EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 9.9.2026 COM(2026) 599 final

2026/0268 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

establishing a framework for measures in Member States to safeguard housing

affordability and availability (Affordable Housing Act)

{SEC(2026) 599 final} - {SWD(2026) 605 final} - {SWD(2026) 606 final} - {SWD(2026) 607 final}

(Text with EEA relevance)

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

This explanatory memorandum accompanies the proposal for a Regulation establishing a

framework for measures in Member States to safeguard housing affordability and availability

(Affordable Housing Act) (the ‘Proposal’).

Housing affordability has become a growing challenge across the Union, particularly in

certain cities, metropolitan regions, islands and tourist destinations, where housing demand

significantly exceeds available supply. While insufficient housing supply remains the

structural driver, demand associated with certain forms of non-primary use of housing may

aggravate affordability pressures in some local markets. These pressures particularly affect

low- and middle-income households, young people and essential workers, and can make it

increasingly difficult for residents to access affordable housing in the places where they live

and work.

In response, competent authorities are increasingly adopting or considering measures

affecting the provision of short-term rental accommodation services or the acquisition and use

of residential property. Such measures seek to preserve housing for long-term residential use

and alleviate pressures on housing affordability and availability. While housing policy

remains primarily a national, regional and local competence, such measures may affect the

freedoms of the internal market and therefore fall within the scope of Union law.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recognised that safeguarding housing

affordability and availability may constitute an overriding reason relating to the public interest

capable of justifying restrictions affecting internal market freedoms. However, existing Union

law, including the Treaty, Directive 2006/123/EC (the ‘Services Directive’) and the CJEU’s

case law, is general in nature. A specific operational framework for assessing housing stress

or demonstrating the justification and proportionality of individual measures is needed to

improve legal certainty for competent authorities, citizens and economic operators and to

reduce the fragmentation of regulatory approaches across the Union.

There is growing recognition that Europe’s shared housing affordability challenge calls for a

shared response. Whilst housing remains mostly a national, regional and local responsibility,

the EU supports, coordinates and complements national, regional and local efforts, within its

competences, while respecting the diversity of housing markets and governance systems

across the EU.

The political guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission (1), recognising the urgency

of the housing crisis, announced the appointment of a Commissioner for housing, and

committed to putting forward the first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan.

At the European Council in October 2025 (2), EU leaders called on the Commission to swiftly

present an ambitious and comprehensive plan for affordable housing, the aim of which would

1 von der Leyen, U. ‘Europe’s Choice – Political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-

2029’, European Commission website, 18 July 2024,

https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-

f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf

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be to support and complement Member States’ efforts, having due regard for the principle of

subsidiarity and national competences. On 10 March 2026, the European Parliament adopted

the final report of the Special Committee on the Housing Crisis, which strongly welcomed the

Commission’s commitment to deliver and implement an ambitious European Affordable

Housing Plan (EAHP) (3).

The Proposal forms part of the EAHP (4) presented by the Commission on 16 December

2025, which includes an analysis of the key drivers of the housing affordability crisis in the

EU (5). It responds to repeated calls from Member States, cities, regions and stakeholders for

greater legal certainty regarding the conditions under which housing-related measures may be

adopted consistently with Union law.

The objective of this Proposal is not to harmonise housing policy, but to establish a common

framework governing the assessment under Union law of certain housing-related measures

intended to safeguard housing affordability and availability. It lays down common

requirements for the justification, proportionality, transparency and review of such measures,

which includes a common methodology for demonstrating housing stress. In doing so, it seeks

to improve legal certainty, transparency and the consistent application of Union law while

fully respecting national, regional and local competences. By reducing legal uncertainty, the

Proposal should also enable competent authorities to address local housing affordability and

availability pressures more effectively where intervention is justified.

The Proposal does not establish under EU law any new right for competent authorities to

restrict access to, or the provision of, short-term accommodation rental services, or the

acquisition or use of property, nor does it prescribe or recommend any such measures. It sets

out the conditions and requirements applicable under EU law where competent authorities

choose to adopt measures that are available to them under national law.

The Proposal seeks to simplify and clarify the existing EU framework applicable to measures

intended to safeguard housing affordability and availability. It does so by notably removing

the notification obligation laid down in Article 15(7) of Directive 2006/123/EC for measures

within the scope of this Regulation, while harmonising the procedure for assessing the

proportionality of those measures.

• The problem and its drivers

The problem addressed by this Proposal is insufficient legal certainty regarding the

compatibility of measures protecting housing affordability and availability with Union law

2 European Council, ‘European Council conclusions, 23 October 2025’, European Council website, 23

October 2025, accessed 13 April 2026,

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2025/10/23/european-council-conclusions-23-

october-2025/. 3 European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2026 on the housing crisis in the

European Union with the aim of proposing solutions for decent, sustainable and affordable housing,

10/03/2026, accessed 10 April 2026, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10- 2026-

0064_EN.html 4 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,

the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - the European

Affordable Housing Plan - COM(2025)1025 final, 2025, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-

/publication/adcb91d5-dbdd-11f0-8da2-01aa75ed71a1 5 https://housing.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2ad4c9f2-602b-43ba-9ed9-

f2ee059cf97_en?filename=0_1.pdf

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governing the internal market freedoms. This results in divergent national, regional and local

measures which negatively affect the proper functioning of the internal market.

This problem has two drivers:

– The first driver is a substantive housing-market challenge that requires public

intervention. In some areas under housing stress, competent authorities are

increasingly seeking to address housing affordability pressures that arise from the

supply-demand mismatch and that may be aggravated by certain forms of non-

primary use of housing.

– The second driver is a governance challenge. Union law recognises that housing

affordability and availability may justify restrictions even if they affect internal

market freedoms. However, the current framework is general in nature. It does not

provide a sufficiently specific and structured basis with which to establish the

presence of housing stress, assess the necessity and proportionality of specific

interventions, balance demand-side and supply-side responses, or to ensure

transparency, monitoring and review over time.

As a result, without further EU action, competent authorities are likely to continue to face

difficulties in identifying, justifying and designing housing-related interventions in a way that

is compatible with Union law, and to struggle to respond effectively to housing affordability

and availability pressures where they are most acute.

Housing policy, urban planning and land-use regulation remain primarily national, regional

and local competences. The purpose of this Proposal is neither to harmonise housing policy

outcomes nor to promote or encourage the adoption of particular housing-related

interventions, but to establish a common European framework governing the way in which

the justification and proportionality of housing-related interventions affecting internal market

freedoms are assessed, reviewed and rendered transparent. It thereby contributes to the

effective functioning of the internal market.

• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

The Proposal complements existing Union legislation governing the internal market.

It builds on Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 (6) on data collection and sharing relating to short-

term rental accommodation services (‘STR Regulation’). While the STR Regulation

establishes a harmonised framework for registration and data sharing, it does not determine

the circumstances in which housing-related restrictions may be justified under Union law. The

two instruments are therefore complementary: the STR Regulation improves transparency and

data availability, whereas this Proposal provides a common framework for assessing housing-

related measures.

The Proposal is also consistent with Directive 2006/123/EC (7). For measures falling within

its scope, this Proposal lays down specific rules governing the demonstration of housing stress

and the assessment of justification, necessity and proportionality, that apply instead of the

6 Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on data

collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services and amending Regulation

(EU) 2018/1724, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1028/oj/eng. 7 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on

services in the internal market, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/123/oj.

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Services Directive. Other applicable provisions of Union law, including the Services

Directive, continue to apply insofar as they are not displaced by those specific rules.

The Proposal is accompanied by a Commission Recommendation on housing supply

measures in areas under housing stress and complements the Commission’s wider initiatives

to increase the supply of affordable housing through simplification, investment and improved

construction capacity. While the Regulation enables more effective action to address

immediate pressures on the existing housing stock, the Recommendation focuses on

increasing supply structurally to deliver lasting improvements in affordability.

The Proposal is also consistent with the Commission’s work to strengthen the European

evidence base on housing, including improved housing statistics, greater transparency of

housing markets and better access to housing data and analysis.

• Consistency with other Union policies

The Proposal is consistent with the Union’s framework governing digital services, including

the e-Commerce Directive (8) and the Digital Services Act (9), and does not affect the

responsibilities established under those instruments.

It is also consistent with the Commission’s forthcoming initiatives on digital fairness,

sustainable tourism, the “Right to Stay” and with the revised State aid framework for services

of general economic interest relating to affordable housing. This Proposal complements these

initiatives by providing greater legal certainty for competent authorities adopting housing-

related measures affecting the internal market.

2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

• Legal basis

The legal basis for the Proposal is Article 114 TFEU. The initiative aims to improve the

functioning of the internal market by establishing a common framework for the assessment of

certain housing-related measures affecting the freedoms of the internal market. While housing

policy remains primarily within the competence of Member States and their national, regional

and local authorities, measures affecting the provision of services or the acquisition or use of

residential property may restrict internal market freedoms and are therefore subject to Union

law.

The Proposal establishes a common methodology for demonstrating housing stress and

common requirements for the justification and proportionality of certain housing-related

measures, while fully respecting Member States’ competence regarding housing policy and

the substantive content of housing measures. Divergent national, regional and local

methodologies and procedural requirements create differing conditions for economic

operators and legal uncertainty regarding restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the

freedom to provide services under Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, in particular as regards short-

term accommodation rental services, and on the free movement of capital under Article 63

TFEU, in particular as regards the acquisition and use of residential property. The Proposal

8 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal

aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market

(‘Directive on electronic commerce’), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/31/oj/eng. 9 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a

Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act),

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng.

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approximates those methodologies and requirements by establishing a common Union

framework for assessing such restrictions. Article 114 TFEU is therefore the appropriate legal

basis.

• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

The Proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity. Housing policy, urban planning and

land-use regulation remain primarily matters for Member States. However, the conditions for

the assessment of whether housing-related measures restricting internal market freedoms

comply with Union law cannot be effectively clarified by Member States acting alone.

While the CJEU has interpreted the relevant legal principles, existing Union law provides no

specific common operational framework for identifying housing stress or assessing the

justification and proportionality of housing-related measures. As a result, competent

authorities apply different methodologies and evidential standards, creating legal uncertainty,

administrative burden and inconsistent application of Union law.

The added value of Union action is therefore to establish a common framework for assessing

housing-related measures affecting the internal market. The Proposal provides a common

methodology for demonstrating housing stress and common requirements for the justification,

necessity, proportionality, transparency and review of such measures. It preserves the

discretion of competent authorities to determine whether intervention is necessary and which

measures are appropriate in light of local circumstances, while ensuring that measures

affecting the internal market are assessed according to common Union standards.

• Proportionality

The Proposal complies with the principle of proportionality because it does not go beyond

what is necessary to improve the functioning of the internal market. It does not harmonise

housing policy, require competent authorities to adopt housing-related measures, or prescribe

the substantive content of such measures. Instead, it lays down only those common

requirements necessary to ensure legal certainty, transparency and the consistent application

of Union law to measures falling within its scope. It does not cover measures taken by the

competent authorities for overriding reasons relating to the public interest other than the

necessity to safeguard housing affordability and availability, such as public policy, public

security, public health, the protection of consumers, the protection of the environment and the

urban environment, the protection of cultural heritage.

As regards measures concerning short-term accommodation rental services, the Proposal

applies only where such measures are adopted for the purpose of safeguarding housing

affordability and availability in areas under housing stress. The Proposal aims to ensure that

they are calibrated to forms of activity that, by reason of their scale, frequency or commercial

character, are more likely to reduce the availability of housing for long-term residential use.

As regards measures affecting the acquisition or use of land and residential property, the

Proposal applies only where such measures are adopted for the purpose of safeguarding

housing affordability and availability in areas under housing stress. It may therefore cover, for

example, restrictions on non-primary residential use, requirements reserving affordable

residential property for owner-occupation or for specified categories of households, including

first-time buyers or lower- and middle-income households, measures addressing long-term

vacancy, or declaration requirements regarding intended use prior to acquisition, or

prohibition of changes of use which prevent housing being converted from residential use to

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commercial or professional use. General rules governing property ownership and transfer,

including inheritance, gifts and transfers within families, measures regulating rents under

residential tenancy contracts, housing benefits, building standards, taxation, and general land-

use, spatial-planning and zoning rules fall outside the scope where they do not have the object

or effect of restricting acquisition or use for the purpose of safeguarding housing affordability

and availability within the meaning of the Regulation.

As confirmed by the impact assessment, this approach provides the appropriate balance

between improving legal certainty and preserving the flexibility of national, regional and local

authorities to respond to local housing-market conditions.

• Choice of the instrument

A Regulation is the most appropriate legal instrument because it establishes a common

procedural framework governing the assessment of housing-related measures affecting the

internal market. Uniform application of those procedural requirements is essential to ensure

legal certainty and the consistent application of Union law across the Union.

Non-binding guidance could promote a more consistent interpretation of existing Union law

but would not provide a sufficiently predictable and uniform framework for competent

authorities, citizens and economic operators. A Directive would require national transposition,

increasing the risk of divergent implementation and hampering progress towards the objective

of improving legal certainty.

A Regulation therefore provides the most effective means of establishing a common

framework while fully respecting Member States’ competence for housing policy and the

substantive design of housing-related measures.

3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER

CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

• Stakeholder consultations

In accordance with the Better Regulation Guidelines, the Commission carried out targeted

consultation activities to complement the extensive public consultation previously undertaken

in 2025 in preparation for the EAHP, which received 13 330 responses.

Between 6 March and 3 April 2026, the Commission organised a Call for Evidence, a targeted

questionnaire and four dedicated workshops with Member States, regions, cities, stakeholders

and experts. The Call for Evidence received 617 contributions and there were 303 responses

to the targeted questionnaire.

The consultations confirmed the presence of broad support for greater legal certainty

regarding the compatibility of housing-related measures with Union law, while emphasising

the need to respect subsidiarity and preserve flexibility for competent authorities. Public

authorities called for a common framework for assessing housing stress and justifying local

measure. Economic operators stressed the importance of proportionality, legal certainty and

evidence-based decision-making, while representatives of tenants, students, social housing

providers and civil society underlined the need for effective tools to safeguard housing

affordability and availability.

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• Collection and use of expertise

The Proposal draws on extensive economic and legal analysis undertaken by the Commission,

including support from the Joint Research Centre and other Commission services.

• Impact assessment

The Proposal is supported by an impact assessment report (SWD(2026) xxx), prepared in

accordance with the Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines.

Following a negative opinion of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board on 5 June 2026, the impact

assessment was substantially revised. The revised report clarifies the problem definition,

objectives, subsidiarity assessment, policy options and impact analysis, and clarifies that the

initiative is a procedural instrument intended to improve legal certainty rather than a housing-

market intervention. It also strengthens the evidence base, stakeholder analysis, litigation

assessment and monitoring framework. The revised report received a positive opinion with

reservations on 17 July 2026.

The impact assessment examined three policy options in addition to the baseline:

Option 1: consisted of non-binding guidance explaining existing Union law and providing

practical recommendations.

Option 2: the preferred option. It establishes a common framework governing housing-related

measures affecting internal market freedoms. It combines a common methodology for

demonstrating housing stress with requirements concerning justification, proportionality,

transparency and periodic review, while preserving national, regional and local discretion

regarding whether and how to intervene.

Option 3: would have introduced a more prescriptive framework, including mandatory

designation of housing stress areas, harmonised thresholds and housing plans, and more

extensive Union-level harmonisation.

The preferred option is expected to contribute to improving housing affordability and

availability in areas experiencing housing stress by enabling more timely, targeted and

evidence-based action where short-term rentals or other non-primary uses demonstrably

aggravate housing pressures. Where such measures preserve or increase the stock of housing

available for long-term residential use, they can help ease pressure on rents and house prices

and improve access to affordable housing, particularly in constrained local markets.

Residents, including tenants and prospective homebuyers, may therefore benefit from greater

housing availability and reduced affordability pressures, while competent authorities gain

greater legal certainty and citizens and economic operators benefit from clearer and more

consistent safeguards. The price-to-income thresholds focus the framework on areas facing

significant affordability pressures, while the subsequent assessment of local housing-market

conditions ensures that measures respond to actual local circumstances. The Proposal

maintains flexibility for Member States and competent authorities and respects subsidiarity.

Environmental and competitiveness impacts are expected to be limited and mainly indirect.

The Proposal is consistent with the Union’s climate objectives.

• Regulatory fitness and simplification

The Proposal contributes to simplification by establishing a common procedural framework

for assessing housing-related measures affecting the internal market. For measures falling

within its scope, the Proposal clarifies the applicable procedural requirements. Under the

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Proposal, there will no longer be a requirement to notify restrictions on short-term

accommodation rental services under Directive 2006/123/EC, which will reduce repetitive

administrative formalities and improve administrative efficiency. The Proposal complements

Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 and avoids creating overlapping or duplicative administrative

requirements.

The Proposal does not impose direct obligations on businesses. Its effects on Small and

medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and microenterprises are therefore indirect and depend on

the housing-related measures adopted by competent authorities. Greater legal certainty,

transparency and predictability are expected to reduce regulatory uncertainty and compliance

costs for economic operators, particularly those active across several jurisdictions. The overall

impact on competitiveness is expected to be limited and broadly neutral.

The Proposal has been designed in accordance with the Commission’s digital-ready

policymaking principles. It builds on existing data sources, promotes interoperability with the

framework established by Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 and avoids unnecessary reporting

obligations.

The Proposal does not explicitly exempt microenterprises, as it does not impose direct

obligations on service providers. Rather, it establishes the conditions under which competent

authorities may adopt measures affecting certain activities. Short-term rental activity

involving housing not used as a primary residence is often carried out by microenterprises,

which may therefore be indirectly affected by measures adopted by competent authorities

under the framework.

The Proposal would be relevant for SMEs, in particular those active in the short-term rental

and tourism sectors, but does not impose direct obligations or compliance costs on them. Its

effects are expected to be mainly indirect and to vary across sectors. SMEs may nevertheless

be affected by measures adopted by competent authorities under the framework, with the

nature and magnitude of those effects depending on the measures concerned and local market

conditions. But at the same time, SMEs would benefit from greater visibility and

predictability about when, where and for how long restrictions may apply, as well as from

common requirements aimed at ensuring that such measures are evidence-based, necessary

and proportionate. These benefits are particularly relevant for SMEs operating across, or

providing services in, multiple local markets. The overall impact on competitiveness is

expected to be limited and broadly neutral. As the initiative is addressed primarily to

competent authorities rather than businesses, its effects are indirect and depend on local

implementation choices. Greater legal certainty, transparency and predictability are expected

to reduce regulatory uncertainty and compliance costs for economic operators active across

multiple jurisdictions, while any adjustment costs resulting from restrictions introduced in

areas under housing stress are expected to remain localised and sector-specific.

• Fundamental rights

The Proposal respects the rights and principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental

Rights of the European Union.

By establishing common procedural safeguards governing the justification, transparency and

periodic review of housing-related measures, the Proposal supports the right to good

administration under Article 41 of the Charter.

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The Proposal is expected to contribute indirectly to the objectives set out in Articles 7, 34(3)

and 36 of the Charter by supporting competent authorities in safeguarding housing

affordability and availability, while ensuring full respect of the right to property under Article

17. In particular, measures in the scope of the Proposal are subject to safeguards, including

objective evidence of a significant adverse effect on housing affordability or availability,

territorial targeting, necessity and proportionality, consideration of less restrictive alternatives,

respect for legal certainty and legitimate expectations, appropriate transitional arrangements,

limitations on duration, periodic review and effective judicial protection. The Proposal does

not itself establish any restriction on property ownership or confer on competent authorities

powers to adopt restrictions that are not available to them under national law.

4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

The implementation of this Regulation has limited budgetary implications for the Union

budget. Additional resources are required primarily to support the implementation, monitoring

and evaluation of the new framework, including the preparation of guidance, stakeholder

engagement, legal and policy follow-up, and the maintenance and continued operation of the

existing Mapadomo tool (a housing database). Wherever possible, the Proposal builds on

existing Commission structures, expertise and digital infrastructure and does not establish a

new Union body, funding programme or digital platform. The detailed financial implications

are set out in the Legislative Financial and Digital Statement accompanying this Proposal.

5. OTHER ELEMENTS

• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

The Commission will monitor the implementation and application of this Regulation in

cooperation with the Member States and competent authorities. The Commission will assess

the way in which the framework established by this Regulation operates, including the

application of the methodology for demonstrating housing stress, the justification,

proportionality, transparency and review of measures adopted under the Regulation, the

reduction in litigation and successful legal challenges. The evaluation will focus on the

effectiveness of the Union framework and will not assess the housing policy choices made by

competent authorities.

The Commission will evaluate this Regulation no earlier than five years after its entry into

application.

• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the Proposal

Chapter I lays down the general provisions. It defines the subject matter and scope of the

Regulation, clarifies its relationship with existing Union legislation, and sets out the key

definitions used throughout the Regulation.

Chapter II establishes the common framework applicable to housing-related measures. It lays

down the methodology for demonstrating housing stress, rules on territorial scope and the

conditions governing non-discrimination, necessity and proportionality. It also establishes

requirements concerning duration, periodic review, transparency and judicial review.

Chapter III contains the final provisions relating to delegated acts, evaluation and review of

the Regulation, and its entry into force and application.

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2026/0268 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

establishing a framework for measures in Member States to safeguard housing

affordability and availability (Affordable Housing Act)

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular

Article 114 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee1,

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions2,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1) The Union is facing a housing affordability crisis that weakens social cohesion and

threatens the overall competitiveness of the Union. This crisis is affecting a growing

number of households, with a rising number of people facing difficulties in securing

quality housing at an affordable price. This affects, in particular, people in vulnerable

situations, but also increasingly middle-income households. Housing unaffordability

has become a constraint on labour mobility, on access to employment and education

opportunities, and on economic development and competitiveness. Essential workers

and persons undertaking seasonal work away from their usual residence can no longer

afford to live in the communities they serve.

(2) The analysis set out in the Commission staff working document ‘Understanding the

housing crisis’3 demonstrates that although housing affordability challenges are

present across the Union, their severity and underlying drivers vary significantly

between and within Member States. In particular, major urban centres, metropolitan

areas with strong labour market growth and certain areas characterised by high tourism

intensity have experienced sustained imbalances between housing supply and demand.

This has led to rapid increases in purchase prices and rents, and increased risks of

residential displacement.

(3) In those areas, demand for residential property has increased due to long-term

urbanisation trends, concentration of economic activity, changing household structures

1 OJ C , , p. . 2 OJ C , , p. . 3 SWD(2025) 1053 final of 16 December 2025.

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and increasing demand for modern living space. Residential property is also

increasingly used for purposes other than permanent residence. This includes use for

tourist accommodation, such as short-term accommodation rental services, occasional

use and investment. In some municipalities or neighbourhoods under housing stress,

non-primary residences can represent a significant share of the housing stock, and

short-term rental accommodation listings a considerable proportion of the overall

rental stock, with a substantial number of hosts renting several properties under such

short-term contracts. While these additional uses can generate economic and social

benefits, including for households struggling to make ends meet, they may also

aggravate housing demand pressures in some constrained local housing markets by

reducing the availability of dwellings for primary use and putting inflationary pressure

on rents and housing prices. The extent of those effects varies considerably depending

on local housing market conditions and the ability of housing supply to respond to

demand. If the supply response is insufficient, such areas may experience housing

stress, often reflected in a growing disconnect between housing prices and rents, on

the one hand, and household incomes, on the other.

(4) Local housing availability can also be constrained by factors affecting the ability of

housing supply to respond to demand. Such factors include land scarcity, planning and

permitting constraints, labour shortages, transport and infrastructure constraints,

vacant properties, and insufficient investment in housebuilding, including affordable

and social housing. Additional housing supply may also be generated through

renovation, repurposing, repartitioning into more units, and bringing vacant dwellings

back into use. In this context, vacant and underused housing in rural areas may also

provide opportunities to increase housing supply. Sustainable improvements in

housing affordability require an increase in the supply of housing, including in

affordable and social housing.

(5) Competent authorities in areas under housing stress have in recent years been

adopting, or are considering, restrictive measures aimed at preserving housing for

long-term residential use and alleviating pressures on housing affordability and

availability. These include measures aimed at preserving residential property for

primary residential use, whether occupied by the owner or by another person,

including by addressing short-term rental activity or other forms of non-primary

residential use.

(6) This Regulation should neither establish a right under Union law for competent

authorities to restrict property ownership or use nor require, prescribe or encourage the

adoption of any such measure. It should establish the conditions and requirements

applicable where competent authorities choose to adopt measures available to them

under national law for the purpose of safeguarding housing affordability and

availability in areas under housing stress, such as restrictions on non-primary

residential use, requirements reserving affordable residential property for owner-

occupation or for specified categories of households, including first-time buyers or

lower- and middle-income households, measures addressing long-term vacancy, or

declaration requirements regarding intended use prior to acquisition, or authorisation

requirements concerning changes of use from residential to commercial or

professional purposes.

(7) National, regional and local approaches diverge not only as regards the measures

adopted, but also in the concepts and indicators used to identify housing stress, the

thresholds applied, the evidence required and the standards used to assess whether

restrictions are justified. Such divergences are likely to increase as more competent

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authorities take action in response to housing pressures. This fragmentation increases

compliance costs and reduces legal certainty for economic operators active across the

internal market, including online platforms operating across the Union, hosts offering

properties in different Member States and cross-border buyers and investors. It thereby

negatively affects the proper functioning of the internal market.

(8) The legal framework is chiefly regulated under Articles 49, 56 and 63 of the Treaty on

the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the jurisprudence of the Court of

Justice of the European Union. For short-term accommodation rental services, access

to, or the provision of, such services are regulated by Directive 2006/123/EC of the

European Parliament and of the Council4. However, there is a lack of clarity as to what

type of measures comply with Union law principles of justification, non-

discrimination and proportionality.

(9) This Regulation should be applied in full respect of the right to property laid down in

Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Measures

restricting the acquisition or use of land or residential property may interfere with the

exercise of that right and should therefore be subject to requirements of necessity and

proportionality. In particular, such measures should be based on objective evidence, be

appropriately targeted in their territorial and material scope, not go beyond what is

necessary to achieve the objective pursued, be limited in duration, respect legal

certainty and legitimate expectations and be subject to effective judicial review. For

instance, where measures address long-term vacancy of residential property,

competent authorities should take into account situations in which non-occupation is

justified by the circumstances of the owner or occupier. In particular, full account

should be taken of temporary absence for reasons such as work, education or training,

health, dependency or social emergency. The framework established by this

Regulation should therefore ensure a fair balance between the protection of the right to

property and the public interest in safeguarding access to affordable housing.

(10) At the same time, in applying this Regulation, competent authorities should have

regard to the right to respect for the home as reflected in Article 7 of the Charter, in

accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.

(11) The fact that a measure falls within the scope of this Regulation should not be

understood as implying that that measure is compatible with Union law. The

compatibility of a measure with Union law depends on compliance with the applicable

requirements of necessity and proportionality, having regard to the nature, scope and

effects of the measure and to the circumstances in which it is applied. As follows from

the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, a measure may, for

example, fail to comply with the requirement of non-discrimination where the

discretion available to the competent authority gives rise to a risk of discriminatory

application, including by subjecting nationals of other Member States to more

stringent scrutiny than nationals of the Member State concerned.

(12) The Court of Justice of the European Union has recognised that safeguarding the

availability and affordability of housing may constitute an overriding reason relating

to the public interest capable of justifying restrictions on internal market freedoms,

provided that the measure is suitable and proportionate. However, there are no specific

rules at Union level that govern how competent authorities should demonstrate

4 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on

services in the internal market (OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/123/oj).

EN 5 EN

housing stress and establish that specific temporary measures are justified, suitable and

proportionate. In the absence of a common framework governing the assessment of

such measures, legal uncertainty may arise regarding the conditions under which

housing-related interventions may be introduced, maintained or adapted. This may

increase administrative burden, compliance costs and litigation risks and reduce

predictability for competent authorities, citizens and economic operators.

(13) To improve legal certainty and the functioning of the internal market, it is necessary to

establish a common Union framework governing the assessment of restrictive

measures falling within the scope of Union law that competent authorities adopt to

safeguard housing affordability and availability. That framework should not seek to

harmonise housing policy choices or require competent authorities to intervene in

housing markets. Rather, it should ensure that measures affecting internal market

freedoms are assessed on the basis of common procedural requirements relating to

evidence, transparency, justification and proportionality. It should contribute to greater

predictability for competent authorities, the public and economic operators, while

preserving the ability of competent authorities to adopt measures that are most suited

to local circumstances.

(14) Housing markets are inherently local and often require responses adapted to local

circumstances. Accordingly, competent authorities should retain the ability to

determine whether intervention is necessary and which measures are most appropriate

in light of local housing conditions. At the same time, citizens and economic operators

active across the internal market would benefit from greater transparency and

predictability regarding the conditions under which housing-related measures may be

adopted.

(15) Directive 2006/123/EC establishes general provisions facilitating the exercise of the

freedom of establishment for service providers and the free movement of services.

That Directive applies to access to, or the provision of, short-term accommodation

rental services. This Regulation governs specific aspects of access to, or the provision

of, short-term accommodation rental services. It should apply, instead of Directive

2006/123/EC, to measures adopted by competent authorities which restrict access to,

or the provision of, short-term accommodation rental services, where those measures

are justified by the necessity to safeguard affordability and availability of residential

property. Directive 2006/123/EC should continue to apply to measures restricting the

access to, or the provision of, short-term accommodation rental services, both on

primary and non-primary residences, taken on the grounds of overriding reasons

relating to the public interest other than the necessity to safeguard housing

affordability and availability, for example public policy, public security, public health,

the protection of consumers, the protection of the environment and the urban

environment, the protection of cultural heritage.

(16) In order to limit the negative impact on the internal market of any measure restricting

access to, or the provision of, short-term accommodation rental services or restricting

acquisition and use of land and residential property, such measures should be limited

to areas where the acute pressure on the availability and affordability of residential

property (‘areas under housing stress’) justifies action to safeguard affordability and

availability of residential property, and be as proportionate as possible.

(17) There is no common Union methodology for determining when housing pressures are

sufficient to justify restrictions affecting the internal market on housing affordability

and availability grounds. Several Member States and their regional and local

EN 6 EN

authorities use different concepts, indicators, thresholds, territorial units, data sources

and procedures to determine whether an area is under housing stress. Some approaches

focus on affordability indicators, such as price-to-income ratio, rent levels or housing

cost overburden. Others use broader diagnostics, such as the share of secondary homes

or vacant dwellings, the concentration of short-term rentals, the impact on social

housing or the pressure on long-term rental markets. The lack of common, objective

criteria creates legal uncertainty and hinders the assessment of whether measures are

objectively justified, appropriately targeted and proportionate.

(18) It is therefore necessary to establish a common Union approach for determining

whether an area is under housing stress.

(19) Where a competent authority intends to adopt a measure pursuant to this Regulation, it

should assess housing stress in the area concerned on the basis of the price-to-income

ratio and its growth across time, together with other indicators that make it possible to

demonstrate that housing stress is unlikely to ease in the future. The fact that an area

meets the criteria for housing stress should not automatically lead to adoption of any

measure under this Regulation by a competent authority. The decision whether to

intervene, and which measures to adopt, should remain with the competent authority.

(20) Price-to-income ratio measures the affordability of housing by comparing the price of

acquiring a dwelling with household income. By combining the price-to-income ratio

over last 10 years of available data, the competent authority can obtain a more

complete picture of recent affordability dynamics. Comparing price-to-income

indicators across regions and time gives a more nuanced view of both current

affordability pressure and recent affordability dynamics and helps authorities identify

emerging hotspots where price-to-income ratios may still be moderate but

deteriorating rapidly. Thresholds on price-to-income indicate a level of unaffordability

of housing and the persistence and aggravation of the local situation. Price-to-income

ratio can also be used as a proxy for rent-to-income, as there is a positive correlation

between housing prices and rents.

(21) The Commission makes available regularly updated estimated data series that

competent authorities can use for the calculation of the price-to-income ratio when

assessing housing stress under this Regulation. Competent authorities should be able

to use other reliable and sufficiently representative data meeting the requirements of

this Regulation.

(22) To better understand housing pressures in a particular area, in addition to price-to-

income ratio, the competent authority should also assess population trends, as well as

housing supply and demand trends in that area. The evidence should be recent and

geographically relevant and capable of verification. It is only when considered

together that these elements help assess the severity of the housing situation and

identify the specific circumstances, drivers and potential aggravating factors in each

area. The territorial scope of the designation should be delimited as narrowly as the

available evidence allows and might be smaller than the territorial unit at which data is

available.

(23) To ensure that any measure restricting access to, or the provision of, short-term

accommodation rental services or restricting the acquisition and use of land and

residential property complies with Union law, it must be non-discriminatory, justified

by an overriding reason relating to the public interest and proportionate.

EN 7 EN

(24) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, competent authorities should

consider the available measures and select those that are suitable to safeguard housing

affordability and availability and are no more restrictive than necessary to achieve that

objective.

(25) Where measures concern the acquisition or use of residential land or residential

property, competent authorities should consider and, where appropriate, use less

restrictive measures than absolute prohibitions of certain acquisitions or uses of

property, such as quantitative caps in areas under housing stress, grandfathering rules,

exceptions for avoidance of undue hardships or fiscal incentives.

(26) In the field of short-term rentals, competent authorities should target the forms of

activity most likely to have an adverse effect on the availability and affordability of

housing for long-term residential use, such as those that are characterised by their

commercial scale. Competent authorities should do so by taking into account objective

criteria such as the number of dwellings offered by a single host, the frequency of the

activity, or comparable indicators.

(27) This Regulation excludes the letting of a host’s primary residence from any

restrictions under its scope. This is because such lettings do not generally remove

housing from the long-term market and should therefore be treated differently from

forms of short-term rental activity that involve the use of housing stock not used as a

primary residence. The exclusion of primary residences from restrictions on short-term

rental activity under this Regulation constitutes a minimum safeguard and competent

authorities may choose to further limit the categories of residential property to which

their measures apply, in line with the principle of proportionality.

(28) Restrictions affecting the acquisition or use of residential property may have indirect

implications, for example on property values, financing conditions or investment.

Such effects will depend on the type, scope and duration of the measures adopted, the

characteristics of the local housing market and the extent to which they are

accompanied by measures to increase housing supply. To ensure that prudential

aspects linked to the measures taken in application of this Regulation are properly

considered, the authority competent to apply this Regulation can consult and cooperate

with the competent authority or the designated authority under point (40) of Article

4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council5

under Article 458(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and under Article 133(3) of

Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council6.

(29) Restrictions affecting internal market freedoms must be suitable for attaining the

objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.

Accordingly, the presence of housing stress in a particular area should not in itself

justify the adoption of restrictive measures. Competent authorities should demonstrate,

on the basis of objective evidence, that the activity concerned has had a significant

adverse effect on housing affordability or availability in the area concerned over at

least three years preceding the adoption of the measure and that the measure is

5 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on

prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No

648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/575/oj).

6 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the

activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms,

amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176,

27.6.2013, p. 338, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/36/oj).

EN 8 EN

necessary and proportionate in light of the specific circumstances of the area

concerned.

(30) While the use of residential property for the purposes other than the primary residence

adds demand pressure in already constrained housing markets, the supply-demand

mismatch is also driven by insufficient supply of residential housing. Restrictions on

access to, or the provision of, short-term accommodation rental services or on the

acquisition and use of land and residential property for purposes other than primary

residence alone cannot address the structural causes of housing shortages in the long

term. While restrictions that are limited in time and in scope could mitigate housing

demand pressures in the short term, competent authorities should complement any

such restriction with measures to increase housing supply in those areas, in particular

the supply of social and affordable housing.

(31) In areas under housing stress, undertaking brownfield development projects and

making better use of the existing building stock could help increase the supply of

housing, especially in urban areas with limited land for new construction. Building

codes, zoning rules, planning and permitting procedures are key factors where action

by competent authorities could help better match housing demand and supply,

supporting both the construction of new housing and bringing vacant dwellings back

into use, as well as renovating and repurposing non-residential buildings into

dwellings, and reducing under-occupation. To support public authorities, in September

2026 the Commission adopted a Recommendation on housing affordability and supply

in areas under housing stress7, including recommendations on mobilising public and

private investments for housing supply, in particular for housing below market rates.

That Recommendation can also support fighting housing exclusion and contribute to

more inclusive and socially cohesive communities where housing is well connected to

employment, education and essential services.

(32) Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 of the European Parliament and of the Council8

establishes a harmonised framework for the registration of hosts providing short-term

accommodation rental services and for the collection and sharing of data relating to

such services. The availability of reliable and comparable information concerning the

location, duration and intensity of short-term accommodation rental activity is

important for competent authorities when assessing housing market conditions and

determining whether measures affecting such activity are justified, necessary and

proportionate. The data collected pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 should

therefore support evidence-based decision-making and facilitate the application of the

proposed regulation.

(33) Measures adopted for the purposes of implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1028

should not fall within the scope of this Regulation. This Regulation should apply only

to other measures which regulate or restrict access to, or the provision of, short-term

accommodation rental services or the acquisition or use of residential property for

purposes other than primary residence on housing affordability grounds. Other

measures relating to residential property and housing, including general rules

governing property ownership and transfer, acquisition through inheritance, gifts and

transfers within families, measures regulating rents under residential tenancy

7 OJ L , , p. . 8 Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on data

collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services and amending Regulation

(EU) 2018/1724 (OJ L, 2024/1028, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1028/oj).

EN 9 EN

contracts, housing benefits, taxation measures of general application, building

standards, and planning or zoning rules of general application, should remain outside

the scope of this Regulation where they do not regulate or otherwise have the object or

effect of leading to restrictions falling within its scope.

(34) The effectiveness of Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 is essential to ensure the reliability

and completeness of the information competent authorities use when assessing

housing pressures and the impact of short-term accommodation rental activity.

Listings that do not comply with the requirements related to registration laid down in

that Regulation undermine the quality of the available information and may hamper

the effective enforcement of national, regional and local rules applicable to short-term

accommodation rental services. It is therefore important that competent authorities are

able, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1028, to require providers of online

short-term rental platforms to remove or disable access without undue delay to listings

that do not comply with those requirements.

(35) Competent authorities should uphold the principles of legal certainty, transparency, the

protection of legitimate expectations and effective judicial protection. Natural and

legal persons affected by measures adopted by competent authorities pursuant to this

Regulation should benefit from appropriate procedural safeguards and have access to

effective judicial review of those measures.

(36) In order to protect legal certainty and legitimate expectations, where competent

authorities adopt measures restricting the acquisition or use of residential propertyor

land, any condition linked to the acquisition should apply only to property acquired

after the date of application of the measure. Persons who acquired property before that

date should therefore not be subject to new restrictions linked to that acquisition

imposed under this Regulation.

(37) To ensure that measures adopted pursuant to this Regulation do not remain in force for

longer than necessary, they should be adopted for a period not exceeding five years,

with a possibility to extend them following a review. Competent authorities should

review them at regular intervals to verify that the conditions set out in this Regulation

continue to be fulfilled. Where those conditions are no longer met, the measures

should be withdrawn without undue delay.

(38) In order to ensure an accurate measurement of housing affordability pressures, the

power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the

Commission to amend data, thresholds, indicators and methodology used for

calculation of price-to-income ratio where objective developments, demonstrated by

relevant statistical or other reliable evidence, make such amendments necessary. It is

of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations

during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be

conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional

Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making9. In particular, to ensure equal

participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the

Council should receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and

their experts should systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert

groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

9 OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2016/512/oj.

EN 10 EN

(39) In order to assess the impact of this Regulation on the functioning of the internal

market and on the housing affordability and availability in Member States, the

Commission should carry out an evaluation of this Regulation.

(40) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely to improve the conditions for the

establishment and functioning of the internal market by providing a common

framework for measures in Member States to safeguard the affordability and

availability of housing, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can

rather, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved at Union

level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity

as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the

principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go

beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Chapter 1

General provisions

Article 1

Subject matter

This Regulation establishes a common framework for measures taken by competent

authorities to safeguard housing affordability and availability with a view to improving the

conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. It lays down common

rules to ensure that measures taken pursuant to this Regulation are justified, transparent,

proportionate and subject to review.

Article 2

Scope

1. This Regulation applies to the following measures taken by competent authorities,

where those measures are justified by the necessity to safeguard housing affordability

and availability:

(a) measures restricting access to, or the provision of, short-term

accommodation rental services in residential property;

(b) measures restricting the acquisition or use of land and residential

property that is not acquired or used for the purpose of a primary

residence, whether occupied by the owner or by another person.

2. This Regulation does not apply to measures taken solely for overriding reasons

relating to the public interest other than the need to safeguard housing affordability

and availability.

Article 3

Relationship with other Union acts

1. The measures referred to in Article 2(1), point (a) shall not be subject to Directive

2006/123/EC, including the notification obligation laid down in Article 15(7) of that

Directive.

EN 11 EN

2. This Regulation does not apply to any measures taken by competent authorities for

the sole purpose of applying the provisions on registration laid down in Chapter II of

Regulation (EU) 2024/1028.

Article 4

Definitions

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

(1) ‘competent authority’ means a national, regional or local authority of a Member State

that is competent to apply this Regulation, including to take measures restricting

access to, or the provision of, short-term accommodation rental services or restricting

the acquisition or use of land and residential property;

(2) ‘area under housing stress’ means a clearly delimited subnational geographical area

where a mismatch between housing supply and housing demand gives rise to

observable pressures on the housing market, on the basis of an assessment carried out

by the competent authority in accordance with Article 6;

(3) ‘residential property’ means immovable property intended for housing purposes;

(4) ‘primary residence’ means the residential property in which a natural person

continues habitually to reside, and where the habitual centre of their interest is also

situated, as further defined under national law;

(5) ‘price-to-income ratio' means the ratio between the representative price of a dwelling

of average size in a specific area, expressed in euro, and the representative disposable

income per capita, expressed in euro;

(6) ‘dwelling’ means a residential unit which may consist of one or several rooms

designed for the occupation of households;

(7) ‘acquisition‘ means the acquisition of ownership of residential property, excluding

transfers by way of succession, pursuant to a matrimonial property regime or the

division or distribution of an estate, corporate reorganisations that do not result in a

change in beneficial ownership, and the realisation of security by a creditor;

(8) ‘short-term accommodation rental service’ means short-term accommodation rental

service as defined in Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1028;

(9) ‘host’ means host as defined in Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1028;

(10) ‘measures’ means provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in

Member States.

Chapter 2

Measures to safeguard housing affordability and availability

Article 5

Requirements for measures to safeguard housing affordability and availability

1. A competent authority may take any of the following measures, to the extent they are

justified by the necessity to safeguard housing affordability and availability, and

provided that those measures comply with the requirements laid down in Articles 6

to 10:

EN 12 EN

(a) measures restricting access to, or the provision of, short-term

accommodation rental services in residential property other than the

host’s primary residence;

(b) measures restricting the acquisition or use of land and residential

property that is not acquired or used for the purpose of primary residence,

whether occupied by the owner or by another person.

2. Measures restricting access to, or the provision of, short-term accommodation rental

services solely on the grounds of safeguarding housing affordability and availability

under this Regulation apply only to accommodation that is not provided by a host in

its primary residence.

Article 6

Assessment of housing stress

1. The competent authority shall assess whether the area in which it intends to take

measures meets the following criteria for being considered an area under housing

stress:

(a) the price-to-income ratio is equal to or exceeds the threshold of eight,

corresponding to eight years of disposable per-capita income to purchase

a dwelling of average size in the residential building stock of the area

concerned;

(b) the price-to-income ratio has increased over the period covering the most

recent 10 years of available data;

(c) in the absence of the measure, the housing stress is unlikely to ease

during the next three years following its adoption based on assessment of

the following elements:

(i) population dynamics;

(ii) supply of housing;

(iii) demand for housing.

2. Where the price-to-income ratio is equal to or exceeds the threshold of 10, paragraph

1, point (b), shall not apply.

3. When assessing whether an area meets the criteria set out in paragraph 1, the

competent authority shall base its assessment on objective, transparent and verifiable

data, and in compliance with sound statistical principles.

4. The price-to-income ratio shall be calculated using data, thresholds, indicators and

methodology specified in the Annex. Competent authorities may use alternative data

at a more granular level, provided that they can demonstrate that the resulting price-

to-income ratio is consistent with the thresholds referred to in paragraph 1, point (a),

and paragraph 2.

5. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 15

to amend paragraph 1, point (a), and paragraph 2 of this Article, as regards the

thresholds, and the Annex, as regards the data, thresholds, indicators and

methodology used for calculation, where objective developments, demonstrated by

EN 13 EN

relevant statistical or other reliable evidence, make such amendments necessary to

ensure an accurate measurement of housing affordability pressures.

Article 7

Territorial scope of an area under housing stress

The territorial scope of an area under housing stress referred to in Article 6 shall not exceed

what is necessary to safeguard housing affordability and availability. Such areas may be

districts, municipalities, metropolitan areas, functional urban areas, agglomerations, rural

areas or any part thereof.

Article 8

Non-discrimination

The measures shall not be directly or indirectly discriminatory between nationals of Member

States on grounds of nationality or, in the case of legal persons established in a Member State,

on grounds of their Member State of establishment.

Article 9

Necessity

1. The measures may only be taken if they are justified by the need to safeguard

housing affordability and availability in the areas under housing stress referred to in

Article 6.

2. A competent authority shall take measures referred to in Article 5(1), point (a), only

where it can demonstrate that the provision of short-term accommodation rental

services in the area under housing stress has had a significant adverse effect on the

availability or affordability of housing in that area over at least three years preceding

the adoption of the measure. Where available, the competent authority shall take into

account data obtained pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2024/1028.

3. A competent authority shall take measures referred to in Article 5(1), point (b), only

where it can demonstrate that acquisition and use of land and residential property for

purposes other than primary residence in the area under housing stress has had a

significant adverse effect on the availability or affordability of housing in that area

over at least three years preceding the adoption of the measure.

4. Measures referred to in Article 5(1), point (b) concerning long-term vacancy shall

not apply where non occupation is justified, including by reasons of temporary

absence for work, education or training, health, ongoing succession proceedings,

legal impediment to occupation or inhabitability.

Article 10

Proportionality

1. The measures shall be suitable for attaining the objective pursued, shall not go

beyond what is necessary to attain that objective and shall meet the following

requirements:

EN 14 EN

(a) they are territorially limited to the area under housing stress and, where

appropriate, calibrated to different levels of housing stress within the

area;

(b) they are based on an assessment that no other less restrictive measure

would be sufficient to improve housing affordability and availability in

an equally effective manner within a reasonable period;

(c) they comply with the principles of legal certainty and the protection of

legitimate expectations;

(d) for measures referred to in Article 5(1), point (a), they are calibrated to

forms of short-term accommodation rental activity that, by reason of their

scale, frequency or commercial character, are more likely to reduce the

availability of housing for long-term residential use;

(e) for measures referred to in Article 5(1), point (a), the competent authority

applies and enforces Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 in the relevant

geographical area, in particular its provisions on registration, including

suspension and withdrawal of registration numbers, verification, data-

sharing and orders requiring the removal or disabling of listings without a

registration number, with an invalid registration number or involving

misuse of a registration number;

(f) for measures referred to in Article 5(1), point (b), insofar as they impose

restrictions on the acquisition of residential property and land, they apply

only to property and land acquired after the date of application of the

measure;

(g) for measures referred to in Article 5(1), point (b) relating to long-term

vacancy, they are calibrated, on the basis of objective criteria, to the

nature and extent of long-term vacancymost likely to reduce the

availability of housing for long-term residential use, taking into account

in particular the number of dwellings held by the same owner in the area

concerned, the duration of non-occupation or acquisition by legal

persons.

2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, where measures affect existing lawful situations,

they shall include appropriate transitional arrangements.

Article 11

Procedural safeguards and judicial review

Natural and legal persons affected by the measures taken pursuant to Article 5 shall have

access to appropriate procedural safeguards and to effective judicial review of those measures,

including the possibility to challenge the assessments carried out by the competent authority

to ensure compliance with Articles 6 to 10.

Article 12

Duration and review of measures

1. Measures shall be adopted for a period not exceeding five years. They may be

extended where, following the review referred to in paragraph 2, the competent

authority concludes that the requirements laid down in Articles 6 to 10 continue to be

fulfilled.

EN 15 EN

2. A competent authority shall regularly review whether a measure referred to in Article

5 continues to comply with the requirements laid down in Articles 6 to 10. The first

review shall be carried out within five years from the date of adoption of the

measure.

3. Where, following the review, a competent authority concludes that a measure no

longer fulfils the requirements laid down in Articles 6 to 10, it shall withdraw that

measure without undue delay.

Article 13

Publication of the measures

1. A competent authority shall make publicly available information on any measure

adopted pursuant to Article 5, and on the extension, amendment or withdrawal of the

measure, before its entry into force.

2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall include:

(a) the assessments carried out by the competent authority to ensure

compliance with Articles 6 to 10;

(b) the precise territorial scope of the area under housing stress and of the

measure;

(c) the duration of the measure.

Chapter 3

Final provisions

Article 14

Existing measures

This Regulation shall not apply to measures adopted before … [PO please insert the date: the

date of entry into force]. However, a competent authority may review such measures in

accordance with this Regulation.

Article 15

Exercise of the delegation

1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the

conditions laid down in this Article 6(3).

2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 6(3) shall be conferred on the

Commission for an indeterminate period of time from … [PO please insert the date:

the date of entry into force of this Regulation].

3. The delegation of power referred to in Article 6(3) may be revoked at any time by

the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to

the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day

following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European

Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any

delegated acts already in force.

EN 16 EN

4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by

each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the

Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making.

5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to

the European Parliament and to the Council.

6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 6(3) shall enter into force only if no

objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council

within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament

and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and

the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That

period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament

or of the Council.

Article 16

Evaluation

By … [PO, please insert the date: same day and month as the date of entry into force plus 5

years], the Commission shall evaluate the impact of this Regulation on the functioning of the

internal market and on housing affordability and availability and shall submit a report on its

main findings to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social

Committee and the Committee of the Regions.

Article 17

Entry into force and application

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in

the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President The President

EN 17 EN

LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL STATEMENT

Contents

1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE ............................................... 20

1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative .................................................................................... 20

1.2. Policy area(s) concerned ............................................................................................ 20

1.3. Objective(s) ................................................................................................................ 20

1.3.1. General objective(s) ................................................................................................... 20

1.3.2. Specific objective(s) ................................................................................................... 20

1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact .................................................................................... 20

1.3.4. Indicators of performance .......................................................................................... 21

1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to: ............................................................................... 22

1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative ............................................................................ 23

1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for

roll-out of the implementation of the initiative .......................................................... 23

1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g.

coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For

the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting

from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise

created by Member States alone. ............................................................................... 23

1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past ................................................ 24

1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with

other appropriate instruments ..................................................................................... 24

1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for

redeployment .............................................................................................................. 24

1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact .................................. 24

1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned ........................................................... 25

2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES................................................................................. 25

2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules .................................................................................. 25

2.2. Management and control system(s) ........................................................................... 26

2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation

mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed ................ 26

2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up

to mitigate them.......................................................................................................... 26

2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between

the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the

expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure) ......................................... 26

2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities .............................................................. 26

3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE ............ 28

EN 18 EN

3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s)

affected ....................................................................................................................... 28

3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations ................................... 30

3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations.................................... 30

3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget ............................................................................. 30

3.2.2. Estimated output funded from operational appropriations (not to be completed for

decentralised agencies)............................................................................................... 33

3.2.3. Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations ............................... 35

3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget .............................................................................. 35

3.2.4. Estimated requirements of human resources.............................................................. 35

3.2.4.1. Financed from voted budget....................................................................................... 35

3.2.5. Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments ................ 38

3.2.6. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework.............................. 39

3.2.7. Third-party contributions ........................................................................................... 39

3.3. Estimated impact on revenue ..................................................................................... 39

4. Digital dimensions ..................................................................................................... 42

4.1. Requirements of digital relevance ..................................................................................... 42

4.2. Data ................................................................................................................................... 42

4.3. Digital solutions ................................................................................................................ 44

4.4. Interoperability assessment ............................................................................................... 45

4.5. Measures to support digital implementation ..................................................................... 46

EN 19 EN

1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework

for measures in Member States to safeguard housing affordability and availability

(Affordable Housing Act)

1.2. Policy area(s) concerned

Affordable housing

Internal Market

Better regulation and evidence-based policymaking

Data and monitoring

1.3. Objective(s)

1.3.1. General objective(s)

General Objective 1: To improve legal certainty, transparency and predictability

regarding the compatibility with Union law of housing-related measures affecting the

internal market.

General Objective 2: To ensure that restrictions to the internal market are

proportionate and a measure of last resort by providing a common methodological

approach that encourages public authorities to consider both demand-side measures

and housing supply, within the limits of EU competence.

1.3.2. Specific objective(s)

Specific objective No

Specific Objective 1.1: Ensure that areas under stress are identified by using

common, evidence-based and transparent criteria to determine when housing

affordability and availability can justify public intervention

Specific Objective 1.2: Establish common procedural requirements governing the

proportionality of specific housing-related interventions affecting the internal market.

Specific Objective 2.1: Support competent authorities in identifying appropriate

measures to increase housing supply in and around areas under housing stress.

1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact

Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the

beneficiaries/groups targeted.

The main direct benefits of the Proposal are improved legal certainty,

transparency, predictability and consistency in the application of Union law. A

common methodology, procedural safeguards, publication requirements and periodic

review would support competent authorities in identifying areas under housing stress

and provide a clearer and more structured basis for assessing whether housing-related

restrictions affecting internal market freedoms are justified and proportionate. This is

expected to reduce regulatory uncertainty, administrative burden, compliance costs

and avoidable litigation for competent authorities, citizens and economic operators.

Data made available under Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 would further strengthen the

EN 20 EN

evidence available for assessing the contribution of short-term rental activity to local

housing pressures, where relevant. Effects on housing affordability and availability

would be indirect, local and dependent on implementation choices by competent

authorities and wider housing market conditions. Residents in areas under housing

stress may benefit where better targeted measures are adopted alongside action to

address housing supply constraints.

1.3.4. Indicators of performance

Specify the indicators for monitoring progress and achievements.

Monitoring will focus on the operation of the governance framework, including the

use and review of the criteria to assess housing stress, the availability and use of

evidence underpinning the identification of areas under housing stress and the

measures adopted, developments in the number and grounds of legal challenges,

including successful challenges relating to evidential or procedural deficiencies

addressed by the Regulation, and whether supply-side considerations are reflected in

local responses to housing stress.

Indicator Objective Baseline Target Data source

KPI 1:

% of

competent

authorities

assessing

housing

stress using

the common

criteria

Effectiveness

– whether the

initiative

succeeds in

persuading

local

authorities to

base the

assessment

on the criteria

proposed

0%

Existing

areas under

housing

stress cannot

be considered

a baseline for

this KPI as

they all use a

different

approach to

the one

proposed

100% Publication by

Member

States/competent

authorities; national

or local publication

of measures

KPI 2:

Share of

measures

renewed or

terminated in

accordance

with the

framework

Impact and

Effectiveness

– whether the

initiative

succeeds in

maintaining

measures

only if

justified by

housing

pressures

Number of

areas under

housing

stress

identified

using the

common

criteria

established

under the

new initiative

75% Publication by

Member

States/competent

authorities; national

or local publication

of measures

KPI 3:

Reduction in

litigation and

successful

Impact and

efficiency -

the initiative

reduces legal

n.a. A measurable

reduction,

over the

evaluation

National court

databases;

administrative

appeal bodies;

EN 21 EN

legal

challenges

(Absolute

number & in

%)

uncertainty,

litigation risk

and related

administrativ

e burdens

period, in the

number of

successful

legal

challenges

based on

insufficient

justification,

discriminatio

n or

disproportion

ality

Commission

complaint handling

KPI 4:

Share of

measures

accompanied

by housing

supply

measures (in

absolute

number and

in %)

Impact and

effectiveness

The initiative

effectively

supports

competent

authorities

with the

selection of

interventions

that are

appropriate to

local housing

conditions

and

contribute

effectively

and

proportionate

ly to

addressing

identified

housing

pressures

0%

Existing

areas under

housing

stress cannot

be considered

a baseline for

this KPI as

they all use a

different

approach to

the one

proposed

The number

of housing

affordability

plans or

equivalent

measures to

increase

housing

supply in

areas under

stress

increases

over time

Publication by

Member

States/competent

authorities; national

or local publication

of measures

1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to:

☒ a new action

¨ a new action following a pilot project / preparatory action19

¨ the extension of an existing action

¨ a merger or redirection of one or more actions towards another/a new action

19 As referred to in Article 58(2), point (a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation.

EN 22 EN

1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative

1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for

roll-out of the implementation of the initiative

The proposal establishes a common Union framework governing the assessment,

under Union law, of measures adopted by competent authorities to safeguard housing

affordability and availability where such measures affect the internal market. It lays

down a common methodology for assessing housing stress and common procedural

requirements governing the justification, proportionality, transparency and review of

those measures.

Following the entry into force of the Regulation, Member State authorities will be

responsible for its application and compliance with the publication and review

requirements laid down in the Regulation. The Commission will support

implementation by making available relevant data, including through the Mapadomo

database where appropriate, providing guidance and facilitating exchanges with

Member States and stakeholders.

Once the Regulation becomes applicable, competent authorities may adopt, amend or

review measures in accordance with the common framework established by the

Regulation. The Commission will monitor the implementation and application of the

Regulation and evaluate its effectiveness in accordance with the review clause.

1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g.

coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For

the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting

from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise

created by Member States alone.

Reasons for action at EU level (ex-ante)

The need for Union action arises because, while housing policy remains primarily a

national, regional and local competence, the compatibility of housing-related

measures affecting the internal market with Union law is governed by EU rules and

interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The CJEU jurisprudence remains limited, case-specific and therefore it does

not establish common methodologies for identifying housing stress, assessing causal

links, defining territorial scope, determining duration or evaluating effectiveness. It

does not and cannot establish a common methodology or procedural framework for

assessing housing stress or for demonstrating that housing-related measures affecting

the internal market are justified. Nor can individual Member States, acting alone,

ensure a coherent and consistent approach.

Expected generated EU added value (ex-post)

The added value of Union action is therefore to establish a common procedural

framework that reconciles local flexibility with shared safeguards ensuring coherence

with Union law. The initiative does not create a new area of Union competence or a

new obligation to assess housing-related measures. Rather, it establishes a

common methodology and procedural framework for applying existing Union law

requirements. The initiative provides common conditions for identifying housing

stress and for assessing the justification and proportionality of housing-related

EN 23 EN

measures, while preserving the discretion of competent authorities to decide whether

intervention is necessary, which measures to adopt and how they should be designed.

It improves legal certainty, transparency and predictability without harmonising

substantive housing policies or replacing national, regional or local competences.

1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past

Experience gained in implementing internal market legislation has shown that

common legal frameworks are most effective when accompanied by timely guidance,

structured dialogue with Member States and consistent monitoring of

implementation. These activities reduce legal uncertainty, facilitate compliance and

help prevent unnecessary infringement proceedings. The proposal therefore requires

adequate human and financial resources to support implementation, while relying as

far as possible on existing Commission expertise and digital tools.

1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with

other appropriate instruments

The proposal is compatible with the Multiannual Financial Framework.

The expenditure concerns:

– data infrastructure and governance

– implementation, monitoring and evaluation

– legislative follow-up

– stakeholder engagement.

The costs are comparable to other Union initiatives establishing common

frameworks and evidence infrastructures, such as European statistics, data

governance and interoperability frameworks.

The activities to be financed in support of the implementation of the present proposal

will benefit from synergies with other horizontal activities in the area of economic

modelling.

1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for

redeployment

Following the assessment of different available financing options the Commission

concluded the resources could be obtained from redeployment from relevant housing

funding programmes under the current MFF and from Heading 7 share allocated to

other funding programmes. There is no specific budget line or spending programme

dedicated to housing in the current MFF.

1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact

☐ limited duration

– ☐ in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY

– ¨ financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations and

from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.

☒ unlimited duration after 20 days from the publication of the Proposal in the

Official Journal,

– Implementation as

EN 24 EN

– followed by full-scale operation.

1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned20

☒ Direct management by the Commission

– ☒ by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;

– ¨ by the executive agencies

¨ Shared management with the Member States

¨ Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to:

– ¨ third countries or the bodies they have designated

– ¨ international organisations and their agencies (to be specified)

– ¨ the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund

– ¨ bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation

– ¨ public law bodies

– ¨ bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that

they are provided with adequate financial guarantees

– ¨ bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the

implementation of a public-private partnership and that are provided with

adequate financial guarantees

– ¨ bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the

common foreign and security policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on

European Union, and identified in the relevant basic act

– ¨ bodies established in a Member State, governed by the private law of a Member

State or Union law and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance with sector-specific

rules, with the implementation of Union funds or budgetary guarantees, to the

extent that such bodies are controlled by public law bodies or by bodies governed

by private law with a public service mission, and are provided with adequate

financial guarantees in the form of joint and several liability by the controlling

bodies or equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for each action,

limited to the maximum amount of the Union support.

Comments

n/a

2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES

2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules

The tasks directly implemented by the Task Force Housing (TFH) related to the

monitoring of the implementation and application of the proposal, will follow the

annual cycle of planning and monitoring, as implemented in the Commission,

including reporting through the Annual Activity Report of DG ENER.

20 Details of budget implementation methods and references to the Financial Regulation may be found on

the BUDGpedia site: https://myintracomm.ec.europa.eu/corp/budget/financial-rules/budget-

implementation/Pages/implementation-methods.aspx.

EN 25 EN

2.2. Management and control system(s)

2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation

mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed

The implementation of the Regulation will primarily be the responsibility of the

competent authorities that decide to adopt housing-related measures falling within its

scope. The Regulation does not require the establishment of new national

administrative structures or Union bodies but lays down common procedural

requirements governing the assessment, justification, proportionality, transparency

and review of such measures.

For the Commission, the proposal will entail tasks relating to supporting

implementation, including the preparation of guidance, stakeholder dialogue,

monitoring and evaluation of the application of the Regulation, and, where

appropriate, enforcement of Union law. These activities will be carried out by the

Housing Task Force and other relevant Commission services, making use, where

possible, of existing administrative structures and digital tools. The proposed

implementation method therefore represents the most efficient and proportionate

means of achieving the objectives of the initiative while limiting additional

administrative costs.

2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up

to mitigate them

The principal implementation risk is the inconsistent application of the Regulation by

competent authorities, which could reduce legal certainty and predictability across

the Union. A further operational risk is that the reference data made available

through Mapadomo may not remain sufficiently up to date to support the assessment

of housing stress where such data are used.

These risks will be mitigated through the preparation of Commission guidance,

regular exchanges with Member States and stakeholders, monitoring of the

application of the Regulation, and, where appropriate, the use of the Commission’s

enforcement powers under the Treaties. The Commission will also ensure the

maintenance and periodic updating of the relevant tools using available data sources

and existing administrative resources.

2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between

the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the

expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure)

The initiative requires managing by the Commission service funds required to

maintain and manage the database and its correct application, however the cost-

effectiveness of the controls cannot be estimated at this stage.

The task assigned to the TFH will be implemented following the already existing

control system and the cost of controls is expected to remain minimal.

2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities

The initiative includes limited funds implemented through direct management mode.

No public procurement procedures are foreseen at this stage (e.g. for monitoring or

evaluation purposes).

EN 26 EN

DG ENER has adopted an Anti-Fraud Strategy (AFS) and an action plan, based on

the Commission AFS. A risk assessment is carried out every year internally to

identify areas most vulnerable to fraud, the controls in place and the actions

necessary to improve the capacity of DG ENER and the TFH to prevent, detect and

correct fraud.

EN 27 EN

3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for

illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial

Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the

post-2027 period remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on

the MFF 2028-2034 and thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary

procedure. All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.

3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget

line(s) affected

The Proposal and its correct implementation will rely on the existing Commission

housing database Mapadomo developed jointly by ECFIN and JRC, which provides

granular NUTS 3 and LAU data on housing stocks and transaction prices and

supports the price-to-income indicator used to identify areas under housing stress.

This database is therefore a key digital enabling asset, allowing competent authorities

to reuse comparable Commission-held data and supporting consistent, evidence-

based implementation without establishing a separate AHA database. The database

requires continued maintenance and updating by Commission staff; these resource

needs are indicated in the tables below.

In addition, the proposed expenditure will be required to support the implementation

of the present proposal via stakeholder engagement (meetings with local and national

authorities, expert working groups), studies and evaluations.

• Existing budget lines

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.

Heading

of

multiann

ual

financial

framewo

rk

Budget line

Type of

expendit

ure

Contribution

Number

Diff./No

n-diff.21

from

EFTA

countri

es22

from

candidat

e

countrie

s and

potential

candidat

es23

From

other

third

countri

es

other

assigned

revenue

Several budget lines, including budget

line 03.0202 - Improving the

competitiveness of enterprises,

particularly SMEs, and supporting

their access to markets 24

Diff. and

Non-

diff.

NO NO NO NO

21 Diff. = Differentiated appropriations / Non-diff. = Non-differentiated appropriations. 22 EFTA: European Free Trade Association 23 Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential candidates from the Western Balkans. 24 The appropriations needed in 2027 will be fully financed through redeployment within relevant existing

programmes in headings 1, 2 and 3 of the multiannual financial framework. The estimated

EN 29 EN

3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations

3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations

– ¨ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations

– ☒ The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below

3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget

EUR million (to three decimal places)

Heading of multiannual financial framework Number

DG: ENER

Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTA

L MFF

2028-

2034 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034

Operational appropriations

Budget line 25

Commitmen

ts

(1a

) 0.68

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0 7.000

Payments (2a

) 0.68

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0 7.000

Budget line 03.0202 - Improving the competitiveness

of enterprises, particularly SMEs, and supporting their

access to markets

Commitmen

ts

(1b

)

0.32 0

Payments (2b

)

0.32 0

Appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope of specific programmes26

25 The appropriations needed in 2027 will be fully financed through redeployment within relevant existing programmes in headings 1, 2 and 3 of the multiannual

financial framework, in particular under chapter 03.02 (Single Market Programme) for Mapadomo and line 06.200401 for Mapadomo maintenance. The estimated

appropriations as of 2028 are indicative and the source of financing and scope remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034.

26 Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former ‘BA’ lines), indirect research, direct research.

EN 30 EN

Budget line (3)

0

TOTAL appropriations Commitmen

ts

=1

a+

1b

+3

1.000 1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0 7.000

for DG ENER Payments

=2

a+

2b

+3

1.000 1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0

1.00

0 7.000

Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL

MFF

2028-

2034

2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034

TOTAL

operational

appropriations

Commitments (4) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 7.000

Payments (5) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 7.000

TOTAL appropriations of an

administrative nature financed

from the envelope for specific

programmes

(6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL

appropriations

under HEADINGs

Commitments =4+6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 7.000

of the multiannual

financial

framework

Payments =5+6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 7.000

EN 31 EN

Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL

MFF

2028-

2034

2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034

TOTAL

operational

appropriations

Commitments (4) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 7.000

Payments (5) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 7.000

TOTAL appropriations of an

administrative nature financed

from the envelope for specific

programmes

(6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL

appropriations

under HEADING

1 to 3

Payments =4+6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 7.000

of the multiannual

financial

framework

=5+6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 7.000

Heading of multiannual financial framework 4 ‘Administrative expenditure’27

DG: ENER

Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL

MFF

2028-

2034

2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034

Ÿ Human resources 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 4.07

Ÿ Other administrative expenditure 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.13

27 The necessary appropriations should be determined using the annual average cost figures available on the appropriate BUDGpedia webpage.

EN 32 EN

TOTAL DG

ENER Appropriations 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 4.20

EUR million (to three decimal places)

Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL

MFF

2028-2034 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034

TOTAL

appropriations under

HEADINGS 1 to 428

Commitments 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 11.20

of the multiannual

financial framework Payments 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 11.20

The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next

Multiannual Financial Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period remain subject to

the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary procedure.

All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.

3.2.2. Estimated output funded from operational appropriations (not to be completed for decentralised agencies)

Commitment appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places)

Indicate

objectives

and outputs

Year

2028

Year

2029

Year

2030

Year

2031

Enter as many years as necessary to

show the duration of the impact

(see Section1.6)

TOTAL

OUTPUTS

28 Headings 1-7 in 2027

EN 33 EN

ò Type

29

Aver

age

cost

N o

Cost N o

Cost N o

Cost N o Cos

t N o Cos

t N o

Cost N o

Cost Tota

l No

Total

cost

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE

No 130…

- Output

- Output

- Output

Subtotal for specific

objective No 1

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE

No 2 ...

- Output

Subtotal for specific

objective No 2

TOTALS

29 Outputs are products and services to be supplied (e.g. number of student exchanges financed, number of km of roads built, etc.). 30 As described in Section 1.3.2. ‘Specific objective(s)’

EN 34 EN

3.2.3. Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations

– ☐ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an

administrative nature

– ☒ The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative

nature, as explained below

3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget

VOTED

APPROPRIATION

S

Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTA

L 2028

- 2034 2027

2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034

HEADING 4

Human resources

0.58

2

0.58

2

0.582

0.582

0.582

0.582

0.582

0.582 4.074

Other administrative

expenditure

0.01

8

0.01

8 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.126

Subtotal HEADING

4

0.60

0

0.60

0 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 4.200

Outside HEADING 4

Human resources

0.00

0

0.00

0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Other expenditure of

an administrative

nature

0.00

0 0.00

0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Subtotal outside

HEADING 4

0.00

0

0.00

0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

TOTAL 0.60

0

0.60

0 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 4.200

The appropriations required for human resources and other expenditure of an administrative

nature will be met by appropriations from the DG that are already assigned to management of

the action and/or have been redeployed within the DG, together, if necessary, with any

additional allocation which may be granted to the managing DG under the annual allocation

procedure and in the light of budgetary constraints.

3.2.4. Estimated requirements of human resources

– ¨ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources

– ☒ The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained

below

3.2.4.1. Financed from voted budget

Estimate to be expressed in full-time equivalent units (FTEs)31

31 Please specify below the table how many FTEs within the number indicated are already assigned to the

management of the action and/or can be redeployed within your DG and what are your net needs.

EN 35 EN

VOTED

APPROPRIATIONS

Y

ea

r

Y

ea

r

Y

ea

r

Y

ea

r

Y

ea

r

Y

ea

r

Y

ea

r

2

0

2

7

2

0

2

8

2

0

2

9

2

0

3

0

2

0

3

1

2

0

3

2

2

0

3

3

2

0

3

4

Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff)

20 01 02 01

(Headquarters and

Commission’s

Representation Offices)

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

20 01 02 03 (EU

Delegations) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(Indirect research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(Direct research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Other budget lines

(specify) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

External staff (inFTEs)

20 02 01 (AC, END

from the ‘global

envelope’)

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

20 02 03 (AC, AL, END

and JPD in the EU

Delegations)

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Admin.

Support

line

at

Headqu

arters

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

[XX.01.Y

Y.YY]

in EU

Delegat

ions

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(AC, END - Indirect

research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(AC, END - Direct

research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Other budget lines

(specify) - Heading 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Other budget lines

(specify) - Outside

Heading 4

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

The staff required to implement the proposal (in FTEs):

Exceptional additional staff*

EN 36 EN

To be covered by

current staff

available in the

Commission

services

To be financed

under Heading 4

or Research

To be financed

from BA line

To be financed

from fees

Establishment

plan posts 3 N/A

External staff

(CA, SNEs,

INT)

Description of tasks to be carried out by:

Officials and temporary staff The implementation of the provisions of the Proposal will give rise to a

number of new tasks for the Commission, requiring dedicated resources

to ensure its effective and timely implementation. These tasks are of a

cross-cutting nature, combining policy coordination, monitoring and

evaluation, legislative follow-up, stakeholder engagement and data

governance in the areas of housing affordability, the internal market,

and evidence-based policymaking.

The allocation of 3 permanent official (AD) FTE within DG ENER is

required to ensure the long-term governance, coordination and

regulatory oversight of the new framework established under the

Proposal. This includes supporting the implementation of the

Regulation, monitoring its application across Member States, ensuring

coherence with the broader Union legal framework (including the

Treaties, the Services Directive and Regulation (EU) 2024/1028), and

following up on the implementation of the Commission

Recommendation on housing affordability in areas under housing stress.

These resources would cover in particular:

1. Monitoring, implementation and evaluation (1.5 FTE)

- coordinating the overall implementation in Member States by

competent authorities and other relevant stakeholders;

- monitoring implementation of the Regulation and preparation of

an evaluation report by 2031;

- ensuring consistency with broader internal market legislation

(TFEU, Services Directive, STR Regulation);

- coordinating with DG GROW, FISMA, SJ, JRC, ECFIN etc.

- follow up on the implementation of the Commission

Recommendation on housing affordability in areas under

housing stress

2. Legal implementation and enforcement (1 FTE)

- responding to implementation questions;

- preparation of Commission guidance;

- preparation of delegated act (if warranted);

- assessment of complaints;

EN 37 EN

- infringement work where necessary.

3. Stakeholder engagement (0.5 FTE)

- implementation dialogue;

- workshops;

- Member State exchanges;

- Housing Alliance discussions;

- website and publication;

- dissemination of guidance.

External staff

The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for

illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial Framework.

The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period

remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and

thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary procedure. All appropriations and

staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.

3.2.5. Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments

Compulsory: the best estimate of the digital technology-related investments entailed

by the proposal/initiative should be included in the table below.

Exceptionally, when required for the implementation of the proposal/initiative, the

appropriations under Heading 4 should be presented in the designated line.

The appropriations under Headings 1-3 should be reflected as “Policy IT expenditure

on operational programmes”. This expenditure refers to the operational budget to be

used to re-use/ buy/ develop IT platforms/ tools directly linked to the implementation

of the initiative and their associated investments (e.g. licences, studies, data storage

etc). The information provided in this table should be consistent with details

presented under Section 4 “Digital dimensions”.

TOTAL

Digital and IT

appropriations

Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL

MFF

2028 -

2034 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034

HEADING 4

IT

expenditure

(corporate)

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Subtotal

HEADING 4

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Outside HEADING 4

EN 38 EN

Policy IT

expenditure

on operational

programmes

0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 3.500

Subtotal

outside

HEADING 4

0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 3.500

TOTAL 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 3.500

3.2.6. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework

The proposal/initiative:

– ☒ can be fully financed through redeployment within the relevant heading of the

multiannual financial framework (MFF)

Redeployment would be required within the SMP budget line to finance the

Mapadomo database in 2027.

– Inter-DG redeployment will be required to provide for the support requested for

DG Energy to execute the tasks under requirement described in section 1.5.1.¨

requires use of the unallocated margin under the relevant heading of the MFF

and/or use of the special instruments as defined in the MFF Regulation

n/a

– ¨ requires a revision of the MFF

n/a

3.2.7. Third-party contributions

The proposal/initiative:

– ☒ does not provide for co-financing by third parties

– ¨ provides for the co-financing by third parties estimated below:

Appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places)

Year Year Year Year Year Year Year

Total 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034

Specify the

co-financing

body

TOTAL

appropriations

co-financed

3.3. Estimated impact on revenue

EN 39 EN

– ☒ The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue.

– ¨ The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact:

– ¨ on own resources

– ¨ on other revenue

– ¨ please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines

EUR million (to three decimal places)

Budget revenue

line:

Appropriations

available for

the current

financial year

Impact of the proposal/initiative32

Year

2028

Year

2029

Year

2030

Year

2031

Year

2032

Year

2033

Year

2034

Article

………….

For assigned revenue, specify the budget expenditure line(s) affected.

Other remarks (e.g. method/formula used for calculating the impact on revenue or

any other information).

N/A

32 In the case of traditional own resources (customs duties, sugar levies), the amounts indicated must be

net amounts, i.e. gross amounts after deduction of 10 % for collection costs, as proposed in

COM(2025)574.

EN 40 EN

EN 41 EN

4. DIGITAL DIMENSIONS

4.1. Requirements of digital relevance

Reference to the

requirement Requirement description

Actors affected or

concerned by the

requirement

High-level

Processes Categories

Article 6; 9; 10 and 12

Evidence supporting measures

Requirement for competent authorities that

choose to adopt housing-related measures

falling within the scope of the Regulation to

process, analyse, and periodically reassess

the information necessary to demonstrate

housing stress and to justify and review

those measures. Where appropriate a

competent authorirty shall reuse digitally

available short-term rental data generated

through Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 for

measures described in Article 5 (1)(a)

Competent authorities

Data

processing; data

reuse

Data

Article 13

Publication of adopted measure(s)

Competent authorities are required to

publish the assessments and decisions

underpinning housing-related measures,

including their territorial scope and duration.

Competent authorities,

general public

Data

processing; data

sharing

Data

4.2. Data

Type of data Reference to the requirement(s) Standard and/or specification (if applicable)

EN 42 EN

Evidence supporting measures Article 6; Article 9; Article 10(1);

Article 12

objective, transparent and verifiable data

Publication of adopted measure(s) Article 13 N/A

Commission monitoring and evaluation Article 16 N/A

Alignment with the European Data Strategy

The initiative is aligned with the European Data Strategy because it prioritises the use, reuse and public availability of existing data to support

evidence-based public decision-making, rather than creating a separate data-collection architecture.

Alignment with the once-only principle

The once-only principle has been followed. The proposal introduces no new data-submission obligations for citizens, hosts, platforms or other

economic operators where the relevant information has already been collected under Regulation (EU) 2024/1028. Competent authorities can

rely on existing EU (e.g. Mapadomo), national, regional and local statistical and administrative data before undertaking any additional

collection.

The Proposal does not establish a new digital service, platform, database, reporting system or registration mechanism. Nor does it introduce

automated decision-making or algorithmic assessment. Competent authorities remain responsible for carrying out the assessments required by

the Regulation.

Data flows

Type of data Reference(s) to

the

requirement(s)

Actors who

provide the data

Actors who

receive the data

Trigger for the data

exchange

Frequency (if

applicable)

Evidence supporting measures, which

includes assessment of housing stress,

demonstration of the contribution of the

activity concerned to housing pressures

Article 6;

Article 9;

Article 10(1);

Competent

authority

General public Decision to adopt

restrictive measures

At least every five

years

EN 43 EN

and assessment of the proportionality of

the measure.

Competent authorities must periodically

review the measures adopted using

updated data to verify that the conditions

justifying the measures continue to be

fulfilled and that the measures remain

necessary and proportionate.

The assessment, where appropriate, shall

reuse data generated by Regulation (EU)

2024/1028 for measures related to short-

term rentals.

Article 12

Publication of adopted measure(s) which

includes the assessment required to adopt

measures, including their territorial

scope and duration,

Article 13 Competent

authority

General public Adoption, renewal,

amendment or

withdrawal of

measure

At least every five

years

The Commission will monitor the

implementation and application of the

Regulation

Article 16 European

Commission

The European

Parliament, the

Council, the

European

Economic and

Social

Committee and

the Committee of

the Regions

20 May 2031 No recurring

evaluation cycle

4.3. Digital solutions

Digital

solution Reference(s) to

the

Main mandated

functionalities Responsible body

How is

accessibility

How is reusability

considered?

Use of AI

technologies

EN 44 EN

requirement(s) catered for? (if

applicable)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Digital solution #1

Digital and/or sectorial policy (when these are

applicable)

Explanation on how it aligns

AI Act N/A

EU Cybersecurity framework N/A

eIDAS N/A

Single Digital Gateway and IMI N/A

Others N/A

4.4. Interoperability assessment

Digital public

service or category

of digital public

services

Description Reference(s) to the

requirement(s)

Interoperable Europe

Solution(s)

Other interoperability solution(s)

Digital public

service #1

N/A N/A N/A N/A

Category of digital

public services

N/A N/A N/A N/A

EN 45 EN

according to

COFOG #1

Digital public service #1

Assessment Measure(s) Potential remaining barriers (if applicable)

Alignment with existing digital

and sectorial policies

Please list the applicable digital

and sectorial policies identified

N/A N/A

Organisational measures for a

smooth cross-border digital public

services delivery

Please list the governance

measures foreseen

N/A N/A

Measures taken to ensure a shared

understanding of the data

Please list such measures

N/A N/A

Use of commonly agreed open

technical specifications and

standards

Please list such measures

N/A N/A

4.5. Measures to support digital implementation

Description of the measure Reference(s) to the requirement(s) Commission Actors to be Expected timeline

EN 46 EN

role

(if applicable)

involved

(if applicable)

(if applicable)

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 9.9.2026 COM(2026) 599 final

ANNEX

ANNEX

to the Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

establishing a framework for measures in Member States to safeguard housing

affordability and availability (Affordable Housing Act)

{SEC(2026) 599 final} - {SWD(2026) 605 final} - {SWD(2026) 606 final} -

{SWD(2026) 607 final}

EN 1 EN

ANNEX

Calculation of price-to-income ratio pertaining to Commission dataset

1. Representative dwelling prices are calculated using the average transaction price of a

dwelling in the area concerned, expressed in euro, at NUTS 3 level in accordance with

Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council1.

2. For representative income per capita, the Commission provides annual time series of

the net disposable income of private households per capita, expressed in euro, based on

Eurostat data at NUTS 2 level or equivalent projections.

3. The two price-to-income ratio thresholds for the purposes of Article 6 shall be

calculated on the basis of the most recent available annual observations. On the basis of this

statistical analysis, the thresholds are set at 8 and 10 years, respectively, of per capita income

required to purchase an existing dwelling of average size in the residential stock of the area

concerned.

1 Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on the

establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) (OJ L 154, 21.6.2003,

p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2003/1059/oj).

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 9.9.2026 SWD(2026) 605 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Subsidiarity grid

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Regulation

Proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework for measures in Member States to

safeguard housing affordability and availability

{COM(2026) 599 final} - {SEC(2026) 599 final} - {SWD(2026) 606 final} -

{SWD(2026) 607 final}

1

Subsidiarity Grid

- As proposed by the Committee of the Regions with guidance in blue

- Obviously, the answers to the questions below, the explanatory memorandum and – if

applicable – the impact assessment should be consistent. This may require some iterations.

- Please try to stay under 10 pages.

1. Can the Union act? What is the legal basis and competence of the Unions’ intended action?

1.1 Which article(s) of the Treaty are used to support the legislative proposal or policy initiative?

The proposal is based on Article 114 TFEU, which empowers the Union to adopt measures for the approximation of laws that have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. The proposal establishes a common framework governing the assessment under Union law of housing-related measures that may affect the free movement of services, establishment and capital, thereby improving the consistent functioning of the internal market.

1.2 Is the Union competence represented by this Treaty article exclusive, shared or supporting in nature?

The proposal falls within the Union’s shared competence pursuant to Article 4(2)(a) TFEU (internal market). While housing policy remains primarily a national, regional and local competence, measures affecting internal market freedoms are governed by Union law.

2. Subsidiarity Principle: Why should the EU act?

2.1 Does the proposal fulfil the procedural requirements of Protocol No. 21: - Has there been a wide consultation before proposing the act? - Is there a detailed statement with qualitative and, where possible, quantitative indicators

allowing an appraisal of whether the action can best be achieved at Union level?

Yes. In accordance with the Better Regulation Guidelines and Protocol No. 2, the proposal is accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and an Impact Assessment containing a detailed assessment of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, supported by qualitative and, where appropriate, quantitative evidence. The Impact Assessment explains why the objectives of the proposal cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States acting alone and why Union action is necessary to establish a common framework governing the assessment of housing-related measures affecting the internal market. The Commission also carried out extensive consultation activities. Building on the public consultation undertaken in preparation of the European Affordable Housing Plan, which received 13 330 responses, the Commission conducted a Call for Evidence, a targeted questionnaire and four dedicated workshops with Member States, regions, cities, stakeholders and experts between 6 March and 3 April 2026. The Call for Evidence received 617 contributions and the targeted questionnaire 303 responses.

1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016E/PRO/02&from=EN

2

The consultations confirmed broad support for greater legal certainty regarding the compatibility of housing-related measures with Union law, while emphasising the need to respect subsidiarity and preserve flexibility for competent authorities. Public authorities called for a common framework to support the assessment of housing stress and the justification of local measures. Economic operators stressed the importance of proportionality, legal certainty and evidence- based decision-making, while representatives of tenants, students, social housing providers and civil society underlined the need for effective tools to safeguard housing affordability and availability. The explanatory memorandum and the Impact Assessment both contain dedicated sections explaining the proposal’s compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.

2.2 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the conformity with the principle of subsidiarity?

The explanatory memorandum explains how the proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity. Housing policy, urban planning and land-use regulation remain primarily matters for Member States. However, the assessment of whether housing-related measures restricting internal market freedoms comply with Union law cannot be effectively addressed by Member States acting alone. While the Court of Justice has established the relevant legal principles, existing Union law provides no common operational framework for identifying housing stress or assessing the justification and proportionality of housing-related measures. As a result, competent authorities apply different methodologies and evidential standards. This creates uncertainty, administrative burden and inconsistent application of Union law. The added value of Union action is therefore to establish a common framework for assessing housing-related measures affecting the internal market. The Proposal provides a common methodology for demonstrating housing stress and common requirements governing the justification, necessity, proportionality, transparency and review of such measures. It preserves the discretion of competent authorities to determine whether intervention is necessary and which measures are appropriate in light of local circumstances, while ensuring that measures affecting the internal market are assessed according to common Union standards.

2.3 Based on the answers to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be achieved sufficiently by the Member States acting alone (necessity for EU action)?

The objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States acting alone because, although housing policy remains national, only the Union can establish a common framework governing the assessment under Union law of housing-related measures affecting the internal market. Without Union action, divergent methodologies and procedural standards would continue to create legal uncertainty and inconsistent application of Union law.

(a) Are there significant/appreciable transnational/cross-border aspects to the problems being tackled? Have these been quantified?

Although housing markets are inherently local, housing-related measures increasingly affect economic activities operating across borders, including the provision of services, investment and the acquisition of residential property. A significant percentage of the EU population lives in areas experiencing housing affordability challenges, while cross-border investment in residential real estate and the provision of short-term accommodation services have grown significantly in recent years, as set out in the impact assessment. Measures adopted by competent authorities therefore increasingly affect economic operators exercising Treaty freedoms across borders. Divergent approaches to assessing the justification and proportionality of such measures create legal

3

uncertainty, increase compliance costs and litigation risks, and may lead to inconsistent conditions for the exercise of internal market freedoms. These cross-border effects justify action at Union level.

(b) Would national action or the absence of the EU level action conflict with core objectives of the Treaty2 or significantly damage the interests of other Member States?

Yes. While housing policy remains primarily a national, regional and local competence, housing- related measures may affect the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties, including the free movement of services, freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. In the absence of a common Union framework, Member States may apply divergent approaches when assessing and justifying such measures under Union law, creating legal uncertainty, fragmentation of the internal market and unequal conditions for economic operators engaging in cross-border activities.

(c) To what extent do Member States have the ability or possibility to enact appropriate measures?

Member States remain fully responsible for designing and implementing their housing policies and are best placed to determine whether intervention is necessary in light of local housing market conditions. However, they cannot, acting individually, establish a common framework governing the assessment of housing-related measures under Union law. Only action at Union level can ensure that such measures are assessed according to common procedural standards, while preserving Member States’ discretion as to whether and how they intervene.

(d) How does the problem and its causes (e.g. negative externalities, spill-over effects) vary across the national, regional and local levels of the EU?

The causes and severity of housing affordability challenges differ considerably across the Union, reflecting diverse demographic trends, tourism pressures, urbanisation, housing supply constraints and regional economic conditions. Consequently, the measures adopted by competent authorities also vary significantly. However, irrespective of these local differences, all such measures must comply with Union law where they affect the internal market. The absence of a common framework for assessing their justification and proportionality therefore creates legal uncertainty across all levels of governance.

(e) Is the problem widespread across the EU or limited to a few Member States?

Housing affordability challenges and housing stress are more acute in some Member States, regions and cities than in others. However, the need for legal certainty regarding the application of Union law to housing-related measures is Union-wide. Competent authorities across the Union may adopt measures affecting internal market freedoms and therefore benefit from a common framework for assessing their justification and proportionality.

(f) Are Member States overstretched in achieving the objectives of the planned measure?

The issue is not whether Member States have the capacity to adopt housing policies or to assess their compatibility with Union law. Competent authorities are already required under the Treaties, the Services Directive, where applicable, and the case law of the Court of Justice to ensure that housing-related measures affecting the internal market are justified, necessary and proportionate. However, in the absence of a common operational framework governing how these assessments

2 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en

4

should be carried out, Member States have developed different methodologies and evidentiary approaches. This creates legal uncertainty for public authorities and economic operators, increases the risk of inconsistent application of Union law and contributes to disputes and litigation. Union action is therefore necessary to provide a common procedural framework while leaving substantive housing policy choices entirely to the Member States.

(g) How do the views/preferred courses of action of national, regional and local authorities differ across the EU?

Consultation activities demonstrated broad support among national, regional and local authorities for greater legal certainty regarding the compatibility of housing-related measures with Union law. While authorities stressed the importance of preserving flexibility to reflect local housing market conditions, many supported the establishment of a common Union framework to guide the assessment of housing stress and the justification and proportionality of housing-related measures. Stakeholders likewise emphasised the need for greater transparency, predictability and evidence-based decision-making.

2.4 Based on the answer to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be better achieved at Union level by reason of scale or effects of that action (EU added value)?

Union action provides a common methodology and procedural framework governing the assessment of housing-related measures affecting the internal market. It improves legal certainty, transparency and the consistent application of Union law while fully preserving Member States’ competence over housing policy.

(a) Are there clear benefits from EU level action?

Yes. The principal benefit of Union action is the establishment of a common methodology and procedural framework for demonstrating housing stress and assessing the justification, necessity and proportionality of housing-related measures under Union law. This promotes greater consistency in the application of internal market rules across the Union and provides clearer guidance for competent authorities when designing and implementing housing measures. It also increases legal certainty for citizens, investors and service providers by making the assessment process more transparent, predictable and evidence-based, thereby reducing the likelihood of inconsistent decisions and avoidable litigation.

(b) Are there economies of scale? Can the objectives be met more efficiently at EU level (larger benefits per unit cost)? Will the functioning of the internal market be improved?

Yes. Rather than each Member State developing its own methodology for assessing housing- related measures under Union law, the proposal establishes a single procedural framework that can be applied consistently throughout the Union. This avoids duplication of effort, facilitates the exchange of good practices and reduces compliance and administrative costs for both competent authorities and economic operators active in more than one Member State. By promoting a more consistent application of internal market rules, the proposal contributes to the proper functioning of the internal market while allowing housing policy decisions to remain tailored to national, regional and local circumstances.

(c) What are the benefits in replacing different national policies and rules with a more homogenous policy approach?

The proposal does not harmonise national housing policies or replace national choices regarding housing measures. Instead, it establishes a common procedural framework governing how

5

housing-related measures that may affect the internal market should be assessed under Union law. This common approach improves the consistency, transparency and predictability of decision- making across the Union, while ensuring that similar legal principles are applied in a comparable manner. It also facilitates judicial review and contributes to a more coherent interpretation of Union law, thereby reducing uncertainty for both competent authorities and economic operators.

(d) Do the benefits of EU-level action outweigh the loss of competence of the Member States and the local and regional authorities (beyond the costs and benefits of acting at national, regional and local levels)?

The proposal does not transfer substantive competence over housing policy to the Union. Member States, regions and local authorities remain entirely responsible for determining whether intervention is necessary, identifying local housing challenges and choosing the housing measures they consider appropriate. The Regulation harmonises only the procedural framework governing the assessment of such measures where they affect the internal market. The limited procedural obligations introduced by the proposal are proportionate to the objective of ensuring the consistent application of Union law and are outweighed by the benefits of increased legal certainty, reduced fragmentation and improved transparency.

(e) Will there be improved legal clarity for those having to implement the legislation?

Yes. The proposal provides competent authorities with a clearer and more structured framework for demonstrating housing stress and assessing the justification, necessity and proportionality of housing-related measures under Union law. By clarifying the evidence to be considered, the procedural steps to be followed and the principles underpinning the assessment, it increases predictability for public authorities, economic operators and citizens alike. Greater legal clarity is expected to facilitate implementation, improve compliance with Union law and reduce the risk of inconsistent application and subsequent litigation.

3. Proportionality: How the EU should act

3.1 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the proportionality of the proposal and a statement allowing appraisal of the compliance of the proposal with the principle of proportionality?

The explanatory memorandum and the impact assessment explain that the proposal complies with the principle of proportionality because it does not go beyond what is necessary to improve the functioning of the internal market. It does not harmonise housing policy, require competent authorities to adopt housing-related measures, nor does it prescribe the substantive content of such measures. Instead, it lays down only those common requirements necessary to ensure legal certainty, transparency and the consistent application of Union law to measures falling within its scope As confirmed by the impact assessment, this approach provides the appropriate balance between improving legal certainty and preserving the flexibility of national, regional and local authorities to respond to local housing market conditions.

3.2 Based on the answers to the questions below and information available from any impact assessment, the explanatory memorandum or other sources, is the proposed action an appropriate way to achieve the intended objectives?

The proposal is a proportionate response to the identified problem. It is limited to those aspects that require action at Union level, namely the establishment of a common procedural framework

6

governing the assessment of housing-related measures affecting the internal market. It does not harmonise housing policy or require Member States to adopt specific housing measures, but instead provides greater legal certainty regarding the application of existing obligations under Union law. The choice of a Regulation ensures the uniform application of procedural requirements across the Union, while leaving to Member States, regions and local authorities full discretion to determine whether intervention is necessary and which housing measures are appropriate in light of local circumstances. The limited administrative costs associated with the proposal are proportionate to its objectives and are expected to be outweighed by the benefits of greater legal certainty, more consistent application of Union law and a reduction in legal disputes.

(a) Is the initiative limited to those aspects that Member States cannot achieve satisfactorily on their own, and where the Union can do better?

Yes. The initiative is limited to establishing a common procedural framework governing the assessment of housing-related measures under Union law. It does not regulate the substance of housing policy or interfere with Member States’ competence to determine whether intervention is necessary or which housing measures should be adopted. While Member States remain responsible for designing and implementing housing policies, only the Union can ensure the consistent application of Treaty freedoms by providing a common framework for assessing the justification, necessity and proportionality of measures affecting the internal market.

(b) Is the form of Union action (choice of instrument) justified, as simple as possible, and coherent with the satisfactory achievement of, and ensuring compliance with the objectives pursued (e.g. choice between regulation, (framework) directive, recommendation, or alternative regulatory methods such as co-legislation, etc.)?

A Regulation is the most appropriate legal instrument because it establishes a common procedural framework governing the assessment of housing-related measures affecting the internal market. Uniform application of those procedural requirements is essential to ensure legal certainty and the consistent application of Union law across the Union. Non-binding guidance could promote a more consistent interpretation of existing Union law but would not provide a sufficiently predictable and uniform framework for competent authorities, citizens and economic operators. A Directive would require national transposition, increasing the risk of divergent implementation and reducing the objective of improving legal certainty. A Regulation therefore provides the most effective means of establishing a common framework while fully respecting Member States’ competence for housing policy and the substantive design of housing-related measures.

(c) Does the Union action leave as much scope for national decision as possible while achieving satisfactorily the objectives set? (e.g. is it possible to limit the European action to minimum standards or use a less stringent policy instrument og approach?)

Yes. The proposal leaves Member States, regions and local authorities the broadest possible discretion consistent with achieving its objectives. It does not require competent authorities to adopt housing-related measures, nor does it harmonise housing policy or prescribe particular policy choices. Authorities remain free to determine whether intervention is necessary, how housing stress is addressed and which measures are most appropriate in their specific circumstances. The Regulation establishes common procedural requirements governing the demonstration of housing stress and the assessment of the justification, necessity and proportionality of measures where they affect the internal market.

7

(d) Does the initiative create financial or administrative cost for the Union, national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators or citizens? Are these costs commensurate with the objective to be achieved?

The proposal gives rise to limited administrative costs for the Commission and for competent authorities responsible for applying the procedural framework. These costs relate primarily to the preparation of evidence supporting housing-related measures, monitoring and reporting activities, and the implementation of the common framework. As explained in the Impact Assessment, these limited costs are expected to be outweighed by the benefits of increased legal certainty, greater transparency, more consistent application of Union law and a reduction in legal disputes, litigation and unnecessary administrative burdens arising from divergent national approaches.

(e) While respecting the Union law, have special circumstances applying in individual Member States been taken into account?

Yes. The proposal fully recognises that housing markets differ significantly across the Union due to variations in demographic trends, territorial characteristics, economic conditions and housing market structures. The common procedural framework is therefore designed to accommodate these differences by requiring assessments to be based on the specific circumstances of the area concerned. Competent authorities retain full discretion to determine whether housing stress exists, whether intervention is justified and which housing measures are most appropriate, provided that they comply with the common procedural requirements established by the Regulation and with Union law.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

17.7.2026

SEC(2026) 599

REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD OPINION

{COM(2026) 599 {SWD(2026) 605-607}

Affordable Housing Act

________________________________ Commission européenne/Europese Commissie, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË - Tel. +32 22991111 [email protected]

EUROPEAN COMMISSION REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD

Brussels, RSB

Opinion

Title: Impact assessment / Affordable Housing Act

Overall 2nd opinion: POSITIVE WITH RESERVATIONS

(A) Policy context The political guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission recognised the urgency of the housing crisis, and in December 2025, the European Commission presented the European Affordable Housing Plan (EAHP) to complement and support Member States’ housing policies and initiatives including at regional and local levels, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity. The EAHP sets out 10 key areas of action where the EU can add value and support efforts by other public authorities and stakeholders, including a new Affordable Housing Act (AHA) to support public authorities in identifying areas of housing stress, and support them, in full respect of subsidiarity, to take measures to protect and promote housing affordability in those areas.

(B) Key issues The Board notes improvements to the report. However, the report still contains significant shortcomings. The Board gives a positive opinion with reservations because it expects the lead Service to rectify the following aspects: (1) The effectiveness of the preferred option is not sufficiently assessed. (2) The coherence of the initiative with other initiatives impacting on housing is not

sufficiently analysed.

2

(C) What to improve (1) The report should better assess and demonstrate the effectiveness of the preferred option,

given the focus on the process and the uncertainties related to the embedded flexibilities. The report should clarify whether competent authorities will receive additional support (e.g. guidance, tools) for implementing the proposed framework. The report should also analyse to what extent relying exclusively on a procedural approach – while contributing to the transparency of the process and accountability of the competent authorities – will sufficiently reduce legal uncertainty.

(2) The report should significantly strengthen the analysis of coherence of the preferred option with the other related initiatives having a bearing on housing (in particular the European Affordable Housing Plan, cohesion policy, short term rentals Regulation).

(3) Given that the preferred option relies on access to robust granular data at local level, the report should assess how the access to the input data needed for the calculation of Tier 1 and Tier 2 indicators will be ensured. In addition, for Tier 2 indicators, the report should analyse the availability and robustness of data resulting from the implementation of Short-Term Rentals Regulation from the perspective of how it may improve the effectiveness of the proposed initiative.

(D) Conclusion The lead Service(s) may proceed with the initiative. The lead Service(s) must revise the report and its executive summary in accordance with the Board’s findings before launching the interservice consultation.

Full title Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Affordable Housing Act

Reference number PLAN/2026/424

Submitted to RSB on 2 July 2026

Date of RSB meeting Written procedure

3

EUROPEAN COMMISSION REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD

Brussels, RSB

Opinion

Title: Impact assessment / Affordable Housing Act

Overall opinion: NEGATIVE

(A) Policy context The political guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission recognised the urgency of addressing the housing crisis, and in December 2025, the European Commission presented the European Affordable Housing Plan (EAHP) to complement and support Member States’ housing policies and initiatives including at regional and local levels, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity. The EAHP sets out 10 key areas of action where the EU can add value and support efforts by other public authorities and stakeholders, including a new Affordable Housing Act (AHA) to support public authorities in identifying areas of housing stress, and support them, in full respect of subsidiarity, to take measures to protect and promote housing affordability in those areas.

(B) Key issues The Board notes the additional information provided and commitments to make changes to the report.However, the Board gives a negative opinion because the report contains the following serious shortcomings that the lead Service must address: (1) The report is not clear about its scope and the problem at the EU level that it aims

to address. It does not substantiate the problem related to the single market with appropriate evidence. The general and specific objectives are not defined in line with better regulation requirements.

(2) The policy measures and options are not sufficiently and clearly defined to allow for the assessment of their impacts. The impacts of the policy options on the single market and on the affordability of housing are not sufficiently analysed.

(3) The conformity with subsidiarity and proportionality principles is not sufficiently demonstrated to justify the proposed action at the EU level.

4

(C) What to improve (1) The context and scope of the initiative should be better explained, especially in relation

to the Services Directive, the Short-Term Rentals Regulation and the Digital Services Act. Based on this, the report should clearly delineate the problem the initiative aims at and how it relates to the broader housing challenge. The magnitude of the problem at EU level should be demonstrated.

(2) The report should provide evidence of negative effects on the Single Market caused by the alleged fragmented approach to demand-side restrictions. In line with a revised problem definition the report should analyse the problem drivers, based on available evidence. The assessment of the problems of legal uncertainty faced by public authorities should be enhanced based on available evidence.

(3) The objectives should subsequently be revised to reflect the actual aim of the intervention. The report should establish clearly the link between the proposed measures, the objectives and the problems to show how this intervention will concomitantly improve both the functioning of the single market in this area and the affordability of housing, without aggravating the housing problem locally.

(4) The policy measures and options should be clearly defined to allow for the assessment of their impacts and comparison. In particular, it should be clear which obligations stem from which policy option, for whom and under what circumstances, and what is the interplay among the measures under each policy option. The voluntary or compulsory nature of the proposed measures should be made clear. For example, option 2 includes recommendations to Member States on supply. However, at the same time, option 2 under b2 includes measures increasing supply as one of the obligations to access to restrictions that would be exceptionally permitted.

(5) The policy measures should better take into account available evidence. For example, given the limited evidence on effectiveness of demand-side measures and their context dependence, the report should demonstrate that developing a harmonised framework is feasible, i.a. regarding the definition of areas under stress. The report should also clarify how the proposed measures will relate to existing restrictions, if and how they will be applied in situations of a potential mismatch between the areas identified as being under housing stress and the area of action by local authorities, and how the conformity of the measures will be assessed and by whom. The report needs to be clear how legal certainty will be ensured for public authorities regarding all the proposed elements.

(6) The effectiveness of the proposed measures needs a more thorough analysis. Given that the harmonised criteria proposed for assessing the conformity of the demand-side restrictions in areas under housing stress leave a significant leeway to the authorities introducing them, the report should consider to what extent an EU regulatory approach can bring added value. The effectiveness and practical aspects of the requirement to propose supply-side measures in order to be allowed to introduce demand-side restrictions needs to be carefully assessed. In case mandatory supply side measures are considered, the report should provide an assessment regarding their costs and enforcement. In addition, the analysis of the potential spillover effects to areas neighbouring those with demand-side restrictions should be strengthened.

5

(7) The report should improve the justification for acting at EU level on housing which is primarily a national/regional/local competence. The subsidiarity and proportionality assessment needs to take into account the effectiveness of the proposed approach and the distribution of competences among various levels of governance.

Some more technical comments have been sent directly to the author Service.

(D) Conclusion The DG must revise the report and its executive summary in accordance with the Board’s findings and resubmit it for a final RSB opinion.

Full title Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Affordable Housing Act

Reference number PLAN/2026/424

Submitted to RSB on 7 May 2026

Date of RSB meeting 3 June 2026

Electronically signed on 17/07/2026 13:21 (UTC+02) in accordance with Article 11 of Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2121

EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 9.9.2026 SWD(2026) 606 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT

Affordable Housing Act

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Regulation

establishing a framework for measures in Member States to safeguard housing

affordability and availability

{COM(2026) 599 final} - {SEC(2026) 599 final} - {SWD(2026) 605 final} -

{SWD(2026) 607 final}

1

1. INTRODUCTION: ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ....................... 3

2. PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................................... 7

3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ....................................................................................... 18

4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? .............................................................. 20

5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ................................................... 21

6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? .......................................... 31

7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ........................................................................... 55

8. PREFERRED OPTION ..................................................................................................... 60

9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?................. 62

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ........................................................................... 65

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) ............................... 75

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ......................................................................... 85

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS .................................................................................... 90

ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK ............................................................................. 102

ANNEX 6: SME CHECK ......................................................................................................... 104

ANNEX 7: THE EU HOUSING CRISIS AND TRENDS IN NON-PRIMARY USE OF THE

HOUSING STOCK .......................................................................................................... 109

ANNEX 8: ACQUISITION, OWNERSHIP AND USE OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY: EU

LEGAL FRAMEWORK, RESTRICTIONS IN MEMBER STATES AND LITIGATION

......................................................................................................................................... 122

ANNEX 9: SHORT-TERM RENTALS: EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK, RESTRICTIONS IN

MEMBER STATES AND LITIGATION ....................................................................... 127

ANNEX 10: EXISTING LEGISLATION TO DEFINE AREAS UNDER STRESS ................ 139

ANNEX 11: COHERENCE WITH OTHER EU LEGISLATION AND POLICIES ............... 156

ANNEX 12: BIBLIOGRAPHY, EVIDENCE AND DATA SOURCES .................................. 160

2

Glossary

Term or acronym Meaning or definition

AHA Affordable Housing Act

CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union

EAHP European Affordable Housing Plan

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

LAU Local Administrative Unit

LTR Long-term Rental

NUTS Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics

STR Short-term Rental

SME Small- and medium-sized enterprises

3

INTRODUCTION: ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT

The European Union is facing a housing affordability crisis, particularly in certain cities,

metropolitan regions, islands and tourist destinations where housing demand

significantly exceeds available supply. In response, public authorities increasingly seek

to adopt measures affecting the use of housing for purposes other than primary residence,

including short-term rentals and secondary homes.

While housing policy, urban planning and land-use regulation remain primarily national,

regional and local competences, housing-related measures affecting internal market

freedoms are already subject to Union law, including the justification and proportionality

requirements under Treaty provisions on the internal market, the Services Directive and

the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The purpose of this initiative

is therefore not to create a new area of Union competence or to introduce a new obligation

to assess housing-related measures. Rather, it establishes a common methodology and

procedural framework for applying existing Union law requirements, thereby improving

legal certainty, transparency and predictability while leaving housing policy choices to

the competent authorities.

The initiative forms part of the implementation of the European Affordable Housing Plan

and complements broader EU actions addressing the structural causes of the housing

crisis. Although housing affordability is not the objective of this initiative, it may

contribute indirectly by improving the ability of competent authorities to adopt evidence-

based and proportionate responses to housing stress. It establishes a common, evidence-

based and transparent framework for identifying areas under housing stress and for

assessing, justifying and reviewing housing-related interventions, while encouraging

those interventions to be considered alongside broader efforts to increase housing supply.

Decisions on whether, where and how to intervene, including the choice of measure,

remain entirely with national, regional and local authorities.

1.1. Economic and societal context

The European Union is facing ahousing affordability crisis that weakens social cohesion

and threatens competitiveness. It increasingly affects labour mobility, access to

employment and education opportunities, and therefore the EU’s overall economic

competitiveness. Affordable housing is a prerequisite for workers to access jobs and for

employers to attract and retain talent.

On 16 December 2025, as part of the European Affordable Housing Plan (1), the

Commission presented an analysis of the key drivers of the housing affordability crisis

in the EU(2), describing changing demand patterns and factors constraining housing

supply which together have contributed to rising housing costs and shortages across the

EU (see summary in Annex 7) (3, 4). The analysis shows that household sizes are

decreasing and the demand for living space per person is increasing, resulting in growing

(1) AHA-BIB-050.

(2) AHA-BIB-053.

(3) AHA-BIB-081.

(4) AHA-BIB-82.

4

demand for dwellings even where population growth remains limited (5, 6). At the same

time, housing is increasingly used for purposes other than permanent residence, including

tourism, occasional use and investment. While these uses can generate important

economic and social benefits, they may also contribute to housing demand pressures in

some local markets. The extent of these effects varies considerably across locations and

housing market conditions and is examined further in this impact assessment.

On the supply side, housing construction has often struggled to keep pace with demand,

particularly in areas where land is scarce and competing uses of land are significant (7).

The Commission estimates that between 2010 and 2024, demographic trends would have

required building 4.6 million more homes than were in fact built (8). Supply constraints

may result from limited availability of developable land, restrictive planning and

permitting procedures, labour shortages in the construction sector, rising construction

costs, infrastructure limitations and insufficient investment in affordable and social

housing. Despite recent signs of recovery, the number of residential building permits in

the EU remains close to historical lows (9). A significant share of the EU housing stock

is not being used efficiently, and there is largely untapped potential in bringing additional

homes to the market through renovation, repurposing, brownfield redevelopment and the

reactivation of vacant dwellings. Transport and connectivity are not always developed in

a way that allows housing demand to spread efficiently to less pressured locations,

thereby reinforcing pressure in already constrained housing markets (10).

The European Affordable Housing Plan identifies a range of actions to address this

structural mismatch between housing supply and demand, including measures to promote

investment, accelerate permitting, support modern construction methods and tackle

labour and skills shortages in the construction sector. However, these measures typically

require time to produce effects. As a result, public authorities in areas under housing

stress increasingly seek complementary responses to address more immediate housing

pressures.

Average EU and national statistics tend to understate the housing challenges because they

conceal significant local differences. Affordability pressures are often most acute in

urban areas, metropolitan regions, islands and tourist destinations. In these“areas under

housing stress” (also referred to in various Member States as high-demand areas, tense

housing markets or areas under housing market stress), persistent mismatches between

housing demand and supply result in housing shortages and rising prices.For example,

while rents increased on average by 23% in the EU between 2015 and February 2026 (11),

in capital cities the increase was much larger: 38% in Brussels, 59% in Berlin, 75% in

Madrid and 103% in Lisbon (12).

A June 2025 Eurobarometer survey (13) found that, on average, across the EU, 40% of

citizens identify lack of affordable housing as an immediate and urgent problem in the

place where they live. The urgency is felt most acutely in cities (51%) compared with

(5) AHA-BIB-160.

(6) AHA-BIB-161.

(7) AHA-BIB-038.

(8) AHA-BOB-037.

(9) AHA-BIB-053.

(10) AHA-BIB-084.

(11) AHA-BIB-059.

(12) For 2-bedroom flats: AHA-BIB-154.

(13) AHA-BIB-051.

5

towns and suburbs (37%) and rural areas (28%), and the highest shares are recorded in

cities in Ireland (72%), Spain (69%) and Luxembourg (68%). The same survey showed

that poverty and homelessness, vacant and derelict buildings, gentrification and

‘touristification’ are also pressing concerns of citizens living in cities. The 2024 Letta

report (14) described the lack of affordable housing as endangering “the freedom to stay

also in receiving areas, not just in the areas that face depopulation”.

1.2. Political and legal context

There is a growing recognition that Europe’s shared housing affordability challenge calls

for a shared response. Whilst housing remains mostly a national, regional and local

responsibility, the EU increasingly supports, coordinates and complements national,

regional and local efforts, while respecting the diversity of housing markets and

governance systems across the EU.

The political guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission (15), recognising the

urgency of the housing crisis, announced the appointment of a Commissioner for housing,

and committed to putting forward the first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan.

Housing featured prominently in President von der Leyen’s State of the Union address in

September 2025 (16), describing it as “more than a housing crisis. It is a social crisis. It

tears at Europe's social fabric. It weakens our cohesion. And it also threatens our

competitiveness”.

At the European Council of October 2025 (17), EU leaders called on the Commission to

swiftly present an ambitious and comprehensive plan for affordable housing, the aim of

which should be to support and complement Member States’ efforts, having due regard

for the principle of subsidiarity and national competences. On 10 March 2026, the

European Parliament adopted the final report of the Special Committee on the Housing

Crisis, which strongly welcomed the Commission’s commitment to deliver and

implement an ambitious European Affordable Housing Plan (18).

The work undertaken by the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs

Council, the European Committee of the Regions (19), the European Economic and Social

Committee (20), and representatives of cities and regions across the EU, including the

European Housing Action Plan presented by mayors from large European cities (21), has

highlighted the importance of cooperation and exchange at EU level in addressing

housing challenges. The 2025 Commission Communication “An EU Agenda for Cities:

Driving Growth and Prosperity” (22) also provides a strategic framework for

strengthening the territorial and urban dimension of EU policies.

(14) AHA-BIB-052.

(15) AHA-BIB-054.

(16) AHA-BIB-055.

(17) AHA-BIB-056.

(18) AHA-BIB-057.

(19) The European Committee of the Regions in its opinion of 13 May 2025 highlighted the territorial

diversity of the housing crisis and the need for a place-based approach to enable local and regional

authorities to develop tailored responses.

(20) In its opinion of 18 September 2025, the European Economic and Social Committee called for an EU

Housing Action Plan to enforce the fundamental right to housing.

(21) AHA-BIB-058.

(22) AHA-BIB-29.

6

Based on extensive consultations (23), in December 2025, the European Commission

presented the European Affordable Housing Plan(EAHP) which sets out 10 key areas of

action where the EU can add value and support efforts by Member States and other public

authorities and stakeholders. The EAHP indicated the Commission's intention to propose

a new Affordable Housing Act (AHA) to support public authorities in identifying areas

of housing stress, and support them, in full respect of subsidiarity, to take measures to

protect and promote housing affordability in those areas. This followed the President’s

announcement in her 2025 State of the Union address that the Commission would

“propose a legal initiative on short-term rentals to tackle the remaining issues”.

The proposed initiative responds to repeated calls from cities, regions, Member States,

the European Parliament and stakeholders for greater clarity regarding the conditions

under which housing-related restrictions to the internal market may be adopted in

compliance with Union law.

The applicable legal framework is defined in the Treaty provisions on free movement of

services and capital and the freedom of establishment, as interpreted by the Court of

Justice of the European Union, and, in the absence of sector-specific secondary

legislation governing access to short-term rental services, the Services Directive, which

governs restrictions affecting access to and exercise of such activities. In addition,

Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 on short-term rental services, applicable since 20 May 2026,

establishes a common framework for registration, data collection, data sharing and

enforcement. The Regulation will significantly improve transparency regarding short-

term rental activity and provide important data and enforcement tools relevant to the

implementation of this initiative. The STR Regulation operates alongside the Digital

Services Act, which continues to apply to aspects of platform activity not specifically

regulated by the STR Regulation, including certain information and enforcement

mechanisms.

As illustrated in more details in the following section and in Annexes 8 and 9, which

further clarify the relationship between this initiative and Union law, while the existing

legal framework provides important legal principles and enforcement tools, it does not

establish a common framework for assessing the necessity, effectiveness and

proportionality of housing-related interventions. In short, there is not enough legal clarity

for public authorities – or indeed for economic operators or citizens – to find operational

solutions to the challenges faced. This is the gap addressed by the present initiative.

The AHA forms part of the broader package of housing-related measures that was

adopted (24) alongside the European Affordable Housing Plan. It has a specific and

targeted function within that package: establishing a common framework for assessing

housing-related restrictions affecting internal market freedoms. It neither finances

housing nor addresses the structural causes of housing shortages, which are tackled

through complementary initiatives on housing data, market transparency, funding,

investment, State aid, cohesion policy, construction capacity, planning and permitting,

renovation, neighbourhood regeneration and simplification (see Annex 11).

The AHA is also complementary to Regulation (EU) 2024/1028. While that Regulation

establishes a harmonised registration and data-sharing framework, it does not determine

(23) Including a public consultation in 2025, to which a broad range of stakeholders and citizens contributed

with 13 000 responses AHA-BIB-053.

(24) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_3048

7

whether housing-related restrictions are justified, necessary or proportionate under Union

law. The AHA addresses that separate question and ensures that competent authorities

rely on data made available under Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 when assessing housing

stress and the proportionality of measures. Similarly, cohesion policy and other Union

funding instruments support investment in social and affordable housing and related

infrastructure, while the AHA establishes the evidential and procedural framework

governing housing-related restrictions. Designation under the AHA has no consequences

for access to Union funding.

2. PROBLEM DEFINITION

2.1. What is the problem?

The problem addressed by this initiative is insufficient legal certainty regarding the

compatibility of measures on short-term rentals and other non-primary use of

housing with Union law governing the internal market freedoms.

8

As housing pressures intensify in certain local housing markets, competent authorities

are increasingly considering – and taking – interventions affecting the use of housing.

While Union law (TFEU, Services

Directive and CJEU jurisprudence)

provides the relevant legal principles of

justification and proportionality of any

restriction to the internal market, it does

not provide a common operational

framework for determining compliance

of specific measures with Union law.

As described in Section 1.1, housing

stress reflects a mismatch between

housing demand and housing supply

that is particularly acute in certain cities,

metropolitan areas, islands and tourist

destinations. In a growing number of

locations, this imbalance has

contributed to rising rents and purchase

prices, and increasing difficulties for

residents, workers, students and

vulnerable groups to afford housing (see

Figure 1 and Annex 7). In many high-

demand areas, housing shortages are

increasingly identified by businesses, public authorities and social partners as a constraint

on economic development (25).

In response to these pressures, public authorities across the Union are adopting or

considering a wide range of measures to safeguard the availability and affordability of

housing, usually aimed at dampening down demand by curbing the number of short-term

rentals or other forms of non-primary use of housing (26).

Housing policy remains primarily a national, regional and local competence. However,

many measures adopted in response to housing pressures affect activities falling within

the scope of Union law.

The problem addressed by this initiative therefore has two drivers.

The first driver is a substantive housing-market challenge that creates pressure for

public intervention. Housing affordability itself is not the direct problem addressed by

this initiative, but it is an essential driver. In some areas under housing stress, competent

authorities are increasingly seeking to address housing pressures that arise from the

(25) AHA-BIB-166.

(26) The Mayors for Housing coalition, which represents 21 diverse cities from different Member States,

has stated: “In many contexts, homes are increasingly treated as investment assets rather than primarily

as places to live, fuelling speculative dynamics, reducing the availability of long-term housing and pushing

up prices”; “Tourism is expected to continue growing significantly in the coming years, at a 3,5% annual

rate, according to the World Travel & Tourism Council. As a result, the pressures associated with STR

activity are likely to intensify, particularly in cities already facing housing shortages and high tourism

demand” and “Regulating short-term rentals is critical to safeguarding residential housing stock and

curbing speculative pressures that contribute to price surges and reduced availability for city inhabitants.”

Figure 1: Housing affordability per municipality in the EU:

Price to income ratio, calculated as average municipal

house price divided by average regional (NUTS2)

disposable income. Source: JRC, based on data from

ESPON (house asking prices, 2025) and Eurostat (average

dwelling size per country and degree of urbanisation and

regional disposable income, 2024

9

supply-demand mismatch and that may be aggravated by certain forms of non-primary

use of housing.

The second driver is a governance challenge. While Union law recognises that housing

affordability and availability may justify restrictions even if they affect internal market

freedoms, the current framework provides only legal principles but does not provide a

sufficiently structured basis for establishing the presence of housing stress and assessing

the necessity and proportionality of specific interventions.

As a result, competent authorities increasingly face difficulties in designing and

implementing housing-related measures that are both effective in addressing local

housing pressures and fully compatible with Union law. At the same time, and partly as

a consequence, citizens, service providers, platforms, property owners and investors face

uncertainty about which restrictions might be adopted, maintained or challenged.

The interaction between these two drivers is central to the problem addressed in this

impact assessment. Housing stress creates pressure for public intervention, while the

absence of a structured framework makes it very difficult for competent authorities to

determine when and how such intervention is justified and likely to be proportionate.

While housing stress primarily reflects local housing market conditions, the governance

challenge arises in the application of a common Union legal framework governing

restrictions affecting internal market freedoms. This distinction defines the limits of

Union action and the areas where it can add value.

2.2. What are the problem drivers?

Driver 1: A supply-demand imbalance aggravated by non-primary use of housing

The first driver is substantive in nature and relates to housing market developments in

areas under housing stress.

As described in Section 1.1 and in Annex 7, housing stress reflects a persistent mismatch

between housing demand and housing supply. While insufficient housing supply remains

a key structural driver, housing demand that is not related to primary residential use may

aggravate affordability pressures in specific local markets. This includes housing used

for short-term rentals, secondary homes, occasional use, investment purposes, and/or

vacant for extended periods.

According to Eurostat, nearly 20% of the dwelling stock in 2021 was not used for primary

residence. In capital cities such as Athens, Lisbon or Paris secondary dwellings and

vacant dwellings each represent 10 to 12% of the dwelling stock. In tourist areas such as

Biarritz, Algarve or the South Aegean region, more than 30% of the dwelling stock are

secondary homes. In Paris, 18 600 dwellings had been vacant more than one year in 2021

(27). A recent study by the JRC (28) shows that the share of unoccupied dwellings

(covering vacant and secondary homes) is positively correlated with housing prices,

probably driven by secondary homes located in highly valued locations, and that the

correlation is substantially stronger in cities.

(27) AHA-BIB-112.

(28) AHA-BIB-038.

10

On average STRs from the four main platforms represent 1.2% of the total dwelling stock

in the EU (29) but at the local level, Airbnb listings can rise to more than 20% of the

dwelling stock in some neighbourhoods and municipalities – which is not representative

of the share of STRs from all platforms, as in some markets Airbnb could account for

half of STR listings or less (30). When compared to the stock of dwellings used for long-

term rental, the share of Airbnb in certain neighbourhoods and municipalities can be even

higher, in particular where the rental market is very thin. In the central neighbourhood of

Madrid for instance, for every 100 rented homes around 40 are used for short-term rentals

(31). The expansion of STRs has evolved from occasional peer-to-peer activity towards a

significant professional and commercial activity in some markets (32), with a high

proportion of multi-property listings in very popular destinations that are experiencing

housing pressures. Inside Airbnb data (33) indicates that the percentage of listings that are

managed by a single entity (host or property manager) with two or more units reached

between 60% and 70% in Barcelona, the South Aegean Islands, Malta, Valencia, for

instance.

The available evidence suggests that the impact of non-primary use of housing differs

significantly across the EU and depends on local housing market conditions. In many

areas the effects may be limited. In others, particularly where housing supply is

constrained and housing demand is strong such as in cities, a large body of evidence,

covering European and US cities, shows that short-term rentals, secondary homes and

other forms of non-primary use contribute to higher housing prices and rents, by reducing

the availability of housing for permanent residential occupation and increasing

competition for an often limited housing stock. As an illustration, a study (34) on the

impact on the Barcelona housing market finds that Airbnb activity is associated with an

increase in rents and prices (186): in a neighbourhood with the average level of Airbnb

listings, rents are 2% and prices are 4.4% higher than in a neighbourhood with no Airbnb

activity. This rises up to 7% for rents and 17% for prices in neighbourhoods in the top

decile of the Airbnb activity distribution. In Europe alone, similar results, albeit with

different magnitudes, have been found in Lisbon, Madrid, Amsterdam, Berlin, Italian

cities and French cities (see Annex 7).

(29) AHA-BIB-38.

(30) There is no official analysis of market shares of the main STR platforms in the EU. Skift Research

estimates that in 2024 Airbnb held around 44% of the global short-term rental market share, followed by

Booking.com with about 18%. Scraped listing data (e.g. AirDNA, InsideAirbnb), industry reports, national

housing and tourism studies, and various internet sources suggest that in countries such as France, Italy

and Spain Airbnb accounts for about 50-60% of STR listings, followed by Booking with 25-35%, Expedia

Group 5–10%, and Tripadvisor in low single digits. The picture is different in Germany and other Central

and Northern European countries, where Airbnb and Booking are estimated to be roughly on par with STR

shares of around 35–45% each. Data on listings might be affected by double counting if a same dwelling

is referenced on several platforms, while data on bookings isn’t.

(31) European Commission calculations, 2025, based on data from the Spanish housing census (2021) and

Inside Airbnb.

(32) While there is no EU-wide definition of professional hosts, Airbnb itself considers an individual host

“when your hosting on Airbnb is only a side activity, or your accommodation is only listed occasionally

on Airbnb, for example when you are away on holiday”. Criteria to determine whether a host is acting as

a business include whether the hosting activity is the primary profession or source of income, the legal

entity of the host, hosting over a longer period of time in order to make a profit, and the number of listings.

It adds “If you’re unsure about your status as a host, we recommend seeking advice from a lawyer or other

professional adviser”. (33) AHA-BIB-134.

(34) AHA-BIB-132.

11

Therefore, while non-primary use of housing is not the root cause of housing stress, it

may aggravate housing pressures in some local markets. As a result, competent

authorities increasingly seek to adopt measures affecting non-primary uses as part of

broader efforts to safeguard housing affordability and preserve housing stock for

residential purposes (see Annexes 8 and 9). At the same time, measures affecting non-

primary use of housing cannot by themselves resolve the underlying causes of housing

shortages. Housing stress ultimately reflects a broader supply-demand mismatch.

Sustainable improvements in housing affordability therefore depend not only on

alleviating demand pressures but also on increasing the supply of housing, including

affordable and social housing.

Competent authorities consequently face a dual challenge: alleviating immediate housing

pressures while addressing the structural constraints affecting housing supply.

Driver 2: Existing EU rules provide legal principles but lack a common operational

framework for assessing and governing housing-related interventions

The second driver is a governance challenge.

Member States remain competent to regulate housing, land use and property markets.

However, measures affecting the provision of services such as short-term rentals, or

investments in real estate may restrict the freedom to provide services, freedom of

establishment or capital movements and must therefore comply with Union law. The

relevant framework is provided by the Treaty (Articles 49 and 56 TFEU), the Services

Directive (35), which applies to restrictions on STRs regardless of whether there is a cross-

border dimension (36) and requires such measures be notified to the European

Commission, and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (including the landmark Cali

Apartments judgment (37). This EU acquis requires such measures to be justified by an

overriding reason in the general interest, non-discriminatory and proportionate.

While the CJEU has recognised that housing affordability may justify restrictions

affecting internal market freedoms (38,39), existing Union law provides only general legal

principles and limited operational direction. The new STR Regulation (40), applicable

since May 2026, creates a harmonised system for STR registration and data sharing.

(35) Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on

services in the internal market.

(36) In the absence of specific secondary legislation on access to STR services, the Services Directive, as

interpreted by the Court of Justice, constitutes the main legal act governing access to, and requirements on,

STR services. The relevant provisions in Chapter III of the Services Directive do not lay down any

condition as to the existence of cross-border interest. In the Visser Judgment of 30 January 2018 (Joined

Cases C-360/15 and C-31/16), the CJEU confirmed that the directive applies to situations even where all

the relevant elements are confined to a single Member State, i.e. where the host and the guest are both

located in the same place without a cross-border dimension.

(37) Judgment of 22 September 2020, Cali Apartments SCI, C-724/18 and C-727/18

(38) Judgment of 30 January 2018, X and Visser, C360/15 and C31/16, EU:C:2018:44, paragraph 135.

(39) See, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 1 October 2009, Woningstichting Sint Servatius, C567/07,

EU:C:2009:593, paragraph 30, and of 8 May 2013, Libert and Others, C197/11 and C203/11,

EU:C:2013:288, paragraphs 50 to 52.

(40) Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on data

collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation.

12

However, it does not determine which substantive restrictions on STR activity are

compatible with Union law.

The European Court of Auditors (41) stated in March 2026 that “the national authorities

in the Member States we visited pointed out that they still lack sufficiently clear guidance

from the Commission regarding the assessment of national regulations for compatibility

with the Services Directive, for example in respect of non-discrimination, necessity and

proportionality of draft national legislation”.

The existing jurisprudence remains limited, case-specific and not sufficiently operational

for the wide range of measures now being adopted across the EU. Because case law

necessarily addresses the facts of individual disputes, it does not establish common

methodologies for identifying housing stress, assessing causal links, defining territorial

scope, determining duration or evaluating effectiveness. There is no common Union

framework for determining when housing stress exists or for documenting the

justification and proportionality of housing-related interventions. As a result, the

assessment of when housing pressures can justify restrictions affecting internal market

freedoms, and whether a specific measure is proportionate, is largely left to a case-by-

case application of general legal principles. Public authorities, especially at local level,

often lack the legal expertise and resources to translate these principles into practice,

including how to demonstrate the existence of housing stress, establish a causal link

between the identified problem and the proposed measure; or show that a measure is

suitable to achieve the objective pursued and that no less restrictive measure would be

equally effective (for more details on the EU legal framework, please refer to Annexes 8

and 9).

As a result, a patchwork of approaches has emerged across the EU internal market aimed

at safeguarding the availability and affordability of housing for local residents. The

divergence concerns both the assessment of housing stress and the design of the measures

adopted in response.

To establish housing stress, several Member States and their authorities at regional and

local level use different concepts, indicators, thresholds, territorial units, data sources and

procedures (cf Annex 10 for further details).

There is also a significant divergence in the nature of the specific measures adopted.

These include restrictions on the acquisition of building land by non-residents,

requirements for a property to serve as habitual residence, limits on the number of

secondary properties permitted, zoning of areas reserved for primary residences, and

restrictions of change of use from residential housing to commercial use (cf Annex 8).

When it comes to regulating STRs, measures include restrictions on rentals other than a

host’s primary residence, maximum thresholds of the number of rental days permitted

per year (with limits ranging from 30 to 120 days per year), spatial planning measures to

limit STRs in specific zones, limits to granting new licenses once STR rentals reach a

defined concentration of the housing stock, and decisions not to grant new STR licenses

or renew existing ones amounting to a de facto ban (for more details, please refer to

Annex 9). To focus measures on the increasingly professionalised or commercialised

nature of STR activity, such regulations do not generally explicitly define “professional”

hosts, but they use proxies such as scale (letting of multiple units), frequency (exceeding

(41) Special report 13/2026: Single market for services, European Court of Auditors.

13

certain thresholds), renting of primary/non-primary residences, or business activity

(licensing regimes for commercial letting, or the host being registered as a business or

deriving regular income).

Many of these differences reflect legitimate local circumstances and should continue to

do so. However, the absence of common procedural rules makes it more difficult for

public authorities to conduct assessments in a transparent, predictable and comparable

manner, subject to public scrutiny. It increases legal uncertainty regarding the conditions

under which interventions are justified and remain proportionate.

Moreover, the existing framework is primarily geared towards the application of legal

principles rather than providing a structured and transparent basis for evidence-based

housing interventions. In their notifications of measures to the Commission, public

authorities consistently raise the lack of dwellings for local residents. However, the

current dialogue between Member States and the Commission thus far has tended to focus

on the legal proportionality of the measure rather than the quantitative and qualitative

necessity.

2.3. Consequences of the problem

The substantive and governance challenges described above have consequences for

public authorities, economic operators, citizens and housing markets in areas under

housing stress.

a) Litigation, compliance costs and reduced predictability

Insufficient legal certainty and the absence of a common operational framework result in

litigation, compliance costs and reduced predictability for public authorities and market

participants.

During the targeted consultation on this initiative, Spain, France and Lithuania, the cities

of Amsterdam, Barcelona, Lisbon and Paris, as well as major cities represented through

the Mayors for Housing Alliance (42), emphasised the importance of reducing the risk of

litigation at European level. The tension between the presumption that authorities act in

the public interest and the compatibility of local regulations with EU internal market rules

has triggered what a legal expert described as “recurrent” legal challenges and

“excessive” litigation across the European Union. The volume of litigation is so high that

it has been described as a factor that “overwhelms national judicial systems” and

undermines the credibility of the regulations themselves (43).

While only several dozen landmark cases have reached the CJEU or national supreme

and constitutional courts, the overall volume of litigation is considerably higher. In the

absence of a centralised European dataset, the Commission estimates that the total

number of cases – including lower court proceedings, administrative appeals and

individual disputes – likely ranges from several hundreds to low thousands across the

(42 ) Mayors from the following cities are members of the alliance: Amsterdam, Athens, Barcelona,

Bologna, Budapest, Copenhagen, Dublin, Florence, Gent, Leipzig, Lisbon, Metropolis of Lyon, Milan,

Paris, Rome, Warsaw and Zagreb.

(43) AHA-BIB-060.

14

Union, with some local regulations generating more than 100 legal cases against a

specific measure (44) (cf Annex 8 and 9).

As for litigation costs, a conservative estimate based on the internal workload of local

authorities and external legal support suggests that the cost of managing legal challenges

against local STR and other non-primary housing restrictions, based on staff time and

external legal costs, may range between EUR 15,000 to over EUR 164,000, depending

on national salary levels, the complexity of the case and the intensity of external legal

support. Where a single local measure generates multiple challenges, as observed in

several STR-related disputes, the cumulative legal and administrative cost for the public

authority could plausibly range from around EUR 0.10-0.17 million for a low-litigation

scenario of 5 cases to EUR 3.35-5.05 million for a high-litigation scenario of 100 cases,

excluding court-system costs, compensation and enforcement delays.

Evidence gathered from major cities experiencing housing stress indicates that the

enforcement and oversight of STR regulations can require substantial administrative

resources, including dedicated enforcement teams, monitoring systems and legal support.

In some cases, authorities reported annual expenditures running into several million euro,

although comparable public data are generally not available. In April 2026, Paris

approved the creation of a 150-person “housing enforcement brigade” dedicated to

enforcement against illegal tourist accommodation, rent control violations, vacant

housing and other housing-related offences. Similarly, Barcelona has established

dedicated inspection activities for tourist accommodation and has recently intensified

cooperation between municipal and regional authorities to increase inspections of

seasonal and tourist rentals.

The Commission, for its part, plays a role both in terms of the Services Directive

notification procedure (45) and through the possibility, as guardian of the Treaties, to open

a mechanism for informal exchanges with a Member State on potential non-compliance

with EU law (“pre-infringement dialogues”), as well as subsequently to initiate an

infringement procedure against a Member State to urge a government to modify/repeal

unfitting rules, and ultimately to refer the issue to the CJEU.

Various measures on STR services introduced by public authorities across the EU

resulted in a number of complaints lodged to the Commission by individual hosts, STR

platforms and associations representing them. Based on these complaints, the

Commission has opened one infringement procedure and three pre-infringement

dialogues. Additionally, several Member States have notified restrictions on STR

(44) AHA-BIB-061: 1/ "as of early 2020, nearly 100 legal cases against the PEUAT had been lodged" before

the High Court of Justice of Catalonia; 2/ Paris had 420 cases pursued by the city against Airbnb hosts for

failure to register and-or respect the 120-night cap applicable to primary residences, with these cases having

been put on hold until the Court of Justice ruled in Cali Apartments.

(45) According to the Services Directive (2006/123/EC), Member States have an obligation to notify

legislative changes affecting the freedom of establishment (Article 15) and the free movement of services

(i.e. temporary cross-border service provision - Articles 16 and 39(5)) either before or (shortly) after their

adoption - to the Commission and to the other Member States. Member States must assess whether the

requirement in question is non-discriminatory (i.e. not directly or indirectly discriminatory with regard to

nationality or place of establishment), justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest and

proportionate (i.e. suitable to achieve the objective pursued, not going beyond what is necessary to attain

the objective and not replaceable by less restrictive means to attain the same objective). The Commission

examines the compatibility of notified requirements with EU law, and may according to Article 15(7) of

the Services Directive, where appropriate, adopt a Decision requesting the notifying Member State to

refrain from adopting the requirements or to abolish already adopted national measures.

15

services to the Commission under the Services Directive. Commission services have

consistently raised concerns about the geographical scope of measures, evidence of

significant inflationary effect of STR activities which could justify restrictive measures,

or the inclusion of main residences. In 2019, the Commission launched an infringement

concerning the Brussels Capital Region framework, questioning the compatibility of the

highly restrictive authorisation system with Union law. That infringement procedure is

currently pending, and the same requirements are the object of a request for a preliminary

ruling by the CJEU (Smartflats case C-813/24) (for more details see Annex 9).

In 2016 and 2018, the Commission offered guidance on how to design proportionate

market access rules and obligations on online platforms, via its Communication on the

collaborative economy (46) and the development of policy principles (47). However,

stakeholders did not consider this sufficient to provide operational certainty regarding

housing-related restrictions, as exemplified by calls for more legal certainty and

transparency coming from the Council (48) and the Parliament (49). On 11 March 2024,

43 MEPs addressed a letter to the European Commission urging it to stop enforcement

actions against local regulations of STRs (50). This followed a letter sent on 20 December

2023 by a coalition of Member States calling for similar action. Mayors of big European

cities have also requested the Commission to stop EU pre-infringement dialogues

regarding their local STR regulations (51) – these Commission enforcement actions are

currently on hold.

The Commission has also received numerous complaints against measures in Member

States to restrict the acquisition and use of housing to preserve access to housing for local

residents, most of which have been resolved in bilateral dialogue with the Member State

in question or remain open. The most frequent complaints concerned various forms of

restrictions on second homes, including quantitative caps, outright prohibitions in certain

areas, and prior authorisation or declaration schemes. The Commission has also been

handling recurring complaints about municipal rules to control access to building land

with a view to giving priority to residents. Other complaints concerned housing

allowances based on residency, building obligations, i.e. obligations to commence or

complete construction within a given period, as well as permanent residence obligations.

Legal uncertainty arises mainly from rules leaving excessive discretion to local

authorities, unclear criteria for authorisations, law amendments with retroactive effects

or variations in administrative practices. Furthermore, the rules and administrative

practices often indirectly disadvantage non-residents from other Member States.

For further details about Commission enforcement activities, please refer to Annex 8 in

the area of capital movements and 9 in the area of STRs.

Although housing markets are local, many housing-related activities have a cross-border

dimension. As a result, legal uncertainty and the resulting compliance and predictability

challenges can affect stakeholders operating across the EU internal market.

(46) AHA-BIB-062.

(47) AHA-BIB-063.

(48) Council Conclusions on ‘The competitiveness of the tourism sector as a driver for sustainable growth,

jobs and social cohesion in the EU for the next decade’ (adopted on 27/05/2019)

(49) AHA-BIB-079.

(50) AHA-BIB-064.

(51) AHA-BIB-058.

16

Short-term rental services are generally offered through online platforms operating across

the Union, and often by hosts established in a different Member State or managing

properties in various EU countries. The Staff Working Document accompanying the

Commission proposal for the STR Regulation estimated that 16.3% of hosts offered STR

services in a Member State other than their country of residence, and 2.5% offered STR

services in more than one Member State. In addition, individuals and investors

increasingly acquire residential property outside their Member State of residence. In

Spain for instance, 13.5% of residential property purchases in the last quarter of 2025

were made by non-nationals. In some provinces, including areas experiencing acute

housing pressures, this share is considerably higher, such as the Balearic Islands (31.5%)

or Santa Cruz de Tenerife (26.4%) (52).

The diversity of national, regional and local approaches may increase information and

compliance costs for economic operators active across different jurisdictions, particularly

where they need to understand and comply with different procedural requirements. This

concerns, for example, STR hosts operating in jurisdictions and online STR platforms

that need to adapt their compliance processes to different national and local requirements

(53, 54, 55), as well as individual buyers and institutional investors engaging in cross-border

property transactions (56, 57). While stakeholders consistently report legal uncertainty and

implementation challenges arising from divergent local approaches (a point emphasised

by STR hosts and platforms during the targeted consultation), there is little empirical

evidence quantifying the extent to which these differences have affected cross-border

activity, investment decisions or market integration.

While some diversity in housing-related measures is inherent to local housing markets

and is expected to remain, the absence of common procedural conditions governing the

justification and proportionality of housing-related interventions is itself a source of legal

uncertainty for competent authorities, economic operators and the Commission when

applying Union law.

b) Risk of less effective and proportionate responses to housing pressures

The absence of a structured framework for assessing housing stress and evaluating

interventions may make it more difficult for competent authorities to identify the most

appropriate, effective and proportionate responses to local housing pressures. This is

exacerbated by the fact that the evidence on the effectiveness of different interventions

varies across locations and depends heavily on local housing market conditions (see

Annex 7).

Even countries that have already introduced criteria to identify areas under housing

pressure, such as Spain and France, called during the targeted consultation for a common

framework that enables Member States to apply proportionate and data-driven housing-

related measures.

(52) AHA-BIB-115.

(53) STR platforms need to build and maintain different technical bridges to talk to various municipal

databases to check if a registration number is still “active” or if a host has exceeded their e.g. 90-day cap.

Most authorisations (like neighbour consent or “change of use” permits) are physical documents in PDF

and including signatures that cannot be automatically verified.

(54) AHA-BIB-075 and AHA-BIB-076.

(55) AHA-BIB-080.

(56) AHA-BIB-190.

(57) AHA-BIB-191.

17

Several studies on EU and non-EU cities show that restrictions on non-primary uses can

lead to lower house prices and rents. A study covering the ban on the construction of new

secondary homes in tourist locations in Switzerland (58) found that the price growth of

primary residences was lowered by 15% whereas the price growth of secondary

residences in the areas affected by the ban increased by 26%. A study conducted on

Lisbon (59) assessed the impact of the partial ban on new STR listings that was

implemented starting in November 2018. It shows that for neighbourhoods targeted by

the ban, one year later real estate prices had decreased by 8% (including a 20% fall in

price of 2-bedroom apartments) – a decrease which was not observed in the adjacent

neighbourhoods not concerned by the ban. These results are not uniform however, and

other studies have shown no reduction in prices or rents, nor spillover effects on

neighbouring areas or unintended effects such as higher local unemployment.

The outcomes of these regulations vary depending on the type of measure implemented,

who is targeted, and most critically they depend on how effectively regulations are

enforced.

Evidence suggests that broader territorial measures may in some circumstances be more

effective, easier to enforce and less prone to generating spillover effects (60,61), although

this must be balanced against legal proportionality requirements which would favour

applying measures only to specific neighbourhoods experiencing tensions on rental

housing (as confirmed by the CJEU in the Cali Apartments ruling).

In practice, the dialogue between public authorities and the Commission has often

focused on the legal proportionality of measures rather than on a structured and

transparent assessment of the justification for action warranted by housing stress, the

contribution of different factors to local housing pressures, the likely effectiveness of

interventions, or the relationship between demand-side and supply-side responses. As a

result, authorities may face difficulties in demonstrating not only that housing pressures

are sufficiently acute to justify intervention, but also that the specific measure is the most

proportionate response to the specific housing challenge identified.

This may reduce the effectiveness of policy responses over time. Authorities may be

reluctant to intervene despite significant housing pressures, or conversely may adopt

measures that are disproportionate and without sufficient evidence regarding their likely

contribution to the objectives pursued. More generally, interventions affecting non-

primary use of housing in isolation from broader efforts to address housing supply

constraints may not strike the balance effectively between housing demand and housing

supply that is required to improve housing affordability.

2.4. How likely is the problem to persist?

In the absence of EU action, the identified challenges of legal uncertainty and governance

are likely to persist and, in some urban centres, tourist destinations and other high-

demand areas, intensify. Housing stress is likely to remain concentrated in areas

characterised by strong housing demand and constrained supply, while public authorities

(58) AHA-BIB-108.

(59) AHA-BIB-149.

(60) AHA-BIB-151.

(61) AHA-BIB-167.

18

continue to seek responses through measures affecting short-term rentals, secondary

homes, vacant dwellings, or other forms of non-primary use of housing. At the same time,

the legal uncertainty surrounding the justification and proportionality of such measures

is likely to persist.

Existing Union law and jurisprudence provide important principles but do not establish

common methodologies for assessing housing stress or demonstrating the justification

and proportionality of interventions. The STR Regulation will significantly improve

registration, data-sharing and enforcement capabilities, but it does not clarify which

substantive measures are compatible with Union law. Public authorities will therefore

continue to face difficulties in demonstrating housing stress, establishing a causal link

between the identified problem and the proposed intervention, assessing the suitability of

measures and demonstrating proportionality. As a result, housing-related restrictions are

likely to remain subject to legal challenge, generating litigation, administrative burden

and compliance costs for both public authorities and economic operators.

Moreover, structural housing supply constraints are likely to continue limiting the

effectiveness of responses focused exclusively on demand-side measures. Although

recent figures suggest some recovery, the number of permits granted remains close to

historical lows and, given the time required for new housing to reach the market, supply

shortages are likely to persist in many areas under housing stress. Evidence collected for

the Staff Working Document accompanying the European Affordable Housing Plan (62)

suggests that public authorities often rely on measures capable of producing more

immediate effects, while longer-term actions aimed at increasing housing supply or better

matching housing demand and supply typically take more time to implement and produce

results.

As a result, without further EU action, competent authorities are likely to continue facing

difficulties in identifying, justifying and designing housing-related interventions in a way

that is compatible with Union law, while also facing challenges in responding

appropriately to housing stress where it is most acute.

3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?

3.1. Legal basis

Member States and their regional and local authorities have the legal competence and are

best placed to determine whether housing pressures exist in their territory, whether

intervention is necessary and which measures are appropriate in light of local housing

market conditions.

In response to housing pressures, competent authorities are adopting a variety of

measures affecting the non-primary use of housing, including authorisation requirements,

registration systems, primary residence requirements, change-of-use rules, restrictions on

property acquisition and other measures (see Annexes 8 and 9). Such measures may affect

individual buyers and institutional investors engaging in cross-border property

transactions, as well as hosts of short-term rental accommodation services and online

platforms, including those operating across several Member States.

(62) AHA-BIB-053.

19

Where such measures affect the freedom to provide services, the freedom of

establishment and the free movement of capital protected by Union law, they must

comply with Union law. The compatibility of such measures with Union law is therefore

already governed by common Union rules and cannot be determined solely at national,

regional or local level.

The initiative does not seek to harmonise housing policy outcomes or determine whether

competent authorities should intervene. Rather, it establishes common procedural

requirements governing housing-related measures affecting internal market freedoms

under Union law. It therefore aims to improve the conditions for the establishment and

functioning of the internal market while fully respecting Member States’ competence

regarding housing policy and the substantive design of housing measures.

Article 114 TFEU provides the legal basis for measures aimed at improving the

establishment and functioning of the internal market. It is therefore the appropriate legal

basis for addressing divergences in procedural requirements governing housing-related

interventions affecting internal market freedoms, thereby improving the consistent

application of Union law.

If the initiative were to be complemented by a Recommendation, then Article 292 TFEU

would be the appropriate legal basis for that part of the package.

3.2. Subsidiarity: necessity and added value of EU action

The need for Union action arises from the governance challenges identified in Section 2.

While housing stress itself reflects local housing market conditions and remains primarily

a matter for Member States and their regional and local authorities, the justification and

proportionality of restrictions affecting internal market freedoms are matters governed

by Union law. The initiative therefore focuses principally on establishing EU-wide

procedural conditions to determine the justification and proportionality of housing-

related interventions, while supporting more effective responses to housing stress within

the limits of Union competence.

As explained in Section 2, public authorities increasingly seek to respond to housing

pressures through divergent measures affecting short-term rentals, secondary homes,

vacant dwellings and other forms of non-primary use of housing which are adapted to the

local housing situation. While Union law provides the legal principles governing such

interventions, it does not provide a common framework for assessing housing stress,

evaluating the necessity and effectiveness of measures, considering the interaction

between demand-side and supply-side responses, or ensuring transparency and review

over time. As a result, public authorities face legal uncertainty, increased litigation risks

and higher administrative and compliance costs.

Existing CJEU jurisprudence remains limited, case-specific and cannot by itself establish

operational conditions applicable across the EU. In different cases analysed in Annex 8

and 9, the Court has consistently rejected measures based on purely economic aims or

broad assumptions, requiring instead precise evidence that the objective set for the

measures is genuinely at risk and that no less restrictive alternatives are available. In

particular, the Cali Apartments judgment confirms that targeted authorisation schemes

for short-term rentals may be lawful where they are supported by evidence of housing

pressure and are limited to the areas and types of housing most affected. The Court

assesses individual disputes brought before it and does not define common indicators,

20

evidentiary standards, review obligations or procedural requirements for competent

authorities. These elements can only be provided through legislative or non-legislative

action at Union level.

Individual Member States are not in a position to establish how restrictions affecting

internal market freedoms should be assessed. Nor can they ensure common standards

regarding evidence, transparency, review and proportionality. Action at Union level is

therefore necessary to establish a coherent framework governing these aspects, as

confirmed during the consultation process (see Annex 2), where public authorities called

for legal certainty for measures from the European Commission, whilst retaining the

ability to respond to local requirements in line with subsidiarity.

The added value of Union action derives from its ability to reconcile local flexibility with

common procedural safeguards that support evidence-based decision-making and ensure

coherence with Union law. Housing markets are inherently local and require responses

adapted to local circumstances. At the same time, measures affecting internal market

freedoms should be subject to shared procedural conditions that improve legal certainty,

transparency and predictability for competent authorities, citizens and economic

operators. Some diversity in housing-related measures will remain, reflecting

subsidiarity, differences in local housing markets, and different policy choices. The

initiative addresses differences in the procedural framework rather than trying to

harmonise substantive housing outcomes, but still thereby improving legal certainty,

transparency and predictability across the internal market. This diversity is reflected even

within Member States. For example, in Germany, federal legislation provides common

criteria for identifying areas under housing stress, while Länder and local authorities

retain discretion in deciding whether to designate such areas and which housing policy

measures to apply, resulting in different responses to similar housing market conditions

(see Annex 10).

Union action would provide added value by establishing common conditions for

identifying housing stress and procedural safeguards governing the assessment,

justification, transparency and review of housing-related interventions.

Importantly, the initiative would not harmonise substantive housing policies or

predetermine the outcome of local decisions. Authorities would remain free to decide

whether intervention is necessary, which measures to adopt and how those measures

should be designed. In practical terms, local authorities would continue to determine the

“what”, while the Union framework would establish common rules regarding the “how”.

The initiative is also proportionate to its objectives. It does not impose specific housing

policies, require authorities to intervene, or establish harmonised restrictions throughout

the Union. Rather, it limits Union action to those elements necessary to establish a joint

framework for assessing, justifying, reviewing and monitoring housing-related

interventions affecting internal market freedoms and the procedural rules necessary to

improve legal certainty and support transparent, evidence-based and proportionate

decision-making. It therefore strikes an appropriate balance between flexibility for local

authorities and coherence in the application of Union law.

21

4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED?

The initiative seeks to address the problem and its two main drivers identified in Section

2. The objectives are presented in an order that reflects the two problem drivers identified

in Section 2 and the areas where Union action can add the greatest value. The initiative

primarily addresses the governance challenge while also supporting competent

authorities in responding to housing pressures.

Consistent with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the objectives focus on

improving the framework within which housing-related interventions are assessed, while

preserving local discretion regarding housing policy choices.

General Objective 1: To improve legal certainty, transparency and predictability

regarding the compatibility with Union law of housing-related measures affecting

the internal market.

This objective addresses the governance challenge identified in Section 2. It seeks to

improve legal certainty, transparency and predictability by establishing common

procedural requirements for identifying areas under housing stress (SO 1.1.), and

assessing, within those areas, the proportionality of specific interventions on short-term

rentals or the acquisition and use of housing affecting internal market freedoms (SO 1.2.).

• Specific Objective 1.1: Ensure that areas under are identified by using

common, evidence-based and transparent criteria to determine when

housing affordability and availability can justify public intervention. This

objective seeks to ensure a consistent and transparent approach to identifying

housing stress, which could justify restrictions to the single market, while

preserving flexibility to reflect local housing market conditions.

• Specific Objective 1.2: Establish common procedural requirements

governing the proportionality of specific housing-related interventions

affecting the internal market.

This objective seeks to improve legal certainty regarding the conditions under

which specific housing-related measures liable to affect the internal market

freedoms (establishment, services, capital) may be adopted, maintained, reviewed

22

and withdrawn, while ensuring that they are necessary, proportionate and limited

to what is required to address identified housing pressures.

General Objective 2: To ensure that restriction to the internal market are

proportionate and measure of last resort by providing a common methodological

approach that encourages public authorities to consider both demand-side

measures and housing supply, within the limits of EU competence. This objective

addresses the substantive challenge identified in Section 2, within the limits of Union

competence. It recognises that housing pressures reflect local supply-demand imbalances

and that restrictions affecting non-primary uses of housing, which are focussed on

demand, cannot generally resolve housing shortages on their own.

• Specific Objective 2.1: To support competent authorities in identifying

appropriate measures to increase housing supply in and around areas under

housing stress. This objective seeks to support competent authorities in

identifying and considering supply-side measures adapted to local circumstances,

while leaving decisions on the choice, design and implementation of such

measures entirely to the competent authorities concerned.

5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS?

5.1. What is the baseline from which options are assessed?

The baseline for this initiative would be a no-policy-change scenario, assuming the

continuation of relevant EU and national measures already in force, while also taking into

account Commission initiatives already announced with an impact on housing. In this

case, that baseline would include the implementation of the European Affordable

Housing Plan (except the action related to the Affordable Housing Act), and the

continuation of national, regional and local housing measures adopted by Member States

and local authorities in response to mounting housing pressures.

The baseline scenario also includes the application since May 2026 of Regulation (EU)

2024/1028 on short-term rental data collection and sharing, which the Commission will

facilitate by providing guidance in Q3 2026 on some of the implementation concerns

raised by public authorities and stakeholders.

5.2. Description of the policy options

In addition to the baseline, three policy options have been identified to pursue the

objectives identified in Section 4. While the options share common elements, they differ

considerably in terms of the nature and degree of EU intervention.

5.2.1. Policy Option 1 – Soft EU intervention and non-legislative approach

Under this option, the Commission would offer a non-legislative approach to assist

Member States and their competent authorities, advising them on how to identify areas

in which housing pressures are particularly significant, clarifying the legal principles

under existing EU law applicable to certain restrictions on non-primary housing in those

areas, and offering practical guidance and best practices on measures to increase supply.

The application of this approach would be voluntary and its uptake would depend entirely

on public authorities, without any obligation to notify or even publish their assessment,

23

comply with specific rules to ensure proportionality, or periodically review their

decisions. It would not establish common procedural requirements, require the

publication of evidence, ensure periodic review or create binding standards applicable to

all competent authorities. Because the guidance would be non-binding, competent

authorities would remain free to depart from it and there would be no mechanism to

ensure consistent application across the Union.

The practical guidance would take the form of a Commission Communication or

Commission notice.

Key components of this non-binding option:

a. Guidance on identifying areas under housing stress, encouraging Member

States/competent authorities to use a set of proposed indicators to understand if any

of their territories are under housing stress. The guidance would recommend data

sources and data collection methods, definitions and best practices for monitoring

compliance. Under this option, there would be no obligation to notify the

Commission, or to publish data and methodologies, and no centralised EU approval

process as competent authorities would self-assess based on the guidance. The

guidance would help competent authorities to identify areas under housing stress

using a transparent, evidence-based approach, easy to implement across all Member

States and respecting the diversity of local housing markets. It would recommend

following a two-tier approach based on a headline indicator to screen housing

affordability stress (Tier1), and a list of additional indicators (Tier2) to cater for local

contexts (further details under Section 5.2.2. and in Annex 4).

• Tier 1 – Harmonised screening: Where the price-to-income ratio, defined as the

average transaction price of a dwelling in the area over the disposable income (63),

is equal to or exceeds a specific threshold; and where the price-to-income ratio

has increased over the period of the preceding ten years. PTI identifies emerging

affordability pressures before they materialise in household expenditure and is

available consistently across Member States. It provides a comparable basis for

EU-wide territorial pre-screening. The data will be available on Mapadomo, a

Commission built regional housing database which includes granular data on

housing stocks and transaction prices.

• Tier 2 – Structured local assessment: Additional indicators demonstrating that

housing stress is unlikely to ease, such as increased population over the last 3

years, or other indicators linked to supply and demand pressures. Competent

authorities would be encouraged to choose the relevant indicators and thresholds

to demonstrate housing stress based on publicly available data and to define the

territorial scope of the designated area as narrowly as the available evidence

allows.

The proposed approach would capture complementary dimensions of housing stress:

affordability pressure (through PTI ratio and its change over the previous ten years)

(63) The choice of PTI ratio as affordability indicator allows to identify areas under housing stress in all

Member States using existing and comparable data. Using the average transaction price of a dwelling at

NUTS3 level balances data availability with the need to capture regional price structures and the actual

characteristics of the dwellings being sold in each market, which may differ substantially between urban,

rural and tourist areas.

24

and the potential causes or aggravating factors through demographic dynamics, and

other supply and demand trends.

b. Guidance to assess and document the justification, proportionality and non-

discrimination of specific measures that may affect the free movement of services

or freedom of establishment (e.g. restrictions on STR) or free movement of capital

(e.g. restrictions on housing acquisition or use). The guidance would draw on

existing EU jurisprudence, including Cali Apartments (C-346/20) and other relevant

housing-related CJEU rulings (see Annexes 8 and 9), as well as the Commission’s

assessment of the justification and proportionality of specific measures that have

been notified by Member States in the past. It would build on the June 2016 legal

guidance “A European agenda for the collaborative economy”, which recommended

that Member States’ restrictions should be limited to situations when it is necessary

to meet public interest objectives while avoiding complete bans, and establishing

thresholds for professional activity. The guidance could illustrate factors that

competent authorities may consider when assessing the contribution of different

forms of short-term rental activity to local housing pressures, for example how to

ensure that measures taken are not too restrictive, how to distinguish occasional

home-sharing from other forms of STR activity that are more likely to remove

dwellings from the long-term housing market. This could cover factors such as

whether the dwelling is the host’s primary residence, the number of units operated,

the intensity of the activity, or the commercial nature of the activity. The guidance

would be an interpretative communication of current Union law and not alter any of

the current obligations under the Services Directive (e.g. notification to the

Commission).

c. Guidance on measures to improve housing supply. The guidance would include

best practices in increasing the supply of affordable and social housing in Member

States, in or near areas under housing stress, including topics such as assessing

housing needs and shortages; mobilising land and existing buildings; improving

planning, permitting and administrative capacity; and identifying funding and

investment needs.

Compliance, monitoring and enforcement: This option would not establish any new

compliance, monitoring or enforcement obligations. Competent authorities would remain

free to decide whether to follow the guidance and would continue to be subject only to

existing obligations under Union law. The Commission would continue to assess relevant

measures through existing mechanisms (64), including notification procedures where

applicable, complaints handling and enforcement action under the Treaties. Because the

guidance would be non-binding, there would be no mechanism to ensure its consistent

application across the Union.

5.2.2. Policy Option 2 – Legislative initiative containing common criteria to

identify stressed housing areas, conditions to apply restrictions and non-

legislative recommendations on supply

Under PO2, the Commission would propose a Regulation establishing a common but

flexible framework for competent authorities in Member States that choose to designate

(64) Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on

services in the internal market, OJ L 376, 27.12.2006.

25

areas under housing stress and adopt restrictions on non-primary use of housing in those

areas for reasons linked to housing affordability. The option would not oblige Member

States or competent authorities to designate areas under housing stress or adopt housing-

related restrictions. However, where they chose to do so, their action should be based on

objective, transparent, and verifiable criteria, proportionality safeguards and review

obligations established under the Regulation.

A Regulation would ensure that all obligations would be directly applicable in a uniform

way across the EU, without the need for national transposition measures, reducing the

risk of fragmentation in how the assessment, designation, and review are carried out. The

legislative proposal would cover points a) and b) below, complemented by a

Recommendation on improving affordability and supply in areas under housing stress

(point c).

The package would cover the following key measures:

a. Common rules on designating areas under stress: The Regulation would not

impose an obligation to monitor housing affordability levels or designate areas under

stress but would establish a common framework for those who decide to do so.

Competent authorities in Member States (at national, regional or local level in

accordance with Member States internal governance) willing to designate an area

under housing stress, would be required by the Regulation to do so based on objective

criteria and evidence, while ensuring that such designations remain targeted, subject

to transparency requirements and regular review. The harmonised criteria would

include the requirements for competent authorities to:

• clearly identify the geographical boundaries of the area under housing stress,

while leaving the precise territorial scope for decision by competent authorities;

• ensure that policy interventions are targeted to the areas where housing pressures

are effectively demonstrated;

• limit the duration of the designation and review it at least every [three] years; and

• publish the methodology and underlying data within [three] months of any

designation of an area under housing stress, including the measures adopted in

relation to the area under housing stress.

As presented in PO1, the overall framework logic of the proposed approach would be

to identify areas under housing stress using a transparent, evidence-based approach

which is easy to implement across all Member States while respecting the diversity

of local housing markets. The designation of areas under housing stress would not be

limited to the strict boundaries of a municipality but would leave open the opportunity

to include commuting zones or a wider area (e.g. functional urban areas).

The framework would harmonise the methodology rather than the outcome.

Competent authorities would apply a common two-step approach: Tier 1 provides a

harmonised affordability screening, while Tier 2 supplements that screening with

objective evidence reflecting local housing-market conditions.

• Tier 1 – Harmonised screening: Where the price-to-income ratio, defined as the

average transaction price of a dwelling in the area over the disposable income (65),

(65) The choice of PTI ratio as affordability indicator allows to identify areas under housing stress in all

Member States using existing and comparable data. Using the average transaction price of a dwelling at

26

is equal to or exceeds a specific threshold (defined in the legal proposal and that

could be subsequently amended via delegated act); and where the price-to-income

ratio has increased over the period of the preceding ten years. The indicator

provides a comparable basis for EU-wide screening and is available consistently

across Member States. Access to the required data would be ensured through the

Commission’s Mapadomo database (which provides housing transaction prices at

the NUTS3 level) combined with disposable income data at NUTS2 level from

Eurostat, together with the necessary historical series. NUTS3 represents an

appropriate balance between territorial granularity, comparability and statistical

robustness. Where reliable and comparable data are available at a more granular

level, competent authorities could use those data together with the corresponding

NUTS 2 disposable income.

• Tier 2 – Structured local assessment: In addition to the common screening,

competent authorities would be required to assess objective local evidence

reflecting the specific drivers of housing stress, such as population growth, or

supply and demand trends. The territorial scope of designations could be as

narrow as the available evidence allows. Tier 2 would remain deliberately less

prescriptive, allowing competent authorities to select appropriate indicators and

define thresholds based on publicly available data, while requiring that the

evidence used be objective, recent, geographically relevant and transparently

documented. Relevant data may include for example official demographic and

housing-stock data, building and planning information, vacancy data, rental-

market information and short-term rental activity. Data made available pursuant

to Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 will strengthen the evidence available for the Tier

2 assessment. Information on the location of units, the number of nights booked

and the number of guests will help competent authorities assess the geographical

concentration and intensity of short-term rental activity more systematically and

better determine whether it may contribute to local housing pressures. The data

stemming from Regulation 2024/1028 would complement, rather than replace,

other local evidence on housing supply, demand and affordability.

The Commission would support implementation by making Tier 1 data available

through Mapadomo and providing practical guidance on the application of the

common methodology.

The effectiveness of the methodology would not require equivalent local datasets in

every Member State. Comparability would be ensured through the common Tier 1

screening, while Tier 2 would provide locally relevant evidence subject to common

requirements of objectivity, transparency and verifiability.

These criteria would operationalise the concept of affordable housing as an overriding

reason relating to the public interest, recognised by the CJEU as a possible

justification for restrictions affecting the internal market, by establishing common

criteria for identifying areas under housing stress.

b. Rules on the introduction of non-primary housing restrictions in stressed areas.

NUTS3 level balances data availability with the need to capture regional price structures and the actual

characteristics of the dwellings being sold in each market, which may differ substantially between urban,

rural and tourist areas.

27

Once the criteria under a) justifying a public intervention are met, these new legal

provisions would help competent authorities determine whether the specific planned

measures are proportionate and compatible with EU internal market rules.

The framework could distinguish between occasional home-sharing and more

professional or commercial forms of short-term rental activity, either through a

property-based or host-based approach, in order to limit restrictions to STR activities

most likely to remove (or keep) properties from the housing market. These hosts

could be defined either

• based on whether the property is an entire dwelling that is not the host’s primary

residence, codifying the Cali Apartments CJEU ruling which confirms that the

letting of a host’s main residence does not generally remove housing from the

long-term market and should therefore be treated differently from forms of short-

term rental activity that involve the use of housing stock that is not used as

primary residence;

• or by means of a distinction of natural and legal person and the level of activity

(e.g. number of units and/or nights per year), as suggested in reaction to an

observed professionalisation and commercialisation of STR activity (66).

Section 6 assesses the impact of these two possible property-based versus host-based

definitions. In both cases, the framework would not prevent competent authorities

from adopting less restrictive approaches where justified by local circumstances.

Competent authorities would retain the discretion to exempt additional categories of

properties or hosts beyond this minimum safeguard, provided that such exemptions

are consistent with the objectives of the measure. For example, an authority could

decide to exclude certain categories of non-primary housing, such as secondary

residences, even where these categories could lawfully be covered by restrictions

under the Regulation.

Two alternative approaches are considered under component b):

o b1 – substantive harmonisation: A list of market access requirements and other

measures that would be permitted in areas under housing stress because they are

deemed proportionate, as well as measures that are not permitted under any

circumstance.

The list of requirements deemed proportionate in areas under housing stress

could codify existing CJEU jurisprudence (e.g. prior authorisation requirement

for change of use from a permanent residential home to tourist accommodation,

requirements making the acquisition of land or of a dwelling subject to prior

declaration that the property will be used as a principal residence by the owner

or tenant) as well as some frequently applied measures such as STR night caps

or zoning systems designating territories for residential use only.

Sub-option b1 could also set out a list of measures that cannot under any

circumstance be deemed justified, proportionate and non-discriminatory could

include unlimited (in time) bans on STRs, or authorisation requirements for non-

residents to buy property without clear objective criteria.

o b2 – procedural harmonisation:

(66) AHA-BIB-078.

28

Under this alternative sub-option, rather than establishing a list of measures that

are deemed permissible or prohibited, the Regulation would establish a common

framework governing how competent authorities assess, justify, adopt, review

and withdraw housing-related interventions affecting the non-primary use of

housing.

Before introducing a restriction, competent authorities would be required to carry

out and publish an assessment demonstrating that the measure is necessary,

proportionate and non-discriminatory in accordance with these new harmonised

Union rules.

Where an area has been designated as being under housing stress in accordance

with the common criteria described under point (a), restrictions affecting the non-

primary use of housing could be adopted to safeguard the availability and

affordability of housing, provided that a number of conditions are met. In

particular, measures would need to be limited to the designated area, subject to

periodic review, and withdrawn where the conditions justifying the intervention

are no longer fulfilled.

Competent authorities would be required to demonstrate, on the basis of objective

evidence, the contribution of the activity concerned to local housing pressures

and the necessity of the proposed intervention.

The framework would further require competent authorities to demonstrate that

relevant transparency, registration and enforcement mechanisms established

under Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 are effectively applied before introducing

restrictions affecting STR activity.

To ensure proportionality and that restrictions be a measure of last resort,

competent authorities would be required to assess restrictive measures in the

context of broader housing market conditions and existing efforts to address

housing shortages. It would not impose mandatory housing investment

obligations or supply-side measures. The choice, design and implementation of

any supply measures would be left to public authorities by virtue of subsidiarity,

although it is hoped that the Commission recommendations would be a source of

inspiration.

c. Recommendations to Member States to improve housing supply

Under this policy option, the legislative elements under a) and b) would be

complemented by a Recommendation encouraging specific measures to improve

affordability and supply in areas under housing stress, with a focus on social and

affordable housing. While the Regulation would establish procedural requirements

ensuring that restrictions are assessed in the context of broader housing supply

considerations, the Recommendation would provide voluntary guidance on measures

to increase housing supply.

The Recommendation would not prescribe specific supply-side measures or require

concrete budgetary commitments, and the choice of appropriate measures would

remain with competent authorities. It would remain non-binding, primarily providing

examples of supply-side measures that authorities may consider, such as such as the

uptake of modern methods of construction, land acquisition and management,

repurposing, renovation, better use of vacant and underused buildings, refurbishing

of existing building stock, brownfield development, as well as streamlined planning

and permitting based on existing evidence and good practices in Member States.

29

Compliance, monitoring and enforcement: Competent authorities would be required

to publish the evidence, methodology, territorial scope and duration underlying the

designation of housing stress areas, the adoption of measures and their renewal, including

the justification supporting the necessity and proportionality (including the adoption or

maintenance of supply-side measures).

The policy option would de facto constitute a lex specialis to the Services Directive for

STR restrictions, and secondary legislation to the Treaty for housing measures affecting

capital movements. It is the basis against which the Commission would assess

compliance of housing-related measures with Union law. Any STR authorisation

requirements or other market access restrictions outside an area under housing stress (or

in an area under stress for other public interest reasons than housing e.g. consumer

protection, protection of the urban environment, social policy objectives, or protection of

national historical and artistic heritage) would still fall under the Services Directive.

Measures complying with the Regulation would not be subject to the notification

procedures currently applicable under the Services Directive. The exemption from the

current notification requirement would not require amending the Services Directive. The

objective would not be to reduce scrutiny but to change its form. Compliance would be

ensured through transparency obligations, publication requirements, periodic review,

complaints mechanisms and judicial review.

The Commission would retain its role as guardian of EU law, including the assessment

of complaints and engagement with Member States where concerns regarding

compliance arise. The approach is similar in governance terms to the General Block

Exemption Regulation in State aid. The EU lays down common conditions under which

Member States can act without prior Commission approval. Compliance is ensured

through transparency, national judicial review, complaints and the Commission's

enforcement role, rather than through ex ante authorisation. The initiative would

introduce transitional provisions requiring competent authorities to review existing

national, regional and local measures, align them with the new framework within a

defined period after entry into force and, if maintained, review them at the intervals

defined in the legal text of the initiative.

5.2.3. Policy Option 3 – Legislative initiative with mandatory harmonised

criteria, EU-wide market access and other requirements, and housing

plans

This option would go beyond establishing a common framework for assessing and

justifying housing-related interventions and instead introduce harmonised substantive

requirements at Union level. It would include more uniform rules on short-term rentals,

stronger obligations regarding housing supply and more extensive duties for Member

States and competent authorities. It therefore represents the most interventionist form of

EU action considered in this Impact Assessment, reflecting calls from some stakeholders

for stronger EU action.

Under this option, a legislative initiative would be proposed, requiring Member States to

regularly assess housing affordability across their geographical territories. Member

States would be required to carry out this assessment based on indicators and thresholds

harmonised in the legislative proposal. Meeting the thresholds would trigger mandatory

designation of an area under housing stress and the obligation to prepare a housing

30

acceleration plan, detailing how housing supply would be increased in the area

throughout the designation period.

The choice of legal instrument would likely be a Directive, since the obligations would

be addressed only to Member States and it would be for Member States to establish

national housing plans and to adopt any related measure in national law to increase the

supply of affordable and social housing. Member States would also need to adopt

implementing national measures on non-primary use of housing in areas under housing

stress taking into account national circumstances.

Compared with PO2, this option would significantly reduce Member State discretion

regarding both the identification of housing stress and the choice of measures used to

address it.

This option would include the following key measures:

a) Mandatory assessment by Member States of areas under housing stress against

indicators and thresholds centrally defined at EU level. Member States would be

required to assess housing affordability regularly using harmonised indicators and

thresholds established at Union level described under PO2 and in Annex 4. Where the

thresholds are met, the area would have to be designated as being under housing stress.

The designation would trigger obligations to notify the Commission and prepare a

housing acceleration plan addressing both demand-side and supply-side measures.

b) EU-wide harmonised rules on non-primary use of housing in areas under housing

stress. Rather than leaving the choice of restrictions to competent authorities subject

to common proportionality requirements, the proposal would establish harmonised

Union-level rules governing certain forms of non-primary use of housing in areas

under housing stress. It could establish common thresholds on the amount of rental

nights and units permitted per STR host (e.g. EU-wide 120 day limit for STR lettings

and prohibition to let more than two units), and imposing change-of-use authorisation

requirements and other measures to limit housing being used for purposes other than

primary residence. The STR restrictions would be limited to certain activities (defined,

as under PO2, either based on the property – an entire dwelling that is not the host’s

primary residence – or by means of a distinction of natural and legal person and the

level of activity).

c) Mandatory planning obligations linked to supply. The national housing plans

described under a) would have to detail measures planned to increase the supply of

affordable and social housing, be it through new build or a better use of the existing

building stock, as well as steps to accelerate planning and permitting for housing

acceleration projects. This obligation would reinforce the temporary nature of

restriction measures as a short-term solution until housing supply is improved. These

housing plans would build on the concept of acceleration areas known from the

Renewable Energy Directivei67, the Net Zero Industry Act (68), the Critical Raw

(67) Directive (EU) 2023/2413 as regards the promotion of energy from renewable source, https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj/eng.

(68) Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-

zero technology manufacturing ecosystem, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj.

31

Materials Act (69) and the proposal for an Industrial Accelerator Act (70). The

Commission would provide a template to assist Member States in drawing up these

housing plans.

Compliance, monitoring and enforcement: PO3 is based on notification requirements

and systematic verification at EU level. Member States would have to submit their draft

plans; the Commission would assess them and issue recommendations that Member

States would be required to take into account before finalising their plans. It would

introduce transitional provisions requiring Member States to review existing national,

regional and local measures and align them with the new framework within a defined

period after entry into force.

5.3. Options discarded at an early stage

The following options were discarded at an early stage.

- Designation of areas under housing stress by the Commission: Under this option,

based on suggestions made by major cities, competent authorities wishing to have an

area recognised as under housing stress would prepare and submit a supporting

dossier based on the indicators, data sources and methodologies they deem

appropriate, while the final assessment and designation would be carried out by the

Commission.This would create a more centralised system while giving competent

authorities maximum flexibility to cater for local conditions. However, it would be

difficult for the Commission to assess local housing circumstances across the Union

with the level of granularity required to support effective and proportionate

interventions. The option would also raise significant subsidiarity concerns and

would likely face strong resistance from Member States. In addition, it would place

a disproportionate administrative burden on the Commission with considerable

financial implications.

- Regulatory measures to increase consumer protection specifically in the STR

sector: The Commission has been made aware about concerns, raised in studies as

well as during the targeted consultation, about a lack of level playing field between

STR hosts and traditional accommodation providers that have to comply with stricter

quality, safety and insurance requirements (71,72), as well as the risk of discriminatory

booking practices (73). The Commission however discarded early on the option of

introducing new rules on consumer protection in the field of STRs since these aspects

are already subject to regulation under building codes in the Member States as well

as the robust EU legislative acquis which provides for strict consumer and user

protection across sectors (notably the Consumer Rights Directive, Unfair

Commercial Practices Directive, Unfair Contract Terms Directive, General Data

Protection Regulation, Digital Services Act, Artificial Intelligence Act, Alternative

(69) Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of

critical raw materials, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj.

(70) COM(2026)100 - Proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework of measures for accelerating

industrial capacity and decarbonisation in strategic sectors.

(71) AHA-BIB-078.

(72) It should be noted, however, that purely economic objectives, such as the protection of competitors or

ensuring the economic basis of specific categories of providers, do not constitute an overriding reason

relating to the public interest (judgment of 22 December 2010 in case C-338/09, Yellow Cab.

Verkehrsbetrieb, para 51).

(73) AHA-BIB-078.

32

Dispute Resolution Directive and the Representative Action Directive). The

Commission also plans to present a Digital Fairness Act to fill the identified gaps and

strengthen consumer protection in the digital environment, complementing existing

EU legislation.

6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS?

The policy options are assessed against the problem definition and the objectives set out

in Sections 2 and 4. Under all options, the direct addressees are Member States and

their competent authorities.

However, the initiative does not directly regulate housing supply, rents, prices or the

operation of short-term rentals. Its direct impacts therefore concern the legal and

operational framework within which competent authorities identify areas under housing

stress and assess the necessity and proportionality of measures affecting the non-primary

use of housing. While differences in local measures will remain, they would be adopted

within a more predictable and transparent procedural framework.

It is important to note that the initiative does not introduce an entirely new assessment

obligation. Competent authorities are already required under Union law to assess

whether measures affecting internal market freedoms are justified, proportionate and

non-discriminatory and, where applicable, to notify draft measures pursuant to the

Services Directive.

This assessment focuses primarily on the direct impacts of the initiative on legal

certainty, transparency and predictability in the application of Union law governing

housing-related interventions affecting the internal market. These are the areas directly

affected by the initiative.

The assessment also focuses on the extent to which each policy option is expected to

improve legal certainty and reduce avoidable grounds for litigation by clarifying the

applicable procedural requirements. However, the impact on the number of future

complaints and court proceedings cannot be quantified.

Impacts on housing affordability and availability, tourism, SMEs and local communities

are indirect and depend on subsequent decisions by competent authorities. The

assessment therefore distinguishes between direct impacts on public authorities and

indirect impacts on affected stakeholder groups, as well as between impacts that can be

assessed more directly – particularly those relating to legal certainty and the functioning

of the internal market – and indirect impacts that remain dependent on local

implementation and market responses.

None of the policy options is expected to have a direct impact on housing

affordability at Union level. Any affordability effects, such as reducing pressure on

rents and purchase prices or improving access for residents (e.g. essential workers), are

indirect and localised, and depend on the adoption and enforcement of housing-related

measures within areas designated under housing stress, the severity of housing stress, the

characteristics of local housing markets and the extent to which such measures are

accompanied by actions to increase housing supply.

Whenever possible, economic, social and environmental impacts have been assessed

quantitatively using the data sources listed in the footnotes and Annex 12. However,

33

much of the available evidence relates to specific cities, regions or measures and focuses

on selected impacts. While these studies provide useful indications regarding the

direction and possible magnitude of effects, their findings cannot be extrapolated

directly to all local housing markets across the Union. Most impacts are therefore

assessed qualitatively, because they depend on future choices by competent authorities,

including whether areas are designated as under housing stress, which measures are

adopted or amended, how local housing, tourism and investment markets respond, and

whether accompanying supply-side measures are pursued. For this reason, the assessment

does not rely on weak quantitative estimates where these would be misleading but instead

provides a qualitative comparison of the policy options while acknowledging the

uncertainty attached to impacts that depend on local implementation.

6.1. Crosscutting spillover impacts

All policy options may generate spillover effects where measures adopted in designated

areas affect neighbouring non-designated areas. Such effects may arise through the

relocation of STR activity and other forms of non-primary housing demand, shifts in

tourism demand towards other forms of accommodation or neighbouring municipalities,

or changes in housing demand and prices across functional housing markets. The

available evidence on spillover effects is limited and highly context-specific and cannot

be extrapolated across the Union. Some studies referenced in Section 2.1. and Annexes

8 and 9 identify displacement of activity towards neighbouring areas, while others find

little or no measurable effect. The magnitude and direction of any spillovers depend on

local housing and tourism market conditions, transport links, labour mobility, housing

supply constraints, enforcement practices and the specific measures adopted by

competent authorities.

Spillovers may be both positive and negative. They may contribute to a more balanced

distribution of tourism and investment towards areas with spare housing or tourism

capacity, or conversely transfer housing pressures to neighbouring areas. The table below

summarises the expected direction and relative likelihood of such effects under each

policy option.

Table 1: Potential spillover impacts by Policy Option

Potential

spillover

Likelihood and potential (positive/negative) impacts

PO1 PO2 PO3

STR

displacement

LOW - Any displacement

depends entirely on

whether competent

authorities choose to adopt

restrictions.

LOW/MEDIUM - Better

territorial targeting,

evidence requirements and

review could redirect some

STR activity towards areas

without housing stress.

MEDIUM -

Restrictions and plans

may displace STR

activity more sharply,

producing positive

spillover if the

displacement is

directed to areas with

spare housing,

tourism or

infrastructure

capacity.

34

Shift of housing

demand

LOW - Housing demand

and investment may

continue as competent

authorities adopt different

housing-related measures

reflecting local

circumstances. The

absence of common

procedural requirements

means that legal

uncertainty and differences

in the assessment of

restrictions would largely

persist.

LOW - Demand may shift

towards neighbouring areas

where STR / second home

investment opportunities

remain available. Positive

spillovers may arise where

demand is redirected

towards areas with greater

housing capacity and lower

affordability pressures.

MEDIUM - More

extensive restrictions,

could encourage a

greater shift of

investment and

second-home demand

towards neighbouring

areas, areas not

designated under

housing stress or

other Member States.

Tourism

demand shifts

to hotels or

neighbouring

municipalities

LOW - Some tourism

demand may be

redistributed to areas with

spare capacity, but with

limited positive impact

MEDIUM - Visitor

demand may shift to hotels

or neighbouring

municipalities, with

possible pressure on hotel

capacity or local services if

they have limited capacity

to absorb the increased

demand.

Potential positive spillover

for areas with available

tourism capacity and

infrastructure.

MEDIUM-HIGH -

Tourism-related

adjustment would be

stronger because of

substantive

requirements

introduced.

Price/rent

effects in

adjacent areas

LOW - If restrictions are

adopted in some areas but

not others, adjacent areas

may face higher demand

pressure.

LOW-MEDIUM -

Adjacent areas may see

rent or price pressure

increase, particularly where

they form part of the same

functional housing market,

if displaced STR, investor

or resident demand

concentrates there, and

mitigation measures are

not adopted.

HIGH - Adjacent

areas could

experience stronger

upward pressure on

rents and prices if

displaced demand

concentrates there,

although positive

effect may arise

where housing

capacity is

underutilised.

Spillover effects remain possible under all policy options but cannot be robustly

quantified ex ante because they depend on local housing and tourism market conditions

and future implementation choices by competent authorities. PO2 is expected to mitigate

unnecessary spillovers more effectively than PO1 by promoting targeted interventions on

common evidence and procedural safeguards, while PO3 could increase spillover effects

through more extensive and systematic restrictions.

More broadly, the initiative may support a more sustainable territorial distribution of

tourism, in coherence with the Commission’s upcoming Sustainable Tourism Strategy

(74). Where competent authorities adopt targeted measures in the most pressured areas,

some tourism demand and related activity may shift towards less-pressured areas. The

(74) AHA-BIB-065.

35

magnitude and direction of these effects would depend on the measures chosen locally,

the availability of alternative accommodation and transport connections, and the capacity

of neighbouring areas to absorb additional demand without aggravating housing, social

or environmental pressures.

6.2. Policy Option 0: Baseline – no further EU action

The baseline is a no-policy-change scenario, assuming the continued application of

existing Union law, including the Treaty freedoms, the Services Directive, CJEU

jurisprudence, and Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 on STR data collection and sharing. It

also assumes the implementation of the Affordable Housing Plan, except for the

Affordable Housing Act itself.

The baseline therefore includes forthcoming and ongoing implementation of the actions

under the EAHP on investment, construction, State aid, housing data, simplification and

housing supply. While these initiatives are expected to contribute to addressing the

broader housing crisis, their impacts cannot be quantified in this impact assessment as

most remain under preparation and will be subject to separate impact assessments. In any

event, they do not directly address the specific problem assessed here (see section 2.1),

but are complementary (see Annex 11).

Without any further EU action, the drivers identified in Section 2 are likely to persist.

Housing pressures are expected to remain concentrated in a number of urban areas,

metropolitan regions, islands and tourist destinations, while the Commission analysis

prepared for the EAHP (75) and opinion polls (76) indicate that public authorities are likely

to continue adopting a diverse range of measures affecting the non-primary use of

housing. Although Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 will improve transparency and data

availability on STRs, strengthening the evidence on the basis of which public authorities

may take housing-related measures, it does not clarify the conditions under which these

restrictions are justified and proportionate under Union law.

The baseline would leave unchanged the current diversity of national, regional and local

approaches, including differences in methodologies, evidentiary standards, procedural

requirements and review practices. Public authorities would continue to rely primarily on

general Treaty principles, the Services Directive and case-specific Court judgments when

designing housing-related interventions, without common indicators, methodologies or

procedural safeguards applicable across the Union. As a result, legal uncertainty,

litigation risks and compliance costs are likely to persist.

Under the baseline scenario, competent authorities are already required to demonstrate

that housing-related restrictions affecting internal market freedoms are justified,

necessary, proportionate and non-discriminatory under Union law. Where the Services

Directive applies, draft measures must also be notified through the Internal Market

Information (IMI) system.

There are no available data on the current administrative costs incurred by competent

authorities when assessing whether housing-related restrictions affecting internal market

freedoms comply with Union law. Nor has the Commission established a standard cost

(75) AHA-BIB-053.

(76) AHA-BIB-051.

36

for preparing the justification and proportionality assessments that accompany measures

notified under the Services Directive. In the absence of such evidence, the estimates

below provide an indicative proxy for the staff resources that may currently be required

by authorities choosing to introduce housing-related restrictions.

Indicative administrative effort associated with preparing housing-related

interventions under the baseline scenario

As no systematic data exist on the resources required to prepare such assessments,

Commission services developed an indicative staff-cost proxy drawing on publicly

available information regarding the analytical work undertaken by authorities in cities

such as Lisbon and Barcelona. These examples illustrate the type of analytical, legal

and evidential work currently required when competent authorities seek to justify

housing-related restrictions under Union law. They do not constitute a representative

sample.

Based on indicative staff costs and an assumed workload ranging from a relatively

straightforward to a more complex assessment, the one-off administrative effort could

plausibly range from approximately EUR 21 000–64 000 for a simpler assessment to

EUR 43 000–127 000 or more for a more complex case. These estimates are based on

an assumed workload of 12 to 24 full-time equivalent (FTE) months and a non-

representative sample of public-sector salary data. They exclude litigation,

enforcement, IT investment, external expertise and overhead costs.

Using the latest available public employment statistics for a non-representative sample

of Member States, the cost was estimated as follows:

All figures in

EUR

Avg. general

government

salary

Lower estimate (12

FTE months)

Higher estimate (24

FTE months)

Portugal (77) 1,780 21,360 42,720

Spain (78) 3,200 38,400 76,800

Germany (79) 4,950 59,400 118,800

France (80) 2,650 31,800 63,600

Slovenia (81) 2,990 35,880 71,760

Ireland (82) 5,306 63,672 127,344

The lower estimate assumes approximately 12 FTE months to identify and compile the

relevant housing market data; assess whether housing affordability and availability

justify intervention under Union law; assess the necessity and proportionality of the

proposed restriction; prepare the required notification where applicable. The higher

estimate assumes approximately 24 FTE months, where more extensive legal analysis,

(77) AHA-BIB-066.

(78) AHA-BIB-067, the selection was based on “Coste salarial total” for “O Administracion Publica y

defensa”.

(79) AHA-BIB-068, average gross annual earnings in “Öffentliche Verwaltung, Verteidigung,

Sozial­versicherung” for 2025.

(80) AHA-BIB-069, net salaries.

(81) AHA-BIB-070.

(82) AHA-BIB-071, average weekly earnings across the public sector were EUR 1,224.44 in Q1 2025. The

weekly average earnings were annualised on a 52-week basis and divided by 12.

37

stakeholder consultation, additional evidence gathering and multiple iterations are

required..

These total costs are estimated to be comprised of the following components:

• Development of the analytical framework, methodology and data sources (40%

of the total cost)

• Collection and analysis of local housing market data together with the

assessment of the justification, necessity and proportionality of the proposed

measures (50% of the total cost)

• Notification or publication of the methodology, data and results, additional

costs for periodical review (10% of the total cost)

The total cost in each Member State would depend on the average salaries for national

and local government employees.

No separate estimate exists for the costs of carrying out the justification and

proportionality assessment itself. The only available estimate concerns the formal

notification of draft measures under the Services Directive, which was estimated at

around 12 working hours (approximately EUR 528) per notification, including

preparation and processing through the IMI system (83). That estimate relates only to

the notification procedure and does not include the underlying analytical and legal

work required to demonstrate that a restriction is justified, necessary and

proportionate. It should therefore be regarded as a significant underestimate of the

overall administrative effort associated with preparing a housing-related intervention.

6.3. Policy Option 1: EU intervention through non-legislative approach

6.3.1. Impact on public authorities

Because uptake is voluntary, all impacts depend entirely on the extent to which competent

authorities choose to follow the guidance.

Costs

Option 1 would entail the lowest direct costs for public authorities because it would not

impose any binding obligations. Costs would arise only where competent authorities

decide to act and choose to use the guidance and adapt existing methodologies, evidence-

gathering practices or proportionality assessments accordingly.

However, as highlighted in the baseline assessment, public authorities are already

required under Union law to assess the justification, proportionality and non-

discriminatory nature of measures affecting internal market freedoms and, in the case of

STR measures, to notify them under the Services Directive. Consequently, the overall

administrative and litigation costs associated with the current framework would be

expected to remain largely unchanged.

(83) Based on the 2016 impact assessment accompanying the proposal on the Services Directive notification

procedure. 2016 prices were indexed to 2026 using EU HICP inflation.

38

Monitoring and enforcement costs under PO1 would be limited because the framework

would be voluntary and would not impose binding obligations to notify, review, publish

methodologies or operate new Union-defined procedures. Competent authorities may

decide to prepare additional material demonstrating how the guidance has been taken into

account, including where STR-related measures are concerned, but these costs would

remain discretionary and would depend on voluntary uptake.

Benefits

The corresponding direct benefits would also be limited. The main advantage of PO1 is

its flexibility and full respect for subsidiarity.

Where followed, the guidance could improve the quality and consistency of local

assessments and support a more structured application of Union law. However, because

the underlying legal framework would remain unchanged, the benefits in terms of legal

certainty, administrative burden and litigation risk are expected to be limited.

Unlike secondary legislation, a Commission Communication or Notice could clarify

existing law but would not establish new rights or obligations and could not serve as the

legal benchmark against which the compatibility of local measures with Union law is

assessed. Nor would it create common requirements regarding transparency, publication

or periodic review.

Indirect impacts on public authorities

PO1 will not have any discernible impact on areas such as tourist tax-related revenues,

VAT or property tax revenues at the level of local authorities. These fiscal and municipal-

service effects are plausible but too indirect and implementation-dependent for quantified

inclusion in this report.

6.3.2. Internal market, legal certainty and litigation impacts

PO1 is expected to have a limited positive impact on the functioning of the internal

market in terms of improving legal certainty and supporting a more consistent

interpretation of existing Union law. Non-binding guidance could assist competent

authorities in designing housing-related measures by explaining relevant Court of Justice

case law and recommending indicators, data sources and good practices for assessing

housing stress and the proportionality of restrictions. Where followed, it could contribute

to more evidence-based, transparent and targeted interventions.

However, experience with previous Commission guidance on STRs in 2016 and 2018 (as

explained in Section 2.3) suggests that non-binding instruments alone have not

significantly reduced litigation or regulatory divergence across the EU. Benefits would

remain limited and uneven because the guidance would not establish common procedural

requirements or legally binding obligations. It could neither introduce common

conditions for identifying housing stress nor require competent authorities to apply

common evidentiary standards, transparency requirements or periodic reviews. As a

result, competent authorities would remain free to depart from the guidance, and the

assessment of housing-related restrictions would continue to rely on existing Union law

and case-by-case interpretation.

Consequently, any reduction in legal uncertainty, litigation risks and compliance costs

would depend on the voluntary uptake of the guidance and is expected to remain modest.

While guidance may encourage greater convergence in administrative practice, it would

39

not provide the level of legal certainty or procedural consistency achievable through a

binding Union framework.

6.3.3. Impact on local residents and communities (indirect impact)

For local residents, impacts would be indirect and limited. To the extent that competent

authorities follow the guidance, local interventions may become more targeted and

evidence-based, potentially improving their proportionality. However, because neither

action nor compliance with the guidance would be mandatory, any effects on housing

affordability and availability would remain uncertain and uneven.

6.3.4. Impact on SMEs (indirect impact)

PO 1 does not create new directly applicable Union- or Member State-level obligations

and would therefore avoid immediate costs for SMEs linked to compliance, reporting or

other procedural requirements.

STR hosts could benefit from somewhat greater legal predictability if local restrictions

are designed and justified more consistently as a result of the guidance. At the same time,

by recommending that any restriction focuses on professional or commercial activity,

some SMEs could be affected.

For the local tourism industry, PO 1 would not impose any direct costs on tourism

operators, local service providers and businesses that benefit from visitor spending.

Depending on the local measures adopted, some accommodation providers such as

hotels, guesthouses and B&Bs could indirectly benefit from a reallocation of demand

away from certain forms of STR activity, although such effects are expected to be limited

under this option.

For local builders and contractors, small property developers, renovation and

refurbishment companies, specialist trades (such as plumbers, electricians, carpenters),

small architecture or design firms and the many other SMEs which are central to housing

supply, new business opportunities would only arise insofar as competent authorities

would apply the measures suggested in the guidance to increase the supply of affordable

and social housing. Therefore, these indirect impacts are assessed to be very weak.

6.3.5. Impact on tourism (indirect impact)

Should competent authorities adopt new or different restrictions on the basis of the

guidance, the main impact under PO1 would be a possible reduction, in designated areas

under housing stress, in the volume or variety of short-term accommodation available.

This could reduce flexibility and choice for tourists in the most pressured locations and

potentially increase accommodation prices (84). Another indirect impact would be to

redirect tourists towards other forms of tourist accommodation depending on the local

market.

Available evidence from the US (85) suggests that STR restrictions can increase hotel

prices where hotel capacity is constrained and visitor demand remains strong. New York

City’s de facto STR ban increased hotel average daily rates by about USD 14-19 per night

and increased hotel revenue by USD 2.1-2.9 billion over the first 18 months. This

(84) AHA-BIB-085.

(85) AHA-BIB-086.

40

suggests that, in popular destinations with capacity-constrained markets, part of the effect

of STR restrictions may be transmitted through higher accommodation prices rather than

reduced visitor numbers.

For the wider tourism industry, while STR restrictions could be compensated by

traditional accommodation providers, there might be potential negative impacts on local

businesses that depend on visitors (such as clothing stores, museums, restaurants, bars

focusing on tourists). However, these effects would not necessarily amount to a net loss

for tourism overall, as some tourism-related demand could shift towards nearby

destinations outside the stressed area, depending on the availability of alternative

accommodation, infrastructure and related services.

6.3.6. Impact on subsidiarity

PO1 fully respects subsidiarity, as Member States and competent authorities would

remain free to decide whether and how to intervene, subject only to the existing

requirements of Union law. Likewise, decisions on measures to increase housing supply

would remain entirely within the competence of national, regional and local authorities.

However, because the guidance would be non-binding, it would not establish common

procedural requirements for identifying housing stress or for assessing, justifying and

reviewing housing-related interventions. As a result, differences in the procedural

approaches applied by competent authorities would largely persist, together with the

associated legal uncertainty and compliance costs for public authorities and economic

operators (see also section 6.3.2). PO1 would do little to improve the consistency,

transparency and predictability of the framework governing restrictions affecting internal

market freedoms.

Economic operators active across different jurisdictions would continue to face differing

local restrictions, while benefiting only to a limited extent from greater consistency in

how those restrictions are assessed and justified under Union law.

6.3.7. Social and environmental impacts

The main social effect of PO1 would be indirect. Where authorities choose to use the

guidance, it could improve the quality of evidence, legal reasoning and proportionality

assessment behind local housing-related measures. That could support, through better

targeted local action, the confidence of local communities that the right to housing is

respected, while reducing the risk of poorly justified restrictions on local business

activities. Where competent authorities choose to follow the guidance on housing supply,

there could also be indirect social benefits through an increase in the availability of

affordable and social housing, particularly for vulnerable groups facing difficulties

accessing adequate housing. However, because the option would not oblige any authority

to act, these effects would remain uncertain and uneven across territories.

Potential environmental impacts, such as reduced energy and water consumption, lower

waste production and lower emissions linked to transport (GHG and particulates) are

expected to be limited. Actual quantitative impacts will depend on the willingness of

local authorities to act. Possible indirect channels, such as changes in tourism intensity,

local mobility patterns or the use of residential stock, would remain contingent on local

choices and on subsequent territorial measures.

41

6.4. Policy Option 2: Legislative initiative creating a common, flexible

framework

The main impact of PO2 would be to improve legal certainty, transparency and

predictability by establishing a common, operational framework governing the

identification of areas under housing stress and the assessment of housing-related

interventions affecting internal market freedoms, while preserving local discretion

regarding whether and how to intervene.

Rather than creating new assessment obligations, PO2 would operationalise existing

Union-law requirements relating to justification and proportionality. It would provide

competent authorities and economic operators with greater clarity regarding the

conditions under which restrictions may be adopted, maintained and withdrawn.

Compared with both the baseline and PO1, PO2 is expected to reduce legal uncertainty,

litigation risks and compliance costs by introducing common procedural requirements

and evidentiary standards, while preserving local discretion regarding whether and how

to intervene. As secondary Union legislation, it would provide a clearer legal framework

for the Commission and national courts when assessing the compatibility of such

measures with Union law.

6.4.1. Impact on public authorities

For public authorities that choose to designate an area under housing stress or introduce

housing-related restrictions, PO2 would provide a common procedural framework

governing such interventions, while preserving discretion regarding whether to designate

an area, introduce restrictions or pursue housing supply measures.

PO2 would support public authorities by establishing a common methodology for

identifying housing stress and common procedural requirements governing the

justification and proportionality of housing-related interventions affecting the internal

market.

6.4.1.1. Administrative costs and benefits linked to preparing housing-related

interventions, justification and proportionality assessment

Costs

Competent authorities choosing to designate an area under housing stress and introduce

housing-related restrictions would need to apply the common methodology and document

the justification, necessity and proportionality of the proposed measures.

Although assessments of justification and proportionality are already required under

Union law, the absence of common procedural requirements currently means that

competent authorities must develop their own methodologies and evidential approaches

on a case-by-case basis. PO2 would reduce that methodological uncertainty by providing

a common framework applicable across the Union.

Additional costs for competent authorities associated with the common methodology are

expected to be limited. The Tier 1 indicators rely on publicly available data and the

Commission, through the JRC, will make the relevant price-to-income data publicly

available via the Mapadomo database. Should competent authorities have data available

at more granular level (e.g. publicly available data for local transaction prices) the

Commission would also be able to provide regional level income data to allow them to

42

calculate their PTI ratio. The flexibility in selecting data for Tier 2 indicators would allow

competent authorities to make use of available data instead of prescribing the use of

specific data that may not be equally accessible or used across the EU.

To support implementation, the Commission would also provide practical supporting

material explaining the calculation of the Tier 1 indicators and the application of the Tier

2 assessment. This support would facilitate consistent application without removing the

responsibility of competent authorities to select and substantiate the locally relevant

evidence or to assess the proportionality of individual measures.

Benefits

The principal benefit of the common framework would be to improve legal certainty by

establishing a common methodology and common procedural requirements. This would

reduce methodological uncertainty for competent authorities and provide a clearer basis

for demonstrating compliance with Union law.

The framework is also expected to reduce administrative effort associated with

developing methodologies from scratch and lower the risk of avoidable litigation arising

from inconsistent evidential approaches, unclear territorial delimitation, insufficient

justification or inadequate review arrangements.

The framework would also have an important capacity-building effect, particularly for

competent authorities with less developed analytical or legal expertise. It would not

remove the need to collect evidence or assess individual measures, but it would provide

a common methodology and procedural template for carrying out assessments already

required under Union law.

A principal benefit of the Tier 1/Tier 2 methodology (see Annex 4) would be to provide

competent authorities with a structured evidential framework both for identifying housing

stress and for demonstrating the justification of subsequent housing-related interventions.

Tier 1 establishes a common EU-wide screening methodology, while Tier 2 enables

authorities to complement that assessment with objective, transparent and verifiable local

evidence reflecting specific territorial circumstances. This would strengthen the

evidential link between housing stress, the choice of intervention and the assessment of

proportionality, while preserving flexibility to reflect local housing market conditions.

Illustrative estimate of potential administrative effort and cost-savings associated

with preparing housing-related interventions (PO2a and PO2b)

The estimate below is illustrative, not based on observed data, as no comparable EU

framework currently exists. It uses the baseline staff-time proxy developed under PO0,

where preparing housing-related interventions is assumed to require 12 FTE months

in a simpler and 24 FTE months in a more demanding case, covering the development

of the analytical framework, methodology and data sources, territorial delimitation,

collection and analysis of local housing market data, together with the assessment of

the justification, necessity and proportionality, publication and preparation of the

review cycle.

For illustrative purposes, the baseline workload was decomposed into three task

blocks: 1) preparation of the declaration framework, including data sources,

43

methodology and indicators, estimated at 40% of the baseline effort; 2) local data

collection and territorial analysis of housing market, assessment of the proposed

measures, analysis of their proportionality and preparing the publication concerning

the selected measures, estimated at 50%; and 3( publication and periodic review,

estimated at 10%. This decomposition is an assumption, not an observed cost

breakdown.

A common framework to designate areas under housing stress (see PO2a), with

predefined indicators, common public data sources and a clearer intervention logic

could reduce a major part of the methodological work required from competent

authorities, especially where no existing framework is in place. It would not remove

the need to delimit the area, assess local housing-market conditions, assemble local

evidence, link local drivers to planned measures, publish the methodology and

underlying data, or review the designation.

On this basis, the illustrative calculation is as follows:

• Building the framework (est. 40% of the baseline cost): choosing indicators,

identifying data sources, designing a methodology, describing the evidence and

drafting a declaration. In this area, the common framework could potentially

save up to 75% of the time and effort needed, because most methodology-design

work can be avoided on the basis of the common indicators, public data sources

and already developed intervention logic (86).

• Place-specific analysis (est. 50% of the baseline costs): determining area

boundaries, checking the local housing market, assembling local evidence,

linking local drivers to planned measures and performing a proportionality

assessment. Most local authorities would still have to perform territorial

delimitation and local evidence gathering and thus the potential savings are

lower, estimated at 10-20% range.

• Procedural and publication costs (10% of baseline costs): there may be no

cost savings associated with this stage, as PO2 requires competent authorities

to publish the methodology and the underlying data within three months of any

designation, and prepare for regularly reviewing the designation.

Therefore, the total savings of the administrative costs associated with the declaration

could be calculated by netting the potential savings against the potential cost increase

as follows:

Table 2: Estimated administrative cost savings associated with PO2 (as % of baseline costs)

Task block Share of PO0

baseline effort

Illustrative saving

under PO2a

Preparation of declaration framework, data

sources, methodology and indicators

40% 75%

(86) No directly comparable EU estimate exists for the designation of housing-stress areas; the assumption

is based on a task-based staff-time decomposition and is cross-checked against Commission simplification

evidence showing that common data, digitalisation and simpler procedures can reduce administrative

burden.

44

Place-specific analysis, including territorial

delimitation, local evidence and link to planned

measures, proportionality analysis

50% 10-20%

Publication, data disclosure and periodic review 10% 0%

Total 100% 35-40%

On these illustrative assumptions, PO2 would reduce the administrative cost of

preparing housing-related interventions by 35-40% for competent authorities without

an existing framework, leaving 60-65% of the baseline cost. The estimate should be

interpreted as a sensitivity assumption rather than an observed saving.

For competent authorities with existing frameworks or already designated areas, PO2

would not lead to such cost reductions, primarily due to the adjustment costs related

to reviewing existing methodologies, updating evidence, adapting review cycles or

revising existing designations. For competent authorities with more advanced or

already aligned frameworks, both adjustment costs and savings may be limited but

legal certainty could still improve.

Indirect impacts on public authorities

PO2 could have some indirect fiscal effects for local authorities, but these are too

uncertain and implementation-dependent to quantify. PO2 would make the designation

of stressed areas and the adoption of restrictions more predictable, which could in turn

impact on tourist tax-related revenues, VAT revenues or local property tax-related

revenues. The actual impact would depend on STR host response, the availability of

hotels and other accommodations and whether visitor demands shifts to neighbouring

areas, none of which can be modelled as previously noted.

6.4.1.2. Impact of sub-options on the introduction of restrictions (PO2b)

This section assesses the two areas in which Section 5 identifies alternative approaches

under PO2.

First, the framework establishes common procedural requirements governing the

assessment of the necessity and proportionality of housing-related restrictions. While

competent authorities are already required under Union law to demonstrate that

restrictions affecting internal market freedoms are justified, proportionate and non-

discriminatory, neither the Treaty, the Services Directive nor the case law of the Court of

Justice provides an operational methodology for carrying out those assessments. Unlike

existing case law, which assesses individual measures ex post and on a case-by-case

basis, the proposed framework would establish ex ante requirements that competent

authorities would apply before measures are adopted. The principal benefit would be

greater legal certainty regarding the compatibility of housing-related measures with

Union law. While the future number of complaints and court proceedings cannot be

quantified, the common framework would make the assessment of restrictions more

transparent, consistent and predictable, thereby reducing avoidable sources of litigation

and the associated administrative and compliance costs.

The two sub-options reflect different approaches to achieving these objectives:

• Sub-option b1 – Substantive harmonisation (list of permitted measures and

measures not permitted under any circumstances): This sub-option would provide

45

the highest degree of ex ante legal certaintyby identifying measures considered

compatible, or incompatible, with Union law in areas under housing stress. It would

reduce legal interpretation costs, simplify policy preparation and be particularly

beneficial for competent authorities with limited legal or analytical capacity.

Its main drawback is reduced flexibility. The causes and manifestations of housing

stress differ considerably across local housing markets, and the proportionality of any

restriction depends on the specific circumstances of the area concerned and on the

design of the measure itself. There is insufficient economic evidence to conclude that

particular housing-related restrictions are always proportionate or always

disproportionate in every situation. A predefined list would therefore risk being

insufficiently adaptable to future developments and diverse local conditions. Overall,

sub-option b1 would maximise legal certainty and administrative simplicity but at the

expense of flexibility and subsidiarity.

• Sub-option b2 – Procedural harmonisation: This sub-option would establish

common procedural requirements governing the necessity, proportionality,

transparency and review of housing-related restrictions while leaving competent

authorities free to determine whether intervention is necessary and which measures

are best suited to local circumstances. Competent authorities currently have to

translate general Treaty principles, the Services Directive and case-specific CJEU

jurisprudence into local measures without a common operational framework. PO2b

would reduce this methodological uncertainty by establishing common procedural

requirements governing the evidence to be gathered, the assessment of

proportionality, transparency obligations and periodic review. This would make the

legal assessment of housing-related restrictions more consistent and predictable while

reducing challenges linked to insufficient evidence, weak documentation, excessive

territorial scope or inadequate review.

The main administrative cost would arise where competent authorities need to amend

existing restrictions to ensure compatibility with the new procedural framework, for

example by introducing periodic review or additional transparency requirements. At

the same time, because competent authorities are already required under Union law

to assess the justification and proportionality of restrictions affecting internal market

freedoms, the common methodology could reduce rather than increase the analytical

burden by replacing ad hoc approaches with a structured procedural framework. In

addition, exempting from the current notification procedure for STR restrictions

under the Services Directive would reduce administrative costs associated with the

existing notification process.

Sub-option b2 would also reinforce the principle that restrictions should remain measures

of last resort by requiring competent authorities to assess them in the context of broader

efforts to address housing shortages, while leaving decisions on housing supply measures

entirely to the competent authorities concerned.

In summary,sub-option b1 would provide the highest degree of legal certainty but

the least flexibility, whereas sub-option b2 would strike a better balance between

legal certainty and adaptability to local conditions.

Secondly, as described in section 5.2.2 in determining the scope of restrictions affecting

STR activity, the framework could distinguish between occasional home-sharing and

more professional or commercial forms of short-term rental activity to limit restrictions

to STR activities most likely to remove properties from the housing market.

46

Limiting STR restrictions to certain categories of hosts would reinforce proportionality,

because restrictions would focus on the activity most likely to remove dwellings from the

long-term rental market in areas under housing stress, while clearly preserving the

possibility for occasional home-sharing. This could be achieved using various proxies:

• Legal structure: Classifying any legal person as professional host has the benefit

of a simple approach. However, no suitable EU-wide quantitative data exist to

assess the likely effects of such a definition. Moreover, in several Member States,

it is common for families to set up legal structures to organise joint ownership of

a dwelling, meaning that legal form alone is not a reliable proxy for professional

activity.

• Number of days rented: As illustrated in Annex 7, in many cities and tourist

hotspots, more than 50% of all Airbnb listings are available for more than 120

nights per year. In cities such as Venice, Athens, Florence or Porto, this share

reaches 75%. Availability does not necessarily mean that the listing has

effectively been rented out for more than 120 nights.A definition of STR

“professional hosts” based on the number of days rented out per year would have

the advantage of uniform application across the EU and could be better

determined through the data collected via the STR Regulation. However, the lack

of evidence of what number of nights would necessarily qualify as professional

activity makes this option hard to reconcile with the principle of subsidiarity.

There are a number of different so-called “night caps” in place (ranging from 30

to 120 days,and sometimes varying within a single Member States) described in

Annex 8, but these are limits on STR activity rather than a definition of

professional hosts. Moreover, restrictions would only apply ex post (after a full

year when the numbers of days the units have been rented is known) and require

annual reassessment. A differentiation based on numbers of days would also risk

qualifying small scale individual hosts renting out their primary residence as

professional.

• Type of residence: As detailed in Annex 6, the percentage of listings that are

managed by a single entity (host or property manager) with two or more units

reached between 60% and 70% in Barcelona, the South Aegean Islands, Malta,

Valencia, for instance. This suggests that the rate of hosts renting more than one

unit is higher in tourist hotspots than elsewhere.Limiting STR restrictions on the

type of residence rented (non-primary residence) would preserve the rights of

individuals occasionally letting their primary residence or part of it.

In summary, a property-based approach focused on non-primary residences would

be easier to administer, more closely linked to housing-market impacts, and more

consistent with the Cali Apartments judgment.

6.4.1.3. Impact of the Recommendation to Member States on supply in areas under

housing stress

The accompanying Recommendation encourages competent authorities to consider

restrictions affecting the non-primary use of housing as part of a broader response to

housing shortages, while leaving decisions on whether and how to increase housing

supply entirely to the competent authorities concerned. It provides practical guidance and

examples of good practice for increasing housing supply in and around areas under

housing stress. To the extent that such guidance is taken up, it could contribute to more

47

coherent and effective local responses to housing stress over the longer term. Its impacts,

however, remain dependent on voluntary implementation and local circumstances.

6.4.2. Internal market, legal certainty and litigation impacts

PO2 is expected to improve legal certainty, transparency and predictability by

establishing common evidential and procedural requirements governing the justification

and proportionality of housing-related interventions affecting the internal market. The

common framework would provide competent authorities and economic operators with

greater clarity regarding the conditions under which restrictions may be adopted,

maintained and withdrawn, thereby reducing uncertainty arising from divergent

interpretations of Union law.

While the number of future complaints and court proceedings cannot be quantified, the

common procedural framework is expected to facilitate the assessment of housing-related

measures by national courts and the Commission, as compatibility with Union law would

be assessed against clearer and more transparent procedural requirements. This should

reduce avoidable sources of litigation, improve the predictability of decisions and lower

administrative and compliance costs associated with legal disputes.

PO2 is expected to have a strong positive impact on the functioning of the internal market

by improving the consistency, transparency and predictability of the procedural

framework governing housing-related interventions. Greater legal certainty would

particularly benefit cross-border operators, including online STR platforms, hosts

operating in several Member States and investors active in residential property markets

across the Union. While housing-related restrictions would continue to differ according

to local housing market conditions and policy choices, they would be assessed, justified

and reviewed within a common procedural framework based on shared requirements

regarding evidence, transparency, proportionality and periodic review.

Within PO2, sub-option b2 provides the most appropriate balance between legal certainty

and subsidiarity. Rather than prescribing which housing-related measures may or may

not be adopted, it establishes common proportionality requirements and procedural

safeguards governing their necessity, design, transparency and review, while leaving

competent authorities free to decide whether intervention is necessary and which

measures are best suited to local circumstances.

6.4.3. Impact on local residents and communities (indirect impact)

PO2 would increase the likelihood that interventions are targeted at areas where housing

pressures are demonstrated and remain proportionate over time.

By encouraging restrictions to be considered alongside broader efforts to increase the

supply of affordable and social housing, PO2 would also support more balanced and

effective local responses to housing stress. To the extent that such supply-side measures

are implemented, they could contribute to addressing the structural supply-demand

imbalance underlying housing pressures.

48

6.4.4. Impact on SMEs (indirect impact)

The main benefit of PO2 for SMEs would be greater visibility and predictability about

when, where and for how long local restrictions would be introduced. PO2 would reduce

the variability of local measures and prevent unjustified or disproportionate interventions,

which is particularly relevant for SMEs embedded in the STR or tourism ecosystems.

At the same time, the potential negative impacts mentioned under PO1 would be more

likely to materialise where areas are designated and measures are adopted. As shown in

Annex 6 (SME assessment), SMEs hosting STR rentals falling under the definition of

professional hosts, as well as SMEs active in the STR ecosystem could be negatively

affected where local authorities introduce any of the measures listed under sub-options

b1 and b2.

Therefore, PO2 would offer a trade-off: more legal certainty and predictability for SMEs

overall, but also a greater likelihood that some SMEs in areas under housing stress –

especially STR hosts and auxiliary services linked to their activity – would face actual

constraints on their business model. At the same time, some accommodation providers,

including hotels, guesthouses and B&Bs, could benefit from a partial reallocation of

demand where restrictions reduce the supply of certain forms of STR accommodation.

SMEs active in construction, renovation, refurbishment and related services could also

benefit indirectly where competent authorities choose to pursue measures to increase

housing supply alongside restrictions, thereby stimulating additional housing

development or the better use of the existing building stock.

6.4.5. Impact on tourism (indirect impact)

PO2 could lead to more areas being designated as under housing stress and, consequently,

to more housing-related restrictions being adopted. By reducing legal uncertainty, it may

facilitate interventions in sectors that depend on non-primary use of dwellings or

investment from non-local property owners.

Under PO2, reductions in the volume or variety of STR accommodation would become

more likely and more predictable in designated areas. This could reduce flexibility and

choice in the most pressured destinations, and contribute to demand shifting towards

hotels, B&Bs, and other types of accommodation. At the same time, it could facilitate the

redirection of tourism to neighbouring municipalities or less-pressured destinations that

could benefit from increased economic activity thus contributing to a more balanced

territorial distribution of tourism.

While tourism-dependent businesses in some high-pressure destinations may experience

adjustment costs, these effects would be accompanied by greater legal certainty and a

more predictable framework for public intervention.

6.4.6. Impact on subsidiarity

In subsidiarity terms, PO2 would involve a limited and proportionate EU intervention. It

would neither require Member States or competent authorities to designate areas under

housing stress nor oblige them to introduce housing-related measures. However, where

they decide to do so, they would be required to apply common procedural requirements

49

governing the justification and proportionality of those measures. This limited procedural

harmonisation is warranted by the need to ensure a more consistent application of Union

law and to improve legal certainty for competent authorities and economic operators

while respecting local housing policy choices.

PO2 would establish a common methodology for identifying housing stress through

harmonised Tier 1 headline indicators, complemented by Tier 2 evidence allowing

competent authorities to take account of objective, transparent and verifiable local data.

This ensures a consistent analytical framework across the Union while preserving the

flexibility needed to reflect diverse territorial and housing market conditions.

6.4.7. Social and economic impacts

PO2 has the potential to generate more positive social effects by improving the ability of

public authorities to preserve the availability and affordability of housing for residents in

areas under housing stress, including groups already identified as particularly exposed to

the housing crisis, such as low- and middle-income households, young people and

essential workers.

PO2 could also generate a more balanced social effect over time by encouraging

restrictive measures to be considered broader efforts to increase the availability and

supply of affordable and social housing. This should reduce the risk that public authorities

rely only on restrictive measures without addressing the underlying supply-demand

imbalance. To the extent that such supply-side measures increase the availability of

affordable and social housing, they may also improve housing opportunities for

vulnerable groups and households facing the greatest affordability pressures.

However, any effects on housing affordability and availability are expected to be indirect

and depend on the implementation choices of competent authorities and broader local

housing market conditions.

Potential environmental impacts of PO2 would be expected to remain limited and

mainly indirect, and the main channels would be changes in tourism intensity, local

mobility patterns and the use of residential building stock. Given that PO2 would serve

to facilitate the introduction of restrictions on STRs or other non-primary uses in stressed

areas, this could moderate tourism concentration and associated local pressures in the

most affected neighbourhoods, with possible positive effects in terms of congestion,

noise, waste generation and management, water and energy consumption, transport

emissions and pressure on local infrastructure, including transport. The supply-side

condition and accompanying recommendations on renovation, repurposing, planning and

permitting could also support better use of the existing building stock leading to a relative

reduction of greenhouse gas emissions associated with new-built housing.

50

6.5. Policy Option 3 – Legislative initiative based on the harmonisation of

stress criteria and housing measures

6.5.1. Impact on public authorities

Unlike PO2, the administrative burden under PO3 would arise primarily from the

mandatory governance framework—regular assessments, planning, reporting and

coordination—rather than from the assessment of the proportionality of individual

restrictions, as these would be more extensively harmonised at Union level.

Administrative costs associated to designating areas under housing stress and

developing affordable housing plans

PO3 would transfer a substantial volume of work to Member State administrations and

remove their discretion over whether to carry out a housing stress assessment. National

authorities would need to organise regular territorial assessments of affordability, ensure

the designation of areas meeting the EU thresholds for housing stress, establish or

empower competent authorities, coordinate the preparation and submission of affordable

housing plans, monitor implementation, report progress, notify the Commission within

fixed deadlines, and manage periodic review cycles.

Under PO3, local authorities would also have less discretion in designing restrictions, as

key elements would be harmonised at Union level. While this would reduce the need for

case-by-case proportionality assessments of individual restrictions, it would also make

local implementation more rigid and reduce the ability to tailor interventions to local

housing market conditions.

Compared with PO2, these tasks would become part of a recurring governance system,

leading to a higher burden for Member States linked to submission, monitoring and

reporting of affordable housing plans. Because housing policy, zoning/planning, tourism

regulation, building supply, land use, and internal-market compliance is often managed

by different Member State authorities, PO3 would require tighter coordination between

national ministries, regional administrations, municipalities and sectoral regulators, and

impose further administrative/coordination costs.

There is also a risk of capacity asymmetry across Member States and municipalities,

where larger administrations with established housing observatories, planning

departments and legal units would be better placed to comply with PO3’s monitoring and

planning requirements. Smaller or lower-capacity authorities would struggle with the

practical tasks of running recurring assessments, producing supply plans and maintaining

reporting cycles.

Estimating the administrative cost of PO3 for the designation of areas under housing stress

For the current calculations, we assume that

• Cost savings associated with using the framework proposed in PO2 would remain the

same

• While all 27 Member States would have to carry out the assessment, designate areas

under housing stress, prepare measures / restrictions and report the results to the

Commission, some would start from a different baseline. Therefore, the estimates below

51

capture the likely cost for Member States without prior housing plans or experience in

assessing housing stress or in designating areas.

• 20% of national NUTS3 regions would be designated

• 12 FTE months for a designation of a NUTS3 region at local level for data collection,

consultation, based on the calculations for the baseline

• One-off national coordination costs for the initial assessment of about EUR 119,000-

170,000 per Member State

• Recurring national costs of about EUR 100,000 per year per Member State for

monitoring and reporting (based on the Impact Assessment prepared for the STR

Regulation).

Using that revised method, the results are as follows:

All

figures in

EUR

Total NUTS3

regions in the

EU (87)

Designation

cost (EUR)

for 20% of

NUTS3

National

coordination

costs – one-off

at EU level

National

coordination

costs –

recurring at

EU level

Total

administrative

cost for Year 1

at EU level

Lower

bound

1,165 20,000 x

232 = 4.6

million

119,000 x 27 =

3.2 million

100,000 x 27

= 2.7 million

10.5 million

Central

estimate

1,165 40,000 x

232 = 9.3

million

140,000 x 27 =

3.8 million

15.8 million

Upper

bound

1,165 60,000 x

232 = 14

million

170,000 x 27 =

4.6 million

21.3 million

Thus, the indicative one-off aggregate administrative burden for EU-27 ranges from around

EUR 10.5 million to around EUR 21.3 million. This estimate excludes any further recurrent

costs at local or national level.

Estimating the administrative cost of PO3 for developing affordable housing plans

PO3 would require Member States that have designated an area under housing stress to

develop affordable housing plans setting out measures to increase the supply of affordable and

social housing. The Commission would provide a template to assist Member States in drawing

up these housing plans and would assess them and may issue recommendations.

Therefore, PO3 would entail three categories of additional costs:

• development of a template by the Commission to assist Member States

(87) Based on the NUTS 2024 classification that is valid from 1 January 2024. It lists 92 regions at NUTS 1,

244 regions at NUTS 2 and 1 165 regions at NUTS 3 level.

52

• design of national housing plans by Member States

• Commission analysis of housing plans and recommendations

Using the EPBD Impact Assessment (88) as a reference, the costs of developing the housing

plans were estimated as unit costs. Since PO3 would require all Member States to carry out

the assessment, designate areas under housing stress, prepare supply plans and report results

to the Commission, the closest comparator is the cost associated with Long-Term Renovation

Strategies (LTRS3), i.e. EUR 150,000 per Member State.

The calculation in the previous box of the administrative cost for the affordability screening

and the designation of areas under housing stress already assumes one-off national

coordination costs, therefore these costs are not included here.

The cost estimate for the Commission assumes a one-off cost for developing EU templates for

affordable housing plans, plus recurring costs, per reporting cycle, for assessing these plans.

All figures in EUR Amount Comment

One-off Commission cost for

developing templates

300,000 Derived by separating the

EPBD LTRS3 combined

Commission cost of EUR

450,000 into a one-off

guidance component of

EUR 300,000

EU-wide Member State cost for

developing plans

150,000 x 27 =

4.1 million

Equivalent to EPBD

LTRS3 national costs

Recurring Commission costs for

assessing 27 housing plans

150,000 per

reporting cycle

Derived from EPBD

LTRS3 combined

Commission cost into

residual assessment cost

Total EU-wide cost for developing,

reviewing and updating housing plans

in Year 1

4.55 million

Benefits

The main benefit of PO3 would be the highest degree of legal certainty and procedural

consistency through a centrally defined system of indicators, mandatory assessment and

review cycles, harmonised restrictions and common reporting requirements.

This would substantially reduce ambiguity regarding the identification of areas under

housing stress and the restrictions applicable in those areas, thereby reducing legal

interpretation costs and methodological differences across Member States.

(88) SWD(2021) 453 final, Part 4, Annex L, page 401.

53

National administrations and Union institutions would also benefit from a standardised

monitoring and reporting framework, improving comparability across Member States

and facilitating oversight of the application of Union law.

Indirect impacts on public authorities

PO3 would make indirect fiscal effects much more likely that under PO2. Mandatory

designation requirements, the reporting and review cycles imposed on public authorities

would make local intervention much more systematic across Member States. This could

lead, in designated areas, to the reduction of STRs, lower number of visitors, lower

economic activity, lower property transactions and lower tax-related revenues for

municipalities. These impacts could be partially offset if demand shifts to hotels in the

same area, instead of neighbouring municipalities or alternative destinations.

6.5.2. Internal market, legal certainty and litigation impacts

PO3 would provide the highest degree of legal certainty and consistency in the

application of Union law by introducing mandatory designation of areas under housing

stress together with more extensive harmonisation of the conditions governing housing-

related interventions. Compared with PO2, it could further reduce uncertainty regarding

the applicable legal framework. However, these additional benefits would come at the

cost of reduced flexibility for competent authorities, higher administrative burdens and

greater risks in terms of subsidiarity and proportionality, as the framework would be less

capable of accommodating diverse local housing market conditions.

While PO3 could further reduce legal uncertainty, it is not possible to quantify any

additional reduction in litigation compared with PO2.

6.5.3. Impact on local residents and communities (indirect impact)

Compared with PO2, the wider impacts of PO3 would be similar in type but stronger in

intensity, because PO3 would make them more systematic across Member States.

PO3 is expected to have the strongest positive impact on local communities in areas under

housing stress. Mandatory designation, and linked housing-supply plans would make

action less dependent on local discretion and would therefore make the expected benefits

for housing availability and affordability more widespread and more immediate.

However, the local-community impact would not be exclusively positive: where EU-

level criteria and restrictions do not fit well with specific local conditions, local

communities and competent authorities would have less discretion to define the affected

area, choose the appropriate mix of measures, or phase restrictions in a way that reflects

local economic and social conditions.

This option could reduce local discretion and therefore the scope for local democratic

choices regarding the timing and design of interventions.

6.5.4. Impact on SMEs (indirect impact)

The impact of PO3 on SMEs would be overall negative, although not uniform across

sectors. Professional STR hosts, property management companies, cleaning and other

ancillary services linked to STR activity would face a higher probability of constraints in

54

areas under housing stress. Tourism-facing SMEs in the designated areas – including

restaurants, cafes, local retail and visitor services – could also be affected where reduced

STR capacity and increasing accommodation prices would lead to lower visitor volumes.

Although PO3 would provide greater legal predictability for companies operating across

several Member States, the increased likelihood of restrictions means that the overall

impact on affected SMEs is expected to be negative. However, the impacts would not be

uniform: accommodation providers such as SMEs active as hotels, guesthouses and

B&Bs could benefit from a shift in demand away from restricted STR activity, while

SMEs active in construction, renovation and housing development could benefit from the

housing acceleration plans and associated supply-side measures.

6.5.5. Impact on tourism (indirect impact)

PO3 could have a potentially negative impact on visitors in designated areas, because the

restrictions could reduce the volume and variety of accommodation available in such

places, while overall visitor numbers would remain the same (see Box 6.5.5 below). This

could reduce the flexibility and choice for tourists and, depending on the local

accommodation supply, could increase prices for accommodation.

Box 6.5.5 - Impact of STR restrictions on visitor numbers – empirical evidence

from Lisbon and Barcelona

Available evidence from Barcelona and Lisbon suggests that STR restrictions can

reduce, stabilise or redirect STR supply, but do not necessarily reduce the number of

visitors.

A 2025 study of Barcelona (89) found that regulation and enforcement affected STR

supply: the authors estimate that, without regulation, Airbnb listings would have been

almost double the observed level – around 20,000 instead of 10,700 (at the time).

Official tourism data suggest that despite limited STR growth, visitor demand

remained high. In 2024, Barcelona city received 15.6 million tourists, only 0.2% fewer

than in 2023, while the wider Barcelona area (the city and surrounding region) received

26.1 million tourists (90).

Lisbon introduced a Municipal Regulation on Local Accommodation in 2019 (91),

including containment area, mandatory registrations in containment areas and later

suspending new registrations in parishes where the ratio between local accommodation

establishments and permanent dwellings reached at least 2.5%.

Tourist overnight stays in Lisbon increased by 145% between 2009 and 2019, reaching

14 million overnight stays in 2019, before the pandemic caused an abrupt fall in 2020.

However, by 2024, the municipality of Lisbon reached 15.7 million overnight stays,

up 3.6%, with non-resident overnight stays up 4.4% (92).

(89) AHA-BIB-087.

(90) AHA-BIB-089.

(91) AHA-BIB-090.

(92) AHA-BIB-091.

55

These examples suggest that the main tourism effect of STR restrictions may be a

change in the accommodation mix, the spatial distribution of the tourism flow, and

accommodation prices rather than a direct, immediate reduction in visitor numbers.

For the wider tourism industry, the impacts would be mixed: traditional

accommodation providers, such as hotels, hostels and B&B, could absorb part of the

demand displaced from STRs if the designated area had surplus capacity. Other tourism-

dependent businesses in high-pressure areas could face adjustment costs if visitor flows

shift to other destinations due to the restrictions.

Conversely, PO3 would strongly support a more even territorial distribution of tourism

demand, diverting visitors towards less-pressured areas and promoting sustainable

tourism. Such neighbouring or alternative areas would be able to absorb the increased

flows, while providing a positive impact on the local economy, without aggravating local

housing stress.

6.5.6. Impact on subsidiarity

PO3 would raise subsidiarity concerns. As described above, PO3 would substantially

reduce Member State, regional and local discretion in housing policy. In particular, the

mandatory designation of areas under housing stress, based on centrally defined

thresholds, harmonised restrictions, and mandatory housing supply plans would move the

intervention closer to partial harmonisation of housing governance in an area that remains

primarily within the competence of Member States, regions and cities.

The subsidiarity impact is particularly high because PO3 would not only harmonise

procedures, but also substantive policy choices. EU-wide rules on STR activity, change-

of-use authorisations or rules to limit professional/commercial STR activity could

prevent competent authorities from tailoring restrictions to local housing market

conditions. A uniform threshold or EU-wide night cap may fit some high-pressure tourist

areas but may also be too strict, too weak or poorly targeted in other areas. This would

create tensions with the need for place-based housing policy. Even a number of cities

who strongly favour restricting STRs and other non-primary uses of housing would resist

loss of their ability to decide what is best for them at a local level.

Overall, PO3 would pose a significantly stronger risk of regulatory overreach and over-

harmonisation. By making restrictions quasi-automatic and uniform, PO3 could create

more far-reaching barriers to the freedom to provide services than are strictly necessary

in some territories, where a less restrictive and more locally adapted measure would be

sufficient.

6.5.7. Social and environmental impacts

The social impact of PO3 would most likely be positive and stronger than under PO2.

By making action in stressed areas more systematic, PO3 would increase the likelihood

that demand-side restrictions are linked to supply-side measures intended to protect or

improve access to social and affordable housing for local residents, including low-income

households and other groups facing difficulties accessing adequate housing. The main

56

limitation is that PO3’s uniformity could reduce the scope for locally tailored balancing

between housing objectives and other local social or economic priorities.

The environmental impacts of PO3 would probably be mixed. On the positive side, PO3

supports a more efficient use of the existing housing stock. The conversion of vacant or

underused dwellings, brownfield development and more systematic housing acceleration

plans in designated stressed areas could have positive impact on GHG emissions, land

consumption and resource efficiency. To the extent these measures increase housing

availability, they could also limit additional land use, reduce pressure for greenfield

developments, remediate contaminated areas, preserve biodiversity and make better use

of the existing urban infrastructure, public transport networks, utilities and local services,

with positive impacts on water and energy consumption, waste generation and

management, noise, pollution and GHG emissions.

PO3 could also reduce environmental pressures linked to highly concentrated tourism

activity in the most stressed areas. By reducing visitor concentration in specific

neighbourhoods, it could reduce congestion, noise, waste generation and pressure on

local water and energy systems. Besides improving local environmental quality, PO3

would also ease pressure on municipal waste collection, cleaning, transport and law

enforcement services.

However, these positive effects could easily be offset if housing demand, tourism activity

or investment demand would be displaced to neighbouring areas, commuter belts or rural

territories outside the designated stressed area. The environmental effect could become

negative if such areas are not sufficiently prepared, less dense or less well served by

public or active modes of transport, so residents and visitors need to rely more heavily

on private cars. The increase in commuting activity would lead to congestion, greenhouse

gas emissions, air pollution and noise – basically exporting environmental pressures from

the designated areas, instead of reducing them.

The overall environmental impact is therefore assessed as mixed, because it depends on

the territorial distribution of displaced demand and on whether supply-side plans

prioritise the better use of existing buildings rather than additional land take for

construction.

6.5.8. Uncertainty acknowledgment

This impact assessment explicitly recognises that the expected impacts of all options are

subject to significant uncertainty. Under PO1, uncertainty is highest because uptake of

guidance would be voluntary. Under PO2, the legal and procedural effects are clearer,

but the housing and tourism impacts remain dependent on local choices and enforcement.

Under PO3, impacts would be more uniform and potentially stronger, but also less

flexible and more likely to generate disproportionate administrative, subsidiarity and

stakeholder impacts.

The main expected effect of the preferred option would be improved legal certainty,

transparency and proportionality, while indirect improvements in housing availability

and affordability are expected only where competent authorities use the framework to

adopt effective, targeted and enforceable local measures.

57

7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?

The three options described above differ in legal intensity, degree of harmonisation and

effects on local discretion: PO1 would provide only guidance and leave the current legal

framework unchanged. PO2 would create binding conditions only when competent

authorities choose to limit non-primary use of housing for affordability objectives, but

preserve local powers over the choice of concrete measures. PO3 would make the

assessment, designation and housing planning more systematic and mandatory and

harmonise substantive restrictions. This distinction allows the impact assessment to

compare different levels of EU intervention against effectiveness, subsidiarity and

proportionality.

To make the options comparable, Table 3 below summarises for each options: 1) the legal

nature of the interventions; 2) the addressees; 3) whether the measures are voluntary or

binding; 4) whether the option applies to new and/or existing designations and

restrictions; 5) the role of supply-side measures and 6) the link with the Services

Directive.

Table 3: Comparison of the Policy Options

Policy Option 1 Policy Option 2 Policy Option 3

Legal nature Non-binding

Communication /

notice

Regulation, complemented

by a Recommendation

Directive or

Regulation,

including mandatory

housing plans

Addressees Member States and

competent authorities

choosing to use

guidance

Member States and

competent authorities

choosing to designate or

intervene

All Member States

and relevant

competent

authorities

Designation of

areas under

housing stress

Voluntary, based on a

guidance

Voluntary decision to

designate, with binding

criteria, transparency and

review obligations

Mandatory

assessment and

designation if EU

thresholds are met

Restrictions on

non-primary

use of housing

Voluntary guidance

base on existing EU

law

Voluntary decision to adopt

restrictions, but binding

procedural and

proportionality rules

Harmonised

restrictions and

minimum

requirements in

designated areas

Existing

designations

No direct effect Existing designations and

restrictions within scope

will have to be reviewed

and aligned, transition

period

Existing national

frameworks need to

be adapted to

national

implementation,

transition period

Supply-side

measures

Non-binding

recommendations

based on good

practices

Supply considerations

integrated into the

framework (housing supply

trends considered under

Tier 2 when assessing

housing stress; restrictions

assessed in the context of

Housing supply

trends considered

under Tier 2 when

assessing housing

stress; Mandatory

housing acceleration

58

broader efforts to increase

housing supply) +

Recommendation on best

practices

plans linked to

designated areas

Services

Directive

Continues to apply to

all STR restrictions

Replaced by lex specialis

for housing-related STR

restrictions (without

notification obligation).

Continues to apply to STR

restrictions for other policy

objectives.

Replaced by lex

specialis for

housing-related STR

restrictions (without

notification

obligation).

Continues to apply to

STR restrictions for

other policy

objectives.

Legal certainty Limited improvement Significant improvement High improvement

The comparison of options below is based on their efficiency and effectiveness,

coherence with EU law, their impact on subsidiarity, their proportionality and their

impact on the internal market. It also assesses and compares whether each option

improves legal certainty (for competent authorities and other stakeholders) while

supporting (indirectly and conditionally) better targeted action in areas under housing

stress.

7.1.1. Efficiency, effectiveness and coherence

Options Efficiency Effectiveness Coherence

PO 1 + - ++

PO 2 ++ ++ +++

PO 3 --- +++ +++ Legend: +- almost no impact; + some positive impact; ++ positive impact; +++ significant positive

impact; - minor negative impact; -- negative impact; --- significant negative impact; +/- mixed impacts.

The comparison among the options presented in section 5 is based on three main criteria

(efficiency, effectiveness and coherence), equally relevant and carrying the same weight

for this assessment.

PO1 impact on efficiency and effectiveness is minimal due to the voluntary nature of the

measures, while being coherent with other EU laws and policies (cf Annex 11).

Experience with the Commission's 2016 and 2018 guidance on short-term rentals

suggests that non-binding guidance, which relies on the voluntary uptake by competent

authorities, is not sufficient on its own to reduce legal uncertainty or ensure a more

consistent application of Union law across the Union and differences in the procedural

assessment, justification and review of housing-related interventions are likely to persist.

Since uptake is voluntary and there is no mechanism to ensure consistent application, the

option is expected to have limited effectiveness in addressing the governance challenge.

PO2 adds value at Union level by establishing common conditions for identifying

housing stress and assessing, justifying and reviewing housing-related restrictions,

without harmonising substantive housing-policy choices. The common requirements on

evidence, territorial targeting, non-discrimination, proportionality, publication, duration

59

and review would reduce uncertainty regarding the process and information on which

competent authorities should base their decisions. They would also provide affected

parties, courts and the Commission with a clearer and more transparent basis for scrutiny.

PO2 also preserves the flexibility needed to reflect differences between local housing

markets. Competent authorities would retain certain discretion in the selection of Tier 2

indicators, the definition of the relevant territorial area and the choice and design of

measures. This means that the option cannot eliminate all uncertainty regarding the

compatibility of individual measures with Union law or predetermine the outcome of

judicial review. It should nevertheless reduce avoidable uncertainty arising from

insufficient evidence, unclear territorial delimitation, inadequate consideration of less

restrictive alternatives, or the absence of publication and periodic review.

PO2 does not mandate specific supply-side measures. However, housing-supply

conditions would form part of the Tier 2 assessment, and restrictions would be considered

in the context of the broader causes of housing stress. This should reduce the risk that

demand-side restrictions are adopted in isolation, while leaving decisions on housing

supply entirely to the competent authorities

PO3 is the least efficient option, mostly due to the substantial volume of work required

from Member State administrations and potential negative impact on tourism and SMEs,

but the most effective as it imposes a series of clear obligations to Member States and

competent authorities in favour of legal certainty and uniformity for the internal market.

The coherence of PO3 is similar to PO2.

7.1.2. Alignment with policy objectives (Effectiveness)

Options General

Objective 1

General

Objective 2

Comment

PO 0

(baseline

-- -- Does not advance either objective

PO 1 - - Supports common understanding through voluntary

guidance.

May support better response when used

PO2 a +++ + Directly supports SO1.1 and SO1.2

Helps identify areas under housing stress, but does not itself

guide the selection of measures.

PO2 b1 ++ + Provides legal certainty on specific measures, but risks

weaker alignment with subsidiarity and proportionality

PO2 b2 +++ +++ Best aligned with SO1.2

Best support to SO2.1 .

PO2 c ++ ++ Supports the broader proportionality context

Supports GO2 by encouraging competent authorities to

consider supply-side measures

PO 3 +++ +/- Strongly advances uniformity, but raises subsidiarity and

proportionality concerns

Could force stronger action, but is less aligned with the

objective of proportionate, place-based responses

Legend: +- almost no impact; + some positive impact; ++ positive impact; +++ significant positive

impact; - minor negative impact; -- negative impact; --- significant negative impact; +/- mixed impacts.

PO1 contributes to both objectives, but only to a limited extent, due to its non-binding

nature. PO2 aligns strongly with the two objectives. PO3 scores high on GO1, but it is

the least aligned with subsidiarity and proportionality.

60

7.1.3. Subsidiarity and stakeholder support

Options Subsidiarity Support by stakeholders Spillover risk

PO 1 +++ ++ +/-

PO 2 ++ ++ +/-

PO 3 - -- +

Legend: +- almost no impact; + some positive impact; ++ positive impact; +++ significant positive

impact; - minor negative impact; -- negative impact; --- significant negative impact; +/- mixed impacts.

PO1 is the most compatible with subsidiarity and the most flexible option because it is

voluntary, non-binding, and leaves competent authorities free to decide whether and how

to act. PO2 represents the best balance between effectiveness and subsidiarity: it

establishes common Union requirements only for the assessment, justification and review

of interventions affecting internal market freedoms, while leaving decisions on whether

to intervene, which measures to adopt and how to increase housing supply to the

competent authorities in line with their local and national specificities. PO3 is the weakest

option on subsidiarity because it would require mandatory assessment and designation,

introduce harmonised substantive restrictions, and impose mandatory procedural steps,

timelines and housing plans.

While the consultation did not describe specific policy options, responses to the targeted

written consultation generally reflected a preference among, Member States and some

local authorities for approaches preserving maximum flexibility and subsidiarity, broadly

corresponding to elements of PO1. Views on a more structured EU framework were

initially mixed, while there was little support for approaches resembling PO3 Mayors,

local communities, SMEs and other stakeholders expressed stronger support for an

approach closer to PO2 – citing the need for legal clarity and certainty, while emphasising

the importance of respecting subsidiarity, and opposing a prescriptive approach such as

PO3. Subsequent discussions with Member States, regions and cities, including dedicated

workshops and the meeting with public authorities of 19 June 2026, indicated growing

support for a procedural harmonisation approach under PO2. In particular, public

authorities increasingly recognised the value of common criteria and procedural

safeguards to support the assessment, justification and proportionality of housing-related

interventions, while preserving local discretion regarding whether and how to act.

STR hosts and platforms stressed the importance of legal clarity and proportionality.

While most of them in their written responses saw no need for additional legislation,

therefore indicating PO2 and particularly PO3 as less desirable options, some

nevertheless expressed concerns that PO1, as just guidance, would not suffice to prevent

local authorities from taking disproportionate measures. They also highlighted the

importance of addressing other factors behind the housing crisis than STRs, namely

secondary homes and underoccupied buildings, and the need for more supply. As in the

case of public authorities, stakeholders have subsequently during meetings signalled that

a procedural harmonisation which does not focus on curbing STR activity may be of

added value.

61

7.1.4. Costs and benefits for key stakeholders (Efficiency)

Option Public authorities

(direct impacts)

Local

communities

(indirect

impacts)

SMEs (indirect

impacts)

Tourism

(indirect

impacts)

PO 1 +/- +/- +/- +/-

PO 2 ++ ++ +/- +/-

PO 3 --- ++ -- -- Legend: +- almost no impact; + some positive impact; ++ positive impact; +++ significant positive

impact; - minor negative impact; -- negative impact; --- significant negative impact; +/- mixed impacts.

PO1 keeps direct costs low for authorities and businesses, but its benefits are also limited

and uneven. For local communities and the tourism economy, impacts are expected to be

limited, as any housing-related benefits remain uncertain and dependent on local

implementation, while any costs and territorial spillovers likewise depend on local

choices.

PO2 provides a clearer and more predictable framework, improving legal certainty for

national and local authorities and supporting more evidence-based and proportionate

decision-making. Compared with PO1, the additional administrative costs of PO2 are

expected to be offset by reductions in litigation risks, methodological uncertainty and

compliance costs. For SMEs and the tourism sector, the balance remains mixed: PO2

improves predictability and consistency in the procedural framework, while restrictions

adopted in designated areas under housing stress may give rise to adjustment costs for

some economic operators.

PO3 provides the highest degree of harmonisation and legal certainty, which could

strengthen the consistency of implementation and indirectly support housing-related

benefits for local communities. However, these benefits are offset by the highest

administrative burden, the lowest flexibility for competent authorities, greater

subsidiarity concerns and the strongest adjustment effects. For SMEs, visitors and the

tourism sector, the overall balance becomes negative because restrictions would be more

extensive and less adaptable to local circumstances than under PO2.

7.1.5. Other impacts

Options Social impacts Environmental impacts Reduction in litigation

PO 1 +/- +/- +/-

PO 2 + + ++

PO 3 ++ +/- +++

Legend: +- almost no impact; + some positive impact; ++ positive impact; +++ significant positive

impact; - minor negative impact; -- negative impact; --- significant negative impact; +/- mixed impacts.

PO1 has limited and uneven economic effects; social impacts are mildly positive where

guidance is used; environmental effects remain limited, indirect and uncertain depending

entirely on local choices.

62

PO2 generates more positive economic and social effects than PO1 because legal

certainty improvements are combined with stronger transparency, review and

proportionality safeguards, and the framework is geared towards considering restrictions

as part of broader efforts to rebalance supply and demand. Environmental impacts remain

mainly indirect but somewhat more positive than under PO1.

PO3 could strengthen social impacts in stressed areas by making action more systematic

and more uniform, but its economic balance is mixed because the stronger intervention

and heavier burden also imply larger adjustment costs. Environmental effects remain

indirect and could become more pronounced in either direction.

8. PREFERRED OPTION

8.1. Preferred policy option

The preferred option is PO2 combining sub-options a, b2 and c.

• It improves legal certainty by establishing a common methodology and

procedural safeguards for assessing housing-related restrictions, while preserving

local flexibility regarding whether, where and how to intervene.

• It respects subsidiarity by leaving competent authorities free to decide whether to

designate areas under housing stress and which measures to adopt.

• It combines the common framework for demand-side restrictions with the

systematic consideration of housing supply and accompanying voluntary

guidance on supply-side responses.

Among the sub-options described in section 5, the combination of sub-options a, b2 and

c is preferred. It establishes a common methodology for identifying areas under housing

stress, combining harmonised Tier 1 headline indicators with objective, transparent and

verifiable Tier 2 evidence, together with common procedural requirements for assessing

the necessity and proportionality of restrictions, while preserving discretion regarding

whether and how to intervene. It would operationalise the Union law principles of

justification and proportionality by establishing common procedural conditions

governing when housing affordability and availability may justify restrictions affecting

internal market freedoms and how the proportionality of those restrictions should be

assessed. Rather than introducing a new assessment obligation, it would specify the

procedural requirements and methodology for applying existing obligations under

Union law. It therefore improves legal certainty and supports compliance with Union law

without prescribing housing policy outcomes.

The assessment suggests that a property-based approach focused on non-primary

residences is preferable because it is more directly linked to housing availability, easier

to administer and more consistent with the objective of targeting activities most likely to

remove dwellings from the long-term housing market, without preventing competent

authorities from adopting less restrictive approaches, including exempting additional

categories of properties (e.g. secondary residences) or hosts from their local restrictions.

Table 4: Comparison of the impacts of policy options 1, 2 (including sub-options) and 3

Impact PO1 PO2 PO3

a b1 b2 c

63

Alignment with

objectives

+ + + +++ ++ +++

Subsidiarity +++ ++ + ++ ++ -

Impact on public

authorities

+/- + +/- + + ---

Impact on local

communities

+/- ++ ++ ++ ++ ++

Impact on SMEs and

local economy

+/- +/- +/- +/- +/- --

Social and

environmental

impacts

+/- + + + + +

Spillover risks +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- ++

Stakeholder support ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ --

Legend: +- almost no impact; + some positive impact; ++ positive impact; +++ significant positive

impact; - minor negative impact; -- negative impact; --- significant negative impact; +/- mixed impacts.

PO1 maximises flexibility and minimises direct costs, but its effectiveness is

constrained by its voluntary nature. While it may improve understanding of existing

Union law, it is unlikely to significantly reduce legal uncertainty, improve consistency in

the procedural assessment of housing-related measures or reduce litigation risks.

PO2 provides the best balance between effectiveness, subsidiarity and

proportionality. The preferred combination of sub-options a, b2 and c improves legal

certainty, transparency and predictability by establishing common procedural

requirements while preserving local discretion regarding the choice of measures and

housing supply responses.

PO3 would severely limit flexibility for Member States and competent authorities and

establish mandatory procedural steps and timelines. This option would provide the

highest level of legal certainty, procedural consistency and predictability across the

Union, but the main trade-off is that it would impose the highest administrative and

coordination burden on Member States and local authorities, raise greater subsidiarity

concerns. PO3 would also imply an increased burden for the European Commission,

linked to the creation of a mandatory framework to identify areas under housing stress

and harmonised EU-wide rules governing restrictions on the non-primary use of housing

in those areas.

Overall, PO2 provides the most balanced response to the problems identified in

Section 2. Its added value lies in strengthening the ability of competent authorities to

respond appropriately to housing stress in a manner consistent with Union law, rather

than harmonising housing policy outcomes, which remain dependent on local

circumstances. It does this by establishing a common methodology and procedural

safeguards through which competent authorities assess, justify and periodically review

housing-related interventions under Union law. Compared with PO1, it substantially

improves legal certainty, transparency and consistency in the application of Union law.

Compared with PO3, it achieves these benefits without mandatory designations,

harmonised restrictions or housing plans. It therefore offers the most appropriate balance

between effectiveness, flexibility and respect for national, regional and local

64

competences. While the preferred option is expected to significantly reduce legal

uncertainty, it cannot eliminate it entirely, as the assessment of individual measures will

continue to depend on the specific circumstances of each case and the quality of the

supporting evidence.

8.2. REFIT and the application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach

This section is not applicable to this proposal.

9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?

The Commission will monitor the implementation and application of the initiative, in

cooperation with Member States and competent authorities, with a view to assessing its

effectiveness. The general effectiveness of the initiative will be monitored based on the

set of KPIs listed in Table 5 below. Monitoring will focus on the effective operation of

the Union framework, including the designation and review of areas under housing stress,

legal certainty in the application of Union law, and the integration of housing supply

considerations into local responses to housing stress. They will not assess the housing

policy choices of competent authorities, but rather whether the Union framework

effectively supports transparent, evidence-based and proportionate decision-making. The

first evaluation should take place not earlier than 5 years after the entry into force of the

initiative. This would allow sufficient implementation experience to accumulate and

would enable the Commission to take account of the evaluation of Regulation (EU)

2024/1028 due in 2031.

65

Table 5: Key Performance Indicators for the evaluation of the initiative

Indicator Definition Objective Baseline Target Data source

KPI 1:

% of competent

authorities

designating

areas under

housing stress

using the

common criteria

Number of newly designated areas

under the framework using the

harmonised criteria, divided by the

total number of designations adopted

(in all MS) during the reporting period

(not earlier than 5 years from the entry

into force of the legislation).

Effectiveness – whether the

initiative succeeds in persuading

local authorities to base the

declarations of “stressed areas”

on the criteria proposed

0%

Existing areas under

housing stress cannot

be considered a

baseline for this KPI as

they all use a different

approach to the one

proposed

100% Publication / notifications by Member

States/competent authorities; national or

local publication of designation

decisions and methodologies

KPI 2:

Share of

designations

renewed or

terminated in

accordance with

the framework

Number of areas that are renewed

because stress persists and areas that

exit the designation because housing

stress conditions no longer apply using

the harmonised criteria adopted (in all

MS) during the reporting period (5

years since the designation of an area

under stress)

Impact and Effectiveness –

whether the initiative succeeds in

maintaining designations only if

justified by housing pressures

Number of areas under

housing stress

designated using the

common criteria

established under the

new initiative

75% Publication / notifications by Member

States/competent authorities; national or

local publication of designation

decisions and methodologies

66

Indicator Definition Objective Baseline Target Data source

KPI 3:

Reduction in

litigation and

successful legal

challenges

(Absolute

number & in %)

Annual number of court or

administrative cases contesting such

measures introduced in stressed areas,

and the proportion of those cases in

which the authority’s measure is

annulled or suspended for lack of

adequate justification or

proportionality

Impact and efficiency - the

initiative reduces legal

uncertainty, litigation risk and

related administrative burdens

n.a. A measurable

reduction, over the

evaluation period,

in the number of

successful legal

challenges based

on insufficient

justification,

discrimination or

disproportionality

National court databases; administrative

appeal bodies; Commission complaint

handling

KPI 4:

Share of

restrictions

accompanied by

housing supply

measures (in

absolute number

andin %)

Restrictive measures in areas under

housing stress that are accompanied by

a housing affordability plan or

equivalent measures to increase

housing supply in areas designated

under stress using the harmonised

criteria.

Impact and effectiveness

The initiative effectively supports

competent authorities with the

selection of interventions that are

appropriate to local housing

conditions and contribute

appropriately and proportionately

to addressing identified housing

pressures

0%

Existing areas under

housing stress cannot

be considered a

baseline for this KPI as

they all use a different

approach to the one

proposed

The number of

housing

affordability plans

or equivalent

measures to

increase housing

supply in areas

designated under

stress using areas

designated

increases over time

Publication by Member

States/competent authorities; national or

local publication of designation

decisions and methodologies

67

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION

Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references

The Lead DG is the Directorate-General for Energy, Task Force Housing.

Decide number of the initiative: PLAN/2026/242

Organisation and timing

The initiative follows the adoption of the European Affordable Housing Plan(93) on 16

December 2025.

The Secretariat-General set up the Inter-service Coordination Group (ICG) on affordable

housing in the second quarter of 2025, which has met nine times and held several written

consultations.

The following DGs were invited to contribute to this impact assessment: SG (Secretariat-

General), CLIMA (Climate Action), COMP (Competition), CNECT (Communications

Networks, Content and Technology), ECFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs), EMPL

(Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion), ENV (Environment), ESTAT (Eurostat),

FISMA (Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union), GROW

(Internal Market & Industry), JRC (Joint Research Centre), JUST (Justice and

Consumers), REGIO (Regional and Urban Policy), MOVE (Mobility and Transport), SJ

(Legal Service), TAXUD (Taxation and Customs Union) and TRADE (Trade).

The preparation of the EAHP included a public consultation that lasted from July to

October 2025, which also covered areas relevant to this initiative.

In preparation of this specific initiative, and complementing the previous open public

consultation, the Task Force Housing organised targeted consultation 06/03/2026 to

03/04/2026. This included a Call for Evidence, inviting stakeholders to submit their views

and analysis, as well as a detailed questionnaire published on the TFH portal and open to

anyone who wished to reply. 617 unique stakeholder and citizen feedbacks were received

to the Call for Evidence, and 303 answers were provided to the detailed questionnaire.

The Commission organised 4 workshops with Members States, regions and cities,

stakeholders and experts, and a subsequent meeting with public authorities on 19 June.

Consultation of the RSB

The RSB was consulted in an upfront meeting on 16/03/2026. The present impact

assessment report was submitted to the RSB on 06/05/2026. The impact assessment was

discussed with the RSB on 03/06/2026, and the RSB issued a negative opinion on

05/06/2026. Based on the RSB recommendations, the impact assessment has been

substantially revised to address the highlighted key issues and areas for improvement.

The problem definition, objectives, subsidiarity assessment, policy options and impact

analysis have been restructured to clarify that the initiative addresses a governance

challenge relating to the application of Union law, rather than the housing crisis itself.

The preferred option has been reframed as a procedural framework improving legal

(93) AHA-BIB-050.

68

certainty, transparency and predictability through a common methodology and

procedural safeguards, while preserving local discretion regarding housing policy

outcomes. The report also strengthens the subsidiarity and legal basis analysis, clarifies

the intervention logic and expected impacts, better distinguishes direct and indirect

effects, and adopts a more evidence-based approach to litigation, spillover effects and

impacts that cannot be robustly quantified. Additional stakeholder analysis and

monitoring arrangements have also been incorporated. The RSB issued a positive opinion

with reservations on 17/07/2026, and the impact assessment further clarified the

coherence with other housing-related initiatives, the effectiveness of the preferred option,

how the Commission will support implementation, access to input data and the link with

the existing STR Regulation (table 7).

Table 6: Overview of RSB recommendations and changes to the Impact Assessment

RSB recommendation Revisions introduced

(B) Key issues

(1) The report is not clear about its scope

and the problem at the EU level that it

aims to address. It does not substantiate

the problem related to the single market

with appropriate evidence. The general

and specific objectives are not defined in

line with better regulation requirements.

The scope has been clarified and the problem definition

refocused on insufficient legal certainty regarding the

compatibility of measures on short-term rentals and

other non-primary use of housing with EU law

governing internal market freedoms. The problem

drivers and consequences have been more clearly

defined and substantiated with evidence from the

Annexes. Additional evidence from the targeted

consultation, studies and case law was introduced to

demonstrate the governance challenges arising from

divergent procedural approaches, legal uncertainty and

the absence of a common operational framework under

Union law. The objectives were also reformulated to

reflect this intervention logic and align with better

regulation requirements.

Relevant sections: Sections 1, 2 and 4; Annexes 2, 8 and

9

(2) The policy measures and options are

not sufficiently and clearly defined to

allow for the assessment of their impacts.

The impacts of the policy options on the

single market and on the affordability of

housing are not sufficiently analysed.

The policy options and their measures have been

substantially revised and clarified to enable a more

robust assessment and comparison of impacts. The

revised report clearly distinguishes between a voluntary

non-legislative approach (PO1), a common procedural

framework including a common methodology

combining Tier 1 headline indicators with objective,

transparent and verifiable Tier 2 evidence, as well as

common proportionality requirements (PO2), and a

more prescriptive harmonised approach involving

additional mandatory obligations (PO3).

The assessment of the impact has also been

strengthened. The revised report provides a more

detailed analysis of impacts on legal certainty,

administrative costs, predictability, as well as indirect

impacts on housing affordability and availability.

69

Additional analysis was introduced on spillover effects,

impacts on SMEs, tourism, local communities and

public authorities, allowing for a more comprehensive

comparison of the policy options.

The revised report further clarifies the relationship

between the initiative and housing affordability. It

explains that the initiative does not directly regulate

housing supply, rents, prices or the operation of housing

markets. Rather, it aims to improve the framework

within which competent authorities assess and justify

housing-related interventions. Any effects on housing

affordability and availability are therefore presented as

indirect, localised and dependent on implementation

choices by competent authorities.

Relevant sections: Sections 5, 6 and 7; Annexes 5 and

7.

(3) The conformity with subsidiarity and

proportionality principles is not

sufficiently demonstrated to justify the

proposed action at the EU level.

The subsidiarity and proportionality assessment was

fundamentally rewritten. The revised report

distinguishes between housing policy competences

retained by Member States and local authorities and the

Union’s competence to address fragmentation affecting

the internal market. The preferred option was clarified

as a procedural framework that establishes common

procedural requirements governing the justification and

proportionality assessment of housing-related

interventions while preserving competent authorities’

discretion regarding whether, where and how to

intervene.

Relevant sections: Section 3.1; Section 3.2; Section 8.1

(C) What to improve

(1) The context and scope of the initiative

should be better explained, especially in

relation to the Services Directive, the

Short-Term Rentals Regulation and the

Digital Services Act. Based on this, the

report should clearly delineate the

problem the initiative aims at and how it

relates to the broader housing challenge.

The magnitude of the problem at EU level

should be demonstrated.

The revised impact assessment clarifies the context,

scope and problem definition of the initiative. It

introduces a clearer explanation of the interaction with

the Services Directive, the STR Regulation and the

Digital Services Act, and clarifies that the initiative does

not regulate housing markets as such but establishes a

complementary framework governing the justification

and proportionality of housing-related restrictions

affecting internal market freedoms.

The revised report also clarifies that the initiative does

not create new assessment obligations or a new area of

Union competence but operationalises existing Union

law governing the justification and proportionality of

restrictions affecting internal market freedoms.

The problem definition has been fundamentally revised

to distinguish more clearly between the broader housing

70

challenge, driven by local supply-demand imbalances

and falling primarily within national, regional and local

competences, and the specific problem addressed by the

initiative: insufficient legal certainty regarding the

compatibility with Union law of housing-related

interventions affecting the internal market. The revised

report explains how housing stress creates pressure for

public intervention (problem driver 1), while the

absence of a common operational framework for such

interventions (problem driver 2) contributes to

fragmentation, legal uncertainty and compliance costs

across the Union (consequences).

The magnitude of the problem at EU level is

demonstrated through additional evidence on the

increasing use of housing-related restrictions across

Member States, the diversity of approaches used to

identify housing stress and regulate non-primary uses of

housing, the growing number of notifications,

complaints, pre-infringement dialogues and litigation

cases, and the cross-border nature of the affected

activities, including short-term rentals and real-estate

investment. The analysis of impacts on legal certainty,

administrative costs, predictability and the functioning

of the internal market has also been strengthened.

Relevant sections: Sections 1 and 2; Annexes 2, 8 and

9.

(2) The report should provide evidence of

negative effects on the Single Market

caused by the alleged fragmented

approach to demand-side restrictions. In

line with a revised problem definition the

report should analyse the problem drivers,

based on available evidence. The

assessment of the problems of legal

uncertainty faced by public authorities

should be enhanced based on available

evidence.

The revised impact assessment strengthens the evidence

base concerning the effects of fragmentation on the

internal market and the legal uncertainty faced by public

authorities and economic operators. The problem

definition and problem-driver analysis have been

restructured and are now supported by additional

evidence from consultations, studies, notifications,

complaints, litigation and Commission enforcement

experience.

The revised report demonstrates more clearly how

divergent approaches to identifying housing stress and

designing housing-related restrictions create legal

uncertainty, divergent procedural approaches and

increased administrative, compliance and litigation

costs across the Union. It includes additional evidence

on the diversity of national, regional and local measures,

the growing number of notifications, complaints, pre-

infringement dialogues and court cases, and the

limitations of relying solely on case-by-case application

of existing general legal principles.

The assessment of legal uncertainty has also been

strengthened. The revised report explains in greater

71

detail the practical difficulties faced by public

authorities in demonstrating the justification and

proportionality of housing-related interventions in the

absence of common operational criteria, methodologies

and evidentiary standards. It also quantifies, where

possible, the administrative and litigation costs

associated with the current fragmented framework.

Relevant sections: Sections 2.2 and 2.3; Annexes 2, 8

and 9

(3) The objectives should subsequently be

revised to reflect the actual aim of the

intervention. The report should establish

clearly the link between the proposed

measures, the objectives and the problems

to show how this intervention will

concomitantly improve both the

functioning of the single market in this

area and the affordability of housing,

without aggravating the housing problem

locally.

The objectives were reformulated to comply with Better

Regulation requirements and to establish a clearer

intervention logic linking the identified problems,

problem drivers, objectives and policy measures. The

revised report distinguishes between the broader

housing challenge and the specific governance problem

addressed by the initiative, and aligns the objectives

with the areas where Union action can add value.

The general objectives now reflect the two problem

drivers identified in Section 2: improving the

functioning of the internal market and legal certainty

regarding housing-related restrictions, and supporting

competent supporting competent authorities in

responding to housing stress through a more systematic

consideration of housing supply. The specific objectives

are directly linked to the identified drivers and to the

corresponding policy measures assessed under each

option.

The revised report also strengthens the explanation of

how the proposed measures contribute to the objectives.

It clarifies that the initiative primarily improves the

framework within which the justification and

proportionality of housing-related interventions is

assessed, documented and reviewed, thereby improving

legal certainty, transparency and consistency in the

application of Union law. Any effects on housing

affordability and availability are presented as indirect

and dependent on local implementation, thereby

reflecting the limits of Union competence and

respecting the principles of subsidiarity and

proportionality.

Relevant sections: Sections 2, 4, 5 and 6.

4) The policy measures and options

should be clearly defined to allow for the

assessment of their impacts and

comparison. In particular, it should be

clear which obligations stem from which

policy option, for whom and under what

The policy options have been substantially revised and

clarified to allow a more robust assessment and

comparison of their impacts. For each option, the

revised report specifies the actors concerned, the

obligations that would arise, the circumstances under

which they would apply, and whether the relevant

72

circumstances, and what is the interplay

among the measures under each policy

option. The voluntary or compulsory

nature of the proposed measures should be

made clear. For example, option 2

includes recommendations to Member

States on supply. However, at the same

time, option 2 under b2 includes measures

increasing supply as one of the obligations

to access to restrictions that would be

exceptionally permitted.

elements are voluntary or mandatory. The interaction

between the different components of each option has

also been clarified and reflected consistently throughout

the impact assessment.

The revised report clearly distinguishes between: (i) a

fully voluntary non-legislative approach (PO1); (ii) a

legislative framework establishing common procedural

requirements for the assessment, justification and

proportionality of housing-related interventions (PO2);

and (iii) a more prescriptive harmonised approach

involving additional mandatory obligations and reduced

discretion for competent authorities (PO3). The

description of the options, the impact assessment and

the comparison of options have been aligned

accordingly.

Within PO2, the revised report separately assesses

PO2a, PO2b1, PO2b2 and PO2c and explains the

rationale for selecting PO2b2 as part of the preferred

option. It also clarifies the distinction between the

legislative and non-legislative components of PO2,

including regarding supply measures. The preferred

option combines a binding framework governing the

conditions under which restrictions affecting internal

market freedoms may be justified and assessed, with a

separate non-binding Recommendation offering best

practices for housing supply responses.

The revised report further clarifies that the legislative

component under PO2 does not impose mandatory

housing investment obligations or supply-side

measures. Rather, it requires competent authorities to

assess restrictive measures in the context of broader

housing market conditions and existing efforts to

address housing shortages, while the accompanying

Recommendation provides voluntary guidance on

housing supply responses. The choice, design and

implementation of any housing supply measures remain

entirely with Member States and competent authorities.

This distinction between mandatory procedural

requirements and voluntary operational

recommendations is now reflected consistently

throughout the report.

Relevant sections: Sections 5, 6 and 7.

5) The policy measures should better take

into account available evidence. For

example, given the limited evidence on

effectiveness of demand-side measures

and their context dependence, the report

should demonstrate that developing a

The revised impact assessment strengthens the evidence

base underpinning the policy measures and clarifies the

limits of the available evidence. It explicitly recognises

that the effectiveness of demand-side measures is

context-dependent and that such measures cannot, by

themselves, resolve structural housing shortages.

73

harmonised framework is feasible, i.a.

regarding the definition of areas under

stress. The report should also clarify how

the proposed measures will relate to

existing restrictions, if and how they will

be applied in situations of a potential

mismatch between the areas identified as

being under housing stress and the area of

action by local authorities, and how the

conformity of the measures will be

assessed and by whom. The report needs

to be clear how legal certainty will be

ensured for public authorities regarding

all the proposed elements

Accordingly, the revised options do not prescribe

specific housing restrictions but focus on establishing a

common governance framework for housing-related

interventions.

The feasibility of the proposed framework has been

strengthened and better demonstrated. The revised

report introduces a two-tier methodology for identifying

housing stress, combining a common headline

screening indicator with supplementary diagnostic

indicators reflecting local housing market conditions.

The methodology is supported by additional analysis

and sensitivity testing and is designed to be operational

for competent authorities while accommodating local

specificities.

The revised report also clarifies how the proposed

framework would apply in practice. It explains the

relationship with existing designations and restrictions,

including transitional review and alignment

mechanisms. It further clarifies that the territorial scope

of areas designated as under housing stress should be

evidence-based and may differ from administrative

boundaries where housing market pressures extend

across a wider functional area.

The assessment of conformity has also been clarified.

The revised report explains that responsibility for

demonstrating compliance with the requirements of

justification, proportionality and non-discrimination

remains with the competent authorities introducing or

renewing restrictions. Legal certainty is strengthened

not by replacing local discretion, but by operationalising

existing Union-law requirements through common

criteria, methodologies and procedural rules.

The analysis of economic, social and environmental

impacts has been expanded and strengthened through

the use of additional evidence and data sources. The

findings from the assessment of existing restrictions,

including those presented in Annexes 8 and 9, have been

integrated more systematically into the impact

assessment.

Relevant sections: Sections 5 and 6; Annexes 4, 8, 9 and

12.

(6) The effectiveness of the proposed

measures needs a more thorough analysis.

Given that the harmonised criteria

proposed for assessing the conformity of

the demand-side restrictions in areas

under housing stress leave a significant

The revised impact assessment substantially strengthens

the analysis of effectiveness and EU added value. It

clarifies that the principal direct effects of the preferred

option are improved legal certainty, transparency,

predictability and more robust decision-making

regarding housing-related restrictions affecting internal

74

leeway to the authorities introducing

them, the report should consider to what

extent an EU regulatory approach can

bring added value. The effectiveness and

practical aspects of the requirement to

propose supply-side measures in order to

be allowed to introduce demand-side

restrictions needs to be carefully assessed.

In case mandatory supply side measures

are considered, the report should provide

an assessment regarding their costs and

enforcement. In addition, the analysis of

the potential spillover effects to areas

neighbouring those with demand-side

restrictions should be strengthened.

market freedoms. Any impacts on housing affordability

and availability are presented as indirect, localised and

dependent on implementation choices by competent

authorities.

The revised report also provides a more detailed

assessment of the added value of an EU framework

despite the discretion retained by competent authorities.

It explains that housing stress, tourism pressures, supply

constraints and non-primary uses of housing vary

considerably across locations and therefore require local

decision-making. The added value of EU action lies not

in harmonising housing policy outcomes, but in

establishing common criteria, methodologies and

procedural safeguards governing the assessment,

justification and proportionality of housing-related

interventions insofar as they fall within the scope of, or

are affected by, EU law. Compared with PO1, the

preferred option is assessed as more effective in

improving legal certainty, transparency and

predictability through a common procedural

framework. Compared with PO3, it achieves these

benefits in a more proportionate manner while

preserving local flexibility and respecting subsidiarity.

The revised report further clarifies the role of housing

supply measures. The report clarifies that under the

preferred policy option, the Regulation does not require

the adoption of housing supply measures but ensures

that restrictions are assessed in the context of broader

housing market conditions and existing efforts to

address housing shortages. The accompanying

Recommendation provides voluntary guidance on

supply-side responses. The choice, design, financing

and implementation of supply-side measures remain

entirely with Member States and competent authorities.

As a result, the assessment focuses primarily on the

administrative costs associated with the framework

itself, and clarifies that the preferred option does not

create an entirely new assessment obligation but

establishes a common methodology for carrying out

assessments already required under Union law.

The analysis of potential spillover effects has also been

strengthened. The revised report includes a dedicated

assessment of possible displacement of STR activity,

shifts in housing demand, tourism substitution effects

and price or rent impacts in neighbouring areas. It

explains that such effects may be positive or negative,

are highly location-specific and depend on the design

and territorial scope of the measures adopted. The

monitoring framework has been expanded accordingly,

75

including indicators relating to designations, reviews,

litigation outcomes and accompanying supply-side

measures.

Relevant sections: Sections 3.2, 6, 7 and 8; Annexes 4,

8 and 9.

(7) The report should improve the

justification for acting at EU level on

housing which is primarily a

national/regional/local competence. The

subsidiarity and proportionality

assessment needs to take into account the

effectiveness of the proposed approach

and the distribution of competences

among various levels of governance.

The revised impact assessment substantially strengthens

the subsidiarity and proportionality assessment and

provides a clearer justification for action at Union level.

It explains more explicitly that housing policy, land-use

planning and housing supply remain primarily within

the competence of Member States and their regional and

local authorities, while the justification and

proportionality of restrictions affecting internal market

freedoms are matters governed by Union law.

The revised report clarifies the distribution of

responsibilities across governance levels and

demonstrates more clearly how the initiative respects

the principle of subsidiarity. It explains that the

initiative does not harmonise housing policy outcomes,

housing market regulation or local planning decisions.

Rather, it establishes a common framework governing

how housing-related interventions affecting internal

market freedoms are assessed, justified and applied. The

report also emphasises that competent authorities

remain responsible for determining whether housing

stress exists, whether intervention is necessary and

which measures, if any, should be adopted.

The justification for EU action has been strengthened by

linking the identified problems and drivers more

directly to the functioning of the internal market. The

revised report explains how the absence of common

criteria, methodologies and procedural safeguards

contributes to legal uncertainty and compliance costs

across the Union, and why these challenges cannot be

addressed effectively through uncoordinated action at

national, regional or local level.

The assessment of policy options has also been revised

to take greater account of subsidiarity, proportionality

and effectiveness. The report compares the implications

of each option for different levels of governance and

explains why the preferred option strikes the most

appropriate balance between improving legal certainty

and preserving local discretion. In particular, it clarifies

that the preferred option harmonises procedural

requirements governing the assessment, justification

and proportionality of restrictions, while leaving

76

substantive housing policy choices to competent

authorities.

Relevant sections: Sections 3, 7 and 8; Annexes 8 and

9.

Evidence, sources and quality (see Annex 12)

Table 7 Overview of RSB 2nd opinion and changes to the Impact Assessment

RSB recommendation Revisions introduced

(B) Key issues

(1) The effectiveness of the preferred

option is not sufficiently assessed.

The text better demonstrates the effectiveness of the

preferred option, including how a procedural approach

will reduce legal uncertainty and what implementation

support will be available to competent authorities.

Relevant sections: section 5,7

(2) The coherence of the initiative with

other initiatives impacting on housing is

not sufficiently analysed.

The report now explains more clearly the AHA’s

specific role within the wider European Affordable

Housing Plan and its complementarity with other EU

instruments.

Relevant sections: section 1,7

(C) What to improve

(1) The report should better assess and

demonstrate the effectiveness of the

preferred option, given the focus on the

process and the uncertainties related to the

embedded flexibilities. The report should

clarify whether competent authorities will

receive additional support (e.g. guidance,

tools) for implementing the proposed

framework. The report should also

analyse to what extent relying exclusively

on a procedural approach – while

contributing to the transparency of the

process and accountability of the

competent authorities – will sufficiently

reduce legal uncertainty.

The assessment of the preferred option has been

strengthened to explain more clearly how common

requirements on evidence, transparency, proportionality

and periodic review improve legal certainty while

preserving local flexibility. The report also

acknowledges the limits of a procedural approach: it is

expected to significantly reduce, but cannot eliminate,

legal uncertainty as individual measures remain

dependent on local circumstances and supporting

evidence. The report further clarifies the Commission's

role in supporting implementation, including through

guidance, methodological support and monitoring.

Relevant sections: 5, 7

(2) The report should significantly

strengthen the analysis of coherence of the

preferred option with the other related

initiatives having a bearing on housing (in

particular the European Affordable

The report now explains more clearly the AHA’s

specific role within the wider European Affordable

Housing Plan and its complementarity with other EU

instruments. In particular, cohesion policy and other

funding instruments support investment and housing

77

Housing Plan, cohesion policy, short term

rentals Regulation).

supply, while the AHA provides the evidential and

procedural framework for housing-related restrictions.

The analysis of the STR Regulation has been expanded

to distinguish its registration, data-sharing and

enforcement functions from the AHA's role in assessing

and justifying housing-related measures.

Relevant sections: 1, 7

(3) Given that the preferred option relies

on access to robust granular data at local

level, the report should assess how the

access to the input data needed for the

calculation of Tier 1 and Tier 2 indicators

will be ensured. In addition, for Tier 2

indicators, the report should analyse the

availability and robustness of data

resulting from the implementation of

Short-Term Rentals Regulation from the

perspective of how it may improve the

effectiveness of the proposed initiative.

The report and methodological annex have been

strengthened with further detail on data sources,

availability and territorial granularity. For Tier 1, access

to comparable price and income data is explained,

including through the Commission’s Mapadomo

database and Eurostat. For Tier 2, the report identifies

available local data sources and explains how data

collected under Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 – including

location, nights booked and guest numbers – will

strengthen the evidence available to assess the

concentration and intensity of STR activity, alongside

other local housing-market evidence.

Relevant sections: section 5, 6 and Annex 4

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ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS

REPORT)

In preparation for the European Affordable Housing Plan, the Commission carried out an

open public consultation between July and October 2025 which attracted 13,330

responses on a broad range of topics including vacant properties, short-term rentals,

speculation, construction, zoning and permitting, financing among others. The replies

were summarised in a Synopsis Report published with the EAHP on 16 December 2025.

Complementing this broad open public consultation, the Commission ran a targeted

consultation for the Affordable Housing Act.

Annex 2.1: CONSULTATION STRATEGY

The objective of the consultation was to gather views from a wide range of stakeholders

on the potential elements of the Affordable Housing Act: (i) identification of areas under

housing stress, (ii) measures to protect housing affordability; and (iii) measures to

increase the supply of housing in these areas. Several consultation activities were carried

out, which were all promoted on the Commission’s central press corner and on the

Housing Task Force’s internet page, as well as social media channels.

1. Call for evidence

The call for evidence ran for a 4-week period from 6 March 2026 to 3 April 2026. It was

published on the Commission’s “Have Your Say” web portal and available in the 24 EU

official languages. The Call for Evidence received 617 replies, from 600 respondents.

The largest group of replies was EU citizens (394 replies, 62.4%). Public authorities were

represented by 33 replies (5,23%). Other key groups were: Non-governmental

organisations, Business associations, Companies, Research Institutions. They

represented between 1% and 8% of replies each.

Responses were received from 19 European countries: Spain (292 responses, 47,3%,),

Belgium (70 responses, 11,35%), Italy (50 responses, 8,1%), Germany (43 responses,

6,97%), France (34 responses, 5,4%). Out of the 394 responses from EU citizens, 196

came from the Canary Islands, mostly citizens of STR hosts emphasising the importance

of holiday rentals as a source of income both for hosts and for other tourism-related

activities.

2. Detailed questionnaire

The detailed questionnaire was published on the EU Survey page and was available from

6 March 2026 to 29 March 2026. All questions were open-ended questions except for one

question which asked respondents to rank ten indicators by order of relevance.

This detailed questionnaire received 303 replies. Respondents represented a wide array

of stakeholders, with the largest group identifying as STR hosts and platforms (77

responses, 25.4%). National authorities are represented by 16 responses (5%), local

authorities are represented by 16 responses (5%) and regional authorities by 13 responses

(4%). Other key groups were: tourism and consumer associations, providers of public,

cooperative, and social housing, professionals from the architectural, construction, and

79

renovation sector, and owner and tenant organisations. They represented between 4 and

9% of responses each.

Respondents were from 25 European countries, with the majority of responses coming

from Italy (47 responses, 15.51%), Portugal (46 responses, 15.18%), Spain (37

responses, 12.21%), France (32 responses, 10.56%), The Netherlands (23 responses,

7.59%) and Ireland (19 responses, 6.27%). No responses were received from: Cyprus

and Greece. In addition, 34 respondents (11.22%) stated that they were active in more

than one country.

3. Workshops

Four different workshops with Member States (1.), regions and cities (2.), stakeholders

(3.) and academia (4.) were held during the consultation process for the Affordable

Housing Act. They were complemented by a meeting with public authorities from

Member States, regions and cities on 19 June.

Annex 2.2: RESULTS OF EACH CONSULTATION STRATEGY

1. Call for evidence

The majority of responses to the call for evidence focused on STRs.

All of the responses from EU citizens located in the Canary Islands highlighted the

positive effects of STRs for hosts (extra income for studies, mortgage, retirement), for

the local economy (jobs and income for the tourist sector) and for STR guests (cheaper

accommodation). They criticised restrictions and put forward the responsibility of the

government in not building more affordable housing, and of a legal system perceived as

too protective of tenant rights. Several respondents called for a distinction between

professional and non-professional hosts.

The majority of the other responses from citizens not linked to the Canary Islands also

highlighted the positive effects of STRs and stated that STRs are not the main cause of

the housing crisis. Several also put forward the nuisances caused by the excessive number

of STRs in their buildings and flats. One quarter of citizen responses stressed the need to

tackle the housing crisis in general and therefore called for STR regulation (restrictions

and taxes), better use of vacant housing, more construction, taxation of speculative

behaviours. Others stated that long permitting times and excessive regulation were

limiting construction.

2. Detailed questionnaire

Question 1. Are you aware of any policies by a Member State/regional/local

government which define areas under housing stress? If so, how are they defined, at

what geographical scale, how are they monitored and reassessed and at what frequency?

207 respondents answered question 1.

Respondents cited the following Member States which have defined and designated

stressed areas at the national level.

- France (zones tendues), based on rent and price data, social housing waiting lists,

revised every year

80

- Spain (zonas de mercado residencial tensionado), based on housing costs, and

price increase compared to inflation, revised every 3 years

- Croatia, based on housing gap and housing affordability index (ratio between the

local median price of a housing unit and the annual local average net income),

revised each year

- Slovenia, based on housing prices in municipality in relation to average prices on

national level and STR share, revised every 2 years

The regional or local governments in the following countries define and designate

stressed areas:

- Germany (Angespannte Wohnungsmärkte), based on rental indicators, criteria

and regulation differ across federal states

- Portugal (Zonas de Pressaeo urbanistica), based on housing prices, demographic

trends, supply shortages on the municipal level, revised every 5 years

- Italy (Comuni ad Alata Tensione Abitativa), based on proposal from the regions,

based on non-standartised critera which differ across regions

- Netherlands, decided on regional and municipal level, based on housing shortage

Respondents also mentioned Ireland where legislation on areas under housing stress has

changed to be applied nationwide (Rent Pressure Zones).

(further details on existing legislation to define areas under housing stress see Annex 10).

Question 2. Please rank the following indicators by relevance for identifying areas

under housing stress. What other indicator would be relevant? 303 respondents

answered question 2.

The most supported indicators were the price to income, rent to income and housing

cost over burden rate. Future housing needs, building permits and overcrowding

rates came after in the ranking. Short term rentals (as a % of the long-term rental stock

or per 1000 inhabitants) and share of primary residences were deemed not so relevant

to measure housing stress.

Although difficult to measure, indicators related to vacancy were mentioned most often

as additional indicators. Other frequently mentioned indicators were related to housing

supply and demand (social housing waiting lists, construction activity), residential

stability and mobility (eviction rate, timing of leaving the parental home), and

demographic factors (timing of leaving the parental home and population growth).

A respondent from Austria specifically rejected the idea of an EU definition for areas

under housing stress.

Some stakeholders opposed the ranking of indicators and more generally the use of

indicators to measure areas under housing stress, emphasising the importance of the local

context and a holistic approach to housing-related issues in a city or region.

Question 3. What should be the policy implications of designating an area as under

housing stress? Should they be focused on short-term rentals, demand-related measures

(e.g. measures relating to acquisitions or usage), and/or supply measures (e.g. incentives

to use vacant housing, permitting measures, social and affordable housing provision,

renovation/repurposing, energy performance improvement, other)? Are there any

81

particular fields in which an initiative at EU level could add value? 243 respondents

answered question 3.

The majority of responses prioritised supply-side measures. Some responses referred to

the conversion and use of vacant buildings, and the renovation of existing buildings to

address energy poverty. Others highlighted the importance of improving and speeding up

permitting. The role of the EU was seen on data collection (on vacancy rates for instance),

and funding.

Regarding potential regulations and restrictions on STRs, STR hosts and platforms

were critical of regulation of STRs at EU level. They emphasised that any measures must

be weighed against the benefits generated by STRs and should complement supply-side

measures. Additionally, they argued that such regulations must be locally evaluated and

proportionate. Local and regional authorities were in favour of stricter regulation of STRs

and more accountability of platforms (e.g. removal of illegal listings). Many civil society

organisations also highlighted the need for more accountability of platforms. All

stakeholders emphasised the importance of being able to design responses at the local

level. In particular, several local and national authorities did not consider a new EU

initiative to be necessary or effective.

Measures on rent control were called for particularly by local authorities and tenant

organisations, as long as they responded to local context and were implemented alongside

other measures to increase supply. Some also highlighted the negative long-term effects

of rent control measures and the legal uncertainty surrounding the implementation of such

measures.

Question 4. What type of measures on non-primary use or acquisition of housing or

on STRs have been put in place at the local, regional or national level in your country?