.
The estimation shall be based on the maximum amount to be spent on the satisfaction
of the needs over the entire duration of the contract, whether awarded to one or more
economic operators, including all forms of payments and benefits, such as:
(a) premiums, fees, commissions and interests;
(b) the total value of options or renewals, where the contract provides for the
possibility of options or renewals.
2. Where public buyers conclude more than one successive contract to satisfy their
need, the calculation of the estimated value shall be based on:
(a) the value of recurring contracts for the same type of purchase during the
preceding 12 months or the buyer’s preceding fiscal year, adjusted, where
possible, to take into account anticipated changes in the quantity or estimated
value of the solution to be procured over the following 12 months;
(b) the estimated value of recurring contracts for the same type of purchase during
the 12 months following the initial contract or the public buyer’s preceding
fiscal year.
Article 33
Conduct of negotiations
1. Public buyers shall respect the principles of proportionality and equal treatment in
the conduct of negotiations and shall ensure that in any given round of negotiations
the number of solutions discussed allows for genuine competition. Public buyers
shall ensure that any disclosure of information during negotiations does not affect the
commercial interests of the economic operators taking part in such negotiations.
2. Without prejudice to other relevant Union legislation, public buyers may negotiate
all non-essential characteristics of the works, supplies and services intended for
purchase, which may include certain elements related, for instance to technical merit,
quantity, delivery conditions and other commercial aspects, but does not include
exclusion grounds, selection criteria and award criteria.
Public buyers shall clearly indicate in the public summary of competition the
characteristics of the works, supplies and services that are not subject to negotiation.
These indications shall be sufficiently precise and comprehensive to circumscribe the
subject-matter of the contract and shall contain the essential conditions of the
contract, on which economic operators would legitimately rely in order to take the
decision whether to participate in the award procedure.
The negotiations shall not substantially alter the subject-matter of the contract.
3. Public buyers may conduct negotiations in one or more rounds. After each round, the
economic operators participating in the negotiations shall be invited to submit a
tender and public buyers may decide to reduce the number of participants based on
the award criteria set pursuant to Article 98.
Public buyers shall inform economic operators when a new round of negotiations
will start and whether or not they will be invited. Public buyers shall inform all
tenderers, whose tenders have not been eliminated, of any changes to the
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specifications or changes to other parts of the procurement detail as a result of the
negotiations.
Public buyers shall provide sufficient time for tenderers to modify and re-submit
amended tenders, as appropriate. Economic operators may submit revised tenders
depending on the outcome of the negotiations.
Where a public buyer has decided to conclude the negotiations and proceed to the
award of the contract, it shall invite each of the remaining economic operators to
submit a final tender.
Chapter 2
Open procedure
Article 34
Launch and conduct of the open procedure
1. In the open procedure, public buyers shall make their procurement needs known
through a public summary of competition published pursuant to Article 110 setting
out whether and which selection criteria apply, and whether they intend to negotiate.
2. Any interested economic operator may express its interest and submit a tender (‘first
tender’) using the electronic eligibility service referred to in Article 133. The
expression of interest shall be submitted together with a tender specifying in
particular how the economic operator proposes to address the needs of the public
buyer. The deadline for receiving expressions of interest with tenders shall be no less
than 20 days from the publication of the public summary of competition.
3. Where a public buyer has indicated that it intends not to negotiate, it shall award the
contract in accordance with Article 98 to one or more economic operators that are
not in a situation of exclusion, and, where applicable, fulfil the selection criteria set
pursuant to Article 27. The contract shall be awarded on the basis of the first tenders
submitted pursuant to paragraph 2.
4. Where the public buyer has indicated that it intends to negotiate, it shall send an
invitation to negotiate to all interested economic operators that are not in a situation
of exclusion, and, where applicable, that fulfil the selection criteria set pursuant to
Article 27.
5. Negotiations shall be carried out in accordance with Article 33. Where the public
buyer has decided to conclude the negotiations and has invited each of the remaining
economic operators to submit a final tender, the contract shall be awarded on the
basis of those final tenders.
6. Public buyers may decide not to negotiate, despite having indicated their intention to
do so, but instead proceed to award the contract on the basis of the first tenders,
provided that they have reserved the possibility of doing so in the public summary of
competition.
Article 35
Finalisation of the procedure and award of the contract
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1. Public buyers shall award the contract to the tenderer or tenderers that have
submitted the tender offering the best quality for money in accordance with Article
98.
2. Without prejudice to the standstill period established in Directives 89/665/EEC43 and
92/13/EEC44, the contract shall be concluded in accordance with the applicable law
of the Member State of the public buyer.
Chapter 3
Dynamic procedure
Article 36
Dynamic procedure
Public buyers may use a dynamic procedure, in which only economic operators that have
joined a given procedure are invited to express interest, submit a tender or participate in
negotiations for individual contracts based on that procedure. Economic operators may
request to join the procedure at any point during its validity.
Article 37
Launch and validity of the dynamic procedure
1. Public buyers conducting a dynamic procedure shall publish a public summary of
competition on the launch of a dynamic procedure pursuant to Article 110, which
shall indicate the duration of validity of the procedure, during which interested
economic operators may request to join the procedure and during which acquisitions
on the basis of the procedure may be made. The dynamic procedure shall remain
open to all interested economic operators throughout its validity.
2. Public buyers may choose between conducting a dynamic procedure without
selection criteria pursuant to Article 38 or a dynamic procedure with selection
criteria pursuant to Article 39, and whether to negotiate in accordance with Article
33. The choices made shall be indicated the public summary of competition on the
launch of a dynamic procedure.
3. Where public buyers intend to award an individual contract for the first time on the
basis of the dynamic procedure, the invitation to express an interest in the specific
contract shall take place not earlier than 25 days after the publication of the public
summary of competition on the launch of a dynamic procedure.
Article 38
Conduct of the dynamic procedure without selection criteria
43 Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply
and public works contracts (OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 33, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1989/665/oj). 44 Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities
operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors (OJ L 76, 23.3.1992, p. 14,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1992/13/oj).
EN 64 EN
1. Upon the publication of the public summary of competition, and until the validity of
the procedure has expired, economic operators may join the procedure by sharing
their profile with the public buyer trough the eligibility system established pursuant
to Article 133. By sharing their profile, the economic operators declare that they are
qualified to perform the contract.
2. Where public buyers intend to award individual contracts based on the dynamic
procedure, they shall inform all economic operators that have until that point joined
the procedure about the individual contract to be awarded, including the precise
description, quantity and timing of the purchase in question. Public buyers shall
invite all economic operators participating in the dynamic procedure to express their
interest in the specific contract to be awarded, setting a reasonable time limit for
expressions of interest.
3. After the expiry of the time limit referred to in paragraph 2, public buyers shall invite
the economic operators that have expressed their interest in the specific contract to be
awarded, either to submit a tender, or to submit a first tender followed by
negotiations.
Where the number of expressions of interest is more than five, the public buyer may,
instead of inviting all economic operators that have expressed their interest, invite
only five or certain more economic operators selected through the electronic
eligibility service by means of random indiscriminate algorithmic determination, and
shall inform through the eligibility system all those not invited.
4. Only economic operators that have submitted a tender shall be considered to be
tenderers concerned within the meaning of Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC.
Article 39
Conduct of the dynamic procedure with selection criteria
1. Upon the publication of the public summary of competition, and until the validity of
the procedure has expired, economic operators may request to join the procedure, by
sharing their profile with the public buyer trough the eligibility system established
pursuant to Article 133. By sharing their profile, the economic operators declare that
they are qualified to perform the contract.
2. The public buyer shall admit economic operators to the procedure on the basis of the
selection criteria indicated in the public summary of competition.
3. Where public buyers intend to award individual contracts based on the dynamic
procedure, they shall inform all economic operators that have until that point been
selected for joining the procedure about the individual contract to be awarded,
including the precise description, quantity and timing of the purchase in question.
Public buyers shall invite all economic operators participating in the dynamic
procedure to express their interest in the specific contract to be awarded, setting a
reasonable time limit for expressions of interest.
4. After the expiry of the time limit referred to in paragraph 3, public buyers shall invite
all economic operators that have expressed their interest in the specific contract to be
awarded either to submit a tender, or to submit a first tender followed by
negotiations.
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By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, public buyers may decide to only
invite a subset of the economic operators having expressed their interest in the
specific contract to be awarded, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory
criteria or rules, provided that they have indicated these in the public summary of
competition on the launch of the dynamic procedure.
Article 40
Finalisation of the procedure and award of the contract
1. Public buyers shall evaluate the final tenders in accordance with Article 98 and
establish a ranking of all economic operators that have submitted a final tender.
Public buyers shall award the contract to one or more economic operators that are not
in a situation of exclusion. The results of this evaluation, including the ranking, shall
be disclosed to the tenderers.
2. Public buyers shall, for every contract signed under a dynamic procedure, publish a
public summary of result pursuant to Article 110.
Chapter 4
Innovation procedure
Article 41
Design and conduct of the innovation procedure
1. Public buyers may use the innovation procedure as set out in this Chapter to address
a societal challenge.
2. The innovation procedure shall be conducted according to the following phases:
(a) determination of the societal challenge and design of the value assessment
framework;
(b) launch of the procedure;
(c) the selection of innovative solution proposals;
(d) testing, validation and assessment of innovative solution proposals;
(e) the award of the public contract.
3. Public buyers shall determine the societal challenge to which they need an innovative
solution proposal and define a value assessment framework that will be used during
the course of the procedure for the assessment of the added value of the innovative
solution proposal addressing the societal challenge. The value assessment framework
shall use performance indicators to measure how much the proposed innovative
solution proposal contributes to addressing the societal challenge in an objective and
measurable way. It shall include a score system and indicate the minimum scores
needed for innovative solution proposals to proceed to the different phases of the
innovation procedure.
4. Elements of the value assessment framework may refer in particular to:
(a) enhanced user and process value, such as feedback gathered from citizens
during the testing and validation of the innovative solution proposal;
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(b) key performance indicators pertaining to increase efficiency or lower nuisance
in the performance of public services, improved sustainability performance,
improved health protection, reduced environmental impacts or increased
security and resilience, such as safer cybersecurity systems;
(c) cost savings for the public buyer as compared with traditional or previously
applied solutions.
Article 42
Launch of the innovation procedure
1. Before the launch of an innovation procedure, public buyers shall conduct a market
consultation according to Article 30 which shall last at least two months, unless a
shorter duration is justified given the specificities of the contract.
2. The public buyer shall make the following information available in the market
consultation:
(a) a preliminary description of the societal challenge;
(b) a preliminary value assessment framework;
(c) an invitation for feedback and dialogue.
3. Upon the closure of the market consultation, public buyers shall, on the basis of the
feedback received, prepare and launch the innovation procedure with a public
summary of competition in accordance with Article 110.
The public buyer shall indicate in the procurement detail:
(a) the final description of the societal challenge;
(b) the minimum functional requirements that the innovative solution proposals
need to meet;
(c) the final value assessment framework;
(d) any cash or in-kind contributions that the public buyer intends or may make
available during the phases of the procedure,
(e) the expected procurement volumes;
(f) draft outlines for the contracts for testing, validation and assessment and for
deployment of the innovative solution proposal, indicating topics for
negotiation on deployment,
(g) information regarding the allocation of intellectual property rights arising in
accordance with Article 64(4).
4. Any economic operator may submit an innovative solution proposal in response to a
public summary of competition together with any information necessary for the
selection of innovative solution proposals.
Article 43
Selection of innovative solution proposals
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1. For the selection of innovative solution proposals, the public buyer shall perform an
eligibility assessment in two phases.
2. In the first phase, the public buyer shall:
(a) verify the absence of any exclusion applicable to the economic operator and,
where the public buyer choses to use selection criteria, proof of selection
criteria;
(b) confirm that the innovative solution proposal submitted by the economic
operator complies with the minimum functional requirements pursuant to
Article 42(3), point (b).
3. In the second phase, the innovative solution proposals of economic operators that
have passed the assessment pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be selected
according to the criteria of the value assessment framework and the evaluation score
referred to in Article 42(3), point (c), based on:
(a) a positive evaluation of the innovation potential of the proposal, as well as its
innovation capacity to address the societal challenge; and
(b) a positive evaluation of the feasibility and scalability of the proposal.
The second phase may be conducted by an interview with the economic operator, or
by way of written exchanges with the economic operator.
4. Where the innovative solution proposal submitted by an economic operator attains at
least the minimum total score for overall positive evaluation, that economic operator
shall proceed to the next phase of the procurement procedure. The public buyer may
limit the number of economic operators to proceed if it indicates such number in the
procurement detail; in that case, the economic operators with the highest scores shall
proceed.
Article 44
Testing, validation and assessment of innovative solution proposals
1. The public buyer shall invite economic operators found eligible pursuant to Article
43 to the testing, validation and assessment phase.
2. The duration of this phase shall not exceed two years from the date of selection of
the innovative solution proposals, unless duly justified.
3. It shall consist of a structured and systematic process conducted by or on behalf of
the public buyer based on the value assessment framework with the purpose of an
overall assessment of the proposal, which shall include, where relevant:
(a) assessing the technical, operational, and functional feasibility of the innovative
solution proposal in addressing the specified societal challenge;
(b) verifying compliance of the innovative solution proposal with the minimum
functional requirements and applicable regulatory frameworks;
(c) evaluating the added value of the innovative proposal in a real-world or
simulated environment;
(d) identifying any risks, limitations, or areas for improvement prior to full-scale
implementation or procurement of the innovative solution proposal.
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It may include laboratory testing, field trials, pilot deployments, user feedback
collection, and comparative analysis.
4. Where Union legislation provides a framework for the assessment of the suitability
of the innovative solution proposal to address the societal challenge, the public buyer
shall rely on that assessment.
5. Any payments for each defined milestone of the testing, validation and assessment
phase shall be upfront.
6. During this phase, economic operators may adjust and enhance their proposals with
the objective of securing compliance with minimum functional requirements and
increasing the added value of their proposal.
7. The public buyer shall make a final assessment of the improved proposal on
compliance with minimum functional requirements and its added value pursuant to
the value assessment framework and minimum scores.
8. The final assessment, indicating a positive or negative decision to proceed to the
phase of awarding the public contract, shall be published as the public summary of
result for the testing, validation and assessment phase.
Article 45
Award of the public contract for deployment of the innovative solution proposal
1. The public buyer shall send an invitation to negotiate to each economic operator that
has received a positive decision to proceed pursuant Article 44(8).
2. In addition to the provisions in Article 33, the public buyer shall indicate the
structure of the negotiations and shall determine how the negotiation is finalised,
including a clear exit strategy for ending the procedure without award by
determining objective criteria in which case negotiations are considered to have
failed.
3. The description of the societal challenge, the minimum functional requirements and
the value assessment framework shall not be subject to negotiation.
4. The negotiation shall focus on deployment of the innovative solution proposal and
may include, but is not limited to:
(a) scope of commercial supply;
(b) rights to exploit in wider markets;
(c) pricing and final procurement volumes, not exceeding the volumes announced
pursuant to Article 42(3), point (e);
(d) future upgrades, maintenance and service conditions of the innovative solution
proposal;
(e) allocation of technical and commercial risks in deployment of the innovative
solution proposal.
5. In case of a successful negotiation with an economic operator, the public buyer shall
award the public contract for deployment of the solution proposal directly to that
economic operator or, in the case of several successful solutions, to those economic
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operators. Awards may take place for up to five years after publication of the positive
decision pursuant Article 44(8).
Chapter 5
Special procedures and tools
Article 46
Contracts requiring only publication of public summary of result
1. In the specific cases and circumstances laid down in Articles 47 and 48, public
buyers may use a special procedure to award a public contract by requesting a
solution directly from one or more economic operators without the need for a
competitive process or prior publication of information on the tender. This request
may take the form of an invitation to negotiate, a request to submit a tender, or a
request to deliver the solution against invoice. Public buyers shall publish a public
summary of result pursuant to Article 110.
2. The award of these contracts shall follow the principles of non-discrimination, equal
treatment and transparency, taking due account of the specific needs and
circumstances of the public buyers in the specific cases and circumstances described
in Article 47 and 48.
Article 47
Conditions for the use of contracts with publication of a public summary of result only
Public buyers may use the procedure described in Article 46 in any of the following
situations, in compliance with the Union’s international commitments:
(a) the solution needed can be supplied only by a particular economic operator and
no reasonable alternative or substitute exists for any of the following reasons:
(i) the aim of the procurement is the creation or acquisition of a unique work of
art or artistic performance;
(ii) competition is absent for technical reasons that cannot be attributed to the
design of a prior procurement procedure or an artificial narrowing down of the
parameters of the procurement;
(iii) the protection of exclusive rights, including intellectual property rights;
(iv) where the opening up of the contract to competition could negatively affect
essential national security interests of the Union or the Member State of the
public buyer and there is no possibility of applying less intrusive measures.
(b) in the case of public supply contracts that concern:
(i) additional deliveries during not more than two years by the original supplier
which are intended either as a partial replacement of supplies or installations or
as the extension of existing supplies or installations, where a change of supplier
would entail disproportionate costs or technical difficulties for the public
buyer;
(ii) for supplies quoted and purchased on a commodity market;
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(iii) for the purchase of supplies or services on particularly advantageous terms
that only arise in the very short term in the case of unusual disposals such as
those arising from winding down or insolvency proceedings.
(c) in the case of public service contracts that concern:
(i) administrative social, educational, healthcare and cultural service contracts
under Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) codes 79950000-8
[Exhibition, fair and congress organisation services], 79951000-5 [Seminar
organisation services], 79952000-2 [Event services], 79952100-3 [Cultural
event organisation services], 79953000-9 [Festival organisation services],
79954000-6 [Party organisation services], 79955000-3 [Fashion shows
organisation services], 79956000-0 [Fair and exhibition organisation services],
92100000-2 [Motion picture and video services], 92200000-3 [Radio and
television services], 92400000-5 [News-agency services];
(ii) Hotel and restaurant services under CPVs 55100000-1 to 55410000-7;
55521000-8 to 55521200-0 [55521000-8 Catering services for private
households, 55521100-9 Meals-on-wheels services, 55521200-0 Meal delivery
service] 55520000-1 Catering services, 55522000-5 Catering services for
transport enterprises, 55523000-2 Catering services for other enterprises or
other institutions, 55524000-9 School catering services 55510000-8 Canteen
services, 55511000-5 Canteen and other restricted clientele cafeteria services,
55512000-2 Canteen management services, 55523100-3 School-meal service.
Article 48
Emergency and crisis
1. Public buyers may make use of the procedure described in Article 46, where, for
reasons of extreme urgency not attributable to the public buyer, the time limits for
the procedures in this Regulation cannot be complied with.
2. Without prejudice to any joint procurement activities organised by the Union
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies where an emergency mode has been
activated pursuant Regulation (EU) 2024/274745, the emergency framework has been
activated pursuant Council Regulation (EU) 2022/237246, serious cross-border
threats to health pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/237147 exist, or the Commission
has declared a crisis or a state of emergency, the condition set out in paragraph 1
shall be deemed to be fulfilled for the type of solutions concerned and for as long as
the state of emergency or the serious cross-border threat exist.
45 Regulation (EU) 2024/2747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2024
establishing a framework of measures related to an internal market emergency and to the resilience of
the internal market and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (Internal Market Emergency
and Resilience Act) (OJ L, 2024/2747, 8.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2747/oj). 46 Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2372 of 24 October 2022 on a framework of measures for ensuring the
supply of crisis-relevant medical countermeasures in the event of a public health emergency at Union
level (OJ L 314, 6.12.2022, p. 64, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2372/oj). 47 Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 on
serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU (OJ L 314, 6.12.2022,
p. 26, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2371/oj).
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Article 49
Qualification list for contracting entities
1. Contracting entities may establish and operate a qualification list. They may award
individual contracts based on it.
2. Contracting entities shall publish a public summary of competition pursuant to
Article 110 on the existence of the qualification list. They shall ensure that economic
operators are at all times able to request to be admitted to the list during its duration
indicated in the public summary of competition.
3. Contracting entities shall establish objective rules and criteria for admission of
economic operators in the qualification list, and objective criteria and rules for the
management of the qualification list, covering matters such as admission, periodic
updating of the qualifications, if any, and the duration. They may divide the
qualification list into different categories according to the subject-matter of
individual contracts based on the qualification list.
4. Rules and criteria for admission to the qualification list shall include the exclusion
criteria pursuant to Article 25 and may relate to exclusion criteria pursuant to
Article 26, selection criteria pursuant to Article 27 and specifications pursuant to
Article 88. Contracting entities shall apply the rules on means of proof in Articles 28,
91 and 92, respectively. Contracting entities shall ensure that the provisions of Title
II of this Part are applied for admission to the list and for the award of individual
contracts, as applicable.
5. Contracting entities awarding contracts based on a qualification list shall invite
economic operators admitted to the qualification list or to the relevant categories
thereof to submit a tender. Contracting entities may conduct negotiations pursuant to
Article 33 followed by an award pursuant to Article 98, or award the contract without
negotiations pursuant to Article 98. They shall publish a public summary of result
pursuant to Article 110 regarding each individual contract awarded.
6. The process of admission to the qualification list, and of awarding individual
contracts based on the system may be carried out in several successive stages.
7. Any charges that are billed in connection with qualification or with updating or
conserving an already obtained qualification shall be proportionate to the generated
costs.
Title II
Strategic design and execution of public procurement
Chapter 1
Green public procurement
Article 50
Green public procurement
1. When procuring products, services and works, public buyers may take environmental
and climate-related considerations into account with a view to preventing, reducing
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or otherwise mitigating adverse environmental and climate-related impacts or
pursuing positive environmental and climate-related impacts throughout their life-
cycle, as compared to alternative products, services and works with the same primary
function (‘green public procurement’).
2. The environmental considerations referred to in paragraph 1 shall support the
achievement of the environmental and climate-related objectives as referred to in
Article 5, including the following:
(a) climate change mitigation, including emission reductions;
(b) climate resilience and adaptation;
(c) the sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources;
(d) the transition to a circular economy, including through bioeconomy;
(e) pollution prevention and control;
(f) the protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems.
3. Public buyers may take such environmental and climate-related considerations into
account as appropriate in specifications, award criteria, contract performance clauses,
or selection criteria, in compliance with the principles set in Article 4 and if they are
linked to the subject-matter of the contract pursuant to Article 90.
4. Mere compliance with general minimum environmental obligations established by
Union law, national law or the international conventions listed in Annex II shall not
by itself be considered ‘green public procurement’ for the purpose of this Regulation.
By contrast, public procurement integrating specific public procurement
environmental criteria or requirements set under this Regulation or other relevant
Union legislation shall be considered ‘green public procurement’ within the meaning
of paragraph 1.
Article 51
Circular economy and resource efficiency
Public buyers may establish specifications, selection criteria, award criteria or
conditions for the performance of contracts that, in line with the objective of a high
level of environmental protection, promote circularity and resource efficiency
throughout the life-cycle of works, products and services. Such requirements or
criteria may, where appropriate, relate to durability, reparability, upgradeability,
reuse, refurbishment, remanufacturing recycled content, the use of secondary raw
materials, waste prevention, preparation for reuse or the procurement of refurbished,
remanufactured or previously used products. Public buyers may also consider
circular business models, including product-as-a-service, leasing, sharing or rental
solutions, rather than the purchase of new products.
Article 52
Energy efficiency
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1. Public buyers shall, when purchasing goods, services or works purchase only
products, services and works with a high energy efficiency performance, unless this
is not technically feasible. To that end they shall:
(a) where a product is covered by a delegated act adopted under Regulation (EU)
2017/136948, Directive 2010/30/EU49 or by a related Commission
implementing act, purchase only products that comply with the criterion laid
down in Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1369;
(b) where a product not covered under point (a) is covered by an implementing
measure under Directive 2009/125/EC50, purchase only products that comply
with energy efficiency benchmarks specified in an implementing measure
under Directive 2009/125/EC;
(c) require in their tenders for service contracts that service providers use, for the
purposes of providing the services in question, only products that comply with
points (a) and (b) when providing the services in question. This requirement
shall apply only to new products purchased by service providers partially or
wholly for the purpose of providing the service in question;
(d) where they purchase, or make new rental agreements for, buildings, ensure that
such building shall, where available comply at least with the technical
screeningcriteria on the substantial contribution to climate change mitigation
provided in the Commission DelegatedRegulation (EU) 2021/213951, Annex I,
section 7.7 (‘Acquisition and Ownership of Buildings’), unless the purpose of
the purchase is:
(i) to undertake deep renovation or demolition;
(ii) to preserve it as a building officially protected as part of a designated
environment, or because of its special architectural or historic merit.
Article 85(1), point (d), shall not apply to the obligations set out in the first
subparagraph, point (d).
2. When the purchase concerns product package fully covered by a delegated act
adopted under Regulation (EU) 2017/1369, public buyers may require that the
aggregate energy efficiency of the product package takes precedence over the energy
efficiency of the individual products within that package, by purchasing the product
package that complies with the criterion of belonging to the highest available energy
efficiency class.
48 Regulation (EU) 2017/1369 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2017 setting a
framework for energy labelling and repealing Directive 2010/30/EU (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1369/oj). 49 Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the indication
by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by
energy-related products (recast) (OJ L 153, 18.6.2010, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/30/oj). 50 Directive 2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing
a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-related products (recast) (OJ L 285,
31.10.2009, p. 10, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/125/oj). 51 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 of 4 June 2021 supplementing Regulation (EU)
2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing the technical screening criteria
for determining the conditions under which an economic activity qualifies as contributing substantially
to climate change mitigation or climate change adaptation and for determining whether that economic
activity causes no significant harm to any of the other environmental objectives (OJ L 442, 9.12.2021,
p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2021/2139/oj).
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Article 53
Food procurement
1. For the purposes of pursuing objectives set in Articles 50(2) and Article 55(2), public
buyers may also take considerations related to the quality and sustainability of food
into account when procuring food, as appropriate, in specifications, award criteria or
conditions for the performance of contracts, to the extent that they are related to the
subject-matter of the contract.
2. The food-specific considerations referred to in paragraph 1 may relate, in particular,
to the following:
(a) fairness and transparency in food supply chains requirements and conditions, in
particular a fair renumeration of the farmers involved in the production of
procured food;
(b) the organisation of the food supply chain;
(c) requirements or conditions on organic production methods, quality schemes
such as geographical indications, and other production methods;
(d) nutritional value and health effects, freshness and seasonality of food criteria;
(e) animal welfare requirements.
Article 54
Requirements for green public procurement for certain products
1. When purchasing products, product families or technologies subject to the Union
legal acts listed in Annex VII, public buyers shall require in specifications, award
criteria or conditions for the performance of contracts such environmental
characteristics as they consider appropriate for the procurement in question, in light
of the objective of ensuring a high level of environmental protection in the Union,
the need for a swift transition to a climate neutral economy and the principles of
equal treatment, non-discrimination and proportionality. Those environmental
characteristics shall be expressed in terms of the classes or levels of performance,
thresholds, environmental aspects or environmental sustainability requirements that
are laid down in the relevant legal acts listed in Annex VII.
2. Where diverging requirements of environmental characteristics create a real risk of
fragmentation of the internal market or in the presence of a need to foster the demand
for products referred to in the Union legal acts listed in Annex VII, the Commission
is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 141 to supplement
this Regulation by specifying the environmental characteristics referred to in
paragraph 1 that public buyers shall require in specifications, award criteria or
conditions for the performance of contracts in relation to products, product families
or technologies subject to the Union legal acts listed in Annex VII.
When adopting delegated acts pursuant to the first subparagraph, the Commission
shall set the requirements at a high level, taking into account:
(a) the value and volume of public contracts awarded for the products, product
families or technologies in question, or for services or works using them for the
activities constituting the subject-matter of the contract;
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(b) the need to ensure sufficient demand for more environmentally sustainable and
low carbon products or technologies;
(c) the economic feasibility for public buyers to buy more environmentally
sustainable products or technologies, without incurring disproportionate costs,
and the availability of such products or technologies on the market;
(d) the effects of the requirements on competition.
3. Public buyers may decide not to require the characteristics specified in delegated acts
adopted pursuant to paragraph 2 where:
(a) a product or technology can only be supplied by a specific economic operator
and no reasonable alternative or substitute exists and the absence of
competition is not the result of an artificial narrowing down of the parameters
of the public procurement procedure; or
(b) the application of the delegated act would oblige the public buyer to acquire
equipment having disproportionate costs or would result in technical
incompatibility in operation and maintenance.
4. Where new Union legal acts setting environmental sustainability and climate-related
requirements for the placing on the market of products or technologies in the Union
are adopted, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance
with Article 141 to amend Annex VII by updating the list of Union legal acts referred
to in that Annex.
Chapter 2
Socially responsible public procurement
Article 55
Socially responsible public procurement
1. Public buyers may take social considerations into account when procuring supplies,
services and works with a view to achieving positive social outcomes or preventing
or mitigating adverse social impacts through the life-cycle of supplies, services and
works (‘socially responsible public procurement’).
2. The social considerations referred to in paragraph 1 shall pursue the social objectives
of the Union, notably those referred to in Article 5, which may include the following:
(a) social inclusion and labour market integration of persons with disabilities and
disadvantaged persons involved in the performance of a given public contract;
(b) high-quality jobs including through acknowledging the role of collective
bargaining, taking into account the diversity of national systems and respecting
the autonomy of social partners, and improvement of working conditions, for
workers performing a given public contract and, in particular, for vulnerable
categories of workers;
(c) accessibility for persons with disabilities and design for all approaches, beyond
the legal requirements set out in Article 56 of this Regulation;
(d) training, upskilling and reskilling of workers performing a given public
contract;
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(e) gender equality and non-discrimination measures for workers performing a
given public contract;
(f) promotion of the social economy and, where applicable, social and affordable
housing;
(g) effective human rights protection across the supply chains relevant to the
procurement in question.
3. Public buyers may take such social considerations into account as appropriate
through criteria or requirements in specifications, award criteria, conditions for the
performance of contracts, or, where relevant to the subject-matter, selection criteria,
provided that they are linked to the subject-matter of the contract pursuant to Article
90, and comply with the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and
proportionality.
4. The mere compliance with applicable labour and social law obligations established
by Union law, national law, collective agreements or by the international social and
labour law conventions listed in Annex II, shall not by itself be considered socially
responsible public procurement.
Article 56
Accessibility
1. For all procurement of goods, services and works which are intended for use by
natural persons, whether the general public or staff of the public buyer, public buyers
shall, except in duly justified cases, require their accessibility for persons with
disabilities, and take account of design for all approaches. To that effect, public
buyers shall include appropriate accessibility requirements in the specifications or
conditions for the performance of contracts.
2. For the products and services referred to in Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2019/882,
public buyers shall establish specifications, as far as accessibility criteria for persons
with disabilities or design for all users are concerned, by reference to Annex I to that
Directive.
Article 57
Reserved contracts
1. Public buyers may reserve the participation in procedures for the award of public
contracts, including for specific lots thereof, to organisations whose main aim is the
social and professional integration of persons with disabilities or disadvantaged
persons, provided that at least 30 % of the employees of those organisations or
programmes are workers with disabilities or with disadvantages, including providing
for such contracts to be performed in the context of supported employment contracts
or sheltered employment programmes, provided that the labour rights of the persons
with disabilities or with disadvantages are safeguarded.
2. Public buyers may reserve the participation in procedures for the award of public
service contracts forming part of the social welfare system which are covered by the
CPV codes listed in Annex VI, including for specific lots thereof, to organisations
which fulfil all of the following conditions:
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(a) the organisation is legally recognised as non-profit under national law of the
Member State where the organisation was established;
(b) the organisation has as its main purpose the delivery of a public welfare service
of general interest;
(c) the organisation’s decisions are not guided by purely commercial
considerations, and any surplus generated from the performance of the contract
is reinvested in delivering the public welfare services of general interest for
which it is constituted.
Article 58
Contracts for social, health and educational services
1. For public contracts having as subject-matter any of the services listed in Annex VI,
public buyers may award contracts in accordance with the procedures provided for in
national law, provided that the nature of the services makes it necessary for the
public buyers to take into account the specificities of the services in question, and
that the principles of transparency and equal treatment as well as the obligations in
paragraph 2 are respected.
2. Public buyers awarding contracts pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall take
into account, through appropriate requirements in specifications, award criteria or
conditions for the performance of contracts, the need to ensure the quality,
continuity, accessibility for people with disabilities, affordability, availability and
comprehensiveness of the services, and the involvement and empowerment of users,
including disadvantaged and vulnerable persons, in order to safeguard their specific
personal medical or social needs. In awarding such contracts, public buyers shall also
take into account the need to ensure respect for the right to self-determination of
persons with disabilities, as laid down in Article 19 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
3. Where a public buyer awards a contract pursuant to this Article, it shall publish a
public summary of result pursuant to Article 110(4) of this Regulation no later than
20 days after the award.
Chapter 3
Public procurement of innovation
Article 59
Innovation objectives in public procurement
Public buyers may take innovation objectives into consideration when procuring supplies,
works or services that comprise, without being limited to, any or several of the following
objectives:
(a) promoting the market deployment of the results from research and innovation within
the Union and to encourage the participation of start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs in
innovation in public procurement, thereby supporting the diffusion of innovation and
the growth of innovative enterprises;
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(b) fostering the growth of lead markets in Union strategic sectors, by encouraging the
development and procurement of innovative solutions that contribute to
environmental sustainability, social inclusion and sustainability, health protection,
digital transformation and technological advancement including interoperability of
and open-source solutions for digital systems and elements of public services;
(c) improving the cost-effectiveness of the public buyer’s purchases compared with
existing or conventional alternatives, while maintaining or enhancing the quality,
quantity, or impact of the solutions.
Article 60
Public procurement of innovation
1. Public buyers shall classify their procurement as public procurement of innovation in
the public summary of competition where the procurement has as its objective the
purchase of an innovative solution. An innovative solution has one or more new
characteristics that deliver better performance or added value compared with
alternative solutions which are available on a large-scale commercial basis on the
relevant market.
New characteristics of an innovative solution may include new or improved
combinations of existing characteristics and new or improved ways of using existing
characteristics, such as using existing characteristics in a new sector or a new
context.
2. In any event, public buyers shall classify their purchases in public summaries as
public procurement of innovation in both of the following cases:
(a) the award of a contract for a solution that was successfully developed in an
innovation procedure pursuant to Article 45;
(b) the award of a contract in an open procedure pursuant to Articles 34 and 35,
where a public buyer intends to purchase a solution after a pre-commercial
procurement as defined in Article 6, point (13).
Article 61
Techniques to pursue innovation objectives in public procurement
1. In order to pursue innovation objectives, public buyers may prepare and design any
procurement procedure using one or more of the following techniques:
(a) seek, analyse and implement advice aimed at identifying the availability of
innovative solutions in the market consultations;
(b) consider the purchase of open-source solutions or solutions with open-source
elements;
(c) use only functional requirements and or, where that is not feasible, allow
explicitly for variants;
(d) limit the selection criteria to what is strictly necessary and proportionate to the
risks of the public contract and the capacities needed to perform it, and, where
appropriate, without requirements on turnover and past performance;
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(e) require a concept for innovation of the supplies, works or services as a
qualitative award criterion, including the feasibility and scalability of that
concept or its impact on the green, social or digital objectives set for the
procurement;
(f) designate one or more specific lots for innovation and provide clear, precise
and unambiguous conditions for any additional purchases based on the contract
awarded in that lot, if the solution proves successful;
(g) combine multiple phases of a public works contract such as design,
construction, operation, and maintenance into a single integrated contract;
(h) aggregate demand of innovative solutions and to allow for task distribution of
testing and validation among public buyers;
(i) allow for experimentation, testing, validation, development, enhancement and
reinvestment in the procurement procedure or contract implementation.
2. The techniques referred to in paragraph 1 may, as appropriate to the technique and
the type of solution concerned, take the form of specifications, selection criteria,
quality considerations when applying the best price-quality ratio method, or
conditions for the performance of contracts.
Article 62
Specification of intellectual property rights
1. For all procedures subject to this Regulation, the public buyer shall specify to its best
effort in the procurement detail the intellectual property rights that it considers
relevant for the execution of the public contract.
2. The information shall be sufficiently clear and precise to enable economic operators
to assess their obligations relating thereto, determine the scope of the rights to be
granted or transferred, and prepare their tenders accordingly.
3. The estimation of the value of the contract pursuant to Article 32 shall take into
account the value of the distribution of intellectual property rights as relevant.
Article 63
Granting licences
1. The economic operator shall grant to the public buyer appropriate, sufficient and
non-exclusive licences to the extent and for the period necessary to enable it to use,
receive, operate, maintain or otherwise benefit from the services, deliverables or
other contractual outputs provided in the performance of the public contract.
The licences referred to in the first subparagraph shall cover both the following
rights:
(a) any pre-existing intellectual property rights owned by, or licensed to, the
economic operator;
(b) any intellectual property rights arising in the performance of the public
contract.
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2. Licences pursuant to paragraph 1 shall permit the public buyer, either directly or
through contractors or service providers acting on its behalf, to use, reproduce,
execute, display, adapt, configure, integrate, maintain, repair, support, upgrade and
otherwise exploit such rights and the related deliverables to the extent necessary to
ensure the continued use of the supplies, services or works for their intended purpose
and the proper performance of the public contract.
Article 64
Limits to transfer of ownership
1. Any pre-existing intellectual property, including software components, models,
methods, platforms, or systems owned or controlled by the economic operator prior
to or independently of the procurement shall remain the property of the economic
operator and shall not be subject to ownership transfer obligations to the public
buyer.
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, public buyers may require the ownership
transfer of pre-existing intellectual property rights that are necessary for the
performance, operation, and maintenance of the solutions, in particular in cases of
critical infrastructure and where this is included in the procurement detail in a
proportionate, transparent and non-discriminatory manner without distorting
competition.
3. For intellectual property rights arising in connection with the performance of a public
contract, public buyers shall specify, where relevant, the allocation of those rights
between the public buyer and the economic operator in the procurement detail.
4. By way of derogation from paragraph 3 of this Article for public contracts subject to
an innovation procedure pursuant to Articles 41 to 45, economic operators shall
retain ownership of the intellectual property rights arising during the innovation
procedure or in the performance of the respective public contract, unless justified by
overriding reasons of the public interest clearly stated in the procurement detail. Such
overriding reasons of public interest may relate inter alia to the need to prevent
technological lock-in, or to protect the security or critical public services of the
public buyer, a Member State or the Union, in particular as regards critical
infrastructure.
Article 65
Building information modelling
1. For the execution of public works contracts with an estimated value equal to or
greater than EUR 25 000 000, public buyers shall require the use of building
information modelling in the execution of the public works contracts.
2. ‘Building Information Modelling’ means the methodologies of collaborative digital
processes using open, interoperable formats with the purpose of creating, managing
and sharing structured information about a public works contract throughout its
lifecycle.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, public buyers may do any of the following:
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(a) request the use of Building Information Modelling only from certain
contractors, or in certain lots, where such requirements would otherwise
impose a disproportionate burden on the economic operators concerned and
fully covering the project in Building Information Modelling is not necessary;
or
(b) not request the use of Building Information Modelling or only request its use
for certain parts of the solution or from certain contractors, where such
requirements would otherwise present a risk for security or public safety.
4. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with
Article 141 in order to amend this Regulation to lower the threshold set out in
paragraph 1 where justified by an increased market uptake of Building Information
Modelling.
Chapter 4
Security and resilience
Article 66
Security considerations in public procurement
1. Public buyers shall take appropriate measures, in addition to measures required or
imposed by virtue of other Union legislation, where relevant, at any stage of the
procurement procedure, from planning and market consultation to contract award and
execution, to ensure the protection of the security and public safety interests of the
Union or one or more Member States for any public procurement procedure
identified as presenting or including a risk for security or public safety. This Chapter
is without prejudice to other requirements under relevant Union legislation.
2. Security and public safety interests of the Union or a Member State relevant for a
given contract may include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) protection of critical infrastructure, strategic dual-use infrastructure, identified
by Member States in accordance with [Article 33 of the Military Mobility
Regulation], especially for those located on a military mobility corridor, critical
supply chains, critical technologies or essential services, resilience against
physical, cyber, or hybrid threats, and prevention across and protection against
risks of any disruption including due to harmful strategic dependencies on
third-country suppliers,
(b) prevention of espionage, sabotage or technology leakage;
(c) crisis preparedness, including business continuity and contingency planning for
disruptions in case of natural disasters or geopolitical instability, pandemics or
cyberattacks;
(d) the prevention of other harmful interference, including third-country and third-
country state-controlled influence;
(e) the cybersecurity of systems, networks, and data processed;
(f) the protection of classified information, sensitive data, research, or intellectual
property from unauthorised access or transfer;
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(g) ensuring public health, including crisis-prepared and self-sufficient health
services; or
(h) resilience to climate-related disruptions.
3. Risks for security or public safety in a public contract may arise in particular from:
(a) the subject-matter of the contract, such as:
(i) sensitivity of the assets involved or to be developed in its implementation;
(ii) access to and handling of sensitive data;
(iii) critical dependency or risk of critical dependency on a limited number of
third-country suppliers, goods, services or technologies;
(iv) risks associated with access to critical infrastructure, strategic dual-use
infrastructure identified by Member States in accordance with [Article 33 of
the Military Mobility Regulation], research facilities, IT systems, or critical
materials;
(v) dual-use nature of the technologies, works, goods or services procured;
(vi) the nature of the public interests attached to it and the potential
consequences of a malfunction or malperformance, such as harm to public
safety, national security, economic stability, health security or fundamental
rights;
(b) the characteristics of economic operators, such as:
(i) ownership, control, or financing structure bearing risks of undue
interference or influence over it;
(ii) security track record, including past breaches, non-compliance with
security standards, or exclusion from other procurement procedures on security
grounds;
(iii) capacity to meet applicable security clearance, personnel vetting, or
information security requirements;
(iv) exposure to third-country legislation that may compel disclosure of
sensitive information or interference with contract performance.
4. Public buyers shall, to the extent possible specify in the procurement detail in a clear,
sufficiently detailed manner appropriate measures that are proportionate to the risks
referred to in paragraph 3 and non-discriminatory. Such measures may be
implemented, in particular through:
(a) specifications, such as mandatory security standards, certifications, personnel
vetting or security clearance obligations, or risk management and assurance
requirements;
(b) award criteria, such as evaluating bidders’ security management systems,
security compliance standards, incident response capabilities, supply chain
security;
(c) conditions for the performance of contracts, such as enabling security oversight
of suppliers through audits, inspections, or documentation reviews and
implementation of corrective measures in case of breaches, including
provisions on subcontracting, ownership change notification, and the protection
of classified or sensitive information;
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(d) selection criteria, where justified, such as possessing security clearances or
otherwise requiring bidders to establish that they do not present risks for
security or public safety pursuant to point (b) of paragraph 3. This shall be
without prejudice to Article 26;
(e) by derogation from Article 34(2), invite to submit a tender in the procedure
referred to in Article 34 only those economic operators who meet specific
objective and non-discriminatory security-related requirements, provided that
the public buyer has indicated its intention to do so, and the security-related
requirements it intends to apply, in the public summary of competition for the
procurement in question.
Public buyers may also indicate in the procurement detail which security measures
they intend to implement where risks for security or public safety arise during the
procurement procedure.
5. Public buyers shall at any time during the procedure exclude an economic operator
from participation in a procurement procedure where the operator has been identified
as a high-risk supplier pursuant to Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXX [CSA2 proposal] in
relation to the provision of ICT components or components that include ICT
components to be used in key ICT assets as identified in accordance with Article […]
of that Regulation.
6. Where there is evidence that disparities in measures affect the functioning of the
internal market, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance
with Article 141 in order to supplement this Regulation by establishing mandatory
technical specifications, selection criteria, award criteria or contract performance
clauses, for specific categories of goods, services or works where such elements
address an identified specific security and public safety interest of the Union.
Article 67
Security measures during contract implementation
1. Without prejudice to contract law of the Member States, the public buyer may
terminate a contract in whole or in part where it determines that the contractor has
failed to comply with measures or obligations aiming at preventing or mitigating
risks for security or public safety, or a risk for security or public safety has
materialised or is likely to materialise. Under the same conditions, they may exclude
certain economic operators during contract implementation.
2. Termination and exclusion pursuant to this Article shall be proportionate in relation
to the risk for security or public safety. Before terminating a contract or excluding an
economic operator, the public buyer shall conduct a written assessment. The public
buyer shall take into account in particular:
(a) the severity of the risk for security or public safety;
(b) the impact of termination on the delivery of public services;
(c) alternative mitigation measures such as contractual amendments or enhanced
monitoring.
3. Unless justified by the severity of the risks involved, the imminence of the threat or
where notification may aggravate the risk, the public buyer shall notify the contractor
in writing of its intent to terminate or exclude, specifying:
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(a) the grounds for termination or exclusion;
(b) the facts and evidence supporting the decision, with the exception of classified
information;
(c) the proposed date of termination or exclusion.
4. The contractor shall have an appropriate time, determined by the public buyer, which
shall not be shorter than at least ten calendar days, to submit observations on the
grounds for termination or exclusion and propose remedial actions. The public buyer
may shorten the deadline in case of emergency.
5. The contractor shall cooperate with the public buyer to secure or transfer data,
documents, or assets related to the contract and ensure continuity of critical services
until the termination takes effect.
Article 68
Cybersecurity
1. Where products with digital elements fall within the scope of
Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Member States shall ensure that compliance with the
essential cybersecurity requirements set out in Annex I to that Regulation, including
the manufacturers’ ability to handle vulnerabilities effectively are taken into
consideration in the procurement process.
2. This Regulation shall not prevent Member States from subjecting products with
digital elements to additional cybersecurity requirements for the procurement or use
of those products for specific purposes, including where those products are procured
or used for national security or defence purposes, provided that such requirements
are consistent with Member States’ obligations laid down in Union law and that they
are necessary and proportionate for the achievement of those purposes.
3. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, and without prejudice to Directive (EU)
2022/255552 where applicable, public buyers may specify in the procurement detail
requirements relating to cybersecurity for the works, supplies or services procured.
To that end, they may include specifications, selection criteria, award criteria or
conditions for the performance of contracts. Such requirements shall be linked to the
subject-matter of the contract and comply with the principles of transparency, non-
discrimination and proportionality.
Article 69
Resilience and security of supply for critical entities or infrastructures
1. Where a public contract is intended to be performed by a public buyer that has been
identified by the competent Member State as a critical entity in accordance with
52 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on
measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No
910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)
(OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).
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Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2022/255753, the public buyer shall, where relevant,
include in the procurement detail requirements relating to security of supply,
economic, physical and geopolitical resilience, as well as transparency and
sustainability of the supply chains for the works, supplies or services procured.
Where appropriate, such requirements shall be based on the risks identified through
the obligation for risk assessment under Article 12 of Directive (EU) 2022/2557.
2. Requirements referred to in paragraph 1 may be set out in specifications, selection
criteria, award criteria or conditions for the performance of contracts, shall be linked
to the subject-matter of the contract and comply with the principles of transparency,
non-discrimination and proportionality.
3. Public buyers may, inter alia, require that the tender contains, or that the contract
provides for, one or more of the following elements:
(a) diversification of the supply chain, including recourse to a multi-source
approach, geographic diversification of production, or limitation of dependency
on a single third country or single economic operator from a third country;
(b) security of supply and continuity, including:
(i) certification or documentation demonstrating that the organisation and
location of the tenderer's supply chain will allow it to comply with the security-
of-supply requirements set out in the contract documents;
(ii) a commitment to ensure that possible changes in the supply chain during
the execution of the contract will not adversely affect compliance with those
requirements;
(iii) stockpiling obligations within the Union;
(iv) business continuity and disaster recovery plans;
(v) commitment from the tenderer to provide, according to terms and
conditions to be agreed, the specific means necessary for the continued
production or provision of spare parts, components, assemblies, software
updates or testing equipment in the event that it is no longer able to ensure the
supply itself;
(c) crisis preparedness and surge capacity, including:
(i) a commitment from the tenderer to establish and/or maintain the capacity
required, including upscaling capabilities, to meet additional needs of the
public buyer as a result of a crisis, according to terms and conditions to be
agreed;
(ii) crisis preparedness plans, mandatory training of management and key
personnel, and incident notification to the public buyer;
(d) supply chain transparency and traceability where proportionate to the
importance of the contract and the risks involved, including the quality of
supply chain management and contingency plans provided by the tenderers;
53 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the
resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p.
164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj).
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(e) obligation for the service providers to indicate any potential double-booking of
capability or services to all concerned public buyers, prior to accepting
conflicting orders;
(f) flexible participation clause, allowing other public buyers to join as contracting
parties without changing the material or quantitative scope of the contract.
4. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with
Article 141 establishing mandatory specifications, selection criteria, award criteria or
conditions for the performance of contracts relating to resilience, security of supply,
and supply chain transparency, for specific categories of works, supplies or services
where a critical dependency, a systemic risk or a critical-infrastructure dimension has
been identified.
5. This Article is without prejudice to security of supply requirements under relevant
Union legislation, in particular to the requirements under Regulation (EU)
2019/124254 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1735.
Chapter 5
European preference
Article 70
Covered economic operators, goods, services or works
1. An economic operator shall be considered ‘covered’ for the purposes of this
Regulation when it has its origin pursuant to Article 74(1) in:
(a) a third country that is party to the GPA, provided that the procurement in
question falls within the scope of the Union's commitments under that
agreement, taking into account the applicable Annexes;
(b) a third country that has concluded a bilateral or multilateral trade agreement
with the Union, under the conditions laid down in that agreement, provided that
the procurement in question falls within the scope of the Union’s public
procurement commitments in that agreement;
(c) a third country that has concluded with the Union an agreement establishing a
customs union, under the conditions laid down in that agreement, provided that
the procurement in question falls within the scope of the Union’s public
procurement commitments in that agreement.
2. Goods, services or works shall be considered ‘covered’ for the purposes of this
Regulation when they have their origin pursuant to Article 74(2), (3) and (4) in:
(a) a third country that is party to the GPA, provided that the procurement in
question falls within the scope of the Union's commitments under that
agreement, taking into account the applicable Annexes;
(b) a third country that has concluded a bilateral or multilateral trade agreement
with the Union, under the conditions laid down in that agreement, provided that
54 Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 setting
CO2 emission performance standards for new heavy-duty vehicles and amending Regulations (EC) No
595/2009 and (EU) 2018/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive
96/53/EC (OJ L 198, 25.7.2019, p. 202, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1242/oj).
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the procurement in question falls within the scope of the Union’s public
procurement commitments in that agreement;
(c) a third country that has concluded with the Union an agreement establishing a
customs union, under the conditions laid down in that agreement, provided that
the procurement in question falls within the scope of the Union’s public
procurement commitments in that agreement.
Article 71
Determining the scope of coverage for third-country covered economic operators, goods,
services or works
1. The Commission shall establish and make available free of charge a publicly
accessible online tool, which sets out, in a comprehensive and up-to-date manner, the
Union’s public procurement commitments in international agreements referred to in
Article 70.
2. Public buyers shall determine, for the purposes of a given procurement procedure,
which economic operators, goods, services and works are covered in accordance with
Article 70, on the basis of the applicable international agreements as reflected in the
online tool referred to in paragraph 1 for the parameters entered, including the public
buyer concerned, the subject-matter and the estimated value of the contract in
relation to the applicable thresholds.
3. The Commission shall keep the online tool updated to reflect fully and at any given
time the Union’s commitments in the field of public procurement, including:
(a) Union acts, in particular Commission decisions to exclude in whole or in part,
a third country’s economic operators, goods, services or works from public
procurement procedures in the Union, in accordance with the applicable EU
legislation;
(b) Union measures with regard to covered economic operators, goods, services or
works, in accordance with Article 72.
(c) Union measures with regard to non-covered economic operators, goods,
services or works, in accordance with Article 75.
Article 72
Restrictions on covered economic operators, goods, services or works
1. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article
141 to amend Article 70 by establishing that covered economic operators from
certain third countries, and/or all or certain covered goods, services, or works from
certain third countries, shall not be considered as covered where:
(a) the Commission has established, on the basis of a factual market access
analysis, that their country of origin has failed to provide national treatment
related to Union economic operators, goods, services or works contrary to its
commitments on public procurement in an international agreement with the
Union;
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(b) such exclusion is justified to avoid dependencies or any other developments
that may threaten the security of supply in the Union of the relevant goods or
services; or
(c) such restriction is justified under any other exception under the applicable
agreement, in particular relating to the protection of economic security
interests.
2. Member States and interested parties may submit to the Commission at any time
indications of the existence of one of the situations referred to in paragraph 1.
Article 73
European preference requirements
1. Public buyers may:
(a) restrict participation only to economic operators and subcontractors originating
inthe Union and those that are covered, or, in the case of groups of economic
operators, or any other form of joint participation, to groups which are either
composed solely of Union or covered economic operators or to groups where
the majority, but not all members of the group are Union or covered economic
operators;
(b) reject a tender in the course of a procedure where it is not submitted by Union
or covered economic operators or groups, including their subcontractors,
thereof as referred to in point (a).
2. Public buyers may do one or more of the following:
(a) require that the goods, services and works offered originate in the Union or be
covered goods, services or works, either fully, or to a certain degree, or for
specific components that participate in the competitive relationship with the
procured goods, services or works;
(b) solely for the purposes of evaluation and ranking of tenders in the award phase
without affecting the price payable under the contract, apply a percentage
reduction to the price of the tender or the allocation of additional award points,
where:
(i) the tender is submitted only by Union or covered economic operators and
subcontractors or, in the case of groups of economic operators, or any other
form of joint participation, to groups composed solely of such operators or to
groups where most, but not all members of the group are Union or covered
economic operators; or
(ii) the tender contains a higher proportion of Union or covered goods, services
or works, in comparison with the other submitted tenders;
(c) reject a tender where the value of Union or covered goods, services or works
contained in the tender is below 50 % of the total estimated value of the tender.
3. The measures referred to in paragraph 2 may only be applied if they have been
clearly stated by the public buyer in the competition public summary. The
competition public summary shall specify the goods, services or works required to be
of Union or covered origin, well as the percentage of reduction or award points
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allocation, together with the corresponding value that the public buyer will apply for
the evaluation and ranking of tenders in the award phase.
4. Public buyers shall notify the national coordinating authority designated pursuant to
Article 138 of any indications of circumvention of measures taken pursuant to this
Article. The national coordinating authority shall inform the Commission of any
systemic flaws identified on the basis of theses notifications.
Article 74
Origin
1. The origin of economic operators or subcontractors shall be determined in
accordance with Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/103155.
2. The origin of goods shall be determined in accordance with Title II, Chapter 2,
Section 1 of Regulation (EU) No 952/201356.
3. The origin of services shall be determined on the basis of the origin of the economic
operator or subcontractor providing the service.
4. The overall origin of works shall be determined pursuant to the origin of the
economic operator, or subcontractor, providing it. For the European preference
requirements, buyers may determine separately the origin of the goods used as part
of the works pursuant to paragraph 2.
Article 75
Union restrictions for third-country non-covered economic operators, goods, services
and works
The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 141, to
amend Article 73 to require public buyers to apply any of the European preference
requirements set out in Article 73 in relation to economic operators, and subcontractors, goods
services and works that are not covered in accordance with Article 70 where this is in the
interest of the Union.
Article 76
Exceptions
Public buyers may decide not to apply European preference requirements, including those in
the delegated acts adopted pursuant to Article 75, where:
55 Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2022 on the
access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union’s public procurement and
concession markets and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union economic operators,
goods and services to the public procurement and concession markets of third countries (International
Procurement Instrument – IPI) (OJ L 173, 30.6.2022, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1031/oj). 56 Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying
down the Union Customs Code (recast) (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/952/oj).
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(a) the contracts in question are governed by Article 48;
(b) the required products or services cannot be supplied by a Union or covered economic
operator, and no reasonable alternative or substitute exists;
(c) no suitable tenders or requests to participate have been submitted, including in
response to a similar public procurement procedure launched by the same public
buyer in the two years preceding the launch of the planned new procurement
procedure; or
(d) the application of such European preference requirements would entail that a public
buyer would have to acquire goods, services or works at disproportionate costs.
Article 77
European preference in sectoral Union legislation
Where Union legislation contains provisions, restricting or setting conditions for participation
in public procurement procedures or giving preference depending on the origin of economic
operators, goods, services or works, the rules set out in this Chapter shall apply, unless
regulated otherwise in the Union legislation in question.
Title III
Horizontal provisions
Chapter 1
Excluded and mixed contracts
Article 78
Defence and security contracts
1. This Regulation does not apply to public contracts the subject-matter of which falls
within the scope of Directive 2009/81/EC, including contracts below the threshold
set out in Article 8 of that Directive and contracts to which that Directive does not
apply pursuant to Article 12 or 13 thereof.
2. This Regulation does not apply to public contracts not exempted in accordance with
paragraph 1, to the extent that the protection of the essential security interests of a
Member State cannot be guaranteed by less intrusive measures, in particular the
measures set out in Title II, Chapter 4 of this Part, or requirements aimed at
protecting the confidential nature of information, which the public buyer makes
available in a contract award procedure as provided for in this Regulation.
3. Furthermore, in conformity with Article 346(1), point (a), of the Treaty, this
Regulation does not apply to public contracts that are not otherwise exempted
pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article to the extent that the application of this
Regulation would oblige a Member State to supply information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to its essential security interests.
4. Where the procurement and performance of the public contract are declared to be
secret or must be accompanied by special security measures in accordance with the
laws, regulations or administrative provisions in force in a Member State, this
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Regulation does not apply provided that the Member State has determined that the
essential security interests concerned cannot be guaranteed by less intrusive
measures, such as those referred to in paragraph 2.
Article 79
R&D procurement excluded
This Regulation does not apply to procurement for public contracts exclusively containing
research and development services as defined in Article 6, point (16).
The first sentence does not apply to procurement for public contracts containing , in addition
to research and development services as defined in Article 6, point (16), other elements falling
within the scope of this Regulation, in particular where testing and validation is part of the
innovation procedure pursuant to Title I, Chapter 4 of this Part, or where research and
development is integrated as an innovation technique in public procurement falling within the
scope of this Regulation pursuant to Article 61.
Article 80
Contracts awarded to controlled entities
1. This Regulation does not apply to public contracts awarded by public buyers to a
legal person governed by private or public law, provided that all of the following
conditions are fulfilled at the time of the award:
(a) the public buyer exercises control over the legal person concerned which is
similar to that which it exercises over its own departments meaning it exercises
a decisive influence over both strategic objectives and significant decisions of
the controlled legal person; such control may also be exercised by another legal
person, which is itself controlled in the same way by the public buyer;
(b) more than 80 % of the activities of the controlled legal person are carried out in
the performance of tasks entrusted to it by the controlling public buyer or by
other legal persons controlled by that public buyer; and
(c) there is no direct private capital participation in the controlled legal person with
the exception of non-controlling and non-blocking forms of private capital
participation required by national legislative provisions, in conformity with the
Treaties, which do not exert a decisive influence on the controlled legal person.
2. Paragraph 1 also applies where a controlled legal person which is a public buyer
awards a contract to its controlling public buyer, or to another legal person controlled
by the same public buyer, provided that there is no direct private capital participation
in the legal person being awarded the public contract.
3. This Regulation does not apply where a public buyer, which does not exercise over a
legal person governed by private or public law control within the meaning of
paragraph 1, awards a public contract to that legal person where all of the following
conditions are fulfilled at the time of the award:
(a) the public buyer exercises jointly with other public buyers a control over that
legal person which is similar to that which they exercise over their own
departments, meaning:
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(i) the decision-making bodies of the controlled legal person are composed of
representatives of all participating public buyers whereas individual
representatives may represent several or all of the participating public buyers;
(ii) those public buyers are able to jointly exert decisive influence over the
strategic objectives and significant decisions of the controlled legal person;
(iii) the controlled legal person does not pursue any interests which are
contrary to those of the controlling public buyers;
(b) more than 80 % of the activities of that legal person are carried out in their
performance of tasks entrusted to it by the controlling public buyers or by other
legal persons controlled by the same public buyers; and
(c) there is no direct private capital participation in the controlled legal person with
the exception of non-controlling and non-blocking forms of private capital
participation required by national legislative provisions, in conformity with the
Treaties, which do not exert a decisive influence on the controlled legal person.
4. For the percentage of activities referred to in paragraph 1, first subparagraph, point
(b), and paragraph 3, first subparagraph, point (b), the average total turnover, or,
where turnover does not appropriately reflect the volume of activities carried out,
another objective and verifiable quantitative indicator of those activities such as costs
incurred or overall income obtained, for the three years preceding the award of the
contract shall be taken into consideration.
Where, by reason of the date on which the relevant legal person or public buyer was
created or commenced activities or by reason of a reorganisation of its activities, the
turnover, or alternative activity based measures such as costs, are either not available
for the preceding three years or no longer relevant, it shall be sufficient to show that
the measurement of activity is credible, particularly by means of business
projections.
5. Member States may maintain or adopt stricter national provisions on the contracts
excluded pursuant to this Article.
6. The exclusions in this Article shall not apply if the public contract shall be
subcontracted in its entirety without a procurement procedure.
Article 81
Public-public cooperation
1. This Regulation does not apply to contracts concluded exclusively between two or
more contracting authorities, including where they carry out activities pursuant to
Article 12 to 18, provided that, at the time of the award:
(a) the resulting contract establishes or implements a cooperative relationship
between the participating contracting authorities with the aim of ensuring that
public services they have to perform are provided with a view to achieving
objectives they have in common;
(b) the implementation of such cooperation is governed solely by considerations
relating to the public interest;
(c) the participating contracting authorities perform on the open market less than
20 % of the activities concerned by the cooperation.
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2. A cooperative relationship pursuant to paragraph 1, point (a), may cover all types of
activities in any legal form or temporary structure or agreement but requires genuine
collaboration by all parties through effective contributions which may be identical or
complimentary or different in size or nature but shall not be limited to cost-sharing.
3. Article 80(4) shall apply in relation to the percentage of activities referred to in
paragraph 1, point (c) of this Article.
4. The exclusion in this Article shall not apply if the solutions provided based on the
resulting contract shall be subcontracted in their entirety without a procurement
procedure.
Article 82
Local and regional administrative cooperation
1. This Regulation does not apply where regional or local authorities entrust each other
with the performance of tasks incumbent on them, or use each other’s own resources
for that purpose, including in exchange for remuneration only, provided that they
perform the task by own resources. For the purposes of this Article, own resources
do not include goods not yet acquired or services that are being provided to one of
the participating local or regional authorities by economic operators or legal persons
entrusted pursuant to Article 80(1), (2) and (3).
2. For the purpose of this Article, ‘regional authorities’ includes authorities listed non-
exhaustively in NUTS 1 and NUTS 2, as referred to in Regulation (EC) No
1059/200357, while ‘local authorities’ includes all authorities of the administrative
units falling under NUTS 3 and smaller administrative units, as referred to in that
Regulation.
Article 83
Contracts awarded to affiliated undertakings
1. This Regulation does not apply where contracting entities award a public contract by
either of the following:
(a) by a contracting entity to an affiliated undertaking;
(b) by a joint venture, formed exclusively by a number of contracting entities for
the purpose of carrying out activities described in Article 12 to 18, to an
undertaking which is affiliated with one of those contracting entities.
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply provided that at least 80 % of the average total turnover of
the affiliated undertaking over the preceding three years derives from the provision
of services, supplies or works to the contracting entity or other undertakings with
which it is affiliated. Where, by reason of the date on which an affiliated undertaking
was created or commenced activities, the turnover is not available for the preceding
three years, it shall be sufficient for that undertaking to show that the turnover is
credible, in particular by means of business projections.
57 Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on the
establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) (OJ L 154, 21.6.2003,
p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2003/1059/oj).
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Where more than one undertaking affiliated with the contracting entity with which
they form a corporate group provides the same or similar services, supplies or works,
the percentages shall be calculated taking into account the total turnover deriving
respectively from the provision of services, supplies or works by those affiliated
undertakings.
3. For the purposes of this Article, ‘affiliated undertaking’ means any undertaking
which meets either of the following requirements:
(a) the annual accounts of which are consolidated with those of the contracting
entity in accordance with the requirements set out in Directive 2013/34/EU58;
(b) in the case of entities, which are not subject to Directive 2013/34/EU, any
undertakings that satisfy one of the following conditions:
(i) they are directly or indirectly, subject to a dominant influence by the
contracting entity;
(ii) they exercise a dominant influence over the contracting entity;
(iii) together with the contracting entity, they are subject to the dominant
influence of another undertaking by virtue of ownership, financial
participation, or the rules which govern it.
4. For the purposes of this Article, ‘dominant influence’ shall have the same meaning as
that set out in Article 8(2).
The Commission may request evidence which demonstrates that the relationship
between the undertaking to which the contract is awarded and the contracting entity
complies with the requirements set out in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.
Article 84
Contracts awarded in a joint venture
1. This Regulation does not apply to public contracts awarded by:
(a) a joint venture, formed exclusively by a number of contracting entities for the
purpose of carrying out activities described in Article 12 to 18, to one of those
contracting entities, provided that the joint venture has been set up in order to
carry out the activity concerned over a period of at least three years and that the
instrument setting up the joint venture provides that the contracting entities,
which form it, will be part thereof for at least the same period;
(b) a contracting entity which forms part of a joint venture referred to in point (a)
to that joint venture.
2. The Commission may request evidence which demonstrates that the relationship
between the joint venture to which the contracts are awarded and the contracting
entity complies with the requirements set out in paragraphs 1.
58 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual
financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of
undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182, 29.6.2013, p. 19, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/34/oj).
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Article 85
Other excluded public contracts
1. This Regulation does not apply to:
(a) public service contracts awarded by a public buyer to another public buyer or
to an association of public buyers on the basis of an exclusive right which they
enjoy pursuant to a law, regulation, or published administrative provision
which is compatible with the Treaty;
(b) public contracts for the principal purpose of permitting the public buyers to
provide or exploit public electronic communications networks or to provide to
the public one or more electronic communications services; for the purposes of
this Article, ‘public electronic communications network’ and ‘electronic
communications service’ shall have the same meaning as in Directive
2018/197259;
(c) public contracts which have to be organised in accordance with procurement
procedures other than those laid down in this Regulation where such
procedures have been established:
(i) by an international agreement in accordance with the Treaties and concern a
common project implementation which requires common purchasing;
(ii) by an international organisation, or
(iii) by an international financing institution fully financing a concerned
project; where the concerned project is co-financed for the most part by such
institution, the parties shall agree which procurement rules shall be applicable;
(d) the acquisition or rental, by whatever financial means, of land, existing
buildings or other immovable property or concerning rights thereon;
(e) the acquisition, development, production or co-production of programme
material intended for media services within the meaning of Regulation (EU)
2024/108360;
(f) legal services which require authority to practice law, such as litigation or
formal representation in court proceedings or are related to the exercise of
public office, including document certification and authentication services
which must be provided by notaries;
(g) arbitration and conciliation services;
(h) financial services in connection with the provision of investment services or
the performance of investment activities within the meaning of Directive
2014/65/EU61 and Regulation (EU) No 600/201462, the administration of
59 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018
establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (Recast) (OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1972/oj). 60 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024
establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive
2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) (OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj). 61 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast) (OJ L
173, 12.6.2014, p. 349, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/65/oj).
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benchmarks within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2016/101163, central bank
services and operations conducted with the European Financial Stability
Facility and the European Stability Mechanism;
(i) valuation services referred to in Articles 36 and 74 of Directive 2014/59/EU64;
(j) grants, financing, investments or loans, whether or not in connection with the
issue, sale, purchase or transfer of securities or other financial instruments;
(k) civil defence, civil protection, and danger prevention services that are provided
by non-profit organisations or associations, and which are covered by CPV
codes 75250000-3, 75251000-0, 75251100-1, 75251110-4, 75251120-7,
75252000-7, 75222000-8, 98113100-9 and 85143000-3 except patient
transport ambulance services;
(l) political campaign services covered by CPV codes 79341400-0, 92111230-3
and 92111240-6, when awarded by a political party in the context of an
election campaign;
(m) employment contracts;
(n) contracts for public passenger services by rail or metro within the meaning of
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.
2. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 1, this Regulation does not apply to the
following contracts which concern activities in the field of utilities pursuant to
Part II, Title I, Chapter 2:
(a) contracts for the purchase of water if awarded by contracting entities engaged
in one or both of the activities relating to drinking water referred to in
Article 14;
(b) contracts awarded by contracting entities themselves being active in the energy
sector by being engaged in an activity referred to in Article 12(1), 13(1) or 18
for the supply of energy or of fuels for the production of energy;
(c) contracts awarded by contracting entities for the purposes of resale or lease to
third parties provided that the contracting entity enjoys no special or exclusive
right to sell or lease the subject of such contracts, and other entities are free to
sell or lease it under the same conditions as the contracting entity;
(d) contracts awarded by contracting entities for purposes other than the pursuit of
their activities as described in Article 12 to 18 or for the pursuit of such
activities in a third country in conditions not involving the physical use of a
62 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on
markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p.
84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/600/oj). 63 Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on indices
used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of
investment funds and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU and Regulation (EU) No
596/2014 (OJ L 171, 29.6.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1011/oj). 64 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending
Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC,
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU)
No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/59/oj).
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network or geographical area within the Union and to design contests
organised for such purposes.
Article 86
Mixed procurement involving defence or security aspects
1. This Article applies to mixed contracts which have as their subject-matter
procurement covered by this Regulation as well as procurement covered by Article
346 of the Treaty or Directive 2009/81/EC.
2. Where the different parts of a given public contract are objectively separable, public
buyers may choose to award separate contracts for the separate parts or to award a
single contract.
3. Where public buyers choose to award separate contracts for separate parts, the
decision regarding the applicable legal regime to any one of such separate contracts
shall be taken on the basis of the characteristics of the separate part concerned.
4. Where public buyers choose to award a single contract, the following criteria shall
apply to determine the applicable legal regime:
(a) where part of a given contract is covered by Article 346 of the Treaty, the
contract may be awarded without applying this Regulation, provided that the
award of a single contract is justified for objective reasons;
(b) where part of a given contract is covered by Directive 2009/81/EC the contract
may be awarded in accordance with that Directive, provided that the award of a
single contract is justified for objective reasons, subject to the thresholds and
exclusions for which that Directive provides.
5. The decision to award a single contract shall not, however, be taken for the purpose
of excluding contracts from the application of either this Regulation or
Directive 2009/81/EC.
6. Paragraph 2, third subparagraph, point (a) applies to mixed contracts to which both
point (a) and point (b) of that subparagraph could otherwise apply.
7. Where the different parts of a given contract are objectively not separable, the
contract may be awarded without applying this Regulation where it includes
elements to which Article 346 of the Treaty applies; otherwise it may be awarded in
accordance with Directive 2009/81/EC.
Article 87
Other mixed contracts
1. Contracts which have as their subject-matter two or more types of procurement,
namely works, services or supplies, or which partially pursue an activity in the field
of utilities pursuant to Part II, Title I, Chapter 2, shall be awarded in accordance with
the provisions applicable to the type of procurement that characterises the main
subject of the contract in question.
2. In the case of mixed contracts consisting partly of social, health and educational
services within the meaning of Article 58 and partly of other services, or in the case
of mixed contracts consisting partly of such services and partly of supplies, the main
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subject shall be determined in accordance with which of the estimated values of the
respective services or supplies is the highest.
3. This Regulation applies to contracts which have as their subject-matter procurement
covered by this Regulation as well as procurement not covered by this Regulation,
irrespective of the main subject-matter or of the value of the parts that would
otherwise fall under a different legal regime, unless otherwise provided in Article 86.
Chapter 2
Subject-matter of the contract and means of proof
Article 88
Specifications
1. Public buyers shall, as part of the procurement detail, set out specifications defining
the characteristics of the works, supplies or services that are subject of the
procurement. Specifications shall be set out in objective, clear and measurable terms,
and formulated in a way that allows interested economic operators to identify the
subject-matter of the contract and public buyers to assess alignment of tenders with
the specifications.
2. The characteristics referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, may, provided that they
are linked to the subject-matter of the contract pursuant to Article 90, relate to
methods or specific processes of production or to strategic aspects as set out in
Title II of this Part.
3. The specifications shall describe the characteristics of the solution to be procured in
terms of functional requirements. ‘Functional requirement’ means a requirement that
describes the performance, desired function, capability, outcome or result that a
work, product or service must achieve, without referring to specific technical means,
design, or methods by which functions or outcomes are to be achieved.
4. Public buyers may derogate from paragraph 3, where standards are mandatory by
Union law or where characteristics cannot be sufficiently or appropriately described
in functional requirements. In the latter case, public buyers may formulate
requirements in specifications in particular by technical prescriptions of the works or
definitions of the characteristics of the supplies or services, or in any of the following
ways by reference to, in order of preference:
(a) harmonised standards, as well as standards and standardisation deliverables
the references of which have been published for the purpose of this paragraph,
in the Official Journal of the European Union or by any other means as
provided in accordance with Union legislation and common specifications,
understood as a technical specification other than a standard and adopted by the
Commission, and the conformity with which provides for a presumption of
conformity with the requirements set out in the relevant Union legislation;
(b) to European standards as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No
1025/2012, including national standards transposing European standards;
(c) European Assessment Documents;
(d) international standards;
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(e) other standardisation deliverables established by a European standardisation
organisation as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012;
(f) in the absence of all the ways referred to in points (a) to (e), specifications may
be formulated by reference to national standards, national technical approvals
or national technical specifications relating to the design, calculation and
execution of the works and use of the supplies; each reference shall be
accompanied by the words ‘or equivalent’.
5. Specifications shall not refer to a specific make or source, or a particular process
which characterises the products or services provided by one specific economic
operator, or to trademarks, patents, types or a specific origin or production, having
the effect of favouring or eliminating certain undertakings or products.
6. The reference referred to in paragraph 5 shall only be allowed on an exceptional
basis, where a minimum level of precision pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 is
otherwise not possible. Such reference shall be accompanied by the words ‘or
equivalent’.
This paragraph shall apply without prejudice to European preference requirements in
this Regulation or other Union legislation.
Where a public buyer uses the option of referring to the standards or specifications
referred to in paragraph 4, it shall not reject a tender on the grounds that the solutions
offered do not comply with the standards or specifications, to which it has referred,
as long as the tenderer proves in its tender that the solutions proposed satisfy the
requirements in a manner equivalent to the requirements defined in the
specifications. The tender may provide the proof by any appropriate means,
including the means of proof referred to in Article 92.
Article 89
Variants
1. Where public buyers do not formulate specifications solely in the form of functional
requirements pursuant to Article 88(3), they shall consider whether to allow variants.
For the purposes of this Regulation, ‘variant’ means a tender that partially deviates
from specifications set out in the procurement detail offering an alternative solution
to meet the public buyer’s needs.
2. Public buyers shall indicate in the procurement detail whether or not they allow
variants, and if not, the main reasons for that decision. Public buyers shall specify
any minimum requirements that variants must satisfy, provided that they do not
unnecessarily restrict the ability of economic operators to propose alternative
solutions capable of meeting the buyer’s needs and objectives. Variants shall be
linked to the subject-matter of the contract pursuant to Article 90 and evaluated on
the basis of the same award criteria as non-variant tenders.
Article 90
Link to the subject-matter
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1. Selection criteria, award criteria, specifications, and the conditions for the
performance of contracts shall be linked to the subject-matter of the contract.
Such a link shall be considered to subsist where the condition, requirement or
criterion in question relates to the works, supplies or services to be provided under
the contract at any stage of their life-cycle.
2. The link to the subject-matter may be either direct, that is to say the condition,
requirement or criterion in question is intrinsically related to the material substance
of the subject-matter of the contract, or indirect.
3. A condition, requirement or criterion shall be considered to be indirectly linked to
the subject-matter of the contract, where, without being part of the material substance
of the works, services or supplies in question, it specifically impacts those works,
services or supplies as regards their preparation, production or any other stage of
their life-cycle to the extent covered by the contract, including the working
conditions of the workers involved in any of those stages of the life-cycle and
responsible sourcing and supply chain transparency for the product subject to the
procurement in question.
Article 91
Labels
1. Where public buyers intend to purchase solutions with specific environmental, social
or other characteristics, they may, in the specifications, the award criteria or the
conditions for the performance of contracts, require a specific label as proof that the
works, services and products correspond to the required characteristics, provided that
all of the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) the label requirements only concern criteria which are linked to the subject-
matter of the contract and are appropriate to define characteristics of the
solutions that are the subject-matter of the contract;
(b) the label requirements are based on objectively verifiable and non-
discriminatory criteria;
(c) the labels are established in an open and transparent procedure in which all
relevant stakeholders, including government bodies, consumers, social
partners, manufacturers, distributors and non-governmental organisations, may
participate;
(d) the labels are accessible to all interested parties;
(e) the label requirements are set by a third party over which the economic
operator applying for the label cannot exercise a decisive influence.
In addition to the conditions set out in the first subparagraph and without prejudice to
requirements set out in other Union legislation, where public buyers require an
ecolabel, the ecolabel shall be the EU Ecolabel, provided that the works, products or
services in question are covered by EU Ecolabel criteria adopted pursuant to
Regulation (EC) No 66/201065. In the absence of EU Ecolabel criteria for the
purchased works, products or services, the required ecolabel shall be a third party-
65 Regulation (EC) No 66/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on
the EU Ecolabel (OJ L 27, 30.1.2010, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/66/oj).
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verified ecolabel based on a life-cycle perspective compliant with the first
subparagraph.
Where public buyers do not require the works, services and products to meet all the
label requirements set out in the first and second subparagraphs, they shall indicate
which label requirements are to be met.
2. Public buyers that require a specific label shall accept all other equivalent labels that
confirm that the works, products or services meet the required characteristics.
3. Where an economic operator demonstrates that it had no possibility of obtaining the
specific label indicated by the public buyer or an equivalent label referred to in
paragraph 2 within the relevant time limits for reasons beyond its control, the public
buyer shall accept other appropriate means of proof, which may include a technical
dossier from the manufacturer, provided that the economic operator concerned
proves that the work, service or supply to be provided by it fulfil the requirements of
the specific label or the specific requirements indicated by the public buyer.
Where a label fulfils the conditions set out in paragraph 1, points (b), (c), (d) and (e),
but also sets out requirements not linked to the subject-matter of the contract, public
buyers shall not require the economic operator to provide the label but may define
the specifications by reference to those of the detailed specifications of that label, or,
where necessary, parts thereof, that are linked to the subject-matter of the contract
and are appropriate to define characteristics of that subject-matter.
Article 92
Means of proof for product requirements
1. Public buyers may require that economic operators provide a declaration of
conformity or a declaration of performance and conformity of a product through the
digital product passport pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 or, where this does
not yet exist, other equivalent electronic means as means of proof of conformity or
compliance with requirements or criteria set out in the specifications, the award
criteria or the conditions for the performance of contracts.
2. Public buyers may require a test report from a notified body, a technical assessment
body, a conformity assessment body or a certificate issued by such a body as means
of proof of conformity with the requirements or criteria set out in the specifications,
the award criteria or the conditions for the performance of contracts.
Where public buyers require the submission of certificates drawn up by a specific
notified body, a technical assessment body or conformity assessment body,
certificates from other equivalent notified bodies, technical assessment bodies or
conformity assessment bodies shall also be accepted by the public buyers, including
those established in other Member States than the one of the public buyer.
For the purpose of this paragraph, a conformity assessment body shall be a body that
performs conformity assessment activities including calibration, testing, certification
and inspection accredited in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 765/200866 of the
European Parliament and of the Council.
66 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out
the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and
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3. Public buyers may accept other appropriate means of proof instead of those referred
to in paragraph 1, such as a technical dossier of the manufacturer where the
economic operator concerned had no access to the certificates or test reports referred
to in paragraph 1, or no possibility of obtaining them within the relevant time limits,
provided that the lack of access is not attributable to the economic operator
concerned and provided that the economic operator concerned thereby proves that
the works, supplies or services provided by it meet the requirements or criteria set
out in the specifications, the award criteria or the conditions for the performance of
contracts. Economic operators may provide other appropriate means of proof only
where the documents referred to in paragraph 1 are not required by other Union
legislation.
Chapter 3
Conduct of the procedure
Article 93
Confidentiality
1. Public buyers shall not disclose information provided by economic operators which
they have designated as confidential, including, but not limited to, technical or trade
secrets and the confidential aspects of tenders, unless otherwise provided in this
Regulation, or in the Union or national law to which the public buyer is subject, in
particular legislation concerning access to information.
2. Public buyers may impose requirements on economic operators aimed at protecting
the confidential nature of information which the public buyers make available
throughout the procurement procedure or in contract implementation.
3. Where justified by security reasons, including but not limited to essential national
security interests or the security of the Union, public buyers may
(a) restrict the information that they provide to economic operators to certain
stages of the procurement procedure; or
(b) make the access to information conditional to having taken certain security
measures, in particular having acquired security clearance in the Member State
where the public contract is to be performed.
Article 94
Conflicts of interest
1. Public buyers shall take appropriate measures to effectively prevent, identify and
remedy conflicts of interest arising in the conduct of procurement procedures,
including the design and preparation of the procedure and the staff involved, the
drawing-up of the procurement detail, the selection of economic operators and the
award of the contract.
For the purposes of this Article, ’conflict of interest’ includes any situation where the
categories of persons referred to in paragraph 2 have, directly or indirectly, a
repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/765/oj).
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personal interest in the outcome of the procurement procedure or conduct of the
contract implementation, which may compromise the impartial and objective
performance of their duties.
For the purpose of this paragraph ‘personal interest’ means any family, emotional,
economic, political or other relevant shared interests with the candidates the
tenderers or contractor including conflicting professional interests.
2. The rules referred to in paragraph 1 shall apply to conflicts of interest involving at
least the following categories of persons:
(a) staff members of the public buyer, procurement service providers or staff
members of other service providers who are involved in the conduct of the
procurement procedure or may influence its outcome;
(b) the members of decision-making bodies of the public buyer, or of other bodies
that influence the decision making of the public buyer, who may influence the
outcome of the procurement procedure, without necessarily being involved in
the conduct of that procedure.
3. The persons referred to in paragraph 2 are required to declare any conflicts of interest
in relation to any of the economic operators participating in a procurement
procedure, as soon as they become aware of such conflicts, in order to enable
remedial action.
Public buyers may require that economic operators declare in their expression of
interest, tender or at the beginning of negotiations the existence of any links with the
persons referred to in point (b) of paragraph 2, which may place those persons in a
situation of conflicts of interest, as well as conflicts of interest in relation to the
subject-matter of the procurement procedure.
4. Without prejudice to Article 140(3), remedial measures shall primarily include the
recusal of the persons referred to in paragraph 2 in question from involvement in the
affected procurement procedure or the re-assignment of that person’s duties and
responsibilities.
Where conflicts of interest cannot be effectively remedied by other means, the
economic operator concerned shall be excluded from the procedure only after it has
been given the opportunity to prove that the situation of suspected conflicts of
interest does not distort competition.
5. All conflicts of interest prevented, identified or declared and the remedial measures
taken shall be documented pursuant to Article 109.
Article 95
Prior involvement in the preparation of the procurement procedure
1. Where an economic operator has been involved in the preparation of the procurement
procedure, public buyers shall take any necessary measures to ensure that
competition is not distorted by the participation of that economic operator.
Participation in a market consultation shall not be considered preparation of the
procurement procedure within the meaning of this Article.
2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall include making available relevant
information exchanged or obtained by the participating economic operator during the
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preparation of the procurement procedure to all interested economic operators, as
well as setting appropriate time limits to ensure fair competition.
3. The economic operator concerned shall only be excluded from the procedure where
there are no other means to ensure equal treatment and after it has been given the
opportunity to prove that its prior involvement does not distort competition.
4. The measures shall be documented pursuant to Article 109.
Article 96
Setting time limits
1. When setting the time limits for expressions of interest or the receipt of tenders and
without prejudice to the minimum and maximum time limits set out in Title I of this
Part, public buyers shall take account of the nature and complexity of the contract,
the necessity of on-site inspections, and the time required for drawing up tenders.
2. Public buyers shall extend time limits set for the receipt of tenders in case of
additional information or significant changes. The length of the extension shall be
proportionate to the relevance and complexity of the information or change.
Article 97
Availability of procurement detail
1. Public buyers shall ensure unrestricted, full direct and free of charge access by
electronic means to the procurement detail from the date of publication of a public
summary of competition until three years after the award of the contract.
2. Where for certain parts of the procurement detail such access referred to in paragraph
1 cannot be provided, public buyers may indicate in the public summary the other
means by which those parts will be made available by other than electronic means.
3. Public buyers shall provide without undue delay to all economic operators all
additional information relating to the specifications and any supporting procurement
detail necessary for the submission of tenders provided that it has been requested in
good time.
4. This Article is without prejudice to Article 93(3).
Article 98
Award criteria
1. Public buyers shall award the contract to the economic operator that offers the best
quality for money.
To that effect, public buyers shall evaluate the tenders received according to the best
price-quality ratio method referred to in paragraph 2, and by applying award criteria
with the minimum quality weighting in accordance with paragraph 4, except as
provided for in paragraph 5.
2. To determine the best price-quality ratio, public buyers shall evaluate the tenders
through a comparison of their price and quality, based on quality criteria linked to the
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subject-matter of the contract. Costs can also be taken into account when determining
the best price-quality ratio.
Quality criteria shall refer to any criteria used to assess the degree to which a tender
proposes beneficial, efficient or sustainable outcomes in relation to the subject-matter
of the contract.
The quality of the tender may, for instance, relate to the following aspects:
(a) technical merit, aesthetic and functional characteristics, accessibility, design
for all users, and production methods;
(b) environmental and climate-related considerations referred to in Article 50,
food-specific considerations referred to in Article 53 where relevant, social
considerations referred to in Article 55, innovation objectives referred to in
Article 59, security and public safety interests as set out in Article 66,
resilience and security of supply requirements as set out in Article 69, or
European preference requirements where a public buyer applies those
requirements in the form of an allocation of award points pursuant to Article
73(2), point (b);
(c) quality of the staff assigned that can significantly impact the level of
performance of the contract, such as the organisation, qualification and
experience of the staff assigned to performing the contract;
(d) after-sales service and technical assistance, delivery conditions such as date at
which or period during which the delivery is to take place or to be completed.
Public buyers may also establish a fixed price on the basis of which economic
operators are to compete on quality criteria only.
3. Award criteria shall be non-discriminatory, proportionate, specific, objective and
measurable; they shall be evaluated in a process containing sufficient safeguards
against irregularities. They shall allow the public buyer to effectively compare the
strengths and weaknesses of the offered goods, services and works, and shall not
have the effect of conferring an unrestricted freedom of choice on the public buyer.
Public buyers shall specify, in the public summary of competition, the criteria and
their relative weighting chosen to determine the best price-quality ratio.
4. The weight of quality criteria shall represent at least 30 % of total points awarded.
For contracts where the subject-matter is labour-intensive, the weight of quality
criteria shall represent at least 50 % of total points awarded.
Where, pursuant to Article 99, public buyers apply life-cycle costing, the weight
given to life-cycle costs shall be counted within the respective percentage share.
Where public buyers apply environmental criteria specific for public procurement set
in Union legislation as referred to in Article 50(4), second subparagraph, including
delegated acts adopted pursuant to Article 54, and where those requirements relate to
award criteria, the weight given to such environmental considerations shall count
within percentages indicated in this paragraph. Mere compliance with obligations not
relating to award criteria shall not be an award criterion.
5. Public buyers may derogate from paragraph 1, second subparagraph, and from
paragraph 4, where the quality of the product, service or works procured can be
ensured in any of the following ways:
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(a) specifications;
(b) where relevant, conditions for the performance of contracts;
(c) a combination of any of the following: quality-based award criteria,
specifications and conditions for the performance of contracts.
Public buyers shall indicate in the public summary of competition which of the ways
set out in the first subparagraph justifies that derogation.
Article 99
Life-cycle costing
1. Where public buyers apply life-cycle costing, this shall, to the extent relevant, cover
parts or all of the following costs over the life-cycle of a product, service or works:
(a) costs borne by the public buyers or other parties for purchase of the solution,
costs of use, consumption of energy and other resources, maintenance costs
and end of life costs, such as collection and recycling costs, based on
appropriate baselines and scenario assessments where appropriate;
(b) costs imputed to environmental and climate externalities linked to the product,
service or works during its life-cycle, provided their monetary value can be
determined and verified.
The costs referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), may include the cost of
emissions of greenhouse gases and of other pollutant emissions or other climate
change mitigation costs.
2. Where public buyers assess the costs using a life-cycle costing approach they shall
indicate in the procurement detail the data to be provided by the tenderers and the
method which the public buyer is to use to determine the life-cycle costs on the basis
of those data.
3. The methods used for assessment of costs imputed to environmental and climate
externalities shall be accessible to all interested parties and based on objectively
verifiable and non-discriminatory criteria. In particular where the method has not
been established for repeated or continuous application, it shall not unduly favour or
disadvantage certain economic operators.
Article 100
Division into lots
1. Public buyers shall consider whether to divide contracts into lots.
2. In assessing whether a contract should be divided into lots, public buyers shall take
into account, where relevant, the potential contribution of such division to increasing
participation of SMEs, reducing dependency on a single supplier, strengthening
supply chain resilience and security of supply, and fostering innovation, as well as,
on the other hand, the impact of such division on the efficiency of and risks related to
the integrity of the procurement. Where division into lots is not mandatory pursuant
to paragraph 6 and public buyers consider that such division is not appropriate, they
shall indicate the main reasons thereof in the procurement detail or in the individual
documentation pursuant to Article 109.
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3. Where public buyers divide a contract into lots, they shall do so in a way that the
scope, size, number and nature of lots are proportionate to the subject-matter and
complexity of the contract.
4. Public buyers may award contracts for individual lots without applying the
procedures provided for under this Regulation, provided that the estimated value net
of VAT of the lot concerned is less than EUR 80 000 for supplies or services or
EUR 1 million for works. However, the aggregate value of the lots thus awarded
without applying this Regulation shall not exceed 20 % of the aggregate value of all
the lots into which the proposed work, the proposed acquisition of similar supplies or
the proposed provision of services has been divided.
5. Public buyers may limit the number of lots for which economic operators may
submit tenders. They shall indicate that limit in the procurement detail.
6. Public buyers may limit the number of lots that may be awarded to a single tenderer.
In such case, public buyers shall state the maximum number, and where applicable,
the possible combinations of lots in the procurement detail. They shall also indicate
in the procurement detail the objective and non-discriminatory criteria or rules they
intend to apply for determining which lots will be awarded where the application of
the award criteria would result in one tenderer being awarded more lots than the
maximum number.
7. Member States may provide that public buyers shall divide contracts into lots.
Article 101
Abnormally low tenders
1. Public buyers shall require tenderers to explain the price or price elements in the
tender, including in relation to the quality of the tender, where these appear to be
abnormally below any of the following:
(a) the price or price elements of the other tender or tenders received in the
procurement procedure;
(b) the market price such as by the public buyer's estimation of contract value, in
particular where it is based on market consultation, and including all costs such
as the cost of labour and working conditions, materials and logistics and for
complying with other contractual requirements as well as other life-cycle
costing;
(c) contract values in past procurement procedures with mostly identical subject-
matter and conditions, in particular in past estimations, tenders or prices paid
by the same public buyer or other public buyers.
The public buyer may limit the requirement to explain the prices or price elements to
the tenderer with the best placed tender in accordance with Article 98, or, where
appropriate, to several of the tenderers with the best ranked tenders.
2. The explanations of the tenderer shall establish the economic viability of the price or
price elements of the tender as not abnormally low over the duration of the contract.
They shall account for the low level of price, including price elements and the
relation to the quality of the tender and compliance with all obligations, and may
include, in particular, the following:
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(a) the economics of the manufacturing process, of the services provided or of the
construction method or the technical solutions chosen;
(b) exceptionally favourable conditions, including state aid where such state aid is
compatible with the internal market;
(c) whether the tenderer complies with all regulatory obligations and strategic
requirements pursuant to Title II of this Part applicable to the contract.
3. Where the public buyer considers the explanations referred to in paragraph 2 to be
satisfactory, it shall record its assessment in the individual documentation pursuant to
Article 109.
4. Where the explanations referred to in paragraph 2 are not considered satisfactory,
including after having asked for clarifications or additional information, the public
buyer shall reject the tender from the procurement procedure.
Article 102
Corrections during procedures and cancellation
1. Before the deadline for each submission of tenders or each start of negotiations,
public buyers may make corrections to the procurement detail without initiating a
new procurement procedure or changing the public summary of competition
provided that:
(a) the correction does not substantially alter the subject-matter of the
procurement; and
(b) the correction is indicated clearly in an updated procurement detail made
available to all economic operators concerned.
If the correction is done less than 24 hours before the deadline for submission of
tenders, the deadline shall be extended by a minimum of two working days, or more
where warranted due to the nature and complexity of the correction.
2. Where information or documentation submitted by economic operators is or appears
to be incomplete or erroneous or where specific information or documentation are
missing, public buyers may provide the economic operators concerned in a strictly
non-discriminatory manner the opportunity to submit, supplement, clarify or
complete the relevant information or documentation within an appropriate time limit
to remedy such deficiency. The first sentence only applies to a minor informality or
irregularity of a tender or eligibility information where such remedy does not
materially change the tender or eligibility information.
3. The public buyer shall cancel the procurement procedure if it identifies material
errors in the procurement procedure that cannot be corrected by any other means and
that are liable to distort competition.
4. The public buyer may, before the contract is signed, cancel the procurement
procedure. In the case of contracts divided into lots or other forms of multiple
sourcing procurement, the cancellation may be done partially. The decision shall be
justified and brought to the attention of the tenderers as soon as possible.
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Article 103
Framework agreements
1. Public buyers may conclude framework agreements pursuant to the procedures in
Title I of this Part. The rules of this Regulation for public contracts shall apply
mutatis mutandis to framework agreements unless otherwise provided for in this
Article.
A ‘framework agreement’ means an agreement between one or more public buyers
and one or more economic operators to establish the terms governing contracts that
may be awarded during a given period.
2. The duration of a framework agreement shall not exceed the following:
(a) three years for framework agreements with one economic operator; or
(b) five years for framework agreements with several economic operators.
The maximum duration of the framework agreement may be set for a longer period
in exceptional cases, where this is duly justified by the complexity or specialised
nature of the procurement and the duration is not longer than what is strictly
necessary in view of the circumstances of the procurement in question.
3. A public buyer shall indicate its intention to conclude a framework agreement
through a public summary of competition. The public summary shall also include the
duration and the maximum cumulative value or volumes of contracts expected to be
concluded based on the framework agreement over its duration. The maximums may
be adjusted in the public summary of result, provided that any adjustment is
proportionate to the terms of the successful tender or tenders.
4. The procurement detail shall include the non-discriminatory and objective criteria
that shall be used to conclude subsequent contracts based on the framework
agreement. Where a framework agreement is concluded with more than one
economic operator, the criteria shall either provide for the rules for reopening of
competition between the economic operators party to the framework agreement or set
out all the terms of how the contracts will be awarded and performed, or a
combination thereof.
Public buyers shall publish a public summary of result pursuant to Article 110 on
each contract concluded based on a framework agreement. Contracts based on a
framework agreement shall not have a duration that exceeds the end of the duration
of the framework agreement by more than 50 % of the duration of the framework
agreement.
Chapter 4
Contract execution
Article 104
Conditions for the performance of contracts
1. Public buyers may lay down conditions relating to the performance of a contract,
provided that they are linked to the subject-matter of the contract in accordance with
Article 90 and clearly indicated in the procurement detail.
EN 110 EN
2. Those conditions may, in addition to general contractual, technical, quality and
economic aspects, such as price indexation, also include conditions related to
strategic considerations, including:
(a) environmental considerations as defined in Article 50, such as the handling of
waste, compliance with sustainability due diligence and reporting in the
execution of the contract, or other requirements in a circular economy;
(b) employment considerations, such as fair working conditions of the workers
employed in the execution of the contract, including remuneration as well as
occupational health and safety at work;
(c) other social considerations as defined in Article 55, such as implementation of
appropriate prevention and mitigation processes related to human rights
impacts arising in the performance of the contract;
(d) innovation objectives as described in Article 59, such as to encourage
continued improvement of the solution;
(e) security and public safety interests as described in Articles 66, or resilience and
security of supply requirements as set out in Article 69, such as security
clearance of the personnel, handling restrictions or continued observance and
improvement of the supply chain.
Article 105
Adjustment mechanisms
1. Public buyers may include in the procurement detail clauses establishing
mechanisms for the adjustment of the conditions of the contract throughout its
duration, provided that those mechanisms:
(a) are objectively justified having regard to the nature of the contract;
(b) maintain the economic balance of the contract;
(c) the clauses are clear, precise and unequivocal.
2. The adjustment mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1 may, in particular, relate to:
(a) predefined rules for the adjustment of revenues, including variations linked to
demand or usage levels;
(b) indexation mechanisms, including those linked to objective economic
indicators, such as price indices, inflation rates or volatility of input costs such
as for key materials;
(c) performance-based payment adjustments, linked to the achievement of
qualitative or performance objectives relating to the supply of works or
services.
3. Adjustments of a contract based on such clauses shall not be considered
modifications pursuant to Article 106.
Article 106
Modifications of contracts during their term
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1. Public buyers may modify awarded contracts or framework agreements during their
term without a new procurement procedure provided that the modification is not
substantial within the meaning of paragraph 3 or falls within one of the cases referred
to in paragraph 4. Any such modification shall respond to objective needs arising
during the performance of the contract, be limited to what is necessary and
appropriate to ensure its performance and continuity and not alter the initial
economic balance of the contract in favour of the contractor.
2. Modification, the value of which does not exceed 15 % of the value of the initial
contract shall be considered non-substantial and may be made without a new
procurement procedure, provided that the modification does not alter the initial
economic balance of the contract.
Where several successive modifications are made, the thresholds shall be assessed on
the basis of the net cumulative value of the successive modifications.
3. A modification shall be considered substantial where it introduces terms which, had
they been part of the original procurement procedure would have changed the
condition of competition, or where it changes essential terms or conditions of the
contract, such as the scope of the contract, the initial economic balance in favour of
the contractor or the identity of the original contractor, in cases other than those
referred to in paragraph 4, point (c).
4. Provided that they do not alter the initial economic balance of the contract in favour
of the contractor, substantial modifications shall be permissible within the meaning
of paragraph 1 only in the following cases:
(a) where additional works, services, or supplies have become necessary during
the performance of the contract, provided that a change of contractor is not
technically or economically feasible, including due to the interdependence of
the existing works or services or because it would result in substantial increase
in costs;
(b) where the modification is necessary due to circumstances which could not
reasonably have been anticipated by a diligent public buyer at the time of the
launch of the procedure, and which significantly affect the performance or
feasibility of the contract, including:
(i) substantial changes in the applicable regulatory or legal framework;
(ii) significant technological developments;
(iii) disruptions, emergencies or crises having a significant economic, societal
or operational impact;
(c) where the original contractor is replaced by another entity due to:
(i) a merger, takeover, acquisition, insolvency or other corporate restructuring,
another economic operator succeeds, wholly or partly, to the rights and
obligations of the initial contractor, provided that the new entity fulfils the
original qualitative selection criteria; that no other substantial modifications are
made to the contract and that the replacement is not intended to circumvent the
application of this Regulation; or
(ii) the public buyer assuming the main contractor’s obligations towards its
subcontractors where that possibly is provided for under national law.
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5. Before modifying a contract, the public buyer shall establish, on the basis of
objective and verifiable elements, that the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are
satisfied. Public buyers shall maintain detailed written records of the essential
elements of the modification, including its justification, its necessity or
appropriateness, and its impact on the economic balance of the contract, in particular
allocation of risks and economic advantages, in order to justify the decisions to
modify the contract and to enable verification of compliance with this Article by
competent supervisory, audit and review bodies.
6. Before any modification of a contract that exceeds 50 % of the initial estimated value
of the contract, the public buyers shall publish a public summary of modification to
that effect. That public summary shall contain the justification for the modification
without a new procurement procedure and the information set out in Article 110.
Successive modifications shall not be aimed at circumventing this Regulation.
By way of derogation from the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the prior
publication obligation does not apply where urgency resulting from an emergency
determined in accordance with Article 48 does not allow for prior publication of the
public summary of modification. In such case, public buyers shall publish a public
summary of modification pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Article.
7. Where public buyers substantially modify a contract pursuant to paragraph 4 of this
Article, and the modification does not exceed 50 % of the initial estimated contract
value of the contract, they shall publish a public summary of modification containing
the information set out in Article 110 within 20 days from the date on which the
modification was made.
8. For the purpose of the calculation of the value referred to in the paragraphs 2, 6 and
7, the updated value shall be the reference value when the contract includes an
indexation clause. If the contract does not include an indexation clause, the updated
value shall be calculated taking into account the average inflation in the Member
State of the public buyer.
9. Modifications of a contract shall not be used to remedy deficiencies of the
contractor’s performance that are not justified by circumstances beyond its control.
Article 107
Termination of contracts
Without prejudice to any other grounds for termination provided for in this Act or under
applicable national law, public buyers shall terminate the contract where:
(a) the economic operator becomes subject of a final conviction for one of the grounds
referred to in Article 25, except where the public buyer establishes that such
termination is not warranted for reasons of overriding public interest and the final
judgment does not preclude this;
(b) the contract or its modification should not have been awarded to the contractor in
view of a serious infringement of the obligations under the Treaties and this
Regulation that has been declared by the Court of Justice of the European Union in a
procedure pursuant to Article 258 of the Treaty.
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Article 108
Payments
1. Without prejudice to their obligations under Directive 2011/7/EU67 of the European
Parliament and of the Council, public buyers shall ensure the timely payment of
contractors and, where applicable, subcontractors.
2. As part of the conditions for the performance of the contract pursuant to Article 104,
public buyers may provide that the contractors pass through the supply chain
equivalent payment terms as laid down in the relevant provisions of Directive
2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council.
3. Member States shall provide, through the National Public Procurement Data Space
(NPPDS), procurement information on payment status linked to each individual
contract concerned pursuant to Article 134(4).
4. Member States shall make available procurement information on prompt payment
compliance for each annual reporting period for each public buyer pursuant to
Article 134(4).
5. In addition to Article 44(6), public buyers may provide for advance payments in the
procurement detail, especially to encourage the participation of SMEs. Where the
contract in question has particular relevance for the innovation considerations set out
in Title II, Chapter 3 of this Part and unless justified by an overriding interest of the
public buyer, public buyers shall provide for an appropriate advance payment to the
contractor.
6. At the request of the subcontractor and where the nature of the contract so allows, the
public buyer shall transfer due payments directly to the subcontractor for services,
supplies or works provided to the main contractor. Such measures may include
appropriate mechanisms permitting the main contractor to object to undue payments.
The arrangements concerning that mode of payment shall be set out in the
procurement detail.
Chapter 5
Publication and documentation rules
Article 109
Individual documentation of procedures
1. Public buyers shall record, in the public buyer’s eProcurement service and make
available in the NPPDS pursuant to Article 134, the necessary documentation to
justify decisions taken in all stages of the procurement procedure, in particular
documentation on communications with economic operators, including in
negotiations if any, and internal decisions for the preparation or correction of the
procurement detail, including after negotiations if any, in selection of economic
operators and award of the contract. The documentation shall be kept for a period of
67 Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating
late payment in commercial transactions (recast) (OJ L 48, 23.2.2011, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/7/oj).
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at least three years from the date of award of the contract, except where a longer
period is required by applicable Union or national law.
2. Procurement information and procurement decisions shall be recorded and managed
in a manner enabling their origin, evolution, justification and approval history to be
identified throughout their lifecycle.
3. Public buyers shall include in their documentation any identified conflicts of interest,
integrity breaches and significant risks for security or public safety affecting
procurement procedures or contract implementation as well as mitigating measures
taken.
Article 110
Publication information in public summaries
1. Public buyers shall publish information in accordance with Article 112 with all the
following public summaries:
(a) consultation;
(b) competition;
(c) result;
(d) contract;
(e) modification;
(f) completion.
2. The publication of a public summary of consultation as referred to in Article 30, shall
include all the following information:
(a) identification of the organisations relevant for the consultation; and
(b) purpose of the consultation including method, communication and submission
terms;
(c) other necessary information regarding the consultation.
3. The publication of a public summary of competition as referred to in Articles 34, 37,
42, 49 and 103 shall include all the following information:
(a) identification of the organisations relevant for the procedure;
(b) purpose of the procedure including method, communication and submission
terms;
(c) description of the procurement, including the nature, quantity or estimated
quantity, and timing of purchases;
(d) duration of validity of the procedure;
(e) contract terms;
(f) if applicable, an indication on the strategic nature of the procurement, such as
the fulfilment of environmental, social or innovation objectives, as well as the
suitability of the procurement for SMEs;
(g) GPA coverage;
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(h) other necessary information regarding competition.
4. The publication of a public summary of result as referred to in Articles 40, 44, 46,
49, 103 and 111 shall include the following information:
(a) identification of the organisations relevant for the procedure;
(b) purpose of the procedure;
(c) result of the procedure, including cancellation;
(d) for contracts awarded pursuant to Article 46: a justification for the decision of
the public buyer to award the contract in accordance with that provision;
(e) for contracts awarded pursuant to Article 46: a description of the request as set
out in the invitation to negotiate, the request to submit a tender or the request to
deliver the solution against invoice;
(f) if applicable, an indication of the strategic nature of the procurement, such as
the fulfilment of environmental, social or innovation objectives, as well as
indication of SME participation;
(g) GPA coverage; and
(h) other necessary information regarding the result.
5. The publication of a public summary of contract of modification or of completion as
set out in Articles 106, 111, and 125, shall include all the following information, as
applicable:
(a) identification of the organisations relevant for the contract;
(b) purpose of the contract;
(c) any contract information published pursuant to this paragraph and changed by
the modification;
(d) reasons for the modification;
(e) result of the contract including information on termination;
(f) other necessary information regarding the contract, modification or completion
information.
6. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated act in accordance with Article
141 to amend the information in each public summary referred to in paragraphs 2 to
6 of this Article in accordance with the implementation needs.
7. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts further detailing the
specific information which shall be contained in each public summary as described
in paragraphs 2 to 6, establishing the connection of public summaries and the
sequencing of specific information contained in multiple public summaries, and
establishing requirements for public buyers to reuse information already provided in
a public summary as well as requirements for eProcurement service providers to
provide a corresponding reuse service. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in
accordance with the advisory procedure referred in Article 143(2).
Article 111
Publication of public summary of result, of contract and of completion
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1. Public buyers shall send the following procurement information pursuant to Article
110 no later than 20 days:
(a) after the conclusion of a market consultation, the award decision in or the
cancellation of a procurement procedure, or as referred to in Article 40, 44, 46,
49 and 103, public buyers shall send a public summary of result;
(b) after the conclusion of a contract where the preceding procurement procedure
was within the scope of this Regulation, public buyers shall send a public
summary of contract;
(c) after the completion of the performance of a contract where the preceding
procurement procedure was within the scope of this Regulation, public buyers
shall send a public summary of completion, including from the day of the
respective event where an awarded contract was not concluded or where the
contract execution was not terminated, including due to a termination pursuant
to Articles 107 and 126 from the day of the respective event.
2. Certain information may be withheld from publication where its release would
impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, would harm
the legitimate commercial interests of a particular economic operator, public or
private, might prejudice fair competition between economic operators. Such
information shall at the same time however be provided to the NPPDS pursuant to
Article 134 as not publicly available information.
3. Public buyers shall ensure the complete, correct and timely provision of procurement
information to the NPPDS pursuant to Article 134.
Article 112
Form and manner of publication
1. The public summaries referred to in Article 110 including changes to information
shall be sent by public buyers through the NPPDS to the Publications Office of the
European Union and shall be published in the Supplement to the Official Journal of
the European Union. no later than five days after it is received, unless the public
buyer requests a later date of publication. The information shall be considered to be
received by the Publications Office of the European Union only once it has been
validated according to the technical validation requirements set up by the Union.
2. The Publications Office of the European Union shall ensure that the public
summaries referred in Article 110 are made available:
(a) as the sole authentic text in at least one of the official languages of the Union
as provided by the public buyer; and
(b) as non-authentic versions in the other official languages of the Union in
addition to authentic text.
3. Public buyers shall be able to supply proof of the date on which their information
was sent for publication.
4. The Publications Office of the European Union shall give the NPPDS confirmation
of the receipt and of the publication of the public summaries sent, indicating the date
of publication. Such confirmation shall be provided by the NPPDS to the public
buyer and shall constitute proof of publication.
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5. Public buyers may publish public summaries for public contracts that are not subject
to the publication requirements laid down in this Regulation, provided that these are
sent to the Publications Office of the European Union according to this Article.
6. The costs of the reception, validation and publication of the public summaries by the
Publications Office of the European Union shall be borne by the Union.
7. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts, specifying the details
concerning the provision of public summaries to the Publications Office of the
European Union and the source of the technical validation requirements referred to in
paragraph 1. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the
advisory procedure referred to in Article 143(2).
Article 113
Publication at national level
1. The information referred to in Article 110 or the implementing act pursuant to
Article 110(7) shall not be published at national level before the publication pursuant
to Article 112. However, publication may in any event take place at the national level
where public buyers have not been notified of the publication within 48 hours after
confirmation of the receipt of the information in accordance with Article 112.
2. Information published at national level shall indicate the date when that the
information was sent to the Publications Office of the European Union as well as the
identifier of the information regarding a procurement procedure published pursuant
to Article 112.
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Part IV
Concessions
Title I
General provisions
Article 114
Scope
1. This Part applies to concessions for the execution of works and provision of services
as defined in Article 115.
2. Unless otherwise provided for in this Part, all the provisions of this Regulation
applicable to public contracts apply to concessions.
Article 115
Definition and characteristics of concessions
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definition shall apply:
(a) ‘concession’ means a contract for pecuniary interest, regardless of its formal
designation, where one or more public buyers entrust the execution of works or
the provision and management of services to one or more economic operators
(‘concessionaire’) for benefit of users and that complies with the following
conditions:
(i) the remuneration of the concessionaire consists either solely in the right to
exploit the works or services that are the subject of the contract or in that right
together with payment by the public buyer; and
(ii) it entails the transfer to the concessionaire of an operating risk in exploiting
those works or services to which the public buyer would be exposed if it was to
execute the works or perform the services itself.
(b) The concession provides for legally enforceable obligations under which the
public buyer determines the nature, scope and conditions for the execution of
the works or the provision and management of services by establishing specific
requirements to ensure that the concessionaire performs those tasks in pursuit
of the objectives defined by that public buyer and complies with those
requirements, throughout the duration of the concession.
(c) The concession has as its subject-matter the performance of those works or
services and shall not consist merely in the entitlement of all operators
fulfilling certain conditions to perform a given task without any selectivity.
Agreements the sole or predominant subject-matter of which is the granting of
a right to occupy or exploit public domain or resources, including leases or
other rights relating to public property, as well as rights of way or other
permissions allowing the use of the public domain for infrastructure or network
deployment, and in respect of which the public buyer establishes only general
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conditions of use without entrusting the performance of specific works or
services, shall not constitute concessions within the meaning of this
Regulation.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, ‘operating risk’ means the risk that the
concessionaire will not recoup, under normal operating conditions, the investments
made and the costs incurred in the execution of the works or the provision and
management of the services which are the subject-matter of the concession, so that
the concessionaire bears the risk of losses attached to the performance of the
concession, such as risks linked to uncertainties affecting demand, revenues,
operating costs, availability, technical and operational conditions or performance.
The operating risk shall involve genuine exposure to the changing market conditions,
and any potential estimated loss incurred by the concessionaire shall not be
economically insignificant.
Article 116
Mixed concession contracts
1. In addition to Articles 86 and 87, the applicable legal regime for contracts containing
elements of concessions and of other public contracts (‘mixed concession contracts’)
shall be determined in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article.
2. Where the different parts of a mixed concession contract are objectively separable,
but are not procured separately by the public buyer, the mixed concession contract
shall be awarded in accordance with Part III.
3. Where the different parts of a mixed concession contract are objectively not
separable, the applicable legal regime shall be determined on the basis of the main
subject-matter of that contract.
Where such a contract contains elements of a services concession and of a supply
contract, the main subject-matter of that contract shall be determined in accordance
with the higher of the estimated values of the respective services or supplies.
Article 117
Excluded concessions
1. In addition to the exclusions provided for in Part III, Title II, Chapter 1, this
Regulation does not apply to the following concessions:
(a) for air transport services based on the grant of an operating licence within the
meaning of Regulation (EC) No 1008/200868 of the European Parliament and
of the Council;
(b) for public passenger transport services within the meaning of Regulation (EC)
No 1370/2007;
68 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008
on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast) (OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, p.
3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1008/oj).
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(c) for provision or operation of fixed networks intended to provide a service to
the public in connection with the production, transport or distribution of
drinking water, or to supply drinking water to such networks;
(d) having one or both of the following subject-matters where they are connected
with an activity referred to in point (c):
(i) hydraulic engineering projects, irrigation or land drainage, provided that the
volume of water to be used for the supply of drinking water represents more
than 20 % of the total volume of water made available by those projects or
installations for irrigation or drainage installations;
(ii) the disposal or treatment of sewage;
(e) for lottery services, which are covered by CPV code 92351100-7, awarded by a
Member State to an economic operator on the basis of an exclusive right;
(f) awarded to an economic operator on the basis of an exclusive right which has
been granted in accordance with the Treaty and Union legislation laying down
common rules on access to the market applicable to the activities referred to in
Annex III, unless that Union legislation does not provide for sector-specific
transparency obligations, in which case Article 20 shall apply.
2. Where a Member State grants an exclusive right to an economic operator for the
exercise of one of the activities referred to in Annex IV, it shall inform the
Commission thereof within one month of granting that exclusive right.
Article 118
Threshold and estimation of the value of a concession
1. This Regulation applies to concessions with an estimated value equal to or greater
than the threshold specified in Article 2(1), point (a).
2. The estimated value of a concession shall be the projected total turnover, net of
VAT, that the concessionaire may generate over the maximum duration of the
concession, as estimated by the public buyer, in consideration for the works and
services that are the subject-matter of the concession, and for the supplies incidental
to such works and services.
3. The estimated value of the concession shall be calculated using an objective method
specified in the procurement detail. In calculating the estimated value of the
concession, the public buyers shall, where applicable, take into account in particular:
(a) the value of any form of option and any extension of the duration of the
concession;
(b) revenue from the payment of fees and fines by the users of the works or
services other than those collected on behalf of the public buyer;
(c) payments or any financial advantage in whatever form, granted by the public
buyer or any other public authority to the concessionaire, including
compensation for performance of a public service obligation and public
investment subsidies;
(d) the value of grants or any other financial advantages, in whatever form, granted
by third parties for the performance of the concession;
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(e) revenue from the sale of any assets forming part of the concession;
(f) the value of all the supplies and services that are made available to the
concessionaire by the public buyers, provided that they are necessary for the
execution of the works or provision of the services;
(g) any prizes, payments, compensation or reimbursement granted to economic
operators in connection with the procedure for the award of a concession.
Title II
Preparation, design and procedure
Article 119
Contractual obligations relating to public needs
1. Public buyers shall determine in the procurement detail mandatory conditions
governing the performance of the concession, they deem necessary, having regard to
the nature and subject-matter of the works or services concerned, including those
aiming at ensuring the continuity, quality, accessibility, safety, and effectiveness of
the works and services provided to users.
2. Where appropriate, the mandatory conditions governing the performance of the
concession, referred to in paragraph 1 shall be established as clear, objective and
measurable performance requirements, including indicators relating to the following:
(a) the quality of service;
(b) the availability and continuity of the service;
(c) the efficiency and reliability;
(d) the sustainability and resilience.
3. Where performance requirements are established in accordance with paragraph 2, the
procurement detail shall enable effective monitoring of the performance and may in
particular include the applicable key performance indicators, the methods for
monitoring and verifying performance, and, where appropriate, the consequences of
performance outcomes, including incentives or deductions.
Article 120
Structured risk assessment
1. Before initiating a procedure for the award of a concession, public buyers shall carry
out an assessment of the main economic risks related to the performance of the
concession, taking into account the nature, duration and economic characteristics of
the works or services concerned.
The assessment shall identify the principal categories of risks associated with the
performance of the concession, distinguishing between, on the one hand, operating
risks relating to the exploitation of the works or services and to exposure to market
uncertainties, and, on the other hand, general contractual risks. The risk assessment
shall determine, on the basis of objective elements, the allocation of those risks
between the parties.
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2. The procurement detail may provide for adjustment mechanisms in accordance with
Article 125 intended to re-allocate or mitigate the risks between the parties where
necessary, having regard to the nature of those risks. The existence of such
mechanisms shall not, in itself, preclude the qualification of the contract as a
concession, provided that the concessionaire continues to bear the operating risk
inherent in the exploitation of the works and services.
Article 121
Parameters for assessing performance
1. Public buyers shall include in concession contracts provisions aimed at ensuring the
long-term efficiency of the works or services, including by promoting environmental
sustainability and technological innovation throughout the duration of the
concession.
The provisions referred to in the first subparagraph shall be directly linked to the
performance of the concession and may in particular include requirements relating to
the contribution to the environmental and climate-related objectives pursuant to
Article 50 or to promote technological development and innovation as well as the
continued improvement of services.
2. Public buyers shall, where relevant, include in concession contracts provisions aimed
at ensuring the security, resilience and continuity of the works or services throughout
the duration of the concession.
Those provisions shall be directly linked to the performance of the concession and
may in particular include requirements ensuring the continuity of essential services
under conditions of disruption, obligations to manage risks affecting the security and
operational resilience, and measures to protect critical infrastructure, systems or data,
or cybersecurity safeguards.
3. Public buyers shall include in concession contracts provisions requiring
concessionaires to maintain adequate records for five years from the date of the
award and reporting mechanisms enabling the public buyer to monitor the
performance and implementation of the concession, to verify compliance with
contractual and legal obligations, and to enable verification of compliance by
competent supervisory, audit and review bodies.
Those provisions may in particular relate to the completeness, accuracy and integrity
of the records, periodic performance information, and the timely notification of
incidents affecting the performance or compliance with legal, safety or
environmental requirements.
4. Where the performance of the concession involves rights over assets, infrastructure
or public property necessary for the operation of the concession, public buyers shall
ensure that the contractual, property or occupancy, arrangements governing the
transfer, return or takeover of those assets upon expiry or termination of the
concession are clear, proportionate, non-discriminatory and are specified in the
procurement detail. Those arrangements shall not create unjustified barriers to
competition or unduly favour the incumbent concessionaire and shall ensure that the
successor operator is able to continue the performance of the concession under
effective and non-discriminatory conditions.
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The procurement detail may in particular specify the conditions governing the use,
transfer or return of the assets upon expiry or termination, including for any
compensation payable, and conditions relating to the transfer or takeover of
personnel.
Article 122
Duration of concessions
1. The duration of a concessions shall be limited to the period necessary for the
concessionaire to recoup the investment made for operating the works or services,
together with a return on invested capital under normal operating conditions, taking
into account the investments required to achieve the specific contractual objectives.
2. The duration of a concession shall be determined having regard to the subject-matter
of the concession and to the public interest in preserving competition and market
access.
3. In determining the duration of a concession, the public buyer shall take into account:
(a) the investments required for the performance of the concession, both initially
and throughout the duration of the concession, including investment in
infrastructure, equipment and intellectual property;
(b) the operating and maintenance costs associated with the exploitation of the
works or services;
(c) the allocation of risks between the parties, provided that the duration of the
concession does not result in the elimination of the operating risk born by the
concessionaire;
(d) the mandatory conditions governing the performance of the concession;
(e) the expected revenues and the period reasonably necessary for the
concessionaire to recover the investments and operating costs together with a
reasonable return;
(f) the need to ensure periodic exposure to competition.
Where appropriate, the duration of the concession shall also take into account the
expected technological, regulatory, and environmental lifecycle relevant to the
subject-matter of the concession.
The determination of the duration of the concession shall not result in a guarantee
that the concessionaire will obtain a predetermined or minimum return on invested
capital. A concession may be awarded for a duration shorter than that required for the
recovery of investments, provided that any financial arrangements linked to that
duration, including compensation or guarantees, do not eliminate or substantially
reduce the operating risk borne by the concessionaire.
4. The public buyer may determine the duration of the concession in the procurement
detail or may provide that the duration forms part of the tender.
5. Where the duration forms part of the tender, the procurement detail shall specify:
(a) the method for determining the duration of the concession, including any
minimum or maximum duration or permissible range;
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(b) the rules governing the evaluation and verification of the duration proposed by
tenderers, including the relationship between that duration and:
(i) the investments to be made;
(ii) the financial structure of the concession;
(iii) the allocation of risks;
(iv) the economic balance of the concession;
(c) the extent to which the proposed duration constitutes an award criterion.
6. The public buyer may include in the procurement detail provisions allowing for the
potential adjustment, extension, reduction or contingent determination of the duration
of the concession.
Any mechanism permitting the adjustment, extension, reduction, or contingent
determination of the duration of the concession shall comply with the following
requirements:
(a) be set out in a clear, precise, and unequivocal manner in the procurement
detail;
(b) specify the conditions under which such adjustments may occur, the applicable
methodology and the maximum duration of the concession, having regard to
the factors referred to in the paragraph 3.
Any adjustment to the duration of the concession that is not provided for in the
procurement detail or is not implemented in accordance with the methodology and
conditions set out pursuant to the second subparagraph, point (b), shall constitute a
modification of the concession and shall be subject to Article 125
Article 123
Procedures for the award of a concession
1. Public buyers shall award concessions in accordance with the procedures provided
for in this Regulation.
2. The public summary of competition for the award of the concession pursuant to
Article 34 shall, in addition, include a summary of the following information:
(a) the main components of the estimated value of the concession, including the
estimated investment costs and operating revenues;
(b) the allocation of the key risks, including, where applicable, the demand,
construction, and regulatory risks.
Title III
Management of concessions
Article 124
Adjustment mechanisms
EN 125 EN
1. Public buyers may include in the procurement detail clauses establishing
mechanisms for the adjustment of the conditions of the concession throughout its
duration, provided that those mechanisms:
(a) are objectively justified having regard to the nature, duration and risk profile of
the concession;
(b) maintain the economic balance of the concession;
(c) preserve the transfer of an operating risk to the concessionaire;
(d) the clauses are clear, precise and unequivocal.
2. The adjustment mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1 may, in particular, relate to:
(a) predefined rules for the adjustment of revenues, including variations linked to
demand or usage levels;
(b) indexation mechanisms, including those linked to objective economic
indicators, such as price indices, inflation rates or volatility of input costs such
as for key materials;
(c) performance-based payment adjustments, linked to the achievement of
qualitative or performance objectives relating to the supply of works or
services;
3. Adjustments of a contract based on such clauses shall not be considered
modifications pursuant to Article 125.
Article 125
Modifications of concessions during their term
1. Public buyers may modify concessions during their term without a new procurement
procedure, provided that the modification is not substantial within the meaning of
paragraph 3 or falls within one of the cases referred to in paragraph 4. Any such
modifications shall respond to objective needs arising during the performance of the
concession, be limited to what is necessary and appropriate to ensure its performance
and continuity and does not alter the initial economic balance of the concession in
favour of the concessionaire.
2. Modification, the value of which does not exceed 15 % of the value of the initial
concession shall be considered non-substantial and may be made without a new
procurement procedure, provided that the modification does not alter the initial
economic balance of the concession.
Where several successive modifications are made, the thresholds shall be assessed on
the basis of the net cumulative value of the successive modifications.
3. A modification shall be considered substantial where it introduces terms which, had
they been part of the original procurement procedure, would have changed the
condition of competition, or where it changes essential terms or condition of the
contract, such as the scope of the concession, , the contractual obligations laid down
in accordance with Article 119, the initial economic balance in favour of the
concessionaire, or the identity of the original concessionaire, in cases other than
those referred to in paragraph 4, point (c).
EN 126 EN
4. Provided that they do not alter the initial economic balance of the concession in
favour of the contractor, substantial modifications shall be permissible, within the
meaning of paragraph 1, in the following cases:
(a) where additional works, services, or supplies become necessary during the
performance of the concession, provided that a change of concessionaire is not
technically or economically feasible, including due to the interdependence of
the existing works or services or because it would result in substantial increase
in costs;
(b) where the modification is necessary due to circumstances which could not
reasonably have been anticipated by a diligent public buyer at the time of the
launch of the procedure for the award of the concessions, and which
significantly affect the performance or feasibility of the concession, including:
(i) substantial changes in the applicable regulatory or legal framework;
(ii) significant technological developments;
(iii) disruptions, emergencies or crises having a significant economic, societal
or operational impact;
(c) where the original concessionaire is replaced by another entity due to:
(a) a merger, takeover, acquisition, insolvency or other corporate
restructuring, where another economic operator succeeds, wholly or
partly, to the rights and obligations of the initial concessionaire, provided
that the new entity fulfils the original qualitative selection criteria; that no
other substantial modifications are made to the concession and that the
replacement is not intended to circumvent the application of this
Regulation;
(b) the public buyer assuming the main concessionaire’s obligations towards
its subcontractors where that possibly is provided for under national law.
5. Before modifying a concession, the public buyer shall establish, on the basis of
objective and verifiable elements, that the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are
satisfied. Public buyers shall maintain detailed written records of the essential
elements of the modification, including its justification, its necessity or
appropriateness, and its impact on the economic balance of the contract, in particular
on the allocation of economic advantages and operating risks under the concession,
in order to justify the decisions to modify the concession and to enable verification of
compliance with this Article by competent supervisory, audit and review bodies.
6. Before any modification of a concession that exceeds 50 % of the value of the initial
concession, the public buyers shall publish a public summary of modification to that
effect. That public summary shall contain the justification for the modification
without a new procurement and the information set out in Article 110. Successive
modifications shall not be aimed at circumventing this Regulation.
By way of derogation from the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the prior
publication obligation does not apply where urgency resulting from an emergency
determined in accordance with Article 48 does not allow for prior publication of the
public summary of modification. In such a case, public buyers shall publish a public
summary of modification in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article.
EN 127 EN
7. Where public buyers substantially modify a concession under the conditions set out
in paragraph 5, and the modification does not exceed 50 % of the value of the initial
concession, they shall publish a public summary of modification containing the
information set out in Article 110 within 20 days from the date on which the
modification was made. Where several successive modifications are made that do not
exceed 50 % of the value of the initial concession, this obligation shall apply to each
modification. Consecutive modifications shall not be aimed at circumventing this
Regulation.
8. Where the improper performance of the concession or the failure of the
concessionaire to provide the works or services threatens the continuity of an
essential service provided under the concession and defined in the concession
document, the public buyers may adopt or require strictly necessary temporary
measures to ensure the uninterrupted provision of that service. The public buyers
shall ensure that those measures are limited to what is objectively necessary to
maintain the continuity of the essential service, are proportionate to the seriousness
of the disruption, and do not result in a modification of the economic balance of the
concession or in a transfer of operating risk from the concessionaire to the public
buyers, except to the extent strictly necessary to ensure the temporary continuation of
the essential service.
9. For the purpose of the calculation of the value referred to in paragraphs 2, 6 and 7 the
updated value shall be the reference value when the contract includes an indexation
clause. If the contract does not include an indexation clause, the updated value shall
be calculated taking into account the average inflation in the Member State of the
public buyer.
10. Modifications of a concession contract shall not be used to remedy deficiencies in the
performance of the concessionaire that are not justified by circumstances beyond its
control, except under condition laid down in paragraph 8.
Article 126
Termination of concessions
1. In addition to Article 107, public buyers may terminate a concession contract before
its expiry, where provided for under Union or national law and where such
termination is justified by overriding reasons of public interest.
2. Any termination pursuant to paragraph 1 shall:
(a) comply with the principles of proportionality and equal treatment;
(b) be duly reasoned and based on objective and verifiable grounds;
(c) be exercised only where the objective pursued cannot reasonably be achieved
by less restrictive measures, including by modifying the concession in
accordance with this Regulation.
3. In the event of termination under this Article, the concessionaire shall be entitled to
appropriate compensation.
4. The justification for the termination and the compensation shall be duly documented
and made available for verification by competent supervisory, audit and review
bodies for a minimum of five years.
EN 128 EN
Part V
Digital ecosystem
Title I
Digital tools
Chapter 1
Electronic communication and interoperability
Article 127
Electronic communication
1. Public buyers shall use electronic communication tools in all their exchanges with
the economic operator in the procurement procedure. They shall use only generally
available and non-discriminatory tools, and their communication shall be in
conformity with the harmonised standard for procurement detail pursuant to Article
129(1) point (b).
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, public buyers may use other means of communication
to the extent that electronic communication is not possible due to the specific
technical requirements of the procurement procedure or to the extent that this is
necessary for one of the following reasons:
(a) a breach of security of the electronic communication; or
(b) the protection of the particularly sensitive nature of data requiring such a high
level of protection that it cannot be properly ensured by using electronic
communication tools.
3. In all communication, exchange and storage of data, public buyers shall ensure that
the integrity of data and the confidentiality of expressions of interest, tenders and
innovative solution proposals are preserved and that they are able to exchange data
with the economic operator through the interoperability network pursuant to Article
128. They shall examine the content of expressions of interest, tenders and
innovative solution proposals only after the time limit set for submitting them has
expired and shall ensure that any unauthorised access is detectable.
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 65, public buyers may
require the use of electronic communication tools which are not generally available
and non-discriminatory only where this is necessary for the conduct of the
procurement procedure and where they provide free and equal access to such tools to
all economic operators intending to participate in the procurement procedure.
5. In accordance with Articles 27 and 37 of Regulation (EU) 910/201469, public buyers
may require the use of advanced electronic signatures or seals, advanced electronic
69 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on
electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and
repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 73, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj).
EN 129 EN
signatures or seals based on a qualified certificate or qualified electronic signatures
or seals for the signature of electronic communication by the economic operator.
Article 128
Interoperability network
1. The Commission shall establish or designate a secure network for data exchange, to
enable public buyers and economic operators to communicate using electronic means
in procurement procedures using different eProcurement service providers
(‘interoperability network’).
2. The Commission shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 141, to
supplement this Regulation in order to establish or designate such an interoperability
network.
The Commission shall ensure that the interoperability network meets the following
requirements:
(a) it complies with the harmonised standards referred to in Article 129 and the
common specifications referred to in Article 130;
(b) it takes into account existing Union tools and standards;
(c) it complies with the requirement for protection of personal data in accordance
with Regulations (EU) 2016/67970 and (EU) 2018/1725, and ensures ‘data
protection by design' and by default as laid down in Article 25 of Regulation
(EU) 2016/679 and Article 27 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725;
(d) it allows for the establishment of a secure, practical, easily implementable,
flexible, configurable and cost-efficient data exchange in all procurement
procedures;
(e) it considers the particular needs of SMEs;
(f) it considers the eProcurement ontology as a semantic framework standardising
the concepts of Union public procurement; and
(g) it considers the public summaries and their technical implementation in
accordance with Article 110.
3. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts laying down the detailed
arrangements for the implementation and operation of the interoperability network,
including, where appropriate, the rules on the re-use of existing networks for the
purposes of this Article. Those implementing acts shall specify at least the following:
(a) technical information on the connection to the interoperability network;
(b) data format and structure including configuration and syntax;
(c) semantic repository;
(d) interoperability requirements;
(e) scalability and performance;
70 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016,
p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj).
EN 130 EN
(f) security and accountability requirements;
(g) data ownership and access management;
(h) qualification of eProcurement service providers;
(i) organisational and technical measures for processing personal data;
(j) arrangements to tackle inappropriate or fraudulent use of the interoperability
network;
(k) availability of the interoperability network and data; and
(l) interconnections made via the interoperability network, including the
interconnection to the digital business credential tool and to the NPPDS.
The implementing acts referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall be
adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 143(2).
4. The Commission may require the interoperability network operator to deny or
remove access to the network for eProcurement service providers where those
providers do not, or no longer, fulfil the requirements laid down in Article 131. The
Commission shall provide appropriate prior notice to eProcurement service providers
of the denial of or loss of access to the network. The interoperability network shall
provide the Commission with the information necessary for assessing the compliance
with the requirements laid down in Article 131.
Article 129
Harmonised standards for public procurement
1. The Commission may adopt a standardization request in accordance with Regulation
(EU) No 1025/2012 for the drafting of harmonized standards, for the semantic data
model and interoperability of the core elements of the following:
(a) the procurement procedures in accordance with this Regulation (the
‘harmonised standard for procurement procedures’); and
(b) at least the main elements of the procurement detail (the ‘harmonised standard
for procurement detail’).
2. Standards adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 shall comply at least with the
following criteria:
(a) they take into account existing Union tools and standards;
(b) they meet the requirement for the protection of personal data in accordance
with Regulations (EU) 2016/679 and (EU) 2018/1725, in particular respecting
the principles of ‘data protection by design’ and by default as laid down in
Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Article 27 of Regulation (EU)
2018/1725;
(c) they allow for the establishment of a secure, easily implementable, flexible,
configurable and cost-efficient data exchange in all procurement procedures;
(d) they consider the particular needs of SMEs; and
(e) they consider the eProcurement ontology as a semantic framework
standardising concept of Union public procurement.
EN 131 EN
3. Where the harmonised standard for procurement procedures or the harmonised
standard for procurement detail, delivered following the request referred to in
paragraph 1, complies with the requirements set out therein, the Commission shall
publish the reference to that harmonised standard in the Official Journal of the
European Union.
Article 130
Common specifications
1. The Commission may adopt implementing acts establishing common specifications
as referred to in Article 88(4), point (a), covering the essential requirements for the
semantic data model of the core elements of the procurement procedures referred to
in Article 129(1), point (a).
Those implementing acts may be adopted where the Commission has requested,
pursuant to Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012, one or more European
standardisation organisations to draft or to revise European standards for those
requirements and:
(a) the request has not been accepted by any of the European standardisation
organisations to which the request was addressed; or
(b) the request has been accepted by at least one of the European standardisation
organisations to which the request was addressed, but the European standards
requested:
(i) are not delivered within the deadline set in the request;
(ii) do not comply with the request; or
(iii) do not satisfy the requirements they aim to cover.
2. Where the references of a harmonised standard are published in the Official Journal
of the European Union, the Commission shall repeal the implementing acts adopted
pursuant to paragraph 1, or the relevant parts thereof, to the extent they cover the
same requirements.
3. When a Member State or the European Parliament considers that a common
specification or parts thereof do not entirely satisfy the requirements which it covers,
it shall inform the Commission thereof by submitting a detailed explanation. The
Commission shall assess that detailed explanation and may, if appropriate, amend the
implementing act establishing the common specification in question.
Chapter 2
eProcurement service providers
Article 131
Obligations of eProcurement service providers
1. eProcurement service providers shall ensure that their eProcurement platforms
comply with the harmonised standards referred to in Article 129, the references of
which have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union, or with the
common specifications adopted pursuant to Article 130.
EN 132 EN
2. eProcurement service providers shall, where relevant, enable the use of the European
Business Wallets established pursuant to Regulation [OP – please add proposal on
the establishment of the European Business Wallets] for the services they provide to
economic operators and public buyers.
3. eProcurement service providers shall ensure that their eProcurement platforms
connect to the interoperability network in accordance with the implementation
arrangements provided in the implementing acts in accordance with Article 128(3).
4. eProcurement service providers shall not be in an exclusion situation pursuant to
Article 25. eProcurement service providers shall be established in the European
Economic Area (EEA), shall be owned and controlled by natural or legal persons that
are established in the EEA and no natural or legal person, established in a third
country shall exercise, directly or indirectly, decisive influence over them.
eProcurement service providers shall store all data related to public procurement
procedures conducted by public buyers pursuant to this Regulation in the EEA.
5. eProcurement service providers shall ensure access to the procurement detail
pursuant to Article 97 and shall not charge any fees for access to any electronic
communication conducted through the interoperability network.
6. eProcurement service providers shall ensure that their eProcurement platform is
compliant with the technical arrangements provided in the implementing act adopted
pursuant to Article 133(5).
7. eProcurement service providers shall connect to an NPPDS established in accordance
with Article 134, unless they provide their services exclusively to economic
operators.
8. Member States shall designate one or more competent authorities responsible for
verifying whether eProcurement service providers comply with the obligations set
out in this Article. They shall provide for penalties applicable to infringement of
those obligations which shall include the temporary prohibition to provide those
eProcurement services. Those penalties shall be effective, proportionate and
dissuasive.
Article 132
Commission eProcurement platform
1. The Commission shall set up and operate an eProcurement platform (‘Commission
eProcurement platform’) and make it available to public buyers, for the purpose of
conducting procurement procedures, and to economic operators, for the purpose of
participating in procurement procedures.
2. The Commission eProcurement platform shall comply with the requirements
applicable for eProcurement service providers set out in Article 131(1) to (6). The
Commission shall make the solution developed for the Commission eProcurement
platform available as open-source software.
3. Member States may require public buyers to use the Commission eProcurement
platform. They shall notify the Commission of that decision at least 12 months in
advance before the date from which public buyers are required to use the
Commission eProcurement platform.
EN 133 EN
Chapter 3
Electronic eligibility
Article 133
Electronic eligibility service
1. The Commission shall set up and operate an electronic eligibility service. The
electronic eligibility service shall provide an electronic verification service for
exclusion grounds, selection criteria and requirement of origin for each procurement
procedure by means of the European Business Wallets established pursuant to
Regulation [OP – please add proposal on the establishment of the European Business
Wallets] or by alternative electronic means which shall be interoperable with the
European Business Wallets.
2. For each procurement procedure, public buyers shall specify the applicable exclusion
grounds, selection criteria and requirements of origin, in the electronic eligibility
service. Economic operators shall create an eligibility profile in the electronic
eligibility service corresponding to the procurement procedure they wish to
participate in. The eligibility profile shall allow public buyers to verify if the
economic operator fulfils the requested requirements through use of the digital
business credential tool.
3. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article
142 to supplement this Regulation, laying down detailed rules of the management the
electronic eligibility service and designating the digital business credential tool and
the related network to be used by economic operators for the purpose of determining
eligibility.
4. When preparing the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 3, the Commission may
select one or more of the following instruments, including any combination thereof,
or any successor thereto:
(a) the European Business Wallets pursuant to [OP: please add Regulation on the
European Business Wallets];
(b) the Once-Only Technical System pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU)
2018/172471;
(c) the European Digital Identity Wallet pursuant to Regulation (EU) No
910/201472;
(d) Member States services where they fulfil the applicable requirements pursuant
to paragraph 5, point (b) to (f), of this Article.
5. The digital business credential tools listed in paragraph 4 of this Article shall fulfil
the following requirements:
71 Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 October 2018
establishing a single digital gateway to provide access to information, to procedures and to assistance
and problem-solving services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p.
1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1724/oj). 72 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on
electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and
repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 73, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj).
EN 134 EN
(a) for instruments set out at Union level, they shall, by 30 June 2028, be
technically implemented in all Member States and be generally available to
economic operators;
(b) they shall be based on existing Union tools and standards;
(c) they shall comply with the requirement for protection of personal data in
accordance with Regulations (EU) 2016/679 and (EU) 2018/1725, and ensure
‘data protection by design’ and by default as laid down in Article 25 of
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Article 27 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 and
provide for appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects
pursuant to Article 10 and Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679;
(d) they shall ensure a secure, easily implementable, flexible, configurable and
cost-efficient data exchange in all procurement procedures;
(e) they shall be adapted to the particular needs of SMEs; and
(f) they shall consider the eProcurement ontology as a semantic framework
standardising the concepts of Union public procurement.
6. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts specifying the technical
arrangements for the electronic eligibility service. Those implementing acts shall
specify in particular the following:
(a) technical set-up and structure of the digital business credential tool network;
(b) technical information on the connection to the digital business credential tool;
(c) data format and structure including configuration and syntax;
(d) semantic repository;
(e) interoperability requirements;
(f) set-up of the algorithmic tool required for the dynamic procedure, including
definition of the algorithm;
(g) scalability and performance;
(h) security and accountability requirements;
(i) data ownership and access management;
(j) technical information on national access points of the digital business
credential tool and the access point of the Commission;
(k) organisational and technical measures for processing personal data;
(l) arrangements to tackle inappropriate or fraudulent use of the digital business
credential tool network;
(m) technical audits;
(n) availability of the digital business credential tool network and data;
(o) obligations of the digital credential business tool network; and
(p) detailed rules on the obligations of the Member States and the Commission
regarding the electronic eligibility service, including handling the exclusion
grounds set out in Articles 25 and 26, and selection criteria set out pursuant to
Article 27.
EN 135 EN
The implementing acts referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall be
adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 143(2).
7. For the purposes of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 the Commission shall be regarded as
the processor as defined in Article 3, point (12), of that Regulation, in relation to the
processing of any personal data that may result from the setting up and management
of the electronic eligibility service.
8. Member States shall inform the Commission within 30 days of the creation of any
new certificates or other forms of documentary evidence to be provided through the
electronic eligibility service.
EN 136 EN
Part VI
Transparency and governance
Title I
Data spaces
Article 134
National Public Procurement Data Spaces
1. Each Member State shall establish or designate a National Public Procurement Data
Space (‘NPPDS’) as the central national data access point for procurement
information related to the public procurement and contract life-cycle and other
related national procurement information covered by this Regulation and shall act as
the Member State’s contact point to the Public Procurement Data Space pursuant to
Article 135.
2. Each Member State shall designate the authority or authorities responsible for the
operation of the NPPDS referred to in paragraph 1 (‘the NPPDS authority’).
The NPPDS shall be established in the EEA, shall be owned and controlled by
natural or legal persons that are established in the EEA and no natural or legal
person, established in a third country, shall exercise, directly or indirectly, decisive
influence over the NPPDS. Procurement information shall be stored within the EEA.
3. The NPPDS authority shall ensure that the following procurement information is
made available through the NPPDS:
(a) procurement information relating to procurement procedures above the
thresholds referred to in Article 2, corresponding to the public summaries
specified in the implementing act adopted pursuant to Article 110;
(b) procurement information relating to procurement procedures below the
thresholds referred to in Article 2, where this procurement information is
provided in the format corresponding to public summaries specified in the
implementing act adopted pursuant to Article 110; and
(c) procurement information relating to public contracts awarded based on the
exclusions pursuant to Articles 80, 81, 83 and 84 in particular information on
the organisations relevant to the contract, the purpose and result of the contract
as well as a justification for the exclusion.
The procurement information referred to in point (a) and (b) shall be made available
through the NPPDS at the same time as it is made available at the Union level or
where it is not made available at the Union level, at the same time as it is made
available at national level. The procurement information referred to in point (c) shall
be made available within 20 days after contract conclusion and contract completion,
respectively.
4. The NPPDS authority shall ensure that procurement information from concluded
contracts and from completed contracts with a value of at least EUR 10 000, where
the preceding procurement would have been covered by this Regulation if its value
had exceeded the relevant threshold laid down in Article 2 is made available through
EN 137 EN
the NPPDS. It shall include information on the organisations relevant to the contract
and the purpose and result of the contract.
The information shall be made available through the NPPDS no later than 20 days
after contract conclusion and contract completion, respectively.
5. The NPPDS authority shall ensure that the following information is made available
through the NPPDS:
(a) information on participants in the procurement procedure, including on the
outcome of their participation;
(b) information on subcontractors and ancillary service providers;
(c) procurement detail, tenders, contracts and handover documents;
(d) information on budget, including information on EU funds;
(e) information on contracts and on individual payments;
(f) information that is relevant for the assessment of the compliance by public
buyers with this Regulation;
(g) information relevant for the assessment of the extent to which public buyers
pursue strategic procurement objectives such as environmental, social or
innovation objectives, and of their contribution to the attainment of those
objectives;
(h) information on the participation of SMEs in public procurement;
(i) information relating to risk factors in public procurement, including corruption,
fraud, collusion, or unfair competition practices;
(j) information on the functioning of national review systems; and
(k) information on the functioning of national procurement markets below and
above the thresholds, including information on national, cross-border and third
country participation including origin of goods and information on beneficial
ownership.
The procurement information shall be made available through the NPPDS as soon as
possible, but not later than 20 days after the occurrence of the respective information
Where the information is related to an ongoing review procedure, it shall be made
available through the NPPDS 20 days from the conclusion of the respective review
procedure.
6. The procurement information shall be considered to be available only once it has
been validated according to the technical validation requirements set up by the
Union. Upon successful validation, the NPPDS shall transmit a validation
confirmation to the entity that made the procurement information available. The
procurement information shall remain available through the NPPDS for at least ten
years from the date it has been made available.
7. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article
141, specifying further categories of procurement information to be made available
to the NPPDS.
8. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts in accordance with
Article 143(2) specifying the procurement information which shall be made available
through the NPPDS as well as its technical format, the designation and modalities of
EN 138 EN
such designation of specific procurement information as publicly or not publicly
available procurement information , the source of the technical validation
requirements according to paragraph 7, as well as establishing the connection of
public summaries and the sequencing of specific information contained in multiple
public summaries, and establishing requirements for public buyers to reuse
information already provided in a public summary as well as requirements for
eProcurement service providers to provide a corresponding reuse service.
Where procurement information is not designated as publicly available, Member
States shall ensure that certain categories of users such as public buyers, competition
authorities, courts of auditors and national Financial Intelligence Units have direct
and comprehensive access rights corresponding to their respective needs and
purposes.
9. Member States shall establish rules ensuring the complete, correct and timely
provision of access to procurement information for the NPPDS in accordance with to
this Regulation, as well as rules providing for data governance that assign clear
responsibilities for the management and use of the available procurement
information, including access for the user categories set out in paragraph 10. Member
States may also establish rules assigning the obligation to provide procurement
information to the NPPDS to specific legal entities, including rules regarding the
provision by or retrieval of procurement information from other national databases.
Member States shall impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive fines in respect
of infringements related to the obligation to provide access to procurement
information. Member States shall communicate these rules to the Commission within
12 months of the adoption of this Regulation.
10. Where a Member State so requests it, the Commission shall provide the Member
States with the source code of the Public Procurement Data Space for purpose of
setting-up the NPPDS.
Article 135
Public Procurement Data Space
1. The Public Procurement Data Space (the ‘PPDS’) established by the Commission
and built on the eProcurement ontology and the Findability, Accessibility,
Interoperability, and Reuse of digital assets (FAIR) principles, shall be a central
repository of procurement information originating from all NPPDS for the
monitoring of public procurement procedures and contracts at Union level.
2. Member States shall provide procurement information available through the NPPDS
to the PPDS within ten days from availability of the procurement information
pursuant to Article 134.
The procurement information shall be considered to be received only once it has
been validated according to the technical validation requirements set up by the
Union. To this end, the NPPDS shall receive a confirmation of the validation. The
procurement information shall remain available to the PPDS at least ten years from
the date it has been made available.
3. The Commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts specifying the
procurement information which shall be provided by the Member States through the
PPDS including its technical format, the minimum publication terms for procurement
EN 139 EN
information not designated as publicly available and the source of the technical
validation requirements according to paragraph 2.
Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure
referred to in Article 143(2).
4. Access to procurement information that is not designated as publicly available shall
be restricted to persons having the necessary access rights granted by the
Commission. Where a Member State requests access rights for a national public
authority to procurement information from another Member State, it shall obtain
access rights only once the other Member State approves the access.
5. The Commission may grant access to the PPDS to Union institutions within the
meaning of Article 2, point (73) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, Executive
Agencies and Union bodies within the meaning of Articles 68, 69 and 70 of that
Regulation, to the European Public Prosecutors Office, to the European Anti-Fraud
Office and to the European Central Bank, corresponding to their respective needs and
purposes.
Article 136
PPDS data exchange
1. The Commission shall establish a data exchange for the management of access to
PPDS and NPPDS procurement information.
2. The Commission shall manage the data exchange and shall ensure that procurement
information is exchanged securely. To this end, the Commission may adopt
implementing acts in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article
143(2) specifying the following implementation arrangements of the data exchange
pursuant to Union law:
(a) technical information on the connection to the data exchange;
(b) data format and structure including configuration and syntax;
(c) semantic repository;
(d) interoperability requirements;
(e) scalability and performance;
(f) security and accountability requirements;
(g) data ownership and access management;
(h) organisational and technical measures for processing personal data;
(i) arrangements to tackle inappropriate or fraudulent use of the data exchange;
(j) availability of the data exchange and data; and
(k) interconnections made via the data exchange, such as to the NPPDS.
EN 140 EN
Title II
Governance
Article 137
Monitoring of the performance of public procurement markets
1. Member States shall monitor and assess the performance of their public procurement
systems, on the basis of the data in their NPPDS. They shall identify potential
shortcomings and possible improvements, thereby supporting the continuous
enhancement of their public procurement system.
Member States shall as a minimum:
(a) assess the barriers to competition and access to procurement opportunities, in
particular for SMEs;
(b) identify and assess the main vulnerabilities and risks affecting the integrity and
efficiency of the public procurement system;
(c) assess the application of security, resilience and European preference
mechanisms, including identifying any indications of circumvention by
economic operators for the latter;
(d) evaluate progress in achieving the strategic procurement objectives, including
environmental, social and innovation considerations;
(e) monitor the performance, adjustments and modifications of large infrastructure
projects and long-running contracts such as concessions.
The results of the assessment referred to in the second subparagraph shall be made
publicly available through appropriate means of information, at least once a year.
Where structural shortcomings have been identified, the measures to address them
shall be underpinned by Member States developing and implementing a
comprehensive, country-specific action plan.
2. Every three years, Member States shall report to the Commission on the results of the
assessment and, where the structural shortcomings are identified, on the measures
taken, planned or envisaged to address those shortcomings, with the first report due
by … [OP please insert the date three years after the entry into force of this
Regulation].
3. The Commission shall monitor and analyse the functioning of public procurement in
the Union, in particular the competition in procurement markets, on the basis of the
data in the Public Procurement Data Space. The Commission shall every three years
provide an analysis of the public procurement system across the Union.
Article 138
National coordinating authority
1. Each Member State shall designate one authority, body or structure as national
coordinating authority for the purposes of this Regulation.
2. The national coordinating authority shall:
EN 141 EN
(a) ensure effective coordination among the national authorities responsible for
carrying out the tasks and exercising the powers provided for under this
Regulation;
(b) facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information between those
authorities;
(c) make available standardised contract documents, guidance or advice for large
infrastructure projects and long-running contracts such as concessions,
including guidance, methodologies or model provisions relating to risk
allocation and financial adjustment mechanisms;
(d) act as the single contact point for the Commission, the competent authorities of
other Member States and, where appropriate, relevant stakeholders in matters
relating to this Regulation.
Member States may provide that modifications of large infrastructure projects and long-
running contracts such as concessions involving an increase in the value exceeding 50 % of
the value of the initial contract shall be subject to a structured and transparent prior review
procedure by the national coordinating authority.
3. The designation of a national coordinating authority pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not
affect the allocation of tasks and powers among competent authorities under national
law.
4. Member States shall notify the Commission of the national coordinating authority
designated pursuant to paragraph 1 and of any subsequent changes thereto.
Article 139
Professionalisation and capacity building
1. Member States shall ensure that the professionalisation of public procurement is a
long-term and strategic element of public governance by taking appropriate
measures, including institutional, organisational, financial and human resources
arrangements.
2. The measures adopted pursuant to this Article shall support the professionalisation of
public buyers throughout the public procurement cycle.
3. In addition, Member States shall promote measures to enhance the ability of
economic operators to effectively participate in public procurement procedures, in
particular SMEs, as well as measures supporting other actors contributing to the
functioning of the public procurement system, such as oversight authorities.
4. Member States shall adopt, implement and periodically update a national strategy for
the professionalisation of public procurement. The strategy shall include at least the
objectives, measures and appropriate monitoring arrangements for the development
of the skills and competencies of public buyers at national, regional and local level.
5. Member States shall review and update the strategy in light of paragraph 6.
6. Member States shall ensure that appropriate support structures are available to public
buyers throughout the public procurement cycle, at national, regional and local level,
with particular attention to public buyers with limited administrative capacity.
EN 142 EN
These support structures shall provide to public buyers guidance, advice, assistance
and other capacity-building measures, in particular in relation to:
(a) procurement planning and needs assessment;
(b) market engagement and dialogue with economic operators;
(c) risk assessment and risk management;
(d) integrity, transparency and the prevention of conflicts of interest, fraud and
corruption;
(e) the preparation and conduct of procurement procedures;
(f) sustainable, innovation and strategic procurement;
(g) contract management and performance monitoring;
(h) collection and dissemination of good practices;
(i) digitalisation and use of electronic procurement systems and data;
(j) supply chain management and resilience.
7. The support structures may also provide guidance, advice, assistance and other
capacity-building measures to economic operators, in particular SMEs, with a view
to facilitating their access to public procurement, as well as to other actors
contributing to the functioning of the public procurement system.
8. The Commission shall assist Member States in their efforts to strengthen the
professionalisation of public procurement, including by promoting cooperation
between national support structures, the exchange of knowledge and good practices,
peer learning, the use of capacity-building tools and, where appropriate, the
development of additional measures.
9. Member States shall monitor and assess the implementation and effectiveness of the
measures adopted pursuant to this Article, including their impact on the performance
of the public procurement system, and shall report as part of the reporting referred to
in Article 137(2).
Article 140
Integrity governance
1. Public buyers shall take appropriate, proportionate, and effective measures to combat
fraud, favouritism, collusion, and corruption, and to effectively prevent, identify, and
remedy conflicts of interest arising in the conduct of procurement procedures and in
the execution of public contracts. Those measures shall be designed to avoid any
distortion of competition, to ensure the transparency of the procedure, and to
guarantee the equal treatment of all economic operators originating from the Union
and covered economic operators in accordance with Article 70(1) participating in the
procurement procedure.
2. To support the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, public buyers shall
use, before award and where relevant during contract execution, appropriate data-
based risks analysis tools, such as Arachne+ or an equivalent tool made available at
national level, to prevent and detect irregularities, fraud, collusion, corruption and
conflict of interest. Member States shall ensure that the tools referred to in the first
EN 143 EN
sentence are effectively accessible to public buyers and, where appropriate,
interoperable with the National Public Procurement Data Spaces referred to in
Article 134.
3. Where the use of the tools referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article identifies a high-
risk pattern, including indications of collusion, conflicts of interest or other integrity
risks, the public buyer shall record in the individual documentation pursuant to
Article 109 appropriate measures taken to remedy the situation or explain why no
such measures were considered necessary.
Where, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, a public buyer identifies a
high risk of irregularities, all procurement personnel involved in the preparation,
evaluation, or award of the public contract shall be required to complete and submit
an electronic integrity declaration. The public buyer shall take appropriate measures
to remedy any irregularities that it has identified and recorded in the individual
documentation pursuant to Article 109 the follow-up carried out.
EN 144 EN
Part VII
Final provisions
Title I
Exercise of delegation and other cross-cutting provisions
Article 141
Exercise of delegation
1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the
conditions laid down in this Article.
2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 2(2), 7(5), 54(2) and (4),
65(4), 66(6), 69(4), 72(1), 75, 110(6), 128(2), 133(3) and 134(7) shall be conferred
on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from … [OP please insert
date of entry into force of this Regulation].
3. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 2(2), 7(5), 54(2) and (4), 65(4), 66(6),
69(4), 72(1), 75, 110(6), 128(2), 133(3) and 134(7) may be revoked at any time by
the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to
the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day
following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European
Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any
delegated acts already in force.
4. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to
the European Parliament and to the Council.
5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 2(2), 7(5), 54(2) and (4), 65(4), 66(6),
69(4), 72(1), 75, 110(6), 128(2), 133(3) and 134(7) shall enter into force only where
no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council
within a period of two months of notification of the act to the European Parliament
and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and
the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That
period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament
or of the Council.
Article 142
Urgency procedure
1. Delegated acts adopted under this Article shall enter into force without delay and
shall apply as long as no objection is expressed in accordance with paragraph 2. The
notification of a delegated act to the European Parliament and to the Council shall
state the reasons for the use of the urgency procedure.
2. Either the European Parliament or the Council may object to a delegated act in
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 141(5). In such case, the
Commission shall repeal the act without delay following the notification of the
decision to object by the European Parliament or by the Council.
EN 145 EN
Article 143
Committee procedure
1. The Commission shall be assisted by the Advisory Committee on Public Contracts
established by Council Decision 71/306/EEC. That committee shall be a committee
within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No
182/2011 shall apply.
3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No
182/2011 shall apply.
Article 144
Outermost regions
Where the specific needs of the public procurement markets of the outermost regions of the
Union within the meaning of Article 349 of the Treaty cannot be met without the adaptation
of certain procedures laid down in this Regulation, Member States may adapt the application
of specific aspects of Part III of this Regulation in line with the Union’s international
obligations and without affecting the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and
transparency. Member States shall notify to the Commission and to the other Member States
the national laws, regulations and administrative provisions providing for such adaptations as
well as their detailed justification. The adaptations concerned shall not apply before three
months after that notification. The Commission shall publish the adaptations in the Official
Journal of the European Union without delay.
Article 145
Procurement with Union support
In addition to any rules set out in this Regulation, for the award and execution of contracts
supported by a Union programme or instrument, public buyers shall apply any conditions
necessary to comply with the requirements for Union support in all management modes
established in Article 62 of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) 2024/2509.
Title II
Amendments, repeals, transitional provisions, entry into force
and application
Article 146
Repeal
1. Directive 2014/23/EU, Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU are
repealed.
EN 146 EN
2. References to the repealed Directives shall be construed as references to this
Regulation and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex VIII,
Part A.
Article 147
Amendments to horizontal public procurement provisions
(1) Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 is amended as follows:
(a) Article 65 is deleted;
(b) in Article 74(3), point (b) is deleted.
References to Article 65 and Article 74(3), point (b), of Regulation 2024/1781 shall
be construed as references to Article 54 and Article 26(1), point (a) of this
Regulation, respectively;
(2) Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 is amended as follows:
(a) paragraphs 4 and 5 are deleted;
(b) the following paragraph is added:
“This Article does not apply to public procurement procedures for net-zero
technologies that are used in a project awarded in an auction pursuant to
Article 26.”.
References to Article 25(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 shall be construed
as references to Article 54 of this Regulation;
(3) Article 85 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 is deleted.
References to Article 85 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 shall be construed as
references to Article 54 of this Regulation;
(4) Article 83 of Regulation (EU) 2024/3110 is deleted.
References to Article 83 of Regulation (EU) 2024/3110 shall be construed as
references to Article 54 of this Regulation;
(5) Article 63 of Regulation (EU) 2025/40 is deleted.
References to Article 63 of Regulation (EU) 2025/40 shall be construed as references
to Article 54 of this Regulation;
(6) Directive 2023/1791 is amended as follows:
(a) Article 7 is deleted;
(b) Annex IV is deleted.
References to Article 7 and Annex IV of Directive 2023/1791 shall be construed as
references to Article 52 of this Regulation;
(7) in Article 11(1) of Directive 2008/98/EC the words ‘procurement criteria’ are
deleted;
(8) in Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1252, point (d) is replaced by the
following:
EN 147 EN
“(d) increase the use of secondary critical raw materials, including through
measures such as taking recycled content into account in financial incentives
for the use of secondary critical raw materials;”
References to Article 26(1), point (d) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 shall be
construed as references to Article 51 of this Regulation, as far as they concern award
criteria related to public procurement;
(9) in Article 24 of Directive 2019/882, paragraph 1 is deleted.
References to Article 24(1) of Directive 2019/882 shall be construed as references to
Article 56 of this Regulation;
(10) in Article 8 of Directive 2022/2381, paragraph 3 is deleted.
References to Article 8(3) of Directive 2022/2381 shall be construed as references to
Article 4(4) of this Regulation;
(11) Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 is deleted.
References to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 shall be construed as
references to Article 68 of this Regulation;
(12) Article 31 of Directive (EU) 2024/1760 is deleted.
References to Article 31 of Directive (EU) 2024/1760 shall be construed as
references to Article 55 of this Regulation;
(13) in Article 63(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1157, point (c) is deleted.
References to Article 63(3), point (c) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1157 shall be
construed as references to Article 26(1), point (a) of this Regulation;
(14) in Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) 1370/2007 the following subparagraph is added:
“Public service contracts pursuant to this Regulation shall be subject to the
provisions on “Security and Resilience” and “European preference”, laid down
in Part III, Title II, Chapter 4 and 5 of … [OP please adapt with the number of
this Regulation]”.
Article 148
Review
1. Every seven years after … [OP please insert the date of entry into force of this
Regulation], the Commission shall carry out an evaluation of this Regulation.
2. The Commission shall present a report on the main findings of the evaluation carried
out in accordance with paragraph 1 to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
Member States shall provide the Commission with the necessary information for the
preparation of the report.
Article 149
Entry into force and application
EN 148 EN
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in
the Official Journal of the European Union.
It shall apply from … [OP please insert date two years following the entry into force of this
Regulation].
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels,
For the European Parliament For the Council
The President The President
[...] [...]
EN 149 EN
LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL STATEMENT
1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on public contracts and
concessions, repealing Directive 2014/23/EU, Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive
2014/25/EU, and amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1157, Regulation (EU)
2024/1781, Regulation (EU) 2024/3110, Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, Regulation
(EU) 2025/40, Directive (EU) 2023/1791, Directive (EU) 2024/1760, Directive
2008/98/EC, Regulation (EU) 2024/1252, Directive (EU) 2019/882, Directive (EU)
2022/2381, Regulation (EU) 2024/1735, and Regulation (EU) 2024/2847.
1.2. Policy area(s) concerned
Public Procurement; Internal Market; Communications Networks, Content and
Technology
1.3. Objective(s)
1.3.1. General objective(s)
The general objectives are to make public procurement a more efficient public
investment instrument, supporting policy objectives, in particular single market
integration, strategic economic autonomy, social and ecological sustainability and
innovation. The general objectives contribute to the achievement of SDG goals, in
particular #9 Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure, #12 Responsible consumption
and production and #8 Decent work and economic growth.
1.3.2. Specific objective(s)
Four specific objectives have been derived from the general objectives, providing
practical detail on how the latter will be achieved.
Specific objective No 1:
Simplify and promote flexibility in procurement procedures and increase legal clarity
and coherence of applicable rules, so as to facilitate public procurement processes
and access to them for economic operators across the single market, including for
SMEs.
Specific objective No 2:
Increase the uptake of environmental, social and innovation public procurement in
support of strategic policy objectives of the Union and provide a more coherent legal
framework in this regard.
Specific objective No 3:
Improve EU economic security and strategic autonomy in public procurement,
promoting a coherent legal framework in this regard.
Specific objective No 4:
Facilitate access to public procurement information, data and IT solutions so as to
reduce administrative burden and increase transparency and monitoring, thereby
preventing and reducing irregular practices and enabling policy-making choices.
EN 150 EN
1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact
Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the
beneficiaries/groups targeted.
This Regulation is expected to bring several positive outcomes for the three main
stakeholders related to public procurement, namely policymakers, public buyers and
economic operators. The main expected results are an easier access to negotiations,
the increase level of competition, and the reduction of administrative burden.
1.3.4. Indicators of performance
Specify the indicators for monitoring progress and achievements.
Monitoring and
evaluation aspect
and relevant
objectives
Indicator(s) Responsibility for
collection Source(s)
Specific Objective 1: Simplify, increase flexibility and coherence of public
procurement rules and procedures
Has the public
procurement
framework become
more simple,
flexible and
coherent?
Length of
procedures in days
counting from the
moment of
publication of the
contract notice
until the award;
Length of
procedures in days
counting from the
moment of
publication of the
contract notice
until the signature
of the contract;
Cancellation rate;
Share of
procedures using
negotiations
European
Commission
Single Market and
Competitiveness
Scoreboard;
PPDS;
New IT tools and
systems foreseen
Specific Objective 2: Increase the uptake of environmental, social and
innovation public procurement
Has the number of
procedures that
Share of
procedures (value
European
Commission Single Market and
Competitiveness
EN 151 EN
Monitoring and
evaluation aspect
and relevant
objectives
Indicator(s) Responsibility for
collection Source(s)
include
environmental,
social and
innovation
elements
increased?
and count) that
include
environmental,
social and
innovation
procurement/share
of BPQR
procedures;
Share of
environmental
procurement using
EU Ecolabel
Scoreboard;
PPDS;
New IT tools and
systems foreseen
Specific Objective 3: Improve EU economic security and strategic autonomy in
public procurement
Has the EU
economic security
and strategic
autonomy in public
procurement
improved?
Share of
participation of
third country
operators (direct +
indirect);
Share of EU origin
of goods procured
in selected sectors
(understood as in
the UCC)
European
Commission
Single Market and
Competitiveness
Scoreboard;
PPDS;
New IT tools and
systems foreseen
Specific Objective 4: Facilitate access to public procurement information, data
and IT tools
Has access to
information on
public procurement
improved?
Transparency rate
(eg. % of GDP
published in
TED/MPL);
Accessibility and
searchability of
databases;
Data quality (e.g.
European
Commission
Single Market and
Competitiveness
Scoreboard;
PPDS;
New IT tools and
systems foreseen
EN 152 EN
Monitoring and
evaluation aspect
and relevant
objectives
Indicator(s) Responsibility for
collection Source(s)
completeness of
data provided);
Data integration
with other
databases (e.g.
company register,
tax register)
General Objectives
For public
buyers:
Facilitate public
procurement
processes and the
implementation of
strategic
objectives,
improve legal
certainty
Share of
procedures (value
and count) that
include
environmental,
social and
innovation
procurement;
Number of first
instance public
procurement
review decisions in
relation to number
of call for
competitions
European
Commission
Single Market and
Competitiveness
Scoreboard;
PPDS;
New IT tools and
systems foreseen
For economic
operators
Facilitate access to
public procurement
(also cross-border)
for EU businesses,
including SMEs
Number of tenders
per procedure;
Number of
contracts awarded
to an economic
operator in a
different MS;
Number of
contracts including
a subcontractor
from a different
MS;
European
Commission
Single Market and
Competitiveness
Scoreboard;
PPDS;
New IT tools and
systems foreseen
EN 153 EN
Monitoring and
evaluation aspect
and relevant
objectives
Indicator(s) Responsibility for
collection Source(s)
Number of
contracts awarded
to SMEs
Horizontal
Reduce
administrative
burden, increase
transparency,
facilitate the
monitoring to
avoid irregularities
and enable policy
choices
Cost per procedure
(for public buyers);
Cost per procedure
(for economic
operators);
Length of
procedure from
planning until the
award of the
contract;
Number of
economic operators
using the digital
tools;
Number of public
buyers using the
digital tools;
Cancellation rate;
Share of
procedures using
negotiation
European
Commission
Single Market and
Competitiveness
Scoreboard;
PPDS;
New IT tools and
systems foreseen
1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to:
☑ a new action
☐ a new action following a pilot project/preparatory action1
☐ the extension of an existing action
☐ a merger or redirection of one or more actions towards another/a new action
1 As referred to in Article 58(2), point (a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation.
EN 154 EN
1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative
1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for
roll-out of the implementation of the initiative
This Regulation aims to simplify the whole public procurement market. This
includes the public procurement digital ecosystem. It requires eProcurement service
providers to ensure interoperability in their services in accordance with the upcoming
standards. Additionally, it will mandate that Member States integrate and connect
their digital business credential tool to the electronic eligibility service and their
respective national registries. This will enable economic operators to fully utilise the
digital business credential tool. Member States will also be required to establish and
connect their National Public Procurement Data Spaces to the PPDS data exchange.
1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g.
coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For
the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting
from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise
created by Member States alone.
Reasons for action at EU level (ex-ante)
While significant efforts have been made in the last 50 years, a single market for
public procurement is not yet achieved. Fragmentation persists in the form of
divergent policy approaches across initiatives, gold-plating at Member State level,
and the use of different digital tools and platforms. These issues make the current EU
public procurement framework an area of perceived administrative burden and
bureaucracy, instead of an instrument for sustainable economic growth. To leverage
public procurement as a driver for competitiveness and efficient and effective public
investment, also supporting EU policy objectives, EU action is needed. Simplifying
the EU public procurement framework and implementing strategic objectives is only
possible through EU action that ensures a consistent change across Member State.
Absence of EU action would perpetuate the inefficiencies in the system and prevent
public buyers from meeting their needs faster and strategically, and economic
operators from accessing procurement contracts across the single market. A coherent
legal framework for public procurement can only be achieved at EU level. In
addition, in absence of EU action, the EU public procurement legislation will
continue to underperform in key strategic aspects, such as advancing on
sustainability, fostering resilient supply chains or ensuring the strategic autonomy of
the EU. Likewise, joint investment in strategic sectors would be limited, while
coordinated action will enable leveraging demand better. Finally, the lack of EU
actions also creates a missed opportunity, as the legislation becomes outdated in light
of current developments (e.g. accelerating digital change and hyper connectivity) and
evolving threats. (e.g. changing security paradigms).
Expected generated EU added value (ex-post)
The proposal aims at amending EU legislation, directly touching upon the EU-wide
procurement market. The same could not be accomplished at Member State level, in
particular considering the need for ensuring a harmonised approach across Member
States, such an approach being of critical importance for effective simplification.
There is a strong value added of EU-level action because the problems that this
proposal tackles are not limited to the territory of a single Member State. Only EU
action can regulate the access of third country bidders and goods to the EU
EN 155 EN
procurement market, as this is an exclusive competence of the EU. Similarly, insofar
as the commitments of the EU under the GPA remain, Member States may not
introduce procedural simplification beyond the level that is set at EU level because
the public procurement thresholds and procedures are governed by EU rules
implementing the procedural commitments under the GPA.
1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past
Previous reforms have shown that digital tools like eProcurement can streamline
processes, but these need to be standardised across all member states to avoid
fragmentation. The new rules should establish clear core requirements while
allowing flexibility in how they are implemented.
Experience has demonstrated that simplified procedures and digital pre-qualification
systems help small and medium-sized businesses participate more effectively in
public procurement. Automated data collection has proven valuable for improving
transparency and enabling better monitoring of procurement processes.
Finally, past reforms have shown that successful implementation requires early
engagement with all stakeholders and providing clear guidance throughout the
process.
1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with
other appropriate instruments
The revision of the Public Procurement Directives supports the EU’s simplification
and competitiveness goals by enabling economic operators with digital tools and
harmonised processes, enabling trusted, secure, and user-friendly compliance with
administrative requirements. This includes streamlined identification, authentication,
and data exchange, ensuring seamless interactions between businesses and public
authorities. Hence, it is fully in line with the objectives of the MFF 2028-2034.
The inclusion of the Commission and Member States in implementing this
Regulation will have financial implications, which could be predominantly covered
by the EU budget under the MFF 2028-2034, depending on the outcome of the
ongoing negotiations on the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF. These costs
are mainly associated with:
1. The digital transformation of procurement processes, including the development
and deployment of eProcurement platforms.
2. The integration of existing IT systems with new digital tools to ensure
interoperability.
3. The establishment of supervisory and monitoring mechanisms to ensure
compliance with the revised Regulation.
1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for
redeployment
The staff needs in the amount of 17 additional FTEs (8 ADs for DG GROW, 4 ADs
for Publications Office, and 5 ENDs for DG GROW) will partly be met by
redeploying existing allocations of the DG. Nevertheless, despite the considerable
efforts made by the Commission to redeploy its human resources in the past year, to
ensure successful delivery and proper implementation of this proposal, an additional
reinforcement of Commission staffing will be required to meet the full need.
With regard to financing, the needs will strictly be met through redeployment.
EN 156 EN
The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for
illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial
Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the
post-2027 period remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on
the MFF 2028-2034 and thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary
procedure. All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.
1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact
☐ limited duration
☐ in effect from [DD.MM]YYYY to [DD.MM]YYYY
☐ financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations
and from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.
☑ unlimited duration
Implementation with a start-up period from 2028 to 2030,
followed by full-scale operation.
1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned(2)2
☑ Direct management by the Commission
☑ by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;
☐ by the executive agencies
☐ Shared management with the Member States
☐ Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to:
☐ third countries or the bodies they have designated;
☐ international organisations and their agencies (to be specified);
☐ the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund;
☐ bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation;
☐ public law bodies;
☐ bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the
extent that they are provided with adequate financial guarantees;
☐ bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted
with the implementation of a public-private partnership and that are
provided with adequate financial guarantees;
☐ bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in
the common foreign and security policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty
on European Union, and identified in the relevant basic act
☐ bodies established in a Member State, governed by the private law of a
Member State or Union law and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance
2 Details of budget implementation methods and references to the Financial Regulation may be found on
the BUDGpedia site: https://myintracomm.ec.europa.eu/corp/budget/financial-rules/budget-
implementation/Pages/implementation-methods.aspx.
EN 157 EN
with sector-specific rules, with the implementation of Union funds or
budgetary guarantees, to the extent that such bodies are controlled by
public law bodies or by bodies governed by private law with a public
service mission, and are provided with adequate financial guarantees in
the form of joint and several liability by the controlling bodies or
equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for each action,
limited to the maximum amount of the Union support.
Comments
2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES
2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules
Every seven years after the entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall
carry out an evaluation of this Regulation.
The Commission shall present a report on the main findings of the evaluation carried
out in accordance with paragraph 1 to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
Member States shall provide the Commission with the necessary information for the
preparation of the report.
2.2. Management and control system(s)
2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation
mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed
The revised Public Procurement Regulation introduce harmonised digital tools and
processes to streamline administrative requirements, ensuring trusted, secure, and
user-friendly compliance. These new rules necessitate the development of technical
specifications, standards, and interoperability frameworks, as well as supervision and
coordination among EU institutions, and Member States.
To effectively implement these measures, the Commission’s services must be
adequately resourced, including:
1. Technical and operational support for digital infrastructure (e.g., eProcurement
platforms, integration with the digital business credential tool).
2. Coordination with Member States to ensure consistent application of the new
legislation.
The implementation of the provisions of the new Regulation is estimated to require
17 Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) within the Commission, ensuring sufficient
capacity for supervision, monitoring, and policy implementation.
2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up
to mitigate them
Risks of delays in implementation on Commission or Member States side, leading to
non-compliance or fragmented application. Regular engagement with Member States
and businesses to identify risks early and align control systems with stakeholder
needs.
EN 158 EN
2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between
the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the
expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure)
The internal control systems in place are effective.
2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities
The existing fraud prevention measures applicable to the Commission will cover the
additional appropriations necessary for this Regulation.
EN 159 EN
3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected
Existing budget lines
In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.
Heading
of
multiannu
al
financial
framework
Budget
line
Type of
expenditur
e
Contribution
Number Diff./Non-
diff. (3)1
from
EFTA
countries
(4)2
from
candidate
countries
and
potential
candidates
(5)3
from other
third
countries
other
assigned
revenue
2
04.02.03 -
Digital
Leadership
Diff. YES(6)4 YES(7)5 NO NO
2 XX.XX.X
X.XX(8)6 Diff. YES YES NO NO
1 Diff. = Differentiated appropriations / Non-diff. = Non-differentiated appropriations. 2 EFTA: European Free Trade Association. 3 Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential candidates from the Western Balkans. 4 Not yet determined. It is the intention of the Commission to have EFTA countries participating. 5 Not yet determined. It is the intention of the Commission to have candidate countries and/or potential candidate countries participating.
EN 160 EN
New budget lines requested
In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.
3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations
3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations
☐ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations
☑ The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below:
3.2.2. Appropriations from voted budget
EUR million (to three decimal places)
The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next
Multiannual Financial Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period remain subject to
the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary
procedure. All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.
This initiative will be financed by redeployment within the operational programmes of the next MFF, and partially by administrative
expenditure. Redeployment financing operational lines will come from operational lines, and redeployment financing administrative lines will
come from administrative lines. At this stage, it is not possible to indicate accurately the contribution from each MFF heading and programme,
while it is expected that a significant contribution will come from programmes under heading 2 of the 2028-2034 MFF (e.g. the European
Competitiveness Fund).
The difference in costs presented in the legislative financial statement and in the impact assessment arises because the legislative financial
statement includes all costs, whereas the impact assessment accounts only for the additional costs introduced by the policy measures on top of
the so-called business-as-usual costs. There are also slight differences in cost classification and presentation stemming from the requirements of
the financial regulation.
6 The details of the budget line cannot be provided at this stage because the nomenclature for the next MFF is still under discussion. However, this line will be the OP
prerogative.
EN 161 EN
Heading of multiannual financial framework Number 2
DG: GROW(9)7 Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL MFF
2028-2034
Operational appropriations
04.02.03 - Digital
Leadership
Commitments (1a) 9.908 10.10
6
10.30
8
10.51
4
10.72
5
10.93
9
11.15
8 73.659
Payments (2a) 2.428 6.476 8.904 12.95
1
12.95
1
14.97
5
14.97
5 73.659
Appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope of specific programmes (10)8
Budget line (3) 0.000
TOTAL appropriations
for DG GROW
Commitments =1a+
1b+3 9.908
10.10
6
10.30
8
10.51
4
10.72
5
10.93
9
11.15
8 73.659
Payments =2a+
2b+3 2.428 6.476 8.904
12.95
1
12.95
1
14.97
5
14.97
5 73.659
DG: Publications Office Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL MFF
2028-2034
7 DG GROW will collaborate with other DGs and Commission services, such as DIGIT, on the implementation of the PPDE. 8 Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former 'BA' lines), indirect research,
direct research.
EN 162 EN
Operational appropriations
XX.XX.XX.XX(11)9
Commitments (1b) 9.208 9.392 9.580 9.772 9.967 10.16
7
10.37
0 68.456
Payments (2b) 2.257 6.018 8.275 12.03
6
12.03
6
13.91
7
13.91
7 68.456
Appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope of specific programmes (12)10
Budget line (3) 0.000
TOTAL appropriations
for Publications Office
Commitments =1a+
ab+3 9.208 9.392 9.580 9.772 9.967
10.16
7
10.37
0 68.456
Payments =2a+
2b+3 2.257 6.018 8.275
12.03
6
12.03
6
13.91
7
13.91
7 68.456
Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL MFF
2028-2034
TOTAL operational
appropriations
Commitments (4) 19.11
6
19.49
9
19.88
8
20.28
6
20.69
2
21.10
6
21.52
8 142.115
Payments (5) 4.685 12.49 17.17 24.98 24.98 28.89 28.89 142.115
9 The details of the budget line cannot be provided at this stage because the nomenclature for the next MFF is still under discussion. However, this line will be the OP
prerogative. 10 Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former 'BA' lines), indirect research,
direct research.
EN 163 EN
4 9 7 7 2 2
TOTAL appropriations of an
administrative nature financed from the
envelope for specific programmes
(6) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOTAL appropriations
under HEADING 2
of the multiannual
financial framework
Commitments =4+6 19.11
6
19.49
9
19.88
8
20.28
6
20.69
2
21.10
6
21.52
8 142.115
Payments =5+6 4.685 12.49
4
17.17
9
24.98
7
24.98
7
28.89
2
28.89
2 142.115
Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTA
L MFF
2028-
2034
TOTAL operational
appropriations (all
operational headings)
Commitments (4) 19.11
6
19.49
9
19.88
8
20.28
6
20.69
2
21.10
6
21.52
8
142.11
5
Payments (5) 4.685 12.49
4
17.17
9
24.98
7
24.98
7
28.89
2
28.89
2
142.11
5
TOTAL appropriations of an
administrative nature financed from the
envelope for specific programmes (all
operational headings)
(6) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOTAL appropriations
Under Heading 1 to 3 Commitments =4+6
19.11
6
19.49
9
19.88
8
20.28
6
20.69
2
21.10
6
21.52
8
142.11
5
EN 164 EN
of the multiannual
financial framework
(Reference amount) Payments =5+6 4.685
12.49
4
17.17
9
24.98
7
24.98
7
28.89
2
28.89
2
142.11
5
Heading of multiannual financial framework 4 ‘Administrative expenditure’ (13)11
DG: GROW(14)12 Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTA
L MFF
2028-
2034
Human resources 2.092 2.134 2.177 2.220 2.264 2.310 2.356 15.553
Other administrative expenditure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOTAL DG GROW Appropriations 2.092 2.134 2.177 2.220 2.264 2.310 2.356 15.553
DG: Publications Office Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTA
L MFF
2028-
2034
Human resources 0.776 0.792 0.807 0.823 0.840 0.857 0.874 5.769
Other administrative expenditure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOTAL Publications Appropriations 0.776 0.792 0.807 0.823 0.840 0.857 0.874 5.769
11 The necessary appropriations should be determined using the annual average cost figures available on the appropriate BUDGpedia webpage. 12 DG GROW will collaborate with other DGs and Commission services, such as DIGIT, on the implementation of the PPDE.
EN 165 EN
Office
TOTAL appropriations under
HEADING 4 of the multiannual
financial framework
(Total
commitme
nts = Total
payments)
2.868 2.925 2.984 3.044 3.104 3.167 3.230 21.322
EUR million (to three decimal places)
Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL
MFF
2028-
2034
TOTAL appropriations under
HEADINGS 1 to 4
of the multiannual financial
framework
Commitments 21.984 22.424 22.872 23.330 23.796 24.272 24.758 163.437
Payments 7.553 15.419 20.163 28.031 28.092 32.058 32.121 163.437
3.2.3. Estimated output funded from operational appropriations (not to be completed for decentralised agencies)
Commitment appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places)
Indi
cate
obje
ctive
Year
2024
Year
2025
Year
2026
Year
2027
Enter as many years as necessary to show
the duration of the impact (see Section 1.6) TOTAL
OUTPUTS
EN 166 EN
s
and
outp
uts
⇓
Type
(15) 13
Aver
age
cost
No Cost No Cost No Cost No Cost No Cost No Cost No Cost Total
No
Total
Cost
SPECIFIC
OBJECTIVE No 1
(16)14: [...]
-
Outp
ut
-
Outp
ut
-
Outp
ut
Subtotal for specific
objective No 1
SPECIFIC
OBJECTIVE No 2
13 Outputs are products and services to be supplied (e.g.: number of student exchanges financed, number of km of roads built, etc.). 14 As described in point 1.4.2. 'Specific objective(s)...'
EN 167 EN
...
-
Outp
ut
Subtotal for specific
objective No 2
TOTALS
3.2.4. Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations
☐ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an administrative nature
☑ The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative nature, as explained below:
3.2.5. Appropriations from voted budget
VOTED APPROPRIATIONS Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL
MFF
2028-2034
HEADING 4
Human resources 2.868 2.925 2.984 3.044 3.104 3.167 3.230 21.322
Other administrative expenditure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Subtotal HEADING 4 2.868 2.925 2.984 3.044 3.104 3.167 3.230 21.322
Outside HEADING 4
EN 168 EN
Human resources 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other expenditure of an administrative
nature 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Subtotal outside HEADING 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOTAL 2.868 2.925 2.984 3.044 3.104 3.167 3.230 21.322
3.2.5.1. Total appropriations
TOTAL
VOTED
APPROPRIATIONS
+
EXTERNAL ASSIGNED
REVENUES
Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTA
L MFF
2028-
2034
HEADING 4
Human resources 2.868 2.925 2.984 3.044 3.104 3.167 3.230 21.322
Other administrative
expenditure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Subtotal HEADING 4 2.868 2.925 2.984 3.044 3.104 3.167 3.230 21.322
Outside HEADING 4
EN 169 EN
Human resources 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other expenditure of an
administrative nature 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Subtotal outside HEADING
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOTAL 2.868 2.925 2.984 3.044 3.104 3.167 3.230 21.322
The staff needs will partly be met by redeploying existing allocations of the Commission services. Nevertheless, despite the
considerable efforts made by the Commission to redeploy its human resources in the past year, to ensure successful delivery and proper
implementation of this proposal, an additional reinforcement of Commission staffing will be required to meet the full need.
The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the
next Multiannual Financial Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period
remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and thereafter shall be determined through the
annual budgetary procedure. All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.
3.2.6. Estimated requirements of human resources
☐ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources
☑ The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained below
3.2.6.1. Financed from voted budget
Estimate to be expressed in full-time equivalent units (FTEs) (17)15
15 Please specify below the table how many FTEs within the number indicated are already assigned to the management of the action and/or can be redeployed within
your DG and what are your net needs.
EN 170 EN
VOTED
APPROPRIATIO
NS
Ye
ar
20
28
Ye
ar
20
29
Ye
ar
20
30
Ye
ar
20
31
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
Establishment plan posts (officials and
temporary staff)
20 01 02 01
(Headquarters and
Commission's
Representation
Offices)
12 12 12 12 12 12 12
20 01 02 03 (EU
Delegations) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 01 01 01
(Indirect research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 01 01 11 (Direct
research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines
(specify) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
External staff (in FTEs)
20 02 01 (AC, END
from the 'global 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
EN 171 EN
envelope')
20 02 03 (AC, AL,
END and JPD in
the EU
Delegations)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ad
min.
supp
ort
line
[XX
.01.
YY.
YY]
at
Headquarter
s
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in EU
Delegations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 01 01 02 (AC,
END - Indirect
research)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 01 01 12 (AC,
END - Direct
research)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines
(specify) - Heading
4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EN 172 EN
Other budget lines
(specify) - Outside
Heading 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
3.2.6.2. Total requirements of human resources
TOTAL
VOTED
APPROPRIATIO
NS
+
EXTERNAL
ASSIGNED
REVENUES
Ye
ar
202
8
Ye
ar
202
9
Ye
ar
203
0
Ye
ar
203
1
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
Establishment plan posts (officials and
temporary staff)
20 01 02 01
(Headquarters and
Commission's
Representation
Offices)
12 12 12 12 12 12 12
20 01 02 03 (EU
Delegations) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EN 173 EN
01 01 01 01
(Indirect research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 01 01 11 (Direct
research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines
(specify) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
External staff (in full time equivalent
units)
20 02 01 (AC,
END from the
global envelope)
5 5 5 5 5 5 5
20 02 03 (AC, AL,
END and JPD in
the EU
Delegations)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ad
min.
sup
port
line
[XX
.01.
YY.
at
Headquarter
s
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
in EU
Delegations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EN 174 EN
YY]
01 01 01 02 (AC,
END - Indirect
research)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 01 01 12 (AC,
END - Direct
research)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines
(specify) - Heading
4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines
(specify) - Outside
Heading 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
The staff required to implement the proposal (in FTEs):
To be covered by
current staff
available in the
Commission
services
Exceptional additional staff*
To be financed
under Heading
To be financed
from BA line
To be financed
from fees
EN 175 EN
4 or Research
Establishment
plan posts 3 9 N/A
External staff
(CA, SNEs,
INT)
2 3
Description of tasks to be carried out by:
Officials and temporary staff
The tasks to be carried out by the officials and temporary staff pertain
the legal workstream, the technical workstream, the coordination and
the supervisory role.
DG GROW will be responsible for the development and the
management of the overall project. DG will collaborate with other DGs
and Commission services, such as DIGIT, on the implementation of the
PPDE.
The Publications Office will be responsible to scale-up their current
applications, evolve standards and the eProcurement Ontology, and
integrate with the interoperability network and PPDS data exchange.
External staff
The tasks to be carried out by the officials and temporary staff pertain
the legal workstream, the technical workstream, the coordination and
the supervisory role.
3.2.7. Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments
Compulsory: the best estimate of the digital technology-related investments entailed by the proposal/initiative should be included in the
table below.
EN 176 EN
Exceptionally, when required for the implementation of the proposal/initiative, the appropriations under Heading 7 should be presented
in the designated line.
The appropriations under Headings 1-6 should be reflected as "Policy IT expenditure on operational programmes". This expenditure
refers to the operational budget to be used to re-use/ buy/ develop IT platforms/ tools directly linked to the implementation of the
initiative and their associated investments (e.g. licences, studies, data storage etc). The information provided in this table should be
consistent with details presented under Section 4 "Digital dimensions".
TOTAL Digital and IT
appropriations
Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL
MFF
2028-2034
HEADING 4
IT expenditure (corporate) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Subtotal HEADING 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Outside HEADING 4
Policy IT expenditure on
operational programmes 19.116 19.499 19.888 20.286 20.692 21.106 21.528 142.115
Subtotal outside HEADING
4 19.116 19.499 19.888 20.286 20.692 21.106 21.528 142.115
TOTAL 19.116 19.499 19.888 20.286 20.692 21.106 21.528 142.115
EN 177 EN
3.2.8. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework
The proposal/initiative:
☑ can be fully financed through redeployment within the relevant heading of the
multiannual financial framework (MFF).
☐ requires use of the unallocated margin under the relevant heading of the MFF
and/or use of the special instruments as defined in the MFF Regulation.
☐ requires a revision of the MFF.
EN 178 EN
3.2.9. Third-party contributions
The proposal/initiative:
☑ does not provide for co-financing by third parties
☐ provides for the co-financing by third parties estimated below:
Appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places)
Year
2024
Year
2025
Year
2026
Year
2027 Total
Specify the co-financing body
TOTAL appropriations co-financed
3.3. Estimated impact on revenue
☐ The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue.
☐ The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact:
☐ on own resources
☐ on other revenue
☐ please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines
EUR million (to three decimal places)
Budget revenue line: Appropriations
available for the
Impact of the proposal/initiative (18)1
Year Year Year Year
1 As regards traditional own resources (customs duties, sugar levies), the amounts indicated must be net amounts, i.e. gross amounts after deduction of 20% for
collection costs.
EN 179 EN
current financial year 2024 2025 2026 2027
Article ..........
For assigned revenue, specify the budget expenditure line(s) affected.
[...]
Other remarks (e.g. method/formula used for calculating the impact on revenue or any other information).
[...]
4. DIGITAL DIMENSIONS
4.1. Requirements of digital relevance
If the policy initiative is assessed as having no requirement of digital relevance, provide an explanation as to why digital means are not
used.
N/A
Otherwise, please list the requirements of digital relevance in the table below:
Reference to the
requirement
Requirement
description
Actor(s) affected or
concerned by the
requirement
High-level Processes Categories
Article 110, Article 111,
Article 112, Article 113 Publication rules
European Commission,
Member States,
eProcurement service
providers
Information publication Data
Article 127 Electronic
communication
Public
buyers, eProcurement
service
IT specifications Digital solutions
EN 180 EN
providers, economic
operators
Article 128 Interoperability network
European Commission,
Member States,
eProcurement service
providers
Data management
Digital public services;
Process digitalisation &
automation
Article 129, 130
Harmonised standards
for public procurement
and common
specifications
European Commission,
Member States,
eProcurement service
providers
Data management Process digitalisation &
automation
Article 131
Obligations of
eProcurement service
providers
Member States,
eProcurement service
providers
IT specifications Digital solutions;
Digital public services
Article 133 Commission
eProcurement platform
European Commission,
Member States, public
buyers
Development of a digital
solution
Digital solutions;
Digital public services
Article 131 Electronic eligibility
service
European Commission,
Member States, public
buyers, economic
operators
Development of a digital
solution
Data;
Digital solutions;
Digital public services;
Process digitalisation &
automation
Article 134 National Public Member States IT and data Data;
EN 181 EN
Procurement Data
Spaces
specifications,
development of a digital
solution
Digital solutions;
Digital public services;
Process digitalisation &
automation
Article 135 Public Procurement
Data Space European Commission
IT and data
specifications,
development of a digital
solution
Data;
Digital solutions;
Digital public services;
Process digitalisation &
automation
Article 136 PPDS data exchange European Commission,
Member States Data exchange
Digital public services;
Process digitalisation &
automation
4.2. Data
High-level description of the data in scope and any related standards/specifications
Type of data Reference to the requirement(s) Standard and/or specification (if
applicable)
Publication data Article 110
The published information will contain
information listed in Article 110. As
stipulated by Article 110(6) and (7), the
Commission shall further define this by
means of delegated and implementing
acts.
EN 182 EN
General Procurement Data Article 134, Article 135
Information as set up in Article 134 will
be made available at national and EU
level. As stipulated by Article 134(7) and
(8), and Article 135(3), the Commission
shall further define this by means of
delegated and implementing acts.
Data on means of proof Article 133
As stipulated by Article 133(3) and (6),
the exclusion ground evidence, selection
criteria evidence, company information,
and evidence on origin should be made
available in the digital business credential
tool and sharable to buyers through the
electronic eligibility service.
Alignment with the European Data Strategy
Explain how the requirement(s) are aligned with the European Data Strategy
The proposal is aligned with the European Data Strategy as it will mandate the sharing of data towards the Public Procurement Data
Space by also introducing National Public Procurement Data Space in each Member State. Thanks to this reinforcement, the
transparency and accountability of public spending, fighting corruption and improving spending quality will be reinforced.
Alignment with the once-only principle
Explain how the once-only principle has been considered and how the possibility to reuse existing data has been explored
The proposal put the once-only principle as a central principle. Thanks to the use of the electronic eligibility service, and the digital
business credential tool, economic operator will have the possibility to only share once the evidence to participate in a public
procurement procedure.
Explain how newly created data is findable, accessible, interoperable and reusable, and meets high-quality standards
EN 183 EN
Newly created data respects the FAIR principles as the Public Procurement Data Space will securely gather, clean and align all data
received from each Member States. This data will be available, with some restrictions applying on sensitive data, in order for each
European citizens to have access to procurement data and get a complete overview of the European market.
Data flows
For each data flow, please fill the table below:
Type of data Reference(s) to the
requirement(s)
Actor who
provides the data
Actor who receives
the data
Trigger for the
data exchange
Frequency (if
applicable)
Publication data Article 110 Public buyers Economic operators Publication of a call
for tenders //
General
procurement data Article 134
National
responsible
authority, including
public buyer
NPPDS authority
Trigger depending
on the data
category, i.e.
contract conclusion
No later than 20
days after the
trigger
General
procurement data Article 135 NPPDS Authority PPDS Authority
Availability in the
NPPDS
Max 10 days after
the availability in
NPPDS
Data on means of
proof Article 133 Economic operators Public buyers
Submission of a
tender //
4.3. Digital solutions
High-level description of digital solutions
Digital solution Reference(s) to
the
Main mandated
functionalities
Responsible
body How is
accessibility
How is
reusability
Use of AI
technologies (if
EN 184 EN
requirement(s) catered for? considered? applicable)
eProcurement
platforms
Article 127,
Article 131
The
eProcurement
platforms shall:
Be in conformity
with harmonised
standards,
Connect to the
interoperability
network
Ensure access to
procurement
details
Be connected to
the electronic
eligibility servic
e
Connect to the
NPPDS
eProcurement
services
providers
N/A
Commission
eProcurement
platform
Article 132
The Commission
eProcurement
platform shall:
Be in conformity
with harmonised
European
Commission
The platform
will be
developed to
take into account
accessibility
It is aimed to
reuse modules
already existing
in the European
Commission or
in the Member
N/A
EN 185 EN
standards,
Connect to the
interoperability
network
Ensure access to
procurement
details
Be connected to
the
electronic eligibi
lity service
Connect to the
NPPS
requirements. States to build
the
eProcurement
platform that
will be provided
by the European
Commission.
Platform fully
available as
open source.
Electronic
eligibility
service
Article 133
The electronic
eligibility
service shall:
Enable digital
verification of
company
information,
exclusion
grounds,
selection criteria
and
requirements of
European
Commission
The platform
will be
developed to
take into account
accessibility
requirements.
It is aimed to
reuse modules
already existing
in the European
Commission,
such as eCertis
and the ESPD,
to build the
service and to
connect it with
digital business
credential tool.
Service fully
N/A
EN 186 EN
origin available as
open source.
National Public
Procurement
Data Spaces
Article 134
The National
Public
Procurement
Data Spaces
shall:
Be connected to
the Public
Procurement
Data Space
Ensure that all
data from
different sources
are available
Member States N/A
Public
Procurement
Data Space
Article 135
The Public
Procurement
Data Space
shall:
Contain publicly
available data
and data that are
not publicly
available
Allow to have
European
Commission
The platform
will be
developed to
take into account
accessibility
requirements.
N/A
EN 187 EN
different access
rights
For each digital solution, explanation of how the digital solution complies with applicable digital policies and legislative enactments
Commission eProcurement platform
Digital and/or sectorial policy
(when these are applicable) Explanation on how it aligns
AI Act
No AI-based decision-making is foreseen for the core legal obligations. If automated risk
detection, ranking, recommendation or fraud analytics are introduced, an AI Act
risk/compliance assessment will be carried out.
EU Cybersecurity framework
Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Member States shall ensure the security,
integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data collected and stored for the purpose of
this Regulation. To be further detailed in the technical specifications.
eIDAS eIDAS may not be relevant for identification, authentication and credential exchange.
Single Digital Gateway and IMI Single Digital Gateway and IMI are not used as implementation channels at this stage.
Others //
Commission eProcurement platform
Digital and/or sectorial policy
(when these are applicable) Explanation on how it aligns
AI Act No AI-based decision-making is foreseen for the core legal obligations. If automated risk
detection, ranking, recommendation or fraud analytics are introduced, an AI Act
EN 188 EN
Digital and/or sectorial policy
(when these are applicable) Explanation on how it aligns
risk/compliance assessment will be carried out.
EU Cybersecurity framework
Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Member States shall ensure the security,
integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data collected and stored for the purpose of
this Regulation. To be further detailed in the technical specifications.
eIDAS eIDAS may not be relevant for identification, authentication and credential exchange.
Single Digital Gateway and IMI Single Digital Gateway and IMI are not used as implementation channels at this stage.
Others //
Electronic eligibility service
Digital and/or sectorial policy
(when these are applicable) Explanation on how it aligns
AI Act
No AI-based decision-making is foreseen for the core legal obligations. If automated risk
detection, ranking, recommendation or fraud analytics are introduced, an AI Act
risk/compliance assessment will be carried out.
EU Cybersecurity framework
Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Member States shall ensure the security,
integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data collected and stored for the purpose of
this Regulation. To be further detailed in the technical specifications.
eIDAS eIDAS may not be relevant for identification, authentication and credential exchange.
EN 189 EN
Single Digital Gateway and IMI Single Digital Gateway and IMI are not used as implementation channels at this stage.
Others //
National Public Procurement Data Spaces
Digital and/or sectorial policy
(when these are applicable) Explanation on how it aligns
AI Act
No AI-based decision-making is foreseen for the core legal obligations. If automated risk
detection, ranking, recommendation or fraud analytics are introduced, an AI Act
risk/compliance assessment will be carried out.
EU Cybersecurity framework
Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Member States shall ensure the security,
integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data collected and stored for the purpose of this
Regulation. To be further detailed in the technical specifications.
eIDAS eIDAS may not be relevant for identification, authentication and credential exchange.
Single Digital Gateway and IMI Single Digital Gateway and IMI are not used as implementation channels at this stage.
Others //
Public Procurement Data Space
Digital and/or sectorial policy
(when these are applicable) Explanation on how it aligns
EN 190 EN
AI Act
No AI-based decision-making is foreseen for the core legal obligations. If automated risk
detection, ranking, recommendation or fraud analytics are introduced, an AI Act
risk/compliance assessment will be carried out.
EU Cybersecurity framework
Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Member States shall ensure the security,
integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data collected and stored for the purpose of this
Regulation. To be further detailed in the technical specifications.
eIDAS eIDAS may not be relevant for identification, authentication and credential exchange.
Single Digital Gateway and IMI Single Digital Gateway and IMI are not used as implementation channels at this stage.
Others //
4.4. Interoperability assessment
Describe the digital public service(s) affected by the requirements
Digital public service
or category of digital
public services
Description Reference(s) to the
requirement(s)
Interoperable Europe
Solution(s)
Other interoperability
solution(s)
Interoperability network
Interoperability network
will be used by
eProcurement platforms
to exchange data to all
other connected
eProcurement platforms.
Article 129, Article 129 //
eProcurement platforms All platforms around the Article 131, Article 132 DCAT_AP //
EN 191 EN
European Union will be
interconnected by
implementing the
standards and
exchanging data through
the interoperability
network.
Core Vocabularies
Electronic eligibility
service
The electronic eligibility
service will be
interconnected to digital
business credential tools
for economic operators
to prove their
compliance with
exclusion grounds.
Article 133 Core Vocabularies //
Public Procurement
Data Space
The Public Procurement
Data Space will gather
notice information from
every National Public
Procurement Data
Spaces through the
PPDS data exchange.
Article 134, Article
135, Article 138
DCAT_AP
Core Vocabularies eProcurement Ontology
Assess the impact of the requirement(s) on cross-border interoperability
Digital public service #1: Interoperability network
EN 192 EN
Assessment Measure(s) Potential remaining barriers (if
applicable)
Alignment with existing digital and
sectorial policies. Please list the
applicable digital and sectorial policies
identified
Implementing Act will provide detailed
further information and will deal with
sectorial files.
The alignment with several sectorial
policies, such as Directive (EU)
2023/1791, Regulation (EU) 2019/1242,
Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, Regulation
(EU) 2024/1781, Directive 2009/33/EC
Organisational measures for a smooth
cross-border digital public services
delivery. Please list the governance
measures foreseen
The main legal act foresees governance for
interoperability network and PPDS data
exchange.
Measures taken to ensure a shared
understanding of the data. Please list
such measures
The validation service will be used for
collection of data and for the publication
of information, in the Supplement to the
Official Journal of the EU and in the
PPDS.
Large unstructured tender files.
National differences.
National reluctance to share non-public
procurement data.
Data quality gaps.
Use of commonly agreed open technical
specifications and standards. Please list
such measures
Standards for the procurement
procedures and the public procurement
details will be developed and
implemented.
Heterogeneous national eProcurement
platforms.
Uncertainty on the network technology
choice.
Uneven digital maturity of Member States.
Digital public service #2: Electronic eligibility service
EN 193 EN
Assessment Measure(s) Potential remaining barriers (if
applicable)
Alignment with existing digital and
sectorial policies. Please list the
applicable digital and sectorial policies
identified
Implementing Act will provide detailed
further information and will deal with
sectorial files.
The alignment with several sectorial
policies, such as Directive (EU)
2023/1791, Regulation (EU) 2019/1242,
Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, Regulation
(EU) 2024/1781, Directive 2009/33/EC
Organisational measures for a smooth
cross-border digital public services
delivery. Please list the governance
measures foreseen
The main legal act foresees governance for
interoperability network and PPDS data
exchange.
Measures taken to ensure a shared
understanding of the data. Please list
such measures
Digital credential tool will be used and
connected to the eligibility service to
ensure correct sharing of data.
Large unstructured tender files.
National differences.
National reluctance to share non-public
procurement data.
Data quality gaps.
Use of commonly agreed open technical
specifications and standards. Please list
such measures
Standards for the procurement procedures
and the public procurement details will be
developed and implemented.
Heterogeneous national eProcurement
platforms.
Uncertainty on the network technology
choice.
Uneven digital maturity of Member States.
Digital public service #3: eProcurement platforms
EN 194 EN
Assessment Measure(s) Potential remaining barriers (if
applicable)
Alignment with existing digital and
sectorial policies. Please list the
applicable digital and sectorial policies
identified
Implementing Act will provide detailed
further information and will deal with
sectorial files.
The alignment with several sectorial
policies, such as Directive (EU)
2023/1791, Regulation (EU) 2019/1242,
Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, Regulation
(EU) 2024/1781, Directive 2009/33/EC
Organisational measures for a smooth
cross-border digital public services
delivery. Please list the governance
measures foreseen
The main legal act foresees governance for
interoperability network and PPDS data
exchange.
Measures taken to ensure a shared
understanding of the data. Please list
such measures
Standards for the procurement procedures
and the public procurement details will be
developed and implemented.
Large unstructured tender files.
National differences.
National reluctance to share non-public
procurement data.
Data quality gaps.
Use of commonly agreed open technical
specifications and standards. Please list
such measures
Standards for the procurement procedures
and the public procurement details will be
developed and implemented.
Heterogeneous national eProcurement
platforms.
Uncertainty on the network technology
choice.
Uneven digital maturity of Member States.
Digital public service #4: Public Procurement Data Space
EN 195 EN
Assessment Measure(s) Potential remaining barriers (if
applicable)
Alignment with existing digital and
sectorial policies. Please list the
applicable digital and sectorial policies
identified
Implementing Act will provide detailed
further information and will deal with
sectorial files.
The alignment with several sectorial
policies, such as Directive (EU)
2023/1791, Regulation (EU) 2019/1242,
Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, Regulation
(EU) 2024/1781, Directive 2009/33/EC
Organisational measures for a smooth
cross-border digital public services
delivery. Please list the governance
measures foreseen
The main legal act foresees governance for
interoperability network and PPDS data
exchange.
Measures taken to ensure a shared
understanding of the data. Please list
such measures
The validation service will be used for
collection of data and for the publication
of information, in the Supplement to the
Official Journal of the EU and in the
PPDS.
Large unstructured tender files.
National differences.
National reluctance to share non-public
procurement data.
Data quality gaps.
Use of commonly agreed open technical
specifications and standards. Please list
such measures
Standards for the procurement procedures
and the public procurement details will be
developed and implemented.
Heterogeneous national eProcurement
platforms.
Uncertainty on the network technology
choice.
Uneven digital maturity of Member States.
EN 196 EN
4.5. Measures to support digital implementation
For each measure to support digital implementation, please fill in the table below
Description of the measure Reference(s) to the
requirement(s) Commission role (if applicable)
Actors to be
involved (if
applicable)
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
t
i
m
e
l
i
n
e
(
i
f
a
p
p
l
EN 197 EN
i
c
a
b
l
e
)
The Commission shall adopt
delegated acts in order to
establish or designate such an
interoperability network.
Article 128(2) The Commission shall adopt
such acts The Commission
/
/
The Commission is empowered
to adopt implementing acts
laying down the detailed
arrangements for the
implementation and operation of
the interoperability network.
Article 128(3) The Commission is empowered
to adopt such acts The Commission
/
/
The Commission may adopt
implementing acts establishing
common specifications covering
the essential requirements for the
semantic data model of the core
elements of the procurement
procedures.
Article 130(2) The Commission may adopt such
acts The Commission
/
/
The Commission is empowered Article 133(3) The Commission is empowered The Commission /
EN 198 EN
to adopt delegated acts laying
down detailed rules of the
management the electronic
eligibility service and designating
the digital business credential
tool and the related network to be
used by economic operators for
the purpose of determining
eligibility.
to adopt such acts /
The Commission is empowered
to adopt implementing acts
specifying the technical
arrangements for the electronic
eligibility service.
Article 133(6) The Commission is empowered
to adopt such acts The Commission
/
/
The Commission is empowered
to adopt delegated
acts specifying further categories
of procurement information to be
made available to the NPPDS.
Article 134(7) The Commission is empowered
to adopt such acts The Commission
/
/
The Commission is empowered
to adopt implementing acts
specifying the procurement
information which shall be made
available through the NPPDS as
well as its technical format, the
designation and modalities of
Article 134(8) The Commission is empowered
to adopt such acts The Commission
/
/
EN 199 EN
such designation of specific
procurement information as
publicly or not publicly available
procurement information and the
source of the technical validation
requirements.
The Commission is empowered
to adopt implementing acts
specifying the procurement
information which shall be
provided by the Member States
through the PPDS including its
technical format, the minimum
publication terms for
procurement information not
designated as publicly available
and the source of the technical
validation requirements.
Article 135(3) The Commission is empowered
to adopt such acts The Commission
/
/
The Commission may adopt
implementing acts specifying the
following implementation
arrangements of the data
exchange pursuant to Union law.
Article 136(2) The Commission may adopt such
acts The Commission
/
/
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 9.9.2026 COM(2026) 590 final
ANNEXES 1 to 8
ANNEXES
to the
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on public contracts and concessions, repealing Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and
2014/25/EU, and amending Regulations (EC) No 1370/2007, (EU) 2023/1542, (EU)
2024/1157, (EU) 2024/1252, (EU) 2024/1735, (EU) 2024/1781, (EU) 2024/2847, (EU)
2024/3110 and (EU) 2025/40, and Directives 2008/98/EC, (EU) 2019/882, (EU) 2022/2381,
(EU) 2023/1791 and (EU) 2024/1760 (Public Procurement Act)
{SEC(2026) 590 final} - {SWD(2026) 590 final} - {SWD(2026) 591 final} -
{SWD(2026) 592 final}
EN 1 EN
ANNEX I
Central government authorities
(1) BELGIUM
(a) Services publics fédéraux (Ministries) – Federale Overheidsdiensten
(Ministries):
(a) SPF Chancellerie du Premier Ministre – FOD Kanselarij van de Eerste
Minister;
(b) SPF Personnel et Organisation – FOD Kanselarij Personeel en
Organisatie;
(c) SPF Budget et Contrôle de la Gestion – FOD Budget en Beheerscontrole;
(d) SPF Technologie de l’Information et de la Communication (Fedict) –
FOD Informatie- en Communicatietechnologie (Fedict);
(e) SPF Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au
Développement – FOD Buitenlandse Zaken, Buitenlandse Handel en
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking;
(f) SPF Intérieur – FOD Binnenlandse Zaken;
(g) SPF Finances – FOD Financiën;
(h) SPF Mobilité et Transports – FOD Mobiliteit en Vervoer;
(i) SPF Emploi, Travail et Concertation sociale – FOD Werkgelegenheid,
Arbeid en sociaal overleg;
(j) SPF Sécurité Sociale et Institutions publiques de Sécurité Sociale – FOD
Sociale Zekerheid en Openbare Instellingen van sociale Zekerheid;
(k) SPF Santé publique, Sécurité de la Chaîne alimentaire et Environnement
– FOD Volksgezondheid, Veiligheid van de Voedselketen en Leefmilieu;
(l) SPF Justice – FOD Justitie;
(m) SPF Economie, PME, Classes moyennes et Energie – FOD Economie,
KMO, Middenstand en Energie;
(n) Ministère de la Défense – Ministerie van Landsverdediging;
(o) Service public de programmation Intégration sociale, Lutte contre la
pauvreté et Economie sociale – Programmatorische Overheidsdienst
Maatschappelijke Integratie, Armoedsbestrijding en sociale Economie;
(p) Service public fédéral de Programmation Développement durable –
Programmatorische federale Overheidsdienst Duurzame Ontwikkeling;
(q) Service public fédéral de Programmation Politique scientifique –
Programmatorische federale Overheidsdienst Wetenschapsbeleid;
(b) Régie des Bâtiments – Regie der Gebouwen:
(a) Office national de Sécurité sociale – Rijksdienst voor sociale Zekerheid;
(b) Institut national d’Assurance sociales pour travailleurs – Rijksinstituut
voor de sociale Verzekeringen der Zelfindépendants standigen;
EN 2 EN
(c) Institut national d’Assurance Maladie-Invalidité – Rijksinstituut voor
Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering;
(d) Office national des Pensions – Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen;
(e) Caisse auxiliaire d’Assurance Maladie-Invalidité – Hulpkas voor Ziekte-
en Invaliditeitsverzekering;
(f) Fond des Maladies professionnelles – Fonds voor Beroepsziekten;
(g) Office national de l’Emploi – Rijksdienst voor Arbeidsvoorzienin.
(2) BULGARIA
(a) Администрация на Народното събрание;
(b) Aдминистрация на Президента Администрация на;
(c) Министерския съвет;
(d) Конституционен съд;
(e) Българска народна банка;
(f) Министерство на външните работи;
(g) Министерство на вътрешните работи;
(h) Министерство на държавната администрация и административната
реформа;
(i) Министерство на извънредните ситуации;
(j) Министерство на земеделието и храните;
(k) Министерство на здравеопазването;
(l) Министерство на икономиката и енергетиката;
(m) Министерство на културата;
(n) Министерство на образованието и науката;
(o) Министерство на околната среда и водите;
(p) Министерство на отбраната;
(q) Министерство на правосъдието;
(r) Министерство на регионалното развитие и благоустройството;
(s) Министерство на транспорта;
(t) Министерство на труда и социалната политика;
(u) Министерство на финансите;
(v) State agencies, state commissions, executive agencies and other state
authorities established by law or by Council of Ministers’ decree having a
function relating to the exercise of executive power:
(a) Агенция за ядрено регулиране;
(b) Висшата атестационна комисия;
(c) Държавна комисия за енергийно и водно регулиране;
(d) Държавна комисия по сигурността на информацията;
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(e) Комисия за защита на конкуренцията;
(f) Комисия за защита на личните данни;
(g) Комисия за защита от дискриминация;
(h) Комисия за регулиране на съобщенията;
(i) Комисия за финансов надзор;
(j) Патентно ведомство на Република България;
(k) Сметна палата на Република България;
(l) Агенция за приватизация;
(m) Агенция за следприватизационен контрол;
(n) Български институт по метрология;
(o) Държавна агенция ‘Архиви’;
(p) Държавна агенция ‘Държавен резерв и военновременни запаси’;
(q) Държавна агенция ‘Национална сигурност’;
(r) Държавна агенция за бежанците;
(s) Държавна агенция за българите в чужбина;
(t) Държавна агенция за закрила на детето;
(u) Държавна агенция за информационни технологии и съобщения;
(v) Държавна агенция за метрологичен и технически надзор;
(w) Държавна агенция за младежта и спорта;
(x) Държавна агенция по горите;
(y) Държавна агенция по туризма;
(z) Държавна комисия по стоковите борси и тържища;
(aa) Институт по публична администрация и европейска интеграция;
(bb) Национален статистически институт;
(cc) Национална агенция за оценяване и акредитация;
(dd) Националната агенция за професионално образование и обучение;
(ee) Национална комисия за борба с трафика на хора;
(ff) Агенция ‘Митници’;
(gg) Агенция за държавна и финансова инспекция;
(hh) Агенция за държавни вземания;
(ii) Агенция за социално подпомагане;
(jj) Агенция за хората с увреждания;
(kk) Агенция по вписванията;
(ll) Агенция по геодезия, картография и кадастър;
(mm) Агенция по енергийна ефективност;
EN 4 EN
(nn) Агенция по заетостта;
(oo) Агенция по обществени поръчки;
(pp) Българска агенция за инвестиции;
(qq) Главна дирекция ‘Гражданска въздухоплавателна администрация’;
(rr) Дирекция ‘Материално-техническо осигуряване и социално
обслужване’ на Министерство на вътрешните работи;
(ss) Дирекция ‘Оперативно издирване’ на Министерство на
вътрешните работи;
(tt) Дирекция ‘Финансово-ресурсно осигуряване’ на Министерство
навътрешните работи;
(uu) Дирекция за национален строителен контрол;
(vv) Държавна комисия по хазарта;
(ww) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Автомобилна администрация’;
(xx) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Борба с градушките’;
(yy) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Българска служба за акредитация’;
(zz) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Военни клубове и информация’;
(aaa) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Главна инспекция по труда’;
(bbb) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Държавна собственост на Министерството
наотбраната’;
(ccc) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Железопътна администрация’;
(ddd) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Изпитвания и контролни измервания на
въоръжение, техника и имущества’;
(eee) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Морска администрация’;
(fff) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Национален филмов център’;
(ggg) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Пристанищна администрация’;
(hhh) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Проучване и поддържане на река Дунав’;
(iii) Изпълнителна агенция ‘Социални дейности на Министерството на
отбраната’;
(jjj) Изпълнителна агенция за икономически анализи и прогнози;
(kkk) Изпълнителна агенция за насърчаване на малките и средни
предприятия;
(lll) Изпълнителна агенция по лекарствата;
(mmm) Изпълнителна агенция по лозата и виното;
(nnn) Изпълнителна агенция по околна среда;
(ooo) Изпълнителна агенция по почвените ресурси;
(ppp) Изпълнителна агенция по рибарство и аквакултури;
(qqq) Изпълнителна агенция по селекция и репродукция в
животновъдството;
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(rrr) Изпълнителна агенция по сортоизпитване, апробация и
семеконтрол;
(sss) Изпълнителна агенция по трансплантация;
(ttt) Изпълнителна агенция по хидромелиорации;
(uuu) Комисията за защита на потребителите;
(vvv) Контролно-техническата инспекция;
(www) Национален център за информация и документация;
(xxx) Национален център по радиобиология и радиационна защита;
(yyy) Национална агенция за приходите;
(zzz) Национална ветеринарномедицинска служба;
(aaaa) Национална служба ‘Полиция’;
(bbbb) Национална служба ‘Пожарна безопасност и защита на
населението’;
(cccc) Национална служба за растителна защита;
(dddd) Национална служба за съвети в земеделието;
(eeee) Национална служба по зърното и фуражите;
(ffff) Служба ‘Военна информация’;
(gggg) Служба ‘Военна полиция’;
(hhhh) Фонд ‘Републиканска пътна инфраструктура’;
(iiii) Авиоотряд 28.
(3) CZECHIA
(a) Ministerstvo dopravy;
(b) Ministerstvo financí;
(c) Ministerstvo kultury;
(d) Ministerstvo obrany;
(e) Ministerstvo pro místní rozvoj;
(f) Ministerstvo práce a sociálních věcí;
(g) Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu;
(h) Ministerstvo spravedlnosti;
(i) Ministerstvo školství, mládeže a tělovýchovy;
(j) Ministerstvo vnitra;
(k) Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí;
(l) Ministerstvo zdravotnictví;
(m) Ministerstvo zemědělství;
(n) Ministerstvo životního prostředí;
(o) Poslanecká sněmovna PČR;
EN 6 EN
(p) Senát PČR;
(q) Kancelář prezidenta;
(r) Český statistický úřad;
(s) Český úřad zeměměřičský a katastrální;
(t) Úřad průmyslového vlastnictví;
(u) Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů;
(v) Bezpečnostní informační služba;
(w) Národní bezpečnostní úřad;
(x) Česká akademie věd;
(y) Vězeňská služba;
(z) Český báňský úřad;
(aa) Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže;
(bb) Správa státních hmotných rezerv;
(cc) Státní úřad pro jadernou bezpečnost;
(dd) Česká národní banka;
(ee) Energetický regulační úřad;
(ff) Úřad vlády České republiky;
(gg) Ústavní soud;
(hh) Nejvyšší soud;
(ii) Nejvyšší správní soud;
(jj) Nejvyšší státní zastupitelství;
(kk) Nejvyšší kontrolní úřad;
(ll) Kancelář Veřejného ochránce práv;
(mm) Grantová agentura České republiky;
(nn) Státní úřad inspekce prace;
(oo) Český telekomunikační úřad.
(4) DENMARK
(a) Folketinget;
(b) Rigsrevisionen;
(c) Statsministeriet;
(d) Udenrigsministeriet;
(e) Beskæftigelsesministeriet:
(f) Fem styrelser og institutioner (five agencies and institutions);
(g) Domstolsstyrelsen;
(h) Finansministeriet:
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(i) Fem styrelser og institutioner (five agencies and institutions);
(j) Forsvarsministeriet:
(k) Fem styrelser og institutioner (five agencies and institutions);
(l) Ministeriet for Sundhed og Forebyggelse:
(m) Adskillige styrelser og institutioner, herunder Statens Serum Institut (Several
agencies and institutions, including Statens Serum Institut);
(n) Justitsministeriet:
(o) Rigspolitichefen, anklagemyndigheden samt en direktorat og et antal styrelser
(Commissioner of Police, the public prosecutor, a directorate and a number of
agencies);
(p) Kirkeministeriet:
(q) Ti stiftsøvrigheder (ten diocesan authorities);
(r) Kulturministeriet — Ministry of Culture:
(s) Fire styrelser samt et antal statsinstitutioner (four departments and a number of
institutions);
(t) Miljøministeriet:
(u) Fem styrelser (five agencies);
(v) Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Invandrere og Integration:
(w) En styrelse (a agency);
(x) Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri:
(y) Fire direktoraterog institutioner (four directorates and institutions);
(z) Ministeriet for Videnskab, Teknologi og Udvikling:
(aa) Adskillige styrelser og institutioner, Forskningscenter Risø og Statens
uddannelsesbygninger (Several agencies and institutions, including Risoe
National Laboratory and Danish National Research and Education Buildings);
(bb) Skatteministeriet:
(cc) En styrelse og institutioner (a agency and several institutions);
(dd) Velfærdsministeriet:
(ee) Tre styrelser og institutioner (three agencies and several institutions);
(ff) Transportministeriet:
(gg) Syv styrelser og institutioner, herunder Øresundsbrokonsortiet (seven agencies
and institutions, including Øresundsbrokonsortiet);
(hh) Undervisningsministeriet:
(ii) Tre styrelser, fire undervisningsinstitutioner og fem andre institutioner (three
agencies, four educational establishments, five other institutions);
(jj) Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriet:
(kk) Adskilligestyrelser og institutioner (Several agencies and institutions);
(ll) Klima- og Energiministeriet:
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(mm) Tre styrelse og institutioner (three agencies and institutions).
(5) GERMANY
(a) Auswärtiges Amt;
(b) Bundeskanzleramt;
(c) Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales;
(d) Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung;
(e) Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz;
(f) Bundesministerium der Finanzen;
(g) Bundesministerium des Innern (only civil goods);
(h) Bundesministerium für Gesundheit;
(i) Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend;
(j) Bundesministerium der Justiz;
(k) Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung;
(l) Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie;
(m) Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung;
(n) Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (no military goods);
(o) Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit.
(6) ESTONIA
(a) Vabariigi Presidendi Kantselei;
(b) Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu;
(c) Eesti Vabariigi Riigikohus;
(d) Riigikontroll;
(e) Õiguskantsler;
(f) Riigikantselei;
(g) Rahvusarhiiv;
(h) Haridus- ja Teadusministeerium;
(i) Justiitsministeerium;
(j) Kaitseministeerium;
(k) Keskkonnaministeerium;
(l) Kultuuriministeerium;
(m) Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium;
(n) Põllumajandusministeerium;
(o) Rahandusministeerium;
(p) Siseministeerium;
(q) Sotsiaalministeerium;
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(r) Välisministeerium;
(s) Keeleinspektsioon;
(t) Riigiprokuratuur;
(u) Teabeamet;
(v) Maa-amet;
(w) Keskkonnainspektsioon;
(x) Metsakaitse- ja Metsauuenduskeskus;
(y) Muinsuskaitseamet;
(z) Patendiamet;
(aa) Tarbijakaitseamet;
(bb) Riigihangete Amet;
(cc) Taimetoodangu Inspektsioon;
(dd) Põllumajanduse Registrite ja Informatsiooni Amet;
(ee) Veterinaar- ja Toiduamet;
(ff) Konkurentsiamet;
(gg) Maksu –ja Tolliamet;
(hh) Statistikaamet;
(ii) Kaitsepolitseiamet;
(jj) Kodakondsus- ja Migratsiooniamet;
(kk) Piirivalveamet;
(ll) Politseiamet;
(mm) Eesti Kohtuekspertiisi Instituut;
(nn) Keskkriminaalpolitsei;
(oo) Päästeamet;
(pp) Andmekaitse Inspektsioon;
(qq) Ravimiamet;
(rr) Sotsiaalkindlustusamet;
(ss) Tööturuamet;
(tt) Tervishoiuamet;
(uu) Tervisekaitseinspektsioon;
(vv) Tööinspektsioon;
(ww) Lennuamet;
(xx) Maanteeamet;
(yy) Veeteede Amet;
(zz) Julgestuspolitsei;
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(aaa) Kaitseressursside Amet;
(bbb) Kaitseväe Logistikakeskus;
(ccc) Tehnilise Järelevalve Amet.
(7) IRELAND
(a) President’s Establishment;
(b) Houses of the Oireachtas — [Parliament];
(c) Department of the Taoiseach — [Prime Minister];
(d) Central Statistics Office;
(e) Department of Finance;
(f) Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General;
(g) Office of the Revenue Commissioners;
(h) Office of Public Works;
(i) State Laboratory;
(j) Office of the Attorney General;
(k) Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions;
(l) Valuation Office;
(m) Office of the Commission for Public Service Appointments;
(n) Public Appointments Service;
(o) Office of the Ombudsman;
(p) Chief State Solicitor’s Office;
(q) Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform;
(r) Courts Service;
(s) Prisons Service;
(t) Office of the Commissioners of Charitable Donations and Bequests;
(u) Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government;
(v) Department of Education and Science;
(w) Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources;
(x) Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food;
(y) Department of Transport;
(z) Department of Health and Children;
(aa) Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment;
(bb) Department of Arts, Sports and Tourism;
(cc) Department of Defence;
(dd) Department of Foreign Affairs;
(ee) Department of Social and Family Affairs;
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(ff) Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht — [Gaelic speaking regions]
Affairs;
(gg) Arts Council;
(hh) National Gallery.
(8) GREECE
(a) Υπουργείο Εσωτερικών;
(b) Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών;
(c) Υπουργείο Οικονομίας και Οικονομικών;
(d) Υπουργείο Ανάπτυξης;
(e) Υπουργείο Δικαιοσύνης;
(f) Υπουργείο Εθνικής Παιδείας και Θρησκευμάτων;
(g) Υπουργείο Πολιτισμού;
(h) Υπουργείο Υγείας και Κοινωνικής Αλληλεγγύης;
(i) Υπουργείο Περιβάλλοντος, Χωροταξίας και Δημοσίων Έργων;
(j) Υπουργείο Απασχόλησης και Κοινωνικής Προστασίας;
(k) Υπουργείο Μεταφορών και Επικοινωνιών;
(l) Υπουργείο Αγροτικής Ανάπτυξης και Τροφίμων;
(m) Υπουργείο Εμπορικής Ναυτιλίας, Αιγαίου και Νησιωτικής Πολιτικής;
(n) Υπουργείο Μακεδονίας- Θράκης;
(o) Γενική Γραμματεία Επικοινωνίας;
(p) Γενική Γραμματεία Ενημέρωσης;
(q) Γενική Γραμματεία Νέας Γενιάς;
(r) Γενική Γραμματεία Ισότητας;
(s) Γενική Γραμματεία Κοινωνικών Ασφαλίσεων;
(t) Γενική Γραμματεία Απόδημου Ελληνισμού;
(u) Γενική Γραμματεία Βιομηχανίας;
(v) Γενική Γραμματεία Έρευνας και Τεχνολογίας;
(w) Γενική Γραμματεία Αθλητισμού;
(x) Γενική Γραμματεία Δημοσίων Έργων;
(y) Γενική Γραμματεία Εθνικής Στατιστικής Υπηρεσίας Ελλάδος;
(z) Εθνικό Συμβούλιο Κοινωνικής Φροντίδας;
(aa) Οργανισμός Εργατικής Κατοικίας;
(bb) Εθνικό Τυπογραφείο;
(cc) Γενικό Χημείο του Κράτους;
(dd) Ταμείο Εθνικής Οδοποιίας;
(ee) Εθνικό Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών;
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(ff) Αριστοτέλειο Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλονίκης;
(gg) Δημοκρίτειο Πανεπιστήμιο Θράκης;
(hh) Πανεπιστήμιο Αιγαίου;
(ii) Πανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων;
(jj) Πανεπιστήμιο Πατρών;
(kk) Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας;
(ll) Πολυτεχνείο Κρήτης;
(mm) Σιβιτανίδειος Δημόσια Σχολή Τεχνών και Επαγγελμάτων;
(nn) Αιγινήτειο Νοσοκομείο;
(oo) Αρεταίειο Νοσοκομείο;
(pp) Εθνικό Κέντρο Δημόσιας Διοίκησης;
(qq) Οργανισμός Διαχείρισης Δημοσίου Υλικού;
(rr) Οργανισμός Γεωργικών Ασφαλίσεων;
(ss) Οργανισμός Σχολικών Κτιρίων;
(tt) Γενικό Επιτελείο Στρατού;
(uu) Γενικό Επιτελείο Ναυτικού;
(vv) Γενικό Επιτελείο Αεροπορίας;
(ww) Ελληνική Επιτροπή Ατομικής Ενέργειας;
(xx) Γενική Γραμματεία Εκπαίδευσης Ενηλίκων;
(yy) Υπουργείο Εθνικής Άμυνας;
(zz) Γενική Γραμματεία Εμπορίου.
(9) SPAIN
(a) Presidencia de Gobierno;
(b) Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación;
(c) Ministerio de Justicia;
(d) Ministerio de Defensa;
(e) Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda;
(f) Ministerio del Interior;
(g) Ministerio de Fomento;
(h) Ministerio de Educación, Política Social y Deportes;
(i) Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio;
(j) Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración;
(k) Ministerio de la Presidencia;
(l) Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas;
(m) Ministerio de Cultura;
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(n) Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo;
(o) Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Medio Rural y Marino;
(p) Ministerio de Vivienda;
(q) Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación;
(r) Ministerio de Igualdad.
(10) FRANCE
(a) Ministries:
(a) Services du Premier ministre;
(b) Ministère chargé de la santé, de la jeunesse et des sports;
(c) Ministère chargé de l’intérieur, de l’outre-mer et des collectivités
territoriales;
(d) Ministère chargé de la justice;
(e) Ministère chargé de la défense;
(f) Ministère chargé des affaires étrangères et européennes;
(g) Ministère chargé de l’éducation nationale;
(h) Ministère chargé de l’économie, des finances et de l’emploi;
(i) Secrétariat d’Etat aux transports;
(j) Secrétariat d’Etat aux entreprises et au commerce extérieur;
(k) Ministère chargé du travail, des relations sociales et de la solidarité;
(l) Ministère chargé de la culture et de la communication;
(m) Ministère chargé du budget, des comptes publics et de la fonction
publique;
(n) Ministère chargé de l’agriculture et de la pêche;
(o) Ministère chargé de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche;
(p) Ministère chargé de l’écologie, du développement et de l’aménagement
durables;
(q) Secrétariat d’Etat à la fonction publique;
(r) Ministère chargé du logement et de la ville;
(s) Secrétariat d’Etat à la coopération et à la francophonie;
(t) Secrétariat d’Etat à l’outre-mer;
(u) Secrétariat d’Etat à la jeunesse, des sports et de la vie associative;
(v) Secrétariat d’Etat aux anciens combattants;
(w) Ministère chargé de l’immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identité
nationale et du co-développement;
(x) Secrétariat d’Etat en charge de la prospective et de l’évaluation des
politiques publiques;
(y) Secrétariat d’Etat aux affaires européennes;
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(z) Secrétariat d’Etat aux affaires étrangères et aux droits de l’homme;
(aa) Secrétariat d’Etat à la consommation et au tourisme;
(bb) Secrétariat d’Etat à la politique de la ville;
(cc) Secrétariat d’Etat à la solidarité;
(dd) Secrétariat d’Etat en charge de l’industrie et de la consommation;
(ee) Secrétariat d’Etat en charge de l’emploi;
(ff) Secrétariat d’Etat en charge du commerce, de l’artisanat, des PME, du
tourisme et des services;
(gg) Secrétariat d’Etat en charge de l’écologie;
(hh) Secrétariat d’Etat en charge du développement de la région-capitale;
(ii) Secrétariat d’Etat en charge de l’aménagement du territoire;
(b) Institutions, independent authorities and jurisdictions:
(a) Présidence de la République;
(b) Assemblée Nationale;
(c) Sénat;
(d) Conseil constitutionnel;
(e) Conseil économique et social;
(f) Conseil supérieur de la magistrature;
(g) Agence française contre le dopage;
(h) Autorité de contrôle des assurances et des mutuelles;
(i) Autorité de contrôle des nuisances sonores aéroportuaires;
(j) Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes;
(k) Autorité de sûreté nucléaire;
(l) Autorité indépendante des marchés financiers;
(m) Comité national d’évaluation des établissements publics à caractère
scientifique, culturel et professionnel;
(n) Commission d’accès aux documents administratifs;
(o) Commission consultative du secret de la défense nationale;
(p) Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements
politiques;
(q) Commission nationale de contrôle des interceptions de sécurité;
(r) Commission nationale de déontologie de la sécurité;
(s) Commission nationale du débat public;
(t) Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés;
(u) Commission des participations et des transferts;
(v) Commission de régulation de l’énergie;
EN 15 EN
(w) Commission de la sécurité des consommateurs;
(x) Commission des sondages;
(y) Commission de la transparence financière de la vie politique;
(z) Conseil de la concurrence;
(aa) Conseil des ventes volontaires de meubles aux enchères publiques;
(bb) Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel;
(cc) Défenseur des enfants;
(dd) Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité;
(ee) Haute autorité de santé;
(ff) Médiateur de la République;
(gg) Cour de justice de la République;
(hh) Tribunal des Conflits;
(ii) Conseil d’Etat;
(jj) Cours administratives d’appel;
(kk) Tribunaux administratifs;
(ll) Cour des Comptes;
(mm) Chambres régionales des Comptes;
(nn) Cours et tribunaux de l’ordre judiciaire (Cour de Cassation, Cours
d’Appel, Tribunaux d’instance et Tribunaux de grande instance);
(c) National public establishments:
(a) Académie de France à Rome;
(b) Académie de marine;
(c) Académie des sciences d’outre-mer;
(d) Académie des technologies;
(e) Agence centrale des organismes de sécurité sociale (ACOSS);
(f) Agence de biomédicine;
(g) Agence pour l’enseignement du français à l’étranger;
(h) Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des aliments;
(i) Agence française de sécurité sanitaire de l’environnement et du travail;
(j) Agence Nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l’égalité des chances;
(k) Agence nationale pour la garantie des droits des mineurs;
(l) Agences de l’eau;
(m) Agence Nationale de l’Accueil des Etrangers et des migrations;
(n) Agence nationale pour l’amélioration des conditions de travail
(ANACT);
(o) Agence nationale pour l’amélioration de l’habitat (ANAH);
EN 16 EN
(p) Agence Nationale pour la Cohésion Sociale et l’Egalité des Chances;
(q) Agence nationale pour l’indemnisation des français d’outre-mer
(ANIFOM);
(r) Assemblée permanente des chambres d’agriculture (APCA);
(s) Bibliothèque publique d’information;
(t) Bibliothèque nationale de France;
(u) Bibliothèque nationale et universitaire de Strasbourg;
(v) Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations;
(w) Caisse nationale des autoroutes (CNA);
(x) Caisse nationale militaire de sécurité sociale (CNMSS);
(y) Caisse de garantie du logement locatif social;
(z) Casa de Velasquez;
(aa) Centre d’enseignement zootechnique;
(bb) Centre d’études de l’emploi;
(cc) Centre d’études supérieures de la sécurité sociale;
(dd) Centres de formation professionnelle et de promotion agricole;
(ee) Centre hospitalier des Quinze-Vingts;
(ff) Centre international d’études supérieures en sciences agronomiques
(Montpellier Sup Agro);
(gg) Centre des liaisons européennes et internationales de sécurité sociale;
(hh) Centre des Monuments Nationaux;
(ii) Centre national d’art et de culture Georges Pompidou;
(jj) Centre national des arts plastiques;
(kk) Centre national de la cinématographie;
(ll) Centre National d’Etudes et d’expérimentation du machinisme agricole,
du génie rural, des eaux et des forêts (CEMAGREF);
(mm) Centre national du livre;
(nn) Centre national de documentation pédagogique;
(oo) Centre national des œuvres universitaires et scolaires (CNOUS);
(pp) Centre national professionnel de la propriété forestière;
(qq) Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (C.N.R.S);
(rr) Centres d’éducation populaire et de sport (CREPS);
(ss) Centres régionaux des œuvres universitaires (CROUS);
(tt) Collège de France;
(uu) Conservatoire de l’espace littoral et des rivages lacustres;
(vv) Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers;
EN 17 EN
(ww) Conservatoire national supérieur de musique et de danse de Paris;
(xx) Conservatoire national supérieur de musique et de danse de Lyon;
(yy) Conservatoire national supérieur d’art dramatique;
(zz) Ecole centrale de Lille;
(aaa) Ecole centrale de Lyon;
(bbb) École centrale des arts et manufactures;
(ccc) École française d’archéologie d’Athènes;
(ddd) École française d’Extrême-Orient;
(eee) École française de Rome;
(fff) École des hautes études en sciences sociales;
(ggg) Ecole du Louvre;
(hhh) École nationale d’administration;
(iii) École nationale de l’aviation civile (ENAC);
(jjj) École nationale des Chartes;
(kkk) École nationale d’équitation;
(lll) Ecole Nationale du Génie de l’Eau et de l’environnement de Strasbourg;
(mmm) Écoles nationales d’ingénieurs;
(nnn) Ecole nationale d’ingénieurs des industries des techniques agricoles et
alimentaires de Nantes;
(ooo) Écoles nationales d’ingénieurs des travaux agricoles;
(ppp) École nationale de la magistrature;
(qqq) Écoles nationales de la marine marchande;
(rrr) École nationale de la santé publique (ENSP);
(sss) École nationale de ski et d’alpinisme;
(ttt) École nationale supérieure des arts décoratifs;
(uuu) École nationale supérieure des arts et techniques du théâtre;
(vvv) École nationale supérieure des arts et industries textiles Roubaix;
(www) Écoles nationales supérieures d’arts et métiers;
(xxx) École nationale supérieure des beaux-arts;
(yyy) École nationale supérieure de céramique industrielle;
(zzz) École nationale supérieure de l’électronique et de ses applications
(ENSEA);
(aaaa) Ecole nationale supérieure du paysage de Versailles;
(bbbb) Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Sciences de l’information et des
bibliothécaires;
(cccc) Ecole nationale supérieure de la sécurité sociale;
EN 18 EN
(dddd) Écoles nationales vétérinaires;
(eeee) École nationale de voile;
(ffff) Écoles normales supérieures;
(gggg) École polytechnique;
(hhhh) École technique professionnelle agricole et forestière de Meymac
(Corrèze);
(iiii) École de sylviculture Crogny (Aube);
(jjjj) École de viticulture et d’œnologie de la Tour- Blanche (Gironde);
(kkkk) École de viticulture — Avize (Marne);
(llll) Etablissement national d’enseignement agronomique de Dijon;
(mmmm) Établissement national des invalides de la marine (ENIM);
(nnnn) Établissement national de bienfaisance Koenigswarter;
(oooo) Établissement public du musée et du domaine national de Versailles;
(pppp) Fondation Carnegie;
(qqqq) Fondation Singer-Polignac;
(rrrr) Haras nationaux;
(ssss) Hôpital national de Saint-Maurice;
(tttt) Institut des hautes études pour la science et la technologie;
(uuuu) Institut français d’archéologie orientale du Caire;
(vvvv) Institut géographique national;
(wwww) Institut National de l’origine et de la qualité;
(xxxx) Institut national des hautes études de sécurité;
(yyyy) Institut de veille sanitaire;
(zzzz) Institut National d’enseignement supérieur et de recherche
agronomique et agroalimentaire de Rennes;
(aaaaa) Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques (I.N.E.D);
(bbbbb) Institut National d’Horticulture;
(ccccc) Institut National de la jeunesse et de l’éducation populaire;
(ddddd) Institut national des jeunes aveugles — Paris;
(eeeee) Institut national des jeunes sourds — Bordeaux;
(fffff) Institut national des jeunes sourds — Chambéry;
(ggggg) Institut national des jeunes sourds — Metz;
(hhhhh) Institut national des jeunes sourds — Paris;
(iiiii) Institut national de physique nucléaire et de physique des particules
(I.N.P.N.P.P);
(jjjjj) Institut national de la propriété industrielle;
EN 19 EN
(kkkkk) Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (I.N.R.A);
(lllll) Institut National de la Recherche Pédagogique (I.N.R.P);
(mmmmm) Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale
(I.N.S.E.R.M);
(nnnnn) Institut national d’histoire de l’art (I.N.H.A.);
(ooooo) Institut national de recherches archéologiques préventives;
(ppppp) Institut National des Sciences de l’Univers;
(qqqqq) Institut National des Sports et de l’Education Physique;
(rrrrr) Institut national supérieur de formation et de recherche pour l’éducation
des jeunes handicapés et les enseignements inadaptés;
(sssss) Instituts nationaux polytechniques;
(ttttt) Instituts nationaux des sciences appliquées;
(uuuuu) Institut national de recherche en informatique et en automatique
(INRIA);
(vvvvv) Institut national de recherche sur les transports et leur sécurité
(INRETS);
(wwwww) Institut de Recherche pour le Développement;
(xxxxx) Instituts régionaux d’administration;
(yyyyy) Institut des Sciences et des Industries du vivant et de
l’environnement (Agro Paris Tech);
(zzzzz) Institut supérieur de mécanique de Paris;
(aaaaaa) Institut Universitaires de Formation des Maîtres;
(bbbbbb) Musée de l’armée;
(cccccc) Musée Gustave-Moreau;
(dddddd) Musée national de la marine;
(eeeeee) Musée national J.-J.-Henner;
(ffffff) Musée du Louvre;
(gggggg) Musée du Quai Branly;
(hhhhhh) Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle;
(iiiiii) Musée Auguste-Rodin;
(jjjjjj) Observatoire de Paris;
(kkkkkk) Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides;
(llllll) Office National des Anciens Combattants et des Victimes de Guerre
(ONAC);
(mmmmmm) Office national de la chasse et de la faune sauvage;
(nnnnnn) Office National de l’eau et des milieux aquatiques;
EN 20 EN
(oooooo) Office national d’information sur les enseignements et les
professions (ONISEP);
(pppppp) Office universitaire et culturel français pour l’Algérie;
(qqqqqq) Ordre national de la Légion d’honneur;
(rrrrrr) Palais de la découverte;
(ssssss) Parcs nationaux;
(tttttt) Universités;
(d) Other national public bodies:
(a) Union des groupements d’achats publics (UGAP);
(b) Agence Nationale pour l’emploi (A.N.P.E);
(c) Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales (CNAF);
(d) Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie des Travailleurs Salariés
(CNAMS);
(e) Caisse Nationale d’Assurance-Vieillesse des Travailleurs Salariés
(CNAVTS).
(11) CROATIA
(a) Hrvatski sabor;
(b) Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske;
(c) Ured predsjednika Republike Hrvatske;
(d) Ured predsjednika Republike Hrvatske po prestanku obnašanja dužnosti;
(e) Vlada Republike Hrvatske;
(f) uredi Vlade Republike Hrvatske;
(g) Ministarstvo gospodarstva;
(h) Ministarstvo regionalnog razvoja i fondova Europske unije;
(i) Ministarstvo financija;
(j) Ministarstvo obrane;
(k) Ministarstvo vanjskih i europskih poslova;
(l) Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova;
(m) Ministarstvo pravosuđa;
(n) Ministarstvo uprave;
(o) Ministarstvo poduzetništva i obrta;
(p) Ministarstvo rada i mirovinskog sustava;
(q) Ministarstvo pomorstva, prometa i infrastrukture;
(r) Ministarstvo poljoprivrede;
(s) Ministarstvo turizma;
(t) Ministarstvo zaštite okoliša i prirode;
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(u) Ministarstvo graditeljstva i prostornog uređenja;
(v) Ministarstvo branitelja;
(w) Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih;
(x) Ministarstvo zdravlja;
(y) Ministarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja i sporta;
(z) Ministarstvo kulture;
(a) državne upravne organizacije;
(b) uredi državne uprave u županijama;
(c) Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske;
(d) Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske;
(e) sudovi;
(f) Državno sudbeno vijeće;
(g) državna odvjetništva;
(h) Državnoodvjetničko vijeće;
(i) pravobraniteljstva;
(j) Državna komisija za kontrolu postupaka javne nabave;
(k) Hrvatska narodna banka;
(l) državne agencije i uredi;
(m) Državni ured za reviziju.
(12) ITALY
(a) Purchasing bodies:
(a) Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri;
(b) Ministero degli Affari Esteri;
(c) Ministero dell’Interno;
(d) Ministero della Giustizia e Uffici giudiziari (esclusi i giudici di pace);
(e) Ministero della Difesa;
(f) Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze;
(g) Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico;
(h) Ministero delle Politiche Agricole, Alimentari e Forestali;
(i) Ministero dell’Ambiente, Tutela del Territorio e del Mare;
(j) Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti;
(k) Ministero del Lavoro, della Salute e delle Politiche Sociali;
(l) Ministero dell’Istruzione, Università e Ricerca;
(m) Ministero per i Beni e le Attività culturali, comprensivo delle sue
articolazioni periferiche;
(b) Other national public bodies:
EN 22 EN
(a) CONSIP (Concessionaria Servizi Informatici Pubblici) .
(13) CYPRUS
(a) Προεδρία και Προεδρικό Μέγαρο:
(b) Γραφείο Συντονιστή Εναρμόνισης;
(c) Υπουργικό Συμβούλιο;
(d) Βουλή των Αντιπροσώπων;
(e) Δικαστική Υπηρεσία;
(f) Νομική Υπηρεσία της Δημοκρατίας;
(g) Ελεγκτική Υπηρεσία της Δημοκρατίας;
(h) Επιτροπή Δημόσιας Υπηρεσίας;
(i) Επιτροπή Εκπαιδευτικής Υπηρεσίας;
(j) Γραφείο Επιτρόπου Διοικήσεως;
(k) Επιτροπή Προστασίας Ανταγωνισμού;
(l) Υπηρεσία Εσωτερικού Ελέγχου;
(m) Γραφείο Προγραμματισμού;
(n) Γενικό Λογιστήριο της Δημοκρατίας;
(o) Γραφείο Επιτρόπου Προστασίας Δεδομένων Προσωπικού Χαρακτήρα;
(p) Γραφείο Εφόρου Δημοσίων Ενισχύσεων;
(q) Αναθεωρητική Αρχή Προσφορών;
(r) Υπηρεσία Εποπτείας και Ανάπτυξης Συνεργατικών Εταιρειών;
(s) Αναθεωρητική Αρχή Προσφύγων;
(t) Υπουργείο Άμυνας;
(u) Υπουργείο Γεωργίας, Φυσικών Πόρων και Περιβάλλοντος:
(a) Τμήμα Γεωργίας;
(b) Κτηνιατρικές Υπηρεσίες;
(c) Τμήμα Δασών;
(d) Τμήμα Αναπτύξεως Υδάτων;
(e) Τμήμα Γεωλογικής Επισκόπησης;
(f) Μετεωρολογική Υπηρεσία;
(g) Τμήμα Αναδασμού;
(h) Υπηρεσία Μεταλλείων;
(i) Ινστιτούτο Γεωργικών Ερευνών;
(j) Τμήμα Αλιείας και Θαλάσσιων Ερευνών;
(v) Υπουργείο Δικαιοσύνης και Δημοσίας Τάξεως:
(a) Αστυνομία;
EN 23 EN
(b) Πυροσβεστική Υπηρεσία Κύπρου;
(c) Τμήμα Φυλακών;
(w) Υπουργείο Εμπορίου, Βιομηχανίας και Τουρισμού:
(a) Τμήμα Εφόρου Εταιρειών και Επίσημου Παραλήπτη;
(x) Υπουργείο Εργασίας και Κοινωνικών Ασφαλίσεων:
(a) Τμήμα Εργασίας;
(b) Τμήμα Κοινωνικών Ασφαλίσεων;
(c) Τμήμα Υπηρεσιών Κοινωνικής Ευημερίας;
(d) Κέντρο Παραγωγικότητας Κύπρου;
(e) Ανώτερο Ξενοδοχειακό Ινστιτούτο Κύπρου;
(f) Ανώτερο Τεχνολογικό Ινστιτούτο;
(g) Τμήμα Επιθεώρησης Εργασίας;
(h) Τμήμα Εργασιακών Σχέσεων;
(y) Υπουργείο Εσωτερικών:
(a) Επαρχιακές Διοικήσεις;
(b) Τμήμα Πολεοδομίας και Οικήσεως;
(c) Τμήμα Αρχείου Πληθυσμού και Μεταναστεύσεως;
(d) Τμήμα Κτηματολογίου και Χωρομετρίας;
(e) Γραφείο Τύπου και Πληροφοριών;
(f) Πολιτική Άμυνα;
(g) Υπηρεσία Μέριμνας και Αποκαταστάσεων Εκτοπισθέντων;
(h) Υπηρεσία Ασύλου;
(z) Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών;
(aa) Υπουργείο Οικονομικών:
(a) Τελωνεία;
(b) Τμήμα Εσωτερικών Προσόδων;
(c) Στατιστική Υπηρεσία;
(d) Τμήμα Κρατικών Αγορών και Προμηθειών;
(e) Τμήμα Δημόσιας Διοίκησης και Προσωπικού;
(f) Κυβερνητικό Τυπογραφείο;
(g) Τμήμα Υπηρεσιών Πληροφορικής;
(bb) Υπουργείο Παιδείας και Πολιτισμού;
(cc) Υπουργείο Συγκοινωνιών και Έργων:
(a) Τμήμα Δημοσίων Έργων;
(b) Τμήμα Αρχαιοτήτων;
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(c) Τμήμα Πολιτικής Αεροπορίας;
(d) Τμήμα Εμπορικής Ναυτιλίας;
(e) Τμήμα Οδικών Μεταφορών;
(f) Τμήμα Ηλεκτρομηχανολογικών Υπηρεσιών;
(g) Τμήμα Ηλεκτρονικών Επικοινωνιών;
(dd) Υπουργείο Υγείας:
(a) Φαρμακευτικές Υπηρεσίες;
(b) Γενικό Χημείο;
(c) Ιατρικές Υπηρεσίες και Υπηρεσίες Δημόσιας Υγείας;
(d) Οδοντιατρικές Υπηρεσίες;
(e) Υπηρεσίες Ψυχικής Υγείας.
(14) LATVIA
(a) Ministries, secretariats of ministers for special assignments, and their
subordinate institutions:
(a) Aizsardzības ministrija un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(b) Ārlietu ministrija un tas padotībā esošās iestādes;
(c) Bērnu un ģimenes lietu ministrija un tās padotībā esošas iestādes;
(d) Ekonomikas ministrija un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(e) Finanšu ministrija un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(f) Iekšlietu ministrija un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(g) Izglītības un zinātnes ministrija un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(h) Kultūras ministrija un tas padotībā esošās iestādes;
(i) Labklājības ministrija un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(j) Reģionālās attīstības un pašvaldības lietu ministrija un tās padotībā
esošās iestādes;
(k) Satiksmes ministrija un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(l) Tieslietu ministrija un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(m) Veselības ministrija un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(n) Vides ministrija un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(o) Zemkopības ministrija un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(p) Īpašu uzdevumu ministra sekretariāti un to padotībā esošās iestādes;
(q) Satversmes aizsardzības birojs;
(b) Other state institution:
(a) Augstākā tiesa;
(b) Centrālā vēlēšanu komisija;
(c) Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija;
EN 25 EN
(d) Latvijas Banka;
(e) Prokuratūra un tās pārraudzībā esošās iestādes;
(f) Saeimas kanceleja un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(g) Satversmes tiesa;
(h) Valsts kanceleja un tās padotībā esošās iestādes;
(i) Valsts kontrole;
(j) Valsts prezidenta kanceleja;
(k) Tiesībsarga birojs;
(l) Nacionālā radio un televīzijas padome;
(m) Citas valsts iestādes, kuras nav ministriju padotībā (Other state
institutions not subordinate to ministries).
(15) LITHUANIA
(a) Prezidentūros kanceliarija;
(b) Seimo kanceliarija:
(a) Institutions accountable to the Seimas [Parliament]: Lietuvos mokslo
taryba;
(b) Seimo kontrolierių įstaiga;
(c) Valstybės kontrolė;
(d) Valstybės saugumo departamentas;
(e) Konkurencijos taryba;
(f) Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir rezistencijos tyrimo centras;
(g) Vertybinių popierių komisija;
(h) Ryšių reguliavimo tarnyba;
(i) Nacionalinė sveikatos taryba;
(j) Etninės kultūros globos taryba;
(k) Lygių galimybių kontrolieriaus tarnyba;
(l) Valstybinė kultūros paveldo komisija;
(m) Vaiko teisių apsaugos kontrolieriaus įstaiga;
(n) Valstybinė kainų ir energetikos kontrolės komisija;
(o) Valstybinė lietuvių kalbos komisija;
(p) Vyriausioji rinkimų komisija;
(q) Vyriausioji tarnybinės etikos komisija;
(r) Žurnalistų etikos inspektoriaus tarnyba;
(c) Vyriausybės kanceliarija;
(d) Institutions accountable to the Vyriausybė [Government]:
(a) Ginklų fondas;
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(b) Informacinės visuomenės plėtros komitetas;
(c) Kūno kultūros ir sporto departamentas;
(d) Lietuvos archyvų departamentas;
(e) Mokestinių ginčų komisija;
(f) Statistikos departamentas;
(g) Tautinių mažumų ir išeivijos departamentas;
(h) Valstybinė tabako ir alkoholio kontrolės tarnyba;
(i) Viešųjų pirkimų tarnyba;
(j) Narkotikų kontrolės departamentas;
(k) Valstybinė atominės energetikos saugos inspekcija;
(l) Valstybinė duomenų apsaugos inspekcija;
(m) Valstybinė lošimų priežiūros komisija;
(n) Valstybinė maisto ir veterinarijos tarnyba;
(o) Vyriausioji administracinių ginčų komisija;
(p) Draudimo priežiūros komisija;
(q) Lietuvos valstybinis mokslo ir studijų fondas;
(r) Lietuvių grįžimo į Tėvynę informacijos centras.
(e) Konstitucinis Teismas;
(f) Lietuvos bankas;
(g) Aplinkos ministerija;
(h) Institutions under the Aplinkos ministerija [Ministry of Environment]:
(a) Generalinė miškų urėdija;
(b) Lietuvos geologijos tarnyba;
(c) Lietuvos hidrometeorologijos tarnyba;
(d) Lietuvos standartizacijos departamentas;
(e) Nacionalinis akreditacijos biuras;
(f) Valstybinė metrologijos tarnyba;
(g) Valstybinė saugomų teritorijų tarnyba;
(h) Valstybinė teritorijų planavimo ir statybos inspekcija;
(i) Finansų ministerija;
(j) Institutions under the Finansų ministerija [Ministry of Finance]:
(a) Muitinės departamentas;
(b) Valstybės dokumentų technologinės apsaugos tarnyba;
(c) Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija;
(d) Finansų ministerijos mokymo centras;
EN 27 EN
(k) Krašto apsaugos ministerija;
(l) Institutions under the Krašto apsaugos ministerija [Ministry of National
Defence]:
(a) Antrasis operatyvinių tarnybų departamentas;
(b) Centralizuota finansų ir turto tarnyba;
(c) Karo prievolės administravimo tarnyba;
(d) Krašto apsaugos archyvas;
(e) Krizių valdymo centras;
(f) Mobilizacijos departamentas;
(g) Ryšių ir informacinių sistemų tarnyba;
(h) Infrastruktūros plėtros departamentas;
(i) Valstybinis pilietinio pasipriešinimo rengimo centras;
(m) Lietuvos kariuomenė;
(n) Krašto apsaugos sistemos kariniai vienetai ir tarnybos;
(o) Kultūros ministerija;
(p) Institutions under the Kultūros ministerija [Ministry of Culture]:
(a) Kultūros paveldo departamentas;
(b) Valstybinė kalbos inspekcija;
(q) Socialinės apsaugos ir darbo ministerija;
(r) Institutions under the Socialinės apsaugos ir darbo ministerija [Ministry of
Social Security and Labour]:
(a) Garantinio fondo administracija;
(b) Valstybės vaiko teisių apsaugos ir įvaikinimo tarnyba;
(c) Lietuvos darbo birža;
(d) Lietuvos darbo rinkos mokymo tarnyba;
(e) Trišalės tarybos sekretoriatas;
(f) Socialinių paslaugų priežiūros departamentas;
(g) Darbo inspekcija;
(h) Valstybinio socialinio draudimo fondo valdyba;
(i) Neįgalumo ir darbingumo nustatymo tarnyba;
(j) Ginčų komisija;
(k) Techninės pagalbos neįgaliesiems centras;
(l) Neįgaliųjų reikalų departamentas;
(s) Susisiekimo ministerija;
(t) Institutions under the Susisiekimo ministerija [Ministry of Transport and
Communications]:
EN 28 EN
(a) Lietuvos automobilių kelių direkcija;
(b) Valstybinė geležinkelio inspekcija;
(c) Valstybinė kelių transporto inspekcija;
(d) Pasienio kontrolės punktų direkcija;
(u) Sveikatos apsaugos ministerija;
(v) Institutions under the Sveikatos apsaugos ministerija [Ministry of Health]:
(a) Valstybinė akreditavimo sveikatos priežiūros veiklai tarnyba;
(b) Valstybinė ligonių kasa;
(c) Valstybinė medicininio audito inspekcija;
(d) Valstybinė vaistų kontrolės tarnyba;
(e) Valstybinė teismo psichiatrijos ir narkologijos tarnyba;
(f) Valstybinė visuomenės sveikatos priežiūros tarnyba;
(g) Farmacijos departamentas;
(h) Sveikatos apsaugos ministerijos Ekstremalių sveikatai situacijų centras;
(i) Lietuvos bioetikos komitetas;
(j) Radiacinės saugos centras;
(w) Švietimo ir mokslo ministerija;
(x) Institutions under the Švietimo ir mokslo ministerija [Ministry of Education
and Science]:
(a) Nacionalinis egzaminų centras;
(b) Studijų kokybės vertinimo centras;
(y) Teisingumo ministerija;
(z) Institutions under the Teisingumo ministerija [Ministry of Justice]:
(a) Kalėjimų departamentas;
(b) Nacionalinė vartotojų teisių apsaugos taryba;
(c) Europos teisės departamentas;
(aa) Teisingumo ministerija;
(bb) Institutions under the Teisingumo ministerija [Ministry of Justice]:
(a) Kalėjimų departamentas;
(b) Nacionalinė vartotojų teisių apsaugos taryba;
(c) Europos teisės departamentas;
(cc) Ūkio ministerija;
(dd) Institutions under the Ūkio ministerija [Ministry of Economy]:
(a) Įmonių bankroto valdymo departamentas;
(b) Valstybinė energetikos inspekcija;
(c) Valstybinė ne maisto produktų inspekcija;
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(d) Valstybinis turizmo departamentas;
(ee) Užsienio reikalų ministerija;
(ff) Diplomatinės atstovybės ir konsulinės įstaigos užsienyje bei atstovybės prie
tarptautinių organizacijų;
(gg) Vidaus reikalų ministerija;
(hh) Institutions under the Vidaus reikalų ministerija [Ministry of the Interior]:
(a) Asmens dokumentų išrašymo centras;
(b) Finansinių nusikaltimų tyrimo tarnyba;
(c) Gyventojų registro tarnyba;
(d) Policijos departamentas;
(e) Priešgaisrinės apsaugos ir gelbėjimo departamentas;
(f) Turto valdymo ir ūkio departamentas;
(g) Vadovybės apsaugos departamentas;
(h) Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba;
(i) Valstybės tarnybos departamentas;
(j) Informatikos ir ryšių departamentas;
(k) Migracijos departamentas;
(l) Sveikatos priežiūros tarnyba;
(m) Bendrasis pagalbos centras;
(ii) Žemės ūkio ministerija;
(jj) Institutions under the Žemės ūkio ministerija [Ministry of Agriculture]:
(a) Nacionalinė mokėjimo agentūra;
(b) Nacionalinė žemės tarnyba;
(c) Valstybinė augalų apsaugos tarnyba;
(d) Valstybinė gyvulių veislininkystės priežiūros tarnyba;
(e) Valstybinė sėklų ir grūdų tarnyba;
(f) Žuvininkystės departamentas;
(kk) Teismai [Courts]:
(a) Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas;
(b) Lietuvos apeliacinis teismas;
(c) Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas;
(d) apygardų teismai;apygardų administraciniai teismai;
(e) apylinkių teismai;
(f) Nacionalinė teismų administracija;
(ll) Generalinė prokuratūra;
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(mm) Other Central Public Administration Entities (institucijos [institutions], įstaigos
[establishments], tarnybos [agencies]):
(a) Aplinkos apsaugos agentūra;
(b) Valstybinė aplinkos apsaugos inspekcija;
(c) Aplinkos projektų valdymo agentūra;
(d) Miško genetinių išteklių, sėklų ir sodmenų tarnyba;
(e) Miško sanitarinės apsaugos tarnyba;
(f) Nacionalinis visuomenės sveikatos tyrimų centras;
(g) Lietuvos AIDS centras;
(h) Nacionalinis organų transplantacijos biuras;
(i) Valstybinis patologijos centras;
(j) Valstybinis psichikos sveikatos centras;
(k) Lietuvos sveikatos informacijos centras;
(l) Slaugos darbuotojų tobulinimosi ir specializacijos centras;
(m) Valstybinis aplinkos sveikatos centras;
(n) Respublikinis mitybos centras;
(o) Užkrečiamųjų ligų profilaktikos ir kontrolės centras;
(p) Trakų visuomenės sveikatos priežiūros ir specialistų tobulinimosi
centras;
(q) Visuomenės sveikatos ugdymo centras;
(r) Muitinės kriminalinė tarnyba;
(s) Muitinės informacinių sistemų centras;
(t) Muitinės laboratorija;
(u) Muitinės mokymo centras;
(v) Valstybinis patentų biuras;
(w) Lietuvos teismo ekspertizės centras;
(x) Centrinė hipotekos įstaiga;
(y) Lietuvos metrologijos inspekcija;
(z) Civilinės aviacijos administracija;
(aa) Lietuvos saugios laivybos administracija;
(bb) Transporto investicijų direkcija;
(cc) Valstybinė vidaus vandenų laivybos inspekcija;
(dd) Pabėgėlių priėmimo centras.
(16) LUXEMBOURG
(a) Ministère d’Etat;
(b) Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de l’Immigration;
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(c) Ministère de l’Agriculture, de la Viticulture et du Développement Rural;
(d) Ministère des Classes moyennes, du Tourisme et du Logement;
(e) Ministère de la Culture, de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche;
(f) Ministère de l’Economie et du Commerce extérieur;
(g) Ministère de l’Education nationale et de la Formation professionnelle;
(h) Ministère de l’Egalité des chances;
(i) Ministère de l’Environnement;
(j) Ministère de la Famille et de l’Intégration;
(k) Ministère des Finances;
(l) Ministère de la Fonction publique et de la Réforme administrative;
(m) Ministère de l’Intérieur et de l’Aménagement du territoire;
(n) Ministère de la Justice;
(o) Ministère de la Santé;
(p) Ministère de la Sécurité sociale;
(q) Ministère des Transports;
(r) Ministère du Travail et de l’Emploi;
(s) Ministère des Travaux publics.
(17) HUNGARY
(a) Egészségügyi Minisztérium;
(b) Földművelésügyi és Vidékfejlesztési Minisztérium;
(c) Gazdasági és Közlekedési Minisztérium;
(d) Honvédelmi Minisztérium;
(e) Igazságügyi és Rendészeti Minisztérium;
(f) Környezetvédelmi és Vízügyi Minisztérium;
(g) Külügyminisztérium;
(h) Miniszterelnöki Hivatal;
(i) Oktatási és Kulturális Minisztérium;
(j) Önkormányzati és Területfejlesztési Minisztérium;
(k) Pénzügyminisztérium;
(l) Szociális és Munkaügyi Minisztérium;
(m) Központi Szolgáltatási Főigazgatóság.
(18) MALTA
(a) Uffiċċju tal-Prim Ministru (Office of the Prime Minister);
(b) Ministeru għall-Familja u Solidarjeta' Soċjali (Ministry for the Family and
Social Solidarity);
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(c) Ministeru ta' l-Edukazzjoni Zghazagh u Impjieg (Ministry for Education Youth
and Employment);
(d) Ministeru tal-Finanzi (Ministry of Finance);
(e) Ministeru tar-Riżorsi u l-Infrastruttura (Ministry for Resources and
Infrastructure);
(f) Ministeru tat-Turiżmu u Kultura (Ministry for Tourism and Culture);
(g) Ministeru tal-Ġustizzja u l-Intern (Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs);
(h) Ministeru għall-Affarijiet Rurali u l-Ambjent (Ministry for Rural Affairs and
the Environment);
(i) Ministeru għal Għawdex (Ministry for Gozo);
(j) Ministeru tas-Saħħa, l-Anzjani u Kura fil-Kommunita' (Ministry of Health, the
Elderly and Community Care);
(k) Ministeru ta' l-Affarijiet Barranin (Ministry of Foreign Affairs);
(l) Ministeru għall-Investimenti, Industrija u Teknologija ta' Informazzjoni
(Ministry for Investment, Industry and Information Technology);
(m) Ministeru għall-Kompetittivà u Komunikazzjoni (Ministry for Competitiveness
and Communications);
(n) Ministeru għall-Iżvilupp Urban u Toroq (Ministry for Urban Development and
Roads).
(19) NETHERLANDS
(a) Ministerie van Algemene Zaken:
(a) Bestuursdepartement;
(b) Bureau van de Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid;
(c) Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst;
(b) Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties
Bestuursdepartement:
(a) Centrale Archiefselectiedienst (CAS);
(b) Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD);
(c) Agentschap Basisadministratie Persoonsgegevens en Reisdocumenten
(BPR);
(d) Agentschap Korps;
(e) Landelijke Politiediensten;
(c) Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken:
(a) Directoraat-generaal Regiobeleid en Consulaire Zaken (DGRC);
(b) Directoraat-generaal Politieke Zaken (DGPZ);
(c) Directoraat-generaal Internationale Samenwerking (DGIS);
(d) Directoraat-generaal Europese Samenwerking (DGES);
(e) Centrum tot Bevordering van de Import uit Ontwikkelingslanden (CBI);
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(f) Centrale diensten ressorterend onder S/PlvS (Support services falling
under the Secretary-general and Deputy Secretary- general);
(g) Buitenlandse Posten (ieder afzonderlijk);
(d) Ministerie van Defensie — (Ministry of Defence):
(a) Bestuursdepartement;
(b) Commando Diensten Centra (CDC);
(c) Defensie Telematica Organisatie (DTO);
(d) Centrale directie van de Defensie Vastgoed Dienst
(e) De afzonderlijke regionale directies van de Defensie Vastgoed Dienst;
(f) Defensie Materieel Organisatie (DMO);
(g) Landelijk Bevoorradingsbedrijf van de Defensie Materieel Organisatie;
(h) Logistiek Centrum van de Defensie Materieel Organisatie
(i) Marinebedrijf van de Defensie Materieel Organisatie;
(j) Defensie Pijpleiding Organisatie (DPO);
(e) Ministerie van Economische Zaken:
(a) Bestuursdepartement;
(b) Centraal Planbureau (CPB);
(c) SenterNovem;
(d) Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen (SodM);
(e) Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa);
(f) Economische Voorlichtingsdienst (EVD);
(g) Agentschap Telecom Kenniscentrum Professioneel & Innovatief
Aanbesteden, Netwerk voor Overheidsopdrachtgevers (PIANOo);
(h) Regiebureau Inkoop Rijksoverheid;
(i) Octrooicentrum Nederland;
(j) Consumentenautoriteit;
(f) Ministerie van Financiën:
(a) Bestuursdepartement;
(b) Belastingdienst Automatiseringscentrum;
(c) Belastingdienst;
(d) de afzonderlijke Directies der Rijksbelastingen (the various Divisions of
the Tax and Customs Administration throughout the Netherlands);
(e) Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst (incl. Economische Controle
dienst (ECD))
(f) Belastingdienst Opleidingen;
(g) Dienst der Domeinen;
(g) Ministerie van Justitie:
EN 34 EN
(a) Bestuursdepartement;
(b) Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen;
(c) Raad voor de Kinderbescherming;
(d) Centraal Justitie Incasso Bureau;
(e) Openbaar Ministerie;
(f) Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst;
(g) Nederlands Forensisch Instituut;
(h) Dienst Terugkeer & Vertrek;
(h) Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit:
(a) Bestuursdepartement;
(b) Dienst Regelingen (DR);
(c) Agentschap Plantenziektenkundige Dienst (PD);
(d) Algemene Inspectiedienst (AID);
(e) Dienst Landelijk Gebied (DLG);
(f) Voedsel en Waren Autoriteit (VWA);
(i) Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen:
(a) Bestuursdepartement;
(b) Inspectie van het Onderwijs;
(c) Erfgoedinspectie;
(d) Centrale Financiën Instellingen;
(e) Nationaal Archief;
(f) Adviesraad voor Wetenschaps- en Technologiebeleid;
(g) Onderwijsraad;
(h) Raad voor Cultuur;
(j) Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid:
(a) Bestuursdepartement;
(b) Inspectie Werk en Inkomen Agentschap SZW;
(k) Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat:
(a) Bestuursdepartement;
(b) Directoraat-Generaal Transport en Luchtvaart;
(c) Directoraat-generaal Personenvervoer;
(d) Directoraat-generaal Water;
(e) Centrale diensten (Central Services);
(f) Shared services Organisatie Verkeer en Watersaat;
(g) Koninklijke Nederlandse Meteorologisch Instituut KNMI;
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(h) Rijkswaterstaat, Bestuur De afzonderlijke regionale Diensten van
Rijkswaterstaat (Each individual regional service of the Directorate-
general of Public Works and Water Management);
(i) De afzonderlijke specialistische diensten van Rijkswaterstaat (Each
individual specialist service of the Directorate- general of Public Works
and Water Management);
(j) Adviesdienst Geo-Informatie en ICT;
(k) Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer (AVV);
(l) Bouwdienst;
(m) Corporate Dienst;
(n) Data ICT Dienst;
(o) Dienst Verkeer en Scheepvaart;
(p) Dienst Weg- en Waterbouwkunde (DWW);
(q) Rijksinstituut voor Kunst en Zee (RIKZ);
(r) Rijksinstituut voor Integraal Zoetwaterbeheer en Afvalwaterbehandeling
(RIZA);
(s) Waterdienst;
(t) Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat, Hoofddirectie;
(u) Port state Control;
(v) Directie Toezichtontwikkeling Communicatie en Onderzoek (TCO);
(w) Toezichthouder Beheer Eenheid Lucht;
(x) Toezichthouder Beheer Eenheid Water;
(y) Toezichthouder Beheer Eenheid Land;
(l) Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer
Bestuursdepartement:
(a) Directoraat-generaal Wonen, Wijken en Integratie;
(b) Directoraat-generaal Ruimte;
(c) Directoraat-generaal Milieubeheer;
(d) Rijksgebouwendienst;
(e) VROM Inspectie;
(m) Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport:
(a) Bestuursdepartement;
(b) Inspectie Gezondheidsbescherming, Waren en Veterinaire Zaken;
(c) Inspectie Gezondheidszorg;
(d) Inspectie Jeugdhulpverlening en Jeugdbescherming;
(e) Rijksinstituut voor de Volksgezondheid en Milieu (RIVM);
(f) Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau;
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(g) Agentschap t.b.v. het College ter Beoordeling van Geneesmiddelen;
(n) Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal;
(o) Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal;
(p) Raad van State;
(q) Algemene Rekenkamer;
(r) Nationale Ombudsman;
(s) Kanselarij der Nederlandse Orden;
(t) Kabinet der Koningin;
(u) Raad voor de rechtspraak en de Rechtbanken.
(20) AUSTRIA
(a) Bundeskanzleramt;
(b) Bundesministerium für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten;
(c) Bundesministerium für Finanzen;
(d) Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, Familie und Jugend;
(e) Bundesministerium für Inneres Bundesministerium für Justiz;
(f) Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung;
(g) Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und
Wasserwirtschaft;
(h) Bundesministerium für Soziales und Konsumentenschutz;
(i) Bundesministerium für Unterricht, Kunst und Kultur;
(j) Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie;
(k) Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit;
(l) Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Forschung;
(m) Österreichische Forschungs- und Prüfzentrum Arsenal Gesellschaft m.b.H;
(n) Bundesbeschaffung G.m.b.H;
(o) Bundesrechenzentrum G.m.b.H.
(21) POLAND
(a) Kancelaria Prezydenta RP;
(b) Kancelaria Sejmu RP Kancelaria Senatu RP Kancelaria Prezesa Rady
Ministrów;
(c) Sąd Najwyższy;
(d) Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny;
(e) Wojewódzkie sądy administracyjne;
(f) Sądy powszechne — rejonowe, okręgowe i apelacyjne;
(g) Trybunał Konstytucyjny;
(h) Najwyższa Izba Kontroli;
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(i) Biuro Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich;
(j) Biuro Rzecznika Praw Dziecka;
(k) Biuro Ochrony Rządu;
(l) Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego;
(m) Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne;
(n) Ministerstwo Pracy i Polityki Społecznej;
(o) Ministerstwo Finansów;
(p) Ministerstwo Gospodarki;
(q) Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego;
(r) Ministerstwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego;
(s) Ministerstwo Edukacji Narodowej;
(t) Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej;
(u) Ministerstwo Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa;
(v) Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości;
(w) Ministerstwo Infrastruktury;
(x) Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego;
(y) Ministerstwo Środowiska;
(z) Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji;
(aa) Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych;
(bb) Ministerstwo Zdrowia;
(cc) Ministerstwo Sportu i Turystyki;
(dd) Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej;
(ee) Urząd Patentowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej;
(ff) Urząd Regulacji Energetyki;
(gg) Urząd do Spraw Kombatantów i Osób Represjonowanych;
(hh) Urząd Transportu Kolejowego;
(ii) Urząd Dozoru Technicznego;
(jj) (Urząd Rejestracji Produktów Leczniczych, Wyrobów Medycznych i
Produktów Biobójczych;
(kk) Urząd do Spraw Repatriacji i Cudzoziemców Urząd Zamówień Publicznych;
(ll) Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i KonsumentówUrząd Lotnictwa Cywilnego;
(mm) Urząd Komunikacji Elektronicznej;
(nn) Wyższy Urząd Górniczy;
(oo) Główny Urząd Miar;
(pp) Główny Urząd Geodezji i Kartografii;
(qq) Główny Urząd Nadzoru Budowlanego;
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(rr) Główny Urząd Statystyczny;
(ss) Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji;
(tt) Generalny Inspektor Ochrony Danych Osobowych;
(uu) Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza;
(vv) Państwowa Inspekcja Pracy Rządowe Centrum Legislacji;
(ww) Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia Polska Akademia Nauk;
(xx) Polskie Centrum Akredytacji;
(yy) Polskie Centrum Badań i Certyfikacji;
(zz) Polska Organizacja Turystyczna;
(aaa) Polski Komitet Normalizacyjny;
(bbb) Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych;
(ccc) Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego;
(ddd) Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych;
(eee) Kasa Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia Społecznego Generalna Dyrekcja Dróg
Krajowych i Autostrad;
(fff) Państwowa Inspekcja Ochrony Roślin i Nasiennictwa;
(ggg) Komenda Główna Państwowej Straży Pożarnej;
(hhh) Komenda Główna Policji;
(iii) Komenda Główna Straży Granicznej;
(jjj) Inspekcja Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych;
(kkk) Główny Inspektorat Ochrony Środowiska;
(lll) Główny Inspektorat Transportu Drogowego;
(mmm) Główny Inspektorat Farmaceutyczny;
(nnn) Główny Inspektorat Sanitarny;
(ooo) Główny Inspektorat Weterynarii;
(ppp) Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego;
(qqq) Agencja Wywiadu;
(rrr) Agencja Mienia Wojskowego;
(sss) Wojskowa Agencja Mieszkaniowa;
(ttt) Agencja Restrukturyzacji i Modernizacji Rolnictwa;
(uuu) Agencja Rynku Rolnego;
(vvv) Agencja Nieruchomości Rolnych;
(www) Państwowa Agencja Atomistyki;
(xxx) Polska Agencja Żeglugi Powietrznej;
(yyy) Polska Agencja Rozwiązywania Problemów Alkoholowych;
(zzz) Agencja Rezerw Materiałowych;
EN 39 EN
(aaaa) Narodowy Bank Polski;
(bbbb) Narodowy Fundusz Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej;
(cccc) Państwowy Fundusz Rehabilitacji Osób Niepełnosprawnych;
(dddd) Instytut Pamięci Narodowej — Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko
Narodowi Polskiemu Rada Ochrony;
(eeee) Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa;
(ffff) Służba Celna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej;
(gggg) Państwowe Gospodarstwo Leśne ‘Lasy Państwowe’;
(hhhh) Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości;
(iiii) Urzędy wojewódzkie;
(jjjj) Samodzielne Publiczne Zakłady Opieki Zdrowotnej, jeśli ich organem
założycielskim jest minister, centralny organ administracji rządowej lub
wojewoda.
(22) PORTUGAL
(a) Presidência do Conselho de Ministros;
(b) Ministério das Finanças e da Administração Pública;
(c) Ministério da Defesa Nacional;
(d) Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros;
(e) Ministério da Administração Interna;
(f) Ministério da Justiça;
(g) Ministério da Economia e da Inovação;
(h) Ministério da Agricultura, Desenvolvimento Rural e Pescas;
(i) Ministério da Educação Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e do Ensino
Superior;
(j) Ministério da Cultura;
(k) Ministério da Saúde;
(l) Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social;
(m) Ministério das Obras Públicas, Transportes e Comunicações;
(n) Ministério do Ambiente, do Ordenamento do Território e do Desenvolvimento
Regional;
(o) Presidença da Republica;
(p) Tribunal Constitucional;
(q) Tribunal de Contas;
(r) Provedoria de Justiça.
(23) ROMANIA
(a) Administrația Prezidențială;
(b) Senatul României;
EN 40 EN
(c) Camera Deputaților;
(d) Inalta Curte de Casație și Justiție;
(e) Curtea Constituțională;
(f) Consiliul Legislativ;
(g) Curtea de Conturi;
(h) Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii;
(i) Parchetul de pe lângă Inalta Curte de Casație și Justiție;
(j) Secretariatul General al Guvernului;
(k) Cancelaria primului ministru;
(l) Ministerul Afacerilor Externe;
(m) Ministerul Economiei și Finanțelor;
(n) Ministerul Justiției;
(o) Ministerul Apărării;
(p) Ministerul Internelor și Reformei Administrative;
(q) Ministerul Muncii, Familiei și Egalității de Șanse;
(r) Ministerul pentru Intreprinderi Mici și Mijlocii, Comerț, Turism și Profesii
Liberale;
(s) Ministerul Agriculturii și Dezvoltării Rurale;
(t) Ministerul Transporturilor;
(u) Ministerul Dezvoltării, Lucrărilor Publice și Locuinței;
(v) Ministerul Educației Cercetării și Tineretului;
(w) Ministerul Sănătății Publice;
(x) Ministerul Culturii și Cultelor;
(y) Ministerul Comunicațiilor și Tehnologiei Informației;
(z) Ministerul Mediului și Dezvoltării Durabile;
(aa) Serviciul Român de Informații;
(bb) Serviciul de Informații Externe;
(cc) Serviciul de Protecție și Pază;
(dd) Serviciul de Telecomunicații Speciale;
(ee) Consiliul Național al Audiovizualului;
(ff) Consiliul Concurenței (CC);
(gg) Direcția Națională Anticorupție;
(hh) Inspectoratul General de Poliție;
(ii) Autoritatea Națională pentru Reglementarea și Monitorizarea Achizițiilor
Publice;
(jj) Consiliul Național de Soluționare a Contestațiilor;
EN 41 EN
(kk) Autoritatea Națională de Reglementare pentru Serviciile Comunitare de
Utilități Publice (ANRSC);
(ll) Autoritatea Națională Sanitară Veterinară și pentru Siguranța Alimentelor;
(mm) Autoritatea Națională pentru Protecția Consumatorilor;
(nn) Autoritatea Navală Română;
(oo) Autoritatea Feroviară Română;
(pp) Autoritatea Rutieră Română;
(qq) Autoritatea Națională pentru Protecția Drepturilor Copilului;
(rr) Autoritatea Națională pentru Persoanele cu Handicap;
(ss) Autoritatea Națională pentru Turism;
(tt) Autoritatea Națională pentru Restituirea Proprietăților;
(uu) Autoritatea Națională pentru Tineret;
(vv) Autoritatea Națională pentru Cercetare Științifică;
(ww) Autoritatea Națională pentru Reglementare în Comunicații și Tehnologia
Informației;
(xx) Autoritatea Națională pentru Serviciile Societății Informaționale;
(yy) Autoritatea Electorală Permanente;
(zz) Agenția pentru Strategii Guvernamentale;
(aaa) Agenția Națională a Medicamentului;
(bbb) Agenția Națională pentru Sport;
(ccc) Agenția Națională pentru Ocuparea Forței de Muncă;
(ddd) Agenția Națională de Reglementare în Domeniul Energiei;
(eee) Agenția Română pentru Conservarea Energiei;
(fff) Agenția Națională pentru Resurse Minerale;
(ggg) Agenția Română pentru Investiții Străine;
(hhh) Agenția Națională pentru Întreprinderi Mici și Mijlocii și Cooperație;
(iii) Agenția Națională a Funcționarilor Publici;
(jjj) Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală;
(kkk) Agenția de Compensare pentru Achiziții de Tehnică Specială;
(lll) Agenția Națională Anti-doping;
(mmm) Agenția Nucleară;
(nnn) Agenția Națională pentru Protecția Familiei;
(ooo) Agenția Națională pentru Egalitatea de Șanse între Bărbați și Femei;
(ppp) Agenția Națională pentru Protecția Mediului;
(qqq) Agenția națională Antidrog.
(24) SLOVENIA
EN 42 EN
(a) Predsednik Republike Slovenije;
(b) Državni zbor Republike Slovenije;
(c) Državni svet Republike Slovenije;
(d) Varuh človekovih pravic;
(e) Ustavno sodišče Republike Slovenije;
(f) Računsko sodišče Republike Slovenije;
(g) Državna revizijska komisja za revizijo postopkov oddaje javnih naročil;
(h) Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti;
(i) Vladne službe;
(j) Ministrstvo za finance;
(k) Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve;
(l) Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve;
(m) Ministrstvo za obrambo;
(n) Ministrstvo za pravosodje;
(o) Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo;
(p) Ministrstvo za kmetijstvo, gozdarstvo in prehrano;
(q) Ministrstvo za promet;
(r) Ministrstvo za okolje in prostor;
(s) Ministrstvo za delo, družino in socialne zadeve;
(t) Ministrstvo za zdravje;
(u) Ministrstvo za javno upravo;
(v) Ministrstvo za šolstvo in šport;
(w) Ministrstvo za visoko šolstvo, znanost in tehnologijo;
(x) Ministrstvo za kulturo;
(y) Vrhovno sodišče Republike Slovenije višja sodišča okrožna sodišča okrajna
sodišča;
(z) Vrhovno državno tožilstvo Republike Slovenije;
(aa) Okrožna državna tožilstva;
(bb) Državno pravobranilstvo;
(cc) Upravno sodišče Republike Slovenije Višje delovno in socialno sodišče
delovna sodišča;
(dd) Davčna uprava Republike Slovenije;
(ee) Carinska uprava Republike Slovenije;
(ff) Urad Republike Slovenije za preprečevanje pranja denarja;
(gg) Urad Republike Slovenije za nadzor prirejanja iger na srečo;
(hh) Uprava Republike Slovenije za javna plačila;
EN 43 EN
(ii) Urad Republike Slovenije za nadzor proračuna;
(jj) Policija;
(kk) Inšpektorat Republike Slovenije za notranje zadeve;
(ll) Generalštab Slovenske vojske;
(mm) Uprava Republike Slovenije za zaščito in reševanje;
(nn) Inšpektorat Republike Slovenije za obrambo;
(oo) Inšpektorat Republike Slovenije za varstvo pred naravnimi in drugimi
nesrečami;
(pp) Uprava Republike Slovenije za izvrševanje kazenskih sankcij;
(qq) Urad Republike Slovenije za varstvo konkurence;
(rr) Urad Republike Slovenije za varstvo potrošnikov;
(ss) Tržni inšpektorat Republike Slovenije;
(tt) Urad Republike Slovenije za intelektualno lastnino;
(uu) Inšpektorat Republike Slovenije za elektronske komunikacije, elektronsko
podpisovanje in pošto;
(vv) Inšpektorat za energetiko in rudarstvo;
(ww) Agencija Republike Slovenije za kmetijske trge in razvoj podeželja;
(xx) Inšpektorat Republike Slovenije za kmetijstvo, gozdarstvo in hrano;
(yy) Fitosanitarna uprava Republike Slovenije;
(zz) Veterinarska uprava Republike Slovenije;
(aaa) Uprava Republike Slovenije za pomorstvo;
(bbb) Direkcija Republike Slovenije za caste;
(ccc) Prometni inšpektorat Republike Slovenije;
(ddd) Direkcija za vodenje investicij v javno železniško infrastrukturo;
(eee) Agencija Republike Slovenije za okolje;
(fff) Geodetska uprava Republike Slovenije;
(ggg) Uprava Republike Slovenije za jedrsko varstvo;
(hhh) Inšpektorat Republike Slovenije za okolje in prostor;
(iii) Inšpektorat Republike Slovenije za delo;
(jjj) Zdravstveni inšpektorat;
(kkk) Urad Republike Slovenije za kemikalije;
(lll) Uprava Republike Slovenije za varstvo pred sevanji;
(mmm) Urad Republike Slovenije za meroslovje;
(nnn) Urad za visoko šolstvo;
(ooo) Urad Republike Slovenije za mladino;
(ppp) Inšpektorat Republike Slovenije za šolstvo in šport;
EN 44 EN
(qqq) Arhiv Republike Slovenije;
(rrr) Inšpektorat Republike Slovenije za kulturo in medije;
(sss) Kabinet predsednika Vlade Republike Slovenije;
(ttt) Generalni sekretariat Vlade Republike Slovenije;
(uuu) Služba vlade za zakonodajo;
(vvv) Služba vlade za evropske zadeve;
(www) Služba vlade za lokalno samoupravo in regionalno politiko;
(xxx) Urad vlade za komuniciranje;
(yyy) Urad za enake možnosti;
(zzz) Urad za verske skupnosti;
(aaaa) Urad za narodnosti;
(bbbb) Urad za makroekonomske analize in razvoj;
(cccc) Statistični urad Republike Slovenije;
(dddd) Slovenska obveščevalno-varnostna agencija;
(eeee) Protokol Republike Slovenije;
(ffff) Urad za varovanje tajnih podatkov;
(gggg) Urad za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu;
(hhhh) Služba Vlade Republike Slovenije za razvoj;
(iiii) Informacijski pooblaščenec;
(jjjj) Državna volilna komisija.
(25) SLOVAKIA
Ministries and other central government authorities as referred to in Act No. 575/2001 Coll.
on the structure of activities of the Government and central state administration authorities in
wording of later regulations:
(a) Kancelária Prezidenta Slovenskej republiky;
(b) Národná rada Slovenskej republiky;
(c) Ministerstvo hospodárstva Slovenskej republiky;
(d) Ministerstvo financií Slovenskej republiky;
(e) Ministerstvo dopravy, pôšt a telekomunikácií Slovenskej republiky;
(f) Ministerstvo pôdohospodárstva Slovenskej republiky;
(g) Ministerstvo výstavby a regionálneho rozvoja Slovenskej republiky;
(h) Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky;
(i) Ministerstvo obrany Slovenskej republiky;
(j) Ministerstvo spravodlivosti Slovenskej republiky;
(k) Ministerstvo zahraničných vecí Slovenskej republiky;
(l) Ministerstvo práce, sociálnych vecí a rodiny Slovenskej republiky;
EN 45 EN
(m) Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky
(n) Ministerstvo školstva Slovenskej republiky;
(o) Ministerstvo kultúry Slovenskej republiky;
(p) Ministerstvo zdravotníctva Slovenskej republiky;
(q) Úrad vlády Slovenskej republiky;
(r) Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky;
(s) Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky;
(t) Úrad geodézie, kartografie a katastra Slovenskej republiky;
(u) Úrad jadrového dozoru Slovenskej republiky;
(v) Úrad pre normalizáciu, metrológiu a skúšobníctvo Slovenskej republiky;
(w) Úrad pre verejné obstarávanie;
(x) Úrad priemyselného vlastníctva Slovenskej republiky;
(y) Správa štátnych hmotných rezerv Slovenskej republiky;
(z) Národný bezpečnostný úrad;
(aa) Ústavný súd Slovenskej republiky;
(bb) Najvyšši súd Slovenskej republiky;
(cc) Generálna prokuratura Slovenskej republiky;
(dd) Najvyšši kontrolný úrad Slovenskej republiky;
(ee) Telekomunikačný úrad Slovenskej republiky;
(ff) Úrad priemyselného vlastníctva Slovenskej republiky;
(gg) Úrad pre finančný trh;
(hh) Úrad na ochranu osobn ý ch udajov;
(ii) Kancelária verejneho ochranu prav.
(26) FINLAND
(a) Oikeuskanslerinvirasto — Justitiekanslersämbetet;
(b) Liikenne- ja viestintäministeriö — Kommunikationsministeriet:
(a) Ajoneuvohallintokeskus AKE — Fordonsförvaltningscentralen AKE;
(b) Ilmailuhallinto — Luftfartsförvaltningen;
(c) Ilmatieteen laitos — Meteorologiska institutet;
(d) Merenkulkulaitos — Sjöfartsverket;
(e) Merentutkimuslaitos — Havsforskningsinstitutet;
(f) Ratahallintokeskus RHK — Banförvaltningscentralen RHK;
(g) Rautatievirasto — Järnvägsverket;
(h) Tiehallinto — Vägförvaltningen;
(i) Viestintävirasto — Kommunikationsverket;
EN 46 EN
(c) Maa- ja metsätalousministeriö — Jord- och skogsbruksministeriet:
(a) Elintarviketurvallisuusvirasto — Livsmedelssäkerhetsverket;
(b) Maanmittauslaitos — Lantmäteriverket;
(c) Maaseutuvirasto — Landsbygdsverket;
(d) Oikeusministeriö — Justitieministeriet:
(a) Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto — Dataombudsmannens byrå;
(b) Tuomioistuimet — Domstolar;
(c) Korkein oikeus — Högsta domstolen;
(d) Korkein hallinto-oikeus — Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen;
(e) Hovioikeudet — Hovrätter;
(f) Käräjäoikeudet — Tingsrätter;
(g) Hallinto-oikeudet –Förvaltningsdomstolar;
(h) Markkinaoikeus — Marknadsdomstolen;
(i) Työtuomioistuin — Arbetsdomstolen;
(j) Vakuutusoikeus — Försäkringsdomstolen;
(k) Kuluttajariitalautakunta — Konsumenttvistenämnden;
(l) Vankeinhoitolaitos — Fångvårdsväsendet;
(m) HEUNI — Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien yhteydessä toimiva Euroopan
kriminaalipolitiikan instituutti — HEUNI — Europeiska institutet för
kriminalpolitik, verksamt i anslutning till Förenta nationerna;
(n) Konkurssiasiamiehen toimisto — Konkursombudsmannens byrå;
(o) Kuluttajariitalautakunta — Konsumenttvistenämnden;
(p) Oikeushallinnon palvelukeskus — Justitieförvaltningens servicecentral;
(q) Oikeushallinnon tietotekniikkakeskus — Justitieförvaltningens
datateknikcentral;
(r) Oikeuspoliittinen tutkimuslaitos (Optula) — Rättspolitiska
forskningsinstitutet;
(s) Oikeusrekisterikeskus — Rättsregistercentralen;
(t) Onnettomuustutkintakeskus — Centralen för undersökning av olyckor;
(u) Rikosseuraamusvirasto — Brottspåföljdsverket;
(v) Rikosseuraamusalan koulutuskeskus — Brottspåföljdsområdets
utbildningscentral;
(w) Rikoksentorjuntaneuvosto — Rådet för brottsförebyggande;
(x) Saamelaiskäräjät — Sametinget;
(y) Valtakunnansyyttäjänvirasto — Riksåklagarämbetet;
(z) Vankeinhoitolaitos — Fångvårdsväsendet;
(e) Opetusministeriö — Undervisningsministeriet:
EN 47 EN
(a) Opetushallitus — Utbildningsstyrelsen;
(b) Valtion elokuvatarkastamo — Statens filmgranskningsbyrå;
(f) Puolustusministeriö — Försvarsministeriet:
(a) Puolustusvoimat — Försvarsmakten;
(g) Sisäasiainministeriö — Inrikesministeriet:
(a) Väestörekisterikeskus — Befolkningsregistercentralen;
(b) Keskusrikospoliisi — Centralkriminalpolisen;
(c) Liikkuva poliisi — Rörliga polisen;
(d) Rajavartiolaitos — Gränsbevakningsväsendet;
(e) Lääninhallitukset — Länstyrelserna;
(f) Suojelupoliisi — Skyddspolisen;
(g) Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu — Polisyrkeshögskolan;
(h) Poliisin tekniikkakeskus — Polisens teknikcentral;
(i) Poliisin tietohallintokeskus — Polisens datacentral;
(j) Helsingin kihlakunnan poliisilaitos — Polisinrättningen i Helsingfors;
(k) Pelastusopisto — Räddningsverket;
(l) Hätäkeskuslaitos — Nödcentralsverket;
(m) Maahanmuuttovirasto — Migrationsverket;
(n) Sisäasiainhallinnon palvelukeskus — Inrikesförvaltningens
servicecentral;
(o) Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö — Social- och hälsovårdsministeriet;
(p) Työttömyysturvan muutoksenhakulautakunta — Besvärsnämnden för
utkomstskyddsärenden;
(q) Sosiaaliturvan muutoksenhakulautakunta — Besvärsnämnden för social
trygghet;
(r) Lääkelaitos — Läkemedelsverket;
(s) Terveydenhuollon oikeusturvakeskus — Rättsskyddscentralen för
hälsovården;
(t) Säteilyturvakeskus — Strålsäkerhetscentralen;
(u) Kansanterveyslaitos — Folkhälsoinstitutet;
(v) Lääkehoidon kehittämiskeskus ROHTO — Utvecklingscentralen för
läkemedelsbe-handling;
(w) Sosiaali- ja terveydenhuollon tuotevalvontakeskus — Social- och
hälsovårdens produkttillsynscentral;
(x) Sosiaali- ja terveysalan tutkimus- ja kehittämiskeskus Stakes —
Forsknings- och utvecklingscentralen för social- och hälsovården Stakes;
(y) Vakuutusvalvontavirasto — Försäkringsinspektionen;
EN 48 EN
(z) Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö — Arbets- och näringsministeriet;
(aa) Kuluttajavirasto — Konsumentverket;
(bb) Kilpailuvirasto — Konkurrensverket;
(cc) Patentti- ja rekisterihallitus — Patent- och registerstyrelsen;
(dd) Valtakunnansovittelijain toimisto — Riksförlikningsmännens byrå;
(ee) Valtion turvapaikanhakijoiden vastaanottokeskukset – Statliga
förläggningar för asylsökande;
(ff) Energiamarkkinavirasto - Energimarknadsverket;
(gg) Geologian tutkimuskeskus — Geologiska forskningscentralen;
(hh) Huoltovarmuuskeskus — Försörjningsberedskapscentralen;
(ii) Kuluttajatutkimuskeskus — Konsumentforskningscentralen;
(jj) Matkailun edistämiskeskus (MEK) — Centralen för turistfrämjande;
(kk) Mittatekniikan keskus (MIKES) — Mätteknikcentralen;
(ll) Tekes — teknologian ja innovaatioiden kehittämiskeskus -Tekes —
utvecklingscentralen för teknologi och innovationer;
(mm) Turvatekniikan keskus (TUKES) — Säkerhetsteknikcentralen;
(nn) Valtion teknillinen tutkimuskeskus (VTT) — Statens tekniska
forskningscentral;
(oo) Syrjintälautakunta — Nationella diskrimineringsnämnden;
(pp) Työneuvosto — Arbetsrådet;
(qq) Vähemmistövaltuutetun toimisto — Minoritetsombudsmannens byrå;
(h) Ulkoasiainministeriö — Utrikesministeriet;
(i) Valtioneuvoston kanslia — Statsrådets kansli;
(j) Valtiovarainministeriö — Finansministeriet:
(a) Valtiokonttori — Statskontoret;
(b) Verohallinto — Skatteförvaltningen;
(c) Tullilaitos — Tullverket;
(d) Tilastokeskus — Statistikcentralen;
(e) Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus — Statens ekonomiska
forskningscentral;
(k) Ympäristöministeriö — Miljöministeriet:
(a) Suomen ympäristökeskus — Finlands miljöcentral;
(b) Asumisen rahoitus- ja kehityskeskus — Finansierings- och
utvecklingscentralen för boendet Valtiontalouden tarkastusvirasto —
Statens revisionsverk.
(27) SWEDEN
A:
EN 49 EN
(a) Affärsverket svenska kraftnät;
(b) Akademien för de fria konsterna;
(c) Alkohol- och läkemedelssortiments-nämnden;
(d) Allmänna pensionsfonden;
(e) Allmänna reklamationsnämnden;
(f) Ambassader;
(g) Ansvarsnämnd, statens;
(h) Arbetsdomstolen;
(i) Arbetsförmedlingen;
(j) Arbetsgivarverk, statens;
(k) Arbetslivsinstitutet;
(l) Arbetsmiljöverket;
(m) Arkitekturmuseet;
(n) Arrendenämnder;
(o) Arvsfondsdelegationen;
(p) Arvsfondsdelegationen;
B:
(a) Banverket;
(b) Barnombudsmannen;
(c) Beredning för utvärdering av medicinsk metodik, statens;
(d) Bergsstaten;
(e) Biografbyrå, statens;
(f) Biografiskt lexikon, svenskt;
(g) Birgittaskolan;
(h) Blekinge tekniska högskola;
(i) Bokföringsnämnden;
(j) Bolagsverket;
(k) Bostadsnämnd, statens;
(l) Bostadskreditnämnd, statens;
(m) Boverket;
(n) Brottsförebyggande rådet;
(o) Brottsoffermyndigheten;
C:
(a) Centrala studiestödsnämnden
D:
EN 50 EN
(a) Danshögskolan;
(b) Datainspektionen;
(c) Departementen;
(d) Domstolsverket;
(e) Dramatiska institutet;
E:
(a) Ekeskolan;
(b) Ekobrottsmyndigheten;
(c) Ekonomistyrningsverket;
(d) Ekonomiska rådet;
(e) Elsäkerhetsverket;
(f) Energimarknadsinspektionen;
(g) Energimyndighet, statens;
(h) EU/FoU-rådet;
(i) Exportkreditnämnden;
(j) Exportråd, Sveriges;
F:
(a) Fastighetsmäklarnämnden;
(b) Fastighetsverk, statens;
(c) Fideikommissnämnden;
(d) Finansinspektionen;
(e) Finanspolitiska rådet;
(f) Finsk-svenska gränsälvskommissionen;
(g) Fiskeriverket;
(h) Flygmedicincentrum;
(i) Folkhälsoinstitut, statens;
(j) Fonden för fukt- och mögelskador;
(k) Forskningsrådet för miljö, areella näringar och samhällsbyggande, Formas;
(l) Folke Bernadotte Akademin;
(m) Forskarskattenämnden;
(n) Forskningsrådet för arbetsliv och socialvetenskap;
(o) FortifikationsverketForum för levande historia;
(p) Försvarets materielverk;
(q) Försvarets radioanstalt;
(r) Försvarets underrättelsenämnd;
EN 51 EN
(s) Försvarshistoriska museer, statens;
(t) Försvarshögskolan;
(u) Försvarsmakten;
(v) Försäkringskassan;
G:
(a) Gentekniknämnden;
(b) Geologiska undersökning;
(c) Geotekniska institut, statens;
(d) Giftinformationscentralen;
(e) Glesbygdsverket;
(f) Grafiska institutet och institutet för högre kommunikation- och
reklamutbildning;
(g) Granskningsnämnden för radio och TV;
(h) Granskningsnämnden för försvarsuppfinningar;
(i) Gymnastik- och Idrottshögskolan;
(j) Göteborgs universitet;
H:
(a) Handelsflottans kultur- och fritidsråd;
(b) Handelsflottans pensionsanstalt;
(c) Handelssekreterare;
(d) Handelskamrar, auktoriserade;
(e) Handikappombudsmannen;
(f) Handikappråd, statens;
(g) Harpsundsnämnden;
(h) Haverikommission, statens;
(i) Historiska museer, statens;
(j) Hjälpmedelsinstitutet;
(k) Hovrätterna;
(l) Hyresnämnder;
(m) Häktena;
(n) Hälso- och sjukvårdens ansvarsnämnd;
(o) Högskolan Dalarna;
(p) Högskolan i BoråsHögskolan i Gävle;
(q) Högskolan i Halmstad;
(r) Högskolan i Kalmar;
(s) Högskolan i Karlskrona/Ronneby;
EN 52 EN
(t) Högskolan i Kristianstad;
(u) Högskolan i Skövde;
(v) Högskolan i Trollhättan/Uddevalla;
(w) Högskolan på Gotland;
(x) Högskolans avskiljandenämnd;
(y) Högskoleverket;
(z) Högsta domstolen;
I:
(a) ILO kommittén;
(b) Inspektionen för arbetslöshetsförsäkringen;
(c) Inspektionen för strategiska produkter;
(d) Institut för kommunikationsanalys, statens;
(e) Institut för psykosocial medicin, statens;
(f) Institut för särskilt utbildningsstöd, statens;
(g) Institutet för arbetsmarknadspolitisk utvärdering;
(h) Institutet för rymdfysik;
(i) Institutet för tillväxtpolitiska studier;
(j) Institutionsstyrelse, statens;
(k) Insättningsgarantinämnden;
(l) Integrationsverket;
(m) Internationella programkontoret för utbildningsområdet;
J:
(a) Jordbruksverk, statens;
(b) Justitiekanslern;
(c) Jämställdhetsombudsmannen;
(d) Jämställdhetsnämnden;
(e) Järnvägar, statens;
(f) Järnvägsstyrelsen;
K:
(a) Kammarkollegiet;
(b) Kammarrätterna;
(c) Karlstads universitet;
(d) Karolinska Institutet;
(e) Kemikalieinspektionen;
(f) Kommerskollegium;
EN 53 EN
(g) Konjunkturinstitutet;
(h) Konkurrensverket;
(i) Konstfack;
(j) Konsthögskolan;
(k) Konstnärsnämnden;
(l) Konstråd,statens;
(m) Konsulat;
(n) Konsumentverket;
(o) Krigsvetenskapsakademin;
(p) Krigsförsäkringsnämnden;
(q) Kriminaltekniska laboratorium, statens;
(r) Kriminalvården;
(s) Krisberedskapsmyndigheten;
(t) Kristinaskolan;
(u) Kronofogdemyndigheten;
(v) Kulturråd, statens;
(w) Kungl. Biblioteket;
(x) Kungl. Konsthögskolan;
(y) Kungl. Musikhögskolan i Stockholm;
(z) Kungl. Tekniska högskolan;
(aa) Kungl. Vitterhets-, historie- och antikvitetsakademien;
(bb) Kungl Vetenskapsakademin;
(cc) Kustbevakningen;
(dd) Kvalitets- och kompetensråd, statens;
(ee) Kärnavfallsfondens styrelse;
L:
(a) Lagrådet;
(b) Lantbruksuniversitet, Sveriges;
(c) Lantmäteriverket;
(d) Linköpings universitet;
(e) Livrustkammaren, Skoklosters slott och Hallwylska museet;
(f) Livsmedelsverk, statens;
(g) Livsmedelsekonomiska institutet;
(h) Ljud- och bildarkiv, statens;
(i) Lokala säkerhetsnämnderna vid kärnkraftverk;
EN 54 EN
(j) Lotteriinspektionen;
(k) Luftfartsverket;
(l) Luftfartsstyrelsen;
(m) Luleå tekniska universitet;
(n) Lunds universitet;
(o) Läkemedelsverket;
(p) Läkemedelsförmånsnämnden;
(q) Länsrätterna;
(r) Länsstyrelserna;
(s) Lärarhögskolan i Stockholm;
M:
(a) Malmö högskola;
(b) Manillaskolan;
(c) Maritima muséer, statens;
(d) Marknadsdomstolen;
(e) Medlingsinstitutet;
(f) Meteorologiska och hydrologiska institut, Sveriges;
(g) Migrationsverket;
(h) Militärhögskolor;
(i) Mittuniversitetet;
(j) Moderna museet;
(k) Museer för världskultur, statens;
(l) Musikaliska Akademien;
(m) Musiksamlingar, statens;
(n) Myndigheten för handikappolitisk samordning;
(o) Myndigheten för internationella adoptionsfrågor;
(p) Myndigheten för skolutveckling;
(q) Myndigheten för kvalificerad yrkesutbildning;
(r) Myndigheten för nätverk och samarbete inom högre utbildning;
(s) Myndigheten för Sveriges nätuniversitet;
(t) Myndigheten för utländska investeringar i Sverige;
(u) Mälardalens högskola;
N:
(a) Nationalmuseum;
(b) Nationellt centrum för flexibelt lärande;
EN 55 EN
(c) Naturhistoriska riksmuseet;
(d) Naturvårdsverket;
(e) Nordiska Afrikainstitutet;
(f) Notarienämnden;
(g) Nämnd för arbetstagares uppfinningar, statens;
(h) Nämnden för statligt stöd till trossamfund;
(i) Nämnden för styrelserepresentationsfrågor;
(j) Nämnden mot diskriminering;
(k) Nämnden för elektronisk förvaltning;
(l) Nämnden för RH anpassad utbildning;
(m) Nämnden för hemslöjdsfrågor;
O:
(a) Oljekrisnämnden;
(b) Ombudsmannen mot diskriminering på grund av sexuell läggning;
(c) Ombudsmannen mot etnisk diskriminering;
(d) Operahögskolan i Stockholm;
P:
(a) Patent- och registreringsverket;
(b) Patentbesvärsrätten;
(c) Pensionsverk, statens;
(d) Personregisternämnd statens, SPAR-nämnden;
(e) Pliktverk, Totalförsvarets;
(f) Polarforskningssekretariatet;
(g) Post- och telestyrelsen;
(h) Premiepensionsmyndigheten;
(i) Presstödsnämnden;
R:
(a) Radio- och TV–verket;
(b) Rederinämnden;
(c) Regeringskansliet;
(d) Regeringsrätten;
(e) Resegarantinämnden;
(f) Registernämnden;
(g) Revisorsnämnden;
(h) Riksantikvarieämbetet;
EN 56 EN
(i) Riksarkivet;
(j) Riksbanken;
(k) Riksdagsförvaltningen;
(l) Riksdagens ombudsmän;
(m) Riksdagens revisorer;
(n) Riksgäldskontoret;
(o) Rikshemvärnsrådet;
(p) Rikspolisstyrelsen;
(q) Riksrevisionen;
(r) Rikstrafiken;
(s) Riksutställningar, Stiftelsen;
(t) Riksvärderingsnämnden;
(u) Rymdstyrelsen;
(v) Rådet för Europeiska socialfonden i Sverige;
(w) Räddningsverk, statens;
(x) Rättshjälpsmyndigheten;
(y) Rättshjälpsnämnden;
(z) Rättsmedicinalverket;
S:
(a) Samarbetsnämnden för statsbidrag till trossamfund;
(b) Sameskolstyrelsen och sameskolor;
(c) Sametinget;
(d) SIS, Standardiseringen i Sverige;
(e) Sjöfartsverket;
(f) Skatterättsnämnden;
(g) Skatteverket;
(h) Skaderegleringsnämnd, statens;
(i) Skiljenämnden i vissa trygghetsfrågor;
(j) Skogsstyrelsen;
(k) Skogsvårdsstyrelserna;
(l) Skogs och lantbruksakademien;
(m) Skolverk, statens;
(n) Skolväsendets överklagandenämnd;
(o) Smittskyddsinstitutet;
(p) Socialstyrelsen;
EN 57 EN
(q) Specialpedagogiska institutet;
(r) Specialskolemyndigheten;
(s) Språk- och folkminnesinstitutet;
(t) Sprängämnesinspektionen;
(u) Statistiska centralbyrån;
(v) Statskontoret;
(w) Stockholms universitet;
(x) Stockholms internationella miljöinstitut;
(y) Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten;
(z) Styrelsen för ackreditering och teknisk kontroll;
(aa) Styrelsen för internationellt utvecklingssamarbete, SIDA;
(bb) Styrelsen för Samefonden;
(cc) Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar;
(dd) Stängselnämnden;
(ee) Svenska institutet;
(ff) Svenska institutet för europapolitiska studier;
(gg) Svenska ESF rådet;
(hh) Svenska Unescorådet;
(ii) Svenska FAO kommittén;
(jj) Svenska Språknämnden;
(kk) Svenska Skeppshypotekskassan;
(ll) Svenska institutet i Alexandria;
(mm) Sveriges författarfond;
(nn) Säkerhetspolisen;
(oo) Säkerhets- och integritetsskyddsnämnden;
(pp) Södertörns högskola;
T:
(a) Taltidningsnämnden;
(b) Talboks- och punktskriftsbiblioteket;
(c) Teaterhögskolan i Stockholm;
(d) Tingsrätterna;
(e) Tjänstepensions och grupplivnämnd, statens;
(f) Tjänsteförslagsnämnden för domstolsväsendet;
(g) Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut;
(h) Totalförsvarets pliktverk;
EN 58 EN
(i) Tullverket;
(j) Turistdelegationen;
U:
(a) Umeå universitet;
(b) Ungdomsstyrelsen;
(c) Uppsala universitet;
(d) Utlandslönenämnd, statens;
(e) Utlänningsnämnden;
(f) Utrikesförvaltningens antagningsnämnd;
(g) Utrikesnämnden;
(h) Utsädeskontroll, statens;
V:
(a) Valideringsdelegationen;
(b) Valmyndigheten;
(c) Vatten- och avloppsnämnd, statens;
(d) Vattenöverdomstolen;
(e) Verket för förvaltningsutveckling;
(f) Verket för högskoleservice;
(g) Verket för innovationssystem (VINNOVA);
(h) Verket för näringslivsutveckling (NUTEK);
(i) Vetenskapsrådet;
(j) Veterinärmedicinska anstalt, statens;
(k) Veterinära ansvarsnämnden;
(l) Väg- och transportforskningsinstitut, statens;
(m) Vägverket;
(n) Vänerskolan;
(o) Växjö universitet;
(p) Växtsortnämnd, statens;
Å:
(a) Åklagarmyndigheten;
(b) Åsbackaskolan;
Ö:
(a) Örebro universitet;
(b) Örlogsmannasällskapet;
(c) Östervångsskolan;
EN 59 EN
(d) Överbefälhavaren;
(e) Överklagandenämnden för högskolan;
(f) Överklagandenämnden för nämndemanna-uppdrag;
(g) Överklagandenämnden för studiestöd;
(h) Överklagandenämnden för totalförsvaret.
EN 60 EN
ANNEX II
List of international environmental, social and labour law conventions
referred to in Articles 4(4), 50(4) and 55(4)
1. International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 87 on Freedom of Association
and the Protection of the Right to Organise;
2. ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining;
3. ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labour;
4. ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour;
5. ILO Convention 138 on Minimum Age;
6. ILO Convention 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation);
7. ILO Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration;
8. ILO Convention 182 on Worst Forms of Child Labour;
9. Vienna Convention for the protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol
on substances that deplete the Ozone Layer;
10. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention);
11. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm POPs
Convention);
12. Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (UNEP/FAO) (The PIC Convention)
Rotterdam, 10 September 1998, and its 3 regional Protocols.
EN 61 EN
ANNEX III
List of procedures and Union legal acts referred to in Article 8(3) and 117(1)
The following procedures, which ensure adequate prior transparency, apply to the granting of
authorisations pursuant to other legal acts of the Union which do not constitute ‘special or
exclusive rights’ within the meaning of Article 8 and 117 of this Regulation:
(a) granting an authorisation to operate natural gas installations in accordance with the
procedures laid down in Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European
Parliament and of the Council1;
(b) authorisation or an invitation to tender for the construction of new electricity
production installations in accordance with Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European
Parliament and of the Council2;
(c) the granting in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 9 of Directive
97/67/EC of authorisations in relation to a postal service;
(d) a procedure for granting an authorisation to carry on an activity involving the
exploitation of hydrocarbons in accordance with Directive 94/22/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council3;
(e) the granting of a public service contract within the meaning of Regulation (EC) No
1370/2007 for the provision of public passenger transport services by bus, tramway,
rail or metro, which have been awarded on the basis of a competitive tendering
procedure in accordance with Article 5(3) thereof, provided that the duration of the
contract is in conformity with Article 4(3) or Article 4(4) of that Regulation4.
1 Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on common
rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Directive (EU)
2023/1791 and repealing Directive 2009/73/EC (recast) (OJ L, 2024/1788, 15.7.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1788/oj). 2 Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common
rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (recast) (OJ L 158,
14.6.2019, p. 125, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/944/oj). 3 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions
for granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons
(OJ L 164, 30.6.1994, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1994/22/oj). 4 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on
public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos
1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2007/1370/oj).
EN 62 EN
ANNEX IV
List of Union legal acts referred to in Article 19(4) and 117(2)
(activities directly exposed to competition)
(a) Transport of distribution of gas or heat – Directive (EU) 2024/17885;
(b) Production, transmission or distribution of electricity – Directive (EU) 2019/9446;
(c) Production, transport or distribution of drinking water – [No entry];
(d) Contracting entities in the field of rail services:
– Directive 2012/34/7;
– Regulation (EC) No 1370/20078;
(e) Contracting entities in the field of urban railway, tramway, trolleybus or motor bus
services – [No entry];
(f) Contracting entities in the field of postal services – Directive 97/67/EC9;
(g) Extraction of oil or gas – Directive 94/22/EC10;
(h) Exploration for and extraction of coal or other solid fuels – [No entry];
(i) Contracting entities in the field of seaport or inland port or other terminal equipment –
[No entry];
(j) Contracting entities in the field of airport installations – [No entry].
5 Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on common
rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Directive (EU)
2023/1791 and repealing Directive 2009/73/EC (recast) (OJ L, 2024/1788, 15.7.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1788/oj). 6 Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common
rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (recast) (OJ L 158,
14.6.2019, p. 125, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/944/oj). 7 Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012
establishing a single European railway area (recast) (OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 32, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/34/oj). 8 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on
public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos
1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2007/1370/oj). 9 Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common
rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of
quality of service (OJ L 15, 21.1.1998, p. 14, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1997/67/oj). 10 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions
for granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons
(OJ L 164, 30.6.1994, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1994/22/oj).
EN 63 EN
ANNEX V
List of activities referred to in Article 6, point 22(a)
Division Group Clas
s
CPV
code Subject
45 450000
00 Construction work
45-1 451000
00 Site preparation work
45-
1-1
451100
00
Building demolition and wrecking
work and earthmoving work
45-
1-2
451200
00 Test drilling and boring work
45-2 452000
00
Works for complete or part
construction and civil engineering
work
45-
2-1
452100
00
Except
:45220
000
Building construction work
Except: Engineering works and
construction work;
45-
2-6
452610
00
Erection and related works of roof
frames and coverings
45-
2-3
452122
12 and
DA03/
DA04
452300
00
Construction work for swimming pool
(public or private); Construction work
for pipelines, communication and
power lines, for highways, roads,
airfields and railways; flatwork.
45-
2-4
452400
00 Construction work for water projects
45-
2-5
452500
00
Construction works for plants, mining
and manufacturing and for buildings
relating to the oil and gas industry
45-
2-6
452620
00
Special trade construction works other
than roof works
45-3 453000
00 Building installation work
EN 64 EN
Division Group Clas
s
CPV
code Subject
45-
3-1
453100
00 Electrical installation work.
45-
3-2
453200
00 Insulation work
45-
3-3
453300
00 Plumbing and sanitary works
45-
3-4
453400
00
Fencing, railing and safety equipment
installation work.
45-4 454000
00 Building completion work
45-
4-1
454100
00 Plastering work
45-
4-2
454200
00 Joinery and carpentry installation work
45-
4-3
454300
00 Floor and wall covering work
45-
4-4
454400
00 Painting and glazing work
45-
4-5
454500
00 Other building completion work
45-5 455000
00
Hire of construction and civil
engineering machinery and equipment
with operator
EN 65 EN
ANNEX VI
Services referred to in Articles 57(2) and 58(1)
CPV Code Description
75200000-8; 75231200-6; 75231240-8;
79611000-0; 79622000-0 [Supply
services of domestic help personnel];
79624000-4 [Supply services of nursing
personnel] and 79625000-1 [Supply
services of medical personnel] from
85000000-9 to 85323000-9; 98133100-5,
98133000-4; 98200000-5; 98500000-8
[Private households with employed
persons] and 98513000-2 to 98514000-9
[Manpower services for households,
Agency staff services for households,
Clerical staff services for households,
Temporary staff for households, Home-
help services and Domestic services]
Health, social and related services
85321000-5 and 85322000-2, 75000000-
6 [Administration, defence and social
security services], 75121000-0,
75122000-7, 75124000-1; from
79995000-5 to 79995200-7; from
80000000-4 Education and training
services to 80660000-8;
Administrative social, educational and
healthcare services
92500000-6 and 92600000-7 Library, archives, museums and other
cultural services, and sporting services
75300000-9 Compulsory social security services
75310000-2, 75311000-9, 75312000-6,
75313000-3, 75313100-4, 75314000-0,
75320000-5, 75330000-8, 75340000-1
Benefit services
98000000-3; 98120000-0; 98132000-7;
98133110-8 and 98130000-3
Other community, social and personal
services including services furnished by
trade unions, political organisations,
youth associations and other membership
organisation services
98131000-0 Religious services
75200000-8 to 75231000-4 Provision of services to the community
75231210-9 to 75231230-5; 75240000-0
to 75252000-7; 794300000-7; 98113100-
9
Prison related services, public security
and rescue services to the extent not
excluded pursuant to Article 85(1)(k)
EN 66 EN
ANNEX VII
List of Union legal acts referred to in Article 54
1. Regulation (EU) 2024/3110 of 27 November 2024 laying down harmonised rules for
the marketing of construction products and repealing Regulation (EU) No
305/201111;
2. Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
June 2024 establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for
sustainable products, amending Directive (EU) 2020/1828 and Regulation (EU)
2023/1542 and repealing Directive 2009/125/EC12;
3. Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
July 2023 concerning batteries and waste batteries, amending Directive 2008/98/EC
and Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and repealing Directive 2006/66/EC13;
4. Regulation (EU) 2025/40 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19
December 2024 on packaging and packaging waste, amending Regulation (EU)
2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2019/904, and repealing Directive 94/62/EC14;
5. Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-
zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU)
2018/172415;
6. Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
June 2019 setting CO2 emission performance standards for new heavy-duty vehicles
and amending Regulations (EC) No 595/2009 and (EU) 2018/956 of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 96/53/EC16;
7. Regulation (EU) 2019/631 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17April
2019 setting CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and for
new light commercial vehicles, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 443/2009 and
(EU) No 510/2011 (recast)17;
8. Regulation (EU) 2020/740 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May
2020 on the labelling of tyres with respect to fuel efficiency and other parameters,
amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1369 and repealing Regulation (EC) No
1222/200918.
11 OJ L, 2024/3110, 18.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3110/oj. 12 OJ L, 2024/1781, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1781/oj. 13 OJ L 191, 28.7.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1542/oj. 14 OJ L, 2025/40, 22.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/40/oj. 15 OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj. 16 OJ L 111, 25.4.2019, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/631/oj. 17 OJ L 111, 25.4.2019, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/631/oj. 18 OJ L 177, 5.6.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/740/oj.
EN 67 EN
ANNEX VIII
Correlation table
Part A - Repeals pursuant to Article 146
This Regulation Dir. 2014/23/EU Dir. 2014/24/EU Dir. 2014/25/EU
Art. 1 Art. 1 Art. 1 Art. 1
Art. 2 Art. 8 Art. 4 Art. 15
Art. 3 Art. 9 Art. 6 Art. 17
Art. 4 Art. 3 Art.18 Art. 36
Art. 5 - - -
Art. 6 Art. 5 Art. 2 Art. 2
Art. 7 Art. 6 Art. 2 Para. 1(1), (3)
Art. 6 Para. 7
Art. 3
Art. 8 Art. 7 Art. 13 Art. 4
Art. 9 - Art. 37 Art. 55
Art. 10 Art. 14 Art. 38 Art. 56
Art. 11 - - Art. 7
Art. 12 Annex II Nr. 1 Art.7 Art. 8
Art. 13 Annex II Nr. 2 Art.7 Art. 9
Art. 14 Art. 12 Art.7 Art. 10
Art. 15 Annex II Nr. 3 Art.7 Art. 11
Art. 16 Annex II Nr. 4 Art.7 Art. 12
Art. 17 Annex II Nr. 5 Art.7 Art. 13
Art. 18 Annex II Nr. 6 Art. 7 Art. 14
Art. 19 Art. 16 - Art. 34
Art. 20 Art. 16 - Art. 35
Art. 21 Art. 26 Art. 19 Art. 37
Art. 22 Art. 26 Para. 2 Art. 19 Para. 2 Art. 37 Para. 2
EN 68 EN
Art. 23 Recital 63, Art. 38
Para. 2, 3
Art. 63 Art. 79
Art. 24 Art. 42 Art. 71 Art. 88
Art. 25 Art. 38 Para. 4, 5 Art. 57 Para. 1, 2 Art. 80
Art. 26 Art. 38 Para. 7 Art. 57 Para. 4 Art. 80
Art. 27 Art. 41 Art. 58 Art. 80 Para. 2
Art. 28 Art. 38 Para. 1, 9 Art. 60 Art. 62
Art. 29 - - -
Art. 30 - Art. 40 Art. 58
Art. 31 - Art. 26 Art. 44
Art. 32 Art. 8 Para. 2, 3 Art. 5 Art. 16
Art. 33 - Art. 26 Para. 3 to 6 -
Art. 34 - Art. 29, 32 Art. 45
Art. 35 Art. 37 Para. 1 Art. 67 Para. 1 Art. 82
Art. 36 - - -
Art. 37 - - -
Art. 38 - - -
Art. 39 - - -
Art. 40 - - -
Art. 41 - Art. 31 Para. 1, 4 Art. 49
Art. 42 - Art. 31 Art. 49
Art. 43 - Art. 31 Para. 2 Art. 49
Art. 44 - Art. 31 Para. 2 Art. 49
Art. 45 - Art. 31 Art. 49
Art. 46 - Art. 32 Art. 50
Art. 47 - Art. 32 Art. 50
EN 69 EN
Art. 48 - Art. 32 (c) Art. 50 (d)
Art. 49 - Annex XII Part II (f) Art. 77
Art. 50 Recital 55, Art. 30
Para. 3
Recital 37, Art. 68
Para. 1
Art. 36 Para. 2
Art. 51 - - -
Art. 52 - Recital 97, Art. 68
Para 1 (a)(ii)
-
Art. 53 - - -
Art. 54 - Recital 97 Art. 36 Para. 2
Art. 55 Recital 55, Art. 19 Recital 37 Art. 36 Para.2
Art. 56 Recital 66, Art. 36
Sub. 1
Recital 53 Art. 93 Para. 2
Art. 57 Art. 24 Art. 20 Art. 38
Art. 58 Art. 19, Annex IV Art. 74 Art. 91
Art. 59 - Art. 31 Art. 49 Para. 1
Art. 60 - Art.2 Para.1 (22) Art. 49 Para. 2
Art. 61 - Recital 47
Art. 62 - Art. 31 Para. 6 Art. 49 Para. 6
Art. 63 - Art. 31 Para. 6, Sub.
2
-
Art. 64 - - -
Art. 65 - - -
Art. 66 - Recital 41 -
Art. 67 - - -
Art. 68 - - -
Art. 69 - - -
Art. 70 - - Art. 85 Para. 1
Art. 71 - - -
EN 70 EN
Art. 72 - - Art. 85 Para. 2
Art. 73 - - -
Art. 74 - -
Art. 74 Nr. 2 - - Art. 85 Para. 2
Art. 75 - - -
Art. 76 - - -
Art. 77 - - -
Art. 78 Art. 23 Art. 15 Art. 24
Art. 79 Art. 25 Art. 14 Art. 32
Art. 80 Art. 17 Art. 12 Art. 28
Art. 81 Recital 45, Art. 17
Para. 4
Recital 31, Art. 12 Art. 28 Para. 4
Art. 82 Art. 2 Para. 1 Art. 12, 2 Para.2 -
Art. 83 Para. 1 Art. 13 - Art. 29 Para. 3
Art. 83 Para. 2 Art. 13 - Art. 29 Para. 2
Art. 83 Para. 3 Art. 13 - Art. 29 Para. 1
Art. 83 Para. 4 Art. 13 - Art. 29 Para. 1 Sub.
1
Art. 84 Art. 14 - Art. 30
Art. 85 Art. 10 Art. 10, 11 -
Art. 86 Art. 21 Art. 16 Art. 25
Art. 87 Art. 20 Art. 3 Art. 5
Art. 88 Art. 36 Art. 42 Art. 60
Art. 89 - Art. 45 Art. 64
Art. 90 - - -
Art. 91 - Art. 43 Art. 61
Art. 92 Art. 38 Para. 1 Art. 44 Art. 62
EN 71 EN
Art. 93 Art. 28 Art. 21 Art. 39
Art. 94 Art. 35 Art. 24 Art. 42
Art. 95 - Art. 41 Art. 59
Art. 96 Art. 39 Art. 47 Art. 66
Art. 97 Art. 40 Art. 53 -
Art. 98 Art. 41 Art. 67 Art. 82
Art. 99 - Art. 68 Art. 83
Art. 100 - Art. 46 Art. 65
Art. 101 - Art. 69 Art. 84
Art. 102 - - -
Art. 103 - Art. 33 Art. 51
Art. 104 Art. 36 Art. 70 Art. 87
Art. 105 - - -
Art. 106 Art. 43 Art. 72 Art. 89
Art. 107 Art. 44 Art. 73 Art. 90
Art. 108 - - -
Art. 109 - Art. 84 Art. 100
Art. 110 - - -
Art. 111 Art. 32 - -
Art. 112 Art. 33 - -
Art. 113 Art. 33 Para. 4 Art. 85 -
Art. 114 Art. 1 Para. 2 - -
Art. 115 Art. 5 - -
Art. 116 Art. 20 - Art. 5 Para. 4, Sub. 3
Art. 116 Para. 2 Art. 20 - Art. 5 Para. 5
Art. 117 Art. 10, 11, 12 - -
EN 72 EN
Art. 118 Art. 8 - -
Art. 119 Art. 53 - -
Art. 120 - - -
Art. 121 - - -
Art. 122 Art. 18 - -
Art. 123 Art. 41 - -
Art. 124 - - -
Art. 125 Art. 43 - -
Art. 126 Art. 44 - -
Art. 127 - - -
Art. 128 - - -
Art. 129 - - -
Art. 130 - - -
Art. 131 - - -
Art. 132 - - -
Art. 133 - - -
Art. 134 - - -
Art. 135 - - -
Art. 136 - - -
Art. 137 Art. 45 Art. 83 Art. 99 Para. 2
Art. 138 - - -
Art. 139 - - Recital 127
Art. 140 Art. 35 - -
Art. 141 Art. 48 Art. 87 Art. 103
Art. 142 Art. 49 Art. 88 Art. 104
Art. 143 Art. 50 Art. 89 Art. 105
EN 73 EN
Art. 144 - - -
Art. 145 - - -
Art. 146 - Art. 91 Art. 107
Art. 147 - - -
Art. 148 Art. 53 Sub. 4 Art. 92 Art. 108
Art. 149 Art. 54 Art. 93 Art. 109
Part B - Amendments pursuant to Article 147
Deleted provision This Regulation
Article 65 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 Article 54
Article 74(3), point (b) of Regulation (EU)
2024/1781
Article 26(1), point (a)
Article 25(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU)
2024/1735
Article 54
Article 85 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 Article 54
Article 83 of Regulation (EU) 2024/3110 Article 54
Article 63 of Regulation (EU) 2025/40 Article 54
Article 7 and Annex IV of Directive
2023/1791
Article 52
Article 26(1), point (d) of Regulation (EU)
2024/1252 as far as it concerns award criteria
related to public procurement
Article 51
Article 24(1) of Directive 2019/882 Article 56
Article 8(3) of Directive 2022/2381 Article 4(4)
Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Article 67
Article 31 of Directive (EU) 2024/1760 Article 55
Article 63(3), point (c) of Regulation (EU)
2024/1157
Article 26(1), point (a)
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 9.9.2026 SWD(2026) 590 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Subsidiarity Grid
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL
on public contracts and concessions, repealing Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and
2014/25/EU, and amending Regulations (EC) No 1370/2007, (EU) 2023/1542, (EU)
2024/1157, (EU) 2024/1252, (EU) 2024/1735, (EU) 2024/1781, (EU) 2024/2847, (EU)
2024/3110 and (EU) 2025/40, and Directives 2008/98/EC, (EU) 2019/882, (EU) 2022/2381,
(EU) 2023/1791 and (EU) 2024/1760 (Public Procurement Act)
{COM(2026) 590 final} - {SEC(2026) 590 final} - {SWD(2026) 591 final} - {SWD(2026) 592 final}
1
Subsidiarity Grid
1. Can the Union act? What is the legal basis and competence of the Unions’ intended action?
1.1 Which article(s) of the Treaty are used to support the legislative proposal or policy initiative?
The legal basis for this proposal is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which enables the European Parliament and the Council to adopt measures to establish the single market and ensure its effective functioning.
1.2 Is the Union competence represented by this Treaty article exclusive, shared or supporting in nature?
Shared competence
2. Subsidiarity Principle: Why should the EU act?
2.1 Does the proposal fulfil the procedural requirements of Protocol No. 21: - Has there been a wide consultation before proposing the act? - Is there a detailed statement with qualitative and, where possible, quantitative indicators
allowing an appraisal of whether the action can best be achieved at Union level?
- The preparation of the proposed Public Procurement Act was subject to a thorough consultation process to gather the views of different stakeholders across the Union.
- A call for evidence and a public consultation ran from 3 November 2025 to 26 January 2026
(12 weeks) via the ‘Have your say’ portal. The call for evidence was first made available in English (3 November – 3 December), and then available in all languages. The call for evidence received 745 contributions, while the public consultation collected 1,037 answers. A factual synopsis report summarising the outcomes of the public consultation activities is publicly accessible on the ‘Europa’ portal2. In parallel, the Commission held targeted consultations: (i) five dedicated meetings with the Stakeholder Expert Group on Public Procurement (SEGPP); (ii) a dedicated meeting with social partners including 26 employers organisations and 24 trade unions; a meeting with NGOs active in the field of environment and social responsibility; and, an SME panel consultation, which ran from 17 December 2025 to 15 February 2026 (105 responses). A synopsis report summarising all stakeholders’ positions and contributions to the proposed Public Procurement Act is presented in Annex 2 to the staff working document on the impact assessment report.
- Furthermore, the explanatory memorandum and Chapter 3 of the impact assessment report
present qualitative indicators enabling an assessment of the need to act at Union level.
2.2 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the conformity with the principle of subsidiarity?
Yes. The explanatory memorandum and Chapter 3 of the impact assessment report include a section that provides detailed proof of compliance with the subsidiarity principle.
1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016E/PRO/02&from=EN 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/15492-EU-public-procurement- rules-revision/public-consultation_en
2
2.3 Based on the answers to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be achieved sufficiently by the Member States acting alone (necessity for EU action)?
(a) Are there significant/appreciable transnational/cross-border aspects to the problems being tackled? Have these been quantified?
The evaluation of the current public procurement directives concluded that significant problems persist that, in absence of EU intervention, would continue to create barriers to the cross-border participation of economic operators in public procurement.
(b) Would national action or the absence of the EU level action conflict with core objectives of the Treaty3 or significantly damage the interests of other Member States?
Yes, Member States’ action alone would lead to a fragmentation of the internal market.
(c) To what extent do Member States have the ability or possibility to enact appropriate measures?
Member States have a limited capacity to act above the public procurement thresholds, as this is covered by international agreements on government procurement. The proposed Regulation is of general application and is binding upon and directly applicable in all Member States. Nevertheless, the proposal includes a few mandatory minimum measures while giving Member States and public buyers discretion as to the manner of implementation and the level of ambition they wish to pursue.
(d) How does the problem and its causes (e.g. negative externalities, spill-over effects) vary across the national, regional and local levels of the EU?
The complexity of the current public procurement framework hampers the roll-out of public spending. The lack of uptake of strategic considerations, and the legal uncertainty surrounding the introduction of security or buy European considerations hamper the resilience of the Union as a whole.
(e) Is the problem widespread across the EU or limited to a few Member States?
The problems identified are widespread across the Union.
(f) Are Member States overstretched in achieving the objectives of the planned measure?
The consultations and the impact assessment carried out during the preparation of this proposal indicated that public buyers generally support the initiative, while seeking to balance the expected benefits of the preferred policy measures against the associated costs.
(g) How do the views/preferred courses of action of national, regional and local authorities differ across the EU?
The consultations and the impact assessment carried out during the preparation of this proposal indicated that national, regional and local authorities generally support the initiative.
3 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en
3
2.4 Based on the answer to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be better achieved at Union level by reason of scale or effects of that action (EU added value)?
(a) Are there clear benefits from EU level action?
Yes, the objectives of the proposed action can be better achieved at Union level.
(b) Are there economies of scale? Can the objectives be met more efficiently at EU level (larger benefits per unit cost)? Will the functioning of the internal market be improved?
Yes. Action by Member States alone would not bring additional benefits and would introduce barriers to the internal market. Acting at EU level will thus improve the functioning of the internal market.
(c) What are the benefits in replacing different national policies and rules with a more homogenous policy approach?
As explained above, fragmented national approaches would risk undermining the single market by creating unequal conditions for public procurement contracts, increasing administrative burdens for economic operators and public buyers alike. A more homogenous EU framework will instead ensure consistency, predictability and interoperability across the Union, allowing public buyers to tender efficiently under a harmonised set of rules. It will also enable better coordination on shared tendering infrastructure, maximising synergies and avoiding duplication of effort.
(d) Do the benefits of EU-level action outweigh the loss of competence of the Member States and the local and regional authorities (beyond the costs and benefits of acting at national, regional and local levels)?
Yes, the benefits of EU level action outweigh the loss of competence of Member States. However, public buyers will see their competences and discretion increased.
(e) Will there be improved legal clarity for those having to implement the legislation?
Yes. The merging of the three previous directives will bring greater legal clarity and certainty.
3. Proportionality: How the EU should act
3.1 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the proportionality of the proposal and a statement allowing appraisal of the compliance of the proposal with the principle of proportionality?
The proposed revision respects the principle of proportionality, as set out in Article 5 TEU and follows what is adapted and necessary to achieve the objectives of ensuring a more efficient, transparent and coherent EU public procurement framework, completing the Union’s strategic objectives. The establishment of the EU eProcurement system is necessary to reduce fragmentation, administrative burden and costs by mandating the interconnection of Member States’ eProcurement systems into a single integrated EU public procurement marketplace reduce compliance costs and facilitating cross-border participation and enhance overall market efficiency.
4
The European preference provisions in sector-specific acts are necessary to respond to the new geopolitical imperatives, while fully respecting the Union’s international commitments. They are designed in a proportionate manner so as not to impose disproportionate financial burdens on public buyers’ budgets. They aim to limit administrative burden for public buyers, notably through implementation support and the use of digital tools within the procurement marketplace. The establishment of the best price-quality ratio as the standard award method with a “comply or explain” mechanism is necessary to achieve social, environmental and innovation objectives. While the impact on fraud and irregularity risks depends on administrative capacity, several safeguards reduce such risks, notably the requirement that all quality criteria remain linked to the subject-matter of the contract, limiting potential distortions of competition.
3.2 Based on the answers to the questions below and information available from any impact assessment, the explanatory memorandum or other sources, is the proposed action an appropriate way to achieve the intended objectives?
(a) Is the initiative limited to those aspects that Member States cannot achieve satisfactorily on their own, and where the Union can do better?
Yes, taking into account that the competences of Member States were already limited due to international commitments.
(b) Is the form of Union action (choice of instrument) justified, as simple as possible, and coherent with the satisfactory achievement of, and ensuring compliance with the objectives pursued (e.g. choice between regulation, (framework) directive, recommendation, or alternative regulatory methods such as co-legislation, etc.)?
A regulation is the most suitable instrument, as it ensures uniform application of core definitions and procedures and a simple digital ecosystem, essential for a functioning single market. It avoids delays linked to transposition and prevents divergences that could arise under a directive.
(c) Does the Union action leave as much scope for national decision as possible while achieving satisfactorily the objectives set? (e.g. is it possible to limit the European action to minimum standards or use a less stringent policy instrument or approach?)
The proposal leaves as much scope for national decisions as possible, taking into account the problems and objectives to be achieved.
(d) Does the initiative create financial or administrative cost for the Union, national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators or citizens? Are these costs commensurate with the objective to be achieved?
The impact assessment found that the costs of the initiative are expected to be modest and outweighed by simplification and time savings, reduced duplication and improved certainty.
(e) While respecting the Union law, have special circumstances applying in individual Member States been taken into account?
5
Yes. The proposal accommodates differences in administrative structure, legal tradition and regional competences by allowing Member States to tailor implementation within common parameters.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
8.6.2026
SEC(2026) 590
REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD OPINION
{COM(2026) 590}
{SWD(2026) 590-592}
Public Procurement Act
Commission européenne/Europese Commissie, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË - Tel. +32 22991111 [email protected]
EUROPEAN COMMISSION REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD
Brussels, RSB
Opinion
Title: Impact assessment report accompanying the proposal for a
revision of the EU public procurement rules
Overall 2nd opinion: POSITIVE WITH RESERVATIONS
(A) Policy context
EU rules on public procurements are set in three core directives applying to public
procurement above EU thresholds. In addition, around 60 sector-specific instruments
contain specific procurement provisions. The Commission Political Guidelines announced
a revision of the directives to enable giving preference to European products in strategic
sectors, ensure EU added value and security of supply, and modernise and simplify rules
with EU start-ups and innovators in mind. In 2025 an evaluation of the directives found
several shortcomings, including related to legal unclarity and incoherences, complex and
rigid procedures, and uneven pursuit of green, social and innovation objectives.
(B) Key issues
The Board notes improvements in the report. However, the report still contains
significant shortcomings. The Board gives a positive opinion with reservations
because it expects the lead Service to rectify the following aspects:
(1) The report does not provide sufficient information on the new open procedure
with negotiations. It does not explain in sufficient detail which steps would be
followed in a typical negotiation, and the aspects that could be subject to
negotiation.
(2) The report does not adequately specify the approach to the use of quality
assessment criteria under BPQR procurement, in particular the “comply or
explain” requirement, and it does not sufficiently analyse its possible
implications.
(3) The report is not clear enough about the choice of method and the high
uncertainties related to the cost benefit analysis and the factors that will
determine the final impacts of the intervention. It also does not sufficiently
describe the extent to which various assumptions may be driving the overall
results of the analysis. As a consequence, some conclusions may potentially be
misleading.
2
(C) What to improve
(1) For the preferred option Flex2, the report needs to clarify the specific procedural steps
to be carried out in a typical negotiation procedure, including rounds of negotiation and
how, when and where information is documented and disseminated between different
actors. The report should better explain the role of the mandatory market consultation.
(2) The report should strengthen the assessment of risks and unintended consequences
stemming from a potentially more extended use of negotiations in combination with the
application of quality criteria as a default option. It should explain in more detail the role
of the digital marketplace in possibly mitigating risks, elaborating on the factors that
would affect its effectiveness and possible cost implications.
(3) Based on an improved analysis of the magnitude of the problem related to environmental,
social and innovation aspects, the report should better specify the option regarding the
use of BPQR criteria. The report should be clear regarding under what conditions the
“comply or explain” mechanism would apply, including in what circumstances a
procurer can abstain from using any BPQR criteria. The report should assess whether it
will be possible to apply the ESI criteria in all procurements, considering the requirement
of proportionality and objectivity. Unintended consequences should be better assessed,
including a possible increase in litigation if the proposed approach to BPQR creates legal
uncertainties.
(4) The report’s analysis of the expected costs and benefits of the different options should
be revised, in particular the expected impacts on costs and savings, especially for
preferred options on flexible and negotiated procurements, as well as the digital
marketplace (taking into consideration that more than half of Member States do not have
the marketplace yet). The current analysis appears to, in large part, rely on assumptions
that can be driving the results of the analysis, and the report could potentially be
misleading as to whether these interventions would lead to net savings or cost increases.
The report should describe in sufficient detail the assumptions and the calculations on
which the cost estimates of the procedures are based to allow for replicability. The report
also needs to assess the impacts on competition and prices for the goods or services
bought that follow from the preferred option.
(D) Conclusion
The lead Service may proceed with the initiative.
The lead Service must revise the report and its executive summary in accordance with
the Board’s findings before launching the interservice consultation.
Full title Impact assessment report accompanying the document Proposal
for a Revision of the EU public procurement rules
Reference number PLAN/2025/2457
Submitted to RSB on 26 May 2026
Date of RSB meeting 3 June 2026
3
EUROPEAN COMMISSION REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD
Brussels, RSB
Opinion
Title: Impact assessment report accompanying the proposal for a revision
of the EU public procurement rules
Overall opinion: NEGATIVE
(A) Policy context
EU rules on public procurements are set in three core directives applying to public
procurement above EU thresholds. In addition, around 60 sector-specific instruments contain
specific procurement provisions. The Commission Political Guidelines announced a revision
of the directives to enable giving preference to European products in strategic sectors, ensure
EU added value and security of supply, and modernise and simplify rules with EU start-ups
and innovators in mind. In 2025 an evaluation of the directives found several shortcomings,
including related to legal unclarity and incoherences, complex and rigid procedures, and
uneven pursuit of green, social and innovation objectives.
(B) Key issues
The Board notes the additional information provided. However, the Board gives a
negative opinion because the report contains the following serious shortcomings that
the lead Service must address:
(1) The report does not adequately analyse the coherence between the intervention and
the ca. 60 sectoral acts that include public procurement provisions. It does not
sufficiently demonstrate how the problem driver of ‘rules that vary by sector’ can
be addressed by the policy options, nor how the intervention would affect these
rules.
(2) The magnitude of problems related to environmental, social and innovation
objectives is not sufficiently analysed.
(3) The report does not specify and justify the policy options well enough. It does not
explain in enough detail how quality will be defined under BPQR procurement and
what this entails for the public buyers across the EU.
(4) The report does not sufficiently assess the costs and benefits resulting from the
preferred option, including the impacts on competition and prices. The report does
not demonstrate the proportionality of the preferred policy option.
4
(5) The report does not sufficiently assess the combined impact and unintended
consequences of the preferred option, including the risks related to introducing
more negotiations and reliance on BPQR principles at the same time.
(C) What to improve
(1) The report should analyse the coherence and interactions between the intervention and
the ca. 60 sector-specific public procurement provisions. It should specify which
measures in each policy option address problem driver 1 – ‘rules that vary by sector’
and ‘how the specific objective 1 to simplify and increase coherence would be
achieved’. The analysis of the internal coherence of the various preferred measures and
of the external coherence of the initiative with current and future initiatives including
specific public procurement rules should be significantly improved.
(2) The report should substantiate the magnitude of the problems, including related to the
use of environmental, social and innovation requirements in public procurement based
on evidence from EU and non-EU countries.
(3) The policy measures and the choice of options must be better specified and substantiated,
based on evidence. The report should provide more details on if and how quality can be
defined under BPQR procurement, and if it can be objectively assessed. The report
should also better analyse how potential trade-offs between different quality aspects
(including environmental, social, innovation and sector-specific objectives), would be
addressed under the intervention. If the public procurement act would not define quality
criteria and would leave procurers the freedom to define quality according to their needs,
the report needs to assess the implications of this approach. The measure ‘Buy
European’ should be more clearly specified, including the approach how to identify the
regulated sectors and actors that will be subject to mandatory buy European provisions.
(4) The analysis of risks and unintended consequences should be significantly strengthened
and focus on the possible increase of the risks of fraud and irregularities inter alia
stemming from increasing complexity due to default of BPQR; and the consequences of
potentially exchanging information with some, but not all, bidders in negotiation
situations. The report should analyse the effectiveness of the MPL in mitigating these
risks.
(5) The report should assess the combined impact of the various policy options, including
impacts following from using BPQR as the default option and increased negotiations at
the same time.
(6) The report should strengthen the assessment of expected economic impacts, including
by better use of observational data. The report needs to adequately assess the impacts of
the policy options on competition and prices paid by public buyers and total cost of
ownership. This should include the costs and benefits associated with the market
outcomes that result from carrying out procurement processes including
competitiveness, notably for SMEs. It should also analyse potential effects of the
limitations on subcontracting and new default rules on IPR.
(7) The report should present a comprehensive overview of the administrative costs and
savings for all options, including the framework for mandatory European preference.
(8) Building on the analysis in annex, the assessment of the impact of the non-voluntary
‘Buy European’ policy options should be expanded to all relevant sectors. As the
5
proposal intends to provide a general framework, it should assess the macro-economic
impact.
(9) In view of the enabling nature of the initiative, the report should be more precise on the
monitoring and evaluation framework that will be put in place to monitor and evaluate
success vis-à-vis the objectives.
Some more technical comments have been sent directly to the author Service.
(D) Conclusion
The DG must revise the report and its executive summary in accordance with the Board’s
findings and resubmit it for a final RSB opinion.
Full title Impact assessment report accompanying the document Proposal for
a Revision of the EU public procurement rules
Reference number PLAN/2025/2457
Submitted to RSB on 20 March 2026
Date of RSB meeting 15 April 2026
Electronically signed on 08/06/2026 19:59 (UTC+02) in accordance with Article 11 of Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2121
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 9.9.2026 SWD(2026) 591 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL
on public contracts and concessions, repealing Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and
2014/25/EU, and amending Regulations (EC) No 1370/2007, (EU) 2023/1542, (EU)
2024/1157, (EU) 2024/1252, (EU) 2024/1735, (EU) 2024/1781, (EU) 2024/2847, (EU)
2024/3110 and (EU) 2025/40, and Directives 2008/98/EC, (EU) 2019/882, (EU) 2022/2381,
(EU) 2023/1791 and (EU) 2024/1760 (Public Procurement Act)
{COM(2026) 590 final} - {SEC(2026) 590 final} - {SWD(2026) 590 final} - {SWD(2026) 592 final}
1
Table of contents
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 5
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION .................................................................................................................... 6
3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ........................................................................................................ 19
4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ............................................................................... 20
5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? .................................................................... 21
6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ........................................................... 32
7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................................................ 61
8. PREFERRED OPTION ...................................................................................................................... 63
9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 68
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 70
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) ................................................ 77
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? .......................................................................................... 88
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ..................................................................................................... 93
ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK ................................................................................................ 95
ANNEX 5’ COMPETITIVENESS CHECK - THE MOST AFFECTED SECTORS .................................. 99
ANNEX 6: SME CHECK .......................................................................................................................... 114
ANNEX 7: FURTHER INFORMATION SUPPORTING SELECTED SECTIONS OF THE IA ............ 144
ANNEX 8: ADMINISTRATIVE COST ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 218
ANNEX 9: DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE OPEN PUBLIC CONSULTATION ................................ 251
ANNEX 10: DIGITAL MARKETPLACE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE NEW PP ACT ......................... 408
ANNEX 11: SECTORIAL LEGISLATION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT ........................................... 414
ANNEX 12: LEGAL REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 427
ANNEX 13: BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 429
2
Term or acronym Meaning or definition
BIM Building Information Modelling
BRT Better Regulation Toolbox
BPQR Best Price-Quality Ratio
European Business Wallet Instrument aimed to facilitate verification of
exclusion grounds and selection criteria
CA Contracting authority, public buyer
CEN European Committee for Standardisation brings
together the National Standardisation Bodies of
different European countries. The working group
CEN/TC 440 on Electronic Procurement oversees
standardisation in the field of eProcurement to support
digital procurement processes and information flows.
CfE Call for Evidence
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
CoR Committee of the Regions
CPV Common Procurement Vocabulary as set out in
Regulation (EC) No 2195/2002.
CRI Corruption Risk Index
DPS Dynamic Purchasing System(s)
EC European Commission
ECA European Court of Auditors
eCertis Tool aimed at providing information to cross-border
public buyers and economic operators on which
evidence can be used to prove compliance with
selection criteria and exclusion grounds.
eDelivery Building block of options concerning procurement
marketplace developed to ensure that digital data
exchange is secure and reliable across various sectors
and EU member states. It provides the essential tools,
software, and services to create a network for secure
digital data exchange
3
EEA European Economic Area
eForms Standardised digital forms used by public buyers for
tender submissions on TED, contract awards and
compliance checks
eInvoicing Process of exchanging invoices in a standardised,
machine-readable electronic format that enables
electronic and automatic handling between a supplier
and a buyer
eNotices2 Platform operated by the Publication Office that
allows users to send digital procurement notices
published on TED. It provides the same functions as
other eForms services provided in each Member State
EO Economic operator, bidder
ePO eProcurement ontology is a framework that defines
concepts, standards and relationships used in
electronic public procurement
ESPD European Single Procurement Document
Evaluation, the SWD(2025) 332 final
FSR Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies
GPA WTO Government Procurement Agreement
GPP Green Public Procurement
GUO Global Ultimate Owner
IPR Intellectual Property Rights
IT Information technology
LSLI Low-skilled labour-intensive (sectors)
MEAT Most economically advantageous tender (as defined
in Article 67 of Directive 2014/24/EU)
MS Member States
OP Publications Office of the European Union
OPC Open Public Consultation for the impact assessment
4
OPC/EV Open Public Consultation for the Evaluation
PPDS Public Procurement Data Space
PPES Public Procurement Eligibility Service
PPI Public procurement of innovation
SDGs Sustainable development goals
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRPP Socially responsible public procurement
TED Tenders electronic daily - Supplement to the Official
Journal of the EU
UCC Union Customs Code
Utilities Water, energy, transport and postal services sectors or
entities operating in these fields
Country codes used in the main part of the document:
AT - Austria
BE - Belgium BG - Bulgaria
DE - Germany
DK - Denmark CY - Cyprus
CZ - Czechia
EE - Estonia EL - Greece
ES - Spain
FI - Finland FR- France
HR - Croatia
HU - Hungary
IE - Ireland IT - Italy
LU - Luxembourg
LT - Lithuania LV - Latvia
MT - Malta
NL - Netherlands, the PL - Poland
PT - Portugal
RO - Romania SE - Sweden
SK - Slovakia
SI - Slovenia
*** CA - Canada
CH – Switzerland
CN – China IL – Israel
JP – Japan
NO - Norway TR - Turkey
UK – United Kingdom, the
US – United States, the
5
1. INTRODUCTION
Public buyers1 in the EU spend around 15% of GDP2 a year on public procurement in sectors such as
energy, construction, transport, social protection or healthcare services. This makes rules on the
procurement of goods, services and works key for ensuring public funds are invested efficiently and
effectively while preventing corruption and anti-competitive practices3. It makes procurement an
instrument to support the Union’s wider policy objectives including further strengthening a highly
competitive, resilient and sustainable social market economy. And it requires setting out clear and
simple procedures to both, public buyers and economic operators.
Three public procurement directives currently form the core of European public procurement
legislation - Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts [“Concessions”]; Directive
2014/24/EU on public procurement [“Classical”]4; and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by
entities operating in the water, energy, transport, and postal services sectors [“Utilities”], hereafter
referred to as a whole as [“the Directives”]. The Directives operate in compliance with international
commitments defined mainly in the Government Procurement Agreement [“GPA”]. Together, the
Directives apply to public procurements above EU thresholds and cover an average annual value of
EUR 616 billion5. The thresholds vary significantly between public works, concessions, supplies and
services, and between procuring entities6. In addition, currently approximately 60 sector-specific
European instruments contain specific procurement provisions (Annex 11), with more in preparation
or in the legislative process. They cover sectors ranging from environmental, social, digital, health,
justice to trade, transport, security, defence, and energy. Below the EU thresholds, Member States
adopt procurement rules that may regulate any of the aspects mentioned above.
This impact assessment analyses policy options for the revision of the Directives7. It follows and
builds upon the Evaluation of the Directives published in October 2025, which concluded that the
objectives of the Directives have only partially been met and remain relevant today [“the
Evaluation”]8.
This initiative relates to a number of sustainable development goals, in particular SDG 9 (Industry,
innovation and infrastructure), SDG 12 (Responsible production and consumption) and SDG 8
(Decent work and economic growth). See Annex 3 for more details.
1 Throughout this document the term “public buyer” refers to contracting authorities and contracting entities as defined in
Directive 2014/23/EU, Directive 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU; see Annex 7. 2 Expenditure by the general government sector only, source: Commission Staff Working Document Evaluation of
Directive 2014/23/EU on Concessions, Directive 2014/24/EU on Public Procurement and Directive 2014/25/EU on
Utilities SWD/2025/332 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025SC0332 ) p. 1 and Annex II. 3 An overview of the EU public procurement Directives and sectorial acts is presented and explained in Annex 7. 4 References to all legal acts referred to in this impact assessment are listed in Annex 12. 5 SWD(2025)332 final, p. 195. 6 Public works and concessions are subject to the Directives as of EUR 5 404 000. Supplies and services are subject to
the Directives from EUR 140 000 for purchases of the central government, EUR 216 000 for purchases by sub-central
authorities, EUR 432 000 for contracts under Utilities, EUR 1 000 000 for social service contracts under Utilities and
EUR 750 000 for social services under the Classical. 7 The revision does not cover Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC on Remedies, nor Directive 2014/55/EU on
electronic invoicing on public procurement. 8 SWD(2025) 332 final.
6
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The Evaluation of the Directives published in preparation of this intervention established the
following key findings:
• the objective of creating greater legal clarity and certainty with respect to the scope and
coverage has not been achieved.
• the remaining objectives have been only partially achieved:
o simplify, streamline and make more flexible public procurement procedures,
o use public procurement to support other policy objectives, such as social, environmental
and innovation policy,
o open markets to greater cross-border competition and facilitate the participation of SMEs,
o strengthen the governance framework to prevent irregularities.
The Evaluation confirmed that all the above objectives remain highly relevant today9, while the
Directives are not fit for purpose to ensure economic security and respond to supply chains
disruptions and dependencies.
The shortcomings identified in the Evaluation affect a market that is economically significant and
strategically important. Public buyers are the main source of demand in sectors such as energy,
transport, waste management, social protection and the provision of healthcare or education services.
Approximately 46 600 public buyers and 173 000 companies signing contracts annually10 are
directly impacted by the rules set up in the Directives. The majority of the bidders are SMEs, they
win 71% of awarded contracts11 (2017-2024 average). The average yearly value of procurement
governed by the Directives is EUR 616 billion (with 55% of this value awarded to SMEs), roughly
5% of EU GDP12. The EU-level framework creates significant spillover effects across the entire
government procurement market (especially to procedures below EU thresholds), which amounts to
around EUR 2.6 trillion, representing roughly15% of GDP (Figure 18, p. 140).
2.1. What are the problems?
Public procurement is perceived as burdensome for public buyers, as well as economic operators.
In 2019-2024, public buyers spent 20 median person days per above EU thresholds public
procurement procedure (i.e. time actively spent on the fulfilment of procedural requirements
stemming from the Directives), while in the case of economic operators the median time was 11
person days per procedure13. In terms of how burdensome each phase of the procedure was, public
buyers spent on average 46% of time in the pre-award phase, 35% in the award phase and 19% of
person-days in the post-award phase. For bidders, the share of effort per phase was 31%, 45% and
9 i.e. the objectives of openness, transparency and competition on which EU public procurement rules are based to
maximise value for taxpayers’ money remain fully valid and continue to underpin the functioning of the system. 10 World Bank (2025), European Union: Competition in Public Procurement, © World Bank
(https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099111425044525338/pdf/P507458-5e8721a3-6dbd-4db9-aaa3-
8383d86173aa.pdf ), value for 2023 p. 22. 11 Ecorys (2025), Cost-Benefit Analysis on the quality and efficiency of public procurement procedures
(https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d8e2e8e0-daf4-11f0-8da2-01aa75ed71a1/language-en), p. 16. 12 EC (2024), Public Procurement Indicators 2022, European CommissionDG GROW.G, June 14, 2024
(https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/60615), p. 2. 13 Ecorys(2025), Cost-Benefit Analysis…, p. 59.
7
24% respectively14. As far as the pre-award phase is concerned, public buyers most frequently
identified the preparation of technical specifications as the most burdensome, with market research,
and the completion of required forms among other commonly cited challenges. During the award
phase, the evaluation of bids was most frequently reported as most burdensome, especially in cases
involving a high volume of bids and extensive documents to verify. For bidders, identifying and
producing the necessary documents is most often cited as burdensome across all three phases. For the
proposal phase, writing the technical proposal is another frequently mentioned burden15.
The above-mentioned time spent on procurement procedures generates administrative costs for
both public buyers and economic operators, which for all transaction combined represent on average
0.9% of the total value of procurement16. However, for contracts close to the thresholds, the cost of
procedures may represent a substantial proportion of the value of the purchased goods or services.
The reason is that the distribution of procurement contract values typically follows a strongly right-
skewed distribution, where the bulk of procedures is of modest value, while a limited number of
large projects generate a long tail and account for a substantial share of the total (e.g. contracts
valued below EUR 300 000 comprised nearly 45.2% of the total award notice volume but
contributed only 1.9% to the total awarded value)17. In 2019-2024 the average cost of procedures
above EU thresholds was EUR 6 000 for public buyers and EUR 11 400 for bidders18. Taking into
account costs borne by both sides of the procurement transaction, including costs incurred by
unsuccessful bidders, implementing above EU threshold procurement procedure generated an
average cost of EUR 43 20019. This means that in the worst-case scenario, the administrative costs of
procuring goods or services by a central authority for a value just above EUR 140 000 (i.e. the lowest
threshold above which the Directives apply), would represent 1/3 of the contract value.
Moreover, the Evaluation found that public buyers face significant legal uncertainty when
implementing the Directives20. Concepts that were most frequently mentioned by stakeholders as
causing legal uncertainty were: opt-outs, exclusion grounds, in-house awards, public-public
cooperation, concessions or contract modifications21. According to a survey among regional and
local authorities, multiple layers of regulation frequently create legal uncertainty, discourage
strategic procurement approaches and disproportionately increase the administrative burden22.
Despite the possibility to choose from several procedures and procurement techniques, public buyers
chose to use the standard open procedure in 82% of all cases23, firstly because the conditions to
access negotiations are deemed too high of a burden24 and secondly, the sole decision to use
14 Idem, p. 63. 15 Idem, pp. 62-63. 16 Ecorys (2025), Cost-Benefit Analysis…, p. 60. 17 World Bank (2025), European Union: Competition… p. 50. 18 The costs were calculated by multiplying the median days reported in the survey by the EU average wage rate of the
private sector and public sector, respectively, using the most recently available Structure of Earnings Survey data of
2022, and adding the average expenditures reported in the survey; source: Ecorys (2025), Cost-Benefit Analysis…, p. 60. 19 Idem. 20 SWD(2025) 332 final, pp. 56-58. 21 SWD(2025) 332 final, pp. 10-13. 22 CoR(2025) How EU…, p. 2, 40. 23 Ecorys (2025), Cost-Benefit Analysis…, p. 50. 24 Today there are four procedures where negotiations are possible (as opposed to two where this is not feasible). To
access the competitive procedure with negotiation or the competitive dialogue, public buyers need to justify that their
8
negotiations is frequently perceived as unnecessarily risky (i.e. legally uncertain) and can be
challenged. Moreover, the lack of legal certainty around negotiations has been linked to the lack of
flexibility for public buyers to provide incentives for economic operators to deliver the best result or
even engage in public contracts25. Loxbo, K., & Pircher, B. (2025) claim that as the complexity of
the rules increases, the challenges of implementation also intensify, often overburdening public
authorities tasked with interpreting and applying these rules - these challenges can lead public
authorities to adopt a risk-averse behaviour26 in public procurement. The exact scale of the problem
of legal uncertainty cannot be quantified more precisely, while it exacerbates the risk aversion of
public buyers and potentially restricts competition.
Public buyers tend to favour the least risky procedural and award choices, even where
alternative approaches could deliver better value for citizens’ money and support broader EU policy
objectives, such as economic security and strategic autonomy of the EU, or social, environmental
and innovation objectives. Evidence collected for the Evaluation indicates that to avoid risks of
delays and litigation public buyers predominantly revert to using the lowest price as sole award
criterion, risking a detrimental effect on the quality, safety and security of public services; and/or to
increasing the level of detail of the procurement documents, thus potentially restricting
competition27. The continued reliance on lowest-price award criteria is evidence of the limited
strategic use of public procurement to contribute to EU’s policy objectives, including environmental,
social, innovation and resilience objectives. According to SME United, procurers often award
contracts to the lowest bidder out of fear of criticism or concerns about possible complaints,
discouraging quality-based decisions to the detriment of the general public28.
Economic operators struggle to participate in public procurement, especially when bidding
cross-border29. The average number of bids per procedure dropped from 5.4 in 2008-2010 to 3.4 in
2017–202430 , even if high-value contracts continued to attract strong interest31. As far as cross border
bidding is concerned, only about 2% of the number and 4% of the value of public procurement in
Europe was awarded directly to economic operators not established in the awarding country. Indirect
cross-border access to procurement markets is higher (around one-fifth of overall procurement
value32), reflecting integrated value chains and corporate structures in the single market, but also
needs cannot be met without the adaptation of readily available solutions, that the contract includes design or innovative
solutions, that the contract entails “specific circumstances related to the nature, the complexity or the legal and financial
make-up or because of the risks attaching to them”, because the technical specifications cannot be sufficiently precise, or
because a prior call for an open or restricted procedure received only irregular tenders, taking into account that a situation
where there is evidence of collusion would be considered irregular. For negotiations under the innovation partnership,
public buyers need to show that the procurement aims at the development of innovative products, services or works and
the subsequent purchase of these. Lastly, the negotiated procedure without prior publication is limited to situations
where there is a lack of competition, a lock-in situation or cases of extreme urgency. 25 Hensher, D.A & Stanley, J. (2008) Transacting under performance-based contract: The role of negotiation and
competitive tendering, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, vol. 42(9), pp. 1143-1151. DOI:
10.1016/j.tra.2008.05.004. 26 Loxbo, K., & Pircher, B. (2025). Complexity meets flexibility: unintended differentiation in EU public
procurement. Journal of European Public Policy, 32(11), 2714–2740. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2427196 27 SWD(2025) 332 final, p. 92 28 CoR (2025), How EU…, p. 50. 29 CoR(2025), How EU…, p. 44. 30 SWD(2025) 332 final, p. 30. 31 World Bank (2025), Competition in Public Procurement…. 32 SWD(2025)332 final, p. 28 and p. 30.
9
pointing to firms setting up subsidiaries in another Member State to access its market in the face of
difficulties to offer notably services and works cross-border (e.g. common in the construction sector).
High administrative burden and regulatory fragmentation are market access barriers that can be
particularly discouraging for SMEs participation33, 34 in both, domestic and cross-border contexts.
Both, public buyers and bidders are affected by the problem of insufficient transparency and
difficulty to monitor public procurement processes. Both problems largely mirror the lack or poor
quality of available data, which in case of Tenders Electronic Daily [“TED”] data35 is a frequent
concern36, 37. Approximately 800 000 new notices are published every year38 and provide information
about EUR 616 billion of public spending. The quality of the data collected in TED exhibits several
shortcomings, including incomplete entries and inconsistent use of classifications and fields, leading
to criticism from ECA39. Effective monitoring of public expenditure is critical to ensure fair
competition and avoid irregular practices. The incomplete and low-quality data also means that the
precise magnitude of the problems and their consequences cannot always be presented in this impact
assessment, in some places necessitating reliance on proxies, surveys, and anecdotal evidence.
2.1.1. Consequences
Given the earlier mentioned market size, any inefficiencies of the EU procurement rules have as a
consequence less efficient public investment into the EU economy, reducing its potential to
stimulate growth, competitiveness, and value for citizens’ money across the Union, ultimately
resulting in higher prices and inferior quality for citizens as a result of weaker competitive pressure40.
According to the Committee of the Regions, the complexity of procurement procedures can divert
resources and attention from other critical tasks41.
Secondly, the above problems result in an uneven achievement of the EU’s environmental, social,
and innovation objectives. By focusing competition primarily on price, public buyers limit the
integration of sustainability, social and innovation considerations, thereby undermining the creation
of sustainable, fair and innovative lead markets and hampering the use of public procurement as a
policy tool. Although there is no reliable and comparable data at EU level (partly due to the lack of
harmonised definitions of what precisely constitutes green, social and innovation procurement), self-
reported data by Member States suggest that strategic uptake is limited in many countries: Green
33 Celotti, P. et al (2021), SME needs analysis in public procurement: Final report, European Commission, 2021.
(https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/analysis-smesneeds-public-procurement_en#details). 34 “Complexity also affects other stakeholders in the procurement process, such as SMEs that may be discouraged from
participating due to procedural burdens” – CoR(2025), How EU…, p. 73. 35 TED - Supplement to the Official Journal of the EU (https://ted.europa.eu/en/). 36 EP(2019), Gaps and Errors in the TED database. European Parliament Directorate General For Internal Policies
Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs, IP/D/CONT/IC/2018-154 PE621.804 25/02/2019
(https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/621804/IPOL_IDA(2019)621804_EN.pdf). 37 Da Rosa, I., Tátrai, T., Tresó, D. (2025), Evaluation of Transparency and Integrity, 2014 Public Procurement
Directives, (https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2873/9217244). 38 EC. Statistics on TED notices (https://ted.europa.eu/en/simap/statistics-on-ted-notices). 39 European Court of Auditors (2023) Special Report 28/2023: Public Procurement in the EU. Less competition for
contracts awarded for works, goods and services in the 10 years up to 2021,
(https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR-2023-28), pp. 33 and 49. 40 OECD (2025c), p. 5. 41 Committee of the Regions(2025), How EU public procurement rules affect regions and cities
(https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c9cbcdca-4beb-11f0-85ba-01aa75ed71a1), p. 72-73.
10
Public Procurement [“GPP”] accounted for less than 5% of procurement procedure in PT and less
than 5% of total value awarded in PL in 202342, while Socially Responsible Public Procurement
[“SRPP”] remains anecdotal in countries such as LV or EE (below 1% in 2023)43. Similarly, for
Public Procurement of Innovation [“PPI”] many Member States report figures below 1%44, with
research confirming that it is concentrated in specific hubs45, while approximately half of EU/EEA
countries are not making use of Innovation Partnerships introduced in the 2014 Directives46.
A third consequence of public buyers tending to favour the least risky procedural and award choices
is an increased vulnerability of supply chains, exposing them to security risks and geopolitical
dependencies on third countries. Especially in times of crisis, such as during the COVID-19
pandemic47 and recent energy crises, the procurement system was not agile enough for public buyers
to anticipate and respond to supply disruptions, market developments, price shocks or strategic
dependencies, and existing procedures were insufficiently flexible to manage risks and ensure
reliable access to critical goods and services. In addition, despite the scale and strategic importance
of public procurement expenditure, public buyers currently lack adequate tools to favour companies
originating in the EU or in partner countries bound by international agreements. As a result, public
procurement is unable to function as an instrument to effectively reduce geopolitical dependencies,
strengthen European industrial capacity and reinforce strategic autonomy in key sectors48.
A fourth consequence notably of insufficient transparency of the EU public procurement system and
difficulties in monitoring procurement processes is inefficient prevention of irregularities such as
bid rigging and other forms of collusion, increasing the risk of distorted competition49 and misuse of
public funds. ECA(2023) concluded that integrity and transparency are still a challenge50. While
strong monitoring and transparency can serve as a deterrence of corruption, missing, incorrect and
inconsistent data undermine the reliability of information and negatively impact confidence in the
system, competition and undermine the effective governance of public procurement51.
Inconsistencies and lack of coherence of public procurement rules may also contribute to risks of
fraud, as analysed by OLAF52.
42 SWD(332), p.225-228. 43 SWD(332), p.228-236 44 SWD(332), p.39. 45 Fundación Cotec para la Innovación, Index for Measuring Public Procurement of Innovation: the innovation vs price
duality (January 2026): https://cotec.es/proyectos-cpt/indice-para-la-medicion-de-la-compra-publica-de-innovaciones/ 46 Report on the use of Innovation Partnerships (IPs) for the period 2016-2024: https://public-buyers-
community.ec.europa.eu/resources/report-use-innovation-partnerships-ips-eea-over-period-2016-2024. 47 OECD (2025c), Implementing the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement in OECD and Partner Countries:
2020-2024 Report, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/02a46a58-en. 48 When OPC/EV respondents were asked whether the Directives are fit for purpose in situations of supply-chain
disruptions (e.g. during a health, energy, or security crisis) 43.9% disagreed (297 replies), while 20.42% (138) thought
that the Directives are fit for purpose in these situations (SWD(2025)332 final, p. 65.). 49 Transparency and integrity are listed as key factors influencing competition, whereas corruption and weak integrity
discourage bidders; source: World Bank (2025), Competition…, p. 16. 50 ECA(2023), Special Report…, p. 62. 51 Idem. 52 OLAF (2017) Fraud in public procurement. A collection of red flags and best practices,
(https://sfc.ec.europa.eu/system/files/documents/sfc-files/fraud-public-procurement-final-20122017-
ares20176254403.pdf).
11
2.2. What are the problem drivers?
Figure 1: Problem tree
2.2.1. Complex procedures and rules that lack flexibility [driver 1]
In terms of overall setup of the current rules, both public buyers and economic operators are affected
by the complexity of procedures and rules that contribute to the problems of legal uncertainty53
and high administrative burden (section 2.1 above). Among the root causes of the observed
complexity are procedural differences54 between Concessions, Classical and Utilities55 that need to
be considered by public buyers. For example, depending on the legal structure of the public buyer,
they may be bound by the provisions of one Directive, but not another.
The lack of legal certainty surrounding negotiations increases the risk aversion of public buyers
and constitutes a missed opportunity to increase the efficiency of public expenditure as noted in the
Call for Evidence by buyers and economic operators alike. Particularly in the case of smaller public
buyers, the lack of legal certainty surrounding negotiations has been associated with efficiency loss
53 SWD(2025) 332 final, p. 8. 54 See Annex 7 - Variability of rules by sector (ad section 2.2). 55 Public buyers first need to know which type of authority (central or sub-central), entity or body governed by public law
they are, exactly what they plan to procure (works, goods and services, or social services), and whether this is a
concession or a public contract. Furthermore, there are several applicable thresholds (i.e., monetary values) above which
the rules apply per Directive. Under the Classical directive there are four thresholds; the Utilities directive has three other
thresholds and the Concessions directive one other.
P ro
b le
m s
PUBLIC BUYERS
Bidders
Contracting authorities face high administrative burden and legal uncertainty, favouring the least risky choices when running
public procurement
EU businesses, including SMEs, face high administrative burden and struggle to
participate in public procurement, also cross-border
Insufficient transparency, difficult to monitor public procurement processes
ECONOMIC OPERATORS (BIDDERS)
• Less efficient public investments into the EU economy • Uneven achievement of the EU's environmental, social, and innovation objectives • Vulnerability of supply chains (e.g. access critical goods and services), security risks, geopolitical
dependencies • Inefficient prevention of irregularities
C o
n se
q u
en ce
s D
ri ve
rs
Complex public procurement
procedures and rules that lack flexibility
Environmental, social and innovative
requirements not incentivised and difficult to
apply
EU procurement framework not
sufficiently supporting EU economic security and strategic autonomy
Dispersed information
and data, fragmented and
misaligned IT solutions
across MS
1 2 3 4
NATIONAL AUTHORITIES / ePROCUREMENT SERVICE PROVIDERS
CONSIDERABLE variation of rules by sector
SOME variation of rules by sector
CONSIDERABLE variation of rules by
sector
12
during execution, due to the need to engage in complex modifications and cost over-runs56.
Furthermore, the differences between Directives affects public buyers during the procedures, as e.g.
negotiations are limited under some of the Directives, but not under others.
In terms of practical complexity, the unique procedural set up of each Directive is reflected in more
than 30 different forms for publishing information about procurement procedures (so called
eForms57), forcing public buyers to be aware of minor differences depending on the legal instrument
used. A recent report by the Committee of the Regions provides multiple examples confirming that
applying different procedures is complex for local and regional authorities as the rules are not clear /
easy to interpret58. Consultations have shown that difficulties (e.g. with the classification of contracts
as public contracts or concessions, or access to negotiations under the Classical Directive) persist59,
the process can be complex, particularly for local and regional authorities that may provide utilities
and are thus bound by both the Classical and Utilities Directives. As regards concession contracts,
complexities are shown by the legal ambiguity in defining concessions and the level of operating risk
to be transferred to private partners. These create divergent uses of the term “concession” across
Member States, pose difficulties to classify contracts as public contracts or concessions, uncertainty
in risk allocation and potential incentives for opportunistic renegotiation during execution.
Furthermore, the Directives do not exist in isolation but, over time, they have become increasingly
complemented by a growing number of sector-specific EU legislative acts covering public
procurement60. In particular, relevant to the procedures (the “how to buy”), 15 legal acts are related
to exclusion grounds (grounds upon which public buyers must exclude a company from a public
procurement process). Those provisions create fragmentation and raise legal uncertainty and
concerns regarding their consistency with the exclusion grounds in the Classical Directive
2014/24/EU, especially in terms of scope of application, duration of the exclusion, applicability of
self-cleaning measures, means of proof, and extraterritorial enforcement of the exclusions. Many
stakeholders have expressed concerns about this proliferation that causes fragmentation and a lack
of legal coherence across EU public procurement rules. During the public consultation prepared in
view of the Evaluation [“OPC/EV”], 37% of respondents (248 replies) disagreed that the rules are
coherent and only 11% (73 replies) supported the view of coherence between the Directives and
sectoral legislation61. Stakeholders highlight the difficulties local and regional authorities face
navigating such complex framework62 and the growing difficulties in applying overlapping legal
frameworks in practice. Member States underline the need for streamlining and alignment of the
initiatives in the interest of finding a balance among the different objectives, greater legal certainty,
56 Baldi, S. et al. (2016) To bid or not to bid: That is the question: Public procurement, project complexity and
corruption. European Journal of Political Economy 42, pp. 89-106. DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.04.002. 57 Formats and procedures for sending notices are established under point three of Annex VIII to Directive 2014/24/EU,
of Annex IX to Directive 2014/25/EU and point two of Annex IX to 2014/23/EU. e-Forms cover the notices related to
planning, competition, award, result of the competitions and modifications before and after the award. Transparency
obligations in the Directives change depending on the legal basis used, the procedure and type of contract. As such,
contracting authorities e.g. cannot use the same template to notify the award of a contract under Utilities than the award
of a contract under the special social services regime under Utilities. 58 CoR(2025), How EU public procurement…., p. 72-73. 59 SWD(2025) 332 final, p. 9. 60 See Annex 7 for more details. 61 SWD (2025) 332 final, p. 161. 62 CoR(2025), How EU….
13
overall coherence, and, where appropriate, the reduction of regulatory burden and costs63. The
observed complexity is often augmented by national gold plating, as confirmed by the CoR64.
Another element of driver 1 that contributes to the problems of legal uncertainty and risk aversion
(affecting public buyers), as well as high administrative burden (affecting both sides of the
procurement transaction) is the lack of flexibility of the rules. For example, stakeholders frequently
mention insufficient flexibility regarding contract modifications, which, during periods of high price
fluctuation, leads to economic loses, as well as a disenfranchisement of economic operators from
procurement65. Specifically for concessions, contract modifications during the concession term
remain a frequent source of misapplication, even if the long-term nature of concessions means that
contracts may need to adapt to economic, regulatory, or technological changes.
For the majority of the OPC/EV respondents, the introduction of multiple procedures and
procurement techniques by the Directives did make procurement processes neither simpler66 nor
faster67 and they are perceived as rigid and not able to adapt to unforeseeable situations or to
negotiate best outcomes68. 48% (398) of OPC/EV respondents consider that the Directives’ rules
aimed at increasing procedural flexibility (e.g. the choice of available procedures, time limits for
submitting offers, contract modifications) did not deliver the intended result69 and the lack of
possibilities to modify the tender documents often led to an early termination of the procedures70.
2.2.2. Environmental, social and innovative requirements not incentivised and difficult to apply
[driver 2]
Low levels of environmental, social and innovation procurement are, among others, driven by a
limited use of quality considerations among procurement award criteria. Price-only awards
remain widespread overall, accounting for 37% of all procedures between 2017 and 2024, up from
30% in the period 2006–201071. Environmental award criteria only feature in 28% of framework
contracts and 22% in one-off contracts, social considerations in 25% for both contract types and
innovation aspects in 8% and 7% in one-off and framework contracts72. When award criteria
frequently do not include qualitative environmental, social and innovation requirements, related
solutions are not incentivised. One out of two OPC/EV respondents (49%: 337 replies) considered
the frequency of awards based only on price too high73.
63 Council Conclusions of 3 June 2024 on the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report No. 28/2023. Improve a fair
and effective competition for EU public procurement contracts awarded for works, goods, and services (C/2024/3521). 64 CoR(2025), How EU…, p. 39. 65 SWD(2025)332 final, p. 93; Altaee (2005), Evaluation of the EU public procurement…, pp. 16-18. 66 In the OPC/EV 54.1% (364) stated that the Directives did not lead to simpler rules, with only 17.8% (121) taking the
opposite view, SWD(2025)332, p. 18. 67 Respondents to the OPC/EV indicated that the Directives never lead to faster procedures bellow EU thresholds (38%:
251 replies) or rarely (17%: 113 replies). When compared with private procurement, less than 4.2% (27) of respondents
considered that the Directive led to faster purchases, while 48.8% (315) of respondents indicated that it is never or rarely
the case. SWD (2025)332, p. 19 and 21. 68 SWD(2025)332 final, p. 14. 69 SWD(2025)332 final, p. 65. 70 SWD(2025)332 final, pp. 20, 94 and 215-215. 71 Ecorys (2025), Table 5.6. 72 SWD(2025) 332, p. 223. 73 SWD(2025) 332, pp.133-135.
14
The need for public buyers and economic operators to identify, take into consideration and apply
multiple different green and social provisions included in various EU sectoral legislative acts
complicates the application of environmental, social and innovation requirements74. Relevant
provisions in sectoral acts take the form of i) horizontal provisions on green and socially responsible
public procurement requirements; ii) sector-specific provisions containing green and socially
responsible requirements on “what to procure” applicable to a specific product group and/or sector;
and iii) empowerments to establish public procurement requirements. These provisions, scattered
across different EU legal acts, reflect different regulatory approaches and techniques and may set
mandatory environmental requirements, in the form of targets, technical specifications, award criteria
or contract performance clauses, among others. Often public buyers must include a combination of
requirements in the same procurement procedure related to sustainability, energy efficiency, circular
economy and due diligence, among others75. They raise concerns in terms of scope of application,
clarity or the link to the subject matter of the contract, among others76, resulting in difficulties in
application. As outlined in the Evaluation, the dispersion of public procurement rules across a
multitude of sectoral acts has contributed even further to administrative burden, legal uncertainty and
propensity to undertake less risky procurement decisions77. This is reflected in the number of legal
challenges related to the application of green and social considerations78.
The difficulty to apply environmental requirements in public procurement is due to a number of
root causes. The first is a lack of a uniform definition of what qualifies as Green Public Procurement
[“GPP”]. Interpretations of what qualifies as sustainable public procurement not only “vary from one
Member State to another”, but “also between contracting authorities from the same Member State”79
and the lack of a uniform definition of GPP has led to as many as 50 different definitions of what
constitutes "green" across Member States80, which limits efforts to incentivise and monitor GPP81
and complicates the cross-border provision of GPP solutions.
Secondly, while environmental labels can serve to implement GPP, in practice they are little used
due to regulatory and administrative complexities82. According to the analysis of the TED data for
DE, FR, IT, SE, DK, HR for the period October 2022-September 2025, only 200 out of 300 000
tenders explicitly referred to ecolabels83. With around 230 ecolabels across the EU84, their use often
74 See Annex 7 for more details 75 Janssen and Caranta study (2026) highlights the complexity of applying multiple public procurement provisions from
sectoral acts, on top of the Public Procurement Directives, within a single public procurement procedure. Examples of
this complexity are included in Caranta and Janssen (upcoming), Expert opinion on the coherence of EU public
procurement regulation: legal and non-legal solutions from the public buyer perspective. 76 For an in-depth analysis of “what to buy” provisions in sectoral acts, see Janssen (2025), The Coherence of Public
Procurement Legislation in the European Union. 77 SWD(2025)332 final, pp. 58-59. 78 Andrea Sundstrand (2026), Green, Social and Labour Considerations in EU Public Procurement. This study identifies
as a central issue the “legal uncertainty surrounding the design and application of sustainability requirements”, with
“contracting authorities frequently facing uncertainty regarding how far environmental, social, or labour-related
requirements can be imposed without breaching procurement principles or distorting competition”. 79 Andrea Sundstrand (2026), Green, Social and Labour Considerations in EU Public Procurement. 80 Ecorys (2025) Cost-Benefit Analysis…, p. 147 (in the “Case Study IV: Strategic public procurement and the impact on
competition”). 81 Sustainable public procurement – Current status and environmental impacts – Knowledge to support policymaking,
Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/06145 82 Online consultation of the Green Public Procurement Advisory Group, 10th of July 2025. 83 Viegand Maagøe (2026), Use of labels in public procurement procedures, DG GROW, Copenhagen, 2026
15
requires complex assessments, discouraging public buyers from referring to them85, 86. Labels differ
in how they structure requirements, in their technical approaches and are national or regional,
creating barriers to cross-border participation (as buyers refer to domestic labels in tender
documents)87. Non-legislative barriers, such as limited administrative capacity, supply chain
constraints88, and insufficient professionalisation and specialised expertise in managing technically
demanding GPP procedures89 exacerbate the problem.
Several root causes make it difficult for public buyers to apply social requirements in public
procurement. First, a lack of clear understanding of what socially responsible public procurement
[“SRPP”] entails, including its definition, scope, legal standing, and boundaries. A clear example of
this ambiguity relates to the application of the link to the subject matter principle to working
conditions of those performing a public contract. Uncertainty persists over whether and how such
conditions can be lawfully linked to the procurement processes. Thus, 39% (279) of OPC
respondents call to explicitly recognise the link between working conditions of those performing a
procurement contract. Member States also identified “difficulties in connecting social considerations
to the subject matter of a contract” as a reason for not implementing SRPP90. The number of case law
related to the inclusion of social requirements further illustrate the magnitude of the problem. The
CJEU had to respond to several requests for preliminary ruling, with the most recent delivered in
March 202691. Between 2018 and 2025, Spanish administrative courts handling public procurement
appeals alone issued at least 81 judgments and rulings concerning the incorporation of social
requirements in public procurement processes, highlighting persistent disputes over the interpretation
of social criteria92, 93.
Secondly, subcontracting practices can make it difficult for public buyers to apply social
requirements because they can fragment responsibility across multiple layers of (sub)contractors.
When work is delegated through subcontracting chains, public buyers may lose oversight, where
there is no transparency. Nearly half of OPC respondents (46%: 315 replies) identified poor
transparency in subcontracting chains as a major barrier to ensuring compliance with labour and
social law obligations. As a result, a growing number of countries (e.g. ES, BE, NO) and
84 See Ecolabel Index: http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ecolabels/?st=region=europe. 85 CCRE-CEMR(2025), Tailoring public procurement to local realities (https://ccre-cemr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2025/02/CEMR-Position-on-Public-Procurement.pdf), p. 4-5. 86 Even the criteria of the ISO 14024 type I ecolabels, certified as meeting specific environmental criteria through
independent third-party verification, are not always the same and in fact are often difficult to compare. 87 Viegand Maagøe (2026), Use of labels in public procurement procedures, DG GROW, Copenhagen, 2026 88 SWD (332), p. 37 89 IISD (2025), How Reforming the European Union’s Public Procurement Directive Can Help Drive a Green Transition,
p.3 90 Report from the Commission. Implementation and best practices of national procurement policies in the Internal
Market (COM/2021/245 final). 91 Case C-210/24 AESTE v Ayuntamiento de Ortuella, [2026] 92 Caimi, V. & Sansonetti, S. (2023). The social impact of public procurement, publication for the Committee on
Employment and Social affairs, European Parliament, Luxembourg. Available at:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/740095/IPOL_STU(2023)740095_EN.pdf. 93 Huyse, H. & Helsen, L. (2025). Socially Responsible Public Procurement: Moving Beyond Islands of Innovation and
Success? KU Leuven. Available at https://hiva.kuleuven.be/en/research/theme/globaldevelopment/p/hringvcs/policy-
brief-1-srpp-review-2-0.pdf.
16
municipalities introduced transparency measures or banned the subcontracting of the entirety of a
contract (i.e. obliging the successful bidder to carry out some of the work itself).
The low uptake of innovation in public procurement is linked to a number of legal root causes.
Firstly, the current legal framework and absence of a definition of what constitutes the procurement
of an innovative solution [“PPI”] discourages public buyers from using public procurement
procedures intended to promote innovation by reinforcing risk-avoiding behaviour. By conditioning
the use of such procedures on proof that solutions available on the market cannot objectively meet
their needs, the framework places a heavy justificatory burden on public buyers and incentivises
defaulting to established market solutions. Thus, the use of the innovation partnership procedure
introduced by the Directives for innovation procurement led to only 218 contract awards between
2016-202494. In addition, where public buyers do engage in procurement of innovation, they are
exposed to heightened audit and compliance risks, as internal control and audit mechanisms typically
treat the procurement of readily available market solutions as the least risky option95.
Secondly, while market engagement before and during the call for tender positively impacts
innovation in public procurement, this is hindered by a perceived legal uncertainty regarding how to
conduct market consultations in a manner that ensures the obligation to maintain a level playing
field for all suppliers96. Thirdly, the common obligation for intellectual property rights [“IPR”] to
be transferred to public buyers in innovation procurement is a disincentive for suppliers to offer
highly innovative solutions, lowers competition and leads to higher costs97. Such procurement
practices requiring the transfer of IPR from suppliers to public buyers can create several risks, such
as leakage of proprietary know-how, uncertainty about the value of product lines when core IPR
must be transferred contract by contract, or inability to reuse technical solutions developed under
previous public contracts (reducing economies of scale and discouraging standardised products).
Thus 49% of surveyed companies reported limited ability to reuse previous experience and solutions,
42% reported it hindered their innovation efforts, 36% said it caused difficulties in pricing their bid,
35% refrained from using the best technical tools in the assignment98.
2.2.3. EU procurement framework not sufficiently supporting EU economic security and strategic
autonomy [driver 3]
The Evaluation found that the Directives’ rules concerning market access for companies from
non-EU countries lack clarity and are not fit for purpose to respond to challenges in terms of
security of supply, strategic autonomy and support to European industrial capacities99. Only 16%
(109) of respondents to the OPC/EV considered the rules on market access for companies from third
countries to be still relevant and adequate. As regards the security of supply chains, 49% (337) of
94 EC(2025) Report on the use of Innovation Partnerships (IPs) EEA over the period 2016-2024 (https://public-buyers-
community.ec.europa.eu/resources/report-use-innovation-partnerships-ips-eea-over-period-2016-2024). 95 EC(2025), Innovation Procurement Hubs – Ecosystem Mapping: Summary Final Report (https://public-buyers-
community.ec.europa.eu/communities/innovation-procurement-hubs-iph/news/iph-ecosystem-mapping-report-out/), p.
28. 96 Berkhout, P., et al (2026), Does market engagement in public procurement foster innovation? Results from a Pan-
European survey, Research Policy 55(1), Article 105372, Elsevier, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2025.105372. 97 Wainikka, Ch. (2026), .Intellectual Property in Public Procurement, Country comparisons and impact on companies,
(forthcoming). 98 Idem. 99 SWD(2025)332 final, p. 67.
17
respondents to the OPC/EV disagreed that the Directives are fit for purpose to contribute to the EU’s
strategic autonomy, including the security of EU supply chains. Several MS also expressed concerns
relating to the dependence on external suppliers for critical materials and technology.
Non-EU direct and indirect participation accounts for 7.5% of the total awarded contract
value and impacts several sectors100. For some certain specialised products, such as railway and
tramway locomotives and rolling stock, pharmaceuticals, software package and information systems,
IT services, medical equipment, support services for land, water and air transport, computer
equipment and supplies, telecommunication services and software programming and consultancy
services, the percentage exceeds 25%.
Many public buyers are not equipped to take decisions relating to the participation of
economic operators from third countries in the EU, with implications for trade and industrial
policy. The EC clarified that third-country bidders without a covered trade agreement (e.g., GPA or
free trade agreements [“FTAs”]) have no guaranteed access to EU public procurement and may be
excluded101. Recently, the CJEU in its Kolin102 and Qingdao103 judgments specified that the issue of
participation by economic operators from third countries falls within the exclusive competence of the
EU under the TFEU. Until the EU legislates, public buyers have broad discretion to decide whether
or not to exclude economic operators from third countries from participating in public procurement
procedures and, if they allow their participation, whether or not to apply score adjustments or other
types of differentiation. During consultations, public buyers indicated that they often face uncertainty
in relation to the implementation of this possibility. In practice, most public buyers are not
sufficiently equipped to exercise this discretionary power effectively and lack access to information
on the specific scope and coverage of concluded trade agreements, resulting in uncertainty and the
lack of a coherent approach. Although the Access2Market platform104 developed by the EC allows
public buyers and economic operators to check information on scope and coverage, this tool is not
systematically used and the information provided is not legally binding. Verifying the origin of
goods is also complex and requires the use of different sources and capabilities by public buyers. The
only existing tool to prioritise bids from economic operators from the EU, the EEA or countries that
have signed such agreements - Article 85 of the Utilities Directive-, remains rarely used in practice,
mainly due to a lack of legal certainty105.
Last, sectoral acts containing horizontal provisions on security and cybersecurity in public
procurement106 fragment the legal framework and risk leading to inconsistencies and a lack of
coherence with the horizontal rules and challenges for public purchasers in implementation.
100 A sample analysis of TED publication data in 2018-2023 focusing on top 10 000 economic operators by award value
(Figure 24, p.198). See Annex 7 – Key figures on cross-border public procurement. 101 European Commission – Guidance on the participation of third country bidders and goods in the EU procurement
market (C(2019) 5494 final). 102 Case C-652/22, Kolin İnşaat Turizm Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v State Commission for the Supervision of Public
Procurement Procedures [2024] ECLI:EU:C:2024:910. 103 Case C-266/22, CRRC Qingdao Sifang Co. Ltd and Astra Vagoane Călători SA v Autoritatea pentru Reformă
Feroviară and Alstom Ferroviaria SpA [2025] ECLI:EU:C:2025:178. 104 EC – Access2Markets (https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/home). 105 Feedback received from bilateral exchanges with public buyers and feedback from the Stakeholder Expert Group on
Public Procurement (SEGPP). 106 See Annex 7 for more details.
18
2.2.4. Dispersed information and data, fragmented and misaligned IT solutions [driver 4]
Insufficient transparency and the difficulty to monitor public procurement processes is driven by
dispersed information and data as well as fragmented and misaligned IT solutions, contributing
to administrative burden. The Evaluation showed that the degree to which transparency can support
the prevention and detection of irregular and anti-competitive procurement practices and help
achieve strategic policy objectives depends on the completeness and quality of the data provided107,
which, however, is of concern108. Missing, incorrect and incoherent data undermine the reliability of
information and negatively impact confidence in the system, competition and the effective
governance of public procurement109. Three root causes are identified.
First, eProcurement in the EU is fragmented and characterised by a multitude of IT systems that
are not generally interoperable: in total, there are 123 eProcurement systems operating across the EU
(Table 20, p.156). This fragmentation results in administrative burden, especially for economic
operators (and notably SMEs)110. While public buyers typically use one eProcurement platform to
conduct a public procurement procedure (planning, publishing calls for tenders, communication,
evaluation, awarding, contracting), economic operators must use any of the 123 eProcurement
platforms chosen by the respective public buyers and their registration, documentation and tendering
structure. By increasing administrative burden, the multitude of eProcurement systems reduces
competition111 and limits cross-border participation112.
Secondly, the absence of a once-only principle113 in public procurement implies that public
buyers apply divergent evidence and documentation requirements across jurisdictions. The dispersed
information requirements contribute to higher administrative burden and cost for the bidders114 (they
need to submit the same information / evidence several times) in particular in cross-border
procurement and increase the risk of errors115. EE is presently the only Member State that offers
access to its national databases for both domestic and cross-border procurement: public buyers from
other Member States can access evidence and verify information about EE economic operators116.
Lastly, insufficiently integrated data governance and lack of life-cycle monitoring is driven by
the fact that the Directives do not establish a digital approach for governing public procurement data
and Member States use different data structures and focus monitoring mostly on pre‑award phases.
By the end of 2025, three Member States were sharing their national procurement notices with the
107 SWD(2025)332 final, p. 43. 108 ECA(2023), Special report …, pp. 32, 34-36. 109 Da Rosa, I., Tátrai, T., Tresó, D. (2025), Evaluation of Transparency and Integrity, 2014 Public Procurement
Directives, (https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2873/9217244). 110 Celotti, P. et al (2021), SME needs …,pp. 38-39, 43, 58. 111 World Bank(2025), Competition …, pp. 36, 46-47, 61-62. 112 Celotti, P. et al (2021), SME needs, pp. 38-39, 58. 113 Once-only principle means that economic operators provide the same information only once to a public
administration. The multitude of input systems stem from national legal and administrative systems, and the absence of a
harmonised or interoperable framework for accessing evidence and registries among Member States. 114 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of European Business Wallets (SWD(2025) 837 final), p. 11. 115 Idem, p. 18. 116 In cross-border procedures involving economic operators from other Member States, tenderers must submit the
evidence on exclusion grounds to the public buyer since foreign contract authorities cannot access their national
databases. Public buyers are still required to review manually the evidence provided (such as documents and certificates).
19
EU Public Procurement Dataspace [“PPDS”], which is designed to ensure availability of
procurement data across Member States117. The ECA noted that TED data is not always complete or
accurate which hinders effective monitoring118. An EP report pointed out to multiple gaps and errors
in TED dataset119 that have not been addressed. An OECD study identified data needed to effectively
measure the performance of public procurement - the EU is currently able to compile only a limited
subset of this data120. The current focus of EU procurement legislation on pre-award stages results in
limited governance and oversight of post-award contract implementation. Therefore, no EU‑wide
mechanisms exist for coherent, real‑time life-cycle data (e.g. from invoices and completion notices).
2.3. How likely is the problem to persist?
As some of the issues identified in section 2.1 constitute a direct outcome of the existing Directives,
they will continue to exist as long as the EU does not act. As the problems affect the entirety of the
EU, Member State’s actions alone cannot fully tackle the problems. Moreover, the continuous
adoption of EU legislation containing public procurement provisions is aggravating the
fragmentation of the legal framework and increasing the complexity of application by public buyers
and economic operators. Thus, not only are the problems expected to persist, but so are their
significant consequences, as detailed in section 2.2.1. The likelihood that the identified problems will
persist is also demonstrated in the baseline scenario. The expectation of the persistence of the
problems caused by the dispersed information and data and fragmented and misaligned IT solutions
aligns with the foresight scenarios concerning the advancement of the digital revolution (i.e. a
megatrend of accelerating technological change and hyperconnectivity).
3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?
3.1. Legal basis
Article 114 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) is the appropriate legal basis to
achieve the objectives of this initiative, namely creating a simpler and efficient harmonised public
procurement system across Member States. This Article is the appropriate legal basis for measures
aimed at achieving the objectives set out in Article 26 TFEU. Previous proposals in the field of
public procurement relied on Articles 53 and 62 TFEU, in combination with Article 114. Taking into
account developments in EU legislation, the existence of sectorial acts harmonising aspects outside
public procurement procedures and the objectives pursued by this initiative, it is no longer
appropriate to use Article 53 and 62 TFEU as legal basis. While the efforts pursued contribute to the
objectives in Article 173 TFEU, the primary aim of this initiative is the harmonisation of public
procurement legislation, which excludes the use of Article 173 TFEU as legal basis. Similarly, while
aspects of the action, such as the access of third country bidders to the EU procurement market, fall
under Article 207 TFEU, these are not sufficient to justify the use of that Article as legal basis.
117 Eight more Member States are either preparing to integrate their data into PPDS or announced their intention to do so. 118 ECA(2023), Special Report…. 119 Gaps and errors are mainly attributed to: the limited number of mandated (compulsory) fields; the fragmentation and
complexity of procurement systems in Member States; lack of compatibility between TED and Member State systems
and the need to enter data twice; lack of compliance with and enforcement of EU legislation; the structure of the TED
platform,; and the limited mandate of the Publications Office of the EU. EP(2019) Gaps and Errors in the TED database
(PE 621.804) (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/621804/IPOL_IDA(2019)621804_EN.pdf). 120 OECD(2023), Public procurement performance: A framework for measuring efficiency, compliance and strategic
goals, OECD, 8 August 2023, pp. 29-63.
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3.2. Subsidiarity: necessity of EU action
While significant efforts have been made in the last 50 years, a single market for public procurement
is not yet achieved. Fragmentation persists in the form of divergent policy approaches across
initiatives, gold-plating at Member State level, and the use of diverging digital tools and platforms.
These issues make the current EU public procurement framework an area of perceived administrative
burden and bureaucracy, instead of an instrument for sustainable economic growth. To leverage
public procurement as a driver for competitiveness and efficient and effective public investment, also
supporting EU policy objectives, EU action is needed. Simplifying the EU public procurement
framework and implementing strategic objectives is only possible through EU action that ensures a
consistent change across Member State. Absence of EU action would perpetuate the inefficiencies in
the system and prevent public buyers from meeting their needs faster and strategically, and economic
operators from accessing procurement contracts across the single market. A coherent legal
framework for public procurement can only be achieved at EU level. In addition, in absence of EU
action, the EU public procurement legislation will continue to underperform in key strategic aspects,
such as advancing on sustainability, fostering resilient supply chains or ensuring the strategic
autonomy of the EU. Likewise, joint investment in strategic sectors would be limited, while
coordinated action will enable leveraging demand better. Finally, the lack of EU actions also creates
a missed opportunity, as the legislation becomes outdated in light of current developments (e.g.
accelerating digital change and hyperconnectivity) and evolving threats. (e.g. changing security
paradigms).
3.3. Subsidiarity: added value of EU action
The proposal aims at amending EU legislation, directly touching upon the EU-wide procurement
market. The same could not be accomplished at Member State level, in particular considering the
need for ensuring a harmonised approach across Member States, such an approach being of critical
importance for effective simplification. There is a strong value added of EU-level action because the
problems that this proposal tackles are not limited to the territory of a single Member State. Only EU
action can regulate the access of third country bidders and goods to the EU procurement market, as
this is an exclusive competence of the EU. Similarly, insofar as the commitments of the EU under
the GPA remain, Member States may not introduce procedural simplification beyond the level that is
set at EU level because the public procurement thresholds and procedures are governed by EU rules
implementing the procedural commitments under the GPA.
4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED?
4.1. General objectives
The general objectives are to make public procurement a more efficient public investment
instrument, supporting policy objectives, in particular single market integration, strategic economic
autonomy, social and ecological sustainability and innovation. The general objectives contribute to
the achievement of SDG goals, in particular #9 Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure, #12
Responsible consumption and production and #8 Decent work and economic growth.
4.2. Specific objectives
In view of the above general objectives and the problem tree presented in Figure 1 above, this EU
intervention pursues the following specific objectives:
21
• Specific objective 1: simplify and promote flexibility in procurement procedures and increase
legal clarity and coherence of applicable rules, so as to facilitate public procurement
processes and access to them for economic operators across the single market, including for
SMEs121;
• Specific objective 2: increase the uptake of environmental, social and innovation public
procurement in support of strategic policy objectives of the Union and provide a more
coherent legal framework in this regard122;
• Specific objective 3: improve EU economic security and strategic autonomy in public
procurement, promoting a coherent legal framework in this regard123;
• Specific objective 4: facilitate access to public procurement information, data and IT
solutions so as to reduce administrative burden and increase transparency and monitoring,
thereby preventing and reducing irregular practices and enabling policy-making choices124.
5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS?
This chapter describes the policy options identified to meet the four specific objectives of this EU
intervention (as set out in section 4.2), addressing the four problem drivers assessed in chapter 2.
Table 1: Policy options
S p
ec if
ic
o b
je ct
iv e
1. Simplify and promote
flexibility in procurement
procedures and increase
legal clarity and coherence
of applicable rules (FLX)
2. Increase the uptake
of environmental, social
and innovation public
procurement and
provide a more coherent
legal framework (ESI)
3. Improve EU economic
security and strategic
autonomy in public
procurement, promoting a
coherent legal framework
(BEU)
4. Facilitate access to
public procurement
information, data and
IT tools (MPL)
P o
li cy
o p
ti o
n s
FLX.0 ESI.0 BEU.0 MPL.0
FLX.1: Targeted
improvements on
simplification, procedural
flexibility and coherence
ESI.1: Inducing green,
social and innovation
procurement
BEU.1: Voluntary European
preference
MPL.1: Decentralised
eProcurement platforms to
establish an
interconnected digital
marketplace ESI.2: Improving
coherence and horizontal
integration in public
procurement
BEU.2: A framework for
coherent European
preference in selected sectors
FLX.2: Simplified & flexible
procedures in a more coherent
system
ESI.3: Mandating green,
social and innovation
procurement
BEU.3: Mandatory European
preference across all sectors
MPL.2: Centralised EU
marketplace replacing MS
marketplaces
5.1. What is the baseline from which options are assessed?
In the absence of a revision of the Directives, the current policy would be continued, making for a
dynamic baseline scenario. The existing Directives would be complemented by further guidance and
121 Addressing the problem of high administrative burden for public buyers and economic operators. 122 Addressing the problem of public buyers favouring the least risky choices when running procurement procedures. 123 Addressing the problem of public buyers favouring the least risky choices and of EU businesses struggling to
participate in procurement. 124 Addressing the problem of insufficient transparency and difficult to monitor public procurement processes as well as
the problem of high administrative burden for public buyers and economic operators.
22
continued capacity-building measures. Additional procurement provisions would continue to be
included in other EU legislative acts. The timeline of this dynamic baseline is until 2032.
In terms of objective 1, if no changes are made, issues relating to the complexity and lack of
flexibility of EU procurement procedures would persist. Public buyers would continue facing
complexity due to the different rules depending on the type of public buyer, the contract value and
the subject matter of the contract, as well as due to the fragmentation and misalignment of provisions
related to exclusion grounds in several sectoral acts. Similarly, public buyers would not have the
flexibility to adapt to their various day to day purchasing needs or address effectively urgent
situations or supply chain disruptions, which, given the volatility of the current geopolitical
landscape, may translate into higher costs and delays in the provision of public services.
As for the intended increase in the uptake of environmental, social and innovation public
procurement (objective 2), the EC would continue to pursue supportive measures, such as training,
guidance, and collaborative networks. Without a policy change, GPP will face additional
fragmentation, as difficulties to identify and apply different procurement provisions in sectoral acts
will hinder market uptake and scalability. SRPP will remain constrained by legal uncertainties and
fragmentation. PPI will continue to be hampered by risk-averse practices. Left unaddressed, these
issues will fail to increase the uptake of green, socially responsible, and innovative solutions.
Regarding objective 3, if no policy change is adopted, the differentiated treatment of economic
operators and goods from countries that are not parties to the GPA or to an FTA will continue to be a
source of complexity for public buyers and bidders. Sectoral rules may continue to develop different
approaches, which would further complicate effective implementation. While public buyers have
broad discretion to exclude third country bidders, they lack legal clarity and instruments to do so in
practice. Current geopolitical developments and policies by third countries are likely to increase the
vulnerability of supply chains and affect the EU economic security.
In the case of objective 4, the rollout of the PPDS is likely to continue gradually. The step-by-step
adoption of key digital tools including the new European Business Wallets and the interoperability
standards can be expected over time, but the extent to which this will happen will depend on the
voluntary participation of the 123 procurement platforms. Based on feedback received from Member
States, the assumption is made that 30% of eProcurement Systems would be adjusted to become
interoperable and that 30% of Member States would develop a national data space to integrate
procurement data. The limited alignment would hamper data integration, monitoring capacities to
detect irregular practices and transparency to promote accountability. Continuing with the current
eProcurement tools would cost the EC a total of about EUR 86 million from 2026 to 2032 (Table 21,
p.157). In the same period the average costs for each of the 123 eProcurement systems are estimated
at EUR 14.4 million (Table 22, p.157). In addition, each Member State would invest EUR 1.6
million for the development of its national data space (Table 23, p.157). Over the above period the
average cost for each public buyer would be EUR 193 000 (Table 24, p.157) and for economic
operators participating in procurement procedures EUR 318 000 (Table 25, p.157).
5.2. Description of the policy options
All policy options considered underneath are designed to address key future challenges of the Union
and take account of megatrends. The digital revolution and emerging geopolitical threats are global
developments that are expected to persist and significantly shape the EU and its public procurement
23
markets. While the former has been the key factor in options MPL, the latter has prompted policy
options BEU aimed at reinforcing EU economic security and strategic autonomy.
5.2.1. Targeted improvements on simplification, procedural flexibility and coherence (FLX.1)
This option would be focused on targeted improvements of the existing procurement procedures,
which would be maintained. The article on the choice of procedures in the Classical Directive
would be amended to allow public buyers to have more flexibility while retaining safeguards to
ensure proper expenditure and prevent corruption and anti-competitive practices. In doing so, public
buyers under the Classical Directive would be able to resort to the competitive procedure with
negotiation together with the open procedure and the restricted procedure as default methods. This
would increase the internal coherence of the Directives by aligning the options for public buyers
under Utilities and the Classical Directive. Further information on the different procedures in the
existing Directives and negotiations is available in Annex 7, Ad Section 2.2. and 5.2.1. and 2. In
addition, public buyers would explicitly be allowed to make material corrections during procurement
procedures e.g. in case of errors, provided that these do not alter the subject matter of the
procurement and are made transparent in the procurement detail. In addition, public buyers would
receive guidance on how to conduct preliminary market consultations before launching procurement
procedures to attract more and better competition and to engage with the market more transparently.
Clearer rules for crisis procurement would be included in the new rules taking into account
sectorial acts to increase legal clarity. Member States would be allowed to take measures to ensure
that security concerns are considered in the award and performance of contracts.
To improve coherence, this option would cross-reference all exclusion grounds from existing
sectorial acts, maintaining them in place in sectoral acts.
This option would include a targeted amendment in relation to concessions, whereby definitions and
key notions, such as operating risk, would be clarified without changing the overall approach,
simplifying and increasing legal clarity. It would represent a shift from a static understanding of
operating risk transfer to a dynamic model of adaptive risk governance, with the new definition
recognising that long-term concession projects are inherently exposed to systemic shocks.
5.2.2. Simplified & flexible procedures in a more coherent system (FLX.2)
To improve legal clarity and internal coherence, the three Directives125 would be merged into one
act126, with procurement procedures and general horizontal rules common to all contracts covered.
This policy option would include the elements of FLX.1 with respect to the introduction of crisis
procurement and clarification of concessions.
The six main procurement procedures existing today would be simplified and merged into two main
procedures (an open procedure - with optional negotiation - and a dynamic procedure),
complemented by two additional specific procedures (an innovation procedure127 and a special
125 Directive 2014/23/EU, Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU. 126 Remedies, Defence and e-Invoicing will continue to be separate as they do not present a coherence issue due to being
either flanking measures (e-Invoicing, Remedies) or pertain to a separate economic sector (Defence). 127 See ESI.2.
24
procedure such as for emergencies). These procedures would be aligned with the revision of the
Defence Procurement Directive to ensure coherence. All procedures could begin with market
consultations, during which public buyers would publish an announcement in the digital
marketplace indicating that they are seeking market information on the procurement object and
specifying the deadline for submissions. Economic operators would then have a predefined period to
submit relevant information to the public buyer through the digital marketplace, such as studies or
opinions. Once the consultation period had ended, public buyers would be required to publish a
public summary of result of the information received.
To simplify the rules, the current open and negotiated procedures would be merged into a new open
procedure with possible negotiations. This procedure would follow the same structure as the
current open procedure, but it would provide public buyers with the flexibility to negotiate non-
essential characteristics of the solutions if they wish to do so128. In this new procedure, public buyers
would have to publish a public summary of competition in the marketplace, inviting economic
operators to express their interest and submit a first tender within a specific deadline. In the public
summary of competition, public buyers would indicate whether they intend to negotiate and specify
the characteristics of the contract that would not be subject to negotiation (essential aspects). In case
of no negotiations, public buyers would assess the offers received and the lack of exclusion grounds
of the economic operators (lack of criminal record, payment of taxes and social contributions, lack of
conflict of interests…), and, where applicable, the suitability of the economic operators to perform
the contract. If they chose to negotiate, they would invite only those economic operators who were
assessed accordingly. Negotiations would be conducted transparently, informing all candidates of the
possibility to negotiate and what aspects would be open for negotiation. If negotiations are
conducted, public buyers would have to conduct them in a way to ensure that all economic operators
have the possibility to negotiate on equal grounds129. Once the buyer has negotiated with all
participants, possibly in several rounds, they would request final offers and award the contract on the
basis of the final offers received130.
To mitigate fraud risks, public buyers will inter alia have to use digital fraud detection tools such as
ARACHNE+, disclose all clarifications equally to bidders, and justify direct awards in a public
summary of result, as well as information gathered during market consultations. Procedures would
be recorded in the marketplace to ensure the transparency and traceability of operations. Similar
procedures are already the standard in other jurisdictions, including the US131, Canada132, or
128 Negotiations may take place, except in respect of the final tenders, in order to “improve the content” of the tenders
and may concern all characteristics of the purchased works, supplies and services including, for instance, quantities,
aesthetics, commercial clauses, functional elements needed to ensure that the deliverable is adapted to the specific need
of the public buyer as well as social, environmental and innovative aspects, in so far as they do not constitute
substantially alter the subject-matter of the contract. . 129 If, after examining the initial offer against the non-negotiable characteristics, public buyers consider that the offers can
be further improved, they may conduct several rounds of negotiations. Public buyers would have to inform the
participating economic operators of any changes to the specifications or changes to other parts of the procurement detail
as a result of the negotiations, as well as document such negotiations and any changes based on them. . Once a public
buyer has conducted a round of negotiations, it may either open a new round of negotiations by inviting economic
operators to improve their offers; to reduce the number of participants ahead of a new round of negotiations based on the
award criteria; or, to invite economic operators to submit their final offers to proceed to the award of the contract. 130 For more detail see Annex 7, Ad Section 5.2.1 and 2, and Annex 10.4. 131 Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 15 (FAC 2026-01), https://www.acquisition.gov/far/part-15. 132 https://canadabuys.canada.ca/en/buyer-s-portal/buyer-s-guide/negotiate/contract-negotiation.
25
Australia133. More information can be found in Annex 7134. Besides, under current EU public
procurement law, irregular practices and arbitrary decisions are counteracted through several
elements of the procedural framework, such as the link to the subject-matter and that award criteria
must be sufficiently clear and verifiable to enable assessment and, where necessary, verification of
the information provided by tenderers135. These elements would be retained unchanged. Thus,
negotiations would continue to be framed by the principles - transparency, fairness and equal
treatment of all competitors - and best practices derived from EU and case law.
Secondly, a dynamic procedure would be established based on the current dynamic purchasing
system, following the model of jurisdictions such as the UK136. Similar to the current dynamic
purchasing system, this option would allow public buyers to keep open lists of interested economic
operators and to launch procurements to the participants in the procedure only, useful in particular
but not only to purchase off-the shelf products faster by reusing information and specifications and
reducing the documentation to be submitted by economic operators.
Special procedures such as for emergency procurement would be foreseen to allow direct awards
subject to an emergency, crisis or other situations allowing limited tendering. The direct awards
would be subject to monitoring and transparency such as through e-Invoicing. In terms of security, it
will include the aspects presented in FLX.1.
All procedures would be conducted through the digital marketplace foreseen under the MPL options.
This would ensure, among other benefits, the once-only principle for information provision by
economic operators, the reusability of information across procedures, and the uniform gathering of
high-quality data. This would enable effective monitoring and the use of tools such as ARACHNE+
for the early detection of patterns of irregular practices137. See MPL options.
To improve coherence, legal clarity and simplify the rules, the integration of the Directives into one
Act would extend the application of strategic procurement, including green, social and innovation
procurement as well as security related aspects, and European preference provisions to concessions.
To streamline public procurement “how to buy” provisions in sector-specific acts, sectoral
provisions related to exclusion grounds would be deleted from sectoral acts to the extent legally
possible and integrated into the future Public Procurement Act. Further information available in
Annex 11. The integration of exclusion grounds would allow for making clear and legally certain
their scope of application, substantive conditions for exclusion, the possibility of derogation, self-
cleaning measures, the burden and means of proof and the maximum period of exclusion for all
grounds.
5.2.3. Inducing green, social and innovation procurement (ESI.1)
Policy option ESI1 would include a number of measures to facilitate the application of
environmental, social, and innovation requirements, as well as other quality criteria, in public
133 Commonwealth Procurement Rules 17 November 2025, https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2025L01263/asmade/text. 134 Annex 7, Ad Section 5.2.1 and 2 – Negotiations in public procurement. 135 Directive 2014/24/EU, Article 67. 136 Dynamic Markets. UK Procurement Act 2023, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/54/contents. 137 Arachne and interoperable systems for detection of fraud are already implemented in 14 MS and has already yielded
successful outcomes in fields such as EU financed contracts or the CAP. COM/2025/58 final. COM/2021/578 final.
26
procurement. First, this option would induce green, social and innovation procurement as part of a
policy that would encourage public buyers to give larger consideration to quality requirements.
Quality requirements can either be defined in technical specifications, or they can be formulated as
award criteria to be assessed for the best price-quality ratio (BPQR)138. This option would establish
BPQR as the award method unless the quality of the product, service or works procured can
be ensured through the technical specifications or the conditions for the performance of
contracts (e.g. for highly standardised products) (“comply or explain” mechanism). A minimum
weight would be set for quality parameters in BPQR amounting to 30% for all procurement
procedures (meaning the price criteria would be capped at 70% of award criteria), and 50% for
labour-intensive contracts, i.e.: those where labour costs normally accounts for at least 50% of the
total contract value (the rationale for setting up weighting at this level is provided in Annex 7, Ad
section 5.2.3.)139.
The future Public Procurement Act would not prescribe which quality requirements - from a non-
exhaustive list presented in the act, including but not limited to environmental, social, and innovation
criteria140 - to include among award criteria or in technical specifications. As is currently the case,
public buyers would retain their existing discretion in each procurement procedure to select
appropriate quality criteria according to their specific needs and tailored to the subject matter of the
contract (except where EU or national law imposes mandatory quality requirements). This reflects
the diverse scope and nature of public procurement procedures. The contracting authority’s
discretion over procurement decisions reflects the principle of subsidiarity, as public authorities are
best placed to assess which resources are required to provide public services, and which criteria are
optimally suited for their needs141. As in the current procurement Directives, the future Public
Procurement Act would prescribe that, whether included in technical specifications or in award
criteria under BPQR, quality criteria must be sufficiently clear, objective, transparent, proportionate,
non-discriminatory, and linked to the subject-matter ensuring an effective, fair and objective
138 The former set minimum requirements that all bidders must meet (pertinent where public buyers are in a position to
define and seek to ensure a defined minimum quality standard that, however, they do not believe needs to be exceeded).
The latter promotes competition on quality criteria - such as by awarding additional points - in addition to price (Best
Price Quality Ratio, BPQR), which is particularly relevant where public buyers prefer economic operators to compete on
a more dynamic basis. 139 Public buyers may choose not to apply quality as an award criterion with a 30% weighting if the quality of the
product, service, or works procured can be ensured by technical specifications, contract performance clauses where
relevant, or a combination of quality-based award criteria, technical specifications, and contract performance clauses.
Public buyers must indicate in the competition information which of the hypotheses for justifying not applying the
quality criteria it relies on. 140 Directive 2014/24/EU already includes a non-exhaustive list of aspects that are considered as “quality” under BPQR,
encompassing, although not limited to, environmental, social and innovation considerations. Quality considerations can
refer to any criterion used to assess the extent to which an offer delivers beneficial, efficient, and sustainable outcomes in
relation to the subject matter of the contract. Apart from environmental, social and innovation considerations, quality also
includes, as per current Directives (among others): i) technical merit (how well it performs technically, e.g.: a machine
produces more output per hour than others); ii) functional characteristics (what functions it has, e.g.: an app that allows
users to do more things); iii) production methods (how it is made, e.g.: using more sustainable and efficient production
processes), trading and its conditions (e.g.: easier electronic invoicing); iv) after-sales service and technical assistance
(e.g.: maintenance services, replacement of parts, regular system updates); as well as security and resilience
considerations and European preference provisions (following the BEU options). 141 Recital 92, Directive 2014/24/EU
27
comparison and verification of the documentation and information provided by the tenderers, in
order to ensure fair competition and avoid irregular practices142.
Examples for how public buyers can define quality in a manner that is effective, fair and objective
include references to standards (e.g. environmental emission standards), measurable inputs (e.g.
quality of inputs used to perform the contract), measurable performance criteria (e.g. number of staff
trained), recognised labels (e.g. EU Ecolabel143), GPP voluntary criteria144, the use of Life Cycle
Costing (LCC) and Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) methodologies145, 146. Approaches such as LCC
may be more feasible for experienced public buyers managing complex high-value contracts than for
smaller public buyers with limited resources that may require simpler evaluation approaches using
standards, labels and easy to measure quantified inputs or performance criteria. The Commission
would provide support and guidance on objective documentation and evaluation to support
accessibility and consistency across procurement procedures. This option also includes provisions
aimed at strengthening the administrative capacity of public buyers, such as requiring Member States
to provide relevant guidance, advice, assistance and other capacity-building measures. To improve
coherence of public procurement provisions, under this policy option, horizontal provisions on GPP
and SRPP would be referenced in the future Public Procurement Act (and kept in sectoral acts) (see
Annex 11).
Under this policy option, coherent definitions of GPP, SRPP and PPI would be provided. In order to
promote GPP, labelswould be recognised as a useful tool, but remain voluntary for public buyers.
Where public buyers decide to accept labels as a proof of compliance with tender requirements, they
would be obliged to make use of the EU Ecolabel, where it exists (but will accept equivalent
ecolabels as proof of compliance). The Commission will continue to develop Practical Guides on the
use of the EU Ecolabel in green public procurement for product groups covered by EU Ecolabel
criteria147. Where EU Ecolabel criteria are not yet in place, public buyers would be able to request as
a proof of compliance with tender requirements other third party-verified ecolabels based on a life
cycle perspective.
In order to promote SRPP, this option would ban the possibility for the main contractor and all
subcontractors to subcontract a contract in its entirety. To improve transparency, bidders would have
142 Recital 90 and 92, Directive 2014/24/EU 143 See EU Practical Guides on the use of the EU Ecolabel in green public procurement , developed by the Commission
(https://green-forum.ec.europa.eu/green-business/green-public-procurement/gpp-criteria-and-requirements_en) 144 EU voluntary green public procurement (GPP) criteria (https://green-forum.ec.europa.eu/green-business/green-public-
procurement/gpp-criteria-and-requirements_en) are developed by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre
(JRC) to facilitate public authorities purchasing goods, services and works with reduced environmental impact
throughout their life cycle. The criteria are formulated in such a way that they can, if deemed appropriate by the
individual authority, be (partially or fully) integrated into the tender documents with minimal editing. The criteria are
split into selection criteria, technical specifications, award criteria and contract performance clauses. 145 See for instance PPE+ (2026) guide “Guidelines on the identification and analysis of cost elements and factors
throughout the procurement cycle”. Available at https://public-buyers-community.ec.europa.eu/communities/ppe-europe-
2024-2028/resources/guidelines-identification-and-analysis-cost-elements-and 146 See also EU practical procurement templates for solar panels, which take into account LCC, carbon reduction and
price per kWh as part of BPQR assessment. Available at: https://public-buyers-community.ec.europa.eu/
communities/community-public-buyers-sustainable-solar-pv/resources/how-prepare-and-start-pv-project 147 Guidelines are available at: https://green-forum.ec.europa.eu/green-business/green-public-procurement/gpp-criteria-
and-requirements_en.
28
to indicate in their tenders the parts of the contract they may intend to subcontract. This option would
moreover introduce a legal clarification that working conditions affecting those workers performing
a contract may be considered linked to the subject matter (allowing public buyers to take into
account working conditions set out, for instance, in collective agreements).
In order to promote PPI, this option would introduce a new innovation procedure thatwould be
based on challenges (public buyers asking economic operators for solutions to address described
problems). Public buyers would only be required to demonstrate that they did not identify existing
solutions that are appropriate or desirable to address their challenge. Prior market consultations
would be required, consisting of a dialogue between the public buyer, economic operators and the
interested public and resulting in the definition of a societal challenge that can be solved through
procurement of innovation. For the scope of the new innovation procedure, arising IPR would remain
with suppliers unless their transfer to the public buyer can be justified to deliver public services.
5.2.4. Improving coherence and horizontal integration in public procurement (ESI.2)
Policy option ESI.2 would consist of option ESI.1 with an increased ambition in relation to
coherence. Horizonal provisions on GPP and SRPP, as well as empowerments to adopt delegated and
implementing acts to establish sustainability criteria for public procurement, would be deleted from
sector-specific acts and integrated into the future Public Procurement Act (for further detail see
Annex 11). This option would harmonise terminology and definitions, introduce targeted linguistic
refinements, remove redundancies and inconsistencies, and merge related provisions.
5.2.5. Mandating green, social and innovation procurement (ESI.3)
Option ESI.3 would establish BPQR with the minimum weight of non-price criteria set out in option
ESI.1 as the standard method for awarding contracts, irrespective of whether quality criteria have
been included already in technical specifications and without any opt out via a “comply or explain”
mechanism. It would furthermore specify the extent of the link to the subject matter principle by
allowing public buyers to take into account a bidder’s overall social and environmental policies when
awarding contracts, insofar these are linked to the procured goods, services or works. This option
would additionally establish the obligation for Member States to set measurable targets for social,
green and innovation procurement, and to report on them. To promote GPP, the use of the EU
Ecolabel would become mandatory for public buyers as a means to prove compliance with GPP
requirements wherever such requirements exist and EU Ecolabel criteria were established. To
promote SRPP, this option would ban the possibility to subcontract beyond the second vertical tier.
To promote PPI, this option would include the same procedures as ESI.1 and 2, as well as
establishing that in any procurement procedure used (and not only the innovation procedure as under
ESI.1), IPR would remain with suppliers unless their transfer to the public buyer can be justified to
deliver public services. To streamline public procurement provisions in sectoral acts, in addition to
ESI.2, under this option, requirements on “what to procure” applicable only to a product group
and/or sector contained in sectoral acts would be deleted and integrated in the general procurement
framework, bringing to the same act both horizontal and sector-specific requirements.
5.2.6. Voluntary European preference (BEU.1)
This option would codify CJEU case law and provide in EU law the existing possibility for public
buyers to restrict the participation in any procurement procedure to economic operators, or
products originating from the EU, a Member of the EEA, a third country that is party to the GPA or
with a bilateral/regional free trade agreement with the EU provided that the procurement in question
29
falls within the scope of the public procurement commitments in such agreement (‘covered economic
operator’)148. To facilitate the practical application and allow to check which countries would be
covered by the above restriction, public buyers and economic operators would use the
Access2Market149 tool. The origin would be determined in accordance with the International
Procurement Instrument Regulation150. The EC would provide public buyers and economic operators
guidance to implement in a coherent way requirements in sectoral acts that include European
preference provisions, including and where relevant by providing tools enabling them to determine
the origin of products in a tender using, for instance, the non-preferential rules of origin under the
Union Customs Code [“UCC”]151. To improve coherence horizontal provisions on cybersecurity in
public procurement, procedural aspects related to resilience in public procurement and product
and/or sector specific resilience and European preference requirements would be cross-referenced
in the future Public Procurement Act (but kept in sectoral acts).
5.2.7. A framework for coherent European preference in selected sectors (BEU.2)
This option would include the codification of CJEU case law as described in BEU.1. In addition, to
promote coherence, it would establish a framework for European preference clauses in future
sectoral acts and delegated acts, leaving the introduction of such clauses in them. Such sectoral acts
and delegated may introduce European preference clauses in strategic sectors to strengthen the EU’s
capacity to diversity and reduce dependencies and support EU industrial and security policy, public
order, trade policy, or crisis or emergency situations. The future Public Procurement Act would
encourage that where acts do include European preference clauses, an analysis of necessity and
proportionality should be conducted, comparing expected benefits and costs, such as market impact
(prices, competition), procedural risks (e.g. litigation risks) and administrative costs.
Sectoral acts and delegated acts would introduce European preference requirements and tailor them
to the sector and/or product group targeted. To ensure coherence and effective application, the future
Public Procurement Act would provide a toolbox of mechanisms that such acts may employ. It
would include mechanisms restricting the participation to suppliers originating from the EU or
covered countries only152, require procurement of certain products originating from the EU or
covered countries only or, as part of the award criteria, favouring bids that are composed of products
originating from the EU or covered countries. Wherever European preference would be deemed
148 Public buyers would still be able to apply the general exemptions under Art. 114 TFEU and 346 TFEU. 149 Access2Market for procurement (https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/my-trade-assistant#procurement) 150 The origin of an economic operator shall be deemed to be: (a) in the case of a natural person, the country of which the
person is a national or where that person has a right of permanent residence; (b) in the case of a legal person, either of the
following: (i) the country under the laws of which the legal person is constituted or otherwise organised and in the
territory of which the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations; (ii) if the legal person is not engaged in
substantive business operations in the territory of the country in which it is constituted or otherwise organised, the origin
of the legal person is to be that of the person or persons who may exercise, directly or indirectly, a dominant influence on
the legal person by virtue of their ownership of that legal person, their financial participation therein, or the rules which
govern that legal person. 151 Under the non-preferential rules of the Union Customs Code, the origin of a product is determined by the country
where it was wholly obtained or, if more than one country is involved, the country where it underwent its last substantial
transformation, justified economically and resulting in a new product or representing an important stage of manufacture. 152 Third country that is party to the GPA or with a bilateral/regional free trade agreement with the EU provided that the
procurement in question falls within the scope of the public procurement commitments in such agreement.
30
appropriate in sectoral legislation or delegated acts, these would include one or several of these
mechanisms.
This option would moreover establish common horizontal elements and practical tools to facilitate
the practical application and coherence on the ground. These common horizontal elements would
include common definitions, documentation requirements and criteria to determine the origin of an
economic operator or a product. The option would require the systematic use of the Access2Market
tool to determine which countries are covered by relevant international agreements. And it would
establish that the non-preferential rules of the UCC are the main reference point for determining the
origin of a product and key components in products in the context of public procurement. The EC
would moreover issue guidance to guide public buyers when applying the European preference
requirements. Last, this option would ensure that the online marketplace(s) (as outlined in MPL
options) would integrate these instruments for public buyers and economic operators, facilitating
their access to procurement procedures, including across single market borders.
To improve coherence and streamline sectoral provisions, instead of referencing public
procurement rules in sectorial legislation, under option BEU.2 horizontal provisions on cybersecurity
in public procurement and procedural aspects related to resilience in public procurement would be
deleted from sectoral acts and integrated into the future Public Procurement Act (see Annex 11). The
EC would work with co-legislators to ensure coherence regarding acts currently in co-decision.
5.2.8. Mandatory European preference across all sectors (BEU.3)
Under this option, when issuing a call for tender, a public buyer would be mandated to restrict the
participation to economic operators originating from the EU/EEA or from covered countries, under
the same conditions as described in BEU.1. This mandatory exclusion would remove the discretion
of public buyers, meaning that all economic operators originating from non-covered third countries
would be systematically excluded from public procurement procedures across all Member States,
subject to safeguard or exception clauses (i.e. a horizontal exception mechanism would be put into
place to allow public buyers to disregard this requirement in the event of a lack of bidders or of
excessive additional costs or other similar special circumstances). To streamline public procurement
provisions, under this option, in addition to horizontal requirements (as in BEU.2), sector-specific
requirements on resilience and Buy European applicable only to a product group and/or sector
contained in sectoral acts would also be deleted from sectoral acts and integrated into the future
Public Procurement Act, bringing to the same act both horizontal and sector-specific requirements.
Like in BEU.2, the EC would publish guidance to facilitate the implementation of this option.
5.2.9. Decentralised eProcurement platforms to establish an interconnected digital marketplace
(MPL.1)
This policy option would establish a network of interoperable Member States’ eProcurement
platforms. To enable data exchanges between Member States’ eProcurement platforms and ensure
their interoperability, the EC would put into place an eProcurement interoperability network which
all eProcurement platforms would be required to join. While public buyers could continue using
Member States’ platforms to prepare procurement procedures, economic operators could access
procurement procedures across Europe through any of the connected eProcurement platforms and
submit tenders, thus facilitating cross-border bidding in the single market. The EC would offer one
eProcurement platform for public buyers and one for economic operators, which are connected to the
Interoperability Network. Member States could decide to discontinue their eProcurement platforms
and use the EC platform for buyers. Economic operators could use the EC platform for economic
31
operators to participate in procurement procedures throughout the EU. MPL.1 would mandate the
use of a digital business credential tool such as the European Business Wallet to allow economic
operators to provide a company profile and to share verified eligibility information EU-wide,
facilitating cross-border access to procurement procedures. To harmonise access to the digital
business credential tool, the EC would establish a Public Procurement Eligibility Service as a central
interface to share and access data.
To facilitate data exchange and coherent monitoring, including of sectoral acts, a data management
framework for monitoring and sharing procurement data between Member States and the EC would
be established. Member States would be required to set up a national PPDS connected to the EU
PPDS established by the EC, to enable automatic digitised monitoring and allow to detect and
prevent irregular practices, corruption and bid-rigging. Literature on the topic153 finds that
eProcurement can strengthen oversight by creating electronic audit trails, facilitating scrutiny of
procurement decisions, and enable data analytics to detect suspicious patterns.
The availability of better-quality data would allow Member States and the EC to further develop
projects leveraging the use of AI in detecting fraud and corruption in public procurement. For
example, allowing IT tools such as the EU-developed ARACHNE+ to identify risks related to
projects, contractors and contracts, according more than 100 indicators (grouped into risk categories
such as procurement, contract management, eligibility, performance, concentration, other
reputational and fraud alerts). To ensure cost-efficiency and centralised oversight, ARACHNE+ (or
an equivalent data-mining tool) would be managed by designated national central bodies in each
Member State (e.g., national procurement agencies, ministries of finance, or anti-fraud offices).
Member States would report on implementation progress annually. The IT tool could notify high-risk
procurements to relevant public authorities (e.g. auditors, competition authorities, national central
procurement offices), as is already the case in 14 Member States154. As core data would be public,
public watchdogs would also be able to make public buyers accountable for their spending decisions.
Pilot projects will be carried out in some Member States on various aspects of MPL to design the
implementation of fraud detection.
5.2.10. Centralised EU marketplace replacing Member States’ marketplaces. (MPL.2)
Under this policy option, the EC would establish and manage a central EU-wide eProcurement
platform replacing Member State’ eProcurement platforms for all procurement procedures falling
under the future Public Procurement Act. Under this central EU system, all European public buyers
and economic operators would register to conduct and participate in public procurement procedures
across the EU. Member States could maintain their eProcurement system for procurement procedures
below the EU-thresholds or decide to use the eProcurement system established by the EC for this
purpose. As under MPL.1, the use of a digital business credential tool such as the European Business
Wallet would be mandated along with the complementary PPES established by the EC. As under
153 E.g. (i) Neupane A., Soar J., Vaidya K., and Yong J. (2012) Role of public e-procurement technology to reduce
corruption in government procurement, 2012 International Public Procurement Conference; (ii) Jiménez A., Hanoteau J.,
Barkemeyer R., (2022) E-procurement and firm corruption to secure public contracts: The moderating role of governance
institutions and supranational support, Journal of Business Research, Volume 149, P. 640-650, ISSN 0148-2963;
(iii) Mackey, T. K., & Cuomo, R. E. (2020). An interdisciplinary review of digital technologies to facilitate anti-
corruption, transparency and accountability in medicines procurement. Global Health Action, 13(sup1), 1695241. 154 COM(2025)58
32
option MPL.1, a data management framework for public procurement would be established to enable
data exchange and monitoring (including use of IT tools such as ARACHNE+ and notification of
Member States’ authorities).
5.3. Options discarded at an early stage
No EU action or stand-alone soft-law: Following the results of the Evaluation this impact assessment
discussed problems that cannot be solved by resorting only to soft-law options.
Change of the threshold levels: Raising the thresholds without a revision of the GPA would expose
the EU to potential negative reciprocal and retaliation measures. For Member State, this increase
would create a legal vacuum between any threshold set at EU level and those at GPA level. In that
vacuum, the GPA’s transparency obligations will continue, but procurement techniques deemed
favourable by public buyers (e.g. Dynamic Purchasing Systems [“DPS”] or framework agreements)
would cease to exist. Member States would not have any margin of manoeuvre to act as this would
contravene the EU’s exclusive competence under Article 207 TFEU. In contrast to the above,
lowering the thresholds could be considered without this breaching international legal commitments.
However, while this would increase the impact of public procurement as a strategic policy
instrument, it would generate additional administrative burden for smaller purchases.
Except for the above, all other options were deemed to have negligible impact.
6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS?
This section assesses the key impact of each policy options identified above. A screening of
significant impacts relevant for different policy options is additionally provided in Annexes 7 and 8.
6.1. Impacts of options improving flexibility and coherence (FLX)
Economic impacts including competitiveness: In order to discuss the economic impacts of a more
flexible system that would allow for easier access to negotiations, a hypothetical substitution of
open by negotiated procedures was used as the closest proxy for the legislative change155 considered
under options FLX. For instance, a 10% increase in the use of the negotiated procedure results in
average costs savings per procedure, varying by Member State between 2% and 10%156.
155 See section 5.2.2: “a new open procedure with negotiation that would allow public authorities to have the flexibility to
negotiate wherever they wish to do so”. 156 Based on data on the average cost of procedure, two scenarios substituting open by negotiated procedure by
increments of 1%, were developed, first without and then with a change in the average number of bidders. The results,
based on data per Member State published in TED in 2017-2024, indicate that introducing negotiations is expected to
reduce the total cost of procedures, compared to the above-mentioned average costs. The decrease is mainly driven by the
fact that the open procedure entails higher costs for bidders, which are multiplied by the average number of bidders in the
calculation formula. Differences observed across countries are primarily driven by country-specific levels of competition,
as well as by the existing distribution of procedures in each Member State. In a scenario with no change in the number of
bidders participating and only 1% change in favour of the negotiated procedure, the savings would be negligible.
However, under the scenario of 10% increase in the use of negotiated procedure, the estimated costs savings for
authorities and participating firms would reach between 2.1% and 9.7% of the current average administrative costs of
procedures. See Annex 8.
33
Once the additional factor is incorporated into the analysis (i.e. changes in the number of bidders), it
becomes clear that the level of competition influences the overall outcome: the greater the number
of bidders, the higher the aggregate costs incurred, as more bidders bear costs linked to the
preparation of offers, which are not recovered when another bidder wins the contract157. However,
increased competition can lead to lower prices for buyers. This is supported by the results of the
OPC, with around 80% of respondents considering that competition, the number of bidders, and
SME participation will increase as a result of FLX measures, and that a decrease in the prices of
procured goods and services is a more likely outcome158.
According to the CoR, local and regional authorities would benefit, as greater flexibility in
procurement rules would reduce their administrative burden, reduce bureaucratic complexity,
allow them to streamline processes and to tailor procurement to their local needs159. Public
authorities responding to the OPC called for the integration of procedures into a reduced number
(one open procedure and one procedure with the option of negotiation or dialogue)160. EU companies
and business associations suggested to allow for more negotiation in procurement procedures, with
some advocating for the introduction of a “fast-track selection procedure”. NGOs, environmental
organisations, and trade unions replied that the proposed simplification measures have the potential
to bring about a range of benefits, including improved protection for workers, increased participation
of SMEs, and enhanced environmental and social sustainability.
With regards to the potential increased risk of fraud and irregularities due to increased
negotiations, it should be noted that there is no analysis concluding that there is a correlation
between increased negotiations and fraud. Rather, the risk of corruption or fraud increases where
discretion and monopolistic behaviours increase161. Moreover, it should be noted that the use of
negotiated procedures is neither new nor uncommon in procurement. Between 2014 and 2024,
competitive procedures with negotiations accounted for between 4% and 10% of all Classical
Directive procedures and between 35% and 47% of all procedures under Utilities162. There are
inherent risks to public procurement, some of which are inevitable depending on the economic
interests at stake, the amount of business involved and the close cooperation that is needed between
the public and private sectors throughout public procurement procedures. Nevertheless, there is
157 The overall conclusion that can be derived from this simulation is that any savings in the administrative costs resulting
from the substitution in procedural arrangements would be partially neutralised if the number of bidders increases, or
strengthened if it decreases. In any case, it should be noted that this estimate does not account for any potential reduction
in overall administrative costs that are expected to materialise if the procurement process is significantly streamlined
(involves less administrative requirements), such as under FLX.2 and MPL. Simpler procedures lead to easier access,
which fosters more competition, which means public buyers have more options and can get better value for money. 158 Among all respondents, 24 percentage points more expected a price decrease than a price increase; for public
authorities, this margin was 16 percentage points, while for businesses, it was 28 percentage points, see annex 7
Respondents’ views on competition, prices and corruption and Annex 9. 159 CoR(2025), How EU public procurement rules…, p. 60. 160 Authorities emphasised that negotiations and ex-post regularisation are essential for maintaining competition and
project delivery and that the current documentation requirements are often impracticable. 161 Annex VII – Ad Section 8 – Trade-offs between allowing more discretion in public procurement and the increased
risks of irregularities in public procurement. 162 See Ecorys (2025), statistics, p. 51.
34
consensus among institutions163 and academia164 alike that one of the most effective remedies is to
strengthen transparency throughout the entire procurement cycle165.
To counteract the risk of fraud, all options include safeguards, including the limitations to what can
be subject to negotiations (non-essential elements of the offer)128, and transparency and equal
treatment obligations in line with the case law and Treaty principles166. Under option FLX.2, all
procedures would be conducted fully digitally through the marketplace foreseen in MPL options,
where negotiations will also be documented as well as information on contract modifications. As a
result, for every procurement there will be a clear trace as to the identities of buyers and economic
operators, as well as the type and subject of the contract and the conduct of negotiations. The
publication of market consultations in the marketplace would create a traceability chain that would
enable competition authorities to detect bid rigging and anti-competitive practices earlier. In
addition, and to align with the Financial Regulation, the use of ARACHNE+ or equivalent data-
based risk analysis tools will be mandatory for all procedures before contract award and, where
relevant, during contract execution. Transparency on contract completion, together with information
on e-Invoicing, would enable public buyers and other relevant authorities (e.g. competition
authorities) to ensure compliance with general principles such as efficient public spending,
transparency, anti-corruption and competition167. This increased transparency will act as a trade-off
for more flexibility for buyers to engage with economic operators through a pre-defined legal
framework for market consultations and negotiations, where they consider these useful. The creation
of the marketplace would serve as a double layer of protection against fraud as it would ensure
consistent monitoring and transparency promoting accountability.
Cost estimation: Under a scenario where the use of negotiations increases by 10 percentage points,
the average cost per procedure is projected to increase by approximately EUR 257 (present value) for
public buyers and decrease by EUR 165 for economic operators. This results in a total cost reduction
per procurement procedure of around EUR 288 for all participants. Based on the number of above-
threshold procedures in the EU, this translates into overall annual savings of roughly EUR 88 million
(ranging from EUR 0 in the case of no change in negotiation use to EUR 219 million in the case of a
25 percentage point increase, matching the level of negotiations currently observed under the
Utilities Directive). These savings are composed of a cost increase of EUR 78 million for public
buyers and a cost decrease of EUR 166 million for economic operators (see table below and Annex
8)168. These savings relate solely to the negotiation element of the FLX options. Other costs and
savings stemming from this option such as simplifications like the once-only principle, clarifications,
or improved coherence-were not quantified due to data limitations.
Table 2: FLX options cost change under 10 percentage points increase in use of negotiations scenario (present value annualised).
163 OLAF – Fraud in public procurement. Available at https://sfc.ec.europa.eu/system/files/documents/sfc-files/fraud-
public-procurement-final-20122017-ares20176254403.pdf. OECD – Integrity in public procurement. Available at
https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/integrity-in-public-procurement.html. 164 Lyra, M.S., Damásio, B., Pinheiro, F.L. et al. Fraud, corruption, and collusion in public procurement activities, a
systematic literature review on data-driven methods. Appl Netw Sci 7, 83 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41109-022-
00523-6. 165 Past policy experiences also support this claim, see Annex VII, Ad section 8. 166 For more information on the conduct of negotiations see Annex VII, Ad section 5.2.1 and 2. 167 For more detail see Annex 7, Ad Section 8. 168 For the sensitivity analysis regarding the number of bidders, see Annex 8.
35
CA EO Total
Per Procedure change (€ per procedure) 257 - 165 - 288*
EU wide cost change (€ million)** 78 - 166 - 88 The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. *takes into account that there are on average 3.3 bids from EO per procedure. Source: In-house analysis. See Annex 8.
Environmental and social impacts: FLX will support environmental and social provisions by cross-
referencing (FLX.1) or integrating (FLX.2) exclusion grounds from sectoral acts. FLX.2 will also
extend the application of green and social procurement to concessions.
6.1.1. Targeted improvements on simplification, procedural flexibility and coherence (FLX.1)
Economic impacts including competitiveness: By introducing targeted amendments to the current
Directives, public buyers would be able to use the competitive procedure with negotiation169 and
make material corrections to the procurement documents with sufficient legal certainty.
To access the competitive procedure with negotiation public buyers using the Classical directive will
no longer need to justify that their needs cannot be met without the adaptation of readily available
solutions, that the contract includes design or innovative solutions, that the contract entails “specific
circumstances related to the nature, the complexity or the legal and financial make-up or because of
the risks attaching to them”, because the technical specifications cannot be sufficiently precise, or
because a prior call for an open or restricted procedure received only irregular tenders, taking into
account that a situation where there is evidence of collusion would be considered irregular. This will
align the procedure in the Classical Directive with that of the Utilities Directive.
Allowing access to negotiations and corrections would minimise the risk aversion of buyers and
economic operators, simplifying the conduct of the procedure and reducing the number of early
terminations due to material errors170. According to OPC respondents, allowing corrections to the
procurement documents throughout the procedure would bring greater simplification (71%: 496
replies), with only 9% anticipating no or negligible impact. Similarly, allowing negotiations
throughout the procedure was deemed to have simplification potential (70%: 466 replies). In terms of
negotiations, these are expected to bring some efficiency gains impacting positively on
competitiveness and SMEs, as presented in FLX above.
Impacts on coherence between the intervention and the sectoral acts including public procurement
provisions: By referencing all exclusion grounds in the future general act, visibility and awareness of
those provisions would increase, ensuring that stakeholders can easily identify which exclusion
grounds they need to take into account in their procurements. Public buyers and economic operators
will no longer need to navigate different pieces of EU legislation, thereby reducing administrative
burdens and the risk of non-compliance. By contrast, as this option would stop short of integrating
the relevant provisions into the PP act, it would not streamline the varying rules and concepts used
into a fully coherent and harmonised single rulebook.
169 Also known as negotiated procedure with publication under Utilities. 170 A study by the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority’s suggests that more than 25% of all contracts is
cancelled due to the inability to proceed with lawful modifications. Konkurrence og forbrugerstyrelsen(2022), Status for
offentlig konkurrence 2022 (https://kfst.dk/media/jtvdhxbu/status-for-offentlig-konkurrence-2022.pdf).
36
Introducing clearer rules for crisis procurement and clarifying security related concerns in the
award and performance of contracts would provide public buyers with clarity on how to conduct
their procurement. This would bring greater coherence with existing sectorial provisions, such as the
Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act, the Directive for a high common level of
cybersecurity, or the upcoming Cloud and AI Development Act.
Regarding concessions, clarifying the definition of concessions could reduce excessive ex ante
financial requirements for economic operators and enhance project resilience. These modifications
were supported by 197 respondents to the OPC, with almost 70% of those considering that legal
certainty would increase to some extent. However, 50% of respondents consider that this amendment
would not have an impact on the reduction of costs, neither for public buyers nor for bidders. As this
option considers that the general structure of the Directives would remain unchanged, no impacts on
digitalisation can be expected from this option alone.
6.1.2. Simplified & flexible procedures in a more coherent system (FLX.2)
Economic impacts including competitiveness:The new open procedure would provide public
buyers with the flexibility to conduct negotiations, with the impacts presented under FLX above. The
dynamic procedure would allow public buyers to engage more swiftly with the market, while
increasing the available competition and fostering cross-border participation171, especially of SMEs.
Facilitating market consultations would encourage their wider use and enable public buyers to gain a
better understanding of the market’s structure. While the procurement procedure will be extended by
the additional time required to submit and analyse responses, this investment is expected to yield cost
savings later in the process. Public buyers may benefit from reduced time spent preparing tender
requirements and evaluating bids, as the bids received are likely to be more concrete. All in all, the
cost impact is expected to be neutral. Benefits of market consultations include attracting better
competition, as well as engaging with the market in a more transparent manner.
Regarding negotiations, in terms of resources, as the new open procedure merges the existing open
procedure and competitive procedure with negotiation, and negotiation remains voluntary for the
buyer, no additional costs would arise from the obligations under the Public Procurement Act. In
terms of timelines, the use of negotiations may increase the length of the procedure where these are
used in very simple procedures where the buyer could have proceed directly to the award, or they
may decrease the length of the procedure in complex technical cases where non-negotiation may
force the public buyer to outsource the evaluation of offers to a technical committee.
Savings generated by reuse of information and widespread use of digital tools would improve the
proportionality of procedures, their transparency and their cost efficiency, impacting positively on
competitiveness. By facilitating the reuse of public summaries and simplifying the requirements to
access procurement, it is expected that the level of competition would increase as the entry barriers
and administrative burden would be reduced. This is supported by literature on the topic, which finds
that reducing administrative burden in public procurement encourages greater competition and
171 Increased cross-border bidding within the EU is expected by 57% of respondents to the open public consultation (10%
finding it very likely and 47% somewhat likely), while 11% found it unlikely (out of 547 responses). This view was
shared by business associations (66%), large EU companies (61%), and EU SMEs (46%). See Annex 9.
37
market engagement. Experimental evidence shows that participants exposed to higher administrative
burdens report significantly lower willingness to bid, even when they would meet all eligibility
criteria (Espaillat et al., 2025)172. This effect is particularly strong for small and new firms, which
often have limited resources and less experience navigating complex procurement processes.
Similarly, the use of market consultations would allow economic operators to be aware of upcoming
procedures, and public buyers to gain market knowledge.
Such approach for off-the-shelf products was supported by 62% (429 replies) of respondents to the
OPC173 (85%: 92 public authorities consulted considered the impact of introducing such procedure a
high simplification, followed by 77%: 66 large companies and 44%: 28 SMEs). Furthermore, based
on the above, this option would have positive impacts in terms of digitalisation and competitiveness.
Special procedures by requesting solutions directly such as in case of emergency would enable
public buyers to tackle their needs faster, reducing the administrative burden to the minimum and
ensuring that the focus is kept on delivering solutions. It would be aligned with emergency
instruments such as IMERA to ensure a framework fit for crisis.
All of the above would be brought together through the integration of procurement in a digital
ecosystem in line with digital by default principle, enabling greater transparency for public buyers,
economic operators and other relevant stakeholders (e.g. competition authorities). These changes
would empower public buyers to buy more efficiently and with more flexibility, whilst increasing the
legal certainty and ex-post monitoring174, ensuring that public funds are well allocated. Moreover,
facilitating the reusability of information across procedures would bring significant savings. As
reported through the OPC/EV, preparing a tender can cost suppliers significantly more in comparison
with private contracts, due mainly to fragmented data and technical requirements. With the proposed
measures, economic operators would be able to access procurement from a single-entry point,
reusing their documentation and thus public procurement would be better integrated in the day-to-
day business practices, while maintaining the necessary safeguards, including transparency,
proportionality and equal treatment. Moreover, the new procedures would be aligned with the
existing rules under the Remedies Directives, to ensure access to fair review where appropriate.
Merging the three Directives into one act would reduce complexity, simplify procedures, avoid
inconsistencies, provide public buyers and economic operators with a coherent and predictable set of
rules and ensure proper single market integration by clearly delimiting where public buyers are
allowed more discretion and where Member States can complement with national rules. Respondents
to the OPC, while advocating for the preservation of separate rules specifically for concessions,
favoured their integration into a bigger harmonised framework with clear guidance and increased
transparency and legal certainty. In terms of procedures, the biggest change will be on concessions,
as at the moment Directive 2014/23/EU does not impose strict procedural rules to these types of
contracts175. However, given the introduction of new simplified procedures, subjecting concession
172 Espaillat, P., Esteve, M., Bel, G., & Batista Foguet, J. M. (2025). Administrative burden in public contracting: are
bidders looking away? Public Management Review, 1–31, doi:10.1080/14719037.2025.2591752. 173 33% (226) of OPC respondents deemed it a high simplification, and 29% (203) perceived it as some simplification. 174 Ex-post monitoring and oversight of procedures would be ensured by linking the procedure to the use of e-Invoices. 175 Work concessions are usually awarded through negotiated procedures or competitive dialogue, while service
concessions tend to use open calls for tender, particularly for smaller, less investment-heavy projects. CEPR(2025),
38
contracts to public procurement rules would not create significant additional administrative burden.
For economic operators, the absence of different ad hoc procedures would provide a single,
predictable procedural framework. This would reduce transaction costs and lower barriers to
participation, particularly for operators active in several Member States and SMEs. A single legal
instrument would allow for a common framework integrating existing “how to buy” public
procurement provisions in sectorial acts on “how to buy”. As a result, inconsistencies and overlaps
would be avoided, and sectorial requirements would be easily accessible176.
Impacts on coherence between the intervention and the sectoral acts including public procurement
provisions: This policy option delivers substantial improvements in legal clarity by consolidating all
exclusion grounds into a single, unified set of rules, eliminating the need to cross-reference scattered
legislation. This approach directly addresses fragmentation, making it far easier for public buyers
and economic operators to identify and understand applicable rules. The resulting enhanced
readability fosters greater visibility and awareness, ensuring stakeholders can more effectively apply
and implement the rules, as they could rely on streamlined concepts in a harmonised manner across
the board–ultimately improving compliance and operational efficiency. By promoting this consistent
and harmonised application of the rules, discrepancies in interpretation and enforcement would be
minimised. Feedback from stakeholders suggests solid support for the integration of exclusion
grounds (core “how to buy”) from current sectorial acts into the public procurement framework with
57% (386) respondents supporting it for existing ones177 and 63% (432) for future ones178, and with
comments suggesting that integration could help harmonise procedures and reduce complexity.
6.2. Impacts of options supporting strategic procurement (ESI)
As far as price effects per procured works, goods or services are concerned, reliable unit price
comparisons are difficult to obtain. Commission services’ attempts to estimate unit prices paid in EU
public procurement using data collected in TED (e.g. Price Comparison Pilot with Member States
experts) were not successful. This section therefore largely relies on a literature review. Considering
the assessment of price effects, it should be taken into account that price commonly includes
overwhelmingly only the initial purchase cost and often not the total cost of ownership, including
maintenance, repair and replacement. Benefits stemming from quality considerations often
materialise over time, extending beyond the contract’s conclusion, and cannot be easily estimated,
particularly in monetary terms (e.g. user satisfaction, impact of training provided to workers).
6.2.1. Inducing green, social and innovation procurement (ESI.1)
OPC results show that stakeholders have a clear preference for the public procurement framework to
further incentivise PPI (73%: 497 replies), GPP (72%: 546 replies) and SRPP (64%: 443 replies).
Support was strongest by trade unions and NGOs but sizeable also by other respondent groups,
notably in relation to PPI and to a lesser extent to GPP (except public authorities).
Private participation in infrastructure (https://cepr.org/system/files/publication-files/245788-
private_participation_in_infrastructure_what_role_for_public_private_partnerships_.pdf), p. 86. 176 This would have a positive impact on gender equality by clarifying requirements derived from the Women on Boards
Directive. 177 This 51% corresponds to 36% (244) that supported the integration of the “how to buy”, together with the 21% (142)
that supported the integration of “how to buy” and “what to buy”. 178 22% (152) of respondents supports the integration of future acts related to “how and what to buy” and 41% (280) of
respondents support the integration of future acts related to “how to buy”.
39
Economic impacts including competitiveness: The empirical evidence suggests that the price effects
of BPQR are likely to be limited and context-specific. In principle, higher quality requirements may
increase suppliers’ costs and therefore lead directly to higher prices. They also affect prices
indirectly by influencing bidder participation. However, the size and direction of these effects
depend significantly on the institutional capacity of public buyers (more details in Annex 7, sub-
section Ad 6.2,). Hoekman and Taş (2024)179, analysing procurement data from EEA countries, the
UK, and North Macedonia, find that a decrease in discretion180 for contracting authorities is
associated with an average increase of prices of approximately EUR 4 189 per tender in countries
with high government effectiveness and EUR 2 790 in countries with lower government
effectiveness. Furthermore, Lines et al. (2020)181, using a descriptive comparative analysis of 118
construction projects in the United States and Canada, estimate that best-value procurement is on
average 7.12% more expensive than lowest-price procurement. However, the median difference is
only around 1%, indicating that at least half of the tenders experience minimal price increases with a
small number of tenders with substantially larger increases. Furthermore, having introduced a
general rule whereby climate and environmental considerations must be weighted by at least 30% in
public procurements (or include climate and environmental requirements in technical specifications)
in 2024182, Norway did not experience indications of an unusually large increase in price
developments in public procurement, as annual costs have increased from NOK 650 billion in 2021,
NOK 742 billion in 2022, NOK 780 billion in 2023 and NOK 835 billion in 2024, while the
proportion of procurements with an environmental weighting of 30 per cent and/or include
environmental requirements in 2025 increased to approximately 75% in 2025, compared to around
57 per cent in 2023183. Similarly, the Procurement Report 2024 for Berlin184 finds that the Berlin
procurement law, which requires specific social (like ILO core labour values) and environmental
considerations, did not lead to higher prices that could not be due to factors such as inflation.
The absence of significant effects on price, when considered as total life cycle cost, is corroborated
by a series of studies. Thus, according to Carvalho, R. (2023)185, sustainable public procurement
enhances efficiency by revealing the long-term financial benefits of sustainable choices. While
sustainable products and services may seem more expensive at first glance, life-cycle costing
demonstrates how energy-efficient options lead to significant cost savings over time due to reduced
179 Hoekman, B., & Taş, B. K. O. (2024).“Discretion and public procurement outcomes in Europe.” European Journal of
Political Economy, 82, 1025 180 Formally, the paper states that a standard deviation decrease in discretion is associated with EUR 4 189 increase per
tender in countries with high government effectiveness and with EUR 2 790 in countries with lower government
effectiveness. 181 Lines, B. C., Kakarapalli, R., & Nguyen, P. H. D. (2020). Does best value procurement cost more than low-bid? A
total project cost perspective. International Journal of Construction Education and Research. 182 Applicable from 1 January 2024, https://lovdata.no/dokument/LTI/forskrift/2023-08-01-1305, 183 The Norwegian Agency for Public and Financial Management, Statistics on climate and environmental considerations
in public procurement, https://www.anskaffelser.no/data-statistikk-og-analyse/utgifter-til-offentlige-innkjop; The average
annual growth rate for 2021–2023 was 9.5%, while the growth rate from 2023 to 2024 (the first year of the reform) was
7%. After adjusting for inflation, the corresponding rates were 3.7% for 2021–2023 and 3.8% for 2023–2024. NO
inflation: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?end=2025&locations=NO&start=2021&view=chart. 184 Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin. (2025, March 12). Vergabebericht 2024. Available at:
https://www.berlin.de/vergabeservice/nachhaltige-beschaffung/berliner-ausschreibungs-und-
vergabegesetz/vergabebericht-2024.pdf 185 Carvalho, R. (2023). Sustainable public procurement: Some Portuguese GPP experiences. In Sustainability in Public
Procurement, Corporate Law and Higher Education (1st ed). Routledge.
40
operating and maintenance costs, while stimulating economic growth by fostering new industries and
creating job opportunities. This is confirmed by Mähönen, M., et al 2023186, who find that
introducing green requirements in public procurement may increase short-term costs and
administrative burden, including higher upfront costs and compliance complexity, but may be
outweighed by long-term benefits such as emissions reductions, innovation, lifecycle cost savings,
and wider economic gains. Lakić, E., Golja, J.G., Gubina, A.F. (2022)187, assessing the impacts of
the green public procurement uptake in Slovenia, found that the uptake of green public procurement
generated around EUR 61 million in financial savings over three years, alongside significant energy
and emissions reductions. See Annex 7, Ad Section 6.2 for further details.
Empirical studies assessing the impact of BPQR on competition are limited. Tátrai et al. (2024)188,
using EU27 TED data (2017–2020) and econometric analysis, show that most economically
advantageous tender criteria are associated with a lower number of bidders, while lowest-price
procedures attract more competition189. Yet, the impact appears to depend strongly on the way BPQR
is implemented. Research shows that BPQR is more likely to reduce competition when evaluation
criteria are vague or subjective, the weight placed on quality is very high, documentation
requirements are burdensome, and contracts are large and complex. These conditions tend to
discourage participation in particular by smaller firms. However, these negative effects can be
mitigated when award criteria are clear and quantifiable, procedures are digitized and standardized,
and access for SMEs is facilitated, allowing public buyers to maintain a healthy level of bidder
participation while still rewarding quality. Studies show moreover that lowest-price awards reduce
product and process innovations, making suppliers focus on their established products and
services190, 191. Moreover, including BPQR among award criteria can be considered a more pro-
competitive approach than including it in technical specifications. This is because non-compliance
with technical specifications excludes bidders upfront, whereas using BPQR as an award criterion-
such as by awarding additional points during evaluation-does not completely exclude other bidders.
Respondents to the public consultations were neutral on the effect of BPQR on competition, with
equal shares considering that competition would either increase or decrease192.
Potential effects of BPQR on risk of fraud and irregularities depend on the administrative
capacities of public buyers, as set out in further detail in Annex 7. Loxbo and Pircher (2025)193 find
that countries with weaker public administrations experienced an increase in single bidding of
approximately 10-11 percentage points, which was associated with their increased use of the most
186 Mähönen, M., Martini, L., Gardiner, J., Lehtilä, S., & Görlach, B. (2023): Public Procurement for Climate Neutrality:
a transformative policy instrument? D4.2: 4i-TRACTION case study report. University of Eastern Finland & Ecologic
Institute, Berlin. 187 Lakić, E., Golja, J.G., Gubina, A.F. (2022). “The analysis of the impacts of green public procurement in Slovenia” 188 Tátrai, T., Vörösmarty, G., & Juhász, P. (2024). “Intensifying Competition in Public Procurement”, Public
Organization Review, 24, pp. 237–257. 189 See Annex 7 for further detail on impact of BPQR on competition. 190 Krieger, B., Prüfer, M., & Strecke, L. (2024). Public procurement can hinder innovation (ZEW Discussion Paper No.
24-009). ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research. 191 However, when assessing the impact of BPQR on competition it must be noted that in some EU/EEA countries,
BPQR is already the default system used by public buyers to award contracts (e.g.: NL, NO, IE, FR, ES, HR, BE and
AT). In these countries, the impact of ESI.1 on competition and prices is therefore expected to be minimal. 192 See Annex 7 and 9 for more details. 193 Loxbo, K., & Pircher, B. (2025). Complexity meets flexibility: unintended differentiation in EU public procurement.
Journal of European Public Policy.
41
economically advantageous tender (MEAT) criteria. In contrast, countries with strong public
administrations saw a reduction in single bidding by 4-7 percentage points, while their MEAT use
remained largely unchanged. Single bidding is widely used as a proxy indicator for irregularities and
the paper concludes that more flexible award criteria may improve or worsen procurement outcome
depending on the capacity of contracting authorities. Further studies suggest that social and
environmental clauses are not generally used as a tool for favouritism194. Several elements that are
part of this policy option would reduce significantly potential risks of irregularities. First, the
mandatory link of all quality criteria to the subject matter of the contract constitutes a fundamental
safeguard against the exercise of excessive discretion by public buyers, as it prevents the use of
unrelated considerations that could favour certain tenders and/or tenderers. By anchoring quality
criteria in the specific characteristics, performance, or lifecycle aspects of each particular contract, it
ensures that evaluation remains as objective as possible. Second, the legal obligation for all quality
criteria to have to comply with the general legal principles of public procurement (i.e. they must be
proportionate, non-discriminatory, and transparent) frames the discretion of public buyers and
operates as additional and cumulative safeguard against arbitrary decision-making, requiring that
award criteria neither unduly restrict competition nor introduce disproportionate quality
considerations. Third, the legal obligation that all quality criteria have to be clearly defined in
advance and disclosed in procurement documents will further reduce risks of irregular practices as it
enables tenderers to fully understand on what basis their tenders will be assessed. Fourth, additional
procedural safeguards, such as separating price and quality assessments, securing the “four eyes
principle”, conducting individual evaluations prior to collective deliberation, maintaining a
documented audit trail and publication of all scoring justifications for high-value contracts would
further reinforce objectivity, as would access to review and remedy mechanisms195.
Due to the fact that public buyers have to manage trade-offs between different policy objectives
when conducting public procurement, a meaningful degree of discretion when defining award
criteria is needed. First, the balancing of competing objectives such as environmental sustainability,
(digital) innovation, and social inclusion is ultimately a political choice. These trade-offs reflect
societal priorities, and policy preferences, which vary across local contexts. Given that much public
procurement is funded and implemented at regional or local level, it is appropriate that these
decisions are taken as close as possible to the communities affected. Local contracting authorities are
better placed to determine how to weigh, for example, climate performance against cost efficiency,
in line with local democratic mandates and needs in the award of the BPQR. This discretion allows
public buyers to tailor procurement strategies to the specific circumstances of each contract and to
identify where the most meaningful intersections between policy objectives lie. Rather than applying
one-size-fits-all award criteria, public buyers need flexibility to design award criteria that reflect the
actual needs of users and stakeholders, the characteristics of the market, and the practical
opportunities for combining objectives. This adaptability is essential to ensure that the BPQR award
not only complies with overarching policy ambitions but delivers effective outcomes on the ground.
194 See for example: François Maréchal, Pierre-Henri Morand, Are social and environmental clauses a tool for
favoritism? Analysis of French public procurement contracts, European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 73, 2022,
102140, (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102140). 195 See Figure 49 in Annex 7, with an example of a typical professional organisation of evaluation of bids. The
illustration shows how different teams handle different aspects of the evaluation in big organisations. An important
practical aspect of the administrational safeguards to counteract biased or arbitrary decisions is e.g. to divide the
evaluation discretion between different teams, and to make sure that the evaluation of quality is separated from the
evaluation of price.
42
An increase in litigation could be considered among the potential consequences of extended use of
BPQR requirements, particularly among less experienced public buyers who may feel uncertain
about its application. This risk will be mitigated to some extent by the built-in safeguards mentioned
earlier (under the risk of fraud), as well as by the support provided by the Commission-through
standardised requirements, criteria, and guidance on objective documentation and evaluation-and by
Member States, through training materials and programmes. Moreover, respondents to the public
consultations more often expected that BPQR requirements would likely reduce litigation (35%) than
those who considered it unlikely (24%). However, among public authorities, the situation was
reversed, with only 7% expecting a reduction in litigation compared to 46% who considered it
unlikely.
The impact of award criteria on SME access varies across sectors. In non-Low-Skilled Labour-
Intensive (non-LSLI) sectors, the use of criteria other than lowest price is associated with a higher
predicted probability of SME award (around 60.2%), while reliance on lowest price reduces this
probability to approximately 54.1% (-6 p.p.). In LSLI sectors, the opposite pattern emerges: applying
the lowest-price criterion increases the probability of SME award from about 54.4% to 56.9% (+2.5
p.p.). These results indicate that the effects are sector-specific and closely linked to underlying cost
structures and delivery models196. Some studies have found that the inclusion of sustainability
aspects in the evaluation criteria has the effect of increasing SMEs’ bidding, as well as the
probability for SMEs to win the contract197.
Theintroduction ofBPQR as the standard award method with a “comply or explain” mechanism and
a minimum mandatory weight for quality criteria was supported by 50% (378) of OPC respondents.
According to almost 9 out 10 (588) OPC respondents, it is very likely (54%: 357 replies) or
somewhat likely (35%: 231 replies) that a legal framework that further incentivises BPQR will result
in the achievement of strategic policy goals (environmental, social and innovation). The second most
likely impact of incentivising BPQR, according to OPC respondents, is improved quality of goods,
services, and works, with 57% (383) considering it very likely and 30% (202) somewhat likely.
Public procurement of innovation actively shapes competition dynamics, including dominance and
market entry. Literature points out that PPI has a positive impact on competition, provided that the
procurement and the underlying contractual conditions are designed effectively198, 199. On the other
hand, there is no strong causal evidence in scientific literature that PPI consistently lowers or raises
prices. Instead, the evidence suggests that PPI primarily changes how prices are determined200,
196 SILO (2026), SME Participation …, p. 49 (publication pending). 197 Carreras, E., & Vannoni, D. (2023). Mandatory Requirements in Sustainable Public Procurement: The Economic
Perspective. In W. Janssen & R. Caranta (Ed.). Mandatory Sustainability Requirements in EU Public Procurement Law:
Reflections on a Paradigm Shift (pp. 57–74). Oxford: Hart Publishing (http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781509963980.ch-004) 198 Chiappinelli, O., Giuffrida, L.M. and Spagnolo, G. (2025). Public procurement as an innovation policy: Where do we
stand? International Journal of Industrial Organization, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103157 199 Blind, K., Pohlisch, J. and Rainville, A. (2020) Innovation and standardization as drivers of companies’ success in
public procurement, J Technol Transf 45, pp. 664–693. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-019-09716-1 200 OLAF - Fraud in Public Procurement. A collection of Red Flags and Best Practices. Available at:
https://sfc.ec.europa.eu/system/files/documents/sfc-files/fraud-public-procurement-final-20122017-
ares20176254403.pdf.
43
potentially leading to higher upfront costs, while potentially generating savings over the longer term
through improved efficiency and performance201.
The new innovation procedure would simplify the current innovation partnership procedure,
reducing compliance issues and administrative burden202. Removing the current procedural
restrictions to its use would empower authorities to adopt the innovation procedure more freely203.
Results from the OPC confirm this approach, with 47% (47) of public buyers, 69% (58) of large
companies and 49% (30) of SMEs expressing support for a simplified innovation procedure.
Nevertheless, given the subject matter the new innovation procedure would still require
administrative resources, expertise and strategic capacity for effective implementation204 and the
absence of standardised methods for valuing innovation and setting price ceilings complicates
transparency and monitoring205.
This highlights the importance of making market pre-consultations a standard step in the
innovation procedure to enable public buyers to understand better the market and the solutions it
can deliver and to generate creative ideas while validating market assumptions. By engaging with
innovative suppliers early, public buyers foster competition and support collaboration where
appropriate. Early dialogue would build a shared understanding of the aim of the innovation sought
between buyers and suppliers, paving the way for smoother contractual relationships and better
public service outcomes206. However, a market consultation too does entail a certain effort: the initial
investment is higher due to the resources required for stakeholder engagement and analysis, but this
upfront investment often accelerates implementation of the procedure and innovative solution later
by reducing uncertainties and aligning expectations on desired outcomes207.
An allocation of intellectual property rights to the supplier (unless the public buyer justifies
otherwise) for all procurements subject to the new innovation procedure would help prevent adverse
consequences stemming from the transfer of IPR to the public buyer. Surveyed innovative companies
report that an intellectual property rights transfer to the public buyer makes them refrain from
submitting a bid (17%), offer an alternative solution with less negative consequences of such a
transfer (12%), increase the price of the bid to factor in the IPR transfer (8%) or expect to delete the
requirement of an intellectual property rights transfer in negotiations with public buyers (22%)208.
Allocating intellectual property rights to the supplier in innovation procurement would increase legal
certainty, lower barriers to participation in innovation procurement particularly for SMEs and enable
201 Chiappinelli, O., Giuffrida, L.M. and Spagnolo, G. (2025). Public procurement as an innovation policy: Where do we
stand? International Journal of Industrial Organization, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103157 202 EC(2025), Ecosystem Mapping Report (https://public-buyers-community.ec.europa.eu/communities/innovation-
procurement-hubs-iph/resources/ecosystem-mapping-report-summary-version), p. 28 203 EIC Scaling Club, Policy Report on Innovation procurement, How Can Policymakers Strengthen the EU Public
Innovation Procurement and Deep-Tech Scaleups’ Participation? [forthcoming]. 204 EC(2025), Ecosystem Mapping Report. 205 EC(2022), Study on the Value of the Innovation Partnership Cooptative, proof pricing for innovation value A
methodology based on innovation collaborative value pricing plus rationale,
(https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/49657/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native). 206 EC(2021) Guidance on innovation procurement (https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/45975). 207 For instance, in the case of one innovation partnerships procurement project valued at EUR 150 million, the cost of
market consultations amounted to EUR 20 000 - just 0.01% of the project value. According to the contracting authority,
this represented a minimal cost in relation to the benefits gained. 208 Wainikka (2026), Intellectual property…. (publication pending)_
44
the reuse of solutions across projects and the single market, helping firms recover investments and
scaling. For suppliers, especially SMEs and start-ups, IPR ownership can be essential to protect
proprietary know-how, attract investment, reuse solutions in future projects, and scale innovations
across markets. This policy option would resolve a structural dilemma in innovation procurement:
when public buyers seek to maximize their ownership of IPR, they are offered less innovative
solutions as economic operators have a disincentive to offer such solutions given this would deprive
them of the strategic IPR assets they need to innovate, expand, and scale their solutions effectively.
That said, where justified, public buyers may mandate the public ownership of IPR where this is
required such as to provide critical public services (e.g. security-related services) or to prevent
technological lock-in. See Annex 7, Ad Section 6.2 for more detail.
Environmental and social impacts: Incentivising the consideration of quality criteria under BPQR
would increase the uptake of environmental, social and innovation procurement. If all additional
quality criteria in BPQR were to translate into green criteria, the central scenario-assuming an 18.5%
increase in BPQR-could result in green procurement accounting for 40% of all procurement
procedures in the EU. In the scenario where Member States align with the countries currently
achieving the highest share of GPP, the use of BPQR quality award criteria, as set out in ESI.1,
would lead to an increase in GPP uptake of between 30 and 80 percentage points-depending on the
current level in each Member State-potentially reaching levels as high as 89%, as observed in LT209.
Similarly, if additional requirements were translated into social criteria, socially responsible public
procurement (SRPP) could reach 43% of all procurement in the EU under the central scenario.
Introducing definitions for GPP, SRPP and PPI would improve legal certainty and coherence,
facilitating the use of environmental, social and innovation procurement and reduce single market
fragmentation. Legal definitions would support implementation of the BPQR and facilitate
processing of data on GPP, SRPP, and PPI in IT systems, reducing administrative burden from easier
data gathering and monitoring. Definitions would support the recognition of environmental and
social objectives and give public buyers greater confidence in integrating sustainability
considerations into their procurement decisions210. A more harmonised approach would facilitate
cross-border procurement of sustainable and innovative solutions, contributing to reduce the price of
sustainable solutions211, 212. OPC respondents strongly supported legal definitions of GPP, while
Member State highlighted that the absence of an SRPP definition hindered its implementation213.
Option ESI.1 would incentivise the use of the EU Ecolabel, by simplifying the verification of
environmental requirements by public buyers for the 27 product groups covered by the EU Ecolabel
scheme, which represent roughly 3% of all tenders by number and around 1.5% by value214.
209 See Annex 7, Ad Section 6.2 GPP impacts 210 EP (2023), The Social Impact of Public Procurement: Can the EU Do More? (PE 740.095)
(https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/IPOL_STU(2023)740095). 211 Yeongjun Yeo, SHIN, K., & Jeong-Dong Lee. The Effects and Implication of Green Public Procurement with
Economy-wide Perspective (2016) (Issue 9519) 212 Magrini, C., Gama Caldas, M., Joint Research Centre, Method for the definition of mandatory Green Public
Procurement requirements (2026). Available at: JRC Publications Repository 213 Report from the Commission Implementation and best practices of national procurement policies in the internal
market (COM(2021) 245 final). 214 This estimate is based on matching the 27 product groups covered by the EU Ecolabel to the Common Procurement
Vocabulary (CPV) codes and identifying the number and value of contract award notices with these codes in TED.
45
The progressive publication by the Commission of Practical Guides on the use of the EU Ecolabel in
green public procurement, for product groups covered by EU Ecolabel criteria, could reduce legal
uncertainty and facilitate the uptake of the EU Ecolabel, including in the context of BPQR. This is
because these product-specific guides provide practical support to public buyers on the most relevant
criteria identified by the JRC on the basis of (1) their link to the subject matter of the procurement
contract; (2) the ease of verification; and (3) their relevance to environmental hotspots215.
During the OPC, 42% (322) of respondents advocated that EU law should make the use of
environmental labels easier to apply and more effective so as to support public purchasing of green
solutions. Some additional effort would still be needed to determine the usefulness of using labels as
proof of compliance and to verify whether EU Ecolabel criteria exists for the desired good or
service216 but procedural savings would occur as public buyers would progressively not need to carry
detailed assessments of the link between the EU Ecolabel criteria and the subject matter of the
contract and could rely on the criteria published in the Practical Guides for the use of the EU
Ecolabel in green public procurement217. Suppliers would benefit from an increased use of the EU
Ecolabel across the EU. The use of one EU-wide label instead of differing Member State labels
would ease cross-border access to procurement218.
With regard to SRPP, the clarification that working conditions for employees performing a contract
are intrinsically linked to its subject matter would support the effective and more coherent
implementation of these conditions, including as part of BPQR. The legal clarification would
empower public buyers to prioritise working conditions with confidence, including those agreed in
collective agreements. OPC respondents, when confronted with seven different measures to
incentivise SRPP, chose this measure as the second most popular (39%: 273 replies).
A ban of subcontracting the entirety of a contract or subcontract to a/another subcontractor would
end purely financial subcontracting where a contractor adds no own value. Both, contractor and
subcontractor would remain free to subcontract any part(s) of the contract. This approach, which
ensures a very high degree of flexibility, has been implemented in some Member States already. The
proposed ban of subcontracting a contract in its entirety received support from 30% (189) of OPC
respondents and was highest among trade unions (91%: 90 replies)219. Transparency obligations
would mitigate the risk of opaque supply chains and facilitate monitoring and controls of more
coherent compliance with labour and social obligations. This was the preferred SRPP measure
among OPC respondents (46%: 315 replies).
Impacts on coherence between the intervention and the sectoral acts including public procurement
provisions: By referencing all horizontal provisions on green and socially responsible public
procurement, as well as product and/or sector specific requirements, this option would enhance
visibility and awareness of such requirements, ensuring that public buyers and economic operators
can easily identify which rules apply to their specific procedure. By contrast, as this option would
215 See, for instance: JRC (2024), Background report to the guide for the use of the EU Ecolabel,
(https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC131863). 216 such information is publicly available at www.ecolabel.eu. 217 It is not possible to quantify these procedural costs / savings with the available data. 218 Viegand Maagøe (2026), Use of labels in public procurement procedures, DG GROW, Copenhagen, 2026 219 Lowest support was among business associations (9%: 11 replies), large EU companies (11%: 11 replies), and public
authorities (16%: 16 replies).
46
stop short of integrating the relevant provisions into the unified set of rules, it would not streamline
the varying rules and concepts used into a fully coherent and harmonised single rulebook.
Cost estimation: To assess the administrative costs of introducing BPQR as the standard award
method, we assume that half of the current price-only procedures will be replaced by BPQR
procedures. This would result in an increase in the use of BPQR by 18.5 percentage points, bringing
its share to around 80%. Such a level of BPQR use aligns with the experience of a Member State that
previously introduced BPQR subject to a comply-or-explain mechanism220. Assessing the impact on
costs of procedures indicates that average bidder costs are higher in case of BPQR than price-only
award criteria by approximately EUR 2 700 (EUR 12 400 versus EUR 9 700)221. On the public
buyer-side, the administrative costs differ by ca. EUR 1 000 (EUR 6 400 for BPQR procedures
compared with EUR 5 400 for non-BPQR)222. Additionally, we estimate that public buyers will need
to spend approximately two hours preparing an explanation in cases where BPQR was not applied.
Cost of using EU Ecolabel consist of a one-off application fee of approx. EUR 1 100 and an annual
fee of on average EUR 12 500223. Assuming an 18.5 percentage point increase in green public
procurement (GPP) (as outlined above), and the use of the EU Ecolabel in half of the additional GPP
for which an EU Ecolabel exists, one-off administrative costs for around 1 000 affected companies
would be around EUR 1.14 million and the recurrent administrative costs EUR 12 million per year
(present value). Altogether, ESI.1 is expected to increase the average present value of administrative
cost per procedure - calculated across all procedures to ensure comparability with other options - by
EUR 181 for public buyers (CA in the table) and EUR 495 for economic operators (EO). At the EU
level, this results in an additional annual cost of EUR 55 million for public buyers, along with a one-
off cost of EUR 1.1 million and an annual cost of EUR 469 million for economic operators, bringing
the total annual cost to EUR 524 million (see table below and Annex 8 for analysis of other
scenarios).
Table 3: ESI.1 cost change under 18.5 percentage points increase in use of BPQR (present value annualised).
CA EO Total
Per procedure change (€)*
BPQR comply or explain 181 456 1 686
Voluntary EU Ecolabel 39** 39
Total 181 495 1 725
EU wide cost change (€ million)
BPQR comply or explain 55 457 512
Voluntary EU Ecolabel 12** 12
Total 55 469 524 Note: To ensure comparability with other options, the cost per procedure reflects the average cost across all procedures, rather than solely those subject to BPQR or EU Ecolabel requirements. Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies; The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. * EU wide cost divided by 304 000 procedures in case of CA and additionally by an average number of 3.3 bids in case of EO to arrive at an average comparable across options; ** one off cost of €3.7 per procedure and €1.1 million EU wide. Source: In-house analysis. See Annex 8.
220 This assumption is aligned with the outcome observed in The Netherlands following the implementation of the same
system in 2013 (BPQR, with "comply or explain"), see Titl, V., & Schotanus, F. (2025). 221 In-house analysis based on Ecorys(2025) survey data 2022-2025, See Annex 8. 222 Idem. 223 EC(2026), EU Ecolabel Fees Table (https://environment.ec.europa.eu/document/download/081fb4e2-e371-4a44-
b42f-90f7300729d5_en?filename=EU_Ecolabel_fees_table_2025_07-withoutTA-V2.pdf) .
47
6.2.2. Improving coherence and horizontal integration in public procurement (ESI.2)
Impacts on coherence between the intervention and the sectoral acts including public procurement
provisions: In addition to the impacts of option ESI.1, which option ESI.2 encompasses, this policy
option would deliver substantial improvements on coherence by integrating horizonal provisions on
GPP and SRPP in the future Public Procurement Act. This would first make it far easier for public
buyers and economic operators to identify applicable requirements, ensuring stakeholders can more
effectively apply and implement the rules-ultimately improving compliance and operational
efficiency. Second, it would streamline and simplify the regulatory framework through targeted
linguistic refinements, the removal of redundancies, and the merging of related provisions. By
harmonising terminology and definitions, the policy option would establish greater legal coherence,
reducing ambiguities that often arise from inconsistent language across different acts. Increased
clarity and consistency would facilitate smoother implementation and promote a more harmonised
application of the rules, minimising discrepancies in interpretation and enforcement. Third, by
integrating the existing empowerments to adopt delegated and implementing acts to establish
sustainability criteria for public procurement, it would also ensure and future-proof a coherent
development of green and social criteria applicable to a specific product group and/or sector. This
structured, unified approach to sectoral legislation would ultimately reduce administrative burden,
lower the risk of misapplication, and enhance the application of sustainable public procurement.
Cost estimation: Quantifiable administrative cost estimates are the same as in ESI.1, but the total
increase in costs-including unquantifiable cost reductions due to increased coherence as described
above-is expected to be lower than in ESI.1.
6.2.3. Mandatory rules for green, social and innovation procurement (ESI.3)
OPC respondents expressed support to mandate GPP (55%: 414 replies), SRPP (52%: 332 replies)
and PPI (33%: 215 replies), though much less than to incentivise them (see above). Support for
mandatory measures was strong among trade unions and NGOs but much less among other groups.
Economic impacts including competitiveness: A compulsory BPQR system, without a “comply or
explain” mechanism would limit the ability of public buyers to tailor procurement strategies to the
specific market context. First, for off-the-shelf, highly standardized products, identifying measurable
added value beyond price can be difficult and ineffective as there is little room for bidders to
compete on quality parameters. Bidders would be incentivised to design offers according to quality
parameters that make little difference for the public buyer. Second, award criteria are not in all cases
the most effective instrument for achieving the optimal balance between cost and performance or
achieving the relevant policy objectives. Where public buyers seek a minimum performance
threshold, quality parameters are better included in technical specifications or contract performance
clauses than in award criteria. In addition, in markets where suppliers are already operating close to
the prevailing technological or regulatory benchmark, the marginal scope for additional qualitative
differentiation for suppliers may be limited and reliance on award criteria may be artificial and
generate limited effects. Where, on the other hand, the market is capable of offering differentiated or
innovative solutions, the use of award criteria may be suited to incentivise suppliers to deliver
enhanced performance as properly designed award criteria can stimulate competition on quality and
encourage tenderers to offer solutions that exceed baseline requirements.
To allocate IPR to suppliers as a default rule across all procurement procedures (and not only
within the scope of the new innovation procedure) would create unnecessary administrative
burden and disproportionate long-term costs in situations where no genuine innovation or wider
48
commercialisation potential exists. Retaining IPR ownership to commercialise and scale solutions is
particularly relevant in the case of very innovative solutions that may be procured through the
innovation procedure. It is a lot less relevant in the procurement of off-the-shelf solutions, where the
transfer of IPR ownership to the public buyer is less likely to undermine innovation solutions.
The establishment of an obligation for Member States to set measurable targets for GPP, SRPP
and PPI met with moderate support of OPC respondents: 29% (222 replies) supported the
introduction of binding national targets for GPP, 39% (251 replies) for SRPP and 12% (80 replies)
for PPI, while 36% (271 replies) supported non-binding ones for GPP, 32% (222 replies) for SRPP
and 22% (152 replies) for PPI. Setting quantitative targets does not necessarily provide information
about the actual effectiveness in achieving underlying policy objectives. While it may be possible to
measure the extent to which criteria are formally included in procurement procedures, this does not
in itself demonstrate whether they produce improvements on substance, nor whether similar results
could have been achieved through more cost-effective means. Public buyers would structure
procurements to satisfy the formal requirement of reaching a target rather than tailoring the
procedure in the manner that best secures value for money. They would face increased reporting
requirements, which would not be in line with the simplification objective of this EU intervention224.
Environmental and social impacts: A specification of the extent of the link to the subject matter
principle would promote strategic policy objectives such as bidders’ overall climate protection or
social responsibility. However, this would have important adverse implications. First, to ensure
transparency, coherence and fairness it would impose additional administrative burden for public
buyers and suppliers, such as standardised certifications or verification mechanisms. Second, it
would negatively impact competition as suppliers would risk facing a less uniform procurement
landscape with divergent criteria stemming from greater buyers’ discretion that could impact their
ability to successfully bid across the internal market. Third, it could lead to increased costs and/or
lower quality of products, services and works as competition is diverted away from the
characteristics of the subject-matter of the contract to competition on overall company performance
with green or social criteria and suppliers face less pressure to improve the price and quality of their
offer. Fourth, extending award criteria to general corporate policies and beyond what is essential for
the contract’s performance may conflict with the principle of proportionality.
A mandatory use of the EU Ecolabel without opt out would apply to up to 3% of tenders covering
products within its scope. Given that around 22% of tenders include green requirements, this would
affect an estimated 2 458 companies, which would need to demonstrate EU Ecolabel ownership for
their goods and services to participate in these tenders. We assume that half of these firms do not
currently hold any ecolabel and would therefore need to acquire one. Additionally, as with ESI.1, we
assume an extra 18.5% of green tenders, but in this case, all would require the EU Ecolabel.
Altogether, around 3 300 firms are expected to acquire one. Under this scenario, companies which
already hold an EU Ecolabel would incur no additional cost. Companies with national ecolabels
would need to provide proof of equivalence, facing no new costs, as equivalence is already
permitted. For national authorities, requiring an EU Ecolabel (where one exists) would not impose
additional administrative burdens and, as in previous scenario, it could generate cost savings, as
authorities would gradually be able to rely on Practical Guides for the use of the EU Ecolabel in
224 Final report from the project “Organisation of workshops in the 27 Member States to develop a dialogue on the use of
strategic public procurement (green social and innovation)”, GROW/2022/OP/0018, February 2025.
49
green public procurement and not need to carry a complex assessment of the link between the EU
Ecolabel criteria and the subject matter of the contract. Given the broader application to more tenders
and bidders, greater cost reductions than under ESI.1 could be expected. However, quantifying the
exact savings is not possible with the available data.
A banning of subcontracting beyond the second tier would shorten subcontracting chains, making
them less complex, helping public buyers to maintain direct oversight of contractors and better
allowing labour inspectorates to verify compliance with labour and social obligations225. However,
such a ban, even if only imposed in high-risk sectors, would impose disproportionate costs on firms.
A Swedish study estimated that a two-tier cap in construction could add EUR 30–45 billion annually
in company costs, including a 10% increase in civil engineering and 2–3% in housing226. Such
measure would also mean that specialised knowledge from lower-tier firms would have to be
incorporated into larger contractors, favouring big, vertically integrated companies. SILO (2026)
confirms that subcontracting increases SME participation in public contracts depending on sectoral
contexts227. OPC respondents showed limited support for this measure beyond trade unions.
Impacts on coherence between the intervention and the sectoral acts including public procurement
provisions: The impact of this option would be complete integration of the “how to buy” and “what
to buy” provisions into a single set of rules. Some of the rules would be applicable horizontally to
any procurement under the scope of the acts and others would be product or sector specific
requirements. However, in those cases, sectoral regulations would be left without their procurement-
related provisions, even though in some cases these are requirements that constitute integral elements
central to the functioning of the sector-specific acts.
Cost estimation: Mandatory BPQR would entail an increase in its use by 37 percentage points to
cover all tenders. Given that BPQR procedures are more expensive than price-only criteria-by EUR 2
700 for economic operators and EUR 1 000 for public buyers -the additional EU-wide cost would
amount to EUR 953 million and EUR 102 million respectively (present value). As mentioned in
section 6.2.1, companies that intend to acquire the EU Ecolabel would bear a one-off application fee
of approx. EUR 1 100 and an annual fee of on average EUR 12 500. With an estimated 3 300
companies affected EU-wide, this would translate to a one-off cost of EUR 3.6 million and a
recurrent annual cost of EUR 38 million (present value)228. Altogether, ESI.3 option is expected to
raise the average cost per procedure - calculated across all procedures to ensure comparability with
other options - by EUR 335 for public buyers (CA in the table) and EUR 1 036 for economic
operators (EO). At EU level, this results in an additional annual cost of EUR 102 million for public
buyers, along a one-off cost of EUR 3.6 million and an annual cost of EUR 953 million for economic
operators, bringing the total annual cost to EUR 1 055 million (see table below and Annex 8).
Table 4: ESI.3 cost change under mandatory use of BPQR (present value annualised).
225 Fafo, Institute for Labour and Social Research, Experiences with Regulations Limiting the Use of Subcontractors in
Public Procurements (https://www.fafo.no/en/publications/publications-in-english/experiences-with-regulations-limiting-
the-use-of-subcontractors-in-public-procurements), p. 10. 226 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (2025). Effects of limiting the number of subcontractor tiers to two
(https://www.svensktnaringsliv.se/bilder_och_dokument/rapporter/7hmwql_effects-of-limiting-the-number-of-
subcontractor-tiers-to-twopdf_1240356.html/Effects+of+limiting++the+number+of++subcontractor++tiers+to+two.pdf) 227 SILO(2026), SME Participation …, p. 49. (publication pending). 228 See Annex 8 (options ESI) for more details.
50
CA EO Total
Per procedure change (€)*
BPQR mandatory 335 912 3 345
Mandatory EU Ecolabel 124** 124
Total 335 1 036 3 469
EU wide cost change (€ million)
BPQR mandatory 102 915 1 017
Mandatory EU Ecolabel 38** 38
Total 102 953 1 055
Note: To ensure comparability with other options, the cost per procedure reflects the average cost across all procedures, rather than solely those subject to BPQR or EU Ecolabel requirements. Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies; The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. * EU wide cost divided by 304 000 procedures in case of CA and additionally by an average number of 3.3 bids in case of EO to arrive at an average comparable across options; ** one off cost of €11.9 per procedure and €3.6 million EU wide. Source: In-house analysis. See Annex 8.
6.3. Impacts of Made in Europe options (BEU)
Economic impacts including competitiveness: Based on an analysis of the top 10 000 companies by
award value, using TED publication data from 2018 to 2023, direct and indirect participation by
bidders from third countries was estimated to account for 7.5% of the total awarded contract
value229, with higher rates in specific sectors. Such participationwas primarily driven by third-
country companies bidding through their EU subsidiaries (indirect third country cross-border
procurement). The localisation of the Global Ultimate Owner [“GUO”] of winning companies
revealed that bidders indirectly coming from third countries were mostly located in the US (EUR
81.3 billion), the UK (EUR 49.6 billion), CH (EUR 46.9 billion), JP (EUR 19.9 billion), NO (EUR
10.8 billion), CA (EUR 8.6 billion), TR (EUR 5.9 billion) and CN (EUR 5.2 billion). Non-EU-
owned economic operators participating directly were typically located in the US, CH, NO, TR, CN.
In terms of contract value, the main categories supplied by non-EU-owned economic operators
included construction and civil engineering work, pharmaceuticals, road transport services, waste-
related services and medical equipment (Figure 25, p.170). Across the EU, the importance of non-
EU-owned economic operators varied widely across Member States. About a dozen Member State
award more than 20% of contract value to non-EU companies (IE, PT, AT, SE, CZ, SK, MT, LU,
SK, ES, EE, BE, and the NL) (Figure 28, p.173). Restricting access to EU‑owned suppliers could
result in increased award concentration in Member State with a narrower supplier base or a greater
dependence on non‑EU‑owned operators for various products (Figure 29, p.174). However, where
solutions by EU companies are available, it is expected that the free flow of goods and services
within the Single Market would adjust to mitigate any disruptions, fostering a more balanced
distribution of resources and opportunities across Member State.
The second approach to identify sectors that may be significantly affected by BEU options regarding
market access involved analysing sectors frequently represented in the submissions under the
Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR)230. These submissions were deemed a reliable proxy for
229 In-house analysis, see Annex 7 (Options BEU). 230 i.e. An extract of submissions made by economic operators or groups of economic operators in accordance with the
requirements of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 (FSR) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1441 was used. FSR
statistics in public domain may differ, as a different classification approach has been used.
51
pinpointing sectors of strategic importance, especially considering the substantial value of the
contracts subject to FSR231. The analysis of FSR data revealed that, out of over 4 100 submissions
received between 2023 and 2025, the primary sectors where foreign subsidies were reported were: IT
and telecommunication (representing nearly 25.3% of submissions), followed by transport (24.6%),
energy (18.1%), construction (10.6%), and health (10.4%). FSR submissions data has been matched
with a corporate ownership database232, revealing that intra-EU ownership accounts for nearly two-
thirds of all FSR cases - or three-quarters of cases for which data was available (Figure 31, p.177).
Among the share allocated to third countries, the main trading partners likely to be impacted by the
new rules include the US (235 entries or 4% presence in submissions; most prominently represented
in pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment, computers and electronics, as well as in IT and other
information services), followed by the UK (147 entries, 2.5%; in IT and other information services,
human health services and telecommunications) and CH (106 entries, 1.9%; in the manufacture of
transport equipment, as well as in electricity, gas and steam supply, and telecommunications). The
list of key countries aligns broadly with the results from the TED data analysis.
The third approach is to use the FIDELIO modelling to anticipate macro-economic effects, taking
into consideration that the impact of a domestic content requirement depends hugely on where in the
value chain it is applied. FIDELIO's analytical strength lies in capturing economy-wide and sectoral
interactions, and for very granular product-level activities, results should be interpreted with caution
however. Across all product categories examined, a consistent pattern emerges: local content
requirements tend to generate positive effects in upstream EU manufacturing industries, while
translating into additional costs for downstream sectors, whether private (such as construction) or
public (such as health, education and general administration).
In the case of steel and aluminium233 (i.e. raw materials in the upstream part of the value chain) the
effects of the policy are expected to be predominantly positive (see Table 30 and Figure 48). Almost
one third of the positive impact in the EU steel and aluminium sectors would concern DE
(EUR 106 million), followed by IT (EUR 44 million). In relative terms, LU stands out with the
highest impact on value added (+2.81% with regards to the baseline - owing to the presence of
ArcelorMittal in the country – the world’s second largest steel producer) followed by LV (+2.44%
increase). The total positive effect in terms of accumulated value added for the EU would be EUR
331 million in 2025-2030.
On the other hand, the construction sector (i.e. downstream) uses steel and aluminium as raw
materials (see: Table 31 and Figure 49). According to the JRC estimates, FR, NL and RO would be
most affected by the higher price of EU produced steel, accounting for 62 % (EUR 995 million) of
the total negative impact (EUR 1.6 billion) of the policy measure. However, in relative terms, HR,
HU and RO would show even greater negative impact (-3.74%, -1.54% and -1.47% respectively),
likely because of their high dependence on non-EU steel production. In comparison, construction
231 Under the FSR, parties bidding for public procurements with an estimated contract value of at least EUR 250 million,
must submit either a notification where the tenderer received foreign financial contributions of at least EUR 4 million per
third country in the three years preceding the notification, or a declaration. 232 Orbis is a comprehensive, global database from Moody's containing standardized financial and ownership information
on over 400-580 million public and private companies (https://www.moodys.com/web/en/us/capabilities/company-
reference-data/orbis.html). 233 85% "Made in EU" content requirement for steel and aluminium (i.e. upstream / raw materials), which is then used in
construction activities procured by the public sector
52
activity in NL and FR, despite much higher monetary values, would see their respective value added
reduced with regards to the baseline by -1.09 % and -0.48 %.
A similar upstream-downstream dynamic is observed for radio, television and communication
equipment (Figure 51), where the FR general public administration would incur an additional cost
of EUR 256 million, PL public health system an increased cost of EUR 49 million, CZ public
education system an extra cost of EUR 47 million. On the positive side, DE computer and electronics
industry would benefit by EUR 71 million in additional value added and increase its exports by EUR
116 million as a result of Buy European requirements in the public procurement of such equipment.
Comparable dynamics emerge for medical, precision and optical instruments (Figure 53), where
FR public health system would bear an increased cost of EUR 161 million, while DE industry would
benefit by EUR 48 million in value added and increase its exports by EUR 78 million.
A local content requirement in public procurement would also affect the trade balance, as it would
directly reduce imports of the goods (or inputs) covered by the measure and increase demand for
domestically produced substitutes. Nonetheless, if domestic upstream industries expand, they may
achieve economies of scale and improve their competitiveness to an extent that increases exports.
For instance, in the case of steel and construction, the combined trade impact of EU content
requirements would be nearly neutral in terms of intra-EU trade balances, almost equally impacting
intra-EU exports of basic metals and intra-EU imports of the construction sector. Some countries are
expected to yield a positive trade balance for the policy measure, especially for DE and IT (see Table
32 and Figure 50). Beyond these quantified effects, the model does not capture the longer-term
benefits associated with reduced exposure to foreign supply disruptions and input price shocks,
which could materially enhance the resilience of EU value chains in sensitive product categories.
Stakeholders expressed strong support for European preference. When asked about economic
security and strategic autonomy (960 replies), preference for European industry in critical sectors
was ranked as the most important characteristic to be achieved234, while a general preference to
European industry came second (out of 7 options). See Annex 9 for further detail.
6.3.1. Voluntary European preference (BEU.1)
Economic impacts including competitiveness: The impact of BEU.1 would be moderated by two
main factors: its discretionary nature and existing international obligations. First, the discretionary
nature of this option grants public buyers’ full autonomy in deciding whether to implement
restrictions. The implementation of BEU.1 would thus not be aligned across Member State and
public buyers. Such fragmentation may reduce legal clarity and predictability for bidders, who would
need to familiarise themselves with varying practices, and coherence. Regarding the costs, this
option could increase transaction costs due to divergent national interpretation of rules and
potentially discourage participation and limit competition. Second, a significant number of non-EU
owned economic operators originate from countries with which the EU has international agreements
on public procurement235: US, UK, CH, JP, NO, CA, IL fall under the GPA WTO scope, and UK,
234 Supported especially by large companies (132 replies), SMEs (92 replies), business associations (216 replies), NGOs
(98 replies) and citizens (137 replies). However, EU public authorities (129 replies) and academia (23 replies) ranked it
third and fourth, respectively. 235 EC – Negotiations and Agreements (https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-
region/negotiations-and-agreements_en).
53
CH, NO, JP and CA have additionally signed free-trade agreements [“FTA”] with the EU covering
public procurement. However, in the GPA and FTAs not all public procurement is covered.
Contracting authorities would need to consider potential risks of security of supply and
dependencies. Among the top ten countries of ownership of non-EU economic operators, fully non-
covered third countries represent only 1.7% for CN, 1.9% for TR and 1.5% for KW. Nevertheless, in
some sectors the position of economic operators from those countries is strong (i.e. CN in electric
modules, TR in the construction sector). Therefore, if public buyers decide to apply exclusions for
non-covered bidders, the operational and service provision risks would be limited in some sectors,
but for other specific sectors, a voluntary exclusion mechanism may pose a risk of security of supply
and dependencies where public buyers fail to identify these risks and act accordingly. On the other
hand, under this option, contracting authorities from countries that may benefit from applying
European preference in a given procedure would be free to do so, while those not benefiting from
European preference would not be required to apply it, resulting in a potentially more optimal
outcome for both groups individually though less effectiveness in reaching the EU policy objective.
Impacts on coherence between the intervention and the sectoral acts including public procurement
provisions: By referencing all horizontal provisions on cybersecurity in public procurement,
procedural aspects of “what to buy” related to resilience in public procurement, as well as
requirements on resilience and Buy European applicable only to a product group and/or sector, this
option would enhance visibility and awareness of such requirements. By contrast, as this option
would stop short of integrating the relevant provisions into the unified set of rules, it would not
streamline the varying rules and concepts used into a coherent and harmonised single rulebook.
Cost estimation: BEU.1 does not entail any additional administrative cost.
6.3.2. Framework for mandatory European preference in selected sectors (BEU.2)
Economic impacts including competitiveness: The impact of this option would also be linked to two
main factors: the sectors covered and the international agreements in place. Should sectoral
legislation introduce EU preference clauses, the following assesses impacts focussing on sectors with
a highest proportion of non-EU suppliers and most represented in FSR submissions236:
The impact of BEU.2 would be very limited in the pharmaceutical sector, where the majority of
contracts awarded to non-EU operators concerned economic operators from the US, CH and the UK,
countries with whom the EU has international agreements in force. Although EU-owned firms are
present in this sector, they may lack an established record of supplying equivalent volumes across all
product categories, which could lead to potential supply disruptions until EU firms are able to scale
up accordingly. For software and information systems, the impact would be limited given the
predominance of operators from countries covered by international agreements, notably the US and
the UK. As with pharmaceuticals, EU-owned alternatives exist but may not be immediately available
at equivalent scale, particularly for specialised or high-value solutions.
The construction sector presents a more nuanced picture. While EU-owned firms account for a
significant share of participation, TR suppliers, not covered by relevant international agreements,
represent a meaningful portion of non-EU participation. BEU.2 would reduce the pool of eligible
236 Sectors subject to European preference requirements will be decided by the co-legislators in sector specific legislation.
54
bidders more significantly than BEU.1. From a cost perspective, the construction sector would also
be indirectly affected as a downstream user of steel and aluminium: the FIDELIO model estimates a
total negative impact of EUR 1.6 billion on construction value added at EU level as a result of higher
input prices driven by local content requirements on those upstream materials. This impact would be
particularly pronounced in FR, NL and RO, which together account for 62% of the total negative
effect (EUR 995 million). In relative terms, HR, HU and RO would be most severely affected,
reflecting their higher dependence on non-EU steel production. Similarly, for technology-intensive
sectors (radio, television and communication equipment; medical, precision and optical instruments;
office machinery and computers) the effects in these sectors are more mixed. While some Member
States such as FR, PL and CZ would face higher procurement costs for their public administrations
and health systems, DE computer and electronics industry would benefit from increased domestic
output and expanded export opportunities. The net impact would depend on the availability of EU-
owned substitutes and the extent to which domestic producers can absorb increased demand.
For electric modules the impact of BEU.2 would be most acute. In 2018 - 2023, 100% of the EUR
371 million procured was awarded to non-EU operators, with EUR 360 million going to economic
operators originating from CN, a country not covered by relevant international agreements. A strict
restriction on non-covered bidders would therefore carry a high risk of supply disruption, given the
near-total absence of EU-owned suppliers currently active in public procurement in this category.
Across all illustrative sectors modelled, an important potential benefit not captured is that, if
domestic sourcing of critical materials is strengthened, the EU would become less exposed to future
supply chain disruptions and input price shocks stemming from possible third-country policy shifts.
This increased resilience of supply chains could reduce vulnerability to external geopolitical or
market shocks, thereby supporting longer-term economic stability.
Impacts on coherence between the intervention and the sectoral acts including public procurement
provisions: The harmonised framework for sector-specific acts with its common horizontal elements
and menu of EU preference mechanisms would ensure coherence, strengthen legal clarity, reduce
interpretative discretion, and limit the risk of divergent and disproportionate application.
Cost estimation: For public buyers, the cost of implementing European preference in public
procurement would involve verifying the location of the global ultimate owner of participating
companies or the origin of procured goods. This verification would be conducted by cross-checking
information submitted by economic operators through a dedicated tool within the digital procurement
marketplace (MPL option), designed to determine beneficial ownership. Regarding the origin of
goods and components, a self-declaration system would leverage existing tools, such as the Digital
Product Passport (DPP), which collates relevant product data from manufacturers, distributors, and
customs authorities. On average, if the tool such as the DPP contains the relevant information, this
verification process is estimated to take on average 2 hours per economic operator237. While
straightforward for domestic operators, it may take longer in a limited number of cases involving
foreign companies, which account for only 2.4% to 6.2% of awarded tenders238. The costs for public
buyers would remain manageable provided that appropriate EU or Member State-level databases are
237 Alternative scenarios, including an average time of up to 8 hours, are analysed in Annex 8. 238 Direct cross border procurement, number of awards, see Annex7 Ad Section 6.3 – Key figures on cross-border public
procurement.
55
available for information verification. For economic operators, costs would arise from providing
evidence as requested by public buyers, such as details on ownership structure, firm registration, or
the origin of components. This process is also estimated to take 2 hours per company. Similar to the
verification process for public buyers, it is expected to be straightforward in most cases, particularly
for domestic firms, but could require additional time for foreign bidders / where complex value
chains necessitate origin verification.
The BEU.2 option is expected to increase the average cost per procedure - calculated across all
procedures to ensure comparability with other options - by EUR 25 for public buyers and EUR 7 for
economic operators (present value), assuming 10% of public procurement is subject to European
preference. At the EU level, this translates into an additional annual cost of EUR 7.4 million for both
public buyers and economic operators, resulting in a total annual cost of EUR 15 million (present
value) (see table below and Annex 8 for details and analysis of alternative scenarios).
Table 5: BEU.2 cost change under 10% of procurement subject to European preference (present value annualised).
CA EO Total
Per procedure change (€)* 25 7 49
EU wide cost change (€ million) 7.4 7.4 15 Note: To ensure comparability with other options, the cost per procedure reflects the average cost across all procedures, rather than solely those 10% subject to European preference. Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies; The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. * EU wide cost divided by 304 000 procedures in case of CA and additionally by an average number of 3.3 bids in case of EO to arrive at an average comparable across options. Source: In-house analysis. See Annex 8.
6.3.3. Mandatory EU preference across all sectors (BEU.3)
Economic impacts including competitiveness: Applying “European preference” requirements
uniformly across all sectors would likely be inefficient and potentially counterproductive. Sectors
differ significantly in terms of supply chain structure, availability of domestic inputs, and the degree
of international integration. A horizontal approach would therefore risk imposing compliance and
verification requirements even in sectors where local sourcing is not feasible or justified, or in
sectors where economic operators from non-covered third countries are negligible.
Unlike the voluntary mechanism described under Option BEU.1, an overall mandatory exclusion
would remove the discretion of contracting authorities, excluding all economic operators originating
from non-covered third countries would be systematically from public procurement procedures
across the EU. The potential impact of such a measure would therefore be broader in scope, although
it would remain significantly moderated by the international agreements in place.
Overall, the result would be a narrower supplier base across all Member State, without the possibility
for contracting authorities to adapt to sector-specific dependencies. The systematic nature of
mandatory exclusion would amplify the impact in specific sub-sectors where non-covered suppliers
play a critical role. As highlighted in the analysis of BEU.2, this would be particularly true for the
electric modules sector, where all the contracts were awarded to economic operators originating from
CN, as well as for the construction sector, where a large part of the contracts were awarded to TR
suppliers. In the pharmaceutical and software and information systems sectors the impact would be
limited given the predominance of operators from countries covered by international agreements.
56
Among the OPC respondents who supported the idea of excluding bidders from countries not
signatories to the EEA, GPA, FTA, or other international agreements with procurement provisions,
71% (278 replies) favoured a mandatory approach239, although a voluntary regime was the preferred
option amongst public authorities (65%: 34 replies).
Impacts on coherence between the intervention and the sectoral acts including public procurement
provisions: The impact of this option would be complete integration of the “how to buy” and “what
to buy” Buy European provisions. Some of the rules would be applicable horizontally to any
procurement under the scope of the acts and others would be product or sector specific requirements.
However, in those cases, sectoral regulations would be left without their procurement-related
provisions, even though in some cases these constitute integral elements central to the functioning of
the sector-specific acts and do not belong into a horizontal Public Procurement Act.
Cost estimation: BEU.3 is expected to increase the average cost per procedure - calculated across all
procedures to ensure comparability with other options - by EUR 245 for public buyers and EUR 74
for economic operators (present value), assuming 100% of public procurement is subject to European
preference. This translates into an additional annual cost of EUR 74.5 million for public buyers and
economic operators, resulting in a total annual cost of EUR 149 million (present value) (see table
below and Annex 8 for details).
Table 6: BEU.3 cost change under 100% of procurement subject to European preference (present value annualised).
CA EO Total
Per procedure change (€)* 245 74 490
EU wide cost change (€ million) 74.5 74.5 149 Note: To ensure comparability with other options, the cost per procedure reflects the average cost across all procedures, rather than solely those 10% subject to European preference. Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies; The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. * EU wide cost divided by 304 000 procedures in case of CA and additionally by an average number of 3.3 bids in case of EO to arrive at an average comparable across options. Source: In-house analysis. See Annex 8.
6.4. Impacts of Digital marketplace(s) options (MPL)
Economic impacts including competitiveness: By establishing an interconnection between the
eProcurement platforms, economic operators may use their preferred platform to participate in all
public procurement procedures across the EU eliminating the need to use multiple platforms and
ensuring a coherent system experience. The digital business credential tool would automate the
provision and validation of evidence (e.g. exclusion grounds) in one coherent instrument to reduce
administrative burden and encourage participation, including cross-border. This will not only
simplify public procurement but also push for greater competition, as fragmentation and technical
incompatibilities will no longer discourage economic operators from participating. By reducing
administrative market access barriers, both MPL options are expected to lead to more economic
operators participating in procurement procedures, including cross-border in the single market, with
239 Trade unions were the strongest advocates (98%: 88 replies), followed by NGOs (75%: 15 replies), citizens (74%: 39
replies), SMEs (70%: 21 replies), large companies (67%: 42 replies) and business associations (66%: 49 replies).
57
a resulting positive impact on prices given that each additional bid received decreases the price on
average by 2.5%240.
A second most important impacts of the digital marketplace would be enhanced transparency
leading to improved accountability and enabling a more effective prevention and detection of
irregular practices. This would be achieved through the collection and combination of full life-
cycle procurement and contract implementation data. The availability of this data in one EU-level
system would enable the systematic use of IT-tools such as ARACHNE+ to identify procedures with
a risk of irregular practices. The automatic notification by the IT tool of high-risk procurements to
relevant national authorities (e.g. auditors, competition authorities, national central procurement
offices) would facilitate their work in preventing, identifying and pursuing irregular practices.
Preventively, as the OECD (2011)241 reports, the mere knowledge that procurement procedures may
be assessed for risks of irregularities is expected to increase the perceived probability of detection
and therefore reduce irregular conduct. The digital marketplace would contribute to improved
transparency and greater accountability. Further assessments and examples in Annex 7 ad section 8.
Furthermore, the digital marketplace will support the coherent application of public procurement
rules by bundling monitoring and reporting requirements stemming from EU legislation. Common
data formats and standards will ensure seamless data exchange and analysis, providing a reliable set
of data for the assessment of policy choices. Furthermore, any additional eligibility requirements
may also be provided and reviewed centrally, which would also make the contracting authority
aware of the existence of all such requirements in EU legislation.
Moreover, the digital marketplace will support policy options on European preference by providing
an automated support to contracting authorities for them to verify the application of EU market
access rules by allowing for the confirmation of the origin of companies or goods (through the DPP).
The Eligibility Network will provide an automated support to verify the company eligibility, reduce
administrative burdens and ensure compliance with the EU legal framework. Additionally, in times
of crisis, the digital marketplace can mitigate the vulnerability and reduce geopolitical dependencies
by providing public buyers with real-time data analytics to anticipate and respond to supply
disruptions, market developments and price shocks.
Environmental and social impacts: Setting up a digital procurement marketplace will support and
provide a technical infrastructure to implement policy measures aimed at strengthening strategic
public procurement (GPP, SRPP and PPI), for example through use of the Digital Product Passport
(DPP) (whenever DPP is mandated for a product and the information is available) which contains
product sustainability information and which would be available through the PPES. The PPES will
moreover allow for the automatic verification of exclusion criteria linked to environmental and social
legislation, and provide for more transparency in the supply chain, flagging for example potentially
socially harmful subcontracting practices. The Data Network, which is referred to in the proposal as
PPDS data exchange, will allow for the use of best practices related to green or social procurement,
240 Bek Aagaard, K., & Gregers Linaa, J. (2024). The impact of competition for public contracts on public
finances, p. 7, (https://kfst.dk/media/bmgjjy3w/the-impact-of-competition-for-public-contracts-on-publicfinances.pdf). 241 OECD (2011), Competition and Procurement: Key Findings, OECD Publishing, Paris,
(https://doi.org/10.1787/c6e6d5ae-en).
58
for example on the use of award criteria or on the connection of social considerations to the subject
matter of the contract. It will also provide a valuable tool for policymakers to pursue policy
objectives that support sustainable and social goals.
83% (526) of OPC respondents who expressed their view on the matter spoke out in favour of
creating a digital procurement marketplace.
6.4.1. Decentralised eProcurement systems to establish an interconnected digital marketplace
(MPL.1)
A significant majority of 65% (443) of OPC respondents favoured interconnecting all existing
Member States’ eProcurement services. Respondents highlighted potential benefits, including the
reduction of administrative burden, easier participation in cross-border procurement and stronger
guarantees on data protection and cybersecurity.
IT architecture impacts: In addition to the impacts assessed above, which are common to both
options, MPL.1 would align with the principles of digital sovereignty and subsidiarity and
preserve flexibility and system integration: Member States and existing eProcurement providers
could continue to tailor their procurement platforms and data management system to local needs and
to integrate with their other IT systems such as national registries, financial systems, for greater
system coherence, ensuring efficiency of public administration. The same platforms and data
management systems would moreover continue to be used for procurement procedures above the EU
thresholds and procedures falling below these threshold (and thus governed by national law),
maintaining synergies for public buyers and allowing economic operators to use the interconnected
platforms for any procurement. MPL.1 would also imply reduced implementation risks and costs
due to absence of radical system overhaul: public buyers and economic operators could keep using
familiar platforms, adjusted only to ensure interoperability. The continued existence of multiple
platforms would encourage market-driven competition and innovation asplatforms would
compete on features, usability and cost, driving continuous improvement.
On the other hand, the co-existence of multiple interconnected platforms and data management
systems would be complex to implement and manage. Some eProcurement platforms may
experience difficulties in adopting the interoperability standard. Divergent national interpretations of
interoperability requirements could lead to interoperability issues, requiring ongoing coordination.
In a decentralised system, resolving issues such as compliance disputes, failed submissions, or data
mismatches could be more complex. Clear governance and support mechanisms would require
continuous collaboration among Member States, platform providers, the EC and CEN to update
standards and resolve compatibility issues. This could create bureaucratic overhead and delays,
particularly if disagreements arise over technical or policy details.
Cost estimation: As far as cost-benefits are concerned, this option would cost the EC EUR 179
million to provide the digital marketplace including EU-services, over the period covered by the
impact analysis (2026-2032). This represents a cost increase of EUR 93.3 million compared to the
baseline The cost for upgrading the eProcurement systems would be EUR 14.6 million on average
(i.e. per one system), an increase of EUR 280 000 over the baseline. For the required development
and interconnection of national data spaces, the average estimated cost per Member State would
59
reach EUR 5.4 million over the above period (an increase by EUR 3.8 million compared to the
baseline242. While the initial investment is substantial, national data spaces hold potential for
generating substantial savings. For the NL alone, such data space could deliver savings of EUR 140
million to EUR 465 million243. However, smaller platforms or Member States with limited resources
might find it challenging to secure the required fundingto ensureinteroperability and system
integration, potentially requiring EU support. Public buyers and economic operators will bear no IT
implementation, development, or operation costs. On the contrary, policy option MPL.1 is expected
to yield recurrent administrative cost savings of around EUR 4 714 per public buyer and EUR 2 714
per winning economic operator244, due to lower human resources cost caused by automation, as well
as the use of the Business Wallet245 – all comparison are net results with regards to the baseline. Due
to network effects stemming from the possibility of using the eProcurement system also below the
EU-thresholds, even higher savings can be expected.
Altogether, MPL.1 option is expected to reduce the average cost per procedure - calculated across all
procedures to ensure comparability with other options - by EUR 723 for public buyers and EUR 1
348 for economic operators, resulting in a total procedure cost reduction of EUR 3 622 (present
value). At the EU level, this results in annual cost savings of EUR 220 million for public buyers and
EUR 881 million for economic operators (present value). However, it also entails annual cost
increases of EUR 18 million at the Member State level (covering adjustments to 70% of
eProcurement platforms and additional spending on national databases and networks) and EUR 18
million for the European Commission (eProcurement support, ARACHNE+ licence cost)246. Overall,
this yields total EU-wide annual cost savings of EUR 1 065 million (See the table below and Annex
8 for further details and alternative scenarios).
Table 7: MPL.1 cost impacts (present value annualised).
CA EO MS EC Total
Per procedure change (€) - 723 - 1 348 - 3 622
EU wide cost change (€ million) - 220 - 881 18 18 - 1 065 Note: To ensure comparability with other options, the cost per procedure reflects the average cost across all procedures. Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies; The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. Source: In-house analysis. See Annex 8.
6.4.2. Centralised marketplace replacing Member States marketplaces. (MPL.2)
This option received low levels of support in the public consultation, accounting for 12% (83) of the
responses. Respondents who favoured this option highlighted significant potential efficiency gains
and cost savings, improved data collection / analysis, reduced barriers to cross-border participation
and overall simplification through the use of a single system.
242 See Annex 8. 243 Utrecht University Centre for Public Procurement (2025), Onderzoek naar een nationale dataspace voor overheids-
opdrachten (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2025/02/10/onderzoek-naar-een-nationale-dataspace-
voor-overheidsopdrachten). 244 EUR 33 000 / 7 years (2026-2032) = EUR 4 714 EUR and EUR 19 000 / 7 years (2026-2032) = EUR 2 714, savings
per non-winning economic operator estimated at EUR 2 063. See annex 8. 245 SWD (2025) 837 final 246 For the purpose of one-in-one-out calculations, these are treated as adjustment costs.
60
IT architecture impacts: The central IT infrastructure of MPL.2 would entail the potential for cost
savings through economies of scale: Consolidating procurement infrastructure at the EU level
would reduce investment needs in Member States systems, lower maintenance costs, and enable
shared development of advanced features (e.g. AI-driven analytics, automated compliance checks). It
would also strengthen data integrity through a single source for procurement data, which would
enable coherent end-to-end data governance, covering pre-award and post-award phases. As MLP.1,
it would allow for coherent compliance monitoring, fraud detection and policy evaluation, while,
however, reducing the administrative burden of reconciling national datasets.
On the other hand, MPL.2 would not align with the principles of data sovereignty and subsidiarity.
It would risk using parallel systems for above- and below-threshold procurements: The new public
procurement legislation could only apply for above the EU-threshold. Public buyers would likely
continue to use national systems for below-threshold procurement, which comprise a significant
portion of their activities, implying fragmentation and lack of coherent systems for economic
operators.MPL would moreoverimply significant change management challenges, including staff
training, data migration, and integration with existing systems, and sunk costs for existing
eProcurement platforms in so far as not all the services that Member States have developed over
the past years are mandatory for below thresholds procedures. One Member State reported that
MLP.2 would mean a sunk investment of up to EUR 120 million. Moreover, MPL.2 would imply a
loss of system integration with other national systems: Member States with advanced eProcurement
solutions, in particular where tightly integrated with other IT systems, e.g. on contract management,
financial systems or national registries, would experience a downgrade in functionality for public
buyers and economic operators. A "lowest common denominator" approach might force these
systems to abandon features that add value at the local level. In terms of resilience, a single platform
would concentrate risk, making it a prime target for cyberattacks or systemic failures.
Cost estimation: As far as cost-benefits of this option are concerned, the centralised marketplace
would ensure consistent processes and reduce maintenance costs by eliminating duplicate systems
for procurement procedures above the EU-thresholds. This option would mean EUR 201.3 million
cost for the EC (over a seven-year application period), which represents a cost increase of EUR
115.6 million compared to the baseline. The average cost per eProcurement system (which Member
States may also choose to maintain for below the threshold procurements) would be EUR 13.4
million over the same period, which would constitute savings of EUR 1 million, compared to the
baseline. As with MPL.1, the average estimated cost per Member State would reach EUR 5.4 million
over seven years (an increase by EUR 3.8 million compared to the baseline)247. Finally, MPL.2 is
expected to bring recurrent administrative cost savings of around EUR 4 714 per public buyer and
EUR 2 714 per winning economic operator over248 (compared to the baseline)249.
Altogether, the MPL.2 option is expected to reduce the average cost per procedure - calculated
across all procedures to ensure comparability with other options - by the same amounts as MPL.1,
namely EUR 723 for public buyers and EUR 1 348 for economic operators (present value). At the
EU level, this generates annual cost savings of EUR 220 million for public buyers and EUR 881
247 See Annex 8. 248 EUR 33 000 / 7 years (2026-2032) = EUR 4 714 EUR and EUR 19 000 / 7 years (2026-2032) = EUR 2 714, savings
per non-winning economic operator estimated at EUR 2 063. See annex 8.. 249 Savings for public buyers and economic operators are the same under MPL.1 and MPl.2.
61
million for economic operators. At the Commission level, the additional cost of establishing a central
eProcurement system is estimated at EUR 16.5 million annually, with the cost of the ARACHNE+
licence amounting to EUR 4.5 million (present value). Conversely, at the Member State level, a
centralised EU eProcurement system would yield annual savings of EUR 0.14 million per local
eProcurement system, resulting in total EU-wide savings of EUR 17.6 million across all 123
platforms. Overall, this leads to total EU-wide annual cost savings of EUR 1 083 million (see the
table below and Annex 8 for further details).
Table 8: MPL.2 cost change (present value annualised).
CA EO MS EC Total
Per procedure change (€)* - 723 - 1 288 - 3 622
EU wide cost change (€ million) - 220 - 881 - 3 21 - 1 083 Note: To ensure comparability with other options, the cost per procedure reflects the average cost across all procedures. Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies; The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. Source: In-house analysis. See Annex 8.
6.5. Common impacts across all policy options
Impacts on SMEs are analysed across all policy options, either in sections on economic and
competitiveness impacts, or in environmental and social impacts – depending on the extent to which
SMEs would be affected by the policy measures proposed – and in more detail in Annex 6.
Environmental and social impacts are most relevant for options ESI and have been analysed in
section 6.2. By this proposal no significant harm to the environment or the security, preparedness
and resilience to climate risks are expected under any of the options analysed. Quite the opposite,
ESI policy options are expected to generate indirect positive environmental and climate-related
impacts. They can contribute to achieving the EU’s 2050 climate-neutrality objective and the Unions
2030 and 2040 climate targets and help mitigate/prevent adverse impacts of climate change.
Geopolitical impacts concern only options BEU where they have been discussed – all other options
are not significantly affected. Digital by default is the overarching principle guiding this EU
intervention. By ensuring further digitisation of procurement procedures, it fully adheres to the
notion of digital-ready and interoperable policies. Digital impacts are embedded in all relevant policy
measures, whereas the main impacts linked with strengthening the role of IT tools appear in options
MPL. Potential impacts on relevant SDGs are mentioned in the introduction and discussed in
Annex 3. The policy options discussed in this impact assessment do not impact the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. The impacts of options MPL and BEU also align with the foresight scenarios
concerning the digital revolution (i.e. a megatrend) and the current geopolitical situation to the extent
that it is likely to continue and have a significant influence on the EU public procurement market.
7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?
The following table compares the various options by assessing their overall effectiveness in terms of
meeting relevant specific objectives, efficiency and coherence:
62
Specific objective s
Policy options
Effectiveness 250
Efficiency Coherence
FLX.1: Improved procedural flexibility and coherence + - +
FLX.2: Simplified & flexible procedures in a more coherent system ++ + ++
ESI.1: Inducing green, social and innovation procurement ++ ++ +
ESI.2: Improving coherence and horizontal integration in public procurement ++ ++ +++
ESI.3: Mandating green, social and innovation procurement +++ - +++
BEU.1: Voluntary European preference + 0 -
BEU.2: A framework for coherent European preference in selected sectors +++ + +
BEU.3: Mandatory European preference across all sectors + -- ++
MPL.1: Decentralised network of interoperable & interconnected MS
procurement marketplaces
++ ++ +
MPL.2: Centralised EU marketplace replacing MS marketplaces ++ + 0
Legend: Impact ratings: +3 = highly positive; +2 = positive; +1 = moderately positive; 0=neutral/modest impact; -1 moderately negative; -2 = negative; -3 = highly negative
Comparison of FLX options: The main difference between the two options under FLX is the degree
of legal clarity, simplification and coherence achieved. Both options would be effective in providing
public buyers with further flexibility -to a different extent-, including the possibility to negotiate,
giving public buyers a higher degree of discretion. Option FLX.1 would not bring efficiency gains
due to the procedural differences between the Directives, which would remain in place. Moreover,
by keeping the current Directives, the integration in the marketplace, and thus the monitoring of
negotiations, would be limited to the measures potentially already introduced by Member States.
Under FLX.2 the benefits of negotiations would be further maximised by the efficiency gains
introduced by the dynamic procedure and the new innovation procedure, as well as the minimisation
of fraud risk through digital elements. In terms of coherence, by integrating exclusion grounds into
the future Public Procurement Act, FLX.2 would allow public buyers to use one single set of
applicable rules, and economic operators to have greater legal certainty as to the applicable rules to a
given procedure, thus supporting coherence beyond FLX.1, which would merely reference exclusion
grounds in sectoral acts. Under FLX.2, the merging of the three directives would moreover allow for
the streamlining of procedures, thus increasing legal certainty and allowing for better monitoring
compared to FLX.1.
Comparison of ESI options: The primary distinction between the options under ESI lies in the degree
and proportionality of regulatory intervention and the degree to which they establish coherence. All
three options would be effective in ensuring that quality requirements, including environmental,
social and innovation, are included in public procurement procedures. ESI.3, which would make
strategic procurement largely compulsory, would be more effective in meeting specific objective 2
than ESI.1 and ESI.2, which seek to incentivise, promote and enable strategic procurement. ESI.3
would, however, be less efficient than ESI.1 and ESI.2 due to its high administrative burden and loss
of operational flexibility. By inducing, but not mandating green, social and innovation procurement,
ESI.1 and ESI.2 constitute the more proportionate policy options. This is the case also in relation to
BPQR, given that ESI.1 and ESI.2 allow public buyers to incorporate quality requirements in
technical specifications instead of award criteria where more relevant, or to justify why such criteria
250 Effectiveness – the extent to which options would achieve the objectives. Efficiency - key economic, social and
environmental impacts and benefit/cost ratio, cost-effectiveness of each option. Coherence – the extent to which options
are coherent with other EU policy objectives, including the Charter for fundamental rights, and with other policy
initiatives and instrument.
63
are not relevant at all for a given procurement procedure. Options ESI.2 and ESI.3 ensure greater
coherence than ESI.1 due to the integration of procurement provisions from sectoral acts.
Comparison of BEU options: All three options would be effective in improving EU economic
security and strategic autonomy. However, their distinction lies in the degree of effectiveness and
efficiency, and the extent to which they establish a coherent framework for European preference
across sectors. BEU.1 would improve legal clarity through codification of case law and support
public buyers with guidance and practical tools to restrict participation of non-covered bidders or
goods. While useful, the effectiveness of BEU.1 would be limited by the lack of establishing a
coherent framework that BEU.2 additionally would introduce. BEU.2 builds upon BEU.1 by
establishing a structured and coherent framework for European preference, without itself introducing
such preference, leaving this to sector-specific EU legislation or to delegated acts. This would enable
targeted European preference requirements to the aimed sectors, in line with harmonised horizontal
and procedural elements. BEU.3, by providing a mandatory EU preference across sectors and
procurement procedures, would ensure the highest degree of coherence. It would, however, be less
effective than BEU.2, as it would encompass within its scope sectors and products posing little or no
risk to EU economic security or strategic autonomy. BEU.3 would also be less efficient, given its
potentially disproportionate impacts on procedural costs and narrower supplier base across all
Member State, without the possibility for contracting authorities to have a sector specific approach.
Comparison of MPL options: Both MPL options would reduce administrative barriers and costs
related to the participation in public procurement procedures, thus increasing competition with an
expected positive impact on prices and quality of offers made. The main difference between the two
options under MPL is how access to procurement data, information and IT tools is being established
and thus specific objective 4 is being reached. Option MPL.1 would achieve this specific objective
through establishing a network of interconnected and interoperable Member States eProcurement
platforms, whereas option MPL.2 would replace such systems by one integrated central EU-level
platform. Both options would be similarly effective in facilitating access to procurement information,
data and IT solutions. However, MPL.1 would be both, more proportionate and more efficient as it
would require lower investments and maintain the integration with Member States’ IT systems as
well as eProcurement solutions below the EU thresholds, which would also make it more coherent.
By ensuring data integration across Member States and allowing for data integration by Member
States also of procedures below EU thresholds, MPL.2 will be the more effective option in
preventing and combating possible irregularities (fraud, corruption).
8. PREFERRED OPTION
8.1. Chosen Options
Based on the above problem definition, description of options and assessment of the impact of policy
options, the following combination is chosen for this EU intervention:
Table 9: Comparison of options
Specific
objectives
1. Simplify and promote
flexibility in
procurement procedures
and increase legal clarity
and coherence of
applicable rules (FLX)
2. Increase the uptake of
environmental, social
and innovation public
procurement and provide
a more coherent legal
framework (ESI)
3. Improve EU economic
security and strategic
autonomy in public
procurement, promoting
a coherent legal
framework (BEU)
4. Facilitate access to
public procurement
information, data and IT
tools (MPL)
64
P o
li cy
o p
ti o
n s
FLX.0 ESI.0 BEU.0 MPL.0
FLX.1 ESI.1 BEU.1 MPL.1
FLX.2 ESI.2 BEU.2 MPL.2
ESI.3 BEU.3
The preferred option to address specific objective 1 is FLX.2 as this is the option ensuring the
highest level of simplification and flexibility and results in more legal certainty. This option,
however, would imply a significant change for public buyers and would require a certain degree of
professionalisation to adapt to the new framework. The costs of optional negotiations would be
balanced by the efficiency gains introduced by new simplified procedures.
The preferred option to address specific objective 2 is ESI.2. In terms of effectiveness in meeting
this specific objective, ESI.1 and ESI.2 score equally. However, ESI.2 scores better than ESI.1 in
terms of the coherence it establishes. Even if ESI.3 would be more effective, it would generate
higher administrative burden and costs and offer lower flexibility.
The preferred option to address specific objective 3 is BEU.2 as the combination of a voluntary
approach for all sectors with a framework for coherent preference in selected sectors (where sectoral
acts provide for such preference). It combines the legal clarity and practical tools offered by BEU.1
with a framework that ensures effectiveness and coherence across sectorial acts, while avoiding the
disproportionate scope and one-size fits all approach of BEU.3.
The preferred option to address specific objective 4 is MPL.1 as it would be as effective, but
more efficient and more coherent than MPL.2. By establishing an EU public procurement
marketplace consisting of a network of interconnected eProcurement platforms, MPL.1 would
address the problem of dispersed data and fragmentation, while avoiding the negative impacts of
MPL.2.
8.2. Combined impact of chosen options
Economic impacts including competitiveness: The combination of FLX.2 and MPL.1 would have
strong impacts on the simplification of public procurement, by making procedures more flexible and
reducing administrative burden. In doing so, they would counterbalance an increase in complexity
and related administrative burden that may result from ESI.2 and BEU.2 supporting the uptake of
environmental, social and innovation procurement and improving EU economic security and
strategic autonomy respectively. MPL.2 reduces the costs of all other options by digitising their
processes. It will serve as the platform for market consultations under FLX.2, as well as for
announcing and recording negotiations. It will also facilitate the once-only principle for document
provision. Additionally, it will cover all stages of new procedures up to the final e-invoice,
enhancing transparency and monitoring.
By simplifying public procurement and reducing administrative burden, the chosen options would
increase the number of bids, positively impacting competition, consistent with literature finding
(Espaillat et al., 2025)251. In particular, FLX.2 and MPL.1 would reduce administrative barriers for
economic operators to participate in procurement procedures. The dynamic procedure foreseen in
251 Espaillat, P., Esteve, M., Bel, G., & Batista Foguet, J. M. (2025). Administrative burden in public contracting: are
bidders looking away? Public Management
65
FLX.2 would allow public buyers to engage more swiftly with the market, increasing competition
and fostering cross-border participation. The same applies to clearer rules on the engagement with
economic operators, that are expected to foster competition. ESI.2 would incentivise competition
based on quality criteria in addition to price through the enhanced use of BPQR. Cross-border
competition in the single market would be enhanced by MPL.1 significantly easing cross-border
bidding through the integrated network of digital procurement platforms and the application of the
once only principle.
As regards impact on prices, ESI.2 would lead to a limited increase in the cost of procured products,
service and works. Higher upfront investment costs are, however, often at least in part expected to be
compensated by lower operational costs and positive exogenous effects. The price impact of BEU.2
would depend on the type of sectors covered and the international agreements in place: it would
therefore potentially be higher in sectors where there is a high dependency on suppliers in countries
not covered by these agreements. These price increases are expected to be balanced by increased
competition stemming from FLX.2 and MPL.1. As shown in the evaluation, every additional bid
received reduces the average price of a procurement contract by 2.5%.
EU economic security and strategic autonomy would be improved by BEU.2 and the framework and
toolbox of mechanisms that it establishes for coherent European preference in selected sectors as
well as the codification of case law permitting public buyers to restrict the participation in
procurement procedures to economic operators from the EU and its partner countries. MPL.1 would
support BEU.2 through digital tools, providing, among others, information on the origin of bidders,
supporting data verification and enabling monitoring of contract execution.
The combination of FLX.2, ESI.2 and MPL.1 would be expected to create a more favourable
environment for SME participation in public procurement. Lower market entry barriers and
compliance costs resulting from simplification measures such as reduced administrative
requirements, more coherent clearer procedural rules, and the development of a digital marketplace
will support higher SME participation and improve their chances of securing public contracts.
Reducing the predominance of price-only award criteria (ESI.2) can improve SMEs’ ability to
compete, as smaller operators are often better positioned to compete on quality, innovation, or
specialised expertise rather than solely on price. For more details on SMEs impacts see Annex 6.
Greater discretion for public buyers, e.g. through procedural flexibilities, such as negotiations in
FLX.2 or the use of BPQR under ESI.2, could entail elevated risks of fraud and irregular
practices. These risks would be counterbalanced by several components of these options themselves
(e.g. link to the subject matter, proportionality requirement, openness, procedural controls, access to
reviews and remedies) and the integration of all procurement procedures in a digital platform under
MPL.1, which will strengthen accountability and transparency, improving oversight and data-driven
control. By consolidating higher-quality and standardised procurement data, the data network would
improve monitoring capabilities at national and EU levels. This would have both, a corrective and
preventive effect. The improved availability of data would facilitate the systematic screening of
procedures and increase the detection of irregularities. Combined with risk-analysis tools such as
ARACHNE+, the data network could detect and flag to competent authorities (e.g. auditors,
competition authorities, review bodies) potentially irregular procurement procedures. Preventively,
the increased transparency and systematic screening of procurement data would raise perceived
likelihood of detection, thereby deterring potential wrongdoing. The system would increase
accountability, affect the ex-ante incentives of potential wrongdoers and reduce risks to engage in
irregular practices. Among respondents to the public consultation, there was a widespread
66
expectation that the MPL options would aid in the prevention of corruption, with a margin of 72
percentage points above those who disagreed. To a lesser extent, respondents also expected that the
simplifications introduced by the FLX options would lead to a reduction in corruption, with a margin
of 27 percentage points above those who thought otherwise.
Environmental and social impacts
The combination of options selected would increase the uptake of environmental, social and
innovation procurement in support of strategic policy objectives. ESI.2 will incentivise the use of
quality award criteria, including green, social and innovation, establishing clear legal definitions and
improving coherence through the integration in the future Public Procurement Act of GPP and SRPP
provisions from sectoral acts would promote the uptake of environmental, social and innovation
procurement. Obligations in relation to subcontracting (notably transparency) and clarifications on
the link to the subject matter, among others, will have positive social impacts. Incentivising the use
of the EU Ecolabel will facilitate green procurement for public buyers. FLX.2 will extend such
procurement to concessions and improve coherence with sectoral legislation, for example regarding
exclusion grounds. MPL.1 would facilitate the inclusion of environmental and social considerations
in procurement procedures by making this less complex for public buyers, inter alia through the
Eligibility Network which automates the verification of exclusion grounds and selection criteria
(including environmental and social requirements). Interconnected EU tools such as the DPP
(holding key product sustainability information) would help public buyers to compare products. The
provision of an automated tool to connect social considerations and the subject matter of the contract
would support SRPP. Making market consultations easier to manage digitally would let contracting
authorities better identify environmentally and socially sustainable solutions, and the data network
would enable improved monitoring and steering of procurement with the aid of comprehensive data
and help public buyers identify environmentally and socially sustainable solutions.
Impacts on coherence between the intervention and the sectoral acts including public procurement
provisions:
The selected combination of options would significantly increase coherence of the public
procurement framework. FLX.2 would integrate the three current Directives into one Public
Procurement Act, ensuring the consistent application of common provisions including on strategic
procurement. By integrating horizontal procurement provisions from sectorial acts, FLX.2 would
provide for a single list of exclusion grounds, enabling public buyers and economic operators to
easily identify the applicable rules and avoid conflicts of law. ESI.2. would integrate horizontal
public procurement provisions from sectorial acts into the Public Procurement Act, deleting them
from sectorial acts. BEU.2 would establish a framework for coherent European preference
mechanisms in sectoral acts. By providing through an integrated digital procurement system for all
procurement procedures, MPL.1 further enhances coherence, including consistent monitoring.
Cost estimation:252
252 Please note that it was not possible to quantify all the savings and costs stemming from the options presented in this
impact assessment due to a lack of reliable data. Consequently, the savings, costs, and scenarios presented relate only to
the quantified aspects of the analysed options and should not be considered as capturing the total monetary impact of
these options. For details, please see annex 8.
67
The preferred option results in a one-off cost of EUR 1.14 million and recurrent annual cost savings
of EUR 613 million (ranging between EUR 170 million and EUR 1.06 billion) (present value
annualised). The probability of generating savings for the scenario of 3.3 bidders is estimated at
97%. FLX.2 and MPL.1 generate annual cost savings of EUR 1 153 million, while ESI and BEU
options increase costs by EUR 539 million. On a per-procedure basis, the average public buyer saves
approximately EUR 261 per procurement procedure. Compared to the procedure cost of EUR 6 000
calculated by Ecorys (2025), this represents a 4.4% saving. For economic operators, the average
saving per procedure is estimated at EUR 1 011. Relative to Ecorys’ cost per procedure for economic
operators of EUR 11 400, this equates to a 8.9% saving. The total savings per procedure involving
3.3 bidders amount to EUR 2 136, equivalent to a 4.9% reduction253. Finally, the estimated cost
impact per entity indicates that an average public buyer is expected to achieve savings of EUR 1 702
annually, while an average economic operator would save EUR 1 530 (see the table below). It should
be noted that not all elements were possible to quantify (e.g., the once-only principle, modifications),
which adds to the uncertainty of the final outcome.
Table 10: Summary of cost changes under the preferred option (present value annualised).
EU wide annual costs
[€ million]
Cost per procedure(a) [€] Cost per entity(b),
annual [€]
CA EO Total CA EO Total CA EO
One off costs (ESI.1.Ecolabel) 1.14 1.14 3.4 2.8
Recurrent costs
FLX.2 78 - 166 - 88 257 - 165 - 288 1 673 - 444
ESI.2.BPQR comply or explain 55 457 512 181 456 1 686 1 180 1 228
ESI.2.Voluntary EU Ecolabel 12 12 39 39 32
BEU.2 7.4 7.4 14.9 25 7 49 160 20
MPL.1 - 220 - 881 - 1 065(c) - 723 - 1 348 - 3 622 - 4 714 - 2 366
Total change - 79 - 570 - 613 - 261 - 1 011 - 2 136 - 1 702 - 1 530 Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies; The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. (a) EU wide cost divided by 304 000 procedures, see Annex 8 for details; (b) EU wide cost divided by 46 648 contracting authorities in case of CA and by 372 440 in case of EO; (c) Includes an additional cost of EUR 18 million for Member States and EUR 18 million for the European Commission arising from the implementation of MPL.1. Source: See Annex 8.
A sensitivity analysis of the total EU wide savings, conducted under varying assumptions, indicates
that the preferred option generates cost savings across all analysed scenarios - covering increases in
the use of negotiations from 0 to 20 percentage points, additional BPQR uptake from 0 to 37
percentage points, and a share of procurement subject to European preferences ranging from 0% to
20% - when the average number of bidders per tender is 3.3 or fewer, as well as in half of the
analysed scenarios for 3.4 bidders (probability of savings around 50%). Conversely, all scenarios
with 3.5 or more bidders per tender result in cost increases. These findings remain consistent even
when accounting for historical growth rates in the number of procedures, public buyers, and
economic operators. The presented costs are based on multiple assumptions and scenarios (a total of
66 main scenarios and 121 scenarios each for 3.3 and 3.4 bidders), as well as limitations in the
quantification of costs and savings. For further details, please consult Annex 8. We believe that the
depicted scenarios provide a robust analysis of potential cost developments for the preferred option,
though different assumptions and scenarios would yield different results.
253 Due to significant variation in contract values and the scale of participating economic operators, average savings
should be treated as indicative only and not as a definitive measure of outcomes.
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8.3. REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency)
The merging of the three directives and reducing the number of available procedures would simplify
the public procurement framework and lead to efficiency gains both for bidders and public buyers.
The improved legal coherence through the integration of procurement provisions from sectorial acts
would further simplify public procurement procedures. A decentralised network of Member States
procurement marketplace would improve interoperability between procurement platforms and enable
implementation of the one-only principle resulting in improved efficiency and costs savings.
8.4. Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach
The initiative falls within the scope of the "one in, one out" approach. The preferred option entails a
one-off cost of EUR 1.14 million for economic operators, alongside recurrent annual cost savings of
EUR 649 million (central scenario, present value annualised) for public buyers and economic
operators combined.254 For public buyers, the new administrative burden is estimated at
EUR 141 million annually, while the removed burden amounts to EUR 220 million annually,
resulting in a net burden reduction of EUR 79 million. For economic operators, the new burden
created is EUR 477 million annually, while the removed burden totals EUR 1 047 million annually,
leading to a net burden reduction of EUR 570 million. For further details, see the table below, as well
as annexes 3 and 8.
Table 11: Summary of “one in one out” applicable annual costs (present value annualised) [EUR million].
CA EO Total
New administrative burdens (INs)
One off costs (ESI.1.Ecolabel) 0.16* 0.16
FLX.2 78 78
ESI.2.BPQR comply or explain 55 457 512
ESI.2.Voluntary EU Ecolabel 12 12
BEU.2 7.4 7.4 15
Total new burden 141 477 617
Removed administrative burdens (OUTs)
FLX.2 166 166
MPL.1 220 881 1 101
Total removed burden 220 1 047 1 267
Net administrative burdens (INs-OUTs) - 79 - 570 - 649 Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies; The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. *one off cost of €1.14 million divided by 7 years to arrive at annual value over the projection period. Source: See Annexes 3 and 8.
9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?
The future Public Procurement Act would include a provision requiring evaluation every 7 years.
The monitoring activities envisage several indicators for each of the objective discussed in this
impact assessment (Table 12, below).
254 It is important to note that the analysis includes both private entities (such as the majority of utilities operators) and
public entities among contracting authorities and economic operators. Due to data limitations, the exact proportion of
each cannot be determined. This may not fully align with the requirements of Better Regulation Toolbox Tool 59, which
specifies that only cost implications for businesses and citizens should be considered.
69
Table 12: Monitoring indicators
Research question Indicators
Specific Objective 1: Simplify, increase flexibility and coherence of public procurement rules and procedures
Has the public procurement
framework become more simple,
flexible and coherent?
Length of procedures in days counting from the moment of publication of the
contract notice until the award (*); Length of procedures in days counting from
the moment of publication of the contract notice until the signature of the
contract; Cancellation rate (*partially); Share of procedures using negotiations
(*now: the use of negotiated procedure)
Specific Objective 2: Increase the uptake of environmental, social and innovation public procurement
Has the number of procedures that
include environmental, social and
innovation elements increased?
Share of procedures (value and count) that include environmental, social and
innovation procurement (*partially) / share of BPQR procedures ;Share of
environmental procurement using EU Ecolabel
Specific Objective 3: Improve EU economic security and strategic autonomy in public procurement
Has the EU economic security and
strategic autonomy in public
procurement improved?
Share of participation of third country operators (direct + indirect); Share of EU
origin of goods procured in selected sectors (understood as in the UCC)
Specific Objective 4: Facilitate access to public procurement information, data and IT tools
Has access to information on public
procurement improved?
Transparency rate (eg. % of GDP published in TED/MPL) (*); Accessibility
and searchability of databases; Data quality (e.g. completeness of data
provided) (*); Data integration with other databases (e.g. company register, tax
register)
General Objectives
(For public buyers) Facilitate public
procurement processes and the
implementation of strategic
objectives, improve legal certainty
Share of procedures (value and count) that include environmental, social and
innovation procurement (*); Number of first instance public procurement
review decisions in relation to number of call for competitions
(For economic operators) Facilitate
access to public procurement (also
cross-border) for EU businesses,
including SMEs
Number of bids per procedure (*); Number of contracts awarded to an
economic operator in a different MS (*); Number of contracts including a
subcontractor from a different MS (*partially); Number of contracts awarded to
SMEs (*)
(Horizontal) Reduce administrative
burden, increase transparency,
facilitate the monitoring to avoid
irregularities and enable policy
choices
Cost per procedure (for public buyers); Cost per procedure (for economic
operators); Length of procedure from planning until the award of the contract;
Number of economic operators using the digital tools; Number of public buyers
using the digital tools; Cancellation rate; Share of procedures using negotiation
(now*: use of negotiated procedure) Sources of information for indicators: Contract notices published on TED, PPDS and national PPDS; Marketplace; surveys. Note: indicators already available are marked with *
The input data for the monitoring activities foreseen (i.e. the listed indicators) is either are already
available or will be available as a result of the introduction of new IT tools and systems foreseen
under option MPI.1. In order to limit administrative burden for public buyers and economic operators
this data will be collected automatically while processing public procurement transactions. Data
curation and dissemination will also form part of the marketplace, including via dashboards and
structured datasets available for download by the general public. This would also strengthen civil
oversight by NGOs and academia, helping to detect irregularities. In a very limited number of cases
where the automatically available data do not provide sufficient insight (i.e. the longer or shorter
duration of procedures is not directly an indicator of simplification), the information will be collected
through targeted one-off surveys.
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ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION
Lead DG, Decide planning / Commission Work Programme references
The lead Directorate-General (DG) is the DG for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and
SMEs (DG GROW).
Decide entry PLAN/2025/2457.
According to the Commission Work Programme 2026, a new legislative proposal on the Public
Procurement Act (Article 114 TFEU) is planned for Q2 2026255.
Derogations granted and justification
Not applicable
Organisation and timing
A call for evidence and an open public consultation run from 3 November 2025 - 26 January 2026256.
Interservice Coordination Group meetings took place on 13.10.25, 16.12.2025, 10.03.2026,
23.04.2026 and 20.05.2026.
The following Commissions services participated: DG AGRI, DG BUDG, DG CLIMA, DG
CNECT, DG COMP, DG DEFIS, DG DIGIT, DG EAC, DG EMPL, DG ECHO, DG ENER, DG
ENV, DG ESTAT, DG HERA, DG FISMA, DG HOME, DG INTPA, JRC, DG JUST, DG MOVE,
DG ENEST, DG REFORM, DG REGIO, DG RTD, DG SANTE, SG, SJ, DG TAXUD, DG
TRADE, OP.
In line with better regulation principles, an Interservice Consultation ran between 10.03.2026 and
13.03.2026, as well as between the 19.05.26 and the 22.05.2026. To the extent possible, comments
from the different Commission services were taken into account.
255 EC – Commission Work Programme 2026 (https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategy-
documents/commission-work-programme/commission-work-programme-2026_en). 256 EC – Have your say, Revision of Public Procurement rules (https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-
say/initiatives/15492-EU-public-procurement-rules-revision_en).
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Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board
The first Regulatory Scrutiny Board meeting took place on 15 April 2026 and resulted in a negative
opinion, with comments outlined in Table 13. A second opinion of "positive with reservations" was
issued for a revised version on 8 June 2026. The comments and how they were addressed are
presented in Table 15.
Table 13: RSB opinion 1: Key issues (part B of the opinion) and the way they were addressed in the revised IA
Question / observation How addressed?
(1) The report does not adequately analyse the
coherence between the intervention and the ca. 60
sectoral acts that include public procurement
provisions. It does not sufficiently demonstrate how
the problem driver of ‘rules that vary by sector’ can be
addressed by the policy options, nor how the
intervention would affect these rules.
The problem definition was adjusted to clarify the different
degrees of lack of coherence across the four problem drivers
(section 2). All policy options were adjusted to address the
problem driver of coherence in an improved manner,
particularly FLX, ESI and BEU.
The assessment of how each policy option supports
coherence, including how sectoral rules would be affected,
was strengthened by analysing per categories of sectoral acts
and assessing impacts of the intervention per policy option.
To support the analysis presented in the main text, a new
Annex 11 was introduced, including a detailed list of sector
specific provisions, setting out how each of these provisions
can be potentially addressed and how each of the policy
options addresses coherence.
(2) The magnitude of problems related to
environmental, social and innovation objectives is not
sufficiently analysed.
The description of the magnitude of problems related to
environmental, social and innovation objectives was
significantly reinforced in chapter 2 (problem definition),
including through the addition of a new sub-section detailing
the consequences of the problem with respect to green,
social and innovation procurement.
In support of Chapter 2, Annex 7 Ad section 2 was also
reworked.
(3) The report does not specify and justify the policy
options well enough. It does not explain in enough
detail how quality will be defined under BPQR
procurement and what this entails for the public buyers
across the EU
The descriptions of all policy options were expanded,
especially with regard to ESI. A detailed explanation of how
quality under BPQR can be defined and assessed was added
to chapter 5.2.1, with a corresponding assessment added to
chapter 6.2.1.
The link of policy options to problem drivers was
reinforced.
The analysis in the main text has been further developed in
Annex 7, to include now -among others- a description of
how quality will be defined under BPQR, a visualisation of
the procedural set up and trade-offs between allowing more
discretion and the risk of irregularities.
(4) The report does not sufficiently assess the costs and
benefits resulting from the preferred option, including
the impacts on competition and prices. The report does
not demonstrate the proportionality of the preferred
policy option.
Assessments of costs and benefits were strengthened in
chapter 6, including with respect to competition and prices
(including notably in relation to ESI options). The costs and
benefits of the preferred option are further discussed in
dedicated annexes (selected subsections of Annex 7 where
the analysis was complemented with literature review).
Changes in the costs of each option are presented in chapter
6, while a summary of all cost changes is provided in
72
chapter 8. Annex 8 contains the detailed calculations of cost
changes. Assessments of proportionality were added to
chapters 6 and 7 (comparison of options).
(5) The report does not sufficiently assess the
combined impact and unintended consequences of the
preferred option, including the risks related to
introducing more negotiations and reliance on BPQR
principles at the same time.
A detailed assessment of the combined impact has been
added to chapter 8, new sub-chapter 8.2. It includes an
assessment of unintended consequences (e.g. corruption,
bid-rigging), which are also discussed in chapters 6.1 (FLX),
6.2 (ESI) and 6.4 (MPL) and in greater depth in Annex 7 Ad
Section 5.2.1 and 2, and Annex 7 Ad Section 8.
Table 14: RSB opinion1: What to improve? (part C of the opinion) and the way they were addressed in the revised IA
Question / comments How addressed?
(1) The report should analyse the coherence and
interactions between the intervention and the ca. 60
sector-specific public procurement provisions. It should
specify which measures in each policy option address
problem driver 1 – ‘rules that vary by sector’ and ‘how
the specific objective 1 to simplify and increase
coherence would be achieved’. The analysis of the
internal coherence of the various preferred measures and
of the external coherence of the initiative with current
and future initiatives including specific public
procurement rules should be significantly improved.
See the reply to question 1 in the table above.
The description of the policy options in FLX has been
updated to address the internal coherence.
(2) The report should substantiate the magnitude of the
problems, including related to the use of environmental,
social and innovation requirements in public
procurement based on evidence from EU and non-EU
countries
See the reply to question 2 in the table above.
(3) The policy measures and the choice of options must
be better specified and substantiated, based on evidence.
The report should provide more details on if and how
quality can be defined under BPQR procurement, and if
it can be objectively assessed. The report should also
better analyse how potential trade-offs between different
quality aspects (including environmental, social,
innovation and sector-specific objectives), would be
addressed under the intervention. If the public
procurement act would not define quality criteria and
would leave procurers the freedom to define quality
according to their needs, the report needs to assess the
implications of this approach.
The measure ‘Buy European’ should be more clearly
specified, including the approach how to identify the
regulated sectors and actors that will be subject to
mandatory buy European provisions.
See the reply to question 3 in the table above as regards
BPQR.
BEU policy options have been updated to be clearer and
more specific about the possible different approaches,
including how to identify the sectors and actors.
73
4. The analysis of risks and unintended consequences
should be significantly strengthened and focus on the
possible increase of the risks of fraud and irregularities
inter alia stemming from increasing complexity due to
default of BPQR; and the consequences of potentially
exchanging information with some, but not all, bidders
in negotiation situations. The report should analyse the
effectiveness of the MPL in mitigating these risks.
Assessments of potential risks of irregular procurement
practices (e.g. fraud, corruption) were added in chapter 6
with respect to several policy options, notably ESI and
FLX. An assessment of the role of MPL options in
mitigating these risks was added and a new Annex (Annex
10) was included to further describe the preferred option
under MPL and how this option would be operationalised.
(5) The report should assess the combined impact of the
various policy options, including impacts following
from using BPQR as the default option and increased
negotiations at the same time.
An assessment of the combined impact was added to
chapter 8.
(6) The report should strengthen the assessment of
expected economic impacts, including by better use of
observational data. The report needs to adequately assess
the impacts of the policy options on competition and
prices paid by public buyers and total cost of ownership.
This should include the costs and benefits associated
with the market outcomes that result from carrying out
procurement processes including competitiveness,
notably for SMEs. It should also analyse potential
effects of the limitations on subcontracting and new
default rules on IPR.
The assessment of economic impacts of policy options,
including on competition and prices. was strengthened in
chapter 6. Where data limitations did not make
calculations possible, relevant research from existing
literature was assessed and presented supported by
findings from stakeholder consultations (+dedicated
Annex 7 Ad Section 7). The description and assessment of
the policy options on subcontracting and IPR were
modified and reinforced (chapters 5 and 6).
(7) The report should present a comprehensive overview
of the administrative costs and savings for all options,
including the framework for mandatory European
preference.
An assessment of administrative costs and savings was
added to all options. An assessment of the combined
impact of the chosen options in terms of administrative
costs and savings was added to chapter 8. An Annex with
more detailed cost calculations was added (Annex 8).
(8) Building on the analysis in annex, the assessment of
the impact of the non-voluntary ‘Buy European’ policy
options should be expanded to all relevant sectors. As
the proposal intends to provide a general framework, it
should assess the macro-economic impact.
The assessment of the impact of the European preference
policy options was significantly reinforced. Based on the
sectors most exposed to participation by third countries,
and drawing in particular on data from the FSR, the sectors
likely to be most affected by the chosen policy option have
been identified. A detailed analysis of the potential impact
of this option on these sectors is provided in Chapter 6,
supplemented by further details in Annex 7 Ad Section
6.3, using in particular the FIDELIO model.
(9) In view of the enabling nature of the initiative, the
report should be more precise on the monitoring and
evaluation framework that will be put in place to
monitor and evaluate success vis-à-vis the objectives.
A more detailed description of the monitoring and
evaluation framework was added to chapter 9.
Other technical comments The revised report introduces several clarifications to the
problem section, objectives, and options analysis. Notably,
an extensive analysis of the public consultations has been
included in Annex 9.
74
Table 15: RSB opinion 2: Key issues (part B of the opinion) and the way they were addressed in the revised IA
Question / observation How addressed?
(1) The report does not provide sufficient information
on the new open procedure with negotiations. It does
not explain in sufficient detail which steps would be
followed in a typical negotiation, and the aspects that
could be subject to negotiation.
The description of option FLX2 has been expanded to
explain how market consultations and negotiations would be
conducted, as well as which aspects could be subject to
negotiation. The impacts section has also been extended to
cover these two elements in greater detail. Further details are
provided in Annex 7, Ad Section 5.2.1 and 2 – Negotiations
in public procurement.
(2) The report does not adequately specify the
approach to the use of quality assessment criteria
under BPQR procurement, in particular the “comply or
explain” requirement, and it does not sufficiently
analyse its possible implications.
The option description has been further clarified to explain
when BPQR requirements could be exempted through a
"comply or explain" approach, as well as what could be
included in quality considerations. It also emphasises that
quality criteria are not limited to environmental, social, and
innovation aspects. In the impacts section, the differing
effects on competition of quality criteria in technical
specifications versus award criteria have been addressed,
along with a discussion of potential unintended
consequences, such as litigation.
(3) The report is not clear enough about the choice of
method and the high uncertainties related to the cost
benefit analysis and the factors that will determine the
final impacts of the intervention. It also does not
sufficiently describe the extent to which various
assumptions may be driving the overall results of the
analysis. As a consequence, some conclusions may
potentially be misleading.
The costs and benefits have been recalculated using more
conservative assumptions, particularly with regard to
savings under the FLX and MPL options. The main report
now highlights the uncertainty surrounding cost and savings
estimates and presents a range of potential results alongside
point estimates. Additionally, Annex 8 has been expanded to
further explain the assumptions and methodology of the cost
analysis and includes additional sensitivity analyses.
Table 16: RSB opinion 2: What to improve? (part C of the opinion) and the way they were addressed in the revised IA
Question / comments How addressed?
(1) For the preferred option Flex2, the report needs to
clarify the specific procedural steps to be carried out in a
typical negotiation procedure, including rounds of
negotiation and how, when and where information is
documented and disseminated between different actors.
The report should better explain the role of the
mandatory market consultation.
Additional information on the conduct of negotiations and
mandatory market consultation is provided in the option
description (Section 5.5.2) as well as in Annex 7, Ad
Section 5.2.1 and 2 – Negotiations in Public.
(2) The report should strengthen the assessment of risks
and unintended consequences stemming from a
potentially more extended use of negotiations in
combination with the application of quality criteria as a
default option. It should explain in more detail the role
of the digital marketplace in possibly mitigating risks,
elaborating on the factors that would affect its
effectiveness and possible cost implications.
The descriptions of risks and mitigation measures related
to negotiations and quality have been strengthened in the
respective option descriptions and impacts sections. The
combined impact assessment has been improved under the
preferred option impacts, with particular attention given to
the role of the digital marketplace.
75
(3) Based on an improved analysis of the magnitude of
the problem related to environmental, social and
innovation aspects, the report should better specify the
option regarding the use of BPQR criteria. The report
should be clear regarding under what conditions the
“comply or explain” mechanism would apply, including
in what circumstances a procurer can abstain from using
any BPQR criteria. The report should assess whether it
will be possible to apply the ESI criteria in all
procurements, considering the requirement of
proportionality and objectivity. Unintended
consequences should be better assessed, including a
possible increase in litigation if the proposed approach
to BPQR creates legal uncertainties.
The option description now clarifies that BPQR quality
criteria extend beyond environmental, social, or innovation
(ESI) aspects, and that other quality considerations may
also be applied. The conditions under which BPQR criteria
need not be applied have been further strengthened, with
examples provided. Additionally, an analysis of the
potential increase in litigation has been incorporated into
the ESI option impacts analysis.
(4) The report’s analysis of the expected costs and
benefits of the different options should be revised, in
particular the expected impacts on costs and savings,
especially for preferred options on flexible and
negotiated procurements, as well as the digital
marketplace (taking into consideration that more than
half of Member States do not have the marketplace yet).
The current analysis appears to, in large part, rely on
assumptions that can be driving the results of the
analysis, and the report could potentially be misleading
as to whether these interventions would lead to net
savings or cost increases. The report should describe in
sufficient detail the assumptions and the calculations on
which the cost estimates of the procedures are based to
allow for replicability. The report also needs to assess
the impacts on competition and prices for the goods or
services bought that follow from the preferred option.
The costs and benefits have been recalculated using more
conservative assumptions, particularly regarding savings
under the FLX and MPL options. The main report now
highlights the uncertainty surrounding cost and savings
estimates and presents a range of potential results
alongside point estimates. Additionally, Annex 8 has been
expanded to provide further explanation of the
assumptions and methodology underlying the cost
analysis, and includes additional sensitivity analyses.
The assessment of impacts on competition and prices has
been further strengthened and is now systematically
presented in the analysis of individual options and the
preferred option.
Evidence, sources and quality
The analysis presented in this impact assessment is based on sources that are listed in Annex 13:
Bibliography.
Additionally, the methodological Annex 4 documents the data preparation, cleaning, and enrichment
procedures applied to data used in the empirical analyses. The objective is to ensure transparency,
reproducibility, and analytical validity by clearly describing how raw data were transformed and
interpreted into the final output.
The primary data source is the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), complemented by additional files
and information coming from external sources, such as ownership information from Orbis
database257 or raw survey results from Ecorys (2025). All operations performed were uniformly
257 https://www.moodys.com/web/en/us/capabilities/company-reference-data/orbis.html
76
applied across all Member States, subject to data availability constraints explicitly described in
Annex 4.
o Reproducibility and Limitations
All cleaning and enrichment steps were applied systematically and documented to facilitate
replication. Manual reviews were limited to high-frequency or high-risk cases where automated
matching could plausibly induce systematic misclassification. Remaining measurement error is
expected to be random and unlikely to bias results in a specific direction.
77
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT)
The revision of the Public Procurement Directive was supported by multiple consultation activities.
These included the consultation of Member States through the Expert Group on Public Procurement
(EXPP) and the Expert Group on Electronic Public Procurement (EXEPP), a joint call for evidence
and online public consultation, a formal hearing of social partners, a hearing of NGOs working on
environment and social responsibility, a dedicated survey targeting SMEs and the setting up of a
Stakeholder Expert Group on Public Procurement (SEGPP). The revision also built upon earlier
public consultations conducted to prepare the evaluation report, as well as targeted consultations
carried out by external consultants in preparation for the evaluation study.
This annex summarises the key results of the above public consultation activities. The additional and
prior consultations conducted in preparation of the Commission evaluation of the existing Public
Procurement Directive are summarised in that report258.
1 Consultation of Member States
A series of meetings with Member States were held in 2025 and 2026 within the framework of the
Commission Government Experts Group on Public Procurement (EXPP) and the Multi-Stakeholder
Expert Group on eProcurement (EXEP) to support the preparation of the revision of the Public
Procurement Directives.
Commission Expert Group on Public Procurement (EXPP)
In 2025, the EXPP convened six times to discuss key elements of the reform: on 31 January, 27
March, 11 June, 10 September, 3 November and 4 November 2025 (joint meeting with EXEP). In
2026, the group met on 20 January. In addition, the informal EXPP subgroup on exclusion grounds
met on 16 January 2026.
The discussions covered a broad range of issues related to the forthcoming reform, including
simplification, green public procurement, socially responsible public procurement, innovation
procurement, concessions, public-public cooperation, EU preference, thresholds, integrated
procurement marketplace, Utilities Directive, legal form of the future act, and discussions on
supportive, non-legislative measures.
Multi-Stakeholder Expert Group on eProcurement (EXEP)
The Multi-Stakeholder Expert Group on eProcurement (EXEP) met on three occasions to discuss
the revision of the public procurement directives: 5-6 June 2025, 3-4 November 2025
(including a joint meeting with EXPP) and 10 February 2026. The Commission met on two
occasions with national stakeholders from each EU Member State and Norway in the annual bilateral
eProcurement workshops (between January and June 2025, and between February and April 2026).
The discussions focused on several key areas of the reform: the legal framework, standardisation,
258 SWD(2025) 332 final
78
procurement procedures, eForms, ecertis and ESPD, Once-Only Principle (OOP) and Business
Wallet, data governance and full lifecycle monitoring, and integrated procurement marketplace.
Commission Stakeholder Expert Group on Public Procurement (SEGPP)
The Commission Stakeholder Expert Group on Public Procurement (SEGPP) has been appointed to
assist the Commission in its work on the evaluation and revision of the EU 2014 public procurement
directives. The 23 members of the SEGPP include individuals and organisations representing and/or
having experience of work in SMEs organisations, industry and business associations, national, local
and regional authorities, national authorities, central purchasing bodies, civil society organizations
and NGOs, academia and trade unions. The value of this expert group is the diversity of stakeholder
representation covering various points of view and opinions.
The group convened on five occasions in 2025 (on 12 February, 15 April, 17 June, 8 October and 15
December) to discuss:
• simplification of the EU public procurement rules,
• EU preference,
• integration of strategic considerations into public procurement (green public procurement,
socially responsible public procurement and public procurement of innovation were each
discussed separately),
• concessions and
• exclusion grounds.
Debates addressed both barriers faced by different stakeholders in public procurement procedures
and potential solutions to overcome these barriers, with some of discussions leading to proposals for
legislative amendments. Varied expertise and background of SEGPP members ensured that diverse
viewpoints were duly represented and considered.
2 Call for Evidence
The call for evidence to support the revision of the Public Procurement Directives was conducted
from 3 November 2025 to 26 January 2026. The call for evidence was first made available in English
(3 November – 3 December), and then available in all EU languages. During this period, 745
responses were submitted in response to the call for evidence. All received responses have been
published259. The largest share of contributions came from business associations (27%: 201 replies)
and companies (20.5%: 153 replies), followed by public authorities (14.6%: 109 replies), NGOs
(12.9%: 96 replies) and EU citizens (12.6%: 94 replies), with smaller proportions from academic
institutions, trade unions, environmental organisations, and non-EU respondents. Geographically,
96% of submissions originated from EU and EEA countries, with Central EU nations (led by
Belgium) accounting for 55% of responses. All EU Member States except Malta and Latvia
participated, alongside inputs from eleven non-EU countries.
259 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/15492-EU-public-procurement-rules-
revision/feedback_en?p_id=21057
79
Several recurring themes emerged from the feedback, reflecting both broad consensus and divergent
perspectives on key procurement challenges.
The idea of “Made in Europe” or “European preference” was frequently raised, with many
stakeholders expressing support but proposing varied approaches to its scope, scale, and
implementation. Some concerns were also raised about potential impacts on pricing, competition
levels, and the risk of retaliatory measures, advocating for a carefully balanced and strategic
approach to such criteria.
Environmental and social sustainability featured prominently, with many respondents calling for a
more enabling legal framework to strengthen sustainability considerations. On environmental
sustainability, there were calls for greater harmonisation of green criteria and mandatory minimum
requirements. For social aspects, many areas of reform were suggested (including subcontracting,
collective agreements, due diligence, link to the subject matter), with some contributions cautioning
against overburdening procurement with policy objectives better addressed through existing labour
regulations.
Simplification was widely supported, with stakeholders emphasising its role in enhancing
competitiveness. Key areas for improvement included streamlining procedural requirements, reusing
bidder information, and increasing flexibility in contract modifications. Many also highlighted
concerns about the complexity and overlap of different legal acts containing public procurement
provisions, calling for a more cohesive and user-friendly regulatory approach. Digitalisation was also
usually quoted in the context of simplification.
Another topic with many references was the use of price-only awards versus the Best Price-Quality
Ratio (BPQR). Many respondents highlighted that excessive reliance on price-only risk poor long-
term outcomes, calling for a new approach that would favour a more systematic application of non-
price considerations.
Digitalisation was frequently cited as a critical enabler of transparency and efficiency. Stakeholders
emphasised the need for interoperable IT platforms to allow data reuse under the ‘once-only’
principle, harmonised data collection as well as direct access to quality public procurement data by
competition authorities.
On public procurement of innovation, respondents highlighted legal rigidity and risk aversion as
major barriers to procuring innovative solutions. Recommendations included more flexible rules to
support SMEs and start-ups and promotion of early-market dialogue to better understand emerging
technologies.
3 Public consultation
An Open Public Consultation to support the revision of the Public Procurement Directives was
conducted from 3 November 2025 to 26 January 2026. The summary of responses is presented
below, while a detailed analysis of all questions is provided in Annex 9.
80
3.1 Respondents’ characteristics
Of the 1 037 responses received, 41% (424) were submitted by stakeholders registered in the
Transparency Register260.
In terms of geographical distribution, 97% (1 011) of the contributions originated from EU and EEA
countries, while the remaining 3% came from non-EU countries. Contributions were received from
all but one EU member state, as well as from one EEA country and nine non-EU countries - the latter
including one outermost region and one candidate country.
The distribution of respondents across the countries surveyed reveals a clear concentration in several
European nations, with notable variations in participation levels (see Figure 2). Among 1037 replies,
97% (1011) come from EU and EEA countries, and 3% from non-EU countries. We have received
contributions from all but one EU country, from one EEA country, and from nine non-EU countries
(including one outermost region and one candidate country).
Figure 2: Distribution of responses per country of origin of respondent
Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Overall, the data highlights a strong representation from Central EU countries, which accounted for
56% (584 replies)261. This is followed by Southern EU countries with 19% (200 replies)262, Northern
EU countries with 11% (119 replies)263, and Eastern EU countries with 10% (108 replies)264.
260 European Union – Transparency Register (https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en). 261 Central EU responses distribution: Germany 38% (223 respondents), Belgium 32% (185), France 18% (106), The
Netherlands 7% (41), Austria 4% (25), Luxembourg 1% (4). 262 Southern EU responses distribution: Italy 41% (82 respondents), Spain 32% (63), Portugal 11% (22), Greece 11%
(21), Malta 4% (8), Cyprus 2% (4). Total 19 responses.
22 3
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The breakdown of respondents by category reveals a clear dominance of business-related and
institutional stakeholders, with notable representation from public authorities and civil society
organisations (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Distribution of responses by type of respondent
Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
3.2 Overall objectives for the revision
Respondents were asked to identify priorities for the revision of public procurement rules. In terms
of improving efficiency and transparency, the top three priorities across most groups were moving
beyond the lowest-cost paradigm, making procurement rules more flexible, and reducing
administrative burden through full digitalisation. While this ranking was broadly consistent among
respondent groups, public authorities differed by prioritising flexibility first and less detailed rules
second.
On priorities for green, social, and innovative procurement, most respondents favoured prioritising
quality over price (usually first or second), followed by facilitating environmentally friendly
purchases (typically second or third), and promoting the purchase of innovative solutions (generally
third or fourth). Public authorities again deviated, placing the avoidance of additional administrative
burden first, less detailed rules second, and environmentally friendly purchases third.
As regards the integration of economic security and strategic autonomy into public procurement
rules, most respondents preferred giving priority to European industry in critical sectors, followed by
263 Northern EU responses distribution: Sweden 34% (41 respondents), Finland 26% (31), Denmark 19% (23), Ireland
13% (16), Norway 7% (8). 264 Eastern EU responses distribution: Czechia 23% (25 respondents), Poland 17% (18), Romania 12% (13), Slovakia
10% (11), Croatia 9% (10), Hungary 8% (9), Estonia 6% (7), Lithuania 6% (7), Bulgaria 5% (5), Latvia 3% (3), Slovenia
0%(0).
6%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
3%
8%
10%
11%
13%
23%
24%
Other Consumer organisation
Environmental organisation Non-EU citizen
Academic/research institution EU citizen
Non-governmental organisation (NGO) Trade union
Public authority Business association
Company/business
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Number of replies (% next to bars)
82
a general preference for European industry and more flexible rules. However, public authorities
ranked flexibility as their top priority, followed by avoiding administrative burden, and then equally
supported giving preference to EU industry and having less detailed rules.
3.3 Detailed questions about the revision
Respondents were invited to respond to more technical questions in relation to the planned revision
and approximately 80% (831) of respondents did so.
3.3.1 Simplification
Respondents were asked to judge the simplification potential of several policy options covering
flexibility of procedures, joint procurement, information exchange, SME participation, and
implementation challenges.
When considering flexibility of procedures, respondents most often saw simplification potential in
more flexible contract modifications (76%: 546 replies), followed by allowing corrections of
procurement documents throughout the procedure (71%: 496 replies), facilitating dialogue with the
market (69%: 492 replies), allowing negotiations throughout the procurement procedure (70%: 466
replies) and simplification of procedures for off-the-shelf purchases (62%: 429 replies).
With regard to joint procurement, respondents identified the greatest simplification potential in
increasing flexibility in setting the duration of framework agreements (66%: 418 replies). This was
followed by facilitating networking among buyers (63%: 440 replies), simplifying rules for setting
up joint procurements, especially across borders (56%: 356 replies), and enhancing the role of
Central Purchasing Bodies (53%: 358 replies).
To improve information exchange and procedural time limits, respondents most frequently
supported allowing the re-use of documentation submitted by bidders (once-only principle) (86%:
620 replies). This was followed by providing model contract templates and technical specifications
for public buyers (75%: 535 replies), and establishing a central EU procurement platform alongside
enhanced digitisation (67%: 483 replies). Lower but still notable levels of support were seen for
setting time limits for bid evaluation (59%: 417 replies) and increasing time limits for submission
(46%: 315 replies).
To support SME participation in public procurement, respondents most highly rated simplifying
rules for forming consortia, particularly for SMEs (70%: 447 replies). This was followed by
encouraging the division of contracts into smaller lots (52%: 348 replies) and introducing EU-level
targets for SME participation in public procurement (47%: 294 replies).
According to respondents, improvements in implementation and contract management could be
achieved by speeding up payments to contractors, particularly SMEs (66%: 457 replies). This was
followed by establishing rules for the post-award phase, including contract implementation (52%:
360 replies), and setting rules for direct payments to subcontractors, especially SMEs (51%: 345
replies). To a lesser extent, respondents also supported increasing the use of pre-financing,
particularly for SMEs (43%: 293 replies).
Regarding the expected impacts of these simplification measures, respondents most frequently
highlighted increased SME participation (82%: 461 replies), a higher number of bidders (81%: 453
83
replies), greater competition (81%: 447 replies), and faster procurement processes (81%: 450
replies).
3.3.2 Coherence with sectoral rules
Respondents were asked whether and how the reform should address existing and future public
procurement provisions in sectoral legislation. Regarding existing rules, responses were divided:
36% (244) supported integrating "how to buy" provisions into the general public procurement
framework, 21% (142) favoured integrating both "how and what to buy" provisions, and 19% (128)
preferred not integrating these provisions at all.
For future legislation, more respondents (41%: 280 replies) opted for integrating "how to buy"
requirements, while the remaining two options received similar levels of support.
3.3.3 Concessions
Respondents were asked to identify which concession-related concepts should be modified. Across
all respondents, the strongest support for modifications was seen in case of additional rules on
contract execution (58%: 256 replies) and rules on duration (55%: 245 replies). Just under half of the
respondents backed changes to publication and transparency rules (47%: 208 replies), as well as
modifications to the definitions of "concessions" and "operating risk" (44%: 197 replies).
The most likely impacts of such modifications were identified as increased legal certainty (77%:
252 replies), followed by a higher number of bidders (63%: 200 replies), greater competition (62%
198 replies), and reduced litigation (60%: 194 replies).
3.3.4 Digitalisation and transparency
Respondents were asked whether they would support the creation of a digital public procurement
marketplace with a single-entry point for economic operators to access public procurement
procedures across the EU.
Across all respondents, around three-quarters (526) supported one of the three proposed options to
change the current eProcurement services, while roughly one in six (118) believed no changes were
necessary. Among the options, interconnecting existing Member States’ eProcurement services
received the highest support at 65% (443), while only 12% (83) supported replacing national
eProcurement services with a central one.
Regarding the impacts of such changes, respondents anticipated a wide range of positive outcomes.
The highest-ranked expected impacts included faster exchange of documents (87%: 526 replies),
wider access to cross-border procedures (80%: 418 replies), harmonisation of tender requirements
across Member States (79%: 478 replies), and increased transparency to aid the prevention of
irregularities (78%: 477 replies).
Several National Competition Authorities, including those from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain, highlighted
the high importance of direct access to quality public procurement data for the prevention and
detection of bid rigging.
84
3.3.5 Made in Europe
All respondent groups except non-EU participants expressed strong support (above 80%)265 for
prioritising European goods and services in public procurement processes.
When asked how to prioritise European goods and services, respondents showed the strongest
preference for expanding the role of non-price criteria, such as social, environmental, resilience,
innovation, security, and “Made in Europe” considerations (92%: 560 replies). This was closely
followed by defining “Made in Europe” criteria for bidder selection-such as requiring a European
business location or setting conditions on the product/service e.g., share of value added (85%: 505
replies). The least favoured option, though still supported by over two-thirds (405) of respondents,
was excluding bidders from countries lacking secured access to EU public procurement markets
through international legal commitments the EU entered into (e.g. Free Trade Agreements covering
public procurement).
When considering the impacts of prioritising European products and services, respondents most
frequently expected an increased chance of winning for EU bidders (92%: 620 replies), followed by
EU economic operators needing to adjust their supply chains to qualify for bidding (88%: 595
replies). High expectations were also placed on boosts to EU employment and investments (both
84%: 574 replies, 571 respectively). Majorities also viewed the following as likely outcomes:
meeting environmental goals (83%: 580 replies), boosting EU innovation (81%: 550 replies),
increasing security of supply (76%: 515 replies), and improving the quality of products, services, and
works (71%: 485 replies). On the cost and risk side, majorities anticipated an increase in the price of
goods and services purchased (63%: 424 replies), potential retaliation by third countries (62%: 413),
and higher administrative costs for public buyers (51%: 334 replies) and EU bidders (46%: 309
replies).
3.3.6 Best price-quality ratio
Around half of all respondents (378) supported requiring public buyers to apply the best price-quality
ratio as the standard contract award criterion266. Similarly, roughly 50% (374) of respondents
favoured introducing a minimum mandatory weight for quality criteria, with support again varying
widely between groups, from 13% (13) among public authorities to 98% (98) among trade unions.
Only around a quarter of respondents supported the introduction of national mandatory quality
targets.
The top expected impacts of incentivising quality requirements were better achievement of
environmental, social, and innovation goals (88%: 588 replies), as well as improved quality of
products, services, and works (87%: 585 replies). High proportions of respondents also anticipated a
boost to EU innovation (82%: 549 replies) and increased efforts by bidders to adjust their supply
chains in order to qualify for bidding (76%: 490 replies).
265 Public authorities (81%: 86 replies), large companies (81%: 87 replies), SMEs (92%: 49 replies), business
associations (80%: 130 replies), trade unions (99%: 95 replies), NGOs (86%: 64 replies), academia (89%: 16 replies),
citizens EU (91%: 86 replies), non-EU participants (42%: 8 replies). 266 However, support for this option varied significantly among respondent groups, ranging from 22% (23) among public
authorities to 96% (96) among trade unions.
85
3.3.7 Green public procurement
Regarding environmentally friendly procurement, almost three-quarters (546) of respondents
supported further incentives for its use. Slightly more than half (414) backed mandatory green
requirements, while around a quarter (173) believed no action was necessary in this area.
Respondents identified clear definitions (56%: 431 replies) and green standards (54%: 410 replies) as
the measures most likely to incentivise the use of green procurement, followed by easier use of
environmental labels (42%: 322 replies).
Such changes were expected to lead to greater achievement of environmental policy goals (89%: 636
replies), a boost to EU innovation (81%: 568 replies), and improved quality of products, services,
and works (75%: 518 replies). Majorities also foresaw an increased chance of EU bidders winning
calls for tender (68%: 474 replies) and a boost to EU employment (63%: 438 replies).
On the negative side, respondents anticipated increased prices of products, services, and works (63%:
442 replies), higher costs for EU bidders (56%: 383 replies), and a greater administrative burden for
both public buyers and EU bidders (both 54%: 379 replies, 349 respectively).
3.3.8 Social considerations in public procurement
Two thirds of respondents (443) support incentivising the use of socially responsible public
procurement, with a bit more than half of respondents (332) also considering mandatory
requirements, while one third (224) view no need for changing the current rules. While business
associations and SMEs both favoured no change to the existing rules, trade union favoured
mandatory provisions (with all other response groups favouring incentivising measures).
Among the proposed concrete measures, increased transparency on subcontracting received the
highest level of support (46%: 315 replies), followed by clarifying ing the link to the subject matter
regarding social considerations affecting workers (39%: 273 replies), banning price-only criteria in
labour-intensive sectors (39%: 252 replies), and establishing socially responsible procurement targets
(39%: 251 replies).
In terms of expected impacts, these measures were considered likely to improve working conditions
(77%: 488 replies), reduce the risk of labour and social law breaches (73%: 454 replies), and
contribute to poverty reduction and increased social inclusion (69%: 430 replies). High proportions
of respondents also anticipated a boost to EU employment (66%: 415 replies) and an increased
chance of EU bidders winning contracts (63%: 391 replies).
On the negative side, respondents expected increased prices (62%: 385 replies), a higher
administrative burden for EU bidders (58%: 360 replies), and an increased burden for buyers (54%:
336 replies).
3.3.9 Public procurement of innovation
Three-quarters of respondents across response groups (497) recognised a need to further incentivise
public procurement of innovation. One-third (215) supported mandatory requirements, while only
one in six (91) saw no need for action in this area.
86
In terms of concrete changes, simplification and removal of legal obstacles was most frequently
mentioned (49%: 333 replies), as was a clear legal definition of public procurement of innovation
(45%: 303 replies) and direct purchase from start-ups (36%: 245 replies).
Incentivising procurement of innovation was expected to boost EU innovation (91%: 469 replies)
and lead to better quality of products, services, and works (80%: 408 replies), as well as provide a
boost to EU industry (79%: 399 replies) and employment (68%: 340 replies). It was also anticipated
to increase SME participation in procurement (65%: 327 replies) and enhance the chances of EU
bidders winning contracts (55%: 275 replies).
On the cost and burden side, around half of the respondents considered an increased administrative
burden for public buyers (53%: 271 replies) and EU bidders (44%: 222 replies) likely, along with
higher prices (47%: 232 replies).
4 Targeted stakeholder Consultations
4.1 Stakeholder Expert Group on Public Procurement (SEGPP)
In addition to the EXPP and EXEP, the Commission Stakeholder Expert Group on Public
Procurement (SEGPP) was appointed to assist the Commission in its work on the evaluation and
revision of the Public Procurement Directives. It brings together 23 members from a variety of
professional backgrounds, including SMEs organisations, industry and business associations,
national, local and regional authorities, central purchasing bodies, civil society organizations and
NGOs, academia and trade unions.
The group convened on five occasions in 2025 (12 February, 15 April, 17 June, 8 October and 15
December) to discuss simplification of the EU public procurement rules, EU preference, green public
procurement, socially responsible public procurement, public procurement of innovation,
concessions and exclusion grounds.
4.2 Social Partner Hearing
A dedicated hearing with European social partners was held on 13 January 2026. A total of 62
participants were present representing 50 social partners organisations (EU cross-industry and
sectoral social partners and national affiliates of cross-industry social partners), including 31
participants from employers’ side and 31 participants from trade unions’ side. The discussions
covered four main topics: price-only vs Best Price-Quality Ratio (BPQR), link to the subject matter,
collective agreements and subcontracting.
Employers’ representatives advocated for the introduction of price adjustment mechanisms, the
retention of the subject-matter principle in its current form, the preservation of the existing approach
to collective agreements in public procurement, while strongly opposing any restrictions on
subcontracting. Trade unions called for a ban on price-only contract awards, the automatic
recognition of working conditions and collective agreements as always linked to the subject matter of
a contract, the prioritisation of companies bound by collective agreements and the restriction of
subcontracting to a maximum of two vertical tiers.
4.3 Meeting with NGOs working on environment and social responsibility
87
On 22 January 2026, a meeting was convened with 13 NGOs active in the field of sustainability to
gather their views and priorities concerning the revision of the EU Public Procurement Directives.
During the discussions, NGOs highlighted several critical issues, including the necessity of
expanding the use of Best Price-Quality Ratio (BPQR) and ensuring greater coherence between
horizontal public procurement rules and sectoral legislation. They also emphasised the importance of
reinforcing the legal standing of sustainability within the EU procurement framework, as well as
addressing challenges related to the use of standards and labels. Concerns were raised regarding the
link to the subject matter principle and its practical application, calling for greater legal certainty.
The meeting additionally touched upon professionalisation of procurement officers, the use of
reserved contracts, the link between EU preference and sustainability requirements, and the necessity
to boost digitalisation.
4.4 Meeting with SME Envoys Network
A targeted consultation with the Network of SME Envoys took place on 3 December 2025.
Participants exchanged views on a number of aspects related to SME participation in public
procurement procedures. Several potential legislative and non-legislative measures were discussed,
alongside simplification and digitalisation of the legislative framework. The streamlining of existing
procedures and improved data collection were highlighted as key elements for enhancing SME
participation in procurement. Participants further addressed the issue of different approaches by
Member States in implementing the existing rules.
4.5 SME Panel consultation
A consultation of SMEs was conducted between 17 December 2025 and 15 February 2026, initially
launched in English and subsequently made available in all official languages from 13 January 2026.
In total, 108 responses were received from SMEs representing different company sizes, countries of
origin and a wide range of economic sectors. The consultation aimed to gather targeted feedback on
several aspects of the current legislative framework, as well as on the expected costs and benefits of
potential legislative measures, with questions specifically designed to reflect the characteristics and
needs of SMEs. It covered key policy areas including simplification of existing rules, digitalisation,
green, social and innovation procurement, as well as measures related to economic security and
strategic autonomy. A detailed summary can be found in Annex 6, Analysis of SMEs participation.
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ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW?
1. Practical implications of the initiative
The revision of the EU public procurement legal framework will streamline and modernise
procurement processes across the EU, benefiting economic operators, contracting authorities,
national authorities, and society as a whole. Businesses are expected to gain from increased
efficiency, clearer rules, and greater access to cross-border tenders, while strategic requirements such
as ecolabels and social criteria may involve some adjustment costs but deliver long-term value.
Public buyers will benefit from simplified procedures, a single consolidated legal framework, and
improved digital procurement platforms, enabling more efficient and transparent tendering. National
authorities and service providers may incur costs in developing and maintaining digital
infrastructures but would benefit from harmonised standards and more effective oversight.
Overall, for the society at large, the initiative is expected to support environmental, social, and
innovation objectives, enhance legal certainty, and strengthen the resilience and efficiency of EU
public procurement, ensuring better value for public investment and increased fairness and
transparency across all stakeholders.
2. Summary of costs and benefits
I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred combination of Options
Description Amount Comments
Direct benefits
Cost reductions due to an
increased use of negotiations
(FLX.2)
€88 million savings annually
(public buyers: cost increase of €85
million, economic operators: cost
reduction of €181 million)
FLX.2 - cost reduction due to the free access to
negotiations267. Actual reduction depends on the
number of bidders (smaller if bidders increase,
larger if decrease).
Cost reductions due to
simplifications (FLX.2)
Not quantified Cost reductions due to e.g.: reuse of documents
(once only principle), possibility for error
corrections (reduced number of terminations due to
errors), reduced administrative burden in case of
emergencies.
Cost reductions due to
further implementation of digital technologies to
improve procurement
processes (MPL.1)
Recurrent administrative cost
savings of around €4 714 per
public buyer and €2 366 per
economic operator due to lower
human resources cost caused by
automation, as well as the use of
the European Business Wallets268.
EU wide total annual saving of
€1 billion.
MPL.1 - economic operators and contracting
authorities will bear no IT implementation,
development, or operation cost. On the contrary,
the preferred policy option is expected to bring
savings to them.
267 Section 6.1, Annex 8. 268 See section 6.4.1.
89
I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred combination of Options
Description Amount Comments
Indirect benefits
Improved EU trade balance
(BEU.2)
Not possible to quantify. The
decline in EU imported inputs in
selected sectors where market
access can become more difficult
will nonetheless improve intra EU
trade, with some Member States
expected to yield a positive trade
balance from the policy measure269.
Overall positive indirect impact through stronger
domestic sourcing, reduced exposure to foreign
supply disruptions, and increased resilience of
supply chains. Short-term effects may vary
regionally. Reduced imports of inputs combined
with increased exports can yield a positive trade
balance. Strengthened domestic sourcing reduces
vulnerability to external geopolitical or market
shocks. Resilience of supply chains
(BEU.2)
Not possible to quantify.
The EU would become less
exposed to future foreign supply
disruptions and input price shocks.
This increased resilience of supply
chains could reduce vulnerability
to external geopolitical or market
shocks, thereby supporting longer-
term economic stability270.
A single public procurement
legal act (FLX.2)
Not possible to quantify.
Improved legal certainty, reduced
complexity, avoid inconsistencies,
and facilitating the prevention of
internal market fragmentation271.
A single legal instrument would allow for a
common framework integrating existing public
procurement provisions in sectorial acts on “how to
buy” and gathering references to existing
requirements on “what do buy”. This could also
close loopholes and achieve better transparency
and fairness across all types of public contracts.
More green, social and
innovation procurement
(ESI.1)
Not possible to quantify.
Improved legal certainty
facilitating the use of
environmental, social and
innovation requirements in public
procurement and some cost savings
(e.g. reducing litigation-related
expenditure and the associated
administrative and time burdens for
both public buyers and economic
operators). EU Ecolabel may
generate cost savings, but it is not
possible to quantify these potential
savings with the available data.
Improve generation and use of
innovative solutions and better
alignment between the tendering
process and innovative solutions
the market can deliver.
Incentivising BPQR will result in the achievement
of strategic policy goals (environmental, social and
innovation)272 and provide long-term value for
public investment. The wider use of EU Ecolabel is
expected to have a positive effect on cross-border
participation. This change would empower public
buyers wishing to do so to prioritise working
conditions with confidence. Easier to ensure
compliance with social and labour obligations,
including human rights.
Enhanced transparency in Enhanced transparency in public Implementation of digital technologies will
269 See section 6.3.2. 270 See section 6.3.2. 271 See section 6.1.2. 272 See section 6.2.1. and annex 4 for technical details.
90
I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred combination of Options
Description Amount Comments
public procurement (MPL.1) procurement platforms will
facilitate the monitoring of public
expenditure. Increased
transparency in this area can
significantly reduce the risk of
corruption, fraud, procurement
irregularities and anti-competitive
practices, such as bid rigging.
Notably, bid rigging can result in
an overcharge of approximately
20% or more in the final contract
price. Consequently, improved
transparency and monitoring can
generate substantial cost savings
for contracting authorities,
ultimately yielding better value for
taxpayers' money.
improve procurement processes through a strong
monitoring and transparency that can improve the
ability to prevent and detect corruption, fraud,
procurement irregularities and anti-competitive
practices like bid rigging. Contracting authorities
are the primary beneficiaries with indirect benefits
to taxpayers through more effective use of public
funds.
II. Overview of costs – Preferred combination of options
Stakeholders
(number)
Businesses - Economic
Operators
Public buyers –
contracting
authorities
National authorities
/ eProcurement
service providers
European
Commission
372 440 46 648 27 MS/ 123
eProcurement
platforms
One-off Recurrent One-off Recurrent One-off Recurrent One-
off
Recurrent
E S
I. 1
Direct adjustment
costs
Direct
administrative
costs- (BPQR)
€ 457
million273
€ 55
million274
Direct
administrative
costs- (Ecolabels)
€ 1.14
million275
€ 12
million276
Direct regulatory
fees and charges
Direct
enforcement
costs
Indirect costs
273 Assumption: BPQR increase by 18.5% of tenders at EU level; see Annex 8 (option ESI) for more details. 274 Idem. 275 Assumption: GPP rises by 18.5% to around 40.5% of all procurement; see Annex 8 (option ESI) for more details. 276 Idem.
91
B E
U .2
Direct
administrative
costs
€ 7.4
million277
€ 7.4
million278
M P
L .1
Direct adjustment
costs (setting up
the digital
marketplace)
€ 18
million279
€ 18
million280
Direct
administrative
costs
Direct regulatory
fees and charges
Direct
enforcement
costs
Indirect costs See Annex 8 for details.
III. Contribution to the administrative burden reduction targets – Preferred option [EUR million]
Administrative costs
[M€]
New recurrent
costs (INs)
(nominal values
per year)
Removed
recurrent costs
(OUTs)
(nominal values
per year)
Net cost (INs
– OUTs)
(nominal values
per year)
New one-off
costs (INs)
(annualised
total net present
value over the
relevant period)
Removed one-
off costs
(OUTs)
(annualised
total net present
value over the
relevant period)
Economic operators
(All businesses)
477
(ESI.BPQR:
457+
ESI.Labels:
12+
BEU: 7.4)
1 047
(FLX:166 +
MPL: 881)
- 570 0.16**
- in which SMEs* 337 -743 -406 0.09***
Contracting authorities
141
(FLX:78+
ESI.BPQR:
55+
BEU:7.4)
220
(MPL: 220) -79
Member States
(Public
administrations)
Citizens
* The costs were calculated as 71% of the costs for all economic operators (the best available approximation for the share of SMEs participating in public procurement), except for the ESI Labels option. In this case, the share stands at 57%, based on the data available at https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/eu-ecolabel-fees-table-2026_en as of 3 March 2026. See Annex 6; **EUR 1.14 million / 7; *** EUR 0.16 million * 57%.
277 Assumption: 10% of procurement subject to European preference. 278 Idem. 279 see Annex 8 (option MPL1) for more details 280 see Annex 8 (option MPL1) for more details
92
Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies. See Annex 6 and 8 for details.
3. Relevant sustainable development goals
IV. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s)
Relevant SDG Expected progress towards the Goal Comments
SDG 9- Industry, innovation
and infrastructure
The preferred policy option is expected to
contribute to target 9.2 Promote inclusive and
sustainable industrialization and 9.b Support
domestic technology development, research and
innovation.
The preferred option is expected to
strengthen EU industrial resilience by
increasing demand for EU products- share
of EU origin of goods procured in selected
sectors. It will also have a positive impact
on the procurement of innovation
solutions.
SDG12-Responsible
production and consumption
The preferred policy option is expected to
contribute to target 12.7 Promote public
procurement practices that are sustainable, in
accordance with national policies and
priorities.
By increasing the uptake of environmental,
social and innovation public procurement,
the preferred policy option will increase
the number the share of procedures (value
and count) that are sustainable.
SDG 8- Decent work and
economic growth
The preferred policy option is expected to
contribute to target 8.3 Promote development-
oriented policies that support productive
activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship,
creativity and innovation, and encourage the
formalization and growth of micro-, small- and
medium-sized enterprises, 8.4 Improve
progressively, global resource efficiency in
consumption and production and 8.8 Protect
labour rights and promote safe and secure
working environments
By increasing the uptake of environmental
and social public procurement, the
preferred policy option will increase the
number the share of procedures (value and
count) that ensure the protection of labour
rights and secure working environment.
The simplification of the procurement
procedures and reduction of costs will
contribute to the growth of micro-, small-
and medium-sized companies.
93
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS
The following analytical methods were applied in this IA:
• Key external studies launched in support of this IA
o Study on SME participation by SILO
- analysing SME participation in the EU public procurement and assessing how
different how different procurement practices across key policy dimensions of public
procurement influence SME participation and success rates.
o Study on competition by the World Bank
- assessing the extent to which the public procurement directives achieved one of the
main objectives – creating the conditions for the opening of public procurement to
competition.
o Study on coherence by Roberto Caranta and Willem Janssen
- analysing the coherence of the public procurement legislation using practical
examples while identifying challenges for the contracting authorities.
o Study on the intellectual property rights (IPR) Christina Wainikka
- reporting on the current state and emerging trends in the allocation of IPR in public
procurement contracts across the EEA and providing qualitative insights into the
potential implications of introducing legal instructions on IPR allocation.
o Study on integration of social and green considerations by Andrea Sundstrand
- analysing to what extent do contracting authorities have difficulties with
Vimplementing SRPP and GPP due to the requirement of the link to the subject
matter and the principle of proportionality and to what extent they have difficulties
using public procurement to promote fair working conditions.
o Study on data by Tünde Tátrai and Isabel da Rosa
- examining the need for possible modifications of the TED Platform and providing
expert advice on development of a holistic data governance model.
o Study on uptake of green public procurement by PwC
- analysing to what extent GPP criteria are currently integrated in the public
procurement, at which stages are GPP requirements applied, what are their impacts
in the contract performance and how is this monitored.
o Study on Labels by Felice Alfieri
- Assessing the uptake of different labels in public procurement procedures,
presenting results of consultations with large contracting authorities and comparing
the requirements of different labels to measure their equivalence.
o Study on the impacts of the MPL options by PwC
- The impacts of MPL options are based on an external study that has been carried out
in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines and Better Regulation Toolbox to
ensure an evidence-based analysis. The following BRT tools were considered for the
quantitative and qualitative analyses of the MPL options, namely Tool #56,
Typology of costs and benefits, was applied to identify and describe the various
types of costs and benefits associated with the policy options. Tool #58, EU
Standard Cost Model, was considered to estimate implementation costs and potential
savings. Tool #63, Cost-benefit analysis, was implemented to evaluate the costs and
benefits related to each policy option. Tool #64, Discount factors, was used to
complement the quantitative analysis and to calculate the net present value (NVP).
94
- Some cost elements, especially those linked to future IT developments, necessarily
rely on assumptions owing to incomplete specifications. Moreover, variations in
national systems and survey coverage restrict cross-country comparability.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the triangulation of multiple evidence sources
provides a robust and balanced analytical basis.
• In-house analysis focusing on:
o descriptive statistics concerning cross-border procurement across key sectors and
countries (to ensure a trend continuation with the most recent study on cross-border
by Prometea281), which are merged with Orbis financial information to have more
detailed info about the winners.
o submissions made by economic operators or groups of economic operators in
accordance with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 and Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2023/1441, merged with Orbis database containing in particular
information on the name, country and type of the Global Ultimate Owners (GUOs) of
the companies mentioned in the FSR submissions.
• Simulation of impacts using FIDELIO model (JRC) - macroeconomic impacts of potential
preferences to goods originating from selected countries used to estimate impacts of BEU
options.
Methodology and results from each of these workstreams are described in more details in the
corresponding sections of this IA.
281 Prometea (2021), Study on the measurement of cross-border penetration in the EU public procurement market, Final
report, European Commission, DG GROW, Brussels, Prometeia SpA, BIP Business Integration Partners – Spa,
Economics for Policy a knowledge Center of Nova School of Business and Economics Lisboa, Publications Office,
March 2021 (https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c7fcd46a-b84d-11eb-8aca-01aa75ed71a1/language-
en#).
95
ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK
Overview of impacts on competitiveness
Dimensions of
Competitiveness
Impact of the
initiative
(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / n.a.)
References to sub-sections of the main report
or annexes
Cost and price
competitiveness
+/0 Positive due to MPL.1 - savings due to the
introduction of digital tools (section 6.4).
Neutral due to BEU.2 - Overall, the impact of
local content requirements is likely to reflect a
combination of positive and negative effects.
Even if the net GDP impact may be ambiguous,
depending on the balance between upstream
expansion in domestic input producing sectors
and potential downstream contraction driven by
higher input costs or reduced competitiveness, it
will nonetheless improve intra EU trade.
(section 6.3 and Annex 4, Options BEU).
International
competitiveness
+ Positive due to BEU.2 – At least some countries
are expected to yield a positive trade balance
from the policy measure, especially for
Germany, and Italy (section 6.3 and Annex 4,
Options BEU).
Capacity to
innovate
++ Strongly positive due to FLX.2/ESI.2 – specific
measures to support the capacity to innovate
such as the new innovation procedure (section
6.1)
SME
competitiveness
+ Positive due to FLX.2 and MPL.1 - measures
reducing the load of documentation to be
presented, facilitating the reuse of technical
documentation, and limited weight of price in
human resource intensive contracts (ESI.2)
(sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.4 and Annex 6).
Most affected sectors282
The analysis focuses on construction works (understood as CPV divisions 45 and 71), which
constitute the largest sectors covered by the Directives, as well as on the manufacturing of
pharmaceuticals, which represents the main component of the third-largest sector (CPV division
33). The relative importance of the sectors in terms of the number of calls for competition is
presented in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Share of calls for competition published in TED by sector in 2023, EEA [%]
Source: In-house analysis
The construction and pharmaceutical sectors also appear among the key sectors when measured
by public procurement value awarded above EU thresholds - over the period 2018–2023,
construction contracts amounted to approximately EUR 528 billion, corresponding to around
25% of 70% of total procurement value covered in the analysis, while pharmaceutical-related
procurement accounted for approximately EUR 104 billion, representing around 5% of the same
total. Their importance for the EU procurement market makes these sectors relevant for assessing
their competitive position.
o Construction sector
282 References to data sources are provided in Annex 5’ Competitiveness check - the most affected sectors.
Public authorities are among the largest clients in the construction sector, procuring works
related to transport networks, schools, hospitals, housing, and other essential infrastructure.
Construction projects typically involve high contract values and long lifecycles, making them a
significant component of public expenditure. At the same time, the sector is often characterised
by complex projects, fragmented supply chains, and a high reliance on subcontracting, which can
create risks related to cost overruns, delays, and quality issues. As a result, even small efficiency
gains in procurement processes can therefore translate into substantial budgetary savings and
influence the quality, durability, and timely delivery of public infrastructure.
The construction sector is one of the largest sectors in the EU economy, with over 4 million
firms and 14 million employees in 2024. The construction sector is characterised by a highly
fragmented market structure dominated by micro-enterprises, which account for more than 94%
of firms. Despite this fragmentation, the sector generates significant economic activity,
contributing 5.6% of EU gross value added (GVA). Economic performance has improved in
recent years, with net turnover reaching EUR 2.32 trillion in 2024, representing a 71% increase
since 2011, and labour productivity rising by 46.6% over the period 2011-2023. Profit margins
have also increased slightly over the same period, with the gross operating rate (GOR) reaching
approximately 47.7% in 2023. Innovation plays a relatively limited role in the sector, with
construction-related R&D expenditure accounting for 0.01% of EU GDP in 2020. Patent activity
in civil engineering technologies remains modest, with 4 397 patent applications filed at the
European Patent Office in 2024, of which 2 602 (around 59%) were submitted by EU-27
applicants. Globally, the EU accounts for around 18% of construction output as of 2023,
although its share has declined due to faster growth in emerging economies, particularly China.
o Manufacturing of pharmaceuticals
Public authorities are among the largest purchasers of pharmaceuticals, what makes procurement
practices in this sector critical for guaranteeing timely access to safe, effective, and affordable
treatments. Moreover, pharmaceutical procurement has a significant impact on public budgets,
therefore more efficient procurement procedure can generate substantial savings especially with
regard to purchases of generic or biosimilar medicines.
The pharmaceutical manufacturing sector is smaller than construction in terms of firms but
significantly more capital-intensive and innovation driven. The sector comprised around 4 100
firms in 2024, employing nearly 700 000 workers, with employment concentrated in large firms
and representing 1.13% of EU27 GVA. The sector has expanded rapidly, with net turnover rising
from EUR 205 billion in 2011 to around €500 billion in 2024, representing an increase of
approximately 139%, and labour productivity nearly doubling over the same period. Profit
margins are also considerably high, with the GOR reaching nearly 75% in 2023, indicating very
strong operating profitability. Innovation also plays a role, with 8 359 pharmaceutical patent
applications filed at the European Patent Office in 2024, of which 31% (2 589) originated from
EU27 companies. Globally, the EU remains a major pharmaceutical producer and the leading
exporter, accounting for 22.2% of global output and 7.42% of global exports in 2023.
Synthetic assessment
The assessment of EU public procurement reforms highlights mixed but largely positive impacts
across key areas. Cost and price competitiveness is neutral overall, as digital tools (e.g., under
MPL.1) reduce administrative costs, while local content requirements (BEU.2) present trade-
offs-potentially boosting upstream domestic sectors but risking higher input costs for
downstream industries. Despite ambiguous GDP effects, intra-EU trade may improve.
international competitiveness is positive, with countries like Germany and Italy expected to gain
a trade surplus from these measures.
Innovation capacity sees a strongly positive outlook (FLX.2/ESI.2), driven by changes like the
new innovation procedure. SME competitiveness also benefits from reduced documentation
burdens, reusable technical files, and limited pricing weight in labour-intensive contracts
(FLX.2/ESI.2/MPL.1).
ANNEX 5’ COMPETITIVENESS CHECK - THE MOST AFFECTED SECTORS
Table 17: Share of calls for competition by sector by year, EEA in 2018-2023 [%]
Sector 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 Petroleum products, fuel, electricity and other sources of energy (CPV division 09)
3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 3%
Food, beverages, tobacco and related products (CPV division 15)
2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2%
Agricultural machinery (CPV division 16)
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Office and computing machinery, equipment and supplies except furniture and software packages (CPV division 30)
3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Electrical machinery, apparatus, equipment and consumables; lighting (CPV division 31)
1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Radio, television, communication, telecommunication and related equipment (CPV division 32)
1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Medical equipments, pharmaceuticals and personal care products (CPV division 33)
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Transport equipment and auxiliary products to transportation (CPV division 34)
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Laboratory, optical and precision equipments (excl. glasses) (CPV division 38)
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Furniture (incl. office furniture), furnishings, domestic appliances (excl. lighting) and cleaning products (CPV division 39)
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Collected and purified water (CPV division 41)
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Industrial machinery (CPV division 42) 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% Construction structures and materials; auxiliary products to construction (except electric apparatus) (CPV division 44)
2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2%
Construction work (CPV division 45) 16% 16% 16% 17% 16% 16% Software package and information systems (CPV division 48)
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Repair and maintenance services (CPV division 50)
5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4%
Hotel, restaurant and retail trade services (CPV division 55)
1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Transport services (excl. Waste transport) (CPV division 60)
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Supporting and auxiliary transport services; travel agencies services (CPV division 63)
1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Financial and insurance services (CPV division 66)
3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Architectural, construction, engineering and inspection services (CPV division 71)
10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 9%
IT services: consulting, software development, Internet and support (CPV division 72)
4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3%
Administration, defence and social security services (CPV division 75)
0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1%
Agricultural, forestry, horticultural, aquacultural and apicultural services (CPV division 77)
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Business services: law, marketing, consulting, recruitment, printing and security (CPV division 79)
5% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6%
Health and social work services (CPV division 85)
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Sewage, refuse, cleaning and environmental services (CPV division 90)
7% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7%
Other 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% Source: in-house analysis.
Competitive position of the most affected sectors
o Construction sector
Key facts:over 4 million firms in 2024; 94% of firms are micro-enterprises; over 14 million
employees in 2024; 5.6% of EU GVA in 2024; GOR 47.7% in 2023; net turnover EUR 2.3
trillion in 2024; labour productivity EUR 52 232 per employee in 2023; 71% increase in net
turnover from 2011-2024; 46.6% increase in labour productivity since 2011-2023; 77% of sector
turnover generated by Micro firms and SMEs in 2024; Global output share 18% in 2023; Global
export share 2.25% in 2024; R&D expenditure 0.01% of EU GDP in 2020; 2 602 civil-
engineering patent applications filed by EU-27 applicants at the European Patent Office in 2024
(59% of total).
Market Structure: In terms of the number of firms in the EU, the construction sector is the third
highest among NACE 1 EU sectors, reaching 4 043 781 firms in 2024. This sector has increased
significantly with 33.66% compared to 2011, when the number of construction firms was
estimated at 3 025 382283 (see the figure below). The sector is also the sixth largest employer
among NACE 1 sectors, employing 14 019 195 workers in 2024. Employment has grown
steadily since 2011, increasing by 19% from 11 775 524 workers284.
Finally, the average number of employees in Hight Growth Enterprises (HGEs) in the sector was
9.4 in 2023, representing a decrease of around 0.4 employees compared with 2021 levels285.
Figure 5: Number of firms in NACE 1 industries in EU27 (2011-2024)
Source: Eurostat
The construction sector is dominated by micro-enterprises (0-9 employees), which is expected
from the construction industry, as it has relatively low entry barriers and a project base nature.
Out of 3 025 382 firms recorded in 2011, approximately 94.3% (around 2.85 million) were
micro-enterprises. Small enterprises (10 to 49 employees) comprised about 5.2% (approximately
157 320 firms), while medium-sized enterprises accounted for roughly 0.5% (around 15 127
firms), putting the total number of SMEs at about 5.7% (around 162 447 firms). Large
companies constituted only about 0.05% of all firms (approximately 1 513 enterprises)286.
In terms of economic contribution, the construction sector accounted for 5.6% of total EU gross
value added (GVA) in 2024, ranked as the 7th industry (see the figure below). The sector
283 Eurostat. Enterprise statistics by size class and NACE Rev. 2 activity (Dataset sbs_sc_ovw). DOI:
10.2908/sbs_sc_ovw 284 Ibid. 285 Eurostat. High growth enterprises and related employment by NACE Rev. 2 activity (Dataset bd_hg). DOI:
10.2908/bd_hg 286 Eurostat. Enterprise statistics by size class and NACE Rev. 2 activity (Dataset sbs_sc_ovw). DOI:
10.2908/sbs_sc_ovw
experienced a small contraction during the period 2010–2015, but value added has increased
since 2015 and currently remains slightly below its 2010 share287.
Figure 6: Industry share in EU-27 gross value added in 2024 [%]
Source: Eurostat
Productivity and profitability of the sector: In 2024, the net turnover of the sector was EUR 2.32
trillion, making it the 7th largest NACE 1 sector by net turnover. The sector has expanded
dramatically since 2011 where the original value was EUR 1.36 trillion, increasing by 71%.
Investigating further, the distribution of net turnover in the EU construction sector by firm size
(see the figure overleaf) reveals the following picture, 33% of the turnover is generated by micro
business, small business generate 26.5% of the net turnover, while Medium enterprises generate
17.5% and large enterprises generate close to quarter (23%) of sector turnover. In total Micro
firms and SMEs are responsible for 77% of sector turnover, which show that the construction
sector is highly SME driven. Large companies play a significant role, most likely in large
complex projects, but do not dominate the sector288.
287 Eurostat. EU inter-country use table at basic prices (Datasets: naio_10_fcp_u4, naio_10_fcp_u3, naio_10_fcp_u2,
naio_10_fcp_u1). DOI: 10.2908/sbs_na_sca_r2 288 Eurostat. Enterprise statistics by size class and NACE Rev. 2 activity (from 2021 onwards) (Dataset
sbs_sc_ovw). DOI: 10.2908/sbs_sc_ovw
Figure 7: Net turnover by firm size 2024 [% share of total]
Source: Eurostat
Looking at operating profit margins, which can be approximated by the Gross Operating Rate
(GOR), an indicator of sectoral profitability before depreciation, interest and taxes, around EUR
47.7 of operating surplus is generated for every EUR 100 of value added in the EU construction
sector. Profitability has increased by 7.95% since 2011 (see the figure below). Over the same
period, profitability rose by 5.29% in China, 12.46% in the United States, and around 73% in
Japan, suggesting stronger profitability growth in some major international construction
markets289, 290.
Figure 8: Gross Operating Rates (GOR) construction sector 2011-2024
Source: Eurostat
289 Eurostat. Annual enterprise statistics for special aggregates of NACE Rev.2 activities (2005-2020)
(Dataset sbs_na_sca_r2). DOI: 10.2908/sbs_na_sca_r2 290 Eurostat. Enterprise statistics by size class and NACE Rev. 2 activity (from 2021 onwards) (Dataset
sbs_sc_ovw). DOI: 10.2908/sbs_sc_ovw
Labour productivity per employee in the EU construction sector has increased over the past
decade. It rose from EUR 35 629 per employee in 2011 to EUR 52 232 in 2023, representing an
overall increase of 46.6%. Rise of productivity experienced a slight decline in 2020, likely due to
COVID-19 pandemic, but has recovered steadily since, reaching in 2023 the highest level in the
observed period (EUR 52 232 per employee)291.
Zooming into productivity per employee by firm size, micro-enterprises account for only 13.56%
of the total value added generated per worker across the sector (productivity contribution), small
enterprises account for 37.28% of productivity contribution, while medium and large companies
account for 22% and 27.1% of productivity contribution (see the figure below)292.
We can see that labour productivity varies significantly by firm size. Interestingly, smaller
enterprises account for the largest share of productivity in the construction sector, followed by
large and medium size enterprises. This implies that the majority of value creation is
concentrated among firms with greater organization and technical capacity, even if the sector is
dominated by micro-enterprises.
Figure 9: Labour productivity per employee by firm size 2023 [% share of the total]
Source: Eurostat
Innovation in the sector: Business enterprise expenditure on research and development (BERD)
in the EU construction sector remains very limited, amounting to approximately 0.01% of EU
GDP in 2020, with no significant change observed since 2015. This is substantially lower than in
manufacturing, where R&D expenditure accounts for around 0.94% of EU GDP293. Overall, the
EU spent approximately 1.5% of GDP on business R&D in 2020. Traditionally, the majority of
291 Eurostat. Enterprise statistics by size class and NACE Rev. 2 activity (Dataset sbs_sc_ovw). DOI:
10.2908/sbs_sc_ovw 292 Ibid. 293 Eurostat, BERD by NACE Rev. 2 activity (dataset: rd_e_berdindr2). DOI: 10.2908/rd_e_berdindr2
business R&D expenditure is concentrated in the manufacturing sector, which accounts for the
largest share of private-sector research and development activities.
Patent applications in civil engineering technologies can be used as an indicator for innovation in
the construction sector, as they capture technological developments related to building
techniques and infrastructure. In 2024, EU27 applicants filed 2 602 civil engineering patent
applications at the European Patent Office (EPO), representing 59% of the total 4 397
applications in this technological field. Furthermore, civil engineering patents account for around
4%294 of all patent applications filed by EU27 countries in 2024295, suggesting a notable level of
innovation in construction-related technologies.
International position of the sector: the EU construction sector currently accounts for
approximately 18% of global construction output in 2023. Although this share remains
substantial, it has declined by around 5.57 percentage point decrease since 2010, reflecting faster
construction growth in emerging economies, particularly in Asia. However, recent data indicate a
modest recovery in the EU’s global position, with its share increasing by 3.85 percentage points
relative to the 2015296, 297, 298, 299.
As the EU’s share of global construction declined from 23.7% in 2010, China’s share increased
rapidly, reaching 23.18% in 2014 and exceeding 27% in subsequent years. This suggests that the
EU’s relative decline partly reflects the rapid expansion of construction activity in China (see the
figure below). After 2015, the EU share stabilised and gradually recovered from 15.9% to 18.1%
by 2023, while the United States shows a steady increase and Japan a continuous decline over
the period300.
294 Total number of patents applied for by EU27 countries in 2024 is 199 264. 295 European Patent Office (https://www.epo.org/en/about-us/statistics/statistics-centre) 296 Eurostat, EU inter-country supply table at basic prices, industry by industry (dataset: naio_10_fcp_s4 ) DOI:
10.2908/naio_10_fcp_s4 297 Eurostat, EU inter-country supply table at basic prices, industry by industry (dataset: naio_10_fcp_s3 ) DOI:
10.2908/naio_10_fcp_s3 298 Eurostat, EU inter-country supply table at basic prices, industry by industry (dataset: naio_10_fcp_s2 ) DOI:
10.2908/naio_10_fcp_s2 299 Eurostat, EU inter-country supply table at basic prices, industry by industry (dataset: naio_10_fcp_s1 ) DOI:
10.2908/naio_10_fcp_s1 300 Ibid.
Figure 10: Country share in global construction output, 2010-2023 [%]
Source: Eurostat
Looking at the EU’s position in global construction exports, the EU maintains a relatively stable
but slightly declining share over the period 2011–2024. The EU share decreased from 2.62% in
2011 to around 2.25% in 2024, representing a moderate decline of about 14% over the period.
By contrast, China’s share increased significantly, rising from 1.9% in 2011 to nearly 3% in
2024, and surpassing the EU from 2016 onwards, reflecting the growing international presence
of Chinese construction firms. This expansion coincides with the relative decline in the EU’s
share of global construction exports. The United States also experienced a modest decline over
the period, falling by around 14% from its initial level (see the figure below)301, 302, 303, 304.
301 Eurostat, EU inter-country input-output table at basic prices, industry by industry, (dataset: naio_10_fcp_ii4 )
DOI: 10.2908/naio_10_fcp_ii4 302 Eurostat, EU inter-country input-output table at basic prices, industry by industry, (dataset: naio_10_fcp_ii3 )
DOI: 10.2908/naio_10_fcp_ii3 303 Eurostat, EU inter-country input-output table at basic prices, industry by industry, (dataset: naio_10_fcp_ii2 )
DOI: 10.2908/naio_10_fcp_ii2 304 Eurostat, EU inter-country input-output table at basic prices, industry by industry, (dataset: naio_10_fcp_ii1 )
DOI: 10.2908/naio_10_fcp_ii1
Figure 11: Country share in global construction exports 2011-2024 [%]
Source: Eurostat
o Pharmaceutical sector
Key facts: 4 100 firms in 2024; 700 000 employees in 2024; 1.13% of EU GVA in 2023; GOR
75% in 2023; net turnover around EUR 500 billion in 2024; labour productivity EUR 290 875
per employee in 2023; 139% increase in sector turnover 2011-2024; labour productivity
increased by about 96% between 2012 and 2023; 8 359 pharmaceutical patent applications filed
at the European Patent Office in 2024 (31% from EU-27 applicants); 4% of all EU patent
applications; pharmaceutical R&D expenditure EUR 52.4 billion in Europe (EU27+ other
countries) in 2023; EU accounts for 22.2% of global pharmaceutical manufacturing output in
2023; EU share of global pharmaceutical exports 7.42% in 2023 (up from 5.13% in 2010).
Market Structure: in 2024, the pharmaceutical manufacturing sector in the EU27305 comprised 4
100 firms, representing a notable increase from 3 659 firms in 2010, or approximately 12%
growth over the period. A closer examination of the firm-size distribution shows that 37% of
firms are small enterprises, 33% are medium-sized enterprises, and around 29% are large
enterprises306.
Employment in the sector increased even more substantially over the same period, rising from
498 127 employees in 2012 to 694 420 in 2024, representing an increase of approximately 39%.
305 In this analysis we use C21 Manufacturing of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
sector as an indicator of the pharmaceutical industry in the EU. 306 Eurostat. Enterprise statistics by size class and NACE Rev. 2 activity (Dataset sbs_sc_ovw). DOI:
10.2908/sbs_sc_ovw
Examining how employment is distributed across firm sizes reveals a strong concentration in
large firms. As illustrated in the figure below, 87% of employees work in large companies, while
10% are employed in medium-sized firms and only 3% in small or micro enterprises307. This
distribution indicates that while firms are relatively evenly spread across size classes,
employment is highly concentrated in large pharmaceutical companies, reflecting the capital- and
R&D-intensive nature of the sector.
Finally, the average number of employees per high-growth enterprise (HGE) in EU
pharmaceutical manufacturing declined from approximately 12.9 employees in 2021 to about
10.9 in 2023308. This suggests that high-growth firms in the sector tend to be relatively small
enterprises expanding from the minimum size threshold.
Figure 12: Employment share by firm size, 2024 [%]
Source: Eurostat
In terms of economic contribution, the share of pharmaceutical manufacturing in total EU Gross
Value Added (GVA) increased significantly between 2010 and 2023. Over this period, the
sector’s contribution to EU GVA rose by approximately 26.18%, reaching around 1.13% of total
EU GVA, indicating the growing economic importance of pharmaceutical production within the
EU economy. As shown in the figure below, the EU recorded the strongest long-term increase in
the sector’s share of GVA among major economies. By contrast, Japan saw a substantial decline
(−20.35%) and China a smaller decline (−10.2%), while the United States recorded a more
modest increase of +9.81% over the same period309, 310.
307 Idem. 308 Eurostat. High growth enterprises and related employment by NACE Rev. 2 activity (Dataset bd_hg). DOI:
10.2908/bd_hg 309 Eurostat. Annual enterprise statistics for special aggregates of NACE Rev.2 activities (2005-2020) (Dataset
sbs_na_sca_r2). DOI: 10.2908/sbs_na_sca_r2
Figure 13: Share in National Gross Value Added of C21 industry, 2010-2023 [%]
Source: Eurostat
Productivity and profitability of the sector: net turnover in EU pharmaceutical manufacturing
increased from approximately EUR 205 billion in 2011 to around EUR 500 billion in 2024 (see
the figure below), representing a sharp increase of nearly 139%, which reflects the strong
expansion of the sector over the period. The manufacturing sector has experienced substantial
expansion over the period, reflecting growing demand and increasing market value of
pharmaceutical products311.
310 Eurostat. Enterprise statistics by size class and NACE Rev. 2 activity (from 2021 onwards) (Dataset
sbs_sc_ovw). DOI: 10.2908/sbs_sc_ovw 311 Eurostat. Enterprise statistics by size class and NACE Rev. 2 activity (Dataset sbs_sc_ovw). DOI:
10.2908/sbs_sc_ovw
Figure 14: Net turnover of C21 industry, 2011-2024 [million EUR]
Source: Eurostat
Looking at operating profit margins (see the figure below), which can be approximated by the
Gross Operating Rate (GOR), an indicator of sectoral profitability before depreciation, interest
and taxes, around EUR 74.9 of operating surplus is generated for every EUR 100 of value added
in the EU pharmaceutical sector in 2023. This represents a very high operating profit margin,
which has increased moderately by about 9% between 2010 and 2023, suggesting that the sector
has maintained strong profitability alongside its expansion in turnover and value added312.
Figure 15: Gross Operating Rates of C21 industry, 2010-2023
Source: Eurostat
312 GROSS OPERATING RATES (GOS) – PROFIT, source not provided!
Lastly, looking at labour productivity in EU pharmaceutical manufacturing has increased
substantially over the period analysed. Between 2012 and 2023, productivity per employee rose
from approximately EUR 146 783 to EUR 290 875, representing a sharp increase of about 96%.
This indicates that the sector has significantly improved its ability to generate economic value
per worker. This suggests a particularly strong rise in output or value added relative to
employment313. The increase also likely reflects the high value-added nature of pharmaceutical
products, where an increase in patented medicines and specialised biologics generate significant
economic value relative to the size of the workforce.
Innovation in the sector: in 2024, the total number of pharmaceutical patent applications filed
with the European Patent Office (EPO) reached 8 359, of which 31% (2 589 applications) were
submitted by EU27 companies. This represents an increase of 3 percentage points compared to
2023, when EU applicants accounted for 28% of pharmaceutical patent filings at the EPO.
Pharmaceutical patents account for around 4% of all EU-27 patent applications and represent the
eighth largest technological field in terms of total patent filings at the EPO314. Within this field,
several EU27 countries rank among the most active applicants at EPO, with Germany, France,
the Netherlands, and Spain appearing in the top ten countries by number of pharmaceutical
patent applications. This suggests a very notable level of innovation in the pharmaceutical
industry.
It should be noted that the R&D expenditure figures in this paragraph refer to EFPIA member
countries rather than the EU-27 alone as the data comes from EFPIA , covering the EU-27 as
well as Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and the United Kingdom (and Serbia and Turkey). In 2023
Europe has spent EUR 52.4 billion on pharmaceutical R&D in comparison to EUR 38.64 billion
euro spent in 2020, which represents around a 35.6% increase over the period. Over the same
period US pharmaceutical R&D expenditure has slightly decreased by −1.4%315.
International position of the sector: the EU’s share of global output in basic pharmaceutical
products and pharmaceutical preparations remains high at 22.2% in 2023 (see the figure below).
However, it has declined slightly since 2020, when the EU accounted for 22.5% of global output.
Over the longer period, the EU share decreased by around 7% compared with 2010, when it
stood at 23.9%. Part of this development can be attributed to the expansion of pharmaceutical
manufacturing in China, whose global output share increased to 22.9% in 2023, placing it close
to the EU. Over the same period, the United States’ share fluctuated but stabilised at around 21%
by 2023. EU, China and the USA hold comparable shares of global pharmaceutical output316, 317, 318, 319.
313 Eurostat, Annual enterprise statistics by size class for special aggregates of NACE Rev.2 activities (Dataset
sbs_sc_sca_r2). DOI: 10.2908/sbs_sc_sca_r2 314 European Patent Office (https://www.epo.org/en/about-us/statistics/statistics-centre ) 315 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA). (2025). The Pharmaceutical
Industry in Figures 2025. Brussels: EFPIA. 316 Eurostat, EU inter-country supply table at basic prices, industry by industry (dataset: naio_10_fcp_s4 ) DOI:
10.2908/naio_10_fcp_s4
Figure 16: Country share in global pharmaceutical output (%) 2010-2023
Source: Eurostat
The EU’s share of global exports of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical
preparations has increased significantly over the period 2010-2023, rising from 5.13% to 7.42%,
which corresponds to an increase of approximately 44.6% compared to the beginning of the
timeline. Despite a small decline in most recent years, the EU remains the largest exporter
among major economies considered320, 321, 322, 323.
Over the same period (see the figure below), the US share fluctuated between roughly 3% and
4.5%, reaching 4.24% in 2023, while China’s share remained considerably lower, increasing
from 1.14% to around 1.48% in 2023. Overall, the data shows that the EU has kept and even
extended its lead as a leading global pharmaceutical exported over China and the US324.
317 Eurostat, EU inter-country supply table at basic prices, industry by industry (dataset: naio_10_fcp_s3 ) DOI:
10.2908/naio_10_fcp_s3 318 Eurostat, EU inter-country supply table at basic prices, industry by industry (dataset: naio_10_fcp_s2 ) DOI:
10.2908/naio_10_fcp_s2 319 Eurostat, EU inter-country supply table at basic prices, industry by industry (dataset: naio_10_fcp_s1 ) DOI:
10.2908/naio_10_fcp_s1 320 Eurostat, EU inter-country input-output table at basic prices, industry by industry, (dataset: naio_10_fcp_ii4 )
DOI: 10.2908/naio_10_fcp_ii4 321 Eurostat, EU inter-country input-output table at basic prices, industry by industry, (dataset: naio_10_fcp_ii3 )
DOI: 10.2908/naio_10_fcp_ii3 322 Eurostat, EU inter-country input-output table at basic prices, industry by industry, (dataset: naio_10_fcp_ii2 )
DOI: 10.2908/naio_10_fcp_ii2 323 Eurostat, EU inter-country input-output table at basic prices, industry by industry, (dataset: naio_10_fcp_ii1 )
DOI: 10.2908/naio_10_fcp_ii1 324 Ibid.
Figure 17: Country share in global pharmaceutical exports, 2011-2024 [%]
Source: Eurostat
ANNEX 6: SME CHECK
Overview of impacts on SMEs325
Relevance for SMEs
The initiative was considered relevant for SMEs by the SME Filter and the interservice group
(ISG)326.
(1) IDENTIFICATION OF AFFECTED BUSINESSES AND ASSESSMENT OF RELEVANCE
Are SMEs directly affected? In which sectors?
Yes, SMEs are directly affected. Public procurement is a significant market for SMEs as direct
contractors and subcontractors. SME shares of awarded contracts vary by sector: agriculture
(83.5%), laboratory/optical/precision equipment (70.2%), office and computing
machinery/equipment/supplies (68.8%), construction (63.5%), transport and food (66.2%
each). SME shares are lower in IT services (51.5%), health and social work services (45%),
and capital-intensive or infrastructure-based sectors such as public utilities (34.7%), petroleum
products and energy (33.7%), collected and purified water (32.8%), postal/telecom (28.6%),
and financial and insurance services (17.9%). For more details, see SILO 2026327.
Estimated number of directly affected SMEs
In 2023, approximately 1.5% of SMEs obtained at least one public procurement contract at
EU level (SILO, 2026)328, corresponding to around 390 thousand SMEs out of 25.8 million
SMEs in the EU-27329. However, the initiative is relevant not only for SMEs that win
contracts, but also for SMEs participating as bidders in public procurement procedures. In
2017–2024, SMEs won 71% of above-threshold contracts, representing 55% of total value
published on TED330.
Estimated number of employees in directly affected SMEs
In 2023, SMEs winning public contracts accounted for around 2% of total SME employment,
corresponding to approximately 1.8 million employees out of 88.7 million people employed
by SMEs in EU non-financial business sector. Participation varies considerably across
Member States and sectors (SILO, 2026)331.
Are SMEs indirectly affected? In which sectors? What is the estimated number of
indirectly affected SMEs and employees?
Yes, SMEs indirectly affected. Given that public procurement represents around 15% of EU
325 For more detailed information, please see in Annex 11. 326 https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/63274 327 SILO (2026), SME Participation …, p. 33. 328 Idem, p. 40. 329 In-house analysis and Annual Report on European SMEs 2023/2024
(https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC138678) , p. 2. 330 Ecorys (2025), Cost-benefit analysis …, p. 16. 331 SILO (2026), SME Participation…, p. 42.
GDP, indirect effects may extend to several million SMEs and a sizeable share of SME
employment in procurement-related markets through subcontracting and wider value chain
participation, particularly across construction, infrastructure, ICT and service markets.
(2) CONSULTATION OF SME STAKEHOLDERS
How has the input from the SME community been taken into consideration?
SME feedback has been considered to the maximum extent possible throughout the
consultation process. Their feedback was collected via the Open Public Consultation, Call for
Evidence, SME Panel consultation, a meeting with the SME Envoy Network, and bilateral
meetings.
Are SMEs’ views different from those of large businesses?
Yes and no, depending on the issue in question. The Open Public Consultation shows that
SMEs and large companies generally agree on the overall objectives of the new public
procurement framework, but differ in their priorities, intensity of support, and expected
impacts, particularly in relation to simplification, digitalisation, and green, social, and
innovation procurement.
3) ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON SMES
What are the estimated direct costs for SMEs of the preferred policy option?
Qualitative assessment332
Award criteria: Limiting the dominance of price in award decisions generally increases SME
access, though effects differ by sector. The use of the lowest-price criterion increases the
probability that a contract is awarded to an SME in LSLI activities. On the contrary, in non-
LSLI activities it is associated with a reduction in SME award probabilities. Sustainability and
innovation award criteria do not affect SME access uniformly and appear especially
challenging for SMEs in LSLI activities.
Subcontracting: In non-LSLI activities, contracts that are likely to be subcontracted tend to
increase SMEs’ chances of winning. In contrast, in LSLI sectors, subcontracting is associated
with a slight decrease in the likelihood that SMEs secure the contract.
Division of contracts into lots: Dividing contracts into lots is consistently associated with
higher SME participation in LSLI activities, while it has little or no impact in non-LSLI
sectors.
Quantitative assessment
Strategic procurement - use of lowest-price criterion: The results of the quantitative
assessment indicate that the effects of price-based versus quality-based criteria are sector-
332 Entire section based on SILO (2026), SME Participation…. (publication pending).
specific and closely linked to underlying cost structures and delivery models.
Strategic procurement - mandatory non-price criteria with comply or explain (≤30%
price weight): The findings suggest that strengthening non-price criteria can be associated
with improved SME access in both LSLI and non-LSLI sectors.
Social procurement - cap price criteria for labour-intensive services (≤50% Price
weight): Limiting the weight of the price criterion to below 50% is associated with higher
SME award probabilities in both LSLI and non-LSLI sectors.
Inclusion of environmental (green) award criteria: The results suggest that environmental
criteria have limited effects in non-LSLI activities, while in LSLI their introduction is
associated with a more pronounced reduction in SME award probabilities.
Inclusion of social award criteria: The inclusion of social award criteria is associated with
lower SME award probabilities in both sectors, with a stronger effect in labour-intensive
activities.
Procurement of innovative solutions: The effects of innovation-oriented procurement
instruments on SME access are strongly sector-dependent, with particularly strong negative
associations for SMEs in labour-intensive sectors when innovation requirements are applied at
the award stage.
Subcontracting (social procurement) – prohibition of 100% subcontracting and
mandatory transparency: The findings indicate that subcontracting plays different roles
across sectoral contexts: it is associated with improved SME access in non-LSLI sectors,
while in labour-intensive sectors it is linked to a modest reduction in the likelihood of SMEs
acting as main contractors.
Division of contracts into lots: Dividing contracts into lots is associated with a substantial
improvement in SMEs’ access in LSLI sectors, while it makes virtually no difference in non-
LSLI sectors.
What are the estimated direct benefits/cost savings for SMEs of the preferred policy
option333?
Qualitative assessment
Costs and benefits are analysed jointly in the above part of section 3, as they are often closely
interlinked: measures that reduce costs for SMEs may simultaneously generate efficiency
gains or improved market access. For clarity, the analysis distinguishes quantitative and
qualitative impacts.
Quantitative assessment
As above.
333 The direct benefits for SMEs can also be cost savings.
What are the indirect impacts of this initiative on SMEs?
Overall, the revision of the Public Procurement Directives is expected to generate positive
indirect impacts on SMEs, in terms of reduction of administrative burdens and higher SME
participation in public procurement.
The revision may also enable SMEs to shift resources away from time-consuming
administrative formalities and compliance obligations, allowing them to focus on the
preparation of higher-quality tenders. This reallocation could enhance their competitiveness
and improve their chances of winning contracts, effectively transforming compliance effort
into strategic business development and value creation.
Finally, clearer, more proportionate and transparent procedures are likely to strengthen trust of
economic operators, particularly SMEs, in public authorities.
(4) MINIMISING NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON SMES
Are SMEs disproportionately affected compared to large companies? If yes, are there
any specific subgroups of SMEs more exposed than others?
We consider that SMEs are not disproportionately affected by the initiative compared to large
companies for the reasons explained below.
Have mitigating measures been included in the preferred option/proposal? Yes
The preferred policy option has been designed with SMEs in mind. While certain measures,
such as those aiming to incentivise green, social and innovation-related considerations, may
entail additional compliance efforts, they were designed in a way to provide public buyers
with enough flexibility to adapt to the market. The initiative also includes further elements
aimed at facilitating SME participation. For instance, the introduction of a single-entry point
to participate in public procurement procedures across the EU, together with the application
of the “once-only” principle, is expected to reduce administrative burdens on economic
operators, especially SMEs. In addition, the dynamic procedure aims to remove important
barriers to SME participation, notably by simplifying selection requirements and reducing
administrative steps in the procurement process.
The preferred policy option in the proposal has been designed with SMEs in mind. For
example, using a single-entry point to participate in all public procurement procedures across
EU, together with reduced reporting burden (once only principle), will facilitate SMEs
participation. In addition, the dynamic procedure will remove important barriers for SME
participation such as selection criteria and burdensome administrative procedure
CONTRIBUTION TO THE 35% BURDEN REDUCTION TARGET FOR SMES
Are there any administrative cost savings relevant for the 35% burden reduction target
for SMEs?
Savings in administrative costs (annualised present value) :334
Administrative cost reductions due to:
Flexibility and simplification (FLX.2): EUR 166 * 71% SMEs335 = EUR 118 million.
Further implementation of digital technologies to improve procurement processes (MPL.1):
EUR 881 million * 71% of contracts won by SMEs = EUR 626 million.
New administrative costs (annualised present value):
BPQR recurrent administrative costs: EUR 457` million * 71% of contracts won by SMEs =
325 million.
EU Ecolabel recurrent administrative costs: EUR 12 million * 57% of Ecolabel licence
holders are SMEs336 = EUR 7 million.
EU Ecolabel one-off administrative costs: EUR 1.14 million * 57% of Ecolabel licence
holders are SMEs = EUR 0.6 million.
BEU recurrent administrative costs: EUR 7.4 million * 71% of contracts won by SMEs =
EUR 5 million.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
n.a.
334 See Annex 8 for details. 335 The best approximate for the share of SMEs participating in public procurement. 336 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/eu-ecolabel-fees-table-2026_en situation as of 3 March 2026.
Analysis of SMEs participation
In the SME consultation, SMEs further highlight their concerns: only 54.6% of respondents
perceive benefits from allowing contracting authorities to reward companies with collective
agreements in place, with a relatively high share expressing uncertainty. Additionally, nearly half
(49.1%) anticipate a rise in costs from such a requirement, underscoring the practical burdens it
would impose on smaller businesses
Public procurement represents a potentially significant market for SMEs, both as direct
contractors and indirectly, for example as subcontractors. SME participation in public
procurement varies significantly across sectors. SME shares are particularly high in activities
that tend to involve relatively standardised outputs and a strong local or regional dimension. This
is especially visible in agricultural and related services, where SMEs win more than four out of
five contracts (83.5%). SME shares are also very high in several specialised and more
knowledge-intensive sectors, including laboratory, optical and precision equipment (70.2%) and
office and computing machinery, equipment and supplies (68.8%), suggesting that SMEs are
frequently successful in awards that require technical capabilities. More details on the rate of
contracts awarded to SMEs are provided in the study by SILO (2026)337.
In core public procurement sectors, such as construction works, SMEs win 63.5% of the
contracts awarded. Similarly, SME shares are high in transport services (66.2%) and in food
(66.2%). By contrast, SME shares are lower in IT services (51.5%) as well as in health and social
work services (45%).
In addition, SME shares are much lower in sectors linked to capital-intensive or infrastructure-
based markets. SMEs win 17.9% of contracts in financial and insurance services, 28.6% in postal
and telecommunications services, 32.8% in collected and purified water, 33.7% in petroleum
products and energy, and 34.7% in public utilities. These are areas where scale, regulation, or
infrastructure constraints often make it harder for smaller suppliers
Given that public procurement represents around 15% of EU GDP and that subcontracting is
particularly prevalent in construction, infrastructure, ICT and service contracts, indirect effects
may extend to several million SMEs and a sizeable share of SME employment in procurement-
related markets.
Beyond subcontracting, many SMEs also participate as suppliers within wider value chains and
supply networks, providing intermediate goods, specialised services, components and inputs to
main contractors. The initiative is therefore likely to have broad ripple effects across SME value
chains, beyond direct contract holders.
o Consultation of SME stakeholders
SMEs’ feedback has been taken into account to the maximum extent possible throughout the
consultation process. Input received from SME representatives, business associations and
337 SILO (2026), SME Participation …..
individual companies was carefully analysed and, wherever possible, reflected in the impact
assessment and policy design. Concretely, SME feedback was mainly collected via the Open
Public Consultation (see Annex 2 and 9), Call for Evidence, SME Panel consultation (See Annex
6, Analysis of SMEs participation for a summary), a meeting with the SME Envoy Network, and
bilateral meetings with SMEs and representative organisations.
Particular attention was given to concerns frequently raised by SMEs, such as administrative
burden, proportionality of selection criteria, division into lots, and the use of digital tools. Where
feasible and consistent with broader policy objectives, proposals have been adjusted to address
these issues, with a view to improving SME participation, simplifying procedures, and ensuring a
more level playing field in public procurement markets.
o Open public consultation – Main findings
The findings of the open public consultation generally show SMEs’ support for moving beyond
lowest-price criterion toward approaches incentivising quality and broader non-price criteria.
As to the European preference, EU SMEs strongly favour prioritising European goods and
services in the public procurement process, especially through greater use of non-price criteria,
while emphasising the need to avoid additional administrative burden.
Regarding to procedures and procurement practices, SMEs highlighted simplifying rules for
forming consortia and introducing EU-level targets for SME participation as key measures to
improve SME access. There was somewhat less support for encouraging the division of contracts
into lots. Additional priorities included increasing flexibility for contract modifications,
facilitating dialogue with the market, and enabling the re-use of bidder documentation (once-
only principle), and interconnection of existing Member States’ eProcurement services. Faster
payments to contractors were identified as the measure with the greatest potential to improve
implementation and contract management, while direct payments to subcontractors, increased
pre-financing, and clearer rules for the post-award phase received more moderate support.
On sustainability, SMEs support incentivising green public procurement through a clear legal
definition, though backing for increased use of standards is more moderate. In social
procurement, most favour maintaining the current framework, with limited support for additional
measures such as incentives linked to subcontracting, collective agreements, or non-binding
targets, or for relaxing the “link to the subject matter” requirement. Likewise, there was limited
support for restricting subcontracting tiers in sectors at high risk of labour rights violations or for
prohibiting the subcontracting of an entire contract to a single subcontractor. By contrast, SMEs
expressed very strong support for strengthening innovation procurement incentives and were the
strongest supporters of making innovation procurement mandatory.
o Call for Evidence and bilateral meetings – Main findings
Regarding digitalisation, recurrent issues were related to limited visibility of procurement
opportunities, fragmented eProcurement platforms across Member States, and lack of
interoperability between national platforms. To address these issues, some of the measures
suggested by stakeholders included the creation of a single entry point for all tenders (above and
below-threshold); real-time notifications for SME-relevant tenders; and expanding use of self-
declarations and minimising demands for documentation evidence.
On simplification and procedures, stakeholders pointed to excessive administrative burdens,
including repetitive submission of documents across multiple procedures. Several emphasised
that complex qualification and selection criteria create structural barriers for SMEs. Others
underlined that contracting authorities may lack sufficient knowledge of market capacity, which
can result in disproportionate requirements or limited competition. At the same time, some
suggested pre-market consultations prior to the publication of calls for tender, to better assess
market capacity and design proportionate requirements. For example, in France public buyers
use sourcing practices during the preparatory phase of the procurement process, where relevant.
This approach aims to improve the understanding of the market without imposing formal
constraints, so that buyers can refine their market knowledge and respond more effectively to
their needs, while complying with competition rules.
Views on European preference vary, with some stakeholders arguing that it should be only
limited to certain strategic sectors (e.g. security), whereas others expressing broader support for
its application, provided that sectors, consequences and requirements are clearly defined. Some
respondents pointed to the risk of increasing administrative costs for EU bidders due to
additional documentation requirements to demonstrate compliance. Others advocated for
mandatory European preference criteria in public procurement for digital technologies.
As to financial barriers, respondents highlighted two key issues, namely disproportionate
financial guarantees and late payment. One of the stakeholders emphasised that “the revision
should also speed up payments from public authorities to contractors, especially SMEs. While
there are considerable differences across sectors, public contracting authorities must lead by
example”. Some countries have put in place measures aim to reduce financial risks for smaller
operators and improve their capacity to participate in public procurement, such as a system of
advance payment for SMEs adopted by France.
Many respondents underlined the division of contracts into lots as essential to facilitate SME
participation, calling for strengthening of the current rules. In that regard, some proposed to
adopt a ‘divide-or-explain' mechanism, whereby contracting authorities should justify any
decision not to divide a contract into lots. In addition, they noted that the creation of bidder
consortia should be simplified, especially for SMEs.
Regarding green, social and innovation public procurement, respondents generally agreed that
the revised legal framework should integrate strategic objectives such as climate action,
environmental sustainability, social inclusion, and innovation into public procurement. At the
same time, they stressed that these criteria should be applied carefully to avoid discrimination,
protect competitiveness, prevent market distortions, and limit administrative burdens,
particularly for SMEs. Some respondents supported the use of the "Most Economically
Advantageous Tender" (MEAT) criteria prioritising quality, sustainability, and innovation over
price. Others warned against mandatory sustainability-related requirements as they would lead to
higher compliance costs for SMEs. Many emphasized that these requirements should be directly
linked to the subject matter of the contract and not reflect a company’s overall sustainability
profile, ensuring procurement opportunities without introducing disproportionate obligations.
Finally, professionalisation of contracting authorities and economic operators, through enhanced
training and the dissemination of best practices, also emerged as a key priority.
The Open Public Consultation shows that SMEs and large companies generally agree on the
overall objectives of the new public procurement framework, but differ in their priorities,
intensity of support, and expected impacts, particularly in relation to simplification,
digitalisation, and green, social, and innovation procurement.
o Simplification
The findings reveal a high degree of convergence between SMEs and large companies, while
also highlighting important differences in intensity of support and implications. For example,
increasing flexibility in contract modifications and facilitating dialogue with the market emerge
as leading priorities for both SMEs and large companies. However, large companies express
markedly stronger support for these measures, with very high endorsement rates (89% for both
measures), compared with SMEs (52% for flexibility and 47% for dialogue with the market).
A similar pattern can be observed in the context of joint procurement. Both SMEs and large
companies consider increasing flexibility in setting the duration of framework agreements to
have the highest simplification potential in this area. However, large companies show a higher
level of support (68%) compared with SMEs (31%).
When considering measures specifically designed to support SMEs, both groups rank
simplifying the rules for forming consortia as having the highest potential, although this is
supported by a larger share of SMEs (78%) in respect to large companies (56%). Views diverge
significantly regarding EU-level targets for SME participation in public procurement, which are
supported by 78% of SMEs but only 24% of large companies. Also, encouraging the division of
contracts into lots is backed by 48% of SMEs compared to 27% of large companies.
In the area of implementation and contract management, both SMEs and large companies
identify speeding up payments to contractors, especially SMEs, as the measure with the greatest
potential to improve contract performance. Support is stronger among SMEs (80%), compared to
36% among large companies. Other measures show some convergence in views, such as
establishing rules for direct payments to subcontractors (33% of SMEs vs. 29% of large
companies) but also clear divergences, such as increasing the use of pre-financing (37% of SMEs
vs. 23% of large companies), and establishing clearer rules for the post-award phase, including
contract implementation (40% of SMEs vs. 32% of large companies).
o Digitalisation and transparency
When asked about a digital public procurement marketplace with a single entry point, SMEs and
large companies showed different attitudes. Only 18% of SMEs opposed the idea, compared to
30% of large companies. SMEs also showed stronger support for interconnecting existing
Member States’ eProcurement services (alone or alongside a central platform), with 69% in
favour versus 51% of large companies.
o Green, social and public procurement of innovation
In the area of green, social and innovation procurement, SMEs and large companies differ
significantly under several aspects. In terms of strengthening quality criteria in public
procurement, a strong 93% of SMEs support minimum quality requirements in technical
specifications (with a comply-or-explain mechanism), versus 68% of large companies; 89% of
SMEs favour changes to the current contract award criteria practice based on the most
economically advantageous tender (MEAT), compared to 59% of large companies.
o Green public procurement
Divergences between SMEs and large companies on green public procurement emerge in both
intensity and priorities. Large companies show stronger overall support for EU incentives (78%
vs. 60% of SMEs). Among respondents in favour of further incentives (“agree” or “strongly
agree”), large companies show stronger support for a clear legal definition of green public
procurement (60% vs. 49% of SMEs). They also prioritise easier use of environmental labels
(50%) and green standards (47%), whereas SMEs show more moderate support for standards
(33%). Conversely, among respondents supporting more regulatory measures (“agree” or
“strongly agree”), SMEs favour mandatory product-specific environmental requirements (38%
vs. 29% of large companies) and mandatory targets (33% vs. 24%).
o Socially responsible public procurement
Socially responsible public procurement diverges markedly between SMEs and large companies.
Over half of large companies support introducing additional incentives, whereas a majority of
SMEs (58%) prefer maintaining the current framework5. Among those in favour of further
incentives (“agree” or “strongly agree”), when it comes to relaxing the “link to the subject
matter” principle, 32% of large companies support softening this rule to allow consideration of
companies’ overall social policies, but only 12% of SMEs do. Allowing collective agreements to
be used as an award criterion is supported by 15% of large companies and 26% of SMEs.
Furthermore, SMEs show stronger backing for making social measures mandatory than large
companies: among SMEs that “agree” or “strongly agree”, 35% support banning price-only
award criteria in low-skilled labour-intensive sectors (vs. 10% of large companies), 35% favour
mandating socially responsible procurement targets (vs. 17% of large companies), 23% support
limiting subcontracting tiers in sectors at high risk of labour rights violations (vs. 9% of large
companies), and 20% would prohibit subcontracting an entire contract to a single subcontractor
(vs. 11% of large companies).
Regarding impacts, among respondents that indicated "very likely" or "somewhat likely"
answers, large companies are more optimistic about social benefits than SMEs, with 82%
expecting improved working conditions (vs. 55% of SMEs), 69% reducing risk of breaches of
labour and social law (vs. 51% of SMEs), 67% contributing to poverty reduction and increased
social inclusion (vs. 49% of SMEs). SMEs, in contrast, are more concerned about economic
burdens: 80% foresee higher prices of products/services/works, 71% foresee greater
administrative burdens for EU businesses, and only 29% expect increased SME participation
under incentive-based measures. Under mandatory obligations, SMEs’ expectation of increased
participation rises to 39%.
o Public procurement of innovation
Among respondents who “agree” or “strongly agree” that EU public procurement law should
further incentivise innovation, SMEs were less supportive than large companies of procedural
and legal measures, such as: simplification of procedures including innovation partnerships or
competitive dialogue (49% of SMEs vs. 69% of large companies), a clear definition of
innovation procurement (34% of SMEs vs. 51% of large companies), and the introduction of a
“comply or explain” mechanism to encourage preliminary market consultations when buying
innovative solutions, to limit excessive financial guarantees, or to allow suppliers to retain
Intellectual Property Rights (26% of SMEs vs. 37% of large companies). Conversely, regarding
mandatory elements, SMEs favoured limiting excessive financial guarantees more than large
companies (21% vs. 12%).
Expectations regarding the effects of mandatory innovation procurement also diverged. Among
respondents indicating "very likely" or "somewhat likely", 81% of SMEs expect improved
quality of products/services/works (vs. 66% of large companies). In contrast, large companies
are more concerned about costs and administrative burden, with 61% expecting higher costs for
EU bidders (versus 41% of SMEs) and 67% expecting greater administrative burden (versus
51% of SMEs).
o Award criteria
Limiting the dominance of price in award decisions generally increases SME access, though
effects differ by sector. The SME study (2026) observed that the use of the lowest-price criterion
increases the probability that a contract is awarded to an SME in Low-Skilled Labour-Intensive
(LSLI) activities. On the contrary, in non-LSLI activities it is associated with a reduction in SME
award probabilities. According to the study, sustainability and innovation award criteria do not
affect SME access uniformly and appear especially challenging for SMEs in LSLI activities.
Environmental criteria significantly lower the probability of SME awards in LSLI activities but
have little or no effect in non-LSLI activities. Similarly, innovation criteria show a marked
reduction in SME access in LSLI activities and only marginal effects in non-LSLI activities.
Social criteria are linked to lower SME participation in both activities, with a stronger negative
impact in LSLI ones.
According to the SME Panel consultation the respondents expect the preferred policy option to
deliver qualitative benefits rather than direct cost savings. The wider use of the Best Price–
Quality Ratio (BPQR) is strongly supported, even though many respondents anticipate moderate
additional preparation or compliance costs.
In contrast, environmental and social compliance-related measures - such as mandatory
environmental requirements or proof through labels - are more frequently associated with higher
expected costs and a more balanced assessment of benefits, suggesting that while SMEs
recognise their policy objectives, they remain cautious about additional administrative and
financial burdens.
o Subcontracting
The SME study (2026) finds that subcontracting plays different roles across procurement
markets. In non-LSLI activities, contracts that are likely to be subcontracted tend to increase
SMEs’ chances of winning. In contrast, in LSLI sectors, subcontracting is associated with a
slight decrease in the likelihood that SMEs secure the contract. This may reflect the fact that in
LSLI activities subcontracting is more often linked to procurement structures in which SMEs are
less likely to act as main contractors.
In the SME Panel consultation, the potential limiting subcontracting beyond a certain tier in
sectors at high risk of labor rights violations received a more mixed assessment. While just over
half of respondents considered the measure beneficial, it was also associated with moderate
expected costs and a comparatively higher share of uncertainty, indicating a balanced but
cautious perception among SMEs regarding its practical implications.
o Division of contracts into lots
The SME study (2026) finds that dividing contracts into lots is consistently associated with
higher SME participation in LSLI activities, while it has little or no impact in non-LSLI sectors.
Dividing contracts into lots is generally associated with higher SME participation, particularly in
labour-intensive and locally oriented markets. This suggests that breaking contracts into smaller
parts is particularly effective in improving SME access in activities that can be naturally split
into smaller, relatively independent tasks (e.g. cleaning, maintenance, routine services,
construction subcomponents).
In the SME Panel consultation, the division of contracts into lots received broad support in the
consultation, with around 70% of respondents assessing it as very highly, highly or moderately
beneficial.
o Procurement of innovative solutions
In the SME Panel consultation, innovation-related measures display a favourable cost–benefit
profile. Around two thirds of respondents (66.7%) assessed the introduction of a specific
procedure allowing direct purchases from start-ups as beneficial, while approximately 63%
supported the establishment of an EU/EEA innovation platform; at the same time, expected cost
implications were comparatively lower than for environmental or social compliance measures
(around 43.5% and 38.9% respectively anticipating at least moderate costs).
o Quantitative assessment
Strategic procurement - use of lowest-price criterion: The impact of award criteria on SME
access varies across sectors. In non-LSLI sectors, the use of criteria other than lowest price is
associated with a higher predicted probability of SME award (around 60.2%), while reliance on
lowest price reduces this probability to approximately 54.1% (-6 p.p.). In LSLI sectors, the
opposite pattern emerges: applying the lowest-price criterion increases the predicted probability
of SME award from about 54.4% to 56.9% (+2.5 p.p.). These results indicate that the effects of
price-based versus quality-based criteria are sector-specific and closely linked to underlying cost
structures and delivery models.
Strategic procurement - mandatory non-price criteria with comply or explain ≤30% price weight:
reducing the weight of price in award decisions to below 20% (i.e. increasing the relative
importance of non-price criteria) is associated with higher SME award probabilities across
sectors. In non-LSLI sectors, the predicted probability of SME award increases from
approximately 57.1% to 61.7% (+4.6 p.p.). In LSLI sectors, the corresponding probability rises
from around 54.5% to 57.5% (+3.0 p.p.). These results suggest that strengthening non-price
criteria can be associated with improved SME access in both sectoral contexts.
Social procurement - cap price criteria for labour-intensive services at (≤50% Price weight):
limiting the weight of the price criterion to below 50% is associated with higher SME award
probabilities in both sectoral contexts. In non-LSLI sectors, the predicted probability of SME
award increases from approximately 56.7% to 60.5% (+3.9 p.p.) when price is not dominant. In
LSLI sectors, a similar effect is observed, with the probability rising from around 54.3% to
58.2% (+3.9 p.p.). These findings indicate that reducing the dominance of price in award
decisions may support SME access across different types of activities.
Inclusion of environmental (green) award criteria: the impact of environmental award criteria on
SME access differs significantly across sectors. In non-LSLI sectors, the inclusion of
environmental criteria is associated with only a marginal change in SME award probability,
declining slightly from approximately 57.2% to 56.8% (-0.4 p.p.). In contrast, in LSLI sectors,
the introduction of environmental criteria is associated with a more pronounced reduction in
SME access: the predicted probability of SME award decreases from around 54.6% to 49.6% (-
5.0 p.p.). These results suggest that while environmental criteria have limited effects in non-
LSLI activities, but may create proportionately greater constraints for SMEs in labour-intensive
sectors.
Inclusion of social award criteria: the inclusion of social award criteria is associated with lower
SME award probabilities in both sectoral contexts, with a stronger effect in labour-intensive
activities. In non-LSLI sectors, the predicted probability of SME award declines from
approximately 57.2% to 55.8% (-1.4 p.p.) when social criteria are applied. In LSLI sectors, the
reduction is more pronounced, with the probability decreasing from around 54.5% to 51.2% (-3.4
p.p.). These findings suggest that while social criteria may support broader policy objectives,
their design and implementation may entail greater constraints for SMEs, particularly in low-
skilled labour-intensive sectors.
Procurement of innovative solutions: the effects of innovation-oriented procurement instruments
on SME access are strongly sector-dependent. In non-LSLI sectors, the use of the Innovative
Partnership procedure is associated with a marked reduction in SME award probabilities. The
predicted probability declines from approximately 57.2% to 46.6% (-10.6 p.p.) when this
procedure is applied. In contrast, in LSLI sectors, its use is associated with a slight increase in
SME access, with the probability rising from around 54.5% to 56.4% (+1.9 p.p.). A similarly
differentiated pattern emerges for innovation-related award criteria. In non-LSLI sectors, their
inclusion is associated with only a marginal increase in SME award probability (from 57.2% to
58.1%, +0.9 p.p.). In LSLI sectors, however, innovation criteria are linked to a substantial
reduction in SME access, with the predicted probability falling from approximately 54.6% to
42.7% (-11.9 p.p.). Overall, these findings indicate that innovation pursued through specific
procedures and innovation embedded in award criteria generate distinct and context-dependent
effects, with particularly strong negative associations for SMEs in labour-intensive sectors when
innovation requirements are applied at the award stage.
Subcontracting (social procurement): prohibition of 100% subcontracting and mandatory
transparency: the association between subcontracting arrangements and SME access varies
across sectors. In non-LSLI sectors, contracts not involving subcontracting show a predicted
SME award probability of approximately 57.0%. Where subcontracting is expected, this
probability increases to around 60.9% (+3.9 p.p.), suggesting that subcontracting can facilitate
SME participation in these markets. In LSLI sectors, the pattern differs. When subcontracting is
not foreseen, the predicted probability of SME award is about 54.8%, declining slightly to
around 53.6% (-1.2 p.p.) when subcontracting is expected. These findings indicate that
subcontracting plays different roles across sectoral contexts: it is associated with improved SME
access in non-LSLI activities, while in labour-intensive sectors it is linked to a modest reduction
in the likelihood of SMEs acting as main contractors.
Division of contracts into lots: in non-LSLI sectors, the predicted probability that an SME wins a
contract is 57.4% when the contract is not divided into lots, and 57.1% when it is divided into
several lots. This represents a very small decrease of around 0.2 percentage points, indicating
that lotting is not meaningfully associated with SMEs’ access in these sectors. In LSLI sectors,
the pattern is markedly different. When contracts are not divided into lots, the predicted
probability of an SME award is about 51.3%. When the contract is divided into more than one
lot, this probability increases to around 56.8%, corresponding to an increase of approximately
5.5 percentage points. Consequently, dividing contracts into lots is associated with a substantial
improvement in SMEs’ access in LSLI sectors, while it makes virtually no difference in non-
LSLI sectors. This indicates that contract lotting plays a particularly important role for SMEs in
low-skilled labour-intensive activities.
o Qualitative assessment - Indirect impacts of this initiative on SMEs
The revision of the Public Procurement Directives is expected to generate positive indirect
impacts on SMEs. Simplified procedures are likely to lower the time and cost needed to prepare
tenders, including legal advisory expenses, while reducing the risk of exclusion due to formal
errors. Together with digital solutions such as the once-only principle and the single entry portal,
these measures should decrease administrative burdens and encourage more SMEs to participate
in public procurement.
More proportionate guarantees and simplified financial requirements are expected to reduce
financial vulnerability and improve the resilience of SMEs engaged in public contracts. Also,
limits to excessive subcontracting chains are expected to encourage direct participation, so that
SMEs may increasingly compete as prime contractors rather than remain dependent on large
intermediaries, enabling greater autonomy. Increased SME participation may in turn contribute
to more resilient and locally anchored supply chains, given that SMEs often operate with
production resources based in the EU or neighbouring regions. This would also have a positive
effect on employment in Europe.
The revision may also enable SMEs to shift resources away from time-consuming administrative
formalities and compliance obligations, allowing them to focus on the preparation of higher-
quality tenders. This reallocation could enhance their competitiveness and improve their chances
of winning contracts, effectively transforming compliance effort into strategic business
development and value creation.
Finally, clearer, more proportionate and transparent procedures are likely to strengthen trust of
economic operators, particularly SMEs, in public authorities.
Overall, the revision is expected to lead to increased and diversified competition with more SME
participation. Ultimately, this would lead to better value for money in public procurement.
Summary on the SME Panel consultation on the
Impact Assessment of the Public Procurement Directives
About the respondents
The SME panel consultation received 108 replies from SMEs of varying sizes and nationalities.
Nearly half of all replies were submitted by micro-sized enterprises (1–9 employees), accounting
for 49% (53). Small enterprises (10–49 employees) represented 22% (24) of respondents. Single-
person businesses and medium-sized enterprises (50–249 employees) each accounted for 13%
(14 replies each). Mid-cap companies (250–749 employees) were minimally represented, with
only three replies.
The 108 replies to the SME panel consultation were geographically diverse, with contributions
received from both EU Member States and non-EU countries, however the participation was
nevertheless concentrated in a limited number of countries. Portugal accounted for the highest
number of replies (17), followed by Romania (15) and Greece (13). Poland contributed eleven
replies. Belgium, Hungary, Turkey and Italy were each represented by nine respondents, while
Bulgaria accounted for eight replies. Spain submitted four replies. Estonia contributed two
responses, and Ireland and Ukraine were each represented by one respondent.
When asked what percentage of their annual turnover comes from public procurement contracts,
the largest group of respondents (34) indicated 0%. A further 26 respondents reported a share of
1–10%. At the other end of the spectrum, 17 respondents stated that more than 75% of their
turnover derives from public procurement, indicating a high level of dependency among a subset
of companies. Smaller numbers reported shares of 11–25% (10), 26–50% (6), and 51–75% (10).
Respondents were fu rther asked about the average value of public procurement contracts for
which their business bids. The largest group (26 replies) indicated contracts below €10 000. A
further twenty respondents reported bidding for contracts between €10 000 and €50 000. Eight
respondents indicated an average contract value of €51 000–€140 000. Seventeen respondents
typically bid for contracts valued between €141 000 and €1 000 000, while ten reported bidding
for contracts exceeding €1 000 000.
Findings of the SME Panel consultation
Potentially burdensome aspects for SMEs when participating in public procurement
€ , , ; 10
€ , – € , , ; 17
€ , – € , ; 8
€ , – € , ; 20
L € , ; 26
Do not know; 24
Did not answer; 3
Avg. value of public procurement contracts
28,7
24,1
11,1
25,9
20,4
22,2
11,1
13,9
27,8
27,8
17,6
20,4
19,4
25,9
25,9
20,4
11,1
16,7
13,9
20,4
23,1
20,4
31,5
22,2
15,7
25,0
13,0
14,8
20,4
18,5
8,3
11,1
9,3
6,5
12,0
8,3
13,0
13,0
7,4
6,5
4,6
6,5
9,3
2,8
4,6
6,5
28,7
21,3
7,4
7,4
12,0
8,3
9,3
7,4
11,1
6,5
13,0
10,2
13,0
10,2
5,6
9,3
10,2
9,3
10,2
11,1
10,2
10,2
10,2
9,3
0,0 10,0 20,0 30,0 40,0 50,0 60,0 70,0 80,0 90,0 100,0
Documentation requirements
Selection criteria
Size of the contract
Time required to prepare bids
Award criteria
Short deadlines
Language barrier
Use of eProcurement platforms
Late payment
Financial guarantees
How burdensome are the following aspects of participating in public procurement procedures for your company? (%)
Very highly burdensome Highly burdensome Moderately burdensome Slightly burdensome
Not burdensome Do not know Did not asnwer
When combining responses indicating that particular aspects are very highly, highly or
moderately burdensome, administrative requirements clearly emerge as the most challenging
elements of participation. Time required to prepare bids is perceived as burdensome by 74.0%
(80 replies) of respondents, while 69.4% (75 replies) report the Documentation requirements
as at least moderately burdensome.
Short deadlines (67.6%: 73 replies) and Financial guarantees (66.7%: 72 replies) are also widely
considered burdensome with the Selection criteria (64.9%: 70 replies) following. Award criteria
and Late payment with same result (62.0% ;67 replies each) similarly present a significant
challenge.
By contrast, Language barriers (35.2%: 38 replies) and the use of eProcurement platforms
(45.4%: 49 replies) are less frequently perceived as burdensome compared to other aspects.
Language barriers even marked as not burdensome at all by 28.7% (31) of respondents.
With regards to language barriers it is worth mentioning that 82 out of the total 108 respondents
stated that they participate in public procurement procedures only in their home country.
Overall, the results indicate that procedural complexity, preparation time and financial
requirements constitute the most significant obstacles to SME participation in public
procurement.
Digitalisation and Transparency
51
26
16
2
11 2
How beneficial would using a single entry point to participate in all public procurement procedures across the EU be for your business
Very higly beneficial Highly beneficial
Moderately beneficial Not very beneficial
Do not know
Regarding the eProcurement platforms, using a single entry point to participate in all public
procurement procedures across the EU was perceived as potentially very highly beneficial
by 51 respondents, highly beneficial by 26 and moderately beneficial by 16 respondents.
This suggests that 93 out of 108 respondents would welcome to be able to use a single
entry point to participate in all public procurement procedures across the EU.
The respondents were further asked how likely would introducing this tool encourage them to
participate in the public procurement procedures in their home countries and other EU Member
states. In both cases a clear majority of respondents indicate that such a tool would encourage
them to participate more often. The combined share of “very likely” and “likely” responses is
almost identical in the two charts, representing roughly seventy percent of respondents. This
suggests strong and consistent support for simplification through a single access point, regardless
of whether participation concerns domestic or cross-border procurement.
40
36
16
14 2
How likely is it that a single entry point would encourage you to participate more often in
public procurement procedures in your home country?
Very likely Likely Not likely
Do not know No answer
37
35
17
16 3
How likely is it that a single entry point would encourage you to participate more often in public procurement procedures in other EU countries?
Very likely Likely Not likely
Do not know No answer
2 1
12
36 52
5
How many different eProcurement platforms does your company currently use to submit offers and to communicate
with buyers?
More than 20
11 - 20
5 - 10
2 - 4
1
No answer
Nearly half of respondents report
using only one platform, while a
further substantial share use
between two and four platforms. A
smaller group indicate using
between five and ten platforms,
and only a very limited number of
respondents rely on more than ten
platforms.
The graph on the potential savings shows that SMEs expect tangible administrative cost savings
from using a single EU-wide tendering platform, although the estimated scale of savings varies.
A notable share of respondents anticipate significant reductions, with many indicating potential
savings above 25%, and the same sized group even expects savings exceeding 50%. At the same
time, a substantial proportion foresee more moderate savings in the range of 1–25%, suggesting
that simplification would generate efficiency gains even if not transformative for all businesses.
A smaller group consider that there would be no cost benefit, while a relatively large number
indicate uncertainty (“do not know”), which may reflect difficulties in estimating administrative
savings in advance.
14
14
17
12 13
37
1
What percentage of administrative costs could you save if you only used one tendering platform to participate in all public procurement procedures across the EU?
More than 50% 26-50% 11-25% 1-10% No cost benefit Do not know No answer
135
Simplification measures
30,6
30,6
35,2
32,4
11,1
27,8
38,0
25,0
25,0
28,7
47,2
34,3
39,8
23,1
32,4
25,9
34,3
23,1
16,7
22,2
23,1
19,4
24,1
19,4
18,5
18,5
21,3
18,5
13,0
13,0
19,4
22,2
17,6
21,3
24,1
17,6
10,2
18,5
16,7
3,7
3,7
6,5
5,6
9,3
10,2
0,9
4,6
1,9
1,9
6,5
8,3
5,6
8,3
1,9
2,8
1,9
12,0
6,5
3,7
7,4
5,6
7,4
2,8
2,8
3,7
8,3
4,6
10,2
7,4
16,7
8,3
9,3
10,2
13,0
11,1
6,5
8,3
6,5
4,6
8,3
6,5
5,6
8,3
8,3
8,3
8,3
11,1
9,3
7,4
9,3
9,3
0,0 10,0 20,0 30,0 40,0 50,0 60,0 70,0 80,0 90,0 100,0
Allow negotiations throughout the procurement procedure
Facilitate dialogue with the market
Simplify procedures for off-the shelf purchases
Increase flexibility in contract modifications (e.g. revising the duration, price changes)
Enhance the role of Central Purchasing Bodies
Increase time limits for submission
Allow reuse of documentation submitted by bidders (once-only principle)
Encourage dividing contracts into lots
Simplify rules for forming consortia
Introduce EU-level targets for SMEs participation in public procurement
Speed up payments to contractors, especially SMEs
Establish rules for direct payments to subcontractors, especially SMEs
Increase the use of pre-financing, especially for SMEs
Indicate how beneficial you would expect these measures to be for your business when participating in public procurement (%)
Very highly beneficial Highly beneficial Moderately beneficial Slightly beneficial Not beneficial Do not know Did not answer
136
Overall, financial and administrative simplification measures received the strongest support.
When combining responses indicating that measures would be very highly, highly or moderately
beneficial, Facilitating dialogue with the market emerges as the most positively assessed
measure (81.5%: 88 replies). This is followed closely by Increasing flexibility in contract
modifications (79.7%: 86 replies) and allowing the Reuse of documentation under a “once-
only” principle (77.8%: 84 replies) For all these measures it can be said that the distribution
between very highly – highly – moderately – beneficial response rate was relatively equal.
Speeding up payments to contractors, especially SMEs (76.8%: 83 replies) also receive strong
support with the highest percentage of very highly beneficial responses (47.2%: 51 replies). In
fact, if the moderately beneficial answers were disregarded for all measures, Speeding up
payments would be the second most popular just after Increasing flexibility. Allowing
negotiations throughout the procurement procedure and Increasing the use of pre-
financing followed with similar popularity (75.0%: 81 replies each) and Simplifying
procedures for off-the-shelf purchases (74.1%: 80 replies) was also viewed as very beneficial.
A slightly lower, though still substantial, level of support is recorded for Introducing EU-level
SME participation targets (70.4%: 76 replies), Encouraging the division of contracts into lots
(69.4%: 75 replies), and Simplifying rules for forming consortia (68.5%: 74 replies). Increasing
time limits for submission (66.7%: 72 replies) follows.
Enhancing the role of Central Purchasing Bodies is perceived as comparatively less beneficial
(53.6%: 58 replies) and is also associated with a higher share of respondents indicating
uncertainty with 13 respondents marking it as not beneficial at all.
Overall, the results show particularly strong support for measures that enhance flexibility,
improve dialogue and reduce administrative and financial burdens, while more institutional
reforms generate comparatively lower levels of endorsement.
137
Green, social and innovative public procurement - Benefits
24,1
17,6
19,4
16,7
18,5
18,5
14,8
22,2
24,1
25,0
31,5
23,1
21,3
24,1
25,0
21,3
18,5
26,9
25,0
24,1
17,6
13,9
15,7
14,8
13,9
13,9
21,3
13,9
17,6
13,9
7,4
14,8
10,2
13,0
10,2
9,3
8,3
5,6
4,6
5,6
5,6
10,2
10,2
10,2
4,6
6,5
10,2
8,3
6,5
5,6
10,2
13,0
11,1
12,0
17,6
17,6
16,7
12,0
11,1
13,9
3,7
7,4
12,0
9,3
10,2
13,0
10,2
11,1
11,1
12,0
0,0 10,0 20,0 30,0 40,0 50,0 60,0 70,0 80,0 90,0 100,0
Use of the Best Price Quality Ratio (BPQR) as the standard award criteria in all public procurement procedures to allow better integration of sustainability criteria (e.g. environmental or social elements) requirements
Use of the labels to prove compliance with environmental requirements in public procurement procedures
A ’ contracts
Use of mandatory minimum environmental requirements in public procurement procedures
In low-skilled labour-intensive sectors (e.g.: cleaning, catering, security, etc.), price-only criteria should be banned, requiring Best Price Quality Ratio (BPQR) instead
Limit subcontracting beyond a certain tier in sectors at high risk of labour rights violations
Allow contracting authorities to reward companies having a collective agreement in place (e.g.: by considering this element during the award criteria phase)
Create an EU- “ ” during the performance of public contracts
Introduction of a specific procedure allowing contracting authorities to directly buy innovative solutions from start-ups
Establishing an EU/EEA platform in which all EU/EEA public sector innovation challenges are communicated to potential suppliers of innovative solutions
Indicate how beneficial you would expect these measures to be for your business when participating in public procurement (%)
Very highly beneficial Highly beneficial Moderately beneficial Slightly beneficial Not beneficial Do not know Did not answer
138
When combining responses indicating that measures would be very highly, highly or moderately
beneficial, the Use of the Best Price–Quality Ratio (BPQR) as the standard award criterion
emerges as the most positively assessed measure (73.1%: 79 replies). This measure also received
the second highest number of very highly positive responses (24.1%: 26 replies) and by far the
highest number of highly beneficial responses (31.5%: 34 replies). Closely following are the
Introduction of a specific procedure allowing contracting authorities to directly buy innovative
solutions from start-ups (66.7%: 72 replies), the Establishment of an EU/EEA platform to
communicate public sector innovation challenges and Creating an EU-wide “whitelist” to
ensure compliance with labour and social law obligations (63.0%: 68 replies each).
Requiring BPQR instead of price-only criteria in labour-intensive sectors (57.4%: 62 replies) is
also viewed as beneficial by many respondents, although the support is less significant.
Similarly, allowing contracting authorities to consider a company’s overall social and
environmental policy when awarding contracts (56.4%: 61 replies) receives moderate support.
Measures focused specifically on environmental compliance receive somewhat more mixed
responses. The Use of labels to prove compliance with environmental requirements (54.6%: 59
replies) and the Introduction of mandatory minimum environmental requirements (55.6%: 60
replies) are considered beneficial by just over half of respondents.
Lower levels of perceived benefit are also recorded for Limiting subcontracting beyond a
certain tier in high-risk sectors (53.7%: 58 replies) and for Allowing contracting authorities to
reward companies with collective agreements in place (54.6%: 59 replies), both of which show
comparatively higher shares of respondents indicating uncertainty.
Overall, the findings suggest stronger support for measures that promote quality-based award
criteria and innovation, while more regulatory or compliance-driven simplifications generate
more moderate levels of endorsement.
Green, social and innovative public procurement – Costs
7,4
16,7
7,4
12,0
7,4
7,4
11,1
8,3
8,3
7,4
18,5
21,3
20,4
18,5
18,5
13,9
11,1
11,1
11,1
10,2
35,2
24,1
30,6
30,6
19,4
25,0
26,9
26,9
24,1
21,3
13,9
9,3
8,3
8,3
11,1
12,0
12,0
13,9
11,1
9,3
4,6
4,6
10,2
5,6
13,0
13,0
8,3
11,1
14,8
18,5
13,9
13,0
12,0
14,8
20,4
18,5
19,4
17,6
18,5
20,4
6,5
11,1
11,1
10,2
10,2
10,2
11,1
11,1
12,0
13,0
0,0 10,0 20,0 30,0 40,0 50,0 60,0 70,0 80,0 90,0 100,0
Use of the Best Price Quality Ratio (BPQR) as the standard award criteria in all public procurement procedures to allow better integration of sustainability criteria (e.g. environmental or social elements) requirements
Use of the labels to prove compliance with environmental requirements in public procurement procedures
A ’
Use of mandatory minimum environmental requirements in public procurement procedures
In low-skilled labour-intensive sectors (e.g.: cleaning, catering, security, etc.), price-only criteria should be banned, requiring Best Price Quality Ratio (BPQR) instead
Limit subcontracting beyond a certain tier in sectors at high risk of labour rights violations
Allow contracting authorities to reward companies having a collective agreement in place (e.g.: by considering this element during the award criteria phase)
Create an EU- “ ” performance of public contracts
Introduction of a specific procedure allowing contracting authorities to directly buy innovative solutions from start-ups
Establishing an EU/EEA platform in which all EU/EEA public sector innovation challenges are communicated to potential suppliers of innovative solutions
Indicate the level of costs you would expect these measures to cause to your business when participating in public procurement (%)
Very high costs High costs Moderate costs Low costs No costs Do not know Did not answer
140
When combining responses indicating very high, high or moderate costs, the use of
labels to prove compliance with environmental requirements is perceived as the most
cost-intensive measure (62.1%: 67 replies) whereas it received the most very high costs
responses (16.7%: 18 replies) of all the measures. This is followed closely by the
Introduction of mandatory minimum environmental requirements (61.1%: 66
replies) and allowing contracting authorities to consider a company’s overall social and
environmental policy when awarding contracts (58.4%: 63 replies), provided that a
notable portion of those responses (30.6%: 33 replies) assessed the costs as moderate.
The Use of the Best Price–Quality Ratio (BPQR) as the standard award criterion is also
associated with a notable expected cost impact (61.1%: 66 replies), although a substantial
share of respondents assesses the costs as moderate (35.2%: 38 replies) rather than high
(18.5%: 20 replies) or very high (7.4%: 8 replies).
A somewhat lower, though still significant, expected cost level is recorded for allowing
contracting authorities to reward companies with collective agreements (49.1%: 53
replies). Limiting subcontracting beyond a certain tier in high-risk sectors and
creating an EU-wide “whitelist” (46.3%: 50 replies each) also fall within this
intermediate range as well as banning price-only criteria in labour-intensive sectors in
favour of BPQR (45.3%: 49 replies).
Lower expected cost impacts are associated with innovation-related measures. The
Introduction of a specific procedure allowing direct purchase from start-ups (43.5%: 47
replies) and the Establishment of an EU/EEA innovation platform (38.9%: 42 replies) are
perceived as comparatively less cost-intensive.
Overall, the findings suggest that measures introducing additional environmental or
social compliance requirements are expected to generate higher cost implications for
businesses, whereas innovation-support measures are perceived as relatively less
burdensome in cost terms.
Green, social and innovative public procurement – Costs and Benefits
When combining responses indicating very high, high or moderate costs, environmental
compliance measures are perceived as the most cost-intensive. The Use of labels to prove
compliance (62.1%) and the Introduction of mandatory minimum environmental
requirements (61.1%) generate the highest expected cost levels. Notably, these measures
were assessed as beneficial by a more moderate share of respondents (just over half),
suggesting a less favourable cost–benefit perception compared to other options.
Similarly, allowing contracting authorities to consider a company’s overall social and
environmental policy when awarding contracts (58.4% expecting meaningful costs) was
previously associated with moderate levels of perceived benefit. This indicates some
hesitation regarding measures that may increase compliance obligations.
The use of the Best Price–Quality Ratio (BPQR) as the standard award criterion presents
a more balanced picture. While 61.1% expect at least moderate costs (35.2% moderate
costs), it was also the most positively assessed measure in terms of benefits (73.2%),
suggesting that respondents may consider the additional costs justified by the expected
advantages.
141
By contrast, innovation-related measures display a more favourable cost–benefit profile.
The introduction of a specific procedure allowing direct purchases from start-ups
(43.5%) and the establishment of an EU/EEA innovation platform (38.9%) were
associated with relatively lower expected costs, while still receiving solid levels of
perceived benefit (around two-thirds of respondents).
Measures such as limiting subcontracting tiers or banning price-only criteria in labour-
intensive sectors fall in an intermediate range, with moderate expected costs and
moderate perceived benefits, indicating a more mixed assessment.
Overall, the comparison suggests that respondents are particularly sensitive to measures
that introduce additional environmental or social compliance obligations, whereas
flexibility- and innovation-oriented reforms appear to combine comparatively lower
expected costs with relatively strong perceived benefits.
Economic security and strategic autonomy
31
2417
12
21
3
How burdensome it would be for your company if new rules required you to verify and document the origin of goods/services or the nationality of subcontractors
for public procurement bids?
Very burdensome Moderately burdensome Slightly burdensome
Not burdensome Do not know No answer
5
74
29
Do you consider the competition with non-EU economic operators as unfair?
No answer No Yes
4
38
47
19
Do you compete with non-EU companies or companies using non-EU subcontractors in
EU public procurement procedures?
No answer Do not know No Yes
142
Taken together, the six graphs focused on Economic security and strategic autonomy
present a relatively nuanced picture of SMEs’ exposure to non-EU competition and their
attitudes towards potential origin-based measures.
First, 47 respondents (43.5%) claim that they do not compete with non-EU companies or
companies using non-EU subcontractors (although 35.2%: 38 respondents reported they
do not know the origin of their competition). And while a share of respondents reports
competing with non-EU companies or firms using non-EU subcontractors (17.6%: 19
replies), this does not appear to translate into widespread perceptions of unfairness. A
clear majority (68.5%: 74 replies) indicate that they do not consider such competition to
be unfair, and most report that they have not lost tenders to non-EU competitors between
2023 and 2025 (78.7%: 85 replies). This suggests that although non-EU participation is
present in the market, it is not systematically perceived by SMEs as distorting
competition.
26
36 15
6
4
19
2
What would be the impact on your competitive position on the EU public procurement markets if preferences were given to companies, products or
services manufactured or originating from Europe?
Very positive Positive Neutral Negative Very negative Do not know No answer
8
11
15
43
25
6
Does your company rely on inputs, components or subcontractors from non-EU countries to deliver
public contracts?
Yes, to a significant degree (>50%)
Yes, moderately (25- 50%)
Yes, minimally (<25%)
No, we source entirely from EU
Do not know
No answer
4
85
19
Between 2023 and 2025, did your company lose a tender to non-EU companies or companies
using non-EU subcontractors?
No answer No Yes
143
Second, supply chain exposure to non-EU inputs appears limited for many respondents.
A large share indicates that they source entirely from within the EU (39.8%: 43 replies),
while reliance on non-EU inputs beyond a minimal level is comparatively less common.
This is an important contextual factor when assessing potential origin-based restrictions
or preferences.
Against this background, the introduction of rules requiring verification and
documentation of the origin of goods, services or subcontractors is perceived as
burdensome by a majority of respondents (with 31 very and 24 moderately burdensome
responses clearly outweighing 17 slightly or 12 not burdensome responses). This
indicates sensitivity to additional administrative requirements, particularly in an
environment where non-EU competition is not widely viewed as unfair.
Finally, the potential introduction of preferences for EU-origin products or services is
largely expected to improve respondents’ competitive position, with a substantial share
indicating a very positive (24%: 26 replies) or positive (33.3%: 36 replies) impact. While
there is a notable level of uncertainty, negative expectations are limited. This suggests
that while firms anticipate competitive advantages from such measures, they remain
cautious about the compliance and administrative implications.
Overall, the results point to a measured position among respondents: non-EU competition
is acknowledged but not widely perceived as unfair or structurally harmful; origin-based
preferences are expected to strengthen competitive positioning; however, additional
verification obligations are viewed as a tangible administrative burden. The findings
therefore highlight a potential policy trade-off between enhancing strategic autonomy
objectives and avoiding additional procedural complexity for participating SMEs.
144
ANNEX 7: FURTHER INFORMATION SUPPORTING SELECTED
SECTIONS OF THE IA
The data included in this Annex refer to information presented in the main part of this
staff working document and provide additional detail, supplementary information, or
broader context. The sub-headings indicate the specific sections of the main document to
which the respective parts relate.
Ad Section 2 - Problem definition
As mentioned in Section 2, the EU-level framework creates significant spillover effects
across the entire government procurement market (i.e. procedures below EU thresholds
or exempt markets), which amounts to around EUR 2.6 trillion, representing roughly
15% of GDP. Figure 18 below presents the change in this share over time.
Figure 18: Total government expenditure on public procurement, as % of GDP EU-27
Source: Government revenue, expenditure and main aggregates [gov_10a_main]
Ad Section 2.1.1 - Cost for winners and the number of award criteria
The analysis of the impact of an increasing number of procedural requirements imposed
on public buyers and bidders, was supported by data on the number of award criteria was
analysed in combination with cost data collected by Ecorys (2025) through the surveys in
2022 and 2025. In particular, in order to assess whether the number of award criteria is
associated with effects on economic operators’ costs, the following regression338
specification was estimated:
, where
338 A linear regression model including a quadratic term in the number of award criteria.
145
• cost_winner = cost of running the procurement procedures for winners,
• c_award = the number of award criteria expressed as a deviation from its sample
mean (i.e. c_award is the mean-centred number of award criteria),
• ln(finalprice) = natural log of the final contract value.
Table 18: Regression results - procedural cost for winners (focus on the number of award criteria used)
Linear regression cost_winner Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf Interval] Sig
c_award -704.463 862.798 -0.82 .414 -2398.396 989.47 c.c_award#c.c_award 763.071 253.773 3.01 .003 264.839 1261.303 ***
ln_finalprice 2444.961 406.388 6.02 0 1647.1 3242.822 ***
Constant -23371.127 5232.221 -4.47 0 -33643.554 -13098.701 ***
Mean dependent var 9058.865 SD dependent var 21105.668
R-squared 0.066 Number of obs 716
F-test 16.767 Prob > F 0.000
Akaike crit. (AIC) 16248.893 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 16267.187
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 Source: In-house analysis based on Ecorys(2025) surveys 2022-2025
The analysis shows that the relationship between the number of award criteria and winner
costs is non-linear. More precisely, the winning bidder’s costs increase more than
proportionally with the number of criteria used, with the effect becoming stronger the
further the tender deviates from the average number of award criteria (1.56). The increase
in costs becomes stronger the further one moves from the average, indicating that
complexity effects grow at an increasing rate. The squared term is positive (i.e.
coefficient on c_award 2 is 763 EUR) and highly significant (p = 0.003). The margins
plot below (Figure 19) visualises the findings.
Figure 19: Predicted winner costs by deviations from the average number of award criteria
Source: In-house analysis based on Ecorys(2025) surveys 2022-2025
In other words, as the relationship is non-linear, the cost increase associated with each
additional award criterion varies with the level of complexity. The marginal cost
increases are reported in Table 19 below. It should be noted, however, that the estimated
marginal effect associated with an increase of one or two additional award criteria above
146
the average is not statistically significant. Statistical significance emerges from three
additional criteria onwards. For example, when three criteria above the average are used,
next additional criterion is associated with an increase in winner procedural costs of
approximately EUR 3 874.
Table 19: Marginal effects table
Delta-method
dy/dx std. err. T P>t [95% conf. interval]
c_award
_at
1 -704.463 862.798 -0.820 0.414 -2398.396 989.470
2 821.679 589.713 1.390 0.164 -336.106 1979.464
3 2347.822 682.867 3.440 0.001 1007.149 3688.495
4 3873.965 1048.836 3.690 0.000 1814.784 5933.145
5 5400.108 1499.670 3.600 0.000 2455.804 8344.411
6 6926.250 1978.173 3.500 0.000 3042.501 10810
Source: In-house analysis based on Ecorys surveys 2022-2025
To summarise, the analysis reveals a non-linear relationship between the number of
award criteria and costs incurred by winning bidders. Moving away from that average is
associated with higher costs for the winning bidder, especially when deviating by more
than two additional criteria from the mean. This suggests that overly complex award
structures may impose disproportionate compliance and bidding costs339.
In contrast to the results for winning bidders, the corresponding regression for buyers’
costs does not display the same clear non-linear pattern. Neither the linear nor the
quadratic term capturing deviations from the average number of award criteria is
statistically significant. While buyers’ costs remain positively associated with contract
value, the relationship between award-criteria complexity and buyers’ administrative
costs appears weaker and less systematic.
Ad Section 2.2 – The public procurement directives legal set-up
Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU set out horizontal procedural rules
on how public buyers should conduct public procurement procedures above certain
values (“how to buy”). In parallel, an increasing number of sector-specific instruments
have introduced over the years two categories of public procurement provisions to
improve the sustainability and resilience of public purchases: requirements on what can
be purchased (“what to buy”), but also additional and varying procedural rules on “how
to buy”.
The purpose of this Annex is to provide a general perspective of the history and
functioning of public procurement and the current legislative framework outside
the Directives. It should be noted that both “how to buy” and “what to buy” needs to be
read together, as the development of sectorial acts has altered the way the general public
procurement framework works.
339 Yet, it should be noted that more complex procedures may require a greater number of criteria to be
properly specified and be more costly to run (to the extent that this effect is not fully captured by the final
price variable), or that both the number of criteria and the cost of the procedure are driven by other
unobserved factors.
147
The Annex also provides a list of all sectoral acts containing public procurement
provisions, including those that do not present coherence issues and would hence be kept
untouched in the different policy options. The list includes recently adopted proposals
that are in co-decision process. The Annex (Ad Section 5.2) also presents an overview of
which acts and how would be affected by the different policy options, as described in the
report.
How to buy
History of the EU public procurement Directives
The initial Directives date from the 70s. The objectives of the first Directive
(71/305/EEC340) were inscribed in the logic of the gradual abolition of restrictions to the
fundamental freedoms (free establishment and freedom to provide services). They aimed
to address trade barriers in the markets for public contracts for works and supplies by
coordinating national procedures and, insofar as possible, taking into account existing
procedures and practices (i.e. not harmonising procedures, but coordinating them). The
following basic principles were thus: the prohibition of technical specifications that could
have a discriminatory effect; adequate advertising of contracts; fixing of objective criteria
for participation; and the introduction of a procedure of joint supervision to ensure the
observation of these principles341.
The principle of adequate advertising was directly linked to the aim of ensuring the
“development of effective competition” for public works contracts. The second
Directive, 77/62/EEC342, confirmed these objectives, and also brought into play the
second freedom: that of free movement of goods. The concept of “introducing equal
conditions of competition”, in this case for supplies contracts, was also added. It also
stated explicitly that contracts with a value below predetermined thresholds could be
exempted from the coordination “inasmuch as their impact on competition is limited”.
A further objective, progressive realization of the internal market, informed the 1988 and
1989 Directives (88/295/EEC343 and 89/440/EEC344). A contemporary of the "Cecchini"
report345, the 1988 Directive also introduced the concept that it is "necessary to develop
the conditions of effective competition for public supply contracts and the economic,
budgetary and industrial benefits which result from it". In this context, it was for instance
specified that "time limits for the receipt of requests for participation and tenders in the
framework of public supply contracts should be extended in order to improve access and
participation by a greater number of suppliers".
340 Council Directive 71/305/EEC of 26 July 1971 concerning the co-ordination of procedures for the
award of public works contracts, OJ L 185, 16.8.1971, pp. 5–14, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1971/305/oj. 341 Recital 3 of Directive 71/305/EEC. 342 Council Directive 77/62/EEC of 21 December 1976 coordinating procedures for the award of public
supply contracts, OJ L 13, 15.1.1977, pp. 1–14, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1977/62/oj. 343 Council Directive 88/295/EEC of 22 March 1988 amending Directive 77/62/EEC relating to the
coordination of procedures on the award of public supply contracts and repealing certain provisions of
Directive 80/767/EEC, OJ L 127, 20.5.1988, pp. 1–14, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1988/295/oj. 344 Council Directive 89/440/EEC of 18 July 1989 amending Directive 71/305/EEC concerning
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, OJ L 210, 21.7.1989, pp. 1–21, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1989/440/oj. 345 ‘Europe 1992, the overall challenge (Cecchini Report)’ SEC(88)524, available at:
https://op.europa.eu/s/Aegz.
148
The previously stated objectives were re-confirmed and clarified; "to eliminate practices
that restrict competition in general and participation in contracts by other Member States'
nationals in particular, it is necessary to improve the access of contractors to procedures
for the award of contracts". This would "create the necessary conditions for efficient
Community-wide competition for contracts so that firms from other Member States can
bid on comparable terms to domestic firms". Works concessions were included in
Directive 89/440/EEC in view of their "increasing importance".
The first Utilities Directive, 90/531/EEC346, was based on the same Treaty provisions and
principles as the preceding Directives. It recognized that "the need to ensure a real
opening-up of the market and a fair balance in the application of procurement rules in
these sectors requires that the entities to be covered must be identified on a different basis
than by reference to their legal status", given that "entities providing such services are in
some cases governed by public law, in others by private law". It also introduced the idea
that, in these sectors, the rules should not "extend to activities of those entities … which
fall within those sectors but nevertheless are directly exposed to competitive forces in
markets to which entry is unrestricted". For oil, gas, coal or other solid fuels, it envisaged
the possibility of "alternative arrangements which will enable the same objective of
opening up contracts to be achieved". Finally, it took the approach that "…the rules to be
applied by the entities concerned should establish a framework for sound commercial
practice and should leave a maximum of flexibility".
The 'Classic Directives' (i.e. the directives applicable to the public sector) were
completed with the Services Directive, 92/50/EEC347, which based itself on the same
considerations, including the realisation of the Internal market, with the particularity that
"full application of this Directive must be limited, for a transitional period, to contracts
for those services where its provisions will enable the full potential for increased cross-
frontier trade to be realized". The subsequent Utilities Directive, 93/38/EEC348 extended
the scope of EU public procurement legislation to service contracts awarded by utilities.
Directive 93/38/EC was also a consolidation Directive insofar as it replaced the previous
Utilities Directive, 90/531/EEC, incorporated its provisions. Thus Directive 93/38/EEC
covered works, supplies and services contracts awarded by utilities.
The next generation of Directives came in 2004, with Directive 2004/17/EC349 governing
Utilities and Directive 2004/18/EC350 pertaining to the Classic sectors.
The recitals of the 2004 Directives still refer to the opening-up of public procurement to
competition. However, these Directives were also seen as being "necessary to meet
346 Council Directive 90/531/EEC of 17 September 1990 on the procurement procedures of entities
operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, OJ L 297, 29.10.1990, pp. 1–48,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1990/531/oj. 347 Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award
of public service contracts, OJ L 209, 24.7.1992, pp. 1–24, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1992/50/oj. 348 Council Directive 93/38/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities
operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, OJ L 199, 9.8.1993, pp. 84–138,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1993/38/oj. 349 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating
the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors,
OJ L 134, pp. 1–113, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/17/oj. 350 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public
service contracts, OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, pp. 114–240, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/18/oj.
149
requests for simplification and modernisation made by contracting authorities and
economic operators". Thus, the recitals refer to new phenomena, such as e-procurement,
electronic means of communication as a tool for simplification and increased efficiency
and transparency. The Directives also refer to the possibility to "help increase
competition and streamline public purchasing". In keeping with the aim of allowing a
flexible framework that will best adapt to national characteristics, the 16th Recital of the
Classic Directive provides that "in order to take account of the different circumstances
obtaining in Member States, Member States should be allowed to choose whether
contracting authorities may use framework agreements, central purchasing bodies,
dynamic purchasing systems, electronic auctions or the competitive dialogue procedure,
as defined and regulated by this Directive."
The Directives were also expected to contribute to the fight against corruption and other
forms of serious crimes351. The Utilities Directive, 2004/17/EC, states that it should not
apply to contracts awarded for the pursuit of a relevant activity "if, in the Member State
in which this activity is carried out, it is directly exposed to competition on markets to
which access is not limited." It adds that there is consequently a need "to introduce a
procedure, applicable to all sectors covered by this Directive, that will enable the effects
of current or future opening up to competition to be taken into account. Such a procedure
should provide legal certainty for the entities concerned, as well as an appropriate
decision-making process, ensuring, within short time limits, uniform application of
Community law in this area."352
The current EU public procurement Directives
The 2014 package contains a framework of procedures to be applied for the award of
contracts by contracting authorities, that is, the public buyers which are either contracting
authorities subject to the provisions of the Classical Directive (Directive 2014/24/EU),
and contracting entities (entities which are subject to the provisions of the Utilities
Directive, Directive 2014/25/EU and Concessions, Directive 2014/23/EU). These are
designed to work as a “tool-box” for Member States to implement, as such, while the
main elements are common to all public buyers, depending on how these have been
transposed, there may be practical differences among Member States.
The Directives are only binding for public buyers, understood as contracting authorities
and contracting entities. With the exception of central government authorities (Annex I of
Directive 2014/24/EU), the Directives do not list the public buyers concerned but provide
general definitions as to which buyers are covered. Depending on whether a public buyer
is a contracting authority or contracting entity, and whether they award a (public)
contract or a concession, different rules apply.
In the Classical Directive, the relevant body means a contracting authority, defined as
the State, regional or local authorities, bodies governed by public law, associations
formed by one or several of such authorities or one or several of such bodies governed by
public law353.
351 See Recital 43 of Directive 2004/28/EC. 352 See Recital 40 of Directive 2004/17/EC. 353 "‘bodies governed by public law’ means bodies that have all of the following characteristics:
(a) they are established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, not having an
industrial or commercial character; (b) they have legal personality; and (c) they are financed, for the most
150
The Utilities and Concessions Directives, on the other hand, applies to bodies,
collectively covered by the term contracting entity. In fact, the Utilities Directive and
the Concessions Directive apply not only to contracting authorities, as just mentioned,
but also to two further categories of entities: public undertakings, defined as "any
undertaking over which the public authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a
dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation therein,
or the rules which govern it"354, and private undertakings, provided these latter exercise
one of the relevant activities on the basis of an exclusive or special right. Exclusive or
special rights are currently defined as rights to "the effect of which is to limit the exercise
[of one of the relevant activities] to one or more entities, and which substantially affects
the ability of other undertakings to carry out such activity on the same territory under
substantially equivalent conditions." It should be stressed that, to constitute special or
exclusive rights within the meaning of the Utilities or Concessions Directive and for the
purpose of determining its scope, it is a further condition that such rights have been
granted otherwise than through a transparent mechanism based on objective, non-
discriminatory criteria which are open to everybody meeting them355. In other words, the
fact that a company holds even an exclusive right to e.g. build and operate an airport is
not in itself sufficient – the exclusivity will be "nullified" if the private company in
question has e.g. won a duly tendered and advertised concessions contract for the
construction and operation of the airport.
The relevant activities or sectors concerned by the Utilities Directive are specifically the
water356, energy357, transport358 and the postal359 services sectors. The Classical and
part, by the State, regional or local authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law; or are subject to
management supervision by those authorities or bodies; or have an administrative, managerial or
supervisory board, more than half of whose members are appointed by the State, regional or local
authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law;". See Article 2(1) point 1 of Directive 2014/24/EU
and the corresponding clarifications set out in its Recital 10. See also the identical provision in Article 3 of
Directive 2014/25/EU and its Recital 12, and almost identical provision in Article 6 of Directive
2014/23/EU and its Recital 21.
According to long-standing jurisprudence these notions must be interpreted functionally. 354 This definition is completed by a list of circumstances under which there is a legal presumption of a
direct or indirect dominant influence. In some ways, the definition of public undertakings can be likened to
that of "body governed by public law" except for the distinguishing fact that public undertakings are
meeting needs in the general interest, which do have an industrial or commercial character. 355 The Utilities Directive, 2014/25/EU, sets this out explicitly in its Article 4(3) and lists the procedures
under other EU legal acts whose application meet these requirements in its Annex II. The Concessions
Directive presents a similar clause under Article 7(2). 356 Provision or operation of fixed networks intended to provide a service to the public in connection with
the production, transport or distribution of drinking water or the supply thereof to such networks. 357 This covers provision or operation of fixed networks intended to provide a service to the public in
connection with the production, transport or distribution of electricity, gas or heat or the supply thereof to
such networks. In this context, the "energy" sector is taken as also comprising "exploitation of a
geographical area for the purpose of exploring for or extracting oil, gas, coal or other solid fuels".
Unlike Directive 2004/17/EC which covered both exploration for and extraction of oil and (natural) gas,
the new Utilities Directive only concerns the extraction of oil and gas, This reduction of the Directive's
scope was decided on the basis of the experience gained through a series of requests for exemption which
had shown that this activity is, as such, fully exposed to competition on markets to which access is not
restricted. 358 Defined as covering the provision or operation of networks providing a service to the public in the field
of transport by railway, automated systems, tramway, trolley bus, bus or cable; In the transport sector in a
broad sense the Utilities Directive also covers the exploitation of a geographical area for the purpose of the
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Concessions Directives however apply to all sectors unless otherwise excluded (e.g. The
Classical Directive does not include defence and security contracts, however concessions
in this area may fall under the scope of Concessions. Similarly, the water sector is
excluded under the Concessions Directive.
In the Utilities’ Directive, it is a further condition that the contracting entity carries out
one of the relevant activities and that the procurement concerned is made for the pursuit
of that activity. In the electricity sector, this would for instance mean that the directive
would apply to above-threshold procurement of not only turbines for the production of
electricity or pylons for a transmission network, but also to the procurement of other
items such as, e.g., protective clothing for the contracting entity's workers, office
furniture for its headquarters, paperclips, coffee to be served at meetings, petrol for
company vehicles, insurance coverage of company property or its employees etc., as long
as it is for the pursuit of that activity.
The design of the public procurement procedures is guided by the general principles of
EU law stemming from the Treaties. This includes notably non-discrimination and
transparency. Therefore, the starting point is that all procurement, which is subject to the
provisions of the Directives, must begin with the publication of some form of notice in
the Official Journal of the EU360. These notices are published electronically, since 2023
through eForms.
There are differences in the notices depending on the type of public buyer: all sub-central
contracting authorities may361 choose between a contract notice and a prior information
notice as a means of calling for competition in respect of all types of public contracts,
Central government authorities however have the possibility of making that choice in
respect of services falling within the light regime for social services, while being obliged
to use a contract notice in respect of all other types of public contracts362 that are subject
to Directive 2014/24/EU. Prior information notices under the Classical Directive function
in the same way as do periodic indicative notices under the Utilities Directive (see
below) when both are used as a call for competition. Contract notices are "ad-hoc"-
notices, i.e. notices that have to be published specifically in connection with one
particular procurement procedure (whether this aims at awarding one single contract,
multiple contracts for multiple lots, a framework agreement, including multiple
framework agreements, or at establishing a dynamic purchasing system). Contract
notices may be used in connection with all types of award procedures, be they open,
provision of airport, maritime or inland port or other terminal facilities to carriers by air, sea or inland
waterway. 359 Coverage of the postal sector under the Utilities Directive was introduced with Directive 2004/17/EC.
The postal sector is considered as comprising "activities relating to the provision of postal services" and,
where provided by an entity which also offers postal services (such as typically distribution of letters), the
provision of certain "other services than postal services", see Art. 13 of Directive 2014/25/EU. To avoid
that contracts awarded in order to provide such other services than postal services fall within the scope of
the Classic Directive, an explicit exclusion from the scope of that Directive was inserted in Article 7 of
Directive 2014/24/EU. 360 Such notices are also published in the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED). 361 Unless the Member State concerned has chosen not to implement this option or restricted it to certain
categories of sub-central contracting authorities. 362 This difference is due to the fact that the GPA does not allow use of a prior information notice as a call
for competition by central government authorities in respect of procurement subject to its provision (but it
doesn't apply to the services falling within the light regime, cf. point 5 below for further details.)
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restricted, competitive procedures with negotiation, competitive dialogues or innovation
partnerships.
For procurements falling within the scope of the Utilities Directive, calls for competition
may take three different forms, namely, contract notices, periodic indicative notices363
and notices on the existence of a qualification system.
In the Utilities Directive, periodic indicative notices can be used by all types of
contracting entities including contracting entities which are central government
authorities, as a means of calling for competition in respect of procurements of any given
type of works, supplies or services that will be procured over a twelve-month period364,
irrespective of the number of individual procurement procedures that will be used for the
purpose. When a periodic indicative notice is the chosen means of calling for
competition, then the specific contract(s) concerned may not be awarded by open
procedures, only by restricted or negotiated procedures or by competitive dialogues in
which participants are chosen among those – and only those – having manifested their
interest in response to the periodic indicative notice. Periodic indicative notices are often
used as a means of calling for competition in respect of repetitive purchases of
homogenous goods, services or works.
Notices on the existence of a qualification system can be used – again by all types of
contracting entities in the Utilities’ sector– as a means of calling for competition in
respect of procurements of any given type of works, supplies or services that will be
procured over the duration of the qualification system, irrespective of the number of
individual procurement procedures that will be used for the purpose. The following
procedure is practically the same as is the case for periodic indicative notices, where a
notice on the existence of a qualification system is the chosen means of calling for
competition. Qualification systems are often used in connection with procurement of
technically exacting works, supplies or services (e. g. railway rolling stock, high pressure
gas pipes etc.).
Transparency is further enhanced by the requirement to publish a contract award notice
after the award of a contract or the conclusion of a framework agreement365. It is
noteworthy that this obligation also applies where the contracts has been awarded
without a call for competition (i. e. without prior publication). Besides, to strengthen the
effectiveness and availability of remedies, there is a minimum of ten days stand-still
period between the communication of the decision to award and the conclusion of the
contract.
363 Periodic indicative notices under the Utilities Directive and Prior Information Notices under Directive
2014/24/EU (and, for that matter, Directive 2014/23/EU) have substantially the same functions (at least for
sub-central contracting authorities). However, the different terminologies are so well established (the "prior
information notice" goes back to Directive 89/440/EEC, whereas "periodic indicative notice" was used
already in Directive 90/531/EEC) that it was decided to leave the difference when negotiating the 2014
Directives. 364 Or a longer period when used for services falling within the light regime. 365 Although Member States may impose an obligation to publish a contract award notice for the individual
contracts based on the framework agreement, grouped on a quarterly basis, the Directive as such does not
impose any such obligation to publish a contract award notice in respect of the individual contracts that are
based on the framework agreement. This is one of the differences between framework agreements and
dynamic purchasing systems: As there are no awards or even conclusions of an agreement following the
publication of a notice to set up a dynamic purchasing system, there is no obligation to publish a contract
award notice at that stage. On the other hand, such obligation does exist in respect of the individual contrac
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It should finally be mentioned that the Directives provide for a sort of "early warning"
system in the form of prior information notices366 which give some information of
planned, future procurement (over the next twelve months) without being used as a
formal call for competition. Such non-binding notices may be published either in the
Official Journal or on the procurer's own website, called a "buyer's profile" in the
Directives. In the latter case, a very short notice (essentially a reference to the publication
on the buyer's profile) must also be published in TED. When the level of information
given is sufficient (and the notice has been published within the prescribed timeframe for
so doing), it may be possible to shorten deadlines applying to the subsequent award
procedures for the announced works, supplies or services.
Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU both contain provisions setting out various
procedures to be used when awarding contracts falling within the scope of the Classical
or Utilities’ Directives subject to the full set of rules. As recalled by the first Recital to
the Classical Directive, the Directives limit themselves to setting a common framework,
they do not harmonise each and every aspect of the various award procedures that are
used at the national level. The procedures of the Directives are the open procedure, the
restricted procedure, the competitive procedure with negotiation (the negotiated
procedure with prior call for competition in the Utilities’ Directive), the competitive
dialogue, the innovation partnership and the negotiated procedure without prior
publication (or without prior call for competition, respectively)367. The Concessions
Directive does not include specific rules on procedures (besides general principles), but
only transparency requirements by means of notices, as described above.
The Classical and Utilities’ Directives both give contracting authorities and entities a free
choice between the open and the restricted procedure. This is, however, not the case for
competitive procedures with negotiation nor competitive dialogues: as one of the major
examples of the additional flexibility that the Utilities Directive provide for, contracting
entities may freely choose to award their contracts by negotiated procedures with prior
call for competition or by a competitive dialogue. Under the Classical Directive, on the
other hand, competitive procedures with negotiation and competitive dialogues may be
used exclusively under the exhaustively listed circumstances set out in its Art. 26(4) of
Directive 2014/24/EU368. Under both Directives, use of the innovation partnership, newly
introduced in 2014, is reserved for cases in which there is a "need for an innovative
product, service or works that cannot be met by purchasing products, services or works
366 Or, under the Utilities Directive, periodic indicative notices. As explained above such notices may - in
addition to a more general "early warning" function - also be used as formal means of calling for
competition. These two distinct functions should be borne in mind when examining a given prior
information notice or a periodic indicative notice. 367 The terminology of the Utilities Directive is slightly different in that it refers to a procedure without
prior call for competition. This difference is mainly historic. Unless otherwise specified, "negotiated
procedure without prior publication " will be used in this Annex also in respect of the just mentioned
corresponding procedure under the Utilities Directive. 368 To simplify, the competitive procedure with negotiation and the competitive dialogues may be used in 5
cases: a) where there is a need for adaptation of readily available solutions; b) the procurement includes
design or innovative solutions; c) there is a need for negotiations because of specific circumstances (nature,
complexity, legal/financial set-up, risks); d) where the technical specifications cannot be set with sufficient
precision by reference to standards etc. and, finally, e) in case of an unsuccessful prior procedure (open or
restricted), i. e. where a previous open or restricted procedure yielded only "irregular" or "unacceptable"
tenders. For full details of the conditions to be met in order to justify the use of a competitive procedure
with negotiation, please see Article 29 of Directive 2014/24/EU.
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already available on the market." Finally, both Directives exhaustively list the cases in
which use of a negotiated procedure without prior publication369 is exceptionally
authorised. Pursuant to longstanding jurisprudence, these cases are to be construed
strictly, and it is incumbent on those who invoke them to prove that this was actually
justified.
The open procedure is the only one-stage procedure in the Directives: the response to the
contract notice is the submission of a full and complete tender, without any intermediary
stages such as a selection of the economic operators who will be authorised to submit a
tender. That is not to say that the aptness to perform the contract concerned of tenderers,
i.e. their technical and economic/financial capacity based on the exclusion grounds and
selection criteria, is not verified in an open procedure; the verification simply takes place
after the tenders have been presented, not prior to that stage370. Following the verification
of the tenderers' suitability, the tenders are then assessed in the light of the previously
stated award criteria.
The 2014 Directives introduced a new measure of flexibility: the possibility, if
implemented in national legislation, to examine the tenders first and only then look at
exclusion and selection criteria (for those having submitted an acceptable tender)371.
Concerning award criteria in particular, it should be noted that in all other procedures
than competitive dialogues and innovation partnerships372 contracting authorities and
entities have a completely free choice between the three ways in which the "most
economically advantageous tender" ("MEAT") may be assessed, namely, on the basis of
a) the price (only), b) cost, using a cost-effectiveness approach such as life-cycle costing,
or c) the best price-quality ratio (BPQR) to be assessed on the basis of award criteria
linked to the subject-matter of the contract. Note that according to longstanding
jurisprudence the rules applicable to award criteria are different from those governing
selection criteria and the two sets of criteria may not be confused, mixed or applied twice
369 To simplify, negotiated procedures without prior publication may be used in 8 groups of cases, that may
be summarized as follows: a) cases in which a prior procedure (with a call for competition) does not yield
any tenders or requests for participation at all or only "unsuitable" ones – this notion is now defined
explicitly in the provision itself; b) cases in which there is only one possible supplier of the goods, works
or services (e.g. because of exclusivity); c) cases of extreme urgency due to force majeure events; d) for
supplies contracts where the products themselves are manufactured purely for the purpose of research or
development; this does not include e.g. procurement of microscopes for a laboratory, unless the microscope
is itself a prototype manufactured to test it; e) certain cases of additional deliveries; f) purchases on
commodity markets or under certain exceptionally advantageous circumstances; g) services contracts
which must be awarded to (one of) the winner(s) of a preceding design contest; and, finally, h) certain
cases of repetitions, in which an original project was regularly tendered with an explicit condition that
(certain of) the works or services might be repeated. For full details of the conditions to be met in order to
justify use of a negotiated procedure without prior publication, please see Articles 32 and 50 of,
respectively, Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU. 370 Whether carried out during the same stage of an award procedure or during different stages, the rules for
each stay the same, respectively. 371 See Art. 56(2) and Art. 76(7) of, respectively, Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU. 372 In competitive dialogues and in innovation partnerships, the award criterion must necessarily be the best
price-quality ratio (BPQR), see among others the last sentences of Art. 30(1) and Art. 31(1) of Directive
2014/24/EU (corresponding to the last sentences of Art. 48(1) and 49(1) of Directive 2014/25/EU).
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(professional capacities and experiences of the specific team proposed in the tender to
perform the contract may however be a suitable award criterion)373.
Exclusion grounds are divided into obligatory and non-mandatory exclusion criteria; the
obligatory clauses concern cases of final convictions for certain serious crimes
(corruption, participation in criminal organisation, fraud or money laundering; terrorist
offences and child labour and other forms of trafficking; as cases of final decisions
(judicial or administrative) establishing breaches of obligations of payment of taxes and
social contribution on the other). These criteria are obligatory for all contracting
authorities, including when they act as contracting entities. However, for the other groups
of contracting entities (public undertakings and private undertakings, the latter having
special or exclusive rights) their use is voluntary, as they may not necessarily have access
to the information needed to verify these criteria.
The non-obligatory exclusion criteria concern various situations that render the economic
operator unable or unsuited for the task (such as bankruptcy, non-compliance with
obligations relating to payment of taxes or social security contributions before the
breaches have been established by final decision, convictions of offences affecting the
professional conduct - e. g. for breach of environmental legislation or labour laws- or
where the economic operator has lied to the procurers)374. The Utilities Directive
provides that the objective rules and criteria, which are used under qualification systems
or for the selection of participants may include the just mentioned exclusion criteria of
the Classical Directive375; however, as mentioned earlier, contracting entities which are
contracting authorities are obliged to assess the obligatory exclusion criteria of Directive
2014/24/EU for voluntary exclusions. Under the Concessions Directive, both contracting
authorities and entities shall apply the mandatory exclusion criteria, and retain discretion
with regards to the optional grounds, as under the Classical Directive376.
In addition to the exclusion criteria as described above, a number of sectorial acts have
introduced additional exclusion grounds. These are described under “what to buy” below.
Selection criteria are criteria aimed at ensuring that economic operators have the
required minimum levels of technical, financial and economic capacities, that they are
enrolled in relevant professional or trade register and that, in respect of service contracts,
they hold appropriate authorisations etc. Contracting authorities must set out beforehand
- in the contract notice (or, where the call for competition was a prior information notice,
in the invitation to confirm interest) which level of capacity is required, bearing in mind
that these must be related and proportionate to the subject-matter of the contract.
Concerning in particular the financial capacity, it should be noted that any requirements
of a minimum turn-over must be limited377, except in duly justified cases, to at the most
twice the estimated contract value.
Compliance with the required minimum levels is initially assessed on the basis of the
information (the preliminary evidence) contained in the European Single Procurement
373 This is explicitly confirmed in the 2014 Directives, cf. Article 67(2)(b) and Article 82(2)(b) of,
respectively, Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/15/EU. See also, respectively, Recitals 94 and 99. 374 For full details, see Art. 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU. 375 See Article 80 of Directive 2014/25/EU. 376 See Article 38 Directive 2014/23/EU. 377 See Article 58(3)(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 80(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU.
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Document (ESPD). This may be further verified during the procedure378. The
contracting authority must verify both the exclusion and the selection criteria as they
apply to the "winning" bidder by requesting the full set of up-to-date supporting
documents. Which documents are concerned is established in the light of the specific
provisions of the Directive on the (types of) documents that may be required as proof.
These shall "primarily" be the types of documentary evidences that are introduced in e-
Certis, the online repository for documentary evidence operated by the Commission379.
The Utilities Directive does not regulate these matters to the same degree of details; the
selection of economic operators under this Directive must solely be carried out on the
basis of objective rules and criteria which are available to interested economic operators.
Similarly, the Concessions Directive only indicates that the conditions for participation
shall relate to the professional, technical and financial standing of economic operators,
and that these shall be related and proportionate to the contract380.
In addition to the procedures described above, the Classical and Utilities Directives also
include a series of techniques or specific procedural tools that can be used in the context
of award procedures, notably: framework agreements and DPS. These options are not
mentioned in the Concessions directive381.
Framework agreements are a contractual tool typically used to set the conditions for a
series of individual purchases, often from more than one economic operator. According
to the type of framework agreement, the conditions which apply to the individual
procurements pursuant to the agreement are set out either in the framework agreement
itself or in the contracts that are based on it382. From the procedural point of view,
framework agreements may be set up using any of the freely available or justified award
procedures described above. Where (all) the conditions governing the individual
procurements pursuant to the agreement have not been set in the framework agreement
itself and the framework agreement has been concluded with more than one economic
operator, contracts based on it are concluded through a mini-competition amongst all
those who are parties to it383. Framework agreements thus constitute a "closed system",
available only to those who were parties to it from the outset (i.e. there is no possibility
378 See Article 59(4)(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU. 379 See Article 61 of Directive 2014/24/EU. 380 See Article 38(1) of Directive 2014/23/EU. 381 The Directives also include rules on other instruments such as electronic auctions, electronic catalogues,
etc. 382 The initial tenders are thus either fully binding if the contracting authority has stipulated that all
conditions will be fixed in the agreement itself. If not, then they are binding as far as certain conditions are
concerned and non-binding in respect of the conditions which the contracting authorities have stipulated
will be the subject of the subsequent mini-competitions. Article 33(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU has added a
third possibility: the contracting authority may indicate from the beginning that while the conditions are
binding as a starting point, they (or some of them) may nevertheless be subject to reopened competition in
specific cases, which must be defined from the beginning through objective criteria. An example might be
that individual, specific contract worth e. g. less than 50 000€ would be awarded according to the terms and
conditions established directly in the framework agreement itself – without reopening the competition, that
is - to one of the economic operators who are parties to the framework agreement and who is identified in
accordance with the previously established objective criteria for so doing. Individual, specific contracts
worth more than 50 000€ would on the contrary be awarded to the party to the framework agreement
having submitted the winning tender in the reopened competition. 383 Under the Directive 2014/25/EU, the individual contracts based on a framework agreement shall be
"awarded on the basis of objective rules and criteria, which may include reopening the competition among
those economic operators party to the framework agreement as concluded", cf. Article 50(2).
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of the agreement being used by contracting authorities not included from the start, just as
no new economic operators may enter the agreements)384. Their duration is normally
limited to four years385.
DPS are an entirely electronic system that may be used in connection with repetitive
purchases of "off-the-shelf" goods or services. They are used to set up a - continuously
open and accessible - list of qualified suppliers among whom the contracts for the
specific deliveries will be awarded over the system's duration. Procedurally, three
different stages can be distinguished, namely, setting up the system,
maintaining/updating it and making the specific purchases. To set up a DPS, the only
available procedure is the restricted procedure, in which the requests for participation are
examined as described above. If no exclusion criteria apply and the selection criteria are
met, then the economic operator will be enrolled into the system.
The system must be open for access (by means of a request for participation as in any
restricted procedure) at any moment during its period of validity; this is ensured through
the so-called "permanent publication". Contracting authorities dispose of a period of ten
working days386 to evaluate the request for participation; when the system is first set up,
the period used for the evaluation of requests for participation may be prolonged (even
further) as long as no invitations to tender are sent (i.e. as long as no specific contracts
are being launched). Once the invitations to tender for the first specific contracts have
been sent, new requests for participation will no longer trigger a "blocking period" –
contracting authorities may go on with the award of specific contracts without having to
await that the assessment of new requests for participation is finished387. The
consequences for the economic operators are limited – once they have been admitted to
the system (after an assessment which may at the most take 15 working days) they have a
right to be invited to tender for all subsequent specific procurements under the DPS over
its entire period of validity, which is not limited to any maximum period.
Lastly, when it comes to define the subject-matter of the contract, the Directives
contain provisions on technical specifications, labels and means of proof.
An important place in the Directives is given to the provisions on technical
specifications388, that is, the requirements of a more technical nature389 that must be met
by the works, goods or services which are the subject-matter of the contract. Since the
adoption of the 2004 Directives390, contracting authorities and entities have had a
384 i. e. there is no possibilities of the agreement being used by contracting authorities not included from the
start, just as no new economic operators may enter the agreements. 385 In the case of Directive 2014/25/EU, the corresponding period is eight years, cf. its Article 51(1). 386 Which may be prolonged to 15 working days, cf. Article 34(5) of Directive 2014/24/EU and the
corresponding Article 52(5) of Directive 2014/25/EU. 387 Due to the permanent publication, new requests for participation may both de jure and de facto be
submitted at any time. Were they to trigger a "blocking period" then the actual use of the DPS for specific
procurement could risk being paralysed and totally unmanageable. 388 Recitals 74 – 77 and 97, Articles 42 - 44 and Annex VII of Directive 2014/24/EU, Recitals 83 – 86 and
102, Articles 60 - 62 and Annex VIII in Directive 2014/25/EU. 389 Annex VII to Directive 2014/24/EU and I of Directive 2014/25/EU define technical specifications in a
quite broad way, which includes aspects such as the environmental performance levels, design and costing
of works, marking and labelling, user instructions, production processes at any stage of the life cycle… 390 The 1988, 1989, 1992 and 1993 Directives all provided for an obligation to refer to standards and other
technical references implementing European ones, with the possibility to derogate from this obligation in
duly justified cases. In the absence of European standards, there was a preference for references, in order of
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completely free choice between two main methods of defining their technical
specifications, namely, either by reference to European standards (as implemented
through national standards) or other technical references, such as European technical
assessments, that are issued by European standardisation bodies (e. g. CEN,
CENELEC391) or in terms of performance or functional requirements, including
environmental characteristics. The uptake of functional requirements has however been
limited. It is also possible to combine these two basic methods, for instance by defining
certain characteristics by reference to a European standard and others in terms of
performance, perhaps adding in the latter case that goods or services that conform to, e.
g., the chosen common technical specification referred to are presumed to meet the
performance or functionality requirements.
The Directives set out a series of explicit, general requirements for the use of labels in the
context of public procurement: the label requirements392 must be linked to the subject-
matter (as defined, in respect of award criteria393), they must be appropriate to define the
required characteristics, be based on objectively verifiable and non-discriminatory
criteria and the label itself must be adopted in an open and transparent manner, be
accessible to all interested parties and, finally, the label requirements must be set by a
third party over which the economic operator applying for the label cannot exercise a
decisive influence.
In case a given label meets the just-mentioned requirements and, in addition, each and
every one of its label requirements are linked to the subject-matter and appropriate, then
the Directives offer contracting authorities an easy way to define their technical
specifications: they do so by requiring that the products, services or works concerned
have a specific label. However, they must also accept all (other) "labels that confirm that
the works, supplies or services meet equivalent label requirements." Furthermore, where
an economic operator demonstrably had "no possibility of obtaining the specific label
indicated by the contracting authority or an equivalent label within the relevant time
limits for reasons that are not attributable to that economic operator" then that economic
operator may use "other appropriate means of proof" (e.g. a technical dossier from the
manufacturer) to prove that the goods, services or works meet the requirements394.
preference, to national standards implementing international ones, other national standards and, finally, any
other standards. See e.g. Article 8 of Directive 88/295/EEC. This obligation is still present in some national
systems. 391 Comité Européen de Normalisation, the European Committee for Standardisation; Comité Européen de
Normalisation Electrotechnique, the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 392 In the 2014 Directives, the "label requirements" are defined as "the requirements to be met by the
works, products, services, processes or procedures in question in order to obtain the label concerned",
whereas term "label" is defined generically as "any document, certificate or attestation confirming that the
works, products, services, processes or procedures in question meet certain requirements;". See Article 2(1)
points 23 and 24 of Directive 2014/24/EU and the identical definitions in Article 2, points 19 and 20 of
Directive 2014/25/EU. 393 See Article 67(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU, and identically, in Article 82(3) of Directive 2014/25/EU. 394 See Article 43(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU and the identical Article 61(1) of Directive 2014/25/EU. It
may in some cases be materially impossible to obtain a given (or an equivalent) label within the time limits
applicable in a specific procurement procedure - contracting authorities have the possibility easily to obtain
trustworthy information on the average time needed through the Procurement Module of the Internal
Market Information System (IMI).
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In case a given label meets the above-mentioned general requirements, but not all of its
label requirements are linked to the subject-matter and appropriate395 contracting
authorities may copy-paste the relevant label requirements (those which are linked and
appropriate) into the technical specifications with the clarification that products, services
or works having the label concerned thereby prove that they meet the requirement
concerned396.
Assessing whether a given solution is – or it is not – technically equivalent to another can
be a difficult task that in particular smaller contracting authorities may find difficult to
handle. The Directives consequently offer them the possibility to require that tenders be
accompanied by third-party verified evidence attesting conformity with the applicable
requirements or criteria. It is worth noting that this possibility applies to criteria or
requirements set out not only in the technical specifications but also in the award criteria
or contract performance clauses397. Here as well, if the economic operator demonstrably
did not have the time to obtain the required third-party certification, then he may as
described above fall back on other appropriate means of proof.
Finally, it should also be recalled that the Directives398 provide for a general prohibition
against among others designing a procurement in such a way as to "artificially narrowing
competition.
With regards to joint procurement, the starting point is that nothing in the Directives
prevents contracting authorities or entities to purchase jointly399 (e.g. Article 38 Directive
2014/24/EU). When making use of this possibility occasionally, the Directives include
clarification as to how and who needs to fulfil transparency obligation.
In the event that public buyers want to establish a more recurrent way to purchase
together, they may have recourse to the formation of central purchasing bodies (CPBs).
CPBs are contracting authorities which either act as wholesalers (i. e. buy, stock and sell
on to other contracting authorities) or as intermediaries (i. e. award contracts or conclude
framework agreements that will be used by other contracting authorities)400. If a CPB is
used, the Directives do not apply to contracts awarded by a contracting authority or a
contracting entity to a central purchasing body, provided that the central purchasing body
has itself complied with the Classical or the Utilities Directives.
395 Some of the label requirements might, for instance, require the economic operator to have a certain
corporate social responsibility policy in place or, in a Fairtrade-like context, require construction of
primary schools in coffee-growing districts. 396 For additional information on environmental requirements, see e.g.
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/index_en.htm. 397 See Article 44 and Recitals 74 and 75 of Directive 2014/24/EU or the equivalent provisions of Article
62 and Recitals 83 and 85 of Directive 2014/25/EU. Examples might be third-party certification that a
diesel motor is in conformity with Euro 5/6 standards as required in the technical specifications and that the
lower emission levels offered is indeed accurate and in conformity with the criteria for obtaining additional
points under the award criteria. 398 See the second subparagraph of Article 18(1) for Directive 2014/24/EU and the corresponding provision
of the second subparagraph of Article 36(1) of Directive 2014/25/EU. 399 See e.g. Article 38 of Directive 2014/24/EU. 400 See Article 2(14) to (16) and Article 37 of Directive 2014/24/EU. It should be noted that the definition
in Art. 2(12) of Directive 2014/25/EU has been broadened compared to those of Directive 2004/17/EC so
that all categories of contracting entities may be "central purchasing bodies" (not only contracting
authorities but also public undertakings or private undertakings, the latter operating on the basis of a
special or exclusive right). The contracting authority in question may or may not itself exercise one of the
relevant activities.
160
Furthermore, in light of the number of sectorial acts that include provisions on joint
procurement including the EU institutions401, it should be noted that under the Directives,
EU institutions are not contracting authorities or entities, and as such, they cannot act as
CPBs under the Directives and benefit from the wholesaler exception. This situation does
not however preclude Member States from participating in procurement by the EU
institutions (which generally falls under the Financial Regulation402, not the Directives).
Ad Section 5.1 - Dynamic baseline
Currently, there are around 123 eProcurement platforms operating across the EU to
facilitate business interactions between buyers and suppliers403. Buyers prepare and
encode data and publish notices (eForms) via their eProcurement service provider on
TED. Suppliers find procurement opportunities on TED or national portals and are
redirected to the buyer’s system to access necessary documents, ask questions and submit
tenders. Additionally, suppliers respond to eligibility criteria through the ESPD to self-
declare their eligibility, while buyers assess certifications after bid submission. In case it
is a cross-border supplier, buyers use eCertis to assess the equivalence of evidence
provided in the other country.
Due to the fragmentation of eProcurement services, tenderers, especially SMEs, face
significant challenges when participating EU-wide. Bidders are often required to submit
tenders through multiple platforms, each with distinct interfaces and procedural
requirements. This not only increases the administrative burden and reduces efficiency
but also limits cross-border participation. SMEs are particularly affected, as they
typically lack the capacity and technical resources to manage this variety of systems,
putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Table 20 below presents the situation as
reported by MS.
Table 20: Number of eProcurement services by Member State
Countries Number of
eProcurement services
Sum
BG, CY, EE, HR, HU, IE,
LT, LU, LV, MT, RO
1 11 (11 x 1)
BE, EL, FI, NL, PL, PT, SE,
SI
2 to 5 16 (8 x 2)
AT, CZ, DK 6 to 11 18 (3 x 6)
ES, FR, SK 12 to 20 36 (3 x 12)
DE, IT 21 and more 42 (2 x 21)
Total Min. 123
401 E.g.: Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022
on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU (Text with EEA
relevance) PE/40/2022/REV/1, OJ L 314, 6.12.2022, pp. 26–63. 402 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September
2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. 403 In-house information collected during bilateral workshops with the Member States.
161
Source: DG GROW
Table 21: Overview of current eProcurement costs for the European Commission [EUR 000]
Root causes Component Y0 - 2026 2026-
2032
Fragmented eProcurement ecosystem Standards 320 320
OP services 10 205 65 490
Absence of a once-only principle eCertis 250 1 600
ESPD 390 2 510
Insufficient data governance, lifecycle
monitoring
PPDS 1 500 9 630
Horizontal eProcurement support team 800 6 220
Total 13 465 85 770
Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options …., p. xx. Table 22: Overview of average costs for one eProcurement Service Provider [EUR 000]
Root causes
addressed
Component Y0 - 2026 2026-2032
Fragmented
eProcurement
ecosystem
Standards 0 130
National eProcurement
system
2 200 14 250
eProcurement network 0 10
Total 2 200 14 390
Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options …., p. XX. Table 23: Overview of average costs for Member State [EUR 000]
Root causes
addressed
Component Y0 - 2026 2026-2032
Insufficient data
governance,
lifecycle monitoring
National data space EUR 0 EUR 1 610
Total EUR 0 EUR 1 610
Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options …., p. XX. Table 24: Overview of average costs for one Contracting Authority [EUR 000]
Categories 2026-2032
Human resources EUR 193
Total per CA EUR 193
Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options …., p. XX. Table 25: Overview of average costs for one Economic Operator [EUR 000]
Categories 2026-2032
Human resources EUR 293
Platform subscription EUR 25
Total per EO EUR 318
Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options …., p. XX.
162
Ad Section 5.2.1 and 2 – Negotiations in public procurement
Under the current Directives, access to negotiation varies:
Directive 2014/23/EU does not include any specific procedure, so it is understood that
negotiation is always available.
Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU both give public buyers a free choice between
the open and the restricted procedure. This is, however, not the case for competitive
procedures with negotiation (negotiated procedures with prior calls for competition) nor
competitive dialogues: as one of the major examples of the additional flexibility that the
Utilities Directive provide for, public buyers may freely choose to award their contracts
by negotiated procedures with prior call for competition or by a competitive dialogue.
Under the Classic Directive, on the other hand, competitive procedures with negotiation
and competitive dialogues may be used exclusively under the circumstances set out in the
Directives: a) where there is a need for adaptation of readily available solutions; b) the
procurement includes design or innovative solutions; it should be noted that the reference
to "design" means that all works contracts whose subject-matter include "both the design
and execution" of works or a work as defined in Article 2(1)(6) will be eligible for
competitive procedures with negotiation or competitive dialogues; c) there is a need for
negotiations because of specific circumstances (nature, complexity, legal/financial set-up,
risks); d) where the technical specifications cannot be set with sufficient precision by
reference to standards etc. and, finally, e) in case of an unsuccessful prior procedure
(open or restricted), i. e. where a previous open or restricted procedure yielded only
"irregular" or "unacceptable" tenders.
Since Directive 2014/24/EU provides for identical conditions for the use of competitive
procedures with negotiation and competitive dialogues, public buyers have an entirely
free choice between the two.
Under both Directives, the use of the new innovation partnership is reserved for cases in
which there is a “need for an innovative product, service or works that cannot be met by
purchasing products, services or works already available on the market”.
The competitive procedure with negotiation404
This procedure involves a first stage in which the economic operators, who have
requested to participate in the procedure, are selected in the same way and on the basis of
the same documentation as in restricted procedures. It is possible to limit the number of
candidates that a public buyer intends to invite to participate in the negotiations with a
minimum of three participants. Public buyers may announce beforehand that they intend
to gradually reduce the number of tenders to be negotiated. This further reduction during
the negotiations is carried out by application of the award criteria, bearing in mind that,
“in the final stage, the number arrived at shall make for genuine competition in so far as
there are enough tenders, solutions or qualified candidates”.
Substantial negotiations may405 take place, except in respect of the final tenders, in order
to “improve the content” of the tenders. Public buyers, however, must set out minimum
404 Also known as ‘negotiated procedure with call for competition’ under Directive 2014/25/EU.
163
requirements, which together with the award criteria are non-negotiable. According to
Recital 45, negotiations “may concern all characteristics of the purchased works, supplies
and services including, for instance, quality, quantities, commercial clauses as well as
social, environmental and innovative aspects, in so far as they do not constitute minimum
requirements”.
The competitive dialogue
This procedure involves a first stage in which the economic operators, who have
requested to participate in the procedure, are selected in the same way and on the basis of
the same documentation as for restricted procedures. Just as is the case for the other
multiple (i.e. two or more) stage procedures (restricted procedures, competitive
procedures with negotiation and innovation partnerships), it is also possible to limit the
number of candidates that a public buyer intends to invite to participate in the dialogue.
As under the competitive procedure with negotiation, the minimum number is three. As
in the competitive procedure with negotiation, public buyers can announce in the tender
notice that they intend to gradually reduce the number of solutions to be discussed during
the dialogue stage. Further reduction during the dialogue is carried out by application of
the award criteria, bearing in mind that, in “the final stage, the number arrived at shall
make for genuine competition in so far as there are enough tenders, solutions or qualified
candidates”406. The main characteristic of a competitive dialogue is of course that it
includes a dialogue stage “to identify and define the means best suited to satisfying their
needs. [Public Buyers] may discuss all aspects of the contract with the chosen candidates
during this dialogue”. Other than this step, the competitive dialogue is virtually identical
to the competitive procedure with negotiation.
The innovation partnership
As already mentioned, the innovation partnership is only allowed in cases in which there
is a “need for an innovative product, service or works that cannot be met by purchasing
products, services or works already available on the market”.
Procedurally, it is based closely on the rules applicable to the competitive procedure with
negotiation, with, however, a series of particularities. These are necessary on the one
hand because of the innovative subject-matter (e.g. the only admissible award criterion in
an innovation partnership is the best-price quality ratio, selection criteria shall in
particular focus on the candidates' “capacity in the field of research and development and
of developing and implementing innovative solutions”) and on the other because the
contract will cover both the R&D stage and the (possible) subsequent (mass)-production
of the innovative work, service or product. This latter aspect implies among other that, to
avoid technological “lock-ins”, an innovation partnership may be conducted with more
than one economic operator. Another particularity of the innovation partnership is the
obligation to structure it in successive phases, in accordance with previously agreed
performance levels, maximum costs, intermediary targets and agreed partial payments.
At the end of each phase, the public buyer may decide to end the innovation partnership
or to reduce the number of partners.
405 Public buyers may also reserve their right to award the contract to one of the initial tenders without
negotiations taking place. 406 This caveat does not apply to Utilities.
164
Negotiation under FLX.1
Under FLX.1 a targeted amendment of the current Directives is proposed to attain
simplification and to provide greater flexibility to public buyers. To provide public
buyers with greater flexibility to negotiate, this option would entail an amendment of
Article 26 paragraph 2 of Directive 2014/24/EU to include the reference to competitive
procedure with negotiation. Paragraph 4 would see the reference to competitive
procedure with negotiation removed. In terms of coherence, this amendment would mean
that Article 26 Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 44 Directive 2014/25/EU would be
aligned when it comes to the choice of procedures.
Negotiation under FLX.2
To simplify the rules, the current open and negotiated procedures would be merged into a
new open procedure with negotiation that would allow public authorities to have the
flexibility to negotiate wherever they wish to do so. It is important to consider that this
proposal comes hand in hand with a merger of the three Directives, whereby in two of
them public buyers have unconditional access to negotiations.
The new proposed procedure would follow a modular logic, allowing public buyers to
decide whether or not in each case they intend to negotiate, and, if they wish to do so,
which non-essential aspects of the contract could potentially be subject to negotiation. To
avoid that economic operators would present sub-optimal offers with the intention to
negotiate these “upwards” during the procurement procedure, it would be clarified that -
same as in the current negotiated procedure- public buyers may always award the
contract after receiving the first round of offers. However, public buyers that have not
indicated their intention to negotiate would not be able to do so.
Public buyers would have to -in addition to the intention or not to negotiate- make their
needs known in the contract notice by describing the subject matter of the contract, the
minimum requirements that the contract would have to fulfil, as well as under which
parameters will quality in the offer be assessed (see Ad Section 5.2.3. below) and which
selection criteria needs to be fulfilled by economic operators.
Economic operators will be asked to submit their initial offer together with their business
wallet to ascertain compliance with selection criteria and lack of exclusion grounds. Once
the economic operator is considered suitable to possibly performing the contract, public
buyers would check the initial offer.
If, after examining the initial offer against the minimum requirements, public buyers
consider that the offers can be improved, they may conduct rounds of negotiations with
all economic operators, which would be limited in time to prevent one economic operator
from having greater access to a public buyer than other, or to have more time to improve
their offer. Public Buyers would have to keep a record of these negotiations, which
would have to be available equally to all economic operators. Once a public buyer has
conducted a round of negotiations with an economic operator, it may either open a new
round of negotiations by inviting economic operators to improve their offers; to reduce
the number of participants ahead of a new round of negotiations; or, to invite economic
operators to submit their final offers to proceed to the award of the contract.
165
Ad Section 5.2.3 - Level of quality weighting
As far as establishing an appropriate minimum level of quality weighting is concerned,
30% was proposed407 as it would maintain flexibility for contracting authorities to apply
higher weightings where this is likely to deliver genuine qualitative improvements, while
not imposing excessive weight on quality when not necessary. It is essential to propose a
balanced approach where BPQR does not prevent price to still be a decisive factor and
that public buyers can still proceed price-only awards in justified scenarios, for example
when high quality standards have been already incorporated in technical specifications.
Where quality considerations are assigned too little weight in the evaluation of tenders,
competition will be driven predominantly by price, potentially incentivising lower
quality or performance and undermining the objective of securing the most economically
advantageous tender in terms of the optimal balance between price and quality.
Conversely, excessively high weighting of quality criteria may also produce unintended
effects. Where the weighting of qualitative elements is set at a level that exceeds the
realistic scope for differentiation between tenders, contracting authorities may be
required to design evaluation criteria that disproportionately reward relatively minor
differences between offers, amplifying marginal distinctions that have limited practical
impact on the performance of the contract. This may lead tenderers to incur additional
costs in order to differentiate their bids in ways that are rewarded under the scoring
methodology, resulting in higher contract prices without a corresponding improvement in
substantive quality.
Some jurisdictions have experience with BPQR: In Norway, contracting authorities shall
give a minimum of 30% weight to climate and environmental considerations408. This has
resulted in approximately 76% of procurements in 2025 including either environmental
requirements or environmental considerations weighted in the award criteria409. In
Poland, a 60% price cap applies to most procurements and public buyers410 and resulted
in effectively increasing the number of contracts awarded using BPQR. In the
Netherlands, the percentage of tenders for major construction and infrastructure contracts
awarded based on lowest price decreased from 70% in 2008 to 22% in 2021411, after the
introduction of compulsory BQPR with a comply or explain mechanism in 2013.
Introducing an elevated minimum quality award criteria share of 50% for labour-
intensive contracts would align with the approach taken in some Member States, such as
Italy that has a 30% price cap412. Four out of five respondents that agreed in the public
consultation that SRPP should further integrate mandatory elements, showed support for
banning price-only awards in labour intensive sectors (or 39% of all respondents), the
preferred option among all presented. It would reduce the risk of competition negatively
affecting salaries and working conditions, while also allowing companies to differentiate
407 Setting a 30% minimum quality threshold would align with established practices in other jurisdictions,
such as Norway’s 30% compulsory weighting for climate and environmental considerations, or Poland’s
60% cap on price weighting in most of cases (or, conversely, 40% minimum quality). 408 Regulation of 12 August 2016 No. 974 on Public Procurement (Norway) (anskaffelsesforskriften) s 7-9. 409 Statistics on climate and environmental considerations in public procurement (Statistikk om klima- og
miljøhensyn i offentlige anskaffelser | Anskaffelser.no) 410 Polish Public Procurement Law of 11 September 2019 (Journal of Laws 2019, item 2019, as amended),
arts 4 and 246. 411 Schotanus, Fredo. (2024). On what basis to award public contracts. 412 Article 108 of Decreto Legislativo 31 March 2023, No. 36 (Italian Public Procurement Code).
166
themselves based on the quality of the services they provide. Social partners from the
cleaning, security and catering sectors (all of them labour-intensive industries), released
joint statements413 by trade unions and employers’ representatives supporting BPQR.
Finally, although some empirical evidence suggests that BPQR leads to higher prices of
the goods, services or works purchased414, other studies argue that while lowest-price
procedures can attract bids averaging around 13% below initial cost estimates, such gains
frequently dissipate during project implementation: projects awarded on lowest price end
up costing 6% more than agreed (meaning that at least half of the costs savings from
lower winning prices are lost because of ex post renegotiation) and almost 1 out of 3
projects end up being delivered later than agreed415. The compulsory use of BPQR would
contribute to a change of paradigm by better pricing in of long-term effects and
sustainable savings rather than prioritising short-term savings (where quality award
criteria are defined accordingly).
Environmental change, digital transformation, and social challenges are tightly
interconnected, and this interconnectedness carries important implications for public
procurement strategies.53. Policymakers and public procurement experts must navigate
inherent trade-offs, as objectives such as technological innovation, environmental
sustainability, and social protection may at times appear competing or even mutually
exclusive. Recognizing and managing these tensions is essential for developing coherent,
balanced procurement approaches that address multiple policy goals. Because these
policy goals are inherently interconnected, and often in tension, public buyers need a
meaningful degree of discretion when defining award criteria in procurement procedures.
First, the balancing of competing objectives such as environmental sustainability, digital
innovation, and social inclusion is ultimately a political choice. These trade-offs reflect
societal priorities, budgetary constraints, and policy preferences, which vary across local
contexts. Given that much public procurement is funded and implemented at regional or
local level, it is appropriate that these decisions are taken as close as possible to the
communities affected. Local contracting authorities are better placed to determine how to
weigh, for example, climate performance against social outcomes or cost efficiency, in
line with local democratic mandates and needs. Second, discretion allows public buyers
to tailor procurement strategies to the specific circumstances of each contract and to
identify where the most meaningful intersections between policy objectives lie. Rather
than applying one-size-fits-all criteria, contracting authorities need flexibility to design
award criteria that reflect the actual needs of users and stakeholders, the characteristics of
the market, and the practical opportunities for combining environmental, digital, and
social goals. This adaptability is essential to ensure that procurement not only complies
with overarching policy ambitions but also delivers effective and context-sensitive
outcomes on the ground.
Cross-sector joint statement from EU social partners calls for quality-based, legally sound public
procurement (https://www.uni-europa.org/news/cross-sector-joint-statement-from-eu-social-partners-calls-
for-quality-based-legally-sound-public-procurement/) 414 Titl, V., & Schotanus, F. D. I. (2025). Analysis effects of various pricing models: More lowest price
tenders can save more than €500 million annually [Literature research]. Utrecht University Center for
Public Procurement. 415 Decarolis, F. (2014). Awarding price, contract performance, and bids screening: Evidence from
procurement auctions. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6(1), 108–132
167
Ad Section 5.2.3 - Visualisation of the procedural setup for BPQR
Figure 20: Procurement process with safeguards guaranteeing oversight and accountability in award decisions based
on BPQR
Source: In-house analysis
Ad Section 5.2.3 - Subcontracting, additional data on the impacts on SMEs
The association between subcontracting arrangements and SME access varies across
sectors. In non-LSLI sectors, contracts not involving subcontracting show a predicted
SME award probability of approximately 57.0%. Where subcontracting is expected, this
probability increases to around 60.9% (+3.9 p.p.), suggesting that subcontracting can
facilitate SME participation in these markets. In LSLI sectors, the pattern differs. When
subcontracting is not foreseen, the predicted probability of SME award is about 54.8%,
declining slightly to around 53.6% (-1.2 p.p.) when subcontracting is expected. These
findings indicate that subcontracting plays different roles across sectoral contexts: it is
associated with improved SME access in non-LSLI activities, while in labour-intensive
sectors it is linked to a modest reduction in the likelihood of SMEs acting as main
contractors.
Ad Section 6.1 – Overview of the positive and negative impacts for public buyers
and innovative suppliers of different IPR allocations
Positive and negative impacts for Public Buyer
168
Positive Negative
IPR remain
with the public
buyers
Innovative solutions are funded
with taxpayers’ money, public
buyers should be able to
maximise their value and long-
term public benefit on an
individual basis. Appropriate
IPR provisions are essential to
safeguard critical public services
and infrastructure.
Public buyers get offered only
second-best solutions because
suppliers need to retain ownership
of their best technologies to
preserve their competitive
advantage. This can also lead to
higher prices in procurement offers.
IPR remain
with the
supplier
-This approach can help increase
SME participation in public
procurement, support innovative
businesses in scaling and
growing, and ultimately allow
public buyers to benefit from
more mature and market-ready
innovative solutions.
A key downside is that, and only in
the case of critical public tasks and
infrastructure, public buyers may
become dependent on negotiations
with private operators to access,
adapt or continue using innovative
solutions.
Positive and negative impacts for innovative suppliers
Positive Negative
IPR remain
with the public
buyers
For suppliers, retaining IPR can
create stronger commercial
incentives, including the ability
to protect their most advanced
solutions and maintain their
competitive edge. They offer
therefore their second-best
solution as a strategy. Another
strategy for suppliers is that they
increase their value of the IPR in
the price of their bid
Transferring or sharing IPR can
raise important concerns, including
the risk of leakage of proprietary
know-how, legal uncertainty
regarding the value and future
exploitation of product lines, and
limitations on reusing solutions
across different public
procurements. In some cases,
protecting core business interests
may even discourage companies
from participating in tenders
altogether.
IPR remain
with the
supplier
Companies retain governance
over strategic assets that are
essential for scaling and growth.
This approach can also provide
greater legal certainty and make
it easier for businesses to
participate in cross-border
procurement opportunities when
public buyers apply more
standardised approaches across
None
169
different Member States.
Ad Section 6.2 - BPQR requirements (potential economic effects)
To analyse the effect of BPQR requirements on prices, a useful theoretical framework is
provided by Estache and Iimi (2012)416, where tender prices are determined by two
components: a direct effect, reflecting the impact of higher quality requirements on costs,
and an indirect effect, operating mainly through changes in competition. Formally:
Tender price = Direct quality effect + Indirect competition effect
The direct effect captures whether higher quality requirements lead to higher production
costs and therefore higher bids, while the indirect effect reflects how BPQR criteria
influence bidder participation, with reduced competition increasing prices.
Direct effect of increased production costs
A simple framework can be used to illustrate the direct effect of BPQR requirements on
bid prices. Let pi denote the bid submitted by firm i. Prices are assumed to be set as a
mark-up over production costs:
= (1 + μ) ()
where μi denotes the markup, capturing the degree of competition in the tender, and ci (q)
is the cost function of firm i, which depends on the required quality level q. Holding
competition constant (for a given μi), an increase in quality requirements under BPQR
leads to higher production costs and therefore higher bid prices. This constitutes the
direct cost channel through which BPQR can affect procurement price.
There is limited empirical evidence on the direct effect, but some existing research
suggests that the direct effect between quality and price is limited. Arai (2021)417, using
panel data and regression analysis for Japanese civil engineering and construction
procurement (2007–2018), finds no large correlation between bid prices and quality
outcomes, indicating that higher quality does not necessarily require proportionally
higher prices. We further explore this issue in the subsequent sub-sections.
Competition effect and number of bids
A central result in auction theory, proven by Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
(1996)418, shows that an auction with N + 1 bidders yields higher expected revenue than
any mechanism involving only N bidders419.
416 Estache, A., & Iimi, A. (2012). “Quality or Price? Evidence from ODA-Financed Public Procurement.”
Public Finance Review, 40(4), 435–469. 417 Arai, K. (2021). “Price and quality: relationship between bid rate and construction performance rating
ranking.”International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, 38(10), 2034–2047. 418 Bulow, J. I., & Klemperer, P. D. (1996). Auctions versus negotiations. American Economic Review,
86(1), 180–194.
170
Auction with N + 1 bidders
(1) [(1, 2, … , {+1})]
Auction with N bidders
(2) [(1, 2, … , , 0)]
Hence:
(3) [(1, 2, … , {+1})] ≥ [(1, 2, … , , 0)]
The extra bidder adds a random draw of marginal revenue with expected value zero, but
because the seller takes a maximum, this draw can only increase (or leave unchanged)
expected revenue. Hence an auction with N + 1 bidder increases expected revenue in
comparison to a situation with N bidders. This result highlights the central role of
competitionin determining outcomes. In procurement settings, although the institutional
framework is not directly equivalent, this insight provides a useful theoretical
benchmark: increased competition, in the form of greater bidder participation, is expected
to translate into lower procurement prices, which constitutes the indirect price effect of
the reform.
The indirect effect through competition appears stronger in empirical research in
comparison to direct price effect. Tátrai et al. (2024)420, using EU27 TED data (2017–
2020) and econometric analysis, show that most economically advantageous tender
criteria are associated with a lower number of bidders, while lowest-price procedures
attract more competition. Similarly, Matas et al. (2025)421, using logistic regression on
Slovenian procurement data (2016–2023), find that the inclusion of non-price criteria
increases the probability of achieving costs at least 5% above benchmarks by 10-20%,
with green criteria further increasing this probability by 5-15%, while social criteria,
interestingly, reduce this probability422, 423. Lundberg et al. (2015)424, using Swedish
procurement data (2009–2010) and OLS analysis, find that Eco labelling has only small
419 The result is derived for an English (ascending) auction under standard assumptions: risk-neutral and
symmetric bidders, independent private values, downward-sloping marginal revenue, and the presence of
only “serious” bidders (i.e. no bidder has a valuation below the seller’s value). 420 Tátrai, T., Vörösmarty, G., & Juhász, P. (2024). “Intensifying Competition in Public Procurement”,
Public Organization Review, 24, 237–257. 421 Matas, S., Oplotnik, Ž. J., & Jagrič, T. (2025). “Can We Have Both? The Challenges of Efficiency
Outcomes in a Public Procurement System and Reaching the Strategic Goals of Procurement.”,
Sustainability, 17(6), 2475. 422 Evidence also suggests that quality criteria may disproportionately affect smaller firms: Stake (2017) ,
using micro-level procurement data from Sweden (2007–2008) and econometric analysis (Poisson
regression and logistic regression), finds that BPQR reduces the probability of winning for SMEs by
around 60%, but participation is unchanged, while larger firms increase their participation by
approximately 60%. 423 Stake, J. (2017). “Evaluating quality or lowest price: consequences for small and medium-sized
enterprises in public procurement.” The Journal of Technology Transfer, 42, 1143–1169.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-016-9477-4 424 Lundberg, S., Marklund, P.-O., Strömbäck, E., & Sundström, D. (2015). “Using public procurement to
implement environmental policy: an empirical analysis.” Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 17,
487–520.
171
effects on participation, suggesting that eco labelling primarily shifts participation toward
already compliant firms.
Net effect
There are a few authors, who calculate the net effect on prices. Evidence from
construction procurement in North America shows that best-value (BPQR-type) criteria
increase prices only moderately. Lines et al. (2020)425, using a descriptive comparative
analysis of 118 construction projects in the United States and Canada (approximately
2010–2019), estimate that best-value procurement is on average 7.12% more expensive
than lowest-price procurement, but the median difference is only around 1%, indicating
that at least half of the tenders experience minimal price increases, with paper further
finding that only a few tenders experiencing large increases, likely push the average up.
Paper further calculates cost performance during project execution, it finds that cost
performance is significantly better under best-value selection (7.6% vs 12.2% cost
growth), suggesting efficiency gains. Similarly, Nguyen et al. (2018)426, using non-
parametric statistical tests and descriptive analysis on 162 projects in the United States
and Canada (2010s), find that best-value procurement results in bids that are on average
6.8% higher than the lowest bid, but still 2.2% lower than the average bid, and that
winning bidders are consistently ranked among the lowest-price offers (top two in 67%
of cases and top three in 88.3% of cases and 24% the lowest bidder is also the highest
quality). Lastly, Hoekman (2024)427, using OLS and logistic regression on procurement
data from EEA countries, the UK, and North Macedonia, finds that more restrictive
procurement rules increase prices, but the magnitude depends on institutional quality: a
one standard deviation decrease in discretion is associated with an increase of
approximately EUR 4 189 per tender in high government effectiveness countries and
EUR 2 790 in lower effectiveness countries.
Overall, the literature suggests that mandatory quality criteria increase procurement
prices, but that the magnitude of the effect is context dependent. In North American
construction procurement, available estimates suggest average price increases of around
6.8-7.12%, while the median increase is closer to 1%. This indicates that many tenders
experience only limited price effects, while a smaller number of cases may drive the
average upward. Expected price effects also likely vary by Member State and
institutional effectiveness.
Impact on the risk of corruption
425 Lines, B. C., Kakarapalli, R., & Nguyen, P. H. D. (2020). Does best value procurement cost more than
low-bid? A total project cost perspective. International Journal of Construction Education and Research.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15578771.2020.1777489 426 Nguyen, P. H. D., Lines, B. C., & Tran, D. Q. (2018). Best-Value Procurement in Design–Bid–Build
Construction Projects: Empirical Analysis of Selection Outcomes. Journal of Construction Engineering and
Management. 427 Hoekman, B., & Taş, B. K. O. (2024).“Discretion and public procurement outcomes in Europe.”
European Journal of Political Economy, 82, 1025
172
Loxbo and Pircher (2025)428 find a clear trend of differentiation, with increasing
divergence in single-bid contract rates across countries with varying administrative
capacities and corruption risks. This underscores a growing disparity between Northern
and Western European countries, known for their administrative capacities, and Eastern
and Southern European countries, which encounter more significant challenges. The
paper applies a difference-in-difference causal model to determine the effects of the 2014
reform on single bidding and the increased use of MEAT using data on EU-28 countries
that are separated into four clusters by public-procurement performance and institutional
quality429, those four groups are compared. The use of single bidding increased
dramatically in worse performing countries, by 10 - 11 percentage points. While single
bidding declined with 4-7 percentage points in best performing countries. The use of
MEAT criteria increased significantly in worst performing countries, while it remained
the same or even declined in best performing countries, who seem to prefer lowest price
as the main award criteria. This is further substantiated by the finding that most single
bidding contracts are MEAT contracts in the worse performing countries. Overall, the
study concludes that the introduction of more flexible procurement rules has widened the
gap between high- and low-performing countries, leading to differentiated
implementation of EU procurement.
To conclude, the introduction of mandatory BPQR rules is likely to have substantially
different effects on Member States depending on institutional quality and transparency
through increasing discretion. Further reflections on the trade-off between granting
contracting authorities’ greater procedural discretion and the potential increased risk of
irregularities are provided in Annex 7, Section 8. Further discussion is also provided on
the role of transparency, accountability mechanisms, and digital monitoring tools in
mitigating such risks.
Ad Section 6.2 – GPP impact per Member State
During the evaluation of the procurement directives, the Commission services gathered
data on the uptake of green procurement across Member States. Data were available for
16 countries, reflecting the situation in 2023, with uptake ranging from 89% in Lithuania
to 4% in Poland and Portugal. The methodology for data gathering differs by country,
making cross-country comparisons not fully reliable.
Under the central scenario of ESI.1/ESI.2 - assuming an 18.5% increase in BPQR (i.e.,
half of current price-only procedures replaced by BPQR) and further assuming that the
additional quality criteria will be green criteria - green procurement could reach nearly a
quarter of all procurement procedures in countries with currently low levels. For the best-
performing countries, the share could rise to between 65% and 80%.
Examining the gap relative to the best-performing country (Lithuania), achieving this
level of green public procurement (GPP) would require countries at the lower end of the
428 Loxbo, K. & Pircher, B. (2025). Complexity meets flexibility: unintended differentiation in EU public
procurement, Journal of European Public Policy. 429 The classification ins based on research on implementation of EU legislation, data from the European
Commission, literature on administrative capacity.
173
scale to increase their GPP share by approximately 80 percentage points. Countries in the
mid-range would need to raise their share by about 60 percentage points, while the best-
performing countries would need an increase of 30–40 percentage points (see the figure
below).
Figure 21: Green procurement uptake by Member States in 2023, showing the gap to the best-performing Member
State and an indicated increase under the 18.5% scenario [share of procedures in %].
* share of value; **-target Note: Only countries for which data were available are presented. The methodology for data gathering differs by country, making cross-country comparisons not fully reliable. Source: In-house analysis based on SWD(2025) 332, pp.225-228
Ad Section 6.3 – Key figures on cross-border public procurement
As far as foreign market access is concerned, around one fifth to one quarter is classified
as cross-border procurement. Concretely, the indirect cross-border procurement430 is
estimated at 21.6% by value for awards below EUR 200 million, and 27.1% for awards
above EUR 200 million. Direct cross-border procurement431 share represents 4.1% of
value of contracts below EUR 200 million and 5.5% of value of contracts above EUR
200 million432. As far foreign market access is concerned, around three quarters of the
awarded public procurement contracts are typically domestic in terms of numbers and
value. One fifth is classified as an indirect cross-border type and the rest as direct cross-
border contracts (Figure 22 below). Recent in-house analysis confirms that the above
structure remains broadly stable.
430 Indirect cross-border procurement describes situations, where the successful bidder is based in the same
country as the contracting authority, but is a subsidiary of a foreign company (i.e. its GUO is not
domestic). 431 Direct cross-border procurement is understood as procurement, where the successful bidder is not
located in the same country as the contracting authority and the bidder is not domestically owned. 432 Prometea(2021), Study on the measurement…, p. 18.
89%
60% 56% 55% 48% 46%
29% 29% 21% 20%
10% 6% 5% 5% 4% 4%
29% 33% 35% 41% 43% 60% 61% 68% 69% 79% 83% 84% 85% 85% 86%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
LT* DK IT FR FI ES IE SI HR HU SE SK** LT EE PL* PT
2023 share of GPP gap from the best increase by 18.5 pp
174
Figure 22: Number (left) and value (right) of awards below EUR 200 million by type of procurement, 2016-2019 [%]
Source: Prometeia (2021), Study on the measurement of cross-border …, p. 20.
As the contract size increases, cross-border procurement becomes more frequent. For
example, for the awards above EUR 200 million, it represented around one third of this
segment of the public procurement market (Figure 23 below).
Figure 23: Number (left) and value (right) of awards greater than EUR 200 million by type of procurement, 2016-2019
[%]
Source: Prometeia(2021), Study on the measurement of cross-border …, p. 20.
Recent in-house analysis, as well as external studies433, confirm that the above structure
remains broadly stable.
As many contracts in the EU public procurement are awarded EOs that are subsidiaries
of firms headquartered abroad, to better understand this foreign presence, it was
necessary to identify the ultimate country of ownership of these EOs. The chosen
approach to achieve the above was to focus on the top 10 000 EOs ranked by awarded
value, a group that accounted for roughly 66% of total contract value between 2018 and
2023. Within this group, the ownership information was successfully matched for 8 743
EOs. These matched entities represented 54% of total awarded value, 28% of all CAN
notices, and just 2% of all awarded EOs during the period-highlighting that while
ownership was identified for the major value‑holders, it covers only a small fraction of
EOs overall.
433 World Bank(2025), Competition…, p. 59-60.
175
Based on the analysis of TED publication data, in 2018-2023 non‑EU participation was
dominated by firms bidding though their EU subsidiaries. The headquarters of such firms
were predominantly located in North America, Europe, Japan, and Turkey. The non-EU-
owned EOs participating directly are typically located in the US, Switzerland, Norway,
Turkey and China.
Figure 24: Non-EU-owned EOs, awarded value, years 2018-2023, EU 27 [billion euro]
Source: In-house analysis
Comparing the above data to the total value of public procurement published in TED
results in an approximate share of the third countries participation of 7.5% (the sum of
awarded value for all countries listed above, excluding “not applicable” observations,
equals EUR 277 billion; the total value of procurement published in TED in 2018-2023
equalled EUR 3.7 trillion434). This is a conservative estimate, as the matching process
resulted in a dataset covering only 70% of the total value.
In terms of sectors concerned, the non-EU owned firms were present across most
categories that are relevant for EU public procurement (70% of total value), as shown in
Figure 25 below.
434 World Bank (2025), Competition…, p. 13.
176
Figure 25: Top categories procured by EU Member States: distribution of awarded value between EU-owned and non-
EU-owned EOs, years 2018-2023, EU 27 [EUR billion]
Source: In-house analysis; Note: 70% of total value of in-scope data, 2 trillion euros total in-scope data
The most important sectors (marked in red in Figure 24 above) were analysed in greater
depth by examining more granular categories to better understand supply composition at
lower levels. As shown in Figure 26 below, the demand in these sectors is largely met by
suppliers from other European countries and North America, while certain specialised
products, such as power electronic modules, depend almost entirely on Chinese suppliers.
Although EU‑owned firms exist in most categories, they may lack a track record of
supplying comparable volumes per the data in scope.
Figure 26: Main categories supplied by non-EU-owned EOs, years 2018-2023, EU 27 [million euro]
Source: In-house analysis; Note: right panel - awarded value to non-EU-owned EOs only
177
Figure 27: Top 5 country of ownership of non-EU EOs by awarded value, 2018-2023, EU 27 [EUR billion]
Source: In-house analysis
Among the main countries of origin of non EU-owned economic operators, only Japan
experienced a decline in its share in real terms. By contrast, operators from the United
States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Norway saw their shares grow.
Figure 28: Top 3 countries by value for non-EU-owned EOs in Member States with non-EU-owned EOs share above
20%, 2018-2023
Source: In-house analysis
Thirteen member countries awarded 20% or more of contract value to non-EU-owned
economic operators. In these cases, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Switzerland emerged as the principal partners, together accounting for approximately
68% of the total in-scope value awarded (to non-EU-owned EOs in these countries).
Restricting public procurement to EU‑owned suppliers would lead to an estimated
three‑percentage‑point increase in award concentration, driven by a reduced pool of
eligible bidders. Although the aggregate impact appears limited, concentration effects are
uneven, with material variation by country and by product.
178
Figure 29: Impact on award concentration across Member States, years 2018-2023, EU 27
Source: In-house analysis Note: difference in percentage points of median market share of main supplier by CPV product, by country; in-scope data only
While the overall increase in award concentration remains modest (3 p.p.), restricting
public procurement to EU‑owned economic operators would have more pronounced
impacts in Member States with a narrower supplier base or a higher reliance on
non‑EU‑owned operators across multiple products. These impacts are particularly
evident in Czechia, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
Ad Section 6.3 - Analysis of FSR data
The dataset used for the analysis is an extract of submissions made by economic
operators or groups of economic operators in accordance with the requirements of
Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 (FSR) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1441. The
analysis was made only for the purpose of supporting the Impact Assessment of the
Revision of the Public Procurement Directives. The information presented has been
processed pursuant to Article 43(3) FSR in such a way as to preserve all confidentiality
requirements and to ensure that no information relating to participating companies or to a
specific public procurement procedure can be identified.
The initial database contained 4 127 observations (submissions) referring to high-value
procurement published in TED in 2023-2025. Observations with status “on hold” and
“case not created” were removed from the working file and will not be subject to further
analysis. The total number of observations retained was at that stage 4 119 (including
pending cases with no status allocated yet).
Table 26: FSR submissions by type, 2023-2025
Submission Frequency Percent (%) Cumulative (%)
Declaration 3 433 83 83
Notification 569 14 97
Pre-notification 95 2 99
Missing 22 1 100
Total 4 119 100 Source: In-house analysis
The submissions per countries of contracting authorities and entities are presented below
(Table 27).
179
Table 27: FSR submission status by country of contracting authority or entity, 2023-2025
Country of CAE
Declaration (N and %)
Notification (N and %)
Pre- notification (N and %)
Total (N and %)
AT 75 13 1 89
84.3 14.6 1.1 100
BE 50 8 1 59
84.75 13.56 1.69 100
BG 11 1 1 13
84.62 7.69 7.69 100
CZ 24 13 1 38
63.16 34.21 2.63 100
DE 506 148 9 663
76.32 22.32 1.36 100
DK 171 31 12 214
79.3 14.5 5.6 100
EE 3 2 0 5
60 40 0 100
EL 2 0 0 2
100 0 0 100
ES 76 7 1 84
90.48 8.33 1.19 100
EU 18 6 0 24
75 25.0 0.0 100
FI 37 2 2 41
90.24 4.88 4.88 100
FR 847 87 10 944
89.72 9.22 1.06 100
HR 7 4 0 11
63.64 36.36 0 100
HU 32 11 0 43
74.42 25.58 0 100
IE 48 11 1 60 80 18.33 1.67 100
IT 588 74 32 694
84.7 10.7 4.6 100
LV 165 0 0 165 100 0 0 100
NL 262 20 4 286
91.61 6.99 1.4 100
NO 3 0 0 3
100 0 0 100
PL 135 48 1 184
73.37 26.1 0.54 100
PT 0 1 1 2 0 50 50 100
RO 161 27 8 196
82.14 13.78 4.08 100
SE 174 54 10 238
73.11 22.69 4.2 100
SI 6 0 0 6
100 0 0 100
SK 32 1 0 33
96.97 3.03 0 100
Total 3 433 569 95 4 097
83.8 13.9 2.3 100
180
Source: In-house analysis
To obtain a sectoral distribution of submissions, the activities related to the procurement
in question were first identified based on the description provided by the applicant. The
following sector categories were proposed based on minimum frequencies per group (i.e.
at least 5%):
• Transport – railway, ports, airports, road infrastructure, etc.
• Health – medical equipment, pharmaceuticals,
• Energy – wind, solar, hydro, nuclear, energy grid, etc.,
• IT, telecommunications – including postal services,
• Environmental services – urban services, water, waste management, etc.
• Construction works (n.e.c.)
• Other
As only one sector per observation (i.e. submission) was allowed, cases for which
allocation to more than one sector could be meaningful (e.g. “construction work for
pipelines, communication and power lines, for highways, roads, airfields and railways”
could belong to Transport, Energy and Construction works (n.e.c)) were resolved as
follows:
• Sector-specific characteristics took precedence: for example, the
construction of water locks was categorised as Environmental services,
while the construction of an electricity grid was categorised as Energy.
• Construction works were treated as a residual category (n.e.c.): works not
clearly belonging to any other category were classified under Construction
works (n.e.c.).
• Ambulances were categorised under Health, and not under Transport.
For observations that were still with no categorisation, the contracting authority was used
to determine the sector. For example, procurement by railway companies was categorised
under Transport, while procurement by a central purchasing body specialising in medical
supplies was categorised under Health. This could imply, for instance, that training
services for personnel of La Poste would be categorised under sector 4 (IT,
telecommunications), rather than under category 7 Other (i.e. otherwise unclassified).
The sectors of activities for which submissions were registered is presented below (Table
28).
Table 28: FSR submissions by sector, 2023-2025
Sector of activity: Frequency Percent (%) Cumulative
IT and Telecommunication 1 043 25.3 25.3
Transport 1 013 24.6 49.9
Energy 747 18.1 68.1
Construction (N.E.C.) 436 10.6 78.6
Health 427 10.4 89.0
Other 244 5.9 94.9
Environmental services 209 5.1 100.0
Total: 4 119 100 Source: In-house analysis
The submission status per sector is provided in below.
181
Figure 30: FSR submissions by sector and status, 2023-2025
Source: In-house analysis
Overall, the submissions refer to 653 unique TED publications435, with an average of 10
submissions per notice (and a maximum of 104 entries for a single notice).
The 4 119 observations consisted of many entries where the economic operators were
gathered in a consortium. To the extent possible these cases were split, so that each line/
observation represents one company. As a result, the dataset expanded to 5 809
companies. However, since many companies appeared multiple times across different
submissions, the number of unique companies was lower, namely 4 214. These firms
were subsequently matched with Orbis436 to obtain information on their Global Ultimate
Owners (GUO). The match rate was 80% with 3 414 companies successfully matched.
Information from Orbis was then merged back into the FSR original data (4 119
observations). However, since the Orbis data are reported at firm level, the base file
stabilised at 5 745 observations (as some of the 4 119 submissions were split/multiplied
in cases involving consortia).
Figure 31: FSR submissions by GUO type, 2023-2025
435 Whereas in case of 86 observations the notice number was missing (e.g. due to the exemption of
publication on TED). 436 Orbis
182
Source: In-house analysis
Based on the FSR submissions received, intra-EU ownership concerned nearly 2/3 of all
FSR cases (or ¾ of cases for which data was available), see the figure below. This
proportion can be also regarded as a good proxy for the indirect cross-border penetration
for high value contracts. This is broadly in line with the above mentioned findings by
Prometea (2021) that estimated indirect cross-border procurement at 20.2% (by number)
and 21.6% (by value) for awards below EUR 200 million, with the shares increasing to
27.8% and 27.1%, respectively, for awards above EUR 200 million437).
437 Prometeia (2021), Study on the measurement…, pp. 18 and 20.
183
Figure 32: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025
Source: In-house analysis
Out of the share allocated to third countries, the analysis of the FSR submissions indicate
that the main trading partners potentially affected by the policy measures foreseen under
BEU options could above all: the United States (235 entries or 4% presence in
submissions), followed by the United Kingdom (147 entries, 2.5%) and Switzerland (106
entries, 1.9%). More detailed information on the main countries is presented in Table 29
below.
Table 29: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025
Country Code Number (%) Cumulative
(%)
Austria AT 138 2.4 2.4
Belgium BE 39 0.68 3.08
Bulgaria BG 21 0.37 3.45
Croatia HR 12 0.21 3.66
Cyprus CY 4 0.07 3.72
Czechia CZ 38 0.66 4.39
Denmark DK 93 1.62 6.01
Estonia EE 3 0.05 6.06
Finland FI 34 0.59 6.65
France FR 877 15.27 21.91
Germany DE 440 7.66 29.57
Greece EL 5 0.09 29.66
Hungary HU 20 0.35 30.01
Ireland IE 71 1.24 31.24
Italy IT 531 9.24 40.49
184
Latvia LV 128 2.23 42.72
Lithuania LT 5 0.09 42.8
Luxembourg LU 73 1.27 44.07
Netherlands NL 242 4.21 48.29
Poland PL 108 1.88 50.17
Portugal PT 8 0.14 50.3
Romania RO 146 2.54 52.85
Slovakia SK 14 0.24 53.09
Slovenia SI 7 0.12 53.21
Spain ES 125 2.18 55.39
Sweden SE 128 2.23 57.62
Norway NO 45 0.78 58.4
Switzerland CH 106 1.85 60.24
United Kingdom UK 146 2.54 62.79
United States US 235 4.09 66.88
China CN 54 0.94 67.82
Japan JP 86 1.5 69.31
Canada CA 36 0.63 69.94
South Korea KR 21 0.37 70.3
India IN 48 0.84 71.14
Turkey TR 83 1.44 72.58
Other countries 169 2.94 75.53
N.A or missing
1 406 24.47 100
Total 5 745 100 Source: In-house analysis
As for the sectors438 concerned by third countries presence, the following NACE
divisions were chosen for further analysis. Basically, the list of sectors was designed to
reflect as closely as possible the key sectors declared in the FSR submissions (see Table
28): Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products (NACE
division 21), Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products (NACE division
26), Manufacture of electrical equipment (NACE division 27), Manufacture of
machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28), Manufacture of transport equipment (NACE
divisions 29-30), Other manufacturing, and repair and installation of machinery and
equipment (NACE divisions 31-33), Electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply
(35), Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation (NACE divisions 36-
39), Construction (NACE divisions 41-43), Transportation and storage (NACE divisions
49-53), Telecommunications (NACE division 61), IT and other information services
(NACE divisions 62-63), Scientific research and development (NACE division 72),
Other professional, scientific and technical activities (NACE divisions 73-75), Human
health services (NACE division 86). The figures below represent shares of ownership by
key sectors.
438 Understood as the main NACE Rev.2 division of the GOU company of the company mentioned in FSR.
185
Figure 33: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – pharmaceuticals
Source: In-house analysis
For manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products, third-
country entities represent a significant majority at 59% of GOUs, with most originating
from the US (13 submissions), followed by India, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland,
Turkey and the UK, while EU-27 entities account for 30%.
Figure 34: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – computers
Source: In-house analysis
A similar pattern emerges in the Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical
products, where third-country ownership reaches 55%, driven mainly by China and the
US (11 submissions each)., with Japan and other countries also represented, compared to
34% for EU-27 entities.
186
Figure 35: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – electrical equipment
Source: In-house analysis
The Manufacture of electrical equipment presents a different picture, as EU-27 entities
dominate at 63%, with third-country ownership accounting for 32%, mainly from China
(9 submissions) and Japan (7), alongside the United States (4), South Korea, Switzerland
and Norway.
Figure 36: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – machinery, equipment
Source: In-house analysis
In the Manufacture of machinery and equipment, EU-27 entities also hold the majority at
61%, while third-country ownership reaches 39%, with the vast majority stemming from
the United States (16 submissions) and smaller shares from China, India, Japan and
Switzerland.
187
Figure 37: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – transport equipment
Source: In-house analysis
The Manufacture of transport equipment shows strong EU-27 presence at 75%, with
third-country ownership remaining relatively low at 17%, largely driven by Switzerland,
(11 submissions) alongside Japan, China, the UK, the USA, Norway, South Korea and
Turkey.
Figure 38: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – other manufacturing
Source: In-house analysis
Other manufacturing, and repair and installation of machinery and equipment, the split is
more balanced, with EU-27 entities at 48% and third-country ownership at 43%, mainly
from the United Sates (19 submissions), complemented by Canada, China, Japan,
Switzerland.
188
Figure 39: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – electricity, gas, steam
Source: In-house analysis
The Electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply sector is predominantly EU-27
owned at 85%, with third-country ownership limited to around 10%, originating from
Switzerland (4 submissions), Japan and Norway.
Figure 40: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – water supply, sewerage
Source: In-house analysis
In Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation, EU-27 entities account
for 64%, while third-country ownership represents a modest 11%.
189
Figure 41: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – construction
Source: In-house analysis
The Construction sector (1161 submissions in total) follows a similar trend, with EU-27
entities dominating at 72% and third-country ownership at 11%, mainly from Turkey (66
submissions), with additional presence from China, India, Japan, Norway, the UK and
the United States.
Figure 42: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – transportation and storage
Source: In-house analysis
For Transportation and storage, EU-27 entities represent 57% and third-country
ownership accounts for 11% (out of 195 submissions in total), spread across Canada,
China, India, Norway (3 submissions each).
190
Figure 43: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – telecommunications
Source: In-house analysis
In Telecommunications, EU-27 entities hold a strong 74%, with third-country ownership
at 21%, primarily from Switzerland and the UK (4 submissins each), alongside Canada,
Japan, Norway.
Figure 44: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – IT and other information
services
Source: In-house analysis
The IT and other information services sector (648 submissions) saw third-country
ownership at 18%, mainly from the United States (38 submissions) and the United
Kingdom (37), with Canada (17), Japan (10), Switzerland (8) and India (4) also
represented.
191
Figure 45: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – scientific R&D
Source: In-house analysis
Within Scientific research and development, EU-27 entities account for 50%, while third-
country ownership reaches 33%, originating from China, India and Japan.
Figure 46: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – other professional,
scientific and technical activities
Source: In-house analysis
Concerning Other professional, scientific and technical activities, EU-27 entities
represented 53% of 43 submissions, third-country ownership stood at 23% from the
United States (4 submissions), Canada, Switzerland and the UK.
192
Figure 47: Country of GUOs of the companies mentioned in FSR submissions, 2023-2025 – Human health services
Source: In-house analysis
Finally, in human health services, EU-27 entities accounted for 41%, while third-country
ownership reached 26%, primarily from the UK (5 submissions) and Switzerland
alongside other countries.
Ad Section 6.3 - Impacts of BEU options using FIDELIO model (JRC)
The analysis of macroeconomic impacts of BEU options was based on the FIDELIO
(Full Interregional Dynamic Econometric Long-term Input-Output) model, which is a
flexible, multi-region, multi-sector, input-output model developed and run by the Joint
Research Centre (JRC) and steered by the Directorate-General for Internal Market,
Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) to become the reference model of the
EU industrial policy and assess socio-economic and environmental impacts of EU trade
and industrial policies. It covers 45 countries, one rest-of-the-world region, 64 economic
sectors and 64 products. It is a tool for estimating the socio-economic and environmental
impacts of EU industrial, trade, and innovation policies for a fair and sustainable EU
economy. FIDELIO’s multi-country general equilibrium structure lets the model capture
how e.g. increased domestic demand in one country raises imports from, and activity in,
others - something simple national models can’t do.
The purpose of using the FIDELIO model was to estimate the potential impacts of the
BEU policy options under consideration, especially as the latter may consist of certain
levels for Local Content Requirements (LCR). In view of the above, FIDELIO was
expected to test how new LCR requirements in public procurement could affect sectoral
outputs and trade balance.
Generally, a local content requirement means that government demand must be sourced
more from domestic suppliers (or from “Made in EU” suppliers), and less from imports.
In FIDELIO this is basically a change in the import share of public demand439. Once
439 For more information on how the demand for imports is modelled in FIDELIO see: Rocchi, P., Reynes,
F., Hu, J., Pedauga, L., Cai, M. et al. (2025), FIDELIO Manual: Model description, equations, data
193
government demand shifts to domestic supply (or “Made in EU” supply), FIDELIO
propagates effects through the economy: output in domestic sectors supplying to
government is expected to increase, imports in those sectors are expected to decrease.
Yet it should be noted that the impact of a domestic content requirement depends hugely
on where in the value chain it is applied:
• Upstream (raw materials, basic inputs): wide economy-wide spillovers, stronger
price effects, higher risk of competitiveness losses downstream.
• Midstream (components): still strong spillovers, but more sector-specific.
• Downstream (final goods): more targeted effects, mainly affecting procurement
prices and the specific supplying industries.
Steel and aluminium
The first simulation run for this impact assessment was based on an 85 % “Made in
EU”440 content requirement for steel and aluminium (i.e. upstream / raw materials),
which is then used in construction activities procured by the public sector. Running the
model resulted in the impacts in terms of accumulated value added in 2025-2030,
presented below – first in the case of the upstream sectors of steel and aluminium (Table
30 below) where effects of the policy are predominantly positive, and then for the
downstream construction sector where some adverse impact may materialise.
Table 30: Impact of Accumulated Value Added (2025-2030) – steel and aluminium
Public Procurement
Country Public Procurement Million EUR
HRV 0.12 0.1
ROU 0.29 5
HUN 0.76 5
LTU 0.67 0.1
NLD 0.42 9
PRT 0.32 2
FRA 0.27 17
AUT 0.49 21
SVN 0.67 3
BGR 0.38 1
POL 0.59 15
DNK 0.44 2
SVK 0.88 8
EU27 0.50 331
SWE 0.36 10
CYP 0.10 0.0
BEL 0.91 31
sources and econometric estimations, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg
(https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/1241946, JRC141957), p. 12. 440 The “Made in EU” concept included the EU 27, Norway, and Switzerland.
194
EST 1.00 0.3
ESP 0.36 19
LUX 2.81 8
DEU 0.51 106
FIN 0.61 12
ITA 0.47 44
GRC 0.63 7
IRL 0.27 1
MLT 0.08 0.0
LVA 2.44 0.1
NOR 0.49 6
CHE 0.01 0.3
CZE 0.39 5 Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO Figure 48: Impact of Accumulated Value Added (2025-2030) – steel and aluminium
Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO
Almost one third of the positive impact in the EU steel and aluminium sectors would
concern Germany (EUR 106 million), followed by Italy (EUR 44 million). In relative
terms, Luxembourg stands out with the highest impact on value added (+2.81% with
regards to the baseline - owing to the presence of ArcelorMittal in the country – the
world’s second largest steel producer) followed by Latvia (+2.44% increase). The total
positive effect in terms of accumulated value added for the EU would be EUR 331
million in 2025-2030.
As the effects of any local content requirement in public procurement would travel across
the value chain, the impacts were also tested on the construction sector (i.e. downstream)
that uses steel and aluminium as raw materials (Table 31 and Figure 49 below).
Construction
Table 31: Impact of Accumulated Value Added (2025-2030) - construction
Public Procurement
Country Public
Procurement Million EUR
195
HRV -3.74 - 74
ROU -1.47 - 131
HUN -1.54 - 70
LTU -0.96 - 25
NLD -1.09 - 325
PRT -0.72 - 49
FRA -0.48 - 539
AUT -0.34 - 72
SVN -0.45 - 9
BGR -0.47 - 7
POL -0.24 - 66
DNK -0.30 - 44
SVK -0.26 - 15
EU27 -0.27 - 1 609
SWE -0.19 - 55
CYP -0.21 - 2
BEL -0.18 - 38
EST -0.09 - 1
ESP -0.07 - 44
LUX 0.02 0.5
DEU -0.02 - 31
FIN -0.02 - 2
ITA -0.01 - 9
GRC -0.07 - 1
IRL -0.01 - 0.5
MLT 0.00 0.0
LVA 0.00 0.0
NOR 0.00 0.3
CHE 0.01 2
CZE 0.00 0.1 Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO
According to the estimates, France, the Netherlands and Romania would be most affected
by the higher price of EU produced steel – these three countries would account for 62 %
(EUR 995 million) of the total negative impact (EUR 1.6 billion) of the policy measure.
However, in relative terms Croatia, Hungary and Romania would show even greater
negative impact, (-3.74%, -1.54% and -1.47% respectively) likely because of their high
dependence on non-EU steel production. To compare, construction activity in the
Netherlands and France, despite much higher monetary values, would see their respective
value added reduced with regards to the baseline by -1.09 % and -0.48 %, respectively.
196
Figure 49: Impact of Accumulated Value Added (2025-2030) - construction
Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO
Moving down the value chain, a LCR in government purchasing would also affect the
trade balance, as it would directly reduce imports of the goods (or inputs) covered by the
measure and increase demand for domestically produced substitutes. Nonetheless, if
domestic upstream industries expand, they may achieve economies of scale and improve
its competitiveness to the extent that increases exports. Eventually, the trade combined
impact of EU content requirements would be nearly neutral in terms of intra-EU trade
balances, almost equally impacting intra-EU exports of basic metals and intra-EU
imports of the construction sector. Concretely, the EU construction sector increase the
intra-EU imported inputs of steel and aluminium, that will be achieved by an increase in
exports of steel and aluminium (C24) by the Member states. Therefore, some countries
are expected to yield a positive trade balance for the policy measure, especially for
Germany and Italy (see the table and figure below).
Table 32: Impact on trade balance - construction, manufacture of basic metals
Public Procurement
Country Construction (F) Manufacture of basic metals (C24)
DEU - 120 397
FRA - 382 85
NLD - 240 30
ITA - 51 194
BEL - 67 148
ESP - 36 91
AUT - 63 61
ROU - 99 16
POL - 60 54
SWE - 44 38
HUN - 52 16
SVK - 20 38
FIN - 12 44
PRT - 35 8
DNK - 30 4
197
HRV - 32 0
CZE - 5 23
NOR - 3 21
BGR - 8 16
GRC - 3 19
SVN - 8 12
LUX - 9 8
LTU - 16 0
IRL - 0 3
LVA - 0 2
EST - 1 1
CYP - 1 0
MLT 0 0
CHE 29 1
EU27 - 1 368 1 330 Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO
When interpreting data from the above table, it’s worth noting that Switzerland is a
special case Swiss imports are negatively affected because the country is not subject to
the EU content regulations on public procurement. Moreover, neither Norway nor
Switzerland benefits significantly from the policy measure.
Figure 50: Impact on trade balance – construction and manufacture of basic metals
Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO
Overall, the impact of local content requirements is likely to reflect a combination of
positive and negative effects. Even if the net GDP impact may be ambiguous, depending
on the balance between upstream expansion in domestic input producing sectors and
potential downstream contraction driven by higher input costs or reduced
competitiveness, it will nonetheless improve intra EU trade.
At the same time, an important potential benefit that is not captured by the model,
namely if domestic sourcing (e.g. of critical materials) is strengthened, the EU would
198
become less exposed to future foreign supply disruptions and input price shocks. This
increased resilience of supply chains could reduce vulnerability to external geopolitical
or market shocks, thereby supporting longer-term economic stability.
Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
The simulation for radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus was
also based on an 75 % “Made in EU” content requirement applied to procurement by the
public sector. As with the previous product categories, the model was used to estimate
the impacts in terms of accumulated value added in 2025-2030, distinguishing between
the upstream manufacturing industries and the downstream public sectors that procure
these goods, where higher input costs may translate into adverse effects on public
budgets.
Figure 51: EU local content requirement on Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus – changes
in the accumulated value-added w.r.t. baseline
Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO
On the upstream side, the EU computer, electronics and optical products industry would
be the main beneficiary of the “Buy European” requirement, as procuring entities reorient
their demand towards EU-based suppliers. Germany would capture the largest share of
this positive effect, with its computer and electronics industry gaining EUR 71 million in
additional accumulated value added over 2025-2030 - reflecting the country's well-
established specialisation in communication equipment, telecommunication infrastructure
and broadcasting technology. At the same time, other German industries supplying inputs
along this value chain would experience an added cost of EUR 12 million, highlighting
once again how local content requirements may yield mixed effects within the same
national economy, depending on each sector's position along the value chain.
199
On the downstream side, the higher cost of EU-produced radio, TV and communication
equipment would translate into additional procurement expenditures for public buyers
across the Union, with the impact concentrated in a few large Member States. The French
general public administration would face the most significant absolute impact, with an
additional cost of EUR 256 million, reflecting both the size of its central administration's
IT and communications expenditure and its relatively high reliance on non-EU suppliers
in this product category. Poland's public health system would face an increased cost of
EUR 49 million, while the Czech public education system would incur an extra cost of
EUR 47 million. These figures point to a pattern similar to that observed in the
construction sector: the downstream sectors most dependent on extra-EU imports of the
regulated goods are also those most exposed to the cost increases driven by the local
content requirement.
Figure 52: EU local content requirement on Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus – trade
impacts
Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO
As with the other product categories examined, the effects of the local content
requirement would ripple through the value chain and reshape trade flows. The measure
would directly reduce extra-EU imports of radio, TV and communication equipment by
public buyers, while stimulating intra-EU trade as Member States substitute towards EU-
produced equipment. The French general public administration would see its (intra-EU)
imports increase by EUR 168 million, Poland's public health system by EUR 34 million,
and the Czech public education system by EUR 31 million. Other Dutch imports would
also rise by EUR 75 million, reflecting indirect spillover effects from procurement
decisions taken in other Member States, a finding consistent with the high degree of
integration of the Netherlands within EU logistics and re-export chains.
200
On the export side, Germany's computer and electronics industry would once again stand
out as the main beneficiary, with intra-EU exports increasing by EUR 116 million,
complemented by an additional EUR 7 million rise in other German exports linked to
procurement decisions in partner countries. Overall, the aggregate trade balance impact at
EU level would be broadly neutral, with the increase in intra-EU exports of
communication equipment roughly offsetting the increase in intra-EU imports by public
buyers. This confirms the pattern already identified for steel and aluminium, medical
instruments and office machinery: local content requirements tend to redistribute trade
flows within the Single Market rather than alter the EU's overall position vis-à-vis third
countries.
Taken together, the results for radio, television and communication equipment reinforce
the broader interpretation developed throughout this impact assessment. While the net
GDP impact remains ambiguous, depending on the balance between upstream expansion
in the EU electronics industry and downstream cost increases in public administration,
healthcare and education, the measure would unambiguously strengthen intra-EU trade
integration and consolidate the position of a limited number of EU industrial leaders,
with Germany emerging as the principal beneficiary. Beyond the quantified effects, an
important benefit that is not captured by the model relates to the strategic nature of
communication equipment. This product category includes goods that are critical for
national security, public administration networks, emergency communications and
increasingly for 5G and next-generation telecommunication infrastructures.
Strengthening domestic sourcing in this area would reduce the EU's exposure to foreign
supply disruptions, mitigate cybersecurity and dependency risks associated with extra-
EU vendors, and contribute to the EU's broader objective of technological sovereignty.
Medical, precision, and optical instruments, watches, and clocks
The simulation for this product category was based on an 75 % “Made in EU” content
requirement applied to the public procurement of medical, precision and optical
instruments, watches, and clocks. As previous examples, the model was used to estimate
the impacts in terms of accumulated value added in 2025-2030, distinguishing between
the upstream manufacturing sectors (where positive effects are expected to concentrate)
and the downstream public sectors that procure these goods (where adverse cost effects
may materialise).
201
Figure 53: EU local content requirement on Medical, precision and optical instruments - changes in the accumulated
value-added w.r.t. baseline
Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO
On the upstream side, the EU computer, electronic and optical products industry would
be the principal beneficiary of the policy measure, as public buyers would shift demand
towards domestically produced equipment. Germany would capture the largest share of
this positive effect, with its computer and electronics industry gaining EUR 48 million in
additional value added over 2025-2030, reflecting the country's strong specialisation in
high-precision instruments and medical devices. Other German industries supplying
inputs to this value chain would, however, experience an added cost of EUR 8 million,
illustrating how local content requirements can generate mixed effects even within the
same national economy depending on a sector's position along the value chain.
On the downstream side, the higher cost of EU-produced medical, precision and optical
instruments would translate into additional procurement expenditures for public buyers
across the Union. France's public health system would bear the largest absolute impact,
with an increased cost of EUR 161 million, reflecting both the size of its hospital
network and its relatively high reliance on non-EU imports of medical devices. The
German general public administration would incur an additional cost of EUR 90 million,
while the Dutch public education system would face an extra cost of EUR 16 million.
These figures point to a pattern similar to that observed for construction: the downstream
sectors most dependent on extra-EU imports of the regulated goods are also those most
exposed to price increases resulting from the local content requirement.
202
Figure 54: EU local content requirement on Medical, precision and optical instruments trade impacts
Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO
The effects of the local content requirement would ripple through the value chain and
reshape trade flows. The measure would directly reduce extra-EU imports of medical,
precision and optical instruments by public buyers and, at the same time, stimulate intra-
EU trade as Member States substitute towards EU-produced equipment. France's public
health system would see its (intra-EU) imports increase by EUR 111 million, the German
general public administration by EUR 71 million, and other Dutch imports by EUR 47
million, the latter reflecting spillovers from procurement decisions taken in other
Member States. The Dutch education system's import increase would be moderated by
EUR 10 million.
On the export side, Germany's computer and electronics industry stands out as the main
beneficiary, with intra-EU exports rising by EUR 78 million, complemented by an
additional EUR 2 million increase in other German exports linked to procurement
decisions in partner countries. Overall, the trade balance impact would be broadly neutral
at EU level, with the rise in intra-EU exports of medical and precision instruments
roughly offsetting the increase in intra-EU imports by public buyers. This confirms the
pattern already identified for steel and aluminium: local content requirements tend to
redistribute trade flows within the Single Market rather than alter the EU's aggregate
external position.
CPA C26: Office machinery and computers
The simulation for office machinery and computers followed the same methodology,
applying an 75 % “Made in EU” content requirement to public procurement in this
203
product category. Given the relatively small size of the EU manufacturing base in office
machinery and computers compared to other product categories, the magnitudes involved
are more modest, but the structural pattern of impacts is similar to those observed in the
other simulations.
Figure 55: EU local content requirement on Office machinery and computers - changes in the accumulated value
added w.r.t. baseline
Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO
On the upstream side, the EU machinery and equipment sector would benefit from the
additional demand generated by the policy. Germany would be the main beneficiary,
with its machinery and equipment industry gaining EUR 12 million in accumulated value
added over 2025-2030. Unlike in the case of medical instruments, the broader German
industrial base would also experience a positive spillover of EUR 4 million, suggesting
that the value chain associated with office machinery and computers may be more
integrated within the German economy and generate more diffuse benefits.
On the downstream side, public buyers would face higher procurement costs as a result
of substituting extra-EU suppliers with EU-based ones. The Swedish general public
administration would incur the largest additional cost (EUR 36 million), reflecting both
the scale of its IT procurement and its previously high reliance on non-EU suppliers.
Slovakia's public health system would face an extra cost of EUR 6 million, while the
Danish public education system would see a more limited increase of EUR 2 million. The
relatively contained size of these impacts compared, for instance, to those observed for
medical equipment, reflects the smaller share of office machinery and computers in total
public expenditure.
Figure 56: EU local content requirement on Office machinery and computers - trade impacts
204
Source: In-house analysis by JRC using FIDELIO
In terms of trade impacts, the policy would once again redirect flows from extra-EU to
intra-EU sources. The Swedish general public administration would increase its (intra-
EU) imports by EUR 25 million, while Slovakia's public health system and the German
education system would each see imports rise by EUR 4 million. Other German imports
would increase by EUR 6 million, reflecting indirect effects from procurement decisions
taken in other Member States.
On the export side, Germany's machinery and equipment industry would see intra-EU
exports rise by EUR 22 million, supplemented by a modest EUR 1 million increase in
other German exports. As with the previous product categories, the aggregate trade
balance impact at EU level would be broadly neutral, with the increase in intra-EU
exports closely matching the increase in intra-EU imports. The measure would therefore
primarily affect the geographical distribution of supply across the Single Market rather
than the EU's overall trade position with the rest of the world.
Limitations of the FIDELIO model for granular activity- or product-level analysis
in all BEU relevant sectors
As explained at the outset, the FIDELIO model is a multi-country macroeconomic input-
output model designed to assess economy-wide and sectoral impacts of policy
interventions across the EU. While it is well suited for analysing broad policy shocks and
structural changes, it presents important limitations when applied to very granular
economic activities (e.g. production of specific products such as rolling stock, city buses,
etc.). First, this is due to the sectoral aggregation constraints, as FIDELIO relies on a
relatively aggregated sectoral classification (based on input-output tables). Individual
products or niche activities are embedded within broader sectors (e.g. C30.2:
205
Manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock is contained in FIDELIO within
C30: Manufacture of other transport equipment, along with other sectors441). As a result,
product-specific dynamics cannot be isolated cleanly (unless certain coefficients are
available and applied442, which may not be possible in all relevant sectors), heterogeneity
within sectors is averaged out, and policy effects are distributed across the entire sector
rather than the specific activity of interest. Secondly, the model is not designed as a
product-level or detailed activity-level tool, as it lacks detailed representation of
individual product markets, differentiation of technologies, or demand patterns at a
granular level, etc. The available sectors are listed in Annex 1 and 2 of the FIDELIO
Manual443 and they do not necessarily match all sectors for which a Buy European
measures may be considered. The examples presented above represent the closest
matches among the most relevant sectors. This implies that attempting to “force” the
model to represent a specific activity (e.g. rolling stock or city buses) could be
suboptimal methodologically. Third, as FIDELIO is calibrated to capture macroeconomic
and sector-wide effects, when shocks are applied to very small segments (i.e. with small
relative weight in the overall sector) the resulting impacts could be diluted in a macro
framework (i.e. the effects may fall below the model’s sensitivity threshold). In practical
terms, even a meaningful change at the product level may not generate detectable macro
or sectoral effects in the model outputs. Finally, the above could trigger risks of
misinterpretation as using the model for highly granular questions may lead to
misleading conclusions. For example, “no impact” results may reflect model aggregation
rather than real-world insignificance and the policy relevance at micro level may be
underestimated. In other words, results obtained may be wrongly interpreted as evidence
of absence of effects rather than absence of measurable effects at the chosen level of
aggregation.
To conclude, FIDELIO is not intended to model each economic activity at a detailed
product level therefore not all sectors relevant for the Buy European options can be
tested. Its analytical strength lies in capturing economy-wide and sectoral interactions,
not micro-level or niche product dynamics. For very granular activities, alternative
approaches (e.g. bottom-up sector studies, or case studies) are more appropriate.
Attempting to model such activities within FIDELIO risks both analytical dilution and
false negatives in impact detection.
Ad Section 6.3 - Ultimate Beneficial Ownership (UBO) registers
Table 33: Ultimate Beneficial Ownership (UBO) registers
Country Ultimate Beneficial Ownership (UBO) register
441 C30.1 - Building of ships and boats, C30.1.1 - Building of ships and floating structures, C30.1.2 -
Building of pleasure and sporting boats, C30.3 - Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery,
C30.4 - Manufacture of military fighting vehicles, C30.9 - Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c.,
C30.9.1 - Manufacture of motorcycles, C30.9.2 - Manufacture of bicycles and invalid carriages, C30.9.9 -
Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. 442 As it was the case in the above presented sectors of CPA C26: Radio, television and communication
equipment and apparatus, C26: Medical, precision, and optical instruments, watches, and clocks, C26:
Office machinery and computers. 443 https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC141957
206
Austria Bundesministerium für Finanzen Register der wirtschaftlichen Eigentümer444
Belgium Registre UBO/UBO Register445
Bulgaria Commercial Register and Non-Profit Legal Entities Register446
Croatia Link for access by national authorities
Link for access by public447
Czech Republic Evidence skutečných majitelů (Czech Register of Beneficial Owners)448
Cyprus National register Cyprus: The Department of Registrar of Companies and Intellectual
Property (DRCIP)
Cyprus Trusts Beneficial Owners Register – ‘CyTBOR’449
Denmark The Central Business Register (CVR)450
Estonia The data of the beneficial owner are made public in the commercial register information
system: Äriregister/Commercial Register451
Finland Patentti-ja Rekisterihallitus (Finnish Patent and Registration Office)452
France The French Institut national de la propriété intellectuelle (INPI) is the entity who will centralize BO
information to be interconnected at EU level
BO info of legal persons are centralized by each greffier des tribunaux de commerce whose
coordination instance is the Conseil national des greffiers des tribunaux de commerce453
Germany Transparenzregister (transparency register)454
Greece Κεντρικό Μητρώο Πραγματικών Δικαιούχων (Κ.Μ.Π.Δ.)455
Hungary The link of the BO registry is not available yet.456
444 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Austria (European e-Justice
Portal). Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Austria_EU_en.pdf 445 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Belgium (European e-Justice
Portal). Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Belgium_EU_en.pdf 446 European Commission. (2022). Information on Bulgaria national Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR).
European e-Justice Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-
justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-08/BOR_Bulgaria_EU_en.pdf 447 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Croatia. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Croatia_EU_en.pdf 448 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Czech Republic. European e-
Justice Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Czech%20Republic_EU_en.pdf 449 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Cyprus. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Cyprus_EU_en.pdf 450 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Denmark. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Denmark_EU_en.pdf 451 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Estonia. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Estonia_EU_en.pdf 452 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Finland. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Finland_EU_en.pdf 453 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – France. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_France_EU_en.pdf 454 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Germany. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Germany_EU_en.pdf 455 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Greece. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Greece_EU_en.pdf
207
Ireland Central Bank of Ireland - Beneficial Ownership Register of Certain Financial Vehicles
Central Register of Beneficial Ownership of Companies and Industrial and Provident Societies - for
beneficial ownership information for corporate and other legal entities457
Italy Information not available
Latvia The information website of The Register of Enterprises of the Republic of Latvia458
Lithuania Legal Entity Participants Information System (JADIS)459
Luxembourg The Register is established under the authority of the AED under the name of “Fiducies and Trusts
Register"460
Malta Register of Beneficial Owners for Commercial Partnerships and Legal Entities is administered by the
Malta Business Registry (MBR)
In case of the BO Register of Trusts which is administered by the MFSA, the platform is called
the Trusts Ultimate Beneficial Ownership Register (TUBOR)461
Netherlands KVK uittreksel UBO-register462
Poland Centralny Rejestr Beneficjentów Rzeczywistych (Central Register of Beneficial Owners)463
Portugal Registo de Beneficiário Efetivo464
Romania The National Trade Register Office manages the Register of Real Beneficiaries465
Slovakia Register konečných užívateľov výhod466
Slovenia Beneficial Ownership register467
Spain Registro Central de Titularidades Reales (RCTIR) website
Access to the procedures that can be carried out in relation to the RCTIR468
456 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Hungary. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Hungary_EU_en.pdf 457 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Ireland. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Ireland_EU_en.pdf 458 Register of Enterprises of the Republic of Latvia. (n.d.). Information website of the Register of
Enterprises. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://www.ur.gov.lv/en/ 459 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Lithuania. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Lithuania_EU_en.pdf 460 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Luxembourg. European e-
Justice Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Luxembourg_EU_en.pdf 461 European Commission. (2022). Information on Malta national BOR. European e-Justice Portal.
Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Malta_EU_en.pdf 462 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Netherlands. European e-
Justice Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Netherlands_EU_en.pdf 463 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Poland. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Poland_EU_en.pdf 464 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Portugal. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Portugal_EU_en.pdf 465 European Commission. (2023). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Romania. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-
09/BOR_Romania_20230921_EU_en.pdf 466 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Slovakia. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Slovakia_EU_en.pdf 467 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Slovenia. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Slovenia_EU_en.pdf
208
Sweden Bolagsverket (Swedish Companies Registration Office)469 Sources: provided in footnotes in the table.
Ad Section 6 - Overview of analysed impacts by option
The types of impacts analysed across all options are described below.
Table 34: Overview of analysed impacts by option
Type of impacts FLX
options
ESI
options
BEU
options
MPL
options
Conduct of business including burdens on business
Impacts on SMEs Competitiveness*
Functioning of the internal market and competition
Third countries and trade
Digital economy- digital by default*
Property rights;470 Intellectual property rights
Innovation (productivity and resource efficiency);
research (academic and industrial)
Fraud, crime, terrorism and security, including hybrid
threats
Resilience, technological sovereignty, open strategic
autonomy, security of supply
Public authorities (and budgets)
Working conditions, job standards and quality
Public health & safety and health systems471
Governance, participation and good administration
Employment
Fundamental rights* Not significant
Do no significant harm, including climate consistency
check*
Sustainable consumption and production
Note: *mandatory impacts
Ad Section 7 - Respondents’ views on competition, prices and corruption
During the consultations, respondents were asked to give their opinions on possible policy
options and to indicate their expected impacts if such measures were introduced.
Expected impacts on competition
468 European Commission. (2024). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Spain (questionnaire v3).
European e-Justice Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-
justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-11/BOR%20questionnaire_Spain_v3_EU_en.pdf 469 European Commission. (2022). Beneficial Ownership Register (BOR) – Sweden. European e-Justice
Portal. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from https://e-justice.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-
08/BOR_Sweden_EU_en.pdf 470 Impacts that are not applicable are indicated by strikethrough in the text. 471 As far as procurement of works goods and services for the health sector is concerned.
209
The figure below shows the difference between respondents who considered an increase in
competition very or somewhat likely and those who considered it very or somewhat
unlikely, categorised by selected respondent group.
Respondents expected that simplification measures (FLX options) would result in
increased competition. The difference between those expecting higher competition and
those expecting lower competition amounted to between 70 (public authorities) and 76 (all
respondents and businesses) percentage points.
A slightly lower margin was observed for the IT marketplace (MPL options), where
expectations of higher competition exceeded those expecting reduced competition by 64–
65 percentage points among all respondents and EU businesses, and by 52 percentage
points among public authorities.
In the case of European preference (BEU), there was an expectation of reduced
competition, with a margin of 18 percentage points among all respondents, 29 percentage
points among public authorities, and 38 percentage points among EU businesses.
Options on voluntary green, social, and innovation procurement (ESI.1) showed more
nuanced expectations. While all respondents considered that BPQR would have no effect
and that green and social procurement would have a slight (6–7 percentage points)
negative impact on competition, more public authorities and EU businesses (from 18 to 34
percentage points) expected competition to decrease. Regarding innovation procurement,
all respondents and EU businesses expected an increase in competition (with differences of
17 and 23 percentage points, respectively), whereas public authorities expected a reduction
(10 percentage points).
It is worth noting that respondents more frequently chose “somewhat likely/unlikely”
rather than “very likely/unlikely,” likely indicating their uncertainty about the final
outcome in the absence of a precise description of the proposed changes. Thus, these
responses should be interpreted as the likely expected direction of price changes based on
the general ideas presented in the public consultations.
210
Figure 57: Expected impacts on competition according to respondents to the public consultation.
Note: In case of MPL and BEU question was on increase in number of offers/bids received. Source: Open Public Consultation, see Annex 9
Expected impacts on prices
While estimating the precise effects on the prices of purchased goods and services is
impossible due to the individual specificities of each tender, the varying ways in which
provisions may be applied, and other factors, we can present respondents’ expectations
gathered during public consultations, regarding the impacts of the proposed changes.
The figure below shows the difference between respondents who considered price
increases very or somewhat likely and those who considered them very or somewhat
unlikely, categorised by selected respondent group.
Regarding the simplification options (FLX options), respondents more often expected
that the proposed measures would decrease the prices of procured goods and services.
Among all respondents, the difference in responses favouring a price decrease was 24
percentage points (p.p.); for public authorities, it was 16 p.p., and for businesses, 28 p.p.
76% 70%
76%
64% 52%
65%
-18% -29%
-38%
0% -30%
-18%
-6% -32%
-23%
-7% -34% -33%
17% -10%
23%
Options on Flexibility and Simplification (FLX) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
IT market place (MPL) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
European Preference (BEU) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
BPQR (ESI1) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
Green pp (ESI1) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
Social pp (ESI1) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
Innovation pp (ESI1) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
Respondents' expectations on likelihood of competition increase
difference between (very and somewhat likely) and (very and somewhat unlikely) answers per respondent group
211
As for the green and innovation procurement options (ESI.1 option) and European
preference (BEU), respondents generally expected prices to increase as a consequence of
introducing voluntary measures. Among all respondents, the margin by which those
expecting price increases exceeded those expecting decreases ranged from 31 to 45
percentage points. For public authorities and businesses, this margin rose to 59–83
percentage points for BEU, BPQR, green, and social procurement, and to 26–41
percentage points for innovation procurement.
It is worth noting that respondents more frequently chose “somewhat likely/unlikely”
rather than “very likely/unlikely,” likely indicating their uncertainty about the final
outcome in the absence of a precise description of the proposed changes. Thus, these
responses should be interpreted as the likely expected direction of price changes based on
the general ideas presented in the public consultations.
Figure 58: Expected impacts on prices according to respondents to the public consultation.
Note: There were no questions on prices for MPL options. Source: Open Public Consultation, see Annex 9
Expected impacts on corruption
The figure below shows the difference between respondents who considered a reduction in
corruption very or somewhat likely and those who considered it very or somewhat
unlikely, categorised by selected respondent group.
The question on corruption was asked in relation to the simplification options (FLX
options). Among other elements, this option includes increased use of negotiations,
-24% -16%
-28%
43% 80%
61%
34% 74%
59%
45% 83%
69%
44% 75%
72%
31% 43%
26%
Options on Flexibility and Simplification (FLX) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
European Preference (BEU) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
BPQR (ESI1) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
Green pp (ESI1) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
Social pp (ESI1) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
Innovation pp (ESI1) All respondents
Public Authorities Companies and Business associations
Respondents' expectations on likelihood of price increases difference between (very and somewhat likely) and (very and somewhat unlikely)
answers per respondent group
212
facilitation of market dialogue, and flexibility in contract modifications, all of which may
present corruption risks. Among all respondents, 27 percentage points more expected that
FLX measures would lead to a reduction in corruption. This margin decreased to 8
percentage points for public authorities but increased to 33 percentage points for EU
businesses.
In the case of introducing the marketplace (MPL), respondents were up to 72 percentage
points more likely (among all respondents and EU businesses) and 45 percentage points
more likely (among public authorities) to believe that this option would increase
transparency, thereby reducing irregular practices.
It is worth noting that respondents more frequently chose “somewhat likely/unlikely”
rather than “very likely/unlikely,” likely indicating their uncertainty about the final
outcome in the absence of a precise description of the proposed changes. Thus, these
responses should be interpreted as the likely expected direction of price changes based on
the general ideas presented in the public consultations.
Figure 59: Expected impacts on corruption according to respondents to the public consultation.
Note: Question on impact on corruption was only asked in case of FLX option. Source: Open Public Consultation, see Annex 9.
27%
8%
33%
Options on Flexibility and Simplification (FLX)
All respondents
Public Authorities
Companies and Business associations
Respondents' expectations on likelihood of reduced corruption
difference between (very and somewhat likely) and (very and somewhat unlikely) answers per respondent group
72%
45%
71%
IT market place (MPL)
All respondents
Public Authorities
Companies and Business associations
Respondents' expectations on Increased transparency to prevent irregular practices
difference between (very and somewhat likely) and (very and somewhat unlikely) answers per respondent group
213
Ad Section 8 - Trade-offs between allowing more discretion in public procurement
and the increased risk of irregularities in the process
In order to discuss the trade-offs between allowing more discretion in public procurement
and the increased risk of irregularities in the process, one can start from a theoretical
model developed by Klitgaard (1988)472 on how corruption manifests itself in public and
private bodies. The model is the following:
= + −
Monopoly refers to the concentration of power over the allocation of a valuable good or
service, such as a procurement contract. Discretion denotes the degree of freedom that
decision-makers have in determining outcomes. High discretion allows officials to decide
who gets the benefit and under which conditions. When rules are ambiguous, complex, or
allow subjective interpretation, this gives space for decision bias and hence corruption.
Accountability reflects the extent to which decision-makers are monitored and can be
held responsible for their actions, this often depends on institutional transparency,
oversight mechanism and legal sanctions. Introduction of mandatory BPQR rules would
increase discretion, which without proper adjustment in accountability and reduction in
procedure complexity could increase the risk of corruption (i.e. one of the forms of
irregularities in public procurement).
As far as the accountability dimension of the public procurement rules is concerned, data
analytics, interoperable eProcurement platforms, and automated risk-flagging
mechanisms are seen as capable of substantially reducing monitoring burden while
improving transparency and auditability of procurement procedures. The above has
already been recognised by international bodies such as the OECD several years ago,
which highlighted the growing role of digitalisation, data analytics, and interoperable
eProcurement platforms in strengthening accountability, transparency, and the ex-post
detection of irregularities in public procurement. In this regard, technological progress is
increasingly perceived as an important factor capable of reducing some of the traditional
control-related concerns associated with granting contracting authorities’ greater
procedural discretion. In particular, the OECD (2011) report points out:
• The principle of transparency – which relates to the availability of information on
contract opportunities, the rules of the process, decision-making and verification and
enforcement – is of critical importance in preventing corruption473.
• Corruption is facilitated, and thus most likely to occur, where there is a lack of
openness or transparency in the procurement process474.
• More formal mechanisms by which to protect the integrity of the procurement
process include: (i) data analysis tools, such as comparisons of public databases to
identify indicators of anticompetitive or corrupt activity, […]. Quantitative analyses of
bid data can help procurement agencies (with the support of competition authorities) to
identify up-front those sectors where infringements of the competition rules are more
472 Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. University of California Press. 473 OECD (2011) Competition and Procurement: Key Findings, p. 19. 474 Idem.
214
likely. In order to do so, it is crucial to examine the bids that have been submitted in the
past to determine if the patterns are consistent with a fully competitive process. These
analyses would allow procurement and competition authorities to maximise their efforts,
optimising tender design in those industry sectors which are at risk and allocating law
enforcement resources to the detection of collusion in those sensitive sectors. Retaining
data from prior tenders may also help in any later bid-rigging prosecutions475.
• Where this is the case, knowing the data has been retained may have a deterrent
effect, and thus help to discourage bid-rigging476.
The last point quoted from OECD (2011), highlights the fact that the accountability
mechanisms embedded in public procurement systems may also have an important
deterrent effect on irregular or corrupt behaviour. The existence of reporting
obligations, ex-post controls, and the possibility of judicial or administrative review may
discourage both contracting authorities and economic operators from engaging in
practices that could later be detected and sanctioned. In particular, the increasing
digitalisation of procurement procedures strengthens this deterrent effect by improving
traceability, facilitating data analysis, and increasing the likelihood that suspicious
patterns or conflicts of interest will be identified ex post. As a result, accountability does
not only serve a corrective function after irregularities occur, but may also shape
behaviour ex ante by increasing the perceived probability of detection and reputational or
legal consequences.
In practice, as greater transparency (e.g. publication obligations and access to
procurement data) can increase accountability and facilitate both public scrutiny and ex-
post controls, Member States increasingly recognise the importance of digital and IT-
based tools for the ex-post prevention and detection of irregularities. As an example:
Portugal sees the systematic screening of procurement data, as a way to identify patterns
potentially associated with irregular conduct and prioritizes digital monitoring tools and
data-driven oversight mechanisms.
One of the priorities of the Portuguese Competition Authority (AdC) in 2026: “To
enhance the use of innovative IT tools, including artificial intelligence, for the detection
of unlawful practices and to support investigations carried out by the AdC teams.”477
“In particular, the optimisation of the ScreenIT platform is envisaged, through the use of
machine learning and artificial intelligence tools applied to data relating to public
procurement procedures collected from the IMPIC database. This tool enables any AdC
employee, even without programming expertise, to monitor the data collected, identify
warning signals and rapidly and easily detect potentially anticompetitive patterns. In
2026, the AdC will also continue to rely on cooperation with the Judicial Police,
pursuant to a protocol concluded between the two entities in the area of investigation,
through the promotion of joint training initiatives and the provision of technical and
procedural support aimed at enhancing the detection and sanctioning of illegal practices
by the AdC.“
475 Idem. 476 Idem. 477 COMPETITION POLICY PRIORITIES FOR 2026
215
Such developments suggest that technological progress may partly mitigate the
traditional trade-off between granting contracting authorities’ greater procedural
discretion and ensuring sufficient safeguards against misuse or irregularities.
In terms of examples of digital monitoring tools and data-driven oversight mechanisms,
one should mention ARACHNE+ which is a risk-scoring tool developed by the
Commission, represented by the DG EMPL and DG REGIO, in close cooperation with
MS national authorities. Its main purpose is to help authorities identify projects,
beneficiaries, contractors, contracts and sub-contractors that may present higher risks of
fraud, conflict of interest, irregularities, or reputational concerns, to help authorities in
their administrative controls specifically in the area of Structural and Investment
Funds478.
The latest version of the tool (V2.3) also allows for ex-ante risk calculation function,
allowing authorities to simulate potential risks before a grant agreement or contract is
signed. This means that the tool can also be used preventively, for example to assess risks
linked to a company participating in a call for tender479.
It is important to note that ARACHNE+ does not automatically detect or prove fraud, it
does not assess individual conduct and does not automatically exclude beneficiaries from
EU funding. The tool creates risk indicators, that can help managing authorities prioritise
checks, audits, management verification and on the spot controls.
In order to calculate the risk indicators, ARACHNE+ gathers data from MS managing
authorities in relation to the European Social and the European Regional Development
funds. This includes information on beneficiaries, project partners, turnover, contractors,
subcontractors, service providers, consortium members and key members480. This data is
further enriched with information from commercial databases ORBIS provided by
Bureau van Dijk and World Compliance provided by LexisNecis Risk Solutions.
ORBIS provides company financial information, addresses, ownership structures,
management, shareholders and historical records. World Compliance provides
information on Profiles of Politically Exposed Persons (PEP), as well as those of their
family members and close associates, sanctions lists, enforcement lists, regulatory
warnings, and risk-relevant media monitoring.
The main benefit is that ARACHNE+ helps managing authorities target their control
resources more efficiently. Instead of treating all projects as equally risky, authorities can
focus administrative checks and on the spot verifications on cases where risk indicators
suggest higher exposure. The tool further improves detection of possible conflicts of
interests prior to signing of a contract. The tool is available without any charges for
478 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union. Nugent, A., & Schwarcz,
A. (2022). Briefing: Instruments and tools at EU level and developed at Member State level to prevent and
tackle fraud: ARACHNE (PE 737.760) 479 European Commission. (2022). Arachne: What is new in Arachne V2.3 (Document version 1.0).
European Commission. 480 European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, “What is
ARACHNE?”, accessed 4 May 2026.
216
MS. The commission also provides technical support and training to help authorities
integrate the tool into their management and control systems.
In terms of challenges and critiques, Some Member States report that ARACHNE+ can
increase administrative burden, especially in MS that already have risk-analysis systems.
Inputting the needed data takes time and can feel duplicative. There have also been
concerns regarding false positives and data quality, some authorities report accuracy
issues, where risk alerts are flagged without corresponding to actual problems. Lastly,
some authorities have argued that ARACHNE+ is more useful for certain types of
projects than for others. For example, Dutch authorities have suggested that the system is
better suited to comparing infrastructure projects, while it is less adapted to innovation-
oriented projects, where outputs and costs are harder to compare.
In ARACHNE+ V2.3, data processing was internalised within the premises of the
European Commission. Data uploaded by MS is no longer transferred outside the
Commission and is no longer accessible to the external service provider. Validation,
enrichment and risk calculation are now managed by the Commission’s ARACHNE+ IT
team and DG DIGIT.
Lastly, a feedback mechanism exists, if a MS or a user identifies an invalid matching
between the internal and external data, they can report the issues to the ARACHNE+
team. The correction will affect the risk calculation, although it does not alter the original
external source of information.
Another example is the use of machine learning in cartel detection DATACROS III
project481:
“In DATACROS III red-flags and anomaly indicators are used to signal to LEA and
investigative journalists the potential involvement or infiltration of organized and
financial crime actors – in a firm. Starting in 2019, DATACROS has been developing
increasingly accurate and effective indicators, alongside practitioners and academics. In
its third iteration, the Government Transparency Institute brings to the consortium a
know-how and experience with public procurement tenders – with the aim of integrating
both a European-wide coverage of tenders and a new set of indicators to aid
DATACROS III users in evaluating them. [...] Recent research has found that using bid-
level indicators alongside various machine learning models, trained on cartels’
strategies, can significantly improve accuracy in spotting cartels. For example, bid-level
indicators trained using proven cartel cases in Switzerland were tested on a cartel case
in Japan, despite the stark differences between the two markets, cartel classification
achieved accuracy rates of 88%–97%. These recent advances suggest that machine
learning can provide scalable, data-driven support for competition authorities seeking to
find procurement cartels. Just as well, advancements are not limited to the scope of
classification models; on the contrary, experimental and emerging modelling tools are
also being explored, pioneering new, further ways to identify suspicious cartel behaviour
7-8.”
Another example of collusion being successfully detected is provided by a case in Korea.
In 2006, the Korean Fair-Trade Commission (KFTC) introduced the Bid Rigging
481 https://www.datacros3.com/the-use-of-machine-learning-in-cartel-detection/
217
Indicator Analysis System (BRIAS) to support the detection of bid rigging in public
procurement482. BRIAS is an automated quantitative-analysis IT system that processes
large volumes of public procurement data and assigns tenders a risk score indicating the
likelihood of bid rigging. The effectiveness of the system depends heavily on the quality
and completeness of the data provided by participating procurement agencies. By 2014,
332 public procurement agencies were participating in BRIAS, including central
administrative agencies, local governments and state-owned companies. An OECD report
from 2016483, finds that the system was flagging around 80 cases per month for further
review. One notable success case was the Seoul Subway Line 7 extension case: BRIAS
helped identify suspicious bidding patterns, which led to an investigation and, in 2007, a
KFTC finding that six major construction companies had engaged in collusion. The
companies had allegedly allocated the six individual lots among themselves, coordinating
so that each company would bid for a different lot rather than competing against one
another. This lack of overlapping bids reduced competitive pressure and contributed to
abnormally high prices. The case resulted in fines of approximately USD 20 million. The
report further states that even the risk of being detected by the BRIAS system likely
reduces fraud risk, which is in line with the theoretical accountability mechanism.
482 OECD. (2016). Fighting bid rigging in public procurement: Report on implementing the OECD
Recommendation. OECD. 483 Ibid.
218
ANNEX 8: ADMINISTRATIVE COST ANALYSIS
***********************************************************************
Please note that it was not possible to quantify all savings and costs arising from the
options presented in this impact assessment due to a lack of reliable data. Consequently,
the savings, costs and scenarios presented relate only to the quantified aspects of the
options analysed and should not be regarded as capturing the full monetary impact of
those options.
***********************************************************************
This annex analyses quantifiable changes in costs incurred by contracting authorities and
economic operators as a result of the different policy options presented in this impact
assessment, as well as the preferred option. Where applicable, costs for other entities,
such as Member States in general or the European Commission484, are also analysed. The
analysis presents a central scenario, as well as a selection of alternative scenarios. In
addition to the first-year calculations, the annualised present value (PV) over a seven-
year application period, applying a 3% discount rate, is presented.
It should be noted that non-quantifiable costs are not analysed in this annex but are
addressed in the main text and Annex 7. The benefits analysed in this annex refer only to
quantifiable cost reductions; other (non-quantifiable) benefits are described in the main
text of this impact assessment.
As public procurement is a regulated activity, all cost changes presented in this annex can
be regarded as changes in administrative burden, unless otherwise specified.
The analysis of all options in this annex is underpinned by several common assumptions,
which are presented in the table below. Additional option-specific assumptions are
presented alongside each option485.
484 The costs for the EU budget differ in the legislative financial statement and the impact assessment. This
discrepancy arises because the legislative financial statement includes all costs, while the impact
assessment accounts only for the additional costs introduced by the policy measures on top of the so-called
business-as-usual costs. Additionally, there are slight differences in cost classification and presentation due
to the requirements of the EU financial regulation. 485 Regarding the number of procedures, contracting authorities, and economic operators, despite the
observed growing trend reported in both the Ecorys and World Bank studies, we will assume for our
calculations that these numbers remain constant over the projected period. This approach allows us to focus
solely on the changes brought by the policy options while keeping other factors constant. However, by the
end of this annex, we will lift this stability assumption and present the impacts of applying historical
growth rates for these variables on the preferred option.
As for the average number of bidders, Ecorys reports a decreasing trend from around 5.9 in 2008–2010 to
around 3.3 in 2019–2024. For the main analysis, we will assume that this average will remain at 3.3 over
the projected period. This assumption is made for the same reasons as above and also reflects the
expectation that policy options related to simplification (FLX) and IT (MPL) will, at a minimum, halt the
decline in the number of bidders. However, the impact of changes in the average number of bidders is
analysed in the sensitivity analysis of the options.
219
Table 35: Common assumptions for cost analysis
Source: Ecorys (2025), Cost-Benefit Analysis, World Bank (2025), Competition in public procurement, Eurostat, in- house analysis.
Assumptions for the sensitivity analysis
For each option, a sensitivity analysis is presented to illustrate the outcomes under
varying conditions. For most options, sensitivity is tested with respect to the average
number of bidders-this applies to FLX, ESI, MPL, and the preferred option. This
sensitivity analysis always shows changes in relation to the central scenario, which
assumes an average of 3.3 bidders. For BEU, sensitivity is tested with respect to the share
of procurement subject to European preference and the time spent by contracting
authorities and economic operators, as these factors have the largest impact.
Choice of range for the average number of bidders
The choice of a 0.1 increment in the number of bidders for the sensitivity analysis is
based on two key considerations: the historical trend in bidder participation and the
purpose of the analysis as a short-term sensitivity exercise.
Firstly, historical data indicates a long-term decline in the average number of bidders,
from 5.9 in 2008–2010 to 3.3 in 2019–2024. This decline occurred alongside a steady
increase in the number of contract award notices (CANs) over the same period. This
suggests that the average number of bidders decreased by approximately 0.2 per year on
average, while the number of CANs rose. A simple regression of the available data
indicates a negative relationship, with an average decrease of around 0.016 bidders for
every 1 000 additional contract award notices.
One possible explanation for this effect is the mechanical effect of procurement
thresholds, which are not indexed for inflation. As a result, a growing number of lower-
value contracts fall under the scope of the procurement directives each year, naturally
attracting fewer bidders than larger contracts. This trend is illustrated in the figure below
(Figure 60).
Item Assumption Source
No of procedures 304 000 Ecorys (2025), Table A.39, no. of CANs in
2023
Number of CA 46 648 World Bank (2025), p. 22, value for 2023
Number of winning EO 173 228 World Bank (2025), p. 22, value for 2023
Average number of bidders (EO) 3.3 Ecorys (2025), Table 5.10, overall average for
years 2019-2024 Cost of procurement procedure for CA €6 000
Cost of procurement procedure for EO €11 400
Wage of a procurement professional €41/hour Eurostat Structure of earnings survey 2022,
Labour Force Survey data for Non-Wage
Labour Costs + 25% overhead, ISCO 2
Professionals
Overlap between EOs winning and
EOs losing
50% An assumption to avoid overestimating the total
number of EOs
Total number of EOs participating 372 440 Number of winning EO +(1-overlap)*( Average
number of bidders -1)* Number of winning EO:
=
173 228+(1-50%)*(3.3-1)*173 228
220
However, the historical trend should be interpreted with caution. There is no certainty
that this trend will continue following the reform, nor that the relationship between the
number of contract award notices and the average number of bidders will remain stable
over time. The decline in bidder numbers may reflect broader market conditions or
changes in the composition of procurement, but it could also be driven by the current
regulatory framework. Nonetheless, using the high historical figure of 5.9 bidders would
not represent a plausible short-term sensitivity scenario around the current baseline of 3.3
bidders. A return from 3.3 to 5.9 bidders would imply a reversal of a long-term trend
observed over more than a decade, rather than a realistic short-term fluctuation.
Instead, the analysis uses smaller increments of 0.1 bidders, as the results are highly
sensitive around the break-even point. Furthermore, this incremental approach provides a
more plausible and suitable range for testing short-term variations around the current
baseline and includes the point at which expected savings turn into costs.
Figure 60 Number of contract award notices and average number of bids.
Note: For graphical presentation, the Ecorys average number of bidders is shown at the midpoints of the two periods: 2008–2010 is represented by 2008, and 2019–2024 by 2022. Source: In-house analysis based on Ecorys(2025).
Change in contracting authorities’ costs with varying average numbers of bidders
To properly assess the impact of changes in the average number of bidders, we adjust the
average cost of procurement procedures for contracting authorities by 0.58%
(approximately EUR 35) for every change of 0.1 bidders, upwards or downwards. This
reflects the change in administrative burden associated with evaluating a higher or lower
number of tenders. To avoid double counting in the calculation of the preferred option,
this adjustment is applied only under the FLX option.
This estimate was calculated using two aggregated reference points from Ecorys (2025).
For the period 2008–2010, when the average number of bidders was 5.9, inflation-
221
adjusted costs for contracting authorities were estimated at EUR 6 900. For 2019–2024,
when the average number of bidders had decreased to 3.3, the estimated cost for
contracting authorities was EUR 6 000.
Assuming a simple linear relationship between these two points, the difference of EUR
900 over 2.6 bidders implies an additional cost of approximately EUR 346 for each
additional bidder. This corresponds to an increase of 5.8% per additional bidder, with
each additional 0.1 bidder increasing costs by 0.58%, or around EUR 34.6. This suggests
that the economic effect is relatively small, particularly for marginal changes.
However, this estimated relationship should be treated with caution. The comparison is
based on only two distinct periods and is therefore likely to reflect broader economic and
procurement law developments, rather than solely changes in administrative costs caused
by variations in the number of bids. This is especially relevant as the 2008–2010 figures
predate the current directives.
Changes in overlap between winning and losing economic operators
The estimated impacts of the MPL options, as well as of the preferred option, depend on
the total number of distinct economic operators (EOs) affected.
The total number of distinct economic operators equals the number of winning EOs plus
the number of losing EOs, minus the number of EOs that appear in both groups. In other
words:
= + − ℎ
To characterise the relationship between the two groups, an overlap rate is defined as the
share of economic operators that, across different tenders, appear both as winners and as
losers, relative to the total number of distinct economic operators486. An overlap of 0%
implies complete separation between the two groups, meaning that winning EOs never
appear as losing EOs and vice versa. Conversely, an overlap of 100% implies that every
economic operator that loses at least one tender also wins at least one tender, meaning
that no economic operator appears exclusively as a loser.
The available data do not allow the overlap rate, the number of losing EOs or the total
number of distinct economic operators to be observed directly. The data provide only an
estimate of the number of winning economic operators (173 228 in 2023). Under a
hypothetical scenario of 100% overlap, this figure would also equal the total number of
distinct economic operators, as every losing EO would also be included among the
winners.
486 This is also known as the Jaccard similarity coefficient: Let:
• W = number of winner EOs
• L = number of loser EOs
• O = number of EOs that are both winners and losers
• U = total unique EOs
Since:
U=W+L−O
the overlap is:
Overlap= O / U = O / (W+L−O)
222
Additional assumptions are therefore required to calibrate the sensitivity analysis.
Besides the number of winning EOs, the data provide the number of contract award
notices (CAN) (304 000 in 2023), implying that each winning economic operator was
awarded, on average, approximately 1.75 contracts (304 000 / 173 228). The data also
indicate an average of 3.3 bidders per contract award notice. Assuming that winning and
losing economic operators participate in tenders with the same average frequency, the
estimated number of distinct participating economic operators under a scenario of 0%
overlap is:
304 000 × 3.3 / 1.75 = 571 652 economic operators.
This figure should not be interpreted as a mathematical upper bound or as an estimate of
the true number of participating economic operators. Rather, it represents a calibration
point derived from the assumptions of 0% overlap and equal average tender participation
by winning and losing economic operators.
Using the two calibration points – 173 228 economic operators at 100% overlap and
571 652 economic operators at 0% overlap - a linear interpolation is applied to estimate
the number of distinct economic operators at intermediate levels of overlap. The formula
used in the sensitivity analysis is therefore487:Unique EOs = Number of winning EOs +
(100% – overlap) × (average number of bidders – 1) × Number of winning EOs
This formula is not intended to estimate the actual number of distinct economic
operators. Rather, it provides a transparent and internally consistent calibration for the
sensitivity analysis. The true relationship between overlap and the number of distinct
economic operators is unknown and need not be linear. Moreover, the approach relies on
assumptions that cannot be verified using the available data, in particular the assumption
that winning and losing economic operators participate in tenders with the same average
frequency. Consequently, the resulting figures should be interpreted as illustrative values
used to assess the sensitivity of the estimated impacts to alternative assumptions
regarding the degree of overlap between winning and losing economic operators.
The central scenario assumes an overlap rate of 50%, resulting in an estimated 372 440
distinct economic operators (see the figure below). Alternative overlap assumptions are
tested in the sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the results.
487 This is a reduced version of:
Unique EOs = Number of winning EOs + (100% – overlap) × (average number of bidders – 1) × CANs /
(CANs/ Number of winning EOs)
223
Figure 61: Estimated number of distinct economic operators by assumed overlap rate.
Source: In-house analysis.
FLX options cost
Note: The costing of FLX options relates solely to changes in the use of negotiations. It
is important to note that FLX options introduce additional simplification measures that
have not been quantified due to a lack of reliable data. These include, for example, the
reuse of documents (once-only principle), the possibility for error corrections that should
reduce the number of terminations due to errors, harmonised definitions, and a reduced
administrative burden in emergencies. Consequently, the savings and scenarios presented
relate only to one aspect of the FLX options – negotiations - and should not be
considered as capturing the total impact of these options.
Percentage change in costs
In order to evaluate the possible impacts of options FLX, a hypothetical scenario was
tested in which the negotiated procedure gradually substituted for the open one by
increments of 1%. The analysis is based on data per Member State on the average use of
procedures and average number of bidders, as published in TED in 2017-2024. The cost
of negotiated and open procedure per contracting authority and economic operators is
taken from Ecorys (2025) study, as provided in the table below.
Table 36: Average cost in EUR spent per above EU threshold procedure in 2019-2024 [EUR]
Contracting authorities Economic operators
Open procedure 8 100 10 900
Restricted 11 400 8 800
Negotiated* 10 900 9 100
Framework agreements 3 500 12 100
Overall (cost across all procedures) 6 000 11 400
Source: Ecorys (2025), Cost-Benefit Analysis…, p.60.
224
The calculation of the total cost followed the approach applied by Ecorys (2025),
namely:
= + ×
Where:
• - total cost per procedure
• - average cost incurred by the contracting authority per procedure
• - average number of bids submitted per procedure (per Member State)
• - average cost incurred by an economic operator per bid submitted
The analysis considered ten hypothetical scenarios in which the share of negotiated
procedure increased from the current level by up to 10%. The figure below presents the
results of such analysis by Member State. The substitution of open procedure by
negotiated is expected to reduce the total cost of procedures, mainly because the former
entails higher costs for bidding companies, which are multiplied by the average number
of bidders in the calculation formula. Differences in the slopes observed across countries
are primarily driven by country-specific levels of competition (as reflected in the average
number of bidders) as well as by the existing distribution of procedures in each Member
State. In particular, in countries where the current share of negotiated procedure is
higher, a 1% increase leads to a more pronounced impact.
Figure 62: Change in the total cost of procedures by Member State, depending on the increase in the use of negotiated
procedure.
Source: In-house analysis based on Ecorys(2025) survey data.
225
The estimated range of savings for all countries combined in case of an increase in the
use of negotiated procedure by up to 10% is presented in the figure below. For example,
with just 1% change the savings would be negligible, but if 5% more procurement
contracts were concluded following the negotiated procedure, the costs for authorities
and participating firms would reach between 95.1% to 98.9% of the current costs (i.e. the
saving would represent 1.1% to 4.9% of total costs of a procedure). Under the extreme
scenario, the estimated range would lie between 97.9% and 90.3% (hence, the savings
could be at least 2.1% or reach up to 9.7%).
Figure 63: Change in the total cost of procedures, depending on the increase in the use of negotiated procedure [%].
Source: In-house analysis based on Ecorys (2025) survey data.
In the next step, another factor was incorporated into the analysis, namely changes in the
number of bidders in increments of 0.1 in both directions, i.e. from -0.5 to +0.5, around
an average level of bidders. Once the additional element is added, it becomes clear that
the level of competition influences the overall outcome: the greater the number of
participating firms, the higher the aggregate costs incurred, as all bidders bear
administrative costs while preparing their offers.
226
Figure 64: Change in the total cost of procedures, depending on the increase in the use of negotiated procedure and
the number of bidders participating [%]
Source: In-house analysis based on Ecorys(2025) survey data.
The five upper panels present scenarios in which the average number of bidders increases
by between 0.1 and 0.5 compared to the current Member State averages. The lower
panels illustrate the same scenarios, but assuming a gradual decrease in the number of
bidders. Each panel constitutes a self-standing figure, with the x-axis representing the
previously discussed scenarios of a gradual substitution of the open procedure by the
negotiated procedure, and the y-axis showing the resulting change in total costs
compared to the current situation.
The overall conclusion that can be derived from the figure above is that any price savings
resulting from the substitution in procedural arrangements will be partially neutralised if
the number of bidders increases and strengthened if it decreases – for example if the
number of bidders decreases by 0.4 and the negotiated procedure is used more frequently
in 10% of cases the cost could drop to 80%. Conversely, assuming a 0.5 increase in the
average number of bidders, the overall cost is expected to increase across all procedural
substitution scenarios, or, at best, remain broadly unchanged (i.e. the upper right-most
panel, the bottom of the spike at 10% increase of negotiated procedure is almost aligned
with 100% of current costs).
It should also be noted that the above estimate does not account for any potential
reduction in overall procedural costs that are expected to materialise if the procurement
process is significantly streamlined (i.e. involves less administrative requirements) or due
to further digitalisation as foreseen in options MPL.
227
Cost in Euro
The estimation of costs in euros for the FLX.1 and FLX.2 options is based on the average
difference in cost between open and negotiated procedures for the years 2019-2024, as
reported by Ecorys (2025). Accordingly, using the negotiated procedure results in an
additional cost of EUR 2 800 for contracting authorities and a cost reduction of
EUR 1 800 for economic operators488.
Currently, under the Classical Directive, negotiations are used in 10% of all procedures
(Ecorys, 2025, Figure 5.4, "competitive with negotiations", value for 2024), with their
use subject to several restrictions and limited to highly complex contracts. In contrast,
under the Utilities Directive-where negotiations face no such restrictions-they account for
35% of all procedures (Ecorys, 2025, Figure 5.5, "competitive with negotiations", value
for 2024). However, this higher usage applies to higher-value contracts due to the
elevated threshold (EUR 443 000 for Utilities compared to EUR 143 000 for the
Classical Directive). Consequently, for our central scenario, we assume an increase in the
use of negotiations - resulting from the simplifications introduced by the FLX option - of
10 percentage points. This is slightly below half the gap between the use of negotiations
in the two directives. For the sensitivity analysis, we will consider scenarios ranging
from 0 to 25 percentage points increase. It should be emphasised that in the new
procedure negotiations remain voluntary, so contracting authorities will only use them if
they provide added value.
Under the central scenario, where the use of negotiations increases by 10 percentage
points, the average cost per procedure is projected to increase by approximately EUR 280
(PV: EUR 257) for contracting authorities and decrease by EUR 180 (PV:165) for each
economic operator. This results in a total cost reduction per procurement procedure of
around EUR 314 (PV: EUR 288), equivalent to a 0.7% reduction from the total average
cost of procedures. Based on the number of above-threshold procedures in the EU in
2023, this translates into overall savings of roughly EUR 95 million (PV: EUR 88
million), composed of an increase of EUR 85 million (PV: EUR 78 million) in costs for
contracting authorities and a reduction of EUR 181 million (PV: EUR 165) for economic
operators (see table below).
Table 37: FLX options cost under 10 percentage points increase in use of negotiations scenario.
CA EO No. of bids Total
Per Procedure (€ per procedure)
Cost change after 10pp increase in
negotiations
+ 280 - 180 3.3 - 314
EU wide cost change (€ million)**
After 10pp increase in negotiations + 85 - 181 - 95
Annual present value (over 7 years at 3% discount rate)
Per Procedure (€ per procedure)
Cost change after 10pp increase in
negotiations
+ 257 - 165 3.3 - 288
488 The lower cost for economic operators in procedures with negotiation is due to the two-stage award
process. In the first stage, bidders submit an expression of interest. Contracting authorities then select a
limited number of bidders to proceed to the second stage, where they submit a technical offer or enter
negotiations (Ecorys, 2025, p. 59). This reduces the average cost for all bidders, as non-winning bidders
incur lower costs.
228
EU wide cost change (€ million)**
After 10pp increase in negotiations + 78 - 165 - 88 Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies. * EU wide cost divided by number of CA and EO x average number of bidders from Table 35 ** per procedure cost multiplied by number of procedures form Table 35, cost for all EOs presented Source: In-house analysis.
When examining different scenarios of increased negotiation use under the current
average of 3.3 bidders, the present value of cost changes ranges from no impact with no
increase in negotiations to savings of EUR 9 million with a 1 percentage point rise, and
EUR 219 million with a 25-percentage point increase. This suggests that each percentage
point increase in negotiation use corresponds to approximately EUR 8.75 million in EU-
wide procurement savings.
The average number of bidders influences the costs. For example, in a scenario with a
10-percentage point increase in negotiations, raising the average number of bidders by
just 0.1 (e.g., from 3.3 to 3.4) turns savings into a cost increase of EUR 235 million (PV)
- an effective cost increase of EUR 322 million.
As shown in the table below, FLX policy options generate savings when the average
number of bidders does not exceed 3.3 for any positive increase in the use of negotiated
procedures. When the average number of bidders reaches 3.4 or more, EU-wide costs
increase across all considered scenarios of changes in negotiation use.
Table 38: Annualised present value of EU-wide total cost changes for FLX options due to changes in the use of
negotiations under different average numbers of bidders, with all other factors held constant [EUR million].
Change in
use of
negotiations
(pp)↓
Average number of bids→
3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6
0% - 982 - 655 - 327 0 327 655 982
1% - 989 - 662 - 336 - 9 318 645 972
2% - 997 - 670 - 344 - 18 309 635 962
3% - 1 004 - 678 - 352 - 26 300 625 951
4% - 1 011 - 686 - 360 - 35 290 616 941
5% - 1 018 - 693 - 369 - 44 281 606 931
6% - 1 026 - 701 - 377 - 53 272 596 921
7% - 1 033 - 709 - 385 - 61 263 586 910
8% - 1 040 - 717 - 393 - 70 253 577 900
9% - 1 047 - 724 - 402 - 79 244 567 890
10% - 1 055 - 732 - 410 - 88 235 557 880
15% - 1 091 - 771 - 451 - 131 189 508 828
20% - 1 127 - 810 - 492 - 175 142 460 777
25% - 1 163 - 848 - 534 - 219 96 411 726 Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. Source: In-house analysis.
229
ESI options cost
BPQR
The use of BPQR - workdays actively spent on running the procedures
One way to inspect the impact of the use of BPQR is to examine differences in the
workdays actively spent on running procurement procedures. For this purpose, the same
dataset containing the survey results was used. To reduce the influence of extreme
outliers and focus on typical procedure durations, the analysis was carried out on a
restricted sample excluding procedures lasting more than 100 days.
Table 39: Duration of procedures in the award phase – buyers
Price only
(mean)
BPQR
(mean)
difference
Duration in days 11.56 13.68 -2.12
No. of observations 245 192 Source: In-house analysis based on Ecorys surveys 2022-2025
Table 39, the average buyer-side duration of procedures in the award phase is 11.6 days
for price-only procedures and 13.7 days for BPQR procedures. This corresponds to an
estimated difference of around 2.1 days, with BPQR procedures taking longer on
average.
Table 40: Duration of procedures in the award phase – winners
Price only
(mean)
BPQR
(mean)
difference
Duration in days 7.87 10.05 -2.18
No. of observations 454 373 Source: In-house analysis based on Ecorys(2025) surveys 2022-2025
Similar patterns can be observed in case of winners, where the duration of award phase
is significantly longer under BPQR than when price-only criteria are used. On average,
BPQR procedures take around 2.2 days longer. Due to a lack of data for non-winners, we
will assume that the same difference applies, though this may result in an overestimation
of the costs associated with the BPQR requirement.
To conclude, when focusing on typical procedure durations (i.e. excluding procedures
lasting more than 100 days), BPQR procedures are associated with longer durations for
both sides of the transaction. Both contracting authorities and winning firms spend more
workdays awarding contracts involving BPQR, with differences of around 2.1–2.2 days
more devoted to the contract award phase. This suggests that the additional complexity
associated with BPQR procedures affects suppliers, as well as contracting authorities.
ESI.1 and 2 BPQR comply or explain
Using the estimated durations of price-only and BPQR procedures, combined with
Ecorys (2025) findings on overall procedure costs and the current 63% share of BPQR
procedures, we estimate the average current cost for contracting authorities at EUR 5 379
for price-only procedures and EUR 6 365 for BPQR procedures. This means BPQR
procedures are EUR 986 (PV: EUR 904) more expensive per case.
230
If, as a result of ESI.1/ESI.2, the share of price-only procedures falls by half (to 18.5%)
and the share of BPQR procedures rises correspondingly, the additional EU-wide annual
cost for contracting authorities would increase by EUR 55.5 million (PV: EUR 51
million). For the remaining 18.5% of price-only procedures, contracting authorities
would need to justify why BPQR was not applied. We estimate this explanation would
cost EUR 81 (PV: EUR 74) per case (based on 2 hours at EUR 40.5 per hour)489,
resulting in an EU-wide cost of EUR 4.5 million (PV: EUR 4 million). Together, the
total additional EU-wide cost for contracting authorities under an 18.5% increase in
BPQR use is estimated at EUR 60 million (PV: EUR 55 million).
Applying the same logic to economic operators, the average costs are EUR 9 706 for
price-only procedures and EUR 12 395 for BPQR procedures - making BPQR
EUR 2 689 (PV: EUR 2 465) more expensive per case. Under a scenario where BPQR
tenders increase by 18.5%, and considering an average of 3.3 bidders per tender, the
additional annual EU-wide cost would amount to EUR 499 million (PV: EUR 457
million).
Combined, the total additional annual EU-wide cost of ESI.1/ESI.2 under an 18.5%
BPQR increase scenario is estimated at EUR 559 million (PV: EUR 512 million) (see
calculations below).
Table 41: ESI.1/ESI.2 BPQR comply or explain additional costs
Entity Cost per
BPQR
procedure (€)
Comments
CA Comply: 986
(PV: 904) • Average time of procedures: 11.56 days * 37% (time and share price only
procedures) + 13.68 days * 63% (time and share of BPQR procedures)=12.9 days (a)
• Difference in time in %: (13.68-11.56)/12.9 = 16%
• Difference in € based on average cost: 16% * 6 000 = 986 (b)
Explain: 81
(PV: 74) • Cost per “explain” procedure: assumption of 2 hours work for procurement
professional remunerated at €40.5/h.(c)
EO 2 689
(PV: 2 465) • Average time of procedures: 7.87 days * 37% (time and share price only
procedures) + 10.05 days * 63% (time and share of BPQR procedures) = 9.2 days (a)
• Difference in time in %: (10.05 -7.87)/9.2 = 24%
• Difference in € based on average cost: 24% * 11 400 = 2 689 (b)
Average change in cost for all procedures (€)
CA 197
(PV: 181) • (€986 + €81) * 18.5% (assumption additional BPQR procedures)
EO 497
(PV: 456) • €2 689 * 18.5% (assumption additional BPQR procedures)
EU wide annual costs (€ million)
CA Comply: 55
(PV: 51)
€986 * 18.5% (assumption additional BPQR procedures) * 304 000 (number of
CANs)(c)
Explain: 5
(PV: 4)
€81 * (37% - 18.5%) (remaining price only procedures for which explanation is
required) * 304 000 (number of CANs)(c)
Total: 60
(PV: 55)
EO 499
(PV: 457)
€2 689 * 18.5% (assumption additional BPQR procedures) * 304 000 (number of
CANs)(c) * 3.3 (average number of bidders)(b)
489 Two hours (based on expert judgement); a sensitivity analysis with alternative time estimates is
presented below.
231
Total 559
(PV: 512)
Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies. The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. (a) time in days from calculations in previous subchapter based in Ecorys surveys; share of procedures from Ecorys (2025), Table 5.6 ; (b) Ecorys (2025), Table 5.10; (c) Table 35 above. Source: In-house analysis.
Alternative scenarios with varying increases in BPQR use and different time
requirements for preparing justifications yield different cost estimates. For instance, if the
share of BPQR procedures remains unchanged at 63%, the EU-wide annual cost of
ESI.1/ESI.2 would consist solely of preparing justification notes. Depending on the time
required, this could range from EUR 0 (e.g., a simple checkbox in an IT system) to EUR
8 million (PV, 2 hours per case) or EUR 33 million (PV, a full working day per case).
If all procedures were to become BPQR (a 37-percentage point increase from current
levels), the annual cost of this option would rise to EUR 1 017 million (PV) - equivalent
to the cost of ESI.3 mandatory BPQR.
For further details, see the table below.
Table 42: Annualised present value of the total EU wide costs of ESI BPQR under varying levels of BPQR uptake and
time required for comply-or-explain notes [EUR million]
Time (h)
↓
BPQR uptake (change in brackets) →
ESI.1/ESI.2 ESI.3
63%
(+0%)
68%
(+5%)
73%
(+10%)
81.5%
(+18.5%)
88%
(+25%)
93%
(+30%)
100%
(+37%)
0 0 137 275 508 687 824 1 017
0.5 2 139 276 509 688 825 1 017
1 4 141 278 510 688 825 1 017
2 8 145 281 512 690 826 1 017
4 17 152 287 517 692 827 1 017
8 33 166 299 525 698 831 1 017 Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. Source: In-house analysis.
ESI.3 mandatory BPQR
For the ESI.3 option, the additional costs per procedure remain the same as those
described under ESI.1/ESI.2, namely EUR 986 (PV: EUR 904) for contracting
authorities and EUR 2 689 (PV: EUR 2 465) for economic operators. The difference
arises in the EU-wide cost calculations, as mandatory BPQR implies an increase in the
use of BPQR procedures by 37 percentage points, from the current level of 63% to 100%.
This results in an EU-wide annual cost increase of EUR 111 million (PV: EUR 102
million) for contracting authorities and EUR 998 million (PV: EUR 915 million) for all
economic operators, bringing the total additional cost to EUR 1 109 million (PV: EUR
1 017 million). For further details, see the table below.
Table 43: ESI.3 mandatory BPQR additional costs
Entity Cost per
BPQR
procedure (€)
Comments
232
CA 986
(PV: 904) • Average time of procedures: 11.56 days * 37% (time and share price only
procedures) + 13.68 days * 63% (time and share of BPQR procedures)=12.9 days (a)
• Difference in time in %: (13.68-11.56)/12.9 = 16%
• Difference in € based on average cost: 16% * 6 000 = 986 (b)
EO 2 689
(PV: 2 465) • Average time of procedures: 7.87 days * 37% (time and share price only
procedures) + 10.05 days * 63% (time and share of BPQR procedures) = 9.2 days (a)
• Difference in time in %: (10.05 -7.87)/9.2 = 24%
• Difference in € based on average cost: 24% * 11 400 = 2 689 (b)
Average change in cost for all procedures (€)
CA 365
(PV: 335) • €986 * 37% (assumption additional BPQR procedures)
EO 995
(PV: 912) • €2 689 * 37% (assumption additional BPQR procedures)
EU wide annual costs (€ million)
CA 111
(PV: 102)
€365 * 304 000 (number of CANs)(c)
EO 998
(PV: 915)
€995 * 304 000 number of CANs)(c) * 3.3 (average number of bidders)(b)
Total 1 109
(PV: 1 017)
Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies. The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. (a) time in days from calculations in previous subchapter based in Ecorys surveys; share of procedures from Ecorys (2025), Table 5.6; (b) Ecorys (2025), Table 5.10; (c) Table 35 above. Source: In-house analysis.
EU Ecolabel
ESI.1/ESI.2 Voluntary EU Ecolabel
Policy Option 1 and 2 (ESI.1/ESI.2) is expected to encourage the use of the EU Ecolabel.
Currently, the EU Ecolabel covers 27 product groups490, representing roughly 3% of all
tenders by number and around 1.5% by value491. This figure reflects the maximum
potential coverage of EU Ecolabel requirements.
For contracting authorities, the first main requirement will be to determine whether they
wish to use labels as proof of compliance and to verify whether EU Ecolabel criteria exist
for the good or service being procured before launching a tender. If both conditions are
met, authorities will need to explicitly request the EU Ecolabel in the tender application.
This is expected to involve negligible or no additional cost. Using the EU Ecolabel may
generate cost savings, as the progressive publication by the Commission of Practical
490 These are: dishwasher detergents; hand dishwashing detergents; hard surface cleaning products; indoor
cleaning services; industrial and institutional dishwasher detergents; industrial and institutional laundry
detergents; laundry detergents; footwear; textile products; hard covering products; wood-, cork- and
bamboo-based floor coverings; electronic displays; bed mattresses; furniture; bed mattresses; growing
media and soil improvers; lubricants; decorative paints, varnishes, and related products; performance
coatings and related products; water-based aerosol spray paints; graphic paper; printed paper, stationery
paper and paper carrier bag products; tissue paper and tissue products; absorbent hygiene products; animal
care products; cosmetic products; tourist accommodation. 491 This estimate is based on matching the 27 product groups covered by the EU Ecolabel to the Common
Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) codes and identifying the number and value of contract award notices with
these codes in the TED database.
233
Guides on the use of the EU Ecolabel in green public procurement for product groups
covered by EU Ecolabel criteria would facilitate its uptake by public buyers. . However,
it is not possible to quantify these potential savings with the available data.
Since the use of the EU Ecolabel will remain voluntary and equivalent ecolabels will be
accepted, this option is not expected to impose additional costs on bidders in case the
share of green procurement requiring ecolabels remains as it is now.
However, if the uptake of green procurement increases-whether as a result of the new
Best Price-Quality Ratio (BPQR) recommendation or due to clarifications under this
option-contracting authorities may demand EU Ecolabels more frequently than at
present. In such cases, the additional cost per company of acquiring an EU Ecolabel
would include a one-off application fee of approximately EUR 1 100 (ranging from
EUR 200 to EUR 2 000) and an annual fee of around EUR 12 500 (ranging from EUR 0
to EUR 25 000).
Using the increase scenarios for BPQR, we estimate that, for example, if green
procurement rises by 18.5 percentage points to around 40.5% of all procurement, and
half of the additional tenders for which the EU Ecolabel criteria exist will require it,
nearly 1 000 more firms would need to acquire one. This would result in a one-off cost of
around EUR 1.1 million and an annual cost of approximately EUR 12.9 million (PV:
EUR 12 million). See calculations below.
Table 44: ESI.1/ESI.2 cost of voluntary EU Ecolabel under 18.5% increase in BPQR
Entity Cost per
company (€)
Comments
EO One-off:
1 100
Average of minimum EU Ecolabel application fee of €200 and maximum fee of
€2 000(a)
Annual fee:
12 500
Average of minimum EU Ecolabel annual fee of €0 and maximum fee of €25 000(a)
EU wide annual costs (€ million)
EO One-off:
1.1
(PV:1.1)
• Estimation of number firms concerned: 372 440 companies(b) * 18.5%
(assumption BPQR increase) * 3% share of tenders covered by EU Ecolabel = 2 067
• 50% of tenders assumed to require EU Ecolabel * 2 067 = 1 034 requiring EU
Ecolabel
• 1 034 firms * €1 100 application fee = €1.1m
Annual fee:
12.9
(PV: 12)
• 1 034 firms * €12 500 annual fee = €12.9m
Average change in annual cost for all procedures (€)
EO 42
(PV: 39) • €12.9 million / 304 000 (number of CANs)(b)
Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies. The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. The present value of a one-off cost (paid upfront only once) is equal to its nominal value. (a) https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/eu-ecolabel-fees-table-2026_en situation as of 3 March 2026 (b) Table 35 above. Source: In-house analysis.
234
Such an increase in demand would also represent an almost 44% rise in the number of
firms holding an EU Ecolabel, increasing from the current figure of around 2 350492 to
approximately 3 390. Nevertheless, it should be noted that companies might still opt for
national ecolabels - for example, due to their wider local recognition - and provide proof
of equivalence during the tender process, as equivalence is already permitted under the
current rules and will continue to be permitted.
Further scenarios are presented in the table below.
Table 45: Estimated present value of additional costs to bidders under a voluntary EU Ecolabel scheme, based on
varying levels of green procurement uptake and requirements for the use of the EU Ecolabel.
Uptake of green procurement (increase on current level in brackets)
22%
(0%)
27%
(+5%)
32%
(+10%)
40.5%
(+18.5%)
47%
(+25%)
52%
(+30%)
59%
(+37%)
% t
en d
er s
w it
h E
U E
co la
b el
r eq
u ir
em en
t
0% No change
25%
N o
c h
an g
e
F: 140
O: €0.15m
A: €1.6m
T: €1.75m
∆: 6%
F: 279
O: €0.31m
A: €3.2m
T: €3.51m
∆: 12%
F: 517
O: €0.57m
A: €5.92m
T: €6.49m
∆: 22%
F: 698
O: €0.77m
A: €8m
T: €8.77m
∆: 30%
F: 838
O: €0.92m
A: €9.6m
T: €10.52m
∆: 36%
F: 1 034
O: €1.14m
A: €11.84m
T: €12.98m
∆: 44%
50%
F: 279
O: €0.31m
A: €3.2m
T: €3.51m
∆: 12%
F: 559
O: €0.61m
A: €6.4m
T: €7.01m
∆: 24%
F: 1 034
O: €1.14m
A: €11.84m
T: €12.98m
∆: 44%
F: 1 397
O: €1.54m
A: €16m
T: €17.54m
∆: 59%
F: 1 676
O: €1.84m
A: €19.21m
T: €21.05m
∆: 71%
F: 2 067
O: €2.27m
A: €23.69m
T: €25.96m
∆: 88%
75%
F: 419
O: €0.46m
A: €4.8m
T: €5.26m
∆: 18%
F: 838
O: €0.92m
A: €9.6m
T: €10.52m
∆: 36%
F: 1 550
O: €1.71m
A: €17.77m
T: €19.48m
∆: 66%
F: 2 095
O: €2.3m
A: €24.01m
T: €26.31m
∆: 89%
F: 2 514
O: €2.77m
A: €28.81m
T: €31.58m
∆: 107%
F: 3 101
O: €3.41m
A: €35.53m
T: €38.94m
∆: 132%
100%
F: 559
O: €0.61m
A: €6.4m
T: €7.01m
∆: 24%
F: 1 117
O: €1.23m
A: €12.8m
T: €14.03m
∆: 47%
F: 2 067
O: €2.27m
A: €23.69m
T: €25.96m
∆: 88%
F: 2 793
O: €3.07m
A: €32.01m
T: €35.08m
∆: 118%
F: 3 352
O: €3.69m
A: €38.41m
T: €42.1m
∆: 142%
F: 4 134
O: €4.55m
A: €47.37m
T: €51.92m
∆: 175%
Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. The present value of a one-off cost (paid upfront only once) is equal to its nominal value. F – number of new firms acquiring EU Ecolabel; O -one-off cost; A: annual cost; T: total first year cost; ∆: % increase in no. of firms with EU Ecolabel from current 2 358 firms (as of March 2026). The number. of firms affected is assumed to be proportional to the number of tenders. Source: In-house analysis.
ESI.3 mandatory EU Ecolabel
A mandatory requirement to use the EU Ecolabel would apply to up to 3% of tenders
covering products within its scope. Given that approximately 22% of tenders already
include green requirements, an estimated 2 458 companies would need to demonstrate
EU Ecolabel ownership to participate. We assume that half of these firms already hold
either an EU Ecolabel or a relevant equivalent national label and can provide proof of
equivalence, thus facing no additional cost. For the remaining 1 229 firms, this would
represent their first acquisition of any ecolabel.
492 As of March 2026, there were 2 358 companies registered in the EU Ecolabel Product Catalogue and
the EU Ecolabel Tourist Accommodation Catalogue, partial data. Source:
https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/circular-economy-topics/eu-ecolabel/businesses/ecolabel-facts-
and-figures_en.
235
Additionally, under option ESI.3, BPQR requirements would become mandatory. As
with ESI.1/ESI.2, we assume this would add an extra 18.5% of green tenders, but in this
case, all tenders for which the EU Ecolabel criteria exist would require it (or an
equivalent). This would increase the number of firms needing to purchase the EU
Ecolabel by 2 067. Altogether, around 3 296 firms would incur a one-off acquisition cost
averaging EUR 1 100 and an annual fee averaging EUR 12 500, resulting in EU-wide
costs of EUR 3.6 million and EUR 41.2 million (PV: EUR 38 million), respectively.
Detailed calculations are presented below.
Table 46: ESI.3 cost of mandatory EU Ecolabel under 18.5% increase in BPQR
Entity Cost per
company (€)
Comments
EO One-off:
1 100
Average of minimum EU Ecolabel application fee of €200 and maximum fee of
€2 000(a)
Annual fee:
12 500
Average of minimum EU Ecolabel annual fee of €0 and maximum fee of €25 000(a)
EU wide
annual costs
(€ million)
EO One-off:
3.6
(PV: 3.6)
• Estimation of number firms concerned:
(372 440 companies(b) * 22% (current level of green procurement) * 3% share of
tenders covered by EU Ecolabel = 2 458 firms * 50% (est. number of firms without
EU Ecolabel) = 1 229 firms)
+ (372 440 companies(b) * 18.5% (assumption BPQR increase) * 3% share of
tenders covered by EU Ecolabel = 2 067)
= 3 296
• 3 296 firms * €1 100 application fee = €3.6m
Annual fee:
41.2
(PV: 38)
• 3 296 firms * €12 500 annual fee = €41.2m
Average change in annual cost for all procedures (€)
EO 136
(PV: 124) • €41.2 million / 304 000 (number of CANs)(b)
Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies. The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. The present value of a one-off cost (paid upfront only once) is equal to its nominal value. (a) https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/eu-ecolabel-fees-table-2026_en situation as of 3 March 2026 (b) Table 35 above. Source: In-house analysis.
ESI options cost summary
The total estimated annual EU-wide cost of ESI.1/ESI.2 is EUR 512 million (PV),
comprising EUR 55 million (PV) for contracting authorities and EUR 469 million (PV)
for economic operators. Economic operators are additionally expected to incur one-off
costs of EUR 1.1 million.
For ESI.3, the total annual EU-wide cost is estimated at EUR 1 055 million (PV),
consisting of EUR 102 million (PV) for contracting authorities and EUR 953 million
(PV) for economic operators. Economic operators would also face one-off costs of EUR
3.6 million. For further details, see the table below.
Table 47: Annualised present value of EU wide additional cost of ESI options [EUR million]
CA EO Total
236
ESI 1/ESI.2 BPQR comply or explain 55 457 512 Voluntary EU Ecolabel 12* 12
Total 55 469 524 ESI 3 BPQR mandatory 102 915 1 017 Mandatory EU Ecolabel 38** 38
Total 102 953 1 055 Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies. The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. * one off cost of €1.1 million ** one off cost of €3.6 million Source: In-house analysis.
BEU options cost
For contracting authorities, the cost of implementing European preference in public
procurement would involve verifying the location of the global ultimate owner of
participating companies or the origin of procured goods. This verification would be
conducted by cross-checking information submitted by economic operators through a
dedicated tool within the digital procurement marketplace (MPL option), designed to
determine beneficial ownership. Regarding the origin of goods and components, a self-
declaration system would leverage existing tools, such as the Digital Product Passport
(DPP), which collates relevant product data from manufacturers, distributors, and
customs authorities. On average, this verification process is estimated to take 2 hours per
economic operator493. While straightforward for domestic operators, it may take longer in
a limited number of cases involving foreign companies, which account for only 2.4% to
6.2% of awarded tenders494, 495. The costs for contracting authorities would remain
manageable provided that appropriate EU or Member State-level databases are available
for information verification.
For economic operators, costs would arise from providing evidence as requested by
public buyers, such as details on ownership structure, firm registration, or the origin of
components. This process is also estimated to take on average 2 hours per economic
operator496. Similar to the verification process for contracting authorities, it is expected to
be straightforward in most cases, particularly for domestic firms, but could require
additional time for foreign bidders or in instances where complex value chains
necessitate origin verification.
In the case of BEU.3, where coverage extends to 100% of procurement, costs would
apply universally. For BEU.2, however, costs would depend on the share of procurement
493 Two hours (based on expert judgement); a sensitivity analysis with alternative time estimates is
presented below. 494 Direct cross border procurement, number of awards, see Annex7 Ad Section 6.3 – Key figures on cross-
border public procurement. 495 For instance, in the case where 6.2% of companies are foreign, an average verification time of 2 hours
implies that while checking foreign bidders might take two working days (16 hours), checking domestic
bidders would take approximately one hour. 496 Two hours (based on expert judgement); a sensitivity analysis with alternative time estimates is
presented below.
237
covered, with the specific sectors to be included determined by sectoral legislation. For
estimation purposes, it is assumed that 10% of procurement procedures (by number)
would be subject to European preference - roughly equivalent, for example, to the share
of medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and personal care products (CPV division 33) or
2/3 of construction work (CPV division 45)497.
Combining these factors, the verification procedure is expected to cost contracting
authorities EUR 267 (PV: EUR 245) and economic operators EUR 81 (PV: EUR 74) per
procedure, resulting in a total cost of EUR 535 (PV: EUR 490) per European preference
procedure. Assuming that 10% of tenders will be subject to the European preference
procedure (BEU.2), the annual EU-wide cost is estimated at EUR 8.13 million (PV: EUR
7.4 million) for contracting authorities and EUR 8.13 million (PV: EUR 7.4 million) for
economic operators, totalling EUR 16.3 million (PV: EUR 14.9 million). If all
procedures are covered (BEU.3), these costs would increase tenfold, to EUR 81.3 million
(PV: EUR 74.5 million) for contracting authorities and EUR 81.3 million (PV: EUR 74.5
million) for economic operators, with a combined total of EUR 163 million (PV: EUR
149 million) (see table below).
The average additional cost per procedure would amount to EUR 27 (PV: EUR 25) for
contracting authorities and EUR 8 (PV: EUR 7) for economic operators in the case of
BEU2. These costs would rise to EUR 267 (PV: EUR 245) and EUR 81 (PV: EUR 74),
respectively, in the case of BEU3.
Table 48: BEU cost under 10% of procurement subject to European preference.
CA EO No. of bids Total
Per Procedure
Time (h) 2h * 3.3 bids =
6.6 h
2h 3.3 6.6h + 2h*3.3
bids = 13.2h
€ / BEU procedure 6.6h * 41€/h =
€267
(PV: 245)
2h * 41€/h=
€81
(PV: 74)
3.3 €535
(PV: 490)
EU wide cost BEU.2**
No. of tenders affected 10% x 304 000 = 30 400
€ million 8.13
(PV: 7.4)
8.13
(PV: 7.4)
16.3
(PV: 14.9)
EU wide cost BEU.3**
No. of tenders affected 100% x 304 000 = 304 000
€ million 81.3
(PV: 74.5)
81.3
(PV: 74.5)
163
(PV: 149)
Average change in annual cost for all procedures (€)
BEU.2
€ / procedure
€8.13 million /
304 000 = €27
(PV: 25)
€8.13 million / 3.3 bids / 304 000
procedures = €8
(PV: 7)
€27+3.3*€8
=€53
(PV: 49)
BEU.3
€ / procedure
€81.3 million /
304 000 =
€267
(PV: 245)
€81.3 million / 3.3 bids / 304 000
procedures = €81
(PV: 74)
€245+3.3*€81
=€535
(PV: 490)
Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies. The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. * EU wide cost divided by the total number of CA and EO x average number of bidders from Table 35
497 See Annex 5’ on the most affected sectors.
238
** per procedure cost multiplied by number of procedures affected, cost for all EOs presented Source: In-house analysis.
The table below presents the total annual EU-wide cost of various combinations of the
share of tenders subject to European preference and the time devoted by contracting
authorities and economic operators to the procedure498.
For a 10% share of tenders under European preference, each additional hour spent by
contracting authorities and economic operators on the procedure increases EU-wide costs
by EUR 7.4 million (PV). For a verification time of two hours, a 10 percentage point
increase in the share of procedures subject to European preference increases the costs by
around EUR 15 million (PV).
Table 49: Annualised present value of EU wide total BEU options cost increase under different average number of
bidders and different time needed for verification (CA) and provision of information (EO) [EUR million].
Time
(h) ↓
share of BEU→
BEU.2 BEU.3
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 7 15 22 30 37 45 52 60 67 74
2 15 30 45 60 74 89 104 119 134 149
3 22 45 67 89 112 134 156 179 201 223
4 30 60 89 119 149 179 209 238 268 298
5 37 74 112 149 186 223 261 298 335 372
6 45 89 134 179 223 268 313 358 402 447
7 52 104 156 209 261 313 365 417 469 521
8 60 119 179 238 298 358 417 477 536 596 Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. The time in hours indicates the time spent by each participant per procedure. For example, 2 hours implies that the contracting authority spends 2 hours and each economic operator spends 2 hours. Source: In-house analysis.
MPL options cost
Decentralised network of Member States’ marketplaces (MPL.1)
The following tables present detailed cost breakdowns per affected stakeholders in case
MPL.1 was chosen, divided by the root causes of drivers identified in section 2.2.4,
namely: i) the fragmented eProcurement ecosystem; ii) the absence of a once-only
principle to the supply of information and evidence; iii) insufficiently integrated data
governance and lack of life-cycle monitoring.
Table 50: MPL.1 - overview of costs for the European Commission [EUR thousand]
Root causes addressed Component Cost for
2026-2032
Changes
compared to
baseline
Fragmented eProcurement ecosystem Standards 2 150 + 1 830
498 A sensitivity analysis with respect to the average number of bidders has not been presented separately,
as it produces less significant changes. For example, with a share of BEU of 10% and a verification time of
2 hours, an average of 3.5 bidders results in a cost of EUR 16 million. However, the sensitivity analysis of
the preferred option is based on the share of procurement subject to European preference and the average
number of bidders, assuming a time spent of 2 hours per procedure by each participant.
239
OP services* 86 990 + 21 500
eProcurement network 30 + 30
EU services 68 120 + 68 120
Absence of a once-only principle PPES 5 070 + 5 070
eCertis 0 - 1 600
ESPD 0 - 2 510
Insufficient data governance and
lifecycle monitoring
PPDS 9 630 0
Data network 930 + 930
Horizontal eProcurement support team 6 220 0
Total 179 140 + 93 370
Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate; + means higher cost; - means lower cost. * OP services costs include current human resources. These specific costs have not been reflected in the legislative financial statement. Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options…, p.66.
Table above features the following components:
• OP services: the Publication Office is providing and maintaining several
services, such as TED, eForms (SDK), and the eProcurement Ontology (ePO).
• eProcurement network: Pan-European digital infrastructure designed to enable
cross-border procurement by connecting national eProcurement platforms,
ensuring interoperability and standardised data exchange.
• EU services: Public Procurement Buyer Platform (PPBP) and Public
Procurement Supplier Platform (PPSP). Voluntary services offered by the
European Commission for contracting authorities and economic operators,
which are connected to the eProcurement Network.
• PPES: Public Procurement Eligibility Service. EU service that integrates the
functionalities of the ESPD and eCertis tools to improve cross-border
procurement. It connects both the Business Wallet Network and the
eProcurement Network, achieving the Once-Only Principle (OOP).
• PPDS: Public Procurement Data Space. Platform that centralises and
standardises public procurement data of the EU which is connected to national
publication portals (currently Austria, Finland, Germany and Norway),
including TED.
• Data network: Digital infrastructure to connect the EU PPDS with national
data spaces.
Table 51: MPL.1 - overview of average costs for one National Authority /(eProcurement) Service Provider [EUR
thousand]
Root causes addressed Component Cost for
2026-2032
Changes
compared to
baseline
Fragmented eProcurement
ecosystem
Interoperability standards 730 + 600
National eProcurement system 13 920 - 330
eProcurement network 20 + 10
Total 14 670 + 280
Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate; + means higher cost; - means lower cost. Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options…, p.70. Table 52: MPL.1 - overview of average costs per Member State [EUR thousand]
Root causes addressed Component Cost
for
Changes
compared to
240
2026-
2032
baseline
Insufficient data governance and lifecycle monitoringNational
database
5 350 + 3 740
Data network 60 + 60
Total 5 410 + 3 800
Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate; + means higher cost. Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options…, p.72.
Table 53: MPL.1 - overview of average costs per Contracting Authority [EUR thousand]
Categories Net cost for 2026-2032 Changes compared to baseline
Human resources 190 - 3
European Business Wallets - 30 - 30
Total 160 - 33
Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. - means lower cost. Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options …., p. 76.
Table 54: MPL.1 - overview of average costs per Economic Operator [EUR thousand]
Categories Net cost for 2026-2032 Changes compared to baseline
Human resources 278 - 15
Platform subscription 22 - 3
European Business Wallets - 1 - 1
Total 299 - 19
Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. - means lower cost. Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options …., p. 73.
Centralised EU marketplace replacing Member States’ marketplaces (MPL.2)
The following tables present detailed cost breakdowns per affected stakeholders in case
MPL.2 was chosen, divided by the root causes of drivers identified in section 2.2.4,
namely: i) the fragmented eProcurement ecosystem; ii) the absence of a once-only
principle to the supply of information and evidence; iii) insufficiently integrated data
governance and lack of life-cycle monitoring.
Table 55: MPL.2 - overview of costs for the European Commission [EUR thousand]
Root causes addressed499 Component Cost for
2026-2032
Changes
compared to
baseline
Fragmented eProcurement
ecosystem
Interoperability standards 0 - 320
OP services* 78 230 + 12 740
PPTP 102 180 + 102 180
Absence of once-only Principle PPES 5 070 + 5 070
499 See section 2.2.4.
241
eCertis 0 - 1 600
ESPD 0 - 2 510
Insufficient data governance and
lifecycle monitoring
PPDS 9 630 0
Horizontal eProcurement support team 6 220 0
Total 201 330 + 115 560
Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate; + means higher cost; - means lower cost. * OP services costs include current human resources. These specific costs have not been reflected in the legislative financial statement. Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options…, p.79.
Table above features the following components:
• PPTP: Public Procurement Tendering Platform. Centralised EU digital platform
designed to replace existing national eProcurement platforms for public
procurement procedures above the EU-thresholds.
• It incorporates the Public Procurement Buyer Platform (PPBP) and Public
Procurement Supplier Platform (PPSP).
Table 56: MPL.2 - overview of average costs for one National Authority/ (eProcurement) Service Provider [EUR
thousand]
Root causes addressed Component Cost for
2026-2032
Changes
compared to
baseline
Fragmented eProcurement
ecosystem
Interoperability standards 0 - 130
National eProcurement system 13 370 - 880
eProcurement network 0 - 10
Total 13 370 -1 020
Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate; - means lower cost. Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options…, p.81.
Table 57: MPL.2 - overview of average costs for one Member State [EUR thousand]
Root causes addressed Component 2026-2032 Changes
compared to
baseline
Insufficient data governance and lifecycle
monitoring
National database 5 350 + 3 740
Data network 60 + 60
Total 5 410 + 3 800
Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate; + means higher cost. Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options…, p.66.
Table 58: MPL.2 - overview of average costs per Contracting Authority [EUR thousand]
Categories Net cost for 2026-2032 Changes compared to baseline
Human resources 190 - 3
European Business Wallets - 30 - 30
Total 160 - 33
242
Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. - means lower cost. Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options …., p. 85. Table 59: MPL.2 -overview of average costs per Economic Operator [EUR thousand]
Categories Net cost for 2026-2032 Changes compared to baseline
Human resources 278 - 15
Platform subscription 22 - 3
European Business Wallets - 1 - 1
Total 299 - 19
Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. - means lower cost. Source: PwC(2026), Assessment of policy options …., p. 83.
Cost calculations
In summary, the MPL.1 option generates average annual cost savings of EUR 4 714 per
contracting authority and EUR 2 336 per economic operator (EUR 2 714 for winning
companies and EUR 2 063 for other tender participants)500. However, it also incurs
additional costs of EUR 40 000 per eProcurement service and approximately EUR 0.5
million per Member State for database and network adjustments. The annualised
additional cost for services provided by the European Commission amounts to EUR 18
million (including EUR 5 million licence cost for ARACHNE+)501.
At the EU level, these changes translate into annual savings of EUR 220 million for
contracting authorities and EUR 881 million for all economic operators. For Member
States, the cost of adjusting 70% of the 123 identified eProcurement platforms (with 30%
adjusting independently as part of the baseline) is estimated at EUR 3.4 million.
Including additional spending on national databases and networks, the total Member
States’ cost reaches EUR 18 million. With the European Commission’s costs remaining
at EUR 18 million, the overall annual savings from MPL.1 are estimated at EUR 1.065
billion. For detailed calculations, please see the table below.
Table 60: Annual present value of MPL.1 cost changes relative to the baseline.
Entity Cost per entity (€) Comments
CA - 4 714 €33 000 / 7 years (Table 53)
EO winning: - 2 714 €19 000 / 7 years (Table 54)
other: - 2 063 (1-24%)*€19 000 / 7 years; 24% share of time spent on
post award phase from Ecorys (2025), Table 5.14
weighted average: - 2 366 (-2 714 + (2.15(a)-1) -2 063)/2.15(a)
MS One eProcurement service: 40 000 €280 000 / 7years (Table 51)
National database and
network
542 857 €3.8 million / 7 years (Table 52)
500 Savings for economic operators that did not win the contract are reduced by 24%, reflecting the share of
time spent on the post-award phase—a stage in which they do not participate (Ecorys (2025), Table 5.14).
It is important to note that this adjustment to non-winners’ costs applies only to the MPL options, based on
a separate study, whereas for the remaining options, the average cost per procedure for all economic
operators is used as provided by the Ecorys study. 501 For the purpose of one-in-one-out calculations, costs for Member States and the Commission are treated
as adjustment costs.
243
EC** Cost European
Commission
13 338 571 €93.37 million / 7 years (Table 50)
ARACHNE+ licence 4 583 708 The present value of €5 million per year, discounted at
3% over a seven-year period
EU wide costs (€ million)
CA - 220 - €4 714 * 46 648 CA
EO - 881 - €2 366 * 372 440 EOs
MS eProcurement services 3.4 €40 000 * 123 eProcurement platforms * 70% that needs
to be adjusted (30% assumed to be adjusted irrespective
of EU action)
National databases and
networks
14.7 €542 857 * 27 MS
Total 18 €3.4 million + €14.7 million
EC(b) Cost European
Commission
18 €13 338 571 + 4 583 708
Total - 1 065
Average change in cost per procedure (€)
CA - 723 €-220 million / 304 000 (number of CANs)(c)
EO - 1 348 €- 881 million / 2.15(a) / 304 000 (number of CANs)(c)
Total - 3 622 (€-220 million + €- 881 million) / 304 000 (number of CANs)(c)
Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies. The table presents only the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. (a) the ratio of the total number of EOs to the number of winning EOs: 372 440 / 173 228 = 2.15 (b) European Commission; (c) Table 35 above. Source: In-house analysis.
The impacts of option MPL.2 differ from MPL.1 primarily with regard to costs at the
Commission and Member State levels. At the Commission level, the additional cost of
creating a central eProcurement system is expected to amount to EUR 16.5 million
annually, plus EUR 5 million for the ARACHNE+ licence cost. Meanwhile, at the
Member State level, a centralised EU eProcurement system would result in annual
savings of EUR 142 857 per local eProcurement system, leading to combined EU-wide
savings of EUR 17.6 million across all 123 platforms.
Overall, the total annual savings for this option would be EUR 18 million higher than for
MPL.1, amounting to EUR 1.083billion. For detailed figures, please refer to the table
below.
Table 61: Annual present value of MPL.2 cost changes relative to the baseline.
Entity Cost per entity (€) Comments
CA - 4 714 €33 000 / 7 years (Table 58)
EO winning: - 2 714 €19 000 / 7 years (Table 59)
other: - 2 063 (1-24%)*€19 000 / 7 years; 24% share of time spent on
post award phase from Ecorys (2025), Table 5.14
weighted average: - 2 366 (-2 714 + (2.15(a)-1) -2 063)/2.15(a)
MS One eProcurement service: - 142 857 - €1 million / 7years (Table 56)
National database and
network
542 857 €3.8 million / 7 years (Table 57)
EC(b) Cost European
Commission
16 514 286 €115.6 million / 7 years (Table 55)
ARACHNE+ licence 4 583 708 The present value of €5 million per year, discounted at
3% over a seven-year period
EU wide costs (€ million)
244
CA - 220 - €4 714 * 46 648 CA
EO - 881 - €2 366 * 372 440 EOs
MS eProcurement services -17.6 - €142 857* 123 eProcurement platforms
National databases and
networks
14.7 €542 857 * 27 MS
Total - 3 - €17.6 million + €14.7 million
EC** Cost European
Commission
21 €16 514 286 + €4 583 708
Total - 1083
Average change in cost per procedure (€)
CA - 723 €-220 million / 304 000 (number of CANs)(c)
EO - 1 348 €- 881 million / 2.15(a) / 304 000 (number of CANs)(c)
Total - 3 622 (€-220 million + €- 881 million) / 304 000 (number of CANs)(c)
Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies. The table presents only the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. (a) the ratio of the total number of EOs to the number of winning EOs: 372 440 / 173 228 = 2.15 (b) European Commission; (c) Table 35 above. Source: In-house analysis.
The outcome of MPL1 and MPL2 depends on the total number of economic operators
affected. The table below presents the outcome of MPL1 based on the average number of
bidders and the overlap between winners and losers, ranging from 0% to 100%. For
instance, with the current average number of bidders at 3.3, the savings generated by
MPL1 can range from EUR 0.65 billion in the case of full overlap between winners and
losers to EUR 1.48 billion in the case of no overlap. In other words, a 10-percentage
point increase in overlap reduces savings by approximately EUR 82 million.
Table 62: EU-wide total MPL1 cost reduction under different average numbers of bidders and varying percentages of
overlap between winners and losers [EUR billion].
Overlap
↓ Average number of bids→
3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4
0% -1.37 -1.40 -1.44 -1.48 -1.51 -1.55 -1.58 -1.62 -1.65 -1.69 -1.73
10% -1.30 -1.33 -1.36 -1.39 -1.43 -1.46 -1.49 -1.52 -1.55 -1.59 -1.62
20% -1.23 -1.25 -1.28 -1.31 -1.34 -1.37 -1.40 -1.43 -1.45 -1.48 -1.51
30% -1.15 -1.18 -1.20 -1.23 -1.25 -1.28 -1.30 -1.33 -1.35 -1.38 -1.40
40% -1.08 -1.10 -1.13 -1.15 -1.17 -1.19 -1.21 -1.23 -1.25 -1.28 -1.30
50% -1.01 -1.03 -1.05 -1.07 -1.08 -1.10 -1.12 -1.14 -1.15 -1.17 -1.19
60% -0.94 -0.95 -0.97 -0.98 -1.00 -1.01 -1.03 -1.04 -1.05 -1.07 -1.08
70% -0.87 -0.88 -0.89 -0.90 -0.91 -0.92 -0.93 -0.94 -0.95 -0.96 -0.98
80% -0.80 -0.80 -0.81 -0.82 -0.83 -0.83 -0.84 -0.85 -0.85 -0.86 -0.87
90% -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.74 -0.74 -0.74 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.76 -0.76
100% -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 Note: The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. Source: In-house analysis.
The sensitivity table for MPL2 is identical to that of MPL1, except that all values are
reduced by EUR 18 million (PV), reflecting the additional savings of MPL2 derived from
the difference in costs to Member States and the Commission.
245
Preferred option cost
The preferred option combines FLX.2, ESI.2, BEU.2, and MPL.1, resulting in a one-off
cost of EUR 1.14 million and recurrent annual cost savings of EUR 613 million (PV).
Within this, FLX.2 and MPL.1 generate cost savings of EUR 1 153 million (PV), while
ESI and BEU options increase costs by EUR 539 million (PV).
On a per-procedure basis, the average contracting authority saves approximately EUR
261 (PV) per procurement procedure. Compared to the procedure cost of EUR 6 000
calculated by Ecorys (2025)502, this represents a 4.4% saving. For economic operators,
the average saving per procedure is estimated at EUR 1 011 (PV). Relative to Ecorys’
cost per procedure for economic operators of EUR 11 400503, this equates to a 8.9%
saving. In both cases MPL option contributes the most to the savings. Due to significant
variation in contract values and the scale of participating economic operators, average
savings should be treated as indicative only and not as a definitive measure of outcomes.
Finally, the estimated cost impact per entity indicates that an average contracting
authority is expected to achieve savings of EUR 1 702 annually, while an average
economic operator would save EUR 1 530. For further details, see the table below.
Table 63: Summary of cost changes under the preferred option (present value).
CA EO MS EC Total
EU wide costs [€ million]
One off costs (ESI.1.Ecolabel) 1.14 1.14 Recurrent costs
FLX.2 78 - 166 - 88
ESI.2.BPQR comply or explain 55 457 512
ESI.2.Voluntary EU Ecolabel 12 12
BEU.2 7.4 7.4 14.9
MPL.1 - 220 - 881 18 18 - 1 065
Total annual EU wide cost change - 79 - 570 18 18 - 613
Cost per procedure* [€]
FLX.2 257 - 165 - 288
ESI.2.BPQR comply or explain 181 456 1 686
ESI.2.Voluntary EU Ecolabel 39 39
BEU.2 25 7 49 MPL.1 - 723 - 1 348 - 3 622
Total cost change per procedure - 261 - 1 011 - 2 136
Cost per entity**, annual [€]
FLX.2 1 673 - 444
ESI.2.BPQR comply or explain 1 180 1 228
ESI.2.Voluntary EU Ecolabel 32
BEU.2 160 20
MPL.1 - 4 714 - 2 366
502 Ecorys (2025), Table 5.10 503 Ibid.
246
Total cost change per entity - 1 702 - 1 530 Note: Presented figures are rounded, though totals are calculated using precise values, which may result in minor discrepancies. The table presents the annualised present value (PV) over seven years of application at a 3% discount rate. * EU wide cost divided by 304 000 procedures in case of CA and additionally by an average number of 3.3 bids in case of EO to arrive at an average comparable across options; Total CA + 3.3*EO (except for EU Ecolabel) ** EU wide cost divided by 46 648 contracting authorities in case of CA and by 372 440 economic operators in case of EO to arrive at an average comparable across options. Source: In-house analysis.
To assess the robustness of these findings, we tested the preferred option under a range of
scenarios by varying the average number of bids, the percentage point increase in the use
of negotiations under FLX, the percentage point increase in BPQR uptake under ESI, and
the share of procurement subject to European Preference under BEU. For simplicity,
these variations are presented in a two-dimensional graph, divided into 11 incremental
scenarios. The scenarios incorporate an increase in the use of negotiations from 0 to 20
percentage points, an additional uptake of BPQR from 0 to 37 percentage points - the
threshold at which all procurement would fall under BPQR - and a share of procurement
covered by European preferences ranging from 0% to 20%.
Although other combinations of these parameters are feasible, they are omitted from this
impact assessment for conciseness. Scenario number 5 represents the central scenario
detailed in this assessment. Under the central scenario, the savings amount to EUR 0.61
billion, ranging from EUR 0.17 billion (scenario 10) to EUR 1.06 billion (scenario 0).
The scenario analysis reveals that the average number of bids per tender has the most
significant impact on costs. Each increase of 0.1 in the average number of bids triggers a
cost rise of around EUR 640 million. Vertical shifts-reflecting changes in negotiation
use, BPQR uptake, or European Preference share-are less pronounced, typically
amounting to around EUR 100 million504.
As a result, the preferred option is projected to generate EU-wide cost savings in all
scenarios where the average number of bids is 3.3 or fewer, as well as in scenarios 0 to 4
when the average reaches 3.4 bids per tender. Conversely, it is expected to lead to EU-
wide cost increases in all scenarios with an average of 3.5 or more bids per tender, as
well as in scenarios 5 to 10 when the average stands at 3.4 bids per tender. For further
details, see the table below.
Table 64: Annual present value of impacts of the preferred option under different scenarios and average number of
bids, assuming a 50% overlap between winning and losing economic operators, with all other elements (such as the
number of procedures, number of contracting authorities and number of winning economic operators) held constant
[EUR billion].
Average number of bids→
Scenario↓ 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6
0: neg.+0%; BPQR+0%; EUpref.+0% -2.31 -1.68 -1.06 -0.43 0.20 0.82
1: neg.+2%; BPQR+4%; EUpref.+2% -2.22 -1.59 -0.96 -0.33 0.30 0.93
2: neg.+4%; BPQR+8%; EUpref.+4% -2.13 -1.49 -0.86 -0.23 0.40 1.03
3: neg.+6%; BPQR+12%; EUpref.+6% -2.03 -1.40 -0.77 -0.13 0.50 1.14
504 It is important to note that the increases in BPQR uptake for scenarios 5 and 10 deviate from the
standard 4 percentage point increment applied in other scenarios for BPQR. This results in a different pace
of cost change between scenarios 4 and 5, 5 and 6 as well as 9 and 10.
247
4: neg.+8%; BPQR+16%; EUpref.+8% -1.94 -1.30 -0.67 -0.03 0.60 1.24
5: neg.+10%; BPQR+18.5%;EUpref.+10% -1.89 -1.25 -0.61 0.02 0.66 1.30
6: neg.+12%; BPQR+20%; EUpref.+12% -1.86 -1.22 -0.59 0.05 0.69 1.32
7: neg.+14%; BPQR+24%; EUpref.+14% -1.77 -1.13 -0.49 0.15 0.79 1.43
8: neg.+16%; BPQR+28%; EUpref.+16% -1.67 -1.03 -0.39 0.25 0.89 1.53
9: neg.+18%; BPQR+32%; EUpref.+18% -1.58 -0.94 -0.29 0.35 0.99 1.64
10: neg.+20%; BPQR+37%; EUpref.+20% -1.46 -0.82 -0.17 0.48 1.12 1.77
Legend: neg.: increase in use of negotiations (percentage points); BPQR: increase in use of BPQR (percentage points); EUpref.: share of procurement covered by the European preference (percentage) Note: All changes presented are relative to the baseline scenario with 3.3 bidders per tender. The time horizon for present value calculations is seven years, with a discount rate of 3%. The analysis assumes that the number of procedures, contracting authorities, and winning economic operators remains constant over the seven-year period examined. Source: In-house analysis.
We have complemented this analysis by examining how the preferred option performs
under varying levels of overlap between winning and losing companies. We calculated
the probabilities of cost increases or savings by applying a normal distribution to both the
overlap and scenarios, with the mean set at the midpoint (scenario 5, 50% overlap) and a
standard deviation equal to the mean. The standard deviation was set equal to the mean,
reflecting the high degree of uncertainty around the underlying distribution. This
approach gives the highest weight to central assumptions while assigning lower
probabilities to extreme outcomes.
Consequently, at an average of 3.3 bidders, the expected value of savings from the
preferred option amounts to EUR 0.6 billion, with a 97% probability of the preferred
option generating cost savings and a 3% probability of cost increases. The highest
savings would occur in cases of low overlap combined with scenarios 0 to 5. Conversely,
cost increases would be more likely in cases of high overlap combined with scenarios 8
to 10 (see the table below).
Table 65: Annual present value of the impacts of the preferred option under different scenarios and varying levels of
overlap between winners and losers, assuming 3.3 bidders per tender, with all other elements (such as the number of
procedures, number of contracting authorities, and number of winning economic operators) held constant [EUR
billion].
Overlap between winners and losers→
Scenario↓ 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0 -1.47 -1.39 -1.30 -1.22 -1.14 -1.06 -0.97 -0.89 -0.81 -0.73 -0.65
1 -1.37 -1.29 -1.21 -1.12 -1.04 -0.96 -0.88 -0.80 -0.71 -0.63 -0.55
2 -1.27 -1.19 -1.11 -1.03 -0.94 -0.86 -0.78 -0.70 -0.62 -0.54 -0.45
3 -1.17 -1.09 -1.01 -0.93 -0.85 -0.77 -0.68 -0.60 -0.52 -0.44 -0.36
4 -1.07 -0.99 -0.91 -0.83 -0.75 -0.67 -0.59 -0.51 -0.43 -0.34 -0.26
5 -1.02 -0.94 -0.86 -0.78 -0.69 -0.61 -0.53 -0.45 -0.37 -0.29 -0.21
6 -0.99 -0.91 -0.83 -0.75 -0.67 -0.59 -0.51 -0.42 -0.34 -0.26 -0.18
7 -0.89 -0.81 -0.73 -0.65 -0.57 -0.49 -0.41 -0.33 -0.25 -0.17 -0.09
8 -0.79 -0.71 -0.63 -0.55 -0.47 -0.39 -0.31 -0.23 -0.15 -0.07 0.01
9 -0.69 -0.61 -0.53 -0.45 -0.37 -0.29 -0.21 -0.13 -0.05 0.03 0.11
10 -0.57 -0.49 -0.41 -0.33 -0.25 -0.17 -0.09 -0.01 0.07 0.15 0.23
Note: For descriptions of the scenarios, see the previous table. All changes presented are relative to the baseline scenario with 3.3 bidders per tender. The time horizon for present value calculations is seven years, with a discount rate of 3%. The analysis assumes that the number of procedures, contracting authorities, and winning economic operators remains constant over the seven-year period examined.
248
When the average number of bidders increases to 3.4, the expected value of the preferred
option amounts to additional cost of EUR 10 million, with a 49% probability of
generating cost savings and a 51% probability of cost increases. The highest savings
would occur in cases of low overlap combined with scenarios 0 to 5, whereas cost
increases would be more likely in cases of high overlap combined with scenarios 5 to 10
(see the table below).
Table 66: Annual present value of the impacts of the preferred option under different scenarios and varying levels of
overlap between winners and losers, assuming 3.4 bidders per tender, with all other elements (such as the number of
procedures, number of contracting authorities, and number of winning economic operators) held constant [EUR
billion].
Overlap between winners and losers→
Scenario↓ 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0 -0.86 -0.77 -0.69 -0.60 -0.52 -0.43 -0.34 -0.26 -0.17 -0.09 0.00
1 -0.76 -0.67 -0.59 -0.50 -0.42 -0.33 -0.24 -0.16 -0.07 0.01 0.10
2 -0.66 -0.57 -0.49 -0.40 -0.32 -0.23 -0.15 -0.06 0.02 0.11 0.19
3 -0.56 -0.47 -0.39 -0.30 -0.22 -0.13 -0.05 0.04 0.12 0.21 0.29
4 -0.46 -0.37 -0.29 -0.20 -0.12 -0.03 0.05 0.14 0.22 0.31 0.39
5 -0.40 -0.31 -0.23 -0.15 -0.06 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.28 0.36 0.45
6 -0.37 -0.29 -0.20 -0.12 -0.03 0.05 0.14 0.22 0.30 0.39 0.47
7 -0.27 -0.19 -0.10 -0.02 0.07 0.15 0.23 0.32 0.40 0.49 0.57
8 -0.17 -0.09 0.00 0.08 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.42 0.50 0.58 0.67
9 -0.07 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.27 0.35 0.43 0.52 0.60 0.68 0.77
10 0.06 0.14 0.23 0.31 0.39 0.48 0.56 0.64 0.73 0.81 0.89
Note: For descriptions of the scenarios, see the previous table. All changes presented are relative to the baseline scenario with 3.3 bidders per tender. The time horizon for present value calculations is seven years, with a discount rate of 3%. The analysis assumes that the number of procedures, contracting authorities, and winning economic operators remains constant over the seven-year period examined.
We have also examined how the outcomes of the preferred option would change if the
average annual historical growth rates observed between 2018 and 2023 were to continue
over the seven-year implementation horizon. These growth rates: +7.2% for the number
of procedures, +2.9% for contracting authorities, and +4.9% for winning economic
operators505 - were applied to the same 0 to 10 scenarios, but only for the overlap of 50%
between winning and unsuccessful economic operators.
This adjustment resulted in a slightly higher annual net present value of savings for 3.3
bids, ranging from EUR 0.12 billion in scenario 10 to EUR 0.67 billion in the central
scenario (scenario 5), and reaching up to EUR 1.22 billion in scenario 0. Extending this
analysis to account for different average numbers of bids per tender reveals that the
break-even point- where savings transition into additional costs - occurs at 3.4 bids per
tender between scenarios 3 and 4. This means that additional costs arise in scenarios 4 to
505 Geometric mean growth rates for 2018–2023 were calculated based on the number of contract award
notices (CANs) as reported in Ecorys (2025), Table A.39: (304 000 [CANs 2023]/ 215 000 [CANs
2018])^(1/5)-1=7.17%, and on the number of contracting authorities (CA) and winning economic operators
(EO) as reported in World Bank (2025), Competition in Public Procurement, p. 22: for CA: (46 648 [CA in
2023] / 40 373 [CA in 2018])^(1/5)-1=2.93%; for EO: (173 228 [EO in 2023] / 136 387 [EO in
2018])^(1/5)-1=4.89%. An additional assumption is that the growth rate for all economic operators is the
same as the growth rate for winning economic operators.
249
10 at 3.4 bids, as well as in all scenarios with 3.5 or more bids per tender (see the table
below).
Table 67: Annual present value of the impacts of the preferred option under different scenarios and average numbers
of bidders, incorporating annual growth in the number of procedures, contracting authorities, and winning economic
operators based on historical averages, assuming a 50% overlap between winning and losing economic operators,
with all other elements held constant [EUR billion].
Average number of bids→
Scenario↓ 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.60
0: neg.+0%; BPQR+0%; EUpref.+0% -2.76 -1.99 -1.22 -0.44 0.33 1.11
1: neg.+2%; BPQR+4%; EUpref.+2% -2.65 -1.87 -1.10 -0.32 0.46 1.24
2: neg.+4%; BPQR+8%; EUpref.+4% -2.54 -1.76 -0.98 -0.20 0.58 1.36
3: neg.+6%; BPQR+12%; EUpref.+6% -2.42 -1.64 -0.86 -0.07 0.71 1.49
4: neg.+8%; BPQR+16%; EUpref.+8% -2.31 -1.52 -0.74 0.05 0.83 1.62
5: neg.+10%; BPQR+18.5%;EUpref.+10% -2.24 -1.46 -0.67 0.12 0.90 1.69
6: neg.+12%; BPQR+20%; EUpref.+12% -2.21 -1.42 -0.64 0.15 0.94 1.72
7: neg.+14%; BPQR+24%; EUpref.+14% -2.09 -1.30 -0.52 0.27 1.06 1.85
8: neg.+16%; BPQR+28%; EUpref.+16% -1.98 -1.19 -0.40 0.40 1.19 1.98
9: neg.+18%; BPQR+32%; EUpref.+18% -1.87 -1.07 -0.28 0.52 1.31 2.11
10: neg.+20%; BPQR+37%; EUpref.+20% -1.72 -0.92 -0.12 0.68 1.47 2.27 Legend: neg.: increase in use of negotiations (percentage points); BPQR: increase in use of BPQR (percentage points); EUpref.: share of procurement covered by the European preference (percentage) Note: All changes presented are relative to the baseline scenario with 3.3 bidders per tender. The time horizon for present value calculations is seven years, with a discount rate of 3%. The analysis assumes that the number of procedures increase by 7.1% annually, contracting authorities by 2.9%, and winning economic operators by 4.9%. Source: In-house analysis.
Limitations of the cost estimation
Several simplifications and data limitations may affect the cost estimates presented in
this chapter. These include:
• The use of EU-wide values rather than country-specific data, along with the
reliance on averages and totals instead of individual observations (for example,
regarding the average cost of all procedures for contracting authorities and
economic operators, average number of bids, share of BPQR and price-only
procedures, and the number of contracting authorities and economic operators).
• The lack of information on the total number of participating economic operators,
which required estimation based on the average number of winning companies,
the average number of bidders and an assumption on overlap between winning
and losing companies. This approach may overestimate the number of companies
affected.
• The absence of data on the time required for new procedures, such as the "comply
or explain" requirement under ESI.1/ESI.2 option or the verification of origin and
information provision under BEU options.
• Insufficient information on the use of EU Ecolabel or national ecolabels in the
tendering process.
• Uncertainty regarding the uptake of new voluntary measures (such as negotiations
under FLX options or BPQR under ESI.1/ESI.2) or the extent of future follow-up
250
regulations (particularly concerning the share of procurement subject to European
preference under BEU.2).
Where possible, these limitations were addressed through scenario analysis, which
considered different potential developments of the values mentioned above.
Nevertheless, these constraints should be borne in mind when using and interpreting
these estimates.
251
ANNEX 9: DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE OPEN PUBLIC
CONSULTATION
***********************************************************************
This annex serves solely as a summary of the contributions submitted by stakeholders
during the public consultations on the revision of the Public Procurement Directives.
Under no circumstances should it be interpreted as reflecting the official position of the
Commission or its services. The responses received through the consultation activities do
not constitute a statistically representative sample of the views of the EU population.
***********************************************************************
The public consultation to support the revision of the Public Procurement Directives was
conducted from 3 November 2025 to 26 January 2026. During this period, 1 037
responses were submitted via the EU Survey tool. All received responses have been
published506.
This document constitutes a detailed summary of the responses received. It begins with
respondent demographics before addressing the general questions on the broad priorities
for the revision. The subsequent sections were completed only by those respondents who
chose to answer the detailed technical questions. The document presents stakeholders’
views on Simplification, Coherence, Concessions, Digitalisation and Transparency,
Made in Europe, Best Price-Quality Ratio, Green and Social Procurement, and the
Procurement of Innovation. The final chapter comprises a summary of the concluding
remarks provided by all respondents.
The analysis of responses is structured by respondent type, based on self-identification.
The categories include all respondents, European Union public authorities, large
companies within the EU, EU small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), EU business
associations, EU trade unions, EU non-governmental organisations (NGOs, including
environmental organisations), academic institutions, EU citizens and other respondents
(including consumer organisations), as well as non-EU respondents. To ensure a
comprehensive analysis, responses from European Economic Area (EEA) countries
(Norway) - which adhere to the EU public procurement rules - have been grouped
together with those from EU member states.
The analysis also presents a geographical breakdown of responses, dividing them into
four distinct regions. The Central EU region comprises respondents from Austria,
Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The Northern EU region
(North EU) includes Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Norway. The Southern EU
region (South EU) covers Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta, and Portugal. Finally, the
Eastern EU region (East EU) encompasses Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary,
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (no replies from Slovenia).
506 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/15492-Revision-of-EU-rules-
on-public-procurement/public-consultation_en
252
Additionally, a separate breakdown of responses from public authorities within these
countries is provided.
For each question analysed, only those respondents who provided an answer have been
included. The number of respondents is indicated for each category. It is important to
note that certain respondent types or groups are represented by a relatively small number
of answers, a factor that should be considered when interpreting the results.
Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. Totals are calculated using
unrounded values, which may result in minor discrepancies between the overall sum and
the combined figures presented.
1) Respondents’ characteristics
Of the 1 037 responses received, 41% (424) were submitted by stakeholders registered in
the Transparency Register507.
In terms of geographical distribution, 97% (1 011) of the contributions originated from
EU and EEA countries, while the remaining 3% came from non-EU countries.
Contributions were received from all but one EU member state, as well as from one EEA
country and nine non-EU countries - the latter including one outermost region and one
candidate country.
The distribution of respondents across the countries surveyed reveals a clear
concentration in several European nations, with notable variations in participation levels
(see Figure 2). Among 1037 replies, 97% (1 011) come from EU and EEA countries, and
3% from non-EU countries. We have received contributions from all but one EU country,
from one EEA country, and from nine non-EU countries (including one outermost region
and one candidate country).
At the forefront, Germany emerges as the most represented country, accounting for 22%
of all respondents (223 respondents). This is closely followed by Belgium, which
contributes 18% (185 respondents), making these two nations the dominant sources of
responses. France also plays a significant role, representing 10% (106 respondents),
while Italy and Spain contribute 8% (82) and 6% (63), respectively.
Among the mid-tier contributors, the Netherlands and Sweden each provide 4% of the
total responses (41 respondents per country), while Finland accounts for 3% (31
respondents). A cluster of nations-including Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Portugal,
Greece, Poland, and Ireland-each contribute between 2% and 1% of the total, with
respondent numbers ranging from 16 to 25.
Towards the lower end of the spectrum, countries such as Romania, Slovakia, Croatia,
Hungary, Norway, Malta, Estonia, and Lithuania each represent between 0.9% and 1.1%
of the total, with respondent counts varying from 7 to 13. Meanwhile, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Luxembourg, and Latvia register minimal participation, each contributing less than 0.5%
(3 to 5 respondents).
507 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en
253
Beyond Europe, a small number of responses originate from non-European countries,
including the United States (1.2%, 12 respondents), the United Kingdom (0.4%, 4
respondents), and a handful of other nations such as Armenia, Israel, Pakistan, and North
Macedonia, each with just one respondent.
Overall, the data highlights a strong representation from Central EU countries, which
accounted for 56% (584 responses)508. This is followed by Southern EU countries with
19% (200 responses)509, Northern EU countries with 11% (119 responses)510, and Eastern
EU countries with 10% (108 responses)511.
Figure 65: Distribution of responses per country of origin of respondent
Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
The breakdown of respondents by category reveals a clear dominance of business-related
and institutional stakeholders, with notable representation from public authorities and
civil society organisations (see Figure 3).
The largest single group comprises companies and businesses, which account for 24% of
all respondents (254 individuals). Closely following are business associations,
representing 23% (237 respondents, 235 from EU/EEA)512. Together, these two
categories make up nearly half (47%) of the total responses, underscoring a strong
engagement from the private sector.
508 Central EU responses distribution: Germany 38% (223 respondents), Belgium 32% (185), France 18%
(106), The Netherlands 7% (41), Austria 4% (25), Luxembourg 1% (4). 509 Southern EU responses distribution: Italy 41% (82 respondents), Spain 32% (63), Portugal 11% (22),
Greece 11% (21), Malta 4% (8), Cyprus 2% (4). Total 19 responses. 510 Northern EU responses distribution: Sweden 34% (41 respondents), Finland 26% (31), Denmark 19%
(23), Ireland 13% (16), Norway 7% (8). 511 Eastern EU responses distribution: Czechia 23% (25 respondents), Poland 17% (18), Romania 12%
(13), Slovakia 10% (11), Croatia 9% (10), Hungary 8% (9), Estonia 6% (7), Lithuania 6% (7), Bulgaria 5%
(5), Latvia 3% (3), Slovenia 0%(0). 512 Geographical distribution of business associations responses: BE (34%), DE (23%), FR, IT (9% each),
ES (7%), SE (3%), NL, PT, PL (2% each), FI, DK (2% each), AT, CZ, HR (1% each).
22 3
18 5
10 6
82 63
41 41 31 25 25 23 22 21 18 16 13 11 10 9 8 7 7 5 4 4 3 8 12 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
50
100
150
200
250
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m an
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254
Public authorities constitute the third-largest group, contributing 13% (138 respondents,
all from EU/EEA), reflecting significant input from governmental or regulatory bodies.
Trade unions also play a prominent role, with 11% (115 respondents, all from
EU/EEA)513, while non-governmental organisations (NGOs) account for 10% (106
respondents, 101 from EU/EEA)514. These figures highlight substantial participation
from labour representatives and civil society.
Academic and research institutions make up 3% (29 respondents, all from EU/EEA)515,
indicating a moderate level of input from the scholarly community. EU citizens represent
8% (86 respondents)516, while non-EU citizens contribute just 0.3% (3 respondents).
The smallest categories include environmental and consumer organisations, each with
only 0.2% (2 respondents). Finally, 6% of respondents (65 individuals, all from
EU/EEA) fall under the "Other" category517.
Figure 66: Distribution of responses by type of respondent
Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
The questionnaire was answered by 138 public authorities, with responses distributed
unevenly across European regions (see the figure below). Among public authorities,
around one-third were local authorities (34%, 47 respondents), one-quarter were regional
513 Geographical distribution of trade unions responses: BE (16%), IT (12%), FR (10%), RO (8%), DK, SE
(7% each), FI, IE (5% each), HU, LT, MT, NL, PL (3% each), AT, BG, HR, EE, DE, EL, LV, NO, ES (2%
each), CZ, SK (1% each). 514 Geographical distribution of EU/EEA NGOs responses: BE (35%), DE (17%), IT (10%), ES (7%), SE
(5%), FR, DK (4% each), NL, CZ, PL (3% each), FI, PT (2% each), EL, IE, RO, MT, LT, BG (1% each). 515 Geographical distribution of academia responses: DE (28%), NL (14%), BE, PT (10% each), FR, IT,
ES, HU (7% each), SE, FI, SK (3% each). 516 Geographical distribution of EU citizens responses: DE (29%), IT, EL (10% each), BE, FR (9% each),
ES, SK (5% each), CZ, PT (3% each), AT, PL, RO (2% each), SE, IE, HR, MT, LT, CY, LV (1% each). 517 Geographical distribution of other responses: BE (17%), IT, ES (12% each), DE, FR (11% each), NL,
AT, PT (6% each), CZ (5%), DK (3%), EL, PL, NO (2% each), BG, FI, HU, SK (1% each).
6%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
3%
8%
10%
11%
13%
23%
24%
Other Consumer organisation
Environmental organisation Non-EU citizen
Academic/research institution EU citizen
Non-governmental organisation (NGO) Trade union
Public authority Business association
Company/business
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Number of replies (% next to bars)
255
authorities (25%, 35 respondents), nearly one-third were national authorities (28%), and
one in five were international authorities (18%).
Around one third of these were local authorities (34%, 47 respondents), one quarter were
regional authorities (25%, 35 respondents), almost one third were national authorities
(28%) and one in five were international (18%).
Central EU public authorities provided the largest share, contributing 82 responses (59%
of the total). Within this group, Germany accounted for 38% (31 respondents), followed
by Belgium (21%, 17 respondents), France (18%, 15 respondents), the Netherlands
(15%, 12 respondents), Austria (6%, 5 respondents), and Luxembourg (2%, 2
respondents).
Northern EU authorities submitted 28 responses (20%), with Sweden representing 50%
(14 respondents) and Finland 36% (10 respondents). Denmark and Ireland each
contributed 7% (2 respondents per country).
Southern EU authorities provided 19 responses (14%), led by Spain (58%, 11
respondents), followed by Cyprus (16%, 3 respondents). Italy accounted for 11% (2
respondents), while Portugal, Greece, and Malta each contributed 5% (1 respondent per
country).
Finally, Eastern EU authorities submitted 9 responses (7%), with Czechia, Hungary,
Estonia, and Lithuania each representing 22% (2 respondents per country), and Slovakia
contributing 11% (1 respondent).
Figure 67: Distribution of responses by public authorities per country
Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Among EU/EEA-based companies and businesses that participated in the consultation, a
total of 238 responses were recorded. The distribution by company size reveals a
dominant representation from large enterprises, which accounted for 58% (139
responses). Small businesses (10–49 employees) contributed 17% (40 responses), closely
followed by micro-enterprises (1–9 employees) at 15% (35 responses). Medium-sized
companies (50–249 employees) made up the smallest share, representing 10% (24
responses) (see the figure below).
The analysis extended to examining the primary sectors of activity-classified by NACE
codes-of the EU-based large enterprises that participated in the consultation. By cross-
31
17
15 14
12 11 10
5
3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
G er
m an
y
Be lg
iu m
Fr an
ce
Sw ed
en
N et
he rla
nd s
Sp ai
n
Fi nl
an d
Au st
ria
C yp
ru s
Ita ly
C ze
ch ia
D en
m ar
k
Ire la
nd
H un
ga ry
Es to
ni a
Li th
ua ni
a
Lu xe
m bo
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M al
ta
Po la
nd
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an ia
C ro
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Bu lg
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La tv
ia
N or
w ay
256
referencing the respondents with a commercial firm database, we successfully matched
127 out of the 139 companies (91%). The findings reveal a notable concentration in
specific industries. The manufacturing sector emerged as the most prominent,
representing 28% (35 firms), followed by electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning
supply at 16% (20 firms). Professional, scientific, and technical activities accounted for
15% (19 firms), while transportation and storage contributed 8% (10 firms). Several
other sectors, including information and communication, financial and insurance
activities, wholesale and retail trade (including motor vehicle repairs), construction, and
water supply; sewerage, waste management, and remediation activities, each represented
between 5% and 7% of the responses.
In addition to sectoral analysis, we investigated the geographical location of the global
ultimate owners of these large enterprises. For 115 firms, the ultimate owner’s location
could be identified. The overwhelming majority-93%-had their ultimate owners based
within the EU or EEA. Among these, France was the most common location, hosting
26% of the ultimate owners, followed by Germany (16%) and Austria (10%). The
remaining 7% of ultimate owners were located outside the EU, with the United States
(3%) and Japan (2%) being the most frequently represented non-EU countries.
Figure 68: Distribution of EU respondents in category Company/business by size
Note: Only replies from the EU considered Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
9.1. Overall objectives
This section of the questionnaire was designed to be accessible to all respondents,
irrespective of their level of technical expertise in public procurement. It featured three
key questions, each asking respondents to rank a set of objectives for the new public
procurement framework in order of importance. The objectives were grouped under three
overarching themes: improving efficiency and transparency, advancing green, social, and
innovative public procurement, and strengthening economic security and strategic
autonomy. To ensure impartiality, respondents were presented with seven to eight
predefined objectives, which were displayed in a randomised order to mitigate potential
Micro (1 to 9 employees)
35 15%
Small (10 to 49 employees)
40 17%
Medium (50 to 249 employees)
24 10%
Large (250 or more)
139 58%
257
response bias. The findings from these rankings are examined in the analysis that
follows.
Table 68: Question: Improving efficiency and transparency of the new rules; ranking of the proposed characteristics of
the new public procurement legal framework in a decreasing order, by type of respondent.
A.
M ov
e be
yo nd
th e
lo w
es t-
co st
pa
ra di
gm
B. M
or e
fle xi
bl e
ru le
s
C . R
ed uc
e ad
m in
is tr
at iv
e bu
rd en
th ro
ug h
fu ll
di gi
ta lis
at io
n
D . F
ac ili
ta te
S M
Es
pa rt
ic ip
at io
n
E. R
ul es
le ss
p ro
ne
to a
nt i-c
om pe
tit iv
e pr
ac tic
es
F. R
ul es
le ss
p ro
ne
to li
tig at
io n
G . L
es s
de ta
ile d
ru le
s
H . F
ac ili
ta te
th e
ag gr
eg at
io n
of
de m
an d
N o.
o f r
es po
ns es
All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 984
Public Authorities EU 4 1 3 8 7 6 2 5 129
Large companies EU 1 2 3 8 4 6 5 7 135
SMEs EU 1 2 4 3 6 7 5 8 94
Business associations EU 1 3 2 4 5 7 6 8 220
Trade unions EU 1 4 6 7 3 2 8 5 111
NGOs EU* 1 3 4 2 7 5 8 6 102
Academia 2 1 5 6 8 4 3 7 25
Citizens + other EU** 1 2 3 4 7 6 5 8 142
Non-EU 1 3 2 7 5 4 6 8 26
Central EU 1 2 3 4 6 7 5 8 558
North EU 2 1 3 6 5 7 4 8 114
South EU 1 3 2 6 5 4 8 7 186
East EU 1 2 3 7 5 4 8 6 100
Central EU authorities 4 1 3 8 7 5 2 6 76
North EU authorities 7 1 3 5 4 8 2 6 26
South EU authorities 3 1 2 4 6 7 8 5 18
East EU authorities 7 1 2 5 4 6 3 8 9 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Top three responses highlighted A. Prioritise broader policy goals by moving beyond the lowest-cost paradigm (e.g. to include objectives like sustainability, innovation, social responsibility and Made in Europe); B. Make procurement rules more flexible (e.g. more space for negotiations, more discretion given to public buyers); C. Reduce administrative burden through full digitalisation (e.g. digitalisation of the entire procurement process, single digital procurement entry point, data reuse); D. Facilitate SMEs participation (e.g. division into lots, payment schemes including direct payments to subcontractors); E. Make procurement rules less prone to anti-competitive practices (e.g. wider use of digital tools to facilitate transparency); F. Make procurement rules less prone to litigation (e.g. more detailed procedural rules to avoid ambiguity); G. Make procurement rules less detailed (e.g. focus on high-level concepts, less rules defining procedural steps); H. Facilitate the aggregation of demand (e.g. joint procurement by several authorities, reinforcing the role of central purchasing bodies, framework agreements); 1 – most important, 8 the least important; ranking based on weighting, first choice received weight of eight, second of seven… EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
The question asked respondents to rank the guiding goals for the public procurement
reforms in terms of improving the efficiency and transparency of the rules. Moving
beyond the lowest-cost paradigm was the top choice for all groups except Public
258
Authorities and Academia. Making procurement rules more flexible was often the second
choice, followed by the reduction in administrative burden through full digitalisation.
Regionally, Central, North, South, and East EU respondents showed similar rankings,
with slight variations.
Public authorities considered that making rules more flexible should be the first priority
of the reform, followed by making procurement rules less detailed and reducing
administrative burden. This choice was similar across all regions, except for South EU
authorities, which placed moving beyond the lowest price at the third place.
European business generally followed the overall trend of all respondents, with slight
shifts in regards to the second and third place, with the exception of SMEs, which
considered facilitation of SME participation in procurement as the third priority.
Trade unions, agreeing on the first place with the rest of respondents, placed rules less
prone to litigation as second and less prone to anti-competitive practice as the third
priority. NGOs gave prominence to SME participation, placing it second after "move
beyond the lowest price" and before more flexible rules.
The option that received the least support was facilitating the aggregation of demand.
SME participation, rules less prone to litigation and anti-competitive practices, and less
detailed rules occupied the middle of the ranking.
Table 69: Question: Green, social and innovative public procurement; ranking of the proposed characteristics of the
new public procurement legal framework in a decreasing order, by type of respondent.
A. P
rio rit
is e
qu al
ity o
ve r
pr ic
e
B. F
ac ili
ta te
en
vi ro
nm en
ta lly
fr ie
nd ly
pu
rc ha
se s
C . F
ac ili
ta te
p ur
ch as
es
of in
no va
tiv e
so lu
tio ns
D . F
ac ili
ta te
s oc
ia lly
re
sp on
si bl
e pu
rc ha
se s
E. A
vo id
a dd
iti on
al
ad m
in is
tr at
iv e
bu rd
en
F. F
ac ili
ta te
S M
E pa
rt ic
ip at
io n
G . L
es s
de ta
ile d
ru le
s
H . P
rio rit
is e
co m
pe tit
io n
an d
pr ic
e sa
vi ng
s
N o.
o f r
es po
ns es
All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 975
Public Authorities EU 4 3 5 6 1 8 2 7 130
Large companies EU 1 2 3 6 4 7 5 8 134
SMEs EU 1 4 2 6 7 3 5 8 92
Business associations EU 1 5 4 7 3 2 6 8 220
Trade unions EU 2 3 4 1 7 5 6 8 110
NGOs EU* 1 2 4 3 6 5 7 8 102
Academia 2 3 5 6 1 7 4 8 26
Citizens + other EU** 1 2 4 3 5 7 6 8 136
Non-EU 1 3 4 6 2 7 5 8 25
Central EU 1 2 3 6 4 5 7 8 553
North EU 1 2 5 3 6 7 4 8 114
South EU 1 2 4 3 6 5 7 8 185
East EU 1 2 4 3 5 7 6 8 98
Central EU authorities 4 3 5 6 1 8 2 7 77
North EU authorities 4 3 6 5 2 7 1 8 26
259
A. P
rio rit
is e
qu al
ity o
ve r
pr ic
e
B. F
ac ili
ta te
en
vi ro
nm en
ta lly
fr ie
nd ly
pu
rc ha
se s
C . F
ac ili
ta te
p ur
ch as
es
of in
no va
tiv e
so lu
tio ns
D . F
ac ili
ta te
s oc
ia lly
re
sp on
si bl
e pu
rc ha
se s
E. A
vo id
a dd
iti on
al
ad m
in is
tr at
iv e
bu rd
en
F. F
ac ili
ta te
S M
E pa
rt ic
ip at
io n
G . L
es s
de ta
ile d
ru le
s
H . P
rio rit
is e
co m
pe tit
io n
an d
pr ic
e sa
vi ng
s
N o.
o f r
es po
ns es
South EU authorities 1 2 5 3 4 7 6 8 18
East EU authorities 2 4 5 8 1 7 3 6 9 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Top three responses highlighted A. Prioritise quality over price when seeking value for money (e.g. wider use of the of best price-quality ratio to support strategic and sustainable procurement); B. Facilitate environmentally friendly purchases (e.g. facilitated use of ecolabels and standards, set targets for green public procurement); C. Facilitate purchases of innovative solutions (e.g. simplifying innovation partnerships, easing access to public procurement for startups); D. Facilitate socially responsible purchases (e.g. improved working conditions, social inclusion); E. Avoid additional administrative burden (e.g. limited rules on social and green conditionalities and associated administrative and evidence requirements for companies and public buyers); F. Facilitate SME participation (e.g. division into lots, payment schemes including direct payments to subcontractors); G. Make procurement rules less detailed (e.g. focus on high-level concepts, less rules defining procedural steps); H. Prioritise competition and price savings (e.g. by avoiding ambitious green and social requirements) 1 – most important, 8 the least important; ranking based on weighting, first choice received weight of eight, second of seven… EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
The topic of Green, social, and innovative public procurement was explored through a
ranking of the proposed characteristics of the new public procurement legal framework in
decreasing order, revealing some notable trends.
There was a clear preference among most respondent groups for prioritising quality over
price (which mostly occupied first or second place), followed by facilitating
environmentally friendly purchases (which was second or third), and the purchases of
innovative solutions (third or fourth).
However, public authorities considered avoiding administrative burden as the key
priority for green, social, and innovative procurement, followed by making rules less
detailed, with facilitation of environmentally friendly purchases taking the third place.
This choice was similar across all regions, except for South EU authorities, which voted
along the lines of all respondents.
European business generally followed the overall trend of all respondents in terms of the
first place. SMEs placed a high priority on facilitating the purchase of innovation
(second) and SME participation (third), while Business Associations ranked SME
participation second and administrative burden avoidance third.
Trade unions differed from the rest by placing facilitation of socially responsible
purchases first, which was also the third choice for NGOs.
Prioritisation of competition and price savings ranked bottom among all groups.
Facilitation of purchases of innovative solutions, socially responsible purchases,
260
avoidance of additional administrative burden, SME participation, and less detailed rules
occupied middle places in the ranking, with variations between respondent groups.
Table 70: Question: Economic security and strategic autonomy; ranking of the proposed characteristics of the new
public procurement legal framework in a decreasing order, by type of respondent.
A.
P re
fe re
nc e
to
Eu ro
pe an
in du
st ry
in
c rit
ic al
s ec
to rs
B. G
en er
al
pr ef
er en
ce to
Eu
ro pe
an in
du st
ry
C . M
or e
fle xi
bl e
ru le
s
D . A
vo id
ad
m in
is tr
at iv
e bu
rd en
E. R
ul es
le ss
p ro
ne
to li
tig at
io n
F. L
es s
de ta
ile d
ru le
s
G . P
rio rit
is e
co m
pe tit
io n
an d
pr ic
e sa
vi ng
s
N o.
o f r
es po
ns es
All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 960
Public Authorities EU 3 5 1 2 6 3 7 129
Large companies EU 1 2 3 4 6 5 7 132
SMEs EU 1 4 3 2 5 6 7 92
Business associations EU 1 3 4 2 5 6 7 216
Trade unions EU 2 1 4 6 3 5 7 108
NGOs EU* 1 4 2 5 3 6 7 98
Academia 4 5 1 2 6 3 7 23
Citizens + other EU** 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 137
Non-EU 5 7 2 1 4 3 6 25
Central EU 1 4 3 2 5 6 7 545
North EU 3 5 1 4 6 2 7 109
South EU 1 2 5 3 4 6 7 183
East EU 1 2 3 6 4 5 7 98
Central EU authorities 3 4 1 2 6 4 7 76
North EU authorities 4 6 2 3 7 1 5 25
South EU authorities 2 1 3 4 5 6 7 19
East EU authorities 3 6 1 2 7 4 5 9 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Top three responses highlighted A. give preference to European industry, products and services in sectors that are critical to EU economic security or of strategic importance to secure Europe’s independence; B. Give general preference to European industry, products and services (Made in Europe) to support investment, growth and jobs in the EU; C. Make procurement rules more flexible (e.g. more discretion given to public buyers); D. Avoid additional administrative burden (e.g. minimal rules on the extent to which Made in Europe requirements are met); E. Make procurement rules less prone to litigation (e.g. more detailed to avoid ambiguity in case of third countries access); F. Make procurement rules less detailed (e.g. focus on high-level concepts rather than detailed requirements on what products, services and works public buyers can purchase); G. Prioritise competition and price savings (e.g. by allowing unrestrained access to European markets to firms from outside Europe); 1 – most important, 7 the least important; ranking based on weighting, first choice received weight of eight, second of seven… EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
The last ranking in the general section concerned priorities for achieving economic
security and strategic autonomy goals with public procurement tools.
261
There was a clear preference among most respondent groups for giving preference to
European industry in critical sectors, followed by a general preference for European
industry and more flexible rules. There were noticeable variations among EU regions,
with northern countries placing flexible rules first, followed by less detailed rules. Also,
avoidance of administrative burden was placed high by the Central EU countries
(second) and South EU countries (third).
Public authorities considered more flexible rules, followed by avoiding administrative
burden, as the key priorities, with less detailed rules and preference to critical sectors ex
aequo on third place. There were regional differences, with South EU authorities
differing slightly by more/less following the general preference of all respondents, as
well as North EU authorities, which placed on the podium less detailed, more flexible,
and burdensome rules.
Large European businesses generally followed the overall trend, but SMEs and Business
Associations placed administrative burden avoidance second.
While both Trade Unions and NGOs placed European preference top, they differed from
other respondents by prioritising rules less prone to litigation (third place), with NGOs
also pointing to the need for flexibility (second).
Notably, Non-EU respondents placed prioritisation of EU industry towards the bottom of
the priorities list, focusing instead on administrative burden avoidance, flexibility, and
less detailed rules.
Prioritisation of competition and price savings again ranked bottom among all the
groups.
This section concluded with a filtering question, offering respondents the choice to either
proceed to the subsequent sections-focused on more detailed and technical aspects of the
public procurement revision-or to move directly to the final comments section, where
they could provide open-ended feedback in free-text format. Of the total respondents,
831 (80%) opted to continue to the detailed sections, while 206 (20%) chose to skip
directly to the final comments. The analysis presented in the following section reflects
only the views of the 831 respondents who engaged with the technical aspects of the
consultation.
9.2. Simplification (FLX options)
9.2.1. Flexible procedures
Figure 69: Question: Please assess the potential of each measure to make procedures more flexible; all replies.
262
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “Please assess the potential of each measure to make
procedures more flexible”, respondents most often see high or some simplification
potential in increasing flexibility in contract modifications (76%: 49% high
simplification potential, 27% some potential), followed by allowing corrections of
procurement documents throughout the procedure (71%: 32% high, 39% some),
facilitating dialogue with the market (68%: 39% high, 29% some), allowing negotiations
throughout the procurement procedure (70%: 34% high, 36% some) and simplification of
procedures for off-the-shelf purchases (62%: 33% high, 29% some).
Disagreement that these measures would simplify procedures, i.e. seeing additional or
high complication potential, is highest for simplifying procedures for off-the-shelf
purchases (28%: 13% additional complication, 15% high complication), followed by
allowing negotiations throughout the procurement procedure (24%: 17% additional
complication, 7% high complication) and allowing corrections of procurement
49%
32%
34%
39%
33%
27%
39%
36%
29%
29%
12%
16%
17%
10%
13%
5%
5%
7%
2%
15%
Increase flexibility in contract modifications (e.g. revising the duration, price changes)
Allow corrections of procurement documents throughout the procedure
Allow negotiations throughout the procurement procedure
Facilitate dialogue with the market
Simplify procedures for off-the shelf purchases (i.e. compliance only with basic principles, such as non-discrimination,
transparency, and procedural fairness)
High simplification potential Some simplification potential No or negligible impact Additional complication potential High complication potential
Increase flexibility in contract modifications (e.g. revising the duration, price changes)
Allow corrections of procurement documents throughout the procedure
Allow negotiations throughout the procurement procedure
Facilitate dialogue with the market
Simplify procedures for off- the shelf purchases (i.e. compliance only with basic principles, such as non- discrimination, transparency, and procedural fairness)
High simplification potential 49% 32% 34% 39% 33% Some simplification potential 27% 39% 36% 29% 29% No or negligible impact 7% 9% 6% 20% 10% Additional complication potential 12% 16% 17% 10% 13% High complication potential 5% 5% 7% 2% 15% No. of responses 715 702 665 716 692
263
documents (21%: 16% additional complication, 5% high complication). Lower
complication expectations are reported for increasing flexibility in contract modifications
(17%: 12% additional complication, 5% high complication) and facilitating dialogue with
the market (12%: 10% additional complication, 2% high complication).
Across all measures, the share of respondents expecting “no or negligible impact” ranges
from 6–7% for allowing negotiations and increasing flexibility in contract modifications,
up to 20% for facilitating dialogue with the market, with intermediate levels of 9–10%
for allowing corrections and simplifying off-the-shelf purchases.
Table 71: Question: Please assess the potential of each measure to make procedures more flexible; Percentage of
respondents that indicated high or some simplification potential, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
This question assessed which measures respondents believed had the highest potential to
make procurement procedures more flexible.
The measure attracting the highest overall support was increasing flexibility in contract
modifications at 76%. Central, North, and South EU respondents aligned with this
preference (72%, 92%, and 79% respectively), while East EU respondents favoured
allowing corrections of procurement documents throughout the procedure at 85%.
Public authorities most frequently selected increasing flexibility in contract modifications
at 87%, with other measures ranging from 77% to 85%.
Respondent Facilitate dialogue with the market
Allow negotiations throughout the procurement procedure
Allow corrections of procurement documents throughout the procedure
Simplify procedures for off- the shelf purchases (i.e. compliance only with basic principles, such as non- discrimination, transparency, and procedural fairness)
Increase flexibility in contract modifications (e.g. revising the duration, price changes)
No. of responses
All 69% 70% 71% 62% 76% 665-716 Public Authorities EU 82% 79% 77% 85% 87% 106-108 Large companies EU 89% 88% 78% 77% 89% 86-96 SMEs EU 47% 44% 40% 44% 52% 62-64 Business associations EU 73% 59% 61% 60% 69% 151-160 Trade unions EU 14% 67% 82% 11% 76% 51-99 NGOs EU* 91% 88% 82% 82% 84% 61-68 Academia 78% 72% 89% 78% 76% 17-18 Citizens + other EU** 76% 66% 71% 71% 76% 93-95 Non-EU 86% 67% 69% 69% 88% 14-16
Central EU 68% 70% 65% 60% 72% 389-405 North EU 63% 86% 89% 62% 92% 59-75 South EU 73% 58% 70% 70% 79% 136-147 East EU 64% 80% 85% 55% 79% 65-77 Central EU authorities 84% 84% 74% 86% 83% 67-69 North EU authorities 84% 75% 94% 95% 100% 16-19 South EU authorities 75% 56% 63% 73% 88% 15-16 East EU authorities 80% 100% 100% 80% 100% 5-5
264
Large companies most often selected facilitating dialogue with the market and increasing
flexibility in contract modifications, both at 89%, with other measures ranging from 77%
to 88%.
SMEs preferred increasing flexibility in contract modifications at 52%, with other
measures ranging from 40% to 47%. Business associations favoured facilitating dialogue
with the market at 73%, with other measures ranging from 59% to 69%.
Trade unions most frequently selected increasing flexibility in contract modifications at
76% and allowing corrections of procurement documents throughout the procedure at
82%, but showed very low support for facilitating dialogue with the market at 14% and
simplifying procedures for off-the-shelf purchases at 11%. NGOs most frequently
selected facilitating dialogue with the market at 91%, with other measures ranging from
82% to 88%.
Academia favoured allowing corrections of procurement documents throughout the
procedure at 89%, with other measures ranging from 72% to 78%. Citizens and other
respondents most often selected facilitating dialogue with the market and increasing
flexibility in contract modifications, both at 76%, with other measures ranging from 66%
to 71%. Non-EU respondents preferred increasing flexibility in contract modifications at
88%, with other measures ranging from 67% to 86%.
265
9.2.2. Joint procurement
Figure 70: Question: Please assess the potential of each measure to simplify joint procurement; all replies.
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “Please assess the potential of each measure to simplify joint
procurement”, respondents most often see high or some simplification potential in
increasing flexibility in setting the duration of framework agreements (66%: 29% high
simplification potential, 37% some potential), followed by facilitating networking among
buyers (63%: 22% high, 41% some), simplifying rules for setting up joint procurements,
especially across borders (56%: 23% high, 33% some) and enhancing the role of Central
Purchasing Bodies (53%: 17% high, 36% some).
Disagreement that these measures would simplify joint procurement, i.e. seeing
additional or high complication potential, is highest for enhancing the role of Central
Purchasing Bodies (24%: 19% additional complication, 5% high complication) and for
simplifying rules for setting up joint procurements across borders (21%: 17% additional
complication, 4% high complication), followed by facilitating networking among buyers
(18%: 14% additional complication, 4% high complication) and increasing flexibility in
setting the duration of framework agreements (17%: 9% additional complication, 8%
high complication).
29%
22%
23%
17%
37%
41%
33%
36%
9%
14%
17%
19%
8%
4%
4%
5%
Increase flexibility in setting the duration of framework agreements
Facilitate networking among buyers (e.g., forming buyer groups or communities of practice)
Simplify rules for setting up joint procurements, especially across borders
Enhance the role of Central Purchasing Bodies
High simplification potential Some simplification potential No or negligible impact
Additional complication potential High complication potential
Increase flexibility in setting the duration of framework agreements
Facilitate networking among buyers (e.g., forming buyer groups or communities of practice)
Simplify rules for setting up joint procurements, especially across borders
Enhance the role of Central Purchasing Bodies
High simplification potential 29% 22% 23% 17% Some simplification potential 37% 41% 33% 36% No or negligible impact 17% 18% 23% 22% Additional complication potential 9% 14% 17% 19% High complication potential 8% 4% 4% 5% No. of responses 637 694 638 674
266
Across all measures, the share of respondents expecting “no or negligible impact” ranges
from 17% for increasing flexibility in the duration of framework agreements to 23% for
simplifying rules for joint procurements, with intermediate levels of 18% for facilitating
networking among buyers and 22% for enhancing the role of Central Purchasing Bodies.
Table 72: Question: Please assess the potential of each measure to simplify joint procurement; Percentage of
respondents that indicated high or some simplification potential, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
This question assessed which measures respondents believed had the highest potential to
simplify joint procurement.
The measure attracting the highest overall support was increasing flexibility in setting the
duration of framework agreements at 66%. North and Central EU respondents aligned
with the overall preference for this measure at 77% and 65% respectively. South EU
respondents favoured facilitating networking among buyers at 68%, while East EU
respondents also preferred this measure at 76%.
Public authorities most frequently selected increasing flexibility in setting the duration of
framework agreements at 87%, with other measures ranging from 58% to 75%.
Large companies most often selected increasing flexibility in setting the duration of
framework agreements at 68%, with other measures ranging from 45% to 55%. SMEs
Respondent
Increase flexibility in setting the duration of framework agreements
Simplify rules for setting up joint procurements, especially across borders
Enhance the role of Central Purchasing Bodies
Facilitate networking among buyers (e.g., forming buyer groups or communities of practice)
No. of responses
All 66% 56% 53% 63% 637-694 Public Authorities EU 87% 63% 58% 75% 107-109 Large companies EU 68% 55% 45% 49% 84-90 SMEs EU 31% 27% 24% 27% 61-62 Business associations EU 49% 53% 40% 47% 156-158 Trade unions EU 55% 50% 96% 94% 33-90 NGOs EU* 85% 77% 67% 82% 60-66 Academia 83% 39% 22% 56% 18-18 Citizens + other EU** 76% 66% 56% 75% 93-94 Non-EU 67% 53% 56% 50% 15-16
Central EU 65% 52% 46% 58% 370-391 North EU 77% 72% 50% 73% 62-70 South EU 59% 59% 66% 68% 131-142 East EU 69% 57% 67% 76% 55-75 Central EU authorities 88% 63% 58% 78% 68-69 North EU authorities 95% 78% 35% 72% 17-19 South EU authorities 75% 50% 81% 63% 16-16 East EU authorities 80% 40% 60% 75% 4-5
267
preferred increasing flexibility in setting the duration of framework agreements at 31%,
with other measures ranging from 24% to 27%. Business associations favoured
simplifying rules for setting up joint procurements at 53%, with other measures ranging
from 40% to 49%.
Trade unions stood out with very high support for enhancing the role of Central
Purchasing Bodies at 96% and facilitating networking among buyers at 94%, but showed
lower support for increasing flexibility in setting the duration of framework agreements
at 55%. NGOs most frequently selected increasing flexibility in setting the duration of
framework agreements at 85%, with other measures ranging from 67% to 82%.
Academia favoured increasing flexibility in setting the duration of framework
agreements at 83%, but showed low support for enhancing the role of Central Purchasing
Bodies at 22%, with other measures ranging from 39% to 56%. Citizens and other
respondents most often selected increasing flexibility in setting the duration of
framework agreements at 76%, with other measures ranging from 56% to 75%. Non-EU
respondents preferred increasing flexibility in setting the duration of framework
agreements at 67%, with other measures ranging from 50% to 56%.
268
9.2.3. Improve information exchange and procedural time-limits
Figure 71: Question: Please assess the potential of each measure to improve information exchange and procedural
time-limits; all replies.
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “Please assess the potential of each measure to improve
information exchange and procedural time-limits”, respondents most often see high or
some simplification potential in allowing re-use of documentation submitted by bidders
(once-only principle) (87%: 43% high simplification potential, 44% some potential),
followed by providing model contract templates and technical specifications templates
for public buyers (75%: 32% high, 43% some) and establishing a central EU
procurement platform and enhancing digitisation (67%: 29% high, 38% some). Lower
but still significant shares see simplification potential in setting time limits for evaluating
bids (59%: 18% high, 41% some) and increasing time limits for submission (46%: 10%
high, 36% some).
Disagreement that these measures would simplify procedures, i.e. seeing additional or
high complication potential, is highest for setting time limits for evaluating bids (24%:
11% additional complication potential, 13% high complication potential), followed by
increasing time limits for submission (22%: 14% additional complication, 8% high
43%
32%
29%
18%
10%
44%
43%
38%
41%
36%
3%
7%
9%
11%
14%
3%
9%
7%
13%
8%
Allow re-use of documentation submitted by bidders (once-only principle)
Provide model contract templates and technical specifications templates for public buyers
Establish a central EU procurement platform and enhance digitisation
Set time limits for evaluating bids
Increase time limits for submission
High simplification potential Some simplification potential No or negligible impact
Additional complication potential High complication potential
Allow re-use of documentation submitted by bidders (once- only principle)
Provide model contract templates and technical specifications templates for public buyers
Establish a central EU procurement platform and enhance digitisation
Set time limits for evaluating bids
Increase time limits for submission
High simplification potential 43% 32% 29% 18% 10% Some simplification potential 44% 43% 38% 41% 36% No or negligible impact 8% 9% 17% 17% 32% Additional complication potential 3% 7% 9% 11% 14% High complication potential 3% 9% 7% 13% 8% No. of responses 720 716 717 705 691
269
complication), establishing a central EU procurement platform and enhancing digitisation
(16%: 9% additional complication, 7% high complication), providing model templates
(16%: 7% additional complication, 9% high complication), and allowing re-use of
documentation (6%: 3% additional complication, 3% high complication).
Across all measures, the share of respondents expecting “no or negligible impact” ranges
from 8% for allowing re-use of documentation to 32% for increasing time limits for
submission, with intermediate levels of 9% for providing model templates and 17% for
both establishing a central EU procurement platform and setting time limits for
evaluating bids.
Table 73: Question: Please assess the potential of each measure to improve information exchange and procedural
time-limits; Percentage of respondents that indicated high or some simplification potential, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
This question assessed which measures respondents believed had the highest potential to
improve information exchange and procedural time limits.
The measure attracting the highest overall support was allowing re-use of documentation
submitted by bidders (once-only principle) at 86%. East EU respondents favoured
providing model contract templates at 91%, while Central, North, and South EU
respondents aligned with the overall top choice (86%, 79%, and 91% respectively).
Respondent
Allow re-use of documentation submitted by bidders (once- only principle)
Increase time limits for submission
Set time limits for evaluating bids
Provide model contract templates and technical specifications templates for public buyers
Establish a central EU procurement platform and enhance digitisation
No. of responses
All 86% 46% 59% 75% 67% 691-720 Public Authorities EU 76% 18% 17% 80% 60% 106-109 Large companies EU 77% 48% 54% 65% 55% 93-96 SMEs EU 88% 63% 76% 63% 40% 62-65 Business associations EU 89% 59% 73% 66% 64% 153-160 Trade unions EU 98% 23% 88% 88% 95% 78-100 NGOs EU* 93% 73% 61% 96% 83% 62-68 Academia 78% 22% 39% 71% 71% 17-18 Citizens + other EU** 84% 39% 50% 73% 68% 92-95 Non-EU 94% 75% 81% 88% 88% 16-16
Central EU 86% 48% 52% 67% 62% 393-404 North EU 79% 30% 51% 68% 63% 70-76 South EU 91% 51% 77% 88% 77% 140-146 East EU 83% 32% 64% 91% 76% 72-78 Central EU authorities 82% 19% 10% 80% 62% 66-69 North EU authorities 53% 6% 11% 63% 37% 18-19 South EU authorities 81% 27% 50% 100% 88% 15-16 East EU authorities 80% 20% 20% 80% 40% 5-5
270
Public authorities most frequently selected providing model contract templates at 80%,
with other measures ranging from 17% to 76%.
Large companies, SMEs, and business associations all most often selected allowing re-
use of documentation (89%, 88%, and 89% respectively). SMEs also showed high
support for setting time limits for evaluating bids at 76%. Other measures for these
groups ranged from 40% to 73%.
Trade unions most frequently selected allowing re-use of documentation at 98% and
establishing a central EU procurement platform at 95%, with very low support for
increasing time limits for submission at 23%. NGOs most frequently selected providing
model contract templates at 96%, with other measures ranging from 61% to 93%.
Academia favoured allowing re-use of documentation at 78%, with low support for
increasing time limits for submission at 22%. Other measures ranged from 39% to 71%.
Citizens and other respondents most often selected allowing re-use of documentation at
84%, with other measures ranging from 39% to 73%. Non-EU respondents most
frequently selected allowing re-use of documentation at 94%, with other measures
ranging from 75% to 88%.
271
9.2.4. Support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs):
Figure 72: Question: Please assess the potential of each measure to support small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs); all replies.
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “Please assess the potential of each measure to support small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)”, respondents most often see high or some
simplification potential in simplifying rules for forming consortia, especially for SMEs
(70%: 34% high simplification potential, 36% some potential), followed by encouraging
dividing contracts into smaller lots (52%: 27% high, 25% some) and EU-level targets for
SME participation in public procurement (47%: 27% high, 20% some).
Disagreement that these measures would support SMEs, i.e. seeing additional or high
complication potential, is highest for EU-level targets for SME participation (31%: 16%
additional complication potential, 15% high complication potential), followed by
encouraging dividing contracts into smaller lots (25%: 15% additional complication,
10% high complication) and simplifying rules for forming consortia (10%: 8% additional
complication, 2% high complication).
34%
27%
27%
36%
25%
20%
8%
15%
16%
2%
10%
15%
Simplify rules for forming consortia, especially for SMEs
Encourage dividing contracts into smaller lots
EU-level targets for SMEs participation in public procurement
High simplification potential Some simplification potential No or negligible impact
Additional complication potential High complication potential
Simplify rules for forming consortia, especially for SMEs
Encourage dividing contracts into smaller lots
EU-level targets for SMEs participation in public procurement
High simplification potential 34% 27% 27% Some simplification potential 36% 25% 20% No or negligible impact 20% 22% 22% Additional complication potential 8% 15% 16% High complication potential 2% 10% 15% No. of responses 638 668 625
272
Across all measures, the share of respondents expecting “no or negligible impact” is
similar, ranging from 20% for simplifying consortia rules to 22% for dividing contracts
into smaller lots and for EU-level SME participation targets.
Table 74: Question: Please assess the potential of each measure to support small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs); Percentage of respondents that indicated high or some simplification potential, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
This question assessed which measures respondents believed had the highest potential to
support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
The measure attracting the highest overall support was simplifying rules for forming
consortia at 70%. East EU respondents preferred encouraging dividing contracts into
smaller lots at 58%. Central, South and North EU respondents aligned with the overall
top choice (74%, 71%, 59% respectively).
Public authorities most frequently selected simplifying rules for forming consortia at
63%, with other measures ranging from 28% to 35%.
Large companies most often selected simplifying rules for forming consortia at 56%,
with other measures ranging from 24% to 27%. SMEs preferred EU-level targets for
SME participation and simplifying rules for forming consortia, both at 78%. Business
associations favoured simplifying rules for forming consortia at 74%, with other
measures ranging from 55% to 56%.
Trade unions most frequently selected encouraging dividing contracts into smaller lots at
81%, with other measures ranging from 42% to 53%. NGOs most frequently selected
Respondent
Encourage dividing contracts into smaller lots
Simplify rules for forming consortia, especially for SMEs
EU-level targets for SMEs participation in public procurement
No. of responses
All 52% 70% 47% 625-668 Public Authorities EU 35% 63% 28% 107-107 Large companies EU 27% 56% 24% 85-87 SMEs EU 48% 78% 78% 65-65 Business associations EU 55% 74% 56% 155-156 Trade unions EU 81% 53% 42% 31-69 NGOs EU* 76% 90% 56% 57-62 Academia 44% 72% 44% 18-18 Citizens + other EU** 58% 72% 52% 92-93 Non-EU 43% 85% 31% 13-14
Central EU 48% 74% 46% 371-381 North EU 43% 59% 32% 56-67 South EU 66% 71% 63% 134-140 East EU 58% 51% 35% 51-66 Central EU authorities 31% 63% 18% 68-68 North EU authorities 17% 47% 17% 18-19 South EU authorities 56% 87% 69% 15-16 East EU authorities 80% 40% 80% 5-5
273
simplifying rules for forming consortia at 90%, with other measures ranging from 56% to
76%.
Academia favoured simplifying rules for forming consortia at 72%, with other measures
at 44%. Citizens and other respondents most often selected simplifying rules for forming
consortia at 72%, with other measures ranging from 52% to 58%. Non-EU respondents
preferred simplifying rules for forming consortia at 85%, with other measures ranging
from 31% to 43%.
274
9.2.5. Improve implementation and contract management
Figure 73: Question: Please assess the potential of each measure to improve implementation and contract
management; all replies.
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “Please assess the potential of each measure to improve
implementation and contract management”, respondents most often see high or some
simplification potential in speeding up payments to contractors, especially SMEs (66%:
36% high simplification potential, 30% some potential), followed by establishing rules
for the post-award phase, including contract implementation (53%: 28% high, 25%
some), establishing rules for direct payments to subcontractors, especially SMEs (50%:
21% high, 29% some), and increasing the use of pre-financing, especially for SMEs
(43%: 20% high, 23% some).
Disagreement that these measures would simplify implementation and contract
management, i.e. seeing additional or high complication potential, is highest for
increasing the use of pre-financing (29%: 19% additional complication potential, 10%
high complication potential), followed by establishing rules for the post-award phase
(27%: 13% additional complication, 14% high complication), establishing rules for direct
36%
28%
21%
20%
30%
25%
29%
23%
9%
13%
12%
19%
8%
14%
13%
10%
Speed up payments to contractors, especially SMEs
Establish rules for the post-award phase, including contract implementation
Establish rules for direct payments to subcontractors, especially SMEs
Increase use of pre-financing, especially for SMEs
High simplification potential Some simplification potential No or negligible impact
Additional complication potential High complication potential
Speed up payments to contractors, especially SMEs
Establish rules for the post-award phase, including contract implementation
Establish rules for direct payments to subcontractors, especially SMEs
Increase use of pre- financing, especially for SMEs
High simplification potential 36% 28% 21% 20% Some simplification potential 30% 25% 29% 23% No or negligible impact 17% 21% 24% 28% Additional complication potential 9% 13% 12% 19% High complication potential 8% 14% 13% 10% No. of responses 688 688 681 680
275
payments to subcontractors (25%: 12% additional complication, 13% high complication),
and speeding up payments to contractors (17%: 9% additional complication, 8% high
complication).
Across all measures, the share of respondents expecting “no or negligible impact” ranges
from 17% for speeding up payments to contractors to 28% for increasing the use of pre-
financing, with intermediate levels of 21% for establishing rules for the post-award phase
and 24% for establishing rules for direct payments to subcontractors.
Table 75: Question: Please assess the potential of each measure to improve implementation and contract
management; Percentage of respondents that indicated high or some simplification potential, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
This question assessed which measures respondents believed had the highest potential to
improve implementation and contract management.
The measure attracting the highest overall support was speeding up payments to
contractors, especially SMEs, at 66%. Central, North, and South EU respondents aligned
with this preference (65%, 52%, and 80% respectively), while East EU respondents
showed equal preference for speeding up payments to contractors, establishing rules for
direct payments to subcontractors, and establishing rules for the post-award phase, all at
60%.
Public authorities most frequently selected increasing use of pre-financing and speeding
up payments to contractors, both at 38%, with other measures ranging from 31% to 32%.
Respondent
Establish rules for the post-award phase, including contract implementation
Increase use of pre- financing, especially for SMEs
Speed up payments to contractors, especially SMEs
Establish rules for direct payments to subcontractors, especially SMEs
No. of responses
All 52% 43% 66% 51% 680-688 Public Authorities EU 32% 38% 38% 31% 107-108 Large companies EU 32% 23% 36% 29% 88-92 SMEs EU 40% 37% 80% 33% 63-64 Business associations EU 45% 53% 77% 49% 149-157 Trade unions EU 93% 27% 96% 88% 93-98 NGOs EU* 82% 80% 83% 81% 51-55 Academia 39% 24% 67% 33% 17-18 Citizens + other EU** 55% 54% 61% 54% 90-93 Non-EU 85% 57% 77% 69% 13-14
Central EU 41% 41% 65% 43% 383-393 North EU 48% 29% 52% 40% 69-73 South EU 78% 60% 80% 71% 140-144 East EU 60% 31% 60% 60% 71-75 Central EU authorities 28% 31% 41% 31% 67-69 North EU authorities 11% 21% 11% 5% 19-19 South EU authorities 69% 81% 67% 56% 15-16 East EU authorities 40% 75% 20% 40% 4-5
276
Large companies most often selected establishing rules for the post-award phase at 36%,
with other measures ranging from 23% to 32%. SMEs preferred speeding up payments to
contractors at 80%, with other measures ranging from 33% to 40%. Business associations
favoured speeding up payments to contractors at 77%, with other measures ranging from
45% to 53%.
Trade unions most frequently selected speeding up payments to contractors at 96% and
establishing rules for the post-award phase at 93%, with other measures ranging from
27% to 88%. NGOs most frequently selected speeding up payments to contractors at
83%, with other measures ranging from 80% to 82%.
Academia favoured speeding up payments to contractors at 67%, with other measures
ranging from 24% to 39%. Citizens and other respondents most often selected speeding
up payments to contractors at 61%, with other measures at 54% to 55%. Non-EU
respondents preferred establishing rules for the post-award phase at 85%, with other
measures ranging from 57% to 77%.
277
9.2.6. Simplifications: comments
9.2.6.1. Public authorities
Approximately 17% of public authorities who provided comments suggested ways to
simplify procurement procedures, essentially proposing methods to streamline and ease
the processes involved in acquiring goods and services. The majority of respondents from
this group highlighted the need for greater flexibility in procurement rules, with many
citing the current regulations as overly complex and restrictive, which can lead to
unnecessary delays and administrative burdens. A common suggestion was to allow for
more negotiation in procurement procedures, with one respondent noting that "the
distinction between the legal regimes applicable to public procurement and procurement
by entities operating in the water, energy, etc. is no longer justified" and suggesting
unification of these regimes to facilitate negotiation. This, they argue, would enable
public authorities to respond more effectively to changing needs and make procurement
processes more efficient. However, a minority of respondents cautioned against
simplification at the expense of social and environmental sustainability objectives,
emphasizing the importance of maintaining fair and transparent processes that prioritize
these goals. Some respondents also stressed the need to support small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) in procurement procedures, with one suggesting the establishment of
a "legal reserve for SMEs" to guarantee their participation, and others highlighting the
importance of making procurement rules manageable for SMEs, as they "form an integral
part of a strong and diversified EU economy". Furthermore, respondents expressed
tension between the desire for digitalisation and the potential for increased complexity,
with one noting that "digitalisation should not be automatically equated with
simplification", and another arguing that "many existing EU digital systems are not user-
friendly". Additionally, some respondents raised concerns about the impact of
simplification on the ability to ensure quality and value for money, with one suggesting
that "quality is also reflected in selection criteria and technical requirements", and
therefore should not be compromised in the pursuit of simplification. Overall, public
authorities are seeking a balance between simplifying procurement procedures and
ensuring that these processes remain effective, sustainable, and supportive of SMEs and
social and environmental objectives.
9.2.6.2. EU companies and business associations
Approximately 18% of EU companies and business associations who provided comments
suggested ways to simplify procurement procedures, essentially proposing methods to
streamline and ease the processes involved in acquiring goods and services. The majority
of respondents from this group highlighted the need for greater flexibility in procurement
rules, with many citing the current regulations as overly complex and restrictive, leading
to unnecessary delays and administrative burdens. A common suggestion was to allow
for more negotiation in procurement procedures, with some advocating for the
introduction of a "fast-track selection procedure" to enable contracting authorities to
select the most economically advantageous offers more swiftly. Others proposed
reducing the number of procedures, replacing the European Single Procurement
Document (ESPD) with a simpler system, and allowing contracting authorities to conduct
negotiations when they consider it appropriate. However, a minority of respondents
cautioned that simplification should not come at the expense of achieving social and
environmental sustainability objectives, and that the focus should be on administrative
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aspects rather than deregulation. Many respondents also emphasized the need to support
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in procurement procedures, with some
suggesting the introduction of a "recycling label" for public procurement, the creation of
a European register of excluded economic operators, and the promotion of training and
templates to enable better lot division and SME-friendly tender design. Some
respondents also raised concerns about the impact of simplification on the ability to
ensure quality and value for money, with one suggesting that "quality is also reflected in
selection criteria and technical requirements", and therefore should not be compromised
in the pursuit of simplification. Overall, EU companies and business associations are
seeking a balance between simplifying procurement procedures and ensuring that these
processes remain fair, transparent, and effective in achieving their objectives. As one
respondent noted, "simplification should support the effective implementation of
mandatory green and industrial policy criteria, ensuring legal certainty and a level
playing field for European circular and bio-based value chains".
9.2.6.1. EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade
unions
Approximately 45% of EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions who
provided comments suggested ways to simplify procurement procedures, emphasizing
that simplification should not lead to deregulation. The majority of respondents from this
group highlighted the need for clearer rules on collective bargaining, green and
sustainable public procurement, and stricter regulation of subcontracting. Many argued
that the existence of a collective agreement with an economic operator is an effective and
non-bureaucratic criterion for promoting quality jobs and fair wages. Some respondents
suggested that simplification could be achieved through digitalization, improved data
systems, and the use of standardized templates and model contracts. However, others
warned that simplification should not compromise environmental and social objectives,
and that the current voluntary approach has failed to shift procurement away from price-
only awards. The need for mandatory environmental and social criteria, as well as clearer
guidelines and greater flexibility in the choice of procurement procedures, was also
emphasized. As one respondent noted, "simplification should not result in lower
standards, but in greater legal certainty, clearer expectations for contracting authorities
and bidders, and stronger implementation capacity." Overall, EU NGOs, environmental
organisations, and trade unions are seeking a balance between simplifying procurement
procedures and ensuring that these processes remain fair, transparent, and effective in
achieving social and environmental objectives.
9.2.6.2. EU academic institutions, consumer organisations,
citizen and other respondents
Approximately 17% of EU academic institutions, consumer organisations, citizen, and
other respondents who provided comments suggested ways to simplify procurement
procedures, emphasizing that simplification should not lead to deregulation. The majority
of respondents from this group highlighted the need for clearer rules, more flexibility in
procedures, and a focus on simplifying the process for economic operators, while
safeguarding the principles of equal treatment and transparency. Many argued that the
current public procurement law is over-complex and further fragmented due to national
tightening, and that a more principle-based approach, with a focus on high-level
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principles rather than detailed steps, would be beneficial. Some respondents suggested
that simplification could be achieved through digitalization, standardization of
documentation, and the use of central procurement platforms. The need for raised
thresholds, more flexible time limits, and a simplified fast-track procedure was also
emphasized. Additionally, some respondents highlighted the importance of supporting
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and social economy enterprises, and that
simplification measures should also apply to these entities. As one respondent noted,
"simplification should not be understood as deregulation. While procedural minimalism
is a legitimate objective, the EU's strategic goals require a broader focus on structural
simplification through openness, modularity, transparency, and digitalization." Overall,
EU academic institutions, consumer organisations, citizen, and other respondents are
seeking a balance between simplifying procurement procedures and ensuring that these
processes remain fair, transparent, and effective in achieving their objectives.
9.2.6.3. Non-EU respondents
Approximately 23% of Non-EU respondents who provided comments suggested ways to
simplify procurement procedures, emphasizing that simplification should not come at the
expense of delivering value for money or compromising quality. The majority of
respondents from this group highlighted the need for clearer, more objective, and
transparent criteria, as well as more flexible and digitalized procedures. Many in medical
field argued that introducing preferential procurement criteria would slow patient access,
reduce competition, and limit the system's ability to choose the best technology for
patients. Some respondents suggested that simplification could be achieved through the
reuse of documents across multiple tenders, the extension of time limits for submissions,
and applying a time limit for the evaluation of bids. The need for robust payment
security, prompt payment timelines, and interest on late payments was also emphasized,
as well as the importance of promoting collective bargaining and quality jobs.
Additionally, some respondents highlighted the potential of digitalization, standardized
contract templates, and data-driven workflows to simplify procurement processes and
reduce administrative burdens. As one respondent noted, "simplification cannot be
achieved through legal streamlining alone while procurement remains fragmented and
document-centric. A shift from document handling to data-driven workflows is
essential." Overall, Non-EU respondents are seeking a balance between simplifying
procurement procedures and ensuring that these processes remain fair, transparent, and
effective in achieving their objectives, while also prioritizing quality, patient outcomes,
and value for money.
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9.2.7. Simplification impacts
Figure 74: Question: Please assess the likelihood of impacts of the proposed simplification measures; all replies.
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “How likely do you believe the following outcomes would
occur if the proposed simplification measures were implemented?”, respondents most
often expect increased SME participation (82%: 35% very likely, 47% somewhat likely),
an increased number of bidders (81%: 32% very likely, 49% somewhat likely), more
competition (81%: 31% very likely, 50% somewhat likely), and faster procurement
processes (81%: 30% very likely, 51% somewhat likely). This is followed by reduced
cost for bidders to participate in procurement (73%: 32% very likely, 41% somewhat
likely), reduced cost for public buyers (70%: 25% very likely, 45% somewhat likely),
increased bidding by EU-based firms (67%: 23% very likely, 44% somewhat likely), and
increased buying power of public buyers (61%: 15% very likely, 46% somewhat likely).
A majority also consider increased legal certainty (65%: 23% very likely, 42% somewhat
likely) and reduced litigation (55%: 14% very likely, 41% somewhat likely) likely. The
lowest shares of positive expectations relate to increased cross-border bidding within the
EU (57%: 10% very likely, 47% somewhat likely), less corruption (41%: 14% very
35%
32%
31%
30%
32%
25%
23%
23%
15%
10%
14%
9%
14%
47%
49%
50%
51%
41%
45%
44%
42%
46%
47%
41%
34%
27%
4%
3%
3%
4%
5%
7%
4%
10%
8%
8%
13%
15%
11%
1%
1%
1%
2%
3%
2%
3%
1%
2%
3%
4%
4%
4%
Increased SME participation
Increased number of bidders
More competition
Faster procurement processes
Reduced cost for bidders to participate in public procurement
Reduced cost for public buyers to conduct public procurement
Increased bidding by EU-based firms
Increased legal certainty
Increased buying power of public buyers
Increased cross-border bidding within the EU
Reduced litigation
Reduced price of goods/services/works
Less corruption
Very likely Somewhat likely No impact Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Increased SME participati on
Increased number of bidders
More competiti on
Faster procurem ent processes
Reduced cost for bidders to participat e in public procurem ent
Reduced cost for public buyers to conduct public procurem ent
Increased bidding by EU-based firms
Increased legal certainty
Increased buying power of public buyers
Increased cross- border bidding within the EU
Reduced litigation
Reduced price of goods/ser vices/wor ks
Less corruptio n
Very likely 35% 32% 31% 30% 32% 25% 23% 23% 15% 10% 14% 9% 14% Somewhat likely 47% 49% 50% 51% 41% 45% 44% 42% 46% 47% 41% 34% 27% No impact 14% 14% 14% 14% 19% 20% 26% 24% 29% 31% 28% 37% 45% Somewhat unlikely 4% 3% 3% 4% 5% 7% 4% 10% 8% 8% 13% 15% 11% Very unlikely 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 2% 3% 1% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4% No. of responses 562 557 551 559 560 561 547 552 554 547 556 550 558
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likely, 27% somewhat likely), and reduced prices of goods, services and works (43%: 9%
very likely, 34% somewhat likely).
Disagreement that these outcomes will occur (somewhat unlikely or very unlikely) is
most pronounced for reduced prices (19%: 15% somewhat unlikely, 4% very unlikely)
and less corruption (15%: 11% somewhat unlikely, 4% very unlikely), followed by
reduced litigation (17%: 13% somewhat unlikely, 4% very unlikely). For other outcomes,
disagreement is lower: increased legal certainty (11%: 10% somewhat unlikely, 1% very
unlikely), cross-border bidding within the EU (11%: 8% somewhat unlikely, 3% very
unlikely), and reduced cost for buyers (9%: 7% somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely).
All other items record single-digit combined “unlikely” shares, with the lowest
disagreement for increased number of bidders, increased SME participation, and more
competition (each 4%: 3–4% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely).
Across all outcomes, the share of respondents expecting “no impact” ranges from 9% for
more competition and 14% for increased SME participation, faster procurement and
increased number of bidders, up to 45% for less corruption and 37% for reduced prices.
Intermediate levels of “no impact” responses are reported for increased buying power
(29%), increased cross-border bidding within the EU (31%), and increased bidding by
EU-based firms (26%).
Table 76: Question: Please assess the likelihood of impacts of the proposed simplification measures; percentage of
respondents that indicated “very likely” or “somewhat likely” answers, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked to assess how likely different impacts of the proposed
simplification measures would be. The table, and the description below, refer only to the
combined shares of “very likely” and “somewhat likely” answers (other response options
were also available but are not shown).
Respondent
Faster procurem ent processes
Increased legal certainty
Reduced litigation
Increased number of bidders
Increased cross- border bidding within the EU
Increased bidding by EU-based firms
Increased SME participati on
Reduced cost for public buyers to conduct public procurem ent
Increased buying power of public buyers
Reduced cost for bidders to participat e in public procurem ent
Reduced price of goods/ser vices/wor ks
Less corruptio n
More competiti on
No. of responses
All 81% 65% 55% 81% 57% 67% 82% 70% 61% 73% 43% 41% 81% 547-562 Public Authorities EU 76% 50% 50% 77% 48% 65% 71% 68% 61% 68% 38% 23% 78% 103-106 Large companies EU 81% 66% 48% 79% 61% 67% 69% 68% 50% 71% 48% 44% 81% 83-90 SMEs EU 83% 64% 62% 77% 46% 59% 94% 72% 47% 79% 45% 47% 77% 46-48 Business associations EU 81% 69% 55% 84% 66% 72% 90% 68% 61% 74% 46% 48% 81% 130-136 Trade unions EU 75% 64% 36% 75% 60% 64% 90% 50% 56% 60% 45% 68% 78% 8-19 NGOs EU* 95% 75% 75% 93% 60% 63% 95% 80% 76% 85% 27% 40% 88% 51-57 Academia 72% 67% 50% 72% 33% 50% 71% 61% 44% 67% 39% 28% 83% 17-18 Citizens + other EU** 75% 70% 56% 83% 60% 71% 82% 70% 69% 69% 49% 41% 82% 86-90 Non-EU 85% 85% 58% 86% 64% 73% 86% 85% 86% 79% 54% 50% 86% 11-14
Central EU 74% 63% 50% 79% 53% 63% 81% 67% 56% 71% 35% 34% 77% 315-329 North EU 77% 51% 50% 80% 46% 57% 81% 62% 54% 68% 42% 36% 82% 49-55 South EU 95% 74% 67% 87% 73% 76% 87% 80% 72% 81% 55% 54% 88% 117-120 East EU 92% 70% 61% 82% 62% 79% 80% 69% 67% 71% 66% 60% 88% 47-50 Central EU authorities 69% 46% 44% 79% 44% 63% 67% 63% 62% 66% 36% 18% 74% 64-67 North EU authorities 72% 44% 44% 67% 41% 67% 83% 67% 33% 67% 50% 29% 76% 17-18 South EU authorities 100% 69% 75% 81% 75% 69% 81% 88% 81% 81% 19% 40% 94% 15-16 East EU authorities 100% 60% 60% 80% 40% 80% 60% 80% 75% 60% 80% 20% 80% 4-5
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Among all respondents, the impacts most often seen as likely were increased SME
participation (82%), faster procurement processes (81%), increased number of bidders
(81%) and more competition (81%). Across the other listed impacts, perceived likelihood
ranged from 41% to 82%. Very low likelihood was reported for less corruption (41%)
and reduced price of goods/services/works (43%).
Among public authorities, more competition (78%) and an increased number of bidders
(77%) were most frequently considered likely impacts. The perceived likelihood of the
remaining impacts ranged from 23% to 76%. Very low likelihood was reported for less
corruption (23%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, increased SME participation
was consistently among the most likely impacts (large companies: 69%; SMEs: 94%;
business associations: 90%). Large companies and business associations also saw faster
procurement processes (both at 81%) and more competition (both at 81%) as particularly
likely, while business associations additionally highlighted an increased number of
bidders (84%). Across these three groups, the perceived likelihood of the other impacts
ranged from 38% to 84%.
Among trade unions and NGOs, increased SME participation was regarded as a very
likely impact (trade unions: 90%; NGOs: 95%), with NGOs also highlighting faster
procurement processes (95%), increased number of bidders (93%) and more competition
(88%) as particularly likely. For these two groups, the perceived likelihood of the
remaining impacts ranged from 27% to 90%. Very low likelihood was reported for
reduced price of goods/services/works among NGOs (27%).
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents, the most
likely impacts tended to cluster around more competition (academia: 83%; citizens and
other respondents: 82%; non-EU respondents: 86%), increased SME participation (71%;
82%; 86%) and an increased number of bidders (72%; 83%; 86%). Non-EU respondents
also most frequently pointed to increased buying power of public buyers (86%) and
reduced cost for public buyers to conduct public procurement (85%) as likely impacts.
Across these three groups, perceived likelihood for the other impacts ranged from 28% to
86%. Very low likelihood was reported for less corruption among academia (28%).
9.2.8. Simplification impacts: comments
Public authorities
Approximately 17% of public authorities who provided comments indicated that the
proposed simplification measures may have various impacts, including reducing the
administrative burden for both buyers and bidders, increasing flexibility and competition,
and allowing for more agile purchasing processes. Some respondents noted that clearer
and more precise rules may reduce the number of legal disputes, while others highlighted
the importance of considering the thresholds for procedures and the potential risks of
simplification, such as increased corruption or different interpretations of the rules. A
few respondents mentioned that simplification measures should take into account specific
requirements, such as health-related needs or strategic interests, and that more flexible
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and simple procedures may allow contracting authorities to focus on proper procurement
and horizontal objectives.
Additionally, some respondents emphasized the need for digitalization and the use of
technology to enhance competition, simplify the process, and improve the performance
of public procurement. They suggested that digitalization could facilitate the
implementation of the "tell us once" principle, improve the interoperability of systems,
and simplify tools such as the EU Business Wallet. Others noted that simplification
measures could lead to a reduction in lead times and administrative burdens, and that
higher thresholds and more room for negotiation could reduce the number of tenders and
allow for more practical and timely adjustments.
However, some respondents also expressed uncertainty or lack of clarity about the
potential impacts of the proposed measures, and a few noted that the origin of the bidder
should not be the primary consideration, but rather the origin of the product or service.
Others highlighted the importance of considering the capacity building needs of buyers
and bidders, and the potential risks of simplification, such as increased corruption or
reduced transparency.
Overall, public authorities are seeking to balance the benefits of simplification, such as
reduced administrative burden and increased flexibility, with the potential risks and
challenges, and to ensure that simplification measures are effective and achieve their
intended objectives. They are looking for a more agile and responsive procurement
system that can adapt to changing needs and circumstances, while also ensuring that the
principles of transparency, equal treatment, and fairness are upheld.
Some respondents also mentioned that the simplification of procedures could result in a
decrease in the legal security of acts, but could also increase performance in public
procurement. They noted that being more flexible with changes during the
implementation of the agreement could prevent legal uncertainty, and that clearer and
more precise rules could reduce the number of legal disputes.
In terms of specific impacts, some respondents noted that simplification measures could
lead to increased participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in public
procurement, while others suggested that the impact on SMEs would depend on various
factors, including the thresholds for procedures and the level of competition. A few
respondents mentioned that simplification measures could also lead to increased cross-
border procurement, but others noted that this would depend on various factors, including
the type of procurement and the level of market knowledge required.
Overall, the comments from public authorities suggest that the proposed simplification
measures have the potential to bring about a range of benefits, including reduced
administrative burden, increased flexibility and competition, and more agile purchasing
processes. However, they also highlight the need for careful consideration of the
potential risks and challenges, and the importance of ensuring that simplification
measures are effective and achieve their intended objectives.
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EU companies and business associations
Approximately 18% of EU companies and business associations who provided comments
indicated that the proposed simplification measures may have various impacts, including
reducing the administrative burden, shortening procedures, and lowering compliance
costs. Some respondents noted that simplification could improve the quality of
procurement outcomes, allow for more flexible and less detailed public procurement
rules, and increase transparency. Others highlighted the importance of introducing
measures to promote the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in
public procurement, such as mandatory division of contracts into lots, promoting trade-
specific lots, and obligating Member States to collect specific data to measure SME and
micro-enterprises' direct access to public procurement.
Additionally, some respondents emphasized the need for digitalization, standardization of
procurement procedures, and the use of technology to enhance competition, simplify the
process, and improve the performance of public procurement. The introduction of an EU
industrial protection order, which would enable sustainable industrial development and
economic, environmental, and social security in the EU, was also mentioned.
However, some respondents also expressed concerns that simplification measures could
lead to increased corruption, reduced transparency, and a lack of legal certainty. Others
noted that the current directives are adequate and fully sufficient, and that problems arise
from their understanding, implementation, and application. The importance of reducing
language barriers, increasing flexibility in contract modifications, and promoting joint
and cross-border procurement was also highlighted.
Overall, EU companies and business associations are seeking a balance between
simplifying procurement procedures and ensuring that these processes remain fair,
transparent, and effective in achieving their objectives. They are looking for a more agile
and responsive procurement system that can adapt to changing needs and circumstances,
while also promoting the participation of SMEs and reducing administrative burdens.
Some respondents also mentioned that simplification measures could lead to a reduction
in litigation, as clearer and more precise rules would reduce the number of disputes.
However, others noted that litigation is not always a problem, and that the focus should
be on ensuring that procurement procedures are fair, transparent, and effective.
The potential benefits of simplification measures, such as increased competition,
improved quality of procurement outcomes, and reduced administrative burdens, were
also highlighted. However, some respondents noted that these benefits may not be
realized if simplification measures are not carefully designed and implemented.
In terms of specific impacts, some respondents noted that simplification measures could
lead to increased participation of SMEs in public procurement, while others suggested
that the impact on SMEs would depend on various factors, including the thresholds for
procedures and the level of competition. A few respondents mentioned that simplification
measures could also lead to increased cross-border procurement, but others noted that
this would depend on various factors, including the type of procurement and the level of
market knowledge required.
Overall, the comments from EU companies and business associations suggest that the
proposed simplification measures have the potential to bring about a range of benefits,
285
including reduced administrative burdens, increased flexibility, and improved
transparency. However, they also highlight the need for careful consideration of the
potential risks and challenges, and the importance of ensuring that simplification
measures are effective and achieve their intended objectives.
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
Approximately 45% of EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions who
provided comments indicated that the proposed simplification measures may have
various impacts, including improving the standards of protection for workers, promoting
quality jobs and collective bargaining, and regulating subcontracting. Many respondents
emphasized that simplification must not come at the expense of workers' rights and that
clearer rules and less legal interpretation are necessary to ensure legal certainty and
protection for workers. Some respondents noted that fair trade certifications and social
responsibility requirements can help translate social objectives into clear, verifiable
procurement criteria, reducing administrative burdens and strengthening legal certainty.
The importance of promoting quality employment, collective bargaining, and effective
regulation of subcontracting was also highlighted. Some respondents warned that
simplification should not result in a lowering of ambition and that public procurement
must retain its capacity to drive demand for sustainable and higher-welfare products.
Others emphasized the need for digitalization, standardization of procurement
procedures, and the use of technology to enhance competition, simplify the process, and
improve the performance of public procurement.
Additionally, some respondents noted that simplification could make socially responsible
public procurement (SRPP) easier to use in practice by reducing administrative burdens
and legal uncertainty for public buyers and service providers. Clearer procedures and
templates have the potential to increase the application of social and quality criteria
rather than simply using the lowest price.
However, some respondents also expressed concerns that simplification measures could
lead to increased corruption, reduced transparency, and a lack of legal certainty. Others
noted that the current directives are adequate and fully sufficient, and that problems arise
from their understanding, implementation, and application.
In terms of specific impacts, some respondents noted that simplification measures could
lead to increased achievement of EU environmental and climate goals, accelerated green
transition, and creation of lead markets for clean products. Others mentioned that
simplification could reduce EU dependency on external materials and energy, enhance
strategic autonomy, and improve integration with sectoral environmental legislation.
Overall, EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions are seeking a balance
between simplifying procurement procedures and ensuring that these processes remain
fair, transparent, and effective in achieving their objectives, while also promoting the
protection of workers' rights and the environment.
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EU academic institutions, consumer organisations, citizen and other respondents
Approximately 17% of EU academic institutions, consumer organisations, citizen, and
other respondents suggested that the proposed simplification measures may have various
impacts, including improving worker protection, promoting quality jobs, and regulating
subcontracting. They emphasized that simplification must not compromise workers'
rights and that clearer rules are necessary to ensure legal certainty. Some respondents
noted that simplification could lead to increased innovation, administrative efficiency,
and SME participation, which could ultimately benefit the economy and society as a
whole.
However, others expressed concerns about potential corruption, reduced transparency,
and legal uncertainty, which could undermine the integrity of public procurement
processes. The importance of digitalization, standardization, and technology in enhancing
competition and simplifying public procurement was also highlighted. Respondents
emphasized the need for a balanced approach that considers the interests of all
stakeholders, including SMEs, workers, and the environment.
Overall, the comments suggest that simplification measures have the potential to bring
benefits, but careful consideration of potential risks and challenges is necessary to ensure
effective and targeted implementation. By striking a balance between simplicity and
rigor, the EU can create a more efficient and effective public procurement system that
supports economic growth, social welfare, and environmental sustainability.
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9.3. Coherence between general rules applicable to all sectors and sectoral
rules
Table 77: Question: Should existing sectoral rules be integrated with the new legislative framework; percentage of
answers, by type of respondent.
Respondent
A. Integrate “how
and what to buy”
B. Integrate How
to buy
C. Do not
integrate Other: No. of
responses
All 21% 36% 19% 24% 680
Public Authorities EU 30% 28% 29% 13% 93
Large companies EU 32% 36% 22% 10% 90
SMEs EU 15% 61% 19% 5% 59
Business associations EU 18% 58% 13% 11% 158
Trade unions EU 1% 2% 3% 93% 91
NGOs EU* 12% 32% 25% 31% 65
Academia 47% 16% 37% 0% 19
Citizens + other EU** 30% 27% 26% 17% 89
Non-EU 13% 50% 6% 31% 16
Central EU 17% 42% 20% 21% 372
North EU 12% 37% 19% 32% 73
South EU 36% 25% 17% 22% 143
East EU 21% 21% 21% 37% 76
Central EU authorities 33% 27% 25% 15% 55
North EU authorities 6% 33% 44% 17% 18
South EU authorities 47% 27% 20% 7% 15
East EU authorities 40% 20% 40% 0% 5 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. A. Existing “how and what to buy” legal provisions in sectoral acts should be integrated in the general legislative framework and be removed from sectoral acts. B. Only existing 'how to buy' legal provisions in sectoral acts should be integrated in the general legislative framework and be removed from sectoral acts. Existing 'what to buy' legal provisions should NOT be integrated in the general legislative framework, they would remain in various sectoral acts and be amended therein to ensure coherence where required. C. Existing “how and what to buy” legal provisions in sectoral acts should NOT be integrated in the general legislative framework. Any conflicting or incoherent provisions in sectoral acts would be removed. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked whether existing sectoral rules should be integrated with the
new legislative framework, and if so, how. The figures refer to the share of respondents
in each group selecting each option.
Across all respondents, the most frequently chosen option was to integrate “how to buy”
only (36%), followed by integrating both “how and what to buy” (21%). Almost one in
five preferred not to integrate sectoral rules (19%), while 24% selected “Other”.
Among public authorities, opinions were relatively evenly split between integrating “how
and what to buy” (30%), integrating “how to buy” only (28%) and not integrating (29%).
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Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, integrating “how to buy” was
the dominant option (36% for large companies, 61% for SMEs, 58% for business
associations). Large companies also showed some support for integrating both “how and
what to buy” (32%), while non-integration attracted lower shares across these three
groups (generally between 13% and 22%).
Trade unions overwhelmingly selected “Other” (93%), with very little support for any of
the explicit integration options (1–3%). NGOs were more divided, with 32% favouring
integrating “how to buy”, 25% opting not to integrate and 12% supporting integrating
“how and what to buy.”
Academia most often supported integrating “how and what to buy” (47%), followed by
not integrating (37%). Citizens and other respondents were more evenly split between
integrating “how and what to buy” (30%), integrating “how to buy” (27%) and not
integrating (26%). Non-EU respondents mainly favoured integrating “how to buy”
(50%).
Respondents were asked to specify their answer. A summary of their responses is
presented below.
Public authorities
Those public authorities who provided comments suggested other ideas for the treatment
of existing sectoral rules, emphasizing the need for a harmonized and coherent legislative
framework. Some respondents proposed extending existing exemptions for R&D services
to include R&D supplies and eliminating impractical exemptions and counter-
exemptions. Others suggested integrating existing legal provisions on "how and what to
buy" in sectoral acts into the general legislative framework, while remaining clearly
linked to their original sectoral acts.
A few respondents proposed that the Public Procurement Directives should establish a
generally applicable legal framework for the procurement behaviour of public sector
bodies, irrespective of the subject matter of the procurement. Others suggested that
sectoral legislation should not contain provisions on public procurement, but should aim
at uniform norms and standards for all if the European Union wants to achieve
overarching policy objectives through the Single Market.
Some respondents also proposed creating a separate rulebook for all the detailed aspects
currently in the public procurement directives and in the sectoral legislation, which can
evolve over time while the public procurement directives remain stable over time. Others
suggested that only existing legal provisions concerning "how to buy" in sectoral acts
should be integrated into the general legislative framework and removed from those
sectoral acts, while existing legal provisions defining "what to buy" should remain within
the relevant sectoral acts and be amended there, where necessary, to ensure coherence.
Overall, public authorities are seeking a balanced and coherent approach to treating
existing sectoral rules, ensuring that the regulatory framework is effective, legally
certain, and supportive of public procurement objectives. They emphasize the need for a
hierarchy of legislative provisions to manage possible contradictions between existing
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regulations and propose various ways to integrate sectoral rules into the general
legislative framework while preserving coherence and consistency.
All other respondents
Those respondents from all other groups (except Public authorities) who suggested other
ideas for the treatment of existing sectoral rules, emphasized the need for consistency and
coherence between the general legislative framework and sectoral acts. Many
respondents noted that integrating "how to buy" provisions from sectoral legislation into
the general framework could harmonize procedures and reduce legal complexity, while
"what to buy" provisions should remain in sectoral acts to preserve clarity and ensure
policy objectives.
Some respondents proposed that the general framework should focus on defining and
simplifying the "how" of procurement, without defining "what" to procure, and that
sector-specific provisions on the subject-matter of the procurement should be included in
an annex to the Public Procurement Directives. Others suggested that stricter rules for
certain procurement items should not be incorporated into the general legal framework
and that merging specific procurement requirements into the general procurement legal
framework should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
The importance of promoting collective bargaining, quality jobs, and direct employment
through public procurement was also highlighted. Many respondents emphasized that the
general framework and sectoral acts should ensure compliance with relevant collective
agreements and sustainable procurement, and that the promotion of collective bargaining
through public procurement should be a horizontal provision for all buyers and sectors.
Some respondents noted that the EU does not have a food-specific sectoral legislation,
and that integrating relevant sustainability and Fair Trade considerations into the
horizontal procurement framework is necessary to ensure coherence and to enable
contracting authorities to reflect policy objectives in their purchasing decisions. Others
proposed that minimum mandatory sustainability criteria for food procurement should be
defined in sectoral legislation, such as those set out in the JRC report on Sustainable
Public Procurement of Food518.
Overall, respondents from all other groups (except Public authorities) are seeking a
balanced and coherent approach to treating existing sectoral rules, ensuring that the
regulatory framework is effective, legally certain, and supportive of public procurement
objectives. They emphasize the need for a hierarchy of legislative provisions to manage
possible contradictions between existing regulations and propose various ways to
integrate sectoral rules into the general legislative framework while preserving coherence
and consistency.
518 E.g. GARCIA HERRERO, L., PEREZ CORNAGO, A., CASONATO, C., SARASA RENEDO, A.,
BAKOGIANNI, I. et al., Criteria for Sustainable Public Procurement (SPP) for Food, Food services, and
Vending machines, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2025,
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/0895877, JRC139495.
290
Table 78: Question: Should future sectoral rules be integrated with the new legislative framework; percentage of
answers, by type of respondent.
Respondent
A. Integrate “how
and what to buy”
B. Integrate How
to buy
C. Do not
integrate Other: No. of responses
All 22% 41% 16% 22% 690
Public Authorities EU 28% 34% 26% 12% 95
Large companies EU 33% 41% 16% 10% 94
SMEs EU 19% 63% 14% 5% 59
Business associations EU 19% 58% 12% 11% 158
Trade unions EU 3% 5% 5% 86% 93
NGOs EU* 12% 53% 12% 23% 66
Academia 47% 16% 32% 5% 19
Citizens + other EU** 33% 33% 20% 13% 90
Non-EU 19% 44% 19% 19% 16
Central EU 19% 46% 16% 19% 376
North EU 15% 42% 16% 27% 74
South EU 36% 30% 13% 21% 148
East EU 20% 30% 17% 33% 76
Central EU authorities 30% 35% 21% 14% 57
North EU authorities 11% 33% 44% 11% 18
South EU authorities 47% 27% 20% 7% 15
East EU authorities 20% 40% 40% 0% 5 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. A. Future “how and what to buy” requirements should be integrated in the general legislative framework. B. Only future “how to buy” requirements should be integrated in the general legislative framework. Future 'what to buy' requirements should NOT be integrated in the general legislative framework – they should continue to be included separately in sector-specific legislation. C. Future “how and what to buy” legal provisions in sectoral acts should NOT be integrated in the general legislative framework. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked whether future sectoral rules should be integrated with the new
legislative framework, and if so, how. The figures refer to the share of respondents in
each group selecting each option.
Across all respondents, the most frequently chosen option was to integrate “how to buy”
only (41%), followed by integrating both “how and what to buy” (22%). A smaller share
preferred not to integrate future sectoral rules (16%), while 22% selected “Other”.
Among public authorities, views were relatively balanced: 34% favoured integrating
“how to buy”, 28% integrating both “how and what to buy”, and 26% not integrating.
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, integrating “how to buy” was
again the dominant option (41% for large companies, 63% for SMEs, 58% for business
associations). Integrating “how and what to buy” attracted some support, particularly
291
among large companies (33%), while non-integration was generally less favoured
(between 12% and 16%).
Trade unions overwhelmingly selected “Other” (86%), with very limited support for any
of the specific integration options (3–5%). NGOs mainly supported integrating “how to
buy” (53%), with smaller shares favouring integrating “how and what to buy” or not
integrating (both 12%).
Academia most often supported integrating “how and what to buy” (47%), followed by
not integrating (32%). Citizens and other respondents were split between integrating
“how and what to buy” and “how to buy” (both 33%), with 20% for not integrating.
Non-EU respondents mainly favoured integrating “how to buy” (44%).
Table 79: Question: Those who had selected option B or C in the previous question (Table 78) were asked whether
future "what to buy" requirements should be subject to common rules defined in a general legislative framework to
avoid conflicts or inconsistencies (e.g. the new general legislative framework should foresee mechanisms and
templates for harmonised legislation ensuring coherence of “what to buy” requirements contained in sector-specific
rules with the general legislative framework).; percentage of answers, by type of respondent.
Respondent Yes No No. of all responses from previous question
All 38% 15% 690
Public Authorities EU 37% 21% 95
Large companies EU 32% 18% 94
SMEs EU 66% 7% 59
Business associations EU 49% 16% 158
Trade unions EU 10% 1% 93
NGOs EU* 48% 17% 66
Academia 32% 16% 19
Citizens + other EU** 34% 17% 90
Non-EU 31% 31% 16
Central EU 40% 17% 376
North EU 35% 20% 74
South EU 35% 7% 148
East EU 38% 7% 76
Central EU authorities 32% 23% 57
North EU authorities 50% 22% 18
South EU authorities 33% 13% 15
East EU authorities 60% 20% 5 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents who chose to integrate "how to buy" requirements only, or who opted not to
integrate either "how to buy" or "what to buy" requirements, were still asked whether
they agreed that future "what to buy" requirements should be subject to common rules
defined in a general legislative framework (e.g. the new general legislative framework
292
should foresee mechanisms and templates for harmonised legislation ensuring coherence
of “what to buy” requirements contained in sector-specific rules with the general
legislative framework). The majority of these respondents answered affirmatively.
Respondents were asked to specify their answers. A summary of their responses is
presented below.
Public authorities
Public authorities proposed various ideas for the treatment of future sectoral rules,
emphasizing the need for a clear hierarchy of legislative provisions to manage potential
contradictions between future regulations. Some respondents suggested extending
existing exemptions for R&D services to include R&D supplies and eliminating
impractical exemptions and counter-exemptions. Others proposed that sectoral legislation
should not contain provisions on public procurement, but instead aim for uniform norms
and standards for all.
Some respondents recommended systematizing the registration of obligatory and general
principles outlined in sectoral guidelines in the general directives. They also suggested
that sectoral legislation should focus on precise technical specifications relating to
products, particularly at the environmental level, and leave considerations related to the
binding framework and purchasing methods to the Directives.
A few respondents cautioned against introducing additional requirements, as they would
further inflate procurement procedures. Others proposed creating a separate rule book for
detailed aspects of public procurement, which could evolve over time while keeping the
public procurement directives stable.
Overall, public authorities are seeking a balanced and coherent approach to treating
future sectoral rules, ensuring that the regulatory framework is effective, legally certain,
and supportive of public procurement objectives. They emphasize the need for a clear
hierarchy between sectoral legislation and general public procurement law, and propose
various ways to integrate future sectoral rules into the general legislative framework
while preserving coherence and consistency.
All other respondents
Respondents from all other groups (except Public authorities) suggested other ideas for
the treatment of future sectoral rules, emphasizing the need for consistency and
coherence between the general legislative framework and sectoral acts. Many
respondents proposed integrating "how to buy" provisions from sectoral legislation into
the general framework, while keeping "what to buy" requirements in sectoral acts. They
also highlighted the importance of promoting collective bargaining, quality jobs, and
direct employment through public procurement, and ensuring that the general framework
and sectoral acts ensure compliance with relevant collective agreements and sustainable
procurement.
The EU's horizontal legal framework on public procurement must ensure that taxpayers'
money goes only to organisations that respect workers' and trade union rights, negotiate
with trade unions, and whose workers (and subcontractors' workers) are covered by
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collective agreements. Respondents suggested that the general legislative framework
should prioritize bio-based materials over fossil-based materials in European public
procurement, and that green public procurement criteria should be set as a delegated act
to the ESPR, focusing on textiles products. They also emphasized the need for a clear
hierarchy between sectoral legislation and general public procurement law, ensuring that
core elements of the Public Procurement Directives prevail.
The consistent approach to future sectoral rules would also involve the application of
representative collective agreements and the clear limitation of subcontracting in the
chain to ensure quality jobs. Respondents proposed that the EU public procurement
legislation should explicitly establish binding principles and safeguards to ensure that
sectoral provisions affecting procurement procedures, eligibility, or award conditions are
interpreted and applied in conformity with the principles of equal treatment, non-
discrimination, competition, and impartiality. The promotion of collective bargaining
through public procurement should be a horizontal provision for all buyers and sectors,
which would simplify application and ensure consistency between the general legislative
framework and sectoral acts.
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9.4. Concessions (FLX options)
Table 80: Question on concessions: Which of the following concepts require modification?; percentage of answers, by
type of respondent.
Respondent
A. Definition of
“concessions ” and
“operating risk”
B. Rules on duration
C. Publication
and transparency
D. Contract
execution additional
rules Other No. of responses
All 44% 55% 47% 58% 35% 444
Public Authorities EU 57% 34% 15% 37% 22% 79
Large companies EU 47% 51% 36% 38% 24% 45
SMEs EU 48% 59% 44% 52% 7% 27
Business associations EU 55% 50% 44% 54% 31% 80
Trade unions EU 2% 84% 77% 84% 78% 86
NGOs EU* 61% 58% 69% 61% 25% 36
Academia 43% 64% 36% 64% 36% 14
Citizens + other EU** 60% 49% 43% 66% 23% 65
Non-EU 42% 42% 75% 58% 42% 12
Central EU 51% 47% 37% 46% 32% 219
North EU 30% 61% 43% 59% 45% 44
South EU 46% 62% 58% 72% 36% 116
East EU 28% 72% 60% 74% 34% 53
Central EU authorities 62% 33% 15% 31% 21% 52
North EU authorities 45% 27% 9% 27% 36% 11
South EU authorities 46% 38% 23% 54% 15% 13
East EU authorities 67% 67% 0% 100% 0% 3 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Multiple choice question; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. A. Definition of “concessions” and “operating risk” for a more consistent application of the general legislative framework and interpretation of financial, operational, regulatory, and market risks in a concession contract (Article 5); B. Rules on duration (e.g. include considerations of other elements such as technical, environmental, innovation, social, labour, etc.) (Article 18); C. Publication and transparency requirements (e.g. public buyers to publish the intent to award a concession at least one year in advance, with exceptions for emergencies, to give more time to the bidders) (Articles 30-37); D. Additional rules on the execution of the contracts (e.g. monitoring of the contract, verification of compliance with objectives, possibility of adapting to unforeseen needs through modifications of contracts, termination, etc.) EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked which concepts on concessions they considered required
modification. The figures below refer to the share of respondents in each group selecting
each concept.
Across all respondents, the strongest support for modifications was seen in case of
additional rules on contract execution (58%) and rules on duration (55%). Just under half
of the respondents backed changes to publication and transparency rules (47%), as well
as modifications to the definitions of "concessions" and "operating risk" (44%).
295
Among public authorities, the concepts most often identified as requiring modification
were the definition of “concessions” and “operating risk” (57%) and to a lesser extent
rules on duration (34%), contract execution additional rules (37%). Very low support was
recorded for publication and transparency (15%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, rules on duration were
frequently mentioned (50% to 59%). SMEs also highlighted additional rules on contract
execution (52%). Business associations identified definition of “concessions” and
“operating risk” top (55%) followed by additional rules on contract execution (54%).
Among trade unions, modifications to all concepts-except definitions-received high
support, at around 80%. NGOs expressed over 60% support for modifications across all
concepts.
Academia showed over 60% support for modifying rules on contract duration and
additional rules on contract execution. Citizens and other respondents supported
modifications to definitions and additional rules on contract execution, both with over
60% approval. Non-EU respondents expressed the highest preference for changes related
to publication and transparency (75%), as well as additional rules on contract execution.
Those who selected Other were asked to elaborate. A summary of their responses is
presented below.
Public authorities
Public authorities proposed various concepts relating to concessions that require
modification, with some suggesting that fewer rules would be beneficial. A few
respondents proposed extending existing exemptions for R&D services to include R&D
supplies and eliminating impractical exemptions and counter-exemptions. Others
suggested establishing clear and precise rules for procurements below threshold, allowing
direct awards below a certain amount or requiring a minimum number of bids above a
defined threshold.
Some respondents suggested avoiding national transpositions that are more stringent than
EU directives and allowing more flexibility in amending current contracts, which are
long-term contracts. Others proposed aligning the thresholds for procedures in the EU
below the European thresholds and making no difference in the variety of governments.
A few respondents noted that not all concessions are major investments and that the
concepts and general rules should be applicable to smaller scale contracts.
There was a lack of consensus among public authorities, with some stating that they do
not have enough knowledge to provide an answer and others suggesting that central
purchasing bodies should be allowed to conclude concessions. A few respondents
mentioned that the duration of a procurement contract is a sensitive issue, as companies
need time to innovate and recoup investments, but the market should not be locked down
or competition restricted. Overall, public authorities are seeking more flexibility and
clarity in concession rules, while avoiding overly complex or restrictive regulations.
All other respondents
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A significant proportion of respondents from the group of all other respondents (except
Public authorities) who provided comments on the question of which other concepts
relating to Concessions require modification, expressed their opposition to extending the
scope of the Concessions Directive to other sectors, such as water or waste water. Many
respondents, including trade unions and worker organisations, emphasised the
importance of ensuring quality jobs and promoting collective bargaining in concessions,
as well as guaranteeing employment continuity when concessions or contracts are
modified. For example, one respondent stated that "Ensuring quality jobs and promoting
collective bargaining is essential for concessions too. When changing
concessions/contracts, ensuring employment continuity must be mandatory." Some
respondents also called for clearer definitions of concessions and operating risk, and for
more transparent and flexible rules on contract duration and modification. A few
respondents suggested that the Concessions Directive should be preserved as a
standalone legislative instrument, while others advocated for stronger harmonisation and
clearer guidance in the area of concessions to improve quality, transparency, and legal
certainty. A minority of respondents saw no need for modifications, arguing that essential
concepts relating to concessions have already been clarified through case law, and that
changes could lead to renewed legal uncertainty.
9.4.1. Concessions impacts
Figure 75: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur if the proposed concepts and rules
on concessions were modified?, all replies.
38%
18%
20%
17%
16%
13%
14%
11%
11%
14%
9%
12%
10%
39%
46%
42%
43%
36%
37%
35%
34%
34%
27%
31%
26%
20%
5%
5%
5%
7%
7%
5%
6%
11%
7%
7%
7%
8%
17%
1%
2%
1%
2%
2%
5%
2%
2%
2%
3%
3%
3%
4%
Increased legal certainty
Increased number of bidders
More competition
Reduced litigation
Increased SME participation
Faster procurement processes
Increased bidding by EU-based firms
Increased cross-border bidding within the EU
Less corruption
Reduced cost for bidders to participate in public procurement
Increased buying power of public buyers
Reduced cost for public buyers to conduct public procurement
Reduced price of goods/services/works
Very likely Somewhat likely No impact Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
297
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “How likely do you believe the following outcomes would
occur if the proposed concepts and rules on concessions were modified?”, respondents
most often expect increased legal certainty (77%: 38% very likely, 39% somewhat
likely), followed by increased number of bidders (64%: 18% very likely, 46% somewhat
likely), more competition (62%: 20% very likely, 42% somewhat likely), and reduced
litigation (60%: 17% very likely, 43% somewhat likely). Smaller majorities foresee
increased SME participation (52%: 16% very likely, 36% somewhat likely), increased
bidding by EU-based firms (49%: 14% very likely, 35% somewhat likely), faster
procurement processes (50%: 13% very likely, 37% somewhat likely), and increased
cross-border bidding within the EU (45%: 11% very likely, 34% somewhat likely). The
lowest shares of positive expectations relate to less corruption (45%: 11% very likely,
34% somewhat likely), reduced cost for bidders (41%: 14% very likely, 27% somewhat
likely), increased buying power of public buyers (40%: 9% very likely, 31% somewhat
likely), reduced cost for public buyers (38%: 12% very likely, 26% somewhat likely),
and reduced prices of goods, services and works (30%: 10% very likely, 20% somewhat
likely).
Disagreement that these outcomes will occur (somewhat unlikely or very unlikely) is
highest for reduced prices (21%: 17% somewhat unlikely, 4% very unlikely), followed
by increased cross-border bidding within the EU (13%: 11% somewhat unlikely, 2% very
unlikely), and reduced litigation and reduced cost for public buyers (each 9%: 7–8%
somewhat unlikely, 2–3% very unlikely). For the remaining outcomes, disagreement is
comparatively low: reduced cost for bidders and increased buying power of public buyers
(each 10%: 7% somewhat unlikely, 3% very unlikely), less corruption (9%: 7%
somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely), increased SME participation (9%: 7% somewhat
unlikely, 2% very unlikely), increased bidding by EU-based firms (8%: 6% somewhat
unlikely, 2% very unlikely), faster procurement processes (10%: 5% somewhat unlikely,
5% very unlikely), more competition (6%: 5% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely),
increased number of bidders (7%: 5% somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely), and
increased legal certainty (6%: 5% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely).
Across all outcomes, the share of respondents expecting “no impact” ranges from 17%
for increased legal certainty and 30% for increased number of bidders, up to 50% for
increased buying power of public buyers and reduced cost for public buyers, and 49% for
reduced prices. Intermediate levels of “no impact” responses are reported for more
Increased legal certainty
Increased number of bidders
More competiti on
Reduced litigation
Increased SME participati on
Faster procurem ent processes
Increased bidding by EU-based firms
Increased cross- border bidding within the EU
Less corruptio n
Reduced cost for bidders to participat e in public procurem ent
Increased buying power of public buyers
Reduced cost for public buyers to conduct public procurem ent
Reduced price of goods/ser vices/wor ks
Very likely 38% 18% 20% 17% 16% 13% 14% 11% 11% 14% 9% 12% 10% Somewhat likely 39% 46% 42% 43% 36% 37% 35% 34% 34% 27% 31% 26% 20% No impact 17% 30% 32% 31% 39% 41% 43% 42% 47% 49% 50% 50% 49% Somewhat unlikely 5% 5% 5% 7% 7% 5% 6% 11% 7% 7% 7% 8% 17% Very unlikely 1% 2% 1% 2% 2% 5% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 4% No. of responses 328 316 318 323 320 322 322 322 319 320 323 317 317
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competition (32%), reduced litigation (31%), increased SME participation (39%), faster
procurement processes (41%), increased bidding by EU-based firms (43%), increased
cross-border bidding within the EU (42%), less corruption (47%), and reduced cost for
bidders (49%).
Table 81: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur if the proposed concepts and rules
on concessions were modified?; percentage of respondents that indicated “very likely” or “somewhat likely” answers,
by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked how likely they believed various outcomes would be if the
proposed concepts and rules on concessions were modified. The figures below describe,
for each impact and respondent group, the combined shares of “very likely” and
“somewhat likely” answers (other response options were also available but are not
shown).
Among all respondents, the outcomes most often seen as likely were increased legal
certainty (77%), increased number of bidders (63%) and more competition (62%). Across
the other outcomes, perceived likelihood ranged from 30% to 63%. Very low likelihood
was reported for reduced price of goods/services/works (30%).
Among public authorities, increased legal certainty (68%) and increased number of
bidders (56%) were most frequently considered likely outcomes. For the other outcomes,
perceived likelihood ranged from 16% to 56%. Very low likelihood was reported for less
corruption (16%) and reduced price of goods/services/works (21%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, increased legal certainty was
consistently among the most likely outcomes (large companies: 76%; SMEs: 75%;
business associations: 79%). SMEs also highlighted more competition (69%), reduced
Respondent
Faster procurem ent processes
Increased legal certainty
Reduced litigation
Increased number of bidders
Increased cross- border bidding within the EU
Increased bidding by EU-based firms
Increased SME participati on
Reduced cost for public buyers to conduct public procurem
Increased buying power of public buyers
Reduced cost for bidders to participat e in public procurem ent
Reduced price of goods/ser vices/wor ks
Less corruptio n
More competiti on
No. of responses
All 49% 77% 60% 63% 45% 49% 52% 39% 40% 41% 30% 45% 62% 316-328 Public Authorities EU 41% 68% 42% 56% 32% 31% 34% 25% 42% 27% 21% 16% 54% 67-71 Large companies EU 46% 76% 68% 54% 42% 50% 33% 41% 42% 32% 28% 36% 56% 35-38 SMEs EU 65% 75% 64% 67% 46% 41% 61% 61% 37% 69% 41% 61% 69% 26-28 Business associations EU 50% 79% 61% 65% 54% 50% 60% 40% 24% 47% 34% 52% 62% 69-73 Trade unions EU 67% 60% 67% 60% 80% 80% 80% 40% 40% 25% 20% 67% 80% 4-6 NGOs EU* 47% 90% 72% 68% 42% 63% 67% 29% 55% 30% 13% 55% 80% 30-32 Academia 36% 83% 67% 58% 33% 42% 45% 33% 33% 33% 27% 55% 58% 11-12 Citizens + other EU** 52% 76% 66% 72% 52% 60% 55% 45% 44% 48% 39% 56% 63% 60-63 Non-EU 78% 100% 56% 63% 56% 63% 75% 57% 78% 67% 63% 50% 71% 7-9
Central EU 43% 69% 53% 53% 31% 36% 42% 30% 31% 33% 23% 33% 52% 166-172 North EU 27% 71% 33% 28% 24% 29% 38% 19% 19% 19% 10% 23% 43% 18-22 South EU 61% 88% 73% 87% 71% 69% 71% 56% 60% 61% 43% 68% 82% 87-92 East EU 61% 85% 82% 75% 58% 66% 48% 45% 34% 36% 39% 58% 70% 32-34 Central EU authorities 39% 65% 39% 56% 26% 19% 31% 26% 41% 28% 21% 14% 51% 42-46 North EU authorities 33% 44% 11% 0% 11% 22% 22% 22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 9-9 South EU authorities 54% 85% 62% 92% 62% 69% 62% 31% 69% 42% 23% 31% 83% 12-13 East EU authorities 33% 100% 100% 67% 67% 67% 0% 0% 67% 33% 67% 33% 67% 3-3
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cost for bidders to participate in public procurement (69%) as particularly likely
outcomes, while business associations pointed to an increased number of bidders (65%)
and more competition (62%). Across these three groups, perceived likelihood of the
remaining outcomes ranged from 24% to 69%. Very low likelihood was reported for
increased buying power of public buyers among business associations (24%).
Among trade unions and NGOs, the outcomes most often regarded as likely included
increased more competition (trade unions: 80%; NGOs: 80%), SME participation (trade
unions: 80%; NGOs: 67%), increased cross-border bidding within the EU (trade unions:
80%) and increased bidding by EU-based firms (trade unions: 80%; NGOs: 63%).
However, the top choice for NGOs was increasing legal certainty, selected by 90% of
respondents. For these two groups, perceived likelihood of the other outcomes ranged
from 13% to 80%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced price of
goods/services/works among NGOs (13%) and among trade unions (20%).
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents, increased
legal certainty was the most or a strongly likely outcome (academia: 83%; citizens and
other respondents: 76%; non-EU respondents: 100%), with reduced litigation also
frequently seen as likely (around 66%). Across these three groups, perceived likelihood
of the other outcomes ranged from 27% to 100%. Very low likelihood was reported for
reduced price of goods/services/works among academia (27%).
Respondents were invited to identify any other likely impacts. A summary of their
responses is presented below.
Public authorities
Approximately 14% of public authorities who provided comments on the question of
other impacts of the proposed changes to concepts and rules on concessions, identified a
need for more flexible options for changes during the implementation phase, as it can be
difficult to estimate in advance how feasible the operation will be for the operator. Some
respondents, such as research organisations, highlighted the potential benefits of being
exempt from EU public tendering law, including increased speed and reduced costs,
while still maintaining transparency. Others noted that the rules on concessions are
reasonably clear, but there are certain grey areas that could be clarified, such as the
interplay between the scope of the requirement that the concessionaire must be truly at
risk and the rule that the duration can be as long as is required for them to make back
their investment. A few respondents emphasized the importance of simplifying and
clarifying the rules on concessions, particularly with regards to valuation and contract
duration. Some public authorities also noted that they have little experience with
concessions and therefore found it difficult to provide a response. A minority of
respondents argued that the EU Concessions regulations should remain in a separate
regime and that no additional rules or obligations should be added, as concessions require
flexibility due to their varying legal and financial arrangements and risks.
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All other respondents
Approximately 15% of all other respondents (except Public authorities) who provided
comments on the question of other impacts of the proposed changes to concepts and rules
on concessions, identified various potential effects, including the need for more
flexibility in concession contracts to adapt to changing circumstances, such as crises or
macroeconomic events. Many respondents emphasized the importance of promoting
quality jobs and collective bargaining in concessions, which would contribute to reducing
litigation, simplifying procedures, increasing legal certainty, and ensuring a level playing
field. Some respondents suggested that clearer definitions of concession and operational
risk, as well as stronger transparency and post-award obligations, would improve legal
certainty and accountability in concessions. Others proposed introducing mandatory price
revision clauses in public contracts, collectively defining clear frameworks for
renegotiation, and allowing SME bidders to submit variants to offer alternatives to strict
requirements. A few respondents highlighted the need for better involvement of regional
providers, more direct coordination, and shorter routes. Some also stressed the
importance of ensuring that concessions are aligned with EU strategic goals, such as
environmental and social objectives, and that they promote innovation and public-private
partnerships. For example, one respondent stated that "Measures to promote quality jobs,
collective bargaining, limiting subcontracting, help reduce litigation, simplify
procedures, increase legal certainty, and ensure greater economic efficiency." Another
respondent noted that "Clearer definitions of concession and operational risk are needed,
duration must be able to take into account environmental, digital and social investments,
obligations to monitor and report impacts are needed, more transparency fosters quality
and competition." Overall, the respondents' comments highlighted the complexity and
variability of concessions, and the need for a balanced and flexible approach that takes
into account the diverse needs and interests of different stakeholders.
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9.5. Digitalisation and transparency (MPL options)
Table 82: Question: Would you support the creation of a digital public procurement marketplace with a single-entry
point for economic operators to public procurement procedures?; percentage of answers, by type of respondent.
Respondent
A. No
B. Yes, by
interconnecting all existing
Member States’ eProcurement
services
C. Yes, by
interconnecting all existing Member
States’ eProcurement services, and
providing a central eProcurement
service
D. Yes, by replacing
all existing Member States’ eProcurement
services with one central EU
eProcurement service
N o
op in
io n
N o.
o f r
es po
ns es
All 17% 39% 25% 12% 6% 686
Public Authorities EU 30% 26% 15% 20% 10% 105
Large companies EU 30% 28% 22% 9% 10% 89
SMEs EU 18% 47% 23% 6% 6% 62 Business associations EU
14% 33% 37% 10% 6% 153
Trade unions EU 0% 97% 3% 0% 0% 94
NGOs EU* 7% 32% 47% 5% 8% 59
Academia 26% 11% 21% 37% 5% 19
Citizens + other EU** 21% 24% 30% 20% 4% 89
Non-EU 0% 31% 25% 44% 0% 16
Central EU 19% 37% 26% 11% 7% 381
North EU 26% 49% 11% 9% 6% 70
South EU 11% 35% 37% 14% 4% 142
East EU 18% 52% 13% 10% 6% 77
Central EU authorities 30% 20% 15% 24% 11% 66
North EU authorities 42% 32% 11% 5% 11% 19
South EU authorities 0% 47% 20% 27% 7% 15
East EU authorities 60% 20% 20% 0% 0% 5 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single choice question; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. A. No, the current environment of eProcurement services is appropriate. B. Yes, by interconnecting all existing Member States’ eProcurement services. Economic operators could use any compatible service as a single point of entry to participate in public procurement procedures across the EU. C. Yes, by interconnecting all existing Member States’ eProcurement services, and providing a central eProcurement service. Economic operators could use the central eProcurement service or any Member State compatible service as a single point of entry to participate in public procurement procedures across the EU. D. Yes, by replacing all existing Member States’ eProcurement services with one central EU eProcurement service. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked whether they would support the creation of a digital public
procurement marketplace with a single entry point for economic operators to access
public procurement procedures. The figures refer to the share of respondents in each
group selecting each option.
Across all respondents, around three-quarters supported one of the three proposed
options to change the current eProcurement services, while roughly one in six believed
no changes were necessary. Among the three options for change, some form of
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interconnection between all existing Member States’ eProcurement services-whether
standalone or combined with additional central services-received the highest support at
65%. Only 12% of respondents favoured replacing national eProcurement services with a
single central system.
Among public authorities, opinions were divided. A significant proportion considered the
current eProcurement environment to be adequate (30%), while others preferred one of
the interconnecting options (41%) or replacing existing systems with a single central EU
service (20%).
Among large companies, SMEs, and business associations, the strongest support was for
interconnecting existing Member States’ eProcurement services, either alone or with a
central service (large companies: 51%, SMEs: 69%, business associations: 71%). Around
one-third of large companies, one in five SMEs, and one in seven business associations
preferred to retain the current eProcurement environment.
Trade unions unanimously supported the interconnection of existing Member States’
eProcurement services (100%). NGOs predominantly favoured one of the
interconnection options (80%), with minimal support for replacing all systems (5%) or
maintaining the current environment (7%).
Academia demonstrated the highest level of support for replacing all existing
eProcurement services with a single central EU system (37%), with slightly lower
backing for interconnection options (32%) or retaining the current environment (26%).
Citizens and other respondents most frequently preferred interconnection (54%), with
less support for maintaining the current environment (21%) or adopting a single central
EU system (20%). Non-EU respondents expressed the strongest support for
interconnection (56%), closely followed by replacing all national services with one
central EU system (44%).
Table 83: Question: What functionalities should the eProcurement services include?; percentage of answers, by type of
respondent.
Respondent
A.
Access to
procurement
procedures
above EU
thresholds
together
with related
procurement
documents
B.
Access to
procurement
procedures
below EU
thresholds
together
with related
procurement
documents
C.
Submission
of offers
from
economic
operators
D.
Access for
public
buyers to
information
about
participating
economic
operators on
exclusion
grounds
E.
Publication
of
complaints
and review
decisions
F.
Publication
of
information
about the
completion
of contracts
G.
Declaration
of inclusion
of green,
social,
innovation,
or Made in
Europe
aspects
H.
Free access
to a library
of
standardised
procurement
documents
I.
Helpdesk,
trainings and
capacity
building for
SMEs
Other No. of
responses
All 72% 50% 61% 84% 48% 50% 73% 61% 56% 31% 472 Public Authorities EU 95% 52% 73% 90% 51% 59% 63% 83% 67% 13% 63 Large companies EU 92% 48% 77% 81% 42% 48% 58% 67% 54% 15% 48 SMEs EU 90% 62% 62% 66% 55% 48% 69% 62% 66% 14% 29 Business associations EU 90% 59% 71% 66% 56% 62% 69% 73% 80% 16% 98 Trade unions EU 4% 1% 3% 99% 10% 7% 95% 3% 2% 83% 94 NGOs EU* 90% 83% 83% 88% 73% 73% 83% 83% 81% 31% 48 Academia 92% 85% 92% 92% 69% 46% 69% 92% 69% 8% 13 Citizens + other EU** 76% 65% 76% 87% 60% 67% 59% 70% 65% 21% 63 Non-EU 94% 63% 88% 94% 69% 75% 75% 81% 63% 31% 16
Central EU 79% 55% 64% 80% 45% 46% 69% 63% 65% 28% 234 North EU 58% 35% 40% 98% 40% 38% 79% 48% 29% 42% 48 South EU 73% 50% 67% 86% 55% 63% 75% 67% 62% 31% 118 East EU 45% 38% 46% 84% 43% 45% 75% 43% 32% 36% 56 Central EU authorities 95% 55% 76% 95% 47% 58% 55% 87% 76% 13% 38 North EU authorities 100% 44% 44% 100% 67% 44% 67% 78% 22% 11% 9 South EU authorities 93% 57% 86% 71% 50% 71% 79% 79% 64% 14% 14 East EU authorities 100% 0% 50% 100% 50% 50% 100% 50% 100% 0% 2
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* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Multiple choice question; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. A. Access to procurement procedures above EU thresholds together with related procurement documents. B. Access to procurement procedures below EU thresholds together with related procurement documents. C. Submission of offers from economic operators. D. Access for public buyers to authentic, up-to-date information about participating economic operators on exclusion grounds (e.g., criminal convictions, bankruptcy, professional misconduct) and selection criteria (e.g. financial capacity, technical ability). E. Publication of complaints and review decisions. F. Publication of information about the completion of contracts. G. Declaration of inclusion of green, social, innovation, or Made in Europe aspects. H. Free access to a library of standardised procurement documents, such as technical specifications or contract templates at least to public authorities. I. Helpdesk, trainings and capacity building for SMEs. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked which functionalities eProcurement services should include.
The figures below refer to the share of respondents in each group selecting each option.
Respondents most commonly selected functionalities that would provide public buyers
with access to information about participating economic operators in relation to exclusion
grounds (84%). Additionally, there was strong support for functionalities enabling
declarations on the inclusion of green, social, innovation, or Made in Europe aspects
(73%), as well as access to procurement procedures above EU thresholds, together with
their related procurement documents (72%).
The most often chosen functionalities by all the respondents included access for public
buyers to information about participating economic operators on exclusion grounds
(84%), declaration of inclusion of green, social, innovation, or Made in Europe aspects
(73%) and access to procurement procedures above EU thresholds together with related
procurement documents (72%).
Among public authorities, the most frequently requested functionalities were access to
procurement procedures above EU thresholds (95%), access for public buyers to
information about participating economic operators on exclusion grounds (90%) and free
access to a library of standardised procurement documents (83%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, access to procedures above
thresholds (around 90%) and submission of offers (62% - 77%) were widely supported as
was access for public buyers to information about participating economic operators on
exclusion grounds and selection criteria (66% - 81%). SMEs also often selected
declarations on green/social/innovation/Made in Europe aspects (69%) and helpdesk,
trainings and capacity building for SMEs (66%). Business associations’ second choice
was helpdesk (80%) followed by free library of standardised procurement documents
(73%).
Among trade unions and NGOs, trade unions prioritised access for public buyers to
information on exclusion grounds and selection criteria (99%) and the declaration of
inclusion of green, social, innovation or Made in Europe aspects (95%), while recording
very low support for most other specific functionalities. NGOs expressed broad support
across many functionalities, with the highest levels for access to above (90%) and below
(83%) threshold procedures, as well as access to information on exclusion grounds and
selection criteria (88%).
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Academia recorded over 90% support for access to procedures above (92%) and below
(85%) thresholds, submission of offers, access to information on exclusion grounds and
free access to a document library (all 92%). Citizens and other respondents most often
selected access to information on exclusion grounds (87%). Non-EU respondents
expressed strongest support for access to information on exclusion grounds (94%) and
above thresholds procedures (94%).
Those who selected Other were asked to elaborate. A summary of their responses is
presented below.
Public authorities
Public authorities suggested that eProcurement services should include several additional
functionalities to improve the tendering process. One key suggestion was to allow for the
submission of paper tenders in certain contexts, such as in fragile areas where access to
electronic means is limited. Another suggestion was to include advanced translation
services to facilitate tenders with bidders from other countries, where language barriers
may be an issue. Some respondents also proposed the creation of a page providing data
and figures on EU public procurement, similar to the example provided by the Dutch
tendering website. Additionally, respondents suggested that all official languages of the
EU Member States should be included, and that information about the content of the
procedure, such as scope, time, and value, should be readily available. Other suggested
functionalities included the possibility to release an auction, AI tools for research, and
procedures for excluding economic operators and notifying contracts that are not
completed or terminated. For example, one respondent stated that "Language is an
obstacle in tenders with bidders from other countries. There may be tools to facilitate
this, some form of advanced translation service for this purpose." Another respondent
suggested that "A page that provides data and figures on EU public procurement" would
be a useful addition to eProcurement services. Overall, the comments highlighted the
need for more flexible, accessible, and user-friendly eProcurement services that can
accommodate the diverse needs of public authorities and bidders across the EU.
EU companies and business associations
EU companies and business associations suggested that eProcurement services should
include several additional functionalities to improve the tendering process. One key
suggestion was the introduction of a European identity card, which would make it easier
for European companies to apply for public contracts. Another suggestion was to provide
statistics by buyer, including the share of live Very Small Enterprises (VSEs) in public
procurement over all public contracts awarded in one year. Respondents also proposed
the inclusion of guidance for the application of Green Public Procurement (GPP) in
practice, as well as a catalogue of recycled materials to support direct procurement of
materials. Additionally, some respondents suggested that the central platform should act
as a data repository, providing unrestricted open APIs for retrieving tender documents
and Q&A, and for submitting bids. Other suggested functionalities included the
enforcement of the "once-only" principle, fully digital bid submission and traceability,
and a library with access to all documentation of economic operators. Some respondents
also emphasized the importance of transparency and data governance, suggesting that
Eurostat should play a key role in monitoring and reporting on public procurement data.
305
For example, one respondent stated that "A centralised repository for pre-populated
ESPDs to reduce the burden on SMEs" would be a useful addition to eProcurement
services. Another respondent suggested that "AI-Powered Matchmaking" could be used
to match procurement opportunities with the profiles of registered SMEs. Overall, the
comments highlighted the need for more streamlined, transparent, and user-friendly
eProcurement services that can facilitate cross-border procurement and support the
participation of SMEs in public procurement.
All other respondents
A significant proportion of respondents from the group of all other respondents (except
Public authorities, companies and business associations) emphasized the importance of
ensuring the exclusion of companies that have violated workers' rights and labour
obligations, as well as those that have engaged in tax avoidance or evasion, or failed to
comply with environmental standards. Many respondents suggested that information on
excluded economic operators should be made available in a central EU registry. Some
respondents also proposed the creation of a European database to track companies that
have not respected workers' and trade union rights. Additionally, respondents suggested
that eProcurement services should include functionalities such as once-only
documentation, digital solutions for accessing authentic information, and automated tools
for bid evaluation and risk assessment. For example, one respondent stated that
"Ensuring exclusion of companies that violated workers rights and labour obligations is
essential. Information on excluded economic operators to be available in central EU
registry. Exclusion to also cover companies that engaged in tax avoidance or evasion or
did not respect environmental standards." Another respondent suggested that "A
centralised European clearing house could represent the optimal solution for consistency
and efficiency across the Single Market." Overall, the comments highlighted the need for
greater transparency, accountability, and social responsibility in public procurement, as
well as the importance of creating a level playing field for all economic operators.
9.5.1. Digital impacts
Figure 76: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur if such a digital public
procurement marketplace is set up?; all replies.
306
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Please note that, due to an error, the questionnaire duplicated the option “In case of one central eProcurement system: higher risk of cyber- attacks/security breaches.” To ensure no responses are omitted, this choice is presented twice in the results. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “How likely do you believe the following outcomes would
occur if such a digital public procurement marketplace is set up?”, respondents most
often expect faster exchange of documents and information (including company
evidence) (86%: 47% very likely, 39% somewhat likely), followed by wider access to
cross-border procurement procedures in the single market (especially for SMEs) (79%:
29% very likely, 50% somewhat likely) and more harmonisation of tender requirements
across Member States and emergence of best practices (79%: 24% very likely, 55%
somewhat likely). This is followed by increased transparency to prevent irregular
practices (78%: 38% very likely, 40% somewhat likely), wider range of procurement
procedures available to economic operators (especially for SMEs) (77%: 28% very
likely, 49% somewhat likely), and, in case of one central eProcurement system, higher
risks of stopping all public procurement procedures in the EU if the system fails (IT
47%
29%
24%
38%
28%
35%
32%
22%
30%
26%
22%
5%
39%
50%
55%
40%
49%
41%
42%
52%
43%
47%
43%
23%
4%
6%
6%
5%
5%
7%
5%
7%
6%
7%
10%
15%
1%
1%
1%
1%
3%
1%
1%
2%
1%
2%
4%
5%
F x …
W - …
M q M S …
Increased transparency to prevent irregular practices
W …
I P : k …
I P : k -…
R …
I P : k -…
Higher number of offers received
Reduced cost for public buyers to conduct procurement procedures
Reduced litigation
Very likely Somewhat likely No impact Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Faster exchange of document s and informati on (including company evidence)
Wider access to cross- border procurem ent procedure s in the single market (especiall y for SMEs)
More harmonis ation of tender requirem ents across Member States and emergenc e of best practices
Increased transpare ncy to prevent irregular practices
Wider range of procurem ent procedure s available to economic operators (especiall y for SMEs)
In case of one central eProcure ment system: higher risks of stopping all public procurem ent procedure s in the EU if the system fails (IT failure)
In case of one central eProcure ment system: higher risk of cyber- attacks/s ecurity breaches
Reduced cost for economic operators to participat e in procurem ent procedure s
In case of one central eProcure ment system: higher risk of cyber- attacks/s ecurity breaches
Higher number of offers received
Reduced cost for public buyers to conduct procurem ent procedure s
Reduced litigation
Very likely 47% 29% 24% 38% 28% 35% 32% 22% 30% 26% 22% 5% Somewhat likely 39% 50% 55% 40% 49% 41% 42% 52% 43% 47% 43% 23% No impact 8% 13% 13% 15% 16% 17% 20% 18% 20% 19% 21% 52% Somewhat unlikely 4% 6% 6% 5% 5% 7% 5% 7% 6% 7% 10% 15% Very unlikely 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 4% 5% No. of responses 608 523 608 609 523 518 509 592 502 529 536 570
307
failure) (76%: 35% very likely, 41% somewhat likely). Further expected outcomes
include, again in case of one central system, higher risk of cyber-attacks/security
breaches (74%: 32% very likely, 42% somewhat likely), reduced cost for economic
operators to participate in procurement procedures (74%: 22% very likely, 52%
somewhat likely), and a higher number of offers received (73%: 26% very likely, 47%
somewhat likely). A closely related item on higher risk of cyber-attacks/security
breaches, where asked again, shows similar positive expectations (73%: 30% very likely,
43% somewhat likely). Finally, 65% expect reduced cost for public buyers to conduct
procurement procedures (22% very likely, 43% somewhat likely), while reduced
litigation records the lowest positive expectation (28%: 5% very likely, 23% somewhat
likely).
Disagreement that these outcomes will occur (somewhat unlikely or very unlikely) is
highest for reduced litigation (20%: 15% somewhat unlikely, 5% very unlikely) and
reduced cost for public buyers (14%: 10% somewhat unlikely, 4% very unlikely). For
other outcomes, disagreement remains lower: higher number of offers received and
reduced cost for economic operators (each 9%: 7% somewhat unlikely, 2% very
unlikely), in case of one central system higher risk of stopping all public procurement
procedures due to IT failure (8%: 7% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely), more
harmonisation of tender requirements and wider access to cross-border procurement
(each 7%: 6% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely), wider range of procedures (8%: 5%
somewhat unlikely, 3% very unlikely), increased transparency (6%: 5% somewhat
unlikely, 1% very unlikely), faster exchange of documents and information (5%: 4%
somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely), and the two items on higher risk of cyber-
attacks/security breaches (6–7%: 5–6% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely).
Across all outcomes, the share of respondents expecting “no impact” ranges from 8% for
faster exchange of documents and information to 52% for reduced litigation.
Intermediate “no impact” levels are reported for wider access to cross-border
procurement and more harmonisation of tender requirements (each 13%), increased
transparency (15%), wider range of procedures (16%), and, in case of one central system,
higher risk of stopping all public procurement procedures due to IT failure (17%) and
higher risk of cyber-attacks/security breaches (20%). For reduced cost for economic
operators, higher number of offers received, and reduced cost for public buyers, “no
impact” responses are between 18% and 21%.
Table 84: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur if such a digital public
procurement marketplace is set up?; percentage of respondents that indicated “very likely” or “somewhat likely”
answers, by type of respondent.
308
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered Top three responses highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. Please note that, due to an error, the questionnaire duplicated the option “In case of one central eProcurement system: higher risk of cyber-attacks/security breaches.” To ensure no responses are omitted, this choice is presented twice in the results. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked how likely they believed different outcomes would be if a
digital public procurement marketplace were set up. The figures below describe, for each
outcome and respondent group, the combined shares of “very likely” and “somewhat
likely” answers (other response options were also available but are not shown).
Among public authorities, the most likely outcomes were higher risks of cyber-
attacks/security breaches in case of one central eProcurement system (84%) and higher
risks of stopping all procurement procedures in case of IT failure (85%), together with
faster exchange of documents and information (78%). For the remaining outcomes,
perceived likelihood ranged from 16% to 85%. Very low likelihood was reported for
reduced litigation (16%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, faster exchange of documents
and information was consistently regarded as a very likely outcome (large companies:
81%; SMEs: 90%; business associations: 86%), as was wider access to cross-border
procedures (75%; 80%; 80%). Business associations also strongly pointed to increased
transparency (86%), while SMEs highlighted reduced cost for economic operators (75%).
Across these three groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining outcomes ranged from
15% to 90%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced litigation among large
companies (15%).
Respondent
Wider range of procurem ent procedure s available to economic operators (especiall y for SMEs)
More harmonis ation of tender requirem ents across Member States and emergenc e of best practices
Wider access to cross- border procurem ent procedure s in the single market (especiall y for SMEs)
Reduced cost for public buyers to conduct procurem ent procedure s
Increased transpare ncy to prevent irregular practices
Reduced litigation
Faster exchange of document s and informati on (including company evidence)
Higher number of offers received
In case of one central eProcure ment system: higher risks of stopping all public procurem ent procedure s in the EU if the system fails (IT failure)
In case of one central eProcure ment system: higher risk of cyber- attacks/s ecurity breaches
Reduced cost for economic operators to participat e in procurem ent procedure s
In case of one central eProcure ment system: higher risk of cyber- attacks/s ecurity breaches
No. of responses
All 76% 79% 80% 65% 78% 28% 87% 73% 76% 73% 73% 74% 502-609 Public Authorities EU 70% 64% 71% 41% 58% 16% 78% 65% 85% 83% 57% 84% 90-98 Large companies EU 66% 73% 75% 57% 68% 15% 81% 64% 79% 74% 64% 73% 73-81 SMEs EU 74% 73% 80% 65% 70% 46% 90% 68% 74% 68% 75% 73% 35-41 Business associations EU 81% 77% 80% 71% 86% 31% 86% 76% 78% 73% 72% 75% 116-125 Trade unions EU 85% 98% 95% 84% 98% 17% 99% 89% 19% 44% 96% 44% 16-93 NGOs EU* 91% 91% 84% 89% 89% 38% 91% 82% 71% 75% 82% 74% 46-58 Academia 58% 79% 74% 63% 79% 47% 79% 79% 84% 79% 74% 79% 19-19 Citizens + other EU** 76% 74% 87% 68% 74% 42% 84% 71% 75% 70% 72% 71% 77-82 Non-EU 94% 89% 94% 75% 89% 44% 100% 94% 59% 53% 83% 47% 16-18
Central EU 73% 72% 76% 57% 71% 25% 84% 69% 74% 73% 72% 74% 264-315 North EU 55% 64% 71% 47% 70% 7% 72% 60% 85% 81% 63% 81% 47-67 South EU 89% 94% 93% 87% 94% 47% 95% 88% 77% 73% 83% 73% 122-138 East EU 78% 88% 76% 73% 85% 20% 92% 61% 78% 71% 71% 77% 49-75 Central EU authorities 72% 63% 67% 39% 58% 17% 82% 67% 78% 80% 60% 80% 54-60 North EU authorities 47% 33% 59% 29% 44% 6% 50% 44% 100% 94% 29% 94% 16-18 South EU authorities 93% 100% 93% 71% 80% 27% 93% 100% 87% 80% 80% 87% 14-15 East EU authorities 60% 80% 80% 20% 40% 0% 80% 20% 100% 100% 50% 100% 4-5
309
Among trade unions and NGOs, the outcomes most often regarded as likely were faster
exchange of documents and information (trade unions: 99%; NGOs: 91%), wider range
of procedures and more harmonisation of tender requirements (trade unions: 85% and
98%; NGOs: both 91%), as well as increased transparency (98% for trade unions and
89% for NGOs). For these two groups, perceived likelihood of the other outcomes ranged
from 17% to 99%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced litigation among trade
unions (17%) and NGOs (38%).
Among academia, the most likely perceived outcome was a higher risk of stopping all
public procurement procedures in the EU in case of one central eProcurement system,
selected by 84% of respondents. Citizens and other participants most frequently
highlighted wider access to cross-border procurement procedures (87%). Meanwhile,
non-EU respondents unanimously identified faster document and information exchange
as the top impact (100%). Across these three groups, the perceived likelihood of other
outcomes ranged from 42% to 94%.
Those who selected Other were asked to elaborate. A summary of their responses is
presented below.
Public authorities
Public authorities expressed a range of views on the potential impacts of a digital public
procurement marketplace. Some respondents, such as research organizations, suggested
that exempting them from EU public tendering law could lead to significant increases in
speed and reductions in cost, while still maintaining transparency. Others, such as a
public authority that uses an online service, reported that they have found no empirical
evidence to support accusations that online services hinder effective governance or the
fight against corruption. A few respondents, such as a public authority that supports a
digital EU-wide procurement platform, emphasized the potential benefits of improved
transparency, reduced fragmentation, and simplified monitoring and contract tracking.
Some respondents also suggested that a digital marketplace could provide access to
standardized procurement documents, helpdesk support, and training for SMEs.
However, others expressed concerns about the potential complexity of a centralized
system, language barriers, and the need to ensure interoperability with local and national
platforms. For example, one respondent stated that "A single centralised system at EU
level would further discourage economic operators and make the system even more
complex for everyone." Another respondent suggested that "A Portal Guide would
increase transparency and ensure consistency of data, making it easier for economic
operators and contracting authorities to work." Overall, the comments highlighted the
need for a balanced approach that takes into account the diverse needs and interests of
different stakeholders.
EU companies and business associations
EU companies and business associations expressed a range of views on the potential
impacts of a digital public procurement marketplace. Some emphasized the potential
benefits of improved digitalization, including increased transparency, reduced
administrative burdens, and enhanced access to procurement opportunities. Others
cautioned against creating unnecessary administrative or technical burdens and
emphasized the importance of designing a practical and user-friendly platform. Several
310
highlighted the need for a hybrid model that links national systems with a central service,
providing redundancy and reducing vulnerability. Some warned against adopting
protectionist measures and emphasized the importance of ensuring that any digital
marketplace is open and non-discriminatory. Others emphasized the potential benefits of
a digital marketplace in terms of increased efficiency, reduced costs, and improved
access to procurement opportunities. For example, some suggested that a digital
marketplace could simplify onboarding for SMEs, eliminate redundant administrative
procedures, and enhance transparency and auditability. Others noted that a digital
marketplace could provide a single point of entry for economic operators, improve the
visibility of contracts, and reduce the risk of errors and inconsistencies. Overall, the
comments highlighted the complexity and diversity of views on the potential impacts of a
digital public procurement marketplace, and the need for a careful and nuanced approach
to its design and implementation.
All other respondents
A digital public procurement marketplace is expected to have several impacts, including
the provision of tools for monitoring and enforcing labour standards and other
obligations, such as cross-referencing of data. Many respondents emphasize the
importance of excluding operators that do not respect their obligations, including those
that engage in tax evasion or avoidance, and creating an EU list of excluded actors.
Additionally, digitalisation is expected to improve transparency, reduce administrative
burdens, and increase access to procurement opportunities for SMEs and cross-border
transactions. Some respondents also highlight the need for a single-entry point for
interoperable e-procurement, robust cybersecurity, and resilience to prevent single points
of failure. Furthermore, digitalisation is expected to facilitate the monitoring and
enforcement of social and environmental standards, and to provide a platform for the
exchange of information and best practices among contracting authorities and economic
operators. Overall, the comments suggest that a digital public procurement marketplace
has the potential to increase efficiency, transparency, and accountability in public
procurement, while also promoting fair competition and social responsibility.
311
9.6. Made in Europe (BEU options)
Table 85: Question: Should European goods and services be prioritised in the procurement process?; percentage of
answers, by type of respondent.
Respondent Yes No No. of responses All 85% 15% 730 Public Authorities EU 81% 19% 106 Large companies EU 81% 19% 107 SMEs EU 92% 8% 53 Business associations EU 80% 20% 162 Trade unions EU 99% 1% 96 NGOs EU* 86% 14% 74 Academia 89% 11% 18 Citizens + other EU** 91% 9% 95 Non-EU 42% 58% 19
Central EU 84% 16% 402 North EU 72% 28% 74 South EU 95% 5% 153 East EU 94% 6% 82 Central EU authorities 78% 22% 68 North EU authorities 76% 24% 17 South EU authorities 94% 6% 16 East EU authorities 100% 0% 5
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
All respondent groups except non-EU participants expressed strong support (above 80%)
for prioritising European goods and services in the public procurement process.
Figure 77: Question: How should European goods and services should be prioritised in procurement process?, all
replies.
67%
54%
29%
25%
31%
39%
2%
4%
11%
1%
2%
2%
1. By giving greater role / prominence / points to non-price criteria in assessment of bids (such as social, green,
resilience, innovation, security, Made in Europe, etc.).
3. By defining Made in Europe criteria for selection of bidders (e.g. criteria placed on business such as European location,
and/or conditions placed on product or service, such as share of value added).
2. By excluding bidders from countries that are not signatories to the European Economic Area (EEA) / Government
Procurement Agreement (GPA) / Free Trade Agreement (FTA) containing procurement provisions/other international
agreements covering public procu
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
312
1. By giving greater role / prominence / points to non- price criteria in assessment of bids (such as social, green, resilience, innovation, security, Made in Europe, etc.).
2. By excluding bidders from countries that are not signatories to the European Economic Area (EEA) / Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) / Free Trade Agreement (FTA) containing procurement provisions/other international agreements covering public procurement or offering goods or services originating from those countries.
3. By defining Made in Europe criteria for selection of bidders (e.g. criteria placed on business such as European location, and/or conditions placed on product or service, such as share of value added).
Strongly agree 67% 29% 54%
Agree 25% 39% 31%
Neutral 4% 18% 10%
Disagree 2% 11% 4%
Strongly disagree 1% 2% 2%
No. of responses 607 595 596 Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
When asked how to prioritise European goods and services, respondents showed the
strongest preference (92% support-67% strongly agree, 25% agree) for expanding the
role of non-price criteria, such as social, environmental, resilience, innovation, security,
and Made in Europe considerations. This was closely followed by defining Made in
Europe criteria for bidder selection-such as requiring a European business location or
setting conditions on the product/service (e.g., share of value added)-which received 85%
support (54% strongly agree, 31% agree). The least favoured option, though still
supported by over two-thirds of respondents (68%-29% strongly agree, 39% agree), was
excluding bidders from countries lacking a public procurement agreement with the EU.
This proposal also faced the highest opposition at around 13%, compared to just 3–6%
for the other two options.
Table 86: Question: How should European goods and services be prioritised in procurement process?; percentage of
respondents that agree or strongly agree, by type of respondent.
Respondent
1. By giving greater role / prominence / points to non-price criteria in assessment of bids (such as social, green, resilience, innovation, security, Made in Europe, etc.).
2. By excluding bidders from countries that are not signatories to the EEA / GPA / FTA /other international agreements with procurement provisions
3. By defining Made in Europe criteria for selection of bidders
N o.
o f r
es po
ns es
All 92% 68% 85% 595-607
Public Authorities EU 76% 64% 80% 83-86
Large companies EU 94% 76% 93% 84-84
SMEs EU 100% 67% 87% 45-46
Business associations EU 94% 66% 84% 121-125
Trade unions EU 100% 98% 100% 91-95
NGOs EU* 95% 34% 57% 61-63
313
Academia 88% 38% 81% 16-16
Citizens + other EU** 90% 65% 86% 84-84
Non-EU 88% 63% 100% 7-8
Central EU 91% 64% 82% 321-327
North EU 81% 73% 78% 49-53
South EU 97% 68% 89% 141-142
East EU 97% 80% 91% 76-77
Central EU authorities 74% 65% 83% 52-53
North EU authorities 54% 83% 75% 12-13
South EU authorities 93% 50% 80% 14-15
East EU authorities 100% 40% 50% 4-5 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations; *** European Economic Area (EEA) / Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) / Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. 1. By giving greater role / prominence / points to non-price criteria in assessment of bids (such as social, green, resilience, innovation, security, Made in Europe, etc.); 2. By excluding bidders from countries that are not signatories to the European Economic Area (EEA) / Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) / Free Trade Agreement (FTA) containing procurement provisions/other international agreements covering public procurement or offering goods or services originating from those countries; 3. By defining Made in Europe criteria for selection of bidders (e.g. criteria placed on business such as European location, and/or conditions placed on product or service, such as share of value added). EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked: "How should European goods and services be prioritised in the
procurement process?" The figures reflect the combined shares of "strongly agree" and
"agree" responses (other options were available but are not shown here).
The option attracting the highest support in all groups except public authorities and non-
EU respondents was giving a greater role to non-price criteria in bid assessments, with
backing ranging from 88% to 100%. Public authorities gave a slightly higher preference
(80% compared to 76%) to defining Made in Europe criteria for the selection of bidders.
This was also the first choice for non-EU respondents. Academia showed almost
unanimous support for all three options.
Table 87: Question: If you "agree" or "strongly agree" with point 2 (Table 86). Should such an exclusion be
mandatory or voluntary?; % of all answers to point 2, by type of respondent.
Respondent Voluntary Mandatory No. of all responses to point 2
All 19% 47% 595
Public Authorities EU 41% 22% 83
Large companies EU 25% 50% 84
SMEs EU 20% 46% 46
Business associations EU 21% 40% 121
Trade unions EU 2% 96% 92
NGOs EU* 8% 25% 61
Academia 19% 19% 16
Citizens + other EU** 17% 46% 84
314
Non-EU 25% 38% 8
Central EU 21% 40% 321
North EU 27% 45% 49
South EU 13% 53% 141
East EU 17% 63% 76
Central EU authorities 38% 27% 52
North EU authorities 58% 17% 12
South EU authorities 36% 14% 14
East EU authorities 40% 0% 5 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations; *** European Economic Area (EEA) / Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) / Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. Point 2. By excluding bidders from countries that are not signatories to the European Economic Area (EEA) / Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) / Free Trade Agreement (FTA) containing procurement provisions/other international agreements covering public procurement or offering goods or services originating from those countries; EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents who believed European goods and services should be prioritised by
excluding bidders from countries without a public procurement agreement with the EU
(point 2, Table 86) were then asked whether this exclusion should be mandatory or
voluntary. For clarity, the figures in the table and below represent the share of all
responses (not just those who agreed or strongly agreed with point 2). In all groups
except public authorities, there was a preference for mandatory exclusion.
Table 88: Question: If you "agree" or "strongly agree" with point 3 (Table 86). Should the use of such "Made in
Europe" criteria be mandatory or voluntary for public buyers?; If mandatory should there be exceptions?; Which
sectors should be covered?; percentage of answers to point 3, by type of respondent.
"Made in Europe" criteria mandatory or voluntary?
If mandatory, should there be exceptions?
Which sectors should be covered?
Respondent Voluntary Mandatory Yes No
Certain sectors
only All
sectors
No. of all responses to point 3
All 27% 57% 48% 7% 24% 58% 596
Public Authorities EU 52% 25% 23% 1% 17% 58% 84
Large companies EU 30% 60% 43% 15% 42% 49% 84
SMEs EU 24% 62% 42% 20% 22% 60% 45
Business associations EU 28% 54% 45% 7% 36% 43% 122
Trade unions EU 2% 98% 96% 0% 3% 97% 91
NGOs EU* 13% 41% 37% 3% 11% 40% 63
Academia 38% 44% 44% 0% 19% 63% 16
Citizens + other EU** 29% 57% 46% 10% 25% 58% 84
Non-EU 57% 43% 43% 0% 71% 29% 7
0
Central EU 30% 50% 41% 7% 23% 55% 323
North EU 24% 53% 49% 4% 16% 57% 49
South EU 21% 67% 58% 9% 34% 53% 141
East EU 20% 70% 62% 8% 8% 82% 76
Central EU authorities 58% 23% 21% 0% 17% 62% 53
315
North EU authorities 58% 17% 17% 0% 8% 58% 12
South EU authorities 33% 47% 40% 7% 27% 53% 15
East EU authorities 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 4 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations; *** European Economic Area (EEA) / Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) / Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. Point 3. By defining Made in Europe criteria for selection of bidders (e.g. criteria placed on business such as European location, and/or conditions placed on product or service, such as share of value added); EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents who selected the option to prioritise European goods and services by
defining Made in Europe criteria for bidder selection (point 3, Table 86) were
subsequently asked whether these criteria should be applied voluntarily or mandatorily
(with or without exceptions) and whether they should cover all sectors or only selected
ones. For clarity, the figures in the table and below show the share of all responses, not
just those who agreed or strongly agreed with point 3.
In all groups except public authorities and non-EU respondents, there was a preference
for mandatory application of these criteria. Across all respondent groups, those who
favoured mandatory criteria also agreed that there should be exemptions. The majority of
all groups except non-EU respondents believed that all sectors should be covered.
Respondents were invited to comment on which sectors should be subject to Made in
Europe provisions.
Public authorities
Public authorities suggested that Made in Europe provisions should apply to various
sectors, including those of strategic importance to the EU, such as technology, defence,
and security-sensitive contracts. Some respondents mentioned specific sectors, including
IT, infrastructure/construction, and critical infrastructure, while others emphasized the
need to focus on sectors that are essential for the EU's security, sovereignty, and
decarbonization. A few respondents highlighted the importance of considering the
availability of European industrial offers in certain sectors, as well as the need to ensure
that regulations are respected by all industries. Some examples of sectors mentioned
include energy, health, ICT, transport, pharmaceuticals, and wood. Overall, the
comments suggest that the scope of Made in Europe provisions should be carefully
considered to ensure that they support the EU's strategic interests and promote fair
competition. For instance, one respondent stated that "Strategic sectors: technology,
defence," should be subject to Made in Europe provisions, while another respondent
suggested that "Only certain strategic sectors (Energy, Health, ICT, Transport)" should
be included.
EU companies and business associations
EU companies and business associations suggested that Made in Europe provisions
should apply to various strategic sectors, including those related to energy, defence,
security, and critical infrastructure. Some respondents mentioned specific sectors, such as
IT, telecoms, and cloud computing, while others emphasized the importance of
316
considering the entire value chain, from raw materials to final products. Many
respondents emphasized the need to promote European industries and jobs, while also
ensuring fair competition and protecting international trade partnerships. Some examples
of sectors mentioned include:
• Energy infrastructure, such as transformers, grids, and transmission components
• Net-zero technologies, such as hydrogen, wind, solar, and batteries
• E-mobility and automotive value chains
• Transport and high-voltage infrastructure
• Defence and critical security technologies
• Critical infrastructure, such as airports, navigation systems, and air traffic control
• ICT sector, including cloud computing and other critical digital infrastructures
• Biobased products, such as bioplastics, biobased polymers, and biobased textiles
• Pharmaceutical products and medical devices
• Products related to healthcare and food sectors
Some respondents suggested a targeted approach, applying Made in Europe criteria to
strategic sectors and considering a voluntary, comply-or-explain framework. Others
emphasized the importance of defining European content in a way that captures key parts
of value chains, while avoiding disproportionate administrative burden. Overall, the
comments suggest that the scope of Made in Europe provisions should be carefully
considered to ensure that they support the EU's strategic interests and promote fair
competition.
Non-EU respondents
Non-EU respondents suggested that Made in Europe provisions should apply to various
strategic sectors, including:
• Strategic sectors, without specifying particular ones
• Personal protective equipment and healthcare
• Steel, energy infrastructure, and construction, where demand certainty can
accelerate decarbonisation and the circular economy
• Key technologies such as AI, cloud, quantum, semiconductors, digital
infrastructure and platforms, cybersecurity, defence, and space
These respondents generally emphasized the importance of focusing on sectors that are
critical to the EU's economic and technological development, as well as those that are
essential for ensuring the EU's security and resilience. Overall, the comments suggest
that the scope of Made in Europe provisions should be targeted and strategic, with a
focus on promoting the EU's competitive advantages and protecting its critical interests.
317
All other respondents
All other respondents (except Public authorities, companies and business associations)
suggested that Made in Europe provisions should apply to various strategic sectors,
including:
• Defence, security, and critical infrastructure
• Energy, including grids, storage, and key renewables components
• Health and pharmaceuticals
• Digital and data infrastructures, such as cloud, semiconductors, and AI-enabling
hardware
• Transport and mobility systems
• Food procurement, especially sustainable and locally sourced food
• Construction and building materials, such as green steel and low-carbon cement
• Circular economy and waste management, including advanced recycling
technologies
• Strategic supplies and services, such as telecommunications and IT
• Sectors related to safety and defence, public transport, and critical infrastructure
• Personal and financial data, utilities such as electricity, water, and gas
Some respondents emphasized the importance of promoting European sovereignty and
independence in strategic sectors, while others highlighted the need to support the
circular economy and sustainable development. A few respondents noted that the
provisions should be focused on sectors where the obligation of "Made in Europe" is
realistic and where there is a developed industry in the EU. Overall, the comments
suggest that the scope of Made in Europe provisions should be targeted and strategic,
with a focus on promoting the EU's competitive advantages and protecting its critical
interests.
Respondents were invited to specify what additional Made in Europe criteria should be
included in EU legislation.
Public authorities
Public authorities suggested that additional Made in Europe criteria should be included in
EU legislation, but with caution and flexibility. Some respondents emphasized the
importance of promoting European products and services, while others highlighted the
need to avoid protectionism and ensure that the rules are simple and easy to apply. Many
respondents suggested that the criteria should be voluntary, rather than mandatory, and
that exemptions should be foreseen for certain sectors or cases. Some key points
mentioned include:
318
• The need for clear definitions of what constitutes a European product or service
• The importance of considering the supply chain and the origin of products, rather
than just the nationality of the company
• The possibility of using positive incentives, such as award criteria linked to
resilience or geographical diversification, to promote European products and
services
• The need to avoid increasing the administrative burden on contracting authorities
and to ensure that the rules are proportionate and flexible
• The importance of ensuring that the rules do not lead to increased costs for local
and regional authorities
• The possibility of using existing instruments, such as the International
Procurement Instrument (IPI), to define and activate European preference
• The need to balance the objective of promoting European products and services
with the need to simplify the procedural legal framework and reduce
administrative burdens.
Some respondents also suggested that the criteria should be limited to certain sectors,
such as strategic or critical sectors, and that the rules should be designed to promote
European industries and jobs, while also ensuring fair competition and protecting
international trade partnerships. Overall, the comments suggest that the inclusion of
Made in Europe criteria in EU legislation should be carefully considered and balanced
with other policy objectives, such as simplification and flexibility.
EU companies and business associations
EU companies and business associations suggested that additional Made in Europe
criteria should be included in EU legislation to promote European products and services,
while also ensuring fair competition and protecting international trade partnerships.
Many respondents emphasized the importance of defining what "Made in Europe"
means, with some suggesting that it should be based on the origin of the product, rather
than the origin of the company importing the product. Some key points mentioned
include:
• The need for clear and simple rules to determine the origin of products and
services
• The importance of considering the entire value chain, from raw materials to final
products
• The need for flexibility and proportionality in the application of Made in Europe
criteria, to avoid unnecessary administrative burdens and ensure that the rules are
effective in promoting European industries and jobs
• The importance of ensuring that Made in Europe criteria do not lead to
protectionism or unfair competition, and that they are compatible with EU
international commitments and WTO rules
319
• The need for a nuanced and targeted approach, with different criteria and
requirements applying to different sectors and industries
• The importance of promoting European value chains and ensuring that public
money is spent on products and services that support European industries and
jobs
• The need for certification and traceability tools to ensure the credibility of Made
in Europe requirements
• The importance of considering the impact of Made in Europe criteria on small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and ensuring that they do not create
unnecessary barriers to entry or disproportionately affect certain industries or
sectors.
Some respondents also suggested that Made in Europe criteria should be applied in a way
that takes into account the entire life cycle of a product or service, including its
production, use, and disposal, and that they should be linked to EU environmental and
social standards. Others emphasized the importance of ensuring that Made in Europe
criteria do not lead to supply chain disruptions or excessive price increases, and that they
are compatible with EU trade policies and international agreements.
Overall, the comments suggest that the inclusion of Made in Europe criteria in EU
legislation should be carefully considered and balanced with other policy objectives, such
as promoting fair competition, protecting international trade partnerships, and ensuring
that the rules are effective in promoting European industries and jobs.
Non-EU respondents
Non-EU respondents suggested that additional Made in Europe criteria should be
included in EU legislation, but with caution and careful consideration. Some key points
mentioned include:
• The need for objective, transparent, and value-creation-based criteria that
incentivize EU investment and promote vendor diversity
• The importance of considering the origin of operators, including quality jobs,
ownership, and tax residence, as well as EU added value
• The need for clear definitions and application of Made in Europe criteria, with a
focus on strategic industries and avoided blanket rules that could lead to cost
increases and supply chain disruptions
• The potential to link EU content provisions with sustainability performance, to
support industrial decarbonization and innovation, and create green jobs in the
EU
• The importance of promoting collective bargaining, quality jobs, and regulating
subcontracting to contribute to the Made in Europe objective
• The need for consistency with EU and WTO law, to avoid discrimination and
ensure that the rules are fair and effective.
320
Some respondents also suggested that multi-winner models, which include designated
award slots for EU-based producers, could be a preferred way to introduce Made in
Europe criteria, while respecting the Single Market and global trade rules. Others
emphasized the importance of voluntary application of Made in Europe criteria, at least
in the initial phase, to allow for flexibility and testing of the approach.
Overall, the comments suggest that the inclusion of Made in Europe criteria in EU
legislation should be carefully considered and balanced with other policy objectives, such
as promoting fair competition, protecting international trade partnerships, and ensuring
that the rules are effective in promoting European industries and jobs.
All other respondents
All other respondents (except Public authorities, companies and business associations)
suggested that additional Made in Europe criteria should be included in EU legislation to
promote European products and services, while also ensuring fair competition and
protecting international trade partnerships. Many respondents emphasized the importance
of considering the origin of operators, including quality jobs, ownership, and tax
residence, as well as EU added value. Some key points mentioned include:
• The need for clear and simple rules to determine the origin of products and
services
• The importance of promoting collective bargaining, quality jobs, and regulating
subcontracting to ensure fair working conditions
• The need for flexibility and proportionality in the application of Made in Europe
criteria, to avoid unnecessary administrative burdens and ensure that the rules are
effective in promoting European industries and jobs
• The importance of ensuring that Made in Europe criteria do not lead to
protectionism or unfair competition, and that they are compatible with EU
international commitments and WTO rules
• The need for a nuanced and targeted approach, with different criteria and
requirements applying to different sectors and industries
• The importance of promoting European value chains and ensuring that public
money is spent on products and services that support European industries and
jobs
• The need for certification and traceability tools to ensure the credibility of Made
in Europe requirements
• The importance of considering the impact of Made in Europe criteria on small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and ensuring that they do not create
unnecessary barriers to entry or disproportionately affect certain industries or
sectors.
Some respondents also suggested that Made in Europe criteria should be applied in a way
that takes into account the entire life cycle of a product or service, including its
production, use, and disposal, and that they should be linked to EU environmental and
321
social standards. Others emphasized the importance of ensuring that Made in Europe
criteria do not lead to supply chain disruptions or excessive price increases, and that they
are compatible with EU trade policies and international agreements.
Overall, the comments suggest that the inclusion of Made in Europe criteria in EU
legislation should be carefully considered and balanced with other policy objectives, such
as promoting fair competition, protecting international trade partnerships, and ensuring
that the rules are effective in promoting European industries and jobs.
9.6.1. Made in Europe impacts
Figure 78: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur if any type of prioritisation of
European products and services was to be implemented?; all replies.
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “How likely do you believe the following outcomes would
occur if any type of prioritisation of European products and services was to be
implemented?”, respondents most often expect an increased chance of winning for EU
bidders (92%: 58% very likely, 34% somewhat likely), followed by EU economic
operators having to adjust their supply chains to be able to bid (88%: 27% very likely,
58%
27%
45%
46%
32%
34%
32%
36%
20%
21%
21%
15%
13%
12%
6%
34%
61%
39%
38%
51%
46%
45%
35%
48%
42%
42%
36%
33%
32%
27%
0%
2%
3%
4%
4%
4%
6%
7%
6%
18%
7%
20%
21%
24%
16%
1
1%
2%
3%
2%
4%
4%
4%
2%
2%
2%
2%
4%
2%
7%
Increased chance of winning for EU bidders
U j …
Boost EU employment
B U ,…
M , …
Boost EU innovation
Increase security of supply
Better quality of products/services/works
Easier access to procurement for EU SMEs
Increase in price of goods and services purchased
R x U …
Increase in administrative cost (verification if conditions are met)
I U …
Lower number of bids received
Reduced litigation Very likely Somewhat likely No impact Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Increased chance of winning for EU bidders
EU economic operators could have to adjust their supply chains to be able to bid
Boost EU employm ent
Boost investme nts levels in the EU (e.g. reindustri alisation, reshoring, more FDI)
Meeting environm ental goals (e.g. shortenin g supply chains, carbon footprint)
Boost EU innovatio n
Increase security of supply
Better quality of products/ services/ works
Easier access to procurem ent for EU SMEs
Increase in price of goods and services purchase d
Retaliatio n by 3rd countries (exclusion of EU companie s from their procurem ent)
Increase in administr ative cost (verificati on if condition s are met)
Increased administr ative cost for EU biddders due to additional document s or evidence
Lower number of bids received
Reduced litigation
Very likely 58% 27% 45% 46% 32% 34% 32% 36% 20% 21% 21% 15% 13% 12% 6% Somewhat likely 34% 61% 39% 38% 51% 46% 45% 35% 48% 42% 42% 36% 33% 32% 27% No impact 7% 10% 11% 9% 12% 12% 14% 17% 24% 17% 29% 28% 30% 30% 45% Somewhat unlikely 0% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4% 6% 7% 6% 18% 7% 20% 21% 24% 16% Very unlikely 1% 1% 2% 3% 2% 4% 4% 4% 2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 2% 7% No. of responses 676 676 683 680 699 682 674 681 670 673 664 659 673 666 657
322
61% somewhat likely). High shares also anticipate boosts to EU employment (84%: 45%
very likely, 39% somewhat likely) and investment levels in the EU (e.g.
reindustrialisation, reshoring, more FDI) (84%: 46% very likely, 38% somewhat likely).
Majorities consider meeting environmental goals (e.g. shortening supply chains, carbon
footprint) (83%: 32% very likely, 51% somewhat likely), boosting EU innovation (80%:
34% very likely, 46% somewhat likely), increasing security of supply (77%: 32% very
likely, 45% somewhat likely), and better quality of products, services and works (71%:
36% very likely, 35% somewhat likely) as likely outcomes. Easier access to procurement
for EU SMEs is also widely seen as likely (68%: 20% very likely, 48% somewhat
likely). On the cost and risk side, a majority expect an increase in price of goods and
services purchased (63%: 21% very likely, 42% somewhat likely), retaliation by third
countries (exclusion of EU companies from their procurement) (63%: 21% very likely,
42% somewhat likely), and an increase in administrative cost for public buyers
(verification if conditions are met) (51%: 15% very likely, 36% somewhat likely).
Increased administrative cost for EU bidders due to additional documents or evidence is
also often seen as likely (46%: 13% very likely, 33% somewhat likely). A lower number
of bids received (44%: 12% very likely, 32% somewhat likely) and reduced litigation
(33%: 6% very likely, 27% somewhat likely) attract the lowest shares of positive
expectations.
Disagreement that these outcomes will occur (somewhat unlikely or very unlikely) is
highest for a lower number of bids received (26%: 24% somewhat unlikely, 2% very
unlikely) and reduced litigation (23%: 16% somewhat unlikely, 7% very unlikely),
followed by increased administrative cost for EU bidders (25%: 21% somewhat unlikely,
4% very unlikely) and increased administrative cost for public buyers (22%: 20%
somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely). Perceived likelihood is also more contested for an
increase in price of goods and services purchased (20%: 18% somewhat unlikely, 2%
very unlikely) and retaliation by third countries (9%: 7% somewhat unlikely, 2% very
unlikely). For the more “beneficial” effects, disagreement is relatively low: 5–7%
somewhat/very unlikely for increased chance of winning for EU bidders, EU operators
needing to adjust supply chains, boosts to EU employment and investment, meeting
environmental goals, boosting innovation, increased security of supply, better quality,
and easier access for EU SMEs.
Across all outcomes, the share of respondents expecting “no impact” ranges from 7% for
increased chance of winning for EU bidders to 45% for reduced litigation. Intermediate
“no impact” levels are reported for EU economic operators adjusting supply chains
(10%), boosts to EU employment (11%) and investment (9%), meeting environmental
goals and boosting EU innovation (each 12%), increased security of supply (14%), better
quality (17%), easier access for EU SMEs (24%), and increase in price of goods and
services purchased (17%). Around three in ten see no impact on retaliation by third
countries (29%), administrative cost for public buyers (28%), and administrative cost for
EU bidders and lower number of bids received (each 30%).
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Table 89: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur if any type of prioritisation of
European products and services was to be implemented?; percentage of respondents that indicated “very likely” or
“somewhat likely” answers, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked how likely they believed different outcomes would be if any
type of prioritisation of European products and services was implemented. The figures
below refer only to the combined shares of “very likely” and “somewhat likely” answers
(other response options were also available but are not shown).
Among public authorities, the outcomes most often seen as likely were increased chance
of winning for EU bidders (88%), EU economic operators needing to adjust their supply
chains (89%) and retaliation by third countries (87%). For other outcomes, perceived
likelihood ranged from 9% to 84%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced
litigation (9%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, increased chance of winning
for EU bidders was consistently among the most likely outcomes (large companies: 97%;
SMEs: 93%; business associations: 92%), together with meeting environmental goals
(88%, 93$, 73%) and need to adjust supply chains (88%, 81%,84%). SMEs in particular,
expected easier access to procurement for EU SMEs (89%). Across these three groups,
perceived likelihood of the remaining outcomes ranged from 24% to 93%. Very low
likelihood was reported for reduced litigation among large companies (24%) and
business associations (26%).
Among trade unions, the most likely outcomes were boosts to EU innovation (100%),
investments and employment (both 99%), together with meeting environmental goals
(98%), better quality of products and services (99%) and EU economic operators having
to adjust supply chains (98%). NGOs most frequently pointed to increased chance of
winning for EU bidders (87%), meeting environmental goals (86%) and boosts to
employment (85%) as likely. For these two groups, perceived likelihood of the other
outcomes ranged from 2% to 98%. Very low likelihood was reported for retaliation by
Respondent
Boost investme nts levels in the EU (e.g. reindustri alisation, reshoring, more FDI)
Boost EU employm ent
Boost EU innovatio n
Increase security of supply
Retaliatio n by 3rd countries (exclusion of EU companie s from their procurem ent)
Reduced litigation
Meeting environm ental goals (e.g. shortenin g supply chains, carbon footprint)
Lower number of bids received
Increase in administr ative cost (verificati on if condition s are met)
Increase in price of goods and services purchase d
Better quality of products/ services/ works
Increased chance of winning for EU bidders
Increased administr ative cost for EU biddders due to additional document s or evidence
Easier access to procurem ent for EU SMEs
EU economic operators could have to adjust their supply chains to be able to bid
No. of responses
All 84% 84% 81% 76% 62% 33% 83% 44% 51% 63% 71% 92% 46% 68% 88% 657-699 Public Authorities EU 81% 82% 78% 65% 87% 9% 82% 46% 67% 84% 51% 88% 53% 57% 89% 99-103 Large companies EU 87% 83% 81% 77% 64% 24% 88% 53% 55% 68% 68% 97% 53% 66% 88% 94-99 SMEs EU 87% 91% 91% 87% 57% 40% 93% 42% 42% 58% 81% 93% 35% 89% 81% 42-45 Business associations EU 77% 77% 74% 70% 72% 26% 73% 55% 60% 71% 70% 92% 58% 59% 84% 144-158 Trade unions EU 99% 99% 100% 97% 6% 95% 98% 2% 4% 7% 99% 97% 4% 95% 98% 84-98 NGOs EU* 76% 85% 73% 80% 55% 20% 86% 48% 53% 63% 78% 87% 45% 65% 82% 60-71 Academia 94% 84% 79% 84% 84% 21% 84% 53% 63% 79% 63% 95% 44% 42% 83% 18-19 Citizens + other EU** 89% 87% 85% 78% 71% 30% 82% 44% 51% 69% 74% 92% 51% 75% 91% 84-90 Non-EU 50% 44% 42% 39% 84% 5% 37% 83% 74% 89% 26% 68% 79% 41% 95% 17-19
Central EU 83% 83% 79% 71% 63% 26% 81% 46% 52% 66% 67% 92% 49% 67% 87% 351-378 North EU 73% 76% 65% 71% 72% 28% 81% 48% 60% 70% 53% 91% 52% 58% 94% 61-73 South EU 92% 92% 92% 89% 65% 43% 91% 43% 49% 62% 88% 94% 39% 74% 88% 141-148 East EU 90% 90% 90% 90% 41% 54% 89% 22% 32% 40% 86% 92% 30% 80% 86% 75-81 Central EU authorities 82% 79% 78% 58% 85% 8% 80% 52% 72% 84% 47% 84% 56% 52% 86% 63-66 North EU authorities 82% 82% 65% 76% 94% 6% 82% 47% 65% 94% 47% 88% 53% 56% 100% 16-17 South EU authorities 79% 100% 93% 71% 87% 20% 93% 20% 50% 73% 80% 100% 29% 73% 93% 14-15 East EU authorities 80% 80% 80% 100% 100% 0% 80% 40% 60% 80% 40% 100% 80% 80% 80% 5-5
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third countries (6%), lower number of bids received (2%), increase in administrative cost
(4%), increase in price (7%) and increased administrative cost for EU bidders (4%)
among trade unions, and for reduced litigation (20%) among NGOs.
Among academia, citizens and other respondents increased chance of winning for EU
bidders was again seen as a very likely outcome (academia: 95%; citizens and other
respondents: 92%), alongside boosts to investment and employment (academia: 94% and
84%; citizens and other respondents: 89% and 87%). For non-EU respondents the most
likely outcomes were EU economic operators needing to adjust their supply chains
(95%), increase in price of goods and services purchased (89%) and retaliation by third
countries (84%). Across these three groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining
outcomes ranged from 5% to 84%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced
litigation among academia (21%) and non-EU respondents (5%).
Respondents were invited to identify any other implications of introducing prioritisation
for European products and services.
Public authorities
Public authorities expressed concerns and identified potential implications of prioritizing
European products and services in public procurement. Some key points mentioned
include:
• The risk of trade disputes and instability in the global environment
• The potential for increased costs and reduced competition, particularly in sectors
with limited suppliers
• The need for clear guidance from the Commission to ensure consistent
application of European preference criteria
• The importance of complying with WTO agreements and international
obligations
• The potential for reduced innovation and quality improvement due to reduced
competitive pressure
• The practical challenges of verifying the origin of products and services
• The need for a nuanced approach, considering the specific needs and
circumstances of different sectors and contracting authorities
• The potential for increased administrative burdens and costs for contracting
authorities and bidders
• The importance of ensuring that European preference criteria do not lead to
protectionism or unfair competition
Some respondents also emphasized the need for a voluntary and flexible approach,
allowing contracting authorities to prioritize European products and services in specific
sectors or cases, while others suggested that the focus should be on promoting high
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economic, social, and environmental standards, rather than solely on European origin.
Additionally, some respondents noted that the introduction of European preference
criteria could lead to increased steering and legislation from EU institutions, which could
be counterproductive. Overall, the comments highlight the complexity and potential
challenges of introducing European preference criteria in public procurement, and the
need for careful consideration and balanced approaches to ensure that such criteria are
effective and fair.
EU companies and business associations
EU companies and business associations identified various implications of prioritizing
European products and services in public procurement, including potential increased
costs, reduced competition, and administrative burdens. Some respondents noted that a
"Made in Europe" principle could strengthen European industrial capacity, resilience,
and security of supply, while others cautioned against rigid geo-prioritization that could
fragment global digital ecosystems and undermine European competitiveness. Many
emphasized the need for a nuanced and targeted approach, considering the specific needs
and circumstances of different sectors and contracting authorities.
Some key concerns mentioned include:
• Retaliatory measures from third countries
• Administrative burdens and costs associated with verifying the origin of products
and services
• Potential negative impact on innovation and quality due to reduced competition
• Difficulty in defining what constitutes "local content" or a "European" product or
supplier
• Risk of higher prices and reduced competition if European suppliers are not
competitive
• Importance of maintaining a level playing field and avoiding protectionism
Respondents also suggested alternative approaches, such as:
• Focusing on non-price criteria like sustainability, innovation, and security of
supply
• Using qualitative criteria like recycling rates or material reuse as award criteria
• Introducing a "Buy European Recyclates" model to promote secondary raw
materials
• Encouraging open and fair trade, rather than introducing "Made in Europe"
preferences
• Supporting European champions through public procurement, while avoiding
"vendor lock-in" to non-EU monopolies
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Overall, the comments highlight the complexity and potential challenges of introducing
European preference criteria in public procurement, and the need for careful
consideration and balanced approaches to ensure that such criteria are effective and fair.
Non-EU respondents
Non-EU respondents identified various implications of prioritizing European products
and services in public procurement, including potential risks to competition, innovation,
and supply chain resilience. Some key concerns mentioned include:
• Increased costs and reduced competition due to restrictive "Made in Europe"
criteria
• Administrative burdens and complexity for public procurers and companies
• Risk of retaliation from third countries and erosion of the rules-based trade order
• Potential negative impact on innovation and access to best-in-class technologies
• Difficulty in defining what constitutes "local content" or a "European" product or
supplier
• Importance of maintaining a level playing field and avoiding protectionism
Some respondents suggested alternative approaches, such as:
• Focusing on non-price criteria like sustainability, innovation, and security of
supply
• Introducing a "Best-of-Breed" Innovation Framework anchored in top-notch
research
• Promoting open industry standards to prevent vendor lock-in and maintain global
competitiveness and interoperability
• Measuring resilience by a provider's track record in securing global workloads
and deploying hyperscale resources instantly during crises
Others emphasized the need for a nuanced and targeted approach, considering the
specific needs and circumstances of different sectors and contracting authorities. Some
noted that "Made in Europe" criteria may not address the root causes of supply
disruptions and risk enforcing and creating new vulnerabilities and barriers to patient and
market access.
Overall, the comments highlight the complexity and potential challenges of introducing
European preference criteria in public procurement, and the need for careful
consideration and balanced approaches to ensure that such criteria are effective and fair.
All other respondents
All other respondents (except Public authorities, companies and business associations)
identified various implications of prioritizing European products and services in public
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procurement, including potential risks to competition, innovation, and supply chain
resilience. Some key concerns mentioned include:
• Risk of higher costs and reduced competition due to restrictive "Made in Europe"
criteria
• Administrative burdens and complexity for public procurers and companies
• Potential negative impact on innovation and access to best-in-class technologies
• Difficulty in defining what constitutes "local content" or a "European" product or
supplier
• Importance of maintaining a level playing field and avoiding protectionism
Some respondents suggested alternative approaches, such as:
• Focusing on non-price criteria like sustainability, innovation, and security of
supply
• Introducing a "Best-of-Breed" Innovation Framework anchored in top-notch
research
• Promoting open industry standards to prevent vendor lock-in and maintain global
competitiveness and interoperability
• Measuring resilience by a provider's track record in securing global workloads
and deploying hyperscale resources instantly during crises
Others emphasized the need for a nuanced and targeted approach, considering the
specific needs and circumstances of different sectors and contracting authorities. Some
noted that "Made in Europe" criteria may not address the root causes of supply
disruptions and risk enforcing and creating new vulnerabilities and barriers to patient and
market access.
The comments highlight the complexity and potential challenges of introducing
European preference criteria in public procurement, and the need for careful
consideration and balanced approaches to ensure that such criteria are effective and fair.
The "Made in Europe" principle must be tied to environmental and social standards, and
must be defined very carefully to maximize the outcome in terms of employment,
investment, and environmental footprint reduction. The criteria must not be a blank
check to European firms, but should be complemented by specific dispositions regarding
cooperation with third countries.
Giving priority to origin of goods will enhance consumer trust and foster sustainable
practices in the supply chain. However, Europe is expensive, so as the cost of goods &
services will be. By giving priority to Made in EU, the contracting authorities would be
paying more, so it will increase the overall cost. The other developing countries would
provide the goods or services at a cheaper value.
The removal of third-country companies from the European market can be
counterproductive in highly specialised markets such as research equipment.
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Some respondents also pointed out that promoting quality jobs and collective bargaining,
as well as ensuring that operators respect labour and social obligations and pay their fair
share of taxes in the EU, would benefit EU operators and create a level playing field. It is
necessary to eliminate the possibility to award contracts on the basis of price only (lowest
price).
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9.7. Best Price-Quality Ratio (BPQR) (ESI options)
Table 90: Question: Should EU law require public buyers to include minimum quality requirements in technical
specifications, subject to a comply-or-explain mechanism?; Should any change be made to the current contract award
criteria practice based on the “most economically advantageous tender” (MEAT)?; percentage of answers, by type of
respondent.
Should EU law require public buyers to include minimum quality requirements in technical specifications, subject to a comply-or-explain mechanism?
Should any change be made to the current contract award criteria practice based on the “most economically advantageous tender” (MEAT)?
Respondent Yes No
No. of responses
Yes No No. of
responses
All77% 23% 745 72% 28% 748
Public Authorities EU 48% 52% 107 35% 65% 104
Large companies EU 68% 32% 97 59% 41% 97
SMEs EU 93% 7% 60 89% 11% 64
Business associations EU 77% 23% 167 78% 22% 169
Trade unions EU 98% 2% 101 98% 2% 100
NGOs EU* 94% 6% 84 90% 10% 84
Academia 63% 37% 19 42% 58% 19
Citizens + other EU** 72% 28% 93 66% 34% 94
Non-EU 100% 0% 17 88% 12% 17
Central EU 71% 29% 419 68% 32% 424
North EU 63% 37% 78 57% 43% 77
South EU 94% 6% 154 86% 14% 154
East EU 86% 14% 77 80% 20% 76
Central EU authorities 43% 57% 69 30% 70% 67
North EU authorities 33% 67% 18 24% 76% 17
South EU authorities 88% 13% 16 75% 25% 16
East EU authorities 25% 75% 4 0% 100% 4 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
To the question "Should EU law require public buyers to include minimum quality
requirements in technical specifications, subject to a comply-or-explain mechanism?" all
respondent groups except public authorities-who were divided on the issue-answered
positively, with support ranging from 68% to 100%.
In response to the second question, "Should any change be made to the current contract
award criteria practice based on the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT)?" a
similar pattern emerged. However, public authorities were more strongly opposed, with
Table 91: Question: If you agree that the current contract award criteria based on the most economically
advantageous tender (MEAT) should be changed (answer Yes to the second question in Table 90), please indicate how
this should be done; multiple choice, percentage of answers, by type of respondent.
Respondent EU law should require public buyers to
EU law should set a minimum mandatory
Member States should be required to
No. of all responses
330
apply Best Price- Quality Ratio (BPQR) as the standard contract award criterion, subject to a comply-or-explain mechanism.
weight (share) for quality criteria in the application of the use of BPQR.
set national targets for BPQR awards of contracts and put into place corresponding action plans and supportive measures.
to MEAT question
All 51% 50% 28% 748
Public Authorities EU 22% 13% 15% 104
Large companies EU 38% 43% 23% 97
SMEs EU 27% 45% 27% 64
Business associations EU 46% 46% 31% 169
Trade unions EU 96% 98% 11% 100
NGOs EU* 81% 75% 60% 84
Academia 37% 26% 11% 19
Citizens + other EU** 40% 38% 31% 94
Non-EU 82% 59% 47% 17
Central EU 44% 44% 26% 424
North EU 47% 45% 30% 77
South EU 63% 60% 29% 154
East EU 58% 67% 26% 76
Central EU authorities 18% 12% 16% 67
North EU authorities 6% 6% 18% 17
South EU authorities 63% 25% 13% 16
East EU authorities 0% 0% 0% 4 * NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Multiple choice question; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Subsequently, respondents who agreed that the current contract award criteria based on
the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) should be changed were asked how
this change should be implemented.
The solution that attracted the highest number of replies among most respondent groups,
except businesses, was requiring public buyers to apply the Best Price-Quality Ratio
(BPQR) as the standard contract award criterion, subject to a comply-or-explain
mechanism. Support for this option ranged from 22% among public authorities to 96%
among trade unions.
EU large companies and SMEs most frequently selected the option for EU law to set a
minimum mandatory weight for quality criteria in the application of the BPQR. Both this
option and the BPQR comply-or-explain approach received similar levels of support
from all respondents, business associations, trade unions, citizens and other respondents.
9.7.1. BPQR impacts
Figure 79: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur if the future general legislative
framework incentivised BPQR?; all replies.
331
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “How likely do you believe the following outcomes would
occur if the future general legislative framework incentivised BPQR?”, respondents most
often expect better achievement of strategic policy goals (e.g. environmental, social,
innovation) (89%: 54% very likely, 35% somewhat likely) and better quality of products,
services and works (87%: 57% very likely, 30% somewhat likely). High shares also
anticipate a boost to EU innovation (82%: 43% very likely, 39% somewhat likely) and
increased efforts for bidders to adjust their supply chains to be able to bid (76%: 16%
very likely, 60% somewhat likely). Majorities consider increased security of supply
(65%: 18% very likely, 47% somewhat likely), higher chances of winning for EU firms
(73%: 34% very likely, 39% somewhat likely), improved working conditions (71%: 35%
very likely, 36% somewhat likely), and more reshoring, reindustrialisation and FDI in the
EU (64%: 30% very likely, 34% somewhat likely) as likely outcomes. On the cost side, a
majority foresee higher costs for EU bidders due to additional environmental/social
elements (54%: 11% very likely, 43% somewhat likely) and higher prices of goods,
services and works purchased (56%: 12% very likely, 44% somewhat likely). Increased
administrative cost for public buyers (verification if conditions are met) is also often
expected (48%: 12% very likely, 36% somewhat likely). Lower positive expectations are
reported for wider access to cross-border procurement (especially for SMEs) (45%: 8%
very likely, 37% somewhat likely), reduced litigation (35%: 21% very likely, 14%
54%
57%
43%
16%
34%
35%
18%
30%
12%
11%
12%
8%
21%
5%
35%
30%
39%
60%
39%
36%
47%
34%
44%
43%
36%
37%
14%
25%
2%
3%
3%
5%
5%
5%
8%
7%
21%
18%
11%
11%
17%
16%
1%
1%
1%
0%
1%
1%
2%
2%
1%
2%
14%
3%
6%
14%
, ,…
Better quality of products/services/works
Boost to EU innovation
I j …
Higher chances of winning for EU firms
Improved working conditions
Increased security of supply
More reshoring, reindustrialisation of the EU, more FDI in the EU
Higher price of goods/services/works purchased
H U / …
I …
Wider access to cross border procurement (especially for SMEs)
Reduced litigation
Reduced number of bids received
Very likely Somewhat likely No impact Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Respondent
Achievem ent of strategic policy goals (e.g. environm ental, social, innovatio n)
Better quality of products/ services/ works
Boost to EU innovatio n
Increased efforts for bidders to adjust their supply chains to be able to bid
Higher chances of winning for EU firms
Improved working condition s
Increased security of supply
More reshoring, reindustri alisation of the EU, more FDI in the EU
Higher price of goods/ser vices/wor ks purchase d
Higher costs for EU bidders (additiona l environm ental/soci al elements)
Increased administr ative cost for public buyers (verificati on if condition s are met)
Wider access to cross border procurem ent (especiall y for SMEs)
Reduced litigation
Reduced number of bids received
Very likely 54% 57% 43% 16% 34% 35% 18% 30% 12% 11% 12% 8% 21% 5% Somewhat likely 35% 30% 39% 60% 39% 36% 47% 34% 44% 43% 36% 37% 14% 25% No impact 9% 10% 14% 19% 21% 23% 26% 27% 23% 26% 28% 42% 41% 41% Somewhat unlikely 2% 3% 3% 5% 5% 5% 8% 7% 21% 18% 11% 11% 17% 16% Very unlikely 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 14% 3% 6% 14% No. of responses 667 676 667 647 668 657 651 643 668 662 664 647 653 635
332
somewhat likely), and reduced number of bids received (30%: 5% very likely, 25%
somewhat likely).
Disagreement that these outcomes will occur (somewhat unlikely or very unlikely) is
highest for reduced number of bids received (30%: 16% somewhat unlikely, 14% very
unlikely), increased administrative cost for public buyers (25%: 11% somewhat unlikely,
14% very unlikely), higher prices of goods, services and works purchased (22%: 21%
somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely), and higher costs for EU bidders (20%: 18%
somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely). For reduced litigation, 23% disagree (17%
somewhat unlikely, 6% very unlikely), and for wider access to cross-border procurement
14% disagree (11% somewhat unlikely, 3% very unlikely). For the “beneficial”
outcomes, disagreement is comparatively low: 3–6% somewhat/very unlikely for
achievement of strategic goals, better quality, EU innovation, adjusted supply chains,
higher chances of winning for EU firms, improved working conditions, increased
security of supply, and more reshoring/reindustrialisation/FDI.
Across all outcomes, the share of respondents expecting “no impact” ranges from 9–10%
for achievement of strategic policy goals and better quality to 42–41% for wider access
to cross-border procurement, reduced litigation, and reduced number of bids received.
Intermediate “no impact” levels are reported for a boost to EU innovation (14%),
increased efforts to adjust supply chains (19%), higher chances of winning for EU firms
(21%), improved working conditions (23%), higher prices and higher costs for EU
bidders (23–26%), increased security of supply (26%), increased administrative cost for
public buyers (28%), and more reshoring, reindustrialisation and FDI in the EU (27%).
Table 92: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur if the future general legislative
framework incentivised BPQR?; percentage of respondents that indicated “very likely” or “somewhat likely” answers,
by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondent Reduced litigation
Achievem ent of strategic policy goals (e.g. environm ental, social, innovatio n)
Improved working condition s
Boost to EU innovatio n
Increased security of supply
Wider access to cross border procurem ent (especiall y for SMEs)
More reshoring, reindustri alisation of the EU, more FDI in the EU
Reduced number of bids received
Increased administr ative cost for public buyers (verificati on if condition s are met)
Higher price of goods/ser vices/wor ks purchase d
Better quality of products/ services/ works
Higher chances of winning for EU firms
Higher costs for EU bidders (additiona l environm ental/soci al elements)
Increased efforts for bidders to adjust their supply chains to be able to bid
No. of responses
All 35% 88% 71% 82% 65% 44% 64% 30% 48% 56% 87% 73% 54% 76% 635-676 Public Authorities EU 7% 76% 58% 60% 34% 22% 36% 43% 71% 78% 64% 52% 75% 67% 94-99 Large companies EU 19% 88% 57% 81% 60% 26% 65% 35% 53% 65% 82% 66% 51% 66% 87-91 SMEs EU 31% 95% 72% 85% 75% 63% 70% 28% 40% 46% 100% 83% 54% 80% 39-41 Business associations EU24% 88% 59% 85% 64% 36% 61% 35% 60% 68% 85% 71% 70% 72% 133-144 Trade unions EU 95% 100% 98% 98% 99% 96% 97% 4% 5% 12% 100% 98% 7% 95% 80-100 NGOs EU* 42% 94% 87% 91% 70% 44% 54% 23% 34% 44% 95% 79% 48% 84% 71-81 Academia 16% 83% 74% 74% 47% 32% 59% 28% 72% 79% 79% 74% 71% 75% 16-19 Citizens + other EU** 30% 81% 69% 79% 61% 40% 68% 29% 51% 64% 89% 74% 61% 72% 85-89 Non-EU 41% 94% 75% 76% 65% 47% 56% 35% 50% 47% 94% 53% 47% 82% 16-17
Central EU 29% 86% 65% 78% 58% 40% 58% 29% 48% 57% 82% 70% 56% 73% 341-365 North EU 37% 83% 66% 75% 57% 34% 50% 40% 54% 57% 77% 64% 52% 71% 66-73 South EU 40% 94% 83% 93% 75% 49% 79% 32% 51% 60% 96% 80% 57% 89% 142-151 East EU 49% 93% 79% 89% 83% 63% 75% 16% 32% 42% 97% 90% 39% 67% 64-73 Central EU authorities 7% 67% 52% 57% 25% 19% 30% 39% 68% 75% 54% 44% 77% 66% 58-62 North EU authorities 6% 81% 67% 50% 33% 6% 29% 61% 83% 78% 61% 44% 67% 63% 16-18 South EU authorities 14% 100% 73% 80% 64% 40% 80% 43% 60% 93% 100% 87% 80% 87% 14-15 East EU authorities 0% 100% 50% 75% 50% 75% 0% 25% 100% 75% 100% 75% 50% 25% 4-4
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Respondents were asked how likely they believed different outcomes would be if the
future general legislative framework incentivised the best price-quality ratio (BPQR).
The figures refer to the combined shares of “very likely” and “somewhat likely” answers
(other response options were also available but are not shown).
Among public authorities, the most likely outcomes were higher price of
goods/services/works purchased (78%), achievement of strategic policy goals (e.g.
environmental, social, innovation) (76%), higher costs for EU bidders (75%) and higher
administrative cost for public buyers (71%). For other outcomes, perceived likelihood
ranged from 7% to 67%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced litigation (7%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, better quality of
products/services/works was consistently seen as a key likely outcome (large companies:
82%; SMEs: 100%; business associations: 85%), alongside achievement of strategic
policy goals (88%; 95%; 88%) and a boost to EU innovation (81%; 85%; 85%). Across
these three groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining outcomes ranged from 24% to
80%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced litigation among large companies
(19%) and business associations (24%).
Among trade unions and NGOs, the outcomes most often regarded as likely included
achievement of strategic policy goals (trade unions: 100%; NGOs: 94%), better quality of
products/services/works (100%; 95%), improved working conditions (98%; 87%) and a
boost to EU innovation (98%; 91%). For these two groups, perceived likelihood of the
other outcomes ranged from 4% to 99%. Very low likelihood was reported among trade
unions for reduced number of bids received (4%), increased administrative cost for
public buyers (5%), higher price of goods/services/works (12%) and higher costs for EU
bidders (7%), and among NGOs for reduced number of bids received (23%) and
increased administrative cost for public buyers (34%).
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents, the most
likely outcomes were again achievement of strategic policy goals (academia: 83%;
citizens and other respondents: 81%; non-EU respondents: 94%), better quality of
products/services/works (79%; 89%; 94%) and, to a lesser extent, boosts to EU
innovation (74%; 79%; 76%). Across these three groups, perceived likelihood of the
remaining outcomes ranged from 16% to 94%. Very low likelihood was reported for
reduced litigation among academia (16%).
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9.8. Green public procurement (ESI options)
Figure 80: Question: To what extent do you agree with the following statements on green/environmentally friendly
public procurement?; all replies.
1. No amendments are required to the existing
legal framework regarding environmental
provisions, including both the general
legislative framework and public procurement
provisions in sectoral legislation.
2. The general legislative framework should
further incentivise the use of green public
procurement.
3. EU public procurement law should
mandate further green public procurement
obligations.
Strongly agree 10% 31% 27%
Agree 13% 40% 28%
Neutral 19% 17% 15%
Disagree 36% 7% 18%
Strongly disagree 22% 4% 12%
No. of responses 748 763 756 Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
When asked about environmental provisions in public procurement (green procurement),
the strongest support was for further incentives to encourage its use, with 72% in favour
(31% strongly agree, 40% agree). This was followed by support for mandating additional
green procurement obligations, backed by 55% (27% strongly agree, 28% agree).
The proposition that no amendments should be made to existing environmental
provisions-whether in general or sectoral public procurement legislation-received support
from less than a quarter of respondents, with a majority of 58% opposing this view.
31%
27%
10%
40%
28%
13%
7%
18%
36%
4%
12%
22%
2. The general legislative framework should further incentivise the use of green public procurement.
3. EU public procurement law should mandate further green public procurement obligations.
1. No amendments are required to the existing legal framework regarding environmental provisions, including
both the general legislative framework and public procurement provisions in sectoral legislation.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
335
Table 93: Question: To what extent do you agree with the following statements on green/environmentally friendly
public procurement?; percentage of respondents that agree or strongly agree, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
This table presents the breakdown of responses by different respondent groups. The
figures represent the combined shares of "strongly agree" and "agree" responses (other
response options were available but are not shown here). In all main groups, the strongest
support was for further incentives to use green procurement.
Respondent
1. No amendments are required to the existing legal framework regarding environmental provisions, including both the general legislative framework and public procurement provisions in sectoral legislation.
2. The general legislative framework should further incentivise the use of green public procurement.
3. EU public procurement law should mandate further green public procurement obligations.
No. of responses
All 23% 72% 55% 748-763 Public Authorities EU 45% 47% 33% 105-108 Large companies EU 24% 78% 50% 104-107 SMEs EU 16% 60% 47% 61-64 Business associations EU 26% 65% 42% 177-179 Trade unions EU 2% 95% 92% 96-100 NGOs EU* 8% 90% 86% 75-81 Academia 21% 84% 53% 19-19 Citizens + other EU** 32% 67% 49% 90-94 Non-EU 19% 88% 50% 16-16
Central EU 23% 67% 51% 427-436 North EU 23% 73% 58% 78-80 South EU 19% 83% 64% 149-155 East EU 34% 67% 56% 77-78 Central EU authorities 53% 41% 30% 66-68 North EU authorities 38% 56% 24% 16-18 South EU authorities 25% 63% 63% 16-16 East EU authorities 33% 50% 17% 6-6
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Table 94: Question: If you "agree" or "strongly agree" with point 2 (Figure 80). Which of the following elements
should be introduced to further incentivise the use of green public procurement?; percentage of answers to point 2, by
type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Multiple choice question; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. Point 2. The general legislative framework should further incentivise the use of green public procurement. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked, among those who agreed or strongly agreed that the regulatory
framework should further incentivise the use of green public procurement, which
elements should be introduced for that purpose. The figures below refer to the share of
those agreeing respondents selecting each option.
The strongest support among all respondents was for clear definitions (56%) and green
standards (54%), followed by easier use of environmental labels (42%). The remaining
measures received support from around a third of respondents.
Among public authorities, the most frequently selected elements were easier use of
environmental labels (41%) and green standards (36%). Support for other elements
ranged from 17% to 31%, with notably lower levels for keeping rules in sectorial acts
while making them more coherent (17%) and for non‑binding targets (22%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, a clear legal definition of
green public procurement was consistently important (60% for large companies, 49% for
SMEs, 46% for business associations). Large companies also placed emphasis on making
environmental labels easier to apply (50%), and on green standards (47%), while SMEs
and business associations showed moderate support for standards (33% and 42%).
Across these three groups, support for other elements ranged from 7% to 50%, with very
low support for prioritising short food supply chains among large companies and
business associations (7% - 10%).
Respondent
EU law should provide a clear legal definition of green public procurement to facilitate its consistent implementation and improve policymaking.
Non-binding targets for green public procurement should be set at the EU and Member State levels, together with accompanying strategies or plans to ensure their achievement.
EU law should make the use of environmental labels easier to apply and more effective so as to support public purchasing of green solutions.
The use of green public procurement should be supported by standards to facilitate the work of public buyers.
EU rules on green public procurement should be kept in sectorial acts but be made more consistent and coherent across sectorial acts.
The link to the subject matter principle should be softened, to allow the possibility to take into account companies’ overall environmental policies (such as due diligence).
EU law should facilitate the prioritisation by public buyers of short supply chains in the public procurement of food. Other:
No. of responses to point 2
All 56% 36% 42% 54% 38% 36% 32% 13% 763 Public Authorities EU 30% 22% 41% 36% 17% 24% 31% 8% 108 Large companies EU 60% 27% 50% 47% 26% 31% 10% 14% 107 SMEs EU 49% 27% 40% 33% 21% 17% 29% 10% 63 Business associations EU 46% 30% 34% 42% 28% 17% 7% 13% 179 Trade unions EU 93% 79% 16% 90% 88% 90% 88% 10% 96
NGOs EU* 80% 37% 73% 81% 60% 57% 54% 22% 81 Academia 58% 16% 68% 53% 37% 42% 42% 5% 19 Citizens + other EU** 48% 31% 45% 53% 33% 24% 31% 13% 94 Non-EU 69% 56% 56% 75% 38% 56% 25% 25% 16
Central EU 52% 33% 41% 50% 33% 32% 28% 14% 436 North EU 50% 42% 41% 56% 47% 47% 37% 14% 78 South EU 70% 34% 52% 59% 45% 38% 35% 11% 155 East EU 58% 44% 27% 54% 42% 38% 46% 4% 78 Central EU authorities 28% 18% 31% 32% 13% 18% 28% 7% 68 North EU authorities 17% 33% 56% 39% 22% 33% 39% 11% 18 South EU authorities 56% 31% 63% 44% 25% 38% 38% 6% 16 East EU authorities 17% 17% 50% 50% 17% 33% 33% 17% 6
337
Trade unions gave very high support (79% - 93%) to all measures except easier use of
green labels (16%). NGOs most frequently supported standards (81%), a clear legal
definition (80%), with all the remaining measures except non-binding targets receiving
above 50% support.
Academia most often favoured easier use of environmental labels (68%), a clear legal
definition (58%) and standards (53%). Citizens and other respondents showed balanced
support for a definition (48%), standards (53%) and environmental labels (45%).
Non‑EU respondents most frequently chose standards (75%) and a clear legal definition
(69%).
Those who selected Other were asked to elaborate. A summary of their responses is
presented below.
Public authorities
A significant proportion of public authorities who provided comments suggested that
changes to incentivise green public procurement should involve simplifying procedures
and reducing administrative burdens, with some proposing the inclusion of policy goals
to promote environmentally and socially sustainable procurement. Many respondents
emphasized the need for consistency and standardisation, with one example stating that
"simplifying verification requirements through standardisation would provide significant
support to contracting authorities and contracting entities". There was also a call for the
procurement directives to better facilitate the use of strategic procurement for strategic
objectives like green public procurement, with some advocating for the use of ESG
ratings, such as Ecovadis, to weigh companies' environmental and social responsibility.
A notable suggestion was to award contracts to the "most economically responsible
tender" rather than the most economically advantageous one, which would provide
increased legal certainty and incentive for an environmental approach. Some respondents
also highlighted the importance of considering fair trade and social criteria in supply
chains, particularly for non-European products. Overall, the comments from public
authorities indicated a desire for a more streamlined and effective approach to green
public procurement, with a focus on simplification, standardisation, and the inclusion of
environmental and social considerations.
EU companies and business associations
A significant proportion of EU companies and business associations who provided
comments suggested that changes to incentivise green public procurement should involve
setting binding targets and providing clear guidance on green criteria, with many
emphasizing the need for a harmonized approach across the EU to avoid unnecessary
administrative burdens. Some respondents, advocated for the use of existing frameworks
like the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation and the Digital Product Passport
to ensure a workable legislative framework. Many companies, supported the use of
binding targets for green public procurement, accompanied by clear strategies, to provide
legal certainty and drive measurable environmental outcomes. There was also a call for
the inclusion of green criteria in public procurement, with some suggesting that these
criteria should be outcome-based, proportionate, and linked to the contract. A few
companies, emphasized the need for mandatory green public procurement, while others,
suggested that incentives should be provided to manufacturers who have decarbonized
338
their industries. Some respondents, highlighted the importance of considering the total
cost of ownership and the life cycle costs of products, rather than just the initial price, to
ensure that green procurement is effective. Overall, the comments from EU companies
and business associations indicated a desire for a more streamlined and effective
approach to green public procurement, with a focus on harmonization, clarity, and
incentives for sustainable practices, as one respondent noted, "the new directive should
reward manufacturers who have decarbonized their industries".
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
A significant proportion of EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions
who provided comments suggested that changes to incentivise green public procurement
should involve setting binding targets for green public procurement at EU and Member
State level, together with accompanying strategies or plans to ensure their achievement,
as stated by one respondent, "binding targets for green public procurement should be set
at EU and Member State level, together with corresponding strategies or plans to ensure
their achievement". Many respondents advocated for the introduction of clear and robust
environmental and climate requirements, including the use of lifecycle costing
methodologies and the Best Price-Quality and Sustainability Ratio (BPQ&S) as the
default award criterion for public contracts. Some respondents, suggested redefining the
Most Economically Advantageous Tender (MEAT) criteria as the Most Advantageous
Tender (MAT) to provide greater flexibility for social and environmental considerations.
There was also a call for the inclusion of animal welfare standards as a criterion in public
procurement procedures, particularly for food procurements, with one respondent noting
that "short supply chains, in themselves, do not guarantee higher animal welfare
outcomes in public food procurement". A few respondents emphasized the need to
prioritize sustainability criteria, including those related to circular economy objectives,
and to promote negotiated procedures for more flexible requirements and specifications.
Overall, the comments from EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions
indicated a desire for a more ambitious and effective approach to green public
procurement, with a focus on binding targets, clear environmental and climate
requirements, and the use of lifecycle costing methodologies, as one respondent noted,
"price-only awards rarely deliver value for money, and should be strictly limited and
replaced with the best price-quality ratio (BPQR)".
All other respondents
Respondents from the 'All other respondents' group who provided comments on which
other changes should be introduced to further incentivise the use of green public
procurement, were essentially asking for adjustments to existing regulations to better
promote environmentally friendly practices. The comments reveal a predominant concern
for establishing binding targets for green public procurement, particularly for sustainable
plastics, at both EU and Member State levels, with many emphasizing the need for
accompanying strategies or action plans to ensure effective implementation. Some
respondents suggest incorporating policy goals that promote environmentally and
socially sustainable procurement. However, a minority argue against a "one-size-fits-all"
approach, instead advocating for principles that allow contracting authorities to apply
green public procurement methodologies on a case-by-case basis, citing potential
restrictions, delays, or increased costs. For instance, one comment notes that rules
creating "artificial restrictions" should not be adopted. Additionally, there are suggestions
for introducing templates for BPQR criteria and verification methods, incentivising the
339
reuse of existing solutions, and providing free access to a central database of green
procurement criteria and case studies. Some respondents also propose offering financial
incentives for public buyers and bidders that exceed green procurement targets, while
others believe that each Member State should retain control over the level of sustainable
development requirements, suggesting legal solutions to facilitate the use of short supply
chains. As one respondent puts it, "EU rules on green public procurement should not be
based on a 'one-size-fits-all' approach," highlighting the tension between uniform
regulations and flexible application.
Table 95: Question: If you "agree" or "strongly agree" with point 3 (Figure 80). Which of the following elements
should be made mandatory?; percentage of answers to point 3, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Multiple choice question; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. Point 3. EU public procurement law should mandate further green public procurement obligations. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that more regulatory measures are needed for
green public procurement were asked which elements should be made mandatory.
Figures refer to the share of these respondents selecting each option.
A third of all respondents supported making exclusion grounds mandatory for companies
violating environmental obligations. Easier use of environmental labels received slightly
lower support at 29%, closely followed by mandatory product-specific minimum
requirements and obligatory green procurement strategies for large buyers, both at 28%.
Among public authorities, mandatory minimum environmental requirements for specific
products, services and works (20%), mandatory targets at EU and national level (16%)
and legal obligations for large public buyers to develop green public procurement
strategies (17%) were most often selected.
The general legislative framework should set mandatory minimum environmental requirements for specific products, services and works to be applied at different stages of procurement procedure.
The general legislative framework should set mandatory minimum horizontal environmental requirements, without imposing sector or product specific requirements.
The current optional exclusion ground for companies that have violated applicable environmental obligations should be made mandatory.
Green public procurement targets should be mandated at EU and at Member State level.
Use of ecolabels should be made mandatory.
Requirement of a link to the subject matter should be eliminated.
Large public buyers shall be legally obliged to develop green public procurement strategies. Other
No. of responses to point 3
All 28% 24% 33% 29% 9% 18% 28% 16% 756 Public Authorities EU 20% 9% 13% 16% 10% 15% 17% 5% 105 Large companies EU 29% 9% 14% 24% 12% 10% 28% 11% 104 SMEs EU 38% 11% 23% 33% 11% 6% 27% 2% 64 Business associations EU 27% 9% 11% 24% 5% 2% 25% 7% 177 Trade unions EU 5% 87% 87% 20% 2% 80% 9% 62% 100 NGOs EU* 52% 35% 76% 75% 15% 13% 63% 27% 79 Academia 47% 16% 32% 26% 21% 11% 37% 11% 19 Citizens + other EU** 33% 17% 32% 29% 11% 9% 33% 7% 92 Non-EU 25% 31% 31% 31% 13% 6% 38% 25% 16
Central EU 27% 20% 28% 28% 9% 14% 27% 14% 429 North EU 20% 31% 41% 29% 4% 30% 23% 23% 80 South EU 41% 23% 41% 38% 14% 19% 35% 16% 154 East EU 19% 36% 39% 18% 4% 29% 19% 26% 77 Central EU authorities 14% 9% 11% 15% 11% 17% 15% 6% 66 North EU authorities 12% 6% 12% 18% 0% 12% 18% 6% 17 South EU authorities 56% 6% 31% 25% 19% 19% 31% 0% 16 East EU authorities 17% 17% 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 0% 6
340
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, mandatory product-specific
environmental requirements were most frequently chosen (29% for large companies,
38% for SMEs, 27% for business associations), followed by mandatory targets (24%-
33%) and mandatory strategies for large public buyers (25–28%).
Trade unions strongly backed mandatory horizontal environmental requirements and
mandatory exclusion grounds for environmental violations (both 87%), and removal of
the link to the subject matter (80%). NGOs most often supported mandatory exclusion
grounds (76%), mandatory targets (75%) and mandatory strategies (63%).
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents, mandatory
product-specific requirements, mandatory exclusion grounds and mandatory strategies
for large public buyers drew the most support (roughly 25–47%, depending on the
group).
Those who selected Other were asked to elaborate. A summary of their responses is
presented below.
Public authorities
Public authorities respondents who provided comments on which other mandatory
obligations regarding the use of green public procurement should be introduced, were
essentially seeking to integrate environmental and social considerations into procurement
decisions. Many respondents suggest amending the directives to require binding
sustainable development objectives, incorporating social and environmental
considerations horizontally across future directives, and considering the durability of
products and materials used in contracts. Some propose making it compulsory to take
account of sustainable development objectives, leaving it to the buyer to determine the
most appropriate considerations for each contract. However, a minority argue against
prescribing specific requirements, such as BPQR weighting or technical requirements, to
achieve EU strategic objectives, stating that this would unnecessarily restrict freedom of
procurement. For instance, one comment notes that "the procurement directives should
focus solely on procurement" and that contracting authorities should determine their own
objectives and methods. Another respondent suggests simplifying the discussion around
ESG (environmental, social, and corporate governance) ratings by introducing a
"mandatory weighing 10% of the ESG Ratings of a Company" in platforms like
Ecovadis. There is also a call to clarify the legislation concerning the link to the subject
matter of the contract, rather than abolishing it, to ensure that considerations relating to
durability are presumed to be related and proportionate to the contract.
EU companies and business associations
EU companies and business associations respondents provided comments on which other
mandatory obligations regarding the use of green public procurement should be
introduced, essentially seeking to promote environmentally friendly and circular
economy practices. Many respondents suggest introducing mandatory minimum
environmental requirements, such as recycled content obligations, circularity
requirements, and carbon footprint considerations, to be applied at different stages of the
procurement procedure. Some propose incorporating default carbon values into
341
purchasing criteria, assessing full lifecycle costs, and recognizing environmental
contributions that go beyond legal minima. There is also a call for sector-specific
requirements, rather than horizontal ones, to ensure targeted and effective
implementation. For instance, one comment suggests introducing "bio-based content
targets" and embedding Green Public Procurement (GPP) criteria to allow companies to
demonstrate compliance using their Product Carbon Footprint data. Another respondent
advocates for making the integration of non-price criteria, such as green and social
criteria, mandatory in public procurement, and ensuring they influence award decisions
through quantifiable scoring systems. However, some respondents caution that
mandatory requirements should be accompanied by practical guidance, support, and
capacity-building for public buyers to ensure feasible implementation, and that
requirements should be proportionate and harmonized at the EU level to avoid
fragmentation and increased compliance costs. As one respondent puts it, "clear rules on
checks of green claims to avoid 'organised green washing'" are necessary, and another
notes that "criteria developed under Public Procurement should be measurable, objective
and harmonized at the EU level."
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions respondents provided
comments on which other mandatory obligations regarding the use of green public
procurement should be introduced, emphasizing the need to prioritize environmental and
social considerations. A dominant view is that "Technical Standards" (Annex VII) should
not address employment and social issues, as employment law, collective agreements,
and human rights standards should take precedence over any label or certification. Many
respondents stress that green public procurement must be accompanied by measures to
promote quality jobs, collective bargaining, and good working conditions, including for
subcontracting. There is a strong call for mandatory horizontal environmental
requirements to provide clear direction to Member States and contracting authorities,
supporting uniform implementation and advancing environmental objectives. Some
respondents propose introducing binding EU-wide targets and strategies, setting
minimum sustainability criteria based on scientific evidence, and assessing full lifecycle
costs. Others suggest promoting fair trade, using credible third-party verified
certifications and labels, and applying circular public procurement criteria to high-impact
sectors. For instance, one comment notes that "environmental public procurement cuts
emissions, reduces waste, and supports circularity by choosing low-impact goods and
services," while another suggests that "integrating Fair Trade strengthens these gains" by
ensuring minimum prices, safer production, and ecosystem protection for farmers.
However, there is also a recognition that mandatory requirements should be balanced
with flexibility to allow for the use of different certifications and labels, and that the "link
to the subject matter" rule should be clarified to enable greater flexibility. As one
respondent puts it, "greater flexibility is crucial to allow the use of credible, third-party
verified certifications and labels that refer to the organization's sustainability
performance."
All other respondents
All other respondents provided comments on which other mandatory obligations
regarding the use of green public procurement should be introduced, emphasizing the
need for a range of measures to promote sustainability and social responsibility. Many
respondents suggest introducing technical requirements, such as carbon footprint
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measurement and reporting, certification, and compulsory training for public buyers in
Life Cycle Analysis and sustainability criteria. Some propose binding social criteria,
including respect for EU labour standards and gender equality, as well as market reserves
for innovative SMEs and digital post-sale monitoring using IoT sensors. There are also
calls for centralisation of green purchases, creation of cross-border central purchasing
bodies, and removal of discretionary grounds for exclusion. A few respondents
emphasize the importance of promoting quality jobs and collective bargaining, including
for subcontracting, and suggest that "Technical Standards" should not address
employment and social issues, as employment law, collective agreements, and human
rights standards should take precedence. Additionally, some respondents propose
mandating standard templates and verification methods for environmental criteria,
creating joint procurement consortia, and providing technical helpdesks and training for
public procurement stakeholders. For instance, one comment suggests that carbon
footprint should be measured and reported, while another proposes "mandatory
earmarking of a minimum percentage of the annual budget for 'Made in Europe'
solutions." Overall, the comments highlight the need for a comprehensive and multi-
faceted approach to promoting green public procurement.
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9.8.1. Green public procurement impacts
Figure 81: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of further incentivising
the use of green public procurement?; all replies.
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “How likely do you believe the following outcomes would
occur as a result of further incentivising the use of green public procurement?”,
respondents most often expect achievement of environmental policy goals (89%: 39%
very likely, 50% somewhat likely), followed by a boost to EU innovation (82%: 23%
very likely, 59% somewhat likely) and better quality of products, services and works
(75%: 27% very likely, 48% somewhat likely). Majorities also foresee increased chance
of winning calls for tender by EU bidders (67%: 14% very likely, 53% somewhat likely),
increased prices of products, services and works (64%: 20% very likely, 44% somewhat
likely), a boost to EU employment (63%: 13% very likely, 50% somewhat likely),
increased costs for EU bidders (56%: 17% very likely, 39% somewhat likely), increased
administrative burden for public buyers (54%: 14% very likely, 40% somewhat likely),
and higher administrative burden for EU bidders (54%: 14% very likely, 40% somewhat
likely). Lower positive expectations are reported for higher SME participation (45%: 5%
very likely, 40% somewhat likely), easier access to cross-border procurement within the
EU (37%: 5% very likely, 32% somewhat likely), reduced competition (34%: 4% very
likely, 30% somewhat likely), and reduced litigation (25%: 4% very likely, 21%
somewhat likely).
39%
23%
27%
14%
20%
13%
17%
14%
14%
5%
5%
4%
4%
50%
59%
48%
53%
44%
50%
39%
40%
40%
40%
32%
30%
21%
3%
3%
3%
4%
17%
10%
19%
20%
20%
20%
11%
25%
21%
1%
2%
2%
2%
1%
2%
1%
1%
1%
4%
3%
3%
10%
Achievement of environmental policy goals
Boost EU innovation
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Increased prices of products / services / works
Boost EU employment
Increased costs for EU bidders
Increased administrative burden for public buyers
Higher administrative burden for EU bidders
Higher SME participation
Easier access to cross border procurement within the EU
Reduced competition
Reduced litigation
Very likely Somewhat likely No impact Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Achievem ent of environm ental policy goals
Boost EU innovatio n
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Increased prices of products / services / works
Boost EU employm ent
Increased costs for EU bidders
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
Higher SME participati on
Easier access to cross border procurem ent within the EU
Reduced competiti on
Reduced litigation
Very likely 39% 23% 27% 14% 20% 13% 17% 14% 14% 5% 5% 4% 4% Somewhat likely 50% 59% 48% 53% 44% 50% 39% 40% 40% 40% 32% 30% 21% No impact 7% 14% 20% 27% 18% 24% 24% 25% 26% 32% 48% 37% 44% Somewhat unlikely 3% 3% 3% 4% 17% 10% 19% 20% 20% 20% 11% 25% 21% Very unlikely 1% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 4% 3% 3% 10% No. of responses 716 700 687 700 697 696 681 697 656 693 679 690 698
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Disagreement that these outcomes will occur (somewhat unlikely or very unlikely) is
highest for reduced litigation (31%: 21% somewhat unlikely, 10% very unlikely),
reduced competition (28%: 25% somewhat unlikely, 3% very unlikely), higher SME
participation (24%: 20% somewhat unlikely, 4% very unlikely), increased administrative
burden for public buyers (21%: 20% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely), higher
administrative burden for EU bidders (21%: 20% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely),
increased costs for EU bidders (20%: 19% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely), and
increased prices of products, services and works (18%: 17% somewhat unlikely, 1% very
unlikely). Lower levels of disagreement are seen for easier access to cross-border
procurement (14%: 11% somewhat unlikely, 3% very unlikely), boost to EU
employment (12%: 10% somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely), increased chance of
winning calls for tender by EU bidders (6%: 4% somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely),
boost to EU innovation (5%: 3% somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely), better quality
(5%: 3% somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely), and achievement of environmental
policy goals (4%: 3% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely).
Across all outcomes, the share of respondents expecting “no impact” ranges from 7% for
achievement of environmental policy goals to 48% for easier access to cross-border
procurement and 44% for reduced litigation. Intermediate “no impact” levels are reported
for boost to EU innovation (14%), better quality (20%), increased prices (18%),
increased chance of winning for EU bidders (27%), boost to EU employment (24%),
increased costs for EU bidders (24%), increased administrative burden for public buyers
(25%), higher administrative burden for EU bidders (26%), higher SME participation
(32%), and reduced competition (37%).
Table 96: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of further incentivising
the use of green public procurement?; percentage of respondents that indicated “very likely” or “somewhat likely”
answers, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked how likely they believed different outcomes would be as a result
of further incentivising the use of green public procurement. The figures refer to the
Respondent Reduced litigation
Boost EU employm ent
Boost EU innovatio n
Achievem ent of environm ental policy goals
Easier access to cross border procurem ent within the EU
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Reduced competiti on
Increased prices of products / services / works
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Higher SME participati on
Increased costs for EU bidders
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
No. of responses
All 25% 63% 81% 89% 38% 54% 34% 63% 75% 68% 44% 56% 53% 656-716 Public Authorities EU 6% 43% 71% 82% 14% 75% 43% 87% 52% 56% 19% 75% 78% 98-100 Large companies EU 10% 56% 82% 89% 32% 54% 34% 69% 71% 65% 28% 61% 58% 93-98 SMEs EU 14% 55% 93% 93% 33% 60% 51% 76% 84% 55% 42% 61% 44% 43-59 Business associations EU 11% 60% 80% 91% 30% 68% 46% 76% 71% 66% 32% 73% 68% 143-164 Trade unions EU 93% 99% 98% 94% 97% 3% 6% 8% 100% 96% 93% 2% 5% 85-97 NGOs EU* 38% 68% 74% 90% 34% 47% 18% 41% 89% 65% 68% 33% 41% 70-79 Academia 5% 47% 63% 89% 11% 58% 28% 89% 63% 58% 41% 65% 56% 16-19 Citizens + other EU** 16% 67% 79% 82% 30% 63% 38% 73% 71% 69% 43% 67% 61% 83-90 Non-EU 27% 50% 86% 100% 57% 47% 43% 60% 93% 79% 50% 50% 36% 12-15
Central EU 20% 59% 79% 87% 29% 57% 38% 66% 71% 63% 39% 59% 55% 358-400 North EU 29% 56% 73% 97% 38% 50% 24% 61% 70% 58% 50% 47% 50% 64-75 South EU 28% 77% 92% 97% 51% 53% 33% 61% 88% 83% 53% 57% 53% 146-152 East EU 40% 68% 80% 72% 51% 47% 31% 57% 71% 71% 47% 49% 49% 68-77 Central EU authorities 7% 44% 70% 77% 8% 80% 48% 87% 47% 52% 18% 79% 83% 60-62 North EU authorities 0% 29% 61% 100% 17% 56% 35% 82% 44% 47% 18% 53% 61% 17-18 South EU authorities 13% 67% 93% 87% 33% 67% 40% 87% 87% 73% 27% 73% 80% 15-15 East EU authorities 0% 17% 50% 67% 20% 100% 33% 100% 33% 67% 20% 100% 67% 5-6
345
combined shares of “very likely” and “somewhat likely” answers (other response options
were also available but are not shown).
Among public authorities, the outcomes most often seen as likely were increased prices
of products, services or works (87%), achievement of environmental policy goals (82%),
higher administrative burden for EU bidders (78%) and for public buyers (75%). For
other outcomes, perceived likelihood ranged from 6% to 75%. Very low likelihood was
reported for reduced litigation (6%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, achievement of environmental
policy goals (large companies: 89%; SMEs: 93%; business associations: 91%) and a
boost to EU innovation (82%; 93%; 80%) were consistently among the most likely
outcomes. All three also pointed to better quality of products, services or works (71% to
84%), and to a lesser extent highlighted increased prices (69% to 76%). Across these
three groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining outcomes ranged from 10% to 93%.
Very low likelihood was reported for reduced litigation (10% to 14%).
Among trade unions and NGOs, trade unions most frequently regarded better quality of
products, services or works (100%), boosts to EU employment (99%) and innovation
(98%) as likely outcomes. NGOs most often pointed to achievement of environmental
policy goals (90%), better quality (89%) and a boost to EU innovation (74%). For these
two groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining outcomes ranged from 2% to 99%.
Very low likelihood was reported among trade unions for increased administrative
burden for public buyers (3%), reduced competition (6%), increased prices (8%),
increased costs for EU bidders (2%) and higher administrative burden for EU bidders
(5%), and among NGOs for reduced competition (18%).
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents, the outcomes
most often seen as likely were achievement of environmental policy goals (academia:
89%; citizens and other respondents: 82%; non-EU respondents: 100%) and a boost to
EU innovation (63%; 79%; 86%) and increase in prices (89%; 73%; 60%). Across these
three groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining outcomes ranged from 5% to 71%.
Very low likelihood was reported for reduced litigation among academia (5%).
Respondents were invited to identify any other likely impacts. A summary of their
responses is presented below.
Public authorities
Approximately a tenth of public authorities respondents provided comments on the likely
impacts of further incentivizing the use of green public procurement, highlighting both
positive and negative effects. Many respondents believe that incentivizing green public
procurement can lead to various benefits, such as reduced overall expenditure for public
authorities, increased use of sustainable products and services, and promotion of regional
economies. Some suggest that clear and mandatory rules can decrease administrative
346
burdens for public buyers, as they provide a clear framework for action. Additionally,
respondents propose various measures to facilitate green public procurement, including
increased flexibility in contract modifications, the use of negotiation procedures without
prior notice, and the development of tools like the carbon performance scale. However,
others warn about potential negative impacts, such as increased administrative burdens
and costs, particularly if verification obligations are imposed on contracting authorities.
There are also concerns about the complexity of environmental criteria and the need for
harmonization and simplification of certifications and standards. For instance, one
comment notes that "the value of the contract should not be calculated solely on the basis
of price," as increased environmental considerations can reduce overall expenditure.
Another respondent suggests that "incentivising the use of European products is strongly
preferable to mandating it," as mandatory requirements could delay the transition to zero-
emission fleets and increase costs. Overall, the comments highlight the need for a
balanced approach that promotes green public procurement while minimizing
administrative burdens and ensuring flexibility for contracting authorities.
EU companies and business associations
Approximately a fifth of EU companies and business associations respondents provided
comments on the likely impacts of further incentivizing the use of green public
procurement, highlighting both positive and negative effects. Many respondents believe
that incentivizing green public procurement can lead to various benefits, such as
increased demand for sustainable products, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, and
improved competitiveness of European suppliers. Some propose introducing sector-
specific requirements, harmonized criteria, and standardized environmental labels to
facilitate the use of green public procurement. Others suggest that a progressive and
incentive-based approach, rather than mandatory requirements, would be more effective
in promoting environmentally responsible procurement. However, some respondents
caution that overly complex processes, burdensome certifications, and rigid criteria can
place SMEs at a disadvantage and discourage them from competing. Additionally, there
are concerns about the potential increase in costs, administrative burdens, and
competitiveness risks for EU value chains. For instance, one comment notes that
"incentivising green public procurement can increase legal certainty and market
predictability, fostering investments in EU-based circular and bio-based value chains,"
while another suggests that "mandatory green criteria are needed to push the entire
market towards higher environmental standards." Some respondents also emphasize the
need for a level playing field, with one comment stating that "the comparison of carbon
values between European products and imported goods should be based on default values
communicated by the Commission rather than those provided by importers." Overall, the
comments highlight the need for a balanced approach that promotes green public
procurement while minimizing administrative burdens and ensuring flexibility for
contracting authorities.
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
Approximately a quarter of EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions
respondents provided comments on the likely impacts of further incentivizing the use of
green public procurement, highlighting both positive and negative effects. Many
respondents believe that incentivizing green public procurement can lead to various
347
benefits, such as reduced greenhouse gas emissions, improved public health, and
increased competitiveness of European bidders. Some propose introducing mandatory
requirements, harmonized criteria, and standardized environmental labels to facilitate the
use of green public procurement. Others suggest that incentivizing green public
procurement can save money, particularly when public authorities award contracts based
on life-cycle costing, and can act as a demand-pull instrument for innovation, creating
predictable demand for environmentally friendly goods, works, and services. However,
some respondents caution that incentivizing green public procurement alone may not be
enough to drive significant changes, and that mandatory requirements are needed to
provide regulatory certainty and ensure a level playing field. Additionally, there are
concerns about the potential increase in administrative burdens, costs, and litigation,
particularly for SMEs. For instance, one comment notes that "incentivising green public
procurement is critical to addressing the EU agri-food system's current challenges," while
another suggests that "mandatory requirements are needed to achieve tangible results and
provide regulatory certainty." Some respondents also emphasize the need for a more
holistic approach, considering both environmental and social aspects, and ensuring that
green public procurement is accessible to social economy actors, such as reuse, repair,
and recycling enterprises. Overall, the comments highlight the need for a balanced
approach that promotes green public procurement while minimizing administrative
burdens and ensuring flexibility for contracting authorities.
All other respondents
Approximately a tenth of all other respondents provided comments on the likely impacts
of further incentivizing the use of green public procurement, highlighting both positive
and negative effects. Many respondents believe that incentivizing green public
procurement can lead to various benefits, such as stimulating demand for compostable
packaging, supporting the development of a European circular economy, and delivering
environmental benefits. Some propose introducing financial incentives, such as an EU
co-funding fund, to reward entities that achieve sustainability targets. Others suggest
creating a central library of eco-labelled products, integrating automatic life cycle cost
calculators, and providing simplified standard contracts to reduce administrative burdens.
However, some respondents caution that incentivising green public procurement alone
may not be enough to drive significant changes, and that a more holistic approach is
needed, considering both environmental and social aspects. Additionally, there are
concerns about the potential increase in costs, and the need for a level playing field.
Some respondents also emphasize the importance of promoting innovation, quality, and
environmental outcomes, while ensuring that green public procurement does not favour
EU bidders by origin and remains consistent with open competition. For instance, one
comment suggests that "incentivising green public procurement can deliver meaningful
environmental benefits when criteria are linked to verifiable lifecycle performance rather
than vendor claims," while another notes that "taking account of the environment in
purchasing should not be regarded as generating additional costs, since it obliges
purchasers to rethink its definition of needs." Overall, the comments highlight the need
for a balanced approach that promotes green public procurement while minimizing
administrative burdens and ensuring flexibility for contracting authorities.
348
Figure 82: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of mandating further
green public procurement obligations?; all replies.
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “How likely do you believe the following outcomes would
occur as a result of mandating further green public procurement obligations?”,
respondents most often expect achievement of environmental policy goals (90%: 49%
very likely, 41% somewhat likely), followed by a boost to EU innovation (79%: 30%
very likely, 49% somewhat likely) and better quality of products, services and works
(73%: 32% very likely, 41% somewhat likely). Majorities also foresee increased chance
of winning calls for tender by EU bidders (70%: 20% very likely, 50% somewhat likely),
increased prices of products, services and works (68%: 24% very likely, 44% somewhat
likely), a boost to EU employment (66%: 20% very likely, 46% somewhat likely),
increased costs for EU bidders (63%: 18% very likely, 45% somewhat likely), and
increased administrative burden for public buyers (62%: 24% very likely, 38% somewhat
likely). Higher administrative burden for EU bidders is similarly expected (62%: 22%
very likely, 40% somewhat likely). Lower but still substantial shares see higher SME
participation (46%: 10% very likely, 36% somewhat likely) and easier access to cross-
border procurement within the EU (42%: 8% very likely, 34% somewhat likely) as
likely, while reduced competition (39%: 9% very likely, 30% somewhat likely) and
reduced litigation (27%: 14% very likely, 13% somewhat likely) attract the lowest
positive expectations.
49%
30%
32%
20%
24%
20%
18%
24%
22%
10%
8%
9%
14%
41%
49%
41%
50%
44%
46%
45%
38%
40%
36%
34%
30%
13%
3%
4%
5%
4%
17%
7%
14%
12%
13%
19%
13%
16%
22%
1%
2%
2%
3%
1%
3%
4%
5%
4%
7%
5%
15%
9%
Achievement of environmental policy goals
Boost EU innovation
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Increased prices of products / services / works
Boost EU employment
Increased costs for EU bidders
Increased administrative burden for public buyers
Higher administrative burden for EU bidders
Higher SME participation
Easier access to cross border procurement within the EU
Reduced competition
Reduced litigation
Very likely Somewhat likely No impact Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Achievem ent of environm ental policy goals
Boost EU innovatio n
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Increased prices of products / services / works
Boost EU employm ent
Increased costs for EU bidders
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
Higher SME participati on
Easier access to cross border procurem ent within the EU
Reduced competiti on
Reduced litigation
Very likely 49% 30% 32% 20% 24% 20% 18% 24% 22% 10% 8% 9% 14% Somewhat likely 41% 49% 41% 50% 44% 46% 45% 38% 40% 36% 34% 30% 13% No impact 6% 15% 20% 24% 14% 24% 19% 20% 21% 27% 40% 31% 42% Somewhat unlikely 3% 4% 5% 4% 17% 7% 14% 12% 13% 19% 13% 16% 22% Very unlikely 1% 2% 2% 3% 1% 3% 4% 5% 4% 7% 5% 15% 9% No. of responses 669 658 657 648 644 659 620 637 636 641 644 641 640
349
Disagreement that these outcomes will occur (somewhat unlikely or very unlikely) is
highest for reduced litigation (31%: 22% somewhat unlikely, 9% very unlikely), reduced
competition (31%: 16% somewhat unlikely, 15% very unlikely), higher SME
participation (26%: 19% somewhat unlikely, 7% very unlikely), easier access to cross-
border procurement (18%: 13% somewhat unlikely, 5% very unlikely), increased prices
of products, services and works (18%: 17% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely),
increased costs for EU bidders (18%: 14% somewhat unlikely, 4% very unlikely), higher
administrative burden for EU bidders (17%: 13% somewhat unlikely, 4% very unlikely),
increased administrative burden for public buyers (17%: 12% somewhat unlikely, 5%
very unlikely), and boost to EU employment (10%: 7% somewhat unlikely, 3% very
unlikely). Lower levels of disagreement are recorded for increased chance of winning for
EU bidders (7%: 4% somewhat unlikely, 3% very unlikely), boost to EU innovation (6%:
4% somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely), better quality (7%: 5% somewhat unlikely,
2% very unlikely), and achievement of environmental policy goals (4%: 3% somewhat
unlikely, 1% very unlikely).
Across all outcomes, the share of respondents expecting “no impact” ranges from 6% for
achievement of environmental policy goals to 42% for reduced litigation and 40% for
easier access to cross-border procurement. Intermediate “no impact” levels are reported
for boost to EU innovation (15%), better quality (20%), increased chance of winning for
EU bidders (24%), increased prices (14%), boost to EU employment (24%), increased
costs for EU bidders (19%), increased administrative burden for public buyers (20%),
higher administrative burden for EU bidders (21%), higher SME participation (27%), and
reduced competition (31%).
Table 97: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of mandating further
green public procurement obligations?; percentage of respondents that indicated “very likely” or “somewhat likely”
answers, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked how likely they believed different outcomes would be as a result
of mandating further green public procurement obligations. The figures refer to the
Respondent Reduced litigation
Boost EU employm ent
Boost EU innovatio n
Achievem ent of environm ental policy goals
Easier access to cross border procurem ent within the EU
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Reduced competiti on
Increased prices of products / services / works
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Higher SME participati on
Increased costs for EU bidders
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
No. of responses
All 27% 66% 79% 90% 41% 62% 38% 68% 73% 69% 46% 64% 62% 620-669 Public Authorities EU 6% 45% 67% 86% 22% 86% 62% 89% 51% 56% 22% 83% 85% 95-100 Large companies EU 11% 59% 80% 86% 34% 64% 39% 77% 66% 68% 28% 69% 65% 88-93 SMEs EU 19% 76% 86% 91% 50% 63% 29% 74% 84% 81% 54% 62% 60% 41-44 Business associations EU 15% 60% 73% 87% 29% 74% 47% 82% 64% 66% 32% 76% 72% 131-143 Trade unions EU 90% 97% 97% 97% 94% 19% 2% 8% 97% 92% 91% 19% 17% 72-97 NGOs EU* 39% 69% 90% 96% 44% 44% 21% 50% 91% 67% 75% 42% 42% 72-79 Academia 16% 53% 63% 94% 17% 68% 35% 95% 74% 67% 47% 72% 61% 17-19 Citizens + other EU** 21% 68% 76% 87% 31% 70% 53% 83% 74% 67% 42% 71% 76% 83-86 Non-EU 27% 64% 64% 93% 50% 57% 40% 67% 79% 57% 50% 75% 71% 12-15
Central EU 21% 61% 76% 89% 32% 65% 41% 72% 69% 65% 39% 65% 63% 334-355 North EU 36% 55% 68% 85% 46% 72% 41% 63% 61% 61% 48% 65% 72% 66-75 South EU 30% 81% 92% 97% 53% 58% 34% 70% 87% 80% 56% 65% 60% 141-150 East EU 39% 69% 79% 84% 57% 52% 30% 54% 76% 78% 58% 49% 51% 67-75 Central EU authorities 9% 46% 67% 86% 10% 88% 63% 95% 44% 56% 20% 85% 85% 57-60 North EU authorities 6% 17% 50% 78% 28% 89% 65% 76% 33% 50% 12% 82% 94% 17-18 South EU authorities 0% 87% 100% 100% 60% 69% 63% 73% 93% 80% 44% 75% 69% 14-16 East EU authorities 0% 17% 50% 67% 17% 100% 33% 100% 67% 17% 17% 80% 100% 5-6
350
combined shares of “very likely” and “somewhat likely” answers (other response options
were also available but are not shown).
Among public authorities, the outcomes most often seen as likely were increased prices
of products, services or works (89%), increased administrative burden for public buyers
(86%), higher administrative burden for EU bidders (85%) and achievement of
environmental goals (86%). For other outcomes, perceived likelihood ranged from 6% to
86%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced litigation (6%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, the outcomes most
consistently regarded as likely were achievement of environmental policy goals (large
companies: 86%; SMEs: 91%; business associations: 87%), boosts to EU innovation
(80%; 86%; 73%) and increased prices (77%; 74%; 82%). SMEs also highlighted better
quality of products, services or works (84%) and increased chance of winning calls for
tender by EU bidders (81%). Across these three groups, perceived likelihood of the
remaining outcomes ranged from 15% to 91%. Very low likelihood was reported for
reduced litigation (11% - 19%).
Trade unions most frequently regarded boosts to EU employment and innovation,
achievement of environmental policy goals and better quality of products, services or
works (each 97%) as likely outcomes. NGOs most often pointed to achievement of
environmental policy goals (96%), better quality (91%) and a boost to EU innovation
(90%). For these two groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining outcomes ranged
from 2% to 96%. Very low likelihood was reported among trade unions for reduced
competition (2%), increased prices (8%), increased administrative burden for public
buyers (19%) and for EU bidders (19%), and among NGOs for reduced competition
(21%).
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents, the outcomes
most often seen as likely were achievement of environmental policy goals (academia:
94%; citizens and other respondents: 87%; non-EU respondents: 93%). Academia and
citizens and other respondents also pointed to increased prices (95% and 83%) and better
quality (74% and 74%). Across these three groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining
outcomes ranged from 16% to 95%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced
litigation among academia and citizens (16%-21%).
Respondents were invited to identify any other likely impacts. A summary of their
responses is presented below.
Public authorities
Approximately a tenth of public authorities respondents provided comments on the likely
impacts of mandating further green public procurement obligations, highlighting
concerns about increased administrative burdens and complexity. Many respondents
believe that the current legal framework for green procurement does not impede
sustainable practices, and that local authorities should have greater autonomy to use
351
procurement as a strategic tool tailored to their specific needs. Some caution that adding
more obligations could complicate the purchasing approach for buyers and businesses,
and that the EU should instead secure the choice of "the most economically responsible
tender" and reduce administrative burdens. Others emphasize the importance of a
voluntary approach to sustainable public procurement, as the challenges are mostly
linked to professionalization and legal certainty concerns. For instance, one comment
notes that "increased environmental considerations have the opposite effect, as they
reduce the overall expenditure of the public authority," while another suggests that
"incentivising the use of European products is strongly preferable to mandating it," as
mandatory requirements could delay the transition to zero-emission fleets and increase
costs. Some respondents also highlight the need for clear, mandatory sustainability
standards for food procurement, and for a coordinating and advisory role for the EU to
ensure that sectoral regulations do not impede procurement. Overall, the comments
highlight the need for a balanced approach that promotes green public procurement while
minimizing administrative burdens and ensuring flexibility for contracting authorities.
EU companies and business associations
Approximately a seventh of EU companies and business associations respondents
provided comments on the likely impacts of mandating further green public procurement
obligations, highlighting both positive and negative effects. Many respondents believe
that mandatory green public procurement obligations can accelerate the uptake of
sustainable solutions, strengthen EU industrial ecosystems, and support the achievement
of climate and circular economy objectives. Some propose introducing mandatory green
criteria, such as minimum recycled content, and prioritizing local companies and "zero-
mile contracts" to reduce carbon emissions and stimulate local economies. Others suggest
that mandatory requirements should be preceded by detailed consultation and alignment
with full life-cycle LCA rules and European standards. However, some respondents
caution that mandatory green public procurement obligations can lead to increased costs,
administrative burdens, and reduced competition, and may not be effective in achieving
environmental objectives. For instance, one comment notes that "mandatory green public
procurement risks narrowing supplier pools, raising costs and administrative burdens,
and reducing competition, while delivering almost no decarbonisation benefits," while
another suggests that "incentivizing green public procurement can deliver meaningful
environmental benefits when criteria are linked to verifiable lifecycle performance rather
than vendor claims." Some respondents also emphasize the need for a proportionate and
sector-specific approach, taking into account the diversity of markets and the potential
impact on SMEs. Overall, the comments highlight the need for a balanced approach that
promotes green public procurement while minimizing administrative burdens and
ensuring flexibility for contracting authorities.
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
Approximately a quarter of EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions
respondents provided comments on the likely impacts of mandating further green public
procurement obligations, highlighting both positive and negative effects. Many
respondents believe that mandatory green public procurement obligations can accelerate
the uptake of sustainable solutions, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and support the
achievement of climate and circular economy objectives. Some propose introducing
mandatory green criteria, such as minimum recycled content, and prioritizing local
companies and "zero-mile contracts" to reduce carbon emissions and stimulate local
352
economies. Others suggest that mandatory requirements should be preceded by detailed
consultation and alignment with full life-cycle LCA rules and European standards.
However, some respondents caution that mandatory green public procurement
obligations can lead to increased costs, administrative burdens, and reduced competition,
and may not be effective in achieving environmental objectives. Overall, the comments
highlight the need for a balanced approach that promotes green public procurement while
minimizing administrative burdens and ensuring flexibility for contracting authorities.
All other respondents
Approximately a tenth of all other respondents provided comments on the likely impacts
of mandating further green public procurement obligations, highlighting both positive
and negative effects. Many respondents believe that mandatory green public procurement
obligations can contribute to the achievement of environmental and strategic objectives,
such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, promoting the use of renewable and circular
materials, and supporting the development of a European circular economy. Some
propose introducing mandatory green criteria, such as minimum recycled content, and
prioritizing local companies and "zero-mile contracts" to reduce carbon emissions and
stimulate local economies. Others suggest that mandatory requirements should be
preceded by detailed consultation and alignment with full life-cycle LCA rules and
European standards. However, some respondents caution that mandatory green public
procurement obligations can lead to increased costs, administrative burdens, and reduced
competition, and may not be effective in achieving environmental objectives. For
instance, one comment notes that "the introduction of new mandatory criteria in public
procurement to address strategic challenges should be avoided," while another suggests
that "mandatory green public procurement obligations can drive environmental progress,
but only if they are designed to avoid rigid, one-size-fits-all requirements." Some
respondents also emphasize the need for a proportionate and sector-specific approach,
taking into account the diversity of markets and the potential impact on SMEs. Overall,
the comments highlight the need for a balanced approach that promotes green public
procurement while minimizing administrative burdens and ensuring flexibility for
contracting authorities.
353
9.9. Social considerations in public procurement (ESI options)
Figure 83: Question: To what extent do you agree with the following statements concerning socially responsible public
procurement?; all replies.
Respondent
1. No amendments are required to the existing
legal framework regarding social
provisions.
2. EU public procurement law should
further incentivise the use of socially
responsible public procurement.
3. The general legislative framework should
mandate further socially responsible public
procurement obligations.
Strongly agree 19% 38% 33%
Agree 14% 26% 19%
Neutral 16% 17% 19%
Disagree 23% 8% 14%
Strongly disagree 28% 12% 15%
No. of responses 669 692 638 Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
When asked about socially responsible public procurement, the strongest support was for
further incentives to encourage its use, with 64% in favour (38% strongly agree, 26%
agree). This was followed by support for mandating additional socially responsible
procurement obligations, backed by 52% (33% strongly agree, 19% agree).
The proposition that no amendments should be made to existing social provisions was
supported by around one third of respondents, while a majority of 51% opposed this
view.
Table 98: Question: To what extent do you agree with the following statements concerning socially responsible public
procurement?; percentage of respondents that agree or strongly agree, by type of respondent.
38%
33%
19%
26%
19%
14%
8%
14%
23%
12%
15%
28%
2. EU public procurement law should further incentivise the use of socially responsible public procurement.
3. The general legislative framework should mandate further socially responsible public procurement
obligations.
1. No amendments are required to the existing legal framework regarding social provisions.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
354
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
This table presents the breakdown of responses by different respondent groups. The
figures represent the combined shares of "strongly agree" and "agree" responses (other
response options were available but are not shown here).
Support for further incentives to use socially responsible procurement received over 50%
backing from all respondent groups except SMEs and business associations, which
instead favoured making no amendments. Trade unions and NGOs showed very high
support for both incentivising and mandating socially responsible procurement, with
approval ranging from 83% to 98%.
Respondent
1. No amendments are required to the existing legal framework regarding social provisions.
2. EU public procurement law should further incentivise the use of socially responsible
3. The general legislative framework should mandate further socially responsible
No. of responses
All 33% 64% 52% 638-692 Public Authorities EU 42% 58% 34% 96-101 Large companies EU 33% 56% 33% 81-87 SMEs EU 58% 43% 45% 40-58 Business associations EU 48% 47% 31% 124-143 Trade unions EU 1% 97% 98% 99-102 NGOs EU* 11% 90% 83% 76-81 Academia 44% 50% 44% 18-18 Citizens + other EU** 40% 57% 43% 86-89 Non-EU 36% 85% 54% 13-14
Central EU 42% 57% 48% 347-390 North EU 33% 71% 51% 72-73 South EU 15% 74% 63% 134-141 East EU 25% 68% 53% 71-75 Central EU authorities 50% 57% 37% 62-65 North EU authorities 36% 75% 19% 14-16 South EU authorities 20% 53% 53% 15-15 East EU authorities 20% 40% 0% 5-5
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Table 99: Question: If you "agree" or "strongly agree" with point 2 (Figure 83). Which of the following elements
should be introduced to further incentivise the use of socially responsible public procurement?; % of all answers to
point 2, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Multiple choice question; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. Point 2. EU public procurement law should further incentivise the use of socially responsible public procurement. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that the framework should further incentivise
the use of socially responsible public procurement were asked which elements should be
introduced. Figures refer to the share of these respondents selecting each option.
Across all respondents, the elements most often selected were increased transparency
requirements in subcontracting (46%), clarification that social considerations affecting
workers performing a contract are linked to the subject matter (39%), and softening the
link to the subject matter to consider companies’ overall social policies (38%) and option
to require or consider collective agreements: (37% each). Non-binding targets and
completion notices also attracted notable, but slightly lower, support (32% and 34%).
Among public authorities, preferences were more dispersed, with most support for
increased subcontracting transparency (40%), followed by clarifying the link to the
subject matter (29%) and option for public buyers to require or consider collective
agreements (28% and 26%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, support levels were generally
modest. The most frequently selected elements were increased subcontracting
transparency (25–27%) and, to a lesser extent, options to require or consider collective
agreements and to introduce non-binding targets (mostly below 25%). Around one third
of large companies favoured softening the link to the subject matter to consider
companies’ overall social policies.
Trade unions showed consistently very high support (around or above 90%) for almost
all elements NGOs most often supported increased subcontracting transparency (68%)
Respondent
Public buyers should be given the option to require bidders to have a collective agreement in place (respecting link to the subject matter principle).
Public buyers should be given the option to consider collective agreements as an award criterion (respecting link to the subject matter principle).
EU law should clarify that social considerations affecting the workers performing a given contract are linked to the subject matter.
The link to the subject matter principle should be softened, to allow the possibility to take into account companies’ overall social policies (such as collective agreements covering all workers or corporate and social responsibility).
'Completion notices' shall be introduced offering the possibility for public buyers to flag labour or social law compliance issues.
Transparency requirements in subcontracting should be increased to ensure compliance with existing labour and social obligations.
Non-binding socially responsible public procurement targets should be set at EU and at Member State levels with accompanying strategies or plans to ensure their achievement. Other
No. of responses to point 2
All 37% 37% 39% 38% 34% 46% 32% 21% 692 Public Authorities EU 28% 26% 29% 32% 27% 40% 23% 12% 101 Large companies EU 20% 15% 25% 32% 16% 25% 16% 7% 87 SMEs EU 19% 26% 16% 12% 12% 24% 19% 5% 58 Business associations EU 18% 19% 20% 17% 15% 27% 22% 7% 143 Trade unions EU 89% 92% 92% 93% 92% 93% 75% 88% 102
NGOs EU* 54% 57% 57% 51% 46% 68% 36% 17% 81 Academia 28% 11% 22% 22% 17% 44% 22% 0% 18 Citizens + other EU** 34% 30% 38% 27% 31% 43% 30% 13% 89 Non-EU 46% 46% 54% 54% 31% 31% 38% 8% 13
0 Central EU 27% 31% 32% 31% 27% 39% 27% 17% 390 North EU 53% 49% 47% 58% 51% 59% 42% 38% 73 South EU 48% 38% 52% 43% 40% 56% 34% 20% 141 East EU 51% 51% 48% 41% 43% 49% 45% 32% 75 Central EU authorities 25% 23% 25% 29% 25% 37% 20% 9% 65 North EU authorities 63% 44% 31% 44% 38% 50% 31% 25% 16 South EU authorities 13% 27% 47% 27% 33% 53% 27% 13% 15 East EU authorities 0% 0% 20% 40% 0% 0% 20% 0% 5
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and options to consider or require collective agreements and clarifying the link to the
subject matter (each 54–57%).
Academia and citizens most often selected increased subcontracting transparency (44%
and 43%). Non-EU respondents most frequently supported clarifying and softening the
link to the subject matter (both 54%) and options to require or consider collective
agreements (both 46%).
Those who selected Other were asked to elaborate. A summary of their responses is
presented below.
Public authorities
Public authorities respondents provided comments on which other changes should be
introduced to further incentivise the use of socially responsible public procurement,
emphasizing the need for clearer guidelines and flexibility in applying social criteria.
Many respondents suggest that the EU should provide incentives for contracting
authorities to use human rights and environmental due diligence (HREDD) in a
proportionate and risk-based way, and that differences in product categories, risk
profiles, and company scale and maturity should be taken into account. Some propose
introducing mandatory weighing of ESG ratings, such as a 10% weighting of a
company's ESG rating in the tender evaluation process. Others suggest allowing public
buyers to consider collective agreements as an eligibility criterion, and giving them the
option to limit the number of subcontractors. There are also calls for softening the "link
to the subject matter" principle, which currently limits the ability to value broader
societal impact, to allow contracting authorities to go beyond mandated requirements
when appropriate. For instance, one comment notes that "the link to the subject matter
principle should be softened, to make possible, e.g., to use an employment requirement
for the contracting entity's general purpose," while another suggests that "clear European
incentives on how to apply human rights and environmental due diligence in a
proportionate and risk-based way would give contracting authorities more confidence to
use these tools effectively." Overall, the comments highlight the need for a more flexible
and nuanced approach to socially responsible public procurement, one that balances the
need for clear guidelines with the need for contracting authorities to be able to respond to
specific social and environmental challenges.
EU companies and business associations
EU companies and business associations respondents provided comments on which other
changes should be introduced to further incentivise the use of socially responsible public
procurement, highlighting the need for a balanced approach that promotes social
responsibility while ensuring competitiveness and avoiding counter-productive effects.
Many respondents emphasize the importance of maintaining the principle of the link with
the subject matter of the contract, and that social requirements should be directly linked
to the contract to avoid imposing too general or disconnected conditions that may
exclude small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Some propose enabling companies
to value ongoing apprenticeship contracts to meet social clauses, and making it easier to
exclude contractors who consistently underpay employees and have many breaches for
work environment obligations. Others suggest that socially responsible public
procurement should explicitly recognize the societal value of open, interoperable, and
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vendor-neutral technologies, and that the evaluation of companies' performance should
be limited to activities under their operational control. There are also calls for
harmonization across Member States, and for making the use of social award criteria
obligatory for specific types of tenders and budget thresholds. For instance, one comment
notes that "socially responsible public procurement should explicitly recognise the
societal value of open, interoperable and vendor-neutral technologies," while another
suggests that "maintaining the principle of the link with the subject matter of the contract
is fundamental." Overall, the comments highlight the need for a nuanced approach that
balances the promotion of social responsibility with the need to ensure competitiveness,
avoid unnecessary administrative burdens, and support SMEs.
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions respondents provided
comments on which other changes should be introduced to further incentivise the use of
socially responsible public procurement, emphasizing the need to promote collective
bargaining, quality jobs, and fair working conditions. Many respondents suggest that
public money should be used to promote quality jobs and strengthen collective
bargaining, and that conditions of workers providing a service should always be linked to
the subject matter of the contract. Some propose introducing mandatory award criteria
and advantages for bidders whose workers are covered by collective agreements, and
limiting subcontracting to one or two sub-layers. Others suggest promoting socially
responsible public procurement (SRPP) in social services, encouraging the use of
reserved contracts and lotting to open access for social economy/SMEs, and introducing
price-revision mechanisms for public contracts based on inflation. There are also calls for
stronger enforcement of social clauses, compliance with collective agreements and labour
law, and the introduction of black lists for companies that violate labour law. For
instance, one comment notes that "public money must be used to promote quality jobs
and strengthen collective bargaining, a European strategic goal," while another suggests
that "collective bargaining and quality jobs should be promoted, through mandatory
award criteria and the advantage given to operators respecting environmental standards,
whose workers are covered by collective agreements." Some respondents also emphasize
the need to redefine the concept of the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT)
to include social and environmental considerations, and to introduce a Best Price-Quality
and Sustainability Ratio (BPQ&S) as the standard award criterion for public contracts.
Overall, the comments highlight the need for a more robust and effective approach to
promoting socially responsible public procurement, one that prioritizes fair working
conditions, collective bargaining, and quality jobs.
All other respondents
All other respondents provided comments on which other changes should be introduced
to further incentivise the use of socially responsible public procurement, highlighting the
need for clearer guidelines and flexibility in applying social criteria. Many respondents
emphasize the importance of promoting collective bargaining, quality jobs, and fair
working conditions, and suggest introducing mandatory award criteria and advantages for
bidders whose workers are covered by collective agreements. Some propose softening or
clarifying the "link to the subject matter" principle, which is currently interpreted too
strictly, and increasing transparency requirements in subcontracting to ensure compliance
with labour and social obligations throughout the supply chain. Others suggest providing
model BPQR criteria and verification methods for social performance to reduce
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administrative burden and litigation risks, and supporting consistent, innovation-friendly
implementation across Member States. For instance, one comment notes that "EU public
procurement should explicitly recognise and reward the societal value of open source
through criteria that value transparency, collaboration, and vendor neutrality." Some
respondents also emphasize the need to define the degree of social requirement at the
level of each Member State, and to enrich EU law with objectives relating to gender
equality in the workplace under the social strand. Overall, the comments highlight the
need for a more flexible and nuanced approach to socially responsible public
procurement, one that balances the promotion of social responsibility with the need to
ensure clarity, transparency, and innovation in the procurement process.
Table 100: Question: You "agree" or "strongly agree" with point 3 (Figure 83). Which of the following elements
should be made mandatory?; % of all answers to point 3, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Multiple choice question; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. Point 3. The general legislative framework should mandate further socially responsible public procurement obligations. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that more regulatory measures are needed for
socially responsible public procurement were asked which elements should be made
mandatory. Figures refer to the share of these respondents selecting each option.
Across all respondents, the most frequently supported mandatory elements were banning
price-only criteria in low-skilled labour-intensive sectors (39%), mandating socially
responsible public procurement targets at EU and Member State level (39%), and making
the current optional exclusion ground for labour and social law violations mandatory
(38%). Limiting subcontracting beyond certain tiers in high-risk sectors also attracted
notable support (36%).
Among public authorities, preferences were more moderate and relatively evenly spread,
with the highest support for limiting subcontracting beyond a certain tier in high-risk
sectors (23%) and making the current optional exclusion ground for labour and social law
violations mandatory (22%).
Respondent
It should not be possible to subcontract an entire contract to a single subcontractor.
Subcontracting beyond a certain tier should be limited in sectors at high risk of labour rights violations.
In low-skilled labour- intensive sectors, price- only criteria should be banned, requiring BPQR instead.
The current optional exclusion ground for companies that have violated applicable labour or social law obligations should be made mandatory.
The horizontal social clause should additionally include fundamental and human rights obligations.
Socially responsible public procurement targets should be mandated at EU and at Member State levels with accompanying strategies or plans to ensure their Other
No. of responses to point 3
All 30% 36% 39% 38% 26% 39% 16% 638 Public Authorities EU 16% 23% 20% 22% 21% 20% 3% 99 Large companies EU 11% 9% 10% 12% 16% 17% 2% 81 SMEs EU 20% 23% 35% 30% 28% 35% 0% 40 Business associations EU 9% 19% 23% 15% 14% 15% 5% 124 Trade unions EU 91% 94% 92% 92% 23% 94% 69% 99
NGOs EU* 31% 60% 68% 72% 63% 76% 18% 78 Academia 22% 28% 22% 44% 33% 33% 0% 18 Citizens + other EU** 28% 26% 34% 29% 23% 24% 10% 86 Non-EU 23% 15% 31% 23% 23% 46% 23% 13
Central EU 23% 31% 34% 34% 26% 34% 12% 347 North EU 40% 46% 46% 43% 29% 46% 25% 72 South EU 39% 42% 48% 43% 27% 45% 18% 134 East EU 36% 46% 46% 47% 18% 49% 25% 72 Central EU authorities 14% 24% 19% 24% 24% 21% 3% 63 North EU authorities 0% 19% 19% 13% 13% 13% 0% 16 South EU authorities 47% 33% 33% 33% 27% 33% 7% 15 East EU authorities 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5
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Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, support levels were generally
low to moderate. SMEs showed relatively higher support for banning price-only criteria
and mandating socially responsible procurement targets (both 35%). Large companies
and business associations showed support of around or below 20% for the proposed
mandatory measures across all options.
Trade unions expressed over 90% support for all measures, with the exception of
including fundamental and human rights obligations in the horizontal social clause,
which received 23% support. NGOs most often supported mandatory targets (76%),
mandatory exclusion grounds (72%) and banning price-only criteria (68%).
Academia showed moderately high support for mandatory exclusion grounds at 44%.
Citizens, other respondents, and non-EU respondents favoured banning price-only
criteria, with support ranging from 31% to 34%. Non-EU respondents also supported
mandatory targets at 46%.
Those who selected Other were asked to elaborate. A summary of their responses is
presented below.
Public authorities
Public authorities respondents provided comments on which other changes regarding
socially responsible public procurement should be made obligatory, highlighting the need
for clearer guidelines and mandatory requirements. Many respondents emphasize the
importance of promoting socially responsible public procurement, and suggest
introducing mandatory weighing of ESG ratings, such as a 10% weighting of a
company's ESG rating in the tender evaluation process. Some propose making
requirements such as systematic environmental management or human rights due
diligence obligatory, as they are linked to the subject matter of the contract and regulate
the way in which the product or service is provided. Others suggest including social
inclusion-related rights in social clauses, to ensure that public procurement promotes
social responsibility and respects human rights. For instance, one comment notes that
"requirements such as systematic environmental management or human rights due
diligence are linked to the subject-matter of the contract," while another suggests that
"social inclusion-related rights should be included in social clauses." Overall, the
comments highlight the need for a more robust and effective approach to promoting
socially responsible public procurement, one that prioritizes social responsibility and
respects human rights.
EU companies and business associations
EU companies and business associations respondents provided comments on which other
changes regarding socially responsible public procurement should be made obligatory,
highlighting the need for a balanced approach that promotes social responsibility while
ensuring competitiveness and avoiding unnecessary administrative burdens. Many
respondents emphasize the importance of limiting "cascading" subcontracting to a single
level, to control the supply chain and protect the workforce, and ensuring the correct
application of labour regulations, including collective agreements. Some propose
requiring procurement contracts to include price revision clauses that compensate for the
360
higher costs incurred as a result of the renewal of collective agreements. Others suggest
that occupational safety and health (OSH) should be an award criterion, and that bidders
with poor OSH performance should be penalized or excluded from the competition.
Some respondents also emphasize the need for incentivizing the use of socially
responsible public procurement, rather than mandating it, and that any obligatory changes
should be aligned with existing requirements, such as the CSDDD. Overall, the
comments highlight the need for a nuanced approach that balances the promotion of
social responsibility with the need to ensure competitiveness, avoid unnecessary
administrative burdens, and support businesses in their efforts to operate responsibly.
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions respondents provided
comments on which other changes regarding socially responsible public procurement
should be made obligatory, emphasizing the need to promote collective bargaining,
quality jobs, and fair working conditions. Many respondents suggest that mandatory
award criteria and advantages should be given to tenderers whose workers are covered by
collective agreements, and that subcontracting should be limited to one or two levels with
joint and several liability. Some propose introducing a mandatory requirement for public
authorities to allocate a percentage of their annual procurement budget to reserved
contracts, and that social impact indicators should be used to assess the preservation of
jobs for individuals from disadvantaged groups. Others suggest that the use of the Most
Economically Advantageous Tender (MEAT)/Best Price Quality Ratio (BPQR) criteria
should be made the standard/default logic for public procurement, and that labour clauses
in procurement contracts should be made mandatory. For instance, one comment notes
that "essential to support collective bargaining and quality jobs, including mandatory
award criteria and giving advantage to tenderers whose workers covered by collective
agreements," while another suggests that "at least 5% of the annual value of public
supply and service contracts should be used for safeguarding high-risk and very-high-risk
product segments from a human-rights and labour-rights perspective." Some respondents
also emphasize the need to promote gender equity in public procurement law, and to
ensure that public procurement selection and advertising encourage and allow female-led
and gender-balanced companies. Overall, the comments highlight the need for a more
robust and effective approach to promoting socially responsible public procurement, one
that prioritizes fair working conditions, collective bargaining, and quality jobs.
All other respondents
All other respondents provided comments on which other changes regarding socially
responsible public procurement should be made obligatory, highlighting the need to
promote collective bargaining, quality jobs, and fair working conditions. Many
respondents suggest that mandatory award criteria and advantages should be given to
tenderers whose workers are covered by collective agreements, and that subcontracting
should be limited to one or two levels with joint and several liability. Some propose
introducing mandatory model BPQR criteria and proportional verification methods for
social performance, and banning price-only criteria in labour-intensive sectors. Others
suggest that EU public procurement should recognize the societal value of open source
through criteria that reward transparency, collaboration, and vendor neutrality, and that
contracting authorities should be incentivized to procure "sustainable software" by giving
priority to vendors that contribute to open source projects. For instance, one comment
notes that "essential to support collective bargaining and quality jobs, including
361
mandatory award criteria and giving advantage to tenderers whose workers covered by
collective agreements," while another suggests that "banning price-only criteria in
labour-intensive sectors would help prevent precarious working conditions and social
dumping." Some respondents also emphasize the need for a reliable and up-to-date
database to enable public buyers to implement exclusion grounds for companies that
have not complied with labour law legislation. Overall, the comments highlight the need
for a more robust and effective approach to promoting socially responsible public
procurement, one that prioritizes fair working conditions, collective bargaining, and
quality jobs.
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9.9.1. Social considerations in public procurement impacts
Figure 84: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of further incentivising
the use of socially responsible public procurement?; all replies.
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “How likely do you believe the following outcomes would
occur as a result of further incentivising the use of socially responsible public
procurement?”, respondents most often expect improved working conditions (77%: 41%
very likely, 36% somewhat likely), followed by reduced risk of labour and social law
breaches (73%: 27% very likely, 46% somewhat likely) and poverty reduction and
increased social inclusion (73%: 23% very likely, 46% somewhat likely). High shares
also anticipate a boost to EU employment (67%: 34% very likely, 33% somewhat likely),
increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders (63%: 26% very likely, 37%
somewhat likely), and increased prices of products, services and works (62%: 15% very
likely, 47% somewhat likely). Majorities consider higher administrative burden for EU
bidders (58%: 20% very likely, 38% somewhat likely), better quality of products,
services and works (57%: 28% very likely, 29% somewhat likely), increased costs for
EU bidders (56%: 18% very likely, 38% somewhat likely), increased administrative
burden for public buyers (55%: 19% very likely, 36% somewhat likely), and a boost to
EU industry (54%: 26% very likely, 28% somewhat likely) as likely outcomes. Lower
positive expectations are reported for higher SME participation (42%: 8% very likely,
34% somewhat likely), making cross-border participation more difficult (37%: 15% very
41%
27%
23%
34%
26%
15%
20%
28%
18%
19%
26%
8%
15%
6%
10%
36%
46%
46%
33%
37%
47%
38%
29%
38%
36%
28%
34%
22%
30%
18%
9%
10%
11%
7%
7%
6%
7%
9%
15%
19%
8%
16%
10%
23%
21%
3%
2%
3%
3%
6%
12%
13%
7%
3%
3%
7%
9%
14%
5%
11%
Improved working conditions
Reduced risk of labour and social law breaches
Poverty reduction and increased social inclusion
Boost EU employment
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Increased prices of products / services / works
Higher administrative burden for EU bidders
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased costs for EU bidders
Increased administrative burden for public buyers
Boost EU industry
Higher SME participation
Make cross-border participation more difficult
Reduced competition
Reduced litigation
Very likely Somewhat likely No impact Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Improved working condition s
Reduced risk of labour and social law breaches
Poverty reduction and increased social inclusion
Boost EU employm ent
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Increased prices of products / services / works
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased costs for EU bidders
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Boost EU industry
Higher SME participati on
Make cross- border participati on more difficult
Reduced competiti on
Reduced litigation
Very likely 41% 27% 23% 34% 26% 15% 20% 28% 18% 19% 26% 8% 15% 6% 10% Somewhat likely 36% 46% 46% 33% 37% 47% 38% 29% 38% 36% 28% 34% 22% 30% 18% No impact 11% 15% 17% 23% 24% 20% 22% 27% 26% 24% 31% 32% 39% 36% 40% Somewhat unlikely 9% 10% 11% 7% 7% 6% 7% 9% 15% 19% 8% 16% 10% 23% 21% Very unlikely 3% 2% 3% 3% 6% 12% 13% 7% 3% 3% 7% 9% 14% 5% 11% No. of responses 632 624 624 625 623 624 617 626 621 618 624 615 611 614 621
363
likely, 22% somewhat likely), reduced competition (36%: 6% very likely, 30%
somewhat likely), and reduced litigation (28%: 10% very likely, 18% somewhat likely).
Disagreement that these outcomes will occur (somewhat unlikely or very unlikely) is
highest for reduced litigation (32%: 21% somewhat unlikely, 11% very unlikely),
reduced competition (28%: 23% somewhat unlikely, 5% very unlikely), making cross-
border participation more difficult (24%: 10% somewhat unlikely, 14% very unlikely),
higher SME participation (25%: 16% somewhat unlikely, 9% very unlikely), higher
administrative burden for EU bidders (20%: 7% somewhat unlikely, 13% very unlikely),
increased administrative burden for public buyers (22%: 19% somewhat unlikely, 3%
very unlikely), and increased costs for EU bidders (18%: 15% somewhat unlikely, 3%
very unlikely). Lower levels of disagreement are seen for increased prices of products,
services and works (18%: 6% somewhat unlikely, 12% very unlikely), boost to EU
industry (15%: 8% somewhat unlikely, 7% very unlikely), better quality (16%: 9%
somewhat unlikely, 7% very unlikely), reduced risk of labour and social law breaches
(12%: 10% somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely), poverty reduction and increased
social inclusion (14%: 11% somewhat unlikely, 3% very unlikely), boost to EU
employment (10%: 7% somewhat unlikely, 3% very unlikely), improved working
conditions (12%: 9% somewhat unlikely, 3% very unlikely), and increased chance of
winning calls for tender by EU bidders (13%: 7% somewhat unlikely, 6% very unlikely).
Across all outcomes, the share of respondents expecting “no impact” ranges from 11%
for improved working conditions to 40% for reduced litigation and 39% for making
cross-border participation more difficult. Intermediate “no impact” levels are reported for
reduced risk of labour and social law breaches (15%), poverty reduction and increased
social inclusion (17%), boost to EU employment (23%), increased chance of winning
calls for tender by EU bidders (24%), increased prices (20%), higher administrative
burden for EU bidders (22%), better quality (27%), increased costs for EU bidders
(26%), increased administrative burden for public buyers (24%), boost to EU industry
(31%), higher SME participation (32%), and reduced competition (36%).
Table 101: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of further
incentivising the use of socially responsible public procurement?; Percentage of respondents that indicated "very
likely" or "somewhat likely" answers, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted.
Respondent Reduced litigation
Boost EU employm ent
Boost EU industry
Poverty reduction and increased social inclusion
Improved working condition s
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Reduced competiti on
Increased prices of products / services / works
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Higher SME participati on
Reduced risk of labour and social law breaches
Increased costs for EU bidders
Make cross- border participati on more difficult
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
No. of responses
All 28% 66% 54% 69% 77% 54% 36% 62% 57% 63% 43% 73% 56% 37% 58% 611-632 Public Authorities EU 8% 59% 47% 73% 83% 72% 43% 77% 40% 63% 24% 76% 73% 42% 73% 90-93 Large companies EU 13% 59% 47% 67% 82% 58% 37% 66% 48% 62% 21% 69% 66% 47% 63% 70-76 SMEs EU 16% 69% 40% 49% 55% 64% 57% 80% 38% 46% 29% 51% 63% 58% 71% 51-54 Business associations EU 13% 54% 41% 48% 63% 74% 55% 81% 39% 50% 23% 57% 72% 56% 75% 126-131 Trade unions EU 94% 100% 97% 98% 99% 3% 2% 11% 99% 98% 97% 100% 10% 2% 4% 89-99 NGOs EU* 29% 68% 52% 82% 88% 42% 14% 49% 82% 59% 62% 88% 46% 11% 51% 69-75 Academia 12% 41% 35% 56% 71% 56% 38% 71% 47% 47% 35% 65% 63% 47% 63% 16-17 Citizens + other EU** 18% 64% 51% 67% 70% 59% 38% 65% 55% 64% 40% 69% 57% 41% 64% 78-82 Non-EU 33% 55% 64% 83% 67% 83% 45% 58% 55% 50% 45% 75% 58% 0% 83% 10-12
Central EU 20% 63% 47% 62% 69% 59% 41% 66% 46% 56% 36% 66% 60% 44% 64% 338-349 North EU 40% 69% 60% 76% 87% 48% 29% 60% 64% 65% 49% 72% 56% 38% 44% 62-67 South EU 31% 76% 69% 84% 95% 49% 27% 58% 78% 76% 52% 92% 51% 25% 53% 131-137 East EU 45% 65% 54% 64% 76% 42% 32% 48% 62% 73% 51% 69% 44% 30% 48% 64-72 Central EU authorities 7% 53% 42% 66% 76% 80% 47% 77% 31% 59% 20% 73% 78% 46% 81% 57-60 North EU authorities 13% 64% 54% 86% 100% 47% 27% 73% 47% 64% 21% 73% 71% 53% 27% 13-15 South EU authorities 7% 79% 71% 93% 86% 64% 50% 79% 79% 79% 54% 93% 57% 8% 85% 13-14 East EU authorities 0% 60% 20% 60% 100% 80% 20% 80% 20% 60% 0% 80% 60% 60% 80% 4-5
364
The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked how likely they believed different outcomes would be as a result
of further incentivising the use of socially responsible public procurement. The figures
refer to the combined shares of “very likely” and “somewhat likely” answers (other
response options were also available but are not shown).
Among public authorities, the outcomes most often seen as likely were improved
working conditions (83%), increase prices (77%) and reduced risk of labour and social
law breaches (76%). For other outcomes, perceived likelihood ranged from 8% to 76%.
Very low likelihood was reported for reduced litigation (8%).
Among large companies, improved working conditions was a key likely outcome (82%),
followed by reduced risk of labour and social law breaches (69%) and poverty reduction
and increased social inclusion (67%). SMEs and business associations pointed to
increased prices of products, services or works (80% and 81%). Across these three
groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining outcomes ranged from 13% to 81%. Very
low likelihood was reported for reduced litigation among (13% - 16%), and for higher
SME participation (21% - 29%).
Trade unions most frequently regarded boosts to EU employment (100%), reduced risk
of labour and social law breaches (100%), improved working conditions (99%) and
poverty reduction and increased social inclusion (98%) as likely outcomes. NGOs most
often highlighted improved working conditions and reduced risk of labour and social law
breaches (both 88%). For these two groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining
outcomes ranged from 2% to 100%. Very low likelihood was reported among trade
unions for increased administrative burden for public buyers (3%), reduced competition
(2%) and higher administrative burden for EU bidders (4%), and among NGOs for
reduced competition (14%) and making cross-border participation more difficult (11%).
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents, improved
working conditions was among the most likely outcomes (academia: 71%; citizens and
other respondents: 70%; non-EU respondents: 67%), alongside poverty reduction and
increased social inclusion (56%; 67%; 83%) and reduced risk of labour and social law
breaches (65%; 69%; 75%). Across these three groups, perceived likelihood of the
remaining outcomes ranged from 12% to 83%. Very low likelihood was reported for
reduced litigation among academia (12%-33%).
Respondents were invited to identify any other likely impacts. A summary of their
responses is presented below.
Public authorities
Approximately a tenth of public authorities respondents provided comments on the likely
impacts of further incentivizing the use of socially responsible public procurement,
highlighting both positive and negative effects. Many respondents believe that
incentivizing socially responsible public procurement can lead to various benefits, such
as promoting fair working conditions, reducing social dumping, and encouraging
365
sustainable practices. Some propose introducing binding obligations on socially
responsible public procurement, including mandatory human rights and environmental
due diligence, to ensure consistent application and sufficient impact. Others suggest that
public procurement law is not the right place to implement social policy, and that
contracting authorities are already bound by collective agreements and labour law. There
are also concerns about the potential complexity and administrative burdens of
introducing new legislative obligations, and the need for increased investment in
professionalizing public procurement officers to support strategic approaches to public
procurement. For instance, one comment notes that "the legislative framework should
impose binding obligations on socially responsible public procurement," while another
suggests that "public procurement law is not the right place to implement social policy."
Some respondents also emphasize the need for flexibility and subsidiarity, allowing
Member States to apply their respective models for handling social aspects in the labour
market. Overall, the comments highlight the need for a balanced approach that promotes
socially responsible public procurement while minimizing administrative burdens and
ensuring flexibility for contracting authorities.
EU companies and business associations
Approximately a tenth of EU companies and business associations respondents provided
comments on the likely impacts of further incentivizing the use of socially responsible
public procurement, highlighting both positive and negative effects. Many respondents
believe that incentivizing socially responsible public procurement can lead to various
benefits, such as promoting fair working conditions, reducing social dumping, and
encouraging sustainable practices. Some propose introducing social criteria, such as
mandatory compliance with labour law, collective agreements, and human rights
standards, to ensure that public procurement promotes social responsibility and respects
workers' rights. Others suggest that social requirements, including incentives, are
generally company-specific and not contract-specific, and are rejected in principle as
they contradict the goal of simplifying procurement processes. There are also concerns
about the potential complexity and administrative burdens of introducing new social
requirements, and the need for increased flexibility and proportionality in applying social
criteria. For instance, one comment notes that "the use of social criteria must be at the
discretion of the public contracting authority," while another suggests that "social
requirements, including incentives, are generally company-specific and not contract-
specific, and are rejected in principle." Some respondents also emphasize the need for a
more nuanced approach, taking into account the specific needs and characteristics of
different sectors and industries, and the importance of balancing social considerations
with other factors, such as competition and innovation. Overall, the comments highlight
the need for a balanced approach that promotes socially responsible public procurement
while minimizing administrative burdens and ensuring flexibility for businesses.
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
Approximately half of EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions
respondents provided comments on the likely impacts of further incentivizing the use of
socially responsible public procurement, highlighting both positive and negative effects.
Many respondents believe that incentivizing socially responsible public procurement can
lead to various benefits, such as promoting fair working conditions, reducing social
dumping, and encouraging sustainable practices. Some propose introducing social
criteria, such as mandatory compliance with labour law, collective agreements, and
366
human rights standards, to ensure that public procurement promotes social responsibility
and respects workers' rights. Others suggest that incentivizing socially responsible public
procurement can improve working conditions, social inclusion, and quality outcomes,
particularly in sectors where labour standards and traceability matter. There are also
concerns about the potential complexity and administrative burdens of introducing new
social requirements, and the need for increased flexibility and proportionality in applying
social criteria. For instance, one comment notes that "it is essential to ensure compliance
with labour law provisions and collective agreements, as well as to promote collective
bargaining and quality jobs through public procurement," while another suggests that
"incentivizing socially responsible public procurement can support improved working
conditions and compliance with existing labour and social obligations." Some
respondents also emphasize the need for a more nuanced approach, taking into account
the specific needs and characteristics of different sectors and industries, and the
importance of balancing social considerations with other factors, such as competition and
innovation. Overall, the comments highlight the need for a balanced approach that
promotes socially responsible public procurement while minimizing administrative
burdens and ensuring flexibility for contracting authorities.
All other respondents
Approximately a tenth of all other respondents provided comments on the likely impacts
of further incentivizing the use of socially responsible public procurement, highlighting
both positive and negative effects. Many respondents believe that incentivizing socially
responsible public procurement can lead to various benefits, such as promoting fair
working conditions, reducing social dumping, and encouraging sustainable practices.
Some propose introducing social criteria, such as mandatory compliance with labour law,
collective agreements, and human rights standards, to ensure that public procurement
promotes social responsibility and respects workers' rights. Others suggest that
incentivizing socially responsible public procurement can improve working conditions,
social inclusion, and quality outcomes, particularly in sectors where labour standards and
traceability matter. There are also concerns about the potential complexity and
administrative burdens of introducing new social requirements, and the need for
increased flexibility and proportionality in applying social criteria. For instance, one
comment notes that "social considerations in public procurement should also be
considered as relevant levers to improve the overall competitiveness of the circular
economy approach," while another suggests that "incentivising SRPP improves working
conditions and reduces labour risks without reducing competition or restricting cross-
border access." Some respondents also emphasize the need for a more nuanced approach,
taking into account the specific needs and characteristics of different sectors and
industries, and the importance of balancing social considerations with other factors, such
as competition and innovation. Overall, the comments highlight the need for a balanced
approach that promotes socially responsible public procurement while minimizing
administrative burdens and ensuring flexibility for contracting authorities.
Figure 85: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of mandating further
socially responsible public procurement obligations?; all replies.
367
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “How likely do you believe the following outcomes would
occur as a result of mandating further socially responsible public procurement
obligations?”, respondents most often expect improved working conditions (80%: 50%
very likely, 30% somewhat likely), reduced risk of labour and social law breaches (77%:
48% very likely, 29% somewhat likely), and poverty reduction and increased social
inclusion (74%: 43% very likely, 31% somewhat likely). High shares also anticipate a
boost to EU employment (68%: 34% very likely, 34% somewhat likely), increased
chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders (66%: 32% very likely, 34% somewhat
likely), and a boost to EU industry (62%: 30% very likely, 32% somewhat likely).
Majorities consider increased prices of products, services and works (60%: 19% very
likely, 41% somewhat likely), better quality of products, services and works (60%: 35%
very likely, 25% somewhat likely), higher administrative burden for EU bidders (59%:
23% very likely, 36% somewhat likely), increased costs for EU bidders (58%: 21% very
likely, 37% somewhat likely), and increased administrative burden for public buyers
(56%: 23% very likely, 33% somewhat likely) as likely outcomes. Lower positive
expectations are reported for higher SME participation (46%: 21% very likely, 25%
somewhat likely), reduced competition (37%: 11% very likely, 26% somewhat likely),
making cross-border participation more difficult (34%: 11% very likely, 23% somewhat
likely), and reduced litigation (32%: 20% very likely, 12% somewhat likely).
Disagreement that these outcomes will occur (somewhat unlikely or very unlikely) is
highest for reduced competition (32%: 16% somewhat unlikely, 16% very unlikely),
50%
48%
43%
34%
32%
30%
19%
35%
23%
21%
23%
21%
11%
11%
20%
30%
29%
31%
34%
34%
32%
41%
25%
36%
37%
33%
25%
26%
23%
12%
6%
6%
7%
8%
5%
6%
17%
7%
9%
7%
11%
16%
16%
11%
20%
3%
3%
3%
4%
3%
4%
3%
4%
13%
14%
13%
9%
16%
14%
10%
Improved working conditions
Reduced risk of labour and social law breaches
Poverty reduction and increased social inclusion
Boost EU employment
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Boost EU industry
Increased prices of products / services / works
Better quality of products / services / works
Higher administrative burden for EU bidders
Increased costs for EU bidders
Increased administrative burden for public buyers
Higher SME participation
Reduced competition
Make cross-border participation more difficult
Reduced litigation
Very likely Somewhat likely No impact Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Improved working condition s
Reduced risk of labour and social law breaches
Poverty reduction and increased social inclusion
Boost EU employm ent
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Boost EU industry
Increased prices of products / services / works
Better quality of products / services / works
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
Increased costs for EU bidders
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Higher SME participati on
Reduced competiti on
Make cross- border participati on more difficult
Reduced litigation
Very likely 50% 48% 43% 34% 32% 30% 19% 35% 23% 21% 23% 21% 11% 11% 20% Somewhat likely 30% 29% 31% 34% 34% 32% 41% 25% 36% 37% 33% 25% 26% 23% 12% No impact 12% 14% 15% 20% 26% 27% 20% 30% 20% 21% 20% 29% 31% 41% 37% Somewhat unlikely 6% 6% 7% 8% 5% 6% 17% 7% 9% 7% 11% 16% 16% 11% 20% Very unlikely 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 4% 3% 4% 13% 14% 13% 9% 16% 14% 10% No. of responses 585 591 591 588 582 580 584 589 581 584 588 587 578 573 581
368
reduced litigation (30%: 20% somewhat unlikely, 10% very unlikely), making cross-
border participation more difficult (25%: 11% somewhat unlikely, 14% very unlikely),
and higher SME participation (25%: 16% somewhat unlikely, 9% very unlikely). Lower,
but still notable, disagreement is reported for higher administrative burden for EU
bidders (22%: 9% somewhat unlikely, 13% very unlikely), increased administrative
burden for public buyers (24%: 11% somewhat unlikely, 13% very unlikely), increased
costs for EU bidders (21%: 7% somewhat unlikely, 14% very unlikely), and increased
prices of products, services and works (20%: 17% somewhat unlikely, 3% very unlikely).
Disagreement is comparatively limited for better quality (11%: 7% somewhat unlikely,
4% very unlikely), a boost to EU industry (10%: 6% somewhat unlikely, 4% very
unlikely), boost to EU employment (12%: 8% somewhat unlikely, 4% very unlikely),
poverty reduction and increased social inclusion (10%: 7% somewhat unlikely, 3% very
unlikely), reduced risk of labour and social law breaches (9%: 6% somewhat unlikely,
3% very unlikely), increased chance of winning for EU bidders (8%: 5% somewhat
unlikely, 3% very unlikely), and improved working conditions (9%: 6% somewhat
unlikely, 3% very unlikely).
Across all outcomes, the share of respondents expecting “no impact” ranges from 12%
for improved working conditions to 41% for making cross-border participation more
difficult and 37% for reduced litigation. Intermediate “no impact” levels are reported for
reduced risk of labour and social law breaches (14%), poverty reduction and increased
social inclusion (15%), boost to EU employment (20%), increased chance of winning for
EU bidders (26%), boost to EU industry (27%), increased prices (20%), better quality
(30%), higher administrative burden for EU bidders (20%), increased costs for EU
bidders (21%), increased administrative burden for public buyers (20%), higher SME
participation (29%), and reduced competition (31%).
Table 102: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of mandating further
socially responsible public procurement obligations?; percentage of respondents that indicated “very likely” or
“somewhat likely” answers, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondent Reduced litigation
Boost EU employm ent
Boost EU industry
Poverty reduction and increased social inclusion
Improved working condition s
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Reduced competiti on
Increased prices of products / services / works
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Higher SME participati on
Reduced risk of labour and social law breaches
Increased costs for EU bidders
Make cross- border participati on more difficult
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
No. of responses
All 32% 68% 62% 75% 80% 56% 37% 60% 60% 65% 46% 76% 58% 34% 59% 573-591 Public Authorities EU 11% 60% 51% 72% 78% 83% 49% 83% 41% 62% 17% 71% 81% 47% 77% 90-93 Large companies EU 10% 63% 57% 68% 79% 59% 44% 63% 49% 64% 30% 70% 68% 43% 65% 72-73 SMEs EU 14% 62% 50% 65% 69% 68% 43% 68% 51% 64% 39% 62% 61% 47% 63% 36-38 Business associations EU 13% 52% 46% 59% 69% 77% 49% 76% 44% 56% 30% 59% 77% 46% 81% 106-112 Trade unions EU 95% 99% 99% 98% 100% 3% 1% 7% 99% 98% 95% 99% 8% 2% 5% 94-100 NGOs EU* 46% 82% 75% 88% 92% 44% 29% 53% 76% 53% 74% 95% 47% 10% 46% 68-74 Academia 25% 31% 38% 60% 69% 56% 44% 94% 50% 56% 44% 69% 75% 56% 69% 15-16 Citizens + other EU** 22% 65% 55% 70% 72% 61% 44% 69% 57% 63% 39% 75% 62% 43% 68% 76-80 Non-EU 30% 45% 60% 82% 64% 73% 45% 73% 55% 36% 36% 64% 82% 22% 73% 9-11
Central EU 26% 63% 57% 68% 74% 62% 40% 64% 50% 62% 41% 71% 63% 36% 61% 298-309 North EU 42% 69% 58% 76% 82% 59% 37% 58% 61% 65% 49% 72% 55% 38% 56% 61-67 South EU 34% 78% 73% 89% 93% 49% 35% 62% 79% 72% 51% 90% 58% 28% 58% 130-135 East EU 46% 75% 63% 76% 80% 42% 25% 42% 67% 72% 61% 80% 39% 32% 48% 69-72 Central EU authorities 12% 57% 50% 68% 72% 86% 51% 84% 34% 62% 13% 67% 85% 51% 81% 57-60 North EU authorities 20% 62% 36% 80% 87% 87% 40% 73% 47% 57% 14% 71% 73% 60% 71% 13-15 South EU authorities 0% 71% 71% 86% 86% 64% 64% 86% 71% 71% 43% 79% 64% 8% 57% 13-14 East EU authorities 0% 60% 40% 60% 100% 80% 0% 80% 20% 40% 0% 100% 100% 60% 100% 4-5
369
Respondents were asked how likely they believed different outcomes would be as a result
of mandating further socially responsible public procurement obligations. The figures
refer to the combined shares of “very likely” and “somewhat likely” answers (other
response options were also available but are not shown).
Among public authorities, the most likely outcomes were increased administrative
burden for public buyers (83%), increased prices of products, services or works (83%)
and increased costs for EU bidders (81%). For the remaining outcomes, perceived
likelihood ranged from 11% to 77%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced
litigation (11%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, improved working conditions
was consistently among the most likely outcomes (large companies: 79%; SMEs: 69%;
business associations: 69%), along with poverty reduction and increased social inclusion
(68%; 65%; 59%). Business associations pointed to higher administrative burden for both
bidders (81%) and public buyers (77%). Across these three groups, perceived likelihood
of the other outcomes ranged between 10% and 77%. Very low likelihood was reported
for reduced litigation among large companies (10% - 14%).
Trade unions almost unanimously pointed to improved working conditions (100%),
boosts to EU employment and industry (both 99%), reduced risk of labour and social law
breaches (99%), better quality of products, services or works (99%), poverty reduction
and increased social inclusion (98%). NGOs most often pointed to reduced risk of labour
and social law breaches (95%) and improved working conditions (92%). For these two
groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining outcomes ranged from 1% to 95%. Very
low likelihood was reported among trade unions for reduced competition (1%), increased
administrative burden for public buyers (3%), increased prices (7%), increased costs for
EU bidders (8%), making cross-border participation more difficult (2%) and higher
administrative burden for EU bidders (5%), and among NGOs for making cross-border
participation more difficult (10%).
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents, the outcomes
most often seen as likely included improved working conditions (academia: 69%;
citizens and other respondents: 72%; non-EU respondents: 64%), poverty reduction and
increased social inclusion (60%; 70%; 82%) and reduced risk of labour and social law
breaches (69%; 75%; 64%). Across these three groups, perceived likelihood of the
remaining outcomes ranged from 22% to 94%. Very low likelihood was reported for
making cross-border participation more difficult among non-EU respondents (22%).
Respondents were invited to identify any other likely impacts. A summary of their
responses is presented below.
Public authorities
Approximately a tenth of public authorities respondents provided comments on the likely
impacts of mandating further socially responsible public procurement obligations,
highlighting both positive and negative effects. Many respondents believe that mandating
socially responsible public procurement can lead to various benefits, such as promoting
fair working conditions, reducing social dumping, and encouraging sustainable practices.
Some propose redefining the Most Economically Advantageous Tender (MEAT) criteria
370
as the Most Advantageous Tender (MAT), establishing the Best Price-Quality and
Sustainability Ratio (BPQ&S) as the default award criterion for public contracts. Others
suggest that social criteria and requirements are unmanageable due to complexity and
may reduce the number of bids and increase costs for buyers. There are also concerns
about the potential administrative burdens and costs of implementing new social
requirements, and the need for increased flexibility and proportionality in applying social
criteria. For instance, one comment notes that "the introduction of the MEAT criteria
created opportunities for strategic procurement through non-price award criteria, but
legal uncertainty persists." Some respondents also emphasize the importance of
monitoring the performance of contracts and the need for expert assistance in
implementing social inclusion clauses. Overall, the comments highlight the need for a
balanced approach that promotes socially responsible public procurement while
minimizing administrative burdens and ensuring flexibility for contracting authorities.
EU companies and business associations
Approximately a tenth of EU companies and business associations respondents provided
comments on the likely impacts of mandating further socially responsible public
procurement obligations, highlighting both positive and negative effects. Many
respondents believe that mandating socially responsible public procurement can lead to
various benefits, such as promoting fair working conditions, reducing social dumping,
and encouraging sustainable practices. Some propose introducing social criteria, such as
mandatory compliance with labour law, collective agreements, and human rights
standards, to ensure that public procurement promotes social responsibility and respects
workers' rights. Others suggest that mandating socially responsible public procurement
can improve compliance and working conditions, while reinforcing green and Made in
Europe requirements. However, there are also concerns about the potential complexity
and administrative burdens of introducing new social requirements, and the need for
increased flexibility and proportionality in applying social criteria. For instance, one
comment notes that "mandatory social procurement requirements can improve
compliance and working conditions while reinforcing green and Made in Europe
requirements," while another suggests that "the introduction of new mandatory criteria in
public procurement law to address strategic challenges should be avoided as a matter of
urgency." Some respondents also emphasize the need for a more nuanced approach,
taking into account the specific needs and characteristics of different sectors and
industries, and the importance of balancing social considerations with other factors, such
as competition and innovation. Overall, the comments highlight the need for a balanced
approach that promotes socially responsible public procurement while minimizing
administrative burdens and ensuring flexibility for businesses.
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
Approximately over half of EU NGOs, environmental organisations, and trade unions
respondents provided comments on the likely impacts of mandating further socially
responsible public procurement obligations, highlighting both positive and negative
effects. Many respondents believe that mandating socially responsible public
procurement can lead to various benefits, such as promoting fair working conditions,
reducing social dumping, and encouraging sustainable practices. Some propose
introducing mandatory social criteria, such as compliance with labour law, collective
agreements, and human rights standards, to ensure that public procurement promotes
social responsibility and respects workers' rights. Others suggest that clearer and
371
mandatory rules will ensure better value for money, contributing to quality job creation,
and should include mandatory criteria related to quality jobs and collective bargaining, as
well as regulation of subcontracting. There are also concerns about the potential
complexity and administrative burdens of introducing new social requirements, and the
need for increased flexibility and proportionality in applying social criteria. For instance,
one comment notes that "clearer and mandatory rules will ensure better value for money,
contributing to quality job creation," while another suggests that "mandatory social
procurement obligations increase costs and reduce competition, while delivering limited
and uneven social outcomes." Some respondents also emphasize the importance of
promoting job quality and collective bargaining, and the need for a clear message to
companies that violations of social rights are not acceptable. Overall, the comments
highlight the need for a balanced approach that promotes socially responsible public
procurement while minimizing administrative burdens and ensuring flexibility for
contracting authorities.
All other respondents
Approximately a tenth of all other respondents provided comments on the likely impacts
of mandating further socially responsible public procurement obligations, highlighting
both positive and negative effects. Many respondents believe that mandating socially
responsible public procurement can lead to various benefits, such as promoting fair
working conditions, reducing social dumping, and encouraging sustainable practices.
Some propose introducing mandatory social criteria, such as compliance with labour law,
collective agreements, and human rights standards, to ensure that public procurement
promotes social responsibility and respects workers' rights. Others suggest that clearer
and mandatory rules will ensure better value for money, contributing to quality job
creation, and should include mandatory criteria related to quality jobs and collective
bargaining, as well as regulation of subcontracting. There are also concerns about the
potential complexity and administrative burdens of introducing new social requirements,
and the need for increased flexibility and proportionality in applying social criteria. For
instance, one comment notes that "clearer and mandatory rules will ensure better value
for money, contributing to quality job creation," while another suggests that "introducing
mandatory social obligations entails a significant risk of slowing development and
creating requirements that quickly become outdated." Some respondents also emphasize
the importance of promoting job quality and collective bargaining, and the need for a
clear message to companies that violations of social rights are not acceptable. Overall,
the comments highlight the need for a balanced approach that promotes socially
responsible public procurement while minimizing administrative burdens and ensuring
flexibility for contracting authorities.
372
9.10. Public procurement of innovation (FLX and ESI options)
Figure 86: Question: To what extent do you agree with the following statements concerning public procurement of
innovation?; all replies.
Respondent
1. No amendments are required to the existing
legal framework regarding the public
procurement of innovation.
2. EU public procurement law should
further incentivise the public procurement of
innovation.
3. EU public procurement law should
mandate the public procurement of
innovation requirements.
Strongly agree 5% 30% 12%
Agree 11% 44% 21%
Neutral 20% 22% 37%
Disagree 44% 3% 19%
Strongly disagree 21% 2% 11%
No. of responses 573 678 654 Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
When asked about public procurement of innovation, the strongest support was for
further incentives to encourage its use, with 73% in favour (30% strongly agree, 44%
agree). This was followed by support for mandating public procurement of innovation
requirements, backed by 33% (12% strongly agree, 21% agree) and opposed by 30% of
respondents.
The proposition that no amendments should be made to the existing legal framework
regarding the public procurement of innovation was supported by 16% of respondents,
while a majority of 64% opposed this view.
30%
12%
5%
44%
21%
11%
3%
19%
44%
2%
11%
21%
2. EU public procurement law should further incentivise the public procurement of innovation.
3. EU public procurement law should mandate the public procurement of innovation requirements.
1. No amendments are required to the existing legal framework regarding the public procurement of innovation.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
373
Table 103: Question: To what extent do you agree with the following statements concerning public procurement of
innovation?; percentage of respondents that agree or strongly agree, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top response highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
This table presents the breakdown of responses by different respondent groups. The
figures represent the combined shares of "strongly agree" and "agree" responses (other
response options were available but are not shown here).
Respondents in all groups showed high support for further incentives to use procurement
of innovation, with backing ranging from 62% among public authorities to 93% for
SMEs. The only exception was trade unions, which showed just 19% support for further
incentives and even lower levels for other options.
Public authorities registered the highest support for no change at 29%. Regarding
mandatory measures, SMEs and business associations were the strongest supporters, with
67% and 45% backing respectively.
Respondent
1. No amendments are required to the existing legal framework regarding the public procurement of innovation.
2. EU public procurement law should further incentivise the public procurement of innovation.
3. EU public procurement law should mandate the public procurement of innovation requirements.
No. of responses
All 16% 73% 33% 573-678 Public Authorities EU 29% 62% 11% 95-100 Large companies EU 11% 87% 34% 82-84 SMEs EU 14% 93% 67% 59-61 Business associations EU 10% 89% 45% 154-161 Trade unions EU 0% 19% 9% 15-89 NGOs EU* 15% 85% 38% 54-60 Academia 17% 78% 22% 18-18 Citizens + other EU** 20% 77% 33% 82-91 Non-EU 23% 71% 21% 13-14
Central EU 16% 76% 32% 344-388 North EU 20% 56% 18% 50-68 South EU 13% 82% 46% 114-140 East EU 17% 56% 27% 52-68 Central EU authorities 27% 57% 8% 62-65 North EU authorities 35% 61% 0% 17-18 South EU authorities 25% 85% 38% 12-13 East EU authorities 50% 75% 25% 4-4
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Table 104: Question: If you "agree" or "strongly agree" with point 2 (Figure 86). Which of the following elements
should be introduced to further incentivise the use of public procurement of innovation?; % of all answers to point 2,
by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Multiple choice question; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. Point 2. EU public procurement law should further incentivise the public procurement of innovation. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that EU public procurement law should
further incentivise the public procurement of innovation were asked which elements
should be introduced. Figures refer to the share of these respondents selecting each
option.
Across all respondents, the most frequently selected elements were simplifying and
removing legal conditions for procedures designed to buy innovative solutions (49%),
providing a clear legal definition of public procurement of innovation (45%) and direct
purchase from start-ups (36%).
Among public authorities, the same three measures attracted the highest support ranging
between 43% and 47%.
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, simplification of procedures
and a clear legal definition were consistently prioritised (simplification: 49–69%;
definition: 34–51%). Business associations also favoured a “comply or explain”
mechanism (40%) and an EU platform (35%).
Trade unions expressed very low support for all listed elements (generally at or below
4%). NGOs, by contrast, strongly supported a clear legal definition (75%), procedural
simplification (57%), direct purchase from start-ups (55%), aggregation of demand
(55%) and an EU platform (58%).
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents,
simplification of procedures was again a core priority (academia: 72%; citizens and other
respondents: 49%; non-EU respondents: 43%), alongside a clear legal definition (61%;
Respondent
EU law should provide a clear legal definition of public procurement of innovation.
EU law should simplify and remove legal conditions to facilitate the use of procurement procedures designed to buy innovative solutions, such as innovation partnerships or competitive dialogue.
Public buyers should be able to directly buy innovative solutions from start-ups more easily through the creation of a specific procedure.
A comply or explain mechanism should be introduced to promote the use of preliminary market consultations when buying innovative solutions, to limit excessive financial guarantees, or to enable suppliers to retain Intellectual Property Rights.
The Commission should promote value engineering in relation to the public procurement of innovation.
Non-binding targets for public procurement of innovation should be set at EU and Member State levels with accompanying strategies or plans to ensure their achievement.
The Commission should promote the aggregation of demand in case of similar needs among public buyers (e.g. collaborative procurement by multiple public buyers).
The Commission should establish an EU platform in which all EU public sector innovation challenges are communicated to suppliers of innovative solutions, including start-ups and innovative SME’s. Other:
No. of responses to point 2
All 45% 49% 36% 32% 23% 22% 25% 34% 9% 678 Public Authorities EU 46% 47% 43% 21% 23% 18% 21% 37% 8% 100 Large companies EU 51% 69% 38% 37% 23% 23% 25% 32% 11% 84 SMEs EU 34% 49% 38% 26% 21% 21% 13% 30% 3% 61 Business associations EU 47% 60% 30% 40% 27% 28% 24% 35% 13% 161 Trade unions EU 3% 3% 4% 2% 2% 1% 2% 3% 2% 89
NGOs EU* 75% 57% 55% 50% 28% 42% 55% 58% 10% 60 Academia 61% 72% 56% 44% 11% 0% 33% 44% 0% 18 Citizens + other EU** 55% 49% 48% 38% 32% 26% 35% 42% 10% 91 Non-EU 57% 43% 50% 50% 36% 50% 36% 64% 14% 14
0 Central EU 43% 49% 35% 28% 20% 22% 24% 32% 11% 388 North EU 32% 44% 32% 28% 25% 19% 16% 25% 3% 68 South EU 59% 53% 42% 44% 26% 26% 31% 46% 9% 140 East EU 34% 46% 32% 29% 25% 18% 21% 26% 1% 68 Central EU authorities 48% 46% 42% 22% 23% 14% 18% 34% 9% 65 North EU authorities 33% 44% 33% 17% 28% 28% 17% 22% 6% 18 South EU authorities 54% 54% 62% 31% 23% 31% 38% 69% 8% 13 East EU authorities 50% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 25% 50% 0% 4
375
55%; 57%). Academia and non-EU respondents also showed relatively high support for
direct purchase from start-ups (56% and 50%), while non-EU respondents most often
backed an EU platform (64%).
Those who selected Other were asked to elaborate. A summary of their responses is
presented below.
Public authorities
Public authorities who provided comments addressed which additional changes could
further incentivise public procurement of innovation.
Most comments emphasised greater procedural flexibility to act as a “launching
customer”, including wider use of the negotiated procedure “without prior
notice/publication”, raising thresholds, and allowing “more room/flexibility to modify”
both during tenders and during contract execution to accommodate iterative
improvements.
Several advocated measures to improve access for innovative SMEs and very small
firms, such as a ‘Young Business Act’ to reserve or reduce barriers for companies
seeking their “first clients”, more flexible use of variants “as a matter of principle” to
encourage innovative and sustainable tenders, and raising thresholds for small lots.
Some called for clearer, more usable innovation tools: the definition of innovation was
described as “insufficiently operational”, and the Innovation Partnership should be
simplified and broadened to integrate research, development, production and scale-up
phases. A minority proposed enabling the “reuse of existing solutions from previously
awarded procedures” across procurers under predefined conditions (e.g. best price–
quality ratio) to support diffusion and scale-up.
A minority also urged allowing public buyers to “directly support, facilitate and
co-create” innovations initiated by economic operators, not limited to start-ups.
A small number proposed more far-reaching legal changes, including expanding
exemptions so that “this Directive shall not apply” to research and development services
and/or research organisations.
Overall, comments largely aligned around reducing administrative burden and increasing
flexibility to buy and scale innovation; no explicit counter-arguments or concerns about
potential trade-offs (e.g. transparency or competition) were recorded in the submissions
provided.
EU companies and business associations
EU companies and business associations who commented outlined further changes that
would incentivise public procurement of innovation. A clear majority urged allowing
variants by default to unlock innovative, better-value offers-especially from SMEs-with
safeguards such as “comply or explain” and permitting a variant alongside a compliant
offer (“permitted and enabled by default”). Many also backed easing direct purchasing by
raising thresholds for awards “without competition,” removing constraints like “cost
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premium thresholds,” and shifting towards functional, outcome-based specifications,
stronger Best-Price–Quality Ratio and lifecycle costing, and “creative award criteria.”
There was broad support for simplifying and de-risking innovation-friendly procedures.
Many asked to streamline access to competitive dialogue, negotiated procedures and
innovation partnerships; some proposed introducing collaborative models such as an
“Alliance/Collaborative Contract.” Several called for clearer use of two-stage contracts
and for addressing IP, noting current rules on “transfer of intellectual property rights…
do not appear adequate” in fast-moving ICT.
Views differed on how best to support SMEs and start-ups. Some advocated a new
specific procedure so public buyers can directly buy innovative solutions from SMEs,
while others preferred making existing procedures more “start-up-ready” rather than
creating an additional route. Complementary measures suggested included milestone
payments, reduced solvency requirements in innovative contracts, mutual guarantees,
project financing, on-boarding new suppliers during delivery, and automatic transition
from pilots or pre-commercial procurement to operational contracts when targets are met.
There were tensions on definitions, coordination tools and targets. Some favoured a clear
legal definition within a comprehensive framework, while others warned such a
definition would be “too narrow and too rigid,” preferring Commission guidance on
interpreting “innovation.” Opinions split on pooling demand: some supported
aggregation to aid smaller actors; others argued the Commission “should not promote” it
but should enable collaborative procurement among multiple buyers. Likewise, some
backed non-binding targets and an EU-wide innovation challenge platform; others
considered targets “not useful” due to red tape and opposed a separate platform,
preferring to embed innovation in a broader digitalisation platform.
Sector-specific and societal aims were also raised by a minority: mandatory “planning
competitions” in architecture; integrating sustainability and public-health criteria into
innovation procurement (e.g. a “shift to more plant-based diets”); accounting for
MedTech “clinical workflow optimisation”; and mainstreaming “adaptive management
and adaptive monitoring.” A small minority urged using procurement as an industrial
policy tool to support “innovations made in Europe” with sovereignty criteria.
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions who commented set out which
further changes would incentivise public procurement of innovation. A majority urged
prioritising innovations with strong environmental and social value, aligned with EU
goals on circularity and climate, backed by practical enablers: competence centres,
standard templates and lifecycle costing methodologies to “reduce uncertainty and
transaction costs,” plus EU-funded capacity-building for local authorities, especially
smaller municipalities. Several also called for clearer definitions, easier access to
innovation-friendly procedures, market consultations “with safeguards,” lower financial
guarantees for SMEs, and fair IPR arrangements.
Many supported creating an EU-wide platform to publish public-sector innovation
challenges and connect buyers with suppliers of innovative solutions, including start-ups,
innovative SMEs and social-economy actors (e.g. reuse, repair and recycling enterprises)
(“an EU platform in which all EU public sector innovation challenges are
communicated”). National good practice platforms were cited as useful models.
377
Some pressed for a circularity hierarchy in PPI that prioritises “direct reuse and
upcycling over recycling and downcycling” (9R framework), and for EU and national
strategies to identify key “lead markets” (e.g. basic materials). A minority focused on
social conditions, arguing public money should promote “quality jobs” and stronger
collective bargaining, with worker conditions clearly linked to the subject matter of the
contract to enable social clauses, foster upward convergence and avoid a “race to the
bottom.”
All other respondents
Other respondents who commented outlined changes to further incentivise public
procurement of innovation. A clear majority asked for simplification and standardisation:
harmonised EU guidance, “standard legal templates,” clearer and less complex
innovation partnership procedures, and practical enablers such as peer exchange, access
to best-practice cases, a dedicated marketplace, simplified tendering for emerging
technologies, and insurance to reduce supplier risk. Many also sought greater procedural
flexibility, including wider use of negotiated procedures beyond “research or small-scale
testing,” and the ability to award “follow-up contracts for successful pilots” under
transparent criteria and proportionality checks to speed scale-up and support transitions
(e.g. energy).
Many supported easier access for small innovators, including “easier direct purchasing
from start-ups,” reduced administrative burden, and model documents covering BPQR,
IPR clauses, performance-based specifications and verification methods. There was
strong emphasis on intellectual property, with repeated calls to “ensure that suppliers
retain the intellectual property rights except where the buyer really needs to own IPR,” to
enhance scaling. A minority proposed enabling the “reuse of existing solutions from
previously awarded procedures,” beyond the original procurer, under predefined
BPQR-related conditions.
Sector-specific and ecosystem proposals came from a minority. In software, respondents
urged a demand-side ecosystem approach that recognises open source as “a core
innovation model,” with award criteria rewarding “interoperability, open standards,
auditability, and reuse,” and market structures enabling second-source and multi-vendor
ecosystems. In construction, some advocated awarding works and design separately to
foster innovation and cut costs. Others proposed formalising collaboration across
“businesses, banks and universities” with coordination rules, tax/fiscal benefits, and even
a specific legal personality for innovation partnerships; several also called for a new,
more flexible (possibly derogatory) procedure, noting the Innovation Partnership is “too
complex” and underused.
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Table 105: Question: If you "agree" or "strongly agree" with point 3 (Figure 86). Which of the following elements
should be made mandatory?; % of all answers to point 3, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Multiple choice question; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top two responses highlighted. Point 3. EU public procurement law should mandate the public procurement of innovation requirements. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that EU public procurement law should
mandate the public procurement of innovation were asked which elements should be
made mandatory. Figures refer to the share of these respondents selecting each option.
Across all respondents, the most frequently supported mandatory elements were
preliminary market consultations when buying innovative solutions (17%) and ensuring
that suppliers retain intellectual property rights (14%).
Among public authorities, support levels were low and relatively even, with 5% in favour
of mandatory preliminary market consultations and 4% for each of mandatory targets,
limits on financial guarantees and retention of intellectual property rights.
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, preliminary market
consultations attracted the highest support (24% for large companies, 20% for SMEs,
25% for business associations). Business associations also showed relatively higher
backing for ensuring that suppliers retain intellectual property rights (23%), while SMEs
more often favoured limiting excessive financial guarantees (21%). Across these three
groups, support for mandatory targets ranged between 14% and 17%.
Trade unions expressed very low support for any of the listed mandatory elements (0–
3%). NGOs, by contrast, reported higher support for preliminary market consultations
(25%) and mandatory targets (22%).
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents, citizens and
other respondents were the most supportive, with 22% backing mandatory preliminary
market consultations and limits on excessive financial guarantees, and 21% supporting
mandatory retention of intellectual property rights. Academia showed lower but balanced
Respondent
Mandatory targets for public procurement of innovation should be set at EU and Member State levels with accompanying strategies or plans to ensure their achievement.
Preliminary market consultations when buying innovative solutions.
Limiting excessive financial guarantees when buying innovative solutions.
Ensuring that suppliers retain Intellectual Property Rights. Other:
No. of responses to point 3
All 12% 17% 12% 14% 4% 654 Public Authorities EU 4% 5% 4% 4% 2% 96 Large companies EU 17% 24% 12% 13% 2% 82 SMEs EU 16% 20% 21% 16% 2% 61 Business associations EU 14% 25% 16% 23% 5% 154 Trade unions EU 2% 3% 0% 2% 2% 87
NGOs EU* 22% 25% 13% 15% 13% 55 Academia 11% 11% 6% 6% 6% 18 Citizens + other EU** 14% 22% 22% 21% 5% 87 Non-EU 14% 7% 0% 7% 7% 14
Central EU 10% 12% 9% 12% 5% 373 North EU 6% 11% 11% 9% 2% 66 South EU 22% 36% 22% 25% 5% 134 East EU 9% 22% 12% 7% 1% 67 Central EU authorities 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 62 North EU authorities 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17 South EU authorities 15% 15% 15% 23% 8% 13 East EU authorities 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 4
379
support (around 6–11% across all elements), while non-EU respondents focused mainly
on mandatory targets (14%), with limited support for other elements.
Those who selected Other were asked to elaborate. A summary of their responses is
presented below.
Public authorities
Public authorities who commented addressed which changes should be made mandatory
regarding the use of public procurement of innovation.
Most comments advocated mandating the acceptance of variants by default (“as a matter
of principle”) to encourage innovative and sustainable tenders and improve access for
VSEs and SMEs. They proposed an obligation to set out “minimum requirements” for
variants in the procurement documents and to ensure award criteria are applicable both to
compliant offers and to variants meeting those minimum requirements.
A smaller number called for mandatory mechanisms to pool demand through “joint
procurement consortia (particularly across country borders)” to address common needs.
EU companies and business associations
EU companies and business associations who commented set out which changes should
be made mandatory to strengthen public procurement of innovation. A clear majority
argued innovation should be treated as a “cross-cutting principle” across all contract
types, with Best Price-Quality Ratio made the default award criterion and high-weighted
non-price factors to avoid “downward competitive dynamics.” They called for
“systematically allowing variants” to unlock innovative offers and warned that “cost
premium thresholds… should not be set” as they could exclude transformative solutions
with superior lifecycle value. Many also insisted innovation be aligned with climate,
health and resilience goals so procurement becomes “a powerful enabler of better, more
sustainable choices.”
Many proposals focused on mandatory process requirements to de-risk and speed uptake:
make transparency and “premarket dialogue and communication” compulsory
(potentially at EU level) and include diverse end-user perspectives (e.g. “patients,
doctors, nurses, technicians”). Create simple, pre-approved procedures for innovation to
give legal certainty to small administrations; require proportional solvency/guarantee
levels, rapid and milestone payments, document reuse (“Once-Only”), accelerated pilots,
incentives for bidders to take technological risk, and “regulatory sandboxes.” Several
also asked to mandate reduced formal requirements, shorter deadlines and fewer
references for small contracts (e.g. up to EUR 200 000).
There was strong emphasis on intellectual property, with calls to make it mandatory that
“suppliers retain the intellectual property rights except where the buyer really needs to
own IPR” (e.g. national security), and to improve legal certainty in newer procedures. On
targets, where used they should be performance-based and technologically neutral, not
prescriptive of specific materials or technologies. A minority, particularly in software,
proposed mandatory, high-weighted criteria such as “interoperability, open standards,
and code auditability,” favouring “upstream-first open source” and requiring “second
380
source” capability via multiple independent providers to ensure vendor neutrality,
resilience and EU strategic autonomy.
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions who commented addressed
which changes should be made mandatory for public procurement of innovation. A
majority called for value-based awards that “move beyond the lowest price,” including
mandatory use of BPQR and lifecycle costing, and the systematic inclusion of non-price
criteria covering “social and environmental objectives, innovation and circularity.”
Several also urged clear, enforceable social and environmental clauses so eligibility
aligns with impact goals.
Many supported mandatory reporting and transparency to monitor progress and ensure
accountability. A recurring proposal was an EU-level tax compliance certificate for
bidders, renewed periodically and based on objective criteria (e.g. limited discrepancies
between global and in-country profitability), which could be presented in public tenders
to strengthen integrity.
There were tensions on the extent of mandating innovation requirements. A minority
argued that, unlike social and environmental conditionalities, innovation should be
sector-specific and target-driven, with contracting authorities incentivised-especially in
identified lead markets-rather than bound by blanket obligations; they “would not
recommend any of the above being made mandatory,” preferring case-by-case or
sector-specific decisions.
All other respondents
Other respondents who commented addressed which changes should be made mandatory
to strengthen public procurement of innovation. Submissions proposed mandating
proportionality and BPQR criteria for innovation-related procurements to ensure
performance-based evaluation “without mandating specific technologies or suppliers,”
alongside enabling “joint procurement consortia (particularly across country borders)” to
meet common needs. One proposal sought to permit making purchases contingent on
research/innovation outcomes in the care sector.
Several called for stronger inclusion rules for SMEs and micro firms, notably in
architecture, to counter over-demanding reference and staffing requirements that
“regularly exclude” the “young and small offices” that drive innovation. Proportionality
duties were seen as a way to rebalance access while maintaining quality.
A minority advanced software-specific mandatory provisions: public frameworks should
recognise permissive and open licensing as legitimate innovation models, require
high-weighted quality criteria such as “interoperability, open standards, and code
auditability,” and support “second-source capability” so multiple providers can maintain
and evolve solutions. This sits in some tension with strict technological neutrality, but
proponents argued these requirements enhance resilience, competition and long-term
public value while avoiding “proprietary dependency.”
381
9.10.1. Public procurement of innovation impacts
Figure 87: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of incentivising public
procurement of innovation?; all replies.
Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “How likely do you believe the following outcomes would
occur as a result of incentivising public procurement of innovation?”, respondents most
often expect a boost to EU innovation (90%: 50% very likely, 40% somewhat likely),
followed by better quality of products, services and works (80%: 31% very likely, 49%
somewhat likely), a boost to EU industry (79%: 26% very likely, 53% somewhat likely),
and a boost to EU employment (67%: 17% very likely, 50% somewhat likely). Majorities
also foresee higher SME participation (65%: 18% very likely, 47% somewhat likely) and
increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders (55%: 12% very likely, 43%
somewhat likely). On the cost and burden side, around half consider increased
administrative burden for public buyers likely (54%: 10% very likely, 44% somewhat
likely), as well as increased prices of products, services and works (47%: 7% very likely,
40% somewhat likely). Lower positive expectations are reported for higher
administrative burden for EU bidders (44%: 7% very likely, 37% somewhat likely),
increased costs for EU bidders (38%: 6% very likely, 32% somewhat likely), and easier
access to cross-border procurement within the EU (37%: 8% very likely, 29% somewhat
likely). The lowest shares of positive expectations concern reduced competition (19%:
50%
31%
26%
17%
18%
12%
10%
7%
7%
6%
8%
3%
3%
40%
49%
53%
50%
47%
43%
44%
40%
37%
32%
29%
16%
11%
2%
2%
4%
7%
9%
8%
10%
11%
10%
10%
9%
30%
23%
1%
0%
1%
1%
2%
1%
3%
4%
4%
4%
2%
6%
5%
Boost EU innovation
Better quality of products / services / works
Boost EU industry
Boost EU employment
Higher SME participation
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Increased administrative burden for public buyers
Increased prices of products / services / works
Higher administrative burden for EU bidders
Increased costs for EU bidders
Easier access to cross border procurement within the EU
Reduced competition
Reduced litigation
Very likely Somewhat likely No impact Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
Boost EU innovatio n
Better quality of products / services / works
Boost EU industry
Boost EU employm ent
Higher SME participati on
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Increased prices of products / services / works
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
Increased costs for EU bidders
Easier access to cross border procurem ent within the EU
Reduced competiti on
Reduced litigation
Very likely 50% 31% 26% 17% 18% 12% 10% 7% 7% 6% 8% 3% 3% Somewhat likely 40% 49% 53% 50% 47% 43% 44% 40% 37% 32% 29% 16% 11% No impact 7% 17% 16% 25% 24% 36% 34% 38% 41% 47% 51% 45% 58% Somewhat unlikely 2% 2% 4% 7% 9% 8% 10% 11% 10% 10% 9% 30% 23% Very unlikely 1% 0% 1% 1% 2% 1% 3% 4% 4% 4% 2% 6% 5% No. of responses 517 508 503 503 501 499 508 496 504 498 496 505 500
382
3% very likely, 16% somewhat likely) and reduced litigation (14%: 3% very likely, 11%
somewhat likely).
Disagreement that these outcomes will occur (somewhat unlikely or very unlikely) is
highest for reduced competition (36%: 30% somewhat unlikely, 6% very unlikely) and
reduced litigation (28%: 23% somewhat unlikely, 5% very unlikely), followed by
increased prices of products, services and works (15%: 11% somewhat unlikely, 4% very
unlikely), increased costs for EU bidders (14%: 10% somewhat unlikely, 4% very
unlikely), and higher administrative burden for EU bidders (14%: 10% somewhat
unlikely, 4% very unlikely). Lower, but still notable, disagreement is reported for easier
access to cross-border procurement (11%: 9% somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely) and
increased administrative burden for public buyers (13%: 10% somewhat unlikely, 3%
very unlikely). Disagreement is comparatively limited for the “beneficial” outcomes: 3–
8% somewhat/very unlikely for boost to EU innovation, better quality, boost to EU
industry, boost to EU employment, higher SME participation, and increased chance of
winning for EU bidders.
Across all outcomes, the share of respondents expecting “no impact” ranges from 7% for
a boost to EU innovation to 58% for reduced litigation and 51% for easier access to
cross-border procurement. Intermediate “no impact” levels are reported for better quality
(17%), boost to EU industry (16%), boost to EU employment (25%), higher SME
participation (24%), increased chance of winning for EU bidders (36%), increased
administrative burden for public buyers (34%), increased prices (38%), higher
administrative burden for EU bidders (41%), increased costs for EU bidders (47%), and
reduced competition (45%).
Table 106: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of incentivising public
procurement of innovation?; percentage of respondents that indicated “very likely” or “somewhat likely” answers, by
type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondent Reduced litigation
Boost EU employm ent
Boost EU innovatio n
Boost EU industry
Easier access to cross border procurem ent within
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Reduced competiti on
Increased prices of products / services / works
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU
Higher SME participati on
Increased costs for EU bidders
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
No. of responses
All 14% 68% 91% 79% 37% 53% 19% 47% 80% 55% 65% 39% 44% 496-517 Public Authorities EU 4% 58% 87% 69% 34% 65% 32% 52% 71% 48% 55% 44% 57% 89-91 Large companies EU 18% 65% 92% 81% 37% 43% 15% 40% 82% 55% 61% 38% 34% 72-76 SMEs EU 10% 80% 93% 81% 44% 43% 15% 26% 90% 60% 75% 36% 35% 39-42 Business associations EU 13% 66% 91% 82% 33% 60% 16% 48% 82% 54% 57% 38% 50% 127-136 Trade unions EU 67% 80% 91% 86% 27% 13% 6% 30% 92% 92% 100% 18% 24% 7-17 NGOs EU* 17% 72% 90% 80% 26% 46% 19% 60% 78% 58% 80% 30% 38% 50-59 Academia 18% 53% 94% 71% 53% 53% 6% 19% 71% 38% 69% 31% 13% 16-17 Citizens + other EU** 16% 74% 92% 85% 49% 57% 22% 54% 85% 59% 75% 48% 49% 74-76 Non-EU 9% 73% 91% 82% 45% 64% 0% 45% 82% 55% 70% 18% 36% 10-11
Central EU 13% 64% 89% 75% 32% 50% 17% 48% 75% 49% 68% 38% 44% 273-288 North EU 12% 47% 89% 76% 33% 62% 16% 31% 76% 49% 59% 21% 42% 42-46 South EU 13% 81% 97% 91% 57% 58% 26% 47% 91% 67% 63% 46% 46% 113-118 East EU 26% 72% 87% 79% 25% 50% 21% 53% 87% 65% 62% 41% 41% 48-54 Central EU authorities 7% 61% 84% 68% 36% 62% 34% 58% 68% 45% 60% 48% 60% 57-58 North EU authorities 0% 31% 88% 63% 20% 63% 27% 25% 60% 44% 44% 6% 50% 15-16 South EU authorities 0% 83% 92% 77% 54% 85% 31% 46% 85% 62% 54% 62% 62% 12-13 East EU authorities 0% 50% 100% 75% 0% 50% 25% 100% 100% 67% 25% 75% 25% 3-4
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Respondents were asked how likely they believed different outcomes would be as a result
of incentivising public procurement of innovation. The figures refer to the combined
shares of “very likely” and “somewhat likely” answers (other response options were also
available but are not shown).
Among public authorities, the outcomes most often seen as likely were a boost to EU
innovation (87%) and to EU industry (69%), better quality of products, services or works
(71%) and increased administrative burden for public buyers (65%). For the remaining
outcomes, perceived likelihood ranged from 4% to 65%. Very low likelihood was
reported for reduced litigation (4%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, boosts to EU innovation were
consistently among the most likely outcomes (large companies: 92%; SMEs: 93%;
business associations: 91%), together with improved quality (82%; 90%; 82%) and,
particularly for SMEs, higher SME participation (75%). Across these three groups,
perceived likelihood of the other outcomes ranged from 10% to 93%. Very low
likelihood was reported for reduced litigation among large companies (10 - 18%).
Among trade unions and NGOs, both groups regarded boosts to EU innovation (trade
unions: 91%; NGOs: 90%) and higher SME participation (100%; 80%) as likely
outcomes. Trade unions also pointed to increased chance of winning for EU bidders
(92%). For these two groups, perceived likelihood of the remaining outcomes ranged
from 6% to 80%. Very low likelihood was reported among trade unions for reduced
competition (6% - 19%).
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents, a boost to
EU innovation was again the most likely outcome (academia: 94%; citizens and other
respondents: 92%; non-EU respondents: 91%), with better quality also frequently
mentioned (71%; 85%; 82%). Across these three groups, perceived likelihood of the
remaining outcomes ranged from 6% to 82%. Very low likelihood was reported for
reduced competition (0 - 6%).
Respondents were invited to identify any other likely impacts. A summary of their
responses is presented below.
Public authorities
Around one in ten public authorities provided comments on the wider impacts of
incentivising public procurement of innovation, generally supporting innovation as a
policy goal but questioning the extent to which procurement should be used to deliver it.
Several argued that procurement “may not be the correct policy goal” compared with
grant funding, and one proposed excluding research and development services (including
those for research organisations) from the directive altogether.
A clear majority preferred incentivising rather than mandating innovation. They warned
that “making innovation mandatory is not the way forward” and that a “one-size-fits-all
model derived from EU legislation” would increase complexity, administrative burdens,
higher prices and “greater risk of litigation”, with some suggesting that “the local level is
not the right place for innovation procurement” in all cases. Innovation was seen as
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emerging from flexibility rather than prescription: “innovation does not occur simply by
mandating new solutions”.
Many comments focused on the need for more flexible procedures to support innovation.
Authorities called for more scope to use negotiated procedures without prior publication,
higher thresholds, and greater flexibility to adjust tenders and contracts “during contract
execution to facilitate innovation”, including the role of public buyers as “launching
customers”. Market engagement was described as “critical”, with calls for clearer rules
on market consultations and even mandatory pre-market engagement for high-value,
strategic tenders, partly to support SME and small-scale local suppliers.
A minority stressed that current innovation procedures are “far too complicated and
complex”, and that mechanisms such as “comply or explain” are not sufficiently clear,
raising concerns that critical obligations could be circumvented. Alongside calls for
promotion of “value engineering”, respondents emphasised that innovative procurement
must not disregard core principles of non-discrimination and transparency. The main
tension lay between the recognised importance of innovation and concerns about
complexity, risk and over-regulation if innovation were mandated rather than
incentivised.
EU companies and business associations
Around one in ten EU companies and business associations commented on the wider
impacts of incentivising public procurement of innovation, generally seeing it as a
powerful but underused lever to strengthen European industry, support green and digital
transitions, and scale up innovative solutions.
Most viewed incentivised innovation procurement as a way to create “early demand
signals”, reduce market risk and accelerate uptake of innovative and sustainable products
and services, especially for SMEs and start-ups. Public buyers acting as “launching
customers/first buyers”, innovation procurement funds, pilots, outcome-based
specifications and public–private partnerships were seen as key to supporting
technologies such as AI, cloud, advanced materials, circular and bio-based solutions,
efficient buildings and textiles, and to boosting “technological sovereignty and resilience
of European value chains”.
A strong majority favoured an incentive-based, voluntary model rather than mandatory
innovation criteria. They argued that “more innovation cannot be legislated”, that
innovation criteria should remain “at the discretion of the public contracting authority”,
and that mandatory requirements risk “complicating and lengthening procedures”,
increasing administrative burden and distorting competition or causing technology
lock-in. Some underlined that social, environmental and innovation considerations are
already possible under current rules if linked to the contract, and warned against overly
prescriptive criteria and documentation that could limit SME participation and
cross-border competition. A smaller group considered existing tools broadly “adequate
and fully sufficient” and cautioned against new constraints.
Many stressed that simplification and flexibility are preconditions for successful
incentives. The current framework was often described as “restrictive” and “extremely
complex”, with innovation procedures “rarely implemented”. Suggested changes
included clearer rules, “agile procedures”, more flexible contract changes and durations,
broader scope for negotiated procedures and market dialogue, regulatory sandboxes,
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milestone payments, reduced guarantees, document standardisation and Once-Only
principles. Additional proposals included SME-only variants subject to minimum
criteria, general acceptance of variant tenders unless expressly excluded, competitions
reserved for SMEs or young professionals, guidelines on “buying innovative”, and
stronger market engagement and IP management. A recurring nuance was that incentives
should not focus solely on start-ups: “innovations from traditional and long-established
companies should also be eligible”.
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unionsnAround one in ten EU
NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions commented on the wider impacts of
incentivising public procurement of innovation, with most linking it to strategic
autonomy, climate and circular transitions, social resilience and the creation of quality
jobs.
A large share argued that clearer and mandatory rules – including “mandatory criteria
related to quality jobs and collective bargaining, & regulation of subcontracting” – would
secure better value for money, legal certainty, equal treatment and fair competition.
Several claimed that keeping criteria optional “guarantees only higher burdens and
costs”, as case-by-case interpretation increases transaction costs for both authorities and
contractors. Some also stressed that price-only procurement is inadequate, especially for
innovation, and that the focus should be on cost-effectiveness and the price–quality ratio,
recognising that higher upfront costs can be offset by long-term improvements.
Many respondents underlined that innovation requires sufficient human and financial
resources in local and regional administrations. They warned that reforms “not
accompanied by human and material support” risk “administrative chaos”, and called for
upskilling and reskilling of the workforce, backed by financial guarantees and
“innovation-friendly procedures” with clearer guidance, simplification and flexibility
while maintaining accountability. Several insisted that the EU should pursue “innovation
for the EU’s strategic autonomy, ecological and social resilience and quality job
creation”, rather than innovation as an end in itself.
A minority, mainly representing local and regional interests, stressed subsidiarity and
opposed prescriptive EU-level obligations. They argued procurement “is about fulfilling
the needs that LRGs, and by extension the citizens, have”, and that contracting
authorities must retain discretion to decide which innovation criteria are appropriate “in
line with their specific needs, capacities and market realities”, with innovation requested
“on a voluntary basis”. Others highlighted that, if well designed, incentivising innovation
can be manageable administratively, improve resilience and enable SMEs, start-ups and
scaleups to compete in strategic sectors, increase supplier diversity and accelerate
diffusion of innovative solutions across the Single Market.
All other respondents
Around one in fourteen respondents in this residual group commented on wider impacts
of incentivising public procurement of innovation, generally seeing it as a way to
transform public services and stimulate industrial and technological restructuring in the
EU, provided the framework becomes clearer, more flexible and less burdensome.
Many argued that innovation-oriented procurement can act as a catalyst for scaling and
diffusion of innovative solutions, strengthening innovation ecosystems, EU industry and
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“strategic autonomy”, especially if combined with demand aggregation, challenge-based
or joint cross-border procurement, and the State acting as “first buyer”. Several stressed
the importance of preliminary market consultations, proportional guarantees, clear IP
rules, and support for innovative SMEs and start-ups, particularly in software and digital
ecosystems where demand for “openness, interoperability and reuse” can improve market
structure and long-term value.
A frequent concern was that existing innovation procedures (notably innovation
partnerships and more dialogue-based procedures) are underused because they are
“complex, costly and ‘uncertain’”, with limited flexibility for contract modifications and
inadequate clarity on pre-commercial procurement. Respondents called for simplified,
more flexible rules; clearer and more imperative functional specifications;
reconsideration and streamlining of innovation partnership rules; explicit confirmation of
PCP exclusions; and, for some, economic or fiscal incentives in large innovation projects
and specialised digital platforms or networks to support PCP/PPI across Member States.
On the degree of obligation, most views supported enabling and incentivising innovation,
but not imposing automatic or uniform innovation requirements. Some asked for public
buyers to be allowed to “prioritize innovative services over non-innovative ones”,
including direct awards without thresholds where competition is not meaningful, while
others insisted that consideration of innovation “cannot be automatic” and must remain
case-by-case. Overall, respondents saw intensified innovation procurement as beneficial
for competitiveness and potentially for EU exports, but conditional on reduced
administrative and financial barriers and a more predictable legal framework.
Figure 88: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of mandating further
socially responsible public procurement obligations?; all replies.
51%
30%
31%
16%
23%
19%
17%
14%
15%
18%
9%
8%
4%
36%
47%
43%
50%
43%
45%
43%
41%
39%
36%
25%
25%
9%
2%
5%
4%
6%
8%
9%
8%
8%
8%
14%
24%
11%
24%
1%
1%
2%
3%
1%
1%
1%
4%
1%
4%
5%
3%
9%
Boost EU innovation
Boost EU industry
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased prices of products / services / works
Increased administrative burden for public buyers
Boost EU employment
Higher administrative burden for EU bidders
Increased costs for EU bidders
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Higher SME participation
Reduced competition
Easier access to cross border procurement within the EU
Reduced litigation
Very likely Somewhat likely No impact Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
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Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
In response to the question “How likely do you believe the following outcomes would
occur as a result of mandating public procurement of innovation?”, respondents most
often expect a boost to EU innovation (87%: 51% very likely, 36% somewhat likely),
followed by a boost to EU industry (77%: 30% very likely, 47% somewhat likely) and
better quality of products, services and works (74%: 31% very likely, 43% somewhat
likely). Majorities also foresee increased prices of products, services and works (66%:
16% very likely, 50% somewhat likely), increased administrative burden for public
buyers (66%: 23% very likely, 43% somewhat likely), a boost to EU employment (64%:
19% very likely, 45% somewhat likely), higher administrative burden for EU bidders
(60%: 17% very likely, 43% somewhat likely), and increased costs for EU bidders (55%:
14% very likely, 41% somewhat likely). Increased chance of winning calls for tender by
EU bidders (54%: 15% very likely, 39% somewhat likely) and higher SME participation
(54%: 18% very likely, 36% somewhat likely) are also often seen as likely. Lower
positive expectations are reported for reduced competition (34%: 9% very likely, 25%
somewhat likely), easier access to cross-border procurement within the EU (33%: 8%
very likely, 25% somewhat likely), and reduced litigation (13%: 4% very likely, 9%
somewhat likely).
Disagreement that these outcomes will occur (somewhat unlikely or very unlikely) is
highest for reduced litigation (33%: 24% somewhat unlikely, 9% very unlikely), reduced
competition (29%: 24% somewhat unlikely, 5% very unlikely), and easier access to
cross-border procurement (14%: 11% somewhat unlikely, 3% very unlikely), followed
by higher SME participation (18%: 14% somewhat unlikely, 4% very unlikely). Lower,
but still notable, disagreement is reported for increased costs for EU bidders (12%: 8%
somewhat unlikely, 4% very unlikely), increased prices (9%: 6% somewhat unlikely, 3%
very unlikely), higher administrative burden for EU bidders (9%: 8% somewhat unlikely,
1% very unlikely), increased administrative burden for public buyers (9%: 8% somewhat
unlikely, 1% very unlikely), and a boost to EU employment (10%: 9% somewhat
unlikely, 1% very unlikely). Disagreement is comparatively limited for better quality
(6%: 4% somewhat unlikely, 2% very unlikely), a boost to EU industry (6%: 5%
somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely), increased chance of winning for EU bidders (9%:
8% somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely), and a boost to EU innovation (3%: 2%
somewhat unlikely, 1% very unlikely).
Across all outcomes, the share of respondents expecting “no impact” ranges from 10%
for a boost to EU innovation to 54% for reduced litigation and 53% for easier access to
cross-border procurement. Intermediate “no impact” levels are reported for a boost to EU
industry (18%), better quality (20%), increased prices (25%), increased administrative
burden for public buyers and boost to EU employment (each 24–26%), higher
administrative burden for EU bidders (30%), increased costs for EU bidders (33%),
Boost EU innovatio n
Boost EU industry
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased prices of products / services / works
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Boost EU employm ent
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
Increased costs for EU bidders
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU bidders
Higher SME participati on
Reduced competiti on
Easier access to cross border procurem ent within the EU
Reduced litigation
Very likely 51% 30% 31% 16% 23% 19% 17% 14% 15% 18% 9% 8% 4% Somewhat likely 36% 47% 43% 50% 43% 45% 43% 41% 39% 36% 25% 25% 9% No impact 10% 18% 20% 25% 24% 26% 30% 33% 37% 27% 37% 53% 54% Somewhat unlikely 2% 5% 4% 6% 8% 9% 8% 8% 8% 14% 24% 11% 24% Very unlikely 1% 1% 2% 3% 1% 1% 1% 4% 1% 4% 5% 3% 9% No. of responses 486 484 488 481 482 482 481 480 482 477 483 476 479
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increased chance of winning for EU bidders (37%), higher SME participation and
reduced competition (each 27–37%).
Table 107: Question: How likely do you believe the following outcomes would occur as a result of mandating further
socially responsible public procurement obligations?; percentage of respondents that indicated “very likely” or
“somewhat likely” answers, by type of respondent.
* NGOs + Environmental organisations; ** includes Consumer Organisations Note: Single-choice responses only; results reflect replies from those who answered. Top three responses highlighted. The number of responses in the last column is shown as a range, as the number of replies varied per column. EU includes NO; Central EU: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; North EU: DK, FI, IE, SE and NO; South EU: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; East EU: BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK; replies of only those who answered are provided Source: Public Consultations on public procurement reform. Commission own analysis.
Respondents were asked how likely they believed different outcomes would be as a result
of mandating further socially responsible public procurement obligations. The figures
refer to the combined shares of “very likely” and “somewhat likely” answers (other
response options were also available but are not shown).
Among public authorities, the outcomes most often seen as likely were boost to EU
innovation (86%), increased administrative burden for public buyers (78%), higher
administrative burden for EU bidders (79%). For the remaining outcomes, perceived
likelihood ranged from 3% to 69%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced
litigation (3%).
Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, a boost to EU innovation was
consistently among the most likely outcomes (large companies: 85%; SMEs: 86%;
business associations: 89%), alongside boost to EU industry (72% - 79%) and better
quality of products, services or works (66% - 81%). SMEs clearly associated these
obligations with higher SME participation (65%), while large companies and business
associations also highlighted increased administrative burden for public buyers (69% -
70%). Across these three groups, perceived likelihood of the other outcomes ranged from
6% to 70%. Very low likelihood was reported for reduced litigation among large
companies (6^ - 8%).
Both trade unions and NGOs most frequently regarded a boost to EU industry (83% -
100%), boosts to EU employment and innovation (77% - 91%). Trade unions also
Respondent Reduced litigation
Boost EU employm ent
Boost EU innovatio n
Boost EU industry
Easier access to cross border procurem ent within
Increased administr ative burden for public buyers
Reduced competiti on
Increased prices of products / services / works
Better quality of products / services / works
Increased chance of winning calls for tender by EU
Higher SME participati on
Increased costs for EU bidders
Higher administr ative burden for EU bidders
No. of responses
All 12% 63% 87% 76% 33% 66% 34% 67% 75% 54% 54% 56% 61% 476-488 Public Authorities EU 3% 53% 86% 69% 24% 78% 48% 74% 69% 48% 44% 69% 79% 86-89 Large companies EU 7% 61% 85% 79% 31% 69% 36% 63% 66% 48% 43% 61% 67% 69-71 SMEs EU 8% 72% 86% 76% 38% 59% 24% 46% 81% 66% 65% 41% 51% 36-38 Business associations EU 6% 63% 89% 72% 29% 70% 33% 66% 78% 50% 45% 58% 60% 120-125 Trade unions EU 67% 91% 91% 100% 83% 33% 25% 27% 87% 100% 91% 17% 33% 11-15 NGOs EU* 28% 77% 87% 83% 24% 57% 31% 76% 74% 67% 76% 47% 40% 50-54 Academia 12% 41% 88% 75% 38% 53% 18% 59% 65% 41% 53% 41% 44% 16-17 Citizens + other EU** 18% 67% 87% 83% 44% 61% 33% 72% 80% 57% 64% 53% 59% 72-76 Non-EU 22% 56% 89% 67% 33% 78% 22% 89% 78% 44% 56% 67% 67% 9-9
Central EU 8% 58% 84% 70% 25% 67% 34% 65% 69% 48% 54% 58% 60% 258-267 North EU 7% 45% 78% 69% 14% 81% 36% 70% 60% 48% 40% 56% 77% 42-45 South EU 15% 82% 96% 92% 52% 63% 39% 69% 87% 65% 58% 58% 64% 113-116 East EU 30% 67% 91% 85% 43% 57% 28% 63% 85% 70% 60% 37% 42% 52-54 Central EU authorities 5% 50% 85% 69% 25% 78% 49% 74% 69% 45% 50% 71% 80% 54-56 North EU authorities 0% 47% 81% 69% 0% 81% 40% 56% 53% 50% 27% 50% 81% 15-16 South EU authorities 0% 85% 92% 77% 54% 69% 46% 85% 77% 62% 46% 77% 85% 13-13 East EU authorities 0% 25% 100% 50% 0% 100% 75% 100% 100% 33% 25% 75% 50% 3-4
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pointed to higher SME participation (91%) and increased chances of winning for EU
bidders (100%) as likely outcomes. For these two groups, perceived likelihood of the
remaining outcomes ranged from 25% to 100%.
Among academia, citizens and other respondents, and non-EU respondents, a boost to
EU innovation and industry were again among the most likely outcomes (67% - 89%),
together with better quality (65%; 80%; 78%). Across these three groups, perceived
likelihood of the remaining outcomes ranged from 12% to 89%. Very low likelihood was
reported for reduced competition and litigation (12%-33%).
Respondents were invited to identify any other likely impacts. A summary of their
responses is presented below.
Public authorities
Around one in twelve public authorities commented on the potential wider impacts of
mandating public procurement of innovation, generally expressing strong scepticism and
preferring incentive-based approaches.
Most respondents argued that “innovation cannot be legislated into existence” and that
mandating innovation procurement would be counterproductive. They warned that
existing innovation procedures are already “far too complicated and complex”, and
“imposing it would be even worse”, increasing costs and administrative burdens for both
contracting authorities and bidders. Several stressed that additional regulations inevitably
“lead to increased costs and administrative burden for the bidders” and that the local
level is “not the right place for innovation procurement” in all cases.
A clear majority favoured voluntary, flexible frameworks over rigid obligations. One
explicitly stated that “incentivising the public procurement of innovation is strongly
preferred to mandating it”, arguing that voluntary approaches preserve flexibility, foster
competition, and allow authorities to choose solutions that best fit local needs and policy
objectives. Related comments called for more use of negotiated procedures without prior
publication, higher thresholds, and greater flexibility to modify tenders and contracts
during execution so that authorities can act as “launching customers”.
Only a small number raised more targeted or alternative mechanisms. These included
excluding research and development services (including those for research organisations)
from the directive altogether, reserving contracts for “impact companies” to advance
social and environmental goals, and strengthening monitoring and reporting on
sustainable public procurement (e.g. using e-procurement tools and a Public Procurement
Data Space). Overall, the dominant concern was that mandating innovation would
increase complexity and risk without guaranteeing better outcomes, whereas enabling
and incentivising innovation within a flexible framework was seen as more effective.
EU companies and business associations
Around one in eight EU companies and business associations commented on the wider
impacts of mandating public procurement of innovation, with a clear majority warning
about increased administrative burden, costs and legal complexity, and preferring
incentive-based or product-specific approaches rather than generic mandatory rules.
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Most respondents argued that “more innovation cannot be legislated”, “creativity cannot
be enforced” and that mandatory innovation criteria risk “artificialising” innovation,
driving solutions that comply formally rather than meet real needs. They anticipated
higher administrative burdens, longer procedures, reduced flexibility for buyers, and
possible discouragement of SME and start-up participation, especially where firms
cannot bear the risks of rigid, innovation-heavy contracts. Several stressed that
innovation is difficult to “measure and weight” and that broad mandatory criteria to
address strategic challenges “should be avoided”, as they could increase litigation and
distort competition.
A sizeable group nevertheless underlined potential positive impacts if mandating is
targeted and proportionate. They suggested that mandatory innovation procurement could
help overcome market inertia, accelerate technology transfer and circular-economy
transitions, modernise public services, strengthen EU “sovereignty and competitiveness”,
and support re-industrialisation (e.g. via “European preference”, reciprocity clauses, or a
“Buy European” -type approach based on product origin). Some sector-specific
comments, particularly in textiles and construction, claimed that enforced demand for
innovative, sustainable solutions would drive new patents, local innovation ecosystems
and progress towards sustainability objectives. One respondent explicitly “supports
mandating public procurement of innovation”, provided innovation criteria are tied to EU
industrial goals.
Across the spectrum, many emphasised that any move towards mandating innovation
must be accompanied by simplification and flexibility. Recurrent proposals included:
clearer and simpler rules for innovation partnerships and dialogue-based procedures;
more flexible contract modification and duration; accelerated procedures, milestone
payments, reduced solvency requirements and mutual guarantees; automatic transition
from pilots and PCP to operational contracts; and stronger, mandatory pre-market
dialogue with users. Several called for better handling of intellectual property rights,
warning that full transfer of IP to contracting authorities “discourages companies from
submitting bids”. Design and architectural competitions were repeatedly highlighted as
an effective, competition-based tool for embedding innovation without broad mandatory
rules.
There were marked tensions between those calling for mandatory, innovation-linked
procurement to drive strategic industrial and sustainability goals, and those insisting that
rigid obligations would be counterproductive, especially in specific sectors (e.g. energy
networks, grids) where innovation is already driven by market and technical dynamics.
While a small minority supported mandating in principle, the prevailing position was that
public procurement “should promote innovation” and can be a “lever for
re-industrialising Europe”, but that this is best achieved through incentives,
outcome-based and sector-specific tools, and more agile procedures, not through generic,
across-the-board mandatory innovation requirements.
EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
Around one in twelve EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
commented on the wider impacts of mandating public procurement of innovation, often
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linking it to climate, circular and industrial transitions, but highlighting strong social,
administrative and capacity concerns.
Many respondents warned that imposing obligations would “further complicate
regulation”, increase administrative burden and make it harder for smaller contracting
authorities and SMEs to participate, with mandatory rules potentially “contradictory and
counterproductive” given existing dense sectoral legislation. Some argued that
innovation “cannot be measured” and that mandating it risks formalising innovation
without enabling it, leading to higher compliance costs, legal uncertainty, risk-averse
behaviour by buyers, and self-exclusion by start-ups and SMEs, thereby narrowing
supplier pools and favouring incumbents.
At the same time, a sizeable group stressed that, if used, mandatory approaches must be
oriented towards “innovation for the EU’s strategic autonomy, ecological and social
resilience and quality job creation”, with innovation broadly defined and including
incremental, social and environmental aspects. Trade union and labour-focused
submissions repeatedly called for the revision to “strengthen social clauses, promote
collective bargaining and quality jobs”, end lowest-price awards in favour of MEAT with
mandatory criteria on quality employment and collective bargaining, regulate
subcontracting (joint and several liability and limits on chain length), exclude firms
breaching labour standards or tax obligations, and safeguard public, public-public and
in-house service provision. Some also noted that mandatory ecological and social
sustainability criteria “automatically lead to innovation”, making an additional
innovation layer unnecessary.
Several contributions emphasised that mandated innovation procurement could widen
gaps between well-resourced and under-resourced authorities unless accompanied by
strong capacity-building, technical assistance and simplified procedures. They called for
standards, competence centres and clearer, innovation-friendly procedures, and for
attention to IT security and sovereignty in digital procurement. Design contests in
architectural services were mentioned as a practical method to achieve innovation while
protecting bidders’ copyrights and ensuring remuneration. Overall, the majority preferred
encouragement, flexibility and robust social conditionality over rigid innovation
obligations that might prioritise procedure over real-world outcomes.
All other respondents
Around one in eleven respondents in this residual group commented on the wider impacts
of mandating public procurement of innovation, generally seeing a role for procurement
in promoting innovative and circular solutions, but expressing concern about higher
costs, administrative burden and rigid rules.
Many respondents argued that public procurement should promote innovation by
acquiring “novel solutions – including biodegradable and compostable products – while
supporting the circular economy and advancing digitalisation”. Mandating innovation
was seen by some as potentially increasing “pilot-to-scale pathways and ecosystem
learning effects”, improving market visibility and reducing fragmentation, and, in
software-intensive markets, strengthening “quality and innovation capacity” if
requirements are outcome-based and aligned with “open, interoperable ecosystems”. A
few mentioned possible benefits such as “increased specialisation and more globally
competitive companies” and greater familiarity of buyers with innovation topics.
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At the same time, a large share warned that any new obligations would “lead to increased
costs and administrative burden for the bidders” and risk procurement delays due to
complexity and capacity gaps. Several pointed out that “higher prices arise whenever a
change is required by law”, and cautioned that rigid or technology-specific mandates
could reduce competition, favour only large innovative firms, and be especially
problematic where private contracting authorities are financially constrained (e.g. in
education). One comment suggested that “incentivising and mandating have more or less
the same result”, but that incentives are preferable as they “allow the market player to be
more innovative”.
Some contributions called for clearer boundary-setting and better framework conditions
rather than blanket obligations. They proposed excluding public R&D and
knowledge-generation services (including universities) from public procurement rules
and treating them as horizontal cooperation, to strengthen public research networks.
Concerns were raised about contracting authorities’ standard practice of demanding full
IP transfer, which “discourages participation and reduces innovation”. Respondents also
noted that innovation partnerships “have been unsuccessful” in practice and favoured
interconnected digital platforms, shared evaluation and AI-supported, interoperable
systems to increase transparency and coordinate effort across countries. Overall, the
majority saw public procurement as a lever to promote innovation, but considered
flexible, outcome-based and interoperability-oriented approaches more effective than
rigid mandatory targets.
9.11. Final comments
All respondents had the opportunity to provide final comments. A summary of their
responses is presented below.
9.11.1. Public authorities
Around half of public authorities provided additional comments, mainly calling for a
simpler, more flexible and better-targeted framework, and often linking specific design
choices to clear cost and benefit implications for both authorities and bidders.
A very large share argued that simplification and higher thresholds would generate
substantial net savings. Authorities described current EU thresholds as “too low” and
capturing “almost all spending”, forcing many straightforward, purely local procurements
into full EU procedures with limited or no cross-border interest. Several called for
thresholds at least to be doubled, with some suggesting specific levels (e.g. EUR 10
million for works and EUR 750 000 for supplies and services) and regular indexation for
inflation. They expected this to cut administrative workload, shorten timelines and reduce
legal risk (fewer review procedures), while having little impact on competition in
practice. One contribution cited that preparing a municipal construction bid can cost
suppliers much more than in comparable private tenders, attributing the differential to
fragmented documentation and varying carbon and reporting requirements; harmonised
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methods and “Once-Only” data submission were seen as ways to reduce these transaction
costs while preserving competition and enabling robust low-carbon criteria.
Most authorities stressed that current regulation is “too complex” and “too dense”,
describing the system as a “bureaucratic crack” rather than a clear, legally certain tool.
They warned that additional horizontal obligations (e.g. generic ESG or ‘Made in
Europe’ requirements) risk further increasing costs, delays and litigation without
guaranteed benefits, especially for small municipalities and SMEs. Many asked for a
leaner procedural directive focused on “how to buy”, leaving substantive sector-specific
requirements to other instruments and avoiding “stacking” of sectoral legislation (for
instance in energy efficiency or environmental law) on top of procurement rules. Across
comments, tools such as the ESPD and eForms were often said to have increased
administrative burden rather than reduced it; some explicitly called for phasing out the
ESPD, replacing it with a single EU-level registry or database of supplier data and
exclusion grounds, and a simple yes/no interface at first stage. A number of authorities
favoured an EU-wide platform that would centralise “once-only” compliance checks and
blacklist enforcement, thereby lowering recurrent verification costs for both contracting
authorities and economic operators.
Negotiation and procedural flexibility were highlighted as central to both efficiency and
value for money. Many authorities proposed aligning the “classical” regime more closely
with the utilities regime, so that negotiation is possible in all procedures beyond a
simplified open procedure, arguing that this would better reflect private-sector practice
and reduce the risk of unsuccessful or uncompetitive tenders. They called for three or so
clear, streamlined procedures (simple open, restricted, and a free negotiation/dialogue
option) and for more scope to regularise and correct bids rather than reject offers for
minor formal defects-seen as a low-cost way to increase effective competition. Several
requested more flexible rules on framework duration (beyond four years) and on contract
modifications and extensions, to avoid costly retendering and to manage inflation, supply
disruptions or innovation. Authorities responsible for fragile or third-country contexts
emphasised that strict electronic and documentation requirements are often impracticable
and that negotiated procedures and ex post regularisation are essential for maintaining
competition and project delivery in such settings.
There was significant debate on the use of procurement for strategic objectives (green,
social, industrial, security of supply). Many authorities accepted that public procurement
can deliver long-term benefits in climate, social policy and resilience, and supported
clearer, standardised tools such as credible labels, eco-management schemes and model
clauses that would simplify verification while driving markets towards low-carbon and
sustainable products. Some highlighted specific sectors, notably food, energy,
construction and timber, where strategic procurement can “reap multiple benefits”:
shifting diets and cutting health and climate costs, stimulating demand for bio-based or
low-carbon materials, and strengthening local supply chains. Others, however, saw
procurement as a relatively blunt instrument for social and environmental aims and
warned that each new layer of obligation tends to raise procurement costs and deter
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suppliers, especially SMEs, without guaranteeing net social gains; they favoured
addressing these goals through dedicated social or environmental legislation or fiscal
instruments instead.
On industrial and sovereignty aspects, authorities were split. A number advocated some
form of European preference or ‘Buy European’ clause, especially in strategic areas
(buses and rolling stock, critical infrastructure, low-carbon materials, pharmaceuticals),
arguing that without explicit preference, EU producers face unfair competition and
de-industrialisation; they linked this to risks of shortages and loss of R&D and
manufacturing capacity. Others-especially export-oriented regions-warned that blanket
‘Made in Europe’ rules would increase prices, reduce supplier choice, be difficult and
costly to administer (complex origin tracking), and invite retaliation, thereby harming EU
firms and overall welfare. A middle position, supported by several authorities, favoured
targeted, sector-specific possibilities to limit procurement to EU-produced goods in
“sensitive areas of services of general interest” or for critical infrastructure, coupled with
strong reciprocity and security-based exclusion tools, but opposed broad horizontal
obligations. Across these positions, authorities emphasised that any strategic conditions
must be legally clear and administratively workable, otherwise enforcement costs and
litigation risks could outweigh the intended benefits.
Many comments focused on strengthening security of supply and emergency
responsiveness. Several authorities argued that the current classical directive gives them
“no latitude” to address security-of-supply risks and proposed importing exclusion
grounds similar to those in the defence and security directive, including for breaches of
information or supply security and lack of reliability. Others called for a wider, clearer
definition of urgency and exceptional circumstances (beyond natural disasters) that
would explicitly cover failures of key suppliers, supply chain disruptions and critical
infrastructure risks, enabling contracts to be awarded without prior publication in
well-defined situations. They also supported EU-wide tools to exclude suppliers and
subcontractors from high-risk countries in critical infrastructure projects. While these
measures might occasionally reduce immediate price competition, respondents
considered the risk reduction and continuity benefits for energy, health and other
essential services to justify the potential cost.
Smaller municipalities and contracting entities repeatedly stressed capacity constraints
and asymmetries in the costs and benefits of complex rules. They reported that
complying with detailed procedures, overlapping sectoral regulation and cross-border
obligations imposes heavy staff and legal costs, which are not offset by increased
competition, since most contracts still attract only domestic bidders. Some advocated a
differentiated regime based on contracting authority size (e.g. lighter rules for
municipalities under 50 000 inhabitants, or an even lighter regime below 5 000),
including simplified procedures, reduced documentation, fewer mandatory strategic
criteria, and broader in-house and inter-municipal cooperation exemptions. Authorities
argued that in-house provision and inter-municipal cooperation can be both cheaper and
socially beneficial and that current rules and case law create uncertainty and deter such
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arrangements. They asked for clearer codification of public–public cooperation outside
the scope of procurement-subject to safeguards such as transparency, joint governance
and cost-based remuneration-to avoid costly legal disputes and to allow pooling of scarce
resources.
Finally, several authorities underscored the importance of implementation,
capacity-building and data rather than only new obligations. They noted that many
strategic options in the current directives remain underused because of legal uncertainty,
lack of guidance and fear of review procedures. Proposals included: an EU-level “skills
academy” for procurement, model templates and standard clauses (e.g. for green or social
criteria, carbon accounting), sector-specific networks (e.g. for food), and more use of
authentic interpretative guidance to give courts and authorities a common reference
point. Many warned that without such support, new mandatory provisions-however well
intentioned-risk raising transaction costs and driving down participation, especially
among SMEs, while failing to deliver the intended policy benefits. Overall, public
authorities tended to see simplification, raised thresholds, more negotiation, better tools
and clearer strategic options as reforms with strong net benefits, whereas generic new
obligations (green, social or industrial) were regarded as more ambiguous, with benefits
highly dependent on how far they are standardised, targeted and supported in practice.
9.11.2. EU companies and business associations
Around half of EU companies and business associations provided additional comments,
generally treating the revision as a major opportunity to reduce procurement costs,
improve market access for SMEs, and re-orient a share of the EU’s annual public
purchasing towards innovation, sustainability and European industrial capacity.
A very large proportion of business respondents stressed simplification and digitalisation
as a high-impact, low-risk reform with clear net benefits. They described current
documentation and reporting obligations as excessive and duplicative, especially for
SMEs and cross-border bidders, and argued that “once-only” submission of evidence,
streamlined ESPD or its replacement by EU-wide registries, harmonised e-procurement
tools and standardised templates could materially reduce transaction costs (staff time,
legal and consulting expenses, bid preparation costs) and shorten timelines. One industry
contribution estimated that preparing a municipal construction bid can cost suppliers
around EUR 20 000–30 000 per tender, compared with EUR 1 000–2 000 in comparable
private contracts, due mainly to fragmented data and technical requirements; harmonised
carbon-assessment methods and machine-readable product data were seen as ways to cut
these costs while still enabling robust low-carbon criteria. Businesses acknowledged
upfront investment needs in interoperable platforms and audit-capable systems, but
generally characterised these as one-off or transitional, outweighed by ongoing
administrative savings, more bids per tender and better value for money.
SME access was a central concern. Many associations noted that SMEs dominate key
ecosystems (for example in construction) yet are “significantly under-represented” in
awards. They linked this to high compliance and solvency requirements, large
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“mega-lots”, complex ESPD and differing national practices. To reduce structural
barriers, they advocated mandatory division into lots (“divide or explain”), explicit SME
tests before publication of specifications to detect disproportionate requirements, SME
reserves for certain low-value or high-local-impact contracts, and simplified rules for
SME consortia. Some proposed that at least 30–33% of public spend should go to SMEs,
echoing national examples. Others stressed the importance of fair subcontracting,
including direct payment to subcontractors if primes fail to pay on time, and bans on
changing agreed subcontracting terms after award. Many argued that these adjustments
would increase the number and diversity of bidders, reduce cancellation and litigation
rates, and ultimately improve competition and local economic returns, even if they
require some redesign effort by contracting authorities.
A second major theme was the use of procurement as a lever for EU industrial
competitiveness, sovereignty and decarbonisation, with clear tensions on the extent and
design of EU preference and green obligations. A large number of industrial
organisations (particularly in steel, metals, cement, pharmaceuticals, textiles, PVC, glass,
recycling and some energy sectors) argued that price-only procurement and full openness
to non-EU suppliers have contributed to de-industrialisation, loss of jobs and relocation
of production. They cited, for example, that the majority of pharmaceutical active
ingredients are now produced in Asia, and warned of heightened risks of shortages.
These respondents called for “privileged access for European producers” through
instruments such as European-content criteria, strengthened reciprocity, “Buy European”
acts based on product origin and not company nationality, or higher price-preference
margins (some argued that the current 3% margin is too low and suggested substantially
higher margins to reflect dumping and subsidies, which can make non-EU offers “50–
100% cheaper”). Several sectors proposed specific carbon-intensity labels or thresholds
(e.g. clearly defined CO₂ classes for stainless steel, or mandatory low-carbon thresholds
for strategic materials) to support investments in decarbonisation. They anticipated that
such measures would initially increase purchase prices but argued that they would secure
strategic supply, sustain quality jobs, and catalyse large-scale industrial and climate
investments.
By contrast, many digital, transport and open-trade oriented associations warned that
broad “Made in Europe” obligations would shrink supplier pools, raise procurement
costs, delay green deployment, and risk trade retaliation. In the digital sector, several
respondents highlighted that EU cloud providers hold less than 10% market share and
that Europe experiences a “digital haemorrhage” of roughly EUR 264 billion per year to
US providers; yet they argued that resilience is better achieved through outcome-based
trust criteria (jurisdiction, auditability, interoperability, reversibility, location of data
centres within the EU) and support for European integrators and open-source ecosystems,
rather than hard origin requirements that could fragment global OSS and software
markets. Others, including some large manufacturers, supported a nuanced approach:
targeted EU preference in clearly defined strategic sectors or products, voluntary and
incentive-based rather than blanket mandatory, including for example awarding EU
offers in case of equal bids or using EU content as a tie-breaker. Several stressed that any
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origin-based criteria must be defined in a way that reflects actual value added and
complex supply chains and must be supported by efficient, digital verification systems,
otherwise compliance costs and legal uncertainty could outweigh industrial benefits.
Businesses were divided on the extent and form of mandatory green and social criteria,
but many acknowledged significant long-term benefits if such rules are well designed.
Environmental and circular-economy actors urged the introduction of mandatory green
public procurement for specific product groups, aligned with other EU instruments
(ESPR, NZIA, Taxonomy, waste and energy legislation), and of life-cycle costing and
total cost of ownership to capture long-term savings from energy and resource efficiency.
For example, in wood and furniture, stakeholders noted that longer product lifespans
reduce environmental impacts and argued that award models should explicitly add
climate performance as a third pillar alongside price and quality. Recycling and
bio-based industries advocated mandatory recycled or bio-based content criteria and GPP
targets to double the circular material use rate, with some calling for public procurement
to act like a European Bio Preferred-style market-pull mechanism. The aluminium sector
cautioned that current “green premiums” of around EUR 10–30 per tonne of aluminium
are far below the costs of decarbonisation investments, and warned that stacking multiple
green premiums across materials can raise the cost of vehicles or buildings by EUR 1
000–2 000 per unit; they argued that procurement should complement, not substitute for,
direct industrial support (e.g. renewable power access, infrastructure, financing) and
should recognise the large emissions savings from recycling EU scrap.
Social partners and service industries emphasised that mandatory minimum weightings
for quality and social criteria, especially in labour-intensive sectors (security, cleaning,
catering, transport, insurance), can avoid a “race to the bottom” and reduce hidden costs
from high staff turnover, accidents and poor service quality. Joint declarations in private
security and facility management, for example, proposed a 60/40 weighting of quality
over price for awards, with mandatory price-revision clauses to reflect changes in wages,
taxes and collective agreements, arguing that this would ensure contract sustainability
while preventing underbidding that later leads to service failure. Several insurance and
financial actors suggested that award criteria could reward operators that reinvest public
insurance premiums in the EU economy, while others stressed the importance of timely
payment terms and free assignment of receivables to reduce financing costs, particularly
for SMEs that rely on factoring.
Across sectors, many companies stressed that further strategic obligations, whether
green, social or industrial, will only deliver net benefits if the underlying framework is
simplified, predictable and digitally enabled. They repeatedly called for: higher and
inflation-adjusted thresholds to avoid subjecting low-value contracts to full EU
procedures; more flexible and longer framework agreements able to be “refreshed”;
clearer definitions of abnormally low tenders with mandatory rejection where bidders
cannot justify compliance with social or environmental obligations; simplified or merged
procedures (e.g. a single negotiated/dialogue route); more flexible contract modification
rules to manage inflation, shocks or innovation; and better alignment and consolidation
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of sector-specific procurement-related regulations to reduce overlapping obligations.
Many explicitly warned that each new requirement “adds red tape” and can deter bidders
or reduce competition, particularly in narrow or seller-dominated markets (for instance in
grids, net-zero technologies or medical devices), potentially leading to more
cancellations, higher prices or supply risks. They therefore favoured an incremental,
phased approach, with 3-5 years transition and substantial investment in
capacity-building, EU-level digital infrastructure, standard templates and model clauses,
so that procurement can move from a narrow cost focus to a more strategic, value-based
tool without creating disproportionate implementation costs or litigation risks.
9.11.3. EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions
Around seven in ten EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions responding
provided additional comments on how the EU public procurement framework should be
revised, with a strong focus on shifting away from lowest-price awards towards strategic,
social, green and innovation-oriented procurement and on clarifying the cost–benefit
balance of such reforms.
Across this group, there is an overwhelming and highly repetitive call to make social
conditionality and collective bargaining central to procurement. A large majority want
the “horizontal social clause” in Article 18(2) significantly strengthened, ILO Convention
C94 explicitly incorporated and enforced, and an obligation that “public money goes only
to operators that respect workers’ and trade union rights, apply collective agreements and
pay decent wages.” Many propose that compliance with applicable collective agreements
be mandatory at all stages (selection, award, performance clauses), with preferential
treatment for bidders “whose workers (and subcontractors’ workers) are covered by
collective agreements” and mandatory exclusion of companies that violate labour law,
social standards, Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) or tax rules.
Several argue that these measures would reduce litigation costs and legal uncertainty for
contracting authorities by clarifying what is permissible and expected. A very strong and
consistent theme is opposition to the current lowest-price paradigm. A large majority
demand a ban on price-only awards and “abnormally low tenders that do not reflect
labour costs or compliance with OSH rules.” They call for MEAT/BPQR/MAT to
become the default and, in practice, mandatory in labour-intensive sectors (construction,
social and health services, food catering, cleaning, security), with “mandatory criteria
connected with quality jobs and collective bargaining” and, in some positions, an explicit
minimum weight for quality criteria.
Trade unions from several countries state that lowest-price awards lead to “wage theft,
social dumping, union-busting and poor quality services,” and reference European
Parliament and European Court of Auditors findings that unfair competition based on
non-respect of social clauses contributes to declining competition in procurement
markets.
Subcontracting regulation is another dominant concern. Many unions and NGOs call for
tighter rules on subcontracting, including limitation of the length of subcontracting
chains (sometimes to one or two tiers in high-risk sectors), joint and several liability
throughout the chain, transparency on all subcontractors, and exclusion of temporary
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work agencies from public contracts. They argue such limits reduce due-diligence and
verification costs for buyers, increase enforceability of social and labour obligations, and
curb “labour-only subcontracting” and organised crime, particularly in construction.
Some national examples (e.g. Norway’s maximum two tiers, Denmark’s experience with
large infrastructure projects) are cited to illustrate both the costs of weak rules (delays,
cost overruns, criminal infiltration) and the benefits of stricter frameworks.
A widely shared position is that public authorities must retain the option of direct public
provision, in-house arrangements and public-public cooperation. Trade unions and social
NGOs stress that procurement rules “must not force outsourcing” and should clearly
exempt certain social and health service models (authorisation systems, licensing,
user-led funding, triangular arrangements in social law) where access is open to all
suitable providers. They highlight that frequent retendering and price-driven awarding in
social services produces “quality losses, continuity problems and inefficient
performance,” with higher long-term fiscal costs.
Environmental and climate priorities are also prominent. A broad coalition of
environmental NGOs, social economy networks and sector-specific actors (healthcare,
construction, ship recycling, circular economy advocates) see procurement as “a key
lever to create lead markets for low-carbon, circular products.” They argue that voluntary
green public procurement has failed to scale (with fewer than about one in six contracts
above the thresholds being “green” and only a small minority including social criteria),
and therefore call for:
• Mandatory minimum environmental and circularity requirements in high-impact
sectors (construction, steel, cement, vehicles, textiles, electronics, healthcare,
food and catering), often grounded in life-cycle assessment and aligned with the
EU Taxonomy, CSDDD, CSRD519 and sectoral legislation.
• Wider and easier use of credible labels and certification (including Fair Trade,
environmental labels, CO₂ performance tools, Cradle to Cradle, ESG scoring) as
proof of compliance, to reduce verification costs and capacity needs for
contracting authorities.
• Recognition of due-diligence systems and risk-based approaches as a way to
standardise social and environmental checks across supply chains and reduce
administrative burdens.
On costs and benefits, several contributions explicitly argue that higher upfront prices are
offset by long-term gains. For example, Fair Trade advocates note that public buyers
have used Fair Trade criteria in food and textiles “without increasing budgets, once
life-cycle costs, durability and reduced waste are taken into account.” Environmental
NGOs highlight that life-cycle costing typically recoups “3–10 %” price premia within
“3–7 years” via lower energy and maintenance costs. One food-system NGO reports
modelling in Germany showing that shifting to plant-rich menus can cut emissions by 16
MtCO₂e520 by 2030 “at a saving of €156 per tonne of CO₂e reduced,” indicating net fiscal
gains rather than extra costs. Other respondents stress that social clauses that prevent
519 CSRD (Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive) and CSDDD (Corporate Sustainability Due
Diligence Directive) 520 Metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent
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social dumping and OSH violations also protect “Made in Europe” operators, enhancing
fair competition rather than weakening it.
Food and agriculture are singled out by many NGOs as a strategic area where
procurement should drive a just and healthy transition.
Multiple environmental, health and farmers’ organisations argue that food procurement
must be recognised as a strategic sector, with minimum EU-wide sustainability and
health criteria and explicit references to JRC criteria for sustainable food procurement.
They emphasise that current rules “hinder the choice of local and sustainable products” in
schools and canteens, and call for:
• Mandatory criteria favouring healthy, plant-rich, locally rooted and European
products, including support for agroecology, organic production, high animal
welfare and short supply chains.
• Use of food procurement to prevent diet-related diseases and reduce the
burden on EU health systems from poor diets.
• Stronger support for SMEs and small-scale farmers via division into lots,
dynamic and decentralised purchasing, long-term contracts and fair prices that
reflect the “true cost” of sustainable production.
• Explicit recognition of food’s role in strategic autonomy and resilience,
including reduced reliance on imported feed and support for local protein
crops.
Social economy actors and NGOs delivering social and disability services stress that
procurement should better enable participation of social enterprises, non-profits and
SMEs.
They call for reserved contracts (Arts. 20 and 77) to be strengthened, for compulsory
division of contracts into smaller lots, and for alternative models (authorisation systems,
reserved markets, user-led funding) to be fully recognised. They argue that these models
reduce transaction costs, enhance innovation in social services and support inclusive
employment, with potential long-term savings through prevention and improved
outcomes.
Digitalisation, simplification and data are seen as enabling conditions, not substitutes for
social or green ambition. Several NGOs and trade unions welcome eForms, the Public
Procurement Data Space and national examples of KPI systems, but underline that only
about 60 % of Member States publish below-threshold data as open data.
They urge:
• Full digital end-to-end procurement, once-only data use and interoperable
platforms (including for below-threshold contracts).
• Mandatory reporting on sustainability and social criteria (e.g. Fair Trade
uptake, labour-rights compliance, CO₂ savings, social enterprise participation)
to track outcomes and inform policy.
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• Stronger transparency, including publication of data on subcontracting,
ESIF-funded521 contracts and below-threshold awards, to curb corruption and
“rogue actors.”
Some contributions stress the need to avoid deregulation under the label of
simplification. They caution against raising thresholds or expanding direct awards in
ways that weaken transparency and competition. Anti-corruption NGOs, in particular,
argue that “smaller contracts often fly under the radar” and that national trends to
increase direct award thresholds have “reduced competition and increased the potential
for corrupt actors.” They argue that more transparency and data are a precondition for
efficient, digitalised procurement, not an administrative luxury.
At the same time, a minority of NGO and worker representatives raise concerns about the
complexity and administrative burden of current rules, especially for small contracting
authorities and SMEs. They report that “procurement regulation is far too detailed,”
pushing small public buyers to hire consultants and discouraging SMEs from bidding,
and call for simpler, more proportional rules and easier correction of minor errors in
tenders. Entrepreneurial stakeholders also warn that poorly calibrated obligations and
risk-averse audit cultures can deter innovative firms and startups from participating, and
argue that simplification should focus on reducing fixed participation costs and making
procedures more predictable.
On economic security and “Made in Europe”, many trade unions and some NGOs
support the Commission’s intention to give preference to European products in strategic
sectors (e.g. energy, critical materials, food, strategic manufacturing), but insist that this
must be tied to strong social and environmental conditions to avoid mere protection of
low-standard production. Some environmental NGOs caution against broad origin-based
preferences and argue instead for traceability, due diligence and high standards as the
main resilience tools.
Overall, EU NGOs, environmental organisations and trade unions converge on the view
that the current largely voluntary, price-driven framework has not produced sufficient
social and green outcomes, and that moving to mandatory social clauses, robust
environmental and circularity criteria, and value-based award methods would yield net
economic benefits over time. They emphasise that this requires clearer legal provisions
(to reduce uncertainty about the “link to the subject matter”), stronger enforcement and
monitoring, sustained investment in capacity-building for contracting authorities, and
digital tools that reduce transaction costs while increasing transparency and
accountability.
Just under half of respondents in this heterogeneous “other” group provided comments.
They used this open question to suggest simplification and clarification of the EU
procurement framework, to argue over the degree to which procurement should pursue
wider social, environmental and strategic objectives (including “Made in Europe”), and
to highlight specific sectoral needs (research, health, water, food, construction, AI).
Across this group there is a strong perceived need to simplify and clarify rules and reduce
transaction costs, both for contracting authorities and for bidders, particularly SMEs.
521 European Structural and Investment Fund
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Many describe current rules as “far too detailed”, fragmented and difficult to apply,
encouraging risk-averse, formalistic behaviour, appeals and delays rather than focus on
outcomes. Recurrent proposals include: raising and dynamically indexing EU thresholds
(often linked to inflation) and making low-value purchases more flexible; standardised
EU templates for notices, award criteria, contracts, evidence and evaluation; clearer
definitions (e.g. of “cross-border interest”, “equivalence”, and contract modifications
under Article 72); and more scope to correct “minor omissions and obvious technical
errors” without automatic exclusion. Several respondents call for a narrower and more
clearly circumscribed notion of “substantial irregularity”, so that exclusion is limited to
serious grounds (tax/social debts, criminal convictions, etc.) and more flexibility is left to
the buyer to regularise tenders.
Digitalisation and data are seen as central enablers of simplification and better
governance. Many respondents propose a European Public Procurement Data Space with
harmonised mandatory fields, AI-assisted validation, and interoperability between
national platforms. They suggest “once-only” solutions such as an EU-level digital
supplier passport or register (sometimes described as ID-wallet with QR code) to avoid
repeated submission of the same certificates, and a central database for verifying
operators’ eligibility. Several explicitly note that the ESPD has not delivered
simplification because many Member States still require both the ESPD and national
documentation; they therefore ask for clear Commission guidance and stronger
standardisation, and stress that non-submission of an ESPD should not trigger automatic
exclusion. Some also propose systematic publication of advance purchasing plans to
allow suppliers to prepare, and expanded monitoring via eForms, including
environmental and social indicators and risk scores for fraud detection.
At the same time, a number of respondents warn that simplification must not become
deregulation. Anti-corruption and civil society actors stress the importance of
transparency, especially for below-threshold contracts, and warn against raising
thresholds or increasing direct awards in ways that would undermine oversight and
competition. They argue that the cost of corruption, poor quality, delays and remedial
litigation can exceed any savings from minimal procedures.
A second major theme concerns the strategic orientation of procurement. Many
respondents want the framework to operate as a powerful tool for innovation, industrial
competitiveness and strategic autonomy. Innovation-focused stakeholders argue that
public procurement should be used as a “lead market” instrument and that the low uptake
of innovation tools is largely due to over-complexity, legal uncertainty and lack of
attractive conditions for suppliers. They propose: derogations from advertising and
competition for certain small-scale procurements of innovative solutions (e.g. PPI below
EUR 200 000 or EUR 600 000, especially following PCP); more flexible use of
negotiated procedures and dialogue (put “procedure with negotiation on an equal footing
with the open tender”); and innovation-friendly IPR and guarantee rules. They also call
for EU-level financial instruments (for example under a European Competitiveness
Fund) to support PPI and help SMEs with upfront costs, and for EU buyer networks and
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joint/federated procurement to aggregate demand in specific areas (e.g. AI, water
technologies, sustainable construction).
There is, however, some tension over how far to go with mandatory strategic
requirements. One camp argues for stronger binding criteria: for example, some call for
all public expenditure to be aligned with EU Taxonomy rules, for binding
greenhouse-gas thresholds to be applied in high-impact sectors, or for plant-based and
sustainable food procurement criteria to be mandatory. Others warn that mandatory
social/green/innovation obligations, if poorly calibrated, risk increasing prices, reducing
supplier pools and disadvantaging SMEs, especially where supply chains are global and
product-level evidence is hard to obtain (construction is often cited in this sense). These
respondents argue that the main problem is not the absence of legal possibilities for
social or green procurement, but the overall overregulation and lack of practical tools and
standardised methodologies (e.g. for life-cycle costing). They therefore favour a focus on
simplification, standard tools and capacity-building, with more limited and well-defined
mandatory elements.
Several respondents ask for procurement to be used more explicitly to support European
sovereignty and “Made in Europe” objectives. Proposals range from stronger reciprocity
clauses and border checks to ensure imported products actually comply with EU
standards, through “Buy European” preferences based on product origin, to minimum
European content requirements in strategic sectors. Some caution that such measures
should remain compatible with international trade obligations, non-protectionist and
linked to high social and environmental standards rather than mere geographic
preference. Others argue more bluntly that the current origin-neutral rules encourage
long-distance sourcing and undermine EU industrial capacity, and that political use of
procurement to foster European industries mirrors practices in major competing
economies.
Social and labour considerations feature, but in this group they are less dominant than in
the trade-union NGO responses. Some respondents explicitly support the demands for
strengthening the social clause, banning lowest-price-only awards and embedding
collective-bargaining-based conditions and exclusion of labour-law violators; others
insist that social and labour conditions should be addressed in other EU legislation, with
procurement remaining primarily a procedural “how to buy” instrument and the “link to
the subject matter” preserved as a key proportionality safeguard. This reflects a clear
tension: one set of actors sees procurement as a central mechanism to enforce social
rights and fair work, another is concerned about procurement being overloaded with
social policy tasks at the expense of simplicity and competition.
On cost–benefit aspects, many respondents emphasise that current complexity and legal
risks generate substantial hidden costs: long procedures, delays, appeals, renegotiations
and extra transaction costs for both sides, especially in construction and research. They
argue that simplifying procedures, clarifying rules, and using digital tools and standard
templates would reduce administrative costs and time-to-award, and increase bidder
participation (particularly SMEs), thereby improving competition and value for money.
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At the same time, some explicitly argue that paying more for quality, sustainability or
local resilience now will reduce long-term public costs – for example, through lower
lifecycle costs, fewer failures and litigation, or improved public health from healthier
food procurement. Others warn that imposing ambitious sustainability criteria without
adequate tools and market readiness can backfire, leading to low competition, higher
prices and cancellations.
Sector-specific needs are highlighted:
• Research and development and large scientific equipment: universities and
research organisations from several Member States stress that markets are highly
concentrated and that EU procurement procedures and remedies cause long
delays that “unnecessarily delay or even prevent research projects”. They propose
a “genuine exception” for R&D: either full exclusion of R&D-related services
and supplies from the Directive, or at least a high dedicated threshold (e.g. EUR 1
million), with only light transparency obligations (notices) applying above it.
• Health and medical technology: hospital and med-tech stakeholders seek more
flexibility to enter longer contracts (e.g. eight-year frameworks instead of four),
scope to combine supply, research and teaching in university hospitals, and
greater room for dialogue and innovative partnership models, while maintaining
transparency and equal treatment.
• Food and agriculture: several respondents emphasise the strategic role of food
procurement for public health, environment and farmer livelihoods. They
advocate adoption or use of JRC sustainable food procurement criteria,
simplification of procedures so that small farmers and SMEs can participate, and
explicit support for plant-based and plant-forward menus, arguing that these can
be cost-competitive and yield health and environmental benefits.
• Water: stakeholders in the water sector see procurement as an instrument to move
towards a “Water-Smart Society” and ask for outcome-based, innovation-friendly
procurement and harmonised rules to reduce fragmentation.
• Architecture and planning: architectural bodies stress that planning is a public
interest service where quality is paramount, propose capping price as a small
share of award criteria (e.g. max 10 %), and call for better remuneration and more
use of architectural competitions to stimulate innovation and maintain quality.
Several respondents underline the importance of green and circular procurement, and of
robust, standardised tools to make it workable. There are calls to promote life-cycle
costing systematically (with EU-provided tools and templates), to broaden use of
environmental management systems and labels such as EMAS522, and to clarify that
522 Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
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company-level procedures addressing material sustainability issues can be considered
sufficiently linked to the subject matter. Some NGOs and foundations argue that
predictable, standard environmental requirements – including mandatory EMS523
certification in some cases – actually help SMEs by creating a level playing field and
reducing arbitrary variation in buyer demands.
On remedies and legal protection, some contributors consider current review mechanisms
too easily used as a tactical tool by competitors, causing delays and extra costs,
especially in construction. They propose allowing review bodies more discretion to avoid
cancelling procedures where infringements are minor or not explicitly grounded in clear
legal obligations, and they ask for review rules to focus on maintaining the general
interest and continuity of public projects.
Finally, several respondents see AI and advanced analytics as a way to improve
procurement governance, through automated checks, risk scoring, fraud detection, and
carbon-footprint verification. At the same time, they call for clear rules on the use of AI
and algorithmic tools in award processes, to maintain transparency, fairness and legal
certainty.
Overall, these “other” respondents converge on the need for a clearer, simpler and more
digitally-enabled framework that reduces transaction costs, enables innovation and
strategic use of procurement (including for green and health objectives), and improves
SME access, while differing over how far procurement should go in enforcing social and
environmental objectives and in prioritising European origin.
9.11.4. Non-EU respondents
Around six in ten non-EU respondents provided comments. They mainly used this space
to argue how the revised EU procurement framework should balance openness to global
competition with strategic EU objectives (resilience, green transition, industrial policy),
and to call for simplification, digitalisation and sector-specific approaches, especially in
health and pharmaceuticals.
Non-EU healthcare and pharmaceutical companies emphasise that procurement rules
should secure timely access to innovative, high-value technologies and medicines, rather
than focus narrowly on upfront price. One medical-device manufacturer calls for a
dedicated section in the Directive for health procurement, including “a dedicated process
for breakthrough implantable devices,” early dialogue with innovators, and value-based
and innovation procurement linked to HTA524 assessments and real-world data on
outcomes and efficiency gains. They argue that rewarding devices on their contribution
to patient outcomes and hospital efficiency would improve health-system capacity and
523 Environmental Management System 524 Health Technology Assessment
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generate long-term cost savings, even if unit prices are higher. Pharmaceutical industry
respondents similarly support procurement reforms that reinforce competitiveness and
resilience, but stress that diversification of supply sources – rather than strict localisation
– is the most cost-effective way to strengthen supply security and control medicines
costs. One contribution calls for procurement criteria that “reward suppliers with a
significant footprint in the EU” and recognise the added value of diversified production,
while warning that rigid localisation requirements could reduce supplier participation and
increase drug prices.
Several non-EU business respondents strongly caution against broad “Made in Europe”
provisions. One argues that inserting such clauses, even on a voluntary basis, “would
restrict buyer choice without delivering meaningful supply-security gains” and add
origin-calculation and reporting burdens in global multi-tier supply chains that
contracting authorities are not equipped to manage. They highlight that MEAT/BPQR
already allows resilience and localisation to be reflected in award criteria, and suggest
any European preference be “strictly pragmatic and limited to sectors where it is
objectively unavoidable, with safeguards that subordinate preference to availability,
compatibility, safety and continuity of essential services.” Healthcare is frequently cited
as a sector where any rigid European preference or application of the International
Procurement Instrument would be “unworkable”, because of the need to prioritise patient
safety, clinical performance and affordability in systems with fixed reimbursement and
limited scope to absorb price premia.
By contrast, a smaller number of non-EU respondents argue that the EU should “promote
the use of made-in-Europe, low-carbon products and have high targets to promote those”,
especially in strategic sectors like critical raw materials. Another contribution suggests
linking any Buy European or minimum EU-content rules directly to environmental
performance, so that they reinforce sustainability rather than purely geographical origin.
This illustrates a tension: while most non-EU business actors emphasise openness to
“trusted suppliers” regardless of nationality, some stakeholders support origin-based
preferences, particularly where they are tied to climate and industrial policy goals.
Non-EU sustainability and procurement experts place strong emphasis on digitalisation,
data and harmonised criteria as the main levers to improve outcomes without adding new
layers of regulation. Several argue that procurement remains “document-driven” rather
than “data-driven”, leading to poor visibility, especially below thresholds, and missed
opportunities to align spending with strategic objectives. Recommendations include:
making procurement “digital by default”; fully using eForms and the Public Procurement
Data Space; adopting common data standards across the full procurement lifecycle; and
investing in digital tools (including AI-assisted analytics) to support planning, risk
detection, and monitoring of environmental performance. These actors advocate a
package approach: making green public procurement the default through a “comply or
explain” model and clear targets, aligning sectoral legislation and GPP criteria,
strengthening monitoring systems to track environmental outcomes, and
professionalising procurers through training and standard tools. They argue that such
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reforms would reduce transaction costs and legal uncertainty, while allowing the EU’s
annual public spending to send predictable demand signals for low-carbon and circular
solutions.
Non-EU suppliers in ICT525 and security-sensitive sectors stress that the framework
should strengthen European industrial capacity and resilience, but “remain open to
trusted non-EU companies that comply with EU law and operate reliably in the EU.”
They support outcome-based award criteria that factor in long-term performance and
resilience, rather than lowest initial price, and call for greater weighting for security and
resilience supported by standardised, non-duplicative evidence. One contribution
suggests a single digital marketplace, once-only documentation and EU-wide templates,
coupled with an EU-level procurement office to drive coherence and simplify
cross-border participation.
On costs and benefits, non-EU respondents tend not to provide precise numerical
estimates, but they highlight several economic mechanisms. First, pushing too far
towards rigid origin-based preferences or heavy new obligations in complex global
supply chains may reduce competition and choice, raise prices (especially in healthcare
and construction), and increase the risk of delays and market withdrawals where products
need re-certification or cannot easily relocate production. Second, they argue that more
strategic, value-based procurement – especially in health and green technologies – should
be seen as an investment: higher unit prices can be offset by long-term savings from
better outcomes, fewer failures, reduced maintenance and greater resilience. Third,
digitalisation, standardisation and once-only documentation are consistently presented as
measures that can cut administrative costs, shorten procedures and encourage more
SMEs and cross-border bidders to participate, improving value for money.
Finally, some non-EU respondents explicitly align themselves with EU trade union
demands on social clauses, arguing that the revision “must strengthen the social clause,
promote collective bargaining … and end lowest-price awards in favour of MEAT.” This
underlines that, even among non-EU actors, there is support for moving away from
lowest-price-only awards towards quality- and value-based approaches, provided that
social and environmental criteria are clearly defined and implemented in ways that
preserve fair, open and predictable competition.
525 Information and communications technology
ANNEX 10: DIGITAL MARKETPLACE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE NEW
PP ACT
10.1. Introduction
The Public Procurement Digital Marketplace would constitute a central element of the future
Public Procurement Act.
It will seek to facilitate access to public procurement procedures, information, data and IT
solutions to reduce administrative burden and increase transparency and monitoring, thereby
increasing participation of companies in procurement procedures, reducing irregular practices
and enabling informed policy-making choices. Moreover, the Digital Marketplace aims to
support the simplification and promotion of flexibility in procurement procedures by
providing technical solutions that simplify stakeholder interaction, consequently also
increasing the uptake of other policy objectives with strategic importance such as EU
economic security and strategic autonomy as well as environmental, social and innovative
goals. The marketplace directly addresses problem drivers such as dispersed information and
data and fragmented and misaligned IT solutions.
This Annex sets out in more detail how the marketplace would be designed under the
preferred option MLP.1 and how it would support the objectives of the future Public
Procurement Act.
10.2. The Digital Marketplace and its functions
The below figure shows a high-level view of the components of the Digital
Marketplace. These can be divided into three networks:
• Interoperability Network: to establish interoperability between the Member States’
and EU eProcurement platforms.
• Eligibility Network: to provide for the Once Only Principle.
• Data Network: to ensure lifecycle monitoring for all procurement projects.
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The three yellow circles depict the three networks that underlay the Digital Marketplace.
Squares depict interconnected components. Black squares depict components that will be
operated by Member States. Blue squares those that will be provided by the Commission.
Public buyers are depicted in red (‘B’). They use any interconnected eProcurement platform
to conduct a public procurement procedure (from planning to award/contract).
Suppliers are depicted in purple (‘S’). They use primarily three platforms: the Public
Procurement Supplier Platform (PPSP) for participating in a procurement procedure, the
Public Procurement Eligibility Service (PPES) for generating their profile to participate in
tenders, and the European Business Wallet (EBW) to provide information and documentation.
Policymakers are depicted in green (‘P’). They have access to a national Public Procurement
Data Space (NPPDS) which not only contains information about notices but also transactional
data like invoices to monitor contract performance or to identify fraud.
10.3. Advantages of this setup
10.3.1. Interoperability Network
The Interoperability Network will leave the existing national eProcurement platforms
(public and private) in place which are used for the electronic conduct of procurement
procedures. It will however require a network for the communication between all platforms,
thereby allowing a supplier to use their chosen platform to participate in procurement
procedures across the EU. For this to work, all platforms must join a network which is able to
transport the messages necessary in a procurement procedure between them. For the
communication to be recognised technically, standards will need to be established which
define the necessary communication elements of a procurement procedure, including a
standard for the main procurement documents. Finally, the Commission will provide a public
buyer and supplier platforms, which will be acting as a reference for the implementation of
the network and the associated standards and can be used by public buyers or suppliers as any
other eProcurement platform.
The Interoperability Network will contribute to the lowering of administrative burdens for
suppliers, as they will only have to use one platform to participate in any procurement
procedure. This will also contribute to the increase of competition, including cross-border
competition, as the fragmentation of platforms will cease to meaningfully affect participation.
Standardisation also supports automation, such as the automated extraction and reuse of data.
10.3.2. Eligibility Network
The Eligibility Network builds on the European Business Wallet (EBW), which will be
mandatory to use for suppliers. The EBW will contain connections to national databases such
as for example national criminal registers. This means that in a procurement procedure where
a supplier must show that they have not been convicted of certain crimes, they will provide
their EBW and link with it the business wallets of any other businesses participating with
them in the procurement procedure (e.g. subcontractors). This and other information - such as
the company information or information on the payment of taxes – will be provided through
the Public Procurement Eligibility Service (PPES), which will generate the supplier’s profile.
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The public buyer will receive this and with it be able to assess the eligibility of the supplier to
participate in the procurement procedure. The public buyer will receive the information either
as a “green” or “red” light, showing the completed assessment of the individual requirement
where this is possible, and/or be able to access the actual up-to-date evidence.
The Eligibility Network will contribute to the lowering of administrative burden for public
buyers and suppliers, as they may both rely on a digital tool that provides up-to-date data
from trusted sources, and they no longer have to provide and verify documents to show their
eligibility It will also contribute to the increase of competition, as it will make it easier for
suppliers to participate, including across borders, as the use of the EBW should lower
linguistic barriers.
10.3.3. Data Network
The Data Network will streamline and centralise the collection of public procurement and
contract implementation data both at national and European level. It will mandate the
establishment of National Public Procurement Data Spaces (NPPDS), which will provide
access to public as well as unpublished data. This will allow the public as well as oversight
and audit authorities, policy makers and public buyers to analyse data for their purposes.
From the NPPDS, data will be provided to the European Public Procurement Data Space
(PPDS), allowing the Commission and other users with access to the PPDS through the data
network to analyse the combined European data. A technical validation of the data prior to its
submission to the PPDS will additionally increase the overall data quality. This validation
will also be applied for the publication of notices by EUBuys (TED), which will continue as
before, with the notices also to be provided to the NPPDS and the PPDS.
The Data Network will provide for improved oversight and monitoring capabilities at national
and EU level. It will allow for the analysis of green, innovative and social purchasing trends
and for the monitoring of purchases from third country suppliers. The public, including public
watchdogs, may access publicly available data to understand their country’s purchasing
decisions and management of public money better. Oversight and competition authorities,
auditors and other independent authorities may draw inferences from the data as to possible
irregularities such as collusion, overpricing, or conflict of interest. Enhanced transparency –
achieved through real-time analysis of public procurement patterns – will strengthen
accountability, thereby effectively deterring irregularities such as fraud, collusion, and
procedural misuse. Such increased transparency will also improve the accountability of public
buyers, deterring irregular practices. Public buyers themselves may analyse the data to find
opportunities for joint procurement or may improve their purchases by learning from best
practice. Policymakers may evaluate the effects of their policies and spot areas for
improvement, e.g. regarding professionalisation.
10.4. The effect of the Digital Marketplace on the new PP Act
10.4.1. Simplification and increased competition
The Interoperability Network will simplify public procurement for suppliers by eliminating
the need to navigate multiple eProcurement platforms. This will reduce administrative
burdens and costs, as suppliers will no longer need to repeat registration and data entry across
different platforms. Additionally, standardising the main public procurement documents will
provide clarity and consistency for public buyers through templates (e.g. for technical
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specifications, award criteria and contract clauses), ensuring as well that suppliers understand
the requirements of the public buyer, regardless of Member State. Establishing
interoperability through the network will not only simplify public procurement for suppliers,
but also foster greater competition, as fragmentation and technical incompatibilities will no
longer discourage suppliers from participating.
The Data Network will provide, through the NPPDS, a reliable digital environment with real-
time insight into public procurement data. This will permit public buyers to better understand
market trends, supplier performance and pricing benchmarks based on which they can make
better informed decisions.
Additionally, the NPPDS and EU PPDS – the EU level data space connecting all NPPDS
through a network – both help public buyers to save time and effort by learning from one
another through the insight into procurement strategies, performances and outcomes – for
example by comparing cost for similar goods in different regions or Member States. A well-
structured data network also facilitates better cross-border procurement by improving data
quality and accessibility, leading to better value for public money by for example allowing
public buyers in different Member States to find opportunities to procure jointly or to use the
services of a central purchasing body in another Member State.
10.4.2. Environmental, social and innovative policy objectives
The Data Network will support public buyers in their use of quality requirements, including
as award criteria under BPQR, by allowing them to search for best practices. For policy
objectives, data analysis will play a key role for future developments and corrections in policy
initiatives, enabling public administrations to gain valuable insights into public procurement
trends and patterns that will allow them to steer public procurement in a manner that supports
their policy objectives. For example, by providing a tool for conducting market consultation
in an automatic format, public buyers are enabled to focus on the content rather than the
procedural aspects.
The PPES will facilitate environmental and social objectives by linking to other relevant
EU tools such as the Digital Product Passport (DPP), which holds the key information of a
product’s sustainability through the eco-design requirements. PPES as such can help public
buyers to have a standardised automatised way to compare products without administrative
complexities. In practise, public buyers could therefore use the PPES not only as a eligibility
service for company information, but also for product related data eligibility, making it easier
to compare products based on the same requirements. Additionally, social policy objectives
could be facilitated by providing an automated tool to connect the social consideration and
the subject matter of the contract, making it easier for public buyers to implement social
considerations as an aspect of a procurement procedure. Finally, subcontracting could be
traced in the PPES when companies apply for a specific procedure, establishing transparency
in the subcontracting chain in a digitally traceable way.
10.4.3. EU economic security and strategic autonomy
The PPES will play a key role in facilitating European preference in public procurement by
providing an automated support for applying EU market access rules (EU/partner-country
coverage, IPI measures, sanctions, and applicable derogations) for public buyers to verify the
origin of suppliers. Its direct connection to the EBW, a digital repository of qualified
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company information deriving from trusted sources, will enable the eProcurement platform of
the public buyer to check the origin of the suppliers at least for businesses registered in the
EU. The automated solution will provide an efficient and reliable way for public buyers to
verify company eligibility, reduce administrative burdens and ensure compliance with the
public procurement legal framework. In addition, in times of crisis, the marketplace can
mitigate the vulnerability of supply chains and reduce geopolitical dependencies by providing
public buyers with real-time data analytics to anticipate and respond to supply disruptions,
market developments and price shocks. Given that the PPES as an instrument could provide
product specific information through the DPP, whenever DPP is mandated for a product and
the origin information in available, this would contribute to strengthening the European
industrial capacity and the reinforcement of strategic autonomy in key sectors.
10.4.4. Fraud and irregularities
The PPES will play a crucial role by providing proactive checks through the real-time
verification of supplier’s eligibility from the EBW through a traffic-light indicator
summarising the assessment. By using the PPES, public buyers can ensure comprehensive
due diligence and mitigate the risk of non-compliant or high-risk participants slipping through
undetected, for example due to a recent conviction of certain crimes. This information can be
accessed at any point of the public procurement procedure as well as beyond during the
delivery of the contract, providing a new real time insight for public buyers to understand
irregularities regarding a specific supplier and allowing them to follow up by cancelling a
contract with a supplier that may in the meantime have been convicted of e.g. fraud.
By enhancing transparency, the marketplace will increase accountability and prevent
irregularities. The Data Network will significantly increase oversight and monitoring
capabilities both at the national and EU levels, by consolidating high-quality standardised
data. The NPPDS will be the key technical infrastructure that systematically gathers national
procurement and transaction data from various national sources, providing insight into the
entire public procurement and contract execution life cycle. This data will be provided to the
EU PPDS, letting the Commission and other users identify potential issues in the single
market that may not be apparent at the national level.
The Data Network combined with cross-referencing tools such as EU’s ARACHNE+ system
provides a meaningful opportunity to flag potentially irregular practices. ARACHNE+ is a
centralised risk scoring and fraud detection tool, which applies advanced algorithms to
calculate risk scores for projects, beneficiaries, contractors and subcontractors at every stage.
In the selection stage, it focuses on evaluating risks based on conflicts of interest, insufficient
financial or administrative capacity, prioritising high-risk cases. Throughout the contract
implementation, it can continuously monitor red flags such as specific patterns, qualification
breaches and performance anomalies. The system provides automated alerts based on AI
prediction forwarded to different stakeholders which needs to be verified and if needed
investigated further by the competent authorities. Additionally, by integrating machine
learning and rule-based logic, the system can constantly develop and improve to make
predictions even more precise. Combining ARACHNE+ with the PPDS will further
strengthen preventive control mechanism and early warnings, enabling public buyers to
intervene and take appropriate action. Additionally, projects which have received EU funding
such as RESPOND (footnote https://www.eu-respond.eu/) and a LT project under which an
AI-based pilot model for assessing fraud and corruption risks in public procurement was
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developed (footnote: https://www.stt.lt/en/news/7481/ai-based-pilot-model-for-assessing-
corruption-risks-in-public-procurement-developed:4165 ) may serve as templates for Member
States and the EC to further develop the analysis of procurement data in furtherance of
integrity goals through the use of advanced tools.
The Data Network will also support oversight bodies, auditors, competition authorities, and
regulators by providing historical data in identifying irregularities like collusion, overpricing
or conflicts of interest through benchmarking, predictive modelling and anomaly detection.
Other important stakeholders, including civil society organisations and watchdogs, will gain
access to publicly available procurement data, which helps to foster greater civic scrutiny on
how public funds are spent.
10.4.5. Coherence
The Digital Marketplace will be able to support the easier application and management of
existing and future sectoral procurement provisions, including the monitoring of their effects
and their application, which aids overall coherence through their inclusion within unified
digital processes.
Regarding the Eligibility Network, sectoral requirements containing exclusion grounds and
selection criteria may be incorporated into the PPES. Where a national database contains the
evidence regarding this exclusion ground or selection criterion, this would mean that the
database would link to the EBW which the supplier may then use to show their compliance.
Even where such a database may not exist, the supplier may use the PPES as a self-
declaration. This would also increase the awareness of the relevant exclusion ground or
selection criterion, including any criterion relating to economic security and strategic
autonomy, as the public buyer would always see the full list of general and sectoral
requirements before choosing the applicable ones for the individual procurement procedure.
The Data Network will facilitate the initial assessment of the possible effects of a planned
sectoral provision. For example, it would allow the Commission to analyse data on the
current participation of third country suppliers in a specific industry, or the overall size and
value of a specific category of procurement (e.g. [zero-emission] vehicles or [energy-
efficient] white goods), to assess the possible impact of specific rules for public procurement
within the internal market overall. This can show policymakers whether the intended effects
are sufficient to justify a policy intervention, or whether the status quo justifies such an
intervention. Furthermore, the establishment of the NPPDS and the PPDS will help with the
centralised collection as well as the standardisation of data, including data required according
to sectoral requirements. Member States may also connect national databases to the NPPDS,
from which it may draw the required sectoral information where this is available, therefore
not asking public buyers to provide such information themselves.
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ANNEX 11: SECTORIAL LEGISLATION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
11.1 Baseline
The introduction of public procurement provisions outside the Directives has led to a
regulatory paradigm shift in which the pursuit of strategic objectives is no longer
voluntary but has also become mandatory. Public buyers must include a combination of
requirements related to cyber security, energy efficiency, circular economy and due diligence,
among others, in a single public procurement procedure.
Currently, public procurement provisions are included in multiple sectoral acts covering
different policy objectives in a variety of sectors, ranging from environmental, social, digital,
health, justice to trade, transport, security, defence, and energy526. In addition, several acts in
preparation may include in the future public procurement aspects.
As outlined in the evaluation of the Public Procurement Directives527, the rapid increase of
the public procurement provisions in sectoral legal acts has contributed to the fragmentation
of the legal framework and led to inconsistencies, risking undermining legal certainty,
compliance, and the coherence of public procurement as a policy tool. The requirements
sometimes overlap, are unclear and spread through various pieces of legislation, making them
difficult to interpret and apply. Public buyers and economic operators struggle to identify
which rules to apply and are not always aware of newly adopted acts528. As a result, public
buyers and economic operators are faced with a more complex legislative framework,
particularly when multiple legislative instruments apply to the same procurement
procedure529.
The European Parliament, in its resolution on public procurement530, emphasised the
fragmentation of the various sector-specific public procurement rules and the difficulty of
implementation for both businesses and local governments, calling for streamlining and
harmonising sectoral rules with the overall public procurement framework.
Similarly, the European Committee of the Regions, in its draft opinion on the evaluation of
the Public Procurement Directives, stressed the importance of addressing sectoral legislation
526 See detailed list of acts in the table at the end of this Annex. 527 SWD(2025) 333 final. 528 To facilitate the identification of sectoral acts applicable to specific public procurement procedures and
improve awareness among public buyers, the Commission expanded the public procurement section in the
Access2Markets tool in 2025. Access2Markets is an online portal that, among other things, helps procuring
entities throughout the EU in determining whether, for an intended procurement, they are obliged to take into
consideration the tenders submitted by bidders from third countries. The new add-on provides public buyers
with guidance on which sectoral acts may apply when procuring works, supplies or services. The tool can be
accessed at this link: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-launches-new-public-procurement-
portal-2024-06-20_en 529 Examples of this complexity are included in Janssen and Caranta (2026), Expert opinion on the coherence of
EU public procurement regulation: legal and non-legal solutions from the public buyer perspective. 530 European Parliament, Resolution on public procurement, 9 September 2025,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0174_EN.pdf
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in the revision process531. Also, in a recent report, it underlined the difficulties local and
regional authorities face navigating such complex framework, especially in certain sectors532.
The complexity of EU public procurement law is also addressed by the European Economic
and Social Committee533.
Member States have similarly expressed concerns about the consistency of the public
procurement legal framework in different fora. For instance, in the Council Conclusions of 3
June 2024 on the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report534, the Council considered that
a thorough examination was needed on the interplay between the Directives and the
multiplicity of sector-specific legal acts containing procurement provisions. It therefore
requested that the Commission examines “the need for streamlining and alignment of the
initiatives in the interest of finding a balance among the different objectives, greater legal
certainty, overall coherence, and, where appropriate, the reduction of regulatory burden and
costs”. In response, under the Single Market Strategy (May 2025), the Commission
committed to revise the public procurement framework to streamline its fragmented and
complex provisions535. Recently, the Commission has announced its intention to tackle the
issue in its Communication - A Simpler, Clearer and Better Enforced EU Rulebook536: “In the
area of public procurement, the EU acquis contains many pieces of legislation setting
requirements on substance and procedure for public procurement. While most of these play a
facilitating role, regulatory deep cleaning would increase clarity and consistency, thereby
facilitating implementation both for public administrations and public contractors. The
Public Procurement Act will simplify procedures and eliminate overlaps and duplications
with the numerous sectorial procurement rules in EU law. Repealing redundant procurement
provisions from sector-specific acts will streamline legislation and ensure coherence.”
In the open public consultation on the revision of the Public Procurement Directives,
respondents were asked whether existing and future sectoral rules should be integrated with
the new legislative framework, and if so, how537. Regarding the existing sectoral rules, views
varied across categories of respondents. Overall, the most frequently chosen option was to
integrate rules on “how to buy” only (36%), followed by integrating both “how and what to
buy” (21%). Almost one in five preferred not to integrate sectoral rules (19%), while 24%
selected “Other”. Public authorities were relatively evenly split between integrating “how and
what to buy” (30%), integrating “how to buy” only (28%), and not integrating (29%). Among
large companies, SMEs and business associations, integrating “how to buy” was the most
frequently selected option (36% for large companies, 61% for SMEs, 58% for business
531 European Committee of the Regions (CoR), Opinion on the evaluation of the Public Procurement Directives,
available at https://cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions/cdr-2298-2025. 532 European Committee of the Regions: Commission for Economic Policy, Valenza, A., Odoardi, L., Giorgino,
E., Marchetti, G. E. et al., How EU public procurement rules affect regions and cities, European Committee of
the Regions, 2025, (https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2863/0379789). 533 The Opinion was adopted on 4 December 2025. It is available at https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-
work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/review-european-public-procurement-legal-framework 534 OJ C, C/2024/3521, 3.6.2024 (ST 10358/24). 535 Single Market Strategy, available at https://single-market-
economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/d92c78d0-7d47-4a16-b53f-
1cead54bcb49_en?filename=Communication%20-%20Single%20Market%20Strategy.pdf 536 COM(2026) 380 final; Regulatory Deep Cleaning Action Plan (Annex I to the Communication). 537 On the results of the public consultation, see more in detail Annex 2 of the Impact Assessment.
416
associations). Large companies also showed some support for integrating both “how and what
to buy” (32%). By contrast, non-integration attracted lower shares across these three groups
(generally between 13% and 22%).
Regarding the future sectoral rules, across all respondents, the most frequently chosen option
was to integrate rules on “how to buy” only (41%), followed by integrating both “how and
what to buy” (22%). A smaller share preferred not to integrate future sectoral rules (16%),
while 22% selected “Other”. Among public authorities, views were relatively balanced: 34%
favoured integrating “how to buy”, 28% integrating both “how and what to buy”, and 26%
not integrating. Among large companies, SMEs and business associations, integrating “how
to buy” was again the dominant option (41% for large companies, 63% for SMEs, 58% for
business associations). Integrating “how and what to buy” attracted some support, particularly
among large companies (33%), while non integration was generally less favoured (between
12% and 16%).
Respondents who chose to integrate “how to buy” requirements only, or who opted not to
integrate either “how to buy” or “what to buy” requirements, were still asked whether they
agreed that future “what to buy” requirements should be subject to common rules defined in a
general legislative framework (e.g. the new general legislative framework should foresee
mechanisms and templates for harmonised legislation ensuring coherence of “what to buy”
requirements contained in sector-specific rules with the general legislative framework). The
majority of these respondents, across all categories, answered affirmatively.
With respect to the “how to buy” rules, the procedural provisions introduced by sectoral acts
that raise issues of fragmentation consistency mostly concern exclusion grounds (grounds
upon which public buyers must exclude a company from a public procurement process).
Fifteen sectoral legal acts (four of which at the stage of proposals) introduced provisions on
exclusion grounds, adding another layer of complexity to the general rules, and in some cases
not fully aligned with the terms, definitions and conditions of the current Public Procurement
Directives.
Article 57 of the Directive 2014/24/EU538 sets out grounds for exclusion of economic
operators from public procurement procedures. The current article includes two lists of
exclusion grounds: mandatory grounds, where contracting authorities must automatically
exclude, and that apply only where there is a conviction by final judgment (Art. 57(1)); and
optional grounds that contracting authorities may apply – but are not obliged to - and that do
not require a final judgment (Art. 57(4)). The article also establishes the possibility of
derogation, self-cleaning measures whereby economic operators cannot be excluded if they
prove that they are reliable, the burden of proof and the maximum period of exclusion.
The provisions introduced by sectoral acts create fragmentation and raise legal uncertainty
and concerns regarding their consistency with Article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU, especially
538 The comparable provisions in the Utilities Directive (2014/25/EU) and in the Concessions Directive
(2014/23/EU) are Art. 80 and Art. 38, respectively.
417
in terms of scope of application, duration of the exclusion, applicability of self-cleaning
measures, means of proof, and extraterritorial enforcement of the exclusions539.
Regarding the “what to buy” aspects, sectoral acts have adopted different regulatory
approaches540. To promote green public procurement, some acts have introduced
sustainability mandatory requirements, which can be sectoral (e.g. Batteries Regulation) or
being applicable to the same product group across different sectors (e.g. Ecodesign
Regulation). Other sectoral instruments have introduced resilience aspects (e.g. Net-Zero
Industry Act (NZIA)541, Heavy-Duty Vehicles Regulation542), while others include security and
cybersecurity aspects (e.g. Cyber Resilience Act543, NIS2 Directive544, NZIA).
In terms of techniques, some sectoral acts have introduced targets related to procurement (e.g.
Clean Vehicles Directive545); others provide that contracting authorities must choose from a
list of technical specifications or award criteria (e.g. Heavy-Duty Vehicles Regulation) or a
list of technical specifications and contract performance criteria (NZIA). Also, other
instruments grant the Commission empowerment to provide for technical specifications,
award criteria, contract performance conditions, or targets (e.g. Ecodesign Regulation546,
Batteries Regulation547, Construction Products Regulation548, NZIA); one act introduces a
new principle (Energy Efficiency Directive549).
This is a classification of the types of sectoral acts on “what to buy”:
- Horizontal provisions on green public procurement requirements
- Horizontal provisions on socially responsible public procurement requirements
- Horizontal provisions on (cyber)security requirements in public procurement
- Procedural aspects of “what do buy” related to resilience in public procurement
- Sector-specific provisions containing requirements on “what to procure” applicable
only to a product group and/or sector
- Empowerments to establish public procurement criteria
Public buyers face challenges in identifying which rules to apply and how to apply the
sustainability and resilience requirements introduced by sectoral acts. For instance, in terms
of scope of application, the Energy Efficiency Directive does not fully align with Directive
539 For an in-depth analysis of the exclusion grounds provisions in sectoral acts, see Janssen, The Coherence of
Public Procurement Legislation in the European Union, 2025. 540 For a more in-depth analysis of the sectoral acts and their interaction with the general Public Procurement
Directives, see Janssen (2025), The Coherence of Public Procurement Legislation in the European Union,
published at https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/865d0382-a7e4-11f0-a7c5-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en . 541 Regulation (EU) 2024/1735. 542 Regulation (EU) 2024/1610. 543 Regulation (EU) 2024/2847. 544 Directive (EU) 2022/2555. 545 Directive (EU) 2019/1161. 546 Regulation (EU) 2024/1781. 547 Regulation (EU) 2023/1542. 548 Regulation (EU) 2024/3110. 549 Directive (EU) 2023/1791.
418
2014/24/EU: while the Energy Efficiency Directive covers building purchase or rental,
buildings are excluded from the application of Directive 2014/24/EU.
Also, requiring companies to comply with due diligence requirements under the Corporate
Sustainability Due Diligence Directive may be challenging and legally uncertain for public
buyers. This stems from the fact that the Public Procurement Directives require the
connection with the subject matter of the contract, excluding criteria and conditions relating
to general corporate policy which cannot be linked to the contract itself.
Janssen and Caranta study (2026) highlights the complexity of applying multiple public
procurement provisions from sectoral acts, on top of the Public Procurement Directives,
within a single public procurement procedure. Through a series of concrete examples related
to construction, computers, electric buses, and food and catering procurement, the study
illustrates how compliance with these rules works in practice for public buyers and the extent
to which this may create practical challenges550.
The study finds that horizontal mandatory rules on tenderers are challenging for public buyers
as their application depends on information that is unavailable or difficult to access. The
combination of requirements related to tenders, such as technical specifications and/or
contract performance clauses, may also raise implementation issues as to the technical
feasibility of the procurement and the related costs.
Last, there are public procurement provisions included in other sectoral acts, which do not
present coherence issues:
▪ Public procurement provisions included in trade policy instruments, which do not
present coherence issues, as the trade policy instruments provide for self-standing
mechanisms outside the public procurement framework.
▪ Defence-related matters, as defence procurement is outside the scope of the general
public procurement framework (there is self-standing defence procurement Directive, in
the process of being revised); and other provisions on procurement outside the scope of
the general public procurement framework.
▪ Emergency / joint procurement rules, as those rules regulate the upstream question of
whether and when certain good or services shall be bought jointly, which is outside the
public procurement framework. Once that decision has been made, the ensuing joint
procurement will in any event be carried out following the relevant rules (financial
regulation / Public Procurement Directives). In addition, there are two acts with
governance-related provisions linked to crisis551.
550 Janssen – Caranta (2026), Expert opinion on the coherence of EU public procurement regulation: legal and
non-legal solutions from the public buyer perspective, upcoming. 551 Regulation (EU) 2024/2747 of 9 October 2024 establishing a framework of measures related to an internal
market emergency and to the resilience of the internal market and amending Council Regulation (EC) No
2679/98 (Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act), and Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 of 23 November
2022 on serious cross-border threats to health.
419
11.2. Overview of Sector-Specific legislation
Table 108: Overview of Sector-specific legislation containing public procurement provisions (in grey acts in co-decision)
HOW TO BUY
Exclusion grounds:
Title Provision Description
1 Regulation on Deforestation
and Forest Degradation
Regulation (EU) 2023/1115
Article
25(2)(d)
This provision introduces a mandatory
exclusion of economic operators from
procurement, for a period of 12 months
following a final judgement.
The EC shall provide an IT tool to register
these judgements.
2 Directive on Protection of
Environment through
Criminal Law
Directive (EU) 2024/1203
Articles
5(3)(c) and
7(2)(c)
This provision mandates Member State to
establish penalties that may take the form of
exclusion grounds.
3 Regulation on Shipments of
Waste
Regulation (EU) 2024/1157
Article
63(3)(c)
This provision states that “Member States shall
[…] be able to impose” as a penalty, among
others, exclusion from public procurement
procedures.”.
4 Regulation on Eco-design for
sustainable products
Regulation (EU) 2024/1781
Article
74(3)(b)
This provision states that “Member States shall
[…] be able to impose” as a penalty, among
others, exclusion from public procurement
procedures.”
5 Directive on Preventing and
Combating Trafficking in
Human Beings and
Protecting Victims
Directive 2011/36/EU
Article
6(2)(b)
This provision mandates Member State to
establish penalties that may take the form of
exclusion grounds.
6 Directive on Combating
Fraud and Counterfeiting of
Payments
Directive 2019/713
Article 11(b) This provision mandates Member State to
establish penalties that may take the form of
exclusion grounds.
7 Directive on Combating
Money Laundering
Directive 2018/1673
Article 8(b) This provision mandates Member State to
establish penalties that may take the form of
temporary or permanent exclusion grounds.
8 Directive on Sanctions
against Employers of
Illegally Staying Third-
Country Nationals
Directive 2009/52/EC
Article 7(b) This provision introduces a mandatory
exclusion ground, leaving discretion to
Member States to define how this is to be
applied in public procurement.
9 Directive on Criminal
Offences and Penalties for
the Violation of Union
Article
7(1)(b)
This provision mandates Member State to
establish penalties that may take the form of
exclusion grounds.
420
Restrictive Measures
Directive (EU) 2024/1226
10 Directive on Pay
Transparency (equal pay for
equal work)
Directive (EU) 2023/970
Article 24(2) This provision establishes that public buyers
must always have the possibility to exclude, but
Member States may make turn this possibility
into a mandatory exclusion ground.
11 Directive on the Protection of
the Union’s financial
interests
Directive (EU) 2017/1371
Article 9(b) This provision introduces a mandatory
exclusion ground, leaving discretion to
Member States to define how this is to be
applied in public procurement.
12 Proposal for a Directive on
Green Claims
COM/2023/166 final
Article 17 -
Exclusion
grounds
This provision introduces a mandatory
exclusion ground for a maximum of 12 months,
leaving discretion to Member States to define
how this is to be applied in public procurement.
13 Proposal for a Directive on
the Prevention & Countering
the Facilitation of
Unauthorised Entry, Transit
and Stay in the EU
COM(2023)755 final
Article
6(5)(d)
This provision introduces a mandatory
exclusion ground, leaving discretion to
Member States to define how this is to be
applied in public procurement.
14 Proposal for a Directive on
Combating the sexual abuse
and sexual exploitation of
children and child sexual
abuse material
COM(2024)60 final
Article 14(1) This provision mandates Member State to
establish penalties that may take the form of
exclusion grounds.
15 Proposal for a Directive on
combating firearms
trafficking and other
firearms-related offences
COM(2026)102 Final
Article
5(3)(b)
This provision mandates Member State to
establish penalties that may take the form of
exclusion grounds.
WHAT TO BUY
Horizontal provisions on green public procurement
Title Provision Description
1 Directive on energy
efficiency
Directive (EU) 2023/1791
Article 7 When using the public procurement Directives
to acquire or rent products, services, buildings
and works, public buyers shall purchase only
products, services buildings and works with
high energy-efficiency performance and take
into account the energy efficiency first
principle.
2 Directive on Corporate
Sustainability Due Diligence
Article 31 When transposing the Directive Member States
need to ensure that compliance with the
Directive qualifies as part of award criteria or
421
Directive (EU) 2024/1760 conditions for the execution of the contract.
3 Directive on Waste
Directive 2008/98/EC
Article 11,
Annexes IV
and IVa
Member States shall establish public
procurement “criteria” for the recycling and
recovery of waste.
Member States may use sustainable public
procurement to encourage better waste
management and the use of recycled products
and materials.
4 Regulation on Critical Raw
Materials
Regulation (EU) 2024/1252
Art. 26(1)(d) Member States shall every two years specify in
their national programmes measures related to
taking recycled content into account in award
criteria.
Horizontal provisions on socially responsible public procurement
Title Provision Description
1 Directive on Adequate
Minimum Wages
Directive (EU) 2022/2041
Article 9 Member States shall take measures to ensure that,
economic operators and their subcontractors
comply with the applicable obligations regarding
wages, the right to organise and collective
bargaining on wage setting, in the field of social
and labour law established by Union law, national
law, collective agreements or international social
and labour law provisions
2 Directive on Accessibility
requirements
Directive (EU) 2019/882
Article
24(1) and
Annex I
Establishes mandatory accessibility requirements to
be included as part of technical specifications.
3 Directive on Women on
boards
Directive (EU) 2022/2381
Article
8(3)
Member States shall ensure that in public contracts
and concessions, listed companies comply with the
applicable obligations in the Directive (ensuring
gender equality), as well as social and labour law.
4 Directive on late payments
Directive 2011/7/EU
NB: Pending in
negotiationsProposal for a
Regulation on Late
payments
COM(2023) 533 Final
Article 4 The Directive establishes deadlines to provide
payments in G2B transactions
Horizontal provisions on (cyber) security in public procurement
Title Provision Description
1 Regulation on horizontal
cybersecurity requirements
Article 5,
Annex I
Mandatory cybersecurity requirements for
public contracts under the Classical Directive
422
Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 and Utilities (it does not cover concessions)
2 Directive on high common
level of cybersecurity (NIS2)
Directive (EU) 2022/2555
Article
7(2)(b)
Member States shall adopt policies to include
cybersecurity related requirements for the
procurement of IT services and products.
Procedural aspects of ‘what to buy’ related to resilience and Buy European + Requirements on
resilience and Buy European applicable only to a product group and/or sector
Title Provision Description
1 Regulation on CO2
emissions of heavy duty
vehicles
Regulation (EU) 2019/1242
Article 3e Public buyers must use the most economically
advantageous tender, which shall include the
best-price quality ratio. Lists conditions to be
used as part of award criteria or technical
specifications. If security of supply is used as
award criterion, it must weigh between 15 and
40%.
2 Regulation for a Net-Zero
Industry Act
Regulation (EU) 2024/1735
Article 25 Public buyers shall use minimum mandatory
sustainability requirements, as well as
contractual obligations related to the resilience
of the contract/component. Derogations in case
of excessive costs and lack of competition.
3 Proposal for a Regulation on
an Industrial Accelerator
COM(2026) 100 Final
Article 11(3) Public Buyers shall apply Buy European
provisions. Derogations in case of excessive
costs or lack of competition.
4 Proposal for Critical
Medicines Act
COM(2025) 102 Final
Provisional trilogue
agreement on 11 May
Section I
Chapter IV
Public buyers shall use resilience requirements
and Buy European provisions.
Sector-specific provisions containing requirements on ‘what to procure’ applicable only to a
product group and/or sector
Title Provision
1 Directive on Clean Vehicles
Directive 2009/33/EC (consolidated version)
Article 5
Tables 3 and 4 of the Annex
2 Directive on the promotion of the use of
energy from renewable sources (RED III)
Directive (EU) 2018/2001 (consolidated
version)
Article 15(2), (2a), (3) and (8)
3 Regulation on Health Data Space
Regulation (EU) 2025/327
Article 15(1)
Article 36(1)(2)(3)
Annex II
423
4 Regulation on Passenger transport services
by rail and by road
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007
All provisions
5 Regulation on the Single European Sky
Regulation (EU) 2024/2803
Article 11
6 Directive on Trans-European Transport
Network (TEN-T)
Directive (EU) 2021/1187
Article 8
7 Regulation on the Union Secure Connectivity
Programme
Regulation (EU) 2023/588
Article 7
Article 19-22
8 Directive on Common Rules for Electricity
Directive
Directive (EU) 2019/944
Article 31
Article 32
Article 38
Article 40
9 Regulation on Electricity Market Design
Regulation (EU) 2019/943 (consolidated
version)
Article 6
Article 20
10 Proposal for a Cybersecurity Act
COM (2026) 11 Final
Article 100(4)(e)
Article 105(1)
11 Combating Corruption Directive
Directive (EU) 2026/1021
Recital 26
12 Directive on European Works Councils
Directive (EU) 2025/2450
Recital 31 on social sustainability
Empowerments for public procurement criteria
Title Provision Description
1 Regulation on Batteries
Regulation (EU) 2023/1542
Article 85 Delegated act to establish green public
procurement criteria to be used as technical
specifications or award criteria.
2 Regulation on packaging
and packaging waste
Regulation (EU) 2025/40
Article 63 Implementing acts to establish minimum green
public procurement criteria, to be used as
technical specifications, selection criteria or
contract performance conditions.
3 Regulation on eco-design for
sustainable products
Regulation (EU) 2024/1781
Article 65 Implementing act to establish minimum
sustainability criteria in public procurement.
424
4 Regulation on Construction
Products
Regulation (EU) 2024/3110
Article 83 Delegated act to establish minimum
sustainability criteria in public procurement to
be used as technical specifications, selection
criteria, conditions for the performance of
contracts or contract award criteria.
5 Regulation for a Net-Zero
Industry Act
Regulation (EU) 2024/1735
Article 25 Implementing act to establish minimum
sustainability criteria in public procurement, to
be used as technical specifications or contract
clauses.
Sectoral acts that do not present coherence issues:
▪ Public procurement provisions included in trade policy instruments:
Title Provision
1 Regulation on Anti-Coercion Instrument
Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of
Annex I point 4
2 Regulation on Foreign Subsidies
Regulation (EU) 2022/2560
Chapter I, Chapter II, Chapter IV, Chapter V
3 Regulation on the Enforcement of
International Trade Rules
Regulation (EU) No 654/2014
Article 5(1)(c), 5(2)
4 Regulation on International Procurement
Instrument
Regulation (EU) 2022/1031
All provisions
5 Council Regulation on Restrictive Measures
– Russia’s Actions Destabilizing the
Situation in Ukraine
Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014
5k
▪ Defence-related matters and other provisions on procurement outside the scope of the general
public procurement framework.
Title Provision
1 Regulation on Security Action for Europe
(SAFE)
Regulation (EU) 2025/1106
Articles 1-2
Articles 16-19
2 Regulation on European Defence Industry
Reinforcement through common
Procurement Act
Regulation (EU) 2023/2418
All provisions
3 Regulation on European Defence Industry
Programme
Articles 2, 4, 8, 10 -12, 15, 18, 19, 28-32
425
Regulation (EU) 2025/2643
4 Regulation on supporting Ammunition
Production
Regulation (EU) 2023/1525
Article 9, 11, 14
5 Regulation on the Union Space Programme
and the European Union Agency for the
Space Programme
Regulation (EU) 2021/696
Title III, Chapter I
Articles 14 to 17
6 Proposal for a Regulation on establishing a
framework of measures to facilitate the
transport of military equipment, goods and
personnel across the Union
COM(2025) 847 Final
Article 3(13)
Article 39
7 Regulation on European Media Freedom Act
Regulation (EU) 2024/1083
Article 25
▪ Emergency / joint procurement rules
Title Provision
1 Regulation on Cross-border Threats to Health
Regulation (EU) 2022/2371
Article 12
2 Regulation on European Chips Act
(Regulation)
Regulation (EU) 2019/943
Article 22(3)
Article 27
3 Regulation on Internal Market Emergency
and resilience Act
Regulation (EU) 2024/2747
Article 40 (obligation for Member States to
coordinate procurement in emergency mode)
4 Regulation on Medical Countermeasures
Council
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2372
Article 7(4) (obligation so that when a Member
State intends to procure crisis-relevant medical
countermeasures or raw materials, they shall
inform the Health Crisis Board accordingly)
Source: in-house analysis
11.3. How would the preferred combination of policy options address sectorial legislation
Sectoral acts concerned
(adopted + in co-decision) Policy options
Driver 1: Complex pp
procedures and rules that
lack flexibility
▪ Considerable
Exclusion grounds
FLX.2
To be deleted as far as possible and integrated
into the PP Act
426
variation of rules
by sector
Driver 2: Environmental,
social and innovation
requirements difficult to
apply
▪ Considerable
variation of rules
by sector
a) Horizontal provisions
on green public
procurement
b) Horizontal provisions
on socially
responsible public
procurement
c) Empowerments for
public procurement
criteria
d) Requirements on
‘what to procure’
applicable only to a
product group
and/or sector
ESI.2
[(a), (b), (c)] To be deleted and integrated as far
as possibly in the PP Act as part of general
provisions related to strategic procurement
+
Framework for future acts
(d) left untouched
Driver 3: EU procurement
framework not sufficiently
supporting EU economic
security and strategic
autonomy
▪ Some variation of
rules by sector
a) Horizontal provisions
on (cyber) security in
public procurement
b) Procedural aspects
of ‘what to buy’
related to resilience
in public procurement
c) Requirements on
resilience and Buy
European applicable
only to a product
group and/or sector
BEU.2
[(a), (b)] To be deleted and integrated as far as
possible in the PP Act as part of general
provisions related to Buy European, resilience and
security
+
Future framework
(c) left untouched
Driver 4: Dispersed
information and data
All mentioned above MPL.1
Facilitate monitoring and access to information by
public buyers
427
ANNEX 12: LEGAL REFERENCES
The references below are listed in order of appearance in the main text.
• Concessions – Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, pp. 1–
64, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/23/oj.
• Classical – Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L
94, 28.3.2014, pp. 65–242, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj.
• Utilities – Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport
and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014,
pp. 243–374, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/25/oj.
• GPA – World Trade Organisation, Agreement on Government Procurement, as
amended on 30 March 2012 (https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/rev-gpr-
94_01_e.pdf).
• Defence Procurement – Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain
works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or
entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and
2004/18/EC, OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, pp. 76–136, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/81/oj.
• Remedies – Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of
review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, OJ L
395, 30.12.1989, pp. 33–35, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1989/665/oj; and
Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and
telecommunications sectors, OJ L 76, 23.3.1992, pp. 14–20, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1992/13/oj.
• Electronic Invoicing – Directive 2014/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 April 2014 on electronic invoicing in public procurement, OJ L 133,
6.5.2014, pp. 1–11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/55/oj.
• NZIA – Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s
net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU)
2018/1724, OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj.
• Heavy-Duty Vehicles – Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 20 June 2019 setting CO2 emission performance standards for new
heavy-duty vehicles and amending Regulations (EC) No 595/2009 and (EU) 2018/956
of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 96/53/EC, OJ L
198, 25.7.2019, pp. 202–240, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1242/2025-08-
14.
428
• e-Forms – Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1780 of 23 September
2019 establishing standard forms for the publication of notices in the field of public
procurement and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1986, OJ L 272,
25.10.2019, pp. 7–73, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1780/2024-11-01.
• IPI – Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 June 2022 on the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to
the Union’s public procurement and concession markets and procedures supporting
negotiations on access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the public
procurement and concession markets of third countries, OJ L 173, 30.6.2022, pp. 1–
16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1031/oj.
• Union Customs Code – Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (recast),
OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, pp. 1–101, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/952/oj.
• IMERA – Regulation (EU) 2024/2747 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 9 October 2024 establishing a framework of measures related to an internal market
emergency and to the resilience of the internal market and amending Council
Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act), OJ L,
2024/2747, 8.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2747/oj.
• NIS2 – Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the
Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and
repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148, OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, pp. 80-152, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj.
• EU Taxonomy Regulation – Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate
sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, OJ L 198,
22.6.2020, pp. 13–43, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/852/oj.
• FSR – Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, OJ L 330,
23.12.2022, pp. 1–45, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj.
• Implementing Regulation FSR – Commission Implementing Regulation (EU)
2023/1441 of 10 July 2023 on detailed arrangements for the conduct of proceedings
by the Commission pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European
Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, OJ
L 177, 12.7.2023, pp. 1–44, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/1441/2023-
10-27.
429
ANNEX 13: BIBLIOGRAPHY
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market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/analysis-smes-needs-public-
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Brussels, October 2019, (https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
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Procurement Procedures, Final Report, DG GROW, Rotterdam, 2025
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ved-eu-udbud.pdf).
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(https://doi.org/10.1787/1c258f55-en).
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(https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en).
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(https://doi.org/10.1787/02a46a58-en).
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efficiency, compliance and strategic goals, OECD, 8 August 2023
(https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/08/public
-procurement-performance_0ebfe3e7/0dde73f4-en.pdf).
• Prometeia (2021), Study on the measurement of cross-border penetration in the
EU public procurement market, Final report, European Commission, DG
GROW, Brussels, Prometeia SpA, BIP Business Integration Partners – Spa,
Economics for Policy a knowledge Center of Nova School of Business and
Economics Lisboa, Publications Office, March 2021
(https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c7fcd46a-b84d-11eb-
8aca-01aa75ed71a1/language-en#).
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costs and benefits, Publications Office of the European Union, 2026,
(publication pending).
• SILO (2026), SME Participation in EU Public Procurement: Evidence from
TED (2018-2023), Publications Office of the European Union, 2026,
(publication pending).
• Titl, V., & Schotanus, F. (2025), Onderzoek naar een nationale dataspace voor
overheidsopdrachten, Utrecht University, February 2025 (https://research-
portal.uu.nl/en/publications/onderzoek-naar-een-nationale-dataspace-voor-
overheidsopdrachten).
• Wainikka, Ch. (2026), Intellectual Property in Public Procurement, Country
comparisons and impact on companies, Publications Office of the European
Union, 2026 (forthcoming).
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World Bank
(https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099111425044525338/pdf/P5074
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EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 9.9.2026 SWD(2026) 592 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL
on public contracts and concessions, repealing Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and
2014/25/EU, and amending Regulations (EC) No 1370/2007, (EU) 2023/1542, (EU)
2024/1157, (EU) 2024/1252, (EU) 2024/1735, (EU) 2024/1781, (EU) 2024/2847, (EU)
2024/3110 and (EU) 2025/40, and Directives 2008/98/EC, (EU) 2019/882, (EU) 2022/2381,
(EU) 2023/1791 and (EU) 2024/1760 (Public Procurement Act)
{COM(2026) 590 final} - {SEC(2026) 590 final} - {SWD(2026) 590 final} - {SWD(2026) 591 final}
1
Executive Summary Sheet
Impact assessment on the Public Procurement Act
A. Need for actions
Why? What is the problem being addressed?
Public authorities in the EU spend around €2.5 trillion (15% of GDP) a year on public procurement.
This makes public procurement rules key for ensuring public funds are invested efficiently and
effectively while preventing irregular practices, as well as making procurement an instrument to support
the Unions wider policy objectives.
Three public procurement directives currently form the core of European public procurement
legislation, one general directive (Directive 2014/24/EU) and two specific directives, one for the
procurement by entities operating in specific sectors (Directive 2014/25) and one for the award of
concessions (Directive 2014/23/EU). The European Commission's in-depth evaluation1 of the 2014
Directives found that public buyers face high administrative burden and legal uncertainty, favouring the
least risky choices when running public procurement. Similarly, EU business, including SMEs, face
high administrative burden and struggle to participate in public procurement, also cross-border. Finally,
fragmented eProcurement systems prevent proper transparency and efficient monitoring and oversight.
The revision of the Public Procurement Directives was announced in the Political Guidelines for the
European Commission 2024–2029.
What is this initiative expected to achieve?
This EU intervention aims to transform public procurement into a more efficient public investment tool
that advances the Union’s strategic policy objectives including single market integration, economic
autonomy, social and ecological sustainability and innovation, yielding best value for money. For public
buyers, it seeks to simplify procurement processes and facilitate the pursuit of strategic goals. For
economic operators, it aims to improve access to procurement opportunities including cross-border in
the single market and for SMEs. For both, it strives to reduce administrative burden while enhancing
transparency to prevent, detect and address irregular practices.
To achieve this, the intervention pursues four specific objectives (SO): to simplify and promote
flexibility in procurement procedures and increase legal clarity and coherence of applicable rules, so as
to facilitate public procurement processes and access to them for economic operators across the single
market, including for SMEs (SO1); to increase the uptake of environmental, social and innovation
public procurement in support of strategic policy objectives of the Union and provide a more coherent
legal framework in this regard (SO2); to improve EU economic security and strategic autonomy in
public procurement, promoting a coherent legal framework in this regard (SO3); and to facilitate access
to public procurement information, data and IT solutions so as to reduce administrative burden and
increase transparency and monitoring, thereby preventing and reducing irregular practices and enabling
policy-making choices (SO4).
1 Commission Staff Working document, Evaluation of Directive 2014/23/EU on Concessions, Directive 2014/24/EU on Public Procurement and Directive 2014/25/EU on Utilities, SWD/2025/0332 final, Brussels 14.10.2025 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025SC0332)
2
Why should EU act? What is the value added of action at the EU level?
The initiative revises the existing EU Directives on public procurement to meet the objectives set out
above and leverage public procurement as a driver for efficient and effective public investment
supporting EU policy objectives. The initiative revising existing EU legislation and regulating the EU-
wide procurement market could not be accomplished at Member State level, not least considering the
need for ensuring a harmonised approach across the single market.
B. Solutions
What legislative and non-legislative options have been considered? Is there a preferred choice or
not? Why?
The policy options (PO) are organised in four main sets of policy measures, with each measure
corresponding to a specific objective and all measures supporting a more coherent public procurement
framework. The options to introduce simplifications and flexibility (FLX) address SO1, the options on
green, social, and innovation procurement (ESI) address SO2, the options on European preference
(BEU) address SO3, and the options on the digital marketplace (MPL) address SO4.
FLX proposes, under FLX.1, a targeted amendment of the current three public procurement directives
to allow negotiations, easier modifications (corrections during procurement procedures e.g. in case of
errors) as well as engagement with the market. This option would cross-reference all exclusion grounds
from existing sectoral legislation, introduce clearer rules for crisis procurement, and establish a dynamic
risk-governance model for concessions.For a more coherent system, FLX.2 merges the three directives
into a single legal instrument, reducing the number of procedures to two main procedures (an open
procedure with optional negotiation and a dynamic procedure) with additionally a new, more
operational innovation procedure and an exceptional procedure with only ex-post publication, including
for emergency situations. It also integrates exclusion grounds from existing sectorial acts and where
possible delete them from the sectoral acts. ESI introduces, under ESI.1, the Best Price-Quality Ratio
as standard award method with a “comply or explain” mechanism. This option clarifies the definition
of social, environmental and innovation procurement, the use of the EU Ecolabel and the link to the
subject matter notably in relation to workers’ rights. It bans the possibility to subcontract the entirety of
a contract and establishes a new innovation procurement procedure where IP rights remain with
suppliers unless otherwise justified. ESI.2 incorporates and builds upon ESI.1 by integrating horizontal
public procurement provisions on green and social procurement included in sectorial acts. Lastly, ESI.3
mandates the Best Price-Quality Ratio, establishes mandatory targets and the compulsory use of EU
Ecolabel criteria; subcontracting beyond the second tier is banned, and bans the transfer of IPR unless
justified to deliver public services. ESI.3 also integrates sector-specific “what to buy” requirements.
BEU codifies, under BEU.1, case law setting a voluntary framework so that public buyers can restrict
the participation in public procurement of economic operators or products from third countries with no
agreement containing commitments covering the relevant procurement. Additionally, BEU.2 would
provide a coherent framework for the future development of European preference provisions in sector-
specific EU acts, establishing mechanisms for how to procure ‘Made in Europe’ where provided for in
sector-specific acts and supporting their implementation by public buyers.Under BEU.3 a public buyer
would be mandated to restrict the participation to EU and covered countries only.
3
MPL mandates, under MPL.1, the interconnection of Member States’ eProcurement systems into one
integrated EU public procurement marketplace for the publication of tenders, submission of bids, award
of contracts and subsequent implementation monitoring. This option also establishes a data network
linking national and EU-level public procurement data. Alternatively, MPL.2 would establish one single
centralised EU eProcurement marketplace replacing Member States’ eProcurement systems.
Is there a preferred choice or not? Why?
The Impact Assessment identifies the combination of FLX.2, ESI.2, BEU.2, and MPL.1 as the
preferred combination of policy options.
C. Impacts of the preferred option
What are the benefits of the preferred option (if any, otherwise main ones)?
In essence, the preferred option reduces the administrative burden for both public buyers and economic
operators through simpler and more flexible procedures. Facilitated market consultations, negotiations,
and corrections are expected to make tendering easier and reduce early terminations due to errors, which
some estimates suggest affect up to 25% of contracts2. Moreover, it will increase the clarity and
coherence of new rules, as well as sectoral rules with public procurement provisions (FLX.2/ESI.2).
Innovation procurement should become easier due to the new innovation procedure. The preferred
option will also foster competition based on quality, making green and social procurement easier and
facilitating the use of standards and ecolabels (ESI.2). It provides legal clarity and coherence, along
with tools to enable the efficient application of European preference to improve economic security and
strategic autonomy (BEU.2).
The new digital marketplace will cover all stages of new procedures, from announcement to the final
e-invoice. Digitisation, including the once-only principle for document submission, will be the biggest
contributor to cost reduction but should also aid in monitoring and fraud prevention (MPL.1).
While it was not always possible to quantify all the benefits with the available data, where quantification
was feasible, the estimated savings amount to EUR 1 billion annually for economic operators and EUR
220 million for public buyers, assuming all other factors remain constant3. Note: these figures do not
include costs - see the following box.
When taking costs into account, the average public buyer saves approximately 4.4% per-procedure,
while the average economic operator saves around 8.9%. The total savings per procedure involving 3.3
bidders amount to around EUR 2 100, equivalent to a 4.9% cost reduction.
What are the costs of the preferred option (if any, otherwise main ones)?
The main costs stem from ESI.2, with the total additional cost for public buyers amounting to EUR 55
million annually as a result of applying the Best Price-Quality Ratio and EU Ecolabel. FLX.2 could
generate around EUR 78 million in additional costs for public buyers if the use of negotiations increases.
MPL.1 would incur costs of EUR 18 million annually for the Commission and EUR 18 million for
Member States over the next seven years. Finally, the total additional cost of adopting European
Preference is estimated at EUR 15 million, shared equally between public buyers and economic
2 A study by the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority’s suggests that more than 25% of all contracts is cancelled due to the inability to proceed with lawful modifications. Konkurrence og forbrugerstyrelsen(2022), Status for offentlig konkurrence 2022 (https://kfst.dk/media/jtvdhxbu/status- for-offentlig-konkurrence-2022.pdf). 3 Present value of annual savings over a seven-year application period, applying a 3% discount rate.
4
operators. As with benefits, not all costs were possible to quantify, and for those that were, additional
assumptions were necessary (see the impact assessment).
How will businesses, SMEs and micro-enterprises be affected?
With an estimated 71% of public procurement contracts won by SMEs, they are expected to be
significant beneficiaries of the preferred policy option. Simplified procedures are likely to lower the
time and cost needed for administrative formalities and compliance obligations. The digital marketplace
would facilitate SME access to public procurement including cross-border and reduce administrative
burden (e.g. once-only principle).
Will there be significant impacts on national budgets and administrations?
The preferred option is expected to result in annual costs of EUR 18 million for all EU Member States
related to IT systems (MPL.1). Additionally, it is expected to increase annual costs for around 46 600
contracting authorities by EUR 141 million (FLX.2, ESI.2, and BEU.2). Nevertheless, contracting
authorities are expected to save approximately EUR 220 million annually due to MPL.1, resulting in
net EU-wide savings of EUR 79 million.
Will there be other significant impacts?
The initiative would imply positive impacts regarding the progress towards SDGs 8, 9 and 12.
D. Follow up
When the policy will be revised?
An evaluation should be carried out every seven years, taking into account a set of predefined
monitoring indicators. The input data for the monitoring activities foreseen (i.e. the listed indicators) is
either already available or will be available as a result of the introduction of new IT tools and systems
foreseen under the combination of preferred policy options. To limit administrative burden for public
buyers and economic operators this data will be collected automatically while processing public
procurement transactions. Data curation and dissemination will also form part of the marketplace,
including via dashboards and structured datasets available for download by the general public. This
would also strengthen transparency and oversight, ensuring accountability and helping to prevent and
detect irregularities.