| Dokumendiregister | Riigikogu |
| Viit | 1-2/26-757/1 |
| Registreeritud | 06.11.2026 |
| Sünkroonitud | 06.11.2026 |
| Liik | EL dokument |
| Funktsioon | |
| Sari | |
| Toimik | KOMISJONI ARUANNE EUROOPA PARLAMENDILE JA NÕUKOGULE 2026. aasta aruanne Euroopa Liidu välistegevuse rahastamisvahendite rakendamise kohta 2025. aastal - COM(2026) 588, SWD(2026) 324 |
| Juurdepääsupiirang | Avalik |
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| Originaal | Ava uues aknas |
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EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 29.10.2026 COM(2026) 588 final
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
THE COUNCIL
2026 Annual Report on the implementation of the European Union's External Action
Instruments in 2025
{SWD(2026) 324 final}
1
Table of Contents FOREWORD ............................................................................................................................................. 2
GLOBAL COMMITMENTS ........................................................................................................................ 4
The EU response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine ........................................................ 4
The EU: a global actor ......................................................................................................................... 4
Global Gateway ................................................................................................................................... 6
Humanitarian assistance ..................................................................................................................... 6
THEMATIC OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................. 8
Human development .......................................................................................................................... 8
Clean transition and climate resilience ............................................................................................... 8
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure .................................................... 9
Sustainable growth and jobs ............................................................................................................. 10
Migration and forced displacement ................................................................................................. 10
Democratic Governance and Human Rights, Peace and Security .................................................... 11
GLOBAL REACH...................................................................................................................................... 13
Sub-Saharan Africa ............................................................................................................................ 13
Asia and the Pacific ........................................................................................................................... 13
The Americas and the Caribbean ...................................................................................................... 14
EU Enlargement (Western Balkans, Türkiye, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Georgia) .................... 15
European Neighbourhood ................................................................................................................ 16
European Neighbourhood East ..................................................................................................... 16
European Neighbourhood South and the Middle East/Gulf region ............................................. 16
Overseas countries and territories (OCTs) ........................................................................................ 17
2
FOREWORD
2025 was a year characterised by profound and often unpredictable changes around the world.
Citizens increasingly felt the fallout from ongoing wars in the neighbourhood. Russia’s war of
aggression in Ukraine continued to spill over into the European Union with the increase of hybrid
campaigns activities aimed at undermining European security. The increasingly volatile context
continued to require the European Union to take greater responsibility for its security and defence,
proactively defend its interests around the world, and step up work to address global challenges,
protect human rights and strengthen multilateralism.
The EU has steadily shifted its approach towards creating mutually beneficial partnerships of equals,
with a double imperative of building resilience and autonomy internationally and at home. A key tool
for this work is the Global Gateway strategy. Through Global Gateway, the EU is able to concentrate
its resources where they can make the biggest sustainable development difference, while protecting
the Union’s interests. The impact has been tangible both in terms of the quantity and quality of
initiatives undertaken.
To maximise the EU’s impact in the world and make the best use of use EU resources and skills, EU
institutions, EU Member States and financial institutions have fully embraced the concept of working
together as “Team Europe”. This approach is now an integral and central part of the external action
toolbox, be it under Global Gateway, in fragile contexts, via humanitarian assistance and civil
protection or in multilateral engagement. The EU’s network of Delegations continues to play a key
role in ensuring a strong and coherent presence on the ground, working closely with EU Member
States and European financial institutions in a “Team Europe” approach.
EU external action throughout 2025 can be divided into four mutually reinforcing pillars: defending
peace and security, promoting enlargement, safeguarding prosperity and economic security and
resilience, and reinforcing multilateralism and global solidarity. The EU’s external action instruments
continued to combine a fast, flexible and integrated way to respond to crises and geopolitical shocks,
with the highest standards for sound financial management.
This report outlines the EU’s and its Members States’ work across all four pillars, including work to
strengthen partnerships, in line with our European values, as well as our actions in many areas from
poverty eradication and sustainable development, to free trade, security, peace and stability,
migration, promoting human rights, gender equality and women’s empowerment, protecting
democracy and the rule of law, and alleviating suffering. EU initiatives also supported partner
countries in tackling climate change and protecting biodiversity, illustrating the EU’s continued efforts
to honour its global commitments.
3
The European Union is at its strongest when we pull together. Along with our comprehensive portfolio
of projects and external instruments, continuing to develop and deliver solid and sustainable results
with a “Team Europe” approach is therefore essential.
High Representative Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner /Vice-President KAJA KALLAS DUBRAVKA ŠUICA MARTA KOS JOZEF SÍKELA HADJA LAHBIB Foreign Affairs & Mediterranean Enlargement International Equality, Security Policy Partnerships Preparedness and
Crisis Management
4
GLOBAL COMMITMENTS
The EU response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine
Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine continued to cause human suffering, widespread
displacement and large-scale destruction of critical civilian and energy infrastructure, while
undermining the European and global security order and aggravating food, energy and economic
vulnerabilities well beyond the region.
By the end of 2025, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have provided combined support
to Ukraine totalling approximately EUR 193.3 billion, including EUR 69.3 billion in military support,
over EUR 103.3 billion in financial, economic and humanitarian support, EUR 3.7 billion from proceeds
linked to immobilised Russian assets, and EUR 17 billion to assist people fleeing the war.
A central pillar of the EU’s response in 2025 was the Ukraine Facility, a dedicated instrument of up to
EUR 50 billion to provide predictable and flexible support for Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and
modernisation combining reform-linked grants and loans with an investment arm, the Ukraine
Investment Framework, with EUR 9.5 billion of EU support and aiming to mobilise up to EUR 40 billion
in public and private investment. By late 2025, up to EUR 6.9 billion had been allocated under this
framework to programmes supporting small businesses, war-affected communities, critical
infrastructure and green and digital transitions.
In 2025, following up on the commitments by G7 leaders and based on a proposal by the Commission,
the EU adopted and disbursed a financial assistance package consisting of an exceptional macro-
financial assistance loan of EUR 18.1 billion. As part of the package, a loan cooperation mechanism is
financed by extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian sovereign assets. In addition,
in December 2025, the EU Member States agreed to provide a loan to Ukraine of EUR 90 billion for
2026 and 2027, based on EU borrowing backed by the EU budget headroom.
Throughout 2025, the EU adopted further packages of restrictive measures (sanctions) to curtail
Russia’s ability to wage its war and to weaken its economic base, for example by restricting Russia’s
access to battlefield technologies and limiting Russia’s energy revenues.
At the same time, sanctions and measures to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels formed
another key strand of the EU’s response, with the EU’s REPowerEU roadmap and related legislation
sharply reducing Russian imports to the EU.
Ukraine remained the largest operation ever under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism with the
Emergency Response Coordination Centre handling 39 updated requests for assistance from Ukraine.
In 2025 alone, the EU provided a total of EUR 220 million in humanitarian aid to alleviate the suffering
of the Ukrainian people. The Temporary Protection Directive for people fleeing the war was extended
until March 2027.
The EU: a global actor
In 2025, the EU operated in an increasingly tense and complex international environment marked by
war near its borders, escalating regional conflicts, disruptions on trade routes, intensifying geopolitical
and geoeconomic competition, and deepening climate and environmental crises. Democratic
backsliding, international law violations, including human rights and international humanitarian law
violations, disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference, and growing
5
pressure on the multilateral system and the rules-based international order further undermined global
stability.
The EU’s response to world developments in 2025 rested on four mutually reinforcing pillars:
defending peace and security, promoting enlargement, safeguarding prosperity and resilience
through sustainable and secure economic ties, and reinforcing multilateralism and global solidarity.
Lasting peace, security and prosperity depends on an effective rules-based international order.
In 2025, the EU further advanced the implementation of its security and defence agenda, through an
integrated approach to multi-faceted security and defence challenges, by maintaining strong military
support for Ukraine, reinforcing its role through Common Security and Defence Policy missions and
the European Peace Facility, boosting resilience to hybrid and cyber threats, and strengthening
security and defence partnerships.
The Union acknowledged that interdependence is increasingly weaponised and in 2025 sought to
reduce critical dependencies while preserving open and rules-based trade. The EU outlined a more
proactive and efficient approach to strengthen its economic security(1). Reflecting the growing
centrality of economic security and resilience in external action, the EU has advanced an economic
foreign policy that links competitiveness, security and partnerships; reinforcing its trade and
partnership agenda with key regions and like-minded partners worldwide. The Global Gateway
strategy became an essential framework to translate this agenda.
The EU reinforced its commitment to multilateralism, global solidarity and the protection of human
rights and humanitarian principles working to defend and adapt the multilateral system, building on
the UN Charter, the 2030 Agenda and the United Nations (UN) “Pact for the Future”. In 2025, the EU
actively supported the UN Secretary-General’s UN80 Initiative, an opportunity to strengthen the
effectiveness, cost-efficiency and coherence of the UN and ensure its ability to deliver across its three
pillars of peace and security, human rights, and development.
In 2025, the EU further elevated the ocean as a strategic priority of its external action, including by
defending the integrity of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as the legal framework for all
ocean activities. At the third UN Ocean Conference, the EU tabled more than 50 voluntary
commitments worth nearly EUR 1 billion, to help mobilise the international community to accelerate
ocean action, notably towards the entry into force of the High Seas Treaty.
During 2025, the EU and its Member States collectively remained the largest provider of official
development assistance (ODA) with EUR 82.5 billion, representing 48% of global ODA(2) based on
preliminary OECD data. However, data shows a significant global decrease in total ODA, mainly driven
by severe US disengagement.
Efforts to more closely coordinate EU external and cohesion funding took a significant step forward
with the launch of the first calls for projects to tackle challenges shared by EU outermost regions, OCTs
and non-EU countries participating in INTERREG programmes.
1 JOIN(2025) 977 2 Global ODA is defined here as including the ODA reported by the EU collective and all other donor countries.
6
Global Gateway
The EU further scaled up Global Gateway, its worldwide investment strategy for building mutually
beneficial partnerships and mobilising public and private resources to bridge the global investment
gap and support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs).
By 2025, the EU, its Member States and European financial institutions had mobilised over EUR 306
billion in Global Gateway investments, well ahead of the 2027 target of EUR 300 billion. Throughout
2025, the “Team Europe” approach remained central to implementation, to ensure coordinated
delivery of high-impact investment packages.
The Global Gateway Investment Hub(3) for Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and
the Asia-Pacific region was launched in October 2025 as the central platform to streamline and amplify
private sector involvement, allowing EU companies to submit investment proposals via Team
Nationals(4) in EU Member States. The Global Gateway Business Advisory Group continued to
strengthen cooperation with the European private sector.
In Northern Africa and the Middle East, the Pact for the Mediterranean, adopted in October 2025,
provides the new political framework for Global Gateway in the region. In 2025, EUR 662 million in
investments were approved, expected to mobilise over EUR 7 billion in investments, bringing total
expected mobilisation to EUR 30 billion in the Southern Mediterranean between 2021 and 2025. In
the Western Balkans, Türkiye, and Eastern Neighbourhood region nearly EUR 40 billion in expected
investments were mobilised between 2021 and 2025.
Humanitarian assistance
In 2025, EU humanitarian aid and civil protection responded to an exceptionally high level of global
needs. The EU is a principled donor guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality,
impartiality, and independence. Together, the EU and its Member States provides the largest share of
global humanitarian funding (34% in 2025), with the EU allocating more than EUR 2.57 billion in 2025
for needs-based humanitarian assistance in 110 countries, alongside over EUR 245 million for the
Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) and related capacities.
The global hunger crisis remains critical. To respond to worldwide hunger, around EUR 600 million was
allocated to humanitarian food and nutrition assistance, in a context where 295 million people faced
acute food insecurity and where famine has been confirmed in Gaza and Sudan.
The main drivers of today’s humanitarian crisis are conflict, insecurity and the impact of climate
change. In today’s armed conflicts, violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) remain
widespread. Thus, in 2025 the European Commission continued to fund and advocate for a better
enabling environment for principled humanitarian aid in the context of increasing violations of IHL and
growing impediments to principled humanitarian access.
The European Humanitarian Response Capacity, rebranded as ReliefEU, provided strategic logistical
support through humanitarian air bridge operations, stockpiling, warehousing and transport services.
In 2025, ReliefEU has provided humanitarian aid in crises and conflict-affected areas including Gaza,
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Myanmar, in close cooperation with humanitarian
3 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/investment-hub_en 4 Domestic whole-of-government coordination mechanisms for the engagement with the private sector.
7
partners and the UCPM. In 2025, over EUR 110 million was allocated to ReliefEU operations, delivering
a total of 6 780 metric tonnes of aid and responding to 20 crises in 18 countries.
The external aspects of civil protection are an integral part of the EU’s response to emergencies,
complementing humanitarian aid and development cooperation by providing rapid, coordinated
assistance in the event of natural and human-induced disasters across the globe. The UCPM was
activated, for example, in response to the Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of the Congo, severe
floods in Cabo Verde and the 7.7-magnitude earthquake in Myanmar in March 2025.
8
THEMATIC OVERVIEW
Human development
Poverty eradication continued to be central to the Commission’s work. Currently, around 10.3% of the
world’s population lives below the extreme poverty line of USD 3 per day. Between 2021 and 2024,
8.1% of EU-financed ODA (over EUR 26.6 billion) directly supported SDG 1 on eradicating poverty.
Humanitarian health action remained essential to protect lives and preserve development gains. In
2025, the EU allocated around EUR 400 million to humanitarian health, a record level, with a focus on
strengthening health systems and epidemic preparedness, advancing basic and universal health
coverage, including women’s health, while responding to a tightening global health financing
environment and rising needs in fragile and conflict-affected countries.
The EU consolidated its role as a leading global supporter of promoting quality education as a human
right and a driver of sustainable development, supporting actions in some 70 partner countries.
Erasmus+ contributed to capacity building and skills development, through cooperation projects with
higher-education institutions, vocational education and youth organisations (EUR 177.1 million in
2025) and through higher education staff and student mobility scholarships (EUR 260.9 million).
In 2025, the EU further consolidated gender equality as a cross-cutting priority in its external action,
in line with the EU Gender Action Plan III(5), including as an example through the mainstreaming of the
“for women, by women” approach across all EU-funded basic needs and livelihoods programmes in
Afghanistan, ensuring that aid reaches women effectively and that they play a meaningful role in the
delivery process.
Almost half of the global population lack access to safely managed sanitation services. During 2025,
the EU continued to support sustainable water, sanitation and hygiene activities, in line with the
European Water Resilience Strategy(6) adopted in 2025, including long-term Global Gateway
investments in around 50 countries, with the private sector mobilised, and via humanitarian assistance
in crises.
Clean transition and climate resilience
In line with the Paris Agreement, the European Green Deal(7) and the Global Gateway strategy(8), the
EU continued to support partner countries to increase sustainable energy access, decarbonise and
adapt to climate change. External action focused on scaling up renewable energy generation,
improving energy efficiency and enhancing regional energy connectivity, while avoiding the creation
or reinforcement of dependencies, as well as supporting climate resilience and disaster risk reduction.
The implementation of the Africa–Europe Green Energy Initiative continued to deliver. The EU, along
with South Africa, also led a year-long campaign(9) to mobilise investment for renewable energy in
Africa resulting in EUR 15.5 billion, including EUR 15.1 billion from Team Europe.
5 JOIN(2020) 17 ; https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-01/join-2020-17-final_en.pdf 6 COM(2025) 280 ; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0280 7 The European Green Deal - European Commission 8 JOIN/2021/30 ; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0030 9 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/international-partnerships/global-gateway/energy-africa_en
9
The EU continued to promote circular and resource efficient urban economies. In 2025, circular
economy actions were supported through global initiatives in over 40 countries and via regional and
national initiatives in more than 80 additional countries in Africa, Asia and LAC, contributing to more
sustainable production and consumption patterns. The focus shifted from policy dialogue to reforms,
partnerships and investments that help partner countries reduce resource pressures, create quality
jobs and strengthen value chains, while enabling resilient economic relations with the EU.
The EU stepped up action on sustainable and deforestation-free value chains. Through DESIRA+ and
related agrifood programmes, it supported value chains in cocoa, coffee, cashew and “forgotten
crops”, linking smallholders to markets, improving soils and promoting agroforestry.
In critical raw materials (CRM), the EU supported sustainable, secure and resilient supply chains,
including projects contributing to the CRM Act’s benchmarks(10) on sourcing, processing, recycling and
diversification, and operationalised a dedicated CRM facility to connect projects with off-takers and
financiers.
The EU and its Member States play a leading role in international climate finance as the world’s largest
provider of climate finance to developing countries. For example, EFSD+ guarantees and blending
supported climate investment, including through Climate Investor Funds, with at least 50 mitigation
and adaptation infrastructure projects under way. The EU Sustainable Finance Advisory Hub
supported the development of green bond frameworks to help mobilise private capital for climate-
aligned investments.
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
In the second half of 2025, the EU started the implementation of the Joint Communication on an
International Digital Strategy for the EU(11), adopted in June 2025, that sets out a comprehensive vision
for mutually beneficial digital transformation, underpinned by an integrated EU Tech Business Offer
that combines secure connectivity, trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI), cybersecurity, space-based
services, trusted digital infrastructure and digital public infrastructure.
Across regions, digital projects under the Global Gateway digital pillar supported and mobilised
international research and innovation ecosystems and stakeholders, while dedicated hubs and
platforms supported knowledge sharing and technical expertise, such as the EU–LAC high-
performance computing network.
Sustainable transport remained a core focus of the EU’s external action, supporting greener and more
resilient connectivity. Along the 12 African priority corridors, the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor,
the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor, and in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in the
Eastern (e.g. Solidarity Lanes connecting Ukraine and Moldova to the EU) and Southern
Neighbourhood regions, various investments span the rail, road, maritime transport, urban mobility,
logistics infrastructure and aviation sectors.
Global Gateway also helps decarbonise global transport through targeted green investments and
initiatives such as the Sustainable Aviation Fuels flagship (with activities across Africa and India), the
Global Maritime Technology Cooperation Centres and the Green Shipping Corridors and Hubs
10 OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj 11 JOIN(2025) 140 of 5 June 2025 ; https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/joint-communication-international- digital-strategy-eu
10
initiative, which support partner countries in implementing the International Maritime Organisation
and the International Civil Aviation Organization climate objectives.
An Early-Stage Investment Mechanism was launched to provide grants to EU companies in the early
stages of sustainable transport, urban development, energy and AI projects, helping de-risk innovation
and crowd in further finance.
At multilateral level, the EU advanced the implementation of the UN Global Digital Compact and
engaged openly and constructively in the Global Dialogue on AI Governance. The World Summit on
the Information Society 20-year review was a major milestone for global digital governance.
Sustainable growth and jobs
In 2025, the EU fostered sustainable and inclusive economic growth, improving the business
environment and mobilising private investment for quality jobs through the Global Gateway strategy
and the European Financial Architecture for Development. External actions combined policy dialogue,
budget support and risk sharing instruments with targeted measures for skills, value chains and
responsible business conduct.
Engagement with the European private sector was scaled up. In addition to the Global Gateway
Investment Hub and Global Gateway Business Advisory Group, EU Business Fora facilitated networking
and deal-making between European companies and partner country governments.
In 2025, 20 new EFSD+(12) guarantees were signed with various Development Finance Institutions, for
a total guarantee amount exceeding EUR 3 billion, and deployment started with 63 operations signed
in 2025. Blending operations approved in 2025 are expected to generate around EUR 18 billion of
investments.
Education and skills programmes (including opportunity-driven vocational education and training
(VET) and higher education) were increasingly aligning with sectors prioritised under Global Gateway,
such as six new opportunity-driven VET projects launched in multiple African countries to match
training with labour-market needs.
Systematic use of the Gender, Disability and Inequality markers helped ensure that investments take
account of distributional impacts, promote women’s economic empowerment, inclusion and connect
underserved communities.
Migration and forced displacement
Across regions, the EU reinforced its human-rights based approach to migration, adopting internal
guidelines and tailored procedures to improve the design, identification, formulation and monitoring
of migration actions and the handling of alleged violations. The EU increasingly used its funds to
promote its migration objectives with partner countries. The EU engaged in dialogues on strategic
partnerships with key partners covering all aspects of migration and forced displacement, supported
by EU funding, in line with the European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy(13).
Thanks to the strengthening of our migration partnerships, irregular crossings at the EU’s external
borders fell to around 179 000 in 2025, a quarter less than in 2024, and the number of asylum
12 The European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus. 13 European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy, COM(2026) 45 final.
11
applications in the Union also decreased in 2025 by around 19% compared to 2024, partly reflecting
enhanced cooperation with partner countries. For example, building on the migration partnership
with Mauritania adopted in 2024, all actions in the EUR 210 million support package were
implemented, significantly reinforcing Mauritania’s capacity to manage migration and forced
displacement and to create economic opportunities in affected regions. These funds were mobilised
also as part of the NDICI’s flexible initiative approach, which is proving again to be key for encouraging
cooperation on migration.
The EU also intensified work against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. A global
action on the financial and digital dimensions of migrant smuggling contributed to the Global Alliance
to Counter Migrant Smuggling and formed part of a EUR 78 million funding package announced in
December 2025.
About 5.8 million migrants, refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and host‑community members
were protected or assisted with EU support under the current multiannual financial framework 2021-
2027.
In 2025, around 15% of the humanitarian aid budget was dedicated to protection with a strong focus
on refugees and IDPs in crises such as Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa.
In 2025, about 87% of humanitarian aid funding was allocated to projects addressing needs of forcibly
displaced people. The EU remained committed to support resettlement and humanitarian admission
and continued to support the Emergency Transfer Mechanism in Rwanda and the Refugee Support
Facility in Türkiye.
Democratic Governance and Human Rights, Peace and Security
In addition to many bilateral and regional interventions, the NDICI–Global Europe thematic
programme on peace, stability and conflict prevention continued to address conflict prevention and
peacebuilding and to tackle global and trans regional threats(14). By end of 2025, 78 actions on conflict
prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness were ongoing. An additional 18 new actions
addressed global peace and security concerns, and 14 new actions on global threats were adopted.
Counter terrorism and prevention of violent extremism were strengthened through instruments such
as the EU–UN Global Terrorist Threat Facility(15), which delivered targeted support packages to Iraq,
Uzbekistan, Nigeria and Somalia, amongst others, and through work on multilateral judicial
cooperation with the League of Arab States.
Election support and observation play a key role in promoting peaceful, inclusive and credible electoral
processes. In 2025, full election observation missions were deployed to Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana,
Honduras, Kosovo, Malawi and The Philippines; election expert missions to Kosovo, Iraq and Surinam;
and follow-up missions to Colombia, Guatemala, Kenya, Lesotho, Maldives, Nigeria and Timor-Leste,
helping to strengthen democratic institutions, build public confidence in electoral processes and deter
fraud, intimidation and violence.
In fragile and conflict-affected settings, the EU maintained a flexible and agile engagement, working
closely with local partners, civil-society organisations, youth and women’s organisations to build
14 https://science4peace.jrc.ec.europa.eu/#/Home/CET/Map 15 https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/en/EU-UN-Global-Terrorism-Threats-Facility This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
12
resilience and promote peace, preferably in a “Team Europe” approach. Global initiatives to protect
civic space, such as the “EU System for an Enabling Environment”, monitored trends and built
civil-society capacities in 80 countries.
The EU reinforced its overall security and defence approach including through initiatives such as
Readiness 2030 and the SAFE instrument. The European Peace Facility remained central to the EU’s
security response, while maintaining that expenditures with military or defence implications are
financed outside the EU budget. Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations, in
addition to rapid crisis response tools, were organised across regions to address the immediate and
longer-term consequences of conflicts, including in the Middle East, Africa and the neighbourhood. In
2025, EU’s cooperation with partners was strengthened by concluding Security and Defence
Partnerships with the United Kingdom and Canada.
13
GLOBAL REACH
Sub-Saharan Africa
In 2025, the EU and Africa further consolidated their strategic partnership covering trade, investment,
peace and security, green transition and digital transformation. The Joint Vision for 2030(16) continued
to guide cooperation, with the Global Gateway Africa–Europe Investment Package at its core,
alongside work on peace, security and governance, migration and mobility, and effective
multilateralism. The third EU–African Union (AU) ministerial meeting and the seventh AU–EU Summit,
held in 2025 together with the AU–EU Business Forum and Civil Society Organisations–Youth Forum,
marked the 25th anniversary of the partnership. The EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean
and Pacific States stepped up their political cooperation and continued working towards the
implementation of the Samoa Agreement.
In 2025, the EU remained Africa’s leading trade, investment, peace and security partner, provider of
ODA, and a leading humanitarian donor. EU trade with the continent reached EUR 360 billion,
representing 33% of Africa’s total trade. EU foreign direct investment stock totalled EUR 250 billion.
By the end of 2025 EU’s support to African countries through the European Peace Facility totalled EUR
400 million.
Support for the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area increased through
assistance on trade facilitation, customs and standards. The Africa–Europe Green Energy Initiative and
the “Scaling up renewables in Africa” campaign expanded work on renewable energy and regional
electricity integration, including grid upgrades and solar and wind investments. The NaturAfrica
programme continued across six priority habitat regions, while Team Europe Initiatives on
transboundary water management and circular economy helped partner countries adapt to climate
change, improve water security and WASH systems.
In 2025, both the Lobito and Douala–N’Djamena corridors, two Global Gateway flagships,
demonstrated that infrastructure can support broader economic development and resilience,
especially in landlocked and vulnerable areas. On-going implementation is successful thanks to strong
African ownership and coordinated actions among the EU, African partners, financial institutions and
private investors.
Humanitarian assistance complemented these efforts: in 2025, the EU responded to the world’s
largest displacement crisis in Sudan (over 10 million IDPs), allocating over EUR 273 million in response
to the crisis (including over EUR 161 million in Sudan alone), and EUR 157 million in the Horn of Africa
to address drought, food insecurity and displacement. The EU has also stayed engaged in Central
Sahel, addressing forced displacement, and in the Great Lakes region, providing healthcare in the face
of epidemics and armed violence.
Asia and the Pacific
In 2025, the EU’s engagement with East Asia, South-East Asia and South Asia continued to deepen,
consolidating the comprehensive regional approach set out in the EU’s Strategy for the Indo-Pacific(17),
including by advancing energy connectivity and Just Energy Transition Partnerships.
16 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54412/final_declaration-en.pdf 17 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-indo-pacific-strategy_en
14
The Global Gateway flagship “Energy Connectivity in South Asia” demonstrates how the EU links
sustainable growth, green transition and regional integration by supporting the development of a
cross-border electricity market.
A key Global Gateway milestone was the signing of the EU–Africa–India Digital Corridor Blue Raman(18),
which will reinforce resilient submarine cable connectivity and a secure, diversified global data
architecture. The EU also adopted a EUR 42 million initiative to strengthen the use of Copernicus data
in Asia Pacific, supporting evidence-based decision making on climate and spatial planning.
At the first EU–Central Asia Summit in April 2025, the EU announced a EUR 12 billion Team Europe
Global Gateway investment package, accompanied by a Declaration of Intent on CRM, targeting
sustainable transport, green energy, digital connectivity and water, resulting in eight new contracts to
improve multimodal links between Central Asia and Europe.
At the first EU-Pacific Business Forum in Fiji, the EU announced nearly EUR 300 million in Global
Gateway investments for climate resilience, sustainable growth, transport, digital connectivity, water,
renewable energy, and trade development across the Pacific, positioning the Green-Blue Alliance(19)
as a flagship for the region.
The EU provided more EUR 163 million in lifesaving assistance in Afghanistan in 2025, as well as
delivering 390 tonnes of medical and nutritional items to alleviate the needs of the Afghani people.
The Americas and the Caribbean
The fourth Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)–EU Summit took place in
November 2025 in Colombia, alongside Civil Society and Business Forums. Leaders reaffirmed the
strategic importance of the EU–CELAC partnership and set priorities, including under the EU–LAC
Global Gateway Investment Agenda (GGIA). Despite a challenging geopolitical context, the EU and
CELAC adopted a Joint Declaration and two complementary declarations on citizen security and care,
underscoring their shared commitment to multilateralism, trade and investment, the green and digital
transitions, social inclusion, and cooperation on security, justice, and the fight against transnational
organised crime.
By 2025, GGIA implementation included more than 80 projects confirming the EU’s position as a
leading investor in LAC and showcasing the strength of the “Team Europe” approach. Flagship
initiatives include regional electricity integration, the Condosat satellite-connectivity initiative, and the
EU–LAC supercomputing network for AI. Since May 2025, the EU holds permanent observer status in
the Latin American and Caribbean Energy Organisation(20) to advance jointly on clean energy transition
and sustainable policies.
Cooperation between the EU and Caribbean partners also deepened within the framework of the
Samoa Agreement and its Caribbean Protocol, anchoring political dialogue and development
cooperation in a renewed, long-term partnership.
In the Caribbean, the Global Gateway Sargassum Initiative developed national roadmaps for
sargassum valorisation, turning an environmental challenge into a significant economic opportunity.
18 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/eu-africa-india-digital-corridor_en 19 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/green-blue-alliance-pacific_en 20 https://www.olade.org/en/
15
Cooperation with the US focused on engagement with different categories and levels of stakeholders
beyond federal authorities via public diplomacy, city to city and education outreach actions.
Engagement with Canada positioned the EU as a trusted and reliable partner in key priorities sectors
such as trade, digital and defence and security. Cooperation with both countries were also centred
around Arctic matters (Arctic Urban Regional Cooperation and Youth engagement).
In and around Venezuela, where 58.6% of the population faces extreme poverty, the EU acted as the
leading humanitarian donor in 2025, providing over EUR 52 million.
A new humanitarian stockpile was established in Barbados to reinforce the EU’s rapid response
capability for tropical cyclones, floods and earthquakes in the Caribbean and neighbouring regions.
EU Enlargement (Western Balkans, Türkiye, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Georgia)
The 2025 Enlargement Package, adopted in November, confirmed that momentum for enlargement
remained high on the EU agenda and that the accession of new Member States was increasingly within
reach, provided that partners deliver on fundamental reforms.
The Western Balkans saw steady progress on the fundamentals of the accession process across most
partners, with Montenegro and Albania moving closer to the objective of completing negotiations. For
Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, the screening process (technical examination of the EU acquis)
closed in 2025, and the Commission assessed that the fundamentals, internal market and external
relations clusters were ready to be opened. Georgia formally remains a candidate country, but recent
actions of the Georgian authorities have de facto halted the accession process. Türkiye remained a
partner of strategic importance and a candidate country despite accession negotiations remaining at
a standstill.
The Commission developed “eAccession”, an innovative AI tool, to help candidate countries accelerate
regulatory approximation while saving time and resources.
The EU continued to support regional economic integration, including through the modernisation of
payment systems and the inclusion by the European Payments Council of Albania, Montenegro and
North Macedonia in the SEPA schemes in October 2025, significantly reducing transaction times and
costs for citizens and businesses.
The Ukraine Facility and the Growth Plans for the Western Balkans and the Republic of Moldova,
illustrate how the EU combines political commitment, financial support and conditionality to
accelerate convergence with the EU. The Facilities consist of EUR 6 billion in grants and loans for the
Western Balkans and EUR 1.9 billion for Moldova, with funding linked to implementation of jointly
agreed Reform Agendas and gradual integration into selected areas of the Single Market. By the end
of 2025, Reform Agendas have been adopted for all partners, and the prefinancing has been disbursed
to Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Moldova.
Partners’ full alignment with the Common Security and Defence Policy and Common Foreign and
Security Policy, including EU restrictive measures, was promoted and the EU responded to partners’
requests to strengthen their resilience and security against hybrid and other threats.
The EU maintained substantial support for refugees in Türkiye, committing EUR 1.3 billion in support
to refugees under the budget for 2025-2027, while a new “visa cascade” system was introduced in
2025 to facilitate travel for bona fide Turkish travellers in the Schengen area.
16
European Neighbourhood
European Neighbourhood East
In the Eastern Neighbourhood, marked by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU
continued to engage with partner countries of the region either on bilateral or on regional basis
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). The Eastern Partnership continued to
provide a well-established and efficient framework of cooperation to all participants. With Belarus,
the EU maintained its policy of pressure on the authorities while supporting citizens, civil society and
independent media.
The programme “Support to Advanced Learning and Training (SALT I-III)” assists Belarusian students,
lecturers and researchers forced to flee the regime. It is a strategically important initiative for
preserving Belarus’ intellectual potential.
The Global Gateway strategy and the 2025-2027 multiannual action plans for the Eastern
Neighbourhood remained key for supporting resilience, connectivity and socio-economic
development. The newly approved multiannual action plans (excluding assistance for Ukraine) totalled
EUR 668.2 million in commitments.
A new strategic approach to the Black Sea region(21) was adopted in May, and a Connectivity Agenda
was endorsed in October, which links Europe with Central Asia through the Black Sea region, Türkiye
and the South Caucasus and provides an important basis for closer cooperation with South Caucasus
partners on sustainable transport, energy and digital links.
European Neighbourhood South and the Middle East/Gulf region
A prosperous, connected, resilient, peaceful and stable North Africa, Middle East and Gulf region is in
the strategic interest of the EU.
In 2025, the EU equipped itself with new tools, notably the Pact for the Mediterranean(22) and the
launch of a number of Strategic and Comprehensive Partnerships, to deliver more coherent,
impact-oriented action across the region. A dedicated Commission Directorate-General for the Middle
East, North Africa and the Gulf became fully operational as the hub for the Commission’s relations
with 19 partner countries.
The war in Gaza continued to generate a severe humanitarian crisis, widespread destruction and
increased instability across the Middle East. The EU convened the first Palestine Donor Group meeting
in November 2025, while tabling a comprehensive programme for Palestine’s recovery and resilience
for 2025-2027 and proposing restrictive measures in response to actions undermining the two-state
solution.
The EU remains the biggest international donor and provider of humanitarian aid to Palestinians,
having allocated a total of EUR 220 million in emergency humanitarian support in 2025. In addition to
funding, the EU maintained operational support through air bridge flights, medical evacuations and
road cargo actions.
21 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1348 22 JOIN(2025) 26 of 16 October 2025 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-pact- mediterranean_en
17
In the Gulf, Strategic Partnership Agreements were offered to all six Gulf Cooperation Council
members; by the end of 2025, five had responded positively and negotiations had been launched with
the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.
The Medusa Submarine Cable System is a transformative project for regional and international
telecommunications, which will provide resilient, high-capacity connectivity routes between Europe
and North Africa.
Overseas countries and territories (OCTs)
The 13 OCTs are non-sovereign entities that maintain special constitutional links to Denmark, France,
and the Netherlands and form an integral part of the wider European family. The territories embrace
an increasingly strategic role for the EU, bringing assets such as vast exclusive economic zones, and
access to important natural resources, including CRM, and key maritime zones and sea routes.
The Decision on the Overseas Association including Greenland (DOAG) earmarks EUR 500 million to
support OCTs’ economic and social development, and address climate change and biodiversity loss for
2021-2027. The Commission proposed an amendment to the DOAG, which entails doubling the funds
allocated to the OCTs to EUR 999 million for the period 2028-2034.
In 2025, relations with Greenland continued to expand and intensify in a context of heightened
international interest for the Arctic, covering areas like CRM, renewable energy, connectivity, in
addition to education and fisheries. The EU-Greenland partnership was marked by two policy
dialogues, high-level visits and the inaugural EU-Greenland Week in November in Brussels.
2025 was the final year of implementation of the first Action Plan of French Polynesia’s Water Policy
(2021-2030). Results achieved included an increase in the number of municipalities distributing
drinking water, continued actions to secure water catchment areas, and the strengthening of sector
governance through a fully operational technical committee. A second Action Plan is scheduled to
cover the period 2026-2030.
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 29.10.2026 SWD(2026) 324 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Accompanying the document
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
THE COUNCIL
2026 Annual Report on the implementation of the European Union's External Action
Instruments in 2025
{COM(2026) 588 final}
i
Table of contents 1. Introduction: EU response to world developments in 2025 ................................................................ 1
1.1. The EU response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (including support for Ukraine
and partner countries in addressing the global consequences) .............................................. 3
1.2. EU enlargement ....................................................................................................................... 5
1.3. European Neighbourhood Policy ............................................................................................. 8
1.4. International partnerships ..................................................................................................... 12
1.5. Humanitarian aid and civil protection ................................................................................... 14
1.6. Security and defence ............................................................................................................. 16
1.7. Peace, stability and conflict prevention ................................................................................ 19
1.8. Human rights and democracy ............................................................................................... 20
2. Delivering on our commitments: promoting EU values and interests and fostering sustainable
development globally ............................................................................................................................ 22
2.1. The Global Gateway strategy ................................................................................................ 22
2.2. ‘Team Europe’ approach ....................................................................................................... 24
2.3. Implementing the 2030 Agenda and other international and European commitments and
policies .................................................................................................................................. 25
2.4. Fragility response .................................................................................................................. 25
2.5. Policy coherence for sustainable development ..................................................................... 26
2.6. Development effectiveness ................................................................................................... 27
2.7. Support for multilateralism and addressing global challenges .............................................. 28
2.8. European financial architecture for development ................................................................ 28
2.9. Means of implementation ..................................................................................................... 31
2.10. Mobilisation of the NDICI−Global Europe cushion ................................................................ 33
3. Thematic overview ........................................................................................................................ 34
Working together towards the SDGs and results achieved with EU support ................................... 34
3.1. Delivery on the spending targets .......................................................................................... 34
3.2. Human development ............................................................................................................ 35
3.2.1. SDG 1 – Reduced poverty ................................................................................................... 35
3.2.2. SDG 2 – Zero hunger ........................................................................................................... 37
3.2.3. SDG 3 – Good health and well-being .................................................................................. 39
3.2.4. SDG 4 – Quality education .................................................................................................. 41
3.2.5. SDG 5 – Gender equality ..................................................................................................... 42
3.2.6. SDG 6 – Clean water and sanitation.................................................................................... 44
ii
3.2.7. SDG 10 – Reduced inequalities ........................................................................................... 45
3.2.8. Other major achievements ................................................................................................. 46
3.3. Green Deal ............................................................................................................................ 46
3.3.1. SDG 7 – Affordable and clean energy ................................................................................. 46
3.3.2. SDG 11 – Sustainable cities and communities .................................................................... 47
3.3.3. SDG 12 – Responsible consumption and production.......................................................... 48
3.3.4. SDG 13 – Climate action ...................................................................................................... 49
3.3.5. SDG 14 – Life below water .................................................................................................. 51
3.3.6. SDG 15 – Life on Land ......................................................................................................... 52
3.3.7. Other major achievements ................................................................................................. 53
3.4. Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure ...................................... 54
3.4.1. SDG 9 – Industry, innovation and infrastructure ................................................................ 54
3.4.2. Other major achievements ................................................................................................. 56
3.5. Sustainable growth and jobs ................................................................................................. 57
3.5.1. SDG 8 – Decent work and economic growth ...................................................................... 57
3.6. Migration and forced displacement...................................................................................... 61
3.6.1. SDG 10.7 – Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of
people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies
...................................................................................................................................................... 61
3.7. Governance, peace and security ........................................................................................... 63
3.7.1. SDG 16 – Peace, justice and strong institutions.................................................................. 63
4. Geographic overview ..................................................................................................................... 67
4.1. Sub-Saharan Africa ................................................................................................................ 67
4.1.1. Introduction (policy developments) .............................................................................. 67
4.1.2. Implementation ............................................................................................................. 69
4.1.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people
affected by conflicts and disasters ................................................................................................ 76
4.1.4. Crisis response and preparedness ................................................................................. 77
4.2. Asia and the Pacific ................................................................................................................ 78
4.2.1. East Asia and South Asia ................................................................................................ 78
4.2.2. Central Asia ................................................................................................................... 85
4.2.3. The Pacific ..................................................................................................................... 89
4.3. The Americas and the Caribbean .......................................................................................... 93
4.3.1. The Americas ................................................................................................................. 93
4.3.2. The Caribbean ............................................................................................................... 97
iii
4.4. EU Enlargement (Western Balkans, Türkiye, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Georgia) . 100
4.4.1. Introduction (policy developments) ............................................................................ 100
4.4.2. Implementation ........................................................................................................... 102
4.4.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people
affected by conflicts and disasters .............................................................................................. 107
4.4.4. Crisis response and preparedness ............................................................................... 108
4.5. European Neighbourhood ................................................................................................... 108
4.5.1. European Neighbourhood East ................................................................................... 108
4.5.2. European Neighbourhood South and the Middle East/Gulf region ............................. 116
4.6. Overseas countries and territories (OCTs) ........................................................................... 125
4.6.1. Introduction (policy developments) ............................................................................ 125
4.6.2. Implementation ........................................................................................................... 126
4.6.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people
affected by conflicts and disasters .............................................................................................. 129
4.6.4. Crisis response and preparedness .............................................................................. 129
5. Managing aid ............................................................................................................................... 130
5.1. Monitoring, reporting and evaluation ................................................................................. 130
5.1.1. Reporting ..................................................................................................................... 130
5.1.2. Monitoring systems ..................................................................................................... 130
5.1.3. Reporting on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) ................................................. 131
5.1.4. Evaluation – review of the work programme .............................................................. 134
5.1.5. Lessons learned ........................................................................................................... 136
5.2. Aid delivery modalities ........................................................................................................ 138
5.2.1. Budget Support ........................................................................................................... 138
5.2.2. Blending ....................................................................................................................... 143
5.2.3. EFSD+, EU budget guarantees ..................................................................................... 145
5.2.4. Technical assistance .................................................................................................... 147
5.2.5. Twinning and TAIEX ..................................................................................................... 147
5.3. Non-programmable funds – rapid response ....................................................................... 148
5.3.1. Crisis response ............................................................................................................. 148
5.3.2. Resilience ..................................................................................................................... 149
5.3.3. Foreign policy needs .................................................................................................... 150
5.4. Improving ways of working.................................................................................................. 151
5.4.1. Simplification of procedures ........................................................................................ 151
iv
5.5. Communication & transparency .......................................................................................... 152
5.5.1. Communication ........................................................................................................... 152
5.5.2. Transparency ............................................................................................................... 156
5.5.3. Learning ....................................................................................................................... 157
6. Results annexes ............................................................................................................................... 158
6.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 158
6.1.1. Methodological basis for selected results reported against the Global Europe Results
Framework, the EU Results Framework, the IPA III Results Framework and the IPA Performance
Framework .................................................................................................................................. 158
6.1.2. Structure of the corporate results framework ................................................................. 158
6.2. Level 2 indicators: Reporting on partner country results supported by the EU (EU RF, GERF, IPA
PF and IPA III) ...................................................................................................................... 159
6.3. Level 3: Reporting on policy mainstreaming as measured by budgetary commitments ........ 162
6.4. Latest results ............................................................................................................................ 162
6.5. Results of the implementation of the Gender Action Plan III .................................................. 163
7. Budget Support Annexes ............................................................................................................ 168
8. Financial Annexes ........................................................................................................................ 174
8.1. EU external assistance in 2025 ........................................................................................... 174
8.1.1. Introduction to financial tables ................................................................................... 174
8.1.2. Financial tables ............................................................................................................ 176
9. Financing and investment operations covered by the EFSD+ external action guarantee .......... 306
Table of abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ 320
1
1. Introduction: EU response to world developments in 2025
In 2025, the European Union faced an increasingly challenging international environment shaped by
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the conflict in Gaza and the persisting instability in the
Middle East and Africa, rising geopolitical and geoeconomic competition, disruptions on trade routes
and worsening climate and environmental crises. At the same time, democratic backsliding, human
rights violations, disinformation, and growing pressure on the multilateral system and rules-based
international order further undermined global stability.
Against this backdrop, the EU needs to take greater responsibility for its own security, prosperity and
resilience. It already achieved some important results in 2025. The EU’s response to mounting global
instability and shifting alliances through focusing more on defense, securing its Neighbourhood and
building mutually beneficial partnerships with the rest of the world.
First, the EU intensified efforts to protect peace and securityin the continent and beyond. Russia’s
continued war against Ukraine and Ukraine’s security are inextricably linked to Europe’s security as a
whole. In 2025, the EU adopted four additional packages of sanctions against Russia, with energy,
financial, trade and anti-circumvention measures, bringing the total number to 19.
By 2025, Team Europe support to Ukraine since 2022 had reached in total around EUR 193.3 billion,
including substantial military, financial, economic and humanitarian assistance. The Ukraine Facility,
worth up to EUR 50 billion over the period 2024-2027, underpinned Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction
and modernisation and supported its path towards EU accession, including through the Ukraine
Investment Framework designed to mobilise significant public and private investment.
At the same time, the EU reinforced its overall own security and defence approach. Through initiatives
such as Readiness 2030 and the SAFE instrument, the EU opened the way for up to EUR 800 billion in
security and defence investment, including through joint procurement, without jeopardising fiscal
sustainability. The European Peace Facility remained central to the EU’s security response, supporting
Ukraine and other partners with military assistance while maintaining that expenditures with military
or defence implications are financed outside the EU budget.
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations and other rapid, flexible crisis
response tools under the EU’s external instruments were mobilised across regions to address the
immediate and longer-term consequences of conflicts, including in the Middle East, Africa and the
EU’s neighbourhood. In 2025, the EU concluded Security and Defence Partnerships with the United
Kingdom and Canada, bringing their total number to eight by the end of the year.
Second, in 2025, EU enlargement remained a geopolitical and strategic priority, with Montenegro,
Albania, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine emerging as frontrunners thanks to progress on
reforms and accession negotiations, as reflected in the European Commission’s Enlargement Package.
The EU also continued to support economic convergence through major funding initiatives, including
the EUR 6 billion Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the EUR 1.9 billion Growth Plan for the
Republic of Moldova. However, accession progress in several other candidate countries slowed in
particular due to democratic backsliding, rule-of-law deficiencies, political instability, governance
challenges and unmet accession commitments.
Third, 2025 confirmed the growing centrality of economic security and resilience in the EU’s external
action. The EU acknowledged that interdependences are increasingly weaponised, notably in the
sectors of energy, new technologies and critical raw materials and strategic supply chains. The EU
advanced an economic foreign policy that links competitiveness, security and partnerships, including
2
through measures on foreign direct investment screening, outbound investment risk assessments and
critical raw materials supply chains, as well as through a reinforced trade and partnership agenda with
partners across the world. The Global Gateway strategy remained one of the main ways for the EU to
translate this agenda into concrete investment and partnerships. By 2025, the EU, its Member States
and European financial institutions had mobilised over EUR 306 billion in Global Gateway investments,
exceeding the original target of EUR 300 billion well ahead of 2027.
The EU’s clean and digital transitions continued to be central to EU external action with a strong ‘Team
Europe’ approach. The EU pursued the clean transition as an effective strategy for achieving strategic
autonomy, security and competitiveness. With EU greenhouse-gas emissions more than 40% below
1990 levels and an economy around 71% larger, the EU positioned itself as a leader in climate-aligned
growth, linking the Clean Industrial Deal, REPowerEU and the Critical Raw Materials Act(1) with external
partnerships and standards. International energy, climate and environmental diplomacy remained
high on the agenda, with the EU playing a leading role in pushing for ambitious outcomes at
multilateral forums on climate, biodiversity, ocean and sustainable finance. Global digital partnerships
were guided by the International Digital Strategy adopted in 2025, which set out a vision for
human-centric, open, secure and interoperable digital transformation through trusted connectivity,
data infrastructure and digital public services in partner countries.
Fourth, the EU reinforced its commitment to multilateralism, a rules-based order and the protection
of international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and humanitarian
principles – as a staunch supporter of the multilateral system, the UN Charter, the 2030 Agenda and
the UN ‘Pact for the Future’. In 2025, the EU actively supported the ‘UN80 Initiative’, the UN’s internal
reform process, to ensure the United Nations remains effective, cost-efficient and responsive, across
the three pillars of the UN system (peace and security, sustainable development and human rights).
The EU played an active role in addressing global challenges through multilateral cooperation,
promoting peaceful solutions to conflicts, advancing implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the
Sustainable Development Goals, climate action and digital governance. The EU remained actively
engaged across key multilateral processes, including the Fourth International Conference on Financing
for Development, the World Social Summit, the UN Ocean Conference, the High-Level Political Forum
on Sustainable Development, the Third International Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries
and the sixteenth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Humanitarian needs reached new peaks, with an estimated 305.1 million people requiring
humanitarian assistance and protection and nearly 295 million people in acute food insecurity at the
beginning of the year. The EU remained among the world’s leading humanitarian donors, allocating
more than EUR 2.56 billion in 2025 for needs-based humanitarian assistance in 110 countries,
alongside external efforts under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. Major crises in Ukraine,
Palestine(2), Sudan, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Venezuela and other contexts
prompted large-scale EU responses, while efforts continued to address ‘forgotten crises’ and to
safeguard humanitarian space and respect for international humanitarian law.
At the same time, record levels of forced displacement – over 117.8 million people worldwide(3) – and
persistent migration pressures along key routes towards Europe reinforced the need for
comprehensive, principled and partnership-based approaches to migration and forced displacement.
1 OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj 2 This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. 3 Global Trends report 2025 | UNHCR
3
The EU advanced engagement with partner countries of origin, transit and destination through
route-based action plans and partnerships, while implementing a human rights-based approach to
migration and supporting protection, inclusion and durable solutions for refugees, internally displaced
people and host communities.
Throughout 2025 and beyond, the EU’s external action instruments sought and will continue seeking
to combine a fast, flexible and integrated way to respond to crises and geopolitical shocks, with high
standards of sound financial management. The EU Delegations worldwide played a key role in ensuring
a strong and coherent presence on the ground, working closely with EU Member States and European
financial institutions in a ‘Team Europe’ approach.
1.1. The EU response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (including support
for Ukraine and partner countries in addressing the global consequences)
Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine remained a defining challenge for the European
Union’s external action in 2025. The war continued to cause human suffering, widespread
displacement and large-scale destruction of critical civilian and energy infrastructure, while
undermining the European and global security order and aggravating food, energy and economic
vulnerabilities well beyond the region. The EU framed its response as a strategic, long-term
commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to the defence of the UN Charter
and international law.
By the end of 2025, combined support from the EU and its Member States to Ukraine and Ukrainians
since the outset of the full-scale invasion amounted to approximately EUR 193.3 billion. This included
EUR 69.3 billion in military support, over EUR 103.3 billion in financial, economic and humanitarian
support, EUR 3.7 billion from proceeds linked to immobilised Russian assets and EUR 17 billion made
available to Member States to assist people fleeing the war. In 2025 alone, the EU covered around
84% of Ukraine’s external financing needs. EU leaders decided in December 2025 to mobilise an
additional EUR 90 billion in common borrowing for 2026-2027 to strengthen Ukraine’s defence
capabilities and ensure the continued functioning of the state, while also contributing to Ukraine’s
resilience and its closer integration with Europe’s defence industrial base.
A central pillar of the EU’s response in 2025 was the Ukraine Facility, a dedicated instrument of up to
EUR 50 billion for 2024-2027 to provide predictable and flexible support for Ukraine’s recovery,
reconstruction and modernisation in line with its EU path. The Facility combines reform-linked grants
and loans with an investment arm, the Ukraine Investment Framework, which has been endowed with
EUR 9.5 billion in EU support and is designed to mobilise up to EUR 40 billion in public and private
investment. By late 2025, up to EUR 6.9 billion had been allocated under this framework to
programmes supporting small businesses, war-affected communities, critical infrastructure and green
and digital transitions.
In 2025, following up on the commitments by G7 leaders and based on a proposal by the Commission,
the EU adopted and disbursed a financial assistance package consisting of an exceptional macro-
financial assistance (MFA) loan of EUR 18.1 billion. As part of the package, a loan cooperation
mechanism is financed by extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian sovereign
assets.
On the EU accession track, 2025 saw further progress. The screening process for Ukraine, the first step
in accession negotiations, was finalised in September 2025, and progress on reforms linked to the
fundamentals of the accession process was recorded, while work continued to support Ukrainian
4
authorities in carrying out reforms. This accession perspective informed the design and conditionality
of the Ukraine Facility and other instruments, anchoring immediate support in a longer-term
integration trajectory.
The EU response combined macro-financial support with deepening economic integration. In 2025,
the EU advanced Ukraine’s gradual integration into the single market, including steps to integrate fully
with the European energy and gas markets by early 2027, subject to accelerated reforms. Work
continued to improve connectivity through the Solidarity Lanes and support for Ukraine’s Black Sea
export corridor, and the EU mobilised more than EUR 2.3 billion, including EUR 1.55 billion in
Connecting Europe Facility grants, to improve transport links among the EU, Ukraine and the Republic
of Moldova, such as new EU-standard-gauge railway sections. A first operation under the EU’s Ukraine
Export Credit Guarantee Facility provided EUR 20 million in guarantees to support EU exports to
Ukraine, pointing to further de-risking of trade and investment.
Military and security assistance remained a core component of the EU’s response. Overall military
support provided by the EU and its Member States since 2022 reached about EUR 69.3 billion by the
end of 2025, of which EUR 6.1 billion was channelled through the European Peace Facility. The
European Peace Facility’s financial ceiling was increased in 2025 by EUR 193.3 billion through the use
of extraordinary revenues generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets, specifically to support
the Ukrainian armed forces. The EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine had trained
around 85 200 Ukrainian military personnel by the end of 2025, while the EU Advisory Mission
continued to assist Ukrainian authorities with reforms in the civilian security sector, border
management and investigation and prosecution of international crimes. This was complemented by
essential support in areas such as de-mining, energy and accountability under NDICI−Global Europe.
EU humanitarian and civil protection assistance helped alleviate the suffering of the Ukrainian
population and made it possible to restore vital physical infrastructure. Since the beginning of the full-
scale invasion in 2022, the Commission has allocated EUR 1.2 billion for humanitarian aid programmes
in Ukraine to be implemented by partners on the ground. Support ranges from shelter and
winterisation, to healthcare, emergency food, multi-purpose cash assistance and more. In 2025, the
Commission allocated EUR 220 million in humanitarian aid for Ukraine.
Ukraine remained the largest operation ever under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). In
2025, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre handled 39 updated requests from Ukraine, and
the EU continued to operate three logistics hubs to pool and channel assistance, focusing on energy,
emergency response capacities, health and medical evacuation. Support included large transformers,
generators and the transfer of an entire thermal power plant fully dismantled and transported to
Ukraine representing the largest single operation to date under the UCPM. Since 2022, over 5 100
patients have been medically evacuated from Ukraine for treatment in hospitals across Europe,
including 729 patients in 2025 alone. The UCPM also remained fully integrated into the EU’s Integrated
Political Crisis Response arrangements, providing situational reporting and coordination across
institutions and Member States.
The EU response extended to people fleeing the war. Member States agreed in 2025 to prolong
temporary protection until 4 March 2027, continuing to offer access to accommodation, education,
healthcare and the labour market to more than 4 million people who have sought refuge in the EU
since 2022. A total of EUR 17 billion was made available to support Member States’ efforts in hosting
and integrating those fleeing the war.
5
Throughout 2025, the EU adopted successive sanctions packages, further restricting Russia’s access to
battlefield technologies, constraining its military-industrial base and tightening controls on energy
revenues, including a forthcoming ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas from 2027. The
Freeze and Seize Task Force reported that, by the end of 2025, EU Member States had frozen more
than EUR 27 billion in private assets belonging to Russian and Belarusian individuals and entities,
complementing the use of extraordinary revenues from immobilised sovereign assets to support
Ukraine. At the same time, sanctions and measures to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels
formed another key strand of the EU’s response. The EU’s REPowerEU roadmap and related legislation
sharply reduced Russian fossil fuels in EU imports: crude oil from 51% to 2%, refined products from
45% to 0%, gas from 43% to 12% and coal from 26% to 0% between 2021 and 2025.
Accountability for aggression and other international crimes was a further focus in 2025. The EU
supported the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, with
an agreement between the Council of Europe and Ukraine signed in June and financed the advanced
team of the tribunal under external action instruments. The EU also signed the Convention
establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine and continued to back investigations
and prosecutorial work at national and international levels, including support for the International
Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression and for Eurojust-coordinated joint investigation
teams.
The consequences of the war continued to reverberate across neighbouring and partner countries.
The EU intensified support to the Republic of Moldova through humanitarian assistance and
energy-security measures, including a Reform and Growth Facility and a EUR 250 million package
under a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience to eliminate dependence
on Russian energy and support integration into the EU energy market. In the wider Eastern Partnership
region, the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea, adopted in 2025, sought to strengthen security,
resilience and sustainable growth in a region deeply affected by the war.
1.2. EU enlargement
Enlargement remained a strategic priority in 2025, a long-term investment in Europe’s peace, stability
and prosperity and as crucial for strengthening the EU’s role on the global stage. In a more contested
geopolitical environment, marked by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and heightened
systemic competition, enlargement is part of the EU’s broader response to defend the rules-based
international order, reinforce security and deepen economic ties with like-minded partners. The 2025
Enlargement Package, adopted in November, confirmed that momentum for enlargement remained
high on the EU agenda and that the accession of new Member States was increasingly within reach,
provided that partners delivered on fundamental reforms.
The EU continues to apply its ‘fundamentals first’ approach, under which the rule of law, fundamental
rights and the functioning of democratic institutions remain at the core of the accession process. The
2025 Enlargement Package provides a comprehensive, merit-based assessment of the progress made
by enlargement partners over the past year. While recognising progress in partners such as
Montenegro, Albania, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine, the package also noted deficiencies and
backsliding in Georgia and Türkiye. As always, the package provided recommendations to guide
aspiring EU members toward accession. This focus on the ‘fundamentals’ was supported by dedicated
support to civil society and independent media where democratic standards were under strain. The
annual Rule of Law report assessing the state of the rule of law across all EU Member States, as well
as four candidate countries: Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia was adopted in July
2025.
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Montenegro consolidated its position as a frontrunner in the accession process, provisionally closing
a further six negotiating chapters in 2025 and bringing the total of provisionally closed chapters to
twelve by the end of 2025; its objective of concluding negotiations by the end of 2026 remains
contingent on sustained reform momentum. Albania opened the remaining four thematic clusters of
negotiating chapters in 2025. All six clusters are now open. Albania’s objective is to conclude
negotiations by the end of 2027. The EU continued to support regional economic integration, including
through the modernisation of payment systems and the extension of the Single Euro Payments Area
(SEPA) to the region; as of October 2025 Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia participated fully
in SEPA schemes, significantly reducing transaction times and costs for citizens and businesses.
The EU maintained an active political dialogue with the Western Balkans, as reflected in the EU-
Western Balkans Summit of 17 December 2025, joint meetings of the Foreign Ministers in April and
November, Political Directors’ meetings in April and October, and other high-level contacts and
bilateral visits. Efforts continued to promote good neighbourly relations, reconciliation and regional
cooperation. The EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue remained the only framework for the
normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
Increasing cooperation in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) became an important objective in the evolving geopolitical context. The EU
promoted partners’ full alignment with the CFSP, including EU restrictive measures, and responded to
partners’ requests to strengthen their resilience and security against hybrid and other threats. A
regional conference on information integrity was held in Skopje in November, followed by a Cyber
Security Tabletop Exercise conducted in December.
A new Security and Defence Dialogue was launched with Montenegro in December, Albania and North
Macedonia held Security and Defence Dialogues in April and May respectively in the framework of
their Security and Defence Partnerships with the EU. The EU committed EUR 36 million in European
Peace Facility (EPF) assistance to Western Balkans’ armed forces in 2025 (Montenegro, Albania and
North Macedonia). A regional seminar was organised in November to inform Western Balkan partners
about EU defence initiatives. The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) continued
supporting Kosovo authorities, and Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to
support local authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment for all citizens.
The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, adopted in 2023, moved in 2025 from design to delivery.
Its four pillars, gradual integration into the EU’s single market, regional economic integration through
the Common Regional Market, fundamental reforms and financial support via the Reform and Growth
Facility, were implemented in a mutually reinforcing manner. All partners adopted Reform Agendas,
and the pre-financing under the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility was fully disbursed to
Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia by June 2025. By the end of the year, EUR 396.4
million in grants and loans have been released under the Facility against the achievement of 39 reform
‘steps’, and out of this amount EUR 184.4 million in loans was disbursed to the beneficiaries’
treasuries. Overall, 38% of the 731 steps contained in the Reform Agendas were assessed as
completed in the first two 2025 reporting cycles, indicating good initial traction in reform
implementation. Leaders of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia
and Serbia met in Skopje in June and in Tirana in November to reaffirm their commitment to the
Growth Plan and its reform and integration agenda.
This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
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In parallel, the EU stepped up support to economic and social development in the Western Balkans
using a wide toolbox. Under the Growth Plan, a Western Balkans guarantee instrument completed its
initial envelope of EUR 60 million in EU funds, unlocking EUR 886 million in financing for small and
medium-sized enterprises. The EU also rolled out WiFi4WB, preparing the installations of free Wi-Fi
hotspots in around 500 municipalities across the region to foster digital connectivity and inclusion,
and organised the first regional EU–Western Balkans Investment Forum to mobilise investors around
reform and investment priorities. These measures complemented ongoing pre-accession assistance
under IPA III and participation in EU programmes such as Horizon Europe and Erasmus+, further
narrowing the gap between enlargement partners and the EU acquis and policies.
For Ukraine, enlargement policy was closely intertwined with security and reconstruction. The Ukraine
Facility, a multiannual instrument of up to EUR 50 billion for 2024-2027, remained the core framework
for EU support to Ukraine’s short-term recovery and medium-term reconstruction and modernisation
in line with its EU path. Under pillar I, the Commission positively assessed 45 reform and investment
‘steps’ in 2025, enabling four budget support payments totalling EUR 10.7 billion; since the Facility’s
launch, cumulative disbursements under pillar I reached EUR 26.8 billion by the end of the year. For
the first time, the Facility also subsidised Ukraine’s borrowing costs on its loans, freeing EUR 321
million in fiscal space in the state budget. Under pillar II, the Ukraine Investment Framework allocated
up to EUR 5.5 billion in guarantee cover and blended finance, with EU contributions and guarantees
totalling EUR 6.9 billion – around 70 % of the Framework’s capacity – expected to mobilise
approximately EUR 21.8 billion in public and private investment. These resources support critical
infrastructure, municipalities and private sector development, while helping integrate Ukraine into EU
value chains.
On the accession track, the bilateral screening process for Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova was
completed in September 2025 in a record time, just over 18 months. The Commission concluded that
both countries had met the conditions required to open negotiations for all clusters. Gradual sectoral
integration advanced in parallel: Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova benefited from the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), from transport arrangements and from measures to
integrate fully into the European energy and gas markets by early 2027, subject to accelerated market
reforms.
In addition to the Republic of Moldova’s solid progress made towards deeper trade ties for the full
implementation of the DCFTA, other key gradual integration initiatives include The Republic of
Moldova’s successful inclusion in the EU Roam-like-at-home area, Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA)
or including the Republic of Moldova in the Cyber Security Reserve. The EU is also stepping up to
achieve integration in sectors such as energy, transport, customs and education.
The Regulation establishing the EUR 1.9 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova
for 2025-2027 entered into force in 2025, providing performance-based financial support for the
implementation of a comprehensive Reform Agenda and growth enhancing investment projects. In
the energy field, the EU and the Republic of Moldova agreed on a two-year Comprehensive Strategy
for Energy Independence and Resilience backed by a EUR 250 million package to eliminate
dependence on Russian energy, increase resilience and facilitate integration into the EU energy
market.
Not all enlargement partners moved forward on the accession path. In Georgia, there was serious
backsliding in the fundamentals across the board, with the adoption of repressive legislation
undermining fundamental rights and freedoms. The Georgian authorities’ course of action has
undermined EU-Georgia relations and moved Georgia away from the EU enlargement process. In view
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of the developments in Georgia, the European Council concluded in June and October 2024 that the
authorities’ course of action jeopardised Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession
process.
Türkiye remained a partner of strategic importance and a candidate country, despite accession
negotiations remaining at a standstill amid serious concerns over the rule of law, respect for
fundamental rights and democratic standards. At the same time, EU and Türkiye continued re-
engaging in areas of common interest, implementing the recommendations of the Joint
Communication from November 2023, in line with the phased, proportionate and reversible approach
endorsed by the European Council. Several EU-Türkiye High-Level Dialogues were held in 2025,
including on the economy, trade, migration and security, climate and research and innovation.
Additionally, the European Investment Bank restarted operations in Türkiye. The engagement
between the EU and Türkiye on foreign and security policy issues continued through bilateral visits,
contacts and meetings at both high- and senior officials’ level. The EU High Representative/Vice-
President Kaja Kallas visited Türkiye in January 2025, while EU Commissioner Kos visited Türkiye in July
2025. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs participated in the informal meeting of the EU Ministers
of Foreign Affairs (Gymnich) in Warsaw (May 2025) and in the Ministerial Meeting on Cross-Regional
Security and Connectivity in Luxembourg (October 2025). The EU Special Envoy for the
implementation of EU sanctions visited Türkiye and engaged on circumvention of sanctions against
Russia in April 2025.
A Political Dialogue at Political Directors’ level, co-chaired by the European Union External Action
Service and Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood, was
held in March 2025. Overall, the EU and Türkiye intensified consultations on foreign and security
policy, with a focus on regional developments (consultation on Western Balkans in September 2025),
security and defence and counterterrorism (informal CSDP consultations and Counter-Terrorism
dialogue in November 2025). Financial assistance under IPA III continued, with EUR 100.4 million
committed in 2025 under the bilateral programme 2025-2027 and an additional EUR 310.7 million for
rural development, civil society and cross-border cooperation. The EU also maintained substantial
support for refugees in Türkiye, committing EUR 1.3 billion in support to refugees under the budget
for 2025-2027, while a new ‘visa cascade’ system was introduced in 2025 to facilitate travel for bona
fide Turkish travellers in EU Schengen area.
In parallel with supporting partners, the EU continued to prepare itself for future enlargements. The
Communication on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews, adopted in 2024, remained the main
reference for analysing the implications of a larger Union in terms of values, policies, budget and
governance. Work initiated under this framework advanced in 2025, feeding into discussions on the
future multiannual financial framework, on institutional reforms and on ensuring that future
enlargements strengthen the EU’s capacity to act.
In addition, the Commission developed an innovative Artificial Intelligence tool called ‘eAccession’ to
help candidate countries accelerate regulatory approximation by saving time and resources in the
process. The tool was endorsed as a Commission Corporate tool and was made accessible for
Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine before other candidate countries in 2026.
1.3. European Neighbourhood Policy
In 2025, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) remained an important framework for advancing
the EU’s strategic interests and values in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood, in fragile settings
such as in Syria, Lebanon and the conflict in Gaza. ENP action combined political engagement,
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macro-financial assistance, Global Gateway investments and humanitarian and civil protection
measures, with a growing emphasis on economic security, energy and digital connectivity, migration
management and resilience.
In the Southern Neighbourhood and the wider Middle East and Gulf, 2025 was marked by major
institutional and policy developments and by acute crises. A dedicated Directorate-General for the
Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf started operations on 1 February 2025, under the authority of
the European Commissioner for the Mediterranean, to bring together cooperation with nineteen
partner countries from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf and to promote peace,
stability, security and prosperity in the region.
Building on the 2021 Agenda for the Mediterranean and its Economic and Investment Plan, the Pact
for the Mediterranean was prepared through consultations with EU Member States, southern
Mediterranean partners, as well as a wide range of stakeholders representing different components
of civil society, including economic, cultural and social actors, academia and think tanks. It was
subsequently adopted on 16 October through the Joint Commission and High Representative
Communication on the Pact for the Mediterranean(4). EU Member States welcomed the adoption of
the Joint Communication in the Council Conclusions adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 20
November and the European Council Conclusions on 18 December 2025. The Pact was officially
launched in Barcelona in November 2025 together with EU Member States and the 10 southern
Mediterranean partner countries on the 30th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration. It provides a
new strategic framework to promote peace, prosperity and stability, based on co-ownership,
co-creation and joint responsibility, and aims to build a Common Mediterranean Space that is more
connected, prosperous, resilient and secure.
In response to the war in Gaza and its regional spillovers, the EU combined diplomatic engagement
with substantial financial support. In April 2025, during the High-level political dialogue between the
EU and the Palestinian Authority, the EU proposed a multiannual Comprehensive Programme for
Palestine’s Recovery and Resilience 2025-2027 worth EUR 1.6 billion to support reforms and recovery
to the benefit of the Palestinian population.
On 20 November 2025, the EU convened the first meeting of the Palestine Donor Group (PDG) in
Brussels, co-chaired by the European Commissioner for the Mediterranean Dubravka Šuica and
Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa. This was a clear deliverable of the EU’s Multiannual
Comprehensive Programme for Palestinian recovery and resilience presented in April 2025, as well as
an expression of the EU’s commitment to the stability of the region, as underlined by President Ursula
von der Leyen in her State of the Union speech in September 2025.
In parallel, in September 2025 the Commission proposed to suspend certain trade-related provisions
of the Association Agreement with Israel, to adopt sanctions on extremist ministers and violent
settlers, and has put on hold bilateral support for Israel, except for support to civil society and Yad
Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Center.
In March, the EU organised the ninth Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the
Region, reaffirming its commitment to an inclusive transition in the country. It brought a pledge of
EUR 2.5 billion with the EU and its Member States again as largest donors. The EU also stepped up its
engagement inside Syria, with a EUR 175 million package in 2025 focused on institutional
capacity-building, socio-economic recovery, and support to transitional justice, accountability and
social cohesion. On 15 November 2025, the EU convened the first Day of Dialogue in Damascus,
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bringing together Syrian civil society organisations, representatives of the Syrian Transitional
Government, and EU officials for a structured day of discussion on Syria’s transition and recovery.
Amid escalation, the EU mobilised further support under the EUR 1 billion (non-humanitarian) package
for Lebanon for 2024-2027 to support the government-led emergency response. Focus was placed on
addressing urgent needs through programmes on cash assistance, health, education, protection and
durable solutions for refugees as well as reinforcing the National Operations Room coordinating the
emergency response. In parallel, engagement on reforms continues in view of the country’s long-term
stability.
Jordan is among the EU’s most strategically significant partners in the Middle East, serving as anchor
of stability in a region under sustained geopolitical pressure. The signing of the Strategic and
Comprehensive Partnership with Jordan in January 2025 elevated bilateral relations to a new level,
providing a long-term framework for cooperation on economic growth, governance reform, the green
transition and security. It is backed by EU instruments including macro financial assistance and budget
support. The EU also deepened engagement with Iraq, a pivotal actor in regional dynamics. This
included a Cooperation Council in October 2025 and targeted collaboration on economic
diversification, connectivity, institutional resilience, and the climate and energy transitions. With a
new government in 2026 the EU is ready to deepen the partnership at a critical juncture.
Across the Southern Neighbourhood, the wider Middle East and the Gulf, the Global Gateway strategy
and Team Europe instruments were increasingly used to support green, digital and connectivity
objectives under the ENP. The Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP) continued to mobilise public
and private investments in strategic sectors. Strategic and comprehensive partnerships with Egypt,
Tunisia and Jordan were further developed, combining where relevant macro-financial assistance,
with budget support and investment to underpin reforms, economic stability and the green transition.
The EU completed negotiations on its trade agreement with Morocco in October 2025.
Migration remains a challenge in the Southern Neighbourhood, notably in North African countries,
which are countries of origin, of transit and of destination for migrants. In December 2025, the EU
adopted a EUR 675 million multiannual migration package to ensure continuation of support to
partner countries to establish a comprehensive and rights-based migration governance and
management system, covering protection for refugees, asylum seekers and vulnerable migrants,
migration governance, including border management and anti-smuggling, return and reintegration
support and legal migration pathways.
Institution-building remained a key component of ENP implementation. TAIEX and Twinning
contributed to reform processes across the neighbourhood in line with EU priorities, particularly in
support of the green and digital transitions and implementation of regional Economic and Investment
Plans.
In the Eastern Neighbourhood, the Eastern Partnership continued to serve as the critical, specialised
eastern dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy, acting as the primary institutional bridge
between the EUand its eastern neighbours. Operating through both bilateral and multilateral formats,
it continued to provide a flexible platform for tailored cooperation with partner countries. Throughout
2025, resilience building remained a cornerstone of EU assistance under the Eastern Partnership
framework. The EU continuously advanced regional stability, security, and peace by supporting the
Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation process while aligning its regional policy to support the Republic of
Moldova and Ukraine on their respective EU enlargement paths. As civic space continued to shrink in
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some countries, multilateral Eastern Partnership initiatives provided a crucial mechanism for
sustained engagement with civil society in restrictive environments.
The Joint Communication on the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region (the Black Sea
Strategy) was adopted on 28 May(5). The strategy includes three flagship initiatives, designed to
accelerate implementation and demonstrate immediate progress, namely: Black Sea Maritime
Security and the establishment of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub; a dedicated Connectivity
Agenda; and preparedness of coastal communities and blue economy sectors.
The Connectivity Agenda linking Europe with Central Asia through the South Caucasus is one of the
flagships of the Black Sea Strategy. It aims to boost economic growth, competitiveness and regional
integration, while aligning with the extended Trans-European Networks and EU’s decarbonisation
goals and international commitments. It combines reforms, digitalisation and infrastructure
investment to achieve regulatory approximation, adherence to safety norms, and interoperability. The
Connectivity Agenda remains a key instrument to address different geopolitical challenges and to
strengthen the EU’s footprint in the Black Sea and South Caucasus regions. The Agenda was politically
endorsed by the EU and partner countries at the Cross-regional Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg in
October.
Support for governance and values reforms on a wide range of areas, including democracy, the rule
of law, public administration reform, anti-corruption, fight against organised crime, reconciliation, civil
protection, human rights, gender equality, civil society engagement, independent media and the fight
against disinformation continued throughout the year. Regional programmes such as the Partnership
for Good Governance, EU4 Integrity, Public Administration Reform and the Fight against Organised
Crime continued to work with national authorities and civil society to progress the necessary reforms.
The EU4Youth programme aimed to enhance participation by young people in society and the
economy and better match skills to labour markets. Through the EU4Gender Equality programme,
support to activities battling gender stereotypes and the provision of advice on strengthening the care
economy were undertaken. Particularly intensive were the activities to support civil society and
independent media in the region.
Within the ongoing EU4Energy programme, capacity building and strengthening of the legislative
framework in the partner countries was undertaken. This has assisted to streamline the diverse
regulatory environments that hinder interconnections and energy market integration which in turn,
has contributed to creating a more stable market for investment.
Partner countries continued to benefit from environmental and climate resilience programmes such
as EU4Climate Resilience, FINTECC EU4Climate window, EU4EMBLAS, EU4Environment, PPRD East 4
and EU4Green Recovery East. In addition, the E5P fund (Eastern European Energy Efficiency and
Environment Partnership) - a multi-donor, blending instrument managed by EBRD supports actions
focusing on municipal energy efficiency and environmental investment. Support to local authorities in
accessing finance to implement their Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans (SECAP) continued
under the third phase of the Covenant of Mayors East. The programme promotes new signatories to
the 2030 targets and provides support for financing municipal SECAP-related projects.
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1.4. International partnerships
In 2025, the EU further strengthened its international partnerships as a way to overcome the
fragmentation of the global environment marked by overlapping crises, geopolitical and geoeconomic
tensions and persistent pressure on multilateralism. The EU’s engagement was structured around
NDICI−Global Europe as the main financial instrument and Global Gateway as the strategic external
investment EU offer to promote sustainable, rules-based connectivity, green and digital transitions
and human development, with a strong emphasis on mutually beneficial cooperation with partner
countries.
The second Global Gateway Forum hosted in Brussels in October represented a major diplomacy
moment with Commission President von der Leyen announcing that the EU, its Member States and
European financial institutions, acting together, had mobilised over EUR 306 billion in Global Gateway
investments, thus surpassing the original objective of up to EUR 300 billion for 2021-2027. On this
occasion, the Global Gateway Investment Hub was launched to help identify, prepare and facilitate
private-sector investment in partner countries, complementing the expansion of EFSD+ (European
Fund for Sustainable Development (Plus)) guarantees and blending operations.
Across regions, Global Gateway investment agendas were rolled out and deepened. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, implementation of the Global Gateway Africa–Europe Investment Package and the EU–AU Joint
Vision for 2030 advanced, including support for transport and economic corridors, regional electricity
integration and the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative, as well as local vaccine manufacturing under
the Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines and Health Technologies (MAV+) Initiative. In
Latin America and the Caribbean, more than 80 projects progressed under the EU–LAC Global Gateway
Investment Agenda, notably in regional electricity integration, the EU–LAC high-performance
computing network and the Global Gateway Sargassum Initiative. In Asia and the Pacific, a
EUR 12 billion Team Europe Global Gateway investment package for Central Asia was announced,
accompanied by work along the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and cooperation on critical raw
materials; the EU also announced EUR 300 million in Global Gateway investments for the Pacific, and
advanced energy connectivity and Just Energy Transition Partnerships in South and South-East Asia.
Partnerships with overseas countries and territories were reinforced, including a proposal to double
the DOAG allocation for OCTs to EUR 999 million. The EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean
and Pacific States (OACPS) continued working towards the implementation of the Samoa Agreement.
Support for the green transition included deployment of the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative,
nature-positive investment and financing solutions, e.g. under NaturAfrica, and innovative Forest
Partnerships, alongside increased efforts on climate-related investments and a stronger focus on the
ocean in line with the European Ocean Pact adopted in June 2025. Support for sustainable agrifood
systems and agricultural value chains was stepped up, with actions such as DESIRA+ that promoted
the protection of soils, the use of ‘forgotten crops’, the use of agroforestry approaches in cocoa, coffee
and cashew crops and better access to local and regional markets. Circular-economy action was
supported in more than 40 countries through global initiatives and in over 80 additional countries via
regional and national programmes. Digital cooperation was scaled up under the International Digital
Strategy, with key flagships such as the EU-Africa-India Blue Raman digital corridor, the EU–LAC
supercomputing network for artificial intelligence, satellite connectivity initiatives and
digital-economy packages with partner countries. Sustainable transport investment across all regions
was promoted in line with the Sustainable Transport Investment Plan, including green shipping, public
transport and rail-decarbonisation facilities.
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Human development also remained central to EU international partnerships. In health, the EU
supported local manufacturing of health products, health-system strengthening and universal health
coverage, health security and health innovation through digital solutions, and co-hosted the Gavi
High-Level Pledging Summit in June 2025. In education, the political target of dedicating at least 10%
of NDICI−Global Europe to education over 2021-2027 continued to be on track to be achieved,
reaching 12% over 2021-2025 and covering around 70 partner countries, with regional initiatives such
as theTeam Europe Initiative ‘Opportunity-driven Skills and Vocational Education and Training in
Africa’ and the Youth Mobility for Africa Global Gateway flagship initiative. Water, sanitation and
hygiene investments were scaled up through blended operations in countries such as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, Pakistan, Benin, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. Youth
participation and empowerment advanced through more than 50 Youth Sounding Boards and youth
policy dialogues on Global Gateway. Gender equality remained a core priority: in line with the Gender
Action Plan, the share of external actions with gender equality as a principal or significant objective
reached to 83% over 2021-2025, and gender and inequality(6) markers began to be applied to EFSD+
operations.
Particular emphasis was placed on strengthening the ‘Team Europe’ approach, bringing together EU
institutions, Member States, European development finance institutions, implementing partners and
the private sector to deliver greater impact. The EU also deepened its engagement with partner
countries through policy dialogues and business-to-business exchanges aimed at supporting locally
owned reform and investment agendas. Throughout 2025, a series of regional business forums helped
connect European companies with investment opportunities under Global Gateway, including the EU–
Central Asia Investors Forum in Uzbekistan, the EU–Latin America and Caribbean Business Forum held
in the framework of the EU–LAC partnership, or the EU–Africa Business Forum convened in Angola on
the occasion of the EU-AU seventh Heads of State and Government Summit.
International partnerships also focused on migration, fragility, governance and peacebuilding. The EU
strengthened cooperation with partner countries on migration and forced displacement
management, including by addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement
through NDICI−Global Europe geographic programmes and the EU Trust Funds, while irregular border
crossings into the EU decreased by more than one-quarter in 2025, to 178 000. Flagship joint
instruments such as the EU Trust Fund for Africa (which entered its final year) and the Colombia Trust
Fund continued to deliver substantial results in jobs, basic services, migration management,
governance and peacebuilding in fragile contexts. The NDICI−Global Europe Rapid Response Pillar and
the thematic programme for peace, stability and conflict prevention enabled swift crisis response and
long-term peacebuilding in Ukraine but also for the wider Eastern Neighbourhood and globally,
including in Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan and the Sahel. Support to multilateral
peacebuilding architectures, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation,
counter-terrorism, cybersecurity and the fight against organised crime contributed to global security
partnerships.
International partnerships were underpinned by a strong commitment to multilateralism and the
2030 Agenda. In terms of public finance, the EU and its Member States collectively remained the
world’s leadingprovider of official development assistance (ODA) with EUR 82.5 billion in 2025,
accounting for 48% of global ODA(7) (0.44% of the EU’s gross national income) based on preliminary
OECD data. However, data shows a significant global decrease in total ODA, mainly driven by severe
6 Only for INTPA managed programmes. 7 Global ODA is defined here as including the ODA reported by the EU collectively and all other donor countries.
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US disengagement. Cooperation arrangements with international financial institutions, including a
new arrangement with the World Bank Group around high-impact Global Gateway investment
projects, and support for multilateral development bank reforms aimed to unlock substantial
additional financing for sustainable, job-rich, climate-resilient and gender-equal growth. Engagement
in the G7, G20, OECD-DAC and UN processes, including an OECD-DAC Peer Review and global forums
on nutrition, circular economy and the ocean, reinforced the EU’s role as a champion of the
Sustainable Development Goals.
1.5. Humanitarian aid and civil protection
In 2025, EU humanitarian aid and civil protection responded to exceptionally high levels of global
need. Operating in contexts of both protracted and newly emerging crises, responding during armed
conflicts, and to natural hazards and climate-related shocks. Humanitarian partners delivered aid to
those most vulnerable, despite increasing encroachment on humanitarian space and widespread
impunity among perpetrators of violence. EU humanitarian assistance remained strictly needs-based
and guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.
Together, the EU and its Member States continued to be among the largest humanitarian donors
worldwide. The EU provided emergency relief and disaster preparedness support in around 110
countries, while civil protection assistance under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) was
increasingly mobilised both inside and outside the Union to respond to complex, multi-hazard
emergencies.
The EU’s overall budget for humanitarian aid and civil protection reached EUR 2.839 billion in
commitments in 2025, including EUR 2.56 billion for humanitarian aid assistance and EUR 245 million
for the UCPM. EU humanitarian funding in 2025 provided relief in 110 countries, more than those
included in UN appeals, reflecting the EU’s global reach and attention to both headline emergencies
and underfunded, forgotten crises.
Needs remained at record levels, 305.1 million people(8) were estimated to require humanitarian
assistance and protection worldwide in 2025. Amidst a fiscal, moral and legitimacy crisis within the
humanitarian system itself. A ‘hyper-prioritised’ Global Humanitarian Overview(9) was published in July
reflecting the deep financial crisis of the global humanitarian sector and thus covering only about one
third of people in need. The significant humanitarian financial crisis reached an all-time low with the
US suspending all aid in 2025. This has forced organisations to scale back or suspend operations,
reducing life-saving assistance and has left affected populations even more vulnerable. To address the
challenges the current humanitarian system is faced with, donors and partners have been doing their
best to maximise the efficiency of available funding. Part of this effort is directed towards system-wide
enabling services given their importance in a safe, principled and needs-based response (information
management, security and logistics). This is particularly important as such services have been
disproportionately hit by the funding cuts. The EU remained principled, focusing on the most
vulnerable in situations of armed conflict, forced displacement, food insecurity and health
emergencies. The global hunger crisis stands atop EU’s agenda: around EUR 600 million was allocated
to humanitarian food and nutrition assistance. Around 295 million people faced acute food insecurity
in 2025, and famine was confirmed simultaneously in Gaza and Sudan for the first time.
8 https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2025-enarfres 9 https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2025-cruel-math-aid-cuts-hyper-
prioritized-report-june-2025
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In the mid of 2025, INFORM(10) Severity (see figure 1) classified 57 of the 115 humanitarian crises with
an available score as high or very high in severity, based on their impact, the conditions of affected
people and the complexity of the operating environment. Africa remained the highest-risk region and
accounted for 12 of the 16 countries in the highest-risk group, while Asia recorded an overall reduction
in risk, driven by lower socioeconomic vulnerability and improved coping capacity, particularly
infrastructure.
Figure 1. INFORM Risk 2026 (left) and INFORM Severity July 2025 (right)
The EU supported a wide range of sectoral interventions through its partners, including food
assistance, nutrition, health, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter, protection and education in
emergencies. Health remained a core sector, with an allocation of around EUR 400 million. Protection
represented around 15% of the humanitarian budget, reflecting the need to respond to grave
violations against children and widespread gender-based and conflict-related sexual violence. Despite
a significant reduction in global funding for education in emergencies, the EU maintained its
commitment to dedicate at least 10% of the initial annual humanitarian budget to education in
emergencies, allocating more than EUR 180 million in 2025.
The EU played a central role in responding to the world’s most severe emergencies. In Ukraine, where
Russia’s war of aggression entered its fourth year and 12.7 million people remained in need of
assistance, the EU allocated EUR 220 million in 2025, bringing its total humanitarian assistance since
February 2022 to EUR 1.2 billion; neighbouring The Republic of Moldova received EUR 9.5 million for
cash and protection support for refugees. In the Gaza Strip, facing an unprecedented humanitarian
disaster in which the entire population are exposed to security and protection risks, the EU committed
EUR 220 million in humanitarian funding in 2025. In Sudan, the world’s largest displacement crisis with
more than 10 million internally displaced people and famine confirmed in parts of North Darfur and
South Kordofan, the EU allocated over EUR 273 million, including more than EUR 161 million inside
Sudan. The EU also remained a major humanitarian donor in crises such as Syria (over EUR 204 million
in 2025), Afghanistan (over EUR 161 million), Yemen (EUR 120 million), the Horn of Africa (EUR 157
million), the Great Lakes region (EUR 129 million), the Central Sahel (nearly EUR 124 million) and
Venezuela, where EU funding of more than EUR 52 million represented around 43% of total
humanitarian contributions.
In addition to geographical funding, the EU used its emergency funding and operational support tool,
ReliefEU that provides fast flexible humanitarian response through emergency funding as well as
10 INFORM. 2026. https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index . INFORM is a collaboration of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Group on Risk, Early Warning and Preparedness and the European Commission. The European Commission Joint Research Centre is the scientific lead of INFORM. DG ECHO is a founding partner and member of the INFORM Steering Group, contributing humanitarian-policy and operational expertise and supporting the use of INFORM evidence in risk-informed decision-making.
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through strategic logistical support such as humanitarian air bridge operations, warehousing and
transport services. In 2025, over EUR 110 million was allocated to ReliefEU operations, which
responded to 20 crises in 18 countries by chartering 127 flights, transporting 6 780 tonnes of aid and
32 641 passengers, and mobilising 1 205 tonnes of pre-positioned stocks. In addition, ReliefEU
provided rapid additional funding to support the response to sudden-onset disasters. Through ALERT
and the support to the IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund, this amounted to EUR 53.5 million
in first line emergency funding via 118 mobilisations in 60 countries.
In addition, humanitarian supply chains are critical for humanitarian operations. It accounts for an
estimated 60-80% of the total humanitarian spending worldwide, from the procurement of relief
items to their final delivery. Optimising the expenditure for the supply chain will lead to efficiency
gains. On 10 December 2025 at a High-Level Conference, conclusions were endorsed by 63
organisations to work towards a more strategic approach to supply chain making it more
collaborative, efficient, and resilient.
Civil protection is an integral part of the EU’s response to emergencies, complementing humanitarian
aid and development cooperation by providing rapid, coordinated assistance in the event of natural
and human-induced disasters within and beyond the Union. The Mechanism was activated, for
example, in response to the earthquake in Myanmar, the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, and severe floods in Cabo Verde, where it facilitated the provision of expert teams,
personal protective equipment, vaccines, shelter and other essential items. Ukraine remained the
largest UCPM operation to date. In 2025, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)
processed 39 updated requests from Ukraine, while the UCPM facilitated the delivery of critical energy
equipment. In Gaza and the wider Middle East, the ERCC coordinated medical evacuations for 344
patients and 941 companions.
1.6. Security and defence
In 2025, in a context of intensifying geopolitical competition and a rapidly deteriorating global security
environment, the EU further advanced the implementation of its security and defence agenda within
the EU’s integrated approach to peace and security. Efforts focused on (i) sustained and large-scale
military support to Ukraine; (ii) strengthening the Union’s role as a security provider through Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations and the European Peace Facility; (iii)
enhancing the EU’s preparedness and resilience against hybrid, cyber and other global threats,
including via sanctions, export-control measures and implementation of the EU Space Strategy for
Security and Defence; and (iv) strengthening partnerships in the area of security and defence. These
efforts were aimed at fostering an integrated approach to multi-faceted security and defence
challenges, such as cyber and hybrid threats, maritime security, crisis management, while advancing
the agenda of climate, peace and security, youth peace and security and cultural heritage in crisis, in
addition to the EU’s human rights due diligence policy as regards security sector support.
The EU remained firmly committed to supporting Ukraine’s self-defence against Russia’s war of
aggression. The European Peace Facility continued to be instrumental in providing military support to
the Ukrainian armed forces, both by financing assistance measures and by reimbursing Member States
for the provision of military equipment. In 2025, assistance measures adopted since 2021 represented
commitment appropriations of EUR 3.56 billion and payment appropriations of EUR 4.22 billion, with
a specific reimbursement scheme for EU Member States’ deliveries to Ukraine running until 2027. The
financial ceiling of the Facility was increased by EUR 1.9 billion generated as extraordinary revenues
from immobilised Russian assets in support of the Ukrainian armed forces. At the same time, the
Military Assistance Mission and the EU Advisory Mission continued to provide training, advice and
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support to Ukraine’s security and law-enforcement institutions, closely coordinated with other EU
instruments and bilateral efforts.
Beyond Ukraine, the European Peace Facility further consolidated the EU’s role as a security partner
for a growing number of countries and regional organisations, including in Africa, the Western Balkans
and the Neighbourhood, including the Middle East, while maintaining strong links with budget-funded
instruments to ensure coherence and complementarity. In 2025, 15 new assistance measures were
established by Council decision, in addition to the continued implementation of measures adopted
between 2021 and 2024.
CSDP missions and operations continued to underpin the EU’s contribution to peace and security in
partner countries. In 2025, civilian CSDP missions, EU Special Representatives and the Kosovo
Specialist Chambers accounted for around 90% of CFSP commitments, 70% of which for civilian
missions receiving EUR 291.4 million out of total CFSP commitments of EUR 416.7 million. The
mandates of eight civilian CSDP missions were renewed, including missions supporting border
management, security and judicial institutions in the Middle East, North Africa, the Western Balkans,
the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Gulf of Guinea. The EU’s two civilian missions in support of the
Palestinian authorities – the police and rule-of-law mission and the border assistance mission for the
Rafah crossing point – adapted operations to the evolving security situation while preparing for
possible redeployment options decided by the Council. In the context of the importance of lessons
and knowledge management in peace, security and defence actions, a second Impact Evaluation in
civilian CSDP missions was carried out on the EU advisory mission in Iraq.
Partnerships and dialogue remained central to the Union’s security and defence policy. High-level
forums and implementation dialogues brought together EU Member States, partner countries,
international organisations, civil society and experts, to discuss peace, security and defence priorities,
including the implementation of the Strategic Compass and the use of the European Peace Facility and
NDICI−Global Europe in support of global peace and security. Security and Defence Dialogues were
pursued with a wide range of partners, and tailored Security and Defence Partnerships continued to
be rolled out (notably with the United Kingdom and Canada in 2025), enhancing cooperation on cyber
and hybrid issues, disinformation, counterterrorism, non-proliferation, maritime security, space,
resilience and crisis management. The strategic partnership with NATO was further strengthened
through close coordination on support to Ukraine, regular high-level and senior-officials’ contacts and
structured dialogues on emerging and disruptive technologies, climate, security and defence, military
transport, space, resilience, cyber and defence industry. In a multilateral forum, the EU and the United
Nations agreed on a new Joint Priorities on Peace and Security for 2025-2028, enhancing field-based
cooperation and expanding cooperation on specific issues.
The EU intensified efforts to address hybrid and cyber threats and to uphold a rules-based order in
cyberspace. Hybrid and cyber threats expanded further in 2025, with state and non-state actors using
malicious cyber activities, disinformation, economic coercion and other hybrid tools targeting our
democratic institutions, electoral processes and critical infrastructure. The EU continued to promote
responsible state behaviour, while making active use of its Cyber Diplomacy and Hybrid toolboxes,
including through the adoption of sanctions under both its regimes to counter cyber attacks and
destabilising activities by Russia. Under NDICI−Global Europe, 80 ongoing thematic interventions
responded to global threats and challenges – including cyber security, maritime security,
disinformation, terrorism and the use of new technologies in conflict – and 14 new interventions on
global threats were adopted in 2025. EU regulation was also developed to better address such threats,
such as the revised Cybersecurity Act proposal, which includes proposals to prevent high-risk suppliers
from receiving any EU funding.
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Controlling the trade in security-sensitive goods remained a key element of the EU’s security and
human-rights policy. The EU strengthened implementation of the Regulation on trade in certain goods
that could be used for torture or capital punishment by updating the control lists and expanding the
scope of regulated goods in 2025 through a delegated act that had been prepared in close consultation
with EU Member State experts and was welcomed by United Nations mechanisms and civil society.
This was accompanied by reporting on export authorisations, the activities of the Anti-Torture
Coordination Group and a review report of the Regulation, confirming the importance of this regime
in preventing EU operators from contributing to serious human rights violations abroad. The EU’s
involvement in the Kimberley Process continued to address the security and human-rights risks linked
to conflict diamonds, including the implications of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to
advocate for substantive reform of the scheme, even though no consensus could be reached in 2025
on expanding the definition of ‘conflict diamonds’.
Addressing global and trans-regional threats, including CBRN risks, terrorism and violent extremism,
remained a major priority. By the end of 2025, there were 80 ongoing thematic interventions
responding to global threats and 14 interventions a5 under NDICI−Global Europe. These interventions
supported actions on early warning and foresight, human security, cyber and maritime security,
accountability and prevention of electoral violence, as well as CBRN risk mitigation, where 63 countries
received specialised support for inter-agency coordination, risk assessments and national action plans.
Under CFSP, 12 new non-proliferation and disarmament actions were signed, bringing the total
number of ongoing actions to 30 with commitments of EUR 97.7 million, including support to the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ activities in Syria and Ukraine and to the 2026
Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation and Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions.
In the space domain, the EU continued implementing the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence,
which aims to strengthen the Union’s posture as a space actor and to protect space systems and
services that are critical for security, defence and crisis response. Work advanced on measures to
enhance the resilience of space-based services, improve space situational awareness and integrate
space solutions into CSDP missions and operations, crisis-response mechanisms and border
management. These efforts were closely linked to emerging initiatives on military mobility, defence
innovation and critical infrastructure protection under the wider security and defence policy
framework.
Counter-terrorism remained an important dimension of the EU’s external security action. The
Counter-Terrorism and Security Experts’ Network continued to contribute to situational awareness
and to guide programmatic support in regions affected by terrorism and violent extremism, including
through capacity-building for law-enforcement and criminal justice systems, prevention of
radicalisation and rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders. The EU sustained its
role in multilateral counter-terrorism forums, including the EU-UN Global Counterterrorism Forum,
where it helped shape responses to emerging threats and promote human-rights-compliant
approaches to counter-terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism. Preventing and fighting
organised crime, including cybercrime, continued to be a key focus of the EU’s external security action
in 2025, with efforts to strengthen partner countries’ law-enforcement, judicial, financial and
intelligence capacities and to promote implementation of multilateral standards. In Latin America and
the Caribbean, EL PAcCTO 2.0 and COPOLAD supported the entire criminal-justice chain and the
development of balanced, evidence-based drug policies, fostering regional and bi-regional
cooperation. In Africa, regional programmes such as SECFIN, and related initiatives targeted organised
and financial crime, illicit financial flows and money-laundering, reinforcing institutions and
cross-border cooperation in line with international standards. In the Middle East and North Africa,
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regional programmes such as Euromed Police, Euromed Justice, EU4Monitoring Drugs and
CyberSouth+ enhanced capacities of authorities working in the criminal justice chain to fight organised
crime in line with EU standards and joint priorities under the framework of the Pact for the
Mediterranean.
1.7. Peace, stability and conflict prevention
In 2025, against a backdrop of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, the war in Gaza,
persistent instability in the Sahel and a record 122 million people forcibly displaced worldwide, the EU
further strengthened its integrated approach to conflicts and crises. Action combined diplomatic
engagement, development cooperation, humanitarian aid, civil protection, crisis response and
security instruments to prevent conflict, support peace processes, stabilise fragile contexts and
address global and trans-regional threats.
The programme on peace, stability and conflict prevention under NDICI−Global Europe continued to
support multilateral and civil-society actors in conflict settings, preventing violence and promoting
dialogue, reconciliation and inclusive governance. By the end of 2025, there were 78 ongoing thematic
interventions in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness that supported multilateral
and civil society actors in conflict-affected or conflict-prone settings to prevent conflict escalation and
promote dialogue and reconciliation, including via innovative approaches. An additional 18 new
interventions addressed global peace and security concerns by supporting mediation, Women, Peace
and Security, disinformation, mine action, accountability and the prevention of electoral violence, and
supporting UN peacebuilding tools. Timely crisis-response measures were launched under the Rapid
Response Pillar of NDICI−Global Europe to help preserve or restore conditions for peace and respect
for human rights. By end-2025, 257 crisis-response interventions were ongoing and 78 new
interventions were adopted during the year, with 38% of new actions in the Middle East and North
Africa, 26% in Europe, 16% in Sub-Saharan Africa and the remainder at global level and in Asia and the
Americas. This included providing essential support for the response to the war in Ukraine, in areas
such as demining, energy and accountability, but also for the wider Eastern Neighbourhood and
globally, including in Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan and the Sahel, among others. These
interventions addressed both the drivers and the consequences of instability and hostility, such as
disinformation, hate speech or gender-based violence.
Initiatives such as the RESILAC2 programme in the Lake Chad Basin, focusing on human capital,
economic recovery and natural resource management, and the Green Corridor in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, which integrates Global Gateway investments with the
humanitarian-development-peace nexus, illustrate this multi-dimensional approach. In South Asia, a
EUR 5 million programme was launched to strengthen resilience to violent extremism in the digital
space and regional cooperation against technology-enabled crime and terrorism, while a new action
on the financial and digital dimensions of migrant smuggling formed part of a EUR 78 million EU
contribution to the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling.
In fragile and conflict-affected settings, the EU maintained a flexible and agile engagement, working
closely with local partners, civil-society organisations, youth and women’s organisations to build
resilience and promote peace, preferably in a ‘Team Europe’ approach. Global initiatives to protect
civic space, such as the ‘EU System for an Enabling Environment’, monitored trends and built
civil-society capacities in 80 countries, while a Human Rights Crisis Facility supported human rights
through confidential projects in closed environments. In Afghanistan, the EU adopted an EUR 83
million programme to support basic needs and livelihoods under a ‘for women, by women’ approach
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and allocated an additional EUR 38.5 million to address displacement, illustrating gender-responsive
support in a highly fragile context.
Foreign-policy instruments complemented these efforts. From the CFSP budget, EUR 416.7 million in
commitments were implemented in 2025, of which 70% supported 14 civilian CSDP missions, 15% the
Kosovo Specialist Chambers, 8% non-proliferation and disarmament actions, 5% EU Special
Representatives and 2% other actions. Eight civilian CSDP mission mandates were renewed, including
those supporting border management, security and judicial institutions in Mali, Armenia, the Republic
of the Republic of Moldova, the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Gulf of Guinea; four new EU
Special Representatives were appointed and three existing mandates extended, covering human
rights, key peace processes and regional crises in, inter alia, the Western Balkans, the Middle East, the
Gulf region, the South Caucasus and the Great Lakes. CFSP-funded non-proliferation and disarmament
work included 12 new actions, bringing to 30 the number of ongoing projects with commitments of
EUR 97.7 million, supporting global treaties and mechanisms on weapons of mass destruction, small
arms and light weapons, mine action and arms-export control.
The EU also invested in addressing global and trans-regional threats that can fuel instability. Under
the peace, stability and global-threats strands, 63 countries received specialised support to mitigate
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks through national CBRN teams, action plans and
critical-infrastructure protection, with specific support to Ukraine on CBRN detection, cybersecurity
and demining. Counter-terrorism and prevention of violent extremism were advanced through
instruments such as the EU-UN Global Terrorist Threat Facility, which provided targeted support
packages to countries such as Iraq, Uzbekistan, Nigeria and Somalia and assisted the reintegration of
people associated with Da’esh, particularly in Central Asia. Cybersecurity and resilience were
strengthened via the EU CyberNet network which was expanded to the Indo-Pacific, connecting 571
experts and 123 organisations, and Budapest Convention-aligned legal reforms in nine partner
countries.
Humanitarian aid and civil protection activities contributed to stability and conflict prevention through
the humanitarian-development-peace and climate-security nexuses. In 2025, disaster preparedness
funding reached EUR 81 million and one in three EU-funded humanitarian projects included a
preparedness component; at the same time, 34 prevention and preparedness projects were
co-financed under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, and regional civil protection programmes in
the EU’s neighbourhood strengthened disaster resilience and risk management capacities. The EU
intensified advocacy for respect of international humanitarian law, principled humanitarian space and
the protection of civilians, including through a EUR 30 million programme with the International
Committee of the Red Cross to prevent IHL violations and the launch of the first annual ‘IHL in Focus’
report, while maintaining a strong focus on protection, gender-based violence and child protection in
its humanitarian operations.
1.8. Human rights and democracy
In 2025, the EU promoted human rights and democratic principles(11) amidst widespread human rights
abuses and violations, democratic backsliding, shrinking civic space, attacks against multilateralism,
and sharp reductions in overall global financial flows. Human rights and democracy remained at the
core of EU external action and enlargement policy, with a strong focus on protecting civic space,
11 More details available in the 2025 Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World. HR(2026)132;
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-annual-reports-human-rights-and-democracy_en
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promoting youth participation, gender equality and women’s empowerment, strengthening the rule
of law and accountability, and applying a human rights-based approach.
Financial support for human rights and democracy was provided in various ways. The Instrument for
Pre-Accession Assistance III and NDICI−Global Europe continued to fund human rights, democracy,
rule-of-law and governance initiatives, including protection of human rights defenders and support to
national human rights institutions. Flexible and demand-driven funding was channelled through the
European Endowment for Democracy, which empowered pro-democracy actors, civil society and
independent media across the Neighbourhood, the Western Balkans, Türkiye, Eurasia and the Middle
East and through the Human Rights Crisis Facility and the EU mechanism for the protection of human
rights defenders (ProtectDefenders.eu) globally, including in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and
Caribbean and Asia-Pacific. Under the regional programming, the decision action ‘Safeguard of basic
rights and democratic governance in the Southern Neighbourhood for 2025-2027’ (EUR 73.7 million)
has been adopted combining support to the regional civil society facility, support to civil society in
Morocco and Tunisia, and contributions to EUPI (Middle East Peace process) and European
endowment for democracy.
Dedicated projects enabled swift, targeted and confidential responses to address the most acute
human rights challenges through a wide range of actions, including emergency response, legal support
to human rights defenders and documentation of human rights violations.
In 2025, the EU provided protection support to at least 10 460 human rights defenders and family
members through its emergency fund and the flagship programme ProtectDefenders.EU. The civil
society-led ‘EU System for an Enabling Environment’ (EU SEE) issued 462 alerts in 63 countries,
triggering targeted interventions in 26 contexts to counter restrictions on civic space, boost civil
society resilience, and protect human rights defenders.
The EU continued to tackle global human rights challenges through long-term thematic partnerships
with civil society. Through the United Against Torture Consortium of NGOs, EU funding reached over
200 anti-torture organisations in over 100 countries, including support to UN treaty-body reviews,
crisis-response actions, survivor support and specialised training. A Global Consortium for Death
Penalty Abolition was active in approximately 40 countries.
The EU continued to strongly support indigenous peoples’ rights in 2025. It supported the Indigenous
Navigator and the Indigenous Peoples’ Centre for Documentation, Research and Information (DOCIP),
which provided advocacy training to 7 500 indigenous representatives in 2025.
The EU contributed to strengthening the international criminal justice system, by supporting the
International Criminal Court, the Eurojust Genocide Network and a Global Initiative against Impunity
for International Crimes and Serious Human Rights Violations.
On media freedom support, EU-funded media development consortia helped strengthen the
resilience of independent media and journalists worldwide, countered harmful information, and
contributed to fostering a more enabling environment for public-interest media, with particular
attention to women journalists and media working in underserved areas. The EU also partnered with
UNESCO to implement Guidelines for the Governance of Digital Platforms. These initiatives are part
of an increase in funding addressing independent media and information integrity.
Democratic participation and electoral processes were another core focus of EU funding in 2025. Full
election observation missions were deployed to Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, Kosovo, Malawi
and the Philippines; election expert missions to Kosovo, Iraq and Suriname; and follow-up missions to
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Colombia, Guatemala, Kenya, Lesotho, Maldives, Nigeria and Timor Leste, contributing to
transparency, inclusiveness, reduction of electoral violence and acceptance of credible results.
The EU remained a leading global actor in electoral assistance, focusing on credible, inclusive and
transparent processes, especially in politically fragile or transitional contexts. EU support prioritised
electoral management bodies, civil society and media capacity building, conflict prevention and
inclusive participation. In the Western Balkans and Eastern and Southern Partnership regions, the EU
continued supporting electoral administration and electoral processes through targeted technical
assistance. For instance, the EU provided targeted technical assistance for electoral and governance-
related efforts in Syria and Iraq, including support for inclusive transitions, media and access to justice,
for example. In various African countries, the EU backed technical preparations, legal and
constitutional expertise, and citizen engagement, and it supported observation and preventive
diplomacy missions of the African Union and regional groupings.
Through the global Women and Youth Democratic Engagement programme (WYDE), the EU further
deepened promotion of the civic and political participation of women and young people.
Beyond elections, the EU strengthened effectiveness and coordination of its approach to democracy
support, through the Team Europe Democracy initiative, funded under the human rights and
democracy programme, which brings together the EU, 15 EU Member States and democracy support
stakeholders, fostering cooperation and partner country engagements on issues like people-centred
justice, anti-corruption, civic space and information integrity.
The EU-funded flagship Inter-Pares programme remained at the core of EU support for representative
parliamentary democracy fostering peer-to-peer cooperation on this issue. In 2025, new
parliamentary capacity building partnerships took place with Indonesia, South Africa, Sierra Leone,
and Sri Lanka, and it kept playing a key role in coordinating parliamentary support to Ukraine.
The human rights-based approach is increasingly embedded in sectoral and geographic cooperation.
New guidance was developed, including on how to apply a human rights-based approach in sectors
such as migration and critical raw materials, as well as a Business and Human Rights toolkit.
The EU also continued strengthening its commitment to protecting children in conflict zones. It
implemented updated guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, supporting prevention, recovery
and reintegration, as well as promoting accountability. These efforts were reinforced through
improved child protection measures in EU missions and ongoing support for the UN Special
Representative on Children and Armed Conflict. In 2025, the EU and UNICEF organised in New York a
third consecutive year of joint dialogues about children in underfunded crises.
2. Delivering on our commitments: promoting EU values and
interests and fostering sustainable development globally
2.1. The Global Gateway strategy
In 2025, the EU further scaled up Global Gateway, its worldwide investment strategy for building
mutually beneficial partnerships and mobilising public and private resources to bridge the global
investment gap and supporting the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. The
2025 Global Gateway Board meeting, chaired by European Commissioner for International
Partnerships Jozef Síkela, discussed ways to accelerate project delivery, enhance cooperation with the
private sector and improve coordination through Team Nationals and the Global Gateway Investment
Hub. At the second Global Gateway Forum, President von der Leyen announced that Global Gateway
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had mobilised over EUR 306 billion in investments, surpassing its original target thanks to the
collective effort of Team Europe, bringing together EU institutions, EU Member States, their financial
institutions, diplomatic networks and the private sector.
Building on this momentum, the Commission strengthened its engagement with the private sector
including through the newly launched Global Gateway Investment Hub(12) for Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin
America and the Caribbean, Asia, Central Asia and the Pacific. The Hub, which is a single-entry point
for EU Member States and their companies, facilitates access to information, opportunities and
support mechanisms across the Global Gateway portfolio, while helping connect businesses with
investment opportunities in partner countries. The Global Gateway Business Advisory Group (BAG)
continued to strengthen cooperation with the European private sector as part of Global Gateway
implementation.
The Global Gateway pipeline of projects and investment packages continued to grow in all regions,
reinforcing the strategy’s operational delivery. The seventh EU-AU summit welcomed the significant
progress on the implementation of the Global Gateway Africa-Europe investment package, notably in
transport corridors such as the Lobito Corridor, regional electricity integration and renewable energy,
as well as local vaccine manufacturing under the MAV+ initiative. The fourth EU–CELAC Summit
welcomed the EU–LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda, with over 100 projects and around EUR
45 billion committed until 2027, including regional electricity integration, high-performance
computing and the Sargassum Initiative, alongside bilateral cooperation in areas such as critical raw
materials and renewable hydrogen. In Asia and the Pacific, the EU-Central Asia Summit delivered a
EUR 12 billion investment package and a critical raw materials declaration, while the EU-Pacific
Business Forum launched nearly EUR 300 million in investments, focused on climate resilience,
infrastructure and sustainable growth.
In Northern Africa and the Middle East, the Pact for the Mediterranean, adopted in October 2025,
provides the new political framework for Global Gateway in the region. In 2025, EUR 662 million in
investments were approved, expected to mobilise over EUR 7 billion in investments, particularly in
digital, renewable energy and access to finance, bringing total expected mobilisation to EUR 30 billion
in the Southern Mediterranean between 2021 and 2025.
Private sector engagement was reinforced through the launch of a general call for expressions of
interest in December 2025 to identify business opportunities, constraints and support needs in the
region. Preparations for the T-MED Investment Platform also continued ahead of its planned launch
in 2026.
In the Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, investment continued to support structural reforms,
convergence with the EU, and integration into European value chains. A dedicated Connectivity
Agenda was launched in 2025 under the Black Sea strategy, reinforcing transport, energy and digital
links across the region. Between 2021 and 2025, nearly EUR 40 billion in expected investment was
mobilised.
Calls for expressions of interest launched in Ukraine and the Western Balkans attracted more than 700
investment proposals, while dedicated investment conferences helped connect businesses, investors
and public authorities to advance strategic investment projects.
Throughout 2025, the ‘Team Europe’ approach remained central to implementation, to ensure
coordinated delivery of high-impact investment packages. To this end, the Global Gateway flagship
12 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/investment-hub_enCommission
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list was streamlined from 264 to 256 projects, reflecting a stronger focus on jointly identified political
priorities. Flagship projects remain concentrated in climate and energy (50%), transport (20%), digital
(12%), health (10%), and education and research (8%), with a geographic distribution broadly aligned
with Global Gateway priorities.
Civil society and local authorities continued to be essential partners for Global Gateway, helping to
ensure inclusive participation, uphold its core principles, and contribute to monitoring and
accountability. The Global Gateway CSO and Local Authorities Advisory Platform held eleven
consultations and meetings on a broad range of topics. At partner-country level, the EU has
strengthened its engagement with civil society around Global Gateway, through the fourth generation
of Civil Society Roadmaps (CSRMs) which better anchor civil society participation around EU priorities
and Global Gateway initiatives.
2.2. ‘Team Europe’ approach
In 2025, the ‘Team Europe’ approach remained central to how the EU and its Member States
coordinate a coherent, visible and tangible response to global challenges, including through the Global
Gateway strategy. Team Europe brings together the EU institutions, EU Member States, their
implementing agencies, European and national development banks, development finance institutions
and the private sector. The implementation of Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) continued, with the
majority of them contributing to Global Gateway (and its flagship projects) and the implementation
of policy initiatives in the Neighbourhood territories, but also covering sectors such as migration,
peace and security, governance or food security.
The EU has also updated guidance on the governance and practice of the ‘Team Europe’ approach,
through the ‘Working Better Together’ document. It provides practical guidance and examples on
promoting a ‘Team Europe’ approach on the ground, including through TEIs, Joint Implementation and
Joint Programming. To ensure continuous engagement by all Team Europe actors, four EU
Development/Enlargement Directors-General meetings were organised and the Commission
continued regular exchanges with networks such as the Practitioners’ Network (PN), the Association
of European Development Finance Institutions (EDFI) and the Joint European Financiers for
International Cooperation (JEFIC).
In May 2025, the Commission launched a strategic evaluation of the ‘Team Europe’ approach. The aim
of the evaluation is to gather detailed insights into how Team Europe operates by assessing its overall
effectiveness and identifying key lessons learned and actionable recommendations to strengthen the
approach and its impact.
As a strategic pillar of the ‘Team Europe’ approach, the Commission continued promoting the set-up
of Team Nationals in EU Member States (domestic whole-of-government coordination mechanisms
for the engagement with the private sector). It also offered technical assistance to support their
conceptualisation and set-up.
Beyond partner countries, the ‘Team Europe’ approach also underpinned work with international
financial institutions. The Commission signed a cooperation arrangement with the World Bank Group
to strengthen coordination around 18 high-impact Global Gateway investment projects and worked
with Council Presidencies to ensure that the EU and its Member States spoke with a single voice in key
Bretton Woods forums. Coordination with European Executive Directors in the World Bank Group and
with Executive Directors at the International Monetary Fund were further developed, consolidating a
shared Team Europe stance on issues such as EU geopolitical and geoeconomic priorities, as well as
the wider international financial architecture. Similarly, as a central player in the UN system and its
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largest financial contributor together with EU Member States, the EU has been consistently advocating
for an ambitious UN80 reform in a ‘Team Europe’ approach, including through Council Conclusions,
EU positioning and statements on the three work strands of the reform process: efficiency gains within
the UN system, mandate implementation review and deeper structural changes.
To further facilitate knowledge sharing in a ‘Team Europe’ approach, the Commission continued the
development of the Team Europe Explorer(13), which is an interactive public tool for visualising
financial data and project-level information on support to partner countries, as well as the
maintenance of the TEIs and the Joint Programming Tracker(14).
2.3. Implementing the 2030 Agenda and other international and European
commitments and policies
The EU remains committed to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) as the overarching framework of its external action and international
partnerships. Our external action support our partner countries to progress towards the SDGs through
a just, green and digital transition, and stronger resilience.
Conflicts and wars, geopolitical tensions, the environmental crisis, economic shocks, rising inequalities
and increasing fragility continue to severely impede progress on the SDGs. The world is not on track
to achieving them by 2030(15). Implementing the SDGs is a cross-cutting ambition for the Commission:
they are embedded across Commission proposals. The College of Commissioners as a whole is
responsible for advancing towards the SDGs; each Member of the College ensures delivery within their
policy field.
Global Gateway is the EU’s external investment strategy and its main contribution to the SDGs beyond
its borders, supporting partner countries in their progress towards sustainable development. Each
Global Gateway flagship project addresses a range of interconnected SDGs. In countries facing
instability or in complex settings, this is complemented by more traditional engagement, focused on
the population’s most immediate needs. The EU also remains an important player on public policies,
notably through contributions to global initiatives. The EU also supports efforts to make the
multilateral system more fit for purpose, reinvigorate the UN, and reform the international financial
architecture, to make them more agile, efficient and effective, delivering better on SDGs at country
level.
2.4. Fragility response
NDICI−Global Europe resources helped address the root causes of fragility and forced displacement,
by leveraging Global Gateway investments and working across the humanitarian-development-peace
(HDP) nexus, as illustrated by initiatives such as the Green Corridor in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Efforts focused on reinforcing the resilience of institutions, communities and ecosystems in
the face of conflict, climate change and economic shocks.
Programmes advanced peace, security and resilience in fragile contexts. Rapid Response actions
supported peace, rights and responses to displacement and climate emergencies, including in Haiti,
while actions in Chad, the Central African Republic and South Sudan also helped address the Sudan
13 https://team-europe-explorer.europa.eu/index_en 14 Team Europe Initiatives and Joint Programming Tracker | Capacity4dev 15 UN Sustainable Development Goals Report 2025, p. 4 (https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2025/The-Sustainable- Development-Goals-Report-2025.pdf)
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crisis. The EU also backed efforts to counter violent extremism, tech-enabled crime and terrorism,
including through new initiatives in Asia.
Across fragile contexts, the EU remained engaged on governance, human rights and civic space,
recognising their centrality to peace and sustainable development. In parallel, it supported internal
displaced persons, refugees and host communities along key routes affected by fragility and conflict.
In Syria, the EU is working to address both humanitarian and development needs, for instance
supporting the public health system and strengthening Syrian pharmaceutical value chains to create
jobs.
The EU has strengthened its own and its partners’ ability to work in a conflict sensitive way especially
in highly and extremely fragile contexts, ensuring a ‘do no harm’ approach. It has also improved
coordination across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors, including through Team
Europe frameworks in Ethiopia, Myanmar and Pakistan.
Humanitarian aid interventions also support resilience building through legal assistance regarding
housing, land rights, support on health and education, food and livelihood systems, and water,
sanitation and hygiene (WASH). The EU has also tested catalytic funding to attract support from
development banks and the private sector. Links with social protection systems have also been
successfully developed in several cases.
The SANAD Fund is creating 448 000 jobs across the MENA region, ranking among the largest job-
creating funds in the region, with total of USD 2.3 billion in sub-loans. The Fund targets Jordan,
Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, as well as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.
2.5. Policy coherence for sustainable development
In 2025, the EU continued to promote Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) as a long-standing
legal and political commitment to ensure that all its internal and external policies support – or at least
do not undermine – sustainable development and poverty reduction in partner countries.
PCD is anchored in the EU Treaties (Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union).
PCD is a key component of the overall EU’s effort to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development and its 17 SDGs across all EU internal and external policies. It is coordinated by central
services, notably through the integration of SDGs in the Better Regulation framework. The
Commission has integrated PCD in its working methods, from upstream policy design under the Better
Regulation agenda (including stakeholder consultations, impact assessments, inter-service
consultations and political validation) to monitoring and evaluation, ensuring a systemic ‘whole-of-
Commission’ approach. PCD also extends to close cooperation with the Council and Parliament
throughout the legislative process, in support of a ‘whole-of-EU’ approach.
In terms of political priorities, PCD efforts in 2025 focused in particular on the European
competitiveness agenda, including initiatives such as the Competitiveness Compass, the Clean
Industrial Deal, the Action Plan on Automotive and forthcoming initiatives in sectors like steel. By
combining grants, budget support, blending and guarantees (notably through EFSD+), the EU seeks to
align investment pipelines with green, digital and inclusive transitions, while reinforcing domestic
resource mobilisation, macro-fiscal stability and sustainable finance in partner countries.
Coherence between climate, biodiversity, critical raw materials and circular-economy policies was
pursued via initiatives such as the Africa–Europe Green Energy Initiative, NaturAfrica, Forest
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Partnerships and support for environmentally and socially sustainable, resilient supply chains of
critical raw materials in line with EU legislation.
The EU also worked to ensure coherence between migration and development policies by supporting
action along key migration routes that address root causes of irregular migration, strengthen
protection and inclusion of refugees and migrants, promote legal pathways and uphold a human
rights-based approach to migration, in line with the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.
In the digital sphere, implementation of the EU’s international digital strategy and the digital pillar of
Global Gateway linked connectivity investment with regulatory convergence, skills, e-governance and
data protection, promoting a human-centric and rights-based digital transformation.
Governance arrangements for PCD relied on strong coordination within the EU and with Member
States under the ‘Team Europe’ approach. Common results frameworks and guidance supported
consistent implementation.
Engagement with partner governments, civil society, local authorities and young people was
strengthened, aligning EU external action with local priorities, supporting SDG localisation and
fostering whole-of-society approaches to PCD.
2.6. Development effectiveness
Development effectiveness (Busan principles, 2011) is actively promoted in the EU’s development
cooperation to achieve the best sustainable impact through official development assistance funding
and other types of support. The ‘Team Europe’ approach is a key contribution to effectiveness by
pulling together European resources (financial, technical and/or human), to avoid fragmentation and
duplication and increasing transparency. It also provides a common space and framework for
collaboration focused on results, in line with partner country priorities and through inclusive multi-
stakeholder dialogue processes.
Throughout 2025, the European Commission continued to promote and put into practice
development effectiveness principles (country ownership, focus on results, transparency, inclusive
partnerships and mutual accountability) across its international partnerships.
As a founding member of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC),
the European Commission remained actively engaged in its governance and work programme. It
supported the Partnership analysis on development effectives of 60 countries under the ‘fourth
monitoring round’ (2023-2026), including country-led national dialogues. These dialogues provide an
important opportunity for governments and partner countries to jointly review development
cooperation practices, identify areas for improvement and agree on follow-up actions based on
evidence and country priorities. 2025 represented a key year for consolidating results and preparing
future discussions on the evolution of the effectiveness agenda.
The Commission continued to contribute actively to discussions within the GPEDC Steering
Committee, representing the EU countries, and addressing topics such as the rapidly evolving
international cooperation landscape where effectiveness needs to continue playing a central role
including across new priorities such as Global Gateway, new financing modalities and a broader range
of development actors.
The European Commission also followed emerging international discussions on the topic, including
the 2030 Pact for Effective Development Cooperation, established during the Fourth International
Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) in Sevilla.
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2.7. Support for multilateralism and addressing global challenges
In 2025, the EU consolidated its role as a leading proponent of effective multilateralism at a time of
escalating geopolitical tensions and attacks on the rules-based international order. The EU pursued its
priorities through the multilateral system while working with partners to reform and streamline
multilateral institutions to make them more inclusive, efficient and effective.
The EU promoted ambition at the 80th UN General Assembly High-Level Week and across a dense
calendar of UN-related events. The EU actively supported the UN80 initiative to strengthen the
effectiveness, cost-efficiency and coherence of the UN system, while preserving the integrity and
balance of its three pillars: peace and security, development and human rights, amid tightening
resources and attacks on the multilateral method. The EU continued to support a strengthened UN
Development System reform, calling for less fragmentation in the field, stronger Country Team
configuration and empowered Resident Coordinators. The EU also continued to support a strong UN
human rights system, built around the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
The EU played an active role in the G20, helping to secure Leaders’ Declarations and Declarations of
Development Ministers, together with two calls to action on social protection systems and combating
illicit financial flows.
The G7 failed to adopt a Leaders’ Declaration, but reached consensus on statements on critical
minerals, artificial intelligence, quantum technology, wildfires, transnational repression and migrant
smuggling.
Cooperation with the OECD was taken further with the completion of the 2025 OECD-DAC Peer Review
of the EU, through the third EU-OECD Strategic Dialogue, and engagement in the ongoing reform of
the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
The EU continued to engage with major bilateral partners. Work proceeded on concluding an
administrative arrangement with the United-Kingdom to establish regular exchanges of information
on development cooperation. Regular technical meetings on priority areas took place with Canada.
Contacts with the United States were impacted by the new administration’s shift in approach to
international aid and the dismantling of USAID.
Under the Samoa Agreement, which brings together 104 signatories, the EU and the Organisation of
African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) stepped up political cooperation through two joint
statements issued on UN Day(16) and ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for
Development(17), reaffirming also their commitment to the principles of the UN Charter.
The EU also supported partner countries in implementing multilateral agreements on climate change,
biodiversity, the conservation and sustainable use of the ocean, sustainable energy, transport and
circular economy, including through targeted technical and financial assistance.
2.8. European financial architecture for development
The roadmap towards an improved European Financial Architecture for Development (EFAD), updated
in March 2024 following consultations with EU Member States, continued to guide action around four
objectives: (i) strengthening the EU’s policy steer, (ii) enhancing coordination between European and
16 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/24/joint-statement-of-the-organisation-of-african- caribbean-and-pacific-states-and-the-european-union-and-its-member-states-on-the-occasion-of-the-united-nations-day/ 17 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/01/eu-and-oacps-reaffirm-commitment-to-global- sustainable-development-ahead-of-ffd4/
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multilateral financial actors, (iii) making the architecture more inclusive, (iv) and increasing the
visibility and impact of Team Europe.
Policy steer
In 2025, activities aimed at ensuring full alignment between the geographic strategic priorities, and
the origination of investment proposals continued. Strategic priorities for all regions as established in
relevant policy documents(18) were regularly shared and discussed with European Development
Finance Institutions (EDFIs) to ensure that EU support (in the form of blending or guarantees) was
targeted accordingly.
The EFSD+ Strategic Board continued to provide strategic guidance to establish the overall investment
priorities as regards the use of the guarantee (such as critical raw materials, least developed
countries/fragile settings and others). The 19 June 2025 board meeting discussed the ‘Strategic
Outlook’, including the strategic use of the remaining EFSD+ open architecture guarantee capacity and
specific top-up proposals.
Coordination
In 2025, the Commission continued dialogue with the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to improve coordination, including
through joint reporting to the Council on EFAD progress.
Cooperation with the World Bank Group (WBG) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was
stepped up further. Following several high-level meetings between the Commission and the WBG
Presidents, a cooperation agreement on Global Gateway High-Impact Projects was signed on the
margins of the Global Gateway Forum. In addition, European Commissioners Síkela, Kos and Šuica held
several strategic policy discussions with IMF and World Bank management, including during the
Annual and Spring Meetings.
Engagement with the private sector remained a core feature of EFAD and was significantly stepped up
with the launch of the Global Gateway Investment Hub in October 2025. The Investment Hub enables
the EU private sector to propose investment projects through the relevant Team National. Several
business forums were organised with partner countries, such as the EU-Pacific business forum in Nadi,
Fiji, in September, the EU-Mongolia business forum in Ulaanbaatar in October, the EU-Central Asia
Economic forum in Tashkent in November and the Mexico-EU business forum in October. The
Commission also organised regular targeted information sessions to raise awareness among Team
Europe actors and explain the submission processes.
The Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST)
manages a dedicated Global Gateway investment hub for investments in enlargement countries and
the Eastern Neighbourhood. In this context, it has launched calls for expression of interest to identify
promising investment proposals, submitted directly by companies. In 2025, calls focused on Ukraine,
the Western Balkans and the Republic of Moldova, with over 700 investment proposals submitted.
Mature investment proposals that are considered strategic, impactful and financially viable are shared
with international financial institutions (IFIs) and may be eligible for a range of guarantee programmes
under the EFSD+. Investment conferences have been co-organised (notably for Ukraine, the Western
18 EU- Africa Global Gateway Investment Package, EU-LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda (GGIA) the Eastern Neighbourhood related Reform Agendas and Growth Plans and the Connectivity Agenda, the Pact for the Mediterranean for the Northern Africa and the Middle East.
30
Balkans and Montenegro in 2025) to bring together businesses, investors, financial institutions and
government representatives to speed up investments.
speed up he Commission launched a general and open call for expressions of interest for the EU
private sector to signal their interest and set out their needs and constraints in relation to investment
and economic actions in the Middle East and North Africa region. The call will help gather market
intelligence on the needs of the EU private sector, provide inputs into the design of new support
instruments, structure the engagement with the EU private sector, and identify potential investment
opportunities.
In June 2025, the Commission held a joint strategic dialogue with the Practitioners’ Network (PN) of
European development cooperation organisations, the EDFIs and the Joint European Financiers for
International Cooperation (JEFIC). The discussions focused on ideas for addressing the complex global
challenges, in particular in the context of budget cuts, and on preparations for the Fourth Conference
on Financing for Development. Several JEFIC and EDFI members formally joined Global Gateway
flagship initiatives, such as the ASEAN power grid, by signing a joint letter of intent with the European
Commission, the EIB and other European partners.
Enhanced coordination between export credit agencies and development finance institutions
continued within the Commission Expert Group on Enhanced Coordination of External Financial Tools,
which explored how to better align development and export finance, supported by analytical work
and recommendations. A second high-level conference in October 2025 confirmed that a broad range
of stakeholders agreed on the need for a financing tool to support the participation of export credit
agencies (ECAs) in Global Gateway, contributing to both development and EU competitiveness
objectives.
To facilitate coherent design, monitoring and reporting on the results achieved with the support of
EFSD+ guarantees and blending, an updated version of the EFSD+ Results Measurement Framework
was finalised in May 2025. The new version reflects development finance institutions’ comments on
the previous one. The revised framework includes a methodology for integrating indicators related to
the Inequality Marker, better capturingleverage and multiplier ratios and reviewing the technical
assistance components of guarantee agreements.
Inclusiveness
In 2025, EU Delegations across the various regions continued to facilitate upstream discussions with
Team Europe actors, IFIs and other stakeholders. They also played a central role in the organisation of
business promotion events and investment conferences, helping to initiate dialogue and align
priorities, organise outreach and promote cooperation around concrete trade and investment
opportunities.
EU Delegations serve as coordinators/focal points to facilitate upstream discussions within the EFAD
ecosystem on the ground. Their role has been further strengthened through several support activities
aimed at sharing information and promoting exchange of practices/experiences among members of
the EFSD+ focal point network in EU Delegations. Non-resident countries will increasingly be invited.
In 2025, the Commission continued to work closely with European financial institutions on pillar
assessments. Follow-up was made more systematic, with common methodologies shared and applied,
to ensure that findings and recommendations were addressed in a more coherent manner. In parallel,
structured dialogue with EU Member States and their institutions intensified through technical
exchanges and high-level meetings. Overall, in 2025 the Commission strengthened the approach
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initiated in 2024, focusing on institutions with a strong international cooperation mandate and
continuing to provide timely support at all stages of the process, from application to monitoring and
follow-up.
Visibility
April 2025 saw the launch of a second round of reporting on investments mobilised in Global Gateway
priority areas, covering the period 2021-2024. The new reporting updated the overall figure and
provided a more detailed breakdown of investments by region. The total investments mobilised – as
announced at the Global Gateway Forum in October 2025 – come to EUR 306 billion.
High-level Team Europe missions took place in 2025 to promote Global Gateway investments in
Mexico, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Papua New Guinea. Investment conferences and platforms
were organised for Ukraine, the Western Balkans, Montenegro and Egypt in 2025, bringing together
businesses, investors, financial institutions and government representatives to speed up investment.
2.9. Means of implementation
In 2025, the EU further consolidated the use of a diversified toolbox of means of implementation to
deliver on the 2030 Agenda and the Global Gateway strategy. Under NDICI–Global Europe and related
instruments, grants, procurement, budget support, financial instruments and guarantees, indirect
management and rapid-response tools were deployed in a complementary manner, supported by
robust internal control systems.
Budget support remained a key policy-driven and performance-based tool, promoting
macroeconomic stability, sound public finance management and debt sustainability. It made it
possible to engage with partner countries on important reforms to strengthen regulatory frameworks
and increase institutional resilience, transparency and oversight with the aim of improving the
investment climate, including in fragile and complex settings.
In parallel, the EU expanded performance-based expenditure schemes, notably through reform and
growth facilities for Ukraine, the Western Balkans and the Republic of Moldova, where payments are
made only upon verified delivery of pre-agreed reform steps. This provides a strong incentive for
partner-country-led reforms.
Blending and guarantees under the EFSD+ remained key derisking instruments to promote private and
public investment in Global Gateway sectors. In 2025, 20 new EFSD+ Open Architecture guarantees
were signed with development finance institutions for a total guarantee amount exceeding EUR 3
billion and covering energy, climate, digital, agriculture, micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME)
financing, and currency hedging. Deployment was speeded up, with 63 operations signed in 2025 for
a total amount of around EUR 1.4 billion.
Under the EFSD+ EIB-dedicated investment windows in INTPA regions, 30 operations were signed in
2025 for a total loan amount of EUR 2.1 billion.
Altogether, in 2025, the EFSD+ INTPA Blending Operational Boards issued a positive opinion for a total
EU contribution of EUR 726 million (including fees) through 38 blending operations. These in turn are
expected to leverage around EUR 13 billion in additional public and private financing.
Under the EFSD+ EIB-dedicated investment windows in ENEST regions, 11 operations were signed in
2025 for a total loan amount slightly above EUR 1 billion. This adds up to a total loan amount of
approximately EUR 4 billion under EFSD+ for investment windows 1 and 2 so far which is expected to
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mobilise investments of around EUR 15 billion. Support provided by guarantees is complemented by
blending projects, which are expected to generate around EUR 514 million in investment.
Under the EFSD+ EIB-dedicated investment windows, in MENA regions, five new operations and three
tranches of existing operations were signed in 2025 for a total loan amount of EUR 1.3 billion. This
adds up to a total loan amount of EUR 4.2 billion under EFSD+ for investment windows 1 and 2 so far,
which is expected to mobilise EUR 15 billion. Support provided by guarantees is complemented by
blending, which is expected to generate around EUR 1.5 billion in investment.
In addition, the dedicated EFSD+ investment window 2 with EIB was signed in July 2025 for an amount
of EUR 5 billion which will support investments undertaken by commercial sub-sovereign
counterparts. Across the EFSD and the EFSD+, 51 guarantee agreements worth a total of EUR 7.7
billion were under management, significantly reinforcing the EU’s capacity to support socio-economic
development and crowd in private investment in partner countries. The EU also simplified the
investment framework by streamlining blending procedures, consolidating multiple guarantee
agreements with the same institution and proposing to adjust regulatory reporting requirements,
including by reallocating surpluses from the legacy EFSD to the EFSD+.
These instruments were complemented in 2025 by the gradual implementation of the Global Green
Bond Initiative (GGBI), which helped to deepen partner countries’ sustainable finance architecture
and expand the pool of eligible climate-aligned investments under Global Gateway. The initiative
supported the preparation of high-quality green bond issuance frameworks, improving transparency
through strict use-of-proceeds requirements, alignment with the GGBI green eligibility criteria, and
better impact reporting and verification mechanisms. This facilitated greater interoperability for EU
and international investors, thereby improving the scalability and financial leverage of Global Gateway
investments.
The EU has also supported stronger engagement with civil society in INTPA partner countries, where
relevant. This has included stronger capacity-building for civil society organisations at country level
through the Civil Society Thematic Programme. In addition, e-learning tools have been developed,
including a multilingual course on how to respond to calls for proposals, which is available through the
INTPA Academy(19).
Technical assistance, knowledge hubs and institution-building tools, such as TAIEX and Twinning,
supported regulatory convergence, alignment with the EU acquis, and capacity for planning and
implementing investments. In 2025, TAIEX was strategically re-oriented towards targeted support for
alignment with the EU acquis and Reform Agendas, with 576 interventions delivered for
neighbourhood and enlargement partners, and roadmaps developed for several countries. Foreign
policy facilities and rapid-response and resilience actions under the NDICI–Global Europe
rapid-response pillar complemented longer-term instruments by enabling swift interventions in crises
and fragile contexts, particularly in situations of conflict, forced displacement and climate shocks.
In 2025, the TAIEX programme launched 50 activities in the MENA region, delivering targeted technical
cooperation across a broad range of sectors. These initiatives focus on regulatory alignment, capacity-
building, and institutional strengthening, covering: (i) sustainable energy and environmental practices
(such as renewable energy, the circular economy, and biodiversity conservation); (ii) justice and
governance reforms (including constitutional processes, electoral transparency, and anti-corruption
measures); and (iii) economic and financial stability (encompassing fiscal policy, policies on anti-
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), and trade compliance).
19 https://international-partnerships.learning.europa.eu/
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Additional priorities include digital transformation, food safety and agricultural innovation, labour
protection, and statistical and analytical capacity-building. Collectively, these efforts boost
institutional resilience, build up technical expertise and ensure alignment with international
standards.
2.10. Mobilisation of the NDICI−Global Europe cushion
In 2025, the European Commission mobilised EUR 871 million of NDICI−Global Europe’s emerging
challenges and priorities cushion. This amounted to 70% of the budget commitment appropriations
for 2025, and 63% of the available commitment appropriations, taking into account the amount of the
cushion carried over from 2024 to 2025.
As in previous years, the cushion was mobilised to support Syrian refugees in Türkiye, with an amount
of EUR 423 million, made available by redeploying availabilities freed up within the NDICI cushion
following revision of the multiannual financial framework. In addition, EUR 60 million was mobilised
to ensure EU support for the political transition in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime.
To deliver on the Global Gateway strategy, EUR 250 million was made available to the EIB to scale up
investments in partner countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Asia and the Pacific.
The cushion also contributed to the EU pledge of EUR 65 million in the context of to the seventh
replenishment of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria for the period 2023-2025.
In the context of the Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience agreed with
the Republic of Moldova, EUR 23 million was mobilised for the provision of short-term support in
response to the energy crisis in the country.
As provided for in Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council(20), the EU
Secure Connectivity programme received a contribution from the cushion of EUR 50 million through
the annual budgetary procedure.
20 OJ L 79, 17.3.2023, pp. 1–39, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/588/oj/eng
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3. Thematic overview
Working together towards the SDGs and results achieved with EU support
In 2025, the EU remained committed to keeping the 2030 Agenda and the 17 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) at the heart of its external action. Implementing and achieving the SDGs is
a cross-cutting ambition of the European Commission: the College of Commissioners is collectively
responsible for progress.
EU external action contributed to advancing sustainable development in partner countries, supporting
climate and environmental action, sustainable and inclusive growth, digital transformation, human
development, good governance, peace and respect for human rights.
The Global Gateway strategy, implemented through a “Team Europe” approach, is at the heart of this
effort. Its large-scale transformative projects advance multiple SDGs simultaneously, spanning
renewable energy, sustainable transport, digital connectivity, food systems and health.
Performance and accountability were underpinned by the Global Europe Results Framework and the
EU Results Framework, which structure how outputs and outcomes are measured and reported. This
systematic results-based culture, together with strong internal control and risk-based assurance,
enables the EU to demonstrate how its external action helps partner countries make tangible progress
towards the SDGs.
3.1. Delivery on the spending targets
In 2025, the EU continued to deliver on the targets set under NDICI–Global Europe and related policy
commitments.
Over 2021-2025:
- 98% of NDICI–Global Europe commitments were eligible as Official Development
Assistance and the Commission expects to reach the target of at least 93% over 2021-
2027.
- 26% of total commitments under NDICI–Global Europe contributed to climate
objectives. The positive trend observed since 2021 continued in 2025, with NDICI–
Global Europe annual contribution to climate objectives raising to 28% in 2025.
Although this demonstrates an improvement in the performance over the years, further
efforts are required to meet the 30% target over 2021-2027.
- 30% of ODA-eligible commitments were dedicated to social inclusion and human
development, slightly decreasing from 32% over 2021-2024. This remains in line with
the positive trajectory observed since 2021 and should allow the Commission to achieve
the 20% target over 2021-2027.
- 17% of the amounts of all adopted actions under NDICI–Global Europe contributed to
support migration management and address forced displacement. If sustained, the
current trajectory will result in the Commission exceeding the target of indicatively 10%
over 2021-2027.
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- 24% of the amounts of all adopted actions from the geographic programmes
contributed to human rights, democracy and good governance and 65% to inclusive and
sustainable growth for human development. The Commission is therefore well on track
to achieve the targets set in the delegated act supplementing the NDICI–Global Europe
regulation, of respectively 15% and 45%.
As regards the multiannual financial framework (MFF) target on biodiversity(21), after reaching a
record high of 11% in 2024, the annual contribution of NDICI–Global Europe to biodiversity
decreased to 8% in 2025. While this still represents a significant increase compared to the 5%
contribution in 2021, efforts will need to be sustained to significantly contribute to the MFF target
in 2026 and 2027. As regards IPA III, the annual contribution to biodiversity stood at 4% in 2025.
On gender equality, in line with the third Gender Action Plan III 2021-2027, the EU maintained high
levels of gender-responsive actions. Over 2021-2025, 83% of adopted actions under NDICI–Global
Europe had gender as a principal or significant objective, with 4% of those actions having gender
equality and women’s and girls’ rights and empowerment as a principal objective. While these
figures demonstrate progress in terms of gender mainstreaming in the implementation of NDICI–
Global Europe, further efforts will be required to secure the achievement of both targets over 2021-
2027.
Finally, in 2025, actions under the responsibility of the Commissioner for International Partnerships
continued to deliver on education, with 13% of commitments dedicated to this political priority (12%
over 2021-2025).
3.2. Human development
3.2.1. SDG 1 – Reduced poverty
Figure 2. SDG 1 – interlinkages with other goals
Figure 2 above shows the main synergies between SDG 1 and a broad range of other significant SDGs
(numbers on the right), notably SDG 5 on gender equality, SDG 10 on reduced inequalities and SDG 16
on peace, justice and strong institutions.
21 See Recital (49) of NDICI-Global Europe and Recital (25) of IPA III regulations.
36
In 2025, the EU continued to place poverty eradication at the heart of its external action, in line with
Article 208 TFEU and the 2030 Agenda. Global trends remained challenging: around 10.3% of the
world’s population (nearly 800 million people) still lives below the extreme poverty line of USD 3 per
day. At the same time, inequalities are widening both within and between countries. Progress on
global human development has slowed to its weakest pace in 35 years (excluding crisis years)(22).
Furthermore, while global social protection coverage reached a historic milestone of more than 50%
of the global population in 2024, almost four billion people (including nearly two billion children) still
lack access to any form of social protection(23).
In 2025, the Commission took part in major global events that strengthened the EU’s commitment to
poverty reduction. These included the FfD4 Sevilla Commitment(24), which stressed sustainable
financing and reforms to support development, and the Second World Summit for Social
Development, whose Political Declaration(25) reaffirmed that poverty eradication, decent work, and
social integration are key pillars of social development.
The Commission has translated these political commitments into concrete resource allocations.
Between 2021 and 2024, 8.1% of EU-financed Official Development Assistance (ODA) (over EUR 26.6
billion) directly supported SDG 1 on eradicating poverty, as part of the wider scope of EU-financed
ODA, where all SDGs are enablers of poverty reduction. Taking a multidimensional view of poverty,
the Commission is on track to meet the NDICI−Global Europe target of allocating at least 20% of ODA
to social inclusion and human development in 2021-2027. By 2025, 30% of EU ODA had been directed
to areas such as healthcare, education and training, nutrition, water and sanitation, decent work, and
universal social protection.
In 2025, Global Gateway investments and performance-based facilities further improved poverty
reduction outcomes by supporting public services, SME development and decent work. The Ukraine
Facility, the Western Balkans Facility and the Moldova Facility disbursed assistance to maintain
macroeconomic stability, protect basic state functions and create fiscal space for social spending and
public services. In the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood, the EU supported SMEs and jobs creation
through the EU4Business and SANAD Fund, with a strong focus on women, young people and rural
clients. In fragile and conflict-affected settings such as Yemen and the Lake Chad Basin, EU
programmes restored public services for millions, supported livelihoods and strengthened resilience
to shocks, thereby contributing to SDG 1.5 on reducing vulnerability and building resilience.
Addressing poverty and supporting inclusive transitions on several continents is an important area of
engagement for EU Member States. The Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on jobs through trade and
investment in the Middle East and North Africa promotes job creation, skills development,
entrepreneurship, and women’s and young people’s economic empowerment. Other relevant
examples are the TEI on inclusive societies in Latin America and the Caribbean and the TEI on social
protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Alongside efforts to boost the income-generating potential of
investments, social protection remains a critical policy instrument for eradicating poverty. The EU
continues to support the strengthening of national social protection systems across 35 countries. In
2025, the EU-funded Digital Convergence Initiative(26) entered its full implementation phase, launching
22 https://www.undp.org/eurasia/press-releases/human-development-report-2025 23 https://www.ilo.org/resource/article/world-social-protection-report-2024-26-figures 24 https://financing.desa.un.org/post-news/ffd4-outcome-document-sevilla-commitment-compromiso-de-sevilla-adopted 25 https://social.desa.un.org/world-summit-2025/documents/doha-political-declaration-agreed-text-090525 26 https://spdci.org/
37
operations in 18 countries and setting up a larger global HelpDesk and an Artificial Intelligence Hub to
advance interoperability across social policy systems.
The Commission has also placed increased emphasis on monitoring the impact of actions in areas that
underpin poverty reduction. For instance, through the Inequality Marker (I-Marker) developed to
assess how EU interventions benefit the poorest 40% of the population and the most vulnerable
groups (for more details see section 3.2.7). Through the STRENGTHEN programme(27) implemented
with the International Labour Organization, the Commission is also performing employment impact
assessments − a key driver of higher incomes and poverty reduction.
3.2.2. SDG 2 – Zero hunger
In 2025, ending hunger, achieving food security and improved nutrition and promoting sustainable
agriculture remained central objectives of EU external action. The resilience of global food systems
was further strained by conflict, climate shocks and trade uncertainty, and in many fragile contexts
across the globe hunger levels rose. Acute food insecurity reached a record level of 22.9%, affecting
over 266 million people in 47 countries and territories. For the first time since the Integrated Food
Security Phase Classification (IPC) system was created, famine was confirmed simultaneously in two
areas: Gaza and Sudan. The situations of greatest concern were registered in Sudan, Gaza, South
Sudan, Haiti, Mali and Yemen.
The EU responded by combining humanitarian assistance and longer-term investments in sustainable
and resilient agrifood systems. In 2025, humanitarian efforts to counter the global food crisis included
around EUR 600 million in food and nutrition assistance from a humanitarian aid budget of
EUR 2.56 billion, including major allocations to crises such as Gaza/occupied Palestinian territory,
Sudan and the regional dimensions of the Sudan crisis, Yemen, the Central Sahel and the Horn of
Africa. In Gaza and Sudan, substantial EU-funded operations, including humanitarian airbridges and
logistics support via ReliefEU, helped deliver life-saving food and nutrition supplies despite severe
access constraints. The EU also updated its Humanitarian Food and Livelihood Assistance (HFLA) Policy
and continued integrating nutrition services into basic healthcare in line with World Health
Organization (WHO) guidance on malnutrition and wasting.
Through NDICI−Global Europe, the EU stepped up support for sustainable agrifood systems. In 2025,
actions such as DESIRA+ promoted the use of “forgotten crops”, improved soils and achieved better
access to local and regional markets, while integrating agroforestry approaches in cocoa, coffee and
cashew value chains. The EU also boosted public and private investment flows towards sustainable
and resilient agrifood systems and scaled up support for trade in deforestation-free products under a
Team Europe Initiative on deforestation-free value chains in over 26 producing countries in Africa,
Latin America and Asia.
The EU launched the New Aquatic Value Chains (NAVAC) programme, funded by the EU and
implemented by the FAO, in collaboration with the Technical University of Denmark (DTU). The
programme aims to increase the availability of nutritious and safe aquatic foods for vulnerable
populations, while strengthening local economies through innovation in aquatic value chains. The
NAVAC programme builds on the extensive experience in value chain analysis, including examples such
as the FISH4ACP programme, which focused on enhancing the productivity and competitiveness of
27 https://www.ilo.org/projects-and-partnerships/projects/strengthening-impact-employment-sector-and-trade-policies- strengthen
38
aquatic value chains in 12 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, ensuring that economic
improvements go hand in hand with environmental sustainability and social inclusiveness.
Global Gateway investments played a growing role in supporting food systems by financing
infrastructure and innovation, including irrigation systems in Somalia, the modernisation of the
Douala-N’Djamena corridor, and agricultural value chains along the Lobito Corridor, in order to
improve productivity, connectivity and market access for farmers. New approaches to diversified and
nutrition-sensitive food systems were promoted with the launch of the “New Aquatic Food Value
Chains for Sustainable Healthy Diets in Fragile Contexts” programme, which encourages sustainable
use of a wider range of aquatic species, reduces pressure on overexploited stocks, and supports food
systems that value ecosystem diversity.
The EU has continued to support Yemen’s economic resilience through the “Strengthening
Institutional and Economic Resilience” project. The project is helping to establish export centres to
improve market access and ensure long-term sustainability in key sectors such as fisheries, agriculture
and apiculture, thereby sustain thousands of livelihoods.
At multilateral level, the EU and its Member States reaffirmed their leadership on food security and
nutrition, notably at the Nutrition for Growth Summit in Paris in March 2025, where Team Europe
renewed its commitment to tackling the global malnutrition crisis. Overall, in 2025 the EU’s combined
humanitarian and development interventions continued to address hunger while investing in
sustainable, climate-resilient and inclusive agrifood systems, thereby underpinning the EU’s
contribution to SDG 2.
Almost 23 million women and children under the age of five benefited from EU-supported nutrition
programmes under the previous multiannual financial framework (MFF 2014-2020). As results under
the current MFF are only beginning to materialise for projects launched between 2022 and 2024,
under the current MFF 2021-2027, more than 200 000 women and children have benefited(28).
Roughly 24 million food‑insecure people received EU assistance under the previous
MFF, as did an additional 200 000 under the current MFF(29).
EU‑supported interventions reached almost 23 million smallholders under the previous
MFF. Under the current MFF, more than 250 000 smallholders have been reached so
far(30).
Nearly 4.8 million hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems were placed under sustainable
management practices with EU support under the previous MFF(31).
28 For methodological reasons, results under the current MFF 2021-2027 cannot be aggregated with those under the previous MFF (2014-2020). Results for the previous MFF are nevertheless presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Results for the previous MFF (2014-2020) are presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025.
39
3.2.3. SDG 3 – Good health and well-being
Figure 3. SDG 3 – interlinkages with other goals
Figure 3 above shows the main synergies between SDG 3 and a broad range of other significant SDGs
(numbers on the right), notably SDG 5 on gender equality, SDG 10 on reduced inequalities, and SDG 16
on peace, justice and strong institutions.
In 2025, in line with the Global Gateway strategy and the EU Global Health Strategy, the EU further
consolidated health as a core pillar of its external action through regional and bilateral programmes
and contributions to key multilateral partners. The focus remained on strengthening health systems
and advancing universal health coverage, including women’s health and sexual and reproductive
rights. In a context marked by cuts to ODA and growing needs in fragile and conflict-affected countries,
the EU remained a reliable and influential partner, supporting human development with a strong
health component through NDICI−Global Europe.
The EU speeded up disbursements under the seventh replenishment of the Global Fund to fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, co-hosted the Gavi High-level Pledging Summit and used its Board role in
Global Health Initiatives, including Gavi and the Pandemic Fund, to mitigate the impact of funding cuts
on partner countries while contributing to strategic debates on governance and effectiveness. The EU
sustained funding for the World Health Organization (WHO), including the Universal Health Coverage
Partnership (UHCP), and launched a reflection process with EU Member States and like-minded
partners to shape its position on the global health architecture and the subsequent process hosted by
the WHO. This served to underline EU leadership in global immunisation efforts and its commitment
to safeguarding essential health services amid fiscal pressures. Local manufacturing of health products
in partner countries remained a priority. The Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines and
Health Technologies (MAV+) Initiative(32) mobilised more than EUR 2 billion in investments, including
guarantee-based transactions with pharmaceutical companies such as Biovac. The initiative also
supported the enabling environment in terms of regulatory strengthening, skills(33) and research. These
investments have contributed to partnerships with EU companies, equitable access to essential health
products, geographic diversification of supply chains and health emergency preparedness.
32 https://global-gateway-forum.ec.europa.eu/news/global-gateway-eu-scales-local-manufacturing-and-access-health- products-africa-advancing-mav-2025-10-10_en 33 https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/library/mav-factsheet-overview-project-annex_en?listing=group_library&refgid=250133
40
Engagement with the African region remained strong in 2025. In early November, the high-level
steering meeting on the AU-EU Health Partnership brought together 15 countries and 11 institutions
from the African continent.
Throughout 2025, the EU maintained meaningful dialogue with civil society, notably through the
Global Health Policy Forum in May. At regional level, the EU supported health system resilience in the
Western Balkans including by advancing all-hazard emergency preparedness, health financing reform
aimed at ensuring universal coverage, and the restoration of immunisation levels following the COVID-
19 pandemic.
Health interventions remained an essential life-saving component of humanitarian aid action, in the
face of growing global needs and a shrinking funding environment. In 2025, the EU allocated around
EUR 400 million to humanitarian health, a record amount. This funding supported health systems
(where possible), and ensured access to basic medical care in emergencies, including epidemic
response, maternal and newborn healthcare, trauma care and mental health and psychosocial
support. It was critical in crises such as Syria, Gaza, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Ukraine, where conflict, attacks on health infrastructure and large-scale
displacement threatened progress towards SDG 3. A further significant achievement in 2025 was the
launch of the new humanitarian health policy guidelines. Humanitarian efforts were complemented
by the work of ReliefEU and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism to address several epidemic
outbreaks, including cholera, Ebola and yellow fever.
Some 35 million women of reproductive age used modern methods of contraception
with EU support under the previous multiannual financial framework (MFF 2014-2020).
Under the current MFF 2021-2027, the figure is 25 million, as results are only beginning
to materialise for projects launched between 2022 and 2024(34).
Around 300 000 children have been fully immunised with EU support under the current MFF.
34 For methodological reasons, results under the current MFF 2021-2027 cannot be aggregated with those under the previous MFF (2014-2020). Results for the previous MFF are nevertheless presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025.
41
3.2.4. SDG 4 – Quality education
Figure 4. SDG 4 – interlinkages with other goals
Figure 4 above shows the main synergies between SDG 4 and a broad range of other significant SDGs
(numbers on the right), notably SDG 5 on gender equality, SDG 8 on decent work and economic
growth, and SDG 10 on reduced inequalities.
The EU further consolidated its role as a leading global supporter of quality education as a human right
and as a driver of sustainable development. Education remained a key priority, with EU investments
continuing at a level which should ensure achievement of the target over 2021-2027. Support reached
more than 70 countries and covered the full education cycle, prioritising system strengthening and
skills for employment.
Under the Global Gateway strategy, education and skills were defined as the key to ensuring that
investments in digital, green and sustainable infrastructure translate into decent jobs and inclusive
growth. The Opportunity-driven Skills and Vocational Education and Training in Africa and VET Toolbox
II helped align curricula and training offers with labour market needs and concrete employment
opportunities. Six VET projects were rolled out in a number of African countries to support job creation
to match training with employment creation. Regional exchanges on public-private partnerships for
VET were organised in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Namibia.
Erasmus+ contributed to capacity building and skills development beyond Europe (in all regions
covered by this report). This was done through capacity building projects in the field of Higher
Education, Vocational Education and Training and informal education (youth), for an amount of EUR
177.1 million in 2025. In addition, the programme financed scholarships for higher education staff and
students amounting to EUR 260.9 million.
In the Enlargement region and the Eastern Neighbourhood, education and skills featured prominently,
with the performance-based facilities specific sections to skills. Under the Western Balkans Reform
and Growth Facility, Albania completed a reform step in the area of social capital by introducing
diversified active labour market policies targeting jobseekers and the long-term unemployed. In the
Eastern Neighbourhood, the “Supporting Education Reforms in the Eastern Partnership region” action
promoted education reforms of the governance and financing of education systems, improving their
equity, gender equality, quality and performance. The newly launched Mediterranean University
under the Pact for the Mediterranean aims to boost regional university cooperation and make the
Mediterranean a hub for transnational higher education and research.
42
The Regional Teachers’ Initiative for Africa was rolled out in 27 Sub-Saharan African countries,
providing technical assistance for policy reforms in 14 countries. It also piloted professional
development models across 14 projects in 12 countries and generated evidence for better teacher
governance through six Africa-Europe research partnerships. These investments helped strengthen
the quality and inclusiveness of basic education systems, including in fragile areas, and complemented
support provided through the Global Partnership for Education and the Education Cannot Wait, which
together reached millions of children.
Education in emergencies was further strengthened against a backdrop of decreasing humanitarian
funding and increasing violations of children’s rights in conflicts. Education is a lifeline for more than
234 million children and young people affected by crisis worldwide. The EU upheld its commitment to
dedicate 10% of the initial annual humanitarian aid budget to education in emergencies. In 2025,
funding exceeded EUR 180 million. Protection remained a key priority, with about 15% of the
humanitarian financial allocation going towards protection activities, reflecting the growing number
of grave violations against children in armed conflicts.
The participation and empowerment of young people were further integrated into education and skills
initiatives. Young people provided advice on policies and programmes in more than 50 countries, and
European Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela held a Global Gateway Policy
dialogue, ensuring that young people’s perspectives inform the design of education and skills
interventions. Education support was also increasingly aligned with the gender equality objectives of
the EU Gender Action Plan as per an evaluation, which called for transformative impact for women
and girls in key sectors.
Around 2.9 million primary- and secondary-school pupils have been enrolled in
education with EU support under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF).
3.2.5. SDG 5 – Gender equality
Figure 5. SDG 5 – interlinkages with other goals
Figure 5 above shows the main synergies between SDG 5 and a broad range of other significant SDGs
(numbers on the right), notably SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth, SDG 10 on reduced
inequalities, and SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions.
43
In 2025, the EU continued to play a major role in promoting gender equality worldwide. The EU
systematically integrated gender equality objectives in its portfolio. The share of actions with gender
equality as a significant or principal policy objective increased from 68% in 2020 to about 79% in 2021-
2025. For NDICI−Global Europe, between 2021 and 2025, the share was 83%, and of those, 4% have
gender equality as their principal target. The EU also extended the use of gender and inequality
markers to EFSD+ operations.
The EU also promoted women’s economic empowerment through various actions, in North
Macedonia, for example, the EU4Gender Equality programme supported women’s participation in the
STEM and digital sectors, while the Team Europe Initiative on women in public ICT and services
promoted women’s leadership in the digital transformation.
Gender equality objectives were integrated in support for universal health coverage with a focus on
women’s health and local manufacturing of health products in partner countries.
In fragile and conflict affected settings, the EU worked closely with women’s organisations and youth
organisations to build resilience, promote peace and safeguard civic space. EU support for the Global
Survivors Fund secured reparations for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence and drove national
policy breakthroughs, such as Ukraine’s world-first wartime reparation law, and strengthened the
global reparations ecosystem. In politically constrained environments, the EU maintained the space
necessary to continue advocating for human rights, including women’s and girls’ rights. This included
a new flagship programme for Afghanistan applying a “for women, by women” approach to basic
needs and livelihoods (EUR 83 million).
The EU established new partnerships to eradicate gender-based violence, mainly through the second
phase of the Spotlight Initiative. New programmes were launched in Ecuador, Uganda, Sierra Leone
and Liberia. In March 2025, the African Union, the UN, and the EU signed a declaration of intent on a
second phase of the Spotlight Initiative Africa Regional Programme. Across the Eastern Partnership
countries, the EU 4 Gender Equality programme supported the prevention of gender-based violence.
In Ukraine, the EU provided psychosocial support services. The ACT programme promoted the
priorities of women’s rights organisations in the preparation of standards and policy frameworks to
prevent and respond to violence against women and girls. To strengthen prevention mechanisms, the
regional programme EU 4 Social Inclusion in the Western Balkans and Türkiye boosted the data
collection capacities of national institutions regarding violence against women.
In 2025, the EU increased its funding for sexual and reproductive health and gender-based violence
response to EUR 114 million, from a previous average of EUR 70 million per year. Around 15% of the
EU humanitarian financial allocation went towards protection interventions that provided holistic
support to survivors, combining medical care, psychosocial assistance and emergency livelihoods.
Approximately 20 milllion people benefited from EU‑funded programmes to counter
sexual and gender‑based violence under the previous multiannual financial framework
(MFF) (35).
35 Results for the previous MFF (2014-2020) are presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025.
44
3.2.6. SDG 6 – Clean water and sanitation
The world remains off-track to achieve SDG 6. In 2024, 2.1 billion people still lacked access to safely
managed drinking water, and almost half of the global population lacked access to safely managed
sanitation. Against this backdrop, the EU continued to scale up support for sustainable water and
sanitation in line with the European Water Resilience Strategy(36) adopted in 2025, including through
long-term investments under the Global Gateway and humanitarian assistance in crises.
In 2025, the EU continued to deliver on its commitment under the Water Action Agenda (WAA) to
support access to an improved drinking water source and/or a sanitation facility for 70 million people.
Global Gateway investments and activities related to access to water, sanitation and hygiene were
implemented in around 50 countries, with the private sector mobilized to extend this further. The
Climate Investor 2 – financing water, sanitation and oceans infrastructure in emerging markets –
surpassed its final close target with USD 1.065 billion mobilized thanks to a EUR 205 million EFSD+
guarantee from the EU, making it the largest climate adaptation infrastructure fund focused on
emerging markets globally. It had nine projects under construction or in operation, including in Viet
Nam, the Philippines and South Africa, and 27 projects under development in 2025. Further blending
operations and guarantees were developed or deployed in Kenya, Tanzania, Ecuador, Brazil, the
Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea and India to expand access for underserved
communities.
In the Mediterranean and Gulf regions, the EU continued its long-standing commitment to managing
scarce water resources. It began designing a regional project to support peer-to-peer exchanges
among basin organisations and integrate earth observation into water management, in line with the
Union for the Mediterranean water agenda. In Jordan, the EU supported sustainable water
management to address structural water scarcity, with the Aqaba-Amman Water Desalination and
Conveyance project, which is a Team Europe flagship initiative.
The EU also made progress on its WAA commitment to improve transboundary cooperation. Through
policy outreach and Team Europe initiatives on transboundary water management in Africa and
Central Asia, the EU helped extend the global reach of the Water Convention, developed three
regional projects and launched a peer-to-peer programme for water basin management.
The EU continued supporting multilateralism on water, contributing to the implementation of the UN
System-Wide Strategy for Water and Sanitation and to the preparations for the 2026 UN Water
Conference.
Humanitarian water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions remained essential in emergencies.
The EU intensified its efforts to promot access to WASH services during humanitarian crises.
Environmental considerations were integrated into WASH-related interventions, while the human
right to water and sanitation remained a priority thanks to the implementation of the EU human rights
guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation. In Yemen, where years of conflict have devastated
basic services, EU humanitarian aid – including via the EU Humanitarian Air Bridge (EUHAB) – delivered
critical medical and WASH supplies to populations facing severe food insecurity and high levels of
malnutrition, partly driven by unsafe water and poor sanitation. In Venezuela, EU funding totalling
over EUR 52 million helped sustain access to clean water and health services in an otherwise severely
underfunded response.
36 COM(2025) 280 ; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0280
45
23 million people had gained access to improved drinking water sources and/or
sanitation facilities with EU support under the previous multiannual financial
framework (MFF 2014-2020). To the end of 2025, 5.3 million people had gained access,
as results under the current MFF 2021-2027 are only beginning to materialise for
projects launched between 2022 and 2024 (37).
3.2.7. SDG 10 – Reduced inequalities
Reducing inequalities is one of the defining challenges of our time. Given how inequalities intersect
with all dimensions of sustainable development, the EU continued building a multifaceted response,
anchored in its Global Gateway strategy.
The Global Gateway strategy contributes to addressing inequalities by mobilising public and private
investments in priority sectors − health, education and research, digital, energy and transport − where
investment can create decent work, expand access to essential services and connect underserved
communities. This is reinforced by a 360-degree approach, through which the enabling environment
is built around each investment, encompassing regulation, human rights (including labour rights),
progressive fiscal policies, social protection, skills development, gender equality, respect for
environmental, social and governance standards, and encouraging partnership with civil society and
local authorities. Through the Team Europe equality flagship projects, the EU is tackling inequality
where it represents both a significant challenge and a political priority. From digitalisation in Kenya to
decent work in Bangladesh, these initiatives are delivering transformational change. This logic has also
been extended to fragile contexts, where the risk of exclusion is greatest: Global Gateway flagship
projects are currently being implemented in more than half of the world's fragile countries (41 out of
61), including 10 classified as highly or extremely fragile.
In 2025, the EU continued to implement concrete policy measures and programmes to drive inequality
reduction. The Gender Action Plan III advances the full, equal and meaningful participation of all
women and girls, while the human rights-based approach keeps rights holders at the very heartof EU
cooperation. With the first-ever Youth Action Plan in external action, the EU is empowering young
people to lead global change by engaging, equipping and connecting the next generation. In 2025, the
EU reaffirmed its commitment to disability inclusion in external action by joining the Amman-Berlin
Global Disability Summit Declaration. The EU achieved disability inclusion in 38.1% of its new actions
funded under the NDICI and 38% of its new actions funded under the IPA III instrument between 2021
and 2024, as measured by the OECD Disability Marker.
The Inequality Marker is both a benchmarking and a policy tool, which ensures that inequality
reduction is assessed systematically across all of the Commission’s Dirctorate-General for
International Partnerships (DG INTPA) funded actions, including Global Gateway priorities. Since June
2025, its application has been extended to EFSD+ operations (starting with blending). 62% of new DG
INTPA actions committed in 2024 contribute to reducing inequalities, up from 59% in 2023. The
Distributional Impact Assessment tool, already applied in Paraguay, Djibouti, Bhutan, Madagascar,
37 For methodological reasons, results under the current MFF 2021-2027 cannot be aggregated with those under the previous MFF (2014-2020). Results for the previous MFF are nevertheless presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025.
46
Benin and Uganda, complements the Inequality Marker by providing a rigorous econometric
methodology to verify whether interventions effectively reach the bottom poorest 40% of the
population.
3.2.8. Other major achievements
Delivering on the Youth Action Plan in external action included rolling out Youth Sounding Boards in
more than 50 EU Delegations and in Brussels HQ.
The EU has supported youth inclusion in various regional dialogue processes. These dialogues have
highlighted Global Gateway’s potential to empower young people by creating opportunities through
investments in skills, decent jobs and inclusion.
The Youth Empowerment Fund supported young people by providing accessible, low-barrier funding
for approximately 1 900 initiatives led by young people in their communities. The Africa-Europe Youth
Academy expanded learning opportunities and exchanges for young people seeking to strengthen
their leadership skills and build networks.
Youth initiatives in the Mediterranean supported political participation, media skills, civic leadership
and active citizenship through programmes such as Mediterranean Youth in Action, EU Media
Connect, EU Jeel Connect and the Young Civil Society Leadership Programme. In 2025, EU Jeel
Connect’s 440 members delivered 61 initiatives, reaching over 5 000 people.
Youth also played a key role in Africa-Europe Partnerships for Culture, which connected artists and
cultural networks across Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region. Programmes such as Halaqat
and Ecologies of Culture supported exchanges, cultural networks and Arab cultural actors, while the
Olive Branch film award promoted shared values at the Cinemamed festival in Brussels.
In 2025, the EU adopted its Pact for the Mediterranean, setting out the policy framework to support
youth empowerment and highlight cultural sites as drivers of economic growth, social inclusion, and
regional revitalisation through cross-sector cooperation, sustainable heritage management, and anti-
trafficking efforts. Actions to implement the Pact are being launched in 2026.
Under thematic programmes (CSO and HRD), the entire 2024 budget allocated to MENA countries
(EUR 24 064 580.24) has been contracted to the benefit of civil society organisations. Under bilateral
programmes, EU countries’ road maps for engagement with civil society set out priority areas for
support and dialogue. A survey has been launched to map needs in terms of updating and design.
Under the regional programming, the decision action “Safeguard of basic rights and democratic
governance in the Southern Neighbourhood for 2025-2027” (EUR 73.7 million) has been adopted. The
initiative combines support to the regional civil society facility, support to civil society in Morocco and
Tunisia, and contributions to the European Public Integrity Foundation (EUPI) (Middle East Peace
process) and the European endowment for democracy.
Civil society organisations were also consulted during the drafting of the Pact and the EU civil society
strategy.
3.3. Green Deal
3.3.1. SDG 7 – Affordable and clean energy
In 2025, the EU continued to contribut to SDG 7 in its external action, focusing on renewable energy
generation, energy efficiency and regional energy connectivity, in line with the European Green Deal
and the Global Gateway strategy.
47
In Africa, the implementation of the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative progressed. EU investments
supported solar, hydro and wind power projects alongside transmission and distribution
infrastructure, which improved access to clean electricity for households and businesses and reduce
reliance on fossil fuels. Progress was also made on energy efficiency, clean cooking, green hydrogen
and derivatives. In addition, President von der Leyen reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to SDG 7 in
Africa by co-launching the “Scaling up Renewables in Africa” campaign which ran from November 2024
to November 2025 and raised EUR 15.5 billion, including over EUR 15.1 billion in pledges from the EU.
In the Middle East and North Africa, the EU continued to support regulatory reforms and investments
in the decarbonisation of industrial sectors and energy efficiency in buildings. Stakeholders were also
consulted on the development of the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean Tech
Initiative (T-MED), a flagship initiative under the Pact for the Mediterranean.
In the Enlargement region and the Eastern Neighbourhood, the EU supported partners' clean energy
transition and integration into the European market. Ukraine introduced a market-based framework
for renewable energy under the Ukraine Facility, while the Republic of Moldova advanced open and
competitive electricity and gas markets under the Reform and Growth Facility. Under the Eastern
Partnership, the EU4Energy programme continued to support alignment with the EU energy acquis,
fostering greater use of renewables, energy efficiency and regional energy security.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, progress was made on Global Gateway regional initiatives on
electricity integration, including the Peru-Ecuador interconnection and the EUR 1 billion EIB lending
facility for the Central American electricity market. Euroclima continued to promote electricity
integration, green hydrogen and other clean energy solutions.
In Asia and the Pacific, the EU progress was made on on the Global Gateway flagship initiative on
Energy Connectivity in South Asia, the ASEAN Power Grid and the Just Energy Transition Partnerships
with Indonesia and Viet Nam. It also worked on green decarbonisation with India, paving the way for
further bilateral cooperation.
All these investments were underpinned by NDICI–Global Europe. Budgetary guarantees and blending
operations under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) were critical to
de-risking private investment in relation to SDG 7. In 2025, 7 EFSD+ guarantees (EUR 1.4 billion)
exclusively supported energy, while about 10 others had energy as a component.
Humanitarian funds complemented these efforts. In Ukraine, the EU supported repairs to damaged
energy infrastructure, including through the delivery of transformers and generators, to maintain
electricity, heating and basic services during winter and while attacks were ongoing. As part of the
greening of humanitarian aid, the EU also supported clean energy in its responses, including solarised
WASH, health or education infrastructure, and implemented innovation projects worth EUR 2.25
million. These focused on access to renewable energy in displacement contexts, through public-
private partnerships, and capacity building for humanitarian organisations. A EUR 1 million of
investment is expected to leverage EUR 5 million for clean energy projects in humanitarian contexts.
3.3.2. SDG 11 – Sustainable cities and communities
In 2025, the EU further strengthened its contribution to SDG 11 by promoting sustainable, resilient
and inclusive urban development as a key pillar of its external action. Cities are recognised as drivers
of economic development and innovation, while being on the front line of climate change,
environmental degradation, social inequalities and the absorption of forced displacement. This is the
case particularly in low- and middle-income countries, where urbanisation continues at high speed.
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Building on earlier work, the EU intensified its support for sustainable cities’ investments in
sustainable and accessible urban mobility and efficient waste management solutions. Under the
Global Gateway strategy, transport investments increasingly looked at “urban nodes” to improve
connectivity, tackle congestion and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and mirror the EU internal
corridor-approach (TEN-T). The MobiliseYourCity partnership, in particular, promoted sustainable
urban mobility plans and supported cities around the globe in delivering urban mobility solutions. In
Latin America and the Caribbean, the EU worked on preparing investments in clean buses and railways
in Costa Rica and Panama, railways and metro lines in Colombia and Mexico and cable-cars in several
cities across the region. The aim was to help decarbonise urban transport, promote European
excellence and good practices and improve access to jobs and services for urban populations.
The EU also launched a call for proposals under the Early-Stage Investment Mechanism (ESIM) with
the aim of getting the EU private sector to support the first phases of innovative and sustainable urban
development projects and bridge the urban investment gap.
The EU continued to promote greener cities and circular and resource-efficient urban economies,
which included work on solid waste management. Investments in sustainable and inclusive WASH
programmes, including Climate Investor 2 projects in the Philippines, Viet Nam and Mexico, and
blending operations in Pakistan, Benin, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, helped expand basic
services that are essential for safe and resilient cities.
Disaster risk reduction and climate resilience remained central to work on cities and communities.
Humanitarian and civil protection tools responded to large-scale urban crises, including in Ukraine and
Gaza, where conflict caused widespread destruction of housing and critical urban infrastructure and
massive displacement of people. Urban preparedness is a key focus area for the EU, as demonstrated
through its investment in Malawi (in collaboration with the UNDP) and Zimbabwe (in partnership with
international organisations to strengthen resilience in rapidly urbanising yet fragile contexts).
Partnerships with local authorities and city networks remained crucial. The EU continued city-to-city
cooperation with initiatives such as the 2025 Cities and Regions Forum on “Localising the Global
Gateway”, and others under the international urban and regional cooperation programme. The
implementation of the fourth phase (2025-2029) of the Covenant of Mayors for Sub-Saharan Africa
reinforced the role of African cities and regions as key partners in sustainable and inclusive urban
development. In the Eastern Partnership, the EU launched the third phase of its flagship initiative
“Mayors for Economic Growth” (with the support of the UNDP), which empowers cities and towns in
Armenia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to address rural depopulation, job creation, climate
change and the digital transition, with a sharper focus on local economic development planning and
access to finance.
3.3.3. SDG 12 – Responsible consumption and production
In 2025, the EU strengthened its contribution to SDG 12 by promoting sustainable consumption and
production (SCP) and the circular economy as pathways to clean economies, in line with the European
Green Deal, the Global Gateway strategy and the Clean Industrial Deal. The focus shifted from policy
dialogue to reforms, partnerships and investments that help partner countries reduce resource
pressures, create quality jobs and strengthen value chains, while enabling resilient economic relations
with the EU.
Circular economy and SCP support was scaled up across international partnerships. Building on
achievements in 2024, when over 100 countries benefited from EU support, actions helped partners
translate Green Deal-related objectives and market requirements into policy reform, green business
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development, eco-innovation, skills development, supply chain management and investment
preparation. Global, regional and national programmes extended to more than 120 partner countries.
The EU contributed to processes, such as the World Circular Economy Forum, the Global Alliance on
Circular Economy and Resource Efficiency, the Africa Circular Economy Alliance and the LAC Coalition
on Circular Economy. In Africa, the EU supported the launch of the Continental Circular Economy
Action Plan for Africa 2024-2034, a roadmap to resource-efficient and inclusive green growth. Flagship
programmes, including the SWITCH programmes in Asia, the Mediterranean and Eastern and Southern
Africa, AL-INVEST Verde and EU4Environment, supported circular value chains, eco-innovation and
green SMEs. The EU Circular Economy Resource Centre strengthened peer-to-peer partnerships
between the EU and various actors in partner countries.
The EU stepped up action on sustainable and deforestation-free value chains. Through DESIRA+ and
related agrifood programmes, it supported value chains in cocoa, coffee, cashew and “forgotten
crops”, linking smallholders to markets, improving soils and promoting agroforestry. The Team Europe
Initiative on deforestation-free value chains expanded to more than 26 producing countries in Africa,
Latin America and Asia, helping them comply with EU market requirements, reduce deforestation and
forest degradation, and promote traceable and sustainable products. EU Forest Partnerships
improved forest management, reduced deforestation and improved partner countries’ benchmarking
under the EU Deforestation Regulation. Complementary work included the design of the EU Forest
Fund, a blending facility for small private-sector companies developing sustainable and legal forest
value chains, and the mapping of innovative financing instruments in 15 forested countries.
In critical raw materials (CRM), the EU supported sustainable, secure and resilient supply chains,
including projects contributing to the CRM Act’s benchmarks on sourcing, processing, recycling and
diversification. It also operationalised a dedicated CRM facility to connect projects with off-takers and
financiers. Action on sustainable cities promoted investments in sustainable urban mobility and
efficient waste-management solutions, contributing to waste reduction and more circular urban
economies. EU humanitarian action integrated SDG 12 through mandatory minimum environmental
requirements for all EU-funded operations and greener procurement, logistics and programme design.
In 2025, the EU funded three “greening” humanitarian aid innovation projects and endorsed common
donor priority actions for greener humanitarian aid under the Humanitarian Aid Donors’ Declaration
on Climate and Environment.
About 30 000 micro, small and medium-sized enterprises applied sustainable
consumption and production practices with EU support under the previous multiannual
financial framework (MFF 2014-2020). As results under the current MFF are only
beginning to materialise for projects launched between 2022 and 2024, almost 5 000
have done the same with EU support under the current MFF 2021-2027(38).
3.3.4. SDG 13 – Climate action
The EU continued to be a leader in the green transition. Climate action was increasingly embedded
across thematic and geographic portfolios. NDICI−Global Europe remained the main budgetary
framework, guided by the 30% climate spending target. Strengthened by the Global Gateway strategy,
it continued to support the integration of mitigation and adaptation measures into all EU action, to
38 For methodological reasons, results under the current MFF 2021-2027 cannot be aggregated with those under the previous MFF (2014-2020). Results for the previous MFF are nevertheless presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025.
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further the green transition and to leverage private investment in clean value chains in partner
countries, in line with the Paris Agreement.
The latest available data for 2025 show that, over 2021-2025, 26% of the total committed amount
under the NDICI−Global Europe contributed to the climate spending target.
The EU and its Member States play a leading role in international climate finance as the world’s largest
provider of climate finance to developed countries. The EU actively seeks to extend the range and
impact of sources and financial instruments and to mobilise more private finance, as major tools to
support international climate action. For example, EFSD+ guarantees and blending supported climate
investment, including through Climate Investor Funds, with at least 50 mitigation and adaptation
infrastructure projects under way. The EU Sustainable Finance Advisory Hub helped develop green
bond frameworks to mobilise climate-aligned private capital.
The EU continued to pursue its climate and environmental goals, including through EU Climate
Dialogues. An additional EUR 15.1 million was provided in support of the Global Methane Pledge
through the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the International Methane Emissions
Observatory (IMEO) and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC). The Intra-ACP Disaster Risk
Reduction Programme (DRRP) continued to contribute to climate resilience, adaptation and mitigation
actions. The Commission also continued its involvement in the Fund for Responding to Loss and
Damage and supported partner countries in their efforts to strengthen and implement their National
Determined Contributions (NDCs), National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and long-term strategies through
the Green Deal Knowledge Hub.
The TEI on adaptation and resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa turned lessons into action by improving
climate and risk data, strengthening early warning systems, expanding access to climate finance and
developing tailor-made insurance products subject to stronger regulatory frameworks. Under the
initiative, the Space for Early Warning in Africa (SEWA) component of the Africa–EU Space Partnership
was launched to support climate resilience and disaster preparedness.
Through TEIs on transboundary water management in Africa and Central Asia, the EU supported new
regional projects and peer-to-peer cooperation on climate-resilient water governance. Global
initiatives on the circular economy covered more than 120 countries, helping reduce resource use and
greenhouse-gas emissions throughout value chains.
Through the StormWatch initiative in the Caribbean, the EU strengthened its partnership to boost the
region’s ability to respond to climate and extreme weather events by providing European technologies
and expertise. In Argentina, Colombia and Brazil, the EU fostered transatlantic cooperation and
regulatory alignment on green technologies, deforestation and environmental regulation by engaging
with public and private stakeholders. Climate initiatives, such as the Second Mediterranean
Assessment Report (MAR2) and the MeetMED initiative, promoted low-carbon transitions and energy
efficiency in buildings in the Mediterranean region.
In 2025 the EU increased its disaster-preparedness budget line to EUR 81 million.
Rapid-response and resilience budget lines under NDICI−Global Europe funded measures to address
climate-exacerbated fragility, including in the Lake Chad Basin, where resilience programmes
incorporated natural resource management.
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3.3.5. SDG 14 – Life below water
In 2025, at the third UN Ocean Conference, the EU tabled more than 50 voluntary commitments,
worth nearly EUR 1 billion. The Conference helped mobilise the international community around the
urgent need to accelerate ocean action and the development of a regenerative, inclusive and climate-
resilient blue economy. The European Ocean Pact and the Finance in Common Ocean Coalition were
instrumental in this endeavour. However, the implementation of SDG 14 and the ocean-related
targets of the 2030 UN Agenda remained off track, with the ocean continuing to face pressure from
pollution, unsustainable fishing practices, biodiversity loss and climate change. In this context, the EU
further strengthened the ocean as a strategic priority in its external action, supporting ocean
governance, ecosystem conservation and restoration, sustainable blue economy development and
ocean science.
At the multilateral level, the European Commission maintained its precautionary stance on deep-sea
mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction, insisting that activities should not proceed until science
has demonstrated the absence of harmful environmental impacts, as required under the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the necessary provisions in the exploitation regulations
for the effective protection of the marine environment have been put in place. In response to attempts
to circumvent the International Seabed Authority, the EU reaffirmed that UNCLOS sets out the legal
framework within which deepsea mining must be carried out.
The EU continued to promote effective ocean governance through international partnerships and
investments. It enforced measures against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing through
bilateral dialogues, catch-certification schemes and support for regional fisheries management
organisations. To strengthen food security and livelihoods, the EU launched a new Aquatic Food Value
Chains programme (NAVAC – with a budget of EUR 20 million), promoting sustainable aquatic food
systems, resilient value chains and support for women and small-scale producers. The programme
also includes a knowledge hub to help partner countries attract sustainable investments.
The EU launched the first component of the Global Ocean programme, including a technical assistance
facility to help developing countries ratify and implement the Agreement on the conservation and
sustainable use of marine Biodiversity of areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement). The
EU sustained its ocean diplomacy efforts and maintained a high level of commitment towards the swift
ratification and entry into force of the Agreement (that took place in January 2026).
In Africa, the EU launched OPERA (with a budget of EUR 10 million) to strengthen ocean monitoring
and forecasting capacities.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the EU began to roll out two regional ocean programmes and launched two
additional ones, for a total amount of EUR 170 million. These programmes promote international
ocean governance, a sustainable blue economy, and conservation and restoration of marine and
coastal ecosystems. In line with the Global Gateway strategy, the programmes support sustainable
finance and identify investment opportunities in sectors such as aquaculture, port decarbonisation
and blue biotechnology. In the Pacific, the Pacific European Union Marine Partnership (PEUMP) II
programme was launched, with a focus on sustainable fisheries value chains.
Addressing marine pollution remained a priority. EU programmes in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea
region and across the globe supported wastewater treatment, marine litter reduction, environmental
monitoring, circular economy solutions and improved waste management.
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In the Caribbean, through the Global Gateway Sargassum Initiative, the EU stepped up its activities
related to sargassum management by strengthening regional cooperation, promoting investments in
private-sector-led pilot projects and building broad partnerships between governments, development
banks and the private sector to scale up promising solutions across the region.
In 2025, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the EU officially launched the “Future-
ready shipping in Africa” initiative to support the African continent’s transition toward a sustainable,
decarbonised and digitally advanced maritime sector. The initiative is backed by a EUR 5 million pledge
from the EU.
3.3.6. SDG 15 – Life on Land
In 2025, the EU continued to strengthen its contribution to SDG 15 by supporting the conservation,
restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems and biodiversity, with strong
links to SDGs 13, 6, 14 and 5.
The EU increased its focus on nature-positive finance, setting up an EU Forest Fund to support small
private-sector companies in the development of sustainable and legal forest value chains and the
preservation of forest resources. It also began mapping opportunities for innovative nature-related
instruments, such as green bonds, forest funds and environmental taxation in 15 forested countries.
In Peru, a pilot project on biodiversity certification and nature credits is being implemented with public
and private partners.
Investments in afforestation, reforestation and sustainable land management across Africa, Asia and
Latin America were supported, including through the Carbon Sinks EFSD+ guarantees (totalling EUR
366 million) signed in October 2024 and other global programmes, such as THRIVELANDS.
The EU maintained its support for legal and sustainable forest value chains through the EU Forest
Partnerships and the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership
Agreements (VPA). In 2025, Ghana became the first African country and only the second in the world
to issue FLEGT licences, providing direct access to the EU market for timber products. Through
DESIRA+, the EU promoted sustainable agricultural value chains in cocoa, coffee, cashew and
“forgotten crops”, enhancing soils, promoting agroforestry and connecting producers to local, regional
and international markets. The Team Europe Initiative on deforestation-free value chains was
extended to more than 26 producing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the second phase of the NaturAfrica’s initiative was approved, covering a total
area of 2 970 395 km². This initiative promotes integrated landscape management to conserve
biodiversity, strengthen territorial governance and foster green economic opportunities in renewable
energy, transport and agro-processing. The Kivu-Kinshasa Green Corridor in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, a Global Gateway flagship project, is a prime example of that approach.
In the Southern neighbourhood, a regional project on forest genetic resources was prepared to
support conservation and sustainable resource use (MEDFORGEN), while the SEMPA Project
(Bolstering Mediterranean Biodiversity and Marine and Coastal Protected Areas for Nature) is
contributing to the achievement of good environmental status (GES) in the Mediterranean Sea and
Coast in seven countries that are parties to the Barcelona Convention. In Eastern Partnership
countries, EU4Environment activities focused on the sustainable management of forests and
land-based resources and on strengthening the Emerald Network, including new steps to promote
protected area coverage in Ukraine. In the Western Balkans, the EU4Green programme supported
protected floodplain areas and legislative alignment with the EU nature acquis.
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The EU continued to promote global biodiversity governance supporting partner countries’
implementation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and other multilateral
environmental agreements, such as the CITES Convention. The EU also launched programmes to
empower indigenous peoples and local communities in conservation actions and policy processes
(COLOURS) and to promote the sustainable and legal use of wildlife resources, including by setting up
a Legal Hub under the Sustainable Wildlife Management Programme.
By the end of 2025, EU-supported interventions, with almost EUR 4 billion mobilised, had placed an
estimated 14 500 km² of terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems under protection. Meanwhile,
large-scale community reserves and land-restoration programmes expanded the area subject to
sustainable use and restoration, contributing to the objective of doubling external biodiversity funding
to EUR 7 billion for 2021-2027.
Some 1.7 million km² of terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems were under protection
with EU support under the previous multiannual financial framework (MFF 2014-2020).
Under the current MFF 2021-2027, the number is 67 000 km² so far, as results under
the current MFF are only beginning to materialise for projects launched between 2022
and 2024(39).
3.3.7. Other major achievements
The recovery of nuclear safety functions damaged since the Russia’s 2022 unprovoked full-scale
invasion continued in Ukraine. A mobile laboratory for in situ radiation measurements was delivered
to Central Radioactive Waste Management Enterprise, along with modernised dosimetry control
systems in the Chornobyl exclusion zone. In 2025, the design of the Integrated Automated Radiation
Monitoring System for the whole of Ukraine, which was developed with EU support, was approved;
implementation started soon after. Finally, the design of a uranium ore processing waste disposal
facility at the site of the former Pridniproskyi Chemical Plant was developed and approved.
The European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation (INSC) was used to
implement part of the EU commitments regarding the implementation of Annex III to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) on civil nuclear cooperation. All activities for Iran were
suspended after the reimposition of UN and EU sanctions related to the Iran nuclear programme in
September 2025 following the activation of the “snapback mechanism”.
The remediation of the fourth of seven priority uranium legacy sites was completed by the EBRD in
Yangiobod, Uzbekistan, in June 2025. Remediation work at the fifth uranium legacy site – Mailuu-Suu
in Kyrgyzstan – are progressing well and a new financial contribution in 2025 ensured that the work
could continue uninterrupted.
39 For methodological reasons, results under the current MFF 2021-2027 cannot be aggregated with those under the previous MFF (2014-2020). Results for the previous MFF are nevertheless presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025.
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3.4. Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
3.4.1. SDG 9 – Industry, innovation and infrastructure
Digital
In June 2025, the European Commission and the EU High Representative/Vice-President adopted a
Joint Communication on an international digital strategy for the EU(40), setting out a vision for the EU's
external action in the digital field.
Under this strategy, the EU deepened and expanded its digital partnerships. Further meetings of the
Digital Partnership Councils took place with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore, while the first
such meeting was held with Canada. New Digital Dialogues have been launched with key African
partners, including Kenya and Morocco.
The EU made progress on implementing the Global Gateway digital priority and the integrated EU
Tech Business Offer, which combines secure and trusted digital infrastructure, Artificial Intelligence
(AI) and software solutions, 5G/6G, cybersecurity and digital public infrastructure.
The EU scaled up investments in secure and resilient infrastructure. The EU-Africa-India Digital
Corridor “Blue Raman” and the Medusa subsea cable strengthened submarine cable connectivity
between Europe, Africa and Asia. Satellite connectivity expanded through blended finance in Central
Asia, pilot projects in Sub-Saharan Africa linked to IRIS², and a new programme in the MENA region.
EFSD+ guarantees, including the expansion of “Africa Connected” beyond Africa, mobilised
investments in digital infrastructure, including 5G rollouts and data centres, which make it possible to
run AI applications.
The EU invested in digital public infrastructure to promote interoperability and digital sovereignty. A
new ICT standardisation initiative and a programme in Nigeria promoted open source solutions. A new
Digital Economy Package with Mozambique combined investments in connectivity with regulatory
reform, digital skills and digital public services.
The EU strengthened cybersecurity and resilience in the face of hybrid threats through a new action
on cybersecurity and AI capacity-building. The Tallinn Cyber Diplomacy Summer School and EU
CyberNet boosted these efforts, while Eastern Partnership programmes improved cybercrime
preparedness and alignment with EU cybersecurity legislation.
In the Neighbourhood and Enlargement regions, the AI-based “eAccession” tool was finalised to
support regulatory alignment with the EU acquis. EU4Digital continued to facilitate integration with
the EU digital single market, and the EU4Digital academy provided free courses on cybersecurity,
digital marketing, business digitalisation and e-commerce, fostering digital entrepreneurship. In the
MENA region, a new initiative supported the digital transformation of partners, focusing on regulatory
reforms, cybersecurity and digital skills.
The EU leveraged Copernicus data in the Asia-Pacific for spatial planning and climate-change
mitigation and initiated the design of a programme on use of satellite navigation and Earth
Observation data in the MENA region. Meanwhile, Stormwatch used EU satellite data and
supercomputing to improve disaster preparedness in Latin America. The EU also strengthened digital
innovation ecosystems in Africa thanks to the Africa-Europe Digital Innovation Bridge ( AEDIB),
40 JOIN(2025) 140 of 5 June 2025 ; https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/joint-communication-international- digital-strategy-eu
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supported the twin transition through the Digital and Green Innovation programme, and advanced
women’s leadership in the public ICT sector with a joint initiative.
Research and Innovation
In 2025, the EU supported research and innovation ecosystems in partner countries as a key driver of
sustainable, inclusive growth. Actions strengthened policy frameworks, scientific and technological
capacities and innovation infrastructures, linking research results to investment and value chain
development.
In Africa, support for research and innovation was closely connected to the Global Gateway Africa–
Europe Investment Package. Actions backed scientific and technological solutions for the energy
transition, sustainable agriculture and health (including local manufacturing of health products) and
innovation in critical raw materials value chains. Building on initiatives such as the Africa Research
Initiative for Scientific Excellence (ARISE) and EU-ACP research and innovation programmes, support
helped consolidate research networks, centres of excellence and incubation structures that foster
collaboration between universities, research institutes, companies and public authorities.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, Global Gateway flagship projects, such as the EU–LAC high-
performance computing network and the sargassum management project, continued to promote
advanced digital research infrastructure and applied innovation in support of climate action and the
blue economy. In Asia and the Pacific, the EU invested in the use of Copernicus data for spatial
planning and climate change mitigation, boosting partner countries’ capacity to generate and use
geospatial information for public policies.
In the Middle East and North Africa, the EU supported the connection of EU national research and
education agencies with the Arab agencies network, laying the ground for further expansion in 2026.
Across regions, digital partnerships under the Global Gateway digital pillar mobilised research and
innovation around secure connectivity, trustworthy AI, cybersecurity, space-based services and digital
public infrastructure. Meanwhile, dedicated hubs and platforms supported the sharing of knowledge
and technical expertise.
Sustainable transport
In 2025, sustainable transport remained a key focus of the EU’s external action under the Global
Gateway strategy, supporting greener and more resilient connectivity. The EU actively promoted
transport infrastructure investments and EU industry worldwide, including in key urban nodes, to
foster sustainable development, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and diversify supply chains.
The Commission’s cooperation with the private sector in the transport field has continued in 2025.
This included consolidating the Railway Working Group on three continents, moving forward on the
Green Shipping Corridors Initiative, preparing the Global Gateway Aviation Dialogues, contributing to
the Global Gateway Bus Working Group and continuing work with the Global Gateway Business
Advisory Group on transport. Implementation of the technical assistance facility Global Gateway
Transport Support Mechanism (GGTSM) continued, with nearly 40 assignments ongoing or completed.
Various global projects in the rail, road or maritime sub-sectors were signed (with the IMO, the
International Road Transport Union (IRU), and the European Maritime Service Agency for the MENA
region) or are in preparation (with the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA)), while still others
(with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the European Union Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), and the IMO) were ongoing. A call for proposals aimed at supporting the EU private sector was
launched under the Early-Stage Investment Mechanism (ESIM).
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Work progressed on priority regions and economic corridors: Along the 12 African priority corridors,
the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC), the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), and in
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in the ENEST (e.g. Solidarity Lanes) and MENA
regions, various investments are under preparation or being advanced – some of which with EIB
IW1(41) backing. These investments span the sectors of rail (Panama, Mexico, South Africa, Bangladesh,
Vietnam, South Caucasus), road (Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan), maritime transport (Benin,
Namibia, Chile, Mexico, Panama and the Caribbean, the Southern Neighbourhood), urban mobility
(Costa Rica, MENA region), logistics infrastructure (Kyrgyzstan) and aviation (studies for sustainable
aviation fuels, in particular in 14 African countries and in India, safety equipment to airports in Burundi
and Liberia). In addition, transport and trade facilitation projects were designed and approved, in
particular in Africa and Central Asia, covering also safety, security, and sector decarbonisation.
EU investments, under the previous multiannual financial framework, supported the
construction of around 14 000 km of roads, the rehabilitation of over 10 000 km, and
the maintenance of almost 60 000 km of existing routes(42).
3.4.2. Other major achievements
The Digital for Development (D4D) Hub continued to bring together EU Member States, EU
institutions, financial actors and the private sector around shared digital priorities and playing a key
role in facilitating the EU Tech Business Offer. During its first year, the offer included policy dialogues,
study visits, business matchmaking, investment facilitation and targeted cooperation with EU digital
companies seeking opportunities in strategic markets. Specific initiatives included the EU-Viet Nam
Global Gateway Investment Forum, the Caribbean-EU Study Visit on Digital Transformation and the
EU-Nigeria Digital Open Days took place.
The Knowledge Hub Digital (KHD) remained an agile facility that provides EU Delegations and partners
with specialised expertise. Its resources were boosted in 2025 due to high demand for its services,
including technical analysis to underpin Global Gateway actions, capacity development and support
for policy dialogues.
Digital skills are intrinsically linked to digital development other than infrastructure. The target groups
on digital skills are on all levels from basic education to specialised university level to all audiences.
The D4D hub identified and showcased successful EU Member State initiatives on digital skills across
partner countries to create a common narrative, strengthen cooperation (including with the private
sector) and scale up previously tested programmes across regions.
The Global Gateway Business Advisory Groups organised exchanges on digital development, including
skills development as a cross-cutting element.
At the EU–CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Summit in November 2025,
leaders endorsed the progress of the EU–LAC Digital Alliance. More than 70 partnerships between
businesses have been concluded in the framework of the EU–LAC Digital Accelerator.
41 The European Investment Bank is the exclusive implementing partner of the Investment Window 1 under NDICI. 42 Results for the previous MFF (2014-2020) are presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025.
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In the Western Balkans, the Digital Summit focused on cooperation in digital services, the digital
identity wallet, interoperability, AI, cybersecurity, e-services, and skills development. The EU launched
new European Digital Innovation Hubs, while North Macedonia and Serbia were selected to host AI
Factory Antennas.
Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova joined the EU’s Roam-Like-At-Home area. The Republic of
Moldova also gained access to the EU Cybersecurity Reserve and received funding for an AI Factory
Antenna and a European Digital Innovation Hub.
The EU-Egypt Summit agreed investments in trusted, secure digital connectivity and data
infrastructures and resolved to push forward on cybersecurity, AI, the data economy and digital skills.
At the 2025 EU-African Union Summit, the parties welcomed each other’s digital strategies and
committed to further cooperation. The EU-India Free Trade Agreement includes a chapter on digital
trade, with the aim of creating a predictable, secure and fair digital trade environment.
The EU remains a staunch supporter of an effective multilateral system and continues to defend the
commitments agreed by consensus in various UN frameworks. The EU continued to implement the
UN Global Digital Compact and engaged openly and constructively in the Global Dialogue on AI
Governance. The World Summit on the Information Society 20-year review (WSIS+20) was a major
milestone for global digital governance, where the EU played a leading role in the consensual adoption
of the outcome document. Through its partnership with the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), the EU advanced work on digital rights, open source software, capacity building, universal
connectivity and AI.
3.5. Sustainable growth and jobs
3.5.1. SDG 8 – Decent work and economic growth
Figure 6. SDG 8 – interlinkages with other goals
Figure 6 above shows the main synergies between SDG 8 and a broad range of other significant SDGs
(numbers on the right), notably SDG 5 on gender equality, SDG 9 on industry, innovation and
infrastructure, and SDG 7 on affordable and clean energy.
In 2025, the EU further increased its contribution to SDG 8 by fostering sustainable and inclusive
economic growth, in particular by accelerating implementation of the Global Gateway strategy and
related strategic investments.
The Commission supported an enabling environment for Global Gateway investments, trade and
sustainable jobs in partner countries. Improving the investment climate and economic governance
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was a priority. Budget support and technical assistance programmes helped partner countries
strengthen public finance management, mobilise domestic resources, reduce debt vulnerabilities and
improve the business environment, in order to scale up Global Gateway investments. For example, in
2025 the new budget support operation in Cabo Verde included measures to optimise the mobilisation
of domestic revenue, digitalise public administration, improve the transparency and efficiency of
tender procedures, restructure selected state-Oowned enterprises (SOEs) in the electricity sector, and
accompany Global Gateway investments in the country (e.g. the Santiago pump storage facility).
Cooperation with the European private sector was scaled up. Notably, the Global Gateway Investment
Hub launched in October 2025 to cover Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbeans, and
the Asia-Pacific region became operational, enabling EU companies to submit investment proposals
directly via a Team Nationaland request support. The Global Gateway Business Advisory Group (GG
BAG) served as the main channel for direct and structured dialogue with the EU private sector. In
addition, EU business Forums facilitated networking and deal-making between European companies
and partner country governments. At the 2025 AU-EU Business Forum, held on the margins of the AU-
EU Summit, 97% of private sector respondents expressed interest in participating in future forums.
The GG BAG Facility provided technical assistance to Commission staff to strengthen cooperation with
the EU private sector.
The EU supported the development of environmentally and socially sustainable, secure and resilient
supply chains for the supply of critical raw materials (CRM) to the EU and contributed to the
implementation of Strategic Partnerships on raw materials value chains with partner countries.
Following a “Team Europe” approach, special attention was given to supporting mutually beneficial
strategic projects and contribute to achieving the CRM Act’s benchmarks on sourcing, processing,
recycling and diversification of suppliers. Additional priority projects of potential EU interest were
identified. The Commission extended the duration and budget role of the INTPA CRM facility in
December 2025. Work started on connecting priority projects to offtakers and financial institutions.
The provision of budgetary guarantees and blending to INTPA partner countries under NDICI–Global
Europe was critical to support Global Gateway objectives. In 2025, 20 new EFSD+ guarantees were
signed with different development finance institutions, for a total guarantee amount exceeding EUR
3 billion, and deployment started with 63 operations signed in 2025. Blending operations approved in
2025 are expected to generate around EUR 18 billion of investments, notably in energy, climate,
digital, agriculture, manufacturing, micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises and capital markets,
which will underpin job-rich, sustainable growth.
Throughout 2025, the Global Green Bond Initiative (GGBI) made significant progress in steering capital
towards green and inclusive growth. Through the EU Sustainable Finance Advisory Hub, targeted
technical assistance was delivered in 11 partner countries and regions, supporting the development
of sustainable finance frameworks, green bond pipelines and regulatory instruments, including
sustainable finance taxonomies and green bond frameworks. These efforts contributed to
strengthening local capital markets and increasing countries’ capacity to mobilise private finance for
climate and environmental investments.
Progress on the GGBI Fund reached a major milestone in 2025, providing the basis for its subsequent
launch. By the end of the year, the GGBI had established the foundations for a large-scale mobilisation
of capital for sustainable infrastructure and climate-related investments in low- and middle-income
countries, while promoting high environmental standards and supporting the development of
domestic green bond markets.
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The Commission continued to rally multilateral support for EU policy priorities through intensified
cooperation with international financial institutions. In October 2025, the Commission signed a
cooperation arrangement with the World Bank Group on high impact projects. In parallel, Team
Europe cooperation was boosted with the launch of the European Procurement Partnership (EuPP) in
December 2025. The partnership brings together the EU, its Member States and partners to support
public procurement reforms in partner countries, increasing visibility, effectiveness, and collective
impact.
Under the NDICI–Global Europe framework, the Commission promoted employment and decent work
as a core response to global challenges, supporting partner countries in building inclusive, sustainable
and job-rich economies. To increase insight in employment outcomes, work on modelling the impact
on jobs of investment continued with the International Labour Organization (ILO) and in 2025 an
online tool was set up to enable direct consultation of the ILO model. The Corporate Sustainability
Due Diligence Directive, adopted in 2024 and amended in 2025, adresses labour standards in the
supply chains of large companies that are active on the single market. The Team Europe Initiative
“Sustainability in Global Value Chains” inventoried and analysed hundreds of accompanying measures
supported by the Commission, EU Member States and international organizations. The aim was to
bring the measures together under a “Due Diligence Navigator” that would enable stakeholders in
partner countries to identify the support measures needed to be ready to meet expectations of
business partners within the scope of the legislation.
Global Gateway corridors and connectivity initiatives aimed to foster trade, investment flows and
regional integration, which are essential to develop productivity gains and new economic
opportunities.
Action taken in 2025 included:
• In Africa, among twelve priority economic corridors, the Lobito Corridor, a strategic
infrastructure that connecting the south of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
Northwestern Province of Zambia to the port of Lobito in Angola. In 2025, EU investments
along this corridor were focused on agricultural value chains and agro-logistics centres, support
for vocational training in the artisanal mining sector and cross-border trade facilitation.
• The ongoing implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) with a large-
scale and comprehensive Team Europe Initiative (with a budget of EUR 1.1 billion). This
includes more than 70 regional projects to support trade facilitation across the continent at
regional and country levels, covering all aspects of market integration (e.g. e-commerce,
intellectual property rights and cross-border trade).
• In Central Asia, a EUR 12 billion Team Europe investment package focused on strengthening
transport links, including through the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, and deepening
cooperation on critical raw materials, digital connectivity, water and energy, including
hydropower infrastructure.
• With India, and within the framework of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor,
concrete progress on the EU–Africa–India Digital Corridor, an initiative aiming to establish
trusted, secure and high-capacity data connection between continents.
• In Central America, a flagship initiative f to strengthen the Regional Electricity Market. In 2025,
the initiative was backed by an EIB EUR 1 billion lending facility for electricity integration and
energy transition and complemented by a growing amount of co-funding by European DFIs and
Latin American MDBs for a minimum EUR 300 million additional amount. These resources were
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complemented by dedicated technical assistance to reinforce the regional market rules and
complete the design of electricity transmission projects.
In agrifood systems, the DESIRA+ initiative and related programmes promoted sustainable value
chains in cocoa, coffee, cashew and “forgotten crops”, to improve soils, encouraging agroforestry and
connect producers to local, regional and international markets. The Team Europe Initiative on
deforestation-free value chains was expanded to include more than 26 producing countries in Africa,
Latin America and Asia, helping partners comply with EU market requirements and supporting more
sustainable, higher-value exports. The EU prepared an EU Forest Fund to support small private sector
companies in developing sustainable and legal forest value chains and preserving forest resources.
The EFSD+ “TERRA” guarantee signed with CDP in 2025, promotes the acceleration of the transition
toward sustainable agrifood systems through integrated capacity building and enhanced access to
innovative finance.
An Early-Stage Investment Mechanism was launched to provide grants to EU companies involved in
the early stages of sustainable transport, urban development, energy and AI projects, helping to
de-risk innovation and crowd in further finance.
Education and skills programmes (including opportunity-driven vocational education and training
(VET) and higher education) were increasingly aligned with sectors prioritised under the Global
Gateway strategy, with six new opportunity-driven VET projects launched in several African countries
to match training with labour market needs. One example is the Ignite GH2 project, which addresses
a critical skills gap in Namibia’s green hydrogen and Power-to-X sectors. Implemented by a consortium
of public and private actors, it aims to upskill some 700 unemployed technical vocational education
and training (TVET) graduates to increase their employability. Systematic use of the gender, disability
and inequality markers helped ensure that investments take account of distributional impacts,
promote women’s economic empowerment and inclusion, and connect underserved communities.
Work continued on responsible value chains and labour standards, including efforts to eradicate child
labour and strengthen social dialogue.
Around 4 million jobs have been supported or sustained with EU support under the
previous multiannual financial framework (MFF 2014-2020). As results under the
current MFF are only beginning to materialise for projects launched between 2022 and
2024, a further 150 000 have so far been supported or sustained under the current
MFF, of which more than 147 000 green jobs (43).
EU‑backed programmes expanded access to finance for nearly 17.5 million firms and more than 3.3
million people under the previous MFF(44).
43 For methodological reasons, results under the current MFF 2021-2027 cannot be aggregated with those under the previous MFF (2014-2020). Results for the previous MFF are nevertheless presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025. 44 Results for the previous MFF (2014-2020) are presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025.
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3.6. Migration and forced displacement
3.6.1. SDG 10.7 – Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of
people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies
Figure 7. SDG 10 – interlinkages with other goals
Figure 7 above shows the main synergies between SDG 10 and a broad range of other significant SDGs
(numbers on the right), notably SDG 5 on gender equality, SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong
institutions, and SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth.
In line with SDG 10.7 and with the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, the EU took decisive steps to
improve its strategic and comprehensive policy and partnership approach to migration and asylum,
with a strong focus on migratory routes towards the EU.
Irregular crossings at the EU’s external borders fell to around 179 000 in 2025, a quarter less than in
2024, partly reflecting enhanced cooperation with partner countries. The number of asylum
applications in the EU also decreased in 2025, by around 19% compared with 2024. However, at the
end of 2025 there were 41.6 million refugees globally, in addition to 9 million asylum seekers and 68.7
million internally displaced people.
The EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans continued to yield very positive results. The 2024 trend in
the number of of reduced irregular border crossings on the Western Balkans route (down 80%)
continued in 2025, sustained by EU financed projects in the region for a total of just over EUR 350
million until 2025. In Türkiye, under the post-Facility support for refugees in Türkiye, the Commission
adopted a EUR 161 million top-up to strengthen the country’s eEastern and South-Eastern borders,
and a EUR 150 million top-up to the project to support voluntary returns of Syrian refugees
implemented by UNHCR.
The legacy of the EU Trust Fund in response to the Syria crisis (the Madad Fund), along with follow-up
actions, continued to underpin support for more than 12 million Syrian refugees and host community
members in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Türkiye and Syria itself. Here, the focus was on education, health,
WASH, livelihoods and social protection as enablers of inclusion and voluntary, safe and dignified
return.
For the Southern Mediterranean, a new migration Multiannual Action Programme 2025-2027 in North
Africa with a budget of EUR 675 million was adopted to support partner countries on migration
management, protection, return and reintegration, and legal migration and mobility. In 2025, the EU
regional programme implemented by the IOM helped over 35 000 migrants to return to their countries
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of origin from North Africa. Furthermore, under the thematic human rights and democracy
programme, the partnership with UNICEF aimed to help children in situations of distress. On legal
mobility, Tunisia registered 1 269 mobilities in 2025, of which over half were women, linked to job
opportunities in the EU in sectors in need of human resources. A total of 399 Tunisian returnees were
also helped to return and reintegrate their region of origin.
These efforts were complemented by the launch of the Pact for the Mediterranean, mainstreaming
the EU’s comprehensive approach to migration. Fostering assisted voluntary returns and sustainable
reintegration of irregular migrants stranded in Sub-Saharan Africa remained a key priority, with
substantial EU support mobilised. In 2025, the flagship Migrant Protection, Return and Reintegration
Programme for Sub-Saharan Africa helped over 20 800 migrants return to their country of origin (with
67% returning from Niger and 13.5% from Mauritania) and over 44 100 reintegrate their country of
origin in Sub-Saharan Africa (including nearly 28 000 migrants returning from North Africa). Building
on the migration partnership with Mauritania adopted in 2024, implementation of all actions in the
EUR 210 million EU support package were ongoing, significantly increasing Mauritania’s capacity to
manage migration and forced displacement and to create economic opportunities in regions affected
by mixed movements. Negotiations on a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Senegal were
launched, complementing wider efforts in West Africa to improve capacities to prevent irregular
departures and unsafe journeys.
In Eastern and Central Africa, new initiatives underlined the EU’s continued engagement to support
the regional impact of the world’s largest displacement crisis. In Chad, the EU mobilised EUR 51 million
to strengthen the resilience of Sudanese refugees and their vulnerable host communities. In South
Sudan, the EU provided EUR 12 million to help communities through resilience-building actions in
areas affected by displacement and returns.
In Asia, the EU stepped up its engagement with Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, in a context
where an estimated 2.9 million Afghans were forcibly returned from Iran and Pakistan in 2025. Under
the Team Europe Initiative on the Afghan displacement situation, the EU combined a EUR 83 million
programme for basic needs and livelihoods with an additional EUR 38.5 million to address the
displacement crisis. It also stepped up migration and mobility dialogues and border management
support to Bangladesh and Pakistan.
The EU also intensified its work fighting migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings at global
level. A EUR 15 million action on the financial and digital dimensions of migrant smuggling was
launched, as part of a EUR 78 million funding package announced in December 2025 as a contribution
to the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling. In addition, at the Global Refugee Forum
Progress Review meeting in December 2025, the Commission demonstrated its firm commitment to
continue supporting refugee hosting countries. This was in contrast to the steep drop in contributions
from other donors, and overall concerns about the sustainability of the international system of
financing.
In 2025, the EU remained committed to open legal pathways to protect people in need of protection
and to support resettlement and humanitarian admission. Eleven Member States transferred more
than 9 700 persons in need of protection in 2025 under the EU Resettlement and Humanitarian
Admission Scheme for 2024-2025 (out of almost 26.000 resettlement and humanitarian admission
transfers over 2024-2025). The EU supported in 2025 the Emergency Transfer Mechanism in Rwanda
(around 1 700 refugees were transferred from Rwanda through the ETM between 2022 and 2025) and
the Refugee Support Facility in Türkiye.
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Humanitarian aid remained a central pillar of the EU’s contribution to SDG 10.7. In 2025 around 15%
of the humanitarian aid budget was dedicated to protection, with a strong focus on refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in crises such as in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan and the
Horn of Africa. In 2025, about 87% of humanitarian aid funding was allocated to projects addressing
forced displacement.
Across regions, the EU strengthened its human-rights based approach to migration, adopting internal
guidelines and tailor-made procedures to improve the design, identification, formulation and
monitoring of migration actions and the handling of alleged violations.
Under the previous multiannual financial framework (MFF 2014-2020), more than 84
million migrants, refugees, internally displaced people and host‑community members
were protected or assisted with EU support. Under the current MFF 2021-2027, it is
now about 5.8 million, as these results are only beginning to materialise for projects
launched between 2022 and 2024(45).
More than 1.3 million people benefited from EU‑supported interventions that aim to reduce social
and economic inequality under the current MFF(46).
3.7. Governance, peace and security
3.7.1. SDG 16 – Peace, justice and strong institutions
Figure 8. SDG 16 – interlinkages with other goals
Figure 8 above shows the main synergies between SDG 16 and a broad range of other significant SDGs
(numbers on the right), notably SDG 5 on gender equality, SDG 10 on reduced inequalities, and SDG 8
on decent work and economic growth.
In 2025, NDICI–Global Europe continued to support peace and security, justice and strong institutions,
including the rule of law, human rights and democracy (see section 1.8).
The programme on peace, stability and crisis response supported: (i) justice and victim rehabilitation
(including to ensure accountability for atrocity crimes committed in Ukraine); (ii) the clearing of mines
to protect returning civilians in Syria; and (iii) the management of post-war debris and the restoration
of access to basic services to communities in Gaza. Regional programmes aimed at boosting people’s
45 For methodological reasons, results under the current MFF 2021-2027 cannot be aggregated with those under the previous MFF (2014-2020). Results for the previous MFF are nevertheless presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025. 46 Ibid.
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resilience through economic recovery, social cohesion and sustainable land management included
RESILAC2 in the Lake Chad Basin and the SIERY project in Yemen, which restored 177 public services
and improved access for over 7 million Yemenis. In addition, geographic programmes in fragile settings
linked human rights with peacebuilding and resilience, for example by protecting human rights
defenders and survivors of gender-based violence in Sudan, supporting community-based
reconciliation in the Tigray region, advancing women’s economic empowerment and access to basic
services in the Central African Republic, and combining land-rights formalisation with environmental
protection and reintegration of ex-combatants in Colombia.
The EU supported non-proliferation and disarmament, amongst other, in Syria and Ukraine through
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weaponsand the Biological Weapons Convention
process, along with measures on small arms and light weapons and arms export controls.
In the field of security, counterterrorism measures and action to prevent violent extremism were
strengthened through the EU–UN Global Terrorist Threat Facility, which delivered support to Iraq,
Nigeria and Somalia, and through work on multilateral judicial cooperation with the League of Arab
States. The EU also addressed illicit financial flows (IFFs), asset recovery and the financial dimension
of organised crime. Through the Team Europe Initiative on Illicit Financial Flows and Transnational
Organised Crime in Africa, the EU and participating EU Member States (Finland, France, Germany,
Sweden and Spain) continued to promote a coordinated “follow the money” approach. The initiative
supported African partners in strengthening AML/CFT frameworks, financial intelligence, beneficial
ownership transparency, tax and trade transparency, inter-agency cooperation, asset tracing and
recovery, and regional cooperation. By connecting crime-related and tax-related IFFs, the Team
Europe Initiative also contributed to stronger institutions, domestic resource mobilisation, financial
integrity and a stronger enabling environment for sustainable investment. In the Middle East and
North Africa region, the Transparency Now project strengthened capacity for cross-border anti-
corruption investigations, including as regards the confiscation and recovery of assets associated with
criminal activities.
Cybersecurity and hybrid threat responses were strengthened. EU CyberNet was expanded to the
Indo-Pacific, connecting experts and organisations and supporting reforms aligned with the Budapest
Convention in nine countries, thereby enabling Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Vanuatu to join
the Convention. New thematic actions addressed cybersecurity, disinformation and the prevention of
electoral violence, while rapid response interventions on foreign policy needs targeted hybrid threats
and cybersecurity, civil aviation security, economic security and foreign information manipulation and
interference (FIMI).
In 2025, the EU further strengthened its support for peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice
and effective, accountable institutions in an increasingly volatile global context. The European
Commission adopted the EU Civil Society Strategy, laying the groundwork for stronger engagement,
support and protection and an empowered civil society, and the EU Democracy Shield, which
underscored the crucial importance of electoral integrity, media freedom, and protection against FIMI.
In parallel, the project “Shielding Democracy: Strengthening the Republic of Moldova's Electoral
Integrity through Enhancing Capacity and Resilience” boosted the Central Electoral Commission’s
capacity to manage electoral risks and counter malign interference, including cyber threats,
disinformation, FIMI, and social media interference. In the Western Balkans, the EU reaffirmed its
commitment to electoral reforms aligned with international recommendations by signing a new
collaboration with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the
Organization for Security and Co‑operation in Europe (OSCE) and working to improve the conduct of
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elections across the six Western Balkans beneficiaries and further align electoral processes with
international obligations, standards and good practice.
The EU also continued to advance the Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the Youth, Peace and
Security Agenda as contribution to inclusive peacebuilding and effective institutions. The EU promoted
the meaningful, inclusive and safe participation of young people in peacebuilding, conflict prevention,
mediation and decision-making processes, especially through the 2nd Youth, Peace and Security
Conference in Brussels in November 2025. It also continued to support youth-led organisations,
including the United Network of Young Peacebuilders. The Joint Declaration of the EU-AU Summit
reiterated the parties’ commitment to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, while EU Security and
Defence Partnerships concluded with the United Kingdom and Canada in 2025 integrated references
to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda as standing paragraphs and reflected the growing
importance of youth participation and perspectives in security policy and peacebuilding initiatives.
The EU placed particular emphasis on “people centred justice”, funding legal aid schemes in Bhutan,
Burundi, Laos, Malawi and Tanzania and village court type mechanisms in Bangladesh and Papua New
Guinea to improve access to justice for marginalised populations. It supported efforts to improve
detention conditions in Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Gabon, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi,
Morocco, Mauritania, Paraguay and Ivory Coast, with special attention to vulnerable groups, such as
internally displaced persons. The EU continued to promote good governance and improve institutions
through sectoral approaches. Through its Forest Partnerships and FLEGT Voluntary Partnership
Agreements, for instance, the EU contributed to ensuring indigenous peoples rights in Honduras and
Guyana, enforcing benefit sharing in Liberia, strengthening the new forest agency in Mongolia, and
empowering women in forest management in Ghana.
The EU maintained its staunch support for civil society organisations, including through the NDICI CSO
Thematic Programme, through capacity building, policy dialogue and support for civic participation
and by empowering civil society organisations as actors of democratic governance, accountability,
transparency and inclusive decision-making. Finally, the EU continued its strategic cooperation with
associations of local authorities, the European Committee of the Regions, and the OECD. It also
promoted decentralised cooperation between local authorities in Europe and partner countries, while
providing technical assistance to strengthen the territorial approach to local development. The 2nd
EU–UN Policy Dialogue and the 9th Forum of Cities and Regions for International Partnerships
showcased how local and regional authorities contribute to SDGs and can play a role in the Global
Gateway investments.
Around 53 million people benefited directly from EU-supported interventions for
civilian post-conflict peacebuilding and conflict prevention under the previous
multiannual financial framework (MFF 2014-2020), with a further 1.9 million benefiting
under the current MFF 2021-2027 (47).
More than 140 000 victims of human rights violations received assistance funded by the EU under the
current MFF, under the previous MFF another 180 000 recieved the same kind of assistance(48).
47 For methodological reasons, results under the current MFF 2021-2027 cannot be aggregated with those under the previous MFF (2014-2020). Results for the previous MFF are nevertheless presented, as reporting is still ongoing: some interventions remain under implementation, while others submitted their final reports in 2025. 48 Ibid.
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Over 6.6 million people benefited from EU‑supported legal aid interventions under the previous MFF.
Under the current MFF, and as these results are only beginning to materialise for projects launched
between 2022 and 2024, so far 91 000 have benefited from legal aid(49).
49 Ibid.
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4. Geographic overview
4.1. Sub-Saharan Africa
4.1.1. Introduction (policy developments)
In 2025, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) further strengthened their strategic
partnership under the Joint Vision for 2030. Two major political milestones marked the year: the third
EU–AU ministerial meeting in Brussels in May, and the seventh AU–EU Summit in Luanda in November.
These events celebrated the 25th anniversary of the partnership and reviewed progress on the Joint
Vision for 2030, alongside the AU–EU Business Forum and the CSO–Youth Forum. In addition,
cooperation also advanced in agriculture with the sixth EU–AU Conference of Agriculture Ministers,
which promoted closer alignment between the AU’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
Programme (CAADP) and the EU’s Vision for Agriculture and Food.
The EU continued to work closely with African partners in multilateral forums, including on
implementing the Pact for the Future and the UN reform agenda, strengthening coordination in bodies
such as the G20, and advancing shared priorities on sustainable development, climate, biodiversity,
reform of the international financial architecture, and on debt vulnerabilities.
26 partnership dialogues between the EU and Sub-Saharan African countries were held in 2025.
In 2025, the EU remained Africa’s leading trade, investment, peace and security partner, provider of
Official Development Assistance, and humanitarian donor. EU trade with the continent reached EUR
360 billion, representing 33% of Africa’s total trade. EU foreign direct investment stock totalled EUR
250 billion.
Implementation of the Global Gateway Africa–Europe Investment Package accelerated significantly
throughout the year. As announced by the President of the European Commission at the seventh AU–
EU Summit, EUR 120 billion had been mobilised until 2025, keeping the partnership on track to meet
the EUR 150 billion target set under the Joint Vision for 2030. Sub-Saharan Africa attracted a growing
pipeline of Team Europe Initiatives and flagship projects in sustainable connectivity, energy, health,
digitalisation and education.
Regional transport and trade corridors remained a key focus. Progress continued, for example, on the
Lobito Corridor linking Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the port of Lobito in
Angola, and on the Douala–N’Djamena Corridor. Support for the operationalisation of the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) increased through assistance on trade facilitation, customs and
standards. In digital connectivity, progress was made through expanded high-speed broadband
coverage and last-mile infrastructure, improving affordability and access to digital services. In the
energy sector, the Africa–Europe Green Energy Initiative expanded support for renewable energy
generation and regional electricity integration, including grid upgrades and investments in solar and
wind power.
The EU also advanced cooperation on natural resources, climate resilience and food systems. Under
the NaturAfrica programme, biodiversity conservation continued across six priority habitat regions.
The Team Europe Initiative on transboundary water management supported partner countries in
improving water security and WASH systems. Global Gateway investments also promoted more
resilient food systems, including irrigation projects in Somalia and climate-smart agricultural value
chains. The implementation of ocean regional programmes covering Sub-Saharan Africa well-
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progressed. Human-centered initiatives like BlueInvest Africa(50) feature African entrepreneurs who
bring investment-ready solutions to ocean and coastal challenges, from climate resilience and marine
biodiversity to circular economy and maritime infrastructures.
Human development remained central to EU–Africa cooperation, with actions in all Sub-Saharan
African countries at bilateral or regional level. This included support for the Team Europe Initiative on
Opportunity-driven Skills and Vocational Education and Training in Africa, aligning skills development
with employment opportunities created by Global Gateway investments. Erasmus+ scholarships for
African students, researchers and academics and capacity building projects in Higher Education,
Vocational Education and Training, and youth expanded further. The Africa Teacher Programme
continued financing the salaries of tens of thousands of teachers.
Health cooperation focused on strengthening health systems and advancing Africa’s health
sovereignty and security. This included support for local manufacturing of vaccines, medicines and
health technologies under the Team Europe Initiative on Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines,
Medicines and Health Technologies in Africa (MAV+), alongside broader action in public and digital
health.
Peace, security and governance challenges intensified across parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. The EU’s
response combined diplomatic engagement, crisis response and complementary security and defence
instruments, anchored in human rights and international humanitarian law. By the end of 2025, the
EU had provided a total of EUR 400 million in support of African countries through the European Peace
Facility, an off-budget instrument, in addition to its contribution to African Peace-keeping operations
through the support program to the AU.
In the Central Sahel, the EU adapted its engagement to the evolving context, maintaining direct
support to populations while continuing to suspend budget support, security programmes and direct
funding to state authorities, and maintaining the CSDP mission EUCAP Sahel Mali. In November 2025,
the Foreign Affairs Council endorsed a Renewed Approach for the Sahel focused on political and
diplomatic engagement, human security, social cohesion and economic opportunities.
The EU also strengthened its response to insecurity spilling from the Sahel into coastal West Africa,
particularly in northern Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, combining security and defence support
with measures to enhance resilience, social cohesion and development. It continued to support peace
and security in the Lake Chad Basin, including through cooperation with the AU and support to the
regional multinational force. In the Great Lakes region, EU action remained guided by the EU Great
Lakes Strategy, combining diplomacy with support for regional peace initiatives linked to the conflict
in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Across the Horn of Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, the Indian Ocean and other subregions, the
EU pursued an integrated approach linking Global Gateway investments, humanitarian assistance,
security support, crisis response and long-term development, including support through the EUMAM
military mission in Mozambique and EPF assistance.
The EU and AU also stepped-up joint efforts on migration and mobility, building on legal pathways,
border management cooperation, and action against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and
trafficking in human beings, notably through the Continent-to-Continent Migration and Mobility
50 https://blueinvestafrica.eu/
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Dialogue. Cooperation on return, readmission and sustainable reintegration remained important.
Cooperation on a human rights-based approach to migration management also continued.
4.1.2. Implementation
Human development and inequalities
In 2025, the EU reinforced implementation of its human development agenda in Sub-Saharan Africa,
with notable progress across education, skills, youth and entrepreneurship. The Regional Teacher
Initiative for Africa continued in 27 countries, strengthening teacher training, management and
support. The Team Europe Initiative on Opportunity-driven Skills and Vocational Education and
Training in Africa (TEI OP-VET) moved into full implementation: its Technical Assistance Facility
became fully operational, regional exchanges expanded, and 11 projects were launched, particularly
in climate- and energy-related sectors.
Youth participation was further embedded through more than 50 Youth Sounding Boards and flagship
mobility schemes including Erasmus+, the Africa-Europe Youth Academy and the Intra-Africa
Academic Mobility Scheme. The Team Europe Initiative ‘Investing in Young Businesses in Africa’ also
scaled up, reaching eight co-funded regional programmes active in over 20 countries.
A further milestone in 2025 was the adoption of the new Study and Research in Africa action, which
broadened the Global Gateway approach to higher education. It aims to increase the attractiveness
of African higher education for mobile learners and strengthen universities’ links with innovation and
investment ecosystems in digital, climate, energy, transport, health and applied research.
The EU continued to support health care systems strengthening, health security through a One Health
approach, sexual and reproductive health and rights, digital health and local manufacturing of
vaccines, medicines and health technologies through the AU-EU Health Partnership Team Europe
Initiative. Support to social protection also expanded in 2025, notably through the Team Europe
initiative on social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa and the new regional Social Protection Systems
Strengthening Action, which will reinforce systems and support just and equitable transitions.
Green Deal
Implementation of the Green Deal agenda accelerated across energy, biodiversity, ocean governance,
forests, climate and water. Through the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative, the EU scaled up
support for grids and renewable energy investments, helping advance the energy transition and
regional power-market integration. This momentum was highlighted at the second Global Gateway
Forum in October 2025, while new flagships on regional electricity market integration and clean
cooking were designed to complement the Continental Energy Programme and an expanding blending
pipeline.
On biodiversity, 2025 marked major preparation for the second phase of NaturAfrica, with a new
investment comparable in scale to phase 1, ensuring continuity across most priority landscapes. The
forthcoming phase strengthens the initiative’s green economy and conflict-sensitivity dimensions
while maintaining support for biodiversity conservation, sustainable livelihoods and local resilience.
Ocean governance also gained further prominence in 2025 through reinforced regional and
continental programmes supporting the external dimension of the European Ocean Pact, launched at
the UN Ocean Conference in which the EU was very active and tabled more than 50 voluntary
commitments worth nearly EUR 1 billion. Many of these commitments cover Sub-Saharan Africa.
These efforts were complemented by support for the ratification and implementation of the BBNJ
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Agreement (Biodiversity Beyond national Jurisdiction), the entry into force of the WTO Agreement on
Fisheries Subsidies and additional work on ocean finance (e.g. FICS Ocean Coalition).
The EU stepped up Forest Partnerships and reached a major milestone on deforestation-free value
chains with the issuance of FLEGT licences in Ghana, making it the first country in Africa and the second
worldwide to do so. A decision was also taken to design a Forest Fund to support private-sector action
in priority countries.
The Team Europe Initiative on Climate Adaptation and Resilience continued to provide the overarching
framework for climate action, with emphasis on the links between mobility and climate change,
adaptation investments and climate-risk financing.
Under the TEI on transboundary water management in Africa, implementation advanced through
three newly approved interventions in major transboundary basins and increased blending operations
for access to water and sanitation across Sub-Saharan Africa.
Sustainable growth and jobs
Sub-Saharan Africa remained central to the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package, with
implementation accelerating in 2025. Progress was driven through support to twelve transport and
economic corridors, operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), advances
under the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative (AEGEI), the Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines,
Medicines and Health Technologies in Africa (MAV+), and the Team Europe Initiative ‘Investing in
Young Businesses in Africa’.
A further milestone was the selection of five strategic critical raw material projects under the Critical
Raw Materials Act, all in Southern Africa, with concrete support mobilised in coordination with other
DG’s. Global Gateway investments also supported food-system resilience, including through
modernisation of the Douala-N’Djamena corridor and agricultural value chains and logistics platforms
along the Lobito Corridor.
Strategic partnerships also deepened in 2025. The first committee of the Angola-EU Sustainable
Investment Facilitation Agreement (SIFA – the first one in all SSA) took place in Luanda in January
2025, setting up concrete milestones to support sustainable investments in the country. Following the
March 2025 EU-South Africa Summit, the Global Gateway investment package with South Africa was
expanded through additional Member State contributions to nearly EUR 12 billion, underpinning the
Clean Trade and Investment Partnership signed in November 2025 and the Memorandum of
Understanding on sustainable minerals and metals signed the same day. In Namibia, the EU-Namibia
Strategic Partnership on Green Hydrogen and Critical Raw Materials delivered concrete results,
including Climate Investor 3-backed investments in HyIron and Zhero, the launch of the IGNITE TVET
programme on green technologies, operationalisation of the Critical Raw Materials pillar through a
Namibia country window under PanAfGeo+, and three support grants to civil society and media on
extractive industries and green industrialisation.
Financial implementation under Global Gateway also intensified. In 2025, 19 EFSD+ guarantee
agreements were signed for Sub-Saharan Africa with a combined capacity of EUR 1.9 billion, bringing
total signed and active guarantees to EUR 3.4 billion. Under the EIB Dedicated Windows, EUR 592
million was approved for eight operations supporting private investment, while 26 blending
operations worth around EUR 608 million were approved. Together, these operations are expected to
mobilise up to EUR 20.5 billion in investments, mainly in energy, transport, digital, health and
agriculture.
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Skills development (VET) projects have been launched in Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Kenya,
Namibia, Senegal and Uganda, in close alignment with investment priorities. Business fora and the
Global Gateway Business Advisory Group Facility further supported investment-climate reforms and
business linkages, including at the AU-EU Business Forum in November 2025.
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
In 2025, the EU stepped up efforts to scale trusted connectivity, digital public infrastructure and
interoperable e-services, further positioning itself and its private sector as partners of reference.
Digital investments advanced across satellite connectivity, submarine and terrestrial networks,
including the EU-Africa-India Blue Raman corridor, as well as data centres and cloud services. These
investments contributed to Africa’s digital single market in support of AfCFTA.
A notable milestone was the launch of a new Digital Economy Package with Mozambique at the Global
Gateway Forum, combining regulatory support, cybersecurity, AI capacity-building and private-sector
development. The EU-Nigeria Digital Open Day in Brussels also helped mobilise private-sector interest
around Project Bridge for fibre-optic networks and other Team Europe Initiatives on e-governance,
digital innovation and skills. These initiatives exemplified the rollout of the EU Tech Business Offer
under the International Digital Strategy launched in 2025. EFSD+ guarantees, including the extension
of the ‘Africa Connected’ guarantee, underpinned further investments in broadband,
data infrastructure and digital innovation ecosystems, while gender considerations were
mainstreamed through the Team Europe Joint Initiative on Women’s Leadership in the public ICT
sector.
Science, research and space cooperation also made progress. The Africa Research Initiative for
Scientific Excellence – ARISE 2.0 – adopted in 2025, aims to strengthen the capabilities of African
researchers and research management systems, fostering innovative pan-African research that is
locally relevant and globally competitive. The second part of the Africa-EU Space Partnership
Programme, also adopted in 2025, will enhance the capacity of African organisations, policymakers,
practitioners and private-sector actors to use space technologies and operational information services
in support of sustainable development and the green transition, building on Copernicus and Galileo
programmes.
Migration and forced displacement
In line with SDG 10.7 and the external dimension of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, the EU
intensified engagement in 2025 with key countries of origin, transit and destination across Sub-
Saharan Africa. Actions focused on labour migration, voluntary return and reintegration, combating
migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, border management, protection and support for
refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities, and addressing root causes of irregular
migration.
A major implementation milestone was the full operationalisation of the migration partnership with
Mauritania. All actions under the EUR 210 million support package, including EUR 60 million under the
Flexible Mechanism for Migration and Forced Displacement, were contracted and moved into
implementation, contributing to stronger management of mixed movements and socioeconomic
opportunities in affected regions. The EU also scaled up support for voluntary returns within Africa,
responding to a growing number of returns and supporting medium-term reintegration assistance in
countries of origin. At the same time, the EU sustained a major humanitarian-development response
to the Sudan crisis and its regional spillover, allocating since 2023 EUR 225 million in development
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funding to Sudan itself, EUR 55 million to neighbouring host countries, and EUR 157 million in the Horn
of Africa to address drought, food insecurity and displacement.
In 2025, the EU also adopted guidelines and internal procedures to strengthen the human-rights-
based approach to migration and improve monitoring and handling of alleged violations.
Governance, peace and security
The EU maintained substantial engagement in 2025 to address fragility, conflict and insecurity in Sub-
Saharan Africa, while linking Global Gateway investments to the humanitarian-development-peace
nexus. Under the NDICI−Global Europe Rapid Response pillar, new crisis-response actions were
approved in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic,
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique and West Africa, supporting stabilisation, peace processes, dialogue,
social cohesion, counter-disinformation and accountability. Thematic actions reinforced conflict
prevention, mediation, transitional justice, early warning, Women, Peace and Security, mine action
and community-based stabilisation. Support to resilient border areas continued through the Peaceful
and Resilient Borderlands programmes, notably in coastal West Africa, the Horn of Africa and the
Great Lakes.
Security and defence cooperation with African partners was reinforced through Common Security and
Defence Policy missions and thematic tools. The EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali and the civilian
and military Security and Defence Initiative in support of West-African countries in the Gulf of Guinea
continued to support security-sector reform and border and maritime
security. Dedicated programmes further strengthened maritime security across the continent,
building the capacity of coastal states to protect ports, ensure safe navigation, and counter threats
including piracy and trafficking. This work covered key maritime zones from the Gulf of Guinea and
the Western Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. The EU UN Global Terrorist Threat Facility
provided targeted support to countries including Nigeria, Uganda and Benin, while launching a
workstream on the role of women in counter-terrorism, with Kenya and Uganda among pilot
countries. The Global Action on Cybercrime enhanced (GLACY-e) supported cybercrime reforms
aligned with the Budapest Convention in nine countries, enabling Rwanda and São Tomé and Príncipe
to join the Convention.
Action against illicit financial flows and organised crime also scaled up through a new EUR 46.5 million
programme that delivered over 200 activities in 37 countries in 2025. With support from the EU Global
Facility on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, South Africa and
Mozambique successfully implemented their action plans and were removed from the Financial Action
Task Force grey list in October 2025.
The EU also continued support for democratic governance, electoral capacities and transitional justice
in partnership with the African Union and its Member States.
Food security and nutrition
Sub-Saharan Africa remained a priority region for EU action on developing a meaningful agri-food
agenda, in particular in specific areas affected by conflicts, climate change and economic shocks. In
2025, the EU continued supporting more resilient and sustainable food systems in complementarity
with Global Gateway investments in infrastructure and innovation, including irrigation in Somalia and
agricultural value chains linked to strategic corridors. Programmes such as DeSIRA+ promoted climate-
smart and agro-ecological innovation and sustainable value chains for cocoa, coffee and cashew. A
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significant new milestone was the approval of the continent-wide Fit for Markets programme to
support partner countries and the private sector on key value chains.
New commitments in support to Farmers Organisations and for the promotion of Geographic
Indications were highlighted at the 6th EU-AU Agriculture Minister Conference in June 2025, where
further alignment and synergy between the new EU Vision on Agriculture and Food and the
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Plan (CAADP) were promoted.
Humanitarian food and nutrition assistance reached around EUR 600 million globally, with
Sudan, South Sudan and Mali among the contexts of highest concern. The Sudan regional response,
Horn of Africa allocation and continued support to the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin reflected the scale
of EU engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nutrition remained central to humanitarian operations, and
Team Europe reaffirmed its leadership at the Nutrition for Growth summit by linking
humanitarian, development and climate action.
Case study on Corridors: Global Gateway flagship projects for sustainable economic development
1) TheLobito Corridor exemplifies the EU’s corridor-based Global Gateway approach to sustainable
growth, green transition and resilience. Linking Angola, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo
to the Atlantic, the corridor combines support for intra-regional trade, climate-smart agriculture and
value chains, renewable energy and responsible critical raw-material value chains. In 2025, progress
continued in combining transport infrastructure with customs cooperation, enterprise support, skills
development, food security and environmental and social sustainability. The corridor
increasingly demonstrated how flagship investments can generate broader territorial development
effects, create jobs, increase local value addition and connect strategic raw materials and agricultural
production to regional and global markets on more sustainable terms.
On-going implementation and scale-up in 2025 was successful thanks to strong African ownership and
coordinated actions among the EU, African partners, financial institutions and private investors.
Investments in the corridor are underpinned by robust governance and local ownership to maximise
benefits for local communities.
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© European Union, 2026.
2) The Douala-N’Djamena corridor illustrates the practical impact of Global Gateway support to
landlocked and fragile economies through strategic connectivity investments. This flagship project
upgrades a key road artery linking Chad to Western and Central Africa, in a context where mobility
and trade depend heavily on the road network and where the corridor accounts for over 40% of the
Chad's population and GDP.
The intervention consists of the rehabilitation of 229 km of the 596 km long highway between
N'Djamena, Koutere and Moundou and the construction of a new 72m bridge in Moulkou, 4 weighing
stations and 6 resting parking areas as well as a significant technical assistance package, including
gender-related risks and opportunities analysis, road safety and climate resilience. EU different on-
going and foreseen programmes support interconnection of transport infrastructure and custom
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digitalisation and contribute to the agenda of trade integration and the improvement of
competitiveness in Central Africa.
Included in the Team Europe Initiative ‘Green Secondary Cities’, the projects around this corridor also
support renewable energy, agri-food value chains, TVET and job creation, and have been further
reinforced by the inauguration of an EU-funded bridge over the Logone River, opening a new official
trade point between Yagoua in Cameroon and Bongor in Chad and unlocking
additional cross-border economic opportunities
In 2025, continued modernisation efforts along this strategic route contributed to more efficient
transport and logistics, while also supporting food-system resilience and improved trade links
between Cameroon and Chad. As a key artery for landlocked areas, the corridor showed how
infrastructure investment can strengthen regional integration, facilitate the movement of goods,
improve access to markets and reinforce stability in vulnerable contexts.
© European Union
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4.1.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people
affected by conflicts and disasters
Sub-Saharan Africa received the largest share of EU humanitarian funding in 2025. Against a backdrop
of needs rising globally, the EU deployed over EUR 900 million of its EUR 2.5 billion humanitarian
budget to crises in the region, with a strong focus on food and nutrition, health, protection and
education in emergencies, as well as on preparedness to combat climate related disasters.
The conflict in Sudan further worsened, consolidating the country’s position as the world’s largest
humanitarian, displacement and hunger crisis. Around ten million people are forcibly displaced inside
the country, and famine has been confirmed in at least five areas, including parts of North Darfur and
South Kordofan. A staggering 19.5 million people, or two out of every five Sudanese, are experiencing
acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). In 2025, the EU allocated over EUR 273 million to the
Sudan regional crisis, including more than EUR 161 million inside Sudan, to provide lifesaving
assistance and protection to affected populations in Sudan and neighbouring countries. The conflict
has brought massive violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights, including war
crimes and likely crimes against humanity. Alongside EU humanitarian aid funding, operational
support through ReliefEU was also provided through 14 EU Humanitarian Air Bridge flights that
transported nearly 1 200 tonnes of relief items, including 360 tonnes from EU stocks, and warehousing
and logistics support in neighbouring Chad to support response to Sudan’s crisis.
In South Sudan, where the presence and arrival of more than one million people fleeing the conflict in
neighbouring Sudan are exacerbating an already fragile situation, the EU provided humanitarian aid
totalling EUR 105 million. Due to recurring floods during rainy season and a situation marked by
increased violence and insecurity, over 70% of the population in South Sudan needed humanitarian
assistance in 2025.
In the Horn of Africa, dry conditions have returned yet again. This is only two years after a historic
drought which caused multiple failed rainy seasons and drove hunger and displacement. Around 14
million people across Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti were food insecure, and nearly 10 million
forcibly displaced in 2025. The EU allocated EUR 158 million to respond to the most acute needs,
prioritising food and nutrition assistance, health, water and sanitation, and protection, whilst
systematically integrating disaster risk reduction and preparedness components into programming.
Violence has escalated further in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in the wider Great
Lakes region, notably due to a major offensive by the M23 armed group in the beginning of 2025,
taking over large parts of territory in eastern DRC, including the regional capitals of Goma and Bukavu.
Daily violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including widespread gender-
based violence, continue to plight civilians. The EU response in the Great Lakes region amounted to
more than EUR 129 million in 2025, combined with several EU Humanitarian Air Bridge flights, and
strengthened humanitarian diplomacy and advocacy efforts. In this context, the EU continued to
support regional and international efforts aimed at de-escalation and a political solution, working
closely with African and international partner. EU-funded operations in eastern DRC supported
notably a holistic approach to gender-based violence, offering medical and psychosocial care
alongside emergency livelihood support for survivors and at-risk communities. EU funding also
addressed further operational priorities such as health responses and Raid Response Mechanisms.
In Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali), the persistence of violence and armed conflicts has
had direct and dramatic consequences for the civilian population. It is jeopardizing gains in
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development, social cohesion, and welfare of the population. Insecurity also restricts humanitarian
access to populations in affected areas as well as the free movement of people and goods. In 2025,
the three countries accounted for 14.9 million people in need, 4.35 million forcibly displaced people
(+4.5% compared to 2024), around 6 million people in severely/acute food insecurity (phases 3 out of
5 levels), almost 630 000 children under five severely malnourished, over 8 000 schools and 670 health
centres closed or dysfunctional. The EU provided nearly EUR 103 million in humanitarian assistance,
with food security and nutrition as dominant sectors, while also supporting protection activities,
WASH, health and emergency education.
Since 2009, the Lake Chad Basin crisis is driven by a regional conflict affecting North-East Nigeria, the
Far North of Cameroon, Chad’s Lac region and Niger’s Diffa region. This is an acute and protracted
crisis. Significant protection threats and large-scale population movements characterise this complex
crisis. In 2025, there were 10.4 million people in need in the region, of which only 5.4 million targeted
under the reprioritised Humanitarian Response Plans. Over 3.4 million people were forcibly displaced
due to attacks by Non-State Armed Groups. Around 6.1 million people were severely/acutely food
insecure (phases 3-4) including over 4.6 million in North-East Nigeria alone. The EU’s multisector
emergency assistance for the people most exposed to the crisis neared to EUR 62 million in 2025
(specifically for these regions of Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger), with most funding going to food
security, health /nutrition and protection.
Humanitarian needs remained acute across Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean, where recurrent
cyclones, floods and severe droughts continued to affect the region. The effect of the 2023/2024 El
Niño-induced drought continued to be felt in 2025 with some 20 million people still facing acute food
insecurity. The region was also affected by epidemics, notably cholera, measles and Mpox. Conflict
and violence have continued in northern Mozambique with 1.3 million displaced people over seven
years of conflict. The EU continued to provide funding for multi-sectoral live saving assistance (food
assistance, nutrition, health, water, sanitation and hygiene, education in emergencies, protection, and
rapid-response mechanisms) as well as funding for key activities to enable humanitarian operations
(transport, data, security). Humanitarian funding was also provided to respond to sudden and
unforeseen shocks such as floods, cyclones, displacements of population and cholera outbreaks, this
includes the use of emergency funding modalities under ReliefEU. Support to disaster preparedness
has also continued both at country and regional levels with the Southern African Development
Community.
Under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), assistance was offered to four Sub-Saharan
African countries in 2025. Three requests were related to epidemics, Ebola in DRC and Kenya, Mpox
in Sierra Leone, where EU Member States deployed health experts to support UN health coordination
structures. Additionally, Cape Verde received relief items, from five EU Member States following a
severe flood. The health-related crises benefited from coordinated use of both humanitarian aid and
the UCPM, which, together with ReliefEU, complemented efforts to prevent and respond to epidemic
outbreaks.
4.1.4. Crisis response and preparedness
In 2025, the EU further strengthened crisis response and preparedness in Sub-Saharan Africa through
NDICI–Global Europe’s rapid-response pillar.
Crisis response actions under NDICI–Global Europe funded swift measures in situations of
(post-)conflict, forced displacement and climate-related shocks, enabling flexible support in fragile
and crisis-affected settings. By the end of 2025, new interventions adopted during the year, including
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in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Nigeria
and across the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, focused on human security, stabilisation,
confidence-building, combating disinformation and supporting accountability and the prevention of
electoral violence.
The EU also maintained dedicated support for peace, stability and crisis preparedness through the
NDICI–Global Europe thematic programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention. Actions
strengthened global capacities for mine action, mediation, Women, Peace and Security, early warning
and foresight, human security, cybersecurity, maritime security, disinformation and the accountability
and prevention of electoral violence, with civil-society-led de-escalation efforts supported in countries
such as Guinea, Somalia and Gabon.
As an example, the EU–UN Global Terrorist Threat Facility delivered targeted counter-terrorism
support packages to Nigeria and Somalia, while child-reintegration initiatives in Nigeria and
anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing support in South Africa and Mozambique
strengthened resilience to violent extremism and terrorism financing. Similarly, cybersecurity
capacity-building enabled Rwanda and São Tomé and Príncipe to join the Budapest Convention,
enhancing protection against cyber-enabled threats.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, crisis response and preparedness increasingly relied on an integrated nexus
approach across external action instruments. In the Lake Chad Basin, the RESILAC2 programme
focused on human capital development, economic recovery and natural resource management to
address drivers of fragility and displacement. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Global Gateway
projects such as the Green Corridor were explicitly designed to apply a
humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach in a fragile and conflict-affected setting, including
the creation of a 500 000 km² community reserve along the Kivu–Kinshasa green corridor. In Somalia,
Global Gateway investments in irrigation systems supported food-system resilience in a context of
recurrent drought, conflict and displacement, while the modernisation of the Douala–N’Djamena
corridor and value-chain investments along the Lobito Corridor contributed to stabilisation and
crisis-risk reduction in Cameroon, Chad, Angola, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Similarly, the EU dedicated EUR 81 million to the disaster-preparedness budget line in 2025, and one
in three humanitarian projects included a preparedness component, including in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Investment in early-warning and information systems for climate-related hazards continued,
supported by stable contributions to the early-warning component of the Copernicus Emergency
Management Service.
Finally, in the West African Gulf of Guinea, the European Peace Facility and Common Security and
Defence Policy actions, including the EU Security and Defence Initiative in support of West African
countries of the Gulf of Guinea, helped strengthen maritime security and crisis-response capacities.
4.2. Asia and the Pacific
4.2.1. East Asia and South Asia
4.2.1.1. Introduction (policy developments)
In 2025, the EU’s engagement with East Asia, South-East Asia and South Asia continued to deepen,
consolidating the comprehensive regional approach set out in the EU’s Strategy for the Indo-Pacific
and building on the political developments of 2024. The EU pursued a broad agenda encompassing
peace and security, connectivity and Global Gateway investments, trade and economic security,
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human rights and democracy, and multilateral cooperation, while managing the impact of Russia’s
war against Ukraine and instability in the Middle East on regional dynamics.
In South Asia, the EU maintained a strong focus on stability, democratic processes and human rights.
In Pakistan, cooperation remained framed by the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+), with
continued monitoring of the implementation of the relevant human- and labour-rights conventions.
In Afghanistan, the EU preserved its presence to maintain technical channels of communication with
the Taliban de facto authorities, in line with the Council Conclusions on Afghanistan of September
2021(51) and March 2023(52), and to support the Afghan population both with humanitarian aid and
basic needs and livelihoods assistance, in particular women and girls, while enabling and sustaining
inclusive, Afghan-led dialogue and engagement processes in line with the ‘for women, by women’
approach and in close coordination with the United Nations-led political process. With India, the EU
further advanced the strategic partnership beyond the 2025 roadmap, including through sustained
negotiations on a free trade agreement and an agreement on geographical indications, and by using
the Trade and Technology Council to address key trade, digital and security issues. Engagement with
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka remained anchored in support for democratic reform processes and in
conditional market access under GSP+, alongside support for human rights, peacebuilding and social
cohesion.
Relations with China continued to be guided by the multifaceted approach of partner, competitor and
systemic rival. The EU sought to maintain constructive and stable relations with China while pursuing
four priorities: addressing the material support provided by Chinese companies to Russia’s war efforts
in Ukraine, rebalancing the economic and trade relationship, and ensuring reliable and predictable
supply chains, particularly in critical raw materials, as well as engaging on global challenges, in
particular climate change and environment. In Mongolia, the EU continued to support economic
diversification, renewable energy and forest partnerships, while interest to explore possible
cooperation on critical raw materials is high on the agenda.
Engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states was
further consolidated in 2025 under the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership and its 2023-2027 plan of
action. Following Laos’s ASEAN chairmanship and Thailand’s role as EU coordinator, the EU pursued
implementation of partner-country-led connectivity, digital and green-transition priorities, including
through Global Gateway investments and enhanced support for the ASEAN Power Grid to strengthen
sustainable regional energy integration. Free-trade agreement negotiations with several ASEAN
partners advanced, alongside a digital trade agreement with Singapore and close political and
human-rights dialogue, including continued pressure on Myanmar’s military regime and support for
the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.
With Japan and the Republic of Korea, the EU built on the security and defence partnerships launched
in 2024, and also continued to deepen cooperation on economic security, resilient supply chains,
green and digital transitions and research and innovation, including negotiations on association to
Horizon Europe. Across East and South Asia, the EU used a ‘Team Europe’ approach and the Global
Gateway strategy to promote sustainable connectivity, high-standard infrastructure, and open and
rules-based regional order, in line with its values-based and multilateral vision for the Indo-Pacific.
51 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11713-2021-REV-2/en/pdf 52 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7264-2023-INIT/en/pdf
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4.2.1.2. Implementation
Human development and inequalities
In 2025, the EU promoted inclusive human development and reduced inequalities across East, South
and South-East Asia, with a focus on fragile and conflict affected contexts.
In Afghanistan, the EU maintained substantial support for basic needs and livelihoods through an EUR
80 million programme on economic stabilisation and community resilience and an additional EUR 3
million in support measures. In parallel, the EU reinforced its response to the Afghan displacement
crisis in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia by EUR 38.5 million.
In Myanmar, the EU committed EUR 29 million to sustain jobs, protect vulnerable communities and
ensure access to education, and released EUR 140 million previously suspended to respond to needs
arising from the 2025 earthquake and the protracted crisis.
In Bangladesh, cooperation on education, technical and vocational education and training and social
protection supported reforms and more inclusive services.
In Viet Nam, a new EUR 40 million technical and vocational education and training programme was
signed; in Cambodia, EUR 8 million strengthened the Partnership in Education for Green and Digital
Jobs and links with European companies; and in Laos, an additional EUR 15 million reinforced the
Partnership in Education and Skills for Inclusive and Green Growth.
Across the region, the EU supported access to health and to water and sanitation through blended
operations in Pakistan, the Philippines and Viet Nam.
Green Deal
Climate and environmental cooperation intensified under Global Gateway and the Neighbourhood,
Development and International Cooperation Instrument (Global Europe). The SWITCH Asia
Programme launched a new EUR 25 million call to scale up circular economy and sustainable
consumption and production initiatives in South and South-East Asia and continued technical
assistance for green public procurement, extended producer responsibility, business engagement,
circular climate finance and parliamentary dialogues.
The EU advanced Just Energy Transition Partnerships with Indonesia and Viet Nam: in Indonesia, it
committed EUR 11 million to the Energy Transition Facility and almost EUR 15 million to a new
cooperation facility for clean energy investments and policy reforms; in Viet Nam, it increased support
to the Energy Transition Facility by EUR 23 million, prepared a transport facility including railway
decarbonisation, continued implementation of the Sustainable Energy Transition Budget Support
Programme and advanced the Women led Green Partnership Programme. In South Asia, the Global
Gateway flagship ‘Energy Connectivity in South Asia’ supported the creation of a cross border
electricity market for regional integration and low carbon development.
In the Association of Southeast Asian Nations region (ASEAN), the EU positioned itself as a leading
development partner for the ASEAN Power Grid, with around EUR 12 million already supporting
project preparation, financing and regional planning and a substantial Team Europe package under
preparation, and committed EUR 30 million for two biodiversity programmes to scale up nature based
solutions and climate resilience. The EU promoted sustainable water and circular economy
investments through blended operations for climate resilient water, sanitation and hygiene in
Pakistan; projects in the Philippines and Viet Nam with Climate Investor 2; the Bakheng Water
Treatment Plant flagship in Cambodia, serving more than 2 million people; a new programme in
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Myanmar for climate resilient rural livelihoods; preparation of a climate resilience flagship in Thailand;
and circular economy actions in Viet Nam, including EUR 9 million in contracts. Engagement with
Thailand and Malaysia on the EU deforestation regulation intensified, with support to smallholders in
rubber and palm oil.
In addition, under the ASEAN Catalytic Green Finance Facility, three EU co financed projects (EUR 26
million) started in 2025 in Laos (sustainable agrifood systems), Indonesia (clean energy transition) and
Cambodia (climate resilient, water secure cities).
Finally, the EU committed EUR 34.5 million to deepen engagement with China on climate and
environmental challenges, focusing on water management and circular, sustainable practices and
supporting implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement.
Sustainable growth and jobs
The first EU–Mongolia Business and Investment Forum gathered over 700 participants, including 70
European companies, and facilitated 160 business meetings. During the event, the Government and
the European Investment Bank signed a memorandum of understanding potentially unlocking up to
EUR 1 billion for Global Gateway renewable energy projects. Preparations started for the first EU–Viet
Nam Business and Investment Forum focusing on transport, energy and digital. The EU advanced
sustainable transport and connectivity, including support for maritime and land corridors such as the
National Road 2 flagship connecting Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam, and promoted investment climate
reforms. In South Asia, Global Gateway energy connectivity projects are expected to generate jobs in
regional grids and renewable energy installations.
The EU supported inclusive and sustainable agri food value chains. In Cambodia, the ASPIRE AT
investment package was launched to strengthen agriculture, food security, value chain
competitiveness and exports. In Laos, the Global Gateway flagship on Trade, Investment and
Connectivity in Agriculture and Forestry was reinforced to improve social protection and labour
standards in coffee, tea and forestry value chains. In Myanmar, an EUR 8 million action was approved
to promote decent jobs in the garment sector. In Indonesia, an EU Desk at the Ministry of Investment
was established in June 2025 to facilitate European foreign direct investment and accompany the
implementation of the trade agreement. In Malaysia, the EU-Malaysia Business Day highlighted the
EU as a key trade and investment partner and supported Global Gateway investments, including the
‘Port of Lumut Maritime Industrial City’ flagship moving beyond feasibility. At regional level, the EU
launched a EUR 4 million initiative on competition and subsidies control, a EUR 6 million initiative on
port safety and a EUR 10 million initiative on aviation cooperation.
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
A key Global Gateway milestone was the signing of the EU–Africa–India Digital Corridor Blue Raman
to reinforce resilient submarine cable connectivity and a secure, diversified global data architecture.
The EU adopted a EUR 42 million initiative to strengthen the use of Copernicus data in Asia Pacific,
with EUR 19.5 million for South and South-East Asia and Mongolia, and approved a EUR 3.5 million
extension of Asi@Connect to support digital connectivity of universities and research institutions in
least developed countries and their cooperation with Europe.
The EU deepened digital governance and cybersecurity cooperation. EU CyberNet expanded to the
Indo Pacific, connecting 571 experts and 123 organisations and supporting reforms on cybercrime and
cybersecurity aligned with the Budapest Convention. New actions with high income Asian countries
strengthened digital partnerships, regulatory dialogue, connectivity investments and economic
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security. In Indonesia, preparatory work continued on potential Global Gateway digital investments,
including Nusantara Smart City. At ASEAN level, SCOPE Digital and CopASEAN widened the use of
Copernicus, broadened digital cooperation and promoted the EU technology offer.
Migration and forced displacement
In South Asia, implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 10.7 and the external dimension of
the Pact on Migration and Asylum focused on the Afghan displacement crisis and protracted refugee
situations. 2.9 million Afghans were forcibly returned from Iran and Pakistan in 2025. Under the Team
Europe Initiative on Afghan displacement, the EU combined long term support for basic needs and
livelihoods in Afghanistan with increased assistance to host countries, migration and mobility
dialogues and support to border management in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
The EU allocated EUR 81 million from the regional budget to migration, including management,
protection and displacement tracking, with EUR 38.5 million in additional funding for the Afghan
displacement crisis. It also provided EUR 15 million for displaced Myanmar populations in Thailand
and increased the Rohingya Resilience Programme in Bangladesh by EUR 14 million, bringing support
in Cox’s Bazar to EUR 49 million. In addition to European Legal Gateway Office pilot in India, talent
partnerships with Bangladesh and Pakistan and programmes on decent work in sectors such as ready
made garments promoted regular migration and higher labour standards.
Governance, peace and security
The EU combined country specific and regional actions. It launched a EUR 5 million programme to
strengthen resilience to violent extremism in the digital space (EUR 4.4 million for South and South
East Asia) and adopted a regional programme in South Asia to reinforce cross border cooperation
against technology enabled crime and terrorism. In Pakistan, the EU pursued its engagement with the
government to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism. In the Philippines, the EU
continued its support to the Mindanao peace process and launched a EUR 16.5 million action on justice
sector reform. In Myanmar, it maintained support to local actors on conflict prevention, resolution
and de-escalation, including protection and lifesaving assistance. In Laos, the EU strengthened
citizens’ engagement and good governance with an additional EUR 1.5 million for civil society, national
and provincial assemblies and access to justice, and enhanced support to public finance management
reform focused on domestic resource mobilisation and transparency.
The EU reinforced cooperation with likeminded partners in the Indo Pacific on economic security,
disaster management and regulatory matters, including rapid support on the implementation of the
EU Waste Shipment Regulation in ASEAN countries, enhanced disaster management and civil
protection in Taiwan and progress on the roadmap for the EU–Australia strategic partnership on
critical raw materials. Additional actions strengthened digital partnerships, economic security
cooperation and cultural relations with partners such as Japan, Singapore and Thailand. In Viet Nam,
the second phase of the EU Justice and Legal Empowerment Programme began, aiming to improve
the rule of law and protection of rights.
Food security and nutrition
Food security and nutrition remained cross cutting priorities. Globally, the EU allocated around EUR
600 million to humanitarian food and nutrition assistance in 2025 and updated its Humanitarian Food
and Livelihood Assistance Policy, applying to crises in Afghanistan, Myanmar and the Rohingya
response. In Afghanistan, around 12.6 million people faced acute food insecurity; the EU supported
climate smart agriculture, sustainable livestock management and alternative livelihoods, particularly
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for farmers affected by the ban on poppy cultivation. In Myanmar, where more than 20 million people
depended on aid even before the March earthquake, EU humanitarian programmes combined food,
nutrition and livelihoods with health, protection and shelter. Through Global Gateway and the NDICI–
Global Europe Instrument, the EU complemented emergency assistance with investments in water,
sanitation and climate resilient infrastructure in Pakistan, the Philippines and Viet Nam, contributing
to sustainable food systems and resilience to climate induced shocks.
Case study
The Global Gateway flagship ‘Energy Connectivity in South Asia’ demonstrates how the EU links
sustainable growth, green transition and regional integration by supporting the development of a
cross-border electricity market. The initiative aims to improve reliability, affordability and
sustainability of power supply, unlock investment in transmission infrastructure and regulatory
harmonisation and facilitate integration of renewable energy. In 2025, preparatory work on priority
interconnections and market arrangements advanced with regional organisations, international
financial institutions and Team Europe partners, with expected benefits in job creation, lower energy
costs and reduced greenhouse gas emissions.
4.2.1.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people affected
by conflicts and disasters
In 2025, East and South Asia remained among the regions most affected by protracted crises, conflict,
and natural hazards and climate induced disasters. Afghanistan remains one of the world’s most
severe humanitarian crises, with 22.9 million people in need of assistance. The restrictions imposed
by the Taliban government put continuous strain on humanitarian operations, particularly women’s
participation in aid delivery and access to humanitarian assistance. Amidst severe food insecurity and
lack of basic services, girls are denied access to school beyond primary level, affecting over 2.6 million
adolescent girls and driving negative coping strategies such as child labour and early or forced
marriage. The EU provided lifesaving assistance worth over EUR 163 million and funded Humanitarian
Air Bridge flights (EUHAB) delivering 390 tonnes of medical and nutritional items to humanitarian
organisations in Afghanistan, supporting key supply chain pipelines. In Afghanistan and other fragile
contexts, the EU pursues a nexus approach that combines immediate lifesaving assistance with longer-
term support for stability and resilience. For example, the EU’s basic needs and livelihoods assistance
complements its lifesaving response at border points by promoting inclusive economic recovery,
access to essential services, and the reintegration of returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs),
while supporting host communities.
The Afghanistan crisis continues to affect neighbouring countries. Pakistan’s implementation of the
Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan and Iran’s increased forced returns of undocumented Afghans
have significantly worsened regional humanitarian pressures. More than 5.5 million Afghans have
returned from Pakistan and Iran since 2023, including around 3 million in 2025 alone, placing severe
strain on Afghanistan’s border points and already overstretched humanitarian response. These
movements risk further destabilising vulnerable communities.
Myanmar was the second most violent context worldwide and reported the highest number of
landmine casualties in 2024-20251. Almost 21 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance
before the 7.7-magnitude earthquake in March impacted an additional two million people. In 2025
the EU allocated EUR 55 million in humanitarian aid assistance to respond to conflict- and disaster
related needs, including protection, health, water and sanitation, food, shelter and education, sending
over 1 000 tonnes of aid via 16 EUHABs.
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In Bangladesh, Cox’s Bazar continued to host the world’s largest refugee camp, with more than 1.2
million Rohingya refugees, and vulnerable host communities. The presence of armed groups has
caused increased protection concerns including forced recruitment, violence and extortion. The EU
provided over EUR 34 million in humanitarian aid in 2025, targeting protection, food assistance,
health, water and sanitation, and education. The EU also addressed wider regional impact of the
Myanmar crisis, allocating EUR 4.5 million to address the urgent protection, food, health and shelter
needs of refugees in other countries of the region.
The 2025 cyclone season had a particularly severe impact on South and South-East Asia. Sri Lankan
authorities requested assistance following the landfall of Tropical Cyclone Ditwah in November 2025,
the worst disaster faced by the country since the 2004 Tsunami. In response, several EU Member
States offered in-kind assistance, notably shelters, a team of structural engineers to support damage
assessment, and 42 satellite maps provided by the Copernicus Emergency Management Service. The
EU allocated EUR 2.2 million in humanitarian aid to support humanitarian partners addressing
immediate needs.
Disaster Risk Management cooperation with the region gained further importance. Implementation
of the administrative arrangement on disaster risk management with the ASEAN Coordinating Centre
for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre), signed in 2024, remained a key framework for
strengthening disaster risk management capacities in Southeast Asia. A similar arrangement with
India’s National Disaster Management Authority was developed in 2025.
4.2.1.4. Crisis response and preparedness
In 2025, the EU strengthened crisis response and preparedness in East and South Asia through an
integrated use of NDICI–Global Europe rapid-response actions, humanitarian aid, civil-protection tools
and foreign-policy instruments, in line with the humanitarian–development–peace nexus.
Rapid-response interventions focused on the most fragile contexts, notably Afghanistan, Myanmar,
Bangladesh, and on regional spillovers.
In Afghanistan, the EU continued to support the protection of the Afghan population, the prevention
of violence towards minorities and marginalised groups and seeked opportunities to promote social
accountability and inclusive dialogue. These actions complemented large-scale humanitarian aid
supporting basic services, resilient livelihoods and community-based protection, with a strong focus
on women’s and girls’ access to assistance under the ‘for women, by women’ approach. In Myanmar,
NDICI crisis-response tools were mobilised to address the consequences of intensified conflict and the
March 2025 earthquake, through support to local civil-society actors and help to preserve civic space.
In Bangladesh, the EU launched a new crisis response action to improve the physical and mental health
of those affected by the 2024 civil unrest and enhance their economic resilience and the social
cohesion of their communities. Regional actions strengthened resilience to violent extremism in the
digital space and cross-border cooperation against technology-enabled crime and terrorism. The EU
also strengthened environmental preparedness through targeted action on climate-related instability,
deforestation-free supply chains, and improved waste governance across South and Southeast Asia.
Additionally, the EU strengthened societal resilience and preparedness by addressing foreign
information manipulation and interference. Through support to independent media, professional
networks, fact-checking capacities and exchanges on monitoring and response, the EU helped build
more informed, resilient and secure information environments in the Indo-Pacific regionally as well as
in Taiwan.
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Preparedness and disaster-risk reduction were reinforced. Implementation of the administrative
arrangement on disaster management with ASEAN and cooperation with the ASEAN Coordinating
Centre for Humanitarian Assistance continued to enhance regional early-warning, contingency
planning and emergency-response coordination, while work advanced on an administrative
arrangement with India’s National Disaster Management Authority to deepen cooperation on
disaster-risk reduction, early-warning systems and civil-protection capacities. The Union Civil
Protection Mechanism and the new ReliefEU tool provided rapid logistical support and in-kind
assistance following emergencies such as the Myanmar earthquake, reinforcing national and regional
response capacities.
4.2.2. Central Asia
4.2.2.1. Introduction (policy developments)
In 2025, high-level dialogues, visits and cooperation between the EU and the countries of Central Asia
continued to intensify, confirming a shared commitment to deepen both bilateral and regional
partnerships. The first EU-Central Asia Summit was held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on 4 April 2025,
where the leaders of the two regions agreed to upgrade their relationship to a strategic partnership
and launched an EUR 12 billion Global Gateway investment package. Ahead of the Summit, European
Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela also visited all five Central Asian countries to
boost prosperity and mobilising investments under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy. The EU High
Representative/Vice-President Kaja Kallas also travelled to the region for the EU Central Asia
Ministerial in March 2025 in Ashgabat. President of the European Council Costa visited Astana on 4
December 2025 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (EPCA) with Kazakhstan.
Building on the ‘Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia’ (2023)(53) and
the 2019 EU Strategy for Central Asia(54), work advanced across the five priority areas: inter-regional
dialogue and cooperation; trade, investment and economic ties; connectivity under the Global
Gateway strategy and the European Green Deal; common security challenges; and people-to-people
contacts.
Connectivity remained at the centre of the partnership. In 2025, the EU’s strategic approach to the
Black Sea(55) introduced a flagship Connectivity Agenda linking Europe with Central Asia through the
South Caucasus, aligning with the extended Trans Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC), the EU’s
decarbonisation objectives and broader geopolitical considerations. The Agenda was endorsed at
ministerial level in Luxembourg on 20 October 2025, and further operationalised at the TCTC and
Connectivity Investors Forum in Tashkent in November 2025, which brought together stakeholders
around a comprehensive transport, trade, digital and energy ‘meta-study’ covering 60 existing studies
and 215 potential investment projects along the corridor.
These developments complemented the Global Gateway-driven partnership launched at the first EU-
Central Asia summit, where the EU had announced a Team Europe investment package focusing on
sustainable transport, critical raw materials, green energy and digital connectivity. The package
supports the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, sustainable critical mineral value chains,
Water/clean-energy/climate and satellite-internet initiatives, positioning Central Asia as a key partner
in a rules-based, sustainable connectivity network.
53 20231023 EU Roadmap Central Asia_EN.pdf 54 JOIN(2019) 9 55 JOIN(2025) 135
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Work also continued on trade and economic relations. The EU advanced the network of Enhanced
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCAs): an EPCA with Kyrgyzstan was signed in 2024,
negotiations with Tajikistan were completed in 2025 and an EPCA with Uzbekistan was signed on 24
October 2025, while the implementation of existing frameworks with Kazakhstan supported
regulatory approximation, investment and sectoral cooperation.
Addressing common security challenges remained a shared priority. The EU and Central Asian partners
intensified cooperation to tackle terrorism, extremism and radicalisation, illicit trafficking and other
transnational threats, including in the framework of the EU–Central Asia High-Level Political and
Security Dialogue and dedicated regional programmes. The regular EU–Central Asia Dialogue on Drugs
also took place in April 2025 and an EU–Central Asia Counterterrorism Dialogue was also established
at the Summit, with its first occurence in July 2025. Dialogue also continued on the implications of
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including efforts to prevent sanctions circumvention.
Human rights and the rule of law remained integral to the partnership. The EU held regular human
rights dialogues with all five Central Asian countries and engaged with national authorities and civil
society on governance reforms and fundamental freedoms.
4.2.2.2. Implementation
Human development and inequalities
In 2025, Central Asian countries benefited from regional and national actions in the sectors of
education/skills development, gender equality/fight against gender-based violence, support to civil
society, health/strengthening vaccination systems.
The implementation of the regional DARYA programme on skills development (EUR 10 million, 2022-
2027, implemented by the European Training Foundation), continued in the five Central Asian
countries with a particular focus on skills development in the Global Gateway priority area of
transport, in particular in Kazakhstan.
Central Asian civil society organisations continued benefitting from support at both national, through
thematic programmes for Civil Society and Democracy and Human Rights, and regional levels, through
the Civil Society Facility for Central Asia (EUR 4.5 million, implemented by the UNOPS, in partnership
with the Danish Institute for Human Rights, since 2024). With the support of the Facility, the annual
EU–Central Asia Civil Society Forum was organised in January 2025 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.
In addition, the contract for a new regional programme in Central Asia (EUR 5.3 million), called
CHANGE (Challenging Harmful Attitudes and Norms for Gender Equality), aimed at tackling gender-
based violence was signed in 2025. Implementation by a consortium of UN agencies (UNFPA, UN
Women, UNDP) will start in the beginning of 2026. This project has three interlinked objectives:
improving social norms, enhancing the role of civil society in fighting Gender-Based Violence and
empowering women economically.
Green Deal
Climate and environmental cooperation with Central Asia was anchored in the Global Gateway
strategy and the Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on water-energy-climate change in Central Asia. In 2025,
three regional EU-funded projects directly supporting the TEI continued being implemented, fostering
dialogue, skills and sustainable investments on water and energy challenges in Central Asia. Those
projects are: the Central Asia Water and Energy Programme (CAWEP) with the World Bank, and two
EU4SustainableCentralAsia projects on water and renewable energy promotion with the German
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Society for International Cooperation (GIZ). The first ever Steering Committee meeting of the TEI took
place in November 2025 in Tashkent. In addition, a project was started in Tajikistan aiming to reduce
electricity grid losses and strengthen the capacities of the national electricity network.
Sustainable growth and jobs
In November 2025, the third EU–Central Asia Economic Forum in Uzbekistan and the second
Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and Connectivity Investors Forum reviewed progress including on
the investment climate. These events resulted in fourteen new contracts, including three new regional
programmes enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials (GROW CRM, SECURE CRM and
DATA4CRM). Two business missions were also organised to Central Asia in the framework of the CRM
Strategic Partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Engagement under the transport objective focused on scaling up investment along the Trans-Caspian
Corridor as a priority Global Gateway corridor, to improve regional connectivity and trade
opportunities. Supported investments are expected to support economic diversification, regional
integration and job creation, including in logistics, construction, energy and services.
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
In the framework of the infrastructure component of the Digital Connectivity TEI aimed at bridging
the digital divide in Central Asia, 328 villages have been connected to the Internet through satellite,
while negotiations have been on-going in other Central Asian countries, particularly in Uzbekistan. The
soft connectivity component comprising all interventions needed to create an enabling policy and
regulatory framework to safely deploy satellite connectivity, implemented by a consortium of EU
Member State agencies (Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania), led by the French agency Expertise
France, started in January 2025 with a budget of EUR 20 million.
The EU also adopted a EUR 42 million initiative to strengthen the use of Copernicus data in Asia-Pacific,
supporting evidence-based decision-making. Out of the total amount, EUR 12.5 million are dedicated
to Central Asia.
Furthermore, a regional EUR 5 million programme was launched in Asia-Pacific to support Asian
countries’ resilience to violent extremism in the digital space, including Central Asia.
Migration and forced displacement
In 2025 the EU approved a EUR 38.5 million top-up package under the Asia-Pacific regional envelope
for migration, forced displacement and mobility, to strengthen its programmes on data collection and
sharing (DATA, implemented by IOM) as well as border management and fight against smuggling of
migrants and trafficking in human beings (PROTECT, implemented by ICMPD and UNODC). The EU also
supports the REMIT project on remittances in Central Asia implemented by IFAD (EUR 6 million).
Governance, peace and security
At the beginning of 2025, the Council appointed a new EU Special Representatives for Central Asia, to
continue strengthening political engagement and the EU’s capacity to support regional stability and
cooperation.
Under its regional security cooperation with Central Asia, the EU launched new phases of the Border
Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA 11, EUR 12 million) and the Central Asia Drug Action
Programme (CADAP 8, EUR 18 million). Both programmes have been refocused considering rising
threats, with BOMCA now concentrating fully on border security, cross-border cooperation and
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improving living conditions in border communities, and CADAP combining continued support for drug
demand reduction with strengthened action against drug trafficking and drug supply. These are
complemented by interventions under the Crisis Response funding stream, the EU retained a specific
focus on supporting Tajikistan in protecting its border with Afghanistan, which remains highly sensitive
from a security perspective for the entire region and beyond.
Food security and nutrition
No dedicated Central Asia -specific action was reported under this heading in 2025; relevant issues
were addressed through broader regional, thematic, or global instruments where applicable.
Case study
The Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC) illustrates the EU’s Global Gateway approach to
sustainable, rules-based connectivity in Central Asia. In 2024, a pledge of EUR 10 billion was made on
behalf of the EU and participating international finance institutions, and by November 2025, about
25% of this pledge had materialised as specific contracts related to TCTC related infrastructure
projects. At the TCTC and Connectivity Investors Forum in November 2025, contracts were signed
related to the modernisation of Aktau Port in Kazakhstan, one of the key logistics hubs on the Caspian
Sea, and the Karabalta–Chaldovar road section in Kyrgyzstan leading to the border with Kazakhstan.
In addition, contracts were signed with the World Bank and the EBRD to finance further preparatory
studies for hard infrastructure projects along the corridor, as well as a contract with GIZ and Expertise
France to provide capacity building to the Governments of Central Asia related to transport and trade
facilitation.
The TCTC is supported as a backbone for sustainable trade and transport between Europe and Central
Asia, with a view to reducing transit times, improving reliability and fostering regional integration. It
shows that corridor-based approaches can deliver significant economic and connectivity gains when
accompanied by customs and regulatory reforms, strong environmental and social safeguards and
close coordination among the EU, partner governments, financial institutions and the private sector.
4.2.2.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people affected
by conflicts and disasters
Central Asia Central Asia remains highly exposed to disasters driven by the combined effects of climate
change and environmental degradation. Erratic rainfall patterns, extreme temperatures, floods,
landslides and earthquakes continue to pose risks to livelihoods and infrastructure. In 2025, the EU’s
humanitarian support to the region focused primarily on disaster-risk reduction, preparedness and
targeted emergency response, building on the approach developed in the previous year.
Building on its partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
the EU and its partners continued to strengthen early-warning systems, contingency planning and
community-level preparedness. The focus remained on climate- and weather-related hazards and on
reinforcing the capacities of national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies to respond rapidly to
localised emergencies.
4.2.2.4. Crisis response and preparedness
Central Asian partners benefitted from regional actions under the NDICI–Global Europe thematic
programme on Stability Peace and Conflict Prevention, notably the network of chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence and related risk-mitigation programmes, which
strengthen national systems’ capacity to anticipate, detect and manage complex crises.
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The Crisis Response and Foreign Policy Needs instruments also remained available to address potential
spillovers from regional instability and to support economic- and energy-security measures linked to
the Trans-Caspian connectivity agenda. In particular, Crisis Response provided rapid support to
increase cross-border cooperation in crisis preparedness and response in support of border
communities in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Under Foreign Policy Needs, information resilience across
Central Asia was strengthened, through the empowerment of media, civil society, and educators to
build a more informed and engaged public by promoting reliable, locally relevant content and
countering propaganda
Disaster-risk reduction and preparedness were central priorities too. Building on earlier support to the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for
evidence-based disaster and emergency preparedness, work in 2025 continued to reinforce
early-warning systems, contingency planning and anticipatory approaches for floods, landslides and
other climate-related hazards, including in follow-up to the severe flooding in Kazakhstan in 2024.
Risk-informed planning increasingly accompanied Global Gateway investments in transport, energy
and digital corridors to ensure that new infrastructure is resilient to climate and seismic risks.
While Central Asian countries did not activate the Union Civil Protection Mechanism in 2025, the
mechanism and related technical-assistance facilities provided a framework for joint risk assessment,
scenario planning and capacity-building, complementing EU thematic programmes on CBRN, cyber
and hybrid threats and contributing to enhanced regional preparedness.
4.2.3. The Pacific
4.2.3.1. Introduction (policy developments)
In 2025, the Pacific Island countries (PICs) remained key partners for the EU in climate action and
green transition, ocean governance and environmental protection, as well as important allies in
defending the international rules-based order with the United Nations at its core. EU engagement
continued to be framed by the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which underlines the
region’s strategic relevance for Europe’s prosperity and security, and by the Global Gateway strategy,
providing a transparent, values-based offer for sustainable, resilient and cooperative infrastructure
development. EU priorities stayed closely aligned with the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent,
particularly on economic development, climate change, the ocean and environment, people,
technology and connectivity, and peace and security.
The EU is a dialogue partner in the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the region’s main political organisation,
and a permanent observer in the Pacific Community (SPC), the principal technical and scientific
regional body. In 2025, high-level political contacts with PIF members were maintained, including
ministerial and senior-official meetings and thematic dialogues on climate, the ocean, sustainable
finance and security, reinforcing the EU’s long-standing role as a reliable partner for the Blue Pacific.
The Samoa Agreement, which entered into force with a dedicated Pacific Protocol, continued to
provide the overarching legal and political framework for a stronger region-to-region partnership. The
Protocol’s shared priorities – including climate and disaster resilience, sustainable ocean-based
economies, human development and good governance – guided the programming of EU support and
Team Europe Initiatives in the Pacific.
In 2025, the EU announced that, under Global Gateway, it would invest close to EUR 300 million in the
Pacific in climate resilience, renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, water and sanitation, and
governance and connectivity, positioning the Green-Blue Alliance as a flagship for the region.
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To increase the impact of its action, the EU continued to work in close synergy with Australia and New
Zealand, two like-minded partners with deep historical, political and economic ties to the Pacific.
Political dialogue with both countries covered responses to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,
security in the Indo-Pacific and non-traditional security threats such as cyber, counter-terrorism and
foreign information manipulation, as well as intensified cooperation on climate action and resilient
supply chains.
4.2.3.2. Implementation
Human development and inequalities
In 2025, EU cooperation in the Pacific continued to tackle structural inequalities, focusing on ending
gender-based violence. Phase II of the regional programme ‘Pacific Partnership to End Violence
Against Women and Girls’ (EUR 8.25 million) advanced in its first full year, building on Phase I and the
Spotlight Initiative.
Green Deal
Implementation of the planned Team Europe Initiative ‘Green-Blue Alliance for the Pacific and
Timor-Leste’ progressed, bringing together Global Gateway investments and other EU and EU Member
States’ instruments to promote equal and inclusive societies, fundamental values, human
development and peace and security across 18 partner countries and overseas countries and
territories.
Climate resilience, the ocean and biodiversity remained central. The Pacific EU Marine Partnership
(EUR 20 million) strengthened ocean governance, sustainable coastal resource management and local
expertise. The Kiwa Initiative (EU contribution EUR 19.9 million), ClimSA (EUR 9 million), Pacific
BioScapes (EUR 12 million) and PacWaste Plus (EUR 16.5 million) promoted nature-based solutions,
sustainable marine and coastal management, and improved waste and pollution control, including
marine litter.
In Timor-Leste, Technical Assistance to Support Carbon Farming delivered a Climate Change Base Law,
a draft carbon farming policy and a national agroforestry strategy. In Papua New Guinea, the Forestry,
Climate Change and Biodiversity programme (EUR 54.7 million) supported transparency reporting,
safeguards to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and participation in global
climate and biodiversity processes. The Pacific Rural Electrification Programme (EUR 15 million) was
rolled out in Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and
Vanuatu.
Sustainable growth and jobs
Global Gateway engagement expanded. The EU–Pacific Business Forum, held in Fiji in September
2025, gathered public and private stakeholders from Pacific Island countries and territories, like
minded partners and EU Member States. The European Commissioner for International Partnerships
Josef Síkela announced nearly EUR 300 million of investments in climate resilience, sustainable
growth, transport, digital connectivity, water and renewable energy.
The new Pacific Trade and Sustainable Development programme was launched, combining trade
policy with support to Pacific small and medium-sized enterprises to expand exports within the region
and to Europe. In Timor-Leste, the Agroforestry Skills for Development project (EUR 5.9 million)
further developed skills and value chains in coconut, cocoa and vanilla. In Papua New Guinea, the
STREIT programme increased rural incomes through support to cocoa, vanilla and fisheries value
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chains, and by investing in rural roads, airstrips and renewable energy to improve access to services,
jobs and markets.
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
The Pacific Digital Economy Programme (EU contribution EUR 8 million), with Australia and New
Zealand, promotes inclusive digital economies in 11 Pacific Island countries by strengthening digital
and financial literacy among rural communities, women and micro, small and medium-sized
enterprises.
In Timor-Leste, the budget support operation ‘Partnership for Public Financial Management and
Digital Transition’ was launched and a first fixed tranche of EUR 1 million was disbursed, supporting
interconnectivity of public financial management systems and links between central and local
administration.
The EU invested in safer and more inclusive public infrastructure and services through two education
and resilience initiatives with UNICEF (EUR 28.2 million), upgrading schools to withstand cyclones,
remain operational during crises and serve as safe spaces. In Vanuatu, schools damaged by Cyclone
Lola are being rebuilt to function as learning spaces and emergency shelters.
At Asia-Pacific level, a EUR 42 million initiative, including EUR 10 million for the Pacific, was adopted
to strengthen capacities to use Copernicus satellite data for spatial planning and climate change
mitigation, providing tools for risk informed decision making under the Global Gateway digital and
green offer.
Migration and Forced Displacement
Migration and forced displacement were not a primary focus of EU geographic programmes in 2025.
The region benefited indirectly from global policy developments on safe and regular migration,
protection and human rights based approaches, which will guide future cooperation on labour
mobility, climate induced displacement and diaspora engagement.
Governance, peace and security
The EU supported democratic governance and resilient institutions. In Solomon Islands, a project (EUR
5.5 million) made electoral processes more inclusive, informed and transparent. At Indo Pacific level,
the CRIMARIO II project and related initiatives enhanced maritime security cooperation through the
IORIS information sharing platform. A new security cooperation action deepened EU partnerships on
maritime security, counter terrorism, cyber and hybrid threats and foreign information manipulation
and interference.
A call for proposals for civil society organisations in the Pacific was completed to strengthen their
capacities in project implementation, advocacy, policy analysis and monitoring of government
programmes. In Timor-Leste, the Sector Reform Performance Contract for Budget Support ‘Supporting
Programme to Deconcentration and Decentralisation process in Timor-Leste’ concluded after five
years.
Food security and nutrition
The STODAS project (EUR 10 million) promotes integrated food systems, nutrition and environmental
sustainability in Fiji, Samoa and Solomon Islands by reinforcing policies, agricultural production and
agribusiness. In Timor-Leste, the project ‘Strengthening Social Inclusion and Nutrition in Timor-Leste’
selected 24 schools for construction of standardised kitchens and 59 farmer groups to supply schools,
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and began updating the National Health Sector Nutrition Strategic Plan and the Specific Nutrition
Intervention Package.
Case study
The blending project ‘Greening of the Port in Rabaul’ in Papua New Guinea, co-financed by the French
Development Agency, the European Investment Bank and the EU, will strengthen the country’s
regional role in trade and logistics and is expected to spur private investment in sustainable processing
of cocoa, fisheries products and timber.
The EU is also supporting Kiribati to develop a new port on Kiritimati Island to enable the eventual
relocation of the capital threatened by climate change. A EUR 2.5 million feasibility study, financed by
the EU and implemented by the European Investment Bank, will guide the design of the multipurpose
port, with the EU ready to support construction to boost economic development and trade through
greater private sector involvement
4.2.3.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people affected
by conflicts and disasters
In 2025, EU humanitarian support in the Pacific focused on strengthening resilience to climate
displacement. In Fiji and Vanuatu, as part of a regional project, the EU maintained a watch
function, closely monitoring disasters and maintaining readiness to activate support should the
impact of a disaster overwhelm national capacities.
In the Philippines island of Mindanao, conflict and natural hazards-induced disasters has fuelled
displacement. The EU allocated EUR 2 million in humanitarian aid to address humanitarian needs,
particularly through a Rapid Response Mechanism. The EU also invested EUR 4 million in Disaster
Preparedness efforts, notably to support the development of shock-responsive social protection and
anticipatory action. Multiple disasters, at times concurrent, affected the Philippines in 2025, severely
straining local capacities. The EU allocated over EUR 3.7 million in ReliefEU emergency funding to
respond to the compound impact of multiple cyclones, floods and earthquakes.
4.2.3.4. Crisis response and preparedness
In 2025, the EU’s crisis response and preparedness in the Pacific focused on strengthening resilience
to climate- and disaster-related shocks within a broader Green-Blue Alliance approach. Support was
framed by the Samoa Agreement’s Pacific Protocol and aligned with the 2050 Strategy for the Blue
Pacific Continent, prioritising climate and disaster resilience, sustainable ocean-based economies and
good governance.
Under NDICI–Global Europe and Global Gateway, new investments of almost EUR 300 million were
announced for climate resilience, renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, water and sanitation,
and transport, with the explicit objective of making infrastructure and services more resilient to
cyclones, floods and sea-level rise. Regional initiatives such as the Kiwa Initiative, Pacific BioScapes
and PacWaste Plus integrated disaster-risk reduction, nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based
adaptation into national and regional planning, thereby reducing future crisis risks.
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4.3. The Americas and the Caribbean
4.3.1. The Americas
4.3.1.1. Introduction (policy developments)
In 2025, relations between the EU and the Americas were marked by a qualitative deepening of the
bi-regional partnership. The main milestone was the fourth CELAC–EU (Community of Latin American
& Caribbean States) Summit, held on 9 November 2025 in Santa Marta, Colombia, and accompanied
by a LAC–EU Civil Society Forum and a LAC–EU Business Forum. Leaders took stock of progress since
the 2023 Brussels summit, reaffirmed the strategic importance of the partnership between the EU and
CELAC, and provided political steering for the next phase of cooperation, including under the EU–LAC
Global Gateway Investment Agenda (GGIA).
Leaders demonstrated their commitment to maintaining a strong bi-regional relationship, despite a
challenging geopolitical context, by adopting a Joint Declaration, alongside two complementary
declarations on the Alliance for Citizen Security and the Pact on Care. Discussions focused on key
priorities for both regions, including the defence of multilateralism, trade and investment, the green
and digital transitions, social inclusion, and cooperation on citizen security, justice, and the fight
against transnational organised crime. The Summit sent a clear message of continuity and partnership,
highlighting the shared commitment of both regions to addressing common challenges and advancing
cooperation.
High-level political and business engagement underpinned the strategic importance and dynamism of
the partnership between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Key milestones in the
EU’s external relations included the signature of the agreement with MERCOSUR, as well as the first
Association Councils with Central America and Chile, further deepening political and economic ties.
Four Election Observation Missions were also deployed. President von der Leyen’s participation in
CARICOM meetings and the first EU–Brazil Investment Forum signalled a more strategic dialogue with
key partners and highlighted the importance of sustainable investment, climate action and digital
cooperation.
Implementation of the GGIA progressed from its launch phase to a scale-up stage. By 2025, more than
80 projects were advancing, confirming the EU’s position as a leading investor in LAC and showcasing
the strength of the ‘Team Europe’ approach. Flagship regional initiatives on regional electricity
integration, a high-performance computing network and satellite connectivity initiatives under the
EU–LAC Digital Alliance and the valorisation of sargassum in the Caribbean illustrated how Global
Gateway is supporting green transition, digital transformation and innovation through high-quality,
sustainable investments in critical sectors.
4.3.1.2. Implementation
Human development and inequalities
In 2025, the EU stepped up cooperation with LAC to reduce inequalities and strengthen social
cohesion, building on the GGIA. The EU worked with partner countries to promote inclusive access to
basic services, social protection and skills, including through global actions on education, health and
social protection in which LAC countries participate, and through Team Europe Initiatives such as
Inclusive Societies in LAC. Investments in sustainable water and sanitation under Global Gateway
contributed to more resilient services, for example through blended operations in Mexico, Ecuador
and the Dominican Republic that improve water access and climate-resilient infrastructure. Work on
youth participation and gender equality – including youth dialogues on Global Gateway and the
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continued implementation of the Gender Action Plan III – helped ensure that new investments address
structural inequalities and intersectional discrimination.
Green Deal
Green transition cooperation focused on climate action, biodiversity and circular economy. The EU
supported circular-economy initiatives and deforestation-free value chains across more than 80
countries, including in LAC, helping reduce environmental pressures and align trade with the European
Green Deal. Through the Team Europe Initiative on deforestation-free value chains and the DeSIRA+
initiative, the EU backed agroforestry and sustainable value chains for cocoa, coffee and cashew,
which are particularly relevant in several American countries. Global Gateway also underpinned work
on critical raw materials, where the EU supported environmentally and socially sustainable supply
chains and began connecting priority projects in partner regions with off-takers and finance via a
dedicated CRM Facility. At global level, the EU announced close to EUR 160 million in new biodiversity
initiatives at the UN biodiversity conference in Cali, Colombia, further signalling the importance of LAC
for global biodiversity protection.
Sustainable growth and jobs
Under the GGIA, the EU reinforced its position as a leading investor in LAC, with more than 80 projects
advancing and a strong emphasis on mobilising private capital under high environmental, social and
governance standards. In 2025, the Latin America and Caribbean Investment Facility (LACIF) was
replenished with EUR 45 million, and ten contribution agreements were signed for EUR 32 million,
which are expected to mobilise about EUR 512 million in investments in sectors such as sustainable
energy, climate, digitalisation, water and sanitation and urban development, with further projects
approved for contracting in 2026. A service contract to provide technical assistance on financial
modelling for GGIA for EUR 3.6 million was also signed.
Sustainable transport was a particular focus, with support for clean buses and railways in Costa Rica
and Panama, rail and metro systems in Colombia and Mexico, and port developments in Chile, Mexico
and the Caribbean, thereby fostering green connectivity, jobs and regional integration. Across the
GGIA portfolio, technical assistance helped improve the investment climate and develop
sustainable-finance frameworks, including work on green-bond issuance and taxonomies through the
Sustainable Finance Advisory Hub.
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
Digital cooperation advanced under the EU–LAC Digital Alliance, a core Global Gateway pillar for the
Americas. By early 2025, the Alliance encompassed 51 members, with dialogues on e-governance,
data governance, connectivity, artificial intelligence and supercomputing producing concrete
operational follow-up. Preparations continued for the extension of the BELLA cable in 2025 to Peru,
Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, with further expansion to the Caribbean planned,
to provide high-capacity, secure digital connectivity. The EU–LAC Digital Accelerator generated over
100 new joint ventures involving 1 500 companies from 86 countries, fostering innovation
partnerships between European and LAC firms. New digital flagship projects agreed in 2025 – including
an EU–LAC supercomputing network for AI and the ‘Condosat’ satellite-connectivity initiative –
strengthened the scientific and technological ties between the two regions and expanded access to
advanced digital infrastructure.
Migration and Forced Displacement
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The EU’s contribution focused on fragility and displacement, with Haiti featuring as one of six
territories of highest concern worldwide for acute food insecurity and violence, and Venezuela
remaining one of the world’s largest, underfunded humanitarian crises. In Haiti, resilience
programming under NDICI–Global Europe’s rapid-response resilience line supported measures in
situations of (post-)conflict, forced displacement and climate-related shocks, complementing
substantial humanitarian food, nutrition and protection assistance. In and around Venezuela, where
basic services have collapsed and 58.6% of the population faces extreme poverty, the EU acted as the
leading humanitarian donor in 2025, providing over EUR 52 million – around 43% of total humanitarian
funding – in a context where the UN humanitarian response plan was severely underfunded. The EU
also continued to work with LAC partners on disaster-preparedness and risk-reduction through the
EU–LAC Memorandum of Understanding on disaster preparedness, helping address climate-related
drivers of displacement and migration. The regional programme EUROFRONT supported several
countries in South America to improve human rights based and efficient border management.
Governance, peace and security
Rapid-response resilience funding under NDICI–Global Europe helped address fragility and
governance challenges in Haiti, where violence, political instability and climate shocks intersect. The
thematic global programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention delivered results in the
Americas on organised crime, the rule of law and maritime security, including joint operations
disrupting illicit trafficking by container, air and sea and the development of prosecution guides
integrating human-rights standards in Ecuador and Trinidad and Tobago, and maritime-security
training for Latin American and Caribbean partners, covering 55 countries and 200 agencies.
Regional programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as EL PACCTO promoting regional
cooperation across law enforcement system with hundreds of multi-country actions and COPOLAD
supporting comprehensive and balanced drugs policies in the region, reinforced not only local
capacities, but also sustainable regional cooperation platforms that produced important joint
operational results against drug trafficking, illicit firearms, trafficking in human beings, crimes against
the environment and illicit trade of cultural goods.
Election-observation missions in Ecuador, Bolivia, Guyana and Honduras as well as targeted actions to
prevent the risk of electoral violence in Bolivia supported credible, transparent electoral processes
and helped mitigate tensions, with the mission in Honduras extended due to delays in verifying
electronically transmitted results. At the same time, actions on disinformation and foreign information
manipulation and interference, strategic communication and public diplomacy strengthened the
capacity of EU Delegations across the Americas to counter hybrid threats and support democratic
resilience.
Food security and nutrition
Food-security challenges in the Americas were addressed through a mix of humanitarian assistance
and longer-term food-system investments. Globally, around EUR 600 million in humanitarian funding
was allocated to food and nutrition assistance in 2025, with Haiti among the six contexts of highest
concern. In Venezuela, EU-funded operations responded to widespread food insecurity driven by
economic collapse and failing basic services. At the same time, the EU supported more sustainable
and resilient agrifood systems in LAC through Global Gateway-aligned initiatives on climate-smart
agriculture and value chains, including DeSIRA+ and the Team Europe Initiative on deforestation-free
value chains, which promote agroforestry, soil-health improvements and market access for cocoa,
coffee and other key products.
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Case study
The EU–LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda (GGIA) illustrates how Global Gateway is being
deployed as a comprehensive approach in the Americas.
Two years after its launch, the GGIA had over 80 projects advancing in implementation in 2025,
covering renewable energy, digital transformation, human development and sustainable transport. It
aims to mobilise up to EUR 45 billion in investments for LAC by 2027 through a combination of EU
budget resources, Member State contributions and development-finance institutions, with a strong
focus on high-quality, sustainable investments in critical and strategic sectors.
Projects include regional electricity integration, sustainable transport systems, the EU–LAC
supercomputing network for AI, the Condosat satellite-connectivity initiative and the Sargassum
Initiative in the Caribbean, which supports national roadmaps to turn sargassum influxes into
economic opportunities.
4.3.1.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people affected
by conflicts and disasters
In 2025, the Americas continued to face complex, overlapping crises. Venezuela remained one of the
largest forgotten crises worldwide, with 58.6% of the population in extreme poverty and around 70%
lacking regular access to health services and clean water. The humanitarian response in the country
has been severely affected by the current deep fiscal crisis plaguing the sector. Only 20% of the 2025
UN Humanitarian Response Plan was funded, making it the third-least funded plan globally. The EU
acted as leading donor, providing over EUR 52 million, around 43% of total humanitarian funding, in
support of life-saving assistance for the most vulnerable.
The Venezuelan crisis continues to impact neighbouring countries. The humanitarian situation in
Colombia deteriorated in 2025 due to the combined effects of the spill over from the Venezuelan crisis
as well as internal conflict, widespread violence and the country’s exposure to hydrometeorological
hazards. As a result of this, 13.6 million people needed humanitarian assistance, of which 9.1 million
from conflict and disasters and 4.5 million refugees and migrants. To respond to these needs, the EU
allocated EUR 30.7 million in humanitarian assistance to help victims of the armed conflict and climate-
related disasters as well as to respond to the needs of refugees and migrants.
In Ecuador, the unprecedented surge in violence started in 2024 continued to generate humanitarian
consequences in 2025. The violence directly affected over 2.6 million people who required
humanitarian assistance. To respond to these needs as well as to help the communities affected by
climate-related events, the EU allocated EUR 8.2 million in 2025.
Central America and Mexico combine a high exposure to violence, natural hazards, poverty and
inequality, in a context of continuing regional displacement. In 2025, more than 4.6 million people in
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, and over half a million refugees and migrants within the region,
needed humanitarian assistance. The EU’s response of EUR 29 million focused on addressing the
critical needs of the most vulnerable resident and displaced populations through multisectoral
assistance and protection, as well as on disaster preparedness. At regional level, implementation of
the EU–LAC Memorandum of Understanding on disaster preparedness and disaster risk management
became a central pillar of external preparedness work, strengthening cooperation on climate
adaptation, resilient infrastructure, early warning systems and integrated risk management across
Latin America and the Caribbean.
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Under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), Ecuador, via a request from the United Nations
Joint Environmental Unit (JEU) requested technical support to cope with an oil spill emergency. A team
of UCPM experts was deployed to provide technical support. Additionally, the European Maritime
Service Agency (EMSA) provided high-resolution satellite imagery on the oil spill damage extent.
4.3.1.4. Crisis response and preparedness
In 2025, the EU strengthened crisis response and preparedness in the Americas through a
complementary use of NDICI–Global Europe rapid-response tools, humanitarian aid and
civil-protection instruments. Support was provided to strengthen cooperation against transnational
drug trafficking in Ecuador and to advance and consolidate peacebuilding efforts in Colombia.
Funding under NDICI–Global Europe thematic programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention
also enabled the implementation of activities aimed at preventing youth recruitment as well as
addressing the impact of criminal activities in the Amazon along the Colombia-Brazil border.
Preparedness and risk-reduction were reinforced at regional level. Implementation of the EU–LAC
Memorandum of Understanding on disaster preparedness and disaster risk management provided a
key framework for cooperation on multi-hazard risk assessment, early-warning systems, resilient
infrastructure and civil-protection capacities across Latin America and the Caribbean. A new EU
humanitarian stockpile established in Barbados in 2025 improved pre-positioning and rapid
deployment of relief items for tropical cyclones, floods and earthquakes in the Caribbean and
neighbouring regions.
4.3.2. The Caribbean
4.3.2.1. Introduction (policy developments)
In 2025, cooperation between the EU and Caribbean partners deepened within the framework of the
Samoa Agreement and its Caribbean Protocol, anchoring political dialogue and development
cooperation in a renewed, long-term partnership. This strategic alliance was strongly reaffirmed at
the fourth CELAC–EU Summit in Santa Marta, Colombia, and the concurrent separate EU-Caribbean
Leaders' meeting. Set against a volatile geopolitical landscape marked by growing global divisions,
these high-level engagements allowed both regions to join forces to defend their core values −
including democracy, human rights, multilateralism, and the international rules-based order − while
demonstrating the EU's unwavering commitment to its Caribbean partners. Leaders advanced the EU–
LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda (GGIA) and engaged in substantive political exchanges on
preserving the Caribbean as a "Zone of Peace," reforming the international financial architecture to
secure concessional financing for small island developing states (SIDS), and promoting inclusive trade,
digital connectivity, and human development.
4.3.2.2. Implementation
Human development and inequalities
In 2025, EU support in the Caribbean continued to address structural vulnerabilities of small island
developing states by integrating social and equality dimensions into Global Gateway investments
under the GGIA. Social components in programmes on climate resilience, water and sanitation and
sustainable transport aimed to improve access to essential services and reduce inequalities, including
for women, young people and remote communities. Caribbean partners also benefited from global
actions on education, health, gender equality and social protection, which help strengthen inclusive
public policies and basic services in contexts exposed to recurrent shocks.
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Green Deal
Climate resilience and the green and blue transitions remained central to cooperation. Through the
GGIA and Global Gateway, the Caribbean benefited from advancing investments in sustainable
transport, renewable energy, resilient water and sanitation and circular-economy solutions, tailored
to hurricane- and sea-level-rise-prone coastal and urban areas. Regional programmes on resilient
infrastructure, disaster-risk reduction and sustainable ocean-based economies supported the
implementation of national climate strategies and regional frameworks, complementing global
initiatives on biodiversity and deforestation-free value chains.
Sustainable growth and jobs
Sustainable, inclusive growth was pursued by promoting diversified, climate-resilient economies.
Blended-finance operations under regional investment facilities helped mobilise private capital for
green infrastructure, energy and services, while technical assistance supported improvements in the
business environment and sustainable-finance frameworks. Global Gateway operations in sectors
such as sustainable transport and ports, climate-resilient water and sanitation and circular economy
are expected to generate decent jobs in construction, operation and maintenance, as well as in
tourism and services, though more systematic monitoring of employment and distributional effects
remains a key lesson for future programming.
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
Digital transformation was further integrated into EU–Caribbean cooperation under the EU–LAC
Digital Alliance. Caribbean partners drew on regional initiatives to improve secure connectivity,
promote e-governance and build regulatory and institutional capacity in areas such as data protection,
cybersecurity and digital markets. Planned expansion of high-capacity connectivity and satellite
initiatives under the Alliance aims to enhance redundancy and resilience of digital infrastructure in
hurricane-prone islands.
Migration and forced displacement
Migration and displacement in the Caribbean are closely linked to recurrent disasters, climate change
and socioeconomic fragility. While most migration-specific EU funding in 2025 targeted other regions,
Caribbean partners benefited indirectly from global policy work on safe and regular migration,
disaster-displacement and human-rights-based approaches to border management and returns. At
the same time, disaster-risk-reduction, climate-resilience and livelihood programmes contributed to
tackling climate-related drivers of displacement and irregular movements.
Governance, peace and security
EU action supported democratic governance and institutional resilience in the Caribbean, in close
coordination with regional organisations. Under thematic programmes on peace, stability and conflict
prevention, the EU contributed to tackling organised crime and strengthening the criminal-justice
chain in the wider Americas, including maritime-security cooperation and specialised training for
law-enforcement and prosecution services. Regional disaster-risk-management cooperation under
the EU–LAC Memorandum of Understanding on disaster preparedness and disaster risk management
also helped improve risk-informed planning, coordination and civil-protection capacities.
Food security and nutrition
Food-security challenges in the Caribbean stem from high import dependence, exposure to
climate-induced shocks and disasters, and vulnerabilities in small domestic markets. EU support
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combined humanitarian food and nutrition assistance in the most affected contexts with longer-term
investments in resilient food systems and sustainable blue and green economies. Regional
programmes promoting sustainable agriculture, fisheries and circular-economy approaches, together
with climate-resilient infrastructure under Global Gateway, contributed to strengthening local
production, reducing losses and improving resilience to hurricanes and droughts.
Case study
Under the EU–LAC GGIA, the Caribbean is beginning to benefit from a pipeline of Global Gateway
investments that combine sustainable connectivity with climate resilience.
Projects under preparation and implementation include climate-resilient transport and port
infrastructure and water and sanitation systems designed to withstand hurricanes and flooding,
thereby safeguarding economic activity and essential services during disasters.
These investments are complemented by strengthened regional disaster-preparedness cooperation
under the EU–LAC Memorandum of Understanding and by the establishment of an EU humanitarian
stockpile in Barbados, which improves pre-positioning and rapid deployment of relief items for
Caribbean crises.
Global Gateway investments coupled with regional preparedness and risk-reduction measures can
significantly reduce the human and economic impact of disasters and enhance the overall resilience
of Caribbean societies.
4.3.2.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people affected
by conflicts and disasters
Haiti’s humanitarian crisis deteriorated in 2025. Gangs control over 80% of the capital Port-au-Prince
and has gained far-reaching influence in many other parts of the country, severely limiting the
population’s access to basic services and forcing 1.3 million people to flee their homes. In 2025, 6
million people required humanitarian assistance. In total, the EU allocated EUR 42.3 million to provide
multisectoral assistance and to violence-affected people in Haiti, including through the organisation
of a an EU humanitarian air bridge (EUHAB) operation.
To reinforce readiness in the Caribbean and the wider Americas, a new EU humanitarian stockpile was
established in Barbados in 2025, improving pre‑positioning and rapid deployment of relief items such
as shelter materials, WASH kits and other essential non‑food items for tropical cyclones, floods,
earthquakes and other hazards.
Under the UCPM, two countries in the Caribbean, Jamaica and Cuba, requested assistance following
the severe impact caused by Hurricane Melissa in October 2025. In response to the request by
Jamaica, EU Member States provided assistance in the form of relief items and the deployment of an
Emergency Medical Team, which treated 469 patients. Additionally, the Copernicus Emergency
Management Service was activated to support the damage assessment in Jamaica, Haiti, and Cuba.
4.3.2.4. Crisis response and preparedness
In 2025, the EU’s crisis response and preparedness in the Caribbean focused on strengthening
resilience to increasingly frequent and intense climate- and weather-related shocks, while ensuring
swift, coordinated reaction when disasters struck. Under NDICI–Global Europe’s rapid-response and
resilience pillar, actions supported measures in situations of (post-)crisis, displacement and
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climate-related shocks and complemented Global Gateway investments in resilient infrastructure,
water and sanitation and energy systems.
Crisis response funding supported swift measures in situations of conflict, forced displacement and
climate-related shocks, notably in Haiti, where governance collapse, armed violence and high
exposure to hurricanes and earthquakes required closely coordinated humanitarian, development
and peacebuilding interventions. These actions aimed to improve citizens’ security, reinforce local
governance and community resilience, and address drivers of food insecurity and displacement in a
humanitarian–development–peace nexus approach.
Preparedness and risk reduction were reinforced at regional level through implementation of the EU–
LAC Memorandum of Understanding on disaster preparedness and disaster risk management, which
provided the main framework for cooperation on multi-hazard risk assessment, early-warning
systems, contingency planning and civil-protection capacities across Latin America and the Caribbean.
4.4. EU Enlargement (Western Balkans, Türkiye, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and
Georgia)
4.4.1. Introduction (policy developments)
In 2025, enlargement remained a central, strategic priority for the European Union, seen as an
investment in peace, security and prosperity on the continent and beyond. The year built on the major
decisions taken in 2023-2024, when accession negotiations were opened with Ukraine and the
Republic of Moldova and a new momentum was injected into the process with the Western Balkans
and other partners.
The 2025 Enlargement Package confirmed progress in a number of areas, while underlining that the
process remains strictly merit-based and conditional on reforms in the rule of law, democracy,
fundamental rights and economic governance. In the Western Balkans, the package noted steady
advancement in most partners, with Montenegro and Albania moving closer to the objective of
completing negotiations. Most Western Balkan partners continued to fully align with the EUCommon
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including with EU statements and restrictive measures against
Russia and Belarus. These included Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia,
as well as Kosovo who aligned voluntarily. Cooperation in the area of security and defence increased
with key partners. A new Security and Defence Dialogue with Montenegro was launched on 2
December 2025 and first Security and Defence Dialogues with Albania and North Macedonia were
held, in April and May, respectively, under their Security and Defence Partnerships with the EU. The
mandate of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) was extended in June 2025.
Furthermore, on 31 October 2025, the United Nations Security Council extended the mandate of
Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina for another 12 months. The EU provided
significant support to Western Balkan partners to counter foreign interference and disinformation,
cyber and other hybrid threats. The EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Belgrade-Pristina
Dialogue held more than a hundred bilateral meetings with the parties and convened several formal
rounds of Chief Negotiators’ meetings.
For Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, 2025 was the first full year of accession negotiations.
Following the launch of intergovernmental conferences in June 2024, the bilateral screening was
completed in record time, and the European Commission assessed all clusters are ready to be opened.
All documents were transmitted to Council before the end of the year, ensuring the Council is in a
position to formally open all clusters once an agreement is found among EU Member States. In
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parallel, gradual sectoral integration continued. For Ukraine, the EU advanced steps to enable full
integration into the European energy market by early 2027, alongside further gas market integration,
contingent on accelerated reforms. The EU also mobilised more than EUR 2.3 billion to improve
transport connections between the EU, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova and supported
modernised trade regimes with both countries.
For the Republic of Moldova, accession negotiations opened in June 2024 were accompanied by a
deepening of the political and security partnership. The EU–Moldova Security and Defence
Partnership, signed in 2024, continued to be implemented to help the Republic of Moldova build-up
its democratic resilience, including through the support provided by the EU Partnership Mission in the
Republic of Moldova. In parallel, the Regulation establishing the Reform and Growth Facility entered
into force in 2025. The Facility supports a Growth Plan built on a Reform Agenda of socio-economic
and fundamental reforms designed to accelerate growth and socio-economic convergence with the
EU. In 2025, EUR 314.9 million was released under the Facility against the achievement of four steps
and the pre-financing. A two-year Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience,
backed by a EUR 250 million package and an additional EUR 30 million in emergency gas assistance for
the Transnistrian region, helped the Republic of Moldova phase out dependence on Russian energy
and support integration into the EU energy market. A first EU–Moldova Summit underlined the
deepening partnership.
In Georgia, rapid democratic backsliding continued and the accession process remained de facto
halted, as concluded by the European Council already in June, October and December 2024. The 2025
Enlargement Package reiterated that the course of action taken by the Georgian authorities is taking
the country further away from the EU path with an unprecedented level of backsliding on EU accession
reforms. High-level political contacts and direct financial assistance to the authorities remained
suspended, while support to Georgian citizens delivered via civil society organisations and other non-
state actors continued.
Türkiye continued to be a candidate country and a partner of strategic importance for the EU, despite
accession negotiations remaining at a standstill since 2018. Engagement progressed in a phased,
proportionate and reversible manner, implementing the recommendations of the Joint
Communication on EU–Türkiye relations from November 2023, based on COREPER’s guidance, as
tasked by the European Council conclusions in April 2024. High-level dialogues on the economy, trade,
migration and security, climate and research and innovation resumed or continued in 2025. A new
multiannual bilateral programme for 2025-2027 committed EUR 311 million to support civil society,
fundamental rights, people-to-people contacts, climate, energy, transport, competitiveness,
employment and social policy, complemented by a further EUR 313.3 million for rural development,
civil society under the Civil Society Facility and cross-border cooperation. The EU and Türkiye began
cooperating in the cross-regional Connectivity Agenda. Türkiye continued to host more than 2.5
million refugees with substantial EU support, while a ‘visa cascade’ system was introduced in July 2025
for bona fide travellers. EFSD+ guarantees under the Türkiye Investment Platform continued to
support investment, while the EIB re-engagement in the country was initiated with two operations of
EUR 100 million each to support SMEs in the areas of renewable energy, energy efficiency and green
industry.
Financially, the EU consolidated the use of dedicated instruments to underpin enlargement. The
Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans – a EUR 6 billion component of the Growth Plan
for the Western Balkans – moved into full implementation, with Reform Agendas approved for all six
partners and first disbursements linked to progress on country-specific reform agendas, gradual
integration into parts of the single market and conditions related to democratic standards and regional
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cooperation, including the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The Instrument for
Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) continued to support reforms, institution-building and investments,
increasingly using performance-based and blending modalities.
Against the background of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, the Ukraine Facility – endowed with
EUR 50 billion for 2024-2027 – remained the core instrument supporting Ukraine’s short-term
recovery and medium-term reconstruction and modernisation, in line with its EU path. Under pillar I,
45 reform and investment steps were positively assessed in 2025, triggering four payments to
Ukraine’s state budget totalling EUR 10.7 billion; since the Facility’s launch, cumulative disbursements
have reached EUR 26.8 billion. The Facility also subsidised borrowing costs for the first time, freeing
EUR 321 million in fiscal space. Under pillar II, up to EUR 5.5 billion in guarantee cover and blended
finance was allocated in 2025; in total, up to EUR 6.9 billion of EU contributions and guarantees –
around 70% of the Ukraine Investment Framework’s capacity – is expected to mobilise approximately
EUR 21.8 billion in public and private investment, including in critical and dual-use sectors and
integration into EU value chains.
In parallel, the European Peace Facility, an off-budget EU instrument, continued to provide
instrumental support to the Armed Forces of Ukraine in its fight against the Russian full-scale invasion,
worth EUR 5 774 million under its assistance measures pillar. In 2025, its financial ceiling was also
topped by EUR 1 933 million in extraordinary revenues from immobilised Russian sovereign assets
earmarked for the armed forces of Ukraine. In addition, the Council adopted several assistance
measures under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the defence capabilities of the armed
forces of several partner countries, including Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, and the
Republic of Moldova.
4.4.2. Implementation
Human development and inequalities
In 2025, enlargement partners continued to use EU support to strengthen human capital, social
inclusion and equality as core pillars of their European path. In the Western Balkans, EU-funded
education, skills and youth measures supported closer integration with EU policies. The College of
Europe campus in Tirana, financed by the EU, further consolidated its role as a regional hub for
expertise on EU integration and public policies, reinforcing a new generation of practitioners
committed to European values. Employment and inclusion remained priorities: over 830 individuals
in Bosnia and Herzegovina were successfully employed after participating in targeted training,
upskilling, and reskilling programmes. Targeted support addressed vulnerable groups and the
reduction of inequalities. In the Western Balkans and Türkiye, the regional initiatives ‘Roma
Integration (Phase III)’, implemented jointly with the Council of Europe, and ‘Support to Roma
Entrepreneurship (Phase II)’ advanced Roma inclusion, supporting governments’ commitments under
the Berlin Process and Chapter 23 (anti-discrimination) and reducing income inequality through better
access to the labour market, entrepreneurship and finance. In Ukraine, the EU and UN Women
launched the Gender Equality Facility to support a gender-responsive recovery and European
integration, strengthening alignment with the EU gender equality acquis and the implementation of
the 2022-2030 State Strategy for Equal Rights.
Erasmus+ helped print over 1.5 million textbooks for Ukrainian schools, since the start of the war,
ensuring continuity of learning, and more than 33 000 Ukrainians have participated in mobility
programmes since 2022. These measures help to preserve human capital and sustain Ukraine’s
integration with the European Education Area and youth networks, even in wartime.
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Interreg NEXT Programmes operating in western part of Ukraine supported tangible cross-border
investments in healthcare, social services and education, including the modernisation of hospitals,
social care facilities and schools in Ukraine. These projects strengthened local resilience by improving
service provision and institutional cooperation in border regions.
In Georgia, backsliding on fundamental values led to a further recalibration of EU engagement;
assistance directly benefiting state authorities was put on hold, while support to to Georgian citizens
continued, including in areas such as youth, education and social inclusion.
Green Deal
The green transition remained central to EU cooperation with enlargement partners and is
increasingly framed as pre-accession acquis alignment and a driver of energy security. In the Western
Balkans and Türkiye, the EU supported decarbonisation and resilience of energy systems, water
management and biodiversity, including through regional actions such as EU4 Energy Transition. This
programme helps 20 cities and towns in the Western Balkans and Türkiye design and implement local
energy and climate action plans, with a focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy solutions.
The EU co-funded flagship green investments through the Western Balkans Investment Framework: a
132 megawatt wind farm in Bosnia and Herzegovina, displacing nearly 447 000 tonnes of CO2 a year;
Kosovo's first large-scale solar plant, increasing solar capacity tenfold to 110 megawatt; a wastewater
treatment plant for Skopje in North Macedonia, ending untreated discharge into the cross-border
Vardar river; and the rehabilitation of 120 km of railway in Albania along the extension of the Trans-
European Transport Core Network.
In the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, regional programmes such as EU4Environment promoted
circular economy practices, green public procurement and resource efficient production.
Interreg NEXT programmes with participation of Ukraine and Moldova support cross-border
environmental initiatives through joint projects on water management, pollution reduction,
ecosystem protection, disaster risk management and climate resilience for local communities.
Georgia remained involved in several green initiatives, for instance on sustainable agriculture, while
direct financial assistance to the authorities was suspended.
Sustainable growth and jobs
Sustainable, inclusive growth in enlargement partners was fostered through trade integration, support
to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), regional value chains and the mobilisation of
investment in line with EU standards. The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, including a EUR 6
billion Reform and Growth Facility for 2024-2027, moved into full implementation. Reform Agendas
were adopted for most Western Balkan partners and pre-financing was disbursed to Albania, North
Macedonia and Serbia, with Bosnia and Herzegovina adopting its agenda in September 2025.
Disbursements are tied to progress on reforms, macro-economic stability and gradual integration into
parts of the EU single market, reinforcing a merit-based approach.
EU-funded initiatives across the Western Balkans illustrated the focus on local growth, innovation and
decent work: in Albania, the ‘EU 4 Labour Market Inclusion’ project (EUR 3 million) strengthened
inclusive employment across 19 municipalities; in North Macedonia, under the Reform and Growth
Facility, labour and market inspections increased by at least 20% and 15%, respectively; and in Serbia,
the ANTARES centre of excellence turned the BioSense Institute into a European hub for digital
agriculture, with its AgroSense platform now used by over 15 000 farmers.
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For Ukraine, the investment pillar of the Ukraine Facility, the Ukraine Investment Framework,
mobilised EU guarantees and blended finance to unlock investment for SMEs, municipalities and
state-owned enterprises, accelerating reconstruction and economic recovery. In the Republic of
Moldova, EU cooperation supported SME development, the creation of a Fund for Entrepreneurship
and Economic Growth and improvements in statistical and spatial-data systems, all of which are
important for evidence-based economic policy.
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
Digital transformation is increasingly central to enlargement, both as a driver of competitiveness and
as part of acquis alignment. In the Western Balkans, the common regional market agenda integrates
digital elements such as digital skills, secure and sustainable digital infrastructures including roaming,
digital transformation of businesses and digital public services. To support this, in 2025 the
Commission adopted the EU4Green and Digital Transition programme, allocating EUR 33 million to
accelerate the digital transition across the Western Balkans. The programme supports connectivity,
including 5G deployment and the expansion of WiFi4WB, as well as the digitalisation of public services
and businesses. Concrete results also included support for digital skills through the modernisation of
13 educational facilities in Montenegro and the establishment of 684 Smart ICT Labs in 627 schools in
Albania, improving learning conditions and enhancing students’ digital and programming skills.
In Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, EU support advanced the digital transition through the
EU4Digital Facility, which accelerated regulatory alignment, supported both countries’ integration into
the EU roaming area, and developed an Artificial Intelligence tool to facilitate acquis transposition. Its
EU4Digital Academy also strengthened digital skills through free online training.
Migration and forced displacement
Migration and forced displacement remained highly salient for enlargement partners, particularly in
the Western Balkans, Türkiye and the Eastern Neighbourhood. EU action was guided by the external
dimension of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans and
regional partnerships. The EU continued to support partner and candidate countries in improving their
migration management and aligning with EU legislation, including the Migration and Asylum Pact and
the Schengen acquis, as well as ongoing reforms such as an enhanced return policy. This was
complemented by closer cooperation with EU agencies in the security and migration field and by the
progressive integration of partner countries into EU security and migration initiatives, reinforcing their
preparedness and resilience.
Türkiye remained a key partner in managing migration flows and hosting refugees from Syria and other
crisis regions. EU support, complementing longer-term measures financed via the Facility for Refugees
in Türkiye and its follow-up, continued to provide basic services, education, health and social cohesion
support to refugees and host communities, as well as reinforcing border and migration management
capacities. In 2025, the EU adopted a EUR 1.3 billion package to ensure the continuation of basic
needs, education, health, voluntary returns to Syria and border management support. In the Republic
of Moldova, which hosts around 130 000 Ukrainian refugees, the EU supported the establishment and
capacity-building of the General Inspectorate for Migration, with particular attention to gender-based
violence and trafficking risks.
In Ukraine itself, the war continued to displace millions. By 2025, 12.7 million people were in need of
humanitarian assistance and nearly 3.4 million were internally displaced, with the EU providing EUR
220 million in humanitarian assistance in 2025 and EUR 1.2 billion since 2022, focusing on
multi-purpose cash, protection and winter assistance.
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Governance, peace and security
IPA III and NDICI-Global Europe support continued to strengthen judicial independence, fight
corruption and organised crime, enhance electoral processes and reinforce fundamental rights and
good governance in Western Balkan partners and Türkiye and the Eastern Partnership. Examples
include an EU-funded Twinning project in North Macedonia on strengthening institutional capacities
to address cultural heritage and environmental crimes, which supported national authorities in
aligning their practices with EU standards and best practices, and the Istanbul anti-Corruption Action
Plan in Eastern Partnership countries.
In the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, the EU’s crisis response made available resources to
strengthen national efforts in countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. This
included support to establishing or consolidating competent government authorities and to help
detect and counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) in a whole-of society
approach. Further to this, Crisis Response in the Republic of Moldova and in Common Foreign and
Security aligned partner countries of the Western Balkans was provided to rapidly build national
cybersecurity capacities in the face of increased threat levels and repeated attacks on national digital
infrastructure.
Security and defence cooperation deepened with several partners. Security and Defence Partnerships
with Albania and North Macedonia, and with the Republic of Moldova, provided frameworks for closer
cooperation on resilience, hybrid threats and security-sector reform. The European Peace Facility
(EPF) delivered equipment and support for armed forces and security actors in enlargement and
neighbourhood partners, including Ukraine, Western Balkan partners, and the Republic of Moldova.
The EU launched several cyber capacity building projects, including a regional project Cyber Balkans
(running in 2023-2026 with a budget of EUR 5 million) that aims to enhance the cyber resilience of
Western Balkan partners in compliance with EU acquis. The Cybersecurity Rapid Response project,
(until September 2025, EUR 1.8 million) covered Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia.
Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and EU special representatives
contributed to conflict prevention and stability. EU rule-of-law, advisory and partnership missions in
Kosovo, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova supported security-sector reform, rule-of-law
institutions, investigation and prosecution of international crimes, and countering hybrid threats while
the EU monitoring mission in Georgia continued to promote stabilisation and confidence-building. An
EU Special Representative for the Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue worked to advance normalisation
between Kosovo and Serbia, a key condition under the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. Thematic
peace and stability actions supported reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and dialogue in the
South Caucasus.
Food security and nutrition
Food security and nutrition in enlargement partners were shaped both by global crises and by the
impact of war and economic shocks. In Ukraine, attacks on energy and agricultural infrastructure,
disruption of trade routes and contamination of land by explosives affected food production and
access, compounding vulnerability for internally displaced persons and host communities. EU
humanitarian assistance contributed to food and nutrition support as part of broader multi-sector
programmes, while development cooperation promoted sustainable and climate-resilient agriculture
through measures aligned with the European Green Deal, although most detailed examples are
reported at global level.
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In Türkiye and neighbouring countries hosting Syrian refugees, EU humanitarian funding provided
food and nutrition assistance alongside basic services, with more than EUR 204 million allocated to
Syrians and host communities in the region in 2025. Rising global food-price volatility and the record
number of people facing acute food insecurity worldwide reported by the Global Report on Food
Crises – 295 million people – confirmed the need to integrate food-system resilience into
enlargement-related policies, including through sustainable value chains and social-protection
measures.
Territorial and cross-border cooperation
Territorial cooperation continued to support good-neighbourly relations, regional integration and
local development in enlargement partners and their EU neighbours. Cross-border cooperation (CBC)
under Pre-Accession Assistance instrument (IPA), supported by over EUR 80 million, delivered tangible
results across the Western Balkans: by 2025, over 2 400 organisations had taken part in cross-border
partnerships, creating 1 300 new jobs and 465 new businesses, while strengthening reconciliation and
the institutional trust that underpins regional integration and EU accession.
The IPA III Programming framework window 5 serves as the common thread for 10 Interreg IPA Cross-
border, three Transnational, and two Interregional Cooperation programmes in the Western Balkans
and Türkiye, mobilizing approximately EUR 1.5 billion in EU funds over the 2021-2027 period. Crucially,
these programmes continue to promote territorial integration and mutual cooperation within the
Adriatic and Ionian basin. In doing so, they actively accelerate progress toward the macro-regional
objectives of both the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR) and the EU Strategy for
the Danube Region (EUSDR).
In 2025, the EU continued to strengthen EU–Ukraine transport connectivity under the Solidarity Lanes
initiative, with Ukraine completing the upgrade of the Yahodyn road border crossing with Poland and
similar works advancing at other TEN-T crossing points along the Polish-Ukrainian border.
Regional civil-protection programmes in the Western Balkans, Türkiye and Eastern Partnership
countries, co-financed through IPA and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, reinforced cross-border
disaster-risk management and preparedness.
Case study - The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans
The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, including the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for
2024-2027, illustrates how the EU combines political commitment, financial support and
conditionality to accelerate convergence with the EU. The Facility consists of EUR 2 billion in grants
and EUR 4 billion in loans, with funding linked to implementation of jointly agreed Reform Agendas
and to gradual integration into selected areas of the single market. By the end of 2025, Reform
Agendas had been adopted for all partners and the pre-financing has been disbursed to Albania,
Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia.
The Plan supports reforms in areas such as rule of law, public administration, the business
environment, energy and green transition, digitalisation and regional integration, and is
complemented by investments via the Western Balkans Investment Framework and Global
Gateway-type operations, for example in transport and energy. Its design makes financial support
conditional on verifiable progress in reforms, democratic standards and regional cooperation,
including normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
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It shows that the Growth Plan can act as a powerful incentive for accelerated reforms and economic
integration, provided that monitoring is robust, transparency is ensured, and reform efforts are
communicated clearly to citizens. It also demonstrates the value of the ‘Team Europe’ approach that
aligns EU, EU Member State and international financial institution support behind a single, jointly
owned reform and investment agenda.
4.4.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people
affected by conflicts and disasters
Türkiye remains an important transit and host country for people fleeing conflict and crises, including
from Syria and other regions. Despite the integration of the refugees into public social services and
support schemes, humanitarian needs in Türkiye remain substantial and structurally entrenched,
particularly among refugee populations unlikely to integrate into national systems or return to Syria
in the foreseeable future. The EU allocated EUR 20 million for the most vulnerable refugees in Türkiye
mainly in protection and basic needs.
As regards UCPM regional cooperation in the IPA region, Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood
regional initiatives that were launched in 2023 continued with implementing activities in the region.
The On-Site Assistance (OSA) project in the Mediterranean (MENA countries), Western Balkans and
Türkiye was extended to the Eastern Neighbourhood and topped up with EUR 900 000 in 2024 and
continued in 2025 in all three regions. The programme provides technical support to the national civil
protection authorities in the region in building their disaster risk prevention, preparedness, and
response, as well as interactions with the UCPM.
Under the UCPM, several capacity building funding instruments are available to support disaster
prevention and preparedness. The Technical Assistance for Disaster Risk Management (Track 1) is a
single-country grant addressing EU Member States, UCPM Participating States, and other countries
such as Kosovo, to assist their efforts to join the UCPM. The same countries are eligible under the
Technical Assistance Financing Facility (TAFF). TAFF aims to give civil protection and disaster risk
management authorities access to prevention and preparedness expertise. In 2025, different projects
under these instruments were awarded to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North
Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, Ukraine, and Türkiye. Another capacity building instrument, of a non-
financial nature, is the UCPM Peer Review Programme. In October 2025, a peer review focused on the
overall disaster risk governance was carried out in Kosovo, bringing Western Balkan partners closer to
EU standards.
In the Western Balkan region, Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro
requested operational assistance under the UCPM following record breaking wildfires in the summer
2025. Albania requested assistance in three instances and received aerial firefighting teams. North
Macedonia requested assistance in two instances and received aerial and ground firefighting. Bosnia
and Herzegovina received aerial and ground firefighting teams. Montenegro received aerial and
ground firefighting teams.
In addition, the Copernicus Emergency Management Service was activated to support damage
assessment efforts in Albania, Montenegro and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while analytical support
from UCPM’s Scientific Partnership on natural hazards was available to them as well.
Additionally, North Macedonia requested assistance following a fire in a nightclub. Medical
evacuations and treatments for 40 patients were provided by 12 EU Member States and UCPM
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Participating States through the UCPM. Particularly among refugee populations unlikely to integrate
into national systems or return to Syria in the foreseeable future.
The EU allocated EUR 20 million for the most vulnerable refugees in Türkiye mainly in protection and
basic needs.
4.4.4. Crisis response and preparedness
In 2025, the EU further strengthened crisis response and preparedness in enlargement countries by
combining the rapid-response and resilience pillar of NDICI–Global Europe, enlargement and
neighbourhood instruments, the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and civil protection tools. In
Ukraine, rapid response an humanitarian demining, accountability for international crimes – notably
by enabling the inception work for the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine –
support for children unlawfully deported and forcibly transferred by Russia, strategic communication
and emergency interventions for energy security and support to critical civilian security actors, as well
as support to veterans and other particulary war-affected groups like children from frontline
communities, complementing large-scale humanitarian assistance and security support through the
European Peace Facility.
In the Republic of Moldova rapid response was notably deployed to support election integrity,
independent media, strategic communications and resilience to hybrid threats (notably cyber and
internal security).
A fourth phase of the regional civil-protection programme for Eastern Partnership countries, launched
in November 2025, aimed to boost disaster resilience and facilitate the progressive integration of
Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova into the Union Civil Protection Mechanism.
In the Western Balkans and Türkiye, rapid-response and pre-accession actions backed measures in
situations of (post-)conflict and climate-related shocks, including community-based resilience,
reconciliation and confidence-building, while the Technical Assistance Financing Facility and regional
civil-protection programmes strengthened prevention, preparedness and risk-management
capacities, for example through wildfire-risk peer reviews and technical-assistance projects
implemented by national authorities and Kosovo.
4.5. European Neighbourhood
4.5.1. European Neighbourhood East
4.5.1.1. Introduction (policy developments)
In the Eastern Neighbourhood, marked by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU
continued to engage with partner countries of the region either on bilateral or on regional basis
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine).
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) framework continues to provide a well-established and efficient
framework of cooperation to all participants, with Belarus engaging via civil society actors. As a robust
policy instrument, the EaP remains central to fostering multilateral cooperation and supporting
structural reforms across the Eastern Neighbourhood. The EaP framework facilitates targeted
technical assistance and institutional support to help partner states implement critical governance,
judicial, and anti-corruption measures. In March 2025 the EU and partner countries endorsed the EaP
Multi-Annual Work Plan 2025-2027 that indicates priorities for the mid-term agenda, including: a
focus on complementarity policy measures to the enlargement process; strengthening further
democratic resilience and security; boosting socio-economic development, investments, and step-up
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support to civil society and youth and ensuring complementarity with other instruments and policy
initiatives of the EU.
In 2025, EU–Moldova relations continued to deepen across all areas, as the Republic of Moldova
advanced on its EU accession path. Cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan was pursued under the
European Neighbourhood Policy and the EaP, which continues to serve as the overarching policy
framework for stability, economic development and bringing partner countries closer to the EU. For
Belarus, the EU maintained its policy of pressure on the authorities while supporting citizens, civil
society and independent media in the face of persistent repression.
The Global Gateway strategy and the 2025-2027 multiannual action programmes for the Eastern
Neighbourhood remained key instruments for supporting resilience, connectivity and socio-economic
development. In July 2025, new multiannual action programmes for the Eastern Neighbourhood
(excluding bilateral assistance for Ukraine) were approved, with commitments of EUR 668.2 million.
A new strategic approach to the Black Sea region, adopted in May 2025, proposes to take forward
regional cooperation and engagement in the Black Sea region along three main pillars: (1) Enhancing
security, stability, and resilience; (2) Fostering sustainable growth and prosperity; (3) Promoting
environmental protection, climate change resilience and preparedness. As a major step in
strengthening EU engagement in the Black Sea region, a first Ministerial Meeting on cross-regional
security and connectivity took place in Luxembourg in October 2025. The Ministerial was a first big
and inclusive step, laying the ground for a coordinated approach on security and connectivity
initiatives, with more regular meetings to be organised in the future.
On regional connectivity, the Ministerial endorsed a Connectivity Agenda linking Europe with Central
Asia through the South Caucasus, with follow-up discussions held at the Trans-Caspian Transport
Corridor and Connectivity Investors Forum in Tashkent. The Connectivity Agenda also provides an
important basis for closer cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan on sustainable transport, energy
and digital links, making it a geopolitical investment in the peace of the region.
At regional level, the EU continued to enhance good governance, rule of law, human rights, gender
equality, civil society, and youth, tailoring the support to different situations in countries. Programmes
such as Partnership for Good Governance, EU4GenderEquality, EU4Youth, EU4Integrity and dedicated
support to civil society were among the channels of support.
Throughout 2025, the EU further increased its political, military, financial, humanitarian, legal and
diplomatic support to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. By the end of 2025, the EU’s support
amounted to over EUR 193.3 billion. This included the EUR 50 billion-worth Ukraine Facility and a
financial assistance package consisting of an exceptional Macro Financial Assistance (MFA) loan of EUR
18.1 billion. EU military support amounted to EUR 69.3 billion, of which EUR 6.1 billion were
channelled through the European Peace Facility. EU leaders decided in December 2025 to mobilise an
additional EUR 90 billion in common borrowing for 2026-2027 to strengthen Ukraine’s defence
capabilities and ensure the continued functioning of the state, while also contributing to Ukraine's
resilience and its closer integration with Europe's defence industrial base.
Continued backsliding on fundamental values led to a further recalibration of EU engagement in
Georgia resulting in halting the assistance directly benefiting state authorities.
EU−Moldova relations deepened significantly in 2025, as the country continued to advance on its EU
accession path, despite persistent hybrid attacks by Russia. A key milestone was the adoption and
signing in March 2025 of the EU Growth Plan for the Republic of Moldova, worth EUR 1.9 billion,
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combining reforms, investments, and financial support to accelerate the Republic of Moldova's
economic development, as part of its EU accession process. The EU–Moldova Association Council on
4 June 2025 focused on the Republic of Moldova's EU accession, political dialogue and reforms,
cooperation and convergence in foreign and security policy, as well as economic and sectoral
cooperation. On 4 July 2025, the EU and the Republic of Moldova held their first-ever summit in
Chișinău, marking a historic milestone in bilateral relations and reaffirming their shared commitment
to a shared future of peace, security, and prosperity. The September 2025 parliamentary elections
delivered a strong mandate for the Republic of Moldova's European path, further consolidating the
political basis for EU reforms. the Republic of Moldova also successfully completed the screening of
its national legislation against the EU acquis in September 2025, paving the way for the formal launch
of negotiations across all thematic clusters. EU engagement with the Republic of Moldova remained
focused on strengthening democratic and economic resilience, advancing the accession process, and
countering external destabilisation.
Cooperation between the European Union and Armenia further deepened at an unprecedented pace
in 2025. The second installment of the Resilience and Growth Plan (EUR 202.5 million) was announced
in September, including a Multisector budget support element, which will incentivise reforms on
export diversification, visa liberalisation and the rule of law, jobs skills and social inclusion. A High-
Level Policy Dialogue to monitor reform implementation was also launched in September. In
November, the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan was handed over to the Armenian authorities. The
Partnership Council of 2 December 2025 highlighted the strong momentum in the EU−Armenia
relations and adopted the new Strategic Agenda for the EU−Armenia Partnership, setting ambitious
cooperation priorities across all sectors and marking a major step in deepening and advancing bilateral
ties. Cooperation on regional connectivity was also stepped up, in line with the Connectivity Agenda
and Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace initiative. This intensified bilateral engagement was reflected in
several high-level visits by Armenian officials to Brussels, including a joint meeting in July between the
Prime Minister of Armenia and the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Council.
EU engagement with Armenia was focused on strengthening the country’s democratic and economic
resilience, supporting the regional peace and normalisation processes, as well as enhancing regional
connectivity, with a view to unlocking significant security and economic benefits for Armenia.
Relations with Azerbaijan evolved in 2025 against the background of a more positive regional context
following the agreement ‘On the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between the
Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan" in August, which opened new space for dialogue
between the two states and for EU engagement in support of a peaceful and stable South Caucasus.
The improved political environment also contributed to the advancement of EU-Azerbaijan bilateral
relations. In September 2025, the EU and Azerbaijan resumed negotiations on the new Partnership
Priorities for 2026-2030, following the expiry of the previous framework in December 2024. High-level
engagement intensified in areas of mutual interest, in particular energy, transport and investment, in
line with the EU’s energy-security and connectivity objectives. In the transport sector, the restoration
of the Nakhchivan railway line was identified as a joint priority project, for which both parties agreed
to launch a feasibility study. It was also agreed to launch a High-Level Working Group on Economic
Cooperation to strengthen cooperation and boost investments, including in connectivity. In parallel,
it was agreed negotiations on the new bilateral agreement would also resume.
At the same time, the EU continued to stress the importance of human rights, gender equality, civil
society, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly and association, and maintained support for
civil society organisations and independent media in an increasingly restrictive environment, including
through thematic and regional Eastern Partnership programmes.
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EU actions under NDICI–Global Europe’s Crisis Response funding stream, its thematic programme on
Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention, as well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy
instruments, such as the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the EU Mission in
Armenia, contributed to confidence-building and reconciliation efforts in the region.
In Belarus, 2025 saw no change in the EU’s fundamental approach. Belarus continued to support
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to engage in hybrid attacks, notably along borders with
Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. Despite the pardon of more than 300 political prisoners, arbitrary arrests
continued in 2025 and hundreds of people remained unjustly detained, amid widespread reports of
ill-treatment and incommunicado detention. In this context, the EU upheld its policy of not providing
any direct assistance to the Belarusian authorities, while sustaining and scaling up support to the
citizens of Belarus, civil society, independent media and democratic forces, including those in exile. A
new assistance programme continued to provide direct support to civil society, human rights
defenders, independent journalism, educational and cultural initiatives and small and medium-sized
enterprises in exile, and Belarusians remained eligible for a range of regional Eastern Partnership
programmes such as EU4Culture, EU4IndependentMedia, EU4GenderEquality, EU4Youth and the
Partnership for Good Governance.
4.5.1.2. Implementation
Human development and inequalities
At regional level, EU4Youth remained the main vehicle to foster youth participation in society and the
economy and to improve skills matching, complemented by new regional programmes on youth
engagement and on education reform to strengthen the quality of education systems. Cultural
cooperation and intercultural dialogue continued through EU4Culture, while health resilience was
reinforced by enhancing preparedness and response to cross-border health threats.
In Armenia, budget support and complementary programmes helped advance reforms to improve
access to quality education, support the socioeconomic inclusion of Karabakh Armenians and other
vulnerable groups and strengthen the political empowerment of youth. The social dimension of the
EUR 270 million Armenia Resilience and Growth Plan 2024-2027 included investments in local services,
women’s health and rural livelihoods in Syunik under the Resilient Syunik Team Europe Initiative,
which has already provided a newly furnished kindergarten for over 150 children, modernised citizen
service offices and support to rural veterinary services.
In Azerbaijan, capacity building to state authorities was provided through various technical assistance
facilities, especially with regards to water management and transport. In Belarus, where no assistance
is channelled to the authorities, the EU continued to support citizens directly. In December 2024, the
European Commission has adopted a new assistance programme ‘EU4People of Belarus: Strengthen
Human Rights and Education’ worth EUR 30 million. The programme aims to preserve an independent
civic space and support unbiased quality education opportunities for Belarusians. This programme
adds to the EUR 170 million mobilised by the EU since 2020 in six key areas: civil society, human rights,
independent media, education, culture, and small and medium sized business in exile. Belarusians also
benefit from regional initiatives such as EU4Culture, EU4IndependentMedia, EU4GenderEquality,
EU4Youth and the Partnership for Good Governance.
Green Deal
The Green Deal increasingly structures cooperation with Eastern Neighbourhood partners through
investments in clean energy, climate resilience, water and air quality. Regionally, the EU4Climate
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Resilience programme supported technical assistance and pilot projects to strengthen climate
adaptation at municipal level, helping partner countries meet their Paris Agreement commitments
and align with EU legislation, while the EU4Green Recovery East programme, launched in 2025,
supported water management, approximation with the EU environmental acquis and the promotion
of circular economy practices in the private sector.
In Armenia, Green Deal actions cut across energy, environment and agriculture. EU-supported
operations promoted renewable energy and energy efficiency in public buildings and provided
nuclear-safety expertise, while newly approved support targeted water management for Lake Sevan,
improved air quality and green agriculture. In Syunik, the Resilient Syunik Team Europe Initiative
installed three solar stations, introduced efficiency and renewable-energy solutions in 10 municipal
buildings and provided energy-efficient stoves to 186 households, linking climate action with better
services and living standards.
In Azerbaijan, COP29 created new momentum for cooperation on green connectivity. With the
signature of the Financing Agreement at the end of 2025, the EU and Azerbaijan agreed to support
water management and to explore connectivity-related initiatives in energy and transport. Belarusian
authorities are not eligible for direct support, but Belarusians can participate in regional environment
and climate programmes that foster sustainable practices across all Eastern Partnership countries.
Sustainable growth and jobs
The Global Gateway strategy remained the main lever for investment and jobs, having unlocked an
estimated EUR 14.5 billion since 2021 through guarantees, blending and bilateral programmes.
In Armenia, EU cooperation backed SME development and access to finance, including targeted
support for wine, textile and agri-food value chains to boost exports and quality standards. The Team
Europe initiative ‘Resilient Syunik’ continues to support MSMEs, strengthening the border region’s
socioeconomic development. Under Resilient Syunik, 32 aspiring entrepreneurs received coaching and
grants to launch businesses in diverse sectors, supporting local employment and diversification.
In Azerbaijan, EU support, also provided through Global Gateway related measures, sought to foster
economic development, diversification, and SME competitiveness including by strengthening the
capacity, environmental performance and financial sustainability of local businesses.
In the Republic of Moldova (as part of the wider Eastern Neighbourhood), the EU contributed to new
national SME support schemes and the creation of a Fund for Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth,
as well as to improved statistical and spatial-data systems for economic planning.
TAIEX activities promoted inclusive growth, for example via a study visit on empowering women in
circular entrepreneurship, which helped Moldovan stakeholders draw on EU experience for
sustainable SME development.
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
Digital cooperation in the Eastern Neighbourhood is driven by EU4Digital and related regional
initiatives. EU4Digital supports integration with the EU digital single market and promotes investment
for broadband and digital innovation.
In 2025, the EU4Digital Facility continued to provide technical support, including in support of
Ukraine’s and the Republic of Moldova’s integration into the EU roaming area, which entered into
effect on 1 January 2026. It also supported the establishment of an artificial intelligence tool to
facilitate transposition of the EU acquis and launched the EU4Digital Academy, a regional digital skills
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platform providing free online courses on cyber-security, digital marketing and business digitalisation
to more than 11 000 users across the Eastern Partnership. In Armenia, work progressed on aligning
eID with EU rules under EU4Digital, while the EaPConnect programme enabled the launch of the
Armenian National Supercomputing Centre, positioning the country as a regional hub for digital
technologies. The EU4Innovation East regional project, launched in June 2024, is supporting start-ups,
with a focus on women-led companies in digital sectors. Azerbaijan continues to benefit from regional
digital skills activities under EU4Digital, as well as bilateral discussions on the digitalisation of transport
corridors, with a focus on the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. The Republic of Moldova continued
alignment with EU payment and infrastructure networks, including by joining SEPA and by furthering
its integration into new TEN-T corridors.
Migration and forced displacement
Migration and forced displacement in the Eastern Neighbourhood were mainly triggered by the
consequences of Russia's war against Ukraine. EUBAM (EU Border Management Assistance Mission)
continued to play a key role at the Republic of Moldova–Ukraine border until November 2025,
mentoring customs and police officers, strengthening security along the administrative line with the
Transnistrian region and supporting implementation of the EU–Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, including
through joint and coordinated controls at key border-crossing points and training more than 500
officers.
The EU worked with partners to maintain visa-liberalisation benchmarks for the Republic of Moldova
and Ukraine and to uphold readmission commitments. The serious democratic backsliding in Georgia
led the Council to adopt in January 2025 a partial suspension of the EU–Georgia visa-facilitation
agreement for holders of diplomatic and service passports, implemented by a majority of EU Member
States.
For Armenia, the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue launched in 2024 advanced: in November 2025, the
Commission presented the EU–Armenia Visa Liberalisation Action Plan in Yerevan, setting out the
benchmarks Armenia must meet across travel document security, border and migration management,
public order, external relations and fundamental rights. The EU also continued to support Armenia's
migration management capacity, including through cooperation with Frontex and the 2024 opening
of a new EU-aligned asylum centre. Belarus continued instrumentalisation of migration against the
EU. Affected Member States received financial support to strengthen their border surveillance
capabilities. The EU broadened the scope of Belarusian sanctions regime to cover hybrid activities that
threaten stability or security in the EU and its Member States.
Governance, peace and security (and conflict prevention)
Regionally, the EU continued to support reforms in governance, democracy, rule of law,
anti-corruption and the fight against organised crime, with a strong emphasis on civil society
engagement, independent media and gender equality. The support was implemented through
programmes such as Partnership for Good Governance, EU4Integrity, EU against Organised Crime as
well as actions under the Crisis Response funding stream were warranted by rapid and/or critical
geopolitical shifts.
In Armenia, budget support advanced judicial and legal reforms and anti-corruption policies, with
complementary technical assistance in justice, law enforcement and security sectors under the CEPA
framework. A Twinning project with the Ministry of Justice and the Corruption Prevention Commission
helped strengthen integrity and corruption prevention in the public sector.
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The EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) continued to monitor the security situation on the ground,
contributing to human security and supporting confidence building between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Crisis-response interventions and thematic peace and stability actions supported countering Foreign
Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), ensured continued financing and operations of
independent media and fostered reconciliation efforts in the South Caucasus. The EU Special
Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia remained central to diplomacy and
mediation.
In Belarus, the EU’s policy of non-recognition and sanctions remained in place; no assistance is
provided to the authorities, while support is directed to citizens, civil society and independent media.
Cross-border cooperation
Under Eastern Partnership frameworks, cross-border projects between EU Member States and
Eastern partners support joint initiatives in areas such as environment, transport, tourism and public
services, while fostering people-to-people contacts and trust.
EUBAM’s joint work with Moldovan and Ukrainian border agencies contributed to the functioning of
the Solidarity Lanes in the lower Danube region up until November 2025. The new Black Sea
Connectivity Agenda, adopted in May 2025, underpins cross-border connectivity between the EU, the
South Caucasus and Central Asia, with Armenia and Azerbaijan as key land bridges.
Regional civil protection programmes in the Eastern Partnership support shared risk assessments, joint
exercises and integration into the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, helping partners manage
cross-border disasters more effectively.
Food security and nutrition
Food security challenges in the Eastern Neighbourhood are closely linked to Russia’s war against
Ukraine, climate change and economic shocks. At regional level, EU4Environment, EU4Rural and other
initiatives support more sustainable and climate resilient agriculture and value chains, though
reporting remains mostly regional. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, rural development and SME
programmes contributed to improved livelihoods, diversification and value addition in agri-food
sectors.
Humanitarian food and nutrition assistance was primarily directed to Ukraine and to refugees and
displaced populations in neighbouring countries, while development cooperation promoted
sustainable agriculture and rural development as part of broader Green Deal and growth agendas.
Case study – Education for Belarusians
Since the disputed 2020 elections, the Belarusian education sector has been heavily affected by
political repression. Students, educators, and researchers are among the most targeted groups, facing
expulsions, dismissals, and persecution for their civic stance. During this difficult period, the
programme ‘Support to Advanced Learning and Training (SALT I-III)’ assists Belarusian students,
lecturers, and researchers forced to flee the regime.
One of the programme’s key elements is financial assistance, which enables students to continue
university studies and helps displaced lecturers and researchers return to academic work and rebuild
professional networks. Survey participants also emphasized the programme’s emotional support,
which restored self-confidence, provided stability, and reaffirmed that their knowledge and expertise
are valued. Belarusian organisations operating abroad emphasised that SALT is a strategically
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important initiative for preserving Belarus’ intellectual potential in forced migration and highlighted
the need to strengthen communication and decision making to enhance the programme’s impact.
An independent survey conducted by RAIT Group shows that the SALT programme has had a
significant impact on the Belarusian community. Respondents evaluated SALT very positively − the Net
Promoter Score (NPS) reached 82 (on a scale from -100 to 100). Such a high score indicates strong
trust in and support for the programme. The results indicate that SALT is particularly important for
Belarusian academic and civic communities that have formed in Poland, Czechia, Germany and
Lithuania.
4.5.1.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people affected
by conflicts and disasters
The spillover effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on neighbouring eastern partners
remained significant in 2025. The Republic of Moldova hosted around 139 000 Ukrainian refugees, for
whom the EU made EUR 9.5 million available in 2025, channelling assistance primarily through cash
and protection services for the most vulnerable. Humanitarian funding for food, basic services and
protection in the Republic of Moldova complemented broader support for institutional resilience and
border management under other EU instruments. On 17 January 2025, the Republic of Moldova
requested assistance due to the risk of energy supply cut-off. In response, five Member States offered
generators and air conditioning systems.
In Armenia, the EU also continued supporting Karabakh Armenians, notably in the sectors of basic
needs, shelter, health and protection. The overarching objective remains their inclusion into national
social protection schemes, enabling a gradual exit of humanitarian actors. A humanitarian-
development-peace nexus process was initiated in 2024 and is expected to conclude in 2026.
In November 2025, the European Commission launched the flagship regional civil protection
programme ‘Prevention, Preparedness and Response to natural and human-induced Disasters in the
Eastern Partnership countries’ (EUR 5 million, 2025-2029). The programme aims to improve disaster
resilience and response capacities while fostering integration and coordination among Eastern
Partnership countries with the UCPM.
4.5.1.4. Crisis response and preparedness
In 2025, the EU further strengthened crisis response and preparedness in the European
Neighbourhood East, combining Rapid Response and thematic instruments under NDICI–Global
Europe with Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) instruments and Team Europe Initiatives.
Actions focused on addressing the security and humanitarian consequences of Russia’s war of
aggression against Ukraine, supporting peaceful solutions, democratic and media resilience in the
South Caucasus, as well as standing by the people of Belarus in the face of continued repression.
In Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EU continued to support efforts towards a peaceful and stable South
Caucasus. The EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) contributed to confidence-building between
communities by observing, and reporting on the situation on the ground, thereby enhancing human
security in conflict-affected areas. Actions under NDICI–Global Europe’s Crisis Response funding
stream as well as the thematic programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict prevention promoted
dialogue and conflict resolution. EU had mobilised EUR 12.6 million to support Karabakh Armenians
in humanitarian aid and civil-protection in-kind support. In Azerbaijan, in the framework of the Team
Europe initiative on Mine Action, the EU continued to provide assistance to humanitarian demining
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and mine action in conflict-affected areas, including through support to demining, equipment, and
capacity-building.
Crisis Response funding was also used in Armenia to ensure the continuity of operations of
independent media and support countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference
(FIMI). In addition, the Resilient Syunik Team Europe Initiative in southern Armenia, with an
approximate five-year budget of EUR 200 million, continued to strengthen socio-economic and
institutional resilience by investing in energy, basic services and livelihoods.
In Belarus, where the authorities maintained support for Russia’s war and repression of dissent, EU
Crisis Response engagement focused on democratic resilience and support to citizens. No assistance
was provided to the authorities; instead, a new assistance programme adopted at the end of 2024
continued to provide direct support in 2025 to civil society, human rights defenders, independent
media, educational and cultural initiatives and small and medium-sized businesses in exile, while
assistance to democratic civic engagement and leadership was stepped up in response to the
deteriorating human rights situation.
At regional level, the Global Gateway and multiannual programmes for the Eastern Neighbourhood
supported structural resilience through investments in connectivity, green transition and
socio-economic development, while dedicated programmes on climate resilience, water management
and energy (EU4Environment, EU4Climate Resilience, Covenant of Mayors East, EU4Energy) helped
partner countries prepare for and reduce the impact of future crises, including those driven by climate
change and environmental degradation.
4.5.2. European Neighbourhood South and the Middle East/Gulf region
4.5.2.1. Introduction (policy developments)
In 2025, the EU’s engagement with the Southern Neighbourhood as well as the wider Middle East
including the Gulf and Iraq entered a new phase of strengthened relationships, in a persistently
volatile regional context. The EU equipped itself with new tools – notably the Pact for the
Mediterranean and Strategic and Comprehensive Partnerships – to deliver more coherent,
impact-oriented action across the region. A dedicated Commission Directorate-General for the Middle
East, North Africa and the Gulf became fully operational as the Commission’s hub for relations with
19 partner countries from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf to develop strong
partnerships with these countries based on mutual interest, and to ensure common sustainable
prosperity and resilience.
The Joint Commission and the High Representative Communication on the Pact for the
Mediterranean, adopted in October 2025, provided the new cooperation framework for the EU-
Southern Neighbourhood relations. Building on the 2021 Agenda for the Mediterranean and based on
co-ownership, co-creation and co-responsibility, it set out priority areas and concrete joint actions to
promote peace, prosperity and stability. It envisaged a two-layer implementation and monitoring
system at EU and Euro-Mediterranean level and a rolling action plan. The Pact was launched jointly by
EU Member States and Southern partners in Barcelona on 28 November, at the occasion of the 30th
anniversary of the Barcelona Process and the 10th Union for the Mediterranean Regional Forum. The
Joint Communication on the Pact was welcomed in the FAC Conclusions of 20 November and the
European Council Conclusions of 18 December, signalling a renewed, partnership-based approach to
the Mediterranean.
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The regional context remained dominated by conflict and fragility. The war in Gaza continued to
generate a severe humanitarian crisis, widespread destruction and increased instability across the
Middle East, with spill-overs involving Hezbollah and Iran and heightened tensions in the Red Sea. The
EU helped frame a more strategic posture through extensive diplomatic outreach, coordinating the
EU contribution to the Gaza Peace Plan as endorsed by UNSC Resolution 2803. It included several
elements, such as facilitating the monitoring of the Rafah crossing point via the re-deployment of
EUBAM (EU Border Management Assistance Mission) Rafah, tabling a comprehensive programme for
Palestine’s recovery and resilience for 2025-2027 and convening the first Palestine Donor Group
meeting. It involved also proposing measures in response to actions undermining the two-state
solution and keeping a pro-active stance in the work of the Global Alliance for the Implementation of
the Two-State Solution.
The situation in Syria changed fundamentally with the fall of the Assad regime; sanctions were lifted
and a substantial support package for institutional capacity, socio-economic recovery and transitional
justice was quickly mobilised, preparing a revitalised EU–Syria relationship. Remaining a complex and
fragile context, Libya experienced escalation of violence with clashes in Tripoli in May 2025. The
escalation of the crisis in Sudan in 2025, adding to the continued instability in the Sahel region, has
had substantial spillover effect on North African countries, who are transit and increasingly destination
countries for migrants and refugees.
At the same time, the EU deepened differentiated bilateral partnerships across the Southern
Neighbourhood. Strategic and Comprehensive Partnerships with Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan provided
structured frameworks for political dialogue, Macro Financial Assistance and Budget Support, reforms
and investment. Engagement with Lebanon and Iraq focused on stabilisation, reforms and economic
diversification, while programmes in Yemen continued to address the root causes of instability and
fed into broader Red Sea security efforts.
The EU regarded the Gulf region as a strategic partner for regional and global security, as well as
economic development. Building on the Joint Commission and High Representative Communication:
‘A strategic partnership with the Gulf’ adopted in 2022, Strategic Partnership Agreements were
offered to the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. By the end of 2025, five had responded
positively and negotiations had been launched with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, with
a view to establishing ambitious and comprehensive legal frameworks for cooperation in areas
including security, climate, energy and digitalisation. On trade, a significant milestone between the EU
and the UAE was the decision to start negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement. Cooperation on peace
and security continued to deepen, also through the second EU-GCC Regional Security Dialogue in April
2025. Work on the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor advanced through steering
committees in New Delhi and Brussels, which agreed on a three-tier governance structure to guide
the implementation from 2026 onwards.
Across the Southern Neighbourhood and the wider Middle East/Gulf, the EU used Global Gateway and
Team Europe to promote sustainable investment and connectivity. An Investment Platform for
blending and guarantees was set up to mobilise public and private investment through EFSD+
guarantees, and country-based platforms and guarantee mechanisms were advanced in Morocco,
Egypt, Jordan and Palestine, with feasibility work under way in Algeria and Tunisia. At the same time,
regional and thematic programmes supported jobs and skills for youth and women, circular-economy
initiatives and democratic governance, while new multiannual migration programmes for the
Southern Neighbourhood reflected the external dimension of the Pact on Migration and Asylum.
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4.5.2.2. Implementation
Human development and inequalities
In 2025, EU support for human development in the Southern Neighbourhood, the wider Middle East
and the Gulf combined large-scale crisis response with long-term investments in basic services, social
cohesion and gender equality. In Syria and neighbouring refugee-hosting countries, the EU and its
Member States had together made available more than EUR 37 billion since 2011, including EUR 2.49
billion inside Syria, with the Madad Trust Fund alone reaching over 11 million people through health,
education, livelihoods and local-infrastructure support. In 2024, the EU adopted EUR 448 million for
Lebanon and Jordan to sustain education, health, WASH, social assistance and resilience for Syrian
refugees and host communities, and these programmes continued to deliver in 2025. Inside Syria, EU
assistance substituted for largely absent public services by maintaining basic and TVET education, skills
training and psychosocial support, and by strengthening health-workforce capacity through
redesigned curricula and new training schemes for mental-health and psychosocial-support
personnel.
In Palestine, the EU maintained and re-built engagement with civil-society organisations after the
escalation of violence in the past years, led the gender Action Plan (GAP) III country-level
implementation plan with EU Member States and civil society, and supported youth participation
through forums, volunteer platforms and cultural initiatives. EU funding of EUR 22 million helped clear
Palestinian Authority arrears for medical referrals to East Jerusalem hospitals, securing access to
essential specialised health care for the population in the West Bank. A statement to restore the
humanitarian corridor from Gaza to East Jerusalem hospitals was co-signed by the EU High
Representative/Vice-President and EU Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis
Management.
In Libya, the EU supported approximately 70 municipalities through local governance and service-
delivery programmes. These initiatives strengthened municipal capacities and improved access to
essential public services, including health, education, water and sanitation, local infrastructure,
livelihoods and social cohesion. The EU subsequently launched a new resilience and recovery
programme supporting municipalities in sectors such as water management, road networks, primary
health care, education and cultural heritage.
In Yemen, the EU worked on improvements in public service delivery, including through the SIERY
project, which has restored 177 public services and improved access for over seven million Yemenis.
The EU also worked on social protection, linking humanitarian cash assistance to livelihoods support.
In Tunisia, the first phase of the school modernisation programme was completed in 2025, with the
rehabilitation of 420 schools and construction of 59 new schools for a total of EUR 223 million, partly
financed with a loan from the European Investment Bank and EUR 22.5 million grant of the EU. A
second phase is ongoing with 80 new schools, climate resilient and digitally connected, under
construction and benefit from a EUR 25 million grant from the EU.
Green Deal
In Algeria, the EU further strengthened its support for the country’s energy transition and climate
objectives through a ‘Team Europe’ approach. In July 2025, the EU and Algeria signed the Financial
Agreement for a new action, adopted under the 2024 Annual Action Plan (AAP) with an EU
contribution of EUR 18 million and German co-financing of EUR 20 million, supporting the
development of Algeria’s first reference green hydrogen plant. In October 2025, the EU and Algeria
signed a Financial Agreement for a EUR 20 million water-sector programme, also adopted under the
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2024 AAP, aimed at strengthening sustainable water resource management and climate adaptation in
a context of water scarcity.
In Morocco, implementation of the 2022 EU–Morocco Green Partnership advanced across energy
transition, economic decarbonisation, climate adaptation, environmental protection and green and
blue economies, providing a comprehensive framework for aligning reforms and investment with the
European Green Deal. In 2025 the budget support ‘Economie Verte’ focusing on circular economy was
signed. In Jordan, the ‘EU–Jordan partnership for a green transition’ programme adopted under the
2024 AAP moved into implementation, supporting decarbonisation, green growth and green jobs.
In Lebanon, EU projects ensured renewable-energy and energy-efficiency solutions for security and
justice institutions and schools, including those used as shelters, and supported the Ministry of Energy
and Water and water establishments in maintaining safe drinking-water provision during conflict
escalation. Additional interventions helped keep nine wastewater-treatment plants operational in
heavily affected areas, while the ‘Hawkamaa’ project backed water utilities under pressure. In Libya,
the EUR 102 million 2025-2027 programme included EUR 23.5 million for climate, energy and
environmental action.
At a regional level, in the field of environment, the EU continued supporting the Barcelona Convention
and the protection of Mediterranean biodiversity and coastal areas, as well as its long-standing
engagement in the management of scarce water resources. It started the design of a future regional
project to facilitate basin organisations peer-to-peer exchanges and integrate earth observation into
water management practices, in accordance with the water agenda of the Union for the
Mediterranean.
In the field of energy, the EU continued supporting the long-standing collaboration of Mediterranean
Transmission System Operators (Med-TSO) and Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MEDREG) to
promote the creation of a Mediterranean energy market, which will provide a key element for the
Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean Tech Initiative (T-MED) under the Pact for the
Mediterranean. The EU also continued supporting the long-standing collaboration of Mediterranean
Energy Agencies through the MeetMED initiative to enhance climate resilience and low-carbon
transitions in the Mediterranean, with significant emphasis on improving energy efficiency in
buildings.
Sustainable growth and jobs
Sustainable growth and decent jobs were pursued through national reforms, regional economic
cooperation programmes and new Global Gateway investment platforms.
In Morocco, the EU ensured timely disbursement of budget support operations and adopted a 2025
Financing Decision supporting business climate and skills improvements.
In Algeria, the EU signed the Financial Agreement for the EUR 7 million ‘Support to Economic
Governance’programme, adopted under the 2024 AAP, to strengthen anti-corruption practices and
the e-governance and statistics systems. Under the 2025 AAP, three new actions were adopted to
promote sustainable growth and job creation: ‘EU-Algeria for Business’ (EUR 16 million), focused on
investments and trade facilitation; ‘Cleantech Platform’ (EUR 18 million), supporting Algeria’s
integration into EU clean-technology value chains; and ‘Masalek’ (EUR 11 million), targeting youth and
women’s engagement in culture and tourism. The latter builds on ‘Jil-Siyaha’, which continued to
deliver results in 2025, including four new thematic tourism routes, 130 certified hospitality trainers,
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15 new tourism-skills curricula and around one million social media interactions generated through
support to young artists.
In Egypt, the EU and Egypt continued to advance with the implementation of six key pillars of the
Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership through its EUR 7.4 billion financial and investment package
for 2024-2027, comprising up to EUR 5 billion in Macro Financial Assistance, EUR 600 million in grants
(including EUR 200 million for migration), and EUR 1.8 billion in additional investments. The
investment dimension is being further operationalised through the EU−Egypt Investment Mechanism,
launched in 2025 to help mobilise additional public and private investment in support of Egypt’s
reform and development priorities. With the disbursement of the Macro Financial Assistance first
instalment of EUR 1 billion in January 2026 (out of EUR 4 billion), the EU continued to support Egypt’s
macro-economic stability, business environment reforms and green transition.
In Libya, the 2025-2027 programme included EUR 23.5 million for economic growth and digital
transformation. Regionally, a portfolio exceeding EUR 465 million supported entrepreneurship, MSME
finance, impact-investing, social economy, women and youth economic empowerment, formalisation
and circular economy under the Team Europe Initiative on Jobs through trade and investment for the
Southern Neighbourhood, in close cooperation with EU Member States, the EIB, EBRD, ETF and the
Union for the Mediterranean. In Yemen, the EU supported economic growth and employment
opportunities by promoting private sector growth, sustainable climate infrastructure, economic
resilience as well as sustainable farming practices and water management to address food insecurity.
In addition, the EU continued to support financial inclusion through the SANAD Fund, enabling 448,000
jobs across the Middle East and North of Africa region since 2018. As one of the region's largest job
creators, SANAD disbursed approximately EUR 1.98 billion (current exchange rate) through debt and
equity sub-funds, with 41% benefiting women, 57% aiding rural and semi-urban borrowers, and 20%
reaching young clients. 96.5% of all sub-loans were disbursed in local currency, across target countries
like Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. SANAD's
equity investments in microfinance institutions and fintech companies are pivotal to institution-
building and to broaden economic access.
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
Regionally, In the field of digital, the EU supported the development of the Medusa subsea cable, who
completed its first landing in 2025 by connecting Marseille (France) with Bizerte (Tunisia) and Nador
(Morocco), and the connection of EU national research and education agencies with the Arab agencies
network, laying the ground for further expansion in 2026. It also started a new initiative supporting
the digital transformation in partner countries focusing on regulatory reforms, cybersecurity, and
digital skills. The European Commission also started its development of the EU digital tech business
offer for the region. Bilaterally, the EU supports partner countries to digitalise public services to
improve service delivery notably in Morocco.
In the field of transport, the EU continued supporting the improvement and harmonisation of
maritime safety, security and environment standards through its collaboration with the European
Maritime Safety Agency in the Southern Neighbourhood and started a new collaboration with
European Financing Institutions and development agencies to develop sustainable urban mobility in
partner countries.
The EU has continued to develop its engagement on higher, education, research and innovation,
notably with North African countries. As first African and Arab country associated to Horizon Europe,
Tunisia has mobilised EUR 16.07 million under Horizon Europe, with 66 signed projects. Egypt
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successfully completed the association to Horizon in 2025 and is actively engaged in the Partnership
for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA). Negotiations with Morocco and
Algeria have continued in 2025 to ensure participation to the Partnership for Research and Innovation
in the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA) for the period 2025-2027. Bilaterally, support is given to ensure
partner countries make the best use of opportunities offered under Erasmus+ or Horizon Europe. For
example, the ‘Ipticar’ twinning began delivering results in Algeria, with three joint master’s
programmes with European universities entering the operational phase, Horizon Europe training
reaching 39 research groups and academics from five universities, and 12 outreach events gathering
over 400 participants. A technical assistance contract was also signed to support the Ministry of Higher
Education and Research in assessing socio-economic sector needs.
At country level, Libya’s 2025-2027 programme includes a dedicated component on digital
transformation.
Migration and forced displacement
The EU adopted in December 2025 a Multiannual Action Programme 2025-2027 for migration in the
Southern Neighbourhood, focusing on protection, migration governance, including border
management and counter migrant smuggling actions, return and reintegration, legal migration and
mobility. EUR 208 million from 2024 budget were contracted in 2025 for actions in the area of
migration governance (EUR 86 million), protection (EUR 53 million), return (EUR 56 million) and legal
migration and mobility (EUR 13 million) implemented in the five north Africa countries.
In Syria and neighbouring countries, EU support continued to tackle the long-term impacts of
displacement, using the legacy and follow-up of Madad to sustain access to education, health, WASH
and livelihoods for refugees and host communities. In Lebanon and Jordan, assistance under the Syria
response included support for basic services, social assistance and resilience, while in Libya and other
North African countries, EU programmes addressed migration management capacities, protection
needs in fragile contexts, and voluntary return and reintegration mechanisms.
Globally, the EU reinforced a human rights based approach to migration and launched a new action
on the financial and digital dimensions of migrant smuggling, which is also relevant for Mediterranean
routes.
Governance, peace and security
Governance, peace and security cooperation in the Southern Neighbourhood and Middle East in 2025
was shaped by conflicts in Gaza, Syria, Libya and Yemen and by wider regional tensions. A regional
action ‘Safeguard of basic rights and democratic governance in the Southern Neighbourhood’ was
adopted for 2025-2027, with almost half its budget at regional level, supporting human rights,
democratic governance, rule of law and civil society across the region.
In Libya, the new 2025-2027 programme included EUR 55 million for governance and stabilisation,
aiming to strengthen institutions, local governance and reconciliation. In Syria, a EUR 175 million
package focused on institutional capacity-building, socio-economic recovery, transitional justice,
accountability and social cohesion. In Yemen, the EU also addressed drivers of instability through
peace and mediation efforts, including by fostering local demand for peace, implementing measures
agreed upon between the parties and expanding civil society space, with the broader objective of
contributing to stability in the Red Sea region. Additionally, the EU worked on developing nexus
approaches on mediation.
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In Palestine, the Comprehensive Programme for Palestinian Recovery and Resilience 2025-2027 (EUR
1.6 billion) linked EU support to agreed reform priorities, including governance and fiscal
sustainability, and was accompanied in November 2025 by the establishment of the Palestine Donor
Group to coordinate international efforts to support the Palestinian authority in its reforms agenda.
Food security and nutrition
Food security challenges in the Southern Neighbourhood and the wider Middle East have been
exacerbated by conflict, climate change and economic crises.
In Syria and neighbouring countries, EU crisis response and development programmes addressed food
insecurity through support to livelihoods, social protection and basic services for refugees and host
communities. In Lebanon, EU support to water, wastewater and energy services under crisis
conditions helped prevent further deterioration of public health and food security conditions. In
Yemen, the SIERY project’s restoration of public services and support to fisheries, agriculture and
apiculture improved livelihoods and access to food for thousands. The EU’s support in the region also
focusses on developing a resilient and modern agriculture sector.
In Algeria, EU support to agricultural innovation advanced through the ‘Innov-Agro’ programme (2024-
2028; EU grant: EUR 6.9 million; German co-financing: EUR 1 million), which selected 40 entrepreneurs
and 21 agri-tech start-ups for a two-year mentoring track combining technical assistance and access
to financing, as well as the signature of the ‘PASA+’ programme (amounting to EUR 15 million)
between the EU and the Italian cooperation to support sustainable agriculture practices with a focus
on SME development.
Territorial and cross-border cooperation
Territorial and cross-border cooperation advanced through new and existing frameworks as well as
corridor-based approaches. The Pact for the Mediterranean, launched in Barcelona in 2025, set a
renewed partnership for a ‘Common Mediterranean Space’ built on co-ownership and shared
responsibility, and integrates economic, social and security dimensions, including connectivity and
energy transitions. Under this umbrella, the EU has been working with southern Mediterranean
partners on a number of areas of mutual interest, across the three pillars of the Pact: people, stronger,
more sustainable and integrated economies; security, preparedness and migration management. In
addition, Interreg cooperation programmes continued to foster multi-country cooperation between
EU Member States and Southern Neighbourhood countries. In 2025, the Interreg NEXT MED
programme allocated over EUR 115 million to joint partnerships across a range of key sectors,
includingclimate change actions, SME competitiveness as well as bottom-up and participatory
approaches.
In Algeria, this approach was reflected in the launch of ADIL (Appui au Développement Intégré Local),
a programme co-financed by the EU (EUR 20 million) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (EUR
1.8 million). Launched in September 2025, ADIL supports decentralisation reforms, local governance
and integrated territorial development.
The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), while still in preparation in 2025, illustrated
how corridor-based Global Gateway approaches can link the Gulf, Levant and Europe through
sustainable infrastructure and trade routes.
Beyond IMEC, cooperation with the Gulf region expanded significantly in 2025. The EU stepped up its
cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on various policy areas of common interest,
including digital and energy interconnections. Additionally, in response to partners’ requests for
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reinforced bilateral legal frameworks, the EU offered to open negotiations on Strategic Partnership
Agreements (SPAs) with all six GCC countries − Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates. The SPAs provide for ambitious, modern, comprehensive and effective legal
frameworks for bilateral cooperation tailored to the shared priorities and objectives of the EU and
each GCC partner. By December 2025, five of the six countries had responded positively to this offer,
and negotiations were officially launched with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.
Finally, the EU Commission contributed to the EEAS-led Red Sea task force, mapping current initiatives
contributing to the stability of the region.
Case study - Global Gateway in the Mediterranean: Medusa Submarine Cable System
Under Global Gateway in the Mediterranean, the Medusa Submarine Cable System landed in Nador
(Morocco) in December 2025, following the earlier deployments in Marseille (France) in October and
Bizerte (Tunisia) in November 2025, reinforcing the system’s progression across both shores of the
Mediterranean.
The milestone underscored the project’s mission to strengthen digital infrastructure by providing
resilient, high-capacity connectivity routes between Europe and North Africa. This investment
enhances the region’s strategic role in global data flows and supports the growing demand for secure
and reliable international bandwidth. The EU financing aims to foster research collaboration between
EU and North Africa universities through strengthen digital connectivity. With ongoing deployments
planned for 2026 towards the East of the Mediterranean, Medusa continues to advance towards full
system implementation, consolidating its role as a transformative project for regional and
international telecommunications.
4.5.2.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people affected
by conflicts and disasters
In 2025, the Southern Neighbourhood and the wider Middle East/Gulf remained among the regions
with the gravest humanitarian needs, driven by protracted conflicts, political instability, economic
crises and climate- and weather-related shocks. The war in Gaza continued relentlessly, with
catastrophic humanitarian consequences. During this period, the situation in Gaza could only be
described as an extreme humanitarian emergency, with massive civilian casualties, displacement and
destruction of infrastructure, with direct implications on the vulnerable population, including famine.
Humanitarian needs in all sectors remain enormous. The entire population of Gaza (2.1 million) is
exposed to security and protection risks and forced displacement. Basic services have all but collapsed.
The population has scant access to food, water, health or education, while they remain constrained
to a fraction of the territory, living in appalling conditions that exacerbate public health risks. A
ceasefire launched in October 2025 contributed to a reduction in violence and some improvement in
the flow of humanitarian aid, albeit of limited scope and duration, as administrative constraints
severely impede humanitarian support.
The EU humanitarian assistance to the people of Palestine focused primarily on life-saving health care,
food and nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), shelter and protection, including for
children and women. EU humanitarian funding was channelled through principled humanitarian
partners, notably UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
non-governmental organisations, in line with humanitarian principles and international humanitarian
law. The EU allocated EUR 220 million in 2025 for humanitarian aid in Palestine. The EU also continued
operational support to partners with 32 EUHABs, transporting 2 705 metric tonnes of aid, including
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554 metric tonnes of EU stockpiles donated to partners. In addition, the EU supported the organisation
of road convoys delivering nearly 1 400 tonnes of humanitarian cargo.
In Lebanon, beyond the regular programming to address the pre-existing crises, the EU allocated an
additional EUR 25 million in humanitarian funding to provide crucial support (in terms of food,
protection, shelter, and health services) to populations affected by the conflict between Hezbollah
and Israel, which led to large-scale displacement. The total EU humanitarian funding in 2024 exceeded
EUR 92 million. In addition, under Lebanon’s request for assistance via the UCPM, medical and shelter
items were delivered throughout 2025.
In Syria and neighbouring refugee-hosting countries, the EU and its Member States remained
collectively the largest donor. Since 2011, over EUR 37 billion has been mobilised for Syrians inside
the country and in Lebanon, Jordan, Türkiye, Iraq and Egypt, including EUR 2.49 billion inside Syria.
Humanitarian operations in 2025 continued to provide food, health, WASH, shelter, protection and
education in emergencies, while supporting early-recovery activities where feasible. In July 2025, the
Syrian Civil Defense Forces requested assistance via the UCPM following multiple wildfires affecting
northwestern Syria. In response, firefighting equipment was delivered in August 2025.
Elsewhere in the region, the EU continued to support refugees and displaced population of protracted
and new crises and disasters in Libya, Yemen and other parts of North Africa and the Middle East. In
Yemen, humanitarian aid continued to tackle severe food insecurity, disease outbreaks and the impact
of protracted conflict, in complementarity with development and peacebuilding initiatives that
restore public services and support livelihoods.
In Libya, the south-eastern region of Al Kufra experienced a significant influx of Sudanese refugees,
with daily new arrivals, over half of them women and children. Recent data estimates a presence of
more than 514 000 refugees, amidst a deteriorating protection environment. In parallel, the increased
demand for services has overwhelmed local resources. In this context, the EU mobilised EUR 2 million
for response in Al Kufra, one of the areas mostly affected by the arrival of Sudanese refugees.
Egypt hosts over 1.5 million refugees and asylum seekers, with Sudanese refugees constituting 76% of
all registered refugees since the conflict in Sudan began in April 2023. With a shrinking asylum space
coinciding with a context of economic crisis for the host population, Sudanese refugees face severe
and multiple increasing barriers in accessing basic services, including health care and education, while
the protection environment has seen a deterioration. In this context, the EU mobilised EUR 9 million
in 2025 to meet the basic needs of the most vulnerable and enable safe and sustainable access to
quality education targeting out of school children.
Still without a resolution for the five-decade long political conflict, tens of thousands of Sahrawi
refugees remain stranded in a forgotten and protracted humanitarian crisis. Gathered in five camps
around Tindouf in the Algerian Sahara Desert, the Sahrawi refugees depend on external humanitarian
assistance for their subsistence. The political sensitivities, as well as extreme conditions thwart any
short-term perspectives for return, integration or resettlement and deter the interest of development
organisations. In 2025, the EU deployed projects amounting to EUR 9 million to respond to the basic
need of Sahrawi refugees in camps. This amount includes EUR 5 million provided for food and nutrition
assistance. Other assistance included support to improve the quality of primary education, the supply
of essential medicines and the provision of safe drinking water.
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4.5.2.4. Crisis response and preparedness
In 2025, the EU strengthened crisis response and preparedness in the Southern Neighbourhood and
the Middle East/Gulf by combining the rapid-response pillar of NDICI–Global Europe, humanitarian
aid, civil-protection tools, macro-financial support and Global Gateway investments within a
humanitarian–development–peace nexus.
Under rapid-response, the EU supported measures in situations of fragility, (post-)conflict, forced
displacement and climate- and environment-related shocks. In Syria and neighbouring
refugee-hosting countries, crisis-response actions complemented large-scale humanitarian aid and
the legacy of the Madad Trust Fund by promoting social cohesion, local governance, livelihoods and
access to basic services for refugees, internally displaced people and host communities. Crisis-
response actions also supported the establishment of the national mine-action centre (NMAC), and
the reduction of risks from explosive ordnance, while advancing stabilisation in the North-East through
learning opportunities and light rehabilitation of key infrastructure and community-based services. In
Iraq, reintegration support was provided to almost 5 000 individuals returning from North-East Syria,
combined with broader stabilisation efforts to promote community acceptance and prevent renewed
cycles of violence. In Yemen, programmes such as SIERY strengthened local governance, restored
public services and supported key value chains, improving communities’ ability to withstand shocks
and reducing the risk of renewed escalation, while supporting the mediation efforts of the UN Office
of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY). In Libya, a new 2025-2027
programme integrated governance, stabilisation, climate, energy and environment, targeting root
causes of fragility and enhancing institutional preparedness. Crisis response actions supported the UN-
led peace process and political mediation.
In Israel and Palestine, crisis response actions put in place a substantial civil society portfolio,
supporting some 50 Israeli and Palestinian organisations on dialogue, grassroot engagement and
independent media. Communities in Gaza were provided with healthcare and psychosocial services,
as mine action support protected them from risks of explosive ordnance and facilitate humanitarian
access. EU’s engagement in the Middle East Peace Process was reinforced by supporting a Women’s
Advisory Council and the Global Alliance for the implementation of the two-State solution. In Lebanon,
crisis response actions strengthened the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces’
stabilisation capacities.
At regional level, the Pact for the Mediterranean provided a framework for an integrated approach to
risk, linking conflict prevention, hybrid-threat resilience and climate- and disaster-risk management
with economic, including macroeconomic support, and social cooperation. The establishment of the
MENA Investment Platform under Global Gateway and flagship initiatives such as the
Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean Tech Cooperation Initiative (T-MED) aimed to align
infrastructure and energy investments with resilience and decarbonisation objectives, while country
investment platforms in Morocco, Egypt and Jordan prepared pipelines of projects that support both
growth and crisis-resilient services.
4.6. Overseas countries and territories (OCTs)
4.6.1. Introduction (policy developments)
In 2025, the European Union further consolidated its partnership with the 13 Overseas Countries and
Territories (OCTs), which, while not part of the EU, maintain special constitutional links with Denmark,
France and the Netherlands and form an integral part of the wider European family as their citizens
are EU citizens. The OCTs play an increasingly strategic role for the EU as outposts of its values and
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interests in the Atlantic, Antarctic, Arctic, Caribbean, Indian and Pacific regions, having vast Exclusive
Economic Zones, rich natural resources, and providing strategic access to key maritime zones and sea
routes. Despite their diversity, the OCTs continue to face common structural constraints: remoteness,
small domestic markets, strong dependence on imports, limited economic diversification, gaps in
connectivity and restricted administrative capacity. These specificities make it essential to support
their resilience and competitiveness through investment in connectivity, the green and digital
transitions and human capital, in line with the Global Gateway strategy.
The partnership is framed by the Decision on the Overseas Association including Greenland (DOAG),
which for 2021-2027 earmarks EUR 500 million to support OCTs’ sustainable development. Priority
sectors include connectivity, energy, education or biodiversity and climate. In 2025, implementation
of the multiannual indicative programmes progressed well, while project pipelines increasingly
reflected Global Gateway-type investments in sustainable infrastructure, green and blue economies
and digital connectivity.
Reflecting the significance of the OCTs, the European Commission proposed an amendment to the
Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland (DOAG), which entails doubling the funds
allocated to the OCTs to EUR 999 million.
Regular institutional and policy dialogues with all OCT authorities continued to support and inform the
partnership in 2025, through three tripartite meetings that brought together OCT authorities, the EU
Member States concerned and the European Commission to review progress and adjust priorities. The
dialogue underlined that the OCTs’ importance in building alliances and addressing common
challenges across respective regions.
Relations with Greenland continued to expand in a context of heightened international interest for
the Arctic. Following the opening of the EU office in Nuuk in 2024 and the first EU business mission,
cooperation in 2025 further broadened from the traditional focus on education towards green growth,
including the sustainable development of raw-material value chains digital connectivity, renewable
energy and sustainable tourism. The EU-Greenland partnership was also marked by two policy
dialogues, high-level visits and the inaugural EU-Greenland Week in November, in Brussels. This event
brought together public and private stakeholders to advance the partnerships in key strategic sectors
by focusing on specific investment opportunities.
At the same time, OCTs in the Pacific and Caribbean were increasingly integrated into regional Global
Gateway initiatives with an emphasis on strengthening the investment agenda and expanding regional
cooperation. In 2025, the three Pacific OCTs participated in the first EU Pacific Business Forum held in
Fiji in September 2025, while several Caribbean OCTs attended the EU–LAC Business Forum in
November 2025.
4.6.2. Implementation
Human development and inequalities
In Greenland, education support under the DOAG was ongoing in 2025 and targeted re- and
up-skilling, improved vocational curricula and student well-being, with the objective of enhancing
learning outcomes and entrepreneurial and innovation skills in emerging sectors such as sustainable
raw materials and renewable energy. Gender equality remained a cross-cutting priority, with new
actions to develop gender-sensitive indicators and sex-disaggregated data wherever possible.
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Green Deal
Climate adaptation, biodiversity and clean energy remained important components of the OCTs-EU
cooperation. The 11th EDF ‘Green Overseas’ (GO) programme supported all OCTs in advancing
sustainability, resilience, and low-carbon development, including through preparatory work for
renewable-energy projects deployments. Regional biodiversity-related programmes delivered
tangible results. In the Pacific, the PROTEGE programme (EUR 36 million) showed significant
achievements in agroecology, water management and the fight against invasive alien species. Lessons
learned are being incorporated into the design of a new regional programme (EUR 36 million)
dedicated to ‘blueing and greening’ food systems. In the Caribbean, the RESEMBID programme (EUR
42.67 million) came to an end in 2025 after having implemented 48 projects across 12 OCTs advancing
clean energy, and safeguarding oceans. The preparation for a new EUR 21 million DOAG programme
to support sustainable management of natural capital continued in 2025. In the Indian Ocean, the new
MARIO programme (EUR 4 million) started its implementation, to enhanced biosecurity, ecological
restoration and eradication of invasive species in the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, to
further preserve marine ecosystems.
The first intra-regional programme for the TAAF, GOPI (Management of Ungulates and Introduced
Predators in the TAAF and La Réunion), was also adopted in November 2025 to strengthen biodiversity
protection through the management of invasive species and to promote regional cooperation in the
south-west Indian Ocean.
Through BESTLIFE2030, OCTs received grants to scale up biodiversity and nature-conservation.
The energy transition was also supported through bilateral programmes: in New Caledonia with EUR
30.9 million to decarbonise the mining sector, in Saba with EUR 4.1 million for a low-carbon energy
mix, and in Greenland within a EUR 22.5 million Green Growth programme aiming at 90% renewables
in public electricity.
Sustainable growth and jobs
Sustainable local development and job creation are promoted through green and blue economies and
tourism. DOAG-funded territorial programmes include sustainable tourism in
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (EUR 27 million) and Wallis and Futuna (EUR 20.4 million), sustainable
agriculture in Sint Eustatius (EUR 2.9 million), a Green Growth programme in Greenland (EUR 22.5
million) and an e-government programme in Aruba (EUR 14.2 million).
A first OCT Business Forum in the Pacific brought together public and private stakeholders to explore
investment opportunities, in line with Global Gateway and in a ‘Team Europe’ approach. OCTs also
remained eligible for InvestEU, opening further avenues for mobilising private and public investment
in sustainable infrastructure, innovation and SMEs.
Digitalisation, science, technology, innovation and infrastructure
Digitalisation is a key lever for modernising public administration and services in the OCTs. The
e-government programme in Aruba (EUR 14.2 million) supported the implementation of the territory’s
e-government strategy, including setting up digital work processes, an e-ID system, a cybersecurity
policy framework and digital payments. The aim is to ease online access to government services and
unlock new economic opportunities, particularly for women and young people. STEM-focused
higher-education investments in Aruba and innovation-oriented green-growth programme in
Greenland also contributed to building a skilled workforce for the digital and green transitions.
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Digital connectivity has been chosen as priority sector for the Intra-regional cooperation in the
Caribbeans thereby contributing to Global Gateway’s green and digital twin transition in cooperation
with neighbouring regions.
Migration and Forced Displacement
Migration and forced displacement are not a stand-alone area of OCT cooperation, but programmes
on education, youth, food systems and energy security contribute indirectly to addressing the drivers
of out-migration by improving livelihoods, resilience and access to services in small island economies.
Governance, peace and security
Actions in the OCTs are designed to reinforce institutional capacity, accountability and inclusiveness.
This is typically pursued through budget support, policy dialogue on sector reforms and cooperation
on public-finance management. The OCT Youth Network (OCT-YN), launched in 2022, enabled 25
young people to follow a learning path on the EU-OCT partnership and EU institutions, while
networking with policymakers and peers. In 2025, the third cohort completed its mandate.
Food security and nutrition
OCTs face specific food-security and nutrition challenges due to remoteness, small markets and import
dependence. The EU supported sustainable agriculture, food security and nutrition through several
OCT-focused actions. In 2025 new programmes were prepared: the EUR 36 million ‘blueing and
greening of food systems’ regional programme for the Pacific will promote sustainable production and
healthy food consumption while in the Caribbean, the natural-capital programme (EUR 21 million) will
strengthen food and nutrition security by developing sustainable and resilient local food value chains.
Case study on Sustainable Water Management in French polynesia
For French Polynesia, ensuring access to drinking water and sanitation services is a key challenge due
to the territory’s geographical characteristics, with 118 islands, of which 76 are inhabited, spread over
2.5 million km² of ocean. In 2021, the territory adopted its first Water Policy (2021-2030), aimed at
improving water services, preserving water resources and strengthening water governance.
Since 2023, the EU has been supporting the implementation of this policy through a EUR 31.1 million
budget support programme. The first Water Policy Action Plan (2021-2025) is set to improve drinking
water and sanitation services, strengthen knowledge and monitoring of water resources, and establish
an adapted governance framework for the sector.
In 2025, EU budget support contributed to the final year of implementation of the first Action Plan.
Results achieved included an increase in the number of municipalities distributing drinking water,
continued actions to secure water catchment areas, and the strengthening of sector governance
through a fully operational technical committee. These efforts support the implementation of the
Water Policy. A second Action Plan is scheduled to cover the period 2026-2030.
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4.6.3. Humanitarian aid and civil protection – responding to the emergency needs of people
affected by conflicts and disasters
OCTs remained highly exposed to climate- and weather-related disasters, including cyclones, storms,
floods, droughts, coastal erosion and, in some cases, volcanic and seismic risks. No large standalone
humanitarian operations were reported specifically for OCTs.
4.6.4. Crisis response and preparedness
In 2025, work focused on strengthening resilience to increasingly frequent and intense climate- and
weather-related shocks, while aligning with the green, blue and digital transitions. Given OCTs’
exposure to cyclones, storms, floods, droughts, coastal erosion and, in some cases, volcanic and
seismic risks, EU support prioritised risk-reduction, early-warning and contingency planning rather
than large stand-alone emergency operations.
Regional programmes financed under the Green Overseas (GO) initiative and subsequent DOAG
actions were central to preparedness. PROTEGE and its follow-up ‘blueing and greening of food
systems’ programme in the Pacific, RESEMBID in the Caribbean and RECI in the Indian Ocean
supported ecosystem-based adaptation, resilient infrastructure, sustainable land and marine
management and community-level preparedness, thereby reducing disaster risks and the social and
economic impact of crises. The GO Facility also helped OCTs develop bankable climate-resilience
projects and improved access to climate finance, including through a dedicated Climate Finance
Forum.
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5. Managing aid
5.1. Monitoring, reporting and evaluation
5.1.1. Reporting
Reporting on the implementation of the European Union’s external action instruments in 2025 was
based on a consolidated set of corporate results frameworks, management reports and financial and
performance information systems. Together, these provide a coherent picture of how interventions
funded under the multiannual financial framework (MFF) contribute to the European Union’s policy
priorities and to international commitments, including the 2030 Agenda.
Reporting on the NDICI−Global Europe instrument
For the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe
(NDICI−Global Europe), the Global Europe Results Framework (GERF) remained the main tool to
monitor and report on progress towards the objectives of the instrument. GERF indicators, which
cover all regions and modalities under NDICI−Global Europe, including the European Fund for
Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), were populated using project and programme logframes,
external monitoring, evaluations and other existing results reporting. In 2025, the quality-assurance
system for GERF and the EU Results Framework (EURF) was further strengthened.
2025 is the fifth year of financial execution of the NDICI−Global Europe, and an increasing volume of
operational results has now materialised. Nevertheless, many results are expected to materialise
towards the end of the current MFF, due to the inevitable time lag between financing an intervention,
implementing the action and generating results.
This time lag between financing and results is a structural feature that is common to any MFF cycle.
As the same is true for the previous MFF, Chapter 6 of this report presents the results of both the
current and the previous MFF. Results data presented in Chapter 3 of this report refer to results
achieved from ongoing interventions, financed under the current MFF.
Reporting on the IPA III instrument
For the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III), reporting continued to be structured around
the IPA III Programming Framework and the IPA III Results Framework. The framework is organised by
thematic ‘Windows’, each with priorities, indicators, baselines and targets that mirror the revised
enlargement methodology. These indicators underpin monitoring, reporting and evaluation of
progress by enlargement partners and inform the narrative on reforms and approximation to the
acquis.
As with NDICI−Global Europe, 2025 was still marked by the structural time lag between commitments,
implementation and observable results. A significant share of outputs and outcomes financed under
the current multiannual financial framework is expected to materialise closer to its end; results
reported in this Annual Report therefore combine data from interventions financed both under the
previous and the current framework.
5.1.2. Monitoring systems
Over the past years, the Commission has engaged substantially in designing tools and processes for
performance-based management. This aims to strengthen evidence-based decision-making, facilitate
monitoring and results reporting, and respond to the growing need for reliable data to capture the
results of EU external action. It is set in a wider transition, moving from a focus on inputs (mostly
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financial) to capturing the EU contribution to the achievement of intended objectives in the field of
external cooperation, an area where being able to measure the impact of actions on target
populations and systems is essential.
Various internal and external monitoring arrangements are in place to assess implementation
progress, achievement of objectives and emerging results, each serving different operational and
accountability purposes. Among these, ROM reviews provide operational staff with an external and
impartial assessment of ongoing interventions. The number of ROM reviews performed in 2025 was
63 under NDICI−Global Europe and 36 under IPA III. Due to a new contract for ROM reviews under
NDICI, the reviews conducted in 2025 were limited.
The IT platform OPSYS is used as a standard tool to capture results for corporate reporting and
management in external action. OPSYS creates a digital repository of EU-funded operations and
provides central access to all stakeholders involved, both inside and outside the Commission. It
assumes a pivotal role in ensuring that the Commission can deliver on the ambitious reporting
obligations set for implementing the NDICI−Global Europe and IPA III instruments.
The Commission, the EU Delegations and our implementing partners perform monitoring activities via
the same tool, including direct reporting by implementing partners and Commission staff, and data
aggregated centrally for reporting by the Commission. There are now 17 341 interventions encoded
in OPSYS and 3 633 NDICI−Global Europe primary interventions were involved in the last results
reporting exercise.
5.1.3. Reporting on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Reporting on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2025 continued to be embedded in the
European Union’s external action performance framework. SDG reporting remained closely linked to
the corporate results frameworks and to the monitoring and evaluation systems described in the
sections on reporting and monitoring.
A key feature of the reporting methodology is the systematic tagging of each operation to one main
SDG and, where relevant, up to nine additional ‘significant’ SDGs. This approach reflects the
interlinked nature of the 2030 Agenda and ensures that the total volume of commitments and
payments can be consistently tracked while making visible the multiple SDG contributions of each
intervention. The same main/significant tagging logic is applied to Global Gateway projects and
flagship initiatives recorded, since 2024, on the Global Gateway platform, creating a single SDG lens
across EU external investment.
For ODA, the EU continued in 2025 to report its SDG contributions in line with the taxonomy agreed
in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Working Party on Development Finance
Statistics. Targeted SDGs are recorded at commitment and payment stages, which allows aggregation
of EU contributions to each goal in line with other major providers. In parallel, the EU further used the
international standard on Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD(56)) to capture
the wider set of officially supported resources that advance sustainable development, including
non-ODA official flows and private finance mobilised by public interventions, in a manner that shows
contributions to the SDGs.
56 https://team-europe-explorer.europa.eu/tossd_en
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The EU continued to roll out and refine its SDG Mapper(57). This text-based tool helps operational staff
identify the most relevant SDG targets and indicators for a given intervention. SDG reporting is
complemented by other corporate markers – notably gender and inequality markers.
The figures below show the volume of commitments by SDGs funded by NDICI−Global Europe. The
bar with saturated colour represents the financial flows to the main SDG while the bar with
transparent colour shows the contributions to other significant SDGs, thereby unveiling the
interlinkages across SDGs that are addressed through EU actions.
Figure 9. Synthesis of the volume of Commitments for each SDG (as main SDG and significant SDG) in
2025 – NDICI funded projects
Figure 10. Commitments (NDICI-GE) by SDG to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in 2025 (million
EUR)
57 https://knowsdgs.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sdgmapper
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Figure 11. Commitments (NDICI-GE) by SDG to Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs) in 2025
(million EUR)
Analysing targeted SDGs by income group of countries shows how EU priorities are implemented
depending on countries’ income levels.
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Figure 12. Relationship between SDGs commitments by SDG in 2025 – NDICI−Global Europe (EUR)
To assess the interlinkages between SDGs, figure 12 illustrates the relationship between main and
significant SDGs. It also confirms the highly integrated nature of the SDG.
5.1.4. Evaluation – review of the work programme
Strategic and thematic evaluations continued to provide evidence on the effectiveness and added
value of the Union’s external action. The evaluation of the EU Gender Action Plan III (GAP III) for
example confirmed that gender mainstreaming has been significantly strengthened across external
action, while underlining uneven implementation across regions and sectors and the need to focus
more strongly on transformative outcomes for women and girls in key Global Gateway sectors such
as green and digital. A strategic evaluation of the ‘Team Europe’ approach launched in 2025 is
expected to guide the deepening of joint programming, joint implementation and coordinated policy
dialogue with EU Member States and European financial institutions, including through Team Europe
Initiatives in priority regions. Such evaluations are being used to fine-tune the 2026–2027
programming.
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In 2025, the Commission completed 6 strategic evaluations in the field of EU external and
humanitarian action comprising:
• Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan (2011-2023)
• Evaluation of the EU's support to partner countries in the education sector (2014-2024)
• Intermediate Evaluation of the implementation of the EU's Gender Action Plan III (2021-2027)
• Global case study on small island developing states contributing to the strategic evaluation of
the collective international development response to the COVID-19 pandemic
• Evaluation of the EU’s humanitarian interventions in Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean
(SAIO) region, 2019-2023
• Evaluation of DG ECHO’s Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) policy, 2019-2023
By the end of 2025, 16 other strategic evaluations were in progress for the following areas:
• Evaluation of the European Union’s Trust Fund Bekou for the period 2014-2023
• Evaluation of the European Union’s regional cooperation with ASEAN (2014-2024)
• Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with Bangladesh (2014-2024)
• Evaluation of the European Union’s cooperation with the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2014-
2024)
• Strategic Evaluation of the EU partnership with Mozambique (2014-2023)
• Strategic Evaluation of the EU partnership with the Democratic Republic of Congo (2021-2024)
• Strategic evaluation of the partnership between the EU and the Republic of Guinea (2014-
2024)
• Final Evaluation of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of
irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (2015-2024)
• Mid-Term Evaluation of the Implementation of the Youth Action Plan in EU external action
(2022-2027)
• ‘Working Better Together as Team Europe’: Strategic evaluation of the Team Europe approach
(2020-2024)
• Comprehensive evaluation of the European Commission’s Humanitarian aid, 2017-2022(58)
• Evaluation of DG ECHO’s approach to reducing the environmental footprint of humanitarian
aid, 2020–2024
• Evaluation of the European Union’s Humanitarian Interventions in Afghanistan, 2020-2024
• Evaluation of Education in Emergencies in EU-funded Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2020-
2024
• Evaluation of DG ECHO's humanitarian response in Ukraine, 2020-2024
• Evaluation of the EU support to Public Administration Reform with a focus on Public Finance
Management in the Enlargement and Neighbourhood Regions (2016-2023)
58 The external supporting evaluation study was completed in 2025 while the Commission Staff Working document was formally adopted in February 2026. The evaluation was published in 2026.
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5.1.5. Lessons learned
Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan (2011-2023)(59)
The evaluation provided an independent assessment of the performance of the cooperation managed
by European Commission in South Sudan, including the EU Trust Fund for Africa and the Foreign Policy
Instrument, but excluding humanitarian aid. It covered financial assistance, political and policy
dialogue, and the alignment of interventions with national priorities. The total spending reached EUR
521 million (aside from EUR 959 million in humanitarian aid) over the period. In view of the
considerable scope, the evaluation used a combination of primary and secondary data: an extensive
portfolio analysis (including a quantitative analysis of budget allocations), a review of the results
attained for a sample of 51 interventions, and a series of five field case studies.
The following points summarise the main lessons from the evaluation:
• Flexibility and Adaptability
The EU's ability to adapt programming to South Sudan’s volatile context, such as through the
triple nexus approach, was critical for maintaining relevance. Regular adjustments to priorities
ensured responsiveness to emerging needs.
• Integrated Approaches to Resilience
Combining sectoral strategies, such as linking infrastructure with agricultural productivity,
amplified impacts. This demonstrates the value of integrated approaches in fragile settings.
• Coordination and Partnerships
Active participation in donor coordination mechanisms, such as pooled funds and joint
programming, enhanced coherence and avoided duplication of efforts.
• Focus on Localised Solutions
Interventions like area-based programming showed success in aligning with local contexts and
addressing community-specific needs.
• Staffing and Institutional Memory
High turnover at the EU Delegation and insufficient onboarding processes resulted in
knowledge gaps and operational inefficiencies. This underlines the need for robust knowledge
management systems.
• Coordination Gaps in Triple Nexus Implementation
Misalignment between humanitarian and development programming cycles created
challenges in operationalising the triple nexus effectively, and could be overcome through
area-based management – which is insufficiently developed.
• Difficult Strategic Engagement with Governance
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Inadequate engagement with state governance structures weakened the institutional impact
of EU interventions.
Intermediate Evaluation of the implementation of the EU's Gender Action Plan III (2021-2024) (60)
The evaluation focused on the implementation of the Gender Action Plan (GAP) III mid-way through
its expected duration (2021-2027) and the results achieved to date in the three areas of engagement:
(1) green transition; (2) digital transformation; and (3) EU support promoting gender equality and
women empowerment (GEWE) through engagement with, and support to, women’s rights
organisations (WROs) and other civil society organisations (CSOs), with a specific focus on conflict,
post-conflict and other fragile contexts. The evaluation also provided a set of recommendations for
the continued implementation of GAP III and beyond.
A series of conclusions emerged from the findings of the evaluation:
• The three-pronged approach of gender mainstreaming, targeted action and political dialogue
has contributed to a more coherent and strategic EU approach but remains insufficiently
integrated across the digital and green areas of engagement.
• The EU’s comparative advantage lies in its convening power and ability to link local
interventions with policy dialogue, yet this potential remains underused.
• EU gender capacity gaps at country level hindered the EU’s transformative ambition.
• Gender mainstreaming has reached scale but remains uneven in quality and depth.
• Intersectionality was increasingly acknowledged, though only partially translated into
practice.
• The EU’s support has produced tangible results on advancing GEWE and laid entry points for
transformative change in some contexts.
• Partnerships with local CSOs and WROs were central to advancing GEWE but limited by
structural and procedural constraints.
• GAP III is relevant in fragile contexts, but delivery mechanisms need further adaptation to
fragility.
• The EU’s monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) systems remain inadequate to
demonstrate transformative change and support adaptive management.
• The EU support has generated valuable lessons and best practices, but lacks mechanisms to
systematise, share, and scale them.
Evaluation of the EU's support to partner countries in the education sector (2014-2024)
The evaluation provided an independent assessment of the European Union's support to education in
external action with a focus on four priority areas: (1) safeguarding education financing; (2) equity and
inclusion, notably gender and digital; (3) teachers and learning; and (4) skills for life and work,
particularly in relation to the Global Gateway strategy. While the evaluation did not cover Erasmus+
and TVET programmes in depth, it examined education-related interventions implemented in INTPA
partner countries, i.e. in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean. The
evaluation also provided EU policymakers with recommendations for shaping future EU education
support, taking into account major current and emerging trends in education.
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The main conclusions were the following:
• The EU has established itself as a key player on the global education stage.
• The EU has functioned more as a stabilising force than as an influencer, due notably to lack of
granular policy orientations and specialist staff.
• From a thematic perspective, the EU’s primary strengths lie in supporting teachers’
development and governance to address quality challenges across all education levels and in
advancing inclusion and equity, primarily in basic education.
• The EU is a strong player in education in emergency and fragile contexts, though
organisational challenges hamper the nexus.
• The EU’s comprehensive skills agenda, covering all types of skills (foundational, advanced,
specialised, technical and soft skills) throughout the education continuum, has been relevant
to partner countries’ needs and the EU’s own strategic priorities. However, there are risks in
shifting funding further away from basic education.
• One major EU strength is its approach of strengthening national education systems, aligned
with national policies, favouring sustainability.
• The EU’s comparative advantage is less well-defined in early childhood education, school
feeding, inclusion of learners with disability, and adult education.
• The EU and the international aid community have shown great interest in specific types of
innovative financing involving private finance, but expectations are overly ambitious. Still, the
EU is well placed to play a leading role on education finance based on the expertise and
reputation it has built in this domain.
• There is a lack of clarity about the role education and skills are meant to play within the EU’s
renewed strategy for external action, and specifically the Global Gateway strategy.
• The EU’s international prominence as a champion of green and digital transition is yet to
materialise in its support to education in partner countries, and the Commission Directorate-
General for International Partnership’s guidance on digital and green education, while
relevant, lacks broad ownership within the EU.
• The absence of a well-structured EU monitoring, evaluation and learning system makes it
challenging for the EU to demonstrate the quality of its work and the importance of support
to education under the Global Gateway strategy, despite its enduring relevance.
5.2. Aid delivery modalities
5.2.1. Budget Support
Budget support is a policy-driven, results-based instrument that continues to efficiently support
partner countries from building state structures and providing basic services to driving policy
transformation and dialogue along a shared partnership agenda. It supports partners in
implementation of macroeconomic, public finance and structural reforms that are prerequisites for
strong statehood, economic stability and sustainable development.
Across all geographies, budget support programmes increasingly target business-friendly and
investment conducive environment through focus on measures to ensure strong institutions, effective
regulation, transparent public procurement, sound public investment management, compliance with
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ESG standards or reforms of State-Owned Enterprises, helping prepare the ground for the Global
Gateway investment projects.
Budget support programmes help partners tackle challenges posed by climate change and combine
their growth agenda and the development of sustainable value chains with environment and
biodiversity protection.
The EU budget support and technical assistance for implementing the
Climate Change Act support Fiji to scale up mitigation and adaptation,
aiming increasing renewable energy and cutting greenhouse gas emissions.
This is achieved by adopting key regulatory frameworks, essential for the
Act’s practical implementation, including the Public Sector Investment
Programme Guidelines, which incorporate screening tools to assess
climate and disaster risks. In parallel, under the EU’s Global Gateway,
feasibility studies for the Qaliwana and Vatutokotoko hydropower plants
have been completed, and discussions on financing are well advanced.
In order to benefit of EU funding through budget support, partner countries need to satisfy four
encompassing eligibility criteria: a relevant and credible public policy; stability-oriented macro-
economic policies; progress in public finance management and revenue mobilisation; and budget
transparency and oversight. Concrete reform results and programme achievements are incentivised
through performance indicators, against which payments are disbursed proportionally. By working
through country systems and strengthening them, EU budget support fosters partners’ ownership and
capacity to sustain results. As additional facilitation, budget support comes with a complementary
component for dedicated technical assistance and capacity development. It fosters domestic
accountability, supporting civil society organisations as allies for transparency.
In Rwanda, the EU budget support programme aims at boosting climate
resilience, agricultural productivity and human capital. In rural hillsides, it
helped smallholder farmers combat soil erosion through sustainable agro-
ecological practices such as terracing and agroforestry, adding 4 300
hectares of radical terraces nationwide. The construction of the Kigali
wholesale market − Global Gateway project – will help Rwanda achieve
its goal of becoming a distribution hub for fresh and processed food in
Eastern and Central Africa. In the area of early childhood education, the
budget support programme increased education spending, raised net
enrolment among 3–6-year-olds from 42.8% to 50%, and sustained universal school feeding.
EU budget support is an asset providing a platform for policy dialogue to promote regulatory reforms
in priority sectors and is implemented in conjunction with operations financed by the EU Member
States, in a ‘Team Europe’ approach.
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The EU is advancing the Global Gateway objectives in the Kyrgyz Republic
by supporting water sector reforms through EU budget support, aligned
with the National Water Strategy 2040. This strengthens the integrated
water resources management by establishing basin-based water
authorities, improving hydrometeorological monitoring and developing a
modern regulatory framework under the new Water Code. It
complements EFSD+ investments in water, sanitation, health (WASH) and
irrigation and, together with the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy
and Climate Change, helps enhance climate resilience, while reducing
regional inequalities. By reinforcing sustainable infrastructure, governance and public services,
the combined support promotes long-term water security, green, inclusive growth and regional
stability in Central Asia.
Budget support is a key instrument of the EU toolbox to promote adequate enabling conditions for
the scale-up of Global Gateway. By supporting macroeconomic stability, strategic sector policies and
stronger institutions, it helps create the enabling environment required for sustainable, quality
investment in strategic sectors. Sound macroeconomic policies contribute to economic resilience,
more predictability for private sector long-term investment decisions and encourage
entrepreneurship. Solid public finance management (PFM) is critical to mobilise domestic resources,
use them efficiently and effectively to deliver public services and promote investment. Combined with
efficient debt management, this allows gaining more fiscal latitude (e.g. for investment) and
strengthening market confidence to contain the borrowing costs and mitigate debt vulnerabilities.
Such a consequential approach promotes growth and, supports economic transformation
In the Dominican Republic, the budget support programme, supports the
country in its transition to a formal, circular and green economy. In 2024,
formal employment rose by 5.9%, securing over 900 000 formal jobs and
registering more than 400 000 MSMEs, alongside a 3% increase in foreign
investment. A key milestone was the mid-2025 adoption of a new public
procurement law, introducing green public procurement, mandatory
digitalisation, and stronger participation of MSMEs, including those
women-owned.
Integrating the revenue and spending sides of public finance management is a key factor in improving
the investment climate in a country. Hence, the EU budget support aims to contribute to that objective
through reforms on public procurement, public investment management, taxation (equity,
transparency and predictability), customs administrations (critical for trade facilitation and the fight
against illicit trade) and the fight again corruption.
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In Cambodia, budget support programmes foster a transparent
regulatory environment by helping the country to digitise public finance
supports the country also in modernisation of technical education
promoting studies in es science, technology, engineering, and math
(STEM) scholarships. In parallel, the 2025 Fisheries Law, introduced the
requirement of compliance with the EU standards for listing and export
fishery products, which combined with modern traceability and safety
systems, facilitate access to premium international markets.
Achieving tangible results requires a coordinated and mutually reinforcing mix of instruments. The
EU’s Global Gateway provides the large-scale, high-quality infrastructure investment needed to close
critical gaps in connectivity, energy, digital access, and health, laying the foundations for long-term
growth. But infrastructure alone is not enough: budget support and reform partnerships help create
the policy and institutional conditions needed to sustain these investments by strengthening public
financial management, governance, and sector frameworks. Technical assistance and capacity
building − through twinning, training, and knowledge exchange − further equip people and institutions
to lead reform from within, reduce aid dependency, and build resilience. Together, this triad creates
a virtuous cycle: investment is more effective in a strong policy environment, reforms gain credibility
when backed by visible development, and capacity building helps ensure lasting impact beyond the
project cycle.
In Vietnam, the EU budget support programme helped the country’s
transition towards sustainable energy, by supporting the introduction of
bankable renewable energy procurement frameworks, such as
competitive auctions and standardised power purchase agreements;
enhancing power market regulation and tariff-setting; and sustained
system planning for integrating variable renewable energy into the grid.
These reforms provide the enabling framework for Global Gateway
investments, such as the Tri An hydropower extension and Bac Ai pumped storage project, as well
as future investments supported by the Energy Investment Facility.
Furthermore, in the Middle East and North Africa, the EU provided budget support to Jordan, Morocco
and Tunisia. Operations supported policy objectives remain relevant for the implementation of the
New Pact for the Mediterranean with Southern Mediterranean partners, launched in November 2025.
The EU budget support contributed to Jordan’s economic modernisation and energy transition, including economic greening and technical and vocational education and training. Renewable sources now account for 26% of the country's energy supply, and 77 professional standards are enforced in the energy sector and across industries such as chemicals and plastics, textiles, ICT, tourism, pharmaceutics, and food processing.
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In the same region, budget support provided a platform for dialogue and reform incentives in a wide
range of sectors, and policy areas including skills, employment, financial inclusion and social
protection; economic governance and public administration reform; competitiveness, trade and
investment climate; green and digital transition. Budget support also assisted with the inclusion of
Syrian refugees in Jordan, to allow Syrian kids to attend schools and benefit from social services.
EU budget support has long contributed to financial inclusion in Morocco. Through targeted measures for women and rural areas, the rate of Moroccan adults holding a bank account increased to 58% at the end of 2024 from 54% at the end of 2023. Mobile payments are also on the rise and microfinance is progressing, in rural areas particularly. These now account for 40% of the overall microfinance portfolio in the country, and women near 50% of total beneficiaries.
During 2025, the EU expanded its Reform and Growth Plan facilities in the Enlargement and Eastern
Neighbourhood region, adding the Republic of Moldova alongside Ukraine and the Western Balkans.
The Republic of Moldova benefited from highly concessional loans with payments tied to applicable
general conditions and achieved reforms. Under the Facility, the EU disburses loans directly to the
national treasury, with a dedicated portion channelled into investment projects.
In parallel, the EU provided budget support grants to Armenia, Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, targeting priority areas including public administration, public
finance management, education, energy, refugees, and justice and border management. In Armenia,
a new multi-sector budget support programme was approved, aligned with the Roadmap for
Implementing the Resilience and Growth Plan (2024-2027).
In Armenia, EU budget support focuses on secondary education and improving access to quality schooling in rural areas. In 2025, construction or renovation of 13 schools began; 95% of schools introduced professional orientation clubs; half of schools in the marzes of Ararat, Kotayk and Gegharkunik were equipped with at least three modern STEM labs; and over 90% of STEM teachers in grades 6, 8 and 11 received
training.
Budget support continues to prove very relevant to support countries in situations of fragility or facing
crisis and exogenous shocks. Deployed as a part of a ‘Team Europe’ approach and in tandem with the
IMF and World Bank programmes, it helps them secure macroeconomic stability, improve public
finances and incentivise critical reforms for sound economic governance and state/economic
resilience.
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Since 2019, the EU has been providing budget support to Somalia with a strong focus on education. In a post-conflict context, where public education had largely collapsed, the EU helps the government rebuild a national education system. Through budget support, policy dialogue and complementary programmes, the education budget increased from 3% to 7%, which brought to the first 5 000 teachers being recruited onto the national payroll under the National Teacher Initiative, and enrolment rates raised, including for girls.
Budget support provided in the form of State and Resilience Building contracts (SRBC) help set the
basis for strong governance and country systems and, ultimately, bring vulnerable countries closer to
opportunities offered by the Global Gateway, as it was the case in Mauritania, Papua New Guinea and
Somalia.
In 2025, the EU budget support contributed with EUR 915 million in payments to partner countries’
budgets. It accounted for 8.46% of payments under NDICI−Global Europe, IPA III, DOAG and
predecessor instruments with still on-going operations. The Western Balkans and Eastern
Neighbourhood received EUR 152 million, the Southern Neighbourhood - EUR 330 million and sub-
Saharan Africa, Americas and the Caribbean, Asia and Pacific and Overseas Countries and Territories
(OCTs) altogether benefitted from EUR 433 million.
The amount of new budget support programmes adopted in 2025 amounted to EUR 915 million, of
which EUR 505 million supported countries in the Middle East and North Africa, EUR 200 million the
Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood and EUR 210 million other parts of the world, including
OCTs. Sector Reform Performance Contracts prevailed with 73% of new commitments, while State
and Resilience Building Contracts accounted for 20% of new commitments. Only 1 SDG Contract was
adopted in 2025 (Cabo Verde) accounting for 7% of all new commitments.
These new operations accompany Global Gateway investments by reinforcing the enabling
environment (e.g. Kyrgyzstan and Papua New Guinea for water sector reforms, Solomon Islands and
Cabo Verde for energy sector reforms, creating the enabling conditions for Global Gateway
investments in renewable energy).
The design and implementation of budget support continue to build on a sound internal risk
management framework, which informs Commission’s strategic priorities and decision, policy
dialogue and risk mitigation in partner countries. In 2025, this framework was extended to all
developing/emerging countries engaged in a bilateral cooperation and where Global Gateway projects
are deployed or have imminent prospects. The conclusions stemming from the risk assessment apply
to all types of implementing modalities. This framework thereby supports the scale up of Global
Gateway by enhancing the focuson political, macroeconomic, fiscal and structural challenges which,
if left unaddressed, may hinder the Global Gateway projects.
5.2.2. Blending
In order to achieve greater scale of investments and increase the impact of official development
assistance, public and private funds must be leveraged as efficiently as possible. The EU has expanded
its financial instruments and policy tools for investment outside the EU to deliver on its ambitious
commitments to sustainable development, enlargement and neighbourhood policies.
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Blending operations are a key modality of EU external action in 2025. The EU combines a limited
contribution, in a non-reimbursable and/or reimbursable form, with non-grant resources such as
loans, equity and guarantees from partner financial institutions to achieve a leveraged development
impact. The strategic use of a limited grant element can support projects with low financial return but
high economic and societal return, making them economically viable and enhancing implementation
quality. Blending may also provide an element of concessionality necessary for loans taken by some
indebted partner states.
Blending draws on a broad ecosystem of European and international partners. The Commission works
in a ‘Team Europe’ approach with EU Member States’ development banks and agencies, the EIB, the
EBRD and other multilateral development banks to mobilise resources coherently and at scale.
Under NDICI–Global Europe and under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+),
blending currently operates through four regional investment facilities: the Africa Investment Platform
(AIP), the Asia-Pacific Investment Facility (APIF), the Latin America and Caribbean Investment Facility
(LACIF), and the Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP)(61). Pre-existing blending facilities are
phasing out their remaining envelopes. All the blending facilities operate in close complementarity
with EFSD+ budgetary guarantees.
Altogether, in 2025, the EFSD+ Operational Boards issued a positive opinion for EUR 1.1 billion EU
contribution (including fees) through 58 blending operations, which in turn are expected to leverage
around EUR 17.8 billion in additional public and private financing.
Those blending operations support the Global Gateway and other Commission priorities such as the
Reform and Growth Plans and the Connectivity Agenda for enlargement countries and the Eastern
Neighbourhood and the Pact for the Mediterranean for Northern Africa and the Middle East.
Table 1. NDICI - EU Blending contributions approved in 2025 by facility
Blending facilities 2025 (million EUR – excluding fees)
NIP 331.4
AIP 602.7
APIF 83.2
LACIF 30.3
Total 1 047.6
Table 2. NDICI - EU Blending contributions approved in 2025 by sector
Sector 2025 (million EUR – excluding fees)
Agriculture 56.6
Digital 85.1
Energy 474.61
Environment 53.74
Private sector 79.05
Social 27.6
Transport 134.6
Urban Development 19
Water / sanitation 72.1
Mixed 45.2
61 In addition, the Türkiye Investment Platform (TIP) serves as a platform steering the use of EFSD+ guarantees with active involvement of Turkish authorities but does so far not include any blending operations.
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Sector 2025 (million EUR – excluding fees)
Total 1 047.6
In addition to the blending platforms under the NDICI−Global Europe instrument, there are also
dedicated platforms for the Western Balkans and Ukraine:
The Western Balkans are covered under the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF), which is
a financial platform that coordinates investments for socio-economic development in the region and
supports the Western Balkan partners in their EU accession process. In 2025, grants for above EUR
384 million were approved to support technical assistance and investment projects in the fields of
clean energy, environment and climate, sustainable transport, human capital development and digital
future(62).
Ukraine is covered under the Ukraine Investment Framework (UIF) launched in 2024 under Pillar II of
the Ukraine Facility. The objective of the UIF is to mobilise investments for the reconstruction,
modernisation and long-term growth of Ukraine, supporting the objectives and the implementation
of the Ukraine Plan consistent with EU policy priorities, while ensuring active participation of the
Ukrainian Government. The UIF had an overall EUR 1.7 billion blending envelope available (including
a EUR 128 million contribution by Norway and EUR 108 million from the windfall profits) to
complement the Ukraine Guarantee where clear instances of market failure affect the economics of
the project and necessitate such concessional EU contributions. By end-2025, an EU contribution of
EUR 635 million (including fees) was mobilised through 16 signed operations.
5.2.3. EFSD+, EU budget guarantees
The European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) is the financial arm of the NDICI−Global
Europe Regulation and a central instrument for implementing the Global Gateway strategy. It also
supports other strategic priorities of the Commission such as the Reform Agendas and Growth Plans
and the Connectivity Agenda with partner countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the
Enlargement Region as well as the Pact for the Mediterranean in view of partner countries in Northern
Africa and the Middle East. It provides budgetary guarantees backed by the External Action Guarantee
(EAG), enabling partner financial institutions to take on higher levels of risk and to mobilise substantial
additional public and private investment in support of sustainable development and the Sustainable
Development Goals.
The EAG was established by NDICI−Global Europe to bring together grants, blending and guarantees
in a single framework. It provides up to EUR 53.4 billion in guarantee capacity, with an indicative EUR
26.7 billion implemented through dedicated European Investment Bank (EIB) investment windows. In
this regard, the Commission has signed two investment windows with the EIB – Investment Window
1 for sovereign and non-commercial sub-sovereign operations and Investment Window 2 to support
investments undertaken by commercial sub-sovereign counterparts – for a total amount of EUR
26.558 billion. Investment window 4 was also signed for EFSD+ guarantees enabling the EIB to provide
support for the private sector, specifically in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, Caribbean and the
Pacific (ACP). Operations under investment window 4 are financed by the ACP Investment Facility
reflows but they are mentioned in this section since they are transferred to the EU Budget and also
provide external action guarantees, for a total amount of EUR 3.5 billion. EUR 13 billion guarantee
capacity is deployed via ‘open architecture’ windows for commercial sub-sovereign and private-sector
operations with other pillar-assessed international and national development finance institutions
62 The funds came from both IPA and the Reform an Growth Facility.
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across all NDICI–Global Europe and IPA III regions. This architecture allows the EU to promote
large-scale, impact-oriented investments in line with Global Gateway priorities such as climate,
energy, digital, health, connectivity and sustainable value chains.
Under the EFSD+ EIB-dedicated Investment Windows:
• in INTPA regions, 30 operations were signed in 2025 for a total loan amount of EUR 2.1 billion.
Support provided by our guarantees is complemented by blending projects which is expected
to generate around EUR 13 billion in investment;
• in ENEST regions, 11 operations were signed in 2025 for a total loan amount slightly above
EUR 1 billion. Overall, this leads to a total loan amount of approximately EUR 4 billion under
EFSD+ for Windows 1 and 2 so far which is expected to mobilise total investments of around
15 billion. Support provided by our guarantees is complemented by blending projects which
is expected to generate around EUR 514 million in investment;
• in MENA regions, 5 new operations and 3 tranches of existing operations were signed in 2025
for a total loan amount of slightly above EUR 1.3 billion. Overall, this leads a total loan amount
of just above EUR 4.2 billion under EFSD+ for Windows 1 and 2 so far which is expected to
mobilise total investments of around EUR 15 billion. Support provided by our guarantees is
complemented by blending which is expected to generate around EUR 1.5 billion in
investment.
By the end of 2025, 11 EFSD (the first generation of budgetary guarantees) guarantee agreements
were managed with a total guarantee capacity of EUR 1.1 billion and 40 EFSD+ Open Architecture
guarantee agreements with a total guarantee capacity of EUR 6.6 billion. The investment period for
the original EFSD ended in 2024, so no new operations can be submitted under that framework, while
EFSD+ guarantee contracting continues until 2027. In 2025 alone, 20 new EFSD+ Open Architecture
guarantee agreements were signed with development finance institutions, for a total guarantee
amount exceeding EUR 3 billion. These guarantees cover priority sectors such as energy, climate,
digital connectivity, agriculture, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, and currency hedging.
Deployment accelerated, with 63 operations signed in 2025 under EFSD+ Open Architecture
guarantees for a total amount of around EUR 1.4 billion.
Governance and risk management of EFSD+ were further strengthened in 2025. Roles and
responsibilities for risk monitoring and response across the EFSD+ strategic and operational boards
were formalised, building on a risk compendium developed under the steering committee on
contingent liabilities. Methodologies and targets were clarified for leverage, additionality,
climate-related indicators, jobs and beneficiaries, and for the share of investments in least developed
and fragile countries. Internal guidance was adopted on what constitutes a default triggering a
guarantee call, on recovery procedures and allocation of recovery costs, and on the use of
Covid-19-related eligibility and fee-discount clauses. Standard data-protection clauses were also
incorporated across guarantee agreements. These reforms respond to Internal Audit Service
recommendations and help ensure that the EFSD+ portfolio remains within the EU’s risk tolerance
while delivering on policy objectives.
EFSD+ budgetary guarantees thus form a core pillar of the EU’s external investment offer. By de-risking
investment in partner countries, they help to crowd in financing at scale, support sustainable and
inclusive growth, and underpin Global Gateway flagships in strategic sectors. Together with blended
finance, technical assistance and policy dialogue, EFSD+ enables the EU to deliver a coherent,
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high-impact response to investment needs in partner countries while safeguarding the Union budget
through prudent provisioning and robust risk-management arrangements.
5.2.4. Technical assistance
Technical assistance (TA) refers to the personnel involved in the implementation and management of
technical cooperation services. Technical cooperation (TC) is associated with actions aimed at
strengthening individual and organisational capacity by providing expertise (short- and long-term TA
personnel, institutional staff exchanges (twinning) arrangements and mobilising diaspora resources,
etc.), training and related learning opportunities (peer exchanges, tertiary education, etc.) and
equipment.
The Framework Contract ‘Services for External Action 2023’ (SEA 2023) was established for four years
and started implementation in February 2024. Its 17 lots span across 14 thematic areas of EU
international partnerships, as well as three horizontal types of services in monitoring and evaluation.
At the end of 2025, after almost two years of implementation, 490 specific contracts (of which 70% to
support Commission Directorate-General for International Partnerships’ services and related EU
Delegations) had been awarded under SEA 2023, for a total of over EUR 188 million. Types of services
include studies and evaluations, monitoring activities, and technical assistance assignments including
facilities to support the work of EU Delegations.
Under NDICI–Global Europe, the EU continued to expand the use of public-sector expertise to support
institutional reforms and implementation of the 2030 Agenda. In 2025, technical assistance remained
a core modality of EU external action, used both to support partner-country reforms and to enhance
the capacity of EU services and delegations to deliver on Global Gateway and other priorities. It was
deployed alongside budget support, blending and guarantees as part of a 360-degree approach that
couples finance with policy dialogue and capacity building.
5.2.5. Twinning and TAIEX
In 2025, Twinning (medium- to long-term assistance) and the Technical Assistance and Information
Exchange instrument (TAIEX) continued to serve as key institution-building tools supporting the
implementation of EU priorities in partner countries and beyond. They provided short-term and
medium-term peer-to-peer support from national administrations of EU Member States to public
institutions in enlargement and neighbourhood partners, in particular to accelerate alignment with
the EU acquis and to strengthen administrative and regulatory capacities.
TAIEX underwent a strategic prioritisation exercise in 2025 to focus more explicitly on acquis
alignment and the acceleration of accession processes. As part of this reorientation, TAIEX Roadmaps
were developed for Montenegro, Albania, the Republic of Moldova, North Macedonia, Serbia and
Kosovo. These roadmaps help structure assistance around the most urgent accession-related needs,
support the implementation of Reform Agendas under performance-based facilities, and contribute
to gradual integration into the EU’s policies and single market, for example in areas such as payment
systems, digital markets and connectivity. In this framework, 576 TAIEX interventions were organised
for partners(63) in 2025, including workshops, screening meetings, study visits, expert missions and
‘work-from-home’ legislative reviews. This targeted support complemented broader efforts to
frontload reforms on the rule of law, economic governance and public administration.
63 covered by the Directorate General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood (ENEST).
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The geographical and thematic scope of TAIEX continued to broaden, building on the expansion
observed in the previous year, when 901 events were facilitated globally. In the European
Neighbourhood, TAIEX remained central to institution-building and to the implementation of the
regional Economic and Investment Plans. In the Eastern Neighbourhood, it provided intensive support
to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova and addressed specific needs related to public administration
reform and the wartime context, for example through a workshop on non-financial motivation and
retention of civil servants under martial law. In the Southern Neighbourhood, TAIEX events supported
reforms aligned with the green and digital transitions, including expert missions on greenhouse-gas
emission inventories and carbon footprint reporting for key infrastructure operators, and regional
workshops on broadband rollout and geoportal development in the Eastern Partnership. TAIEX was
also used to strengthen capacities of audit authorities in candidate countries, including through
dedicated workshops that contributed to the closure of earlier pre-accession programmes.
Twinning continued to complement TAIEX as a medium-term instrument based on the secondment of
Member State experts to partner administrations. It remained an important tool for supporting
legislative approximation, public administration reform and the strengthening of democratic
institutions in enlargement and neighbourhood partners. In 2024, 82 Twinning projects were ongoing
worldwide, involving 25 Member States either as lead or junior partners, with projects supporting,
inter alia, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Algeria. In 2025, Twinning, together with TAIEX,
strategically supported the implementation of the Commission’s priorities in partner countries by
promoting durable institutional links, transferring know-how and good administrative practice, and
underpinning reforms in key sectors such as justice, internal security, public finance management and
the green and digital transitions.
5.3. Non-programmable funds – rapid response
5.3.1. Crisis response
Non-programmable crisis response funds under the rapid-response pillar of NDICI−Global Europe are
the main instrument within the EU foreign policy toolbox to address evolving conflicts and political
shocks and to quickly deal with emerging political priorities. Thanks to the crisis response funding, in
2025 the EU responded swiftly to major crises worldwide, including in Ukraine, the Republic of
Moldova, Armenia, Sudan, Syria, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo,
etc.
These interventions enabled the EU to swiftly contribute to stability in situations of crisis or emerging
crisis, by providing flexible support designed to help preserve, establish or re-establish conditions of
peace and respect for fundamental human rights, in line with EU policy priorities and values. Crisis
response bridges the critical gap between the outbreak of a crisis, humanitarian assistance,
longer-term cooperation and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including civilian CSDP
missions and the European Peace Facility.
By the end of 2025, there were 257 ongoing crisis response interventions, with 78 new crisis response
interventions adopted during the year. Wherever possible crisis response operations continued to be
largely implemented through civil society organisations on the ground. However, in certain contexts,
the EU partnered with international organisations, notably the United Nations, which often act as
single-entry partners in highly volatile environments.
In Ukraine, crisis response funds mobilised as of April 2022 have been critical to establishing the
Special Tribunal and the International Claims Commission, key for transitional justice and
accountability. In 2025, the EU provided critical crisis-response support to counter Russia’s war of
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aggression against Ukraine, bolstering demining, energy security and accountability, and increasing
stabilisation efforts in the Eastern Neighbourhood, notably in the Republic of Moldova and Armenia.
Meanwhile, in the Middle East, new actions were ramped up to tackle escalating instability in Syria,
Gaza and the West Bank, Lebanon and Iraq, reinforcing human security, social cohesion and key
multilateral efforts, including on mediation. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, crisis response interventions
targeted acute and long-term crises in Sudan and South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
Central African Republic, Nigeria and the Sahel and the Horn of Africa regions, focusing on
stabilisation, mediation, local peacebuilding and protection of civilians. Beyond these, crisis response
actions continued in Myanmar, Haiti, and other fragile or post-crisis zones, underscoring the global
scope of the instrument.
Crisis-response actions tackled both the drivers and the consequences of instability, sustaining peace,
brokering ceasefire agreements, supporting democratic transition, and tackling global threats, from
the South Caucasus to Sudan, Syria or the Central African Republic.
Interventions have helped fill the gap left by the US in the area of disinformation and media integrity,
supporting independent media, countering Russia’s propaganda war and strengthening partner
countries’ strategic communications and cyber resilience capacities to withstand interference in
democratic processes.
Mine action and rubble removal remained a priority in Ukraine, Syria, Gaza, Armenia and Lebanon. In
Ukraine alone, land the size of the Netherlands has been made available for agricultural cultivation.
Crisis response has been instrumental to support mediation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding
efforts, in close coordination with multilateral partners, from Sudan to Yemen, Syria and beyond.
5.3.2. Resilience
Non-programmable funds under the rapid-response pillar of NDICI−Global Europe continued in 2025
to play a key role in strengthening the resilience of partner countries facing crises, fragility and growing
global shocks. The rapid-response pillar is non-programmable by design, has a global scope and offers
a flexible toolbox that allows the EU to act swiftly and in a complementary way to geographic and
thematic programmes. Within this pillar, the resilience window is dedicated to reinforcing the capacity
of individuals, communities and states to withstand, adapt to and recover from shocks, including
conflicts, economic crises, climate and environmental stress and forced displacement.
The crisis-response window aims ‘to swiftly contribute to stability in a situation of crisis or emerging
crisis’ and to help (re)create conditions for peace and respect for human rights. Instead, the resilience
window complements this by focusing on longer-term measures ‘to strengthen the resilience of
individuals, communities and states to prepare for such shocks and develop adapted responses to
their impact’. It does so by improving livelihoods and access to basic services for vulnerable
communities, supporting adaptive social protection systems, building climate and environmental
resilience, and helping to create more secure and cohesive local communities.
Rapid-response resilience actions are implemented through a range of instruments, including grants,
technical assistance, support to multilateral partners and a global expert support facility. They may
accompany or prepare political and peace processes, support the UN peace architecture, or underpin
specialised facilities such as those on anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of
terrorism, which contribute to more resilient institutions and societies.
Under the current multiannual financial framework, a dedicated resilience component of the
rapid-response pillar has an indicative allocation of EUR 1.043 billion for 2021–2027. In 2024, the
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resilience budget amounted to EUR 149 million and was translated into a portfolio of interventions
targeting conflict-affected and climate-vulnerable regions.
Resilience actions supported conflict-affected communities in eastern and central Africa; programmes
in West Africa to strengthen community-level security, basic services and social cohesion; adaptive
social protection schemes in Pakistan; security and resilience initiatives in Ecuador and eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo; and climate-resilience programmes in the Caribbean and Pacific
regions. These actions often combined support for livelihoods, local governance, climate adaptation,
disaster-risk reduction and community security.
5.3.3. Foreign policy needs
In 2025, non-programmable funds for foreign policy needs under NDICI–Global Europe continued to
provide a flexible and demand-driven tool to respond rapidly to urgent and strategic external policy
priorities. These interventions complemented geographic and thematic programmes and the wider
EU foreign policy toolbox by supporting the external dimension of internal policies, strengthening
partnerships with strategically important partners and tackling global challenges with a direct impact
on EU interests. The instrument was used to advance policy, economic and security objectives,
including hybrid and cyber security, civil aviation security, economic security, the fight against
disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), as well as to foster
public and cultural diplomacy and promote the EU’s visibility worldwide.
In 2025, 16 new foreign policy needs interventions were launched. They addressed global challenges
such as economic security, public diplomacy and the fight against disinformation and FIMI, and
supported the EU’s efforts to build alliances, deepen regulatory and policy dialogues and project
influence in an increasingly contested geopolitical environment.
In Asia and the Indo-Pacific, Foreign Policy Needs interventions helped address challenges related to
the implementation of new EU regulatory frameworks, including support to partners in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) facing difficulties in implementing the revised EU
Waste Shipment Regulation. Other actions enhanced disaster management and civil protection
capacities in Taiwan and advanced the roadmap for the EU–Australia strategic partnership on critical
raw materials, contributing to the EU’s economic security and diversification of supply chains. Foreign
policy needs funds in 2025 also supported priority initiatives linked to Russia’s war of aggression
against Ukraine and its wider implications. One flagship example was the financing of the advanced
team of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, contributing to the
development of new international norms and mechanisms to ensure accountability in line with the
Charter of the United Nations.
A dedicated Rapid Response Mechanism to support EU foreign policy needs was launched in 2025 as
a horizontal, demand-driven facility. It provides swift support for initiatives addressing urgent or
imperative EU foreign policy priorities. During 2025, implementation started for 13 initiatives under
this mechanism, with a total value of EUR 3.5 million. These small, agile actions covered a wide range
of topics and geographies and were designed to respond quickly to high-priority political requests,
complementing more substantial foreign policy needs projects and geographic programmes. Examples
include:
• Support for direct business outcomes during the EU-Ukraine Defence Industry Forum, leading
to the signature of Memoranda of understanding and letters of intent,
• Strategic intelligence feeding EU action with the recommendations provided to counter FIMI
in LAC and strengthen EU engagement,
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• Support to ministerial and regional dialogues involving EU and partner countries (Ukraine,
Indo-Pacific),
• Concrete policy uptake at high level in Guatemala, the recommendations of the judicial and
electoral monitoring mission being formally presented to the President and various local
stakeholders.
5.4. Improving ways of working
5.4.1. Simplification of procedures
Legislative framework
The year 2025 was marked by the adoption, by the Commission, of its proposals for the future Basic
Acts which will govern the Commission’s competences under the multiannual financial framework
(MFF) 2028-2034, in the field of external actions: the proposal for the Regulation on Global Europe(64),
the proposal for the Regulation on the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and
Decommissioning(65) and the proposal for the Amendment to the Decision on the Association of the
OCTs including Greenland(66).
With these three proposals, the simplification of the legislative architecture of the external actions
heading, which started years ago, aims to obtain a next level: the proposed single Global Europe
Regulation would incorporate and build on the current MFF 2021-2027 Regulation (EU) 2021/947
establishing Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation – Global Europe, Regulation
(EU) 2021/1529 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance, Regulation (EU) 2024/792
establishing the Ukraine Facility, Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 establishing the Reform and Growth
Facility for the Western Balkans, and Regulation (EU) 2025/535 establishing the Reform and Growth
Facility for the Republic of Moldova. Furthermore, under the proposal, humanitarian aid actions would
equally be funded under the Global Europe Regulation and implemented in line with the Humanitarian
Aid Regulation (EC) 1257/96.
At the same time, the provisions covering monitoring, reporting, evaluation and communication
would disappear from the external action Basic Acts and instead be covered by the Performance
Regulation(67), which would be horizontal for the entire MFF. While the INSC-D-proposal and DOAG-
proposal cannot be part of the integration into a single Global Europe Regulation, due to their distinct
Treaty-basis, they both contain cross-references to the Global Europe Regulation, thereby
harmonising the implementation provisions.
Planning of actions
Another key simplification measure was that for the Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, the
Commission shift to a more systematic multi-annual planning approach for 2025-2027 instead of usual
annual action plans adopted each year. This approach reduced the number of Commission financing
decisions for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood partners by consolidating country and regional
support into broader action documents. Action plans were streamlined to focus on high-level strategic
priorities, with detailed operational planning captured in internal action fiches.
64 GE-COM(2025) 551 65 INSC-D - COM(2025) 598 66 DOAG - COM(2025) 599 67 COM(2025)545
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Direct and indirect management
In 2025, the EU pursued a targeted simplification agenda for external action procedures in line with
the political objective of making implementation simpler and faster, while maintaining high standards
of legality, regularity and sound financial management. The approach focused on adjusting delivery
modalities, streamlining grant and procurement processes and rationalising control and reporting
requirements, without weakening the internal control framework.
A central development was the promotion of financing not linked to costs (‘FNLC’, fully integrated in
the 2025 version of the Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions (PRAG)) and
the introduction, following a Commission decision in 2025 authorising the use of single lump-sum
grants in external action, of grants reimbursed in the form of single lump sums which will be fully
integrated to the next PRAG. These modalities simplify financial management and reporting by
focusing on the achievement of agreed results and the performance of activities instead of detailed
cost reporting, thereby reducing the administrative burden for implementing partners and speeding
up processing.
For its geographies, DG ENEST also developed internal guidelines for the use of FNLC at intervention
level (i.e. for a programme or a project). The main purpose of these guidelines is to help staff who
programme, design, monitor and implement interventions to adopt the most suitable form of Union
contribution, including FNLC.
Procedures for grants and procurement under the 2025 PRAG were reviewed through two ‘reality
checks’ with stakeholder organisations representing civil society and service providers. These
exchanges examined how the new grant rules and procurement provisions work in practice and
identified operational bottlenecks, with a view to aligning contractual provisions more closely with
implementation realities and improving accessibility, especially for smaller organisations.
Delivery modalities were rationalised to reduce complexity. For the countries under the remit of the
Commission Directorate-General for International Partnerships, programme estimates were phased
out, and the use of indirect management with partner countries limited to procurement contracts,
discontinuing the possibility for partner authorities to act as granting authorities for EU-funded grants.
This shift simplifies roles and responsibilities and avoids, given the upcoming adoption of the Model
grant agreement managed in eGrants, having two concurrent contract models and sets of
implementing rules. The evaluation process for calls for proposals was also simplified by merging two
evaluation steps into a single stage, shortening time-to-contract and easing the workload for both
evaluators and applicants.
Progress and lessons were captured in the first Annual Progress Report on Simplification,
Implementation and Enforcement(68), transmitted to the European Parliament and the Council in
October 2025, and were discussed with stakeholders in dedicated implementation dialogues with
civil-society organisations, local authorities and the private sector.
5.5. Communication & transparency
5.5.1. Communication
In 2025, communication remained an integral part of the EU’s external action, supporting political
objectives, deepening partnerships and reinforcing the EU’s credibility as a reliable, predictable and
values-based global actor. Communication, public diplomacy and visibility activities were further
68 COM(2025) 871.
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consolidated under an integrated strategic communication approach designed to ensure that
awareness, understanding and perception of the EU in both EU and partner countries match the scale
and ambition of the EU’s engagement. This approach emphasised coherent narratives,
evidence-based messaging and the systematic use of Global Gateway as the overarching brand for the
EU’s external investment strategy.
Strategic communication
The EU continued to roll out a strategic communication model that moves away from fragmented,
project-by-project visibility towards country- and region-specific campaign strategies built around
clear political priorities.
Communication resources were progressively consolidated, including under the Annual work
programme 2025 for information outreach on EU external relations, allowing economies of scale,
more consistent messaging and better support for EU Delegations to perform their communication
activities. EU Delegations remained at the centre of the EU’s external communication, with each asked
to develop a locally tailored campaign and also acting as first points of contact for local media,
institutions, civil society, youth and private-sector stakeholders.
Communicating Global Gateway milestones and flagship projects was a particular focus in 2025. The
second Global Gateway Forum in Brussels in October provided a major diplomacy moment with
President von der Leyen announcing that Global Gateway had mobilised over EUR 306 billion in
investments, surpassing the original target of EUR 300 billion. The Forum, together with the launch of
the Global Gateway Investment Hubs and the launch of calls for expression of interest to identify
promising investment proposals in the enlargement, eastern Neighbourhood and southern
Mediterranean regions, reinforced the EU’s narrative as a leading provider of sustainable, high-quality
infrastructure and investment, and offered extensive opportunities for outreach to partner
governments, the private sector and civil society.
Public diplomacy
Public-diplomacy efforts were strongly anchored in high-level political events and thematic summits.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, key milestones such as the third EU–AU Ministerial, the seventh AU–EU Summit
and the EU-Africa Business Forum coincided with the 25th anniversary of the EU–AU partnership and
served to showcase progress under the Global Gateway Africa–Europe Investment Package and
related initiatives. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the fourth CELAC–EU Summit, accompanied by
civil-society and business fora, provided an important platform to communicate the EU–LAC Global
Gateway Investment Agenda and its more than 80 advancing projects. Similar visibility and outreach
functions were fulfilled by the fourth EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum, the inaugural EU–Central Asia
Summit, the EU–Central Asia Economic Forum and connectivity investors’ fora, the EU–Mongolia
Business and Investment Forum, and the first EU–Pacific Business Forum in Fiji, at which major Global
Gateway investments were announced.
In 2025, a baseline for outreach on enlargement in Member Stateswas established through the Special
Eurobarometer on enlargement. Perception surveys conducted in the Western Balkans and Eastern
Neighbourhood continued framing the outreach and engagement work in partner countries. In
countries covered by EU Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood policies, key milestones included
the publication of the annual Enlargement package. The 2025 Enlargement Forum put enlargement
on the radar of relevant stakeholders as a key political priority of the EU. High-level events were
marking policy milestones, such as the Intergovernmental conferences with Montenegro and Albania
marking progress in the EU accession process, the first-ever EU-Moldova summit in Chișinău and the
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EU-Western Balkans summit in Brussels. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025, the EU, Ukraine
and international partners convened governments, financial institutions and businesses to mobilise
investment for Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction. Business fora, such as EU-Montenegro
Investment Conference and EU-Western Balkans investment in Albania, focused on mobilising private
investment. Leaders’ meetings held in Skopje and Tirana reviewed progress on implementing the
Growth Plan and the Reform Agendas with partners in the Western Balkans. Gradual Integration
continued to be a powerful tool to promote enlargement by offering tangible benefits of EU
membership to citizens and businesses ahead of accession.
In the Middle East, North Africa and Gulf region, key milestones for public diplomacy revolved around
events marking the inclusive consultation process pertaining to the preparation of the Pact for the
Mediterranean and its official launch on 28 November 2025, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary
of the Barcelona Process. In addition, the adoption of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership
between the EU and Jordan, the holding of a very first summit between the EU and Egypt (also marked
by the organisation of a high-level event on Investments, Competitiveness and Innovation), and the
organisation of the very first Palestine Donor Group embodying the EU's commitment to the stability
of the region (in addition to being a clear deliverable of the EU's Multiannual Comprehensive
Programme in support to Palestinian people), gave way to substantial communication actions.
In 2025, six Kapuscinski Development Lectures drew 3 528 participants, featuring experts like Sabina
Alkire, Karine Sargsyan, and Sonia Guajajara on topics from Artificial Intelligence and climate justice
to youth empowerment. The hybrid events strengthened the EU’s engagement with global audiences
on sustainable development.
In a continued commitment to champion media freedom and independent journalism, the Lorenzo
Natali Prize became part of the Voices Festival as a dedicated award category: Lorenzo Natali Prize -
International Best Practices in Journalism. By integrating the Prize into the Voices Festival, the aim was
to amplify its reach and impact, giving even greater visibility to the remarkable work of independent
journalists across the globe. The annual Connecting Media Communities conference also continued to
promote collaboration among independent journalists from across the world to build greater media
resilience against political and economic pressure.
These events were complemented by structured dialogue mechanisms with the private sector and
other stakeholders. The Global Gateway Business Advisory Group served as the main channel for
direct dialogue with European companies, while the operationalisation of the Global Gateway
Investment Hub created an additional contact point for investors and financial institutions. Feedback
from the 2025 AU–EU Business Forum, where 97 % of private-sector respondents expressed interest
in future editions, illustrated the effectiveness of these outreach efforts.
Public diplomacy also placed strong emphasis on youth, civil society and local authorities. More than
50 Youth Sounding Boards provided advice and feedback on EU external action, including through a
Youth Policy Dialogue on Global Gateway, and the first Youth Policy Dialogue on EU Foreign Policy.
Furthermore, multilateral fora such as the UN General Assembly High-Level Week, the High-Level
Political Forum on Sustainable Development, the International Conference on Financing for
Development, the World Social Summit, the UN Oceans Conference and the UN Conference on Trade
and Development were used to promote Global Gateway as a major contribution to the Sustainable
Development Goals and to reiterate the EU’s commitment to multilateralism, human rights,
democracy and international law. Participation in G7 and G20 processes and engagement with the
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OECD and international financial institutions similarly reinforced the EU’s narrative on sustainable,
rules-based development and quality infrastructure.
Communication campaigns and social media
In 2025, communication campaigns to raise awareness of the EU’s international partnership portfolio
were implemented across partner countries, run by Headquarters and EU Delegations. These included
thematic campaigns on EU investments in energy, a major sporting partnership to promote the Africa
EU partnership, and a series of mini-campaigns designed to showcase Global Gateway flagships
around high visibility political milestones. These campaigns delivered strong, measurable results and
demonstrated high levels of relevance and credibility for the target audience, strengthening positive
perception and trust in the EU as a partner.
Throughout the year, social media played a key role in boosting engagement and global visibility.
Content on international partnerships shifted to reflect European Commissioner for International
Partnerships Jozef Síkela’s portfolio, with a stronger focus on investment, infrastructure, and the
Global Gateway strategy. Major social media campaigns included the Global Gateway Forum and the
CELAC-EU Summit, including the LAC-EU Civil Society and Business Forums. A key milestone was the
launch of the Global Gateway LinkedIn page in August to better engage the private sector. Across all
platforms, organic content generated around 4 million impressions, helping to raise awareness and
spark global conversations.
Several communication activities were carried out in 2025 showcasing how EU foreign policy is being
implemented through concrete actions. It contributed in a tangible way to global peace and security,
profiling the EU as a reliable, credible and predictable global actor and leveraging EU interests and
partnerships abroad.Various communication campaigns were launched, including on the EU's
response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the war's global impact. They were
complemented by regional and local campaigns on issues where the EU is recognised as an impactful
partner, such as on efforts related to job creation and social developments, mitigation and adaptation
to climate change, and the promotion of fundamental values.
Countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI)
In 2025, the EU consolidated its global leadership in countering Foreign Information Manipulation and
Interference (FIMI), as malign actors — such as Russia and China — intensified efforts to undermine
democratic processes, erode EU cohesion and destabilise neighbouring and priority regions. Building
on work from previous years, the EU strengthened its ability to anticipate, expose and respond to an
increasingly complex and transnational FIMI threat environment. This was made possible by advancing
its detection, analysis and disruption capabilities, deepening its international partnerships and
strengthening its participation in multilateral frameworks.
In March, the third Report on FIMI Threats was published, introducing the FIMI Exposure Matrix, an
analytical tool that helps map, connect and attribute channels to the FIMI state-outlet apparatus. A
key achievement was the establishment of the FIMI Situational Awareness Hub, an internal
mechanism that turns insight into action, converting data analysis and open-source investigation into
early warning capabilities and coordinated responses. In June, a joint technical report, exposing
Russia’s FIMI activities in Africa through the African Initiative news agency, was published by the
European Union External Action Service (EEAS) together with the French Service for Vigilance and
Protection against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM) and the Foreign, Commonwealth and
Development Office (FCDO) of the United Kingdom.
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Another significant development was the European Democracy Shield, developed jointly by the
European Commission and EEAS. Safeguarding the integrity of the information space constitutes one
of its central pillars. One of its key deliverables, the European Centre for Democratic Resilience (ECDR)
is intended to empower, protect, and promote strong and resilient democracies across the EU,
including by facilitating the cooperation between EU Member States and partners to address threats
such as FIMI.
In March, the EU High Representative/Vice President Kaja Kallas hosted the annual FIMI conference,
entitled ‘United in Response’, bringing together major stakeholders from the EU institutions, the civil
society and private sector, and international partners. The Africa FIMI Conference, held in the same
month, brought the African and European FIMI defender communities together for the first time.
At the multilateral level, the EEAS played a central role in operationalising the G7 Rapid Response
Mechanism (RRM) Collective Response Framework, and enhanced cooperation with NATO. At the
30th EU-Japan Summit in July 2025, both parties agreed to establish the inaugural Dialogue on FIMI.
Furthermore, new Security and Defence Partnerships (SDP) were signed with the United Kingdom and
Canada, including counter-FIMI cooperation as a security priority.
In a year marked by numerous national and regional elections worldwide, particular attention was
devoted to safeguarding electoral integrity, most notably in the Republic of Moldova, where the EU
provided critical support against FIMI during the Parliamentary elections.
EU Delegations and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations benefited
from enhanced training and tools to detect and respond to FIMI, especially in the Eastern
Neighbourhood, southern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa.
The EUvsDisinfo remained a key awareness-raising tool, reaching over 40 million users and having
documented more than 19 500 cases by the end of the year.
NDICI−Global Europe’s Crisis Response funding stream played a crucial part in operationalising the
EU’s toolbox by providing partner governments with the resources and capacities to improve strategic
communication and counter FIMI while also supporting a resilient information environment, to ensure
the continued financing and operations of key independent media. A whole-of-society approach
remained essential. Civil-society organisations, fact-checkers, independent media and researchers
continued to play a key role in exposing FIMI, building resilience and promoting trustworthy
information. Finally, the EU expanded sanctions targeting FIMI actors and infrastructure.
5.5.2. Transparency
The European Commission long-standing commitment to transparency in its external action is
enshrined in its political, legal and contractual framework and active participation in major
international initiatives.
The Commission promotes transparency and accountability by ensuring that data on EU-funded
projects are accessible, comparable and credible. In 2025, the EU continued reporting financial
information and project details through key international standards, including OECD-DAC's (DAC
Advance Questionnaire Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and summary DAC tables, Contract Award
report and ODA contributions to the EU Budget of EU Member States), as well as Total Official Support
for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).
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The Commission supports IATI in the development of a Data Quality Dashboard to further improve
transparency and promotes peer-to-peer learning among Member States on reporting to this
international initiative.
The Commission is also committed to enhancing interoperability across international financing and
reporting systems, in line with the Financing for Development (FfD4) commitments of Sevilla, to
improve the quality, credibility and usability of data for partner countries and other stakeholders.
At the EU level, the Team Europe Explorer is a unique pubicly available interactive data tool
developped by the Commission which centralises existing OECD financial data on EU external
cooperation (ODA and TOSSD) and project-level information, allowing for disagreggation between
European Commission and EU Member States’ support to partner countries.
5.5.3. Learning
The European Commission continues to deliver on its mandate also by strengthening its focus on the
staff skills needed for the future, namely as regards the growing Global Gateway agenda and the
modernisation of the EU Delegations’ network. The Commission reinforced the training, mentoring
and coaching offer by organising it around a new comprehensive competency framework aimed at
helping staff to upskill and reskill in an structured manner, based on the key skills and roles needed,
for the Commission Directorate-General for International Partnerships specifically, to achieve its
mission.
For example, a new Global Gateway training package has been released in 2025, facilitating to staff,
as well as to external partners and the general public, the practical understanding and the
methodology used in Global Gateway projects. Also in 2025, a new learning package for staff
managing investments under the new EFSD+ mechanism was launched. This package provides access
to the latest information and best practices in sustainable finance and investment management. Along
the same lines, an increased offer of courses on private sector engagement in sustainable
development is under way.
In 2025, DG INTPA organised almost 500 different learning courses - mostly delivered remotely in
different online formats. Many of these courses are also freely available to citizens and practitioners
interested in EU international partnerships and sustainable development polices. Among them was
the Fundamental Training Package offered in four cycles, as well as regular methodological and
thematic courses.
The EU International Partnerships Academy(69) reached more than 30 000 enrolled learners coming
from more than 190 countries. The platform currently offers more than 430 different learning
resources and has reached more than 1.8 million visits from its establishment. The average user
satisfaction rate based on participants’ feedback was 82%. The Academy also collaborates with other
international organisations on the production of learning resources, for example within the Learn4Dev
donor competence network that is an effective space to co-create learning resources for international
cooperation and sustainable development practitioners.
69 https://international-partnerships.learning.europa.eu
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6. Results annexes
6.1. Introduction
6.1.1. Methodological basis for selected results reported against the Global Europe Results
Framework, the EU Results Framework, the IPA III Results Framework and the IPA Performance
Framework
This is the fifth year of financial execution of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation
Instrument-Global Europe (NDICI−Global Europe) which is implemented by Commission Directorates-General
INTPA, ENEST and MENA(70) and FPI. The main tool for monitoring and reporting results to be achieved by
NDICI−Global Europe is the Global Europe Results Framework (GERF)(71) which was launched in 2022. It is also
the fifth year of implementation of the Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA III), whose tool for monitoring and
reporting results is the IPA III Results Framework(72), also launched in 2022. IPA III is implemented by DG ENEST
and MENA.
As it takes time for results to materialise, results for NDICI−Global Europe and IPA III have started to be
achieved since 2023 and see a slow but constant increase. There is a time lag between the adoption of
Financing Decisions, contracting, and results achievements. Some results, particularly outcomes, tend to
materialise only at the end of the implementation of the interventions. Once results are achieved, the data
has to be collected in the monitoring systems, the evidence must be documented, encoded in the dedicated
IT system (OPSYS) and subsequently approved by the responsible Operational Manager(73) for non-
Neighbourhood and Neighbourhood regions, and the Instrument for Pre-accession Performance framework
(IPA PF) for the Enlargement region, which were introduced in 2018 for that purpose. This chapter of the annex
describes the methodological basis for results presented in the sections ‘Selected Results’ of chapter 3 and in
this annex.
EURF and GERF
Chapter 3 of the present Annual Report includes only results from the GERF, covering ongoing or closed EU-
funded interventions that started before 01 July 2025. Specifically, chapter 3 draws upon indicators included
in level 2 of the framework, as explained below. The annexes to the present chapter present both the EURF
and the GERF indicators and their progress of implementation (financial execution) until mid-2025.
IPA PF and IPA III RF
Chapter 3 of the present Annual Report includes results from the IPA III, covering ongoing or closed EU-funded
interventions that started before 01 July 2025. Chapter 3 draws upon indicators included in level 2 of the
framework, as explained below. The annexes present both the IPA PF and the IPA III RF indicators and their
progress of implementation (final execution) up to mid-2025.
6.1.2. Structure of the corporate results framework
All the corporate results frameworks presented here are structured around three levels of results. At the core
of the frameworks, a set of respectively 39 (GERF), 31 (EURF), 36 (IPA RF) and 110 (IPA III) indicators at output
and outcome level (Level 2) measure results achieved by EU-funded projects and programmes.
70 SWD(2022) 22 of 25 January 2022. 71 SWD(2022) 445 of 20 December 2022. 72 European Commission’s Staff Working Document (SWD)(2018) 444, ‘A revised EU international cooperation and development results framework, the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the New European Consensus on Development’. 73 Methodological notes are available online https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/resources/results-indicators_en.
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Level 1 corresponds to development progress in partner countries; that is, the medium- and long-term
development impact achieved in partnership and collaboration with others. Impacts reflect the operational
context in which EU external assistance is provided. As these indicators describe overall country progress, they
inherently reflect the combined contribution of partner countries, the EU and many other actors, and cannot
be attributed to the EU alone.
Data source Level 1: Internationally available indicators, as much as possible from the SDG database.
Level 2 focuses on development outcomes and outputs to which EU-funded interventions contribute in
collaboration with partner governments and other funding providers. In line with the principles of aid
effectiveness and effective development cooperation that emphasise partnerships and country ownership,
results at this level are presented on a contribution basis. Rather than results being based on the share of
funding provided by the EU, they represent the combined efforts of a variety of partners, including the EU,
Member States, partner country governments and public institutions, local communities, international finance
agencies, CSOs, non-profit entities and private companies. Data collection is guided by specific methodological
notes(74).
Data source Level 2: Results data are drawn from the reports of EU implementation partners (i.e., partner
countries, international organisations, Member States’ development agencies, international financial
institutions and NGOs).
Level 3 focuses on the mainstreaming of policy priorities, as measured by budgetary commitments directed at
specific cross-cutting issues (e.g., human development, gender, or nutrition), and focuses on organisational
financial data. Some of the indicators have organisational targets.
Data source level 3: Internal financial monitoring systems.
6.2. Level 2 indicators: Reporting on partner country results supported by the EU (EU RF, GERF,
IPA PF and IPA III)
Selection criteria:
For the different frameworks, the following selection criteria for ongoing and completed interventions(75) were
used:
EURF: Started before 1 July 2025 and ended after 31 December 2022. This year over 3 400 projects and
programmes reported latest results information, out of which more than 1 100 projects and programmes
contributed to at least one of the corporate indicators.
GERF: Started before 1 July 2025 and ended after 31 December 2022. This year over 3 600 projects and
programmes reported latest results information, out of which 942 projects and programmes contributed to at
least one of the corporate indicators.
IPA PF: Started before 1 July 2025 and ended after 31 December 2022. This year, 378 projects and programmes
reported latest results information, out of which 82 projects and programmes contributed to at least one of
the corporate indicators.
74 The interventions considered were financed using the following instruments: the European Development Fund (EDF); the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI); the programmable part of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) under Art. 5; the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation; the Instrument for Greenland; and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). 75 Any intervention, funded by the old MFF 2014-2020, that ended after 31/12/2022 or is still ongoing and had not finalised reporting
against the logframe in OPSYS during previous years.
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IPA III: Started before 1 July 2025 and ended after 31 December 2022. This year 413 projects and programmes
reported latest results information, out of which 142projects and programmes contributed to at least one of
the corporate indicators.
The sample of ongoing interventions continues to expand over time. As in previous years, the results reported
cannot be interpreted as providing a full picture of the interventions financed by the EU in the countries
concerned.
Methodology notes: Methodology notes are available for each of the frameworks’ indicators to ensure that
data from the various reporting sources could be aggregated consistently. These notes provide definitions and
data sources clearly explaining what type of interventions should be included when reporting against an
indicator. For GERF and EURF, the notes can be found at https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/resources/results-
indicators/global-europe-results-framework_en
For IPA III, the notes can be found at https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/resources/results-indicators/ipa-iii-
methodological-notes_en
Data: Results data is drawn from the reports of EU implementation partners (i.e., partner countries,
international organisations, Member States’ development agencies, international financial institutions and
NGOs). These organisations use data collected from a variety of sources, such as the management information
system of partner countries, the individual project monitoring frameworks of implementation partners and
representative surveys.
Reporting: The relative figures report cumulative numbers. The numbers are cumulated with careful
consideration of potential double counting across projects and programmes and across years. The approach
taken is to err on the side of safety, so any potentially double counted results are excluded from the results
reported.
For some level 2 indicators in GERF and EURF, the majority of results comes from one single intervention, in
most cases from funds. For GERF, the concerned results are scaled down by the size of the EU financial
contribution relative to the total budget of the undertaking; this process is used for the concerned indicators
and only if the EU contributes with less than 50% to the overall budget of the fund. Previously under EURF,
the results reported have been calculated using a contribution-based approach. This means that where an
intervention has been financed by the EU jointly with other funders – such as partner country governments or
other donors – the overall results of the collective effort are reported, rather than those linked to the share
of funding provided by the EU specifically.
EURF indicator 2.30 ‘Number of countries supported by the EU to strengthen revenue mobilisation, public
financial management and/or budget transparency’ is an exception in terms of scope and data collection. In
addition to the interventions included in the exercise, this indicator draws on all countries with an ongoing EU
budget support contract.
EURF indicators 2.9 ‘Number of individuals with access to electricity with EU support through a) new access,
b) improved access’, 2.10 ‘Renewable energy generation capacity installed with EU support (MW)’ and 2.21
‘Greenhouse gas emissions avoided with EU support (tonnes CO2eq)’ (76) also include reporting by the EU–
Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (EU-AITF). EURF 2.9 reports inferred figures, which were calculated using the
KfW model for estimating access using electricity generation capacity, the data will not be updated again given
76 Methodology for this indicator can be found here: https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/sites/default/files/media/2.21_- _ghg_emissions_avoided_10-2019.pdf
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the change to OPSYS reporting and the 2023 value will remain. EURF 2.10 and EURF 2.21 report expected
results.
Given its use in the Gender Action Plan III (GAP III), the new GERF indicator 2.37 ‘Number of people benefitting
from EU-funded interventions to counter sexual and gender-based violence’ is already reported upon,
numbered as EURF 2.31.
GERF indicator 2.19 ‘Number of countries supported by the EU to strengthen revenue mobilisation, public
financial management and/or budget transparency’ is an exception in terms of scope and data collection. In
addition to the interventions included in the exercise, this indicator draws on all countries with an ongoing EU
budget support contract.
GERF indicators 2.3 ‘Number of individuals with access to electricity with EU support through a) new access,
b) improved access’, 2.4 ‘Renewable energy generation capacity installed with EU support (MW)’ and 2.7
‘Greenhouse gas emissions avoided with EU support (tonnes CO2eq)’ (77) are reporting values actually
achieved.
GERF indicators 2.20 ‘Number of migrants, refugees, and internally displaced people or individuals from host
communities protected or assisted with EU support’, 2.32 ‘Number of food insecure people receiving EU
assistance’ and, 2.39 ‘Number of people directly benefiting from EU supported interventions that aim to
reduce social and economic inequality’ can be used while more specific sectoral indicators are used as well.
Thus, beneficiaries should not be aggregated between indicators.
Results by sex of beneficiaries: The SWD(2018) 444(78) and SWD(2022) 455 final(79) mentions that, where
possible, results are to be disaggregated by sex. Where this disaggregation has not been provided, it is either
because this was not relevant for the indicator in question (e.g., GERF 2.2 ‘Agricultural and pastoral ecosystems
where sustainable management practices have been introduced with EU support’) or because the data were
not available. Due to data availability at intervention level, the sum of sex-disaggregated results may not equal
the total results figures. These cases are also present in IPA related results data.
Results by country: When presenting results broken down by country/IPA beneficiary, figures are reported
according to the country where the result was achieved. While efforts have been made to capture this detailed
level of reporting as far as possible, data were not always available at this level; for example, in the case of
multi-country regional interventions where country-level results were not reported (e.g. results are presented
under the label ‘Western Balkans regional results’). Where the EU has funded interventions in overseas
countries and territories, results achieved are reported at this level. This approach is also taken where
indicators measure the number of countries supported in a specific sector.
Quality: The data are subjected to an extensive quality assurance process to ensure that:
• The data sources are reliable;
77 Methodology for this indicator can be found here: https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/sites/default/files/media/2.21_- _ghg_emissions_avoided_10-2019.pdf 78 European Commission’s Staff Working Document (SWD)(2018) 444, ‘A revised EU international cooperation and development results framework, the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the New European Consensus on Development’. 79 These annexes will be available for download on the International Partnerships website. The link is not active yet, as these documents cannot be uploaded and made publicly available before the adoption of this report. The link will therefore be active in the Publications Office’s version (and not in this Interinstitutional version going through adoption). Until then, these annexes are available in a zip file accompanying the report and its Staff Working Document. To note that some of the results, including efforts to meet the targets, also feature in chapter 3.
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• The link between the indicators from the monitoring system of the intervention and the indicators
from the relative framework is robust; and
• The individuals who have benefited from the same intervention over different years, and/or from
different interventions ending and/or ongoing in the same year, are only counted once.
However, given the great variety of data sources used, the data quality may vary.
Joint reporting with EU Trust Fund for Africa interventions: As part of the 2018 revision of the results
framework, efforts have been made to harmonise indicator methodologies to enable joint reporting with
other monitoring systems. Since 2024 the EU Trust Fund for Africa interventions were fully incorporated in
OPSYS, and thus now complete reporting against all relevant EU Result Framework indicators.
6.3. Level 3: Reporting on policy mainstreaming as measured by budgetary commitments
Level 3 indicators report on financial flows in 2025 and include all funds managed by the financing instrument
NDICI−Global Europe. Level 3 reporting excludes funds under the previous MFF (2014-2020), i.e., the
presentation of payments does not present all payments made in 2025.
Some of the Level 3 indicators have associated spending targets, provided in the legal basis to the
NDICI−Global Europe (e.g., climate, social inclusion and human development, migration and forced
displacement) and a gender target. In some cases, the priority is derived from formal EU policy commitments
endorsed by the Council (e.g. Gender Action Plan III) or international commitments made by the EU (e.g.
nutrition).
All ten Level 3 indicators from the 2018 EURF have been included in the GERF, with a couple of minor
adjustments (i.e., two indicators from the 2018 EURF have been merged, and the methodology to calculate
the indicator on human development has been updated). This confirms the stability of the EU commitment to
providing support in these areas. Level 3 indicators, similar to those of the GERF, are also part of IPA III RF.
6.4. Latest results
Please find below results under the following link(80):
For the previous MFF (2014-2020): a detailed overview of all data (Excel format).
for the current MFF (2021-2027): a detailed overview of all data (Excel format).
Consolidated version of the data of both MFFs (PDF format).
80 These annexes will be available for download on the International Partnerships website. The link is not active yet, as these documents cannot be uploaded and made publicly available before the adoption of this report. The link will therefore be active in the Publications Office’s version (and not in this Interstinstitutional version going through adoption). Until then, these annexes are available in a zip file accompanying the report and its Staff Working Document. To note that some of the results, including efforts to meet the targets, also feature in chapter 3.
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6.5. Results of the implementation of the Gender Action Plan III
Table 1. Progress on the GAP III’s institutional and strategic objectives and indicators for the European Union
Institutions
Objective and targets of the GAP III (Part I) Progress in 2025
Objective 1. Increase the number and the funding of new actions that are gender mainstreamed (OECD Gender Marker 1) and targeted (G2)
Target 1: 85% of new actions are gender responsive/targeted (G1+G2) by 2025(81)
On track – Over the period 2021–2025, 79% of actions were gender-responsive or targeted. Under NDICI–Global Europe, 83% of actions were marked G1 or G2 (out of which 4.5% were marked as G2). The corresponding shares were 79% under IPA III and 59% under CFSP. In 2025, 76% of new actions were gender-responsive or gender-targeted, including 88% for DG INTPA, 85% for DG ENEST, 89% for DG MENA, 47% for FPI, and 81% for other Comission Directorate-Generals (DGs).
Target 2: 100% of new actions not targeting gender equality (G0) justified over 2021–2025
In progress – 60% of new actions marked G0 were correctly justified in 2025(82).
Target 3: At least two rapid response actions or peace and stability themed actions per year
Target achieved – 76% (191 out of 252) of rapid response actions approved in 2021–2025 are gender mainstreamed. 51% of new rapid response actions (21 out of 41) were gender mainstreamed in 2025.
Target 5: At least one gender-targeted action (G2 action) per country allocation over 2021–2025
In progress – By the end of 2025, 60 countries had at least one G2 action. In 2025, nine new country- level G2 actions were committed. Since 2021, a total of 68 country-level G2 actions have been adopted.
Target 6: At least one gender-targeted action (G2) per regional allocation over 2021–2025
Target achieved – By the end of 2025, all six regions (Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Eastern Partnership, the Western Balkans and Türkiye, and the Southern Neighbourhood) had at least one G2 action. A total of 18 regional and global G2 actions were adopted between 2021 and 2025.
Target 7: Increase amount of funding in support of gender equality and women’s empowerment actions (G1 and G2)
In progress – between 2021 and 2025, commitments for actions contributing to gender equality (marked G1 or G2) totalled EUR 58.610 billion, representing 82% of all commitments under NDICI, IPA III and CFSP during that period. Of this amount, EUR 1.374 billion, or 2%, was committed to gender-targeted actions. In 2025
81 Data cover all new actions under the MFF 21-27 for NDICI-Global Europe, CSFP and IPA III. 82 Data calculated on a sample of actions from DG INTPA, as done for 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024.
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Objective and targets of the GAP III (Part I) Progress in 2025
alone, 80% of total commitments, amounting to EUR 10.644 billion, supported GEWE.
Target 8: Increase amount of funding directed towards women’s rights organisations and movements (WROs)
In progress – In 2025, commitments to women’s rights organisations and movements amounted to EUR 47.3 million, bringing the total volume of commitments adopted over 2021–2025 to EUR 295 million.
Target 9: Number of new EU-funded humanitarian programmes marked 1 or marked 2 by the DG ECHO Gender- Age Marker Target: In 2024 (for 2021 start date projects): 95%
In progress – 81% of projects with a start date in 2025 were marked as 1 or 2 by the DG ECHO gender and age marker(83).
Objective 2. Gender perspective is mainstreamed in all actions under the investment framework Target: 85% of all blending operations and guarantees are gender responsive/targeted (G1/G2) by 2025
In progress – Between 2021 and 2025, 67% of blending operations and 70% of guarantee agreements were marked G1 or G2. In 2025, 71% of blending operations (45 in total) and 85% of guarantees (20 in total) were gender- mainstreamed. For DG INTPA, the corresponding shares were 80% for blending operations (30 in total) and 88% for guarantees (17 in total). For DG ENEST, the figures were 50% for blending operations (14 in total) and 50% for guarantees (2 in total). In MENA, all blending operations and guarantees were gender-mainstreamed, with 1 out of 1 operation and 1 out of 1 guarantee marked accordingly.
Objective 3. Gender Responsive Budgeting is promoted Target: At least 20% of new actions supporting public finance management (PFM) reforms include a gender budgeting component
Target achieved – Since 2021, 62% of actions supporting PFM included a gender responsive budgeting component (65% for DG INTPA, 80% for DG ENEST and 33% for DG MENA). In 2025, 70% of all new actions in PFM had a gender budgeting component.
Objective 4. Gender specific and/or sex-disaggregated indicators are systematically used Target: 85% of new actions by 2025 have at least the latest progress data entry sex-disaggregated or gender-specific, as mandated by the indicator formulation
In progress – By the end of 2025, 49% of interventions that monitor gender-relevant indicators and had already started reporting had provided sufficient data for those indicators(84).
Objective 5. GAP III implementation is informed by sound gender profile and framed in ‘country-level implementation plans’ (CLIPs)
Target 1: One ‘country-level implementation plan’ agreed per country and transmitted to headquarters (HQ)
On track – By the end of 2025, 97% of EU Delegation had a CLIP, representing 132 out of 136 countries(85).
83 From 2024 onwards ECHO presents the results on the analysis of the gender and age markers of the projects starting in the given year. Previous annual reporting data was taken from the Gender-Age Marker Assessment Report (2018-2021). 84 the calculation is based on a gender data score, which measures the percentage of gender-mainstreamed interventions that report results and provide sufficient data on gender-specific indicators. The data cover IPA III, NDICI, the Overseas instrument, and the Energy instrument, and refer only to predefined indicators. 85 For the purpose of this indicator, only ODA recipient countries have been considered.
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Objective and targets of the GAP III (Part I) Progress in 2025
Target 2: One gender analysis per priority sector in all countries
In progress – 88% of EU Delegations had conducted at least one gender sector analysis, and 53% had gender sector analyses covering all their priority sectors.
Objective 6. Gender perspective is integrated in ‘Working Better Together’ approaches and in broader coordination Target: 85% of new joint programming documents over 2021- 2025 reference and integrate the priorities of GAP III
Target achieved – Since 2021, 87% of all EU actions contributing to Team Europe Initiatives (TEI) were gender mainstreamed. In 2025, 91% of TEI were gender marked.
Objective 7. Political, security and sectoral policy dialogues integrate a gender perspective
Target 1: All EU Delegations are engaged in at least one high- level dialogue on gender equality and women’s empowerment with institutional actors per year per country
In progress – In 2025, 76% of EU Delegations reported having held at least one high-level dialogue with the partner country’s government on gender equality and women’s empowerment.
Target 2: All EU Delegations are engaged in dialogue on gender equality and women’s empowerment with civil society at least once per country per year over 2021- 2025
In progress – In 2025, 88% of EU Delegations held a high-level dialogue on gender equality and women’s empowerment with civil society, including women’s and girls’ organisations In addition, 19% reported doing so through a structured dialogue framework established with civil society organisations in the partner country.
Target 3: At least one dialogue per year with civil society on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) policy per (relevant) partner country
Target achieved – In 2025, 74% of EU Delegations consulted and/or involved civil society organisations in dialogues on WPS.
Objective 8. All EU actions implemented at regional level are gender mainstreamed
Target 1: a regional/multi-country gender profile conducted or updated in at least four regions by end 2022
Target not achieved – by 2025, only three regions had developed regional or multi-country gender profiles: East Asia, the Eastern Partnership, and the Southern Neighbourhood. In East Asia, two profiles covered ASEAN countries, while the Pacific Islands produced one gender profile and three sectoral profiles. The Eastern Partnership produced five regional analyses, and the Southern Neighbourhood produced one profile.
Target 2: At least three regions have identified priorities to implement GAP III by end 2022
Target achieved – By 2025, five of the six regions had established regional or sub-regional priorities: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Eastern Partnership, and the Southern Neighbourhood.
Objective 9. The EU takes on a coordinated leadership on gender equality and women’s empowerment in international meetings (UN, AU, NATO, ASEAN, OSCE, G7, G20, etc.)
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Objective and targets of the GAP III (Part I) Progress in 2025
Target 1: At least two joint EU positions for key gender international/regional events and negotiations per year
Target achieved – The EEAS reported at least 11 joint positions, of which six were delivered during the 69th Session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW).
Target 2: Statements and commitments made by EU officials on gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE) and Women, Peace and Security (WPS)
Target achieved – The EEAS reported 25 statements and 6 commitments on GEWE and WPS, including in fora such as the UN, the UN Security Council, the UN Human Rights Council, the G20, and the OSCE, as well as at summits with the African Union, Canada, and CELAC. In addition, 69% of EU Delegations reported that their Head of Delegation made at least one statement or commitment on GEWE and WPS in 2025.
Target 3: EU and its Member States’ bilateral and regional dialogues that include WPS-related priorities and commitments
Target achieved – The EEAS reported 34 bilateral, 6 regional and 3 multilateral dialogues that included WPS-related priorities and commitments. Topics included: political participation, conflict prevention and mediation and combatting GBV. 53% of EU Delegations were engaged in bilateral or regional dialogues on WPS-related priorities and commitments in 2025.
Target 4: EU bilateral and multilateral/regional agreements and/or joint activities and programmes on WPS, gender equality and women’s empowerment with partners inter alia UN, AU, NATO, CoE, OSCE, G7, G20 and ASEAN
Target achieved – The EEAS reported 21 agreements, activities or programmes, including 7 with the UN.
Target 5: EU commitments/ engagements with the humanitarian initiative ‘Call to Action on Protection from Gender-based Violence in Emergencies’ and new Road Map 2021–2024
Target achieved – The EU participated to the relevant events and reported on its eight commitments. In particular, ECHO contributed to the drafting of the new Roadmap, collected and shared GBV and gender funding data, and increased humanitarian funding for SRH and GBV response from EUR 70 million to EUR 114 million in 2025.
Objective 10. Gender-responsive leadership enhanced
Target 1: 50% of women in senior and middle management positions in COM and EEAS services, EU Delegations, CSDP missions and operations
In progress – By the end of 2025, women held 47% of senior management positions in the Commission, 45% in EEAS headquarters, and 26% in EU Delegations. At middle-management level, the figures were 50% in the Commission, 36% in EEAS headquarters, and 39% in EU Delegations. Women also held 11% of management positions in CSDP missions and operations.
Target 2: The minimum of 33% proportion of women mediators, negotiators and technical experts present in formal as well as informal peace processes where the EU and its MS are engaged, with specific mention of those in high-level and leadership positions
In progress – In 2025, women accounted for 27% of EU Special Representatives, with 3 out of 11 positions held by women. They served in the Horn of Africa, the South Caucasus, and as EU Special Representative for Human Rights.
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Objective and targets of the GAP III (Part I) Progress in 2025
Target 3: Gender balanced personnel in EU Election observation missions
Target achieved – 50% of the observers deployed in 2025 were women.
Target 4: 50% women appointed as Deputy Chief Observer within EU election observation missions
In progress – 43% of the Deputy Chief Observers were women (3 out of 7).
Target 5: 100% of management trained on gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE) and on GAP III
In progress – Since the adoption of GAP III, 40% of senior and middle managers in EU Delegations have been trained on gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE) and/or on GAP III, covering 62% of EU Delegations. The estimated figure for headquarters is 37%.
Target 6: 100% of men and women staff at all levels, a) EU HQ b) diplomatic staff, c) civilian staff and d) military staff, participating in CSDP missions and operations that are trained on WPS (WPS Ind. 4)
In progress – In 2025, 100% of staff in CSDP civilian missions, military missions and military operations received training on women, peace and security (WPS). Overall, this meant that 70% of EEAS staff received WPS training.
Target 7: 100% of staff trained on conduct and discipline that includes content related to SEA and harassment including SH, among a) EU HQ b) diplomatic staff, c) civilian staff and d) military staff participating in CSDP missions and operations (WPS Ind. 5)
In progress – 100% of staff in CSDP civilian missions, military missions and military operations, as well as 18% of staff at EEAS HQs received training on conduct and discipline, including content on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and harassment, including sexual harassment (SH).
Objective 11. Gender Advisors, Focal Persons/Points support for the integration of a gender perspective in EU policies, interventions, and dialogues
Target 1: All EU Delegations and headquarters external services have a gender focal person (GFP)
In progress – 87% of services had a GFP—81% at HQs and 95% in EU Delegations. In total, there were 407 GFPs, including 284 at headquarters and 123 in EU Delegations.
Target 2: Those gender focal persons have corresponding tasks in their job description
In progress – Overall, 60% of GFPs had these responsibilities included in their job description, with the share reaching 66% at HQs and 50% in EU Delegations.
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7. Budget Support Annexes
The following tables and charts present the financial and geographic distribution of the EU budget support portfolio at the end of 2025, of budget support
payments made in 2025 and of main features of ongoing budget support contracts. These figures include OCTs, which are non-ODA eligible countries.
Table 1. EU budget support portfolio at the end of 2025 per region
Region Number of countries
Number of budget support
contracts
Type of budget support contracts (number)
Budget support total open commitments at the end of 2025
(in million EUR) Share of budget support portfolio at
the end of 2025
Total disbursed in 2025 (in million EUR)
Total ongoing of which new
commitments in 2025 SDG-C SRBC SRPC
Asia 11 24 0 0 24 1 588.6 20.0 15.1% 134.6
Caribbean 5 8 0 1 7 222.8 0 2.1% 4.9
Central Africa 2 2 0 0 2 50.3 0 0.5% 0.9
Eastern Africa 6 16 0 2 14 1 011.5 70.0 9.6% 43.1
Eastern neighbourhood 4 19 0 6 13 1 856.1 200.0 17.7% 126.5
Latin America 5 12 0 0 12 289.6 0 2.8% 26.7
Overseas countries and territories (OCTs)
10 12 0 0 12 291.5 0 2.8%
56.3
Pacific 9 13 0 3 10 177.1 35.6 1.7% 20.2
Southern Africa 5 12 0 3 9 358.5 66.0 3.4% 15.3
Southern neighbourhood 3 29 0 4 25 2 440.9 505.5 23.3% 330.3
West Africa 13 22 5 12 5 1 289.0 18.0 12.3% 130.5
Western Balkans 6 20 0 7 13 919.8 0 8.8% 25.8
All regions 79 188 5 37 146 10 495.7 915.1 100% 915.1
Sustainable Development Goals Contracts (SDG-C) comprise EUR 219.7 million (2%), State and Resilience Building Contracts (SRBC) EUR 3 343.3 million (32%)
and Sector Reform Performance Contracs (SPRC) EUR 6 932.7 million (66%), respectively.
This list includes countries, where budget support operations were on hold in 2025 due to political reasons and/of failure to meet eligibility criteria.
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Table 2. Countries and OCTs with EU budget support contracts(86)
Asia (11) Eastern Neighbourhood (4) Southern Africa (5)
• Bangladesh • Bhutan • Cambodia • Kyrgyzstan • Laos
• Mongolia • Myanmar • Nepal • Tajikistan • Uzbekistan • Vietnam
• Armenia • Georgia • Moldova • Ukraine
• Angola • Malawi • Namibia • South Africa • Zambia
Caribbean (5) Latin America (5) Southern Neigbourhood (3)
• Barbados • Dominican Republic • Haiti • Jamaica • Saint Lucia
• Bolivia • Colombia • Guyana • Honduras • Paraguay
• Jordan • Morocco • Tunisia
Central Africa (2) OCT (10) West Africa (13)
• Cameroon • Sao Tome and Principe
• Aruba • Bonaire • French Polynesia • Greenland • New Caledonia
• Saba • Sint Eustatius • St Barthélemy • St Pierre et Miquelon • Wallis et Futuna
• Benin • Cabo Verde • Chad • Côte d'Ivoire • Gambia • Guinea • Liberia
• Mali • Mauritania • Niger • Senegal • Sierra Leone • Togo
Eastern Africa (6) Pacific (9) Western Balkans (6)
• Ethiopia • Kenya • Rwanda • Somalia • Tanzania • Uganda
• Fiji • Kiribati • Papua New Guinea • Samoa • Solomon Islands • Timor-Leste • Tonga • Tuvalu • Vanuatu
• Albania • Bosnia and Herzegovina • Kosovo • Montenegro • North Macedonia • Serbia
86 This list includes countries where budget support operations were on hold in 2025 due to political reasons and/of failure to meet eligibility criteria.
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Figure 1. Distribution of the EU budget support portfolio by region in 2025
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Figure 2. Average size of budget support portfolio per country in each region in EUR
Figure 3. Average size of individual budget support operation in each region in EUR
Interpretation:
The first chart above depicts – region by region – the average budget support portfolio per country
(consisting of one or more operations). The average over all regions is EUR 131 million. The second
one below provides the average size of an individual budget support operation – region by region. The
overall average is 55 million.
0
20 000 000
40 000 000
60 000 000
80 000 000
100 000 000
120 000 000
Average size of individual budget support operation in each region in EUR
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Figure 4. Budget support disbursements from 2021 to 2025 (in million EUR)
Figure 5. Share of fixed and variable tranches in 2025 budget support payments
The chart above provides the share of fixed and variable tranches in actual payments, respectively
29% and 71% on average. These shares vary widely between regions. DG INTPA regions had an average
variable share of 60.46%, DG ENEST of 93.46% and DG MENA 74.42%. As variable tranches are not
necessarily paid in full, their share by design is relatively higher in the original disbursement profile of
operations.
- 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Budget support disbursements from 2021 to 2025 (in million EUR)
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Share of fixed and variable tranches in 2025 budget support payments
Fixed tranche Variable tranche
173
Figures 6 & 7. Main SDG for all new budget support operations approved under the current MFF (for the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025)
All budget support operations can contribute up to 10 SDGs with one SDG being selected as ‘principal’ target. The chart below depicts the principal focus of
operations only and therefore not their full coverage of SDGs as such.
174
8. Financial Annexes
8.1. EU external assistance in 2025
8.1.1. Introduction to financial tables
General concepts, definitions and standards
The tables and graphs in these financial annexes present the main data on the EU’s International
Partnerships (including development assistance) in 2025 by country, region, sector and instrument.
These activities are mainly funded by Heading VI – ‘Neighbourhood and the World’ of the general
budget of the European Union, as well as the Ukraine Facility, established in 2024 as an Special
Instrument outside the MFF ceilings.
The legal and financial basis of the EU’s International Partnerships under the 2021-2027 Multiannual
Financial Framework (MFF) is composed of several instruments. The main one is the Neighbourhood,
Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI−Global Europe).
NDICI−Global Europe includes geographical and thematic components previously covered by the
European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). NDICI−Global Europe is entirely funded by the general budget of the
EU. Other instruments include Humanitarian Aid, the third Instrument of Pre- Accession (IPA III), the
Ukraine Facility, the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, as well as the recently
established Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism (ULCM) and Union Secure Connectivity (USC)
instruments. While new commitments in 2025 are only made on new MFF instruments, payments are
made on both the new MFF and the previous MFF instruments, as well as the EDF.
As of 2025, former Directorate-General for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement (DG
NEAR) has been divided in two new Directorates General: Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood
(DG ENEST) and Middle-East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA). All transactions reported in 2025,
including payments made on contracts signed by DG NEAR during previous years, have been split
between these new DGs(87).
Whenever references are made in the following tables to the 'EU budget', this refers to the part of the
EU general budget managed by the European Commission, including the co-financing provided by
other partners (e.g. Member States, third countries, and international organisations). It does not cover
EU Member States' national budgets for development assistance.
The methodology of the financial annexes of the Annual Report is compliant with international
standards as defined by OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and in particular:
• The financial tables are done at the two levels of project implementation used by OECD DAC:
Commitments and Payments. Commitments are the legal and budgetary reservation of funds
for a project to come, as defined by the project description document. Commitments best
reflect the provider’s intentions as they are usually implemented within the five years
following the year they are reported. Payments are the sums disbursed to beneficiaries of
contracts within agreed projects. They best reflect what has actually been implemented
during the reported year.
• De-commitments (representing partial or total withdrawal of reserved funds for a given
project, due to the completion, modification or cancellation of the project) are reported as
87 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy-and-enlargement-negotiations-dg-near_en
175
negative commitments in the financial annexes. It eliminates the risk of over-reporting
commitments and allows for a better overall picture of the implementation of the budget.
• The concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA) used throughout the tables and figures
is defined by the OECD DAC. Not all EU external assistance can be reported as ODA. Whether
a project is classified as ODA depends on the eligibility of the recipient country and the
purpose and contents of the project.
• The definition of ‘region’ reflects the country groupings used by OECD DAC. It does not always
coincide with the country groupings used in the Commission instruments. The granularity
level of some of the tables allow for a breakdown by country and instrument for analytical
purposes. Please note that the level of granularity is usually higher for payments than for
commitments.
• The taxonomy of countries and territories of the financial annexes of the Annual Report is
compliant with the European Commission’s Interinstitutional Style Guide as well as the latest
guidelines elaborated by the European Commission’s Secretariat General on the subject. In
particular:
o ‘Kosovo*’ in the tables refers to the following note: (*) This designation is without
prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
o ‘Palestine**’ in the tables refers to the following note: (**) This designation shall not
be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the
individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
• The grouping of ODA-eligible countries in four groups (Least Developed Countries or LDCs;
Other Low Income Countries or OLICs; Lower Middle Income Countries or LMICs; Upper
Middle Income Countries or UMICs) is a dimension widely used by OECD DAC and other
international organisations. It is based on Gross National Income (GNI) per capita calculations
and on human development indexes.
• Activities of global nature targetting all developing countries, or activities targetting recipient
countries in more than one continent (e.g. projects targetting North of Africa and Middle East)
are classified as ‘Developing countries, unspecified’.
• The activity sectors used in the tables are those used by OECD DAC for sectoral ventilation
(DAC purpose codes).
• Tables including data on ODA per capita are based on 2024 population statistics from the
World Bank.
Several methodological differences between the presentation of the data in this Annual Report and
the OECD DAC statistics make it difficult to compare the two data sets. To give a few examples, on the
one hand, co-financing (contributions by EU Member States directly to specific projects) are included
in the Annual Report as they are part of the EU’s operational portfolio, but not reported to OECD DAC
in order to avoid double counting. On the other hand, transactions not funded by the Heading VI such
as concessional loans by the European Investment Bank, Macro Financial Assistance loans to the
European Neighbourhood and loans under the Eastern Neighborhood Facilities (Ukraine, Western
Balkans and Moildova) are reported to the OECD DAC but are not included in this report. Considering
the volume of loans to the European Neighbourhood, and in particular to Ukraine in 2025, they are
included (for information only) in a specific box in Table 1.
176
Structure and common elements
The transition to the new MFF in 2021 introduced new instruments and substantially modified the
financial structure of the EU External Action. To reflect this as well as the evolution of reporting needs,
the financial annexes were substantially modified and simplified at the time, while preserving the
continuity of the series. This new layout has been used in 2025 as well.
Financial annexes of the 2025 Annual Report are structured in four sections as follows:
• Tables 1 to 18 are the core of the financial reporting. These tables remain mostly unchanged
year after year and ensure the continuity of the statistical series. They present commitments
and payments funded by the Heading VI and the Ukraine Facility.
• Tables 19 to 22 are specific to the new MFF 2021-2027 and address specific needs and legal
requirements.
• Tables TF1 to TF6 present data on the implementation of the European Union Trust Funds.
At the top right of each table, a small information box specifies whether the figures in the table are
Commitments or Disbursements; whether only Official Development Assistance (ODA) figures or non-
ODA figures are included (Yes or No); whether the EDF is included or not, and the EC service managing
the funds (Directorate-General for International Partnerships (INTPA) or other Directorates General).
To improve readability, all numbers in the tables are presented as rounded up to the nearest EUR
million. Negative numbers (e.g. in the case of decommitments) are reported in red color with the
minus sign in front. When a table shows the number ‘0’, it means that the exact figure is between EUR
0 and EUR 0.5 million. When a table shows a blank, it means that the exact figure is zero. When a table
shows the number ‘- 0’, it means that the exact figure is between EUR – 0.5 million and EUR 0.
A list of abbreviations is also provided in this annex.
8.1.2. Financial tables
Note: All amounts are displayed in EUR millions and in current prices.
The Annual Report main financial annex consists of the following tables:
1 – Percentage of EU Budget committed and disbursed on External Action in 2025
This table shows the relative importance of external assistance in the overall expenditure of the EU
budget.
Since 2023, it includes an additional information box on extra-budgetary loans to neighbourhood
countries. The loans as such (except for their provisioning), are not funded by Heading VI of the EU
budget so they are not part of this Annual Report in principle, but constitute ODA and are therefore
reported to the OECD DAC in ‘grant equivalent’, the standard DAC reporting method for sovereign
sector loans. They are included here for information.
It should be noted that the amount of the EU Budget committed and disbursed on External Action in
2025 includes an amount of EUR 496.2 million of interest costs subsidised by the EU budget on loans
extended to Ukraine(88).
88 EUR 174.4 million for Macro Financial Assistance Loans extended in 2022, EUR 321.4 million from loans under the Ukraine Facility and EUR 0.4 million for loans under the MFA+ instrument.
177
2 – Proportion of External Action used for Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2025
This table provides a breakdown between ODA and non ODA by Directorate-General.
3A – General EU budget for External Action in 2025 by DG and instrument – Commitments
3B – General EU budget for External Action in 2025 by DG and instrument – Disbursements
These tables provide detailed breakdowns of the commitments and payments funded by the EU
Budget by managing DG, instrument and source of funding (regular own resources contributions from
Member States or co-financing).
In 2025, two additional instruments fall under the scope of this report: the Ukraine Loan cooperation
mechanism (ULCM) and the Union Secure Connectivity (USC).
The ULCM was established under Regulation (EU) 2024/2773, and is part of a G7 initiative adopted at
the G7 summit in Apulia in June 2024 to support Ukraine with loans of up to EUR 45 billion. Under the
ULCM, extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7
member states are used to repay those loans and the associated interest costs. The loans falling under
the scope of the ULCM include EUR 18.1 billion under the so-called MFA-ERA loan extended by the
EU, as well as loans by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. As the European
Commission manages the collection and the disbursement of the ULCM, all the revenues collected
and disbursed for all G7 lenders transit through the EU Budget as external assigned revenues, and
appear therefore as non-regular contributions (i.e. in the co-financing section of Table 3). In addition,
as the support to Ukraine does not originate from the lenders’ own resources (but from immobilised
Russian assets) the amounts are classified as non-ODA.
4 – European Development Fund (EDF) in 2025 – Disbursements
This table presents a breakdown of the payments funded by the European Development Fund for
2024. New commitments targeting the geographical area of former EDFs are now made under
NDICI−Global Europe and are part of the EU budget shown on table 3A above.
5A – Sectoral breakdown of ODA managed by the European Commission in 2025 - Commitments
5B – Sectoral breakdown of ODA managed by the European Commission in 2025 – Disbursements
6A – Country breakdown of European Commission development assistance in 2025 – Commitments
6B – Country breakdown of European Commission development assistance in 2025 – Disbursements
7 – Distribution of ODA by OECD Sector and Country Grouping in 2025
It should be noted that the category ‘Other’ covers both, regional activities, as well as activities
targetting developing countries in general.
8A – ODA Recipient Country by main OECD sector in 2025 – Commitments
8B – ODA Recipient Country by main OECD sector in 2025 – Disbursements
These tables combines a ventilation of ODA by sector and by country and includes a calculation of
ODA per capita.
It should be noted that the category ‘Developing countries Unallocated’ covers both, regional
activities, as well as activities targetting developing countries in general.
178
9A – INTPA in 2025: A closer look. Sectoral breakdown per region – Commitments
9B – INTPA in 2025: A closer look. Sectoral breakdown per region – Disbursements
10A – Budget Non-INTPA in 2025: A closer look. Sectoral breakdown per region – Commitments
10B – Budget Non-INTPA in 2025: A closer look. Sectoral breakdown per region – Disbursements
11A – Sectoral breakdown per instrument in 2025 – Commitments
11B – Sectoral breakdown per instrument in 2025 – Disbursements
12A – Breakdown by country and instrument for 2025 – Commitments
12B – Breakdown by country and instrument for 2025 – Disbursements
These tables provide a complete detailed breakdown of EU external assistance. They include ODA
eligible countries as well as ineligible countries and territories, non-allocated flows, core funding to
multilaterals and administrative costs to give a complete picture.
13A – Breakdown by co-operation modality and by instrument 2025 – Commitments
13B – Breakdown by co-operation modality and by instrument 2025 – Disbursements
Tables 14 to 17 show an evolution over the last five years of some key variables: sources of the external
assistance by Directorate General, sectoral breakdown, breakdown by region, income group and aid
modality.
14A – Sources of External Action in 2021 – 2025 and breakdown ODA / non ODA – Commitments
14B – Sources of External Action in 2021 - 2025 and breakdown ODA / non ODA – Disbursements
15 – Sectoral breakdown of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for 2021 – 2025
16A – Regional distribution of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries for 2021
– 2025
16B – Regional distribution of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries for 2021
– 2025
17 – Breakdown by co-operation modality for 2021 – 2025
18 – ODA by instrument for 2021 – 2027
This table (newly introduced in 2021) provides a history of ODA and non ODA amounts under the
current MFF broken down by instrument.
19 – Breakdown by Management Type - Disbursements in 2025
179
This table addresses requests by the Council of the European Union(89) and shows 2025 payments by
type of implementation partners in both direct and indirect management, as referenced in the
Financial Regulation(90).
Detailed lists of contracts signed with international organisations or development agencies in indirect
management are available in the Annual Activity Reports (annex 6) of the Directorate General for
International Partnerships (INTPA), the Directorate General for Enlargement and Eastern
Neighbourhood (ENEST), the Directorate-General for Middle East, North Africa and Gulf, the Service
for Foreign Policy Instruments and the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and
Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) respectively, at the following link:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/annual-activity-reports_en
20 – Disbursements - Breakdown by forms of Union Funding as defined in Articles 41 and 27 NDICI-
Global Europe
This table provides a breakdown of 2025 payments by ‘forms of union funding’ using the new
taxonomy defined in Article 27 of the NDICI−Global Europe basic act, as requested by Article 41 of the
NDICI−Global Europe basic act(91), for both direct and indirect management modes.
For the sake of clarity, certain forms of EU funding that are not explicitly included in Article 27
NDICI−Global Europe are shown on distinct lines: this is in particular the case of Contribution and
Delegation Agreements as well as Programme Estimates.
‘Blending’ is defined in the context of this table as payments on contracts funded by the European
Commission leading to the mobilisation of additional public or private finance for the implementation
of projects. Mobilised funds per se are not included.
21 – Disbursements related to the previous MFF
This table (added in 2021) provides a detailed breakdown of completion lines (disbursements funded
by the previous MFF) by instrument, excluding the EDF covered by table 4 above.
22A – Amount of contributing programmes per SDG for 2025 – Commitments
22B – Amount of contributing programmes per SDG for 2025 – Disbursements
These tables (added in 2021) present the contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
in 2025 for Commitments and Disbursements. Each transaction contributes to one ‘main’ SDG and up
to nine ‘significant’ SDGs, for a maximum total of 10. As there can be only one ‘main’ SDG per
transaction, there is no double counting of ‘main’ SDGs and the total matches the total of transactions.
The ‘significant’ SDGs reflects the transversal nature of SDGs.
Table TF1 to TF6 provide information on the implementation of EU Trust Funds. EU Trust Funds are
funding tools that pool together resources from different donors (including the European
Commission) in order to enable a quick, flexible, and collective EU response to the different
dimensions of a situation requiring urgent response. They are specific instruments with their own
accounts and financial management.
89 WK 1423/2020 REV 2. 90 Article 62(1), point c), of the Financial Regulation. 91 Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe
180
As of 2025, four EU Trust Funds are active: TF Africa (fostering stability and assisting a broad group of
countries across the African continent), TF Bêkou (addressing the crisis in Central Africa), TF Madad
(addressing the consequences of the Syrian crisis) and TF Colombia (in support of Colombia's post-
conflict peace building efforts).
The tables TF 1 to TF 6 are shown to provide some information on the financial implementation of the
EU Trust Funds in a way that is consistent with international DAC standards.
Annex TF 1 shows the incoming contributions to the Trust Funds, both during previous years and for
2025.
Annexes TF 2 to TF 6 provide the breakdown of the expenditure realised by the active Trust Funds.
TF 1 Overview of incoming contributions (disbursements from contributors)
TF 2A Overview of committed and disbursed amounts
TF 2B Proportion of Trust Funds assistance used for Official Development Aid (ODA) in 2025
For the first time in 2025, table TF 2A and TF 2B include a cumulative total of ODA and non ODA
commitments and payment. These cumulative totals have been updated to include the conclusions of
the Special Report 17/2024 by the European Court of Auditors on the Trust Fund Africa (link:
https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR-2024-17) and in particular recommendation 4c
(§90).
TF 3A Sectoral breakdown of Trust Fund Africa
TF 3B Regional breakdown of Trust Fund Africa
TF 4 Sectoral breakdown of Trust Fund Bêkou
TF 5 Sectoral breakdown of Trust Fund Colombia
TF 6 Sectoral breakdown of Trust Fund Madad
181
Commitments Disbursements
ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 1: Percentage of EU Budget committed and disbursed on External Action in 2025
EU Budget Committed and Disbursed on External Action Commitments Disbursements
EU Budget Execution without External Action 184.829 222.088
External Action (Budget + EDF) 23.618 21.081
EU Budget + EDF 208.447 243.169
Memo item for Macro Financial Assistance (MFA) Loans (in EUR millions) 2024 EC MFA Loans Commitments Disbursements Grant Equivalent Loan Programme
Albania76 76 17 Western Balkans Facility
Jordan250 250 54 Macro Financial Assistance
Moldova289 289 64 Reform and Growth Facility - Moldova
Montenegro21215Western Balkans Facility
North Macedonia 36 36 8 Western Balkans Facility
Serbia 52 52 12 Western Balkans Facility
Ukraine 10.052 10.052 2.941 Ukraine Facility
Ukraine 18.116 18.116 2.088 Macro Financial Assistance - ULCM
Graphs Table 1 - Proportion of EU budget committed/disbursed on External action in 2025
88%
12%
Commitments
EU Budget Execution without External Action
External Action (Budget + EDF) 90%
10%
Disbursements
EU Budget Execution without External Action
External Action (Budget + EDF)
182
Commitments Disbursements
ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 2: Proportion of External Action used for Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2025
Commitments (in EUR millions)
EU Budget ODA Non-ODA Total
DG INTPA Budget 5.964 130 6.094
DG ENEST Budget 8.507 112 8.619
DG MENA Budget 2.325 14 2.338
EDF -325 -38 -362
Other DGs Budget 5.792 1.838 7.630
Total 22.263 2.056 24.319
Disbursements (in EUR millions)
EU Budget ODA Non-ODA Total
DG INTPA Budget 5.664 107 5.771
DG ENEST Budget 4.789 8 4.797
DG MENA Budget 1.760 38 1.798
EDF 936 14 950
Other DGs Budget 5.714 1.813 7.527
Total 18.863 1.980 20.843
183
Graphs Table 2
-2 000 0 2 000 4 000 6 000 8 000 10 000
DG INTPA Budget
DG ENEST Budget
DG MENA Budget
EDF
Other DGs Budget
D G
s Committed amount (EUR million)
ODA
Non-ODA
0 2 000 4 000 6 000 8 000
DG INTPA Budget
DG ENEST Budget
DG MENA Budget
EDF
Other DGs Budget
D G
s
Disbursed amount (EUR million)
ODA
Non-ODA
92%
8%
Proportion of committed amount under External Action used for ODA
ODA
Non-ODA
91%
9%
Proportion of disbursed amount under External Action used for ODA
ODA
Non-ODA
184
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 3A: General EU budget for External Action in 2025 by DG and instrument – Commitments (in EUR millions)
Type of aid
Services 01.
NDICI Geo
02. NDICI
Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06. Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility
08. CFSP
09. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Other
EDF Total
Regular Contribution
ODA
INTPA 4.786 691 130 64 5 -28 -328 5.320
ENEST 1.134 16 325 1.777 4.257 587 -85 8.011
MENA 2.278 43 -3 2.319
ECHO 5 0 2.552 2 2.559
FPI 10 148 243 280 -6 675
AGRI 175 5 180
CLIMA 12 2 0 15
ECFIN 135 28 163
ENV 13 4 17
REGIO 117 74 -4 187
Other DGs 389 1 71 11 4 474
Commission's administration 335 10 57 31 9 1 2 0 645 1.088
ODA Total 8.854 924 1.033 2.562 2.156 4.298 596 281 65 5 645 -83 -328 21.008
Non- ODA
All 93 2 127 7 124 61 50 87 -38 512
Commission's administration 7 0 0 1 9
Non-ODA Total 93 2 134 7 124 62 50 87 -38 521
Regular Contribution Total 8.947 926 1.167 2.562 2.163 4.298 596 405 65 66 50 645 5 -366 21.529
Cofinancing
ODA
INTPA 131 2 4 136
ENEST 480 -1 479
MENA 5 5
ECHO 1 1
Other DGs 9 3 20 570 601
Commission's administration 1 0 4 0 0 28 33
ODA Total 145 2 1 1 6 500 0 28 569 4 1.255
Non- ODA
All 1.535 1.535
Commission's administration 0 0 0 0
Non-ODA Total 0 0 0 1.535 1.535
Cofinancing Total 145 2 1 1 6 500 1 1.535 28 569 4 2.790
Total 9.092 928 1.167 2.563 2.169 4.798 596 406 65 66 1.535 50 672 574 -362 24.319
185
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 3B: General EU budget for External Action in 2025 by DG and instrument – Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Type of aid
Services 01.
NDICI Geo
02. NDICI
Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06. Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility
08. CFSP
09. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Other
Completion Lines
EDF Total
Regular Contribution
ODA
INTPA 3.525 1.040 53 49 0 30 521 929 6.147
ENEST 622 33 431 1.063 1.790 73 2 517 4.530
MENA 1.333 28 1 396 1.758
ECHO 1 0 2.462 2 2 2.466
FPI 3 158 249 298 0 38 746
AGRI 91 5 13 109
CLIMA 15 0 1 1 16
ECFIN 135 11 146
ENV 24 4 28
REGIO 117 29 0 146
Other DGs 343 2 201 0 8 11 564
Commission's administration 332 10 59 16 4 1 2 0 640 1.063
ODA Total 6.079 1.299 1.065 2.472 1.442 1.806 77 299 51 0 640 63 1.499 929 17.718
Non- ODA
All 79 32 35 4 126 3 59 0 73 11 14 437
Commission's administration 6 0 0 0 1 8
Non-ODA Total 79 32 41 4 127 3 60 0 73 11 14 445
Regular Contribution Total 6.158 1.332 1.106 2.472 1.446 1.806 77 426 54 61 0 640 136 1.509 943 18.163
Cofinancing
ODA
INTPA 264 0 4 7 274
ENEST 233 22 255
MENA 0 1 1
ECHO 4 4
FPI 2 2
Other DGs 7 2 0 568 0 578
Commission's administration 1 0 3 0 0 26 31
ODA Total 271 0 2 4 6 233 0 26 568 27 7 1.145
Non- ODA
All 1.535 0 1.535
Commission's administration 0 0 0 0
Non-ODA Total 0 0 0 1.535 0 1.535
Cofinancing Total 271 0 2 4 6 233 1 1.535 26 568 27 7 2.680
Total 6.429 1.332 1.108 2.476 1.452 2.038 77 426 54 61 1.535 0 666 704 1.536 950 20.843
186
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA No No
Budget Non INTPA No No
EDF Yes Yes
Table 4: European Development Fund (EDF) in 2025 (in EUR millions)
ODA Non-ODA Total
Cotonou
Regular Contribution
A Envelope 480 2 482
Regional allocations 231 3 234
Intra-ACP allocations 173 9 182
Implementation costs 41 0 41
B Envelope 4 4
Regular Contribution Total 929 14 943
Cofinancing
A Envelope 0 0
Regional allocations 3 3
Intra-ACP allocations 3 3
Cofinancing Total 7 7
Cotonou Total 936 14 950
Total EDF 936 14 950
187
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 5A: Sectoral breakdown of ODA managed by the European Commission in 2025 – Commitments (in EUR millions)
Sector DG INTPA Budget DG ENEST
Budget DG MENA Budget EDF
Other DGs Budget
Total
Social infrastructure and services 2.318 1.627 1.601 -190 1.024 6.381
Education 418 296 135 -14 435 1.271
Basic education 140 31 62 -2 231
Education, level unspecified 76 250 13 -8 293 624
Post-secondary education 91 8 -2 142 240
Secondary education 111 7 60 -3 175
Government and civil society 1.290 793 1.001 -134 581 3.531
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security 90 35 41 -35 523 654
Government and civil society, general 1.200 759 960 -100 58 2.878
Health 237 312 65 -6 0 607
Basic health 136 196 3 -4 331
Health, general 101 116 62 -2 276
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 0 0
Other social infrastructure and services 197 180 379 -32 5 729
Other social infrastructure and services 197 180 379 -32 5 729
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 43 0 44
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 43 0 44
Water and sanitation 132 46 22 -3 2 199
Water and sanitation 132 46 22 -3 2 199
Economic infrastructure and services 1.758 1.669 187 -54 83 3.643
Banking and financial services 210 12 23 -0 -0 244
Banking and financial services 210 12 23 -0 -0 244
Business and other services 118 78 87 -4 279
Business and other services 118 78 87 -4 279
Communications 411 188 20 -0 80 699
Communications 411 188 20 -0 80 699
Energy 626 434 56 -3 4 1.117
Energy generation, renewable sources 375 119 22 -2 2 515
Energy policy 122 299 34 -1 3 457
188
Sector DG INTPA Budget DG ENEST
Budget DG MENA Budget EDF
Other DGs Budget
Total
Heating, cooling and energy distribution 66 14 79
Nuclear energy plants 64 64
Energy generation, non-renewable sources 2 2
Transport and storage 392 957 -45 -1 1.303
Transport and storage 392 957 -45 -1 1.303
Production sectors 896 986 368 -43 9 2.217
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 457 130 75 -28 5 639
Agriculture 381 125 67 -25 5 554
Fishing 27 4 -3 29
Forestry 49 5 4 -0 57
Industry, mineral resources and mining, construction 295 830 214 -9 1.330
Industry 274 729 214 -9 1.208
Mineral resources and mining 21 101 122
Trade and tourism 143 26 80 -5 4 248
Tourism 5 6 4 15
Trade policy and regulations and trade-related adjustment 138 20 76 -5 4 233
Multisector/Cross-cutting 667 1.498 71 -24 471 2.682
General environmental protection 342 95 42 -5 32 507
General environmental protection 342 95 42 -5 32 507
Other multisector 325 1.402 28 -19 439 2.176
Other multisector 325 1.402 28 -19 439 2.176
Commodity aid and general programme assistance 65 2.396 -9 706 3.159
Developmental food assistance -3 -6 -8
Developmental food assistance -3 -6 -8
General budget support 68 2.396 -3 706 3.167
General budget support 68 2.396 -3 706 3.167
Humanitarian aid 44 312 94 -3 2.572 3.019
Disaster preparedness 14 1 1 -0 18 34
Disaster preparedness 14 1 1 -0 18 34
Emergency response 10 -0 82 -3 2.554 2.644
Emergency response 10 -0 82 -3 2.554 2.644
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 20 311 10 -0 341
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 20 311 10 -0 341
Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 215 19 4 -2 926 1.162
Administrative costs of donors 186 17 1 -2 923 1.125
Administrative costs of donors 186 17 1 -2 923 1.125
Unallocated / Unspecified 29 2 3 3 37
Unallocated / Unspecified 29 2 3 3 37
Total 5.964 8.507 2.325 -325 5.792 22.263
189
Graphs Table 5A
-1 000
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Sectoral breakdown
Committed amount by sector
Other DGs Budget
EDF
DG MENA Budget
DG ENEST Budget
DG INTPA Budget
190
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 5B: Sectoral breakdown of ODA managed by the European Commission in 2025 – Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Sector DG INTPA Budget DG ENEST
Budget DG MENA
Budget EDF Other DGs Budget Total
Social infrastructure and services 2.878 1.691 1.034 203 1.268 7.074
Education 545 401 116 30 427 1.518
Basic education 226 91 54 4 0 375
Education, level unspecified 126 240 21 6 264 657
Post-secondary education 27 14 12 4 146 203
Secondary education 166 56 29 16 17 284
Government and civil society 1.252 652 586 91 716 3.297
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security 114 30 14 25 636 820
Government and civil society, general 1.137 622 573 66 80 2.477
Health 644 94 91 34 110 973
Basic health 551 62 27 29 107 776
Health, general 88 31 61 5 2 187
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 6 1 3 1 10
Other social infrastructure and services 247 270 135 14 15 679
Other social infrastructure and services 247 270 135 14 15 679
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 58 0 1 59
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 58 0 1 59
Water and sanitation 133 275 106 34 0 548
Water and sanitation 133 275 106 34 0 548
Economic infrastructure and services 862 774 199 324 7 2.167
Banking and financial services 118 2 66 6 1 193
Banking and financial services 118 2 66 6 1 193
Business and other services 111 36 27 28 2 203
Business and other services 111 36 27 28 2 203
Communications 144 84 4 6 1 240
Communications 144 84 4 6 1 240
Energy 397 359 95 104 1 957
Energy generation, non-renewable sources 30 14 44
Energy generation, renewable sources 210 242 40 52 0 544
191
Sector DG INTPA Budget DG ENEST
Budget DG MENA
Budget EDF Other DGs Budget Total
Energy policy 68 87 55 11 1 222
Heating, cooling and energy distribution 31 17 0 42 90
Nuclear energy plants 58 0 58
Transport and storage 92 293 7 180 2 574
Transport and storage 92 293 7 180 2 574
Production sectors 732 481 135 227 17 1.593
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 387 54 83 165 7 696
Agriculture 319 48 60 135 7 568
Fishing 15 1 4 24 44
Forestry 53 6 19 6 83
Industry, mineral resources and mining, construction 243 399 47 37 2 728
Construction 0 0 0
Industry 230 375 47 34 2 687
Mineral resources and mining 13 24 3 1 41
Trade and tourism 102 28 6 26 8 169
Tourism 3 2 3 2 1 11
Trade policy and regulations and trade-related adjustment 99 26 3 24 6 158
Multisector/Cross-cutting 747 349 111 102 335 1.644
General environmental protection 266 55 27 39 53 440
General environmental protection 266 55 27 39 53 440
Other multisector 481 293 85 63 282 1.204
Other multisector 481 293 85 63 282 1.204
Commodity aid and general programme assistance 171 1.249 87 27 704 2.237
Developmental food assistance 22 1 23
Developmental food assistance 22 1 23
General budget support 149 1.249 87 26 704 2.214
General budget support 149 1.249 87 26 704 2.214
Humanitarian aid 62 238 190 15 2.465 2.971
Disaster preparedness 7 1 130 137
Disaster preparedness 7 1 130 137
Emergency response 49 6 175 14 2.335 2.578
Emergency response 49 6 175 14 2.335 2.578
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 7 232 16 0 1 255
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 7 232 16 0 1 255
Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 213 7 2 37 918 1.177
Administrative costs of donors 183 5 1 37 914 1.140
Administrative costs of donors 183 5 1 37 914 1.140
Unallocated / Unspecified 30 1 1 0 4 37
Unallocated / Unspecified 30 1 1 0 4 37
Total 5.664 4.789 1.760 936 5.714 18.863
192
193
Graphs Table 5B
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Sectoral breakdown
Disbursed amount by sector
Other DGs Budget
EDF
DG MENA Budget
DG ENEST Budget
DG INTPA Budget
194
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 6A: Country breakdown of European Commission development assistance in 2025 – Commitments (in EUR millions)
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Part I: Developing Countries and Territories (Official Development Assistance) 5.964 8.507 2.325 5.792 -325 22.263
Bilateral 5.954 8.507 2.325 5.762 -325 22.223
Africa 3.441 0 716 1.092 -271 4.978
Africa (North of Sahara) 0 0 716 59 0 775
Algeria LMICS 0 0 45 0 0 45
Egypt LMICS 0 0 100 1 0 101
Libya UMICS 0 0 33 31 0 64
Morocco LMICS 0 0 268 0 0 268
North of Sahara, regional UNALLOC 0 0 130 24 0 154
Tunisia LMICS 0 0 140 3 0 143
Africa (South of Sahara) 2.885 0 0 1.019 -257 3.647
Angola LDCS 50 0 0 0 -1 49
Benin LDCS 67 0 0 0 -1 66
Botswana UMICS 8 0 0 0 -0 8
Burkina Faso LDCS 1 0 0 0 -19 -18
Burundi LDCS 32 0 0 0 -2 30
Cabo Verde LMICS 20 0 0 0 -0 19
Cameroon LMICS 41 0 0 0 0 41
Central African Republic LDCS 0 0 0 15 0 15
Chad LDCS 50 0 0 0 -9 41
Comoros LDCS 5 0 0 0 0 5
Congo LMICS 18 0 0 -0 0 18
Democratic Republic of the Congo LDCS 166 0 0 0 -1 165
Djibouti LDCS 7 0 0 0 -0 7
Eastern Africa, regional UNALLOC 50 0 0 445 -0 494
Equatorial Guinea UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eritrea LDCS 0 0 0 0 -20 -20
Eswatini LMICS 0 0 0 0 -2 -2
Ethiopia LDCS 90 0 0 2 -0 92
Gabon UMICS 9 0 0 0 -2 7
Gambia LDCS 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Ghana LMICS 54 0 0 0 -1 53
Guinea LDCS 50 0 0 0 -0 50
Guinea-Bissau LDCS 0 0 0 0 0 0
195
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Ivory Coast LMICS 55 0 0 0 0 55
Kenya LMICS 22 0 0 -0 -13 8
Lesotho LDCS 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Liberia LDCS 25 0 0 0 -1 24
Madagascar LDCS 2 0 0 0 -10 -8
Malawi LDCS 0 0 0 0 -3 -3
Mali LDCS 1 0 0 29 -98 -68
Mauritania LDCS 34 0 0 0 -2 32
Mauritius UMICS 2 0 0 0 0 2
Middle Africa, regional UNALLOC 28 0 0 119 0 147
Mozambique LDCS 51 0 0 0 -15 35
Namibia UMICS 0 0 0 0 -2 -2
Niger LDCS 0 0 0 -2 -6 -8
Nigeria LMICS 73 0 0 6 -3 76
Rwanda LDCS 59 0 0 0 0 59
Sao Tome and Principe LDCS 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Senegal LDCS 0 0 0 -0 -1 -1
Sierra Leone LDCS 2 0 0 0 -3 -1
Somalia LDCS 87 0 0 41 -1 128
South Africa UMICS 86 0 0 0 0 86
South of Sahara, regional UNALLOC 1.214 0 0 319 -18 1.516
South Sudan LDCS 33 0 0 1 -1 33
Southern Africa, regional UNALLOC 12 0 0 39 -0 51
Sudan LDCS 0 0 0 4 0 4
Tanzania LDCS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Togo LDCS 20 0 0 0 -0 20
Uganda LDCS 0 0 0 0 -18 -18
Western Africa, regional UNALLOC 247 0 0 -0 0 246
Zambia LDCS 116 0 0 0 -1 115
Zimbabwe LMICS 0 0 0 -0 -1 -1
Africa, unspecified 556 0 0 14 -14 557
Africa, regional UNALLOC 556 0 0 14 -14 557
America 378 0 0 157 -13 523
America (North & Central America) 104 0 0 0 -9 95
Belize UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Caribbean & Central America, regional UNALLOC -0 0 0 0 0 -0
Caribbean, regional UNALLOC 35 0 0 0 -3 32
Central America, regional UNALLOC 7 0 0 0 0 7
Costa Rica UMICS 8 0 0 0 0 8
Cuba UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dominican Republic UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
El Salvador UMICS 10 0 0 0 0 10
Grenada UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guatemala UMICS 24 0 0 0 0 24
Haiti LDCS 15 0 0 0 -6 9
Honduras LMICS 6 0 0 0 0 6
196
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Jamaica UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nicaragua LMICS -0 0 0 0 0 -0
Panama UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
St. Lucia UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
St.Vincent & Grenadines UMICS 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
America (South America) 99 0 0 1 -1 99
Argentina UMICS 5 0 0 0 0 5
Bolivia LMICS 11 0 0 0 0 11
Brazil UMICS 15 0 0 0 0 15
Colombia UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ecuador UMICS 10 0 0 0 0 10
Guyana UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paraguay UMICS -1 0 0 0 0 -1
Peru UMICS 14 0 0 1 0 15
South America, regional UNALLOC 38 0 0 0 0 38
Suriname UMICS 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Venezuela UMICS 7 0 0 0 0 7
America, unspecified 175 0 0 156 -2 329
America, regional UNALLOC 175 0 0 156 -2 329
Asia 757 15 1.158 1.114 -1 3.043
Asia (Far East Asia) 106 0 0 0 -1 105
Cambodia LDCS 10 0 0 0 0 10
China UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Far East Asia, regional UNALLOC -0 0 0 0 0 -0
Indonesia UMICS 15 0 0 0 0 15
Lao (People's Democratic Republic) LDCS 34 0 0 0 0 34
Malaysia UMICS 3 0 0 0 0 3
Mongolia LMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Philippines LMICS 2 0 0 0 0 2
Thailand UMICS 18 0 0 0 0 18
Timor-Leste LDCS 12 0 0 0 -1 11
Viet Nam LMICS 12 0 0 0 0 12
Asia (Middle East Asia) 0 0 1.158 772 0 1.930
Iran LMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iraq UMICS -0 0 54 52 0 106
Jordan LMICS 0 0 166 0 0 166
Lebanon LMICS 0 0 264 18 0 282
Middle East, regional UNALLOC 0 0 0 311 0 311
Palestine** UMICS 0 0 494 240 0 734
Syria OTHER_LICS 0 0 134 32 0 166
Yemen LDCS 0 0 47 119 0 166
Asia (South & Central Asia) 345 15 0 336 0 697
Afghanistan LDCS 102 0 0 0 0 102
Armenia UMICS 5 49 0 22 0 76
Azerbaïjan UMICS 0 -7 0 0 0 -7
197
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Bangladesh LDCS 40 0 0 2 0 42
Bhutan LMICS -0 0 0 0 0 -0
Central Asia, regional UNALLOC -14 0 0 -1 0 -15
Georgia UMICS 0 -27 0 22 0 -5
India LMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kazakhstan UMICS 8 0 0 0 0 8
Kyrgyz Republic LMICS 28 0 0 0 0 28
Maldives UMICS 4 0 0 0 0 4
Myanmar LDCS 25 0 0 5 0 30
Nepal LDCS 10 0 0 0 0 10
Pakistan LMICS 73 0 0 0 0 73
South & Central Asia, regional UNALLOC 0 0 0 286 0 286
South Asia, regional UNALLOC 9 0 0 0 0 9
Sri Lanka LMICS 20 0 0 0 0 20
Tajikistan LMICS 5 0 0 0 0 5
Turkmenistan UMICS 2 0 0 0 0 2
Uzbekistan LMICS 28 0 0 0 0 28
Asia, unspecified 306 0 0 6 0 312
Asia, regional UNALLOC 306 0 0 6 0 312
Europe 58 7.864 0 1.533 -0 9.456
Europe 58 7.864 0 1.533 -0 9.456
Albania UMICS 0 75 0 21 0 97
Belarus UMICS 0 30 0 0 0 30
Bosnia-Herzegovina UMICS 0 38 0 0 0 38
Europe, regional UNALLOC 22 1.601 0 304 0 1.927
Kosovo* UMICS 0 4 0 30 0 34
Moldova UMICS 0 282 0 22 0 303
Montenegro UMICS 0 97 0 10 0 107
North Macedonia UMICS 0 3 0 22 0 25
Serbia UMICS 0 142 0 74 0 216
Türkiye UMICS 0 808 0 106 -0 914
Ukraine LMICS 37 4.783 0 944 0 5.764
Oceania 75 0 0 0 -2 73
Oceania 75 0 0 0 -2 73
Fiji UMICS -0 0 0 0 0 -0
Kiribati LDCS 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Micronesia, Fed. States LMICS 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Oceania, regional UNALLOC 33 0 0 0 -0 33
Papua New Guinea LMICS 28 0 0 0 0 28
Polynesia, regional UNALLOC 2 0 0 0 0 2
Samoa LMICS 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Solomon Islands LDCS 10 0 0 0 0 10
Tonga UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tuvalu LDCS -1 0 0 0 0 -1
Vanuatu LMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wallis & Futuna UMICS 3 0 0 0 -0 3
198
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Developing countries 1.244 627 451 1.866 -38 4.151
Developing countries, unspecified 1.244 627 451 1.866 -38 4.151
Developing countries, unspecified UNALLOC 1.244 627 451 1.866 -38 4.151
Multilateral (inflows) 3 0 0 30 0 32
Other multilateral institution 0 0 0 1 0 1
Other multilateral institution 0 0 0 1 0 1
Adaptation Fund 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 0 0 0 0 0 0
World Customs Organization Customs Co-operation Fund 0 0 0 1 0 1
United Nations agency, fund or commission (UN) 3 0 0 1 0 3
United Nations agency, fund or commission (UN) 3 0 0 1 0 3
FAO 3 0 0 0 0 3
IAEA-Assessed 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNEP 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNFCCC 0 0 0 1 0 1
Regional Development Bank 0 0 0 28 0 28
Regional Development Bank 0 0 0 28 0 28
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 0 0 0 28 0 28
Triangular co-operation 8 0 0 0 0 8
America 8 0 0 0 0 8
America, unspecified 8 0 0 0 0 8
America, regional UNALLOC 8 0 0 0 0 8
Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition (NON-ODA eligible countries) 46 0 0 11 -4 54
Bilateral 46 0 0 11 -4 54
Africa 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Africa (South of Sahara) 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Seychelles MADCTS 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
America 2 0 0 0 -3 -1
America (North & Central America) 2 0 0 0 -3 -1
Aruba MADCTS 2 0 0 0 -0 1
Bahamas MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barbados MADCTS 0 0 0 0 -2 -2
Curaçao MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands Antilles MADCTS 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Saint Pierre And Miquelon MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sint Maarten MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trinidad And Tobago MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asia (Middle East Asia) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Israel MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Saudi Arabia MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Arab Emirates MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Europe 41 0 0 0 0 41
Europe 41 0 0 0 0 41
Greenland MADCTS 41 0 0 0 0 41
Russia CEECS/NIS 0 0 0 0 0 0
199
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Oceania 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Oceania 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
French Polynesia MADCTS 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
New Caledonia MADCTS 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Other 3 0 0 11 0 15
Other 3 0 0 11 0 15
MADCT Unallocated MADCTS 3 0 0 11 0 15
Part III: ODA Countries Non-ODA Eligible Flows 74 112 14 1.818 -34 1.984
Part IV: Other flows in non-ODA countries 9 0 0 9 0 18
TOTAL COMMITTED AMOUNT
6.094 8.619 2.338 7.630 -362 24.319
(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
(**) This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
200
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 6B: Country breakdown of European Commission development assistance in 2025 – Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Part I: Developing Countries and Territories (Official Development Assistance) 5.664 4.789 1.760 5.714 936 18.863
Bilateral 5.524 4.789 1.750 5.699 936 18.698
Africa 2.900 0 754 1.138 738 5.530
Africa (North of Sahara) 0 0 754 61 0 815
Algeria LMICS 0 0 22 8 0 29
Egypt LMICS 0 0 93 7 0 101
Libya UMICS 0 0 54 36 0 90
Morocco LMICS 0 0 329 2 0 330
North of Sahara, regional UNALLOC 0 0 69 4 0 73
Tunisia LMICS 0 0 187 4 0 191
Africa (South of Sahara) 2.289 0 0 1.023 690 4.002
Angola LDCS 21 0 0 3 11 34
Benin LDCS 52 0 0 3 10 65
Botswana UMICS 3 0 0 0 1 4
Burkina Faso LDCS 72 0 0 27 3 102
Burundi LDCS 50 0 0 3 10 62
Cabo Verde LMICS 6 0 0 0 0 6
Cameroon LMICS 29 0 0 17 7 53
Central African Republic LDCS 40 0 0 42 4 87
Chad LDCS 47 0 0 51 23 121
Comoros LDCS 8 0 0 0 3 11
Congo LMICS 8 0 0 0 13 21
Democratic Republic of the Congo LDCS 156 0 0 98 47 302
Djibouti LDCS 10 0 0 1 13 24
Eastern Africa, regional UNALLOC 95 0 0 115 23 233
Equatorial Guinea UMICS 1 0 0 0 0 1
Eritrea LDCS 1 0 0 0 0 1
Eswatini LMICS 7 0 0 0 6 12
Ethiopia LDCS 105 0 0 61 20 186
Gabon UMICS 13 0 0 0 0 13
201
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Gambia LDCS 24 0 0 1 7 31
Ghana LMICS 32 0 0 0 11 43
Guinea LDCS 20 0 0 0 17 38
Guinea-Bissau LDCS 16 0 0 1 3 19
Ivory Coast LMICS 54 0 0 6 21 81
Kenya LMICS 46 0 0 14 22 82
Lesotho LDCS 11 0 0 0 10 22
Liberia LDCS 49 0 0 0 6 56
Madagascar LDCS 43 0 0 6 87 136
Malawi LDCS 52 0 0 3 40 95
Mali LDCS 15 0 0 46 18 79
Mauritania LDCS 70 0 0 5 5 80
Mauritius UMICS 2 0 0 0 5 7
Middle Africa, regional UNALLOC 20 0 0 2 0 22
Mozambique LDCS 54 0 0 19 53 126
Namibia UMICS 3 0 0 0 5 8
Niger LDCS 12 0 0 24 2 37
Nigeria LMICS 92 0 0 52 13 157
Rwanda LDCS 71 0 0 1 11 83
Sao Tome and Principe LDCS 3 0 0 0 0 4
Senegal LDCS 34 0 0 1 7 43
Sierra Leone LDCS 54 0 0 1 18 73
Somalia LDCS 71 0 0 89 7 167
South Africa UMICS 31 0 0 2 0 33
South of Sahara, regional UNALLOC 184 0 0 67 44 295
South Sudan LDCS 56 0 0 60 0 117
Southern Africa, regional UNALLOC 47 0 0 3 0 51
Sudan LDCS 65 0 0 126 0 191
Tanzania LDCS 50 0 0 1 20 70
Togo LDCS 13 0 0 0 11 25
Uganda LDCS 58 0 0 21 8 88
Western Africa, regional UNALLOC 116 0 0 47 7 171
Zambia LDCS 72 0 0 2 39 112
Zimbabwe LMICS 24 0 0 1 0 26
Africa, unspecified 611 0 0 54 48 713
Africa, regional UNALLOC 611 0 0 54 48 713
America 378 0 0 212 61 651
America (North & Central America) 176 0 0 84 60 320
Belize UMICS 1 0 0 0 1 2
Caribbean & Central America, regional UNALLOC 3 0 0 1 0 4
Caribbean, regional UNALLOC 13 0 0 9 14 35
Central America, regional UNALLOC 12 0 0 21 0 33
202
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Costa Rica UMICS 7 0 0 1 0 8
Cuba UMICS 22 0 0 5 0 27
Dominican Republic UMICS 7 0 0 2 9 17
El Salvador UMICS 21 0 0 0 0 21
Grenada UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guatemala UMICS 16 0 0 0 0 16
Haiti LDCS 20 0 0 38 31 89
Honduras LMICS 21 0 0 3 0 24
Jamaica UMICS 4 0 0 0 4 7
Mexico UMICS 16 0 0 6 0 21
Nicaragua LMICS 10 0 0 0 0 10
Panama UMICS 3 0 0 0 0 3
St. Lucia UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
St.Vincent & Grenadines UMICS 0 0 0 0 2 2
America (South America) 145 0 0 101 1 247
Argentina UMICS 7 0 0 1 0 8
Bolivia LMICS 21 0 0 6 0 28
Brazil UMICS 15 0 0 1 0 16
Colombia UMICS 18 0 0 28 0 46
Ecuador UMICS 17 0 0 2 0 19
Guyana UMICS 1 0 0 0 1 1
Paraguay UMICS 23 0 0 0 0 23
Peru UMICS 18 0 0 1 0 19
South America, regional UNALLOC 21 0 0 33 0 54
Suriname UMICS 1 0 0 0 0 1
Venezuela UMICS 3 0 0 30 0 33
America, unspecified 57 0 0 26 0 84
America, regional UNALLOC 57 0 0 26 0 84
Asia 926 99 934 1.208 1 3.168
Asia (Far East Asia) 204 0 0 32 1 237
Cambodia LDCS 49 0 0 1 0 50
China UMICS 10 0 0 2 0 12
Far East Asia, regional UNALLOC 8 0 0 9 0 17
Indonesia UMICS 17 0 0 2 0 18
Lao (People's Democratic Republic) LDCS 26 0 0 1 0 27
Malaysia UMICS 3 0 0 1 0 4
Mongolia LMICS 11 0 0 1 0 13
Philippines LMICS 40 0 0 14 0 54
Thailand UMICS 7 0 0 0 0 7
Timor-Leste LDCS 12 0 0 0 1 14
Viet Nam LMICS 21 0 0 1 0 22
Asia (Middle East Asia) 4 0 933 772 0 1.709
203
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Iran LMICS 2 0 0 9 0 11
Iraq UMICS 1 0 30 54 0 85
Jordan LMICS 0 0 141 13 0 154
Lebanon LMICS 0 0 243 130 0 372
Middle East, regional UNALLOC 0 0 38 19 0 57
Palestine** UMICS 1 0 397 217 0 615
Syria OTHER_LICS 0 0 67 201 0 268
Yemen LDCS 0 0 17 131 0 147
Asia (South & Central Asia) 660 99 0 369 0 1.128
Afghanistan LDCS 149 0 0 193 0 342
Armenia UMICS 2 56 0 28 0 86
Azerbaïjan UMICS 0 6 0 0 0 6
Bangladesh LDCS 100 0 0 45 0 145
Bhutan LMICS 10 0 0 0 0 10
Central Asia, regional UNALLOC 63 0 0 6 0 69
Georgia UMICS 0 36 0 22 0 59
India LMICS 14 0 0 1 0 15
Kazakhstan UMICS 8 0 0 0 0 8
Kyrgyz Republic LMICS 25 0 0 1 0 26
Maldives UMICS 2 0 0 0 0 2
Myanmar LDCS 52 0 0 50 0 102
Nepal LDCS 50 0 0 1 0 51
Pakistan LMICS 67 0 0 17 0 85
South & Central Asia, regional UNALLOC 2 0 0 2 0 4
South Asia, regional UNALLOC 19 0 0 0 0 19
Sri Lanka LMICS 23 0 0 1 0 24
Tajikistan LMICS 46 0 0 1 0 47
Turkmenistan UMICS 5 0 0 0 0 5
Uzbekistan LMICS 22 0 0 0 0 22
Asia, unspecified 57 0 1 35 0 93
Asia, regional UNALLOC 57 0 1 35 0 93
Europe 82 4.424 0 1.509 0 6.014
Europe 82 4.424 0 1.509 0 6.014
Albania UMICS 0 64 0 1 0 65
Belarus UMICS 0 12 0 0 0 13
Bosnia-Herzegovina UMICS 0 72 0 3 0 74
Europe, regional UNALLOC 56 525 0 193 0 774
Kosovo* UMICS 0 62 0 31 0 93
Moldova UMICS 1 173 0 39 0 213
Montenegro UMICS 0 63 0 8 0 70
North Macedonia UMICS 0 60 0 6 0 66
Serbia UMICS 0 107 0 27 0 134
204
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Türkiye UMICS 1 1.130 0 242 0 1.372
Ukraine LMICS 24 2.156 0 961 0 3.141
Oceania 59 0 0 1 44 104
Oceania 59 0 0 1 44 104
Fiji UMICS 9 0 0 0 0 9
Kiribati LDCS 2 0 0 0 2 4
Micronesia, Fed. States LMICS 1 0 0 1 0 2
Oceania, regional UNALLOC 3 0 0 0 21 24
Papua New Guinea LMICS 25 0 0 0 12 37
Polynesia, regional UNALLOC 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samoa LMICS 3 0 0 0 0 3
Solomon Islands LDCS 8 0 0 0 8 16
Tonga UMICS 2 0 0 0 0 2
Tuvalu LDCS 1 0 0 0 0 1
Vanuatu LMICS 5 0 0 0 2 7
Wallis & Futuna UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Developing countries 1.180 267 61 1.630 92 3.231
Developing countries, unspecified 1.180 267 61 1.630 92 3.231
Developing countries, unspecified UNALLOC 1.180 267 61 1.630 92 3.231
Bilateral, core contributions to NGOs and other private bodies / PPPs 16 0 10 3 0 29
Bilateral, core contributions to NGOs and other private bodies / PPPs 16 0 10 3 0 29
Bilateral, core contributions to NGOs and other private bodies / PPPs 16 0 10 3 0 29
Bilateral, core contributions to NGOs and other private bodies / PPPs 16 0 10 3 0 29
Multilateral (inflows) 101 0 0 12 0 113
Other multilateral institution 100 0 0 1 0 101
Other multilateral institution 100 0 0 1 0 101
Adaptation Fund 50 0 0 0 0 50
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 50 0 0 0 0 50
World Customs Organization Customs Co-operation Fund 0 0 0 1 0 1
United Nations agency, fund or commission (UN) 1 0 0 1 0 2
United Nations agency, fund or commission (UN) 1 0 0 1 0 2
IAEA-Assessed 1 0 0 0 0 1
UNEP 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNFCCC 0 0 0 1 0 1
Regional Development Bank 0 0 0 10 0 10
Regional Development Bank 0 0 0 10 0 10
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 0 0 0 10 0 10
Triangular co-operation 23 0 0 1 0 23
Africa 10 0 0 0 0 10
Africa (South of Sahara) 10 0 0 0 0 10
Burkina Faso LDCS 2 0 0 0 0 2
Eastern Africa, regional UNALLOC 1 0 0 0 0 1
205
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
Senegal LDCS 3 0 0 0 0 3
Sierra Leone LDCS 3 0 0 0 0 3
South of Sahara, regional UNALLOC 2 0 0 0 0 2
America 6 0 0 1 0 7
America, unspecified 6 0 0 1 0 7
America, regional UNALLOC 6 0 0 1 0 7
Asia 1 0 0 0 0 1
Asia (Far East Asia) 1 0 0 0 0 1
Far East Asia, regional UNALLOC 1 0 0 0 0 1
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oceania, regional UNALLOC 0 0 0 0 0 0
Developing countries 6 0 0 0 0 6
Developing countries, unspecified 6 0 0 0 0 6
Developing countries, unspecified UNALLOC 6 0 0 0 0 6
Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition (NON-ODA eligible countries) 67 1 11 38 5 123
Bilateral 67 1 11 38 5 123
Africa 1 0 0 0 0 1
Africa (South of Sahara) 1 0 0 0 0 1
Seychelles MADCTS 1 0 0 0 0 1
America 16 0 0 0 5 22
America (North & Central America) 10 0 0 0 5 15
Aruba MADCTS 2 0 0 0 0 2
Bahamas MADCTS 0 0 0 0 1 1
Barbados MADCTS 0 0 0 0 2 3
Curaçao MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Saint Pierre And Miquelon MADCTS 7 0 0 0 0 7
Sint Maarten MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trinidad And Tobago MADCTS 0 0 0 0 2 2
America (South America) 7 0 0 0 0 7
Chile MADCTS 5 0 0 0 0 5
Uruguay MADCTS 2 0 0 0 0 2
Asia 0 0 11 8 0 19
Asia (Far East Asia) 0 0 0 5 0 5
Brunei MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong, China MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korea MADCTS 0 0 0 4 0 4
Singapore MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taiwan MADCTS 0 0 0 1 0 1
Asia (Middle East Asia) 0 0 11 3 0 14
Israel MADCTS 0 0 11 1 0 12
Saudi Arabia MADCTS 0 0 0 1 0 1
206
Country / Region Income Group DG INTPA DG ENEST DG MENA Other DGs EDF Total
United Arab Emirates MADCTS 0 0 0 1 0 1
Europe 34 1 0 7 0 43
Europe 34 1 0 7 0 43
Greenland MADCTS 34 0 0 0 0 34
Russia CEECS/NIS 0 1 0 7 0 8
Oceania 13 0 0 0 0 13
Oceania 13 0 0 0 0 13
French Polynesia MADCTS 6 0 0 0 0 6
New Caledonia MADCTS 7 0 0 0 0 7
Other 3 0 0 23 0 26
Other 3 0 0 23 0 26
MADCT Unallocated MADCTS 3 0 0 23 0 26
Part III: ODA Countries Non-ODA Eligible Flows 35 6 27 1.740 9 1.817
Part IV: Other flows in non-ODA countries 5 0 0 35 0 40
TOTAL DISBURSED AMOUNT 5.771 4.797 1.798 7.527 950 20.843
(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
(**) This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
207
Commitments Disbursements
ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 7: Distribution of ODA by OECD Sector and Country Grouping in 2025
Commitments (in EUR million)
Income Group ODA Per Capita
Social infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid,
food security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
LDC + OLIC + LMIC + UMIC - 3.680 1.580 1.356 1.033 2.989 998 2 11.638
Least Developed Countries 1,05 493 232 240 104 39 137 1.245
Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories 2,58 1.445 1.025 872 523 2.875 506 2 7.249
Other Low Income Countries 3,23 101 26 36 2 166
Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories 1,11 1.640 296 208 404 75 355 -0 2.978
Other - 2.701 2.063 861 1.649 170 2.021 1.160 10.625
Total Commitments - 6.381 3.643 2.217 2.682 3.159 3.019 1.162 22.263
Disbursements (in EUR million)
Income Group ODA Per Capita
Social infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid, food
security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
LDC + OLIC + LMIC + UMIC - 4.853 1.415 1.004 898 2.094 2.401 3 12.669
Least Developed Countries 3,11 1.447 450 360 265 168 1.004 0 3.694
Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories 1,86 1.214 580 505 225 1.916 799 0 5.241
Other Low Income Countries 5,23 45 2 26 194 1 268
Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories 1,29 2.147 385 136 382 10 404 2 3.466
Other - 2.221 752 589 746 143 570 1.174 6.194
Total Disbursements 7.074 2.167 1.593 1.644 2.237 2.971 1.177 18.863
208
Commitments (in EUR million)
Region ODA Per Capita Social
infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid,
food security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
Africa 3 1.779 1.152 745 320 60 921 4.978
America 1 84 114 61 116 155 531
Asia 0,65 1.349 252 201 163 27 1.050 2 3.043
Europe 16,05 1.869 1.684 914 1.500 2.937 553 -1 9.456
Oceania 1,56 28 11 16 12 5 73
Developing countries, unspecified 0 1.271 430 280 572 135 334 1.161 4.183
Total 6.381 3.643 2.217 2.682 3.159 3.019 1.162 22.263
Disbursements (in EUR million)
Region ODA Per Capita Social
infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid,
food security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
Africa 3,66 2.330 857 750 466 230 909 4 5.546
America 0,62 242 65 77 90 21 164 0 658
Asia 0,68 1.458 187 149 209 21 1.155 2 3.181
Europe 10,21 1.987 742 391 552 1.817 503 23 6.015
Oceania 2,23 39 7 17 32 9 1 104
Developing countries, unspecified 0 1.019 310 209 295 139 239 1.147 3.358
Total 7.074 2.167 1.593 1.644 2.237 2.971 1.177 18.863
209
Graphs Table 7
-2 000
0
2 000
4 000
6 000
8 000
10 000
12 000
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Income Group
Committed amounts to OECD sector by Country income group
Other/ Unallocated
Humanitarian aid
Budget support, food aid, food security
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Production
Economic infrastructures and services
Social infrastructures
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Income Group
Disbursed amounts to OECD sector by Country income group
Other/ Unallocated
Humanitarian aid
Budget support, food aid, food security
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Production
Economic infrastructures and services
Social infrastructures
210
-2 000
0
2 000
4 000
6 000
8 000
10 000
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Region
Committed amounts to OECD sector by Region
Other/ Unallocated
Humanitarian aid
Budget support, food aid, food security
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Production
Economic infrastructures and services
Social infrastructures
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Region
Disbursed amounts to OECD sector by Region
Other/ Unallocated
Humanitarian aid
Budget support, food aid, food security
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Production
Economic infrastructures and services
Social infrastructures
211
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 8A: ODA Recipient Country by main OECD sector in 2025 – Commitments (in EUR millions)
Income Group Country Commitments
Per Capita Social
infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid, food
security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
Least Developed Countries
Afghanistan 2 81 6 8 8 102
Angola 1,3 -1 50 49
Bangladesh 0,24 40 3 -3 1 42
Benin 4,58 2 48 7 10 66
Burkina Faso -0,75 -18 -18
Burundi 2,1 0 -1 30 30
Cambodia 0,57 8 2 10
Central African Republic 2,88 15 15
Chad 2 36 10 -0 -5 41
Comoros 5,77 5 5
Democratic Republic of the Congo
1,51 51 33 40 41 165
Djibouti 5,89 7 7
Eritrea -5,66 -20 -20
Ethiopia 0,7 41 4 25 23 92
Guinea 3,36 -0 50 50
Haiti 0,79 9 -3 -0 2 1 9
Kiribati -2,48 -0 -0
Lao (People's Democratic Republic)
4,41 18 7 6 3 34
Lesotho -0,49 -1 -0 -1
Liberia 4,36 3 5 14 2 24
Madagascar -0,24 2 -1 -8 -8
Malawi -0,14 -2 -0 -1 -0 -3
Mali -2,76 -46 -23 1 -0 -68
Mauritania 6,22 28 5 -0 -0 32
Mozambique 1,02 -3 25 10 4 0 35
Myanmar 0,55 9 4 5 8 5 30
Nepal 0,32 9 -0 1 10
212
Income Group Country Commitments
Per Capita Social
infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid, food
security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
Niger -0,29 -4 -2 -1 -1 -8
Rwanda 4,14 18 40 1 59
Sao Tome and Principe -1,1 -0 -0
Senegal -0,05 -0 -0 -1 -1
Sierra Leone -0,15 2 -3 -0 -0 -1
Solomon Islands 12,21 3 7 10
Somalia 6,71 118 10 128
South Sudan 2,75 33 -1 33
Sudan 0,07 4 4
Timor-Leste 7,83 9 3 -0 -0 11
Togo 2,09 -0 20 20
Tuvalu -72,04 -0 -0 -0 -1
Uganda -0,36 -0 -13 -5 -18
Yemen 4,08 27 11 9 119 166
Zambia 5,39 12 63 40 115
Gambia -0,14 -0 -0
Least Developed Countries Total 493 232 240 104 39 137 1.245
Lower Middle Income Countries and
Territories
Algeria 0,96 4 21 20 45
Bhutan -0,22 -0 -0
Cabo Verde 36,85 1 1 -0 18 19
Cameroon 1,41 2 8 32 41
Congo 2,84 -0 18 18
Egypt 0,87 58 11 18 14 1 101
Eswatini -1,27 -0 -0 -1 -2
Ghana 1,55 47 -0 -1 7 53
Honduras 0,55 1 5 6
Ivory Coast 1,73 32 9 4 10 55
Jordan 14,33 136 26 3 166
Kenya 0,15 7 11 -8 -0 -0 8
Kyrgyz Republic 3,92 18 10 0 28
Lebanon 48,6 243 10 14 6 8 2 282
Micronesia, Fed. States -6,3 -0 -1 -1
Morocco 7,02 162 42 52 12 268
Nigeria 0,33 49 -0 5 22 -0 76
Pakistan 0,29 39 27 6 73
Papua New Guinea 2,65 26 2 28
Philippines 0,02 0 2 2
Samoa -1,58 -0 -0
Sri Lanka 0,92 11 4 5 20
Tajikistan 0,51 3 2 0 5
Tunisia 11,63 105 10 25 3 143
213
Income Group Country Commitments
Per Capita Social
infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid, food
security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
Ukraine 152,25 510 829 675 395 2.857 499 5.764
Uzbekistan 0,77 6 6 11 4 1 28
Viet Nam 0,12 -14 25 12
Zimbabwe -0,04 -0 -1 -1
Bolivia 0,89 2 9 11
Nicaragua -0,04 -0 -0
Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories Total 1.445 1.025 872 523 2.875 506 2 7.249
Other Low Income Countries
Syria 6,71 101 26 36 2 166
Other Low Income Countries Total 101 26 36 2 166
Upper Middle Income Countries and
Territories
Albania 40,65 46 18 8 24 97
Argentina 0,11 1 1 3 5
Armenia 25 41 5 30 76
Azerbaïjan -0,69 1 -9 2 -7
Belarus 3,28 26 4 30
Bosnia-Herzegovina 12,15 38 38
Botswana 3,09 -0 8 8
El Salvador 1,5 2 7 1 10
Fiji -0,04 -0 -0 -0
Gabon 2,9 -0 8 7
Georgia -1,3 5 -9 3 -4 1 -5
Guatemala 1,3 8 8 8 24
Iraq 2,3 80 -0 4 2 20 106
Kazakhstan 0,39 4 4 8
Kosovo* 21,31 34 34
Libya 8,71 53 3 6 3 64
Maldives 7,58 2 2 4
Mauritius 1,2 1 1 0 2
Moldova 126,16 95 66 46 41 45 10 303
Montenegro 171,03 30 59 18 107
North Macedonia 13,93 39 -35 22 25
Palestine** 138,79 388 28 16 302 734
Paraguay -0,12 -1 -1
Peru 0,45 1 14 15
Serbia 32,79 51 56 110 216
South Africa 1,34 5 7 75 86
St.Vincent & Grenadines -1,68 -0 -0
Thailand 0,25 15 3 18
Türkiye 10,69 668 77 26 123 20 -0 914
Venezuela 0,25 7 7
Wallis & Futuna 249,01 1 -0 2 3
214
Income Group Country Commitments
Per Capita Social
infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid, food
security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
Costa Rica 1,56 8 8
Ecuador 0,52 8 2 10
Brazil 0,07 15 15
Namibia -0,51 -2 -2
Suriname -1,59 -1 -1
Indonesia 0,05 15 15
Malaysia 0,08 3 3
Turkmenistan 0,27 2 2
Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories Total 1.640 296 208 404 75 355 -0 2.978
Other Developing Countries Unallocated
0 2.701 2.063 861 1.649 170 2.021 1.160 10.625
Other Total 2.701 2.063 861 1.649 170 2.021 1.160 10.625
Total 6.381 3.643 2.217 2.682 3.159 3.019 1.162 22.263
(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
(**) This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
215
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 8B: ODA Recipient Country by main OECD sector in 2025 – Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Income Group Country Disbursements
Per Capita Social
infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid,
food security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
Least Developed Countries
Afghanistan 8,3 91 21 10 40 7 185 354
Angola 0,9 24 2 7 0 1 34
Bangladesh 0,84 87 1 0 5 51 145
Benin 4,51 15 21 8 3 16 1 65
Burkina Faso 4,41 51 2 12 13 26 104
Burundi 4,39 45 6 7 3 2 62
Cambodia 2,83 23 2 16 8 50
Central African Republic 16,26 51 4 9 1 21 87
Chad 5,97 43 6 8 14 2 49 121
Comoros 12,78 6 2 3 1 0 11
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2,76 105 48 36 16 98 302
Djibouti 20,25 10 4 9 1 24
Eritrea 0,22 1 0 0 1
Ethiopia 1,41 74 14 31 10 57 186
Gambia 11,36 8 6 1 1 16 31
Guinea 2,55 11 23 0 4 0 38
Guinea-Bissau 8,77 12 1 6 1 19
Haiti 7,57 22 2 7 8 21 29 0 89
Kiribati 26,96 0 0 0 3 4
Lao (People's Democratic Republic) 3,46 18 1 7 1 0 27
Lesotho 9,3 19 1 1 0 22
Liberia 9,96 17 5 8 4 21 56
Madagascar 4,25 28 71 10 21 6 136
Malawi 4,41 58 24 9 3 0 95
Mali 3,32 45 9 10 2 14 81
Mauritania 15,42 29 1 7 38 6 80
Mozambique 3,65 48 40 2 17 0 19 126
216
Income Group Country Disbursements
Per Capita Social
infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid,
food security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
Myanmar 1,87 38 4 0 12 47 102
Nepal 1,73 41 1 3 6 0 51
Niger 1,37 7 2 3 3 0 22 37
Rwanda 5,81 31 4 34 8 6 83
Sao Tome and Principe 16,16 3 0 0 4
Senegal 2,44 35 5 2 0 2 45
Sierra Leone 8,71 22 22 15 0 17 75
Solomon Islands 19,33 11 5 16
Somalia 8,78 82 14 16 6 11 37 167
South Sudan 9,81 38 9 10 0 60 117
Sudan 3,78 62 4 7 118 191
Tanzania 1,02 33 11 16 10 0 70
Timor-Leste 9,84 11 1 1 1 14
Togo 2,62 10 8 4 3 0 0 25
Tuvalu 139,92 1 0 1 1
Uganda 1,76 43 8 15 3 0 19 0 88
Yemen 3,63 17 0 0 4 127 147
Zambia 5,25 27 50 27 4 3 1 112
Least Developed Countries Total 1.447 450 360 265 168 1.004 0 3.694
Lower Middle Income Countries
and Territories
Algeria 0,63 7 5 7 3 8 29
Bhutan 12,36 6 0 2 2 10
Bolivia 2,22 18 2 2 7 28
Cabo Verde 11,66 1 0 0 0 5 6
Cameroon 1,81 17 3 3 13 17 0 53
Congo 3,32 4 1 10 6 21
Egypt 0,87 51 15 19 10 6 101
Eswatini 10,01 7 1 4 0 12
Ghana 1,31 27 4 8 5 1 45
Honduras 2,26 17 2 4 1 0 24
India 0,01 7 2 1 4 1 15
Iran 0,12 0 2 0 9 11
Ivory Coast 2,53 28 21 10 5 15 2 81
Jordan 13,34 106 12 6 9 7 14 154
Kenya 1,45 29 23 11 5 14 0 82
Kyrgyz Republic 3,58 21 3 1 0 26
Lebanon 64,15 154 10 10 2 196 372
Micronesia, Fed. States 14,22 1 1 2
Mongolia 3,55 5 0 5 2 0 13
Morocco 8,68 138 59 44 14 75 0 330
217
Income Group Country Disbursements
Per Capita Social
infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid,
food security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
Nicaragua 1,4 4 1 2 3 0 10
Nigeria 0,68 86 29 1 3 38 157
Pakistan 0,34 42 5 13 7 17 85
Papua New Guinea 3,47 15 5 6 12 0 37
Philippines 0,47 32 3 8 4 8 54
Samoa 13,23 3 0 3
Sri Lanka 1,15 17 2 3 3 25
Tajikistan 4,39 26 13 3 5 47
Tunisia 15,57 67 66 12 30 5 12 191
Ukraine 82,95 243 286 294 52 1.809 456 3.141
Uzbekistan 0,62 9 0 7 7 22
Vanuatu 20,7 3 0 1 2 7
Viet Nam 0,22 10 3 4 4 1 22
Zimbabwe 1,53 14 2 3 6 1 26
Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories Total 1.214 580 505 225 1.916 799 0 5.241
Other Low Income Countries
Syria 10,85 45 2 26 194 1 268
Other Low Income Countries Total 45 2 26 194 1 268
Upper Middle Income Countries
and Territories
Albania 27,53 46 5 5 10 65
Argentina 0,17 2 0 1 4 8
Armenia 28,32 60 6 10 7 4 86
Azerbaïjan 0,63 3 2 0 2 6
Belarus 1,39 10 2 1 13
Belize 4,3 1 1 0 0 2
Bosnia-Herzegovina 23,43 44 16 1 6 8 0 74
Botswana 1,5 0 0 2 1 4
Brazil 0,08 7 2 6 1 1 16
China 0,01 3 2 3 5 12
Colombia 0,86 21 1 1 3 19 46
Costa Rica 1,47 5 1 1 1 8
Cuba 2,44 10 5 6 0 5 27
Dominican Republic 1,51 7 5 0 4 2 0 17
Ecuador 1,06 11 1 3 4 1 19
El Salvador 3,32 15 2 3 0 21
Equatorial Guinea 0,3 1 1
Fiji 9,4 2 0 1 5 1 9
Gabon 5,24 1 11 0 1 13
Georgia 15,89 37 9 7 7 59
Grenada 1,73 0 0
218
Income Group Country Disbursements
Per Capita Social
infrastructures
Economic infrastructures
and services Production
Multisector/ Crosscutting
Budget support, food aid,
food security
Humanitarian aid
Other/ Unallocated
Total
Guatemala 0,87 5 2 6 2 16
Guyana 1,72 1 0 1
Indonesia 0,07 11 3 1 3 1 18
Iraq 1,84 53 5 1 6 20 85
Jamaica 2,54 5 1 1 7
Kazakhstan 0,39 3 5 0 0 8
Kosovo* 58,11 65 14 4 1 8 0 0 93
Libya 12,44 82 6 0 1 3 92
Malaysia 0,1 3 0 0 4
Maldives 4,43 2 1 2
Mauritius 5,63 1 1 4 1 0 7
Mexico 0,16 11 5 0 5 21
Moldova 89,02 46 127 4 23 13 0 214
Montenegro 112,55 24 33 2 11 70
Namibia 2,7 2 1 4 0 8
North Macedonia 35,98 36 14 5 10 0 66
Palestine** 116,23 324 2 16 4 1 266 1 615
Panama 0,63 1 2 3
Paraguay 3,38 18 0 3 2 23
Peru 0,56 12 1 0 6 19
Serbia 20,29 70 18 2 42 0 1 134
South Africa 0,51 23 1 4 5 0 33
St. Lucia 1,34 0 0
St.Vincent & Grenadines 20,47 2 2
Suriname 1,06 1 0 1
Thailand 0,1 5 0 1 1 7
Tonga 16,73 1 0 0 0 2
Türkiye 16,05 1.057 67 28 197 24 0 1.372
Turkmenistan 0,67 0 1 3 5
Venezuela 1,16 3 0 30 33
Wallis & Futuna 6,59 0 0
Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories Total 2.147 385 136 382 10 404 2 3.466
Other Developing Countries Unallocated 0 2.221 752 589 746 143 570 1.174 6.194
Other Total 2.221 752 589 746 143 570 1.174 6.194
Total 7.074 2.167 1.593 1.644 2.237 2.971 1.177 18.863
(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
(**) This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
219
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA No No
EDF Yes No
Table 9A: INTPA in 2025: A closer look. Sectoral breakdown per region – Commitments (in EUR millions)
Sector Africa America Asia Europe Oceania Developing countries,
unspecified Total
Social infrastructure and services 1.142 80 330 1 28 547 2.128
Education 202 21 59 -0 2 120 404
Basic education 39 17 83 139
Education, level unspecified 15 4 17 -0 2 30 68
Post-secondary education 79 2 8 1 90
Secondary education 69 15 17 1 6 108
Government and civil society 678 17 192 1 25 243 1.156
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security 44 3 9 56
Government and civil society, general 634 14 184 1 25 243 1.100
Health 97 4 31 0 98 231
Basic health 29 4 1 0 98 132
Health, general 68 31 0 99
Other social infrastructure and services 58 27 44 0 0 35 165
Other social infrastructure and services 58 27 44 0 0 35 165
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 2 -0 -0 42 43
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 2 -0 -0 42 43
Water and sanitation 106 11 3 -0 9 129
Water and sanitation 106 11 3 -0 9 129
Economic infrastructure and services 1.037 114 176 37 11 329 1.704
Banking and financial services 56 13 4 138 210
Banking and financial services 56 13 4 138 210
Business and other services 41 32 33 8 114
Business and other services 41 32 33 8 114
Communications 287 16 59 -0 48 411
Communications 287 16 59 -0 48 411
Energy 334 42 68 37 8 133 623
Energy generation, renewable sources 229 24 15 -1 105 372
Energy policy 48 16 43 9 6 121
Heating, cooling and energy distribution 58 2 5 66
220
Sector Africa America Asia Europe Oceania Developing countries,
unspecified Total
Nuclear energy plants -0 5 37 22 64
Transport and storage 318 11 17 1 347
Transport and storage 318 11 17 1 347
Production sectors 630 61 114 16 32 853
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 329 14 47 3 36 429
Agriculture 270 8 46 1 32 356
Fishing 20 2 2 25
Forestry 39 6 1 3 49
Industry, mineral resources and mining, construction 184 46 56 4 -4 286
Industry 177 32 56 4 -4 265
Mineral resources and mining 7 14 0 21
Trade and tourism 117 2 11 8 -0 138
Tourism 3 2 5
Trade policy and regulations and trade-related adjustment 114 2 11 7 -0 133
Multisector/Cross-cutting 285 116 138 22 12 70 643
General environmental protection 136 58 79 9 56 337
General environmental protection 136 58 79 9 56 337
Other multisector 149 57 59 22 3 14 306
Other multisector 149 57 59 22 3 14 306
Commodity aid and general programme assistance 60 -3 0 57
Developmental food assistance -5 -3 0 -8
Developmental food assistance -5 -3 0 -8
General budget support 65 65
General budget support 65 65
Humanitarian aid 16 1 1 5 17 41
Disaster preparedness -0 5 8 14
Disaster preparedness -0 5 8 14
Emergency response 5 1 1 8
Emergency response 5 1 1 8
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 11 8 19
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 11 8 19
Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 1 -1 213 213
Unallocated / Unspecified 1 -1 30 29
Unallocated / Unspecified 1 -1 30 29
Administrative costs of donors 183 183
Administrative costs of donors 183 183
Total 3.170 373 757 58 73 1.208 5.640
…
221
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA No No
EDF Yes No
Table 9B: INTPA in 2025: A closer look. Sectoral breakdown per region – Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Sector Africa America Asia Europe Oceania Developing countries,
unspecified Total
Social infrastructure and services 1.665 198 540 21 38 619 3.081
Education 258 24 165 1 1 125 575
Basic education 86 3 53 87 230
Education, level unspecified 49 15 36 0 1 31 132
Post-secondary education 19 0 11 0 1 31
Secondary education 104 6 66 6 182
Government and civil society 849 107 239 19 26 102 1.342
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security 117 13 10 0 0 140
Government and civil society, general 732 94 229 19 26 102 1.203
Health 298 18 42 1 319 678
Basic health 213 13 35 318 580
Health, general 84 3 4 1 1 93
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 0 1 4 6
Other social infrastructure and services 126 31 58 2 43 260
Other social infrastructure and services 126 31 58 2 43 260
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 33 1 1 24 59
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 33 1 1 24 59
Water and sanitation 101 17 34 10 5 167
Water and sanitation 101 17 34 10 5 167
Economic infrastructure and services 706 65 138 29 7 241 1.186
Banking and financial services 13 7 7 96 123
Banking and financial services 13 7 7 96 123
Business and other services 89 18 18 1 0 13 139
Business and other services 89 18 18 1 0 13 139
Communications 67 13 23 2 46 151
Communications 67 13 23 2 46 151
Energy 297 19 74 27 1 83 501
Energy generation, non-renewable sources 29 1 30
Energy generation, renewable sources 162 11 10 0 78 262
Energy policy 52 4 21 0 0 2 78
222
Sector Africa America Asia Europe Oceania Developing countries,
unspecified Total
Heating, cooling and energy distribution 53 5 15 0 0 73
Nuclear energy plants 1 28 26 2 58
Transport and storage 240 8 16 1 5 2 272
Transport and storage 240 8 16 1 5 2 272
Production sectors 659 77 96 1 17 110 959
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 336 42 64 0 11 97 551
Agriculture 292 29 45 0 2 85 454
Fishing 19 0 8 4 8 39
Forestry 25 13 12 5 4 59
Industry, mineral resources and mining, construction 229 19 23 1 9 280
Construction 0 0
Industry 217 18 21 1 7 264
Mineral resources and mining 12 1 2 2 16
Trade and tourism 93 16 9 0 4 5 127
Tourism 4 1 4
Trade policy and regulations and trade-related adjustment 89 16 9 0 4 5 123
Multisector/Cross-cutting 406 85 134 9 32 183 849
General environmental protection 166 48 29 2 11 48 305
General environmental protection 166 48 29 2 11 48 305
Other multisector 240 37 106 7 21 134 544
Other multisector 240 37 106 7 21 134 544
Commodity aid and general programme assistance 150 21 14 9 3 198
Developmental food assistance 6 0 14 3 23
Developmental food assistance 6 0 14 3 23
General budget support 145 21 9 174
General budget support 145 21 9 174
Humanitarian aid 58 1 17 1 0 77
Disaster preparedness 4 0 3 0 7
Disaster preparedness 4 0 3 0 7
Emergency response 48 0 14 1 63
Emergency response 48 0 14 1 63
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 6 0 7
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 6 0 7
Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 4 0 22 224 250
Administrative costs of donors 0 0 219 220
Administrative costs of donors 0 0 219 220
Unallocated / Unspecified 4 0 22 4 30
Unallocated / Unspecified 4 0 22 4 30
Total 3.650 446 940 82 103 1.379 6.600
223
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA No No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF No No
Table 10A: Budget Non-INTPA in 2025: A closer look. Sectoral breakdown per region – Commitments (in EUR millions)
Sector Africa America Asia Europe Developing countries,
unspecified Total
Social infrastructure and services 637 4 1.019 1.868 724 4.252
Education 40 91 385 351 867
Education, level unspecified 0 7 321 228 556
Post-secondary education 1 0 27 123 150
Secondary education 39 22 7 68
Basic education 62 31 92
Government and civil society 452 4 596 963 361 2.375
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security 156 4 173 209 57 598
Government and civil society, general 296 423 754 305 1.777
Health 10 55 311 1 376
Basic health -0 3 195 1 199
Health, general 10 52 116 178
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 0 0
Other social infrastructure and services 133 246 183 1 563
Other social infrastructure and services 133 246 183 1 563
Water and sanitation 3 31 27 10 70
Water and sanitation 3 31 27 10 70
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 0 0
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 0 0
Economic infrastructure and services 116 75 1.647 101 1.939
Banking and financial services 5 18 0 11 34
Banking and financial services 5 18 0 11 34
Business and other services 50 35 75 5 165
Business and other services 50 35 75 5 165
Communications 50 7 231 288
Communications 50 7 231 288
Energy 11 12 405 66 495
Energy policy 11 4 316 4 336
Energy generation, renewable sources 9 82 52 143
224
Sector Africa America Asia Europe Developing countries,
unspecified Total
Energy generation, non-renewable sources 2 2
Heating, cooling and energy distribution 5 9 14
Transport and storage 2 936 19 957
Transport and storage 2 936 19 957
Production sectors 115 87 914 247 1.363
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 25 55 124 5 210
Agriculture 25 48 120 5 197
Fishing 4 4
Forestry 4 5 8
Industry, mineral resources and mining, construction 13 28 764 238 1.044
Industry 13 28 663 238 943
Mineral resources and mining 101 101
Trade and tourism 77 3 26 4 110
Tourism 4 6 10
Trade policy and regulations and trade-related adjustment 73 3 20 4 101
Multisector/Cross-cutting 35 25 1.478 502 2.039
General environmental protection 17 13 88 52 169
General environmental protection 17 13 88 52 169
Other multisector 18 13 1.389 450 1.870
Other multisector 18 13 1.389 450 1.870
Humanitarian aid 905 153 1.050 553 318 2.978
Disaster preparedness 4 4 5 7 20
Disaster preparedness 4 4 5 7 20
Emergency response 898 153 1.038 250 298 2.637
Emergency response 898 153 1.038 250 298 2.637
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 3 8 298 13 322
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 3 8 298 13 322
Commodity aid and general programme assistance 30 2.937 135 3.102
General budget support 30 2.937 135 3.102
General budget support 30 2.937 135 3.102
Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 2 0 947 949
Unallocated / Unspecified 2 -0 6 8
Unallocated / Unspecified 2 -0 6 8
Administrative costs of donors 0 941 941
Administrative costs of donors 0 941 941
Total 1.808 157 2.287 9.397 2.974 16.623
225
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA No No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF No No
Table 10B: Budget Non-INTPA in 2025: A closer look. Sectoral breakdown per region – Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Africa America Asia Europe Oceania Developing countries,
unspecified Grand Total
Social infrastructure and services 664 44 917 1.965 1 401 3.993
Education 76 10 114 499 1 243 943
Basic education 7 46 91 1 145
Education, level unspecified 8 20 305 192 525
Post-secondary education 51 8 24 43 1 44 172
Secondary education 10 2 23 60 6 102
Government and civil society 480 34 561 767 0 113 1.955
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security 239 18 198 182 42 680
Government and civil society, general 241 16 362 584 0 71 1.274
Health 34 62 191 9 296
Basic health 9 21 160 8 197
Health, general 24 38 31 0 94
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 0 3 0 1 5
Other social infrastructure and services 36 102 270 10 419
Other social infrastructure and services 36 102 270 10 419
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 0 0
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 0 0
Water and sanitation 38 78 238 26 380
Water and sanitation 38 78 238 26 380
Economic infrastructure and services 150 0 48 714 69 981
Banking and financial services 54 11 3 2 69
Banking and financial services 54 11 3 2 69
Business and other services 14 0 15 28 7 65
Business and other services 14 0 15 28 7 65
Communications 2 5 69 14 90
Communications 2 5 69 14 90
Energy 78 0 14 343 20 456
Energy generation, renewable sources 34 5 241 2 282
Energy policy 44 10 76 13 143
226
Africa America Asia Europe Oceania Developing countries,
unspecified Grand Total
Nuclear energy plants 0 0 0
Heating, cooling and energy distribution 0 12 5 17
Energy generation, non-renewable sources 14 14
Transport and storage 2 3 270 26 302
Transport and storage 2 3 270 26 302
Production sectors 91 53 390 99 634
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 65 22 46 10 144
Agriculture 42 22 44 6 115
Fishing 4 1 5
Forestry 19 1 5 24
Industry, mineral resources and mining, construction 24 23 319 82 448
Industry 24 23 295 82 423
Mineral resources and mining 0 24 0 25
Trade and tourism 2 7 26 7 42
Tourism 2 1 4 6
Trade policy and regulations and trade-related adjustment 1 6 22 7 35
Multisector/Cross-cutting 60 5 75 543 112 795
General environmental protection 15 1 15 49 55 135
General environmental protection 15 1 15 49 55 135
Other multisector 45 4 61 494 57 660
Other multisector 45 4 61 494 57 660
Commodity aid and general programme assistance 80 7 1.817 135 2.040
General budget support 80 7 1.817 135 2.040
General budget support 80 7 1.817 135 2.040
Humanitarian aid 851 163 1.138 503 0 239 2.894
Disaster preparedness 41 17 57 3 12 130
Disaster preparedness 41 17 57 3 12 130
Emergency response 797 146 1.078 291 0 203 2.515
Emergency response 797 146 1.078 291 0 203 2.515
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 13 4 208 24 249
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 13 4 208 24 249
Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 2 1 924 927
Administrative costs of donors 1 1 919 920
Administrative costs of donors 1 1 919 920
Unallocated / Unspecified 1 0 5 7
Unallocated / Unspecified 1 0 5 7
Grand Total 1.896 212 2.241 5.933 1 1.979 12.264
227
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 11A: Sectoral breakdown per instrument in 2025 – Commitments (in EUR millions)
1.
NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUMA
5. IPA III
6. Ukraine Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFSP
9. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULC M
12 .
US C
13. Admin
14. Other
EDF Total
Social infrastructure and services 3.843 758 588 0 716 437 0 280 0 2 0 0 0 -53 -190 6.381
Education 800 129 18 0 247 99 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -9 -14 1.271
Basic education 119 83 18 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 231
Education, level unspecified 295 37 0 0 223 87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -9 -8 624
Post-secondary education 221 2 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -2 240
Secondary education 166 6 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1 -3 175
Government and civil society 2.059 463 431 0 252 206 0 280 0 0 0 0 0 -25 -134 3.531
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security 151 108 138 0 15 0 0 280 0 0 0 0 0 -4 -35 654
Government and civil society, general 1.907 355 293 0 237 206 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -21 -100 2.878
Health 210 97 50 0 145 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -6 607
Basic health 97 43 50 0 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -4 331
Health, general 113 53 0 0 0 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -2 276
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other social infrastructure and services 604 21 87 0 45 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -16 -32 729
Other social infrastructure and services 604 21 87 0 45 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -16 -32 729
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 2 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 44
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 2 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 44
Water and sanitation 168 7 2 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -3 199
Water and sanitation 168 7 2 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -3 199
Economic infrastructure and services 2.053 63 20 0 769 776 0 0 64 0 0 0 0 -47 -54 3.643
Banking and financial services 243 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0 244
Banking and financial services 243 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0 244
Business and other services 205 7 0 0 15 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -4 279
Business and other services 205 7 0 0 15 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -4 279
Communications 454 24 20 0 66 135 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0 699
228
1.
NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUMA
5. IPA III
6. Ukraine Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFSP
9. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULC M
12 .
US C
13. Admin
14. Other
EDF Total
Communications 454 24 20 0 66 135 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0 699
Energy 706 14 0 0 102 236 0 0 64 0 0 0 0 -1 -3 1.117
Energy generation, non-renewable sources 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Energy generation, renewable sources 468 2 0 0 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -2 515
Energy policy 162 12 0 0 48 236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -1 457
Heating, cooling and energy distribution 75 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79
Nuclear energy plants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 0 0 0 0 -0 0 64
Transport and storage 445 16 0 0 585 347 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -44 -45 1.303
Transport and storage 445 16 0 0 585 347 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -44 -45 1.303
Production sectors 1.391 13 0 0 178 675 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 -0 -43 2.217
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 551 12 0 0 7 93 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 -28 639
Agriculture 471 7 0 0 2 93 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 -25 554
Fishing 30 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3 29
Forestry 50 3 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0 57
Industry, mineral resources and mining, construction 609 1 0 0 150 582 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 -9 1.330
Industry 588 1 0 0 142 489 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 -9 1.208
Mineral resources and mining 21 0 0 0 8 93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 122
Trade and tourism 230 1 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 -0 -5 248
Tourism 7 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 15
Trade policy and regulations and trade-related adjustment 223 1 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -5 233
Multisector/Cross-cutting 1.277 75 55 0 414 334 552 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -24 2.682
General environmental protection 379 39 8 0 72 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -5 507
General environmental protection 379 39 8 0 72 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -5 507
Other multisector 897 36 47 0 341 322 552 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -19 2.176
Other multisector 897 36 47 0 341 322 552 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -19 2.176
Commodity aid and general programme assistance 278 2 0 0 0 2.286 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 566 -9 3.159
Developmental food assistance 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 -6 -8
Developmental food assistance 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 -6 -8
General budget support 278 0 0 0 0 2.286 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 571 -3 3.167
General budget support 278 0 0 0 0 2.286 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 571 -3 3.167
Humanitarian aid 155 0 34 2.551 24 258 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -3 3.019
Disaster preparedness 13 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0 34
Disaster preparedness 13 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0 34
Emergency response 92 0 5 2.551 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -3 2.644
Emergency response 92 0 5 2.551 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -3 2.644
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 51 0 8 0 24 258 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0 341
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 51 0 8 0 24 258 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0 341
229
1.
NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUMA
5. IPA III
6. Ukraine Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFSP
9. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULC M
12 .
US C
13. Admin
14. Other
EDF Total
Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 4 15 336 12 61 31 9 1 2 0 0 0 672 23 -2 1.162
Administrative costs of donors 1 3 336 11 61 31 9 1 2 0 0 0 672 1 -2 1.125
Administrative costs of donors 1 3 336 11 61 31 9 1 2 0 0 0 672 1 -2 1.125
Unallocated / Unspecified 2 12 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 37
Unallocated / Unspecified 2 12 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 37
Total 8.999 925 1.034 2.563 2.162 4.798 596 282 65 5 0 0 672 486 -325 22.263
230
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 11B: Sectoral breakdown per instrument in 2025 – Disbursements (in EUR millions)
1.
NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUMA
5. IPA III
6. Ukraine Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFSP
9. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULC M
12. US C
11. Admi
n
12. Oth er
Com- pl-
etion Lines
EDF Total
Social infrastructure and services 3.175 1.052 664 13 855 72 0 296 0 0 0 0 0 2 743 203 7.074
Education 794 127 86 0 320 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 132 30 1.518
Basic education 183 88 56 0 2 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 4 375
Education, level unspecified 298 32 3 0 282 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 35 6 657
Post-secondary education 164 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 203
Secondary education 149 7 27 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 16 284
Government and civil society 1.474 554 386 13 259 19 0 296 0 0 0 0 0 0 206 91 3.297
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security 123 111 212 13 16 2 0 296 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 25 820
Government and civil society, general 1.351 443 175 0 242 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 184 66 2.477
Health 398 300 1 0 148 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69 34 973
Basic health 280 282 1 0 143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 29 776
Health, general 110 17 0 0 4 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 5 187
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 10
Other social infrastructure and services 311 41 178 0 21 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 112 14 679
Other social infrastructure and services 311 41 178 0 21 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 112 14 679
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 33 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 59
Population policies/programmes and reproductive health 33 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 59
Water and sanitation 165 5 12 0 107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 223 34 548
Water and sanitation 165 5 12 0 107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 223 34 548
Economic infrastructure and services 960 47 12 0 228 250 0 0 49 0 0 0 0 3 293 324 2.167
Banking and financial services 133 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 6 193
Banking and financial services 133 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 6 193
Business and other services 123 11 1 0 11 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 28 203
Business and other services 123 11 1 0 11 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 28 203
Communications 138 27 1 0 34 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 6 240
231
1.
NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUMA
5. IPA III
6. Ukraine Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFSP
9. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULC M
12. US C
11. Admi
n
12. Oth er
Com- pl-
etion Lines
EDF Total
Communications 138 27 1 0 34 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 6 240
Energy 447 3 10 0 47 140 0 0 49 0 0 0 0 2 153 104 957
Energy generation, non-renewable sources 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 44
Energy generation, renewable sources 309 1 10 0 27 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 52 544
Energy policy 92 2 0 0 11 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 53 11 222
Heating, cooling and energy distribution 16 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 42 90
Nuclear energy plants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 58
Transport and storage 119 3 0 0 135 82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 180 574
Transport and storage 119 3 0 0 135 82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 180 574
Production sectors 756 45 28 0 32 279 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 216 227 1.593
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 337 28 10 0 5 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 120 165 696
Agriculture 265 27 10 0 5 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 97 135 568
Fishing 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 24 44
Forestry 66 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 6 83
Industry, mineral resources and mining, construction 324 4 18 0 16 254 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 37 728
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Industry 313 1 18 0 16 230 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 34 687
Mineral resources and mining 11 3 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 41
Trade and tourism 95 14 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 20 26 169
Tourism 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 11
Trade policy and regulations and trade- related adjustment 91 14 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 17 24 158
Multisector/Cross-cutting 792 125 22 0 254 1 73 2 0 0 0 0 0 37 236 102 1.644
General environmental protection 235 66 1 0 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 76 39 440
General environmental protection 235 66 1 0 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 76 39 440
Other multisector 556 58 21 0 238 0 73 2 0 0 0 0 0 33 160 63 1.204
Other multisector 556 58 21 0 238 0 73 2 0 0 0 0 0 33 160 63 1.204
Commodity aid and general programme assistance 378 1 0 0 8 1.240 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 569 14 27 2.237
Developmental food assistance 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 1 23
Developmental food assistance 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 1 23
General budget support 366 0 0 0 8 1.240 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 569 5 26 2.214
General budget support 366 0 0 0 8 1.240 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 569 5 26 2.214
Humanitarian aid 283 6 8 2.451 8 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 15 2.971
Disaster preparedness 5 6 2 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 137
Disaster preparedness 5 6 2 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 137
Emergency response 227 0 6 2.329 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 2.578
Emergency response 227 0 6 2.329 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 2.578
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 52 0 0 0 7 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 255
232
1.
NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUMA
5. IPA III
6. Ukraine Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFSP
9. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULC M
12. US C
11. Admi
n
12. Oth er
Com- pl-
etion Lines
EDF Total
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 52 0 0 0 7 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 255
Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 7 22 333 13 62 16 4 1 2 0 0 0 666 10 4 37 1.177
Administrative costs of donors 2 1 333 10 62 16 4 1 2 0 0 0 666 4 1 37 1.140
Administrative costs of donors 2 1 333 10 62 16 4 1 2 0 0 0 666 4 1 37 1.140
Unallocated / Unspecified 4 22 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 0 37
Unallocated / Unspecified 4 22 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 0 37
Total 6.350 1.299 1.067 2.476 1.447 2.038 77 299 51 0 0 0 666 631 1.526 936 18.863
233
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 12A: Breakdown by country and instrument for 2025 – Commitments (in EUR millions)
Country / Region Income group
1. NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUM
A
5. IPA III
6. Ukrain
e Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFS
P
9. INS C
10. OC T
11. ULC M
12 .
US C
13. Adm
in
14. Othe
r EDF Total
Part I: Developing Countries and Territories (Official Development Assistance)
8.999 925 698 2.553 2.101 4.767 587 280 64 5 0 0 0 486 -325 21.142
Bilateral 8.991 925 698 2.553 2.101 4.767 587 280 64 5 0 0 0 454 -325 21.101
Africa 4.038 82 128 898 0 0 0 107 0 0 0 0 0 -6 -271 4.978
Africa (North of Sahara) 723 0 4 20 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 775
Algeria LMICS 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45
Egypt LMICS 100 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 101
Libya UMICS 34 0 3 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 64
Morocco LMICS 268 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 268
North of Sahara, regional UNALLOC 134 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 154
Tunisia LMICS 143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 143
Africa (South of Sahara) 2.902 14 34 878 0 0 0 79 0 0 0 0 0 -4 -257 3.647
Angola LDCS 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 49
Benin LDCS 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 66
Botswana UMICS 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 8
Burkina Faso LDCS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -19 -18
Burundi LDCS 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 30
Cabo Verde LMICS 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0 19
Cameroon LMICS 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41
Central African Republic LDCS 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Chad LDCS 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -9 41
Comoros LDCS 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Congo LMICS 18 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
Democratic Republic of the Congo LDCS 166 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 165
Djibouti LDCS 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 7
Eastern Africa, regional UNALLOC 50 0 0 445 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 494
Eritrea LDCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -20 -20
234
Country / Region Income group
1. NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUM
A
5. IPA III
6. Ukrain
e Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFS
P
9. INS C
10. OC T
11. ULC M
12 .
US C
13. Adm
in
14. Othe
r EDF Total
Eswatini LMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2
Ethiopia LDCS 90 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0 92
Gabon UMICS 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 7
Gambia LDCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Ghana LMICS 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 53
Guinea LDCS 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 50
Ivory Coast LMICS 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55
Kenya LMICS 22 0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -13 8
Lesotho LDCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Liberia LDCS 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 24
Madagascar LDCS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -10 -8
Malawi LDCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3 -3
Mali LDCS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 -98 -68
Mauritania LDCS 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 32
Mauritius UMICS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Middle Africa, regional UNALLOC 28 0 2 117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 147
Mozambique LDCS 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -15 35
Namibia UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2
Niger LDCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -6 -8
Nigeria LMICS 73 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -3 76
Rwanda LDCS 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59
Sao Tome and Principe LDCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Senegal LDCS 0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Sierra Leone LDCS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3 -1
Somalia LDCS 87 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 128
South Africa UMICS 86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 86
South of Sahara, regional UNALLOC 1.230 14 12 277 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -18 1.516
South Sudan LDCS 33 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -1 33
Southern Africa, regional UNALLOC 12 0 0 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 51
Sudan LDCS 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 4
Togo LDCS 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 20
Uganda LDCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -18 -18
Western Africa, regional UNALLOC 247 0 0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 246
Zambia LDCS 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 115
Zimbabwe LMICS 0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Africa, unspecified 413 68 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -14 557
Africa, regional UNALLOC 413 68 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -14 557
America 369 0 16 153 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 -6 -13 523
America (North & Central America) 90 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -9 95
235
Country / Region Income group
1. NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUM
A
5. IPA III
6. Ukrain
e Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFS
P
9. INS C
10. OC T
11. ULC M
12 .
US C
13. Adm
in
14. Othe
r EDF Total
Caribbean & Central America, regional UNALLOC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 -0
Caribbean, regional UNALLOC 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3 32
Central America, regional UNALLOC 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Costa Rica UMICS 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
El Salvador UMICS 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Guatemala UMICS 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
Haiti LDCS 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -6 9
Honduras LMICS 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Nicaragua LMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 -0
St.Vincent & Grenadines UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
America (South America) 104 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -6 -1 99
Argentina UMICS 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Bolivia LMICS 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Brazil UMICS 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Ecuador UMICS 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Paraguay UMICS 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -6 0 -1
Peru UMICS 14 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
South America, regional UNALLOC 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38
Suriname UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Venezuela UMICS 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
America, unspecified 175 0 0 153 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -2 329
America, regional UNALLOC 175 0 0 153 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -2 329
Asia 1.972 28 53 953 0 0 0 98 5 0 0 0 0 -64 -1 3.043
Asia (Far East Asia) 107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -1 105
Cambodia LDCS 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Far East Asia, regional UNALLOC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 -0
Indonesia UMICS 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Lao (People's Democratic Republic) LDCS 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 34
Malaysia UMICS 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Philippines LMICS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Thailand UMICS 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
Timor-Leste LDCS 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 11
Viet Nam LMICS 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Asia (Middle East Asia) 1.171 0 45 667 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 0 0 -6 0 1.930
Iraq UMICS 54 0 1 20 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 106
Jordan LMICS 166 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 166
Lebanon LMICS 264 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 282
Middle East, regional UNALLOC 7 0 -3 308 0 0 0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 311
236
Country / Region Income group
1. NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUM
A
5. IPA III
6. Ukrain
e Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFS
P
9. INS C
10. OC T
11. ULC M
12 .
US C
13. Adm
in
14. Othe
r EDF Total
Palestine** UMICS 494 0 0 220 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 734
Syria OTHER_LI CS 139 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -5 0 166
Yemen LDCS 47 0 -3 119 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 166
Asia (South & Central Asia) 408 0 6 286 0 0 0 44 5 0 0 0 0 -53 0 697
Afghanistan LDCS 111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -9 0 102
Armenia UMICS 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 5 0 0 0 0 -0 0 76
Azerbaïjan UMICS -7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -7
Bangladesh LDCS 47 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -8 0 42
Bhutan LMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 -0
Central Asia, regional UNALLOC 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -15 0 -15
Georgia UMICS -8 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 -19 0 -5
Kazakhstan UMICS 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Kyrgyz Republic LMICS 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28
Maldives UMICS 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Myanmar LDCS 25 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 30
Nepal LDCS 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Pakistan LMICS 73 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 73
South & Central Asia, regional UNALLOC 0 0 0 286 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 286
South Asia, regional UNALLOC 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 9
Sri Lanka LMICS 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 20
Tajikistan LMICS 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Turkmenistan UMICS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Uzbekistan LMICS 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 28
Asia, unspecified 286 28 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3 0 312
Asia, regional UNALLOC 286 28 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3 0 312
Europe 637 102 408 250 2.099 4.767 587 71 37 0 0 0 0 498 -0 9.456
Europe 637 102 408 250 2.099 4.767 0 71 37 0 0 0 0 498 -0 9.456
Albania UMICS 0 0 0 0 97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 97
Belarus UMICS 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30
Bosnia-Herzegovina UMICS 0 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38
Europe, regional UNALLOC 214 102 45 0 997 0 587 0 0 0 0 0 0 -18 0 1.927
Kosovo* UMICS 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 34
Moldova UMICS 293 0 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 303
Montenegro UMICS 0 0 0 0 107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 107
North Macedonia UMICS 0 0 0 0 68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -43 0 25
Serbia UMICS 1 0 0 0 224 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -9 0 216
Türkiye UMICS 7 0 325 20 564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -0 914
Ukraine LMICS 92 0 38 220 0 4.767 0 41 37 0 0 0 0 569 0 5.764
237
Country / Region Income group
1. NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUM
A
5. IPA III
6. Ukrain
e Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFS
P
9. INS C
10. OC T
11. ULC M
12 .
US C
13. Adm
in
14. Othe
r EDF Total
Oceania 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 -1 -2 73
Oceania 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 -1 -2 73
Fiji UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 -0
Kiribati LDCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Micronesia, Fed. States LMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Oceania, regional UNALLOC 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -0 33
Papua New Guinea LMICS 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28
Polynesia, regional UNALLOC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Samoa LMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Solomon Islands LDCS 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Tuvalu LDCS -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
Wallis & Futuna UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 -0 3
Developing countries 1.904 713 92 299 2 0 0 1 22 0 0 0 0 33 -38 3.029
Developing countries, unspecified 1.904 713 92 299 2 0 0 1 22 0 0 0 0 33 -38 3.029
Developing countries, unspecified UNALLOC 1.904 713 92 299 2 0 0 1 22 0 0 0 0 33 -38 3.029
Multilateral (inflows) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 0 32
Other multilateral institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Other multilateral institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
World Customs Organization Customs Co- operation Fund 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
United Nations agency, fund or commission (UN) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
United Nations agency, fund or commission (UN) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
FAO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
UNEP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNFCCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Regional Development Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 28
Regional Development Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 28
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 28
Triangular co-operation 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
America 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
America, unspecified 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
America, regional UNALLOC 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
238
Country / Region Income group
1. NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUM
A
5. IPA III
6. Ukrain
e Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFS
P
9. INS C
10. OC T
11. ULC M
12 .
US C
13. Adm
in
14. Othe
r EDF Total
Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition (NON-ODA eligible countries) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 5 -4 45
Bilateral 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 5 -4 45
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Africa (South of Sahara) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Seychelles MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
America 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 -3 -1
America (North & Central America) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 -3 -1
Aruba MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 -0 1
Barbados MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2
Netherlands Antilles MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asia (Middle East Asia) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Arab Emirates MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Europe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 0 0 41
Europe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 0 0 41
Greenland MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 0 0 41
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
French Polynesia MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
New Caledonia MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 -0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 6
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 6
MADCT Unallocated MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 6
Part III: ODA Countries Non-ODA Eligible Flows 86 0 127 0 7 0 0 124 0 8 1.535 50 0 82 -34 1.984
Part IV: Other flows in non-ODA countries 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 18
Administrative Costs Ex-BA lines - Heading 6 0 0 343 10 61 31 9 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 458
Administrative Costs - Heading 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 672 0 0 672
TOTAL COMMITTED AMOUNT
9.092 928 1.167 2.563 2.169 4.798 596 406 65 66 1.535 50 672 574 -362 24.319
(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
(**) This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
239
Graphs Table 12A
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
United Nations agency, fund or commission (UN)
Other multilateral institution
Oceania
Developing countries, unspecified
Asia (South & Central Asia)
Asia (Far East Asia)
America (South America)
Africa, unspecified
Africa (North of Sahara)
Commitments Amount per Instruments expressed in Percentage (%)
C o
u n
tr y
Percentage of Committed Amount to each Region/ Multilateral institution per Instrument
01. NDICI Geo
02. NDICI Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06.Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility
08. CFSP
09. INSC
240
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 12B: Breakdown by country and instrument for 2025 – Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Country / Region Income group
1. NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUMA
5. IPA III
6. Ukraine Facility
7. West- ern
Balkans Facility
8. CFSP
9. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Other
Comple- tion Lines
EDF Total
Part I: Developing Countries and Territories (Official Development Assistance)
6.350 1.299 734 2.465 1.385 2.023 73 298 49 0 0 0 0 631 1.526 936 17.769
Bilateral 6.268 1.253 731 2.465 1.385 2.023 73 298 48 0 0 0 0 619 1.505 936 17.603
Africa 3.108 233 109 829 0 0 0 119 1 0 0 0 0 1 392 738 5.530
Africa (North of Sahara) 488 10 10 17 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 270 0 815
Algeria LMICS 12 1 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 29
Egypt LMICS 53 2 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 0 101
Libya UMICS 55 2 9 2 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 90
Morocco LMICS 253 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 0 330
North of Sahara, regional UNALLOC 63 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 73
Tunisia LMICS 52 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 136 0 191
Africa (South of Sahara) 2.079 145 94 811 0 0 0 100 1 0 0 0 0 1 81 690 4.002
Angola LDCS 19 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 34
Benin LDCS 47 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 65
Botswana UMICS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Burkina Faso LDCS 66 3 2 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 102
Burundi LDCS 46 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 62
Cabo Verde LMICS 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Cameroon LMICS 25 3 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 53
Central African Republic LDCS 35 4 2 21 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 87
Chad LDCS 46 1 2 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 23 121
Comoros LDCS 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 11
Congo LMICS 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 21
241
Democratic Republic of the Congo LDCS 124 8 31 91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 47 302
Djibouti LDCS 8 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 24
Eastern Africa, regional UNALLOC 90 2 0 113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 23 233
Equatorial Guinea UMICS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Eritrea LDCS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Eswatini LMICS 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 12
Ethiopia LDCS 100 4 8 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 20 186
Gabon UMICS 12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Gambia LDCS 23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 31
Ghana LMICS 28 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 43
Guinea LDCS 17 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 38
Guinea-Bissau LDCS 12 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 19
Ivory Coast LMICS 50 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 21 81
Kenya LMICS 42 6 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 82
Lesotho LDCS 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 22
Liberia LDCS 48 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 56
Madagascar LDCS 41 1 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 87 136
Malawi LDCS 49 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 95
Mali LDCS 8 6 0 15 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 18 79
Mauritania LDCS 68 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 80
Mauritius UMICS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 7
Middle Africa, regional UNALLOC 19 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 22
Mozambique LDCS 49 3 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 53 126
Namibia UMICS 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 8
Niger LDCS 11 0 2 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 37
Nigeria LMICS 88 5 12 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 157
Rwanda LDCS 68 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 83
Sao Tome and Principe LDCS 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Senegal LDCS 29 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 43
Sierra Leone LDCS 52 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 73
Somalia LDCS 67 2 3 34 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 167
South Africa UMICS 21 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 33
South of Sahara, regional UNALLOC 156 17 1 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 44 295
South Sudan LDCS 47 3 7 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 117
Southern Africa, regional UNALLOC 47 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51
Sudan LDCS 63 3 10 114 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 191
242
Tanzania LDCS 46 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 70
Togo LDCS 10 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 25
Uganda LDCS 57 4 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 88
Western Africa, regional UNALLOC 114 8 0 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 171
Zambia LDCS 66 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 39 112
Zimbabwe LMICS 20 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 26
Africa, unspecified 541 79 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 40 48 713
Africa, regional UNALLOC 541 79 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 40 48 713
America 232 69 23 163 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 99 61 651
America (North & Central America) 100 29 14 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 60 320
Belize UMICS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Caribbean & Central America, regional UNALLOC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 4
Caribbean, regional UNALLOC 9 1 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 35
Central America, regional UNALLOC 12 0 2 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33
Costa Rica UMICS 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 8
Cuba UMICS 8 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 27
Dominican Republic UMICS 5 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 17
El Salvador UMICS 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 21
Grenada UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guatemala UMICS 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 16
Haiti LDCS 14 5 9 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 31 89
Honduras LMICS 15 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 24
Jamaica UMICS 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 7
Mexico UMICS 9 6 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 21
Nicaragua LMICS 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10
Panama UMICS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3
St. Lucia UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
St.Vincent & Grenadines UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
America (South America) 88 36 7 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 1 247
Argentina UMICS 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8
Bolivia LMICS 17 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 28
Brazil UMICS 8 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 16
Colombia UMICS 6 11 1 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 46
Ecuador UMICS 6 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 19
Guyana UMICS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
243
Paraguay UMICS 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 23
Peru UMICS 14 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 19
South America, regional UNALLOC 21 2 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 54
Suriname UMICS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Venezuela UMICS 1 2 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33
America, unspecified 44 4 2 16 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 13 0 84
America, regional UNALLOC 44 4 2 16 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 13 0 84
Asia 1.473 104 85 973 0 0 0 100 25 0 0 0 0 0 406 1 3.168
Asia (Far East Asia) 115 30 1 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 78 1 237
Cambodia LDCS 23 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 50
China UMICS 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 12
Far East Asia, regional UNALLOC 8 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 17
Indonesia UMICS 3 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 18
Lao (People's Democratic Republic) LDCS 21 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 27
Malaysia UMICS 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Mongolia LMICS 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 13
Philippines LMICS 22 9 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 54
Thailand UMICS 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Timor-Leste LDCS 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 14
Viet Nam LMICS 9 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 22
Asia (Middle East Asia) 808 17 56 655 0 0 0 55 1 0 0 0 0 0 117 0 1.709
Iran LMICS 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 11
Iraq UMICS 23 1 4 18 0 0 0 31 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 85
Jordan LMICS 89 2 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 0 154
Lebanon LMICS 224 2 20 109 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 372
Middle East, regional UNALLOC 42 0 11 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57
Palestine** UMICS 375 4 14 182 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 615
Syria OTHER_LICS 43 5 7 194 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 268
Yemen LDCS 12 2 0 128 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 147
Asia (South & Central Asia) 498 40 19 299 0 0 0 44 24 0 0 0 0 0 204 0 1.128
Afghanistan LDCS 137 1 1 192 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 342
Armenia UMICS 29 1 2 4 0 0 0 22 1 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 86
Azerbaïjan UMICS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 6
Bangladesh LDCS 64 9 2 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 145
Bhutan LMICS 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10
244
Central Asia, regional UNALLOC 33 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 69
Georgia UMICS 19 3 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 59
India LMICS 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 15
Kazakhstan UMICS 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Kyrgyz Republic LMICS 16 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 26
Maldives UMICS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Myanmar LDCS 43 1 3 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 102
Nepal LDCS 42 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 51
Pakistan LMICS 22 2 9 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 0 85
South & Central Asia, regional UNALLOC 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
South Asia, regional UNALLOC 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 19
Sri Lanka LMICS 10 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 24
Tajikistan LMICS 20 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 47
Turkmenistan UMICS 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Uzbekistan LMICS 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 22
Asia, unspecified 52 17 9 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 93
Asia, regional UNALLOC 52 17 9 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 93
Europe 465 90 501 285 1.377 2.023 73 72 21 0 0 0 0 577 530 0 6.014
Europe 465 90 501 285 1.377 2.023 73 72 21 0 0 0 0 577 530 0 6.014
Albania UMICS 0 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 65
Belarus UMICS 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 13
Bosnia- Herzegovina UMICS 0 1 0 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 74
Europe, regional UNALLOC 138 75 15 0 368 0 73 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 94 0 774
Kosovo* UMICS 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 0 93
Moldova UMICS 180 1 10 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 213
Montenegro UMICS 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 70
North Macedonia UMICS 0 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 66
Serbia UMICS 0 1 0 0 77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 0 134
Türkiye UMICS 7 1 422 24 714 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 203 0 1.372
Ukraine LMICS 130 9 53 248 0 2.023 0 41 20 0 0 0 0 569 48 0 3.141
Oceania 54 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 44 104
Oceania 54 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 44 104
Fiji UMICS 6 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Kiribati LDCS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4
Micronesia, Fed. States LMICS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Oceania, regional UNALLOC 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 24
245
Papua New Guinea LMICS 23 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 37
Polynesia, regional UNALLOC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samoa LMICS 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Solomon Islands LDCS 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 16
Tonga UMICS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Tuvalu LDCS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Vanuatu LMICS 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7
Wallis & Futuna UMICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Developing countries 936 754 10 215 8 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 37 76 92 2.136
Developing countries, unspecified 936 754 10 215 8 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 37 76 92 2.136
Developing countries, unspecified UNALLOC 936 754 10 215 8 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 37 76 92 2.136
Bilateral, core contributions to NGOs and other private bodies / PPPs 11 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 29
Bilateral, core contributions to NGOs and other private bodies / PPPs 11 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 29
Bilateral, core contributions to NGOs and other private bodies / PPPs 11 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 29
Bilateral, core contributions to NGOs and other private bodies / PPPs 11 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 29
Multilateral (inflows) 61 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 113
Other multilateral institution 61 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 101
Other multilateral institution 61 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 101
Adaptation Fund 40 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 21 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
246
World Customs Organization Customs Co- operation Fund 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
United Nations agency, fund or commission (UN) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
United Nations agency, fund or commission (UN) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
IAEA-Assessed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
UNEP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNFCCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Regional Development Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 10
Regional Development Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 10
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 10
Triangular co-operation 10 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 23
Africa 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Africa (South of Sahara) 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Burkina Faso LDCS 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Eastern Africa, regional UNALLOC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Senegal LDCS 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Sierra Leone LDCS 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
South of Sahara, regional UNALLOC 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
America 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 7
America, unspecified 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 7
America, regional UNALLOC 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 7
Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Asia (Far East Asia) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Far East Asia, regional UNALLOC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oceania, regional UNALLOC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
247
Developing countries 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Developing countries, unspecified 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Developing countries, unspecified UNALLOC 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition (NON-ODA eligible countries) 18 10 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 56 0 0 0 16 4 5 115
Bilateral 18 10 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 56 0 0 0 16 4 5 115
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Africa (South of Sahara) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Seychelles MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
America 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 5 22
America (North & Central America) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 5 15
Aruba MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Bahamas MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Barbados MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3
Curaçao MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Saint Pierre And Miquelon MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Sint Maarten MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trinidad And Tobago MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
America (South America) 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Chile MADCTS 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Uruguay MADCTS 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Asia 14 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 19
Asia (Far East Asia) 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Brunei MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong, China MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korea MADCTS 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Singapore MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taiwan MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Asia (Middle East Asia) 9 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 14
Israel MADCTS 8 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 12
Saudi Arabia MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
248
United Arab Emirates MADCTS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Europe 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 0 1 0 43
Europe 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 0 1 0 43
Greenland MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 0 1 0 34
Russia CEECS/NIS 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
French Polynesia MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
New Caledonia MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 2 0 18
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 2 0 18
MADCT Unallocated MADCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 2 0 18
Part III: ODA Countries Non-ODA Eligible Flows 52 13 13 0 4 0 0 126 3 0 1.535 0 0 56 6 9 1.817
Part IV: Other flows in non-ODA countries 9 9 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 40
Administrative Costs Ex-BA lines - Heading 6 0 0 339 10 62 16 4 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 436
Administrative Costs - Heading 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 666 0 0 0 666
TOTAL DISBURSED AMOUNT
6.429 1.332 1.108 2.476 1.452 2.038 77 426 54 61 1.535 0 666 704 1.536 950 20.843
(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
(**) This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
249
Graphs Table 12B
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
United Nations agency, fund or commission (UN)
Other multilateral institution
Oceania
Developing countries, unspecified
Asia, unspecified
Asia (Middle East Asia)
America, unspecified
America (North & Central America)
Africa (South of Sahara)
Disbursements Amount per Instruments expressed in Percentage (%)
C o
u n
tr y
Percentage of Disbursed Amount to each Region/ Multilateral institution per Instrument
01. NDICI Geo
02. NDICI Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06.Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility
08. CFSP
09. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
250
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 13A: Breakdown by co-operation modality and by instrument 2025 – Commitments (in EUR millions)
Co-operation modality / instrument 1.
NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUMA
5. IPA III
6. Ukraine Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFSP
9. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Other
EDF Total
A01 General budget support 278 0 0 0 0 2.286 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 571 -3 3.132 A02 Sector budget support 914 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 -24 -10 883 B02 Core contributions to multilateral institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 0 32
B03 Contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by international organisations (multilateral, INGO)
122 184 35 0 153 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 -1 504
B04 Basket funds/pooled funding 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -114 -115 C01 Project-type interventions 7.306 725 663 2.489 1.878 2.480 587 280 64 2 0 0 0 -119 -166 16.189 D01 Donor country personnel 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 D02 Other technical assistance 31 4 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -20 17 E01 Scholarships/training in donor country 345 0 0 0 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -8 400 G01 Administrative costs not included elsewhere 2 0 336 10 62 31 9 1 2 0 0 0 672 1 -2 1.124 H01 Development awareness 1 12 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 35 Total 8.999 925 1.034 2.563 2.162 4.798 77 282 65 5 0 0 672 486 -325 22.263
251
Graphs Table 13A
-2 000
0
2 000
4 000
6 000
8 000
10 000
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Instruments
Committed amount to each cooperation modality by Instrument
Administrative costs not included elsewhere
Basket funds/pooled funding
Contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by international organisations (multilateral, INGO) Core contributions to multilateral institutions
Development awareness
Donor country personnel
General budget support
Other technical assistance
Project-type interventions
Scholarships/training in donor country
Sector budget support
252
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 13B: Breakdown by co-operation modality and by instrument 2025 – Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Co-operation modality / instrument
1. NDICI Geo
2. NDICI
Thema
3. NDICI Other
4. HUMA
5. IPA III
6. Ukraine Facility
7. Western Balkans Facility
8. CFSP
9. INSC
10. OCT
11. UL CM
12. USC
13. Adm
in
14. Other
Comple- tion Lines
EDF Total
A01 General budget support 363 0 0 0 8 1.240 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 569 4 26 2.210 A02 Sector budget support 716 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 191 20 938
B01
Core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institutes
6 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 23
B02
Core contributions to multilateral institutions
61 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 113
B03
Contributions to specific- purpose programmes and funds managed by international organisations (multilateral, INGO)
185 301 10 22 6 51 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 15 34 19 668
B04 Basket funds/pooled funding 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8
C01 Project-type interventions 4.660 924 717 2.378 1.298 731 73 298 24 0 0 0 0 19 1.249 812 13.183
D01 Donor country personnel 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 64 D02 Other technical assistance 28 10 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 29 18 99
E01
Scholarships/training in donor country
324 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 384
G01
Administrative costs not included elsewhere
2 1 333 10 62 16 4 1 2 0 0 0 666 4 1 37 1.140
H01 Development awareness 0 22 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 0 32
Total 6.350 1.299 1.067 2.476 1.447 2.038 77 299 51 0 0 0 666 631 1.526 936 18.863
253
Graphs Table 13B
….
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Instruments
Disbursed amount to each cooperation modality by Instrument
Administrative costs not included elsewhere
Basket funds/pooled funding
Contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by international organisations (multilateral, INGO) Core contributions to multilateral institutions
Core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institutes
Development awareness
Donor country personnel
General budget support
Other technical assistance
Project-type interventions
Scholarships/training in donor country
Sector budget support
254
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 14A: Sources of External Action in 2021 – 2025 – Commitments (in EUR millions)
Budget 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
DG INTPA Budget 8.302 7.288 8.262 7.315 6.094 37.261
ODA 8.231 7.187 8.148 7.198 5.964 36.728
Non-ODA 71 101 115 116 130 533
DG NEAR Budget 3.530 7.368 5.867 10.308 27.074
ODA 3.526 7.264 5.692 10.270 26.751
Non-ODA 4 104 176 39 322
DG ENEST Budget 8.619 8.619
ODA 8.507 8.507
Non-ODA 112 112
DG MENA Budget 2.338 2.338
ODA 2.325 2.325
Non-ODA 14 14
Other DGs Budget 3.899 5.312 5.155 5.997 7.630 27.992
ODA 3.716 5.042 4.834 5.807 5.792 25.191
Non-ODA 183 269 320 190 1.838 2.801
EDF 19 602 0 -2 -362 257
ODA 19 602 0 -2 -325 295
Non-ODA 0 0 0 0 -38 -38
Total 15.751 20.569 19.284 23.618 24.319 103.540
255
Graphs Table 14A
Committed amount between 2021 and 2025 by DG
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
40 000
DG INTPA Budget
DG NEAR Budget
DG ENEST Budget
DG MENA Budget
Other DGs Budget
EDF DG INTPA Budget
DG NEAR Budget
DG ENEST Budget
DG MENA Budget
Other DGs Budget
EDF
ODA Non-ODA
EU R
m ill
io n
s
DGs per ODA breakdown
2025
2024
2023
2022
2021
256
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 14B: Sources of External Action in 2021 – 2025 – Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Budget 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
DG INTPA Budget 3.157 4.371 5.571 5.047 5.771 23.917
ODA 3.138 4.323 5.493 4.948 5.664 23.566
Non-ODA 19 48 78 99 107 351
DG NEAR Budget 3.801 5.716 4.886 8.885 23.288
ODA 3.783 5.703 4.841 8.817 23.144
Non-ODA 18 13 45 67 144
DG ENEST Budget 4.797 4.797
ODA 4.789 4.789
Non-ODA 8 8
DG MENA Budget 1.798 1.798
ODA 1.760 1.760
Non-ODA 38 38
Other DGs Budget 4.476 4.980 5.356 5.744 7.527 28.083
ODA 4.237 4.742 4.951 5.406 5.714 25.051
Non-ODA 238 239 405 338 1.813 3.032
EDF 3.435 2.451 2.103 1.405 950 10.345
ODA 3.231 2.379 2.045 1.294 936 9.886
Non-ODA 203 72 58 111 14 459
Total 14.869 17.519 17.917 21.081 20.843 92.229
257
Graphs Table 14B
Disbursed amount between 2021 and 2025 by DG
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
ODA Non-ODA ODA Non-ODA ODA Non-ODA ODA Non-ODA ODA Non-ODA ODA Non-ODA
DG INTPA Budget DG NEAR Budget DG ENEST Budget DG MENA Budget Other DGs Budget EDF
EU R
m ill
io n
s
DGs per ODA breakdown
2025
2024
2023
2022
2021
258
Commitments Disbursements
ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 15: Sectoral breakdown of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for 2021 – 2025
Commitments: Sector of Destination (in EUR millions)
Sector 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
Social infrastructure and services 7.089 7.891 8.433 7.482 6.381 37.275
Economic infrastructure and services 2.799 2.706 1.558 2.602 3.643 13.308
Production sectors 612 1.673 1.612 2.310 2.217 8.425
Multisector/Cross-cutting 1.060 1.759 1.636 2.293 2.682 9.430
Commodity aid and general programme assistance 610 998 1.560 4.302 3.159 10.628
Humanitarian aid 2.366 3.112 2.747 2.934 3.019 14.178
Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 957 1.956 1.127 1.351 1.162 6.554
Total 15.492 20.095 18.673 23.273 22.263 99.796
Disbursements: Sector of Destination (in EUR millions)
Sector 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
Social infrastructure and services 5.817 7.054 6.781 6.910 7.074 33.637
Economic infrastructure and services 1.190 1.550 2.085 1.876 2.167 8.868
Production sectors 1.260 1.139 1.312 1.455 1.593 6.760
Multisector/Cross-cutting 2.162 1.546 1.875 1.728 1.644 8.955
Commodity aid and general programme assistance 198 1.241 1.101 4.627 2.237 9.404
Debt Relief 183 183
Humanitarian aid 2.603 2.756 2.899 2.734 2.971 13.963
Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 975 1.860 1.277 1.137 1.177 6.426
Total 14.390 17.147 17.330 20.466 18.863 88.196
259
Graphs Table 15 – Committed/Disbursed amount per sector between 2021 and 2025
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Commitments Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified
Humanitarian aid
Commodity aid and general programme assistance
Multisector/Cross-cutting
Production sectors
Economic infrastructure and services
Social infrastructure and services
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Disbursements Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified
Humanitarian aid
Debt Relief
Commodity aid and general programme assistance
Multisector/Cross-cutting
Production sectors
Economic infrastructure and services
Social infrastructure and services
260
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 16A: Regional distribution of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries for 2021 – 2025
Commitments (in EUR millions)
Region Sub-region 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
Africa 6.325 6.965 5.938 5.985 4.978 30.192
Africa (South of Sahara) 3.836 3.944 3.622 4.374 3.647 19.423
Africa (North of Sahara) 745 799 599 344 775 3.262
Africa, unspecified 1.743 2.222 1.717 1.267 557 7.506
America 539 516 588 615 531 2.789
America (South America) 68 72 171 151 99 560
America (North & Central America) 212 209 185 219 95 919
America, unspecified 259 235 233 246 337 1.309
Asia 2.029 2.944 2.994 2.915 3.043 13.925
Asia (South & Central Asia) 505 814 593 1.086 697 3.694
Asia (Middle East Asia) 944 1.533 1.459 1.453 1.930 7.319
Asia, unspecified 514 414 742 209 312 2.191
Asia (Far East Asia) 66 183 199 167 105 720
Europe 2.923 4.990 4.546 9.372 9.456 31.286
Europe 2.923 4.990 4.546 9.372 9.456 31.286
Oceania 53 89 34 79 73 328
Oceania 53 89 34 79 73 328
Developing countries 3.624 4.579 4.573 4.307 4.183 21.265
Developing countries, unspecified 3.624 4.579 4.573 4.307 4.183 21.265
Other 12 12
Other 12 12
Total 15.492 20.095 18.673 23.273 22.263 99.796
261
Distribution by income for 2021 - 2025 (in EUR millions)
Income group 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
LDCS Least Developed Countries 2.505 2.860 2.740 2.718 1.245 12.068
LMICS Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories 1.520 3.018 2.568 7.088 7.249 21.443
OTHER_LICS Other Low Income Countries 67 67 63 166 362
MADCTS More Advanced Developing Countries 12 12
UMICS Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories 1.959 3.293 2.993 2.717 2.978 13.940
UNALLOC Unallocated 9.509 10.845 10.305 10.687 10.625 51.972
Total 15.492 20.095 18.673 23.273 22.263 99.796
Distribution by region and income for year 2025 (in EUR millions)
Region LDCS LMICS UMICS UNALLOC OTHER_LICS Total
Africa 823 825 165 3.164 4.978
America 9 17 91 413 531
Asia 404 616 954 904 166 3.043
Europe 5.764 1.765 1.927 9.456
Oceania 9 27 3 34 73
Developing countries, unspecified 4.183 4.183
Total 1.245 7.249 2.978 10.625 166 22.263
262
Graphs Table 16A
Committed amount per region between 2021 and 2025
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
(blank) 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
(blank)
Other
Developing countries
Oceania
Europe
Asia
America
Africa
263
Committed amount per country group between 2021 and 2025
Committed amount per country group and per region in 2025
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Unallocated
Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories
More Advanced Developing Countries
Other Low Income Countries
Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories
Least Developed Countries
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
10 000
Africa America Asia Europe OceaniaDeveloping countries, unspecified
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Region
OTHER_LICS
UNALLOC
UMICS
LMICS
LDCS
264
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 16B: Regional distribution of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries for 2021 – 2025
Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Region Sub-region 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
Africa 4.906 5.253 5.253 5.221 5.546 26.178
Africa (North of Sahara) 626 777 584 856 817 3.661
Africa (South of Sahara) 3.756 3.712 3.946 3.718 4.016 19.148
Africa, unspecified 524 764 722 646 713 3.369
America 726 651 653 653 658 3.342
America (North & Central America) 375 293 248 285 320 1.521
America (South America) 292 283 301 284 248 1.408
America, unspecified 60 75 104 84 90 413
Asia 2.879 2.738 2.951 3.199 3.181 14.949
Asia (Far East Asia) 298 268 258 212 238 1.273
Asia (Middle East Asia) 1.313 1.329 1.433 1.552 1.709 7.336
Asia (South & Central Asia) 1.213 1.079 1.123 1.110 1.141 5.666
Asia, unspecified 56 62 138 325 93 675
Europe 3.412 4.212 3.939 7.678 6.015 25.255
Europe 3.412 4.212 3.939 7.678 6.015 25.255
Oceania 113 98 120 87 104 521
Oceania 113 98 120 87 104 521
Developing countries 2.353 4.189 4.416 3.629 3.358 17.945
Developing countries, unspecified 2.353 4.189 4.416 3.629 3.358 17.945
Other 0 5 5
Other 0 5 5
Total 14.390 17.147 17.330 20.466 18.863 88.196
265
Distribution by income for 2021 - 2025 (in EUR millions)
Income group 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
LDCS Least Developed Countries 3.478 3.308 3.682 3.565 3.694 17.727
LMICS Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories 2.874 3.200 2.680 7.194 5.241 21.189
OTHER_LICS Other Low Income Countries 54 391 210 256 268 1.179
MADCTS More Advanced Developing Countries 0 5 5
UMICS Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories 3.279 3.282 3.565 3.026 3.466 16.618
UNALLOC Unallocated 4.705 6.961 7.193 6.425 6.194 31.478
CEECS/NIS Central and Eastern European Countries / New Independent States 0 0
Total 14.390 17.147 17.330 20.466 18.863 88.196
Distribution by region and income for year 2025 (in EUR millions)
Region LDCS LMICS UMICS UNALLOC OTHER_LICS Total
Africa 2.694 1.135 157 1.560 5.546
America 89 62 291 216 658
Asia 890 856 907 261 268 3.181
Europe 3.141 2.101 774 6.015
Oceania 21 48 11 25 104
Developing countries, unspecified 3.358 3.358
Total 3.694 5.241 3.466 6.194 268 18.863
266
Graphs Table 16B
Disbursed amount per region between 2021 and 2025
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Reporting Years
Other
Developing countries
Oceania
Europe
Asia
America
Africa
267
Disbursed amount per country between 2021 and 2025
Disbursed amount per country income group in each region in 2025
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Reporting Years
Central and Eastern European Countries / New Independent States
Unallocated
Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories
More Advanced Developing Countries
Other Low Income Countries
Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories
Least Developed Countries
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
Africa America Asia Europe Oceania Developing countries, unspecified
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Region
OTHER_LICS
UNALLOC
UMICS
LMICS
LDCS
268
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 17: Breakdown by co-operation modality for 2021 - 2025
Commitments (in EUR millions)
Cooperation modality 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
A01
General budget support 591 1.032 1.547 4.299 3.132 10.601
A02
Sector budget support 575 945 456 462 883 3.321
B01
Core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institutes 1 1 1
B02
Core contributions to multilateral institutions 5 3 3 188 32 231
B03
Contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by international organisations (multilateral, INGO) 771 1.290 1.317 408 504 4.289
B04
Basket funds/pooled funding -115 -115
C01
Project-type interventions 12.515 15.303 14.092 16.575 16.189 74.674
D01
Donor country personnel 62 62
D02
Other technical assistance 97 66 21 35 17 236
E01
Scholarships/training in donor country 30 392 189 229 400 1.239
G01
Administrative costs not included elsewhere 882 951 988 1.053 1.124 4.997
H01
Development awareness 26 68 61 25 35 213
-
269
Cooperation modality 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
Other mechanisms 46 46
Total 15.492 20.095 18.673 23.273 22.263 99.796
Graphs Table 17
Committed amount by cooperation modality between 2021 and 2025
-5000
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Reporting Years
Sector budget support
Scholarships/training in donor country
Project-type interventions
Other technical assistance
Other mechanisms
General budget support
Donor country personnel
Development awareness
270
Commitments Disbursements
ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes No
Budget Non INTPA Yes No
EDF Yes No
Table 18: ODA by instrument for 2021 - 2027
Commitments (in EUR millions) - ODA amounts by instrument
Instrument 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
01. NDICI Geo 7.298 11.360 9.524 9.038 8.999 46.219
02. NDICI Thema 2.363 1.129 2.343 1.025 925 7.786
03. NDICI Other 1.093 1.269 833 1.518 1.034 5.746
04. HUMA 2.196 2.496 2.433 2.511 2.563 12.200
05. IPA III 1.588 2.294 2.485 2.128 2.162 10.656
06.Ukraine Facility 4.887 4.798 9.685
07. Western Balkans Facility 400 596 995
08. CFSP 284 267 334 316 282 1.482
09. INSC 38 31 45 43 65 223
10. OCT 0 0 0 18 5 22
11. ULCM 0 0
12. USC 0 0
13. Admin 507 544 578 643 672 2.943
14. Other 106 103 99 749 486 1.543
EDF 19 602 0 -2 -325 295
Total 15.492 20.095 18.673 23.273 22.263 99.796
271
Disbursements (in EUR millions) - ODA amounts by instrument
Instrument 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
01. NDICI Geo 206 3.874 4.493 5.611 6.350 20.535
02. NDICI Thema 725 1.091 1.256 1.014 1.299 5.386
03. NDICI Other 353 792 782 898 1.067 3.892
04. HUMA 2.448 2.445 2.495 2.438 2.476 12.303
05. IPA III 46 435 1.124 1.363 1.447 4.415
06.Ukraine Facility 3.637 2.038 5.676
07. Western Balkans Facility 0 77 77
08. CFSP 271 278 332 316 299 1.497
09. INSC 1 4 20 26 51 102
10. OCT 0 0 0 0 0 0
11. ULCM 0 0
12. USC 0 0
13. Admin 502 543 578 643 666 2.931
14. Other 74 83 86 499 631 1.372
Completion Lines 6.531 5.224 4.119 2.726 1.526 20.126
EDF 3.231 2.379 2.045 1.294 936 9.886
Total 14.390 17.147 17.330 20.466 18.863 88.196
Commitments (in EUR millions) - Non-ODA amounts by instrument
Instrument 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
01. NDICI Geo 4 63 287 98 93 545
02. NDICI Thema 17 0 10 8 2 36
03. NDICI Other 20 59 57 40 134 310
04. HUMA 0 0 1 0 0 1
05. IPA III 0 104 69 0 7 179
06.Ukraine Facility 0 0 0
07. Western Balkans Facility 0 0 0
08. CFSP 124 120 49 73 124 491
09. INSC 0 5 0 0 0 5
10. OCT 63 72 70 54 62 321
11. ULCM 1.535 1.535
12. USC 50 50
13. Admin 0 0 0 0 0 0
14. Other 30 52 69 72 87 310
EDF 0 0 0 0 -38 -38
Total 259 474 611 345 2056 3744
272
Disbursements (in EUR millions) - Non-ODA amounts by instrument
Instrument 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
01. NDICI Geo 0 1 74 150 79 305
02. NDICI Thema 3 1 19 28 32 83
03. NDICI Other 6 15 58 62 41 181
04. HUMA 3 1 4 3 0 10
05. IPA III 0 0 70 23 4 98
06.Ukraine Facility 0 0 0
07. Western Balkans Facility 1 0 1
08. CFSP 116 130 77 77 127 527
09. INSC 0 0 0 0 3 4
10. OCT 1 30 47 54 60 192
11. ULCM 1.535 1.535
12. USC 0 0
13. Admin 0 0 0 0 0 0
14. Other 21 49 57 61 73 261
Completion Lines 126 73 121 45 11 377
EDF 203 72 58 111 14 459
Total 479 372 586 615 1980 4033
273
Graphs Table 18
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Total committed amount in ODA
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Disbursed amount in ODA by Instrument
01. NDICI Geo
02. NDICI Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06.Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility
08. CFSP
09. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Other
Completion Lines
EDF
274
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s Total committed amount in Non-ODA
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
40 000
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 EU
R m
ill io
n s
Disbursed amount in Non-ODA by Instrument
01. NDICI Geo
02. NDICI Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06.Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility 08. CFSP
09. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Other
Completion Lines
275
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 19: Breakdown by Management Type - Disbursements in 2025 (in EUR millions)
I. Budget Support
Other Management Categories 19.319 Budget Support 1.524 Ukraine 601 Morocco 231 Moldova 121 Tunisia 54 Bangladesh 50 Jordan 49 Mauritania 37 Greenland 34 Benin 27 Nepal 22 Others 300 Total 20.843
II. Third Countries
Other Management Categories 12.002 Indirect Management - Other categories 8.626 Indirect Management - Third Countries 215 Democratic Republic of the Congo 38 Mozambique 28 Zambia 21 Chad 18 Madagascar 9 Rwanda 8 Tanzania 7 Sierra Leone 7 Ethiopia 7 Eastern Africa, regional 6 Others 66 Total 20.843
276
III. International Organisations
Other Management Categories 12.002 Indirect Management - International Organisations 5.003 WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME*PROGRAMME ALIMENTAIRE MONDIAL 584 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION 529 UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND*LE FFONDS DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ENFANCE 472 EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 435 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES*HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES REFUGIES 432 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME*PROGRAMME DES NATIONS UNIES POURLE DEVELOPPEMENT 316 UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION*ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES 306 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 272 THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS*ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ALIMENTATION ET L'AGRICULTURE 159 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION*ORGANISATION MONDIALE DE LA SANTE 158 Others 1.338 Indirect Management - Other categories 3.838 Total 20.843
United Nations 3.547 International Financial Institutions 851 Other International Organisations 605 Total of Indirect Management - International Organisations 5.003
IV. Agencies
Other Management Categories 12.002 Indirect Management - Other categories 6.513 Indirect Management - EU MS Agencies 2.328 DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GIZ) GMBH 618 KREDITANSTALT FUR WIEDERAUFBAU 379 AGENCE FRANCAISE DE DEVELOPPEMENT 341 EXPERTISE FRANCE 211 ENABEL, BELGISCH ONTWIKKELINGSAGENTSCHAP*ENABEL, AGENCE BELGE DE DEVELOPPEMENT 137 NEDERLANDSE FINANCIERINGS-MAATSCHAPPIJ VOOR ONTWIKKELINGSLANDEN NV 80 AGENZIA ITALIANA PER LA COOPERAZION E ALLO SVILUPPODEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 66 FUNDACION INTERNACIONAL Y PARA IBEROAMERICA DE ADMINISTRACION Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS*ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICIES 46 AGENCIA ESPANOLA DE COOPERACION INTERNACIONAL PARA EL DESARROLLO 40 DEUTSCHER AKADEMISCHER AUSTAUSCHDIENST EV*DAAD GERMAN ACADEMIC EXCHANGE SERVICE 33 Others 376 Total 20.843
V. EIB/EIF
Other Management Categories 12.002 Indirect Management - Other categories 8.450 Indirect Management - EIB/EIF 391 Total 20.843
277
Graphs Table 19
93%
7%
Budget Support - Disbursements
Other Management Categories
Budget Support
57%26%
10%
4%
3% 0%
Indirect Management - Disbursements
Indirect Mgt. - Int. Org.
Indirect Mgt. - EU MS Agencies
Indirect Mgt. - Other Entrusted Entities
Indirect Mgt. - EIB/EIF
Indirect Mgt. - Benef. Country
Indirect Mgt. - Other
278
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 20: Disbursements - Breakdown by forms of Union Funding as defined in Articles 41 and 27 NDICI (in EUR millions)
NDICI Other Instruments Total
NDICI - Indirect
Management
NDICI - Other Management
Modes NDICI - Total
Other Instruments -
Indirect Management
Other Instruments -
Other Management
Modes
Other Instruments -
Total
Indirect Management
Other Management
Modes Total
Grants 14 2.279 2.292 56 1.966 2.022 70 4.245 4.314
Budget Support 0 695 695 0 829 829 0 1.524 1.524
Others 0 535 535 1 3.401 3.402 1 3.936 3.937
Administrative Expenditures 15 481 496 0 834 834 15 1.315 1.330
Procurement Contracts 5 351 356 141 378 519 145 729 874
Services 1 348 350 37 320 357 38 668 706
Of which: Blending 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
Supplies 0 2 2 8 31 39 8 34 42
Works 4 0 4 96 26 122 99 26 125
Financial Instruments 31 214 246 196 0 196 227 214 442
Of which: Blending 31 0 31 123 0 123 154 0 154
Contribution & Delegation Agreements 4.226 15 4.242 4.128 3 4.131 8.354 18 8.373
Of which: Blending 200 0 200 522 0 522 722 0 722
Remunerated External Experts (Individual Experts) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Program Estimates 5 0 5 23 0 23 27 0 27
Contribution to EU Trust Funds 1 0 1 0 20 20 1 20 21
Total 4.297 4.572 8.869 4.544 7.430 11.974 8.841 12.002 20.843
279
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF No No
Table 21: Disbursements related to the previous MFF
Disbursements Completion Lines (in EUR millions)
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
DCI 2.245 1.783 1.482 1.016 526 7.053
EIDHR 129 70 53 21 5 279
ENI 1.767 1.561 1.236 702 506 5.772
Greenland 6 0 1 1 8
IcSP 234 129 127 51 27 568
INSC 16 15 21 15 9 76
IPA II 2.146 1.655 1.242 915 443 6.402
PI-ICI+ 114 83 79 51 18 346
Total 6.658 5.297 4.241 2.771 1.536 20.503
280
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 22A: Number of contributing programmes per SDG for 2025 – Commitments (in EUR millions)
SDG Contribution Main SDG Significant SDG
SDG 1 No poverty 3.358 1.608
SDG 2 Zero hunger 359 5.633
SDG 3 Good health and well-being 451 5.963
SDG 4 Quality education 1.102 4.221
SDG 5 Gender equality 164 11.813
SDG 6 Clean water and sanitation 82 6.084
SDG 7 Affordable and clean energy 314 5.725
SDG 8 Decent work and economic growth 4.781 5.031
SDG 9 Industry, innovation and infrastructure 2.647 6.063
SDG 10 Reduced inequalities 1.314 3.170
SDG 11 Sustainable cities and communities 121 4.037
SDG 12 Responsible consumption and production 145 1.611
SDG 13 Climate action 526 9.718
SDG 14 Life below water 108 476
SDG 15 Life on land 211 1.136
SDG 16 Peace, justice and strong institutions 3.890 3.737
SDG 17 Partnerships for the goals 4.746 10.157
24.319 86.181
281
Graphs Table 22A
Amount committed per SDG in 2025
0
2 000
4 000
6 000
8 000
10 000
12 000
14 000
16 000
SDG 1 SDG 2 SDG 3 SDG 4 SDG 5 SDG 6 SDG 7 SDG 8 SDG 9 SDG 10 SDG 11 SDG 12 SDG 13 SDG 14 SDG 15 SDG 16 SDG 17
EU R
m ill
io n
s
282
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 22B: Number of contributing programmes per SDG for 2025 – Disbursements (in EUR millions)
SDG Contribution Main SDG Significant SDG
SDG 1 No poverty 1.939 3.581
SDG 2 Zero hunger 1.085 2.589
SDG 3 Good health and well-being 1.567 2.424
SDG 4 Quality education 1.584 1.927
SDG 5 Gender equality 221 11.425
SDG 6 Clean water and sanitation 590 2.741
SDG 7 Affordable and clean energy 492 2.422
SDG 8 Decent work and economic growth 2.359 3.289
SDG 9 Industry, innovation and infrastructure 1.016 3.225
SDG 10 Reduced inequalities 1.126 3.423
SDG 11 Sustainable cities and communities 199 2.044
SDG 12 Responsible consumption and production 106 1.375
SDG 13 Climate action 644 4.542
SDG 14 Life below water 72 263
SDG 15 Life on land 265 1.020
SDG 16 Peace, justice and strong institutions 2.819 2.472
SDG 17 Partnerships for the goals 4.760 8.560
20.843 57.321
283
Graphs Table 22B
Amount disbursed per SDG in 2025
0
2 000
4 000
6 000
8 000
10 000
12 000
14 000
SDG 1 SDG 2 SDG 3 SDG 4 SDG 5 SDG 6 SDG 7 SDG 8 SDG 9 SDG 10 SDG 11 SDG 12 SDG 13 SDG 14 SDG 15 SDG 16 SDG 17
EU R
m ill
io n
s
284
TableTF1: Overview of incoming contributions (disbursements from contributors in EUR millions)
Trust Fund Cumulative previous
Years Current Year (2025) Total
Trust Fund Africa 4.910 0 4.910
Contribution received from Commission Annual Budget 1.044 0 1.044
Contribution received from EDF 3.242 0 3.242
Contribution received from Member States 592 0 592
Contribution received from Non-Member States 31 0 31
Trust Fund Bêkou 310 0 310
Contribution received from Commission Annual Budget 72 0 72
Contribution received from EDF 148 0 148
Contribution received from Member States 89 0 89
Contribution received from Non-Member States 1 0 1
Trust Fund Colombia 126 2 128
Contribution received from Commission Annual Budget 89 2 91
Contribution received from EDF 0 0 0
Contribution received from Member States 37 0 37
Contribution received from Non-Member States 0 0 0
Trust Fund Madad 2.365 18 2.382
Contribution received from Commission Annual Budget 2.102 18 2.120
Contribution received from EDF 0 0 0
Contribution received from Member States 238 0 238
Contribution received from Non-Member States 25 0 25
Total Trust Funds 7.710 20 7.730
Contribution received from Commission (Annual Budget + EDF) 6.698 20 6.717
Contribution received from Member States 956 0 956
Contributions received from Non-Member States 57 0 57
285
Graphs Table TF1
Disbursed amount from incoming contributions cumulated (in EUR millions)
Disbursed amount from incoming contributions in 2025 (in EUR millions)
3 865
310
126
2 365
Trust Fund Africa
Trust fund Bêkou
Trust Fund Colombia
Trust fund Madad
0 0 2
18
Trust Fund Africa
Trust fund Bêkou
Trust Fund Colombia
Trust fund Madad
286
TableTF2A: Overview of committed and disbursed amounts
Commitments (in EUR millions)
Trust Fund Cumulative Previous Years Current Year (2025) Total
Trust Fund Africa 5.463 -7 5.457
Trust Fund Bêkou 341 0 341
Trust Fund Colombia 140 1 140
Trust Fund Madad 2.434 -2 2.431
8.377 -8 8.369
Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Trust Fund Cumulative Previous Years Current Year (2025) Total
Trust Fund Africa 4.790 84 4.875
Trust Fund Bêkou 290 10 300
Trust Fund Colombia 122 3 126
Trust Fund Madad 2.347 13 2.360
7.550 110 7.661
Decommitments (for information; in EUR millions)
Trust Fund Cumulative Previous Years Current Year (2025) Total
Trust Fund Africa -2 -7 -9
Trust Fund Bêkou -2 0 -2
Trust Fund Colombia 0 -0 -0
Trust Fund Madad -0 -3 -3
-5 -10 -15
287
Graphs Table TF2A
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Commitments
Trust Fund Madad
Trust Fund Colombia
Trust Fund Bêkou
Trust Fund Africa
0
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Disbursements
Trust Fund Madad
Trust Fund Colombia
Trust Fund Bêkou
Trust Fund Africa
288
TableTF2B: Proportion of Trust Funds assistance used for Official Development Aid (ODA) in 2025
Commitments (in EUR millions)
Trust Fund Commitments - Cumulative Years Commitments 2025 Total ODA Non-ODA ** ODA Non-ODA ** ODA Non-ODA **
Trust Fund Africa 5.349 114 -6 -0 5.343 114
Trust Fund Bêkou 341 0 0 0 341 0
Trust Fund Colombia 140 0 1 0 140 0
Trust Fund Madad 2.434 0 -2 0 2.431 0
8.263 114 -8 -0 8.255 114
Disbursements (in EUR millions)
Trust Fund Disbursements - Cumulative Years Disbursements 2025 Total ODA Non-ODA ** ODA Non-ODA ** ODA Non-ODA **
Trust Fund Africa 4.732 58 84 0 4.816 58
Trust Fund Bêkou 290 0 10 0 300 0
Trust Fund Colombia 122 0 3 0 126 0
Trust Fund Madad 2.347 0 13 0 2.360 0
7.492 58 110 0 7.602 58
** The cumulative non-ODA amounts have been updated following the conclusions of the special report of the European Court of Auditors on the EUTF Africa, and implementation of its
recommendation 4c. The non-ODA part of the Trust Fund Africa is entirely funded by the Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) under Heading IV of the EU Budget.
Therefore, the part of the Trust Fund Africa funded by other financial sources (including EU Budget Heading VI, the EDF and EU Member States contributions) is 100% ODA eligible.
289
TableTF3A: Sectoral breakdown of Trust Fund Africa
Sahel region and Lake Chad area
Horn of Africa North of Africa Regional and Other Total Africa
Commit-
ments Disburse-
ments Commit-
ments Disburse-
ments Commit-
ments Disburse-
ments Commit-
ments Disburse-
ments Commit-
ments Disburse-
ments
100 - Social infrastructure and services -4 24 -1 32 0 5 0 0 -4 62
110 - Education -1 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 -1 20
11110 - Education policy and administrative management 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 17
11120 - Education facilities and training -0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -0 1
11220 - Primary education 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
11231 - Basic life skills for youth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11330 - Vocational training -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1
120 - Health -0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 -0 2
12220 - Basic health care -0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 -0 2
12240 - Basic nutrition -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0
130 - Population policies/programmes and reproductive health -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1
13010 - Population policy and administrative management -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1
140 - Water and sanitation 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
14010 - Water sector policy and administrative management 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
150 - Government and civil society -1 15 -1 7 0 5 0 0 -1 26
15110 - Public sector policy and administrative management -0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -0 1
15130 - Legal and judicial development -0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 1
15150 - Democratic participation and civil society 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15160 - Human rights 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
15170 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15190 - Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility -0 0 0 3 0 4 0 0 0 7
15210 - Security system management and reform -0 6 0 3 0 0 0 0 -0 8
15220 - Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution -0 6 -1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 7
15230 - Participation in international peacekeeping operations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
160 - Other social infrastructure and services -1 8 -0 3 0 0 0 0 -1 11
16010 - Social protection 0 0 -0 1 0 0 0 0 -0 1
290
Sahel region and Lake Chad area
Horn of Africa North of Africa Regional and Other Total Africa
Commit-
ments Disburse-
ments Commit-
ments Disburse-
ments Commit-
ments Disburse-
ments Commit-
ments Disburse-
ments Commit-
ments Disburse-
ments
16020 - Employment creation -0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 -0 2
16050 - Multisector aid for basic social services -0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 8
200 - Economic infrastructure and services 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 6
210 - Transport and storage 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
21020 - Road transport 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
240 - Banking and financial services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24030 - Formal sector financial intermediaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
250 - Business and other services 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3
25010 - Business Policy and Administration 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
25030 - Business development services 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
300 - Production sectors -0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -0 1
310 - Agriculture, forestry and fishing -0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -0 1
31120 - Agricultural development -0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -0 1
320 - Industry, mineral resources and mining, construction 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
32130 - Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) development 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting 0 0 -2 1 0 0 0 0 -2 2
410 - General environmental protection 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
41010 - Environmental policy and administrative management 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
430 - Other multisector 0 0 -2 1 0 0 0 0 -2 1
43010 - Multisector aid 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
43040 - Rural development 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0
500 - Commodity aid and general programme assistance
0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4
520 - Developmental food assistance 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4
52010 - Food assistance 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4
700 - Humanitarian aid 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4
720 - Emergency response 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
72010 - Material relief assistance and services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
72050 - Relief co-ordination and support services 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
730 - Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
73010 - Immediate post-emergency reconstruction and rehabilitation 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
910 - Administrative costs of donors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
91010 - Administrative costs (non-sector allocable) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
-4 25 -3 48 0 7 0 1 -7 81
291
Graphs Table TF3A
Committed amount by sector
Disbursed amount by sector
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
100 - Social infrastructure and services
200 - Economic infrastructure and services
300 - Production sectors
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting
500 - Commodity aid and general programme assistance
700 - Humanitarian aid
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified
292
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
100 - Social infrastructure and services
200 - Economic infrastructure and services
300 - Production sectors
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting
500 - Commodity aid and general programme assistance
700 - Humanitarian aid
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified
293
TableTF3B: Regional breakdown of Trust Fund Africa (in EUR millions)
Country Commitments Disbursements
Africa -7 84
Africa -1 5
Africa, regional -1 5
Africa (North of Sahara) 0 9
Egypt 0 3
Libya 0 0
Morocco 0 1
North of Sahara, regional 0 2
Tunisia 0 3
Africa (South of Sahara) -6 70
Burkina Faso 0 1
Burundi 0 0
Chad 0 0
Djibouti -0 0
Eastern Africa, regional 0 0
Ethiopia 0 8
Gambia 0 0
Ghana -0 0
Guinea -0 0
Ivory Coast -0 1
Kenya 0 0
Mali -1 12
Mauritania 0 0
Niger -0 0
Nigeria -1 0
Rwanda 0 0
Senegal -0 0
Somalia 0 6
South of Sahara, regional -1 5
South Sudan -2 7
Sudan 0 28
Uganda 0 2
Developing countries 0 0
Developing countries, unspecified 0 0
Developing countries, unspecified 0 0
-7 84
294
Graphs Table TF3B
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Committed amount by region
Africa
Africa (North of Sahara)
Africa (South of Sahara)
Developing countries, unspecified
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
Disbursed amount by region
Africa
Africa (North of Sahara)
Africa (South of Sahara)
Developing countries, unspecified
295
TableTF4: Sectoral breakdown of Trust Fund Bêkou (in EUR millions)
Sector Commitments Disbursements
100 - Social infrastructure and services 0 7
110 - Education 0 3
11330 - Vocational training 0 3
120 - Health 0 3
12110 - Health policy and administrative management 0 0
12220 - Basic health care 0 3
150 - Government and civil society 0 0
15153 - Media and free flow of information 0 0
15180 - Ending violence against women and girls 0 0
15220 - Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution 0 0
200 - Economic infrastructure and services 0 1
250 - Business and other services 0 1
25030 - Business development services 0 1
300 - Production sectors 0 0
310 - Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0 0
31110 - Agricultural policy and administrative management 0 0
31120 - Agricultural development 0 0
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting 0 2
430 - Other multisector 0 2
43010 - Multisector aid 0 2
700 - Humanitarian aid 0 0
720 - Emergency response 0 0
72010 - Material relief assistance and services 0 0
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 0 0
910 - Administrative costs of donors 0 0
91010 - Administrative costs (non-sector allocable) 0 0
998 - Unallocated / Unspecified 0 0
99820 - Promotion of development awareness (non-sector allocable) 0 0
0 10
296
Graphs Table TF4
Committed amount by sector since 2021
Disbursed amount by sector since 2021
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
100 - Social infrastructure and services
200 - Economic infrastructure and services
300 - Production sectors
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting
700 - Humanitarian aid
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
100 - Social infrastructure and services
200 - Economic infrastructure and services
300 - Production sectors
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting
700 - Humanitarian aid
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified
297
TableTF5: Sectoral breakdown of Trust Fund Colombia (in EUR millions)
Sector Commitments Disbursements
100 - Social infrastructure and services 1 2
150 - Government and civil society 1 2
15110 - Public sector policy and administrative management 1 0
15220 - Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution 0 1
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting 0 2
430 - Other multisector 0 2
43010 - Multisector aid 0 0
43040 - Rural development 0 1
43050 - Non-agricultural alternative development 0 0
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified -0 0
910 - Administrative costs of donors -0 0
91010 - Administrative costs (non-sector allocable) -0 0
1 3
Graphs Table TF5
Committed amount by sector since 2021
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s 100 - Social infrastructure and services
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified
298
Disbursed amount by sector since 2021
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
100 - Social infrastructure and services
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified
299
TableTF6: Sectoral breakdown of Trust Fund Madad (in EUR millions)
Sector Commitments Disbursements
100 - Social infrastructure and services -2 9
110 - Education -1 2
11220 - Primary education -1 0
11420 - Higher education -0 2
120 - Health -1 0
12230 - Basic health infrastructure 0 0
12261 - Health education -1 0
140 - Water and sanitation 0 2
14020 - Water supply and sanitation - large systems 0 2
150 - Government and civil society -0 2
15112 - Decentralisation and support to subnational government 0 0
15170 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions -0 0
15180 - Ending violence against women and girls 0 2
160 - Other social infrastructure and services -0 3
16010 - Social protection -0 1
16020 - Employment creation 0 3
300 - Production sectors 0 0
310 - Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0 0
31120 - Agricultural development 0 0
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting -0 0
430 - Other multisector -0 0
43010 - Multisector aid -0 0
500 - Commodity aid and general programme assistance 0 4
510 - General budget support 0 4
51010 - General budget support-related aid 0 4
700 - Humanitarian aid -0 0
730 - Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation -0 0
73010 - Immediate post-emergency reconstruction and rehabilitation -0 0
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified 0 0
910 - Administrative costs of donors 0 0
91010 - Administrative costs (non-sector allocable) 0 0
998 - Unallocated / Unspecified 0 0
99820 - Promotion of development awareness (non-sector allocable) 0 0
-2 13
300
Graphs Table TF6
Committed amount by sector since 2021
Disbursed amount by sector since 2021
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
100 - Social infrastructure and services
300 - Production sectors
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting
500 - Commodity aid and general programme assistance
700 - Humanitarian aid
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
EU R
m ill
io n
s
100 - Social infrastructure and services
300 - Production sectors
400 - Multisector/Cross-cutting
500 - Commodity aid and general programme assistance
700 - Humanitarian aid
900 - Other : Administrative costs of donors / Unallocated / Unspecified
301
Commitments ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 3A BIS: General EU budget for External Action in 2025 by DG – Commitments(92)
Commitments – Regular Contribution
Type of Aid DGs 01.
NDICI Geo
02. NDICI Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06. Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility
08. CFSP
09. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Other
EDF Total
ODA INTPA 4.786 691 130 64 5 -28 -
328 5.320
ODA ENEST 1.134 16 325 1.777 4.257 587 -85 8.011
ODA MENA 2.278 43 -3 2.319
ODA ECHO 5 0 2.552 2 2.559
ODA FPI 10 148 243 280 -6 675
ODA AGRI 175 5 180
ODA CLIMA 12 2 0 15
ODA ECFIN 135 28 163
ODA ENV 13 4 17
ODA REGIO 117 74 -4 187
ODA Other DGs 389 1 71 11 4 474
ODA Commission's administration
335 10 57 31 9 1 2 0 645 1.088
ODA Total - 8.854 924 1.033 2.562 2.156 4.298 596 281 65 5 645 -83 -
328 21.008
Non-ODA All 9321277 12461 50 87-38512
Non-ODA Commission's administration
70 01 9
Non-ODA Total - 93 2 134 7 124 62 50 87 -38 521
Total Regular Contribution
- 8.947 926 1.167 2.562 2.163 4.298 596 405 65 66 50 645 5 -
366 21.529
92 Table 3A BIS to 4 BIS below duplicate tables 3A to 4 above in a way that has been specifically adapted to be machine-readable. Work is in progress for some other tables that may not be fully machine-readable yet.
302
Commitments – Cofinancing
Type of Aid DGs 01.
NDICI Geo
02. NDICI
Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06. Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility
08. CFSP
09. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Other
EDF Total
ODA INTPA 131 2 4 136
ODA ENEST 480 -1 479
ODA MENA 5 5
ODA ECHO 1 1
ODA Other DGs 9 3 20 570 601
ODA Commission's administration 1 0 4 0 0 28 33
ODA Total 145 2 1 1 6 500 0 28 569 4 1.255
Non-ODA All 1.535 1.535
Non-ODA Commission's administration 0 0 0 0
Non-ODA Total 0 0 0 1.535 1.535
Total Cofinancing 145 2 1 1 6 500 1 1.535 28 569 4 2.790
Commitments
Total by Instrument 01.
NDICI Geo
02. NDICI Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06. Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility
08. CFSP
09. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Other
EDF Total
Total Commitments 9.092 928 1.167 2.563 2.169 4.798 596 406 65 66 1.535 50 672 574 -362 24.319
303
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA Yes Yes
Budget Non INTPA Yes Yes
EDF Yes Yes
Table 3B BIS: General EU budget for External Action in 2025 by DG – Disbursements
Disbursements – Regular Contribution
Type of Aid DGs 01.
NDICI Geo
02. NDICI
Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06. Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility
08. CFSP
09. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Other
Completion Lines
EDF Total
ODA INTPA 3.525 1.040 53 49 0 30 521 929 6.147
ODA ENEST 622 33 431 1.063 1.790 73 2 517 4.530
ODA MENA 1.333 28 1 396 1.758
ODA ECHO 1 0 2.462 2 2 2.466
ODA FPI 3 158 249 298 0 38 746
ODA AGRI 91 5 13 109
ODA CLIMA 15 0 1 1 16
ODA ECFIN 135 11 146
ODA ENV 24 4 28
ODA REGIO 117 29 0 146
ODA Other DGs 343 2 201 0 8 11 564
ODA Commission's administration
332 10 59 16 4 1 2 0 640 1.063
ODA Total - 6.079 1.299 1.065 2.472 1.442 1.806 77 299 51 0 640 63 1.499 929 17.718
Non-ODA All 79 32 35 4 126 3 59 0 73 11 14 437
Non-ODA Commission's administration
6 0 0 0 1 8
Non-ODA Total
- 79 32 41 4 127 3 60 0 73 11 14 445
Total Regular Contribution
- 6.158 1.332 1.106 2.472 1.446 1.806 77 426 54 61 0 640 136 1.509 943 18.163
304
Disbursements - Cofinancing
Type of Aid DGs 01.
NDICI Geo
02. NDICI
Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06. Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility
08. CFSP
09. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Other
Completion Lines
EDF Total
ODA INTPA 264 0 4 7 274
ODA ENEST 233 22 255
ODA MENA 0 1 1
ODA ECHO 4 4
ODA FPI 2 2
ODA Other DGs 7 2 0 568 0 578
ODA Commission's administratio n
1 0 3 0 0 26 31
ODA Total - 271 0 2 4 6 233 0 26 568 27 7 1.145
Non-ODA All 1.535 0 1.535
Non-ODA Commission's administratio n
0 0 0 0
Non-ODA Total - 0 0 0 1.535 0 1.535
Total Cofinancing
- 271 0 2 4 6 233 1 1.535 26 568 27 7 2.680
Disbursements
External Action 01.
NDICI Geo
02. NDICI
Thema
03. NDICI Other
04. HUMA
05. IPA III
06. Ukraine Facility
07. Western Balkans Facility
08. CFSP
09. INSC
10. OCT
11. ULCM
12. USC
13. Admin
14. Othe
r
Comple- tion Lines
EDF Total
Total Disbursements 6.429 1.332 1.108 2.476 1.452 2.038 77 426 54 61 1.535 0 666 704 1.536 950 20.843
305
Disbursements ODA Non-ODA
Budget INTPA No No
Budget Non INTPA No No
EDF Yes Yes
Table 4 BIS: European Development Fund (EDF) in 2025
Cotonou
Aid Instrument ODA Non-ODA Total
Cofinancing A Envelope 0 0
Cofinancing Regional allocations 3 3
Cofinancing Intra-ACP allocations 3 3
Cofinancing Total Total of all instruments - 7 7
Regular Contribution A Envelope 4802482
Regular Contribution Regional allocations 2313234
Regular Contribution Intra-ACP allocations 1739182
Regular Contribution Implementation costs 41041
Regular Contribution B Envelope 4 4
Regular Contribution Total Total of all instruments 929 14 943
Cotonou Total 936 14 950
EDF Total 936 14 950
306
9. Financing and investment operations covered by the EFSD+ external
action guarantee Chapter 5.2.3. of this report gives an overview of the EU’s use of financial instruments supported by the
External Action Guarantee (EAG) under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+).
Background:
The EAG was established by Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe Regulation (NDICI–Global Europe), adopted on 9 June 2021. NDICI–Global Europe unifies grants, blending and guarantees, which allows the EU to strategically promote public and private investment worldwide in support to sustainable development through the EFSD+. Investments are backed by an up to EUR 53.4 billion EAG.
The EU’s focus is to invest in projects that will contribute to its global ambitions: the Global Gateway strategy, the Green Deal, and jobs and sustainable and inclusive growth. The EFSD+ will also be key to rebuild and reconstruct Ukraine, in line with building back better principles.
Per NDICI–Global Europe, around half of the EAG (an indicative amount of EUR 26.7 billion) should be implemented by the European Investment Bank (EIB), mostly for sovereign and non-commercial sub- sovereign operations. By end-2025, three EIB dedicated investment windows are signed and operational: investment window 1 (operations with sovereign and non-commercial sub-sovereign counterparts available to all eligible regions), investment window 2 (operations with commercial sub-sovereign counterparts available to all eligible regions) and investment window 4 (EFSD+ guarantees enabling the EIB to provide support for the private sector in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific).
The rest of the EFSD+ budgetary guarantees will be implemented through the ‘Open Architecture’ windows for commercial sub-sovereign and private sector operations across all DG INTPA, DG ENEST and DG MENA regions, which are open to other Pillar-Assessed financial institutions. In 2022, a call for proposals was launched under the Open Architecture and the remaining capacity under the current Multiannual Financial Framework will be allocated through top-up to signed guarantees.
The tables in this annex show the deployment of the EFSD+ budgetary guarantees by end 2025.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 below show the list of covered operations signed under the EIB dedicated investment windows. Further information including contribution to NDICI–Global Europe objectives, additionality, and leverage effect achieved is available on the individual operation pages on the EIB website.
Tables 4 and 5 respectively show the list of signed guarantee programmes and covered operations under the Open Architecture. Detailed information on each programme is published in June each year as part of the draft budget, in Working Document XI. The report provides information on operational, financial and risk aspects of budgetary guarantees, including leverage, multiplier, amounts transferred to final recipients, number of final recipients, investments made by final recipients, private sector resources mobilised.
The contribution of the guarantees as a whole to the policy objectives of the EFSD and EFSD+ and NDICI–
Global Europe regulations is also covered.
307
Table 1: EIB investment window 1 covered operations
Lead Directorate-
General Operation name Country Sub-region
Region
EIB signature
date
EIB amount signed (EUR
million)
INTPA 20060128 - OMVG - Interconnection Guinea West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 05/12/2022 17.00
INTPA 20130229 - Dhaka Environmentally Sustainable Water Supply B
Bangladesh South Asia Asia–Pacific 30/07/2025 70.00
INTPA 20140106 - Tajik - Kyrgyz Power Interconnection B Kyrgyzstan Central Asia Asia–Pacific 12/05/2025 9.00
INTPA 20140271 - Jirama Water III - Prioritaire Madagascar East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 09/12/2019 35.00
INTPA 20140437 - Eau et assainissement Cotonou phase 3 B Benin West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 17/12/2021 27.00
INTPA 20140650 - Belabo-Ngaoundere Railway Renewal Cameroon Cameroon East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 31/12/2021 106.00
INTPA 20160156 - Saidabad Raw Water Conveyor B Bangladesh South Asia Asia–Pacific 10/10/2025 90.00
INTPA 20160638 - Interconnexion electrique 225 kV Guinee-Mali Guinea West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 04/03/2021 170.00
INTPA 20170824 - Sao Tome Sustainable Roads Sao Tome and Principe
Southern Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 19/12/2019 12.50
INTPA 20170912 - Aep Niamey II Niger West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 18/12/2019 105.00
INTPA 20170981 - Cameroon Rural Electrification Cameroon East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 08/01/2025 43.00
INTPA 20180309 - Djibouti Water Supply And Wastewater Treatment Djibouti East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 07/07/2023 79.20
INTPA 20180376 - Nigeria Access to Agri Markets Framework Loan Nigeria West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 29/12/2023 150.00
INTPA 20180377 - Nigeria Climate Adaptation - Erosion and Watershed
Nigeria West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 29/12/2020 175.00
INTPA 20180600 - Cape Verde Connectivity Programme Cape Verde West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 10/04/2019 21.95
INTPA 20190162 - Interconnexion Antananarivo Toamasina Prirtem- 1
Madagascar East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 29/11/2021 81.30
INTPA 20190316 - Mongolia Development of Secondary Urban Centres
Mongolia East / Central Asia Asia–Pacific 29/12/2023 44.91
INTPA 20190331 - Mozambique Climate Resilient FL Mozambique Southern Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 23/11/2020 100.00
INTPA 20190410 - Development Bank Ghana Ghana West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 28/12/2020 170.00
INTPA 20190635 - Mauritania Covid-19 Resilience Submarine Cable Mauritania West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 22/12/2020 25.00
INTPA 20190660 - ATI Membership Contribution Cameroon Cameroon East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 09/03/2020 11.37
INTPA 20190662 - ATI Membership Contribution Niger Niger West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 05/12/2019 11.37
INTPA 20190663 - ATI Membership Contribution Togo Togo West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 16/12/2019 11.37
INTPA 20190756 - Senegal Dechets Solides (Promoged) and Covid-19 Senegal West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 09/02/2021 50.00
INTPA 20190875 - Programme de restauration durable des forets Côte d'Ivoire West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 11/11/2024 150.00
INTPA 20190920 - Senegal eau potable and covid-19 Senegal West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 09/02/2021 64.50
INTPA 20200030 - Electricity Access Rwanda Rwanda East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 23/12/2020 100.00
INTPA 20200039 - Congo Digital Transformation Congo East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 30/12/2022 26.00
INTPA 20200097 - Modernisation du reseau routier au Tchad Chad East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 22/09/2022 141.20
INTPA 20200098 - Assainissement et drainage de Ouagadougou Burkina Faso West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 27/11/2020 15.00
INTPA 20200099 - ATI Membership Contribution Chad Chad East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 04/11/2020 15.00
INTPA 20200223 - ATI Membership Contribution Benin Benin West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 13/10/2020 15.00
INTPA 20200337 - ATI Membership Contribution Senegal Senegal West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 03/11/2020 15.00
INTPA 20200413 - Senegal Covid-19 Health Programme Senegal West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 23/07/2020 75.00
INTPA 20200426 - ATI Membership Contribution Burkina Faso Burkina Faso West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 16/10/2020 15.00
308
Lead Directorate-
General Operation name Country Sub-region
Region
EIB signature
date
EIB amount signed (EUR
million)
INTPA 20200476 - Assainissement pluvial de villes du Benin Benin West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 24/03/2021 110.00
INTPA 20200476 - Assainissement pluvial de villes du Benin Benin West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 06/12/2021 14.94
INTPA 20200624 - Riposte sanitaire covid-19 Benin Benin West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 27/11/2020 30.00
INTPA 20200632 - Saint Lucia Covid-19 Health Resilience Saint Lucia Caribbean Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
20/09/2022 13.50
INTPA 20200668 - Riposte sanitaire covid-19 Niger Niger West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 28/12/2020 15.00
INTPA 20200764 - Barbados Covid-19 Health Resilience Barbados Caribbean Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
14/06/2021 50.00
INTPA 20200764 - Barbados Covid-19 Health Resilience Barbados Caribbean Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
19/03/2025 10.00
INTPA 20200777 - Angola Covid-19 Health Resilience Angola Southern Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 24/02/2022 50.00
INTPA 20200788 - Rwanda Covid 19 Health Resilience Rwanda East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 29/09/2021 22.00
INTPA 20200820 - Covid-19 Health Response Ghana Ghana West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 10/12/2021 75.00
INTPA 20200841 - Benin resilience economique covid 19 Benin West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 17/12/2021 45.00
INTPA 20200935 - Sao Tome Water Supply Sao Tome and Principe
Southern Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 31/12/2022 8.44
INTPA 20210138 - Ecuador-Peru Power Interconnection Ecuador Latin America (South America)
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
28/12/2023 112.47
INTPA 20210403 - Dakar Public Transport Network Restructuring Senegal West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 27/12/2022 166.90
INTPA 20210432 - AEP Grand Conakry - Guinea - Phase 1 Guinea West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 11/08/2025 220.00
INTPA 20210433 - Guinea-Bissau Tah-7 Resilient Road Corridor Guinea-Bissau West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 17/12/2024 105.00
INTPA 20210682 - Aspire-AT Cambodia South-East Asia Asia–Pacific 20/12/2024 60.00
INTPA 20210721 - Maldives Covid-19 Health Facility Maldives South Asia Asia–Pacific 22/06/2022 18.40
INTPA 20220140 - Mauritania Regional Transmission Corridor Mauritania West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 01/10/2025 90.00
INTPA 20220186 - Argentina Transmission Network Investments FL Argentina Latin America (South America)
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
30/12/2022 100.00
INTPA 20220280 - Bangladesh Renewable Energy Facility Bangladesh South Asia Asia–Pacific 25/10/2023 350.00
INTPA 20220718 - Water-Energy Framework Loan Malawi Malawi East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 23/07/2025 90.00
INTPA 20220778 - Bhutan Hydro and Solar Energy Facility Bhutan South Asia Asia–Pacific 17/04/2024 150.00
INTPA 20220821 - Cape Verde Green Energy FL Cape Verde West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 29/12/2023 120.00
INTPA 20220860 - Cabo Verde Blue Economy Sustainable Ports FL Cape Verde West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 02/09/2024 80.00
INTPA 20220860 - Cabo Verde Blue Economy Sustainable Ports FL Cape Verde West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 27/12/2024 34.00
INTPA 20220950 - Assainissement pluvial de villes du Benin II Benin West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 29/12/2023 70.00
INTPA 20230070 - Nigeria Green and Digital Microfinance/MSME and Midcaps
Nigeria West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 11/12/2025 60.00
INTPA 20230070 - Nigeria Green and Digital Microfinance/MSME and Midcaps
Nigeria West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 11/12/2025 140.00
INTPA 20230186 - Alimentation en eau potable nord du Benin Benin West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 29/12/2023 62.00
INTPA 20230689 - Barbados Global Gateway Nature Guarantee Barbados Caribbean Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
25/11/2024 142.93
INTPA 20230707 - Lagos Nigeria Waterways Sustainable Transport Nigeria West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 11/12/2025 170.00
INTPA 20230892 - Costa Rica Electric Train Costa Rica Central America (Latin America)
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
29/09/2025 213.26
309
Lead Directorate-
General Operation name Country Sub-region
Region
EIB signature
date
EIB amount signed (EUR
million)
INTPA 20240202 - Atidi Membership Increase Cote D Ivoire Côte d'Ivoire West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 27/12/2024 50.00
INTPA 20240347 - BDE Water and Sanitation II Ecuador Latin America (South America)
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
09/11/2025 86.50
INTPA 20240472 - Clean Oceans Initiative Grand Nokoue Benin Benin West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 23/12/2024 35.50
INTPA 20240649 - Sustainable Water Supply Greater Banjul Gambia Gambia West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 23/12/2025 22.10
INTPA 20240752 - Karachi Water Infrastructure Framework Loan Pakistan South Asia Asia–Pacific 17/12/2025 60.00
ENEST 92574 MOLDOVA ROADS IV Moldova, Republic of
Eastern Neighbourhood 31/03/2022 150.00
ENEST 96156 MOLDOVA ROADS III B Moldova, Republic of
Eastern Neighbourhood 15/12/2022 100.00
ENEST 92372 GEORGIA-ZEMO SAMGORI IRRIGATION PROJECT Georgia Eastern Neighbourhood 22/12/2022 20.00
ENEST 94441 ARMENIA ECONOMIC RESILIENCE FACILITY Armenia Eastern Neighbourhood 27/12/2022 70.00
MENA 96104 FAYOUM WASTEWATER EXPANSION PROJECT B Egypt Southern Neighbourhood 29/12/2022 46.00
MENA 92160 HELWAN WASTEWATER TREATMENT PROJECT Egypt Southern Neighbourhood 30/11/2022 78.00
MENA 90359 TANTA-EL MANSOURA-DAMIETTA RAILWAY UPGRADING
Egypt Southern Neighbourhood 07/11/2022 221.00
MENA 91625 AQABA-AMMAN WATER DESALINATION AND CONVEYANCE
Jordan Southern Neighbourhood 08/12/2022 200.00
MENA 92780 STEG - PROGRAMME TRANSPORT ET DISTRIBUTION Tunisia Southern Neighbourhood 28/12/2022 65.80
MENA 94840 STRENGTHENING TUNISIA FOOD RESILIENCE Tunisia Southern Neighbourhood 16/12/2022 150.00
ENEST 94741 ROUTE 10 RAIL REHABILITATION B Kosovo Western Balkans 21/12/2022 38.00
ENEST 94231 SERBIAN INLAND WATERWAY INFRASTRUCTURE B Serbia Western Balkans 13/12/2022 31.00
ENEST 96081 CONNECTED SCHOOLS IN SERBIA B Serbia Western Balkans 29/12/2022 5.00
ENEST 90483 MUNICIPAL WATER INFRASTRUCTURE NORTH MACEDONIA
North Macedonia Western Balkans 23/11/2022 50.00
ENEST 95787 IDF LOAN FOR SMES CLIMATE - PRIORITY PROJECTS VI B Montenegro Western Balkans 29/07/2022 50.00
ENEST 93755 SERBIA CORRIDOR X RAILWAYS FL - GLOBAL GATEWAY Serbia Western Balkans 16/12/2022 550.00
ENEST 91071 BANJA LUKA MEDICAL COMPLEX Bosnia and Herzegovina
Western Balkans 14/06/2023 22.50
ENEST 91071 BANJA LUKA MEDICAL COMPLEX Bosnia and Herzegovina
Western Balkans 14/06/2023 52.50
ENEST 94965 SARAJEVO URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT B Bosnia and Herzegovina
Western Balkans 15/06/2023 35.00
ENEST 93885 SERBIAN EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURE FL Serbia Western Balkans 19/01/2023 40.00
ENEST 96962 ROAD REHABILITATION AND SAFETY B Serbia Western Balkans 06/10/2023 85.00
MENA 87375 STEG - TUNISIA ITALY POWER INTERCONNECTION Tunisia Southern Neighbourhood 30/12/2023 45.00
310
Lead Directorate-
General Operation name Country Sub-region
Region
EIB signature
date
EIB amount signed (EUR
million)
MENA 89310 MODERNISATION ETABLISSEMENTS SCOLAIRES II Tunisia Southern Neighbourhood 10/07/2023 40.00
ENEST 90016 YEREVAN ENERGY EFFICIENCY PHASE II Armenia Eastern Neighbourhood 29/11/2023 25.00
MENA 96314 AQABA-AMMAN WATER DESALINATION AND CONVEYANCE B
Jordan Southern Neighbourhood 03/12/2023 100.00
ENEST 91812 WINDFARM VLASIC Bosnia and Herzegovina
Western Balkans 19/10/2023 36.00
MENA 94002 GREEN SUSTAINABLE INDUSTRY - GSI Egypt Southern Neighbourhood 31/12/2023 135.00
ENEST 94720 DBNM LOAN FOR SMES MID-CAPS AND GREEN TRANSITION
North Macedonia Western Balkans 24/07/2023 100.00
ENEST 96068 MOLDOVA SOLIDARITY LANES Moldova, Republic of
Eastern Neighbourhood 15/12/2023 41.20
MENA 96201 INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FORESTS IN MOROCCO Morocco Southern Neighbourhood 29/12/2023 100.00
ENEST 96318 CORRIDOR VIII RAIL - EASTERN SECTION MK North Macedonia Western Balkans 18/12/2023 175.00
ENEST 96470 EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK LOAN Türkiye Türkiye 15/11/2023 400.00
MENA 91760 CORRIDOR SFAX - KASSERINE Tunisia Southern Neighbourhood 13/06/2024 210.00
ENEST 91927 MONTENEGRO RAILWAYS REHABILITATION Montenegro Western Balkans 27/05/2024 40.00
ENEST 92824 SMART METERING SERBIA Serbia Western Balkans 28/06/2024 80.00
ENEST 94223 VORE HANI I HOTIT RAILWAY LINE Albania Western Balkans 20/03/2024 100.00
ENEST 94576 KEK SOLAR PV - GLOBAL GATEWAY Kosovo Western Balkans 18/03/2024 33.00
MENA 97952 TUNISIE - RELANCE ECONOMIQUE B Tunisia Southern Neighbourhood 18/03/2024 170.00
MENA 96373 NORTHEAST RAMALLAH WASTEWATER Palestine Southern Neighbourhood 10/01/2024 19.90
ENEST 97043 UKRAINE RECOVERY III Ukraine Eastern Neighbourhood 11/06/2024 10.00
ENEST 97043 UKRAINE RECOVERY III Ukraine Eastern Neighbourhood 11/06/2024 10.00
ENEST 97043 UKRAINE RECOVERY III Ukraine Eastern Neighbourhood 11/06/2024 70.00
ENEST 97043 UKRAINE RECOVERY III Ukraine Eastern Neighbourhood 11/06/2024 10.00
MENA 94890 EGYPT FOOD RESILIENCE Egypt Southern Neighbourhood 31/12/2024 90.00
ENEST 95884 EPS GREEN FINANCING A Serbia Western Balkans 27/12/2024 100.00
MENA 96461 JORDAN WATER SECURITY AND CLIMATE ADAPTATION Jordan Southern Neighbourhood 18/07/2024 400.00
ENEST 96752 ARMENIA SISIAN-KAJARAN ROAD PROJECT Armenia Eastern Neighbourhood 12/11/2024 236.00
ENEST 96851 MOLDOVA FOREST DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME Moldova, Republic of
Eastern Neighbourhood 17/09/2024 200.00
MENA 97342 MOROCCO POST-EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION Morocco Southern Neighbourhood 01/10/2024 230.00
311
Lead Directorate-
General Operation name Country Sub-region
Region
EIB signature
date
EIB amount signed (EUR
million)
MENA 97342 MOROCCO POST-EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION Morocco Southern Neighbourhood 01/10/2024 200.00
MENA 97342 MOROCCO POST-EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION Morocco Southern Neighbourhood 01/10/2024 70.00
ENEST 97445 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UPGRADE II Serbia Western Balkans 23/12/2024 25.00
MENA 98686 - JORDAN VALLEY WATER RESOURCES B Jordan Southern Neighbourhood 28/03/2025 24.30
MENA 97984 - ONEE PRODUCTION D EAU POTABLE III (AEP3) Morocco Southern Neighbourhood 22/05/2025 70.00
MENA 97456 - ONEE - TRANSMISSION ENERGIE RENOUVELABLE Morocco Southern Neighbourhood 22/05/2025 170.00
MENA 98779 - APPUI AU SECTEUR DE L EAU POTABLE C Tunisia Southern Neighbourhood 28/04/2025 22.00
MENA 98790 - APPUI AU SECTEUR DE L EAU POTABLE D Tunisia Southern Neighbourhood 28/04/2025 8.00
ENEST 88314 - CORRIDOR VIII RAIL PHASE I - ALBANIA Albania Western Balkans 08/04/2025 30.00
ENEST 94541 - POKLECANI WIND FARM Bosnia and Herzegovina
Western Balkans 08/05/2025 103.05
ENEST 99442 - MONTENEGRO EDUCATION PROGRAMME D Montenegro Western Balkans 20/06/2025 18.00
ENEST 98444 RAILWAY NIS-DIMITROVGRAD B Serbia Western Balkans 11/08/2025 100.00
ENEST 87081 MOLDOVA REGIONAL HOSPITALS Moldova, Republic of
Eastern Neighbourhood 08/07/2025 101.00
ENEST 91756 SUSTAINABLE IMPROVEMENT OF ROAD NETWORK Serbia Western Balkans 23/12/2025 150.00
ENEST 94488 ARMENIA - RESILIENT SYUNIK PROGRAM Armenia Eastern Neighbourhood 16/07/2025 25.00
ENEST 94488 ARMENIA - RESILIENT SYUNIK PROGRAM Armenia Eastern Neighbourhood 16/07/2025 25.00
ENEST 94932 CLINICAL CENTERS PHASE II Serbia Western Balkans 28/10/2025 157.00
MENA 98166 MOROCCO POST-EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION B Morocco Southern Neighbourhood 01/12/2025 230.00
MENA 98166 MOROCCO POST-EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION B Morocco Southern Neighbourhood 01/12/2025 200.00
MENA 98166 MOROCCO POST-EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION B Morocco Southern Neighbourhood 01/12/2025 70.00
ENEST 97550 RAIL ROUTE 4 REHABILITATION BAR-GOLUBOVCI Montenegro Western Balkans 22/12/2025 63.00
MENA 98383 PALESTINIAN PRIVATE SECTOR RECOVERY & RESILIENCE Palestine Southern Neighbourhood 23/09/2025 400.00
ENEST 98604 CHISINAU DISTRICT HEATING PROJECT Moldova, Republic of
Eastern Neighbourhood 03/07/2025 143.50
ENEST 99401 ARMENIA ECONOMIC RESILIENCE FACILITY II Armenia Eastern Neighbourhood 28/10/2025 100.00
312
Table 2: EIB investment window 2 covered operations
Lead Directorate-
General Operation name Country Sub-region
Region
EIB signature
date
EIB amount signed (EUR
million)
INTPA 20240004 - Kazakhstan - Strategic Framework Facility Kazakhstan Central Asia Asia–Pacific 23/12/2024 200.00
INTPA 20250019 - Electricity Integration and Energy Transition - CR
Costa Rica Central America (Latin America)
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
22/12/2025 170.29
MENA 93759 ONCF REHABILITATION FERROVIAIRE A Morocco Southern Neighbourhood 11/11/2022 200.00
MENA 94708 TECHNOPOLES MAROC II Morocco Southern Neighbourhood 29/12/2023 115.00
MENA 50367 OBELISK SOLAR PV AND BESS B Egypt Southern Neighbourhood 30/12/2025 17.00
MENA 99368 OBELISK SOLAR PV AND BESS Egypt Southern Neighbourhood 30/12/2025 110.60
Table 3: EIB investment window 4 covered operations
These operations are financed by the ACP Investment Facility reflows as opposed to EIB investment window 1 and open architecture, both part
of the EAG mechanism, but they are provided here since they also provide external action guarantees, be it from a different financing source.
Lead Directorate
-General Operation name Country Sub-region
Region
EIB signature
date
EIB amount signed (EUR
million)
INTPA 20190749 - Banque Agricole - Senegal Green Agri Value Chain Senegal West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 30-08-24 30,00
INTPA 20220112 - Banfondesa Microfinance Loan Dominican Republic Caribbean Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
21-12-22 10,00
INTPA 20220361 - Ebid - Ecowas Climate Action FL Regional - West Africa West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 19-12-25 50,00
INTPA 20220361 - Ebid - Ecowas Climate Action FL Regional - West Africa West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 13-05-24 100,00
INTPA 20220368 - Abi Youth and Gender Loan for SMEs And Midcaps Regional - West Africa West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 21-06-23 65,00
INTPA 20220385 - Green African Agri Value Chain - FCB Zambia Zambia Southern Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 09-06-23 10,00
INTPA 20220390 - ETG Regional Expansion Regional - Africa West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 27-12-24 105,41
INTPA 20220477 - Cofina - Green African Agri Value Chain Côte d'Ivoire West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 05-07-23 16,10
INTPA 20220477 - Cofina - Green African Agri Value Chain Senegal West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 05-07-23 9,75
INTPA 20220491 - Tanzania Gender and Blue Economy - CRDB Bank Tanzania, United republic of
East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 22-02-23 90,00
INTPA 20220491 - Tanzania Gender and Blue Economy - CRDB Bank Tanzania, United republic of
East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 22-02-23 60,00
INTPA 20220525 - Access Bank PLC Nigeria Gender Loan for SMEs Nigeria West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 07-09-23 50,00
INTPA 20220584 - BMI Youth and Gender Loan for SMEs and Midcaps Mauritania West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 23-05-23 20,00
INTPA 20220593 - Tanzania Gender and Blue Economy Facility – KCB Tanzania, United republic of
East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 21-02-23 20,00
313
Lead Directorate
-General Operation name Country Sub-region
Region
EIB signature
date
EIB amount signed (EUR
million)
INTPA 20220594 - Tanzania Gender & Blue Economy - NMB Bank Tanzania, United republic of
East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 23-02-23 60,00
INTPA 20220594 - Tanzania Gender & Blue Economy - NMB Bank Tanzania, United republic of
East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 23-02-23 40,00
INTPA 20220605 - Women and Youth Empowerment Loan - WEMA Nigeria West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 16-10-25 50,00
INTPA 20220671 - BCI Youth And Gender Loan for SMEs And Midcaps Mauritania West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 07-02-24 20,00
INTPA 20220703 - Axian Telecom Expansion Madagascar East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 03-12-24 38,05
INTPA 20220703 - Axian Telecom Expansion Tanzania, United republic of
East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 03-12-24 57,08
INTPA 20220790 - ACP Gender Finance Facility - Moza Banco Mozambique Southern Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 20-12-23 10,00
INTPA 20220792 - BRD Green Finance FL Rwanda East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 30-11-23 20,00
INTPA 20220799 - Green African Agri Value Chains - ZICB Zambia Zambia Southern Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 30-07-25 15,00
INTPA 20220836 - Cape Verde Regional Digital Connectivity Cape Verde West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 02-09-24 37,00
INTPA 20220898 - ACP Gender Finance Facility - BNI Mozambique Southern Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 10-12-24 15,00
INTPA 20230065 - Cabo Verde Wind Power Expansion Cape Verde West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 30-07-25 39,06
INTPA 20230077 - Cerudeb Uganda Microloan Uganda East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 19-12-23 50,00
INTPA 20230121 - BEA Youth & Gender Inclusion & Blue Economy BMIL Mauritania West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 06-05-25 15,00
INTPA 20230318 - ACP Gender Finance Facility HFB Uganda East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 22-12-23 25,00
INTPA 20230338 - ACP Gender SME Finance Facility - KCB Kenya Kenya East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 22-05-24 50,00
INTPA 20230346 - ACP Gender Microfinance Facility - KCB Kenya Kenya East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 22-05-24 15,00
INTPA 20230378 - ACP Gender Finance Facility - Family Bank Kenya East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 30-04-25 50,00
INTPA 20230452 - Ademi Microfinance Gender Dominican Republic Caribbean Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
08-12-25 10,42
INTPA 20230452 - Ademi Microfinance Gender Dominican Republic Caribbean Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
04-12-25 10,41
INTPA 20230452 - Ademi Microfinance Gender Dominican Republic Caribbean Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
08-12-25 4,47
INTPA 20230452 - Ademi Microfinance Gender Dominican Republic Caribbean Latin America & Caribbean (LAC)
04-12-25 4,46
INTPA 20230482 - Green Agriculture Value Chain - Bank of Kigali Rwanda East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 14-03-24 50,00
INTPA 20230540 - ACP Inclusive Growth And Youth Employment-KCB Ken
Kenya East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 22-05-24 50,00
INTPA 20230646 - Vista GUI 1 Youth and Gender Agri MBIL Guinea West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 30-07-25 20,00
INTPA 20230646 - Vista GUI 1 Youth and Gender Agri MBIL Sierra Leone West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 31-07-25 10,00
INTPA 20230702 - BNI Agriculture & Cocoa & Youth Employment Mbil Côte d'Ivoire West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 11-11-24 100,00
INTPA 20230768 - Stanbic Uganda - Gender Contract Uganda East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 31-07-25 25,00
INTPA 20230768 - Stanbic Uganda - Gender Contract Uganda East and Central Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 31-07-25 75,00
INTPA 20240336 - Mauritania Railway Modernisation Mauritania West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 24-11-25 108,28
INTPA 20250451 - Nigeria Agriculture Value Chains Bank of Industry Nigeria West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 22-12-25 85,00
314
Table 4: Open Architecture signed guarantee programmes
Lead Directorate-General
guarantee name Region
Signature
date
Amount signed (EUR
million)
ENEST Better Futures Programme - Eastern Partnership for Real Sector Neighbourhood 22/12/2023 90,00
ENEST Better Futures Programme - Global Allocation for Real Sector Americas and Caribbean, Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Sub- Saharan Africa, Turkey
25/04/2025 201,00
ENEST Digital Transformation Platform Neighbourhood 15/11/2022 35,00
ENEST Financial Inclusion in the Neighbourhood (East and South) Neighbourhood 15/11/2022 115,00
ENEST Financing and Accelerating the Sustainable Transition of Cities ("FAST Cities")
Americas and Caribbean, Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Turkey
21/10/2024 176,00
ENEST Green Transition Neighbourhood 30/04/2025 300,00
ENEST Growth4All Programme in the Western Balkans and Türkiye Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Turkey
19/08/2024 78,00
ENEST HI BAR Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Turkey
12/03/2024 168,00
ENEST MSME Access to Green, Growth and Inclusive Finance - PPG Component Neighbourhood 18/06/2024 70,00
ENEST Municipal, Infrastructure and Industrial Resilience Guarantee Programme Plus
Neighbourhood, Turkey 02/01/2024
60,00
ENEST Supporting a Market-Oriented Green Transformation in the Eastern Neighbourhood and W
Neighbourhood 27/06/2024
260,00
ENEST Risk Sharing for ESG Projects Neighbourhood, Asia & Pacific 30/12/2025 76,75
INTPA Accelerate the Energy Transition - AccelerET Asia & Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa 05/03/2025 165,00
INTPA Acceleration Human Development (HDX) Americas and Caribbean, Asia & Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa
11/10/2023 750,00
INTPA Africa GreenCo Sub-Saharan Africa 19/12/2025 50,00
INTPA African Local Currency Bond Program Neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa 25/10/2023 100,00
INTPA Choose Africa VC Sub-Saharan Africa 22/07/2025 44,00
INTPA Cityriz Sub-Saharan Africa 25/04/2022 30,00
INTPA Covax II Americas and Caribbean, Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Sub- Saharan Africa
22/11/2021 200,00
INTPA DFCD Aya – Land Use Facility Americas and Caribbean, Asia & Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa
18/10/2024 105,00
INTPA Digital Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 25/09/2025 115,00
INTPA EDFI Carbon Sinks Americas and Caribbean, Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Sub- Saharan Africa
10/10/2024 366,00
INTPA EDFI MSME Platform Neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa 29/07/2022 80,00
INTPA EDFI MSME Platform Plus Neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa 25/06/2024 225,00
INTPA EDFI Renewable Energy Transition Americas and Caribbean, Asia & Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa
21/05/2025 332,00
315
Lead Directorate-General
guarantee name Region
Signature
date
Amount signed (EUR
million)
INTPA EDFI Transforming Global Value Chains Americas and Caribbean, Asia & Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa
21/05/2025 194,00
INTPA EU Market Creation Facility - Capacity Component Plus Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Sub- Saharan Africa
29/11/2024 246,00
INTPA EU Market Creation Facility (EUMCF) – Pricing Component Plus (PC+) Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Sub- Saharan Africa
04/07/2025 150,00
INTPA EU-Finnfund Global Connected Guarantee Sub-Saharan Africa 26/10/2023 100,00
INTPA Fisea Plus Sub-Saharan Africa 06/05/2022 35,00
INTPA Global Investment Equity Fund Programme Americas and Caribbean, Sub- Saharan Africa
27/11/2024 100,00
INTPA Global Social Impact Fund Programme Sub-Saharan Africa 23/12/2025 12,00
INTPA Green Energy for Africa and Asia Asia & Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa 26/02/2025 361,00
INTPA Impact+ Risk Sharing Mechanism Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Sub- Saharan Africa
30/09/2025 178,00
INTPA Liquidity Accelerator Fund Americas and Caribbean, Sub- Saharan Africa
04/04/2025 19,00
INTPA Liquidity Platform for Impact Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Sub- Saharan Africa, Turkey
08/10/2025 216,00
INTPA Local Governments Access to Financing Guarantee Programme Neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa 27/05/2022 30,00
INTPA Nasira+: A New Chance Guarantee for Underserved Entrepreneurs and Green Financing
Americas and Caribbean, Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Sub- Saharan Africa, Turkey
09/09/2025 265,00
INTPA OCFF - Ocean and Climate Finance Facility Sub-Saharan Africa 05/09/2025 205,00
INTPA SDG Fund II Asia & Pacific, Neighbourhood, Sub- Saharan Africa
07/11/2024 72,00
INTPA Sustainable Off-Grid Lighting Programme Sub-Saharan Africa 13/10/2025 76,00
INTPA TERRA – Transforming and Empowering Resilient and Responsible Agribusiness
Neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey
07/05/2025 110,00
INTPA Triple Bottom Line Inclusive Finance in Latin America Programme – Phase II
Americas and Caribbean 23/12/2025
50,00
Table 5: Open Architecture covered operations
Directorate- General
Operation name Sub-region Country Region Cover Start Date Amount
signed (EUR million)
ENEST FIF - MSME loan - Armswissbank (EFSD+ P3) Eastern Neighbourhood Armenia Neighbourhood 16/05/2024 0.92
ENEST FIF - PRS - MAIB (EFSD+2) Eastern Neighbourhood Moldova Neighbourhood 12/11/2024 20.00
ENEST FIF - WB WiB II Phase II - Erste bank (EFSD+1) Western Balkans Montenegro Neighbourhood 14/10/2025 0.20
MENA Aqaba Digital Hub Southern Neighbourhood Jordan Neighbourhood 31/12/2025 12.00
ENEST Chisinau Urban Enhancement Project Eastern Neighbourhood Moldova Neighbourhood 19/08/2025 39.10
316
Directorate- General
Operation name Sub-region Country Region Cover Start Date Amount
signed (EUR million)
MENA DFF - Project Verde Southern Neighbourhood Egypt Neighbourhood 19/02/2025 25.00
MENA DFF non SME: GoBus inter-city Southern Neighbourhood Egypt Neighbourhood 15/09/2025 10.89
ENEST EPBIH Solar transition Programme Western Balkans Bosnia and
Herzegovina Neighbourhood
30/12/2025 50.00
ENEST FIF – ACBA Bank MSME Loan (EFSD+3) Eastern Neighbourhood Armenia Neighbourhood 04/09/2023 4.61
ENEST FIF - ACBA Bank MSME Loan (EFSD+3) Eastern Neighbourhood Armenia Neighbourhood 04/09/2023 4.62
MENA FIF - Al Amana - Youth in Business (EFSD+ P3) Southern Neighbourhood Morocco Neighbourhood 24/01/2025 20.00
ENEST FIF - Bank Respublika MSME Loan III (EFSD+3) Eastern Neighbourhood Azerbaijan Neighbourhood 18/10/2024 3.46
ENEST FIF - Bank Respublika MSME Loan III (EFSD+3) Eastern Neighbourhood Azerbaijan Neighbourhood 18/10/2024 6.92
ENEST FIF - EaP WiB - TBC Bank II (EFSD+3) Eastern Neighbourhood Georgia Neighbourhood 18/09/2023 18.63
ENEST FIF - Mikrofin Flood Response MSME Line (EFSD+ 3) Western Balkans Bosnia and
Herzegovina Neighbourhood
31/01/2025 2.00
MENA FIF - Morocco WiB - Fondation Arrawaj (EFSD+3) Southern Neighbourhood Morocco Neighbourhood 05/12/2023 10.00
MENA FIF - Morocco WiB - Fondation Arrawaj (EFSD+3) Southern Neighbourhood Morocco Neighbourhood 05/12/2023 10.00
ENEST FIF - PRS - ACBA Bank (EFSD+2) Eastern Neighbourhood Armenia Neighbourhood 14/05/2024 25.00
MENA FIF - PRS - CIB (EFSD+2) Southern Neighbourhood Egypt Neighbourhood 14/11/2024 25.00
ENEST FIF - PRS - OTP Bank SA (EFSD+2) Eastern Neighbourhood Moldova Neighbourhood 04/11/2024 15.00
ENEST FIF - PRS - ProCredit Bank Skopje (EFSD+ 2)
Western Balkans North Macedonia
Neighbourhood 29/12/2025 25.00
ENEST FIF - PRS - Raiffeisen Bank BiH (EFSD+2)
Western Balkans Bosnia and Herzegovina
Neighbourhood 26/09/2025 25.00
ENEST FIF - PRS - Raiffeisen Bank Kosovo (EFSD+ 2) Western Balkans Kosovo Neighbourhood 22/12/2025 25.00
ENEST FIF - PRS - Union Bank Albania (EFSD+2) Western Balkans Albania Neighbourhood 16/12/2025 25.00
MENA FIF - Tunisia YiB - Enda - Pilot (EFSD+ P3) Southern Neighbourhood Tunisia Neighbourhood 01/10/2025 4.43
ENEST FIF - Turkiye YiB - Akbank
Turkey Turkey
Turkey 28/11/2025 43.14
ENEST FIF - Turkiye YiB - Sekerbank (EFSD+ P3)
Turkey Turkey
Turkey 12/12/2025 30.00
ENEST FIF - WB - YiB II - Banca Intesa Belgrade Western Balkans Serbia Neighbourhood 24/03/2025 1.50
ENEST FIF - WB WiB II Phase II - KRK (EFSD+1) Western Balkans Kosovo Neighbourhood 28/03/2025 0.20
ENEST FIF - WB WiB Phase II - AFK III (EFSD+1) Western Balkans Kosovo Neighbourhood 26/08/2025 0.10
ENEST FIF - WB WiB Phase II - Intesa Sanpaolo BiH (EFSD+1)
Western Balkans Bosnia and Herzegovina
Neighbourhood 18/12/2025 0.10
ENEST FIF - WB WiB Phase II - PCBA (EFSD+ 1) Western Balkans Albania Neighbourhood 10/11/2025 0.10
ENEST FIF - WB YIB - Banka per Biznes (BPB) II (EFSD+ 1) Western Balkans Kosovo Neighbourhood 21/10/2025 0.45
ENEST FIF - WB YiB - Intesa Sanpaolo BiH (EFSD+ 1)
Western Balkans Bosnia and Herzegovina
Neighbourhood 18/12/2025 0.10
ENEST FIF - WB YiB - Raiffeisen Bank BiH (EFSD+1)
Western Balkans Bosnia and Herzegovina
Neighbourhood 28/04/2025 0.25
ENEST FIF - WB YiB II - Union Bank (EFSD+1) Western Balkans Albania Neighbourhood 30/12/2024 0.20
ENEST FIF - WiB V Phase II - Banca Intesa Belgrade (EFSD+ 1) Western Balkans Serbia Neighbourhood 11/02/2025 1.05
ENEST FIF - YiB Loan - ACBA Bank (EFSD+ 1) Eastern Neighbourhood Armenia Neighbourhood 08/12/2025 3.48
ENEST FIF - YiB loan - AccessBank Loan (EFSD+1) Eastern Neighbourhood Azerbaijan Neighbourhood 16/12/2025 1.70
317
Directorate- General
Operation name Sub-region Country Region Cover Start Date Amount
signed (EUR million)
ENEST FIF-PRS-CKB (EFSD+2) Western Balkans Montenegro Neighbourhood 27/11/2025 12.50
ENEST Elektroprivreda Crne Gore Western Balkans Montenegro Neighbourhood 06/09/2024 40.00
ENEST LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY "VINNYTSKA PTAHOFABRYKA
Eastern Neighbourhood Ukraine Neighbourhood 02/01/2024 63.95
MENA Marsa Maroc Port Modernisation Southern Neighbourhood Morocco Neighbourhood 06/12/2024 65.78
MENA Project Cofi Southern Neighbourhood Morocco Neighbourhood 29/10/2025 50.00
MENA FIF – Finea SME line (EFSD+ 3) Southern Neighbourhood Morocco Neighbourhood 07/04/2025 23.5
MENA Project Hannibal Southern Neighbourhood Tunisia Neighbourhood 24/07/2025 50.00
ENEST Project Piazza Earthquake Response
Turkey Turkey
Turkey 25/03/2024 16.20
MENA PRS - QNB (EFSD+2) Southern Neighbourhood Egypt Neighbourhood 08/11/2024 35.00
INTPA Sarimay Solar
Middle East and Central Asia Uzbekistan
Asia & Pacific 01/11/2024 6.45
MENA Scatec BESS Southern Neighbourhood Egypt Neighbourhood 12/06/2025 88.65
ENEST FIF - EaP WiB IV - PCBG (EFSD+ 1+3) Eastern Neighbourhood Georgia Neighbourhood 11/03/2024 5.00
INTPA Integral Management Programme of Solid Waste and
Green Areas in Cuenca, Ecuador
Central America Ecuador Americas and Caribbean
01/04/2025 25.00
INTPA 2. MedAccess Guarantee Ltd Southern Africa and Indian Ocean
Sub-Saharan Africa 28/10/2025 52.00
INTPA 1. BioNTech Rwanda Ltd East Africa Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa 08/10/2025 60.00
INTPA 3. Biologicals & Vaccines Institute of Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd
Southern Africa South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 18/12/2025 111.00
INTPA 2. Fleeti Holding S.A.S. West Africa Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa 08/10/2025 1.00
INTPA 3. BNB Technologies, Inc. West Africa Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa 18/11/2025 1.71
INTPA 1. Ventures Platform Pan-African Fund II LP Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa 31/10/2025 6.53
INTPA Covax II Global Global 22/11/2021 200.00
INTPA 6. Vietnam Maritime Commercial Joint Stock Bank Southeast Asia Viet Nam Asia and the Pacific 24/01/2025 28.65
INTPA 8. Phuc Sinh Dak Nong Corporation Southeast Asia Viet Nam Asia and the Pacific 04/04/2025 10.85
INTPA 2. Camimex Joint Stock Company Southeast Asia Viet Nam Asia and the Pacific 18/10/2024 8.30
INTPA 5. Miro Forestry Developments Limited West Africa Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa 11/12/2024 0.99
INTPA 3. Camimex Joint Stock Company Southeast Asia Viet Nam Asia and the Pacific 21/10/2024 5.53
INTPA 11. First National Bank Zambia Limited Southern Africa Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa 17/12/2025 8.53
INTPA 1. Dvara KGFS Private Ltd South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 18/10/2024 6.45
INTPA 4. Helios CLEAR Fund Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 18/10/2024 8.95
INTPA 10. Stichting Hivos-Triodos Fonds Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 24/07/2025 17.01
INTPA 9. Miro Forestry Developments Limited West Africa Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa 18/06/2025 0.30
INTPA 7. GH2 Industries (Private) Limited South Asia Pakistan Asia and the Pacific 28/03/2025 4.63
INTPA 02 CS01-2409-FIN-BTN-Mountain Hazelnuts South Asia Bhutan Asia and the Pacific 12/03/2025 5.10
INTPA 03 CS04-2412-PRO-FUND-Averrhoa Global Global 07/11/2025 20.00
INTPA 04 CS13-2509-PRO-FUND-AXA Global Global 20/11/2025 21.57
INTPA 01 CS02-2411-DEG-FUND-NBCF Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 23/12/2024 19.57
318
Directorate- General
Operation name Sub-region Country Region Cover Start Date Amount
signed (EUR million)
INTPA 05 CS14-2509-DEG-FUND-AXA Global Global 19/12/2025 19.14
INTPA 06 CS05-2505-DEG-FUND-TRF I Latin America Latin America 19/12/2025 18.68
INTPA 7. CRDB Bank Burundi S.A. (Oesterreichische Entwicklungsbank AG)
East Africa Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa 05/12/2025 12.86
INTPA 5. CRDB Bank PLC East Africa Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa 31/07/2025 21.68
INTPA 3. The Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited East Africa Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa 21/03/2024 23.05
ENEST 1. Microinvest Eastern Europe and the Caucasus
Moldova Europe and Central Asia
30/08/2023 10.00
INTPA 2. Apollo Agriculture East Africa Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa 04/03/2024 4.62
INTPA 6. CRDB Bank Burundi S.A East Africa Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa 05/12/2025 8.57
ENEST 5. Armeconombank Eastern Europe and the Caucasus
Armenia Europe and Central Asia
07/11/2025 26.11
INTPA 3. Platcorp Holdings Ltd East Africa Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa 11/07/2025 8.50
INTPA 2. Compagnie Transnationale d’Investissement (‘Groupe COFINA’)
West Africa Côte d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa 15/11/2024 20.00
INTPA 6. CRDB Bank Public Limited Company (Tanzania) East Africa Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa 08/12/2025 64.41
ENEST 4. Microinvest SRL Eastern Europe and the Caucasus
Moldova Europe and Central Asia
25/09/2025 15.00
INTPA 1. NMB Bank Ltd Southern Africa Zimbabwe Sub-Saharan Africa 30/10/2024 13.86
INTPA 01. RET01-2505-FMO-Global-FAST-P Southeast Asia Indonesia Asia and the Pacific 01/09/2025 42.27
INTPA 01 TGVC06-2507-BIO-KE-Limbua East Africa Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa 03/09/2025 2.00
INTPA 03 TGVC07-2507-DEG-BGD-Banga South Asia Bangladesh Asia and the Pacific 17/12/2025 21.23
INTPA 02 TGVC04-2506-BIO-CI-FoodsCo West Africa Côte d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa 17/09/2025 3.00
INTPA TCX Capacity Plus Inclusion Notice 2 Global Global 18/12/2025 50.00
INTPA TCX Capacity Plus Inclusion Notice 1 Global Global 17/12/2025 100.00
INTPA 1. Communication and Renewable Energy Infrastructure (CREI)
East Africa South Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa 12/06/2024 4.66
INTPA 3. Cassava Technologies Limited Southern Africa South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 12/12/2024 14.26
INTPA 6. Poa Internet East Africa Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa 11/08/2025 2.78
INTPA 7. Communication and Renewable Energy Infrastructure (CREI) - Second Investment
East Africa South Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa 07/11/2025 4.32
INTPA 5. Wave Mobile Money West Africa Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa 03/06/2025 13.00
INTPA 2. Beacon Power Systems Southern Africa Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa 25/10/2024 1.95
INTPA 4. Fibertime Group Southern Africa South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 14/01/2025 2.07
INTPA 2. I&P Afrique Entrepreneurs West Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 28/11/2025 7.00
INTPA Salt Equity I LP Southern Africa and Indian Ocean
Sub-Saharan Africa 15/12/2022 5.65
MENA 01 AZIZA (Aziza de Commerce de Detail) North Africa Tunisia Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East
23/12/2025 2.66
MENA 03 Cairo Scan (Cairo Scan Radiology & Labs Co. (Egypt)) North Africa Egypt Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East
23/12/2025 2.66
319
Directorate- General
Operation name Sub-region Country Region Cover Start Date Amount
signed (EUR million)
INTPA 07 Pureplay Skin Sciences South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.00
INTPA 09 Utkarsh South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.00
INTPA 11 Prataap South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.00
INTPA 27 Varaha South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 35 BharatAgri South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 26 Farmley South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 08 Viridity (Anthem) South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.00
INTPA 16 Softlogic South Asia Sri Lanka Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.60
INTPA 10 WheelsEMI (Bike Bazaar) South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.00
INTPA 13 Reliance Southeast Asia Indonesia Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.60
INTPA 02 Metamed (Ray-Lab Ltd) Neighbourhood / South Neighbourhood 23/12/2025 2.66
INTPA 15 miLife West Africa Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa 23/12/2025 1.60
INTPA 38 Suite42 South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 40 Krishitantra South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 05 Finova South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.00
INTPA 06 Fettle Tone (Niva Bupa) South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.00
INTPA 17 DeHaat South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 18 Arya South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 19 Agnext South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 24 Intello Labs South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 25 Niqo South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 28 Pixxel South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 29 DGV South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 31 Bijak South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 37 Loopworm South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 39 E-Feed South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 12 Northern Arc South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.60
INTPA 14 Dvara South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.60
INTPA 20 AquaConnect South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 21 AgriM South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 22 Fasal South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 23 Tractor Junction South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 30 Stellapps South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 32 Animall South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 33 Agrizy South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 34 Bioprime South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 36 Krishify South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 0.33
INTPA 04 Go Digit South Asia India Asia and the Pacific 23/12/2025 1.00
INTPA 01 Nafasi Water Technologies (Pty) Ltd Southern Africa South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 28/11/2025 3.58
320
Table of abbreviations
Abbreviation Meaning
AAP(s) Annual Action Plan(s)
ACP Africa, Caribbean, Pacific
ADB Asian Development Bank
AECID Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation)
AEDIB the Africa Europe Digital Innovation Bridge
AEGEI the Africa-EU Green Energy initiative
AfCFTA the African Continental Free Trade Area
AFD Agence Française de Développement (French development agency)
AfDB African Development Bank
AfT Aid for trade
DG AGRI The Commission’s Directorate- General for Agriculture and Rural Development
AI Artificial intelligence
AIP Africa Investment Platform
ALERT Acute Large Emergency Response Tool
AMC countries
Advance Market Commitment countries
AMCOW The African Ministers’ Council on Water
ANBO African Network of Basin Organisations
APIF Asia Pacific Investment Facility
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
AUC African Union Commission
BBNJ Agreement on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
BS Budget Support
BSOs Business Support Organisations
CAR Central African Republic
CARICOM the Caribbean Community
Abbreviation Meaning
CBC Cross-Border Cooperation
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CDB Caribbean Development Bank
CEECS Central and Eastern European Countries
CEPA Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement
CFATF Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy Instrument
DG CLIMA The Commission’s Directorate- General for Climate Action
CLIP(s) Country Level Implementation Plan(s)
COFIDES Compañía Española de Financiación del Desarrollo (Spanish development bank)
CoM Covenant of Mayors
COP15 15th meeting of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in Montreal
COP16 16th meeting of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
COP26 26th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Glasgow
COP27 27th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Sharm el-Sheikh
COP28 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Dubai
COP29 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Baku
COVAX COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access
COVID-19 Corona Virus Disease of 2019
CPVA Central Project Management Agency of Lithuania
321
Abbreviation Meaning
CRIS Common RELEX Information System
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO Civil Society Organisations
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DARYA Dialogue and Action for Resourceful Youth in Central Asia programme
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
DCI Development Cooperation Instrument
DEAR Development Education and Awareness Raising programme
DFI(s) development finance institution(s)
DGs Directorate-Generals
DOAG Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
DREF Disaster Response Emergency Fund
EABF EU-Africa Business Forum
EaP the Eastern Partnership
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC the European Commission
DG ECFIN The Commission’s Directorate- General for Economic and Financial Affairs
DG ECHO The Commission’s Directorate- General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
EDF European Development Fund
EEAS the European External Action Service
EFAD the European Financial Architecture for Development
EFSD (+) European Fund for Sustainable Development (Plus)
EIB The European Investment Bank
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EIP Economic Investment Plan
Abbreviation Meaning
EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats
DG EMPL The Commission’s Directorate- General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
DG ENEST The Commission’s Directorate- General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood
ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
DG ENV The Commission’s Directorate- General for the Environment
EP European Parliament
EPA(s) Economic Partnership Agreement(s)
EPCA(s) Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement(s)
EPF European Peace Facility
ERCC the Emergency Response Coordination Centre
ESA Eastern and Southern Africa
EU European Union
EUAA EU Agency for Asylum
EUAM EU Advisory Mission
EUBAM EU Border Management Assistance Mission
EUCAP EU Capacity Building Mission
EUGH EU Global Health Strategy
EUHAB EU humanitarian air bridge
EULEX EU Rule of Law Mission
EUMAM EU Military Assistance Mission
EUMM EU Monitoring Mission
EUMPM EU Military Partnership Mission
EUPI EU Peacebuilding Initiative
EUPOL EU Police Mission
EUR Euro
EUROPOL EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
EUSR EU Special Representative
FAC The Foreign Affairs Council
FAO The Food and Agriculture Organisation
FFPA Financial Framework Partnership Agreements
322
Abbreviation Meaning
FIIAPP International and Ibero- American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies
FINTECC EBRD’s Finance and Technology Transfer Centre for Climate Change programme
FLEGT Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FMO Nederlandse Financierings- Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V. (Dutch entrepreneurial development bank)
FPAs Framework Partnership Agreements
FPI Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
FRF Food and Resilience Facility
Frontex the European Border and Coast Guard Agency
GACERE Global Alliance on Circular Economy and Resource Efficiency
GAP III Gender Action Plan III
GAVI Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation
GBF Global Biodiversity Framework
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDC UN Global Digital Compact
GDP gross domestic product
GERF the Global Europe Results Framework
GGW the Great Green Wall
GIFP EU’s Global Illicit Flows Programme
GIZ The German Society for International Cooperation
GNI Gross national income
GPE Global Partnership for Education
GPEDC Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
GPEI Global Polio Eradication Initiative
GSK GlaxoSmithKline pharmaceutical and biotechnology company
G7 Group of Seven - intergovernmental political forum
Abbreviation Meaning
G20 Group of Twenty - intergovernmental forum for international economic cooperation
G77 Group of seventy seven - intergovernmental organization of developing countries in
the United Nations
HDP Humanitarian-Development- Peace
Heading IV MFF Heading – Global Europe
Heading VI MFF Heading – Neighbourhood and the World
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HLEG High-Level Expert Group
HRBA Human Rights-Based Approach
HRDN Human Rights and Democracy Network
HRVP EU High Representative/Vice- President
HUMA Humanitarian Aid
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IcSP Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT Information and Communications Technology
IDPs Internally displaced persons
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFIs International Financial Institutions
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IHL International Humanitarian Law
IICA Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
INSC Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organisation
323
Abbreviation Meaning
DG INTPA The Commission’s Directorate- General for International Partnerships
IOM International Organisation for Migration
IPA Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IPARD IPA Rural Development programme
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency
ITC International Trade Centre
JETP Just Energy Transition Partnerships
JRC the Joint Research Centre
KfW Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank)
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
LACIF Latin America and Caribbean Investment Facility
LDC(S) Least Developed Country(ies)
LGBTI+ Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and other
LMIC(S) Lower Middle-Income Country(ies)
MADCT(S) More Advanced Developing Countries and Territories
MAV+ Team Europe Initiative on Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines and Health Technologies in Africa
DG MENA The Commission’s Directorate- General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf
MFA Macro Financial Assistance
MFA+ Macro-Financial Assistance Plus instrument providing support to Ukraine for 2023
MFF Multiannual Financial Framework
MGA Model Grant Agreement
MIP Multiannual Indicative Programme
MS Member States
MSME(s) Micro-, Small and Medium-sized Enterprise(s)
Abbreviation Meaning
NATO the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDC(s) Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
NDICI–Global Europe
The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument-Global Europe
DG NEAR The Commission’s Directorate- General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (Note: in 2025, this NEAR was divided into DG ENEST and DG MENA).
NEET Not in Education, Employment, or Training
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP Neighbourhood Investment Platform
NIS Newly Independent States
OACPS Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States
OAS Organisation of American States
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCTs Overseas countries and territories
Non-ODA Development aid not classified as Official Development Assistance (ODA)
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECS Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
OHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OLIC/OTHER LIC(S)
Other Low-Income Country(ies)
OPSYS Operational System (used by the EC for External Actions)
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co- operation in Europe
PAR Public Administration Reform
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
324
Abbreviation Meaning
PCD Policy coherence for development
PFD Policy Forum on Development
PFM Public Financial Management
PICs Pacific Island Countries
PPP Public Private Partnership
PRAG Practical guide
PROPARCO Promotion et Participation pour la Coopération Économique (French development finance institution)
DG REGIO The Commission’s Directorate- General for Regional and Urban Policy
REDD+ The ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries’ Framework
RELEX Relations Extérieures (External Relations - Family includes DG INTPA, DG NEAR and FPI)
rescEU European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
R&I Research and Innovation
SADC Southern Africa Development Community
SAFE Security, Accountability and Fight Against Crime programme
SAFS Sustainable Agri-Food Systems
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
DG SANTE The Commission’s Directorate- General for Health and Food Safety
SCP Sustainable Consumption and Production
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SDI Security and defence initiative
SECAP(s) Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plan(s)
SEESAC Southeastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SIS Safeguards Information System
SME Small to medium-sized enterprise
SRHR Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
Abbreviation Meaning
SSR Security Sector Reform
SSR/G Security Sector Reform and Governance
STEM Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics
STI Science, Technology and Innovation
TA Technical assistance
TAAF Terres Australes et Antarctiques Françaises - French Southern and Antarctic Territories
TAFs Technical Assistance Facilities
TAIEX Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
DG TAXUD The Commission’s Directorate- General for Taxation and Customs Union
TC Technical cooperation
TED Team Europe Initiative on Democracy
TEI Team Europe Initiative
DG TRADE The Commission’s Directorate- General for Trade
TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UCPM EU Civil Protection Mechanism
UfM Union for the Mediterranean
UHC Universal Health Coverage
UHC-P Universal Health Coverage Partnership
UMIC(S) Upper Middle-Income Country(ies)
UN United Nations
UNCCD Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP United Nations’ lead agency on international development
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
325
Abbreviation Meaning
UNITAD United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ISIL
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSE United Nation Special Envoy
UNVIM United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism
USD US Dollar
VET Vocational education and training
Abbreviation Meaning
VPA(s) Voluntary Partnership Agreement(s)
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WBG the World Bank Group
WBIF Western Balkans Investment Framework
WES Water and Environment Support
WHO the World Health Organisation
WTO the World Trade Organisation
YAP Youth Action Plan
ET ET
EUROOPA KOMISJON
Brüssel, 29.10.2026 COM(2026) 588 final
KOMISJONI ARUANNE EUROOPA PARLAMENDILE JA NÕUKOGULE
2026. aasta aruanne Euroopa Liidu välistegevuse rahastamisvahendite rakendamise
kohta 2025. aastal
{SWD(2026) 324 final}
1
Sisukord Eessõna ................................................................................................................................................... 2
ÜLEMAAILMSED KOHUSTUSED ............................................................................................................... 4
ELi reageerimine Venemaa Ukraina-vastasele agressioonisõjale ....................................................... 4
Euroopa Liit: tegija rahvusvahelisel tasandil ....................................................................................... 4
Global Gateway ................................................................................................................................... 6
Humanitaarabi .................................................................................................................................... 6
TEMAATILINE ÜLEVAADE ........................................................................................................................ 8
Inimareng ............................................................................................................................................ 8
Üleminek puhtale energiale ja kliimakerksus ..................................................................................... 8
Digiüleminek, teadustegevus, tehnoloogia, innovatsioon ja taristu .................................................. 9
Kestlik majanduskasv ja töökohtade loomine .................................................................................. 10
Ränne ja sundränne .......................................................................................................................... 10
Demokraatlik valitsemistava ning inimõigused, rahu ja julgeolek .................................................... 11
ÜLEMAAILMSED SAAVUTUSED ............................................................................................................. 13
Sahara-tagune Aafrika....................................................................................................................... 13
Aasia ja Vaikse ookeani piirkond ....................................................................................................... 13
Ameerika ja Kariibi piirkond .............................................................................................................. 14
Laienemisprotsessis osalevad riigid (Lääne-Balkani partnerid, Türgi, Ukraina, Moldova Vabariik,
Gruusia) ............................................................................................................................................. 15
Euroopa naabruskond ....................................................................................................................... 16
Euroopa idanaabrus ...................................................................................................................... 16
Euroopa lõunanaabrus ja Lähis-Ida / Pärsia lahe piirkond............................................................ 16
Ülemeremaad ja -territooriumid (ÜMTd) ......................................................................................... 17
2
Eessõna
2025. aastat iseloomustasid põhjalikud ja sageli ettearvamatud muutused kogu maailmas. Kodanikud
tundsid oma naabruskonnas toimuvate sõdade tagajärgi üha teravamalt. Venemaa agressioonisõda
Ukrainas mõjutas jätkuvalt Euroopa Liitu, kuna sagenesid hübriidkampaaniad, mille eesmärk on
õõnestada Euroopa julgeolekut. Üha ebastabiilsema olukorra tõttu pidi Euroopa Liit võtma suurema
vastutuse oma julgeoleku ja kaitse eest, kaitsma ennetavalt oma huve kogu maailmas ning tõhustama
tööd ülemaailmsete probleemide lahendamisel, inimõiguste kaitsel ja mitmepoolsuse tugevdamisel.
ELi lähenemisviis on järjekindlalt liikunud võrdsete poolte vastastikku kasulike partnerluste loomise
suunas ning sellel on kaks eesmärki – suurendada vastupanuvõimet ja autonoomiat nii rahvusvahelisel
tasandil kui ka kodus. Üks põhitööriist selleks on strateegia „Global Gateway“. Global Gateway kaudu
saab EL suunata oma ressursid sinna, kus neist on kestliku arengu jaoks kõige rohkem kasu, kaitstes
samal ajal liidu huve. Mõju on olnud käegakatsutav nii tehtud algatuste hulga kui ka kvaliteedi
vaatenurgast.
Selleks et maksimeerida ELi mõju maailmas ning kasutada parimal viisil ära ELi ressursse ja oskusi,
lähtuvad ELi institutsioonid, ELi liikmesriigid ja finantsasutused täielikult Euroopa tiimina tehtava
koostöö kontseptsioonist. See lähenemisviis on nüüd välistegevuse vahendite lahutamatu ja keskne
osa nii Global Gateway rakendamisel, ebakindlates oludes, humanitaarabi andmisel ja
elanikkonnakaitses kui ka mitmepoolses tegevuses. ELi delegatsioonide võrgustik mängib endiselt
olulist rolli tugeva ja sidusa kohaloleku tagamisel, tehes Euroopa tiimi lähenemisviisi raames tihedat
koostööd ELi liikmesriikide ja Euroopa finantsasutustega.
ELi 2025. aasta välistegevuse võib jagada nelja üksteist tugevdavasse sambasse: rahu ja julgeoleku
kaitsmine, laienemise edendamine, jõukuse, majandusjulgeoleku ja vastupanuvõime kindlustamine
ning mitmepoolsuse ja ülemaailmse solidaarsuse tugevdamine. ELi välistegevuse rahastamisvahendid
kujutavad endast jätkuvalt kombinatsiooni kiirest, paindlikust ja integreeritud reageerimisest
kriisidele ja geopoliitilistele šokkidele ning usaldusväärse finantsjuhtimise rangeimatest standarditest.
Käesolevas aruandes kirjeldatakse ELi ja selle liikmesriikide tööd kõigis neljas sambas, sealhulgas tööd
partnerluste tugevdamiseks kooskõlas meie Euroopa väärtustega, samuti meie meetmeid paljudes
valdkondades alates vaesuse kaotamisest ja kestlikust arengust kuni vabakaubanduse, julgeoleku,
rahu ja stabiilsuse, rände, inimõiguste, soolise võrdõiguslikkuse ja naiste mõjuvõimu suurendamise,
demokraatia ja õigusriigi kaitsmise ning kannatuste leevendamiseni. ELi algatustega toetatati
partnerriike ka kliimamuutuste vastu võitlemisel ja elurikkuse kaitsmisel, mis näitab, et ELi teeb
jätkuvalt jõupingutusi, et täita oma kohustusi kogu maailmas.
3
Euroopa Liit on kõige tugevam siis, kui me oma jõud ühendame. Seetõttu on lisaks meie terviklikule
projektide ja välisvahendite portfellile oluline jätkata kindlate ja jätkusuutlike tulemuste
ettevalmistamist ja saavutamist Euroopa tiimi lähenemisviisi abil.
Kõrge esindaja Euroopa Komisjoni volinik Euroopa Komisjoni volinik Euroopa Komisjoni volinik Euroopa Komisjoni volinik
/ asepresident KAJA KALLAS DUBRAVKA ŠUICA MARTA KOS JOZEF SÍKELA HADJA LAHBIB Välisasjad ja Vahemere piirkond Laienemine Rahvusvaheline Võrdõiguslikkus; julgeolekupoliitika partnerlus kriisivalmidus ja
-ohje
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ÜLEMAAILMSED KOHUSTUSED
ELi reageerimine Venemaa Ukraina-vastasele agressioonisõjale
Venemaa täiemahuline agressioonisõda Ukraina vastu põhjustas jätkuvalt inimkannatusi, ulatuslikku
sundrännet ning elutähtsa tsiviil- ja energiataristu laialdast hävingut, õõnestades samal ajal Euroopa
ja ülemaailmset julgeolekukorda ning süvendades toidu-, energia- ja majandusalast haavatavust ka
tublisti väljaspool piirkonda.
2025. aasta lõpuks oli Euroopa Liit (EL) ja selle liikmesriigid andnud Ukrainale kombineeritud toetust
kokku ligikaudu 193,3 miljardit eurot, sealhulgas 69,3 miljardit eurot sõjalist toetust, üle 103,3 miljardi
euro rahalist, majanduslikku ja humanitaarabi, 3,7 miljardit eurot Venemaale kuuluvate tõkestatud
varadega seotud tulust ja 17 miljardit eurot sõja eest põgenevate inimeste abistamiseks.
ELi reageerimisel 2025. aastal oli kesksel kohal Ukraina rahastu, mis on kuni 50 miljardi euro suurune
sihtotstarbeline vahend, et anda Ukraina taastumiseks, ülesehitamiseks ja moderniseerimiseks
prognoositavat ja paindlikku toetust, ühendades reformidega seotud toetused ja laenud Ukraina
investeerimisraamistikuga, mida EL on toetanud 9,5 miljardi euroga ning millega püütakse kaasata
kuni 40 miljardit eurot avaliku ja erasektori investeeringuid. 2025. aasta lõpuks oli selle raamistiku
alusel eraldatud kuni 6,9 miljardit eurot programmide jaoks, millega toetatakse väikeettevõtjaid,
sõjast mõjutatud kogukondi, elutähtsat taristut ning rohe- ja digipööret.
Täites G7 juhtide võetud kohustusi ja tuginedes komisjoni ettepanekule, võttis EL 2025. aastal vastu
ja maksis välja finantsabi paketi, mis seisnes 18,1 miljardi euro suuruses erakorralise
makromajandusliku finantsabi laenus. Selle paketi üks osa on laenukoostöö mehhanism, mida
rahastatakse Venemaale kuuluvatest tõkestatud riigivaradest saadavast erakorralisest tulust. Lisaks
leppisid ELi liikmesriigid 2025. aasta detsembris kokku, et annavad Ukrainale 2026. ja 2027. aastaks
90 miljardi euro suuruse laenu, mis põhineb ELi võetud laenudel, mis on tagatud ELi eelarve
manööverdamisruumiga.
EL võttis kogu 2025. aasta vältel vastu täiendavaid piiravate meetmete (sanktsioonide) pakette, et
kärpida Venemaa võimet sõda pidada ja nõrgestada Venemaa majanduslikku baasi, näiteks piirates
Venemaa juurdepääsu lahinguvälja tehnoloogiale ja vähendades Venemaa energiatulu.
Samal ajal olid ELi reageerimisel kesksel kohal sanktsioonid ja meetmed, millega vähendada sõltuvust
Venemaa fossiilkütustest – ELi kavaga „REPowerEU“ ja seonduvate õigusaktidega kahandati järsult
Venemaa importi ELi.
Ukrainaga oli endiselt seotud kõigi aegade suurim ELi elanikkonnakaitse mehhanismi operatsioon –
hädaolukordadele reageerimise koordineerimiskeskus menetles Ukrainast laekunud 39 ajakohastatud
abitaotlust. EL andis ainuüksi 2025. aastal kokku 220 miljonit eurot humanitaarabi, et leevendada
Ukraina rahva kannatusi. Sõja eest põgenevate inimeste ajutise kaitse direktiivi kohaldamist pikendati
2027. aasta märtsini.
Euroopa Liit: tegija rahvusvahelisel tasandil
2025. aastal tegutses EL üha pingelisemas ja keerukamas rahvusvahelises keskkonnas, mida
iseloomustasid sõda liidu piiride lähedal, eskaleeruvad piirkondlikud konfliktid, häired kaubateedel,
tugevnev geopoliitiline ja geomajanduslik konkurents ning süvenevad kliima- ja keskkonnakriisid.
Ülemaailmset stabiilsust kahjustasid veelgi demokraatia taandareng, rahvusvahelise õiguse,
sealhulgas inimõiguste ja rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse rikkumised, desinformatsioon ning
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välisriigist lähtuv infoga manipuleerimine ja sekkumine ning kasvav surve mitmepoolsele süsteemile
ja reeglitel põhinevale rahvusvahelisele korrale.
ELi tugines 2025. aastal maailmas toimunud muutustele reageerimisel neljale üksteist tugevdavale
sambale: rahu ja julgeoleku kaitsmine, laienemise edendamine, jõukuse ja vastupanuvõime
kindlustamine kestlike ja turvaliste majandussidemete kaudu ning mitmepoolsuse ja ülemaailmse
solidaarsuse tugevdamine. Püsiv rahu, julgeolek ja jõukus sõltuvad tõhusast reeglitel põhinevast
rahvusvahelisest korrast.
2025. aastal edendas EL veelgi oma julgeoleku- ja kaitsealase tegevuskava elluviimist, rakendades
terviklikku lähenemisviisi mitmetahulistele julgeoleku- ja kaitseprobleemidele: EL säilitas tugeva
sõjalise toetuse Ukrainale, tugevdas ühise julgeoleku- ja kaitsepoliitika missioonide ja Euroopa
rahutagamisrahastu kaudu oma rolli, suurendas võimet panna vastu hübriid- ja küberohtudele ning
tugevdas julgeoleku- ja kaitsepartnerlusi.
Liit tunnistas, et vastastikust sõltuvust kasutatakse üha enam relvana, ning püüdis 2025. aastal kriitilist
sõltuvust vähendada, säilitades samal ajal avatud ja reeglitel põhineva kaubanduse. EL esitas
ennetavama ja tõhusama lähenemisviisi, et tugevdada oma majandusjulgeolekut1. Võttes arvesse
majandusjulgeoleku ja vastupanuvõime kasvavat tähtsust välistegevuses, on EL edendanud
välismajanduspoliitikat, kus on ühendatud konkurentsivõime, julgeolek ja partnerlused, tugevdades
oma tegevuskava, mis käsitleb kaubandust ja partnerlusi oluliste piirkondade ja sarnaselt meelestatud
partneritega kogu maailmas. Selle tegevuskava elluviimisel oli oluline raamistik strateegia „Global
Gateway“.
EL pühendus veelgi enam mitmepoolsusele, ülemaailmsele solidaarsusele ning inimõiguste ja
humanitaarpõhimõtete kaitsele, tehes tööd mitmepoolse süsteemi kaitsmiseks ja kohandamiseks
kooskõlas ÜRO põhikirjaga, kestliku arengu tegevuskavaga 2030 ja ÜRO tulevikupaktiga. EL toetas
2025. aastal aktiivselt ÜRO peasekretäri algatust „ÜRO 80“, mis annab võimaluse suurendada ÜRO
tulemuslikkust, kulutõhusust ja sidusust ning tagada selle suutlikkus saavutada tulemusi oma kõigis
kolmes sambas, milleks on rahu ja julgeolek, inimõigused ja areng.
2025. aastal seadis EL oma välistegevuses strateegilise prioriteedina veelgi tähtsamale kohale
ookeanid, sealhulgas kaitstes ÜRO mereõiguse konventsiooni terviklikkust, sest see on kogu
ookeanidega seotud tegevuse õigusraamistikuks. EL võttis kolmandal ÜRO ookeanikonverentsil üle 50
vabatahtliku kohustuse kogusummas peaaegu 1 miljard eurot, et aidata kaasata rahvusvahelist
kogukonda, kiirendamaks ookeanidega seotud tegevust, eelkõige silmas pidades lähenevat
avamerelepingu jõustumist.
EL koos liikmesriikidega oli ka 2025. aastal suurim ametliku arenguabi andja, eraldades vastavalt OECD
esialgsetele andmetele 82,5 miljardit eurot, mis moodustab 48 % üleilmsest ametlikust arenguabist2.
Samas on andmetest näha, et üleilmse ametliku arenguabi kogusumma on märkimisväärselt
kahanenud, mis on peamiselt tingitud USA panuse järsust vähendamisest.
Püüdlustes koordineerida tihedamalt ELi välis- ja ühtekuuluvuspoliitika rahastamist astuti oluline
samm edasi esimeste projektikonkursside käivitamisega Interregi programmides osalevate ELi
1 JOIN(2025) 977. 2 Üleilmne ametlik arenguabi, millest on teatanud EL tervikuna ja kõik teised doonorriigid.
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äärepoolseimate piirkondade, ülemeremaade ja -territooriumide ning kolmandate riikide ühiste
probleemide lahendamiseks.
Global Gateway
EL laiendas veelgi strateegiat „Global Gateway“ – oma ülemaailmset investeerimisstrateegiat
vastastikku kasulike partnerluste loomiseks ning avaliku ja erasektori vahendite kaasamiseks, et
kaotada ülemaailmne investeerimispuudujääk ning toetada kestliku arengu tegevuskava 2030 ja
kestliku arengu eesmärkide elluviimist.
2025. aastaks olid EL, selle liikmesriigid ja Euroopa finantsasutused võtnud Global Gateway
investeeringutena kasutusele üle 306 miljardi euro, ületades sellega varakult 2027. aastaks seatud
300 miljardi euro eesmärgi. Kogu 2025. aasta vältel püsis kesksel kohal Euroopa tiimi lähenemisviis, et
tagada suure mõjuga investeerimispakettide koordineeritud rakendamine.
2025. aasta oktoobris käivitati Global Gateway investeerimiskeskus Sahara-taguse Aafrika, Ladina-
Ameerika ja Kariibi piirkonna ning Aasia ja Vaikse ookeani piirkonna jaoks3. Tegemist on keskse
platvormiga erasektori kaasamise ühtlustamiseks ja võimendamiseks, mis võimaldab ELi ettevõtjatel
esitada ELi liikmesriikides investeerimisettepanekuid riikliku koordineerimismehhanismi4 kaudu.
Global Gateway ettevõtlusalane nõuanderühm jätkas koostöö tugevdamist Euroopa erasektoriga.
2025. aasta oktoobris vastu võetud Vahemere piirkonna leppega on kehtestatud uus poliitiline
raamistik strateegia „Global Gateway“ rakendamiseks Põhja-Aafrikas ja Lähis-Idas. 2025. aastal kiideti
heaks investeeringud kogusummas 662 miljonit eurot, mis peaksid kaasa tooma üle 7 miljardi euro
investeeringuid, mille tulemusel on aastatel 2021–2025 Vahemere lõunapiirkonnas eeldatavasti
kasutusele võetud kokku 30 miljardit eurot. Lääne-Balkanil, Türgis ja idanaabruses kaasati
aastatel 2021–2025 eeldatavate investeeringutena peaaegu 40 miljardit eurot.
Humanitaarabi
2025. aastal reageeris EL oma humanitaarabi ja elanikkonnakaitse mehhanismiga erakordselt suurtele
üleilmsetele vajadustele. EL on põhimõttekindel rahastaja, juhindudes sellistest humanitaarabi
põhimõtetest nagu inimlikkus, neutraalsus, erapooletus ja sõltumatus. EL ja selle liikmesriigid annavad
üheskoos suurima osa vahenditest ülemaailmse humanitaarabi rahastamiseks (2025. aastal 34 %).
2025. aastal eraldas EL rohkem kui 2,57 miljardit eurot vajaduspõhiseks humanitaarabiks 110 riigis
ning üle 245 miljoni euro liidu elanikkonnakaitse mehhanismi ja seonduva suutlikkuse jaoks.
Endiselt on väga murettekitav ülemaailmne näljakriis. Sellele reageerimiseks – olukorras, kus
295 miljonit inimest seisis silmitsi tõsise toiduga kindlustamatusega ning Gazas ja Sudaanis oli kinnitust
leidnud näljahäda – eraldati toidu- ja toitumisalaseks humanitaarabiks ligikaudu 600 miljonit eurot.
Praeguse humanitaarkriisi peamised põhjused on konfliktid, ebakindlus ja kliimamuutuste mõju.
Relvakonfliktides on endiselt laialt levinud rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse rikkumine. Euroopa
Komisjon edendas ja rahastas ka 2025. aastal keskkonda, mis võimaldab paremini anda
põhimõttekindlat humanitaarabi, võttes arvesse üha sagedasemat rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse
rikkumist ja järjest suuremaid takistusi sellisele humanitaarabile juurdepääsul.
3 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/investment-hub_en. 4 Riigisisene kogu valitsemissektorit hõlmav koordineerimismehhanism erasektori kaasamiseks.
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Euroopa humanitaarabiüksus (uue nimega ReliefEU), pakkus humanitaarabi õhusilla operatsioonide,
varude loomise, ladustamise ja transporditeenuste kaudu strateegilist logistilist tuge. 2025. aastal anti
ReliefEU kaudu humanitaarabi kriisides ja konfliktidest mõjutatud piirkondades, sealhulgas Gazas,
Sudaanis, Kongo Demokraatlikus Vabariigis ja Myanmaris, tihedas koostöös humanitaarpartnerite ja
liidu elanikkonnakaitse mehhanismiga. 2025. aastal eraldati ReliefEU operatsioonide jaoks üle
110 miljoni euro, anti 6 780 tonni abi ja reageeriti 20 kriisile 18 riigis.
ELi reageerimine hädaolukordadele hõlmab elanikkonnakaitset, millega täiendatakse humanitaarabi
ja arengukoostööd, andes kogu maailmas kiiret ja koordineeritud abi loodusõnnetuste ja
inimtegevusest tingitud katastroofide korral. Liidu elanikkonnakaitse mehhanismi kasutati näiteks
selleks, et reageerida Ebola viiruse puhangule Kongo Demokraatlikus Vabariigis, tõsistele üleujutustele
Cabo Verdes ja 7,7-magnituudisele maavärinale Myanmaris 2025. aasta märtsis.
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TEMAATILINE ÜLEVAADE
Inimareng
Komisjoni töös püsis kesksel kohal vaesuse kaotamine. Praegu elab ligikaudu 10,3 % maailma
elanikkonnast allpool äärmise vaesuse piiri (3 USA dollarit päevas). Aastatel 2021–2024 kasutati 8,1 %
ELi rahastatud ametlikust arenguabist (enam kui 26,6 miljardit eurot) selleks, et otseselt toetada
kestliku arengu eesmärki nr 1, milleks on kaotada vaesus.
Elude kaitsmiseks ja saavutatud arengu säilitamiseks oli jätkuvalt oluline tervishoiualane
humanitaartegevus. 2025. aastal eraldas EL selle jaoks ligikaudu 400 miljonit eurot – rekordilise
summa –, keskendudes tervishoiusüsteemide ja epideemiateks valmisoleku tugevdamisele ning üldise
elementaarse tervisekindlustuse edendamisele, sealhulgas naiste tervisele, reageerides ülemaailmse
tervishoiu rahastamise keskkonna karmistumisele ning kasvavatele vajadustele ebakindlates ja
konfliktidest mõjutatud riikides.
EL tugevdas oma rolli kvaliteetse hariduse kui inimõiguse edendamise üleilmse toetajana ja kestliku
arengu edendajana, toetades meetmeid ligikaudu 70 partnerriigis. Programmiga „Erasmus+“ aidati
kaasa suutlikkuse suurendamisele ja oskuste arendamisele, kasutades selleks koostööprojekte
kõrgharidusasutuste, kutsehariduse valdkonna ja noorteorganisatsioonidega (2025. aastal
177,1 miljonit eurot) ning stipendiume kõrgharidustöötajate ja üliõpilaste liikuvuse jaoks
(260,9 miljonit eurot).
2025. aastal tugevdas EL veelgi soolist võrdõiguslikkust kui oma välistegevuse valdkonnaülest
prioriteeti kooskõlas ELi soolise võrdõiguslikkuse kolmanda tegevuskavaga,5 sealhulgas süvalaiendas
lähenemisviisi „naistelt naistele“ kõigisse ELi rahastatavatesse põhivajaduste ja elatusvahendite
programmidesse Afganistanis, kandmaks hoolt selle eest, et abi jõuab tõhusalt naisteni ja et neil on
abi andmise protsessis sisuline roll.
Peaaegu pooltel maailma elanikel ei ole juurdepääsu ohututele kanalisatsiooniteenustele.
2025. aastal jätkas EL kestliku veemajanduse, sanitaartingimuste ja hügieeniga seotud tegevuse
toetamist kooskõlas 2025. aastal vastu võetud Euroopa veekerksuse strateegiaga,6 sealhulgas Global
Gateway pikaajaliste investeeringute tegemisega ligikaudu 50 riigis, kaasates erasektori, ja
humanitaarabi andmisega kriisides.
Üleminek puhtale energiale ja kliimakerksus
EL jätkas Pariisi kokkuleppe, Euroopa rohelise kokkuleppe7 ja strateegia „Global Gateway“8 kohaselt
partnerriikide toetamist, et suurendada juurdepääsu kestlikule energiale, vähendada süsinikuheidet
ja kohaneda kliimamuutustega. Välistegevuses keskenduti taastuvenergia tootmise suurendamisele,
energiatõhususe edendamisele ja piirkondliku energiaühenduvuse parandamisele, vältides samal ajal
sõltuvuste tekitamist või süvendamist ning toetades kliimakerksust ja katastroofiohu vähendamist.
5 JOIN(2020) 17 ; https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-01/join-2020-17-final_en.pdf 6 COM(2025) 280 ; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ET/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0280 7 Euroopa Komisjon, Euroopa roheline kokkulepe. 8 JOIN/2021/30 ; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ET/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0030
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Jätkus Aafrika-Euroopa roheenergiaalgatuse tulemuslik rakendamine. Samuti juhtis EL koos Lõuna-
Aafrikaga aastapikkust kampaaniat,9 et kaasata Aafrika taastuvenergia jaoks investeeringuid, mille
tulemuseks oli 15,5 miljardit eurot, sealhulgas 15,1 miljardit eurot Euroopa tiimilt.
EL jätkas ring- ja ressursitõhusa linnamajanduse edendamist. 2025. aastal toetati ringmajanduse
meetmeid üleilmsete algatuste kaudu rohkem kui 40 riigis ning piirkondlike ja riiklike algatuste kaudu
täiendavalt enam kui 80 riigis Aafrikas, Aasias ning Ladina-Ameerika ja Kariibi piirkonnas, millega aidati
kujundada kestlikumaid tootmis- ja tarbimisharjumusi. Tähelepanu nihkus poliitiliselt dialoogilt
reformidele, partnerlustele ja investeeringutele, mis aitavad partnerriikidel vähendada survet
ressurssidele, luua kvaliteetseid töökohti ja tugevdada väärtusahelaid ning samal ajal võimaldavad
vastupidavaid majandussuhteid ELiga.
EL tõhustas tegevust kestlike ja raadamisvabade väärtusahelate valdkonnas. Algatuse DESIRA+ ja
seonduvate põllumajandusliku toidutööstuse programmide kaudu toetati kakao, kohvi, kašupähkli ja
nn unustatud põllukultuuride väärtusahelaid, ühendades väikepõllumajandustootjad turgudega,
parandades mulda ja edendades agrometsandust.
EL toetas kestlikke, turvalisi ja vastupidavaid kriitiliste toormete tarneahelaid, sealhulgas projekte, mis
aitavad saavutada kriitiliste toormete määruses10 sätestatud hankimise, töötlemise, ringlussevõtu ja
mitmekesistamise sihttasemeid, ning võttis kasutusele sihtotstarbelise kriitiliste toormete rahastu, et
viia projektid kokku ostjate ja rahastajatega.
EL ja selle liikmesriigid mängivad juhtivat rolli rahvusvahelises kliimarahastuses kui maailma suurim
kliimameetmete rahastaja arengumaades. Näiteks toetati EFSD+ tagatiste ja segarahastamisega
kliimainvesteeringuid, sealhulgas kliimainvestorite fondide kaudu, kusjuures käimas on vähemalt
50 leevendus- ja kohanemistaristu projekti. ELi kestliku rahanduse nõustamiskeskus toetas
rohevõlakirjade raamistike väljatöötamist, et aidata kaasata kliimaga arvestavatesse
investeeringutesse erakapitali.
Digiüleminek, teadustegevus, tehnoloogia, innovatsioon ja taristu
2025. aasta teises pooles hakkas EL rakendama 2025. aasta juunis vastu võetud ühisteatist ELi
rahvusvahelise digistrateegia kohta11. Teatises on esitatud terviklik visioon vastastikku kasulikust
digipöördest, mida toetab integreeritud ELi tehnoloogiaettevõtluse pakkumine, kus on ühendatud
turvaline ühenduvus, usaldusväärne tehisintellekt, küberturvalisus, kosmosepõhised teenused,
usaldusväärne digitaristu ja digitaalne avalik taristu.
Eri piirkondades toetati ja kaasati Global Gateway digisamba projektidega rahvusvahelisi
teadusuuringute ja innovatsiooni ökosüsteeme ja sidusrühmi, samal ajal kui spetsiaalsed keskused ja
platvormid, nagu ELi ning Ladina-Ameerika ja Kariibi piirkonna kõrgjõudlusega andmetöötluse
võrgustik, toetasid teadmiste jagamist ja tehnilist oskusteavet.
ELi välistegevuses pöörati jätkuvalt suurt tähelepanu kestlikule transpordile, toetades
keskkonnahoidlikumaid ja vastupidavamaid ühendusi. 12 Aafrika prioriteetses koridoris, Kaspia mere
transpordikoridoris, India, Lähis-Ida ja Euroopa koridoris ning Aasias, Ladina-Ameerikas ja Kariibi
piirkonnas, ent samuti idanaabruses (nt solidaarsuskoridorides, mis ühendavad Ukrainat ja Moldovat
9 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/international-partnerships/global-gateway/energy-africa_en 10 ELT L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj. 11 JOIN(2025) 140, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/joint-communication-international-digital-strategy-eu.
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ELiga) ja lõunanaabruses tehtud mitmesugused investeeringud hõlmavad raudtee-, maantee- ja
meretransporti, linnalist liikumiskeskkonda, logistikataristut ja lennundussektorit.
Global Gateway aitab ka vähendada ülemaailmse transpordi süsinikuheidet tänu sihipärastele
keskkonnahoidlikele investeeringutele ja algatustele, nagu kestlike lennukikütuste juhtalgatus
(meetmed Aafrikas ja Indias), ülemaailmsed meretehnoloogia koostöökeskused ning rohelaevateed ja
punkerdamissõlmed, millega toetatakse partnerriike Rahvusvahelise Mereorganisatsiooni ja
Rahvusvahelise Tsiviillennunduse Organisatsiooni kliimaeesmärkide elluviimisel.
Käivitati varajase etapi investeeringute mehhanism, et anda ELi ettevõtjatele kestlikku transporti,
linnaarengut, energiat ja tehisintellekti käsitlevate projektide varajastes etappides toetusi, millega
aidatakse vähendada innovatsiooniga seotud riske ja kaasata täiendavaid rahalisi vahendeid.
Mitmepoolsel tasandil edendas EL ÜRO ülemaailmse digikokkuleppe rakendamist ning osales avatult
ja konstruktiivselt tehisintellekti juhtimise alases ülemaailmses dialoogis. Ülemaailmse digitaalse
juhtimise jaoks oli oluline verstapost infoühiskonna teemalise ülemaailmse tippkohtumise 20 aasta
ülevaade.
Kestlik majanduskasv ja töökohtade loomine
2025. aastal edendas EL kestlikku ja kaasavat majanduskasvu, parandades ettevõtluskeskkonda ning
kaasates strateegia „Global Gateway“ ja Euroopa arengualase finantsstruktuuri kaudu
erainvesteeringuid kvaliteetsete töökohtade loomiseks. Välistegevuses ühendati poliitiline dialoog,
eelarvetoetus ja riskijagamisvahendid sihipäraste meetmetega oskuste, väärtusahelate ja
vastutustundliku ettevõtluse valdkonnas.
Tihendati koostööd Euroopa erasektoriga. Global Gateway investeerimiskeskuste ja ettevõtlusalase
nõuanderühma kõrval hõlbustasid Euroopa ettevõtjate ja partnerriikide valitsuste vaheliste võrgustike
loomist ja tehingute tegemist ELi ettevõtlusfoorumid.
2025. aastal allkirjastati erinevate arengut rahastavate asutustega 20 uut EFSD+12 tagatist
kogusummas üle 3 miljardi euro ning kasutuselevõtt algas 63 tehingu allkirjastamisega 2025. aastal.
2025. aastal heaks kiidetud segarahastamistoimingud peaksid kaasa tooma ligikaudu 18 miljardit
eurot investeeringuid.
Haridus- ja oskuste programmides (sh võimalustepõhises kutseõppes ja kõrghariduses) keskenduti
üha enam strateegias „Global Gateway“ prioriteediks seatud sektoritele – näiteks mitmes Aafrika riigis
käivitati kuus uut võimalustepõhise kutseõppe projekti, et viia koolitus vastavusse tööturu
vajadustega.
Soomõõdiku, erivajadustega inimeste võimestamise mõõdiku ja võrdõiguslikkuse mõõdiku
süstemaatiline kasutamine aitas tagada, et investeerimisel võetakse arvesse mõju jaotumist,
edendatakse naiste majandusliku mõjuvõimu suurendamist ja kaasamist ning pööratakse tähelepanu
alateenindatud kogukondadele.
Ränne ja sundränne
EL tugevdas kõigis piirkondades oma inimõigustel põhinevat lähenemist rändele, võttes vastu
sisesuunised ja kohandatud menetlused, et parandada rändemeetmete kavandamist,
12 Euroopa Kestliku Arengu Fond+.
11
kindlakstegemist, sõnastamist ja järelevalvet ning väidetavate rikkumiste käsitlemist. EL kasutas oma
vahendeid üha enam selleks, et edendada koos partnerriikidega oma rändealaseid eesmärke. EL pidas
kooskõlas Euroopa varjupaiga- ja rändehaldusstrateegiaga13 dialooge peamiste partneritega ELi
rahaliste vahenditega toetatavate strateegiliste partnerluste üle, käsitledes kõiki rände ja sundrände
aspekte.
Tänu rändepartnerluste tugevdamisele vähenes ebaseaduslike ELi välispiiri ületuste arv 2025. aastal
ligikaudu 179 000ni, mida on veerandi võrra vähem kui 2024. aastal. Ka varjupaigataotluste arv liidus
vähenes, kahanedes 2025. aastal 2024. aastaga võrreldes ligikaudu 19 %, mis osaliselt kajastab
tõhustatud koostööd partnerriikidega. Näiteks, tuginedes 2024. aastal Mauritaaniaga sõlmitud
rändepartnerlusele, rakendati kõik 210 miljoni euro suuruse toetuspaketi meetmed, millega
suurendati märkimisväärselt Mauritaania suutlikkust hallata rännet ja sundrännet ning luua
mõjutatud piirkondades majanduslikke võimalusi. Nende vahendite kasutuselevõtul rakendati
naabruspiirkonna, arengu- ja rahvusvahelise koostöö instrumendi „Globaalne Euroopa“ paindliku
algatuse lähenemisviisi, mis osutus taas oluliseks rändealase koostöö soodustamisel.
EL tõhustas ka rändajate ebaseadusliku üle piiri toimetamise ja inimkaubanduse vastast tööd.
Üleilmne meede, milles keskenduti rändajate smugeldamise finants- ja digimõõtmele, aitas kaasa
rändajate ebaseadusliku üle piiri toimetamise vastu võitlemise ülemaailmse liidu tegevusele ja oli osa
2025. aasta detsembris välja kuulutatud 78 miljoni euro suurusest rahastamispaketist.
Kehtiva mitmeaastase finantsraamistiku (2021–2027) raames antud ELi toetusega kaitsti või abistati
ligikaudu 5,8 miljardit rändajat, pagulast, riigisisest põgenikku ja vastuvõtva kogukonna liiget.
2025. aastal eraldati ligikaudu 15 % humanitaarabi eelarvest kaitse jaoks, pöörates suurt tähelepanu
pagulastele ja riigisisestele põgenikele Ukraina, Gaza, Sudaani, Süüria, Afganistani ja Aafrika Sarve
kriisis. Humanitaarabi vahenditest ligikaudu 87 % eraldati 2025. aastal projektidele, millega rahuldati
põgenike vajadusi. EL pühendus jätkuvalt ümberasustamise ja humanitaarsetel põhjustel
vastuvõtmise toetamisele ning jätkas Rwanda erakorralise ümberpaigutamise mehhanismi ja Türgi
pagulasrahastu toetamist.
Demokraatlik valitsemistava ning inimõigused, rahu ja julgeolek
Lisaks paljudele kahepoolsetele ja piirkondlikele sekkumistele jätkati instrumendi „Globaalne
Euroopa“ rahu, stabiilsust ja konfliktide ennetamist käsitleva temaatilise programmi raames
tegelemist konfliktide ennetamise ja rahu kindlustamisega ning ülemaailmsete ja piiriüleste
ohtudega14. 2025. aasta lõpus oli käimas 78 konfliktiennetuse, rahuloome ja kriisiks valmisoleku
meedet. Peale selle lahendati 18 uue meetmega ülemaailmse rahu ja julgeolekuga seotud probleeme
ning võeti 14 uut meedet seoses ülemaailmsete ohtudega.
ELi ja ÜRO ülemaailmse terrorismiohu vastu võitlemise rahastamisvahendiga,15 millest eraldati
sihtotstarbelisi toetuspakette teiste seas Iraagile, Usbekistanile, Nigeeriale ja Somaaliale, ning Araabia
Riikide Liigaga tehtud mitmepoolse õigusalase koostööga tugevdati terrorismivastast võitlust ja
vägivaldse äärmusluse ennetamist.
13 Euroopa varjupaiga- ja rändehaldusstrateegia, COM(2026) 45 final. 14 https://science4peace.jrc.ec.europa.eu/#/Home/CET/Map. 15 https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/en/EU-UN-Global-Terrorism-Threats-Facility.
12
Rahumeelsete, kaasavate ja usaldusväärsete valimisprotsesside edendamiseks on oluline toetada ja
vaadelda valimisi. 2025. aastal lähetati täielikud valimisvaatlusmissioonid Boliiviasse, Ecuadori,
Guyanasse, Hondurasesse, Kosovosse, Malawisse ja Filipiinidele, valimisekspertide missioonid
Kosovosse, Iraaki ja Surinamesse ning järelmissioonid Colombiasse, Guatemalasse, Keeniasse,
Lesothosse, Maldiividele, Nigeeriasse ja Ida-Timorisse, et aidata tugevdada demokraatlikke
institutsioone, suurendada üldsuse usaldust valimisprotsesside vastu ning hoida ära pettusi,
hirmutamist ja vägivalda.
EL jätkas paindlikku reageerimist ebakindlates ja konfliktidest mõjutatud olukordades, tehes tihedat
koostööd kohalike partnerite, kodanikuühiskonna organisatsioonide ning noorte- ja
naisteorganisatsioonidega, et suurendada vastupanuvõimet ja edendada rahu, eelistatavalt Euroopa
tiimi lähenemisviisi kaudu. Kodanikuühiskonna tegutsemisruumi kaitsmiseks mõeldud üleilmsete
algatuste, näiteks kodanikuühiskonna jaoks soodsa keskkonna süsteemi algatuse raames jälgiti
suundumusi ja suurendati kodanikuühiskonna suutlikkust 80 riigis.
EL tugevdas oma üldist julgeoleku- ja kaitsealast lähenemisviisi, sealhulgas kasutades kava
„Kaitsevalmidus 2030“ ja SAFE-rahastamisvahendit. ELi julgeolekualases reageerimises oli jätkuvalt
kesksel kohal Euroopa rahutagamisrahastu, samal ajal kanti hoolt selle eest, et sõjalise või
kaitsepoliitilise tähendusega kulutusi rahastatakse väljaspool ELi eelarvet. Lisaks kriisidele kiireks
reageerimiseks mõeldud vahenditele kasutati eri piirkondades ühise julgeoleku- ja kaitsepoliitika
missioone ja operatsioone, et tegeleda konfliktide vahetute ja pikaajaliste tagajärgedega, sealhulgas
Lähis-Idas, Aafrikas ja naaberriikides. 2025. aastal tugevdas EL koostööd partneritega, sõlmides
julgeoleku- ja kaitsepartnerluse Ühendkuningriigi ja Kanadaga.
Kõnealune nimetus ei piira seisukohti staatuse suhtes ning on kooskõlas ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu resolutsiooniga 1244(1999) ja Rahvusvahelise Kohtu arvamusega Kosovo iseseisvusdeklaratsiooni kohta.
13
ÜLEMAAILMSED SAAVUTUSED
Sahara-tagune Aafrika
2025. aastal tõhustasid EL ja Aafrika veelgi oma strateegilist partnerlust, mis hõlmab kaubandust,
investeeringuid, rahu ja julgeolekut ning rohe- ja digipööret. Koostöö tegemisel juhinduti jätkuvalt
ühisest visioonist aastani 2030,16 mille keskmes on strateegia „Global Gateway“ Aafrika-Euroopa
investeeringute pakett ning töö rahu, julgeoleku ja valitsemise, rände ja liikuvuse ning tõhusa
mitmepoolsuse valdkonnas. Partnerluse 25. aastapäeva tähistati ELi ja Aafrika Liidu ministrite
kolmanda kohtumisega ning Aafrika Liidu ja ELi seitsmenda tippkohtumisega, mis toimusid
2025. aastal koos Aafrika Liidu ja ELi ettevõtlusfoorumi ning kodanikuühiskonna organisatsioonide ja
noortefoorumiga. EL ning Aafrika, Kariibi mere ja Vaikse ookeani piirkonna riikide organisatsioon
tõhustasid oma poliitilist koostööd ja jätkasid tööd Samoa lepingu rakendamiseks.
EL oli ka 2025. aastal Aafrika juhtiv kaubandus-, investeerimis-, rahu- ja julgeolekupartner ning
ametliku arenguabi ja humanitaarabi andja. ELi kaubavahetus Aafrikaga ulatus 360 miljardi euroni, mis
moodustab 33 % Aafrika kogukaubandusest. ELi välismaiste otseinvesteeringute kogumaht oli
250 miljardit eurot. 2025. aasta lõpuks oli EL toetanud Euroopa rahutagamisrahastu kaudu Aafrika
riike kokku 400 miljoni euroga.
Suurenes Aafrika mandri vabakaubanduspiirkonna kasutuselevõtmise toetamine kaubanduse
hõlbustamise, tolli ja standardite alase abi kaudu. Aafrika-Euroopa roheenergiaalgatusega ja
kampaaniaga „Taastuvenergia kasutamise suurendamine Aafrikas“ laiendati tööd taastuvenergia ja
elektrisüsteemide piirkondliku integreerimise, sealhulgas võrkude ajakohastamise ning päikese- ja
tuuleenergiasse investeerimise valdkonnas. Jätkus programmi NaturAfrica elluviimine kuues
esmatähtsas elupaikade piirkonnas ning Euroopa tiimi algatused piiriülese veemajanduse ja
ringmajanduse valdkonnas aitasid partnerriikidel kohaneda kliimamuutustega ning parandada veega
kindlustatust ning vee-, sanitaar- ja hügieenisüsteeme.
2025. aastal näitasid nii Lobito kui ka Douala-N’Djamena koridor – kaks Global Gateway juhtalgatust –
, et taristu võib toetada laiemat majandusarengut ja vastupanuvõimet, eelkõige sisemaa- ja
haavatavates piirkondades. Rakendamine kulgeb edukalt tänu Aafrika tugevale isevastutusele ning
ELi, Aafrika partnerite, finantsasutuste ja erainvestorite koordineeritud tegevusele.
Nimetatud jõupingutusi täiendas humanitaarabi: 2025. aastal reageeris EL maailma suurimale
sundrändekriisile Sudaanis (enam kui 10 miljonit riigisisest põgenikku), andes üle 273 miljoni euro (sh
üle 161 miljoni euro Sudaanis), ning eraldas 157 miljonit eurot Aafrika Sarve piirkonnale, et tegeleda
põua, toiduga kindlustamatuse ja sundrände probleemiga. EL on jätkanud tegutsemist ka Kesk-Sahelis,
keskendudes sundrändele, ning Ida-Aafrika järvede piirkonnas, kandes kesk epideemiaid ja
relvavägivalda hoolt tervishoiu eest.
Aasia ja Vaikse ookeani piirkond
2025. aastal süvendati edasi ELi koostööd Ida-, Kagu- ja Lõuna-Aasiaga: tugevdati ELi India ja Vaikse
ookeani piirkonna strateegias17 sätestatud terviklikku piirkondlikku lähenemisviisi, sealhulgas
edendati energiaühendusi ja energiasüsteemi õiglase ümberkujundamise partnerlusi.
16 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54412/final_declaration-en.pdf. 17 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-indo-pacific-strategy_en.
14
Global Gateway juhtalgatusest „Energiaühendused Lõuna-Aasias“ on näha, kuidas EL ühendab kestliku
majanduskasvu, rohepöörde ja piirkondliku integreerimise, toetades piiriülese elektrituru arendamist.
Oluline verstapost strateegia „Global Gateway“ rakendamisel oli ELi-Aafrika-India digikoridori Blue
Raman18 rajamist käsitleva projekti allkirjastamine. Projektiga tugevdatakse vastupidavat
merekaabliühendust ning turvalist ja mitmekesist ülemaailmset andmearhitektuuri. Lisaks võttis EL
vastu 42 miljoni euro suuruse algatuse, et tugevdada Copernicuse andmete kasutamist Aasias ja
Vaikse ookeani piirkonnas, millega toetatakse tõenduspõhiste otsuste tegemist kliima ja ruumilise
planeerimise valdkonnas.
2025. aasta aprillis toimunud esimesel ELi ja Kesk-Aasia tippkohtumisel teatas EL 12 miljardi euro
suurusest Global Gateway Euroopa tiimi investeerimispaketist ja kriitilisi toormeid käsitlevast
kavatsuste deklaratsioonist, milles keskendutakse kestlikule transpordile, roheenergiale, digitaalsele
ühenduvusele ja veele ning mille tulemuseks on kaheksa uut lepingut Kesk-Aasia ja Euroopa vaheliste
mitmeliigiliste ühenduste parandamiseks.
Fidžil aset leidnud esimesel ELi ja Vaikse ookeani piirkonna ettevõtlusfoorumil teatas EL Global
Gateway investeeringutest kogusummas peaaegu 300 miljonit eurot kliimakerksuse, kestliku
majanduskasvu, transpordi, digitaalse ühenduvuse, vee, taastuvenergia ja kaubanduse arendamise
jaoks kogu Vaikse ookeani piirkonnas, seades piirkonnas juhtalgatuseks Vaikse ookeani piirkonna
rohe- ja siniliidu19.
EL andis 2025. aastal rohkem kui 163 miljoni euro väärtuses elupäästvat abi Afganistanis ning toimetas
Afganistani rahva vajaduste rahuldamiseks kohale 390 tonni meditsiinivahendeid ja toiduaineid.
Ameerika ja Kariibi piirkond
2025. aasta novembris toimus Colombias kõrvuti kodanikuühiskonna foorumi ja ettevõtlusfoorumiga
neljas ELi – Ladina-Ameerika ja Kariibi Riikide Ühenduse (CELAC) tippkohtumine. Juhid kinnitasid taas
ELi ja CELACi partnerluse strateegilist tähtsust ning määrasid kindlaks prioriteedid, sealhulgas
strateegia „Global Gateway“ ELi – Ladina-Ameerika ja Kariibi piirkonna investeerimiskava raames.
Hoolimata keerulisest geopoliitilisest olukorrast võtsid EL ja CELAC vastu ühisdeklaratsiooni ja kaks
täiendavat deklaratsiooni kodanike julgeoleku ja hoolekande kohta, rõhutades oma ühist
pühendumust mitmepoolsusele, kaubandusele ja investeeringutele, rohe- ja digipöördele, sotsiaalsele
kaasatusele ning koostööle julgeoleku, õiguse ja rahvusvahelise organiseeritud kuritegevuse vastase
võitluse valdkonnas.
2025. aastaks oli strateegia „Global Gateway“ ELi – Ladina-Ameerika ja Kariibi piirkonna
investeerimiskava raames käivitatud rohkem kui 80 projekti, mis kinnitavad ELi kui juhtiva investori
positsiooni Ladina-Ameerika ja Kariibi piirkonnas ning näitavad Euroopa tiimi lähenemisviisi tugevust.
Juhtalgatuste hulka kuuluvad elektrisüsteemide piirkondlik integreerimine ning satelliitühenduse
algatus Condosat, samuti ELi ning Ladina-Ameerika ja Kariibi piirkonna superandmetöötluse võrgustik
tehisintellekti jaoks. Alates 2025. aasta maist on ELil Ladina-Ameerika ja Kariibi piirkonna
energiaorganisatsioonis20 alalise vaatleja staatus, et ühiselt edendada üleminekut puhtale energiale ja
kestlikku poliitikat.
18 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/eu-africa-india-digital-corridor_en. 19 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/green-blue-alliance-pacific_en. 20 https://www.olade.org/en/.
15
ELi ja Kariibi piirkonna partnerite vaheline koostöö süvenes ka Samoa lepingu ja selle Kariibi piirkonna
protokolli kui poliitilist dialoogi ja arengukoostööd kinnistava uuendatud pikaajalise partnerluse
raames.
Kariibi piirkonnas töötati Global Gateway mariadru algatuse raames välja riiklikud tegevuskavad
mariadru väärindamiseks, et muuta keskkonnaprobleem märkimisväärseks majanduslikuks
võimaluseks.
Koostöö tegemisel USAga keskenduti föderaaltasandist madalamate tasandite eri kategooriate
sidusrühmade kaasamisele läbi avaliku diplomaatia ning linnadevahelise ja haridusalase
teavitustegevuse. Koostöö tegemisel Kanadaga oli EL usaldusväärne partner sellistes esmatähtsates
sektorites nagu kaubandus, digivaldkond ning kaitse ja julgeolek. Mõlema riigiga tehtud koostöös
pöörati suurt tähelepanu ka Arktikat puudutavatele küsimustele (Arktika linnade ja piirkondade
koostöö ning noorte kaasamine).
EL oli 2025. aastal juhtiv humanitaarabi andja (üle 52 miljoni euro) Venezuelas ja selle ümbruses, kus
58,6 % elanikkonnast seisab silmitsi äärmise vaesusega.
Selleks et tugevdada ELi võimet kiiresti reageerida Kariibi piirkonnas ja naaberpiirkondades esinevate
troopiliste tsüklonite, üleujutuste ja maavärinate korral, loodi uus humanitaarabi varu Barbadosel.
Laienemisprotsessis osalevad riigid (Lääne-Balkani partnerid, Türgi, Ukraina, Moldova
Vabariik, Gruusia)
Novembris vastu võetud 2025. aasta laienemispakett kinnitas, et laienemise hoogustamine on ELi
tegevuskavas endiselt tähtsal kohal ja et uute riikide ühinemine on üha enam käeulatuses, tingimusel
et partnerid viivad ellu põhjalikud reformid.
Enamik Lääne-Balkani partnereid on teinud ühinemisprotsessi põhiküsimustes järjepidevalt
edusamme, kusjuures Montenegro ja Albaania liiguvad aina lähemale eesmärgile läbirääkimised
lõpule viia. Ukraina ja Moldova Vabariigi jaoks lõppes 2025. aastal sõelumisprotsess (liidu acquis’
tehniline läbivaatamine) ning komisjoni hinnangul olid põhiküsimuste, siseturu ja välissuhete
teemavaldkonnad avamiseks valmis. Gruusia jääb ametlikult kandidaatriigiks, kuid Gruusia
ametiasutuste hiljutine tegevus on ühinemisprotsessi de facto peatanud. Türgi on endiselt
strateegilise tähtsusega partner ja kandidaatriik, kuigi ühinemisläbirääkimised on seiskunud.
Komisjon töötas välja uuendusliku tehisintellekti vahendi eAccession, et aidata kandidaatriikidel
kiirendada õigusnormide ühtlustamist ning samal ajal säästa aega ja ressursse.
EL jätkas piirkondliku majandusintegratsiooni toetamist, sealhulgas maksesüsteemide ajakohastamise
kaudu ning sellega, et Euroopa Maksenõukogu kaasas 2025. aasta oktoobris Albaania, Montenegro ja
Põhja-Makedoonia SEPA skeemidesse, tänu millele lüheneb märkimisväärselt tehingute tegemiseks
kuluv aeg ning vähenevad kodanike ja ettevõtjate kulud.
Ukraina rahastu ning Lääne-Balkani ja Moldova Vabariigi majanduskasvu kavade põhjal on näha,
kuidas EL ühendab poliitilise pühendumuse, rahalise toetuse ja tingimuslikkuse, et kiirendada
lähenemist ELile. Need kavad hõlmavad 6 miljardit eurot toetusi ja laene Lääne-Balkani partneritele
ning 1,9 miljardit eurot Moldovale, kusjuures rahastamine on seotud ühiselt kokku lepitud
reformikavade rakendamisega ja järkjärgulise integreerumisega ühtse turu valitud valdkondadesse.
2025. aasta lõpuks oli reformikava vastu võetud kõigi partnerite jaoks ning Albaaniale, Montenegrole,
Põhja-Makedooniale, Serbiale ja Moldovale oli tehtud eelmakse.
16
Edendati partnerite täielikku kooskõla ühise julgeoleku- ja kaitsepoliitikaga ning ühise välis- ja
julgeolekupoliitikaga, sealhulgas ELi piiravate meetmete järgimist, ning EL vastas partnerite taotlustele
tugevdada nende vastupanuvõimet ja julgeolekut hübriid- ja muude ohtude suhtes.
EL säilitas märkimisväärse toetuse pagulastele Türgis, eraldades 2025.–2027. aasta eelarvest
pagulaste toetamiseks 1,3 miljardit eurot. Lisaks võeti 2025. aastal kasutusele uus astmeline viisade
andmise süsteem, et hõlbustada heausksete Türgi inimeste reisimist Schengeni alal.
Euroopa naabruskond
Euroopa idanaabrus
EL jätkas idanaabruses, millele on vajutanud pitseri Venemaa agressioonisõda Ukraina vastu, koostööd
partnerriikidega (Armeenia, Aserbaidžaan, Valgevene, Gruusia, Moldova ja Ukraina) kas kahepoolsel
või piirkondlikul tasandil. Idapartnerlus oli jätkuvalt hästi toimiv ja tõhus koostööraamistik kõigile
osalejatele. EL jätkas survepoliitika rakendamist Valgevene ametivõimude suhtes, toetades samal ajal
kodanikke, kodanikuühiskonda ja sõltumatut meediat.
Programmiga „Kaasaegsete õppe- ja koolitusvõimaluste toetamine“ (SALT I-III) aidatakse režiimi eest
põgenema sunnitud Valgevene üliõpilasi, õppejõude ja teadlasi. See on strateegiliselt tähtis algatus
Valgevene intellektuaalse potentsiaali säilitamiseks.
Vastupanuvõime, ühenduvuse ja sotsiaal-majandusliku arengu toetamisel olid endiselt keskse
tähtsusega strateegia „Global Gateway“ ja idanaabruse mitmeaastased tegevuskavad aastateks 2025–
2027. Hiljuti heaks kiidetud mitmeaastaste tegevuskavade kulukohustuste kogusumma on
668,2 miljonit eurot (ei hõlma Ukrainale antavat abi).
Mais võeti vastu uus Musta mere piirkonna strateegia21 ja oktoobris kiideti heaks ühenduvuse
tegevuskava, millega ühendatakse Euroopa Musta mere piirkonna, Türgi ja Lõuna-Kaukaasia kaudu
Kesk-Aasiaga ning luuakse oluline alus Lõuna-Kaukaasia partneritega tihedama koostöö tegemiseks
kestlike transpordi-, energia- ja digiühenduste valdkonnas.
Euroopa lõunanaabrus ja Lähis-Ida / Pärsia lahe piirkond
ELi strateegiline huvi on jõukas, ühendatud, vastupanuvõimeline, rahumeelne ja stabiilne Põhja-
Aafrika, Lähis-Ida ja Pärsia lahe piirkond.
2025. aastal varustas EL end uute vahenditega: kiideti heaks Vahemere piirkonna lepe22 ning käivitati
mitu strateegilist ja laiaulatuslikku partnerlust, et võtta kogu piirkonnas sidusamaid mõjule
orienteeritud meetmeid. Haldamaks komisjoni suhteid 19 partnerriigiga, hakkas täies mahus tööle
spetsiaalne Lähis-Ida, Põhja-Aafrika ja Pärsia lahe peadirektoraat.
Sõda Gazas põhjustas jätkuvalt tõsist humanitaarkriisi, ulatuslikku hävingut ja üha suuremat
ebastabiilsust kogu Lähis-Idas. EL kutsus 2025. aasta novembris kokku Palestiina rahastajate rühma
esimese koosoleku ning esitas samal ajal Palestiina taastamise ja vastupanuvõime tervikliku
programmi aastateks 2025–2027 ning ettepaneku rakendada piiravaid meetmeid vastusena
tegevusele, mis kahjustab kahe riigi kooseksisteerimisel põhinevat lahendust.
21 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/et/ip_25_1348. 22 JOIN(2025) 26, https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-pact-mediterranean_en.
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EL oli endiselt suurim rahvusvaheline rahastaja ja palestiinlastele humanitaarabi andja, eraldades
2025. aastal kokku 220 miljonit eurot erakorralist humanitaarabi. Lisaks rahastamisele jätkas EL
operatiivabi andmist, korraldades õhusilla lende, meditsiinilist evakuatsiooni ja maanteevedusid.
Pärsia lahe piirkonnas pakuti kõigile kuuele Pärsia lahe koostöönõukogu liikmele strateegilise
partnerluse lepingut. 2025. aasta lõpuks olid andnud positiivse vastuse viis riiki ning olid alanud
läbirääkimised Araabia Ühendemiraatide ja Katariga.
Merekaablisüsteem Medusa on murranguline projekt piirkondliku ja rahvusvahelise
telekommunikatsiooni jaoks, tagades vastupidavad ja suure läbilaskevõimega ühendused Euroopa ja
Põhja-Aafrika vahel.
Ülemeremaad ja -territooriumid (ÜMTd)
13 ülemeremaad ja -territooriumi on mitteriiklikud üksused, millel on põhiseaduslikud seosed Taani,
Prantsusmaa ja Madalmaadega ning mis on laiema Euroopa perekonna lahutamatu osa. ÜMTdel on
ELi jaoks üha strateegilisem roll – neil on ulatuslikud majandusvööndid ning juurdepääs olulistele
loodusvaradele, sealhulgas kriitilistele toormetele, ning peamistele merepiirkondadele ja -teedele.
ÜMTde, sealhulgas Gröönimaa assotsieerimise otsusega on eraldatud aastateks 2021–2027 ÜMTde
majandusliku ja sotsiaalse arengu toetamiseks ning kliimamuutuste ja elurikkuse vähenemise
probleemiga tegelemiseks 500 miljonit eurot. Komisjon tegi ettepaneku seda otsust muuta, millega
kahekordistatakse ÜMTdele antavaid vahendeid, eraldades 2028.–2034. aastaks 999 miljonit eurot.
2025. aastal jätkus suhete laiendamine ja tihendamine Gröönimaaga, seda olukorras, kus
rahvusvaheline huvi Arktika vastu on kasvanud; lisaks haridusele ja kalandusele hõlmati sellised
valdkonnad nagu kriitilised toormed, taastuvenergia ja ühenduvus. ELi ja Gröönimaa partnerluse
raames toimusid kaks poliitilist dialoogi, kõrgetasemelised visiidid ning novembris Brüsselis esimene
ELi ja Gröönimaa nädal.
2025. aastal viidi viimast aastat ellu esimest Prantsuse Polüneesia veepoliitika tegevuskava (2021–
2030). Saavutatud tulemuste hulka kuuluvad joogivett jagavate omavalitsuste arvu suurenemine,
jätkuvad meetmed valgalade kindlustamiseks ja veesektori juhtimise tugevdamine täielikult toimiva
tehnilise komitee kaudu. Teine tegevuskava on kavandatud hõlmama ajavahemikku 2026–2030.