EN EN

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

Brussels, 3.11.2026 JOIN(2026) 26 final

Joint Report

on the implementation of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)

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Joint Report

on the implementation of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)

Introduction

On 24 October 20231, the Council approved the Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy

(EUMSS) and its Action Plan2, with the overall aim of strengthening Europe’s ability to address

an increasingly volatile maritime security environment. At the same time, it invited ‘the

Commission and the High Representative to submit to the Council a joint progress report with

contributions from the Member States three years after the Strategy is approved by the

Council’.

Over the past three years, proliferating hybrid threats, including cyberattacks, drone incursions,

disruptions to critical maritime infrastructure (CMI), and increased maritime piracy and drug

trafficking activities, have underscored the urgent need for a coordinated, capability-driven

approach. Geopolitical tensions in the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the

Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf, the Red Sea and the Indo-Pacific region, compounded by the rise

of the shadow fleet and sanction evasion, have further elevated risks to global trade, energy

security and freedom of navigation. Unilateral approaches to the Straits regime or the Area3 and

its resources undermine the international order at sea, based on the rule of law and international

law, as reflected in the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and

threaten the very framework of global maritime security. Against this backdrop, the EUMSS

has served as a unifying framework, aligning civilian and military efforts to enhance maritime

domain awareness (MDA), operational effectiveness, resilience and international cooperation.

The EUMSS is fully aligned with the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence4 of March

2022. Since the approval of the Revised EUMSS, other relevant initiatives have been adopted.

These initiatives include, in particular: the Preparedness Union Strategy; ProtectEU - the

Internal Security Strategy; the Cable Security Action Plan; the European Ocean Pact; the Drone

and Counter-Drone Action Plan; the Maritime Industrial Strategy; the EU Drugs Strategic

Framework and EU Action Plan against Drug Trafficking; the EU Ports Strategy; the EU’s

Strategic Approach to the Black Sea region, and the OceanEye. The initiatives include actions

aligned with the strategic objectives of the EUMSS.

Since 2023, four Member States (Spain, Denmark, Ireland, France) have developed or updated

national maritime security strategies, which are aligned with the EUMSS, with similar

objectives and actions. Spain updated its National Maritime Security Strategy in 2024. In 2025,

Denmark adopted a Global Strategy for Maritime Security 2025-2028. In 2026, Ireland

launched its first-ever National Maritime Security Strategy 2026-2030 and France updated its

National Maritime Security Strategy.

This Joint Report summarises the actions which the Member States5, the European External

Action Service (EEAS), the European Commission and the relevant EU agencies have

1 7311/23. 2 14280/23. 3 The Area is the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 4 7371/22. 5 Fifteen Member States submitted input on the actions they implemented between 2023 and 2026.

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implemented since the Revised EUMSS was approved. It is structured around the six strategic

objectives of the EUMSS, as follows.

Strategic Objective 1. Step up activities at sea

Under Strategic Objective 1, the EU and the Member States focused their actions on Common

Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) naval operations at sea and maritime security exercises,

including strong intra-EU cooperation, civ-mil cooperation and cooperation with partner

countries and organisations.

Since October 2023, the EU has continued to conduct its CSDP naval operations EUNAVFOR

ATALANTA in the Western Indian Ocean and EUNAVFOR MED IRINI in the Mediterranean

Sea. In addition, in February 2024, the EU launched Operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES,

providing a concrete answer to the growing threat to maritime security and freedom of

navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf region. ATALANTA monitored more than 50 piracy

events in the reporting period and arrested six pirates in 2024. ASPIDES demonstrated the EU’s

ability to conduct a limited, kinetic naval operation in a high-risk area. Since the start of its

mandate, ASPIDES has provided close protection to more than 760 merchant vessels and

monitored more than 2 000, with a 100% success rate.

During the reporting period, both ATALANTA and ASPIDES had their mandates upgraded

with two non-executive tasks: to monitor the shadow fleet and to report on suspicious activities

related to critical undersea infrastructure. In addition, ASPIDES received the non-executive

tasks of monitoring illicit arms trafficking, training the Djibouti maritime forces and

coordinating with the Yemeni coastguard. ATALANTA received enhanced, non-executive

responsibilities to monitor arms trafficking and narcotics trafficking off the coast of Somalia

In 2025, IRINI received similar, additional tasks concerning maritime situational awareness

about illicit activities and the protection of critical infrastructure. In 2026, IRINI and

ATALANTA were tasked with undertaking flag verification inspections of shadow fleet vessels

in accordance with UNCLOS (see below under Strategic Objective 4. Manage risks and

threats).

Several Member States maintained continuous participation in CSDP naval operations, with

some providing uninterrupted naval assets despite resource constraints. However, the total

naval and air assets provided to the operations continued to fall short of the combined joint

statements of requirement. The EU consolidated the implementation of the Coordinated

Maritime Presences (CMP) concept in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) with a continuous naval

presence ensured by several Member States but ended it in the north-western Indian Ocean,

focusing instead attention and resources on the EU naval Operations ATALANTA and

ASPIDES.

Within the scope of the cooperation agreement signed with ATALANTA in 2022 and ASPIDES

in 2025, EMSA6 provided these operations with MDA, including access to the maritime picture

and customised tools to more efficiently assess higher-risk traffic passing through the area of

operations.

There has been significant progress regarding maritime security exercises, as follows.

6 European Maritime Safety Agency.

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The first annual EU maritime security exercise, EU MARSEC 24, took place in May 2024 near

Cartagena, Spain, bringing together EU institutions, specialised agencies (EMSA, EFCA7,

Frontex)8, and EU Member States’ navies and coastguards. Scenarios focused on tackling IUU

fishing and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure. The second such exercise took

place in July 2025 near La Spezia, Italy, focusing on the same issues. In September 2026, the

third MARSEC EU took place near Helsinki, Finland, with a dedicated focus on protecting

critical underwater infrastructure. The establishment of a dedicated EU maritime security

exercise is an important step towards meeting the EU’s objectives of becoming a more effective

and comprehensive maritime security actor9 and contributing to improved readiness,

interoperability and resilience. EU MARSEC 26 highlighted the importance of exchanging

information – including classified information – to enhance MDA, referring to the Common

Information Sharing Environment for the maritime domain (CISE) as an appropriate tool.

EMSA has developed customised notification services in cooperation with Finland that were

deployed during the MARSEC exercise, utilizing CISE to exchange information.

Frontex has provided Member States with extensive EUROSUR fusion services10, including

Earth observation products from the Copernicus Border Surveillance Service and multipurpose

aerial surveillance, to detect and track vessels suspected of being involved in irregular migration

or cross-border crime and to monitor coastal areas.

EMSA has provided earth observation and fusion products to 78 authorised organisations via

the Copernicus Maritime Surveillance (CMS) service supporting European maritime security

operations worldwide, including the three EUNAVFOR operations: ATALANTA, IRINI and

ASPIDES, as well as counter-piracy operations by Member States’ navies under CMP in the

GoG.

EFCA’s role in multipurpose maritime operations, geospatial intelligence for countering illegal,

unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, coastguard training and exchange programme, and

close cooperation with EMSA and Frontex are some key contributions from fisheries control to

the broader maritime security objectives.

The EU strengthened cooperation on coastguard functions among the relevant Member State

authorities, particularly through interagency cooperation (between EFCA, EMSA and Frontex)

and the coastguard function forums, enhancing capabilities in providing supporting tools to

Member States conducting search-and-rescue, contributing to the protection of CMI, tackling

cross-border crime, irregular migration, IUU fishing, etc. Nine multipurpose maritime

operations (MMOs) took place, involving EFCA, EMSA and Frontex and Member States in the

western Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the English Channel and southern North Sea, and the Adriatic

Sea. The Commission financially supported the work of the two main coastguard function

forums (the European Coast Guard Functions Forum (ECGFF) and the Mediterranean Coast

Guard Functions Forum (MedCGFF)), which are chaired by participating countries11 on an

7 European Fisheries Control Agency. 8 European Border and Coast Guard Agency. 9 The lessons learned from MARSEC EU 24, and several recommendations can be found in the input provided

by Spain. 10 Eurosur Fusion Services (EFS) support and add value to operational activities. EFS provides essential

components to compile the European Situational Picture (ESP) and the Common Pre-frontier intelligence Picture

(CPIP) from a variety of sources, including platforms deployed under the Common Application of Surveillance

Tools (https://coastguard.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026-03/EFS%20Service%20Catalogue.pdf) 11 ECGFF chair: 2023 – BE; 2024 – PT; 2025 and 2026 – IT; 2027 – ES. MedCGFF chair: 2023 (not organised);

2024 – AL; 2025 – IT; 2026 – ES.

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annually rotating basis. The two forums promote cooperation and exchange of best practices on

all operational challenges facing coastguard authorities.

In the framework of the Maritime Intelligence Community – Risk Analysis Network

(MIC-RAN), EFCA, EMSA and Europol were involved in developing two maritime risk

profiles in 2024 for drug smuggling via bulk carriers and an analytical report in 2025 on the

role of West Africa as key transit hub for cocaine trafficking from Latin America to the EU. In

March 2026, the Commission published guidance on AEO - Customs Cooperation to Detect,

Report and React to Suspicious Activities, fostering private-sector participation in the fight

against illegal trafficking and organised crime. The Import Control System 2 (ICS2), deployed

for maritime and inland waterways trade flows in 2025, improved the detection of security

threats in the supply chain.

SatCen provides geospatial intelligence to support CSDP naval operations and helps improve

maritime situational awareness across the EU. It also provides a broad range of geospatial

products to Frontex and EU Member States, supporting operational activities, participating in

MMOs and facilitating the timely sharing of intelligence, including search-and-rescue context

at sea. In line with an agreement signed in January 2026, SatCen provides EFCA with geospatial

intelligence products to counter IUU fishing. In addition, SatCen has been actively involved in

testing aerial surveillance capabilities in cooperation with Frontex.

As one pillar of the European Ports Alliance, the Commission supported anti-drug-trafficking

operations by strengthening customs cooperation through the EU Customs Alliance for Borders

(EUCAB), which comprises a maritime unit committed to enhancing coordinated management

of EU maritime borders. The Commission further developed another key pillar of the European

Port Alliance, the public-private partnership to increase the resilience of ports and maritime

logistics against drug trafficking.

In the framework of the EU Drugs Strategic Framework and the EU Action Plan against Drug

Trafficking, the Commission together with the EEAS, Member States, EU agencies and bodies

is also engaging in increasing port security in third countries with the help of the European

Ports Alliance and by undertaking voluntary port security assessments. The Commission is

working on increasing civil-military partnerships to tackle maritime drug trafficking and is

working with stakeholders on a European approach against diversifying criminal methods

including at-sea transfers and drop-off methods.

The Commission also continued its support, including funding, to the Maritime Analysis

Operations Centre on Narcotics (MAOC-N12), which has ensured the interception of hundreds

of tons of illicit drugs (cocaine, cannabis) being shipped to Europe, in the past three years.

However, due to limited available naval interception capabilities among its members many

suspicious vessels could not be intercepted.

In the framework of the EU European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats –

EMPACT - the EU’s flagship operational framework to combat serious and organised crime,

Member States with the support of the Commission, EU agencies and bodies undertook

maritime operations to tackle various types of organised crime in particular drug trafficking and

migrant smuggling.

12 MAOC-N is an intelligence and coordination centre for maritime and aerial anti-drug trafficking operations in

the Atlantic Ocean including near the coast of West-Africa as well as the Mediterranean. Eight EU Member

States and the United Kingdom are members of MAOC-N.

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Maritime authorities of Member States have endeavoured to enforce and apply the requirements

set out at UN Security Council (UNSC) and EU level regarding sanctions and restrictive

measures in reaction to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as measures

against North Korea.

Strategic Objective 2. Cooperate with partners

Under Strategic Objective 2, the EU and the Member States focused their actions on

cooperation with partner countries including in the GoG, the Red Sea, the Western Indian

Ocean, South-East Asia, the Pacific and Latin America. Areas of cooperation included capacity

building against piracy, IUU and drug trafficking, support for port safety and security, and

enhancing regional maritime cooperation.

The EU has continued to promote respect of international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, and to

fight against illicit activities at sea. Since October 2023, the EU has co-chaired with Vietnam,

Australia, Canada and New Zealand two Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Regional Forum (ARF) workshops implementing UNCLOS and other international instruments

to address emerging maritime issues. Maritime security is also a priority area in many of the

security and defence partnerships concluded between the EU and like-minded partners (e.g.

Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Ghana, India, UK, Iceland and Norway). Furthermore,

maritime security and safeguarding the integrity of UNCLOS continues to be a priority of the

EU in multilateral forums such as the UN13 and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

On 12 October 2026, the High Representative issued on behalf of the EU a Pledge on

maintaining the integrity of the International Law of the Sea – “No Fees/No Tolls” - supported

by more than 30 partners, with more countries expected to join.

Maritime security became part of the agenda of the G7 with the dedicated Declaration by

Foreign Ministers on Maritime Security and Prosperity in March 2025 and the declaration by

Environment Ministers on “Mobilising against IUU fishing”. Maritime security has featured

prominently in security and defence dialogues with partners in Africa, Asia and Latin America,

including a dedicated annual maritime security dialogue with India. Areas of cooperation with

partners include exchanges on emerging maritime security challenges, operational cooperation

at sea with ATALANTA, cooperation in the framework of regional maritime security

structures, and joint seminars on topics of common interest, such as the regional workshop on

critical undersea infrastructure protection in the Western Indian Ocean, held in Delhi in

December 2025.

EU-NATO cooperation on maritime security issues continued via regular staff contacts. EEAS

co-chaired and ensured the follow up to the annual staff-to-staff talks, held in 2024, 2025 and

2026, alongside the Commission and European Defence Agency. In parallel, EU services had

regular informal staff talks with NATO counterparts on CMI protection. This cooperation was

complemented by reciprocal briefings on topics of mutual interest, including the operational

dimension and the countering of the shadow fleet phenomenon. The Commission and EEAS

held informal scenario-based dialogues hosted by the Hybrid Centre of Excellence in Helsinki

in 2025 and 2026, with a particular focus on CMI protection. The Commission participated in

and ensured follow-up to the EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Resilience in January and July

2024, and in January 2025 and January 2026, alongside the EEAS.

13 A/RES/80/110 – Oceans and the law of the sea.

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The Commission has also promoted cooperation with non-EU countries on coastguard

functions through the Mediterranean Coast Guard Functions Forum (MCGFF); stepped up

support for maritime surveillance with non-EU partners, through EUROSUR, in line with the

European Border and Coast Guard Regulation; and continued collaboration with the United

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to tackle transnational crime at sea.

From 2024 to 2026, EFCA, EMSA and Frontex participated in the MCGFF, organising

workshops on deceptive shipping practices, the protection of CMI and other maritime security

topics, and supported training cooperation and capacity building and the development of

professional coastguard skills.

In the GoG, the CMP matured into a practical instrument of the EU’s integrated approach,

combining sustained naval presence with partnership-driven security cooperation. In 2024, EU

Member States maintained a permanent maritime presence in the region, conducting 71 port

calls across 21 ports in 16 countries. In 2025, vessels of EU Member States carried out 58 port

calls in 22 ports across 17 countries. During the first half of 2026, EU Member States continued

their commitment through 28 port calls in 17 ports across 14 countries.

This engagement is complemented by substantial EU and Member State investment in maritime

security. EU-funded programmes in the GoG currently amount to approximately

EUR 117 million and support maritime governance, law enforcement, operational capabilities,

information sharing, port security, sustainable ocean management and regional cooperation.

Implemented in close coordination with the EEAS and regional partners, these initiatives

directly contribute to the objectives and functioning of the Yaoundé Architecture.

EU-funded projects, including Enhanced MARitime Action in the Gulf of Guinea (EnMAR)

and Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Security (SWAIMS), have supported

numerous port visits, capacity-building activities and regional exchanges, increasing the

visibility of the EU as a maritime security partner. Through EnMAR, a series of events were

organised in the region together with the Network of Professional Women in the Maritime and

Port Sectors for West and Central Africa, helping to integrate the Women, Peace and Security

agenda into EU engagement.

The Safe Seas for Africa programme, implemented across the 19 coastal states of the GoG,

strengthens the legal and judicial chain from interdiction at sea to prosecution, reinforces the

institutional capacity of the Yaoundé Architecture, and fosters operational dialogue with the

maritime sector. The programme also covers the Western Indian Ocean, ensuring a coherent

EU approach to maritime security on both sides of the continent.

Coordination with EU Member States continued through the informal CMP GoG coordination

mechanism, which supported a more coordinated Team Europe approach in regional

engagements, including the annual GoG Chiefs of Navy Symposium and the G7++ Friends of

the Gulf of Guinea (FoGG). A new EnMAR+ project started in July 2026, covering both the

GoG and the Western Indian Ocean.

Cooperation with key international partners was further strengthened through naval

engagements and dialogue, including exercises with Brazil between 2023 and 2026, a first joint

exercise with India in 2023 in the GoG, and the first EU-Brazil Workshop on Maritime Security

(Lisbon, 2-3 December 2025), which explored practical avenues for enhanced Atlantic

maritime security cooperation, including through CMP.

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In 2024, 2025 and 2026, the EEAS convened annual roundtables in Brussels, bringing together

GoG ambassadors, regional organisations, EU Member States and EU institutions. These events

strengthened dialogue on regional maritime security cooperation, helping to promote a

coordinated Team Europe approach in support of maritime security in the GoG.

In the Indian Ocean, the EU maintained its two naval operations and reinforced its presence. In

April 2024, it became a Friend of the Djibouti Code of Conduct-Jeddah Amendment (DCoC-

JA) against piracy, armed robbery and broader maritime security threats in the Western Indian

Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. As a follow-up to the 2025 high-level meeting of the DCoC-JA,

the EEAS convened a roundtable of ambassadors in Brussels to discuss further cooperation.

France became a full member of DCoC-JA in November 2025.

The EU supported capacity building in the Western Indian Ocean, in the Red Sea and the Gulf

of Aden through various programmes on maritime governance, the rule of law – including legal

finish procedures – and coastguard functions, including support for the Djibouti and Yemeni

coastguards, notably through the Red Sea Programme and the Western Indian Ocean

component of Safe Seas for Africa. It also supported port safety and security in the area as well

as capacity building of the regional institution (Indian Ocean Commission). Through Safe Seas

for Africa, which consolidates the achievements of the MASE programme. It supported the

Regional Maritime Security Architecture in the Western Indian Ocean, with the Regional

Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar and the Regional Coordination Operation

Centre in the Seychelles. In the context of its growing partnership with India, the EU intends to

appoint a liaison officer to India’s Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region.

Operation ATALANTA conducted further joint activities at sea with partners, including the

annual Aldabra exercise carried out with the Seychelles since September 2022; the annual

Doraleh regional exercise with Djibouti since November 2024; several exercises with Kenya

since May 2024; continued, frequent exercises with Japan and the Republic of Korea; and an

exercise with India in May-June 2025. In November 2025, ATALANTA and the Indian navy

coordinated in a real-life anti-piracy operation that also involved a Japanese surveillance aircraft

(liberation of MV Hellas Aphrodite). In addition, ATALANTA reinforced its cooperation with

Somalia on suspected IUU fishing activities in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

In the Indo-Pacific, the EU-funded Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (EUCRIMARIO)

project has continued to expand its network of partners in the region. EUCRIMARIO extended

its activities to cover all Latin American countries with a Pacific and Atlantic coast, providing

capacity building to partner countries to enhance their MDA and to deal with various challenges

and threats in the maritime domain. Personnel in more than 57 countries across some

150 organisations have been trained and are using the IORIS information-sharing platform,

including some for communication with merchant shipping. IORIS has been used by over

500 merchant vessels to communicate with ASPIDES while crossing the Red Sea. The

EU-funded Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA) project and its

successor ESIWA+ organised seminars and workshops that allowed the EU and its Indo-Pacific

partners to share experience on important topics such as international maritime law and freedom

of navigation, the regulation of uncrewed underwater vessels, maritime cybersecurity and the

protection of CMI.

Member States strengthened cooperation with the IMO and other regional sea conventions to

counter threats that may affect ships and port facilities worldwide, ensuring the implementation

of relevant international conventions and codes, also applying their competence for flag and

port State control under the Paris Memorandum of Understanding.

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The EU pursued its cooperation with partners on fisheries, launching the West Africa

Sustainable Ocean Programme in 2025. In January 2026, EFCA launched the Sustainable

Western Indian Ocean Programme. In March 2026, the Commission funded the launch event

for the Partnership for Advancing Decent Work in Fisheries and a workshop in support of the

ratification of the Work in Fishing Convention14.

In 2025, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) launched the Maritime UN Sanctions

Enforcement (MUSE) project, implemented by UNODC to fight the evasion of UNSC

sanctions in the maritime sector and associated transnational organised crime.

The EU Advisory Mission to Ukraine (EUAM) has started work to establish a Joint Maritime

Security Centre (JMSC) for the country. By the end of 2028, an MDA system will be

operational for the naval forces and the maritime guard, integrated with the national information

exchange system and capable of exchanging data with NATO and civilian institutions.

Strategic Objective 3. Lead in maritime domain awareness (MDA)

Under Strategic Objective 3, the EU and the Member States focused their actions on enhancing

MDA, in particular by implementing the Common Information Sharing Environment for the

maritime domain (CISE)15 and increasing the number of Member States and EU agencies

connected to it; strengthening civil-military information exchange through the CISE-MARSUR

interconnection; and conducting many exercises, workshops and projects on MDA.

The Commission launched the operational phase of the CISE on 1 July 2024, with the assistance

of EMSA and in cooperation with Member States and other relevant agencies. The launching

of the operational phase of CISE was an important milestone. There is support among Member

States for using CISE in the context of the EUMSS and for the purposes of the regional ‘cable

hubs’ or ‘integrated maritime surveillance hubs’ or ‘maritime security hubs. Several additional

connections to CISE have been established in Member States and agencies since 2023, and

more are in preparation. As of June 2026, there are 14 operational CISE nodes (connections) in

Member States and agencies (BG, CY, EL-navy, ES-armada, FR-SGMER, HR, IT-CG, IT-

Navy, MT, RO, SI, EFCA, EMSA, SatCen) and 8 nodes in preparation (ES-GUCI, IT-ASI, DE,

FI, NL, IE, PT, Frontex).

The classified version of the CISE network (EU-RESTRICTED level) is planned to be launched

by the end of 2026, providing further impetus to information exchanges between cross-sectoral

civilian and military stakeholders within the EU. The secure and routine exchange of classified

information is a key enabler for effective MDA, and to enhanced EU resilience, readiness and

ability to detect and deter threats and protect CMI, including from hybrid threats and other

disruptions. Enhanced information sharing and cooperation can reduce timelines to responses,

accelerate recovery, strengthen interoperability between EU Member State coastguards, navies

and other stakeholders, and increase operational effectiveness when needed. Cooperation with

industry and CMI operators needs to be strengthened through enhanced situational awareness,

enabling EU agencies, Member State stakeholders and private-sector actors to tailor their

responses more effectively to a range of incidents, while drawing on their respective

capabilities, information and expertise.

14 The ILO, together with the governments of France and the United Kingdom, officially launched the ‘Partnership

for Advancing Decent Work in Fisheries’ Campaign – a multi-year initiative focusing on awareness-raising,

advocacy, technical assistance, capacity building and elevating fishers’ voices. 15 CISE is financially supported by the EMFAF and participating Member States.

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Since the CISE-MARSUR technical connectivity was established via an adaptor at SatCen in

October 2024, the European Defence Agency (EDA), EMSA and SatCen have been actively

progressing with implementing the connection. In this context, a coordinated effort is underway

to enable information to be exchanged regularly between the two networks by the end of 2026.

In parallel, EDA has been tasked with supporting the upgrade of MARSUR to the EU-SECRET

level, with the dual objective of enhancing its operational relevance and ensuring continued

capability to exchange information with CISE at the EU-RESTRICTED level. SatCen

continues to provide critical technical and operational support to MARSUR, including the

hosting of the ‘bridging node’ that connects the MARSUR network with CISE. This

connectivity will allow satellite-derived information to flow seamlessly between civil and

military domains, creating an enhanced picture of the maritime environment. Civil-military

synergies will improve MDA.

The Commission funds ongoing projects aimed at enhancing maritime border control and

securing the maritime domain (‘CONNECTOR’, ‘CROSSMARE’ and ‘MARCONNECT’) and

future ones (HORIZON border surveillance and maritime security), to develop solutions that

address capability needs of security practitioners, including to explore future capabilities

compatible with CISE.

The Commission continued to provide satellite support to Member State authorities, EU

agencies and international organisations through the CMS service, including for the

surveillance and protection of CMI. In addition, operational ocean forecasting and marine

environmental intelligence through Copernicus provided maritime surveillance actors an

environmental context that enhances operational decision-making. In 2025, SatCen signed a

new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to join the interinstitutional framework contract

for Frontex surveillance aircraft services.

Overall, the information submitted by EU Member States reconfirms the support for EU MDA

networks like CISE and MARSUR. This includes increased participation through more

information sharing and upgrading existing nodes or installing new ones to facilitate exchanges,

and designating authorities at national level to lead on CISE. Some reservations were also

expressed about the unclassified exchanges on CMI. However, Member States signalled

confidence that the new classified capability of CISE can incentivise such data sharing. Some

Member States are working to establish integrated national databases to achieve comprehensive

supervision of the entire area of interest under their respective jurisdictions. Upon completion,

these databases could be integrated with CISE, further improving MDA.

EU Member States used CISE in exercises to test and validate its applicability during events

like MARSEC EU (see above), MMO ADRIA SAREX 2024 (SI, Koper), and MMO ADRIA

2025 – Adriatic Sea SARex/POLex 2025 (HR, Dubrovnik).

As a complement to operational and legally mandated surveillance systems and to CISE, some

EU Member States participated in the SUCBAS (Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea)

multinational initiative that facilitates unclassified exchanges on maritime surveillance,

maritime threats and shipping among coastal states in the Baltic region, involving also partners

like Norway and the UK. In the Mediterranean, other systems used by EU Member States, e.g.

SMART/FENIX and the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre (V-RMTC), contribute to

enhanced MDA and information exchanges among a broad array of stakeholders.

The MARSUR network has increasingly been used for military communication between EU

Member States over the past two years. The majority of MARSUR nodes are now active and

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fully operational, and the system is readily available to contributing Member States for regular

use. Several participants, including Spain and Italy, already make consistent operational use of

MARSUR to exchange information between their maritime assets deployed in the GoG,

demonstrating its growing effectiveness and operational value.

By the end of the current year, standard operating procedures are expected to enable the

MARSUR network to operate as a federated European maritime surveillance network. In

parallel, MARSUR III-contributing Member States have extended the scope of the existing

bilateral EDA-EEAS arrangement to authorise EU operation headquarters (OHQ) to install

MARSUR nodes for the conduct of CSDP missions, operations and exercises. As a result, an

upgraded MARSUR node is being installed at the Military Planning and Conduct Capability

(MPCC), and additional nodes will be deployed at OHQs.

To accelerate progress, contributing Member States have decided to proceed directly with the

implementation of the EU-SECRET layer, the accreditation of which will encompass the

existing EU-RESTRICTED layer. This security upgrade, for which a dedicated one-year project

will be launched in the first quarter of 2027, will further enhance the relevance of MARSUR as

a backbone of the Integrated Maritime and Seabed Defence (IMSD) initiative.

To bolster MDA, some Member States have reinforced their radar and automatic identification

system (AIS) capabilities, complemented by electro-optical systems, and leveraged remotely

piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) also through cooperation with EMSA.

Some Member States have made progress with surveys to upgrade the data on shipping routes

in their waters, as well as undertaking bathymetric measurements that have greatly increased

awareness of wrecks and navigational hazards. In addition, some Member States have expressed

support for the full integration and leveraging of EU satellite initiatives like IRIS²

(Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite) and have enhanced

their efforts to secure Outermost Regions and overseas territories.

The EU provided MDA assistance to partners in various regions of interest through the EU

CRIMARIO project (see Strategic Objective 2). Similarly, it supported the Yaoundé

Architecture in the GoG through the EU-funded YARIS information-sharing platform. In

January 2026, YARIS underwent a transfer from the EU to the EUACC (the EU-Africa

Chamber of Commerce), another step towards enhanced regional ownership.

Strategic Objective 4. Manage risks and threats

Under Strategic Objective 4, the EU and the Member States focused their actions on enhancing

capabilities to monitor, protect and repair critical maritime infrastructure (CMI); adopting

and/or implementing various initiatives, strategies and projects related to CMI protection; and

enhancing measures to tackle shadow fleet activities.

To enhance the protection of CMI, the Commission followed up on the implementation of

legislation relating to cybersecurity and the resilience of critical entities, namely the NIS 2

Directive and the Directive on Resilience of Critical Entities16 (CER Directive). The

Commission adopted the following relevant initiatives: a recommendation on secure and

resilient submarine cable infrastructures in February 2024; the ProtectEU: a European Internal

Security Strategy in April 2025; the European Ocean Pact in June 2025, which includes

16 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience

of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC.

11

maritime security and defence among its key priorities, identifies MDA, including a European

unmanned fleet, unexploded ordnance removal strategy for specific flagship initiatives and has

announced a forthcoming Ocean Act; the action plan on drone and counter-drone security in

February 2026; the EU Ports Strategy and the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy in March 2026;

and finally the communication on the OceanEye: An EU ocean observation initiative in June

2026. The OceanEye delivers a comprehensive operational European ocean observation system

and a European Digital Ocean System that integrates proven operational capabilities of the

Copernicus Marine Service and the European Marine Observation and Data Network

(EMODNET) and extends them through the European Digital Twin Ocean. The OceanEye will

position the EU as the world’s leading provider of ocean information, enhancing our collective

capabilities in ocean protection and restoration, climate forecasting, blue economy activities

such as fisheries and aquaculture, offshore energy (including wind farms), and shipping, and

maritime security and defence, including the effects of climate change and environmental

degradation.

Regarding climate-related threats to maritime security, the EU and its Member States are

implementing the joint communication of 2023 on the climate-security nexus17, as reflected

also in the joint implementation report18 of 2025, while initiatives such as the OceanEye offer

additional tools and possibilities for prevention and preparedness against such threats.

In February 2025, the Commission and the High Representative adopted an EU action plan on

cable security, which aims to complement and support actions at national level through a

whole-of-resilience cycle approach: to prevent, detect, respond and repair, and deter cable

damage. This action plan highlights the importance of the regional approach in achieving these

objectives, including proposing the establishment of regional cable surveillance hubs. To

support the implementation of the Cable Recommendation and Action Plan, the Commission

set up the Submarine Cable Infrastructures Expert Group comprising representatives from

Member States’ authorities and the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), which published

two reports. In October 2025, a first report that included mapping, risk assessment and stress

testing of the EU’s submarine cable infrastructure. In February 2026, a second report proposed

a cable security toolbox which recommends a set of mitigation measures to address the risk

scenarios identified in the October 2025 report, and a list of cable projects of European interest

(CPEI) in the field of telecommunications. In July 2026, the Commission approved funding of

a project to reinforce undersea data cable repair capabilities involving authorities and industry.

A further call for proposals will be launched to increase European capacity in this area. In

August 2026, the project (NEPTUNE) on a Horizon Europe-funded roadmap for next-

generation submarine cable technologies started and will run until July 2029.

In March 2025, the Commission and High Representative adopted the EU Preparedness Union

Strategy, which includes measures to address maritime security threats; and the ‘EU’s strategic

approach to the Black Sea region’ in May 2025, including the proposal to establish a Black Sea

maritime security hub. Coastal EU Member States Bulgaria and Romania subsequently

assumed the lead on implementation of the ‘EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region’,

including by defining a concept and priority areas. Information-sharing mechanisms have been

strengthened through the Critical Entities Resilience Group (CERG), facilitating cross-border

17 JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL A new outlook on

the climate and security nexus: Addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace,

security and defence. 18 SWD(2025) 49 final Subject: JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Progress Report on the implementation

of the Joint Communication - ‘A New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus’.

12

cooperation among Member States and partner countries (Norway, Iceland) across 11 critical

sectors.

In addition to EU-level initiatives, concrete initiatives have also been taken by Member States,

such as the joint declaration on cooperation regarding the protection of infrastructure in the

North Sea signed in April 2024 by six northern European countries (including four Member

States) and the MoU on the protection of critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea,

signed in Vihula in May 2025 by eight EU Member States, the European Union, Norway and

Iceland. The CSDP naval operations mandates were updated, to task them with contributing to

CMI protection.

Several Member States are conducting risk assessments and mapping of their critical onshore,

offshore and underwater infrastructures, including ports, focusing also on boosting resilience

against cyberattacks. RPAS and satellite imagery are becoming a common feature in most

coastal Member States when it comes to patrolling and protecting shores and infrastructures.

Several Member States took measures for CMI surveillance, including situational centres

embedded in the coastguard agencies, dedicated monitoring operations in EEZ (in cooperation

with EMSA), and national hybrid attack simulations, including simulated damage to CMI. In

transposing the CER Directive, stress tests on critical infrastructure were undertaken, including

with methodologies from the EU’s Joint Research Centre and the European Centre of

Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. EMSA supports Member States on request

following cases of damage to CMI by providing relevant information.

Member States continue developing capabilities for the protection of critical seabed

infrastructure (see Strategic Objective 5 below).

Member States have increased communication and information sharing with each other and in

dedicated regional frameworks (e.g. Northseal, Joint Declaration Group, NB8) or systems

(SIENA). To foster information fusion and MDA, cooperation was also strengthened within the

framework of EMSA and Frontex, using data from Copernicus. Member States adopted and

implemented new risk management models, often automated with specific algorithms for

monitoring and detecting anomalies, such as those of EMSA’s integrated maritime surveillance

service. Several Member States participate actively in NATO’s Baltic Sentry19, including

through the deployment of naval assets to enhance CMI protection.

EU funding instruments, including the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the Digital Europe

Programme (DEP), the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), the

Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the multiannual financial framework (MFF), play a key role

in supporting concrete measures to strengthen the resilience and security of submarine cable

infrastructure. This includes investments in infrastructure protection, repair capabilities and

emerging solutions such as cable hubs and integrated surveillance mechanisms.

In the context of implementing the Cable Security Action Plan, in June 2026, the Commission

decided after evaluations to provide funding to two such hubs proposed by Member States, one

in the Baltic and one in the Mediterranean. Finland took a lead role in the Baltic cable hub (also

referred to as ‘integrated surveillance mechanism’) and used the MARSEC EU 2026 exercise

to test this new mechanism.

19 https://shape.nato.int/operations/operations-and-missions/baltic-sentry.

13

To reinforce undersea cable repair capabilities, in July 2026 the Commission approved funding

for a project involving Member State authorities and industry. In addition, a further call for

proposals20 will be launched in autumn 2026, to increase European capacity for the repair of

submarine communication cables.

Numerous actions have been taken at EU and Member State level to tackle the threats associated

with shadow fleet activities. In October 2025, the European Council called for further measures

to disrupt the operations of the shadow fleet, and to address the significant environmental and

security risks that the shadow fleet poses. To that end, the EU has undertaken several actions to

enhance the enforcement of environmental and maritime safety standards, including in the IMO,

and working with flag states to improve oversight over their registries and compliance with the

international regulatory framework. The EU has also further strengthened its restrictive

measures, imposing sanctions on some 700 shadow fleet vessels and around 100 enablers, as

well as other actors in the broader ecosystem. Member States have also strengthened their

enforcement actions and boarded and inspected several flagless or falsely flagged shadow fleet

vessels, fully in line with UNCLOS. In spring 2026, Member States updated the rules of

engagement of CSDP naval operation IRINI to allow it to undertake flag verification boardings

of shadow fleet vessels under the right of visit in accordance with Article 110 of UNCLOS. As

of August 2026, IRINI had conducted six such actions. In July 2026, the Member States tasked

ATALANTA with doing the same. In addition, the Commission Delegated Directive (EU)

2025/811 on information to be notified to ship reporting systems entered into force, which

requires Member States to request insurance certificates from ships in transit; this is particularly

relevant to shadow fleet vessels, which are often uninsured.

In October 2025, the High Representative appointed an EEAS shadow fleet coordinator to

support coordination between Member States and the exchange of best practices, in a

‘whole-of-route’ approach. In June 2026, the Council gave a mandate to the High

Representative to negotiate pre-authorised boarding agreements with selected non-EU countries

to support further action against vessels suspected of violating international legal and regulatory

obligations.

proposes this change to limit the exposure of EMSA to potential retaliation] In view of shadow

fleet activities, EMSA provides support on request of the Member States and the Commission,

based on Member States’ needs and the existing operational system’s abilities.

Within the EU, maritime cybersecurity is addressed through horizontal legislation such as the

NIS2 Directive, the Cyber Resilience Act, and EU maritime security legislation. Regulation

(EC) No 725/2004 requires computer systems and networks to be taken into account in security

assessments for both ships and port facilities. In addition, the Commission has developed

several guidance documents, e.g. on applying cybersecurity requirements, and ENISA is

working on revising a guidance document on Cyber Risk Management for Ports.

Beyond the EU, the Union is working actively with the International Maritime Organization

(IMO) to integrate cybersecurity measures for ships into the IMO’s mandatory instruments.

This work also addresses the links between ships and port facilities and contributed to the

recently adopted revised IMO Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management. Current joint

efforts are focused on developing IMO Cyber Code for the entire maritime ecosystem.

20 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/support/news/40037.

14

In the area of port security and surveillance, most Member States adopted a stricter legal

framework on cybersecurity, with some setting up dedicated inter-ministerial agencies, also

taking into account the NIS 2 and CER directives. On the operational side, such surveillance is

conducted mainly with autonomous systems, as tested by NATO Task Force X, in which many

EU Member States participate. EU-funded projects such as VIGIMARE, EMPORIA and

CYSCROMS also helped advance maritime security. Member States have been active both at

EU level in adopting new legislation and filling gaps, and at IMO level in adopting stricter

regulations against crime and malicious activities.

The majority of coastal Member States participate regularly in maritime security exercises and

run parallel national exercises on a yearly basis, which helps improve their level of readiness.

On cyberthreats, ENISA led the exercise Cyber Europe 2026 focused on enhancing cyber

preparedness and ensuring continuity of essential services, including maritime cybersecurity,

and tested the EU blueprint for cyber crisis managementin line with the June 2025 Council

Recommendation.

In May 2024, EDA and three Member States co-organised the Rubikon table-top exercise to

evaluate how to improve collaboration and coordination in case of cross-border events related

to critical infrastructure at sea. Lessons learned from this exercise are now in the

implementation phase. The Commission, EDA and EEAS participated in the REPMUS exercise

with the Portuguese navy and NATO in September 2024, 2025, and 2026.

SatCen produces geospatial intelligence from all types of remotely sensed data, including

satellite and aerial imagery, and continually adopts new technologies to enhance these

capabilities. SatCen is developing, in the frame of the joint communication on the

climate-security nexus, the Climate and Environment Security Data and Analysis Hub

(CESDA) as a single-entry point for enhanced analysis, early warning and foresight on climate

security.

In the framework of tackling unexploded ordnance at sea (UXO), the Commission launched

various projects to enhance the detection and mapping of UXO from the sea (MUNIMAP,

MMinE-SwEEPER), to scale up technologies for UXO removal/neutralisation (‘Save our

Seas’) and develop better methods for identifying, clearing and disposing of munitions, and

developing guidelines for practitioners (CAMMERA). These projects focus on the Baltic Sea,

but results will also be applied to other sea basins, e.g. the Black Sea, once the situation permits.

The EU Ocean Pact comprises a flagship action to develop a comprehensive strategy for the

large-scale removal of UXO from the sea basins around the EU. The Commission is working

with Member States towards such an initiative.

The Commission funded research and development projects (e.g. SMAUG, UNDERSEC and

COLOSSUS) to develop and test sensors, drones and artificial intelligence to protect ports and

ships. It organised a maritime cybersecurity conference and published cybersecurity guidance

for ships; and ensured the transposition and/or implementation of legislation relating to

cybersecurity, the resilience of critical entities, etc. These investments are expected to deliver

additional capabilities that will be usable in all sea basins around the EU, depending on the

coastal EU Member States’ needs, while contributing to superior levels of monitoring, detection

and protection, supporting the EU’s overall resilience and readiness.

To combat cross-border crime and hybrid threats, Frontex, in collaboration with Europol, is

expanding joint operational activities under the EMPACT framework, targeting firearms

smuggling, human trafficking and terrorist movements through cross-border crime action days

15

and joint operations and multipurpose maritime operations (MMOs). Parallel and coordinated

efforts by EMSA, EFCA and Frontex under the ECGFF cybersecurity working group are

enhancing coastguard cooperation against hybrid threats, promoting best practice sharing on

maritime cyber risks. As the EU and the sea basins around it continue to be major targets for

malign hybrid and cyber activities, the ECGFF is set to play an essential role for the coastguard

dimension of maritime security at EU level.

The Commission is intensifying maritime security compliance through the MARSEC

Committee (involving Member States’ authorities) and Stakeholder Advisory Group on

Maritime Security (SAGMAS), aligning industry and regulatory efforts with emerging threats,

including organised crime and hybrid threats. The SAGMAS format provides for direct

exchanges with private industry, thus fostering public-private sector connectivity and

information sharing.

Strategic Objective 5. Enhance capabilities

Under Strategic Objective 5, the EU and the Member States focused their actions on

strengthening maritime capabilities to address evolving threats, on operational deployments,

technological advancements, and adapting relevant legal frameworks. Capability development

prioritised the safeguarding of submarine cables, pipelines and ports, with increased patrols,

remotely operated vehicle (ROV) deployments and satellite monitoring. The threat posed by the

shadow fleet has driven targeted surveillance and interdiction efforts, including imagery

intelligence (IMINT) collection and ship-to-ship transfer monitoring.

Member States bolstered responses to hybrid threats (cyberattacks, GPS jamming, deceptive

shipping) through surveillance and MDA tools (e.g. the CMS Service, SafeSeaNet); EU-NATO

cooperation (e.g. BALTOPS, Open Spirit); and rapid-reaction frameworks for electronic

warfare and underwater infrastructure protection.

Member States have significantly enhanced capabilities under the EUMSS, but sustained

investment, legal alignment and EU-NATO synergy are critical to addressing emerging

maritime threats. Priorities include critical infrastructure resilience, hybrid threat response and

regional cooperation mechanisms.

EDA is preparing a project to develop a scalable, modular and AI-enabled

mine-countermeasure (MCM) system (SEADEEP) capable of detecting, classifying and

neutralising stealth and buried mines, which will be deployable via unmanned or crewed surface

platforms; a project (INTELLISEA) to develop an immersive multi-domain simulation

environment to support risk assessment, protection, resilience and crisis response for CMI; and

a project (GEOFENCING) to create a smart maritime geofencing capability that combines

unmanned systems and distributed sensors to monitor, protect and enhance the resilience of

critical offshore infrastructure. Since August 2025, EDA has supported the implementation of

the PESCO Critical Seabed Infrastructure Protection (CSIP) project, in which 12 Member

States are involved. At the end of 2026, a first operational demonstration in a real environment

will test technological solutions for seabed infrastructure protection available on the EU defence

market, proposed by multinational consortia and chosen by Member States. In February 2026,

EDA completed a project (SABUVIS II) on underwater vehicle swarms and is now preparing

its third phase (SABUVIS III). EDA is supporting the preparation of a project (UNCODE) on

the development, testing and evaluation of an underwater communication and data management

system for seabed warfare.

16

The EDA Action Plan on Autonomous Systems (APAS) aims to help the Member States speed

up the development of highly autonomous, effective, efficient and reliable autonomous

systems for land, air, maritime and cross-domain operations. This action plan comprises

EUMSS-related activities, already ongoing or at an advanced stage of preparation:

• Modular Lightweight Minesweeping – Next Generation (MLM-NG);

• Signature Management Countering Multi-Influence UW Sensor Threats (SIRAMIS III);

• High Sea-State Autonomous Launch and Recovery Systems (HSS-A-LARS);

• European Unmanned Foiling Vessel for Attack and Countermeasure Missions (MAILU).

Under the framework of European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI), EDA and

the Commission are closely cooperating to help Member States implement the Integrated

Maritime and Seabed Defence (IMSD) initiative, ensuring coherence between capability

development, industrial aspects and operational requirements. This includes fostering synergies

between EU-funded instruments and defence initiatives, and helping Member States identify

and implement priority maritime capability projects. Work on the IMSD is progressing, with a

particular focus on reinforcing MSA, enhancing the protection of CMI, while developing

modular, standardised and interoperable naval combat capabilities with open

systems-of-systems architectures, including hybrid systems, effectors and manned-unmanned

teaming. In this context, MARSUR III is expected to play a key role as a backbone for

information exchange within the broader IMSD framework.

Frontex is currently executing a pilot project testing vertical take-off and landing (VTOL)

unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for maritime surveillance, to assess performance,

cost-efficiency and reliability.

To strengthen underwater capabilities, the Commission is advancing several high-impact

initiatives. The E=MCM and SEACURE projects, selected under the EDF 2023 call, are

developing an EU-wide concept of operations for mine countermeasures (MCM), enhancing

collective resilience against underwater threats. Additionally, the SHIELD project, now in

preparation under EDF 2025, aims to deliver the unmanned underwater super system (UUSS)

– a next-generation, AI-driven network integrating distributed unmanned vehicles, sensors and

adaptive microservices to safeguard critical seabed infrastructure.

To further accelerate autonomous and unmanned systems, the Commission launched the action

plan on drones and counter-drones in Q1 2026, fostering manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T)

capabilities for naval and coastguard operations. Advancing vessel automation, the

Commission has also opened a dedicated EDF 2026 Work Programme call for ‘Enhanced

medium-size semi-autonomous surface vessels’, targeting resilient automated platforms with

reduced crew requirements and AI-driven decision-support systems. These initiatives

collectively underscore the EU’s commitment to technological sovereignty, ensuring that

Member States’ navies and coastguards are equipped with cutting-edge, interoperable and

adaptive capabilities to address evolving maritime security challenges.

The non-mandatory IMO Code on maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS) entered into

force in July 2026. While the adoption of MASS will be gradual, it introduces a new era with

significant challenges for maritime safety and security. Risks vary by vessel type; those with

crew on board function similarly to conventional ships, whereas unmanned vessels – whether

17

remote-controlled or fully autonomous – face higher vulnerabilities to loss of control, system

failures and cyber-incidents.

The EU Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 sets out objectives and milestones to strengthen

Europe’s defence technological and industrial base. It aims to expand production capacity,

accelerate delivery and reduce critical dependencies across the supply chains. In support of

these objectives, the European Commission is conducting a survey to gather insights from the

defence and security industry regarding key factors influencing the performance,

competitiveness, innovation, capacity and export potential of European companies.

Strategic Objective 6. Educate and train

Under Strategic Objective 6, the EU and the Member States continued to invest in improving

skills and capabilities, supporting EU joint endeavours and investing in international

cooperation/capacity building to assist partners. Such actions have consolidated the EU

maritime culture at navy and coastguard levels, improved interoperability, enhanced readiness

and resilience, and facilitated the sharing of best practices and ability to respond to evolving

maritime threats, as well as cross-border cooperation.

The European initiative for the exchange of young officers (EMILYO or Military Erasmus) has

stimulated exchanges and quality training of future naval personnel across the EU Member

States, fostering networking, trust and the sharing of know-how among participants.

National naval colleges and maritime institutions undertook a wide variety of courses and

training, ranging from navigation, hydrography, electronic warfare and maritime operations to

crisis management and countering marine pollution, among others. Efforts by EU Member

States also sought to promote maritime careers, encourage diversity and strengthen lifelong

learning opportunities across the sector.

Maritime cybersecurity and MDA received increased attention in the education and training

activities of several Member States. Many Member States organised cybersecurity exercises,

workshops and awareness programmes to strengthen resilience against cyberthreats affecting

ports, vessels, communication systems and other CMI. Research initiatives and training

activities focused on risk management, cyber incident response, and information sharing,

reflecting the growing importance of cybersecurity within maritime security frameworks.

Research initiatives also covered IUU, climate security and other maritime crime.

Member States highlighted the value of maritime exercises, and of capacity-building

programmes like the EU Correspondence Group on Capacity Building and Training Exchange

Programme. Several Member States cooperated with the EU-funded IMO to deliver training in

line with its requirements and standards.

Member States actively supported maritime security capacity-building efforts in regions such

as the GoG and the Horn of Africa, including via the CMP in the first case, and Operation

ATALANTA in the latter. EU Member States have also supported many partners bilaterally,

including São Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and the Eastern

Africa Standby Force (EASF). Through training, technical assistance, equipment support and

operational cooperation, these programmes strengthened local capabilities in areas including

maritime surveillance, counter-piracy, law enforcement and counterterrorism. In addition,

Operation IRINI provided active support to the training of the Libyan coastguard and to

capacity building for the Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre.

18

The EU support in Africa aimed at increasing the capacities and capabilities of national

maritime law enforcement agencies to prevent, respond and investigate maritime crime (e.g. to

train and equip coast guards, national marines and support joint patrols), enhancing legal finish

(e.g. training judges in maritime law and peer-to-peer mentoring) and strengthening the

capacities of the maritime security architectures in the two regions (Yaoundé Architecture and

Djibouti Code of Conduct area); as well as developing coordination at intra-regional level. It

also focused on enhancing the capacities and capabilities of maritime affairs and port authorities

in terms on port security and safety of navigation.

The EEAS has advanced cooperation with other international partners and organisations,

including NATO-accredited centres, by participating in activities held on maritime themes (e.g.

the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC) annual conferences).

The EEAS and European Security and Defence College (ESDC) have addressed CMI protection

through events such as the peer-to-peer seminar on CMI protection with Indo-Pacific partners,

co-organised with the EU ESIWA+ project and the Italian navy (April 2026). The seminar

confirmed mutual interest in exchanged experiences and best practices and identified, and

similar challenges related to CMI protection, including underwater infrastructure and the need

for further dialogue and exchanges on such topical themes. To further support the Yaoundé

Architecture in the GoG, the ESDC, EnMAR and Portuguese National Defence College

organised a peer-to-peer seminar in Lisbon in July 2025, which brought together experts from

EU Member States and the Yaoundé Architecture structures to exchange best practice and

experience.

The EU agencies offered relevant training to Member States and non-EU country authorities on

various coastguard functions, such as search-and-rescue and maritime cybersecurity, e.g.

through a major cybersecurity conference, the coastguard training catalogues and the

coastguard exchange programme operated by EFCA and funded by EMFAF. The agencies also

actively promoted the participation of women in maritime professions, including through the

ECGFF framework.

To promote women’s participation in maritime security, the Commission established three

maritime-focused university alliances (SEA-EU, EUNICoast, EU-CONEXUS), embedding

gender balance as a core principle. The Commission’s Women in Transport – EU Platform for

Change served as a key forum for sharing best practices and improving female representation

in the sector, culminating in recommendations to attract, recruit and retain women. Through the

EnMAR project, the EU engaged with the professional women’s association of west and central

Africa and organised a series of events in the region, and a study tour to Europe, on women in

maritime security.

Sustainability was prioritised through the greening award initiative, launched by Frontex,

EMSA and EFCA, with a second edition scheduled for 2026 to recognise eco-conscious

advancements in coastguard operations.

Operational capacity building was advanced through multipurpose maritime exercises (MMEs)

under multipurpose maritime operations (MMOs), including five major exercises (2024-2025)

in the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Adriatic Sea, which enhanced cross-agency

coordination and allowed for real-world testing of emerging technologies. The COASTEX

exercises, conducted under the ECGFF framework and hosted by Portugal and Italy,

demonstrated enhanced joint response capabilities, with EMSA providing earth observation

(EO) and underwater services, Frontex contributing aerial surveillance via its FSA DA62, and

EFCA deploying an offshore patrol vessel (OPV).

19

Furthermore, the 2025 online Coast Guard Global Summit – Human Resources Development

(CGGS HRD) programme, co-hosted by the three agencies, extended training opportunities to

non-EU countries, fostering international collaboration. These efforts align with broader

Member State initiatives, such as national training programmes and the EMILYO initiative,

collectively reinforcing the EU’s maritime security and operational resilience.

Conclusions

Maritime security has become a high priority for overall EU security, including securing the

EU’s fundamental maritime interests, such as ensuring freedom of navigation; upholding

international law, in particular UNCLOS; addressing EU security risks including organised

crime and terrorism; protecting natural resources and the marine environment and managing

the consequences of climate change and environmental degradation on maritime security;

countering the shadow fleet; ensuring the resilience and protection of CMI; protecting the EU’s

external borders; and safeguarding EU Member States’ maritime zones.

As maritime security threats, incidents, hybrid activities and military conflicts have

dramatically increased since 2023, in the sea basins around the EU and beyond, the EU and its

Member States have stepped up their actions to enhance maritime security through EU-level

and international cooperation, playing a key role in global initiatives and forums, and

developing the necessary technological capabilities. The report demonstrates that the collective

action taken by Member States and EU institutions is effective and impactful.

The EU and its Member States must maintain the momentum, further stepping up coordinated

actions, particularly to enhance our shared MDA, our capabilities for joint action in the

maritime domain, and in strengthening synergies between civilian and military actors, including

maritime industry and CMI operators, and in expanding our joint EU role as a global maritime

security actor.

Overall, the EUMSS has demonstrated its unique value in promoting cooperation and concrete

actions at national and EU level, contributing to the overall effort of the EU and its Member

States on security and defence. It also remains an effective instrument for implementing the

relevant priorities of the European Ocean Pact and all EU policy frameworks for which

maritime security is an enabler and/or contributes to their objectives. The EUMSS Action Plan

is conceived with the flexibility to accommodate actions towards new or escalating threats in

the maritime domain in a constantly changing geopolitical context.