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| Toimik | Ettepanek - COM(2026) 1030, SEC(2026) 1030, SWD(2026) 1030, SWD(2026) 1031 |
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EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 27.10.2026
COM(2026) 1030 final
2026/0342 (COD)
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the European Border and Coast Guard (recast)
{SEC(2026) 1030 final} - {SWD(2026) 1030 final} - {SWD(2026) 1031 final}
EN 1 EN
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
The European Union (EU) must ensure effective control of its external borders. A
significant progress has been made over last years. The EU has put in place the most
advanced border management system in the world effectively tackling security risks and
illegal migration. Illegal border crossings have fallen to their lowest level since 2021, down
55% over the past two years and by more than a third in 2026 alone. Returns of those without
the right to stay in the EU have increased to more than 30%. The EU’s collective capacity to
manage its external borders has been progressively strengthened with the European Border
and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) acting as a key Union actor in supporting Member States
to effectively manage the Union’s external borders.
Despite this progress, the protection of EU borders must be further strengthened to respond to
the current complex and evolving challenges. Although the number of illegal border
crossings into the EU has steadily declined since 20231, migratory pressures are likely to
persist at both land and sea borders as migrants seek to evade enhanced controls at border
crossing points. New technologies and social media are increasingly being exploited to
influence migratory flows, facilitate unauthorised crossings and shift routes, undermining the
security of the EU’s external borders. Migrant smuggling continues to have a major impact2,
as smuggling networks become ever more professional and sophisticated, adapting routes and
methods according to demand, opportunities and obstacles. Geopolitical developments
continue to shape the EU’s external border environment, combined with an increasing range
of hybrid threats from disinformation and online manipulation by criminal and other hostile
actors to cyber-attacks targeting border management systems and critical infrastructure. In
particular, the instrumentalisation of migrants and weaponisation of migration3 is a continued
source of pressure, testing our collective ability to protect the EU’s external borders. Cross-
border crime is evolving at an unprecedented pace, testing the resilience of the EU’s external
borders, as organised criminal groups and networks engage in a wide range of illegal
activities, such as vehicle theft, drug trafficking4, firearms trafficking, or document fraud. The
EU’s proximity to current and former conflict zones also increases its exposure to firearms
trafficking, raising the risk that such weapons may be used in Europe.
Furthermore, the events in Ceuta in the summer of 2026 demonstrated how quickly sudden
and mass arrivals can build up at the EU's external borders and lead to an exceptional
situation. It has also highlighted the importance of the EU and Member States ability to
anticipate, prevent and timely respond to emergencies and crises.
At the same time, despite sustained efforts by Member States and EU agencies, a substantial
proportion of third-country nationals subject to a return decision does not effectively leave
1 Illegal border crossings into the EU were approximately 380 000 in 2023 and fell in 2025 to
approximately 178 000 constituting less than half of the total recorded in 2023 and the lowest level since 2021.
Preliminary data shows that unauthorised crossings into the EU fell by 37% in the first seven months of 2026,
compared to the same period in 2025, with approximately 61 000 detections recorded at the EU’s external
borders. 2 As reiterated in the European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy, over 90% of irregular
migrants who reach the EU use services of smugglers for parts or entirety of their journey. 3 See Communication of the Commission on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of
migration and strengthening security at the EU’s external borders, COM(2024) 570 final. 4 According to Europol, half of the most threatening criminal networks operating in the EU are involved
in drug trafficking.
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the EU territory.5 Differences in national capacities, operational practices, and cooperation
with third countries also underline the need for stronger coordination and more joint action at
EU level, supported by modern digital tools. This would ensure that the EU builds on the
momentum generated in return policy by the full implementation of the Pact on Migration
and Asylum and the adoption of the Return Regulation6.
Addressing these challenges requires a modern and credible migration management
framework based on a strong border governance to prevent illegal migration and ensure
effective returns of those with no right to stay.7 Strengthening Frontex is a flagship initiative
of the Commission for delivering on these objectives.
Already now, the Frontex is the largest EU Agency that embodies the European dimension
of border management and return policy by pooling resources, expertise and operational
capacity that no single Member State could sustain alone, thereby ensuring a consistent high
standard of border control across the Union. As a result, Frontex is the key asset in
strengthening the integrity of the Schengen area, reinforcing mutual trust among Member
States, and giving practical expression to the principle that the security of one external border
is a shared concern of the EU as a whole. Along with Europol and Eurojust, it is also a key
component of the European response to security challenges.
To reach the current position, Frontex had to significantly evolve over the last years. Since
2016, together with the relevant national authorities, it forms the European Border and
Coast Guard (EBCG), where the responsibility for the EU’s external borders is shared with
Member States, based on loyal cooperation and support.8 The Agency delivers on its
objectives and tasks through its standing corps9, i.e. the EU's first uniformed border
management and return service expected to reach 10 000 deployable officers by 2027, and the
European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) that provides a common framework for
situational awareness and operational cooperation.
Taking into account these achievements and potential, the President’s political guidelines
(2024-2029) set the objective of enhancing Frontex’s operational capacity, including by
increasing the staff available for Frontex operations to 30 000 and by equipping it with state-
of-the-art surveillance and situational awareness technologies. The 5-Point Plan10, adopted
by the Commission following the Ceuta events, emphasised the need to strengthen situational
awareness in order to anticipate and prevent emergencies at the EU’s external borders, and to
respond in a timely manner to crisis situations, with Frontex being a key actor delivering on
this commitment.
The need to reinforce Frontex, in particular as regards the management of the EU’s external
borders and the implementation of the common system for returns, has been consistently
highlighted by the Member States. Stakeholder consultations, including with Frontex, the
5 Based on Eurostat data, the return rate of third-country nationals with a return decision in the European
Union was approximately 30% in the first quarter of 2026. 6 In March 2025, the Commission proposed a Regulation establishing a common system for the return of
third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, replacing the Return Directive, which was adopted by the
co-legislators in October 2026 as Regulation (EU) 2026/2280. 7 COM(2026) 45 final. 8 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament an of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the
European Border and Coast guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and repealing Regulation (EC) of
the European Parliament and the Council (EC) No 863/2007, the Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, and
Council Decision 2005/267. 9 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on
the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624. 10 5-point plan to prevent, anticipate and respond to sudden, mass illegal arrivals - Migration and Home
Affairs
EN 3 EN
evaluation of the Frontex Regulation of 202311 and the study accompanying the impact
assessment carried out in 202512, highlighted the need to: improve the efficiency of Frontex’s
role in border management and return; ensure Frontex has sufficient operational capacity to
deliver on its objectives; and expand training and planning capabilities.
The proposal responds to these challenges. It aims to ensure that Frontex has the tools,
governance and operational capacity to support Member States at the external borders, and to
improve the effectiveness of returns. To this end, the proposal sets out several modifications
in three main priority areas.
Firstly, the proposal transforms Frontex into a truly European agency able to provide a more
reliable and tailored support to border protection and return. By increasing the standing corps
to 30 000, including through a new European border and return reserve, the Agency will have
greater and more flexible capacity, based on a larger pool of officers trained to high common
European standards, that will also lead to improved interoperability between EU and national
resources enabling faster and more effective deployments, and maximised operational impact
of each deployment while easing pressure on Member States’ own systems. The Agency will
also be equipped with the possibility to acquire, lease and co-own state-of-the-art technical
assets that will result in better value-for-money for Member States, more predictable
deployments, and reduced critical dependencies.
Secondly, the proposal transforms Frontex into a central operational pillar of the Common
European System for Returns responsible for return-related support: from strategic
planning, prioritisation, through coordination and implementation of return operations, to
readmission and reintegration. The proposal will enhance coordination and strategic pooling
of resources aligned with the operational needs identified by Member States, simplify
procedures and achieve efficiency through economies of scale, strengthen expertise and
capacity to support Member States, and improve governance and strategic planning of the
return processes. In this context, together with this proposal, the Commission is taking
additional steps to further improve the effectiveness of returns by putting forward a proposal
for a Regulation on the digitalisation of case managements in the area of return,
readmission and reintegration, establishing a common digital backbone, connecting the
relevant authorities, processes and tools13. This proposal represents an important tool in the
Union’s toolbox to deliver on the Union’s enhanced ambition to have swift and effective
returns, as an integral component of a well-managed EU migration system. Frontex will play
a key role in the new common digital architecture, which will allow to manage the return
process in a more efficient, cost-effective manner, simplifying procedures and reducing
administrative burden.
Thirdly, Frontex will become a more agile and reliable partner supporting Member States
in preparedness and crisis response. This will include strengthened role in situational
awareness and risk assessment through to more tailored operational support to Member States
facing exceptional situations, and closer cooperation with third countries. This will ensure that
Member States receive the support they need in situations they need it most.
Secure EU borders are a prerequisite for the functioning of the Schengen area, the safety of
EU citizens, and trust among Member States. The proposals ultimately contributes to
achieving these objectives.
11 Evaluation study; – https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/whats-new/publications/study-support-ebcg-
regulation-evaluation_en 12 Impact Assessment - SWD(2026) 1030 13 COM(2026) 1037
EN 4 EN
• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
The proposal contributes to the EU policy framework on integrated border management,
return and migration management, and the protection of the Schengen area. It is an important
element of ensuring a high level of security while safeguarding the free movement of persons
through the effective management of the EU's external borders.
The proposal updates the legal framework established by Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 on the
European Border and Coast Guard, which is the primary legislative instrument. It
preserves the core architecture of the existing framework based on shared responsibility,
contributions to the standing corps, close cooperation between all Frontex actors, and the
division of responsibilities between different EU institutions and bodies, while addressing the
legal, operational and structural shortcomings.
Furthermore, the proposal builds on and further develops the comprehensive approach set out
in the Pact on Migration and Asylum, where, in line with Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the
European Parliament and of the Council14, border management, asylum and return should
function as integrated and mutually reinforcing elements of EU migration management. It
aims to equip Frontex to assist Member States in swiftly processing third-country nationals
arriving at external borders and returning those with no right to stay in the EU, including
through EU-level strategic planning and coordination, as well as cooperation with third
countries in the area of return.
The proposal will ensure that Frontex’s mandate and operational capacity evolve in line with
the increased ambition and requirements of the EU return framework and, notably, in the
implementation of the Common European System for Returns established by the Return
Regulation. It thereby reinforces the coherence between European Integrated Border
Management, the broader EU migration architecture, and its return policy.
The proposal is also consistent with the whole-of-route approach to migration management
and the broader objectives of the 2026 European Asylum and Migration Management
Strategy, which emphasises strengthened cooperation with third countries along migration
routes. In this context, a stronger operational role for Frontex in cooperating with third
countries in the area of return would complement existing Union and Member State
cooperation frameworks, contribute to addressing migratory pressure along migration routes
and support greater continuity and coherence across the return process.
The proposal is also consistent with the Schengen Borders Code. In particular, it aligns the
possibilities of cooperation with third countries with the agreements foreseen in the Code. It
also builds on the experiences with the Union’s multiannual strategic policy for European
integrated border management.
The proposal builds on the deployment of large-scale EU information systems for border
management and security of the Schengen area, including the Schengen Information
System (SIS), the Entry/Exit System (EES), the European Travel Information and
Authorisation System (ETIAS), the Visa Information System (VIS), thereby contributing to
more effective border management, improved risk analysis and enhanced interoperability
across the Union. The proposal will be accompanied by modifications to two Interoperability
Regulations, as well as the SIS return and SIS borders Regulations, which are necessary to
enable the ETIAS Central Unit in Frontex to assume a new role after the completion of its
current assignment, and to establish a SIRENE Bureau within Frontex to enable the exchange
of information on SIS alerts on return and for refusal of entry and stay.
14 Regulation - EU - 2024/1351 - EN - EUR-Lex.
EN 5 EN
• Consistency with other Union policies
The proposal is consistent with the Union's broader policies on internal security, external
relations and enlargement.
It is consistent with the objectives of the new European internal security strategy, ProtectEU,
which identifies secure external borders as an essential component of the EU's internal
security architecture, and supports a more integrated European response to hybrid threats,
organised crime and illegal migration. By strengthening Frontex through enhanced
surveillance and situational awareness capabilities and by providing the legal framework for
the further development of Frontex’s standing corps, the proposal directly contributes to the
objective of reinforcing EU external border management and therefore supports the objective
of strengthening internal security. To that end, it also facilitates closer operational cooperation
and information exchange between Frontex, Europol and national law enforcement authorities
in the fight against migrant smuggling and other cross-border criminal activities. The proposal
is also consistent with the European Commission’s proposal for a new sanctions regime
tackling forms of organised crime which threaten the EU’s values and security, including
migrant smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking and arms trafficking, which is
currently pending negotiations.15
The proposal contributes to the broader response to hybrid threats. In particular, it aims to
enrich the situational picture by extending the scope of data sharing in the framework of
EUROSUR. Together with inter-agency cooperation at the EU level, this will lead to a
significant improvement of the situational awareness and an increase of reaction capabilities
within the EU, without creating overlaps with other information systems deployed by EU
agencies. The proposal will be complemented by the planned Earth Observation
Governmental Service (EOGS), being prepared by the Commission, which will expand the
Earth observation capabilities available to the Union for security and defence.
The proposal also aims to further enhance European cooperation on coastguard functions
with the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) and the European Maritime Safety
Agency (EMSA), as well as with other relevant EU actors, to improve the complementarity
and synergies between those agencies and to provide more efficient and cost-effective multi-
purpose services to national authorities, while fully respecting the division of responsibilities
between the respective actors.
The proposal is consistent with EU policy on cooperation with third countries. In addition
to contributing to the whole-of-route approach set out in the European Asylum and Migration
Management Strategy, it strengthens the Union’s ability to engage with partner countries
along key migratory routes. It promotes closer strategic and operational cooperation through
status agreements and capacity-building measures. It offers reinforced support in areas, such
as vulnerability assessments, tailored training or risk assessment products to improve
cooperation on border management, combat abuses of visas to the EU and prevent illegal
border crossings. This will help support alignment with the EU acquis on migration, asylum
and visa policy, and strengthen cooperation on return and readmission.
The proposed measures remain coherent with broader EU external action objectives. The
proposal seeks to enable Frontex, and by extension the EU, to better identify and leverage
synergies across the various strands of EU external action, wherever such synergies exist,
maximising effectiveness and mitigating the risk of duplicated efforts, without reducing the
15 JOIN (2026) 17 final, Brussels 9.7.2026 - 2026/0198 (NLE) SENSITIVE and HR (2026) 165
LIMITED; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_26_1565
EN 6 EN
role of the EU Institutions and the Member States in defining and influencing Union policy in
this area.
The proposal supports the implementation of the first EU Visa Policy Strategy, which
recognises the visa system as the Union’s first line of security screening. It reaffirms the dual
objective of visa policy: to safeguard EU security and integrity while facilitating legitimate
bona fide travel that is beneficial to the Union. In this context, the proposal strengthens
Frontex’s contribution to the implementation of the EU visa policy, including through training
capacity, document security and document fraud expertise, and capacities to develop targeted
risk analysis products. By enhancing Frontex’s support to Member States on visa policy with
a new Visa support office, the proposal reinforces the security dimension of EU visa policy in
a manner consistent with the objectives of the Visa Policy Strategy.
Furthermore, the proposal also supports the EU's digital transformation agenda by
facilitating the use of modern surveillance technologies, interoperable information systems
and advanced situational awareness capabilities within European Integrated Border
Management. This will be complemented by the proposal for a Regulation on the
digitalisation case management in the area of return, readmission and reintegration. This
proposal provides Frontex with the appropriate operational framework to develop further and
support the effective implementation of the future digital architecture, enabling more efficient
information exchange, coordination and management of return-related processes.
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
• Legal basis
The proposal is based on Articles 77(2)(b) and (d), and by Article 79(2)(c) of the TFEU.
Article 77(2)(b) empowers the Union to adopt legislation governing checks on individuals
crossing external borders. Article 77(2)(d) provides for the adoption of measures necessary
for the progressive development of an integrated management system for external borders.
Article 79(2)(c) authorises the implementation of measures to address illegal migration,
including removal and repatriation of individuals residing without valid authorisation.
• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)
The challenges addressed by this proposal are inherently transnational and cannot be
effectively tackled by Member States acting alone. The management of the Union's external
borders is a shared European responsibility, and shortcomings in one part of the external
border may have consequences for the functioning, security and integrity of the Schengen
area as a whole. Geopolitical developments, hybrid threats, increasingly sophisticated
criminal and smuggling networks, and the growing need for digital and operational
capabilities have further highlighted the need for a coordinated Union response in the area of
border management and return. Fragmented national approaches limit the effectiveness of
border management, return operations and crisis preparedness, and cannot adequately address
challenges that extend beyond the territory or capacities of individual Member States. Action
at Union level is, therefore, both necessary and more effective.
Effective management and control of the Union’s external borders is in the interest of all
Member States. The abolition of internal border controls within the Schengen area means that
external border management directly affects the functioning, security, and integrity of the
Union as a whole. Perceived deficiencies in the management of external borders, combined
with migratory challenges and security risks, have led in the past to the reintroduction of
internal border controls undermining trust between Member States. Abuses of visas to the
EN 7 EN
Union also place strain on that trust.
Through the European Border and Coast Guard, Frontex supports Member States by
providing a common operational framework, facilitating the pooling of expertise and
technical assets, strengthening common risk analysis and situational awareness, and enabling
the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment where needed. It also reinforces the
coordination of return operations, promotes the consistent application of common standards,
and enhances cooperation with third countries, thereby increasing the effectiveness of national
authorities while fully respecting their operational responsibilities. By developing shared
capabilities and coordination mechanisms at Union level, the proposal avoids duplication,
generates economies of scale and ensures a coherent and resilient approach to the
management of the Union's external borders. In a Schengen area without internal border
controls, such collective action is essential to safeguard the effective functioning of the area of
freedom, security and justice while ensuring the uniform implementation of the integrated
European border management system.
• Proportionality
In line with the principle of proportionality, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European
Union, this proposal does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve its objectives. The
proposal introduces targeted measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the European Border
and Coast Guard framework by addressing systemic shortcomings in areas where coordinated
Union action provides clear added value, including the deployment of the standing corps,
border surveillance, return operations, and crisis response. It focuses on reinforcing
operational cooperation, improving coordination and ensuring the uniform application of
common standards, while preserving Member States' operational responsibility and primary
competence for the management of their external borders. The proposal is limited to measures
that cannot be effectively achieved by Member States acting alone and leaves flexibility for
national authorities in the implementation of common standards, taking into account their
specific operational, legal and geographical contexts.
• Choice of the instrument
This proposal amends and expands Regulation (EU) 2019/1896. Since the amendments to be
made are substantial in number and nature, the legal act is a recast in order to ensure the
necessary clarity.
The evolution of the Agency’s role requires a modernised legal framework to provide the
legal certainty, predictability, and accountability necessary for it to carry out its reinforced
mandate effectively. The revised legal framework needs to allow the Agency to perform its
enhanced functions efficiently while operating within a clear, robust, and predictable legal
environment, and maintaining the operational flexibility needed to respond to evolving
threats.
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
• Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation
On 2 February 2024, the European Commission published its evaluation report on Regulation
(EU) 2019/189616, including a review of the standing corps, on the basis of the data available
up to the end of 2023. The evaluation did not cover the Agency’s integrated capability
16 EUR-Lex - 52024DC0075 - EN - EUR-Lex
EN 8 EN
planning, as that mechanism was formalised only at the end of the evaluation period. The
evaluation concluded that the Regulation remained broadly fit for purpose in responding to
the challenges affecting the Union’s external borders. It nevertheless identified certain
shortcomings and areas requiring further improvement. In particular, it highlighted: the lack
of clarity on the exact role of Frontex in implementing certain tasks, such as those related to
cross border crime; divergent operational procedures across Member States, which impede the
uniform implementation of EIBM; the need for a long-term strategic approach and
predictability in investments in human and technical capabilities; gaps in the quality of
training provided to the standing corps and constraints arising from the Staff Regulations that
prevent full integration of the Agency’s own operational staff; limitations in providing an
updated, accurate and comprehensive situational picture and risk analysis; and obstacles to the
conclusion of working arrangements that hamper cooperation with third countries. Finally, the
evaluation report suggested to improve the oversight and strategic steering, particularly on
return-related issues. These gaps were subsequently reflected in an action plan that is
regularly updated by the Commission and Frontex.
• Stakeholder consultations
The proposal was prepared through a broad consultation process involving national
authorities, Frontex, other EU agencies, civil society, academia, international organisations,
social partners, and the general public on the functioning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896.
A Call for Evidence17 collected initial views on key shortcomings and policy options,
followed by a public consultation18 on the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU added
value of the current framework.
This was complemented by a targeted survey19 of practitioners and specialised organisations,
as well as targeted interviews on operational constraints, governance arrangements and
safeguards.
The Commission discussed the future of the Agency and the revision of its mandate with
Member States in several Council configurations, including the Justice and Home Affairs
Council, Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA), and the
Council Frontiers Working Party. Member States’ experts were also consulted through the
Schengen Borders Committee, the EBCG expert group and bilateral exchanges.
In June 2024, the Justice and Home Affairs Council underlined organisational, technical and
governance-related shortcoming sand called for a structural reform of the Agency alongside
more flexible and adequately resourced operational capacities. In March 2025, the European
Council reaffirmed the Union’s determination to strengthen security at its external borders
and ensure their effective control in full compliance with Union and international law.
The Commission also exchanged views with the European Parliament, notably the Committee
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Schengen and Borders Scrutiny
Working Group
Exchanges were also held between the Commission and the Agency highlighting the need to
move from a fragmented and reactive model towards an integrated and resilient system,
supported by stronger planning, investment, training, technological development, cooperation
with Member States and third countries, and full respect for ethical standards and fundamental
rights.
17 European Border and Coast Guard/Frontex – standing corps review and evaluation of Regulation 18 European Border and Coast Guard – update of EU rules 19 ICF study to be published.
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The consultation results showed broad agreement that, despite the significant contribution of
the European Border and Coast Guard framework, implementation shortcomings warrant
targeted legislative adjustments to further strengthen the European integrated border
management. Stakeholders also supported strengthening Frontex’s role in the area of return,
readmission and reintegration, and cooperation with third countries. Many Member States,
national authorities and operational actors underlined the need to further modernise the
regulatory framework to reflect technological developments, interoperable information
systems, stronger risk analysis and preparedness, and clearer responsibilities between the
Agency and national authorities. The feedback received was taken into account in the design
of the proposal, including by reflecting stakeholders’ calls for greater legal clarity,
streamlined procedures, and technological adaptations.
• Collection and use of expertise
The Commission relied on external expertise to support both the evaluation and the impact
assessment accompanying this proposal. In particular, an external study carried out between 2
April 2025 and 2 February 2026 provided a comprehensive evidence base drawing on input
from Member States, EU bodies, offices and agencies, Frontex, standing corps officers,
Frontex Consultative Forum members, law enforcement networks, and other relevant
stakeholders.
• Impact assessment
Prior to the legislative proposal, an impact assessment had been carried out to examine policy
options for addressing shortcomings in the current EBCG Regulation that reduce its
effectiveness in border management and return, as well as deficiencies in training, planning
and Frontex’s quality control mechanisms.
The baseline scenario assumed that structural problems would persist. These problems
stemmed from legal ambiguities, limitations in the existing mandate and established practices,
notably in the areas of return, data sharing and equipment procurement. It also assumed that
the strategic risks identified in the Strategic Risk Analysis Report20 would materialise and
place additional pressure on the Schengen area. Although non-legislative adjustments and
fuller use of existing tools could bring some incremental improvements, they would not be
sufficient to overcome these structural constraints or to ensure the flexibility and surge
capacity required to respond to rapidly changing operational needs.
Against this background, three policy options were assessed.
Policy Option 1 focused on enhancing the effectiveness by addressing shortcomings identified
in the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation and improving overall preparedness for crisis
situations, while maintaining the current pace of development and implementation of the
EIBM.
Policy Option 2 built on this approach by introducing additional measures to strengthen
border management and return, including a new standing corps category, reinforced training,
and steps towards a more harmonised EIBM-based structure supported by better planning,
quality assurance and technical equipment development.
20 Strategic_Risk_Analysis_2024_Report.pdf
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Policy Option 3 represented the most ambitious approach, providing for a broader expansion
of the EBCG mandate and capabilities in order to fully deliver on EIBM objectives and
maximise Frontex’s role in border management and return.
• Regulatory fitness and simplification
The proposal simplifies the implementation of the European Border and Coast Guard
framework, while ensuring that any additional obligations for Member States are
proportionate and justified by operational needs.
The preferred options reinforce the Agency’s role in overall planning and coordination.
Member States may need to improve the quality of information shared under existing rules.
The introduction of common methodologies, templates and the streamlining of processes will
reduce repeated requests and improve the link between priorities, operational needs and
resources. The proposal also removes duplicate EUROSUR tasks, strengthens central fusion
services, promotes the reuse of risk analysis outputs in planning, and lowers the default
communication network classification to the level generally used in practice, while allowing
higher classification where needed. Overall, this should reduce duplication, avoid over-
classification, and make better use of existing information.
The proposal also introduces simplifications for operational cooperation and support. In the
external dimension, status agreements with third countries can also cover technical assistance,
avoiding separate working arrangement where operational cooperation is already covered. It
also allows more targeted and flexible agreements and extends cooperation with international
organisations beyond the current list. In technical equipment and innovation, the Agency
could organise joint procurement, act as a central purchasing body, and promote common
technical standards, reducing redundant tenders, testing and procurement. Support for
Member States’ standing corps category 2 contributions is also simplified by linking
financing directly to actual secondments, making it easier to verify and administer.
The expected increase of operations, the expansion of Agency’s tasks and activities could
increase the workload of the Management Board and executive director. The proposal
therefore foresees modifications to the Agency’s governance structure to increase the
efficiency of the Management Board, in particular by reinforcing the Executive Board as
competent preparatory entity, which could assume certain roles in operational decisions
making in different areas, in particular return.
Overall, any additional burdens, particularly in planning coordination, acquisitions of
technical equipment, information sharing, and training, would be offset by the positive impact
on the security in the Schengen area, thanks to more efficient border management and returns.
As regards the increase of the standing corps size, the accompanying measures, in particular
the modified training architecture, the simplified financial support, and use of multiannual
rather than annual contribution schemes, should significantly alleviate the burdens related to
recruitment and upkeep of the European border and return reserve.
The regulatory burden varies per thematic area but remains limited overall, as many of the
proposed measures clarify existing rules and build on existing structures, in particular for
return and training.
More generally, the recast seeks to make the Agency’s mandate easier to implement by
clarifying the applicable rules, aligning procedures with operational realities, and promoting
reuse of existing tools instead of creating additional layers of obligations.
EN 11 EN
• Fundamental rights
This proposal respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably the rights to respect for
private and family life (Article 7), protection of personal data (Article 8), asylum (Article 18),
protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition, including the principle of non-
refoulement (Article 19), the rights of the child (Article 24), and the right to an effective
remedy (Article 47).
In line with relevant Union and international law, the proposal ensures that operational
activities are carried out with full respect for fundamental rights and with particular attention
to vulnerable persons and the best interests of the child. Any interference with Charter rights
must be necessary, proportionate and subject to appropriate safeguards. Data-related measures
remain subject to the applicable Union data protection framework. The proposal also
maintains oversight and accountability mechanisms.
Where cooperation with third countries is envisaged, it must take place within the framework
of Union external action. Status agreements for operations involving executive powers must
include safeguards.
Overall, the proposal seeks to ensure that operational effectiveness and fundamental rights
protection are mutually reinforcing. It supports effective border management and return-
related action while preserving clear legal limits, procedural guarantees, monitoring and
remedies.
4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
The proposal envisages a strengthened role of Frontex in supporting Member States, including
by gradually expanding its capabilities (human and technical resources), as well as enhancing
its core activities in relation to the management of the external borders and returns. The
implementation of the new proposed measures as well as ensuring the continuation of
Frontex’ existing activities has budgetary implications at EU level.
At the same time, experience with the implementation of the current Regulation has
demonstrated that a single seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework period can suffice,
albeit not without challenges, to implement the standing corps concept in its current form,
namely 10 000 deployable officers across category 1 of Agency statutory staff, category 2 of
national officers seconded by Member States for longer-term deployments, and category 3 of
national officers made available by Member States for short-term deployments, as well as a
dormant category 4 for rapid reactions. Based on experience over a 7-years period, two
additional periods of the same duration, until 2041, would represent a reasonable
implementation timeframe to reach the objective of expanding the standing corps to 30 000
officers. The proposed growth would not be achieved through the linear expansion of the
existing categories. In line with the rationale for deeper integration and interoperability
described above, a sustainable increase in category 1 staff would instead be accompanied by
the introduction of an additional reserve of uniformly trained national officers, whose training
and potential subsequent deployments in an EBCG context would be organised and overseen
by the Agency.
For the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) period (2028-2034), the Commission
proposed to allocate EUR 11.888 billion to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.
The budget will include costs linked to EBCG standing corps, taking into account the
envisaged growth of the standing corps category 1 officers and the establishment of a new
European border and return reserve (by 2034), the setting up of a comprehensive training
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framework for all categories of standing corps, the implementation of the multiannual strategy
for the acquisition, leasing and development of the Agency’s equipment, strengthening
Frontex’ support to Member States covering return, readmission and reintegration,
cooperation frameworks with partner third countries, EU entities and international
organisations, the development of the digital tools to foster return in line with the proposal for
a Regulation on the digitalisation of case management in the area of return, readmission and
reintegration, Frontex’ current operational activities (e.g. EUROSUR).
Some of the proposed measures aim to increase efficiency and cost-effectiveness, reducing
financial and administrative burden for the Agency. This includes aligning, as a general rule,
the place of employment to the place of deployment rationalising the system of financial
allocations for standing corps to render it better tailored for long-term operational service, as
well as increased efficiency of Frontex-managed returns, including through improved
coordination on returns.
The proposal also envisages that incoming revenues can be considered in relation to Frontex
costs. This includes the fee generated by the operation of ETIAS, expected to cover costs
related to ETIAS operational expenditures, and could include additional revenues from fees
generated from services run by the Agency, including for instance carrying out compliance
checks of travel and identity documents.
Additionally, within the policy reference framework set out in Article 22(2) of the National
and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPP) Regulation, the Commission will call on Member
States to finance measures in their National and Regional Partnership Plans in support of the
implementation of this Regulation.
The detailed financial implications of the proposal are set out in the legislative financial
statement accompanying the proposal. The estimated financial and staffing implications for
2028 and beyond are provided for illustrative purposes only and do not pre-empt decisions on
the next MFF. The funding sources and the extent of the EU’s financial commitment beyond
2027 will depend on the outcome of the interinstitutional negotiations for the 2028-2034
MFF. Thereafter they must be determined through the annual budgetary procedure. All
appropriations and staffing allocations from 2028 onwards are therefore indicative.
5. OTHER ELEMENTS
• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
The implementation of the proposal will follow reinforced governance structures applicable to
decentralised EU agencies, with Frontex reporting regularly to the Management Board. The
Executive Board will assist the Management Board in overseeing the preparation and
implementation of the annual and multiannual programming, and in reinforcing supervision of
administrative and budgetary management.
Performance, operational outcomes, and compliance with legal and data protection
obligations will be monitored and evaluated using established reporting cycles and
procedures. The proposal retains the Frontex’s obligation to exchange information relevant to
its tasks with the Commission and the Member States, which will enable effective monitoring
of the overall performance of the Regulation.
The Commission will evaluate the functioning and effectiveness of the Regulation s and
report on its performance.
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• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
Explanations are provided for substantial changes in operative part per Chapter. The
consequential modifications or technical adjustments are listed at the end of this section.
Chapter I – European Border and Coast Guard
Article 1 (subject matter) emphasises the enhanced role of Frontex in European integrated
border management to support free movement in the Schengen area, the common system for
returns, cooperation with third countries, and a high level of internal security of the Union by
countering cross-border crime, while reflecting legislative developments such as the entry into
force of the Pact on Migration and Asylum and the adoption of the Return Regulation.
Article 2 introduces targeted technical amendments to clarify concepts where legal
uncertainty hindered implementation. These include new definitions and clarifications
concerning Agency’s operational actions in border management and returns. It also reflects
Frontex’s role in countering hybrid threats more clearly as well asits increased tasks in return.
The stronger emphasis on return, the greater clarity on Frontex’s role in countering hybrid
threats in border management, and a new focus on the implementation of the Union visa
policy are also reflected in Article 3 on European Integrated Border Management (EIBM).
Article 5 (European Border and Coast Guard Agency) sets the ambition to increase the
capacity of the standing corps after 2027, towards a target of 30 000, to strengthen Frontex’s
capacity to respond to challenges at the EU external borders, accommodating its new tasks
and the expected increase in demand for support on border management and the
implementation of the Pact, in particular the return border procedure.
Article 7 on shared responsibility reflects the equal importance of border management and
return among the Agency’s tasks. In addition to the existing provisions on border
management, the article introduces the central role of Frontex in returns from the Union and
clarifies the need for the Member States to coordinate their national return operations with the
Agency.
Article 8 enhances the multiannual strategic policy cycle for EIBM, notably by requiring
Member States to transmit their national strategies for EIBM to the Agency and the
Commission. The Agency will assess their completeness and consistency with the Union’s
multiannual strategic policy and the Agency’s technical and operational strategy.
Article 9 improves integrated planning for border management and return. Risk analysis,
EUROSUR, vulnerability assessments and relevant Schengen evaluation findings will feed
into operational, contingency and capability development planning, allowing risks and
capability gaps to inform decisions on staffing, training, equipment and operational support.
A new Article 10 establishes a multiannual European integrated border management
planning coordination scheme, adopted by the Management Board, setting common
timelines for the main planning outputs. It aligns the national strategies for EIBM,
contingency and capability development plans, return planning information, the capability
roadmap and relevant Agency outputs, without creating additional planning products.
Chapter II – Functioning of the European Border and Coast Guard
Article 11 on the tasks of the Agency is revised to better define and integrate the Agency’s
role on return in its tasks. New tasks cover the planning, coordination, and carrying out of
return activities, the management of an EU reintegration programme, the implementation of
the return border procedure, the digitalisation of return, readmission and reintegration, and
assistance to third countries in the area of return.
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This Article also gives the Agency a clear mandate to monitor internet activities, including
online platforms, with the explicit and well-defined purpose of enhancing the Union’s
preparedness through improved situational awareness and risk analysis. The resulting
anonymised and aggregated information may be used to enrich the European situational
picture.
The Article clarifies the Agency’s task of conducting debriefing interviews, including the
scope and purpose. The entry into force of the Pact on Migration and Asylum risked creating
confusion and ambiguities between the role of screening procedures and possibility to
perform debriefing interviews, which are also addressed in this Article and in the definition of
‘debriefings’.
In addition, the Article specifies how the Agency may assist Member States in combatting
cross-border crime at the external borders of the Union, including through operational
support, possible use of executive powers, and improved situational awareness. It also reflects
hybrid threats.
Furthermore, the Article tasks the Agency with supporting the Member States in
implementing the Union’s visa policy and in the prevention of abuses by third-country
nationals of short-stay and long-term visas to the EU and abuses in relation to residence
permits.
Finally, it leverages the Agency’s expertise in the area of integrated border management, by
promoting an expanded involvement of the Agency in the implementation of Union projects
on border management in third countries. This ensures the effectiveness of these projects, on
one hand, and promotes coordination, synergies and cost-efficiency, while avoiding
duplications of EU-funded efforts.
Articles 15 to 17 enhance the security of information exchange, including within EUROSUR,
by upgrading the communication network and establishing a security accreditation
structure. The communication network will enable the secure, near-real-time exchange of
sensitive non-classified and EU classified information across the EBCG. The Security
Accreditation Authority will cover systems within the Agency, while the Security
Accreditation Board will cover the European and external components of EUROSUR and
related systems and applications.
This effort is complemented by various amendments to Articles concerning EUROSUR,
namely Articles 21-31. Articles 21 and 22, specifically concerning the purpose and the
scope of EUROSUR as the EBCG integrated framework for the exchange of information and
for operational cooperation, are expanded to include incident reporting concerning threats of
hybrid nature at the external borders.
Article 26 reinforces the mechanism of monitoring of EUROSUR, allowing the executive
director to act in case of identified shortcomings in data reporting, when large-scale inflow of
people is detected at the borders or when monitoring online platforms identifies migratory
threats.
Articles 27 and 29 complete this streamlined approach by reiterating the new additional focus
on hybrid threats and later explicitly calling for the introduction – into the European
Situational Picture that is accessible to, and populated by, the EBCG as a whole – of data
derived from activities, including monitoring of online platforms. Moreover, Article 28
dedicated to the national situational pictures clarifies that events and incidents should be
reported in EUROSUR within 24 hours. The proposed approach aims to deliver significant
added value in terms of data quality and situational awareness. The EUROSUR framework
itself is kept separate from personal data processing activities (except in clearly defined,
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exceptional circumstances, as is already the case), and the Agency is tasked with enriching
and complementing the European Situational Picture with aggregated, anonymised, statistical
data that may derive from processes, performed outside the EUROSUR framework, that may
entail processing of personal data, such as analysis of debriefing interviews or the monitoring
of online platforms. This approach will transform the European Situational Picture into an
even more effective and broadly applicable situational awareness and preparedness tool.
Article 29 extends access to the European Situational Picture to the Commission and
relevant JHA Agencies, as well as EFCA and EMSA, to facilitate greater interoperability and
better cooperation among relevant EU bodies and Agencies.
Similarly, in Article 31, the Agency is explicitly mandated to provide information derived
from its EUROSUR fusion services, such as aerial surveillance and satellite imagery, to the
Commission, the EEAS and the aforementioned Agencies, upon their request, thus
significantly improving the quality of the data and available information. The Agency may
also use relevant surveillance tools on its own initiative to collect pre-frontier information for
the European situational picture. However, in cases of potential crisis situation, certain
measures, such as the timeliness of reporting and monitoring of EUROSUR as well as the use
of EUROSUR fusion services, will be further reinforced.
In accordance with new Article 32 on advance warning mechanism, the Agency will
contribute to the monitoring of the security of external borders or migratory flows when
Member States report deterioration of the situation at their external borders. In such cases, the
reporting will be immediate, alerts will be issued in the European Situational Picture for all
Member States to become aware, and the Agency will have the possibility to launch the
EUROSUR fusion services over the external border section under pressure, in consultation
with the Member State concerned. As a consequence, a joint operation or border intervention
may be activated. These additional measures aim to reinforce the early warning dimension of
EUROSUR and provide additional tools to deter any potential crisis.
Article 33 sets up an Online monitoring and response centre, to allow the Agency to
contribute to situational awareness and better inform the decision makers at EU and national
level on incidents originating in online activities, which could potentially affect the
management of external borders and migration policy. This will include the possibility to
notify online platforms of illegal content on their services, with Frontex acting as a trusted
flagger in accordance with the Digital Services Act (DSA), as well as the possibility to ask
national competent authorities to issue removal orders in line with the relevant DSA
provisions. The new centre will also cooperate closely with other relevant EU Agencies and
bodies to ensure coordination and complementarity of efforts.
Article 34 strengthens the Agency’s risk analysis by providing for general, tailored and
strategic risk analysis products, extending its coverage to return, hybrid threats and relevant
developments in third countries, and linking it more closely to the EIBM policy cycle and
integrated planning.
The Agency’s vulnerability assessment is strengthened in Article 37 to enhance its scope,
clarity, and effectiveness. The vulnerability assessment will explicitly cover return, including
the implementation of the return border procedure, Member States’ capacity to manage large-
scale arrivals and return operations within legal deadlines, and the monitoring of the quality of
data fed into EUROSUR. The Article also introduces the possibility for the Agency to
perform vulnerability assessments in third countries, upon a request by that third country,
which would lead to recommendations helping third countries improve their integrated border
management and/or return frameworks. Lastly, the Article better links the vulnerability
assessment and the Schengen evaluation mechanisms.
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Articles 41-53 that govern the Agency’s activities at the external border aim to optimise and
clarify the existing framework. The border intervention is revised to allow for the executive
director to activate the new European border and return reserve in exceptional situations.
Operational plans must better reflect vulnerability assessments and Schengen evaluations,
and, where relevant, support cooperation with national civil protection authorities, including
in natural disasters. Article 46 on proposed actions at external borders introduces the
possibility for the management board to issue a recommendation, based on a proposal from
the executive director setting out, where necessary, operational actions to be taken by the
Member States concerned, together with the timeframe for their implementation. This
provision strengthens the tools available to the Agency to ensure an effective protection of
external borders in cooperation and with transparency towards other Member States.
The new Article 48 lays down specific arrangements for the Agency’s operational response in
situations of crisis at the external borders, as defined in Regulation (EU) 2024/1359. It
enables the Executive Director to recommend to the Member State concerned to request the
Agency to initiate, reinforce or adapt operational support, including through joint operations,
border interventions or other relevant actions under Article 41. The Member State is required
to respond within a short deadline, reflecting the urgency inherent in crisis situations. To
ensure a swift and effective reaction, the Article provides that the Agency should prioritise the
deployment of officers from the European border and return reserve already present in the
Member State concerned, as well as from the Agency’s quick reaction force. It also allows the
Agency to provide technical and operational support without requiring the immediate formal
revision of an existing Operational Plan or the negotiation of a new one, thereby reducing
procedural delays in emergencies. Given the urgent nature and complexity of such
deployments, the Article foresees that monitoring of compliance with fundamental rights is to
be carried out ex post, thus ensuring adequate focus on response and adjusting monitoring to
operational needs in exceptional circumstances, while leaving the Member States a possibility
to request the earlier involvement of the fundamental rights monitors. The Article ensures
accountability and institutional oversight by requiring the Agency and the Member State
concerned to report to the Management Board, within one month of the declaration of the
crisis situation, on progress regarding the update of the existing or the preparation of a new
Operational Plan.
Under Article 52, the potential decision by the executive director to terminate or suspend a
Frontex joint operation in whole would carry significant impact for both the Agency and the
concerned Member State. For example, for the Agency, such decision may create pressure to
justify its absence from a situation affected by significant migratory pressure. The Member
State concerned would be forced to deal with the migratory pressure without the technical and
operational support provided by the Agency. This scenario differs markedly, in terms of scale
and operational impact, from smaller-scale scenarios where Frontex may suspend an activity.
Therefore, the regulation is revised to require the executive director to consult the
Management Board in this case, contributing to better informed decision-making and
responsibility-sharing among the EBCG.
Articles 54-65, concerning the role of the Agency in return, have been significantly
overhauled to address existing gaps in coordination, planning and operational needs. The
Agency is given a key role in the common system for returns, starting with the establishment
of a Return Coordination Centre within Frontex with tasks including the collection and
analysis of operational information on return, supporting the planning and coordination of
reintegration assistance, regularly sharing information on planned return operations with the
Member States to maximise cost-effectiveness and efficiency, and drawing up and
maintaining the already-existing rolling operational plan for return. The proposed changes are
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intended to strengthen the Agency’s ability to anticipate needs, coordinate available resources
and provide comprehensive operational support, thereby contributing to a more effective and
coherent implementation of the common system for returns.
Moreover, Member States will be required to provide Frontex with clearer and more
indicative and quantifiable planning data on return, allowing the Agency to develop a more
reliable picture of expected return need and better organise its resources to support returns
from the Union. This data will also be shared with the Commission. More systematic and
forward-looking planning will allow resources to be deployed where they are most needed
and will improve the Union’s ability to anticipate fluctuations in return needs. With regard to
the provision of technical and operational assistance on returns from the Union, Article
55 is significantly expanded and complements Article 59 to effectively turn Frontex into the
Union actor in all aspects and phases of return procedures, from European-level
coordination to return counselling to reintegration assistance and all activities in between.
This broader role is intended to provide greater continuity across the different stages of the
return process, reducing fragmentation between activities and enabling the Agency to provide
more coherent operational support to Member States.
In parallel, this enhanced role is matched with a significant role for the Agency in the
digitalisation of the area of return,which is intended to address the current fragmentation of
return case management and information exchange and provide the Union with a more
integrated digital infrastructure supporting the return process. This starts with the task to
manage and further develop the RECAMAS model (the Frontex-developed reference
blueprint designed to support Member States build, upgrade and harmonise their IT systems
for return) to develop and manage the Frontex RECAMAS (an off-the-shelf IT system based
on the RECAMAS model), the integrated Union readmission case management system
(iRCMS), and the Union reintegration case management system (RIAT), in line with the
Commission proposal for a Regulation on digitalisation of return, readmission and
reintegration. Frontex is also tasked with operating an integrated return management platform
that is connected to the aforementioned systems, in order to cement the Agency’s central role
in the coordination of return activities from the Union. The need to prioritise returns in the
context of the Return Border Procedure is also explicitly mentioned.
The Agency’s role in the provision of reintegration assistance is also elevated in order to
address the current fragmentation of reintegration support and make better strategic use of the
resources and programmes available at Union and national level. Frontex will be responsible
for identifying the Member States’ reintegration-related needs, coordinating the provision of
reintegration to returnees departing from the EU, not only among Member States but also with
all partners involved in the delivery of reintegration, including in third countries, developing a
Union-level reintegration programme, and facilitating the referral of returnees to relevant
development programmes in third countries. Overall, this endeavours to not only significantly
increase the effectiveness of existing programmes, eliminating loopholes or wasteful
duplications, but also contribute to long-term reintegration.
Articles 57 and 58 contribute to the Agency’s enhanced role in the digitalisation of return, by
tasking the Agency with continuing to operate but also further develop the Integrated Return
Management Platform (IRMA) and establishing its role in relation to the Schengen
Information System. Article 58 also establishes a SIRENE office within the Agency,
strengthening the Agency’s access to, and exchange of, relevant SIS alerts on return and for
refusal of entry and stay, enhancing the Agency’s situational awareness.
Articles 63 and 64 give Frontex a mandate to support return activities departing from
third countries. This represents an entirely new set of tasks and responsibilities for the
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Agency, consisting of technical and operational assistance depending on the specific
circumstances. Such assistance can be provided in two cases. Firstly, when assisting the third
country with returns that are based on a return decision of a Member State, provided this is in
the strategic interest of the Union. Secondly, when assisting the third country with
implementing an individual obligation to leave under its national law, covering: countries that
have been granted the status of candidate country for accession, countries bound by the
European Convention on Human Rights, countries designated as ‘safe third countries’ at
Union level, and other countries provided that there is clear EU interest. In all cases, the
Agency’s operational assistance can be provided only based on a Union level international
agreement specifying the scope of the Agency’s assistance, the safeguards, the tasks and
powers of the members of the return teams, and their privileges and immunities. Article 64
outlines the minimum safeguards that such agreements should contain, such as the
commitment by the third country to respect international human rights standards and the
principle of non-refoulement. In addition, it may be necessary to include other or more
detailed safeguards depending on the third country’s level of alignment with EU rules and
standards.
Article 65 completes this new framework by explicitly mandating cooperation with third
countries on return to be in line with Union policy priorities. The Article requires that all
resource-related implications of such operational cooperation – and their foreseen impact on
the Agency’s ability to support returns from the Union, which remains its main focus– be duly
considered before the Commission recommends to the Council to authorise it to negotiate an
agreement with a third country.
Articles 66-79 strengthen the Agency’s capabilities in order to ensure that the planned
increase in personnel is matched by interoperable, sustainable and readily deployable
operational capacity. The new architecture of the standing corps is proposed, with a reinforced
category 1 and a new European border and return reserve to support the European Border and
Coast Guard in the effective implementation of European Integrated Border Management and
the common system for return.
The concept of a European border and return reserve, an addition to the existing categories
is provided for in Article 70. It aims to create a truly integrated European border management
personnel that seamlessly links national and Frontex personnel. Over time, national authorities
could draw, at no extra cost, personnel with enhanced EIBM training in border management
and return, while strengthening cooperation with counterparts from other Member States. This
workforce would primarily perform national border management and return tasks, but with
the Agency’s coordination, it could also be mobilised to rapidly respond to developments at
the external border or in the area of return, helping to ensure a swift, qualified, and effective
response to challenges related to border and migration management. Apart from category 4,
which was already phased out as of 2025, the existing categories remain in place, with a
reinforced and more flexible category 1.
The proposal also makes the standing corps more flexible in its operational tasks, increasing
its effectiveness and improving the support Frontex can offer both in the field and at
headquarters. It further clarifies the executive powers of category 1 officers so they can better
support Member States and includes minor revisions to improve Agency’s planning and
continuity, such as extending the minimum category 3 deployment from one month to two.
Technical amendments also introduce more flexible training and qualification requirements
for officers not expected to perform border control tasks. This ensures that requirements
match actual duties rather than applying a standardised approach. The objective is to help the
Agency to recruit personnel with the necessary expertise to perform the wide range of tasks of
the Agency. For specialist functions, such as return coordination, intelligence analysis, or
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monitoring, the recruitment of experts must not be limited by requirements such as passing
standardised physical tests or demonstrating proficiency with a service weapon. This
improved approach will broaden the pool for recruitment and facilitate the acquisition of
expertise and talent.
Article 71 introduces into the Regulation the existing concepts of chain of command and
contingents, which Frontex is currently operationalising. This structure enables the creation
of geographical or thematic structures overseeing Frontex’s activities in specific areas at the
EU external borders and third countries, to ensure a more consistent implementation of the
Agency’s operational and logistical activities by bringing the operational coordination closer
to the operational area, and facilitate cooperation between the Agency and the host Member
State or third country. The already defined concept of antenna offices is further clarified in
Article 73, to ensure that it is embedded into the contingent management structure, thus
promoting the identification of synergies, ensuring cost-effectiveness, and avoiding
duplication of structures or reporting lines.
A new Article 72 is established to introduce the concept of quick reaction force, composed
of deployable standing corps officers who are equipped and trained to be rapidly deployed at
short notice and covering all operational areas at the EU external borders. Such quick reaction
force will be deployed almost instantly, for instance within 24 hours, based on a decision of
the executive director, for a time-limited deployment. It could be followed by a border
intervention, and subsequently a joint operation pending the amendment of the operational
plan. This will allow the Agency to respond immediately to urgent and unforeseen operational
needs, while ensuring gradual transition to other already existing mechanisms for operational
support. The Article further clarifies that, in such situations, the monitoring of compliance
with fundamental rights is to be carried out ex post as continuous on-site monitoring may not
be feasible due to operational urgency or access constraints. The existing mechanism whereby
Member States receive funding to support their contributions to the standing corps is being
reviewed in Article 74. While the overall objective of providing flexibility and alleviating the
impact on Member States remains unchanged, the revised model aims at defining a more
practical and simplified system, where the payment is based on effective contributions, rather
than the standing corps development, and better reflects the new architecture of the standing
corps.
The Articles 75 and 76 on training have been substantially revised to reflect the Agency’s
significantly expanded responsibilities as a central training centre for the EBCG, notably in
light of the new the European border and return reserve. Article 75 requires the Agency to set
up a uniform training framework for all standing corps officers and, where relevant and
requested, support the training of national officers, at both its headquarters and in cooperation
with Member States’ partnership academies. This comprehensive training framework includes
basic training for statutory staff, pre-deployment training for all participants of operational
activities, specialised and profile-specific training, including on use of relevant IT systems in
return, for forced return monitors and fundamental rights monitors. Frontex must work closely
with other Agenises, in particular the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training
(CEPOL), to maximise efficiency and conduct regular scenario-based, practical training
exercises, including with possible participation of candidate countries. Article 76 further
clarifies the training requirements for the European border and return reserve by
establishing a dedicated EIBM training curriculum, combining theoretical and practical
components, to ensure that reserve staff are fully prepared for their service in the national
authorities and potential deployments as category 2 or 3 officers, for border interventions or
return-related tasks.
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Article 77 strengthens the Agency’s role in acquiring and leasing technical equipment. It
allows Frontex to carry out, coordinate, and participate in joint procurement with Member
States or other Union entities, including for digital, analytical and, where appropriate, AI-
enabled tools, and where appropriate, to act as a contracting authority or central purchasing
body The Agency’s multiannual strategy will guide the development of state-of-the-art,
interoperable, and resilient capabilities and address critical dependencies. A detailed
implementation plan will cover procurement planning, life-cycle costs, staffing and training
implications and risk mitigation. Significant acquisitions or leases must also be based on a
needs and cost-benefit analysis.
Article 78 revises the technical equipment pool and clarifies co-ownership between the
Agency and one or more Member States. For jointly procured equipment, the participating
parties must agree in advance on registration in the pool and availability for Agency
operations. The revised rules also strengthen registration and availability requirements for
Union funded equipment and expand the information recorded for each asset, improving the
overview and predictability of deployable capabilities.
Article 80 strengthens the Agency’s role in research and innovation for border management
and return, aligning its activities with the multiannual strategic policy cycle for EIBM, the
capability roadmap and operational needs. The Agency may participate in and receive funding
under relevant Union programmes, support pilot projects and the testing and operational
uptake of new technologies, and promote coordination within the European innovation
ecosystem It must also take into account critical dependencies and European strategic
autonomy. The accompanying recital clarifies that the development, procurement, testing or
deployment of AI systems must comply with the AI Act and other applicable Union law,
including human oversight and fundamental rights safeguards. Artificial intelligence should
support, not replace, accountable human decision-making.
Article 81 on the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central
Unit was revised to task Frontex with supporting the Member States, upon their request, with
the manual verification of different identities in the context of the interoperability regulations,
and providing training to the Member States and to third countries on the detection of
fraudulent documents.
Articles 82-93 enhance the Agency’s external cooperation with partners by increasing the
effectiveness and flexibility of the current framework and by simplifying provisions deemed
obsolete or inadequate. For example, Article 82 removes the existing closed list of
international organisations with which Frontex can cooperate, providing instead a list of
priority partners with which the Agency may cooperate should there be an EU interest to do
so. This will allow the Agency to flexibly adapt to changing needs and to cooperate with
international organisations that may become increasingly important partners. Article 87
introduces the possibility for Frontex to support activities of Member States under
agreements with third countries. This means that, when a Member State agrees with a third
country to cooperate for instance along a shared border in accordance with the Schengen
Borders Code, the Agency will be explicitly allowed to deploy teams for technical and
operational assistance on both sides of the border, provided that an international agreement
defining this cooperation is in place. Oftentimes, these agreements take place in contexts
where bilateral cooperation is necessary or provides operational value. Despite this, at present,
where such bilateral agreements are in place, Frontex is excluded by a legislative oversight
that this proposal rectifies. This extends the spectrum of circumstances in which the EU,
through Frontex, can support the Member States and partner third countries on the safe and
effective management of the external borders. Article 88 enhances the Agency’s flexibility to
cooperate with third countries. In addition to the possibility of concluding broader status
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agreements, the provision introduces the option of more targeted status agreements with third
countries, tailored to specific operational needs and geographical scopes, where a full-scale
agreement is not necessary. This will help reduce the time and resources needed to negotiate
such agreements and will make cooperation more focused and agile. Moreover, the Agency is
also tasked with implementing Union projects in third countries in its areas of competence,
with a view to avoid duplications of efforts and ensuring strategic alignment in the Union’s
outreach and support to third countries.
Article 90 clarifies the Agency’s cooperation with third countries for the purposes of
EUROSUR, reflecting third countries’ interest in incorporating EUROSUR in their
prospective cooperation with Frontex. Such cooperation would mean that, on the one hand,
the EBCG would have access to first-hand information on the migratory situation in a given
third country, and on the other, third countries would benefit from the services offered by
Frontex to improve their border management. Moreover, such cooperation will ensure that the
standards for information exchange in EUROSUR agreed at the EU level would be
implemented by partner third countries. The greatest advantage of such cooperation is the
even greater situational awareness across the globe, particularly concerning migratory flows
towards the EU which will be more effectively monitored and analysed through a whole-of-
route approach.
Article 91 reinforces the Commission’s strategic guidance and oversight on the Agency’s
engagement with third countries, including by specifying the requirements for the model
status agreement and working arrangement, and introducing a new framework for Frontex
support to bilateral or multilateral agreements on shared border crossing points. Article 92
updates the provisions governing Frontex liaison officers, explicitly providing for the
possibility to deploy liaison officers to support the Agency’s – and the Union’s – objectives in
the area of return.
Chapter III - Document Security, Identity Management, and Visa Support
Article 94 expands and clarifies the Agency’s responsibilities on the False and Authentic
Documents Online (FADO) system to address identified technical and operational obstacles
and provide greater clarity. To enhance the Agency’s role as a centre of expertise, Member
States are more clearly mandated with providing false, specimen, and authentic travel
documents so that the Agency can build a more complete library of such documents.
Appointed Agency staff is allowed to carry these authentic, specimen, and false documents, in
order to address operational and legal obstacles encountered in the implementation of the
current regulation and the transport of such documents for purposes such as training in
Member States. The Agency may perform compliance checks of travel and identity
documents, either upon request of the Commission or on request of a third party for a fee.
Overall, the Agency is expected to play a greater role in the detection of false documents by
coordinating Member States’ efforts, providing regular document security training, deploying
and maintaining document verification technology, and supporting partner third countries
with capacity building on document fraud detection to reinforce the Union’s internal security.
A new Article 95 establishes a Frontex Visa Support Office to support Member States’
authorities in the implementing visa policy. This includes providing relevant training on visa
policy and on the prevention of abuse, delivering risk analysis on trends, such as visa
shopping, visa abuses, document fraud in relation to visas, and the prevention and detection of
document fraud in relation to visa and residence permits. This new entity will offer support to
Member States in areas where there is a real added value to share practices and experience at
EU level such as trainings, risk analysis, fight against documentary fraud where informal
cooperation already exist at EU level but should be reinforced and better structured such a
EN 22 EN
support would strengthen the security dimension of EU visa policy, enhance prevention of
abuse before people reach the external borders, support a more consistent implementation of
visa rules by Member States. Building on the Agency’s broader expertise in integrated border
management, the new Visa Support Office will also improve information-sharing and
communication with Member States and other stakeholders on visa-related matters.
Chapter IV - General provisions
This Chapter features several technical amendments to reflect new concepts introduced
elsewhere, for example as regards return, or clarifications of existing tasks where their
implementation was affected by perceived lack of clarity, such as with regard to the
employment of executive powers by standing corps officers.
Section 1 defines general rules. Article 98 confirms the closure of an investigation by the
fundamental rights officer when findings determine the lack of involvement of any members
of the Frontex teams, while ensuring that, in case national border or coastal guards are
implicated in the incident, any relevant information on the incident in question will be
transmitted to the competent independent national bodies. This provision provides clarity on
the relevant procedures and ensures closer involvement of the relevant national authorities in
the monitoring of fundamental rights compliance at the borders of the Member State
concerned.
Section 2 provides simplification and greater effectiveness on processing of personal data,
without overhauling the existing framework, in particular to avoid imposing challenging
implementation processes upon the Agency. Article 103 introduces standardised rules on the
cooperation between the EDPS and national supervisory authorities, similar to those
governing such cooperation of other Agencies. Article 104 defines more clearly and flexibly
the purposes for which the Agency may process personal data by aligning them with the
lists of its tasks found in Article 11. The introduction of online monitoring among the
Agency’s tasks, with a defined purpose in situational awareness and risk analysis, also
dictates the clarification in this Article that this activity is not intended to lead to the
collection or storage of any personal data. Article 105 similarly provides clarity with regards
to the categories of personal data processable by the Agency. A significant amendment is
made by modifying an article on processing of personal data in EUROSUR. Article 106
clarifies that the processing of personal data is foreseen within EUROSUR in clearly defined
cases where it is exceptionally necessary for its purposes, rectifying existing confusion that is
connected to the ‘aircraft and vessel identification numbers’, but also by adding two other
exceptional situations: when protecting or saving lives of individuals and in case of imminent
threat to the integrity of the external borders.
Two new provisions are also inserted. Article 106 concerns the restriction of data subject
rights for the purpose of large-scale IT systems and their interoperability. Article 109
concerns the establishment of a new “hit/no-hit” system that will allow Europol to indirectly
query a dedicated Frontex database to determine whether the Agency may be in possession of
data relevant to the fulfilment of Europol’s mandate. A positive hit will confirm the necessity
of transmitting the relevant data, eliminating a persistent obstacle currently limiting data
exchange between the two Agencies. This framework will also promote full compliance with
data protection rules by ensuring that the necessity of a data transmission is clearly
established before data collected for other purposes is transmitted as operational personal data
to Europol.
Section 3 on the general framework and organisation of the Agency addresses certain
employment conditions of the standing corps category 1 deployable staff that hinder the
effectiveness of their performance during operations and have an impact on cost-efficiency. It
EN 23 EN
revises the existing deployment model, based on missions, to establish, as a general rule, the
place of deployment for statutory staff as their place of employment, rather than the seat of
the Agency. This builds a financially more sustainable and administratively less burdensome
approach. Furthermore, it aligns compensations for specific working conditions of the
standing corps officers’ (e.g. shift work, arduous working conditions) with the operational
reality of their deployments and therefore establishes a clear system that better reflects and
compensates hardship or more challenging working conditions and ensures equal conditions
for deployed staff. Additionally, the proposed revisions align the initial contract of statutory
staff to the length of their operational trainings, to more effectively take into account the
outcome of the compulsory training.
Article 118 is amended to better reflect the existing structure of the Agency, and to require
that the Agency’s support functions, including independent offices, receive appropriate
resources to perform their duties. The results of the evaluation of the current Regulation, as
well as consultation with relevant stakeholders, have highlighted persistent deficits in the
resources available to offices such as the Agency’s Inspections and Controls Office or Data
Protection Office, and this provision endeavours to communicate clearly the need to ensure
their adequate staffing and budgeting.
Article 119 on the functions of the Management Board features several technical
amendments to retain its steering and governance role across new or enhanced tasks of the
Agency, concerning in particular the Agency’s role in the area of return. It also clarifies a
number of already-existing responsibilities of the Management Board concerning, for
example, the appointment of the Agency’s data protection officer and internal audit capability
officer or its disciplinary authority over the Agency’s management and independent offices.
This is complemented by Article 121 that reinforces the Executive Board’s strategic role by
enabling it to meet in different configurations to discuss matters related to budgets and
accounts, EIBM, and return. To ensure that relevant experts are present in these
configurations, the Regulation foresees the possibility for the designated member of the
Executive Board to delegate the participation in a meeting in a particular configuration, with
modalities to be determined in greater detail in a Management Board decision. This will
strengthen the Agency’s steering role in areas, such as return and EIBM, by ensuring the
direct involvement of Member States’ practitioners in in the relevant decision-making
processes.
Article 129 clarifies that the monitoring of compliance with fundamental rights relates to the
operational activities carried out by the staff of the Agency. It also introduces a new provision
providing for the consultation of relevant national authorities in the context of investigations
concerning compliance with fundamental rights. These changes bring greater clarity to the
scope of monitoring activities and support a more consistent understanding of their
application, while ensuring closer involvement and responsibility of national authorities in
ongoing investigations.
Article 130 introduces a new mechanism to support the Agency’s monitoring of compliance
with fundamental rights based on a risk assessment prepared by the fundamental rights officer
in coordination with the executive director. This approach enables monitoring activities to be
organised in a more targeted and tailored manner, taking into account the identified risks,
thereby supporting the efficient use of monitoring resources and strengthening the preventive
framework that assists the Agency and Member States in ensuring compliance with
fundamental rights.
Chapter V – Final provisions
EN 24 EN
Article 143 reflects the necessary transitional provisions affected by the recast of this
Regulation.
A revised Annex I is introduced to reflect the capacity of the standing corps beyond 2027.
The table replaces the existing yearly target model with a bi-yearly target covering the next
MFF period, in order to give the Agency more flexibility, particularly given the need to
implement from scratch the new European border and return reserve concept. Annex IV
therefore also includes the foreseen contributions by Member State to the new European
border and return reserve within the next MFF period. Annex V on the use of force also
features various technical revisions to address persistent lack of clarity and incongruity in
existing provisions, without overhauling the existing framework that is otherwise largely
deemed effective. A correlation table is added in Annex VII.
EN 25 EN
2019/1896
2026/0342 (COD)
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on the European Border and Coast Guard (recast)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular
Article 77(2), points (b) and (d), and Article 79(2), point (c), thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee21,
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions22,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,
Whereas:
new
(1) A number of amendments are to be made to Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the
European Parliament and of the Council23. In the interests of clarity, that Regulation
should be recast.
(2) In order to ensure legal continuity, this Regulation should preserve the legal effects of
measures adopted pursuant to the repealed Regulation. In particular, the European
Border and Coast Agency should continue functioning until amended, replaced or
repealed in accordance with this Regulation. The management board and executive
director should continue, for the remaining period of their respective term of office,
continue to exercise their duties and responsibilities.
(3) Pursuant to Article 67(1), (2) and (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU), the Union is to offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and
justice in which the absence of internal border controls for persons is ensured, a
common policy on immigration and external border control are established, and a high
level of security is ensured through measures to prevent and combat cross border
21 OJ C . 22 OJ C . 23 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on
the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU)
2016/1624 (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1896/oj).
EN 26 EN
crime, among others. Effective border management and an effective Union return
policy are mutually reinforcing and indispensable for the establishment of the area of
freedom, security and justice and proper functioning of the Schengen area. Those
policies, flanked by other measures, in particular as regards asylum, while ensuring the
effective management of migration in full compliance with international law and
Union law, including fundamental rights, should contribute to ensuring the proper
functioning of the Schengen area without internal border controls and maintaining a
high level of internal security within the Union.
2019/1896 recital 1 (adapted)
The objective of Union policy in the field of external border management is to develop and
implement European integrated border management at national and Union level, which is a
necessary corollary to the free movement of persons within the Union and is a fundamental
component of an area of freedom, security and justice. European integrated border
management is central to improving migration management. The aim is to manage the
crossing of the external borders efficiently and address migratory challenges and potential
future threats at those borders, thereby contributing to addressing serious crime with a cross-
border dimension and ensuring a high level of internal security within the Union. At the same
time, it is necessary to act in full respect for fundamental rights and in a manner that
safeguards the free movement of persons within the Union.
new
(4) The gradual establishment of an integrated border management is the objective of
Union policy that should be pursued at national and Union level. To ensure the
effective implementation of a European integrated border management (‘EIBM’), and
to support the implementation of the common system for returns, a European Border
and Coast Guard should be established and further developed. The European Border
and Coast Guard should be composed of the European Border and Coast Guard
Agency (‘Agency’), commonly referred to as Frontex, and the national authorities
responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent that they
carry out maritime border surveillance operations and any other border control tasks,
and the national authorities responsible for return. As such, the European Border and
Coast Guard should rely upon the common use of information, capabilities and
systems at national level and the response of the Agency at Union level.
(5) The European Border and Coast Guard should pursue the objectives set out by the
TFEU by implementing the EIBM. EIBM should bring together, in a coherent
framework, border control, situational awareness, risk analysis, inter-agency and third-
country cooperation, return, quality-control mechanisms and solidarity measures. Its
implementation should be guided by the multiannual strategic policy cycle and
translated through integrated planning into operational preparedness, contingency
planning and the coordinated development and deployment of human and technical
capabilities. It should thereby contribute to effective management of the external
borders, the proper functioning of the Schengen area without internal border controls
and a high level of internal security, in full respect of Union and international law.
Within that framework, the common system for returns is an essential component of
EIBM and of the comprehensive approach set out in Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of
EN 27 EN
the European Parliament and of the Council24 and Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 of the
European Parliament and of the Council25 . Border management, access to
international protection and return should operate coherently and in a mutually
reinforcing manner.
2019/1896 recital 2 (adapted)
The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External
Borders of the Member States of the European Union was established by Council Regulation
(EC) No 2007/2004. Since taking up its responsibilities on 1 May 2005, it has been successful
in assisting Member States with implementing the operational aspects of external border
management through joint operations and rapid border interventions, risk analysis,
information exchange, relations with third countries and the return of returnees.
new
(6) Within the European Border and Coast Guard, the Agency has an important role as
regards the management of external borders, which encompasses border checks and
border surveillance, combating cross-border crime and addressing threats of hybrid
nature. It is also a crucial actor in the implementation of the Union policy regarding
cooperation with third countries in the management of the external borders and return
and the central entity in the implementation of the common system for returns. The
European Border and Coast Guard Agency (the ‘Agency’), replaces the European
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union, which was established by Council Regulation
(EC) No 2007/200426 and took up responsibilities on 1 May 2005. Since then, the
Agency successfully assisted Member States with implementing the operational
aspects of external border management and returns and other return-related activities.
Following this replacement, the tasks of the European Border and Coast Guard
Agency have been expanded with full continuity in all its activities and procedures.
2019/1896 recital 3 (adapted)
new
(7) The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External
Borders of the Member States of the European Union has been renamed the European
24 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum
and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (OJ L 1351, 22.5.2024, p. 1,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj). 25 Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 October 2026
establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union,
and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directive
2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC, OJ L, 2026/2280, 15.10.2026, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/2280/oj. 26 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European
Union (OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, p. 1, ELI http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/2007/oj).
EN 28 EN
Border and Coast Guard Agency (the ‘Agency’), commonly referred to as Frontex,
and its tasks have been expanded with full continuity in all its activities and
procedures To ensure tThe key roles of the Agency in the management of
external borders, cooperation with third countries and return, the Agency should be
conferred with the following tasks: to establish a technical and operational
strategy as part of the implementation of the multiannual strategic policy cycle for
EIBM European integrated border management; to oversee the effective
functioning of border control at the external borders; to carry out risk analysis and
vulnerability assessments; to provide increased technical and operational assistance to
Member States and third countries through joint operations and border interventions;
to ensure the practical execution of measures in a situation requiring urgent action at
the external borders; to provide technical and operational assistance in the support of
search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea ; to strategically plan,
coordinate, and carry out return operations; to manage and operate a Union
reintegration programme, and provide assistance to Member State’s in all phases of
the return process, including with the implementation of the return border procedure;
and to support the digitalisation of all phases of the return, readmission and
reintegration processes; to support the competent national authorities, Europol, and
Eurojust in combating cross-border crime and threats of hybrid nature affecting the
management of external borders, to the extent allowed by the Agency’s mandate and
in the implementation of visa policy and prevention of abuses by third-country
nationals of short-stay and long-term visas to the Union and in relation to residence
permits and to organise, coordinate and conduct return operations and return
interventions.
2019/1896 recital 4 (adapted)
Since the beginning of the migratory crisis in 2015, the Commission has taken up important
initiatives and has proposed a series of measures with a view to strengthening the protection
of the external borders and restoring the normal functioning of the Schengen area. A proposal
for significantly enhancing the mandate of the European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders was presented in December 2015 and
negotiated swiftly in 2016. The resulting regulation, Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the
European Parliament and of the Council27, entered into force on 6 October 2016.
new
(8) The effective implementation of EIBM should be based on a shared responsibility of
the Agency and the national authorities responsible for border management, including
coast guards to the extent that they carry out maritime border surveillance operations
and any other border control tasks and the national authorities responsible for return.
Under this model, the Member States retain the primary responsibility for the
management of their external borders in their interest and in the interest of all Member
27 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on
the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament
and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC (OJ L
251, 16.9.2016, p. 1).
EN 29 EN
States. The effective implementation of the common system for returns should be
based on a shared responsibility between the European Border and Coast Guard
Agency and the national authorities responsible for return, where the Agency should
serve as the Union actor responsible for the strategic planning, prioritisation,
coordination and implementation of return operations, for forced and voluntary
returns, and other return-related activities, in line with the Union's migration policy
priorities and based on the operational needs of the Member States. Credible and
efficient return policies are an essential complement to asylum and border
management, helping to reduce illegal immigration and discourage unauthorised
movements, while remaining fully compliant with fundamental rights, the principle of
non-refoulement, and other obligations under Union and international law.
2019/1896 recital 5
However, the Union framework in the areas of external border control, return, combating
cross-border crime, and asylum still needs to be further improved. To that end, and to further
underpin the current and future envisaged operational efforts, the European Border and Coast
Guard should be reformed by giving the Agency a stronger mandate and, in particular, by
providing it with the necessary capabilities in the form of a European Border and Coast Guard
standing corps (the ‘standing corps’). The standing corps should gradually but swiftly reach
the strategic target of having a capacity of 10000 operational staff, as set out in Annex I, with
executive powers, where applicable, to effectively support Member States on the ground in
their efforts to protect the external borders, to fight cross-border crime and to significantly
step up the effective and sustainable return of irregular migrants. Such a capacity of 10000
operational staff represents the maximum available capacity required to effectively address
existing and future operational needs for border and return operations in the Union and third
countries, including a rapid reaction capacity to face future crises.
new
(9) To underpin current and future envisaged operational efforts, the European Border and
Coast Guard should be provided with the necessary capabilities in the form of a
European Border and Coast Guard standing corps (the ‘standing corps’). The standing
corps which should reach a capacity of 10 000 operational staff by the end of 2027,
should be further reinforced in order to effectively step up its support to Member States
in the harmonised implementation of EIBM, including the management of the external
borders and return, as well as to respond to the tasks resulting from the adoption and
implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum and of Regulation (EU)
2026/2280 creating the common system for returns. The strengthening of these
capabilities should be achieved through a revised architecture of the standing corps,
where, on one hand, the category 1 should increase to ensure the readiness of the
Agency to support new tasks at all times, based on diversified and reinforced profiles
and, on the other, a new European border and return reserve should be introduced,
where the highly trained professionals partially formed by the Agency and supported
by Union funds, reinforce the national capacities as regards border management and
implementation of the common system for returns. The European border and return
reserve should be composed of national officers who would remain at the disposal of
the Member States. While these officers should already be trained by their national
EN 30 EN
authorities, they would be offered an EIBM training provided by the Agency. Their
training and subsequent deployment would guarantee greater integration and
interoperability between the Member States and the Agency, as the reserve personnel
would help to deliver on EIBM-related tasks both in the service of their national
authorities and when participating in activities of the Agency by seamlessly joining
category 2 or 3, as well as in emergency situations under the activation rules applicable
to border interventions. The establishment and growth of the European border and
return reserve would over time enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of all European
Border and Coast Guard deployments, therefore maximising the impact of every
officers’ contribution thanks to the application of common standards, familiarity with
European Border and Coast Guard and Agency tools, equipment, and systems, and
greater interoperability. Under the modified architecture of the standing corps, and due
to the enhanced effectiveness delivered by the gradual introduction of the European
border and return reserve, the contributions of the Member States to categories 2 and 3
should remain unchanged, while category 4, already phased out as of 2025, should not
be reinstated.
(10) In accordance with the policy reference framework, Member States are encouraged to
fund, in their National and Regional Partnership Plans, measures aimed at achieving
continuous operational readiness and the capacity to contribute national staff
performing border management and return activities to the European border and return
reserve.Member States can also receive targeted assistance in the form of financial
incentives for each national officer who has undergone a training curriculum provided
by Frontex and put at the disposal of the European border and return reserve. In that
context, Member States may claim an amount of EUR 21 000 per officer trained with
the payment to be made when the corresponding milestone or target is fulfilled.
2019/1896 recital 6 (adapted)
The Commission should carry out a review of the overall number and composition of the
standing corps, including the size of individual Member States' contributions thereto, as well
as of its training, expertise and professionalism. By March 2024, the Commission should,
where necessary, submit appropriate proposals to amend Annexes I, II, III and IV. Where the
Commission does not present a proposal, it should explain the reason therefor.
new
(11) The European Border and Coast Guard should be provided with the technical
capabilities necessary to respond to evolving operational needs and to implement
effectively EIBM, including return-related means of transport and IT infrastructure.
2019/1896 recital 7
new
(12) The implementation of this Regulation, in particular the establishment of the standing
corps, including after the Commission's review of the standing corps, should be
subject to the multiannual financial framework. To ensure the effective
implementation of EIBM and increase the efficiency of Union return policy through
EN 31 EN
the effective implementation of the Return Regulation, the European Border and Coast
Guard should be provided with the requisite financial and human resources and
equipment.
2019/1896 recital 8 (adapted)
In its conclusions of 28 June 2018, the European Council called for further strengthening of
the supportive role of the Agency, including in cooperation with third countries, through
increased resources and an enhanced mandate, with a view to ensuring effective external
border control and significantly stepping up the effective return of irregular migrants.
new
(13) As the Union actor in the common system for returns, the Agency should coordinate
and support the application of Union measures relating to the management of the
external borders and return by reinforcing, assessing and coordinating the actions of
the Member States which implement those measures, while Member States remain
responsible for issuing return decisions. In particular, the Agency should strategically
plan and coordinate return operations from the Member States and other return-related
activities through a coordination centre, organise and carry out return operations, for
both voluntary and forced returns, as well as manage and operate a Union reintegration
programme. The Agency should also provide technical and operational assistance to
Member States relating to all stages of the return process, including counselling,
booking or arranging flights, assistance with the identification of third-country
nationals and issuance of travel documents in the context of requests for readmission,
organising return escorts and ground support at transit airports. When acting in the
area of return, the Agency should give priority to supporting returns in the context of
the border procedure referred to in Regulation (EU) 2024/1349 of the European
Parliament and of the Council28, in order to support them effectively and within the
deadlines set out in that Regulation.
2019/1896 recital 9
It is necessary to monitor the crossing of the external borders efficiently, to address migratory
challenges and potential future threats at the external borders, to ensure a high level of
internal security within the Union, to safeguard the functioning of the Schengen area and to
respect the overarching principle of solidarity. Those actions and objectives should be
accompanied by the proactive management of migration, including the necessary measures in
third countries. To that end, it is necessary to consolidate the European Border and Coast
Guard and to further expand the mandate of the Agency.
28 Regulation (EU) 2024/1349 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing
a return border procedure, and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 (OJ L, 2024/1349, 22.5.2024,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1349/oj).
EN 32 EN
new
(14) Member States should coordinate their activities related to return with the Agency. For
that purpose, Member States should share information and data with the Agency as
provided for in this regulation in a timely manner to ensure the Agency’s capacity to
coordinate and support Member States’ activities appropriately based on national
estimated needs with sufficient resources. To enable the Agency to prepare those
planning outputs and to anticipate operational needs in the field of return, Member
States should communicate their operational plans related to return to the Agency on
an annual basis. Where relevant, those plans should also indicate Member States’
priorities as regards the nationalities of returnees and specify the profiles of the
returnees concerned, such as rejected applicants for international protection, persons
with criminal convictions or other relevant categories.
2019/1896 recital 10 (adapted)
new
(15) When implementing EIBM European integrated border management,
coherence with other policy objectives should be ensured. In particular, EIBM does
not alter the respective competences of the Commission, the European Union Customs
Authority and the Member States in the customs area, in particular regarding controls,
risk management and the exchange of information. Cooperation between the Agency
and the European Union Customs Authority should strengthen the complementarity of
border management and customs activities while preserving their respective
competences and the EUROSUR framework. Practical arrangements for verifying
requests and for the use and further disclosure of exchanged information should be
specified in a working arrangement between the agencies, respecting applicable
security requirements and requirements for originator’s consent.
new
(16) The Agency should carry out its tasks in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity
and without affecting the responsibilities of the Member States with regard to
maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security. The Agency should
carry out its tasks without affecting the competence of the Member States as regards
defence. Member States should be able to cooperate at operational level with other
Member States or third countries at the external borders, including as regards military
operations with a law enforcement purpose, to the extent that that cooperation is
compatible with the actions of the Agency.
(17) Threats of a hybrid nature affecting the management of external borders comprise such
phenomena as instrumentalisation of migrants and weaponisation of migration,
disinformation, cyber incidents affecting border management systems or technical
infrastructure, interference with infrastructure relevant to border management, and
cross-border criminal activities forming part of a broader hybrid campaign, in line
with the mandate of the Agency. In relation to such threats, the Agency should support
the competent national authorities, within the limits of the tasks conferred on it by this
Regulation, including through situational awareness, risk analysis and technical or
EN 33 EN
operational assistance and, where appropriate, in cooperation with other competent
authorities. This activity should not affect the competence of Member States as
regards national security and defence.
(18) The instrumentalisation of migrants and weaponisation of migration by hostile state
and non-state actors, on the one hand, and cross-border migrant smuggling, on the
other, increasingly rely on online platforms and intermediary services to exploit and
amplify vulnerabilities at the Union’s external borders. Such actors may use those
platforms and services to disseminate misleading information, advertise smuggling
services, coordinate movements, recruit facilitators, provide logistical guidance, and
rapidly adapt their methods in ways that undermine the orderly management of
migration, threaten border security, and put the lives and safety of migrants at risk.
The cross-border nature, speed and scale of such online activities present a challenge
for the competent authorities and relevant Union bodies.
(19) In order to contribute to situational awareness, support the identification of emerging
trends, and facilitate a coordinated response, the Agency should be able to monitor
publicly accessible activities on intermediate service, including online platforms. Such
monitoring should therefore be limited in purpose and scope and performed to help
identifying online activities relevant for the management of external borders and
migration towards the Union. It should enable the Agency to inform the Commission
and the Council of increasing threats and to produce, complement and enrich its risk
analysis products. These new tasks relating to activities on intermediary services
should not involve phone searches or the collection of personal data. When carrying
out such monitoring, the Agency should neither collect, store nor otherwise process,
transmit or transfer personal data. Any risk analysis products containing information
derived from monitoring activities on intermediary services should include only
anonymised and aggregated data for statistical, risk analysis and situational awareness
purposes. These activities should be carried out within the limits of the Agency’s
mandate.
(20) Therefore, to deliver on these tasks, within the limits of the legal basis governing its
establishment, the Agency should develop a capacity to monitor the activities on
online platforms. The new structure should support the analysis of patterns, methods
and risks linked to the online dimension of the instrumentalisation of migrants and
weaponisation of migration and of cross-border migrant smuggling, in full respect of
Union and international law, including applicable rules on fundamental rights, data
protection, and the competences of the Member States and other Union bodies, offices
and agencies.
(21) Given its activities at the external borders, the Agency should contribute to preventing
and detecting terrorism and cross-border crime, such as migrant smuggling, trafficking
in human beings, document fraud, trafficking of drugs, stolen vehicles, trafficking
illicit goods and firearms, identification of cross-border criminal networks where it is
appropriate for it to act and where it has obtained relevant information through its
activities in relation to the management of the external borders. Such activities should
not affect the respective responsibilities of customs authorities and the European
Union Customs Authority under Regulation (EU) 2026/2108. It should also share with
the national authorities its own situational awareness and analytical outputs relevant
for combating terrorism and cross-border crime, such as risk analysis, analysis of
criminality in migratory flows and of open-source information pertinent to security. To
ensure an effective continuum of Union-level support in the fight against cross-border
crime and terrorism, the Agency should establish structured cooperation with Europol,
EN 34 EN
which is the Union agency responsible for supporting and strengthening Member
States' actions and their cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime and
terrorism. Such cooperation should foster the timely exchange of relevant information
and enhance operational synergies between the two agencies, thereby strengthening
the overall effectiveness of Union action in the fight against cross-border crime,
notably migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. The Agency should
cooperate with Europol to ensure that their respective tasks and activities are
complementary and to avoid duplication of efforts.
(22) The Agency, Europol, and Eurojust should cooperate in accordance with the principles
of sincere cooperation and mutual trust, to ensure that they remain mutually appraised
of one another’s respective priorities and actions, including through the transmission
of information, including personal data, where necessary and proportionate for the
performance of their tasks. In that context, the establishment of a “hit/no-hit” system
should provide a fast and efficient mechanism for Europol and Eurojust to determine
whether the Agency holds operational personal data’s relevant and necessary for the
performance of their respective mandates, and on that basis, to assess the necessity of
requesting the transmission of such data by the Agency in a targeted manner and in
compliance with the applicable data protection legal framework. That mechanism
should not in itself entail access to the underlying personal data, but should serve
exclusively to verify the possible existence of such data and to enable duly justified
requests where the conditions for transmission are fulfilled.
2019/1896 recital 24
(23) The extended tasks and competence of the Agency should be balanced with
strengthened fundamental rights safeguards and increased accountability and liability,
in particular in terms of the exercise of executive powers by the statutory staff.
2019/1896 recital 11 (adapted)
new
(24) European integrated border management EIBM should be developed ,
based on the four-tier access control model, comprises comprising measures in
third countries, such as under the common visa policy, measures with neighbouring
third countries, border control measures at the external borders, risk analysis and
measures within the Schengen area and return. It should contribute, within the
scope of EIBM, to addressing migratory challenges along the entire migratory route,
including third countries of origin, transit and neighbouring third countries, measures
at external borders, and returns.
new
(25) Cooperation with third countries is an important element of EIBM. It should serve to
promote Union standards in border management and return, to exchange information
and risk analysis, and to facilitate the implementation of returns with a view to
increasing their efficiency. The Agency contributes, through its cooperation with third
countries under this Regulation, to an effective cooperation between third countries
EN 35 EN
and the EU Member States. The Agency should play a key role in supporting third
countries in the area of border management and return, including through the
deployment of the standing corps where such support is requested and required to
protect external borders and the effective management of the Union's migration policy.
Where relevant, the Agency should also provide assistance to third countries on
matters related to implementation of Union visa policy. Such cooperation may concern
training and sharing expertise on risks related to abuses of short-stay and long-stay
visas to the Union and in relation to residence permits, including on document fraud.
(26) As a part of the four-tier access control model, the Agency should provide support to
Member States in the implementation of the common visa policy and prevention of
abuses of short-stay and long-stay visas to the Union and in relation to residence
permits. To that end, the Agency should establish a Visa Support Office. The Visa
Support Office should provide assistance to the competent central authorities of
Member States and their consulates in third countries, and to Union delegations, with
the support of immigration liaison officers and liaison officers of the Agency, where
relevant. It should primarily prepare, maintain and make available to the competent
national authorities up-to-date risk analysis products relevant to the implementation of
the EU visa policy, and more broadly the identification of fraudulent documents and
material misrepresentation. It should also prepare and share ad-hoc risk analysis
reports focussing on specific third countries, identifying evolving trends in document
fraud for the purpose of obtaining short-stay and long-stay visas, any modus operandi
leading to abuses of short-stay and long-term visas to the Union and in relation to
residence permits, and visa misuse and fraudulent practices, including potential
situations where a third-country national seeks entry and residence in the territory of a
Member State for purposes other than those for which he or she applies to be admitted,
or in which a third-country national, after having been lawfully admitted and resided,
remains on the territory of a Member State beyond the period of authorised stay
without a legal right to do so. Where relevant, the support of the Visa Support Office
could be extended to third-country authorities, in particular for candidate countries.
The Visa Support Office should be sufficiently manned to provide close to real time
remote services to the competent national authorities to detect false documents. The
establishment of the Visa Support Office should not lead to the involvement of the
Agency in processing or issuing of individual visa applications or decisions thereon,
which remains the competence of the Member States.
(27) In order to facilitate a pivotal cooperation with third countries while addressing
migratory challenges along the entire migratory route, in particular in third countries
of origin, transit and third countries neighbouring the Schengen area, the Agency
should deploy liaison officers from its own staff to ensure the most efficient possible
utilisation of its expanded role and capabilities. Since the nature and scope of
cooperation with third countries should take into account their geographical location,
as well as the role of that third country in effectively addressing migratory routes
towards the Union, it is necessary that distinct profiles of liaison officers be
established. The experts deployed as liaison officers should meet the specific
requirements of one or more of these profiles, which should cover inter alia border
management, returns and visa support related tasks, depending on the main area of
cooperation with the third country concerned.
(28) Cooperation with neighbouring third countries, and in particular candidate countries,
which for the purpose of this Regulation include third countries with whom
preliminarily negotiations have been initiated in view of future opening of the
EN 36 EN
accession process, without prejudice to positions of Member States on their status,
should be defined by close technical and operational cooperation and the provision of
reliable support by the Union, including the Agency. This support should ensure to
retain a focus on strengthening border management capabilities, supporting the
alignment with the Union’s acquis on migration, return, and visa policy, and
enhancing cooperation on readmission and return-related objectives.
2019/1896 recital 12
European integrated border management should be implemented as a shared responsibility of
the Agency and the national authorities responsible for border management, including coast
guards to the extent that they carry out maritime border surveillance operations and any other
border control tasks, as well as the national authorities responsible for return. While Member
States retain the primary responsibility for the management of their external borders in their
interest and in the interest of all Member States and are responsible for issuing return
decisions, the Agency should support the application of Union measures relating to the
management of the external borders and return by reinforcing, assessing and coordinating the
actions of the Member States which implement those measures. The activities of the Agency
should complement the efforts of the Member States.
2019/1896 recital 13 (adapted)
To ensure the effective implementation of European integrated border management and
increase the efficiency of Union return policy, a European Border and Coast Guard should be
established. It should be provided with the requisite financial and human resources and
equipment. The European Border and Coast Guard should be composed of the Agency and
the national authorities responsible for border management, including coast guards to the
extent that they carry out border control tasks, as well as the national authorities responsible
for return. As such it will rely upon the common use of information, capabilities and systems
at national level and the response of the Agency at Union level.
2019/1896 recital 14
European integrated border management does not alter the respective competences of the
Commission and the Member States in the customs area, in particular regarding controls, risk
management and the exchange of information.
2019/1896 recital 15 (adapted)
new
(29) The development of policy and law on external border control and return, including
the development of a multiannual strategic policy for EIBM European
integrated border management, in line with the policy and law on external border
control and return, remains a responsibility of the Union institutions. Close
coordination between the Agency and those institutions should be guaranteed.
EN 37 EN
2019/1896 recital 16 (adapted)
(30) The effective implementation of European integrated border management
EIBM by the European Border and Coast Guard should be ensured by means
of a multiannual strategic policy cycle. The multiannual cycle should set out an
integrated, unified and continuous process for providing strategic guidelines to all the
relevant actors at Union level and at national level in the area of border management
and return so that those actors are able to implement European integrated border
management EIBM in a coherent manner. It should also address all relevant
interactions of the European Border and Coast Guard with the Commission and other
Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and cooperation with other relevant
partners, including third countries and third parties as appropriate.
new
(31) In order to ensure a coherent implementation of EIBM, national strategies for EIBM
should be aligned with the multiannual strategic policy for EIBM and with the
technical and operational strategy established by the Agency. Member States should
therefore submit those national strategies to the Agency and to the Commission. The
submission to the Agency is necessary to allow it to assess the completeness and
consistency of those strategies and to support dialogue with the Member States
concerned. The submission to the Commission is necessary to enable it to monitor the
coherent implementation of Union policy priorities, including in view of the
programming and use of relevant Union funding instruments. That assessment should
not duplicate the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism or the vulnerability
assessment.
(32) In order to ensure coherence, predictability and timely alignment between the main
planning strands of EIBM, the management board should adopt a multiannual EIBM
coordination scheme. That scheme should set common timelines for the preparation,
transmission, update and review of the main planning outputs provided for in this
Regulation, including national strategies for EIBM, contingency plans, national
capability development plans and the capability roadmap, as well as the relevant
strategic and operational outputs of the Agency. It should support a coherent planning
cycle at Union and national level and should take into account the strategic risk
analysis, relevant findings from vulnerability assessments and the Schengen evaluation
and monitoring mechanism, information available through EUROSUR and other
relevant strategic, operational and analytical information, without altering the
respective responsibilities of the Member States and the Agency under this Regulation.
It should not replace existing planning or programming documents or create additional
substantive planning obligations. By aligning the border management and return
planning strands, the scheme should facilitate coherent priority-setting and the
allocation of operational and budgetary resources in the Agency’s annual and
multiannual programming.
EN 38 EN
2019/1896 recital 17 (adapted)
new
(33) European integrated border management EIBM requires integrated planning
between the Member States and the Agency for border management and return
operations in order to prepare responses to challenges at the external borders, for
supporting contingency planning and for coordinating the long-term
development of capabilities both in terms of recruitment and training and in terms of
the acquisition and development of equipment. In order to ensure that the integrated
planning process for border management and return is coherent, forward looking and
based on up-to-date operational and strategic information, the Agency should support
that process through its relevant annual and multiannual planning outputs, including
the single programming document. Those outputs should draw on risk analysis,
vulnerability assessments, information available in the framework of EUROSUR,
operational lessons learned, relevant technology and capability trends, and other
relevant strategic, operational and analytical information. They should contribute to
the preparation and update of operational planning, contingency planning and
capability development planning, without altering the respective responsibilities of the
Member States and the Agency under this Regulation. The integrated planning process
should also support the efficient allocation of resources and the development of
capabilities, including by informing the programming and use of relevant Union
funding instruments.
2019/1896 recital 18
(34) The Agency should develop technical standards for information exchange as provided
for in this Regulation. In addition, for the effective implementation of Regulation (EU)
2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council29, common minimum
standards for external border surveillance should be developed. To that end, the
Agency should be able to contribute to the development of common minimum
standards in line with the respective competences of the Member States and the
Commission. Those common minimum standards should be developed taking into
account the type of borders, the impact levels attributed by the Agency to each
external border section and other factors such as geographical particularities. When
developing those common minimum standards, possible limitations deriving from
national law should be taken into account.
2019/1896 recital 19
(35) The technical standards for information systems and software applications should be
aligned with the standards used by the European Union Agency for the Operational
Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
(eu-LISA) for other IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice.
29 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ L
77, 23.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/399/oj).
EN 39 EN
new
(36) In order to support the implementation of the interoperability framework established
by Regulations (EU) 2019/81730 and (EU) 2019/81831 of the European Parliament and
of the Council, and to improve the efficient functioning of the multiple-identity
detector established by those Regulations, the Agency should, at the request of the
Member States, support them with the manual verification of different identities in
accordance with Article 29a of those Regulations. Such support should be provided
through the ETIAS Central Unit.
2019/1896 recital 22
The Agency should carry out its tasks in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and
without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Member States with regard to maintaining law
and order and safeguarding internal security
2019/1896 recital 23
The Agency should carry out its tasks without prejudice to the competence of the Member
States as regards defence.
2019/1896 recital 24
The extended tasks and competence of the Agency should be balanced with strengthened
fundamental rights safeguards and increased accountability and liability, in particular in terms
of the exercise of executive powers by the statutory staff.
2019/1896 recital 25
new
(37) The Agency relies on the cooperation of Member States to be able to perform its tasks
effectively. In that respect, it is important for the Agency and the Member States to act
in good faith and to exchange accurate information in a timely manner. No Member
State should be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers
contrary to it may harm the essential interests of its security.
30 Regulation (EU) 2019/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on
establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of borders
and visa and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU)
2018/1240, (EU) 2018/1726 and (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council and
Council Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/JHA (OJ L 135, 22.5.2019, p. 27,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/817/oj). 31 Regulation (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on
establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of police and
judicial cooperation, asylum and migration and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU)
2018/1862 and (EU) 2019/816 (OJ L 135, 22.5.2019, p. 85,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/818/oj).
EN 40 EN
2019/1896 recital 26
new
(38) Member States should also, in their own interest and in the interest of the other
Member States, contribute relevant data necessary for the activities carried out by the
Agency, including for the purposes of situational awareness, risk analysis,
vulnerability assessments and integrated planning. Equally, they should ensure that the
data are accurate and up-to-date and are obtained and entered lawfully. Where those
data include personal data, Union law on data protection should apply in full.
Moreover, the quality of the information exchanged between the Member States
and the Agency, which should be ensured through standardisation, the automation of
the information exchange across networks and systems, and the timeliness of the
exchange of such information are prerequisites for the proper functioning of EIBM.
new
(39) EUROSUR is necessary to provide the European Border and Coast Guard a
framework for the exchange of information and operational cooperation between
Member States' national authorities and the Agency. EUROSUR provides national
authorities and the Agency with the infrastructure and tools needed to enhance their
situational awareness and to increase reaction capability at the external borders, but
also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area, for the purpose of detecting,
preventing and combating illegal immigration, and cross-border crime and threats of
hybrid nature affecting the management of external borders, thereby contributing to
saving the lives of migrants and ensuring their protection. However, the provision of
situational awareness within the Schengen area should not lead to the Agency
performing or supporting operational activities at the internal borders of the Member
States. The Agency should provide the necessary assistance for the development and
operation of EUROSUR, including the interoperability of systems, in particular by
establishing, maintaining and coordinating EUROSUR.
(40) Personal data may only be processed in the framework of EUROSUR exceptionally,
such as in cases where the Agency is obliged to process personal data in emergency
situations, in particular to ensure the protection and saving lives. In this context, video
images of persons captured during such emergency situations could be processed,
including facial images, ship and aircraft identification numbers, geographical location
of ships and aircrafts, or data allowing to identify vulnerable groups, such as age,
gender, physical and mental state.
2019/1896 recital 28
EUROSUR is necessary for the European Border and Coast Guard to be able to provide a
framework for the exchange of information and the operational cooperation between Member
States' national authorities and with the Agency. EUROSUR provides national authorities and
the Agency with the infrastructure and tools needed to improve their situational awareness
and to increase reaction capability at the external borders for the purpose of detecting,
preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime, thereby contributing to
saving the lives of migrants and ensuring their protection
EN 41 EN
2019/1896 recital 29 (adapted)
new
(41) Member States should establish national coordination centres to exchange
information and cooperate within the framework of EUROSUR with other Member
States, third countries and with the Agency with respect to border surveillance and the
carrying out of border checks. It is essential for the proper functioning of EUROSUR
that all national authorities with a responsibility for external border surveillance under
national law cooperate via national coordination centres. Member States should
establish national coordination centres to improve the exchange of information and
cooperation cooperate within the framework of EUROSUR between
with other Member States , third countries and with the Agency with
respect to border surveillance and the carrying out of border checks. It is essential for
the proper functioning of EUROSUR that all national authorities with a responsibility
for external border surveillance under national law cooperate via national coordination
centres. The role of the national coordination centre is without affecting the
competence established at national level with regard to planning and implementing
border control. Member States can also make their national coordination centres
responsible for coordinating the exchange of information and for cooperation with
regard to other components of EIBM. The division of tasks between a national
coordination centres and a National Frontex Point of Contact should be determined in
the EUROSUR Handbook, in close cooperation with Member States and the
Agency.
2019/1896 recital 30 (adapted)
The role of the national coordination centre to coordinate and exchange information among all
authorities with a responsibility for external border control at national level is without
prejudice to the competence established at national level with regard to planning and
implementing border control.
2019/1896 recital 35 (adapted)
new
(42) Air border surveillance should be an element of border management since both
commercial and private flights and remotely piloted aircraft systems are used for
illegal activities related to immigration, andcross-border crime and various types of
threats of hybrid nature, such as by targeting border infrastructure . Air border
surveillance aims to detect and monitor such suspicious flights crossing or intending to
cross the external borders and to perform related risk analysis with a view to triggering
reaction capabilities by the competent authorities of the Union and the Member States.
For that purpose, inter-agency cooperation at Union level should be promoted between
the Agency, the entity being appointed the Network Manager of the European
Air Traffic Management Network (EATMN) and the European Union Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) , but also at the national level involving civil and military
authorities . Where relevant, Member States should be able to receive information
EN 42 EN
on suspicious external flights and react accordingly. The Agency should monitor and
support research and innovation activities in that area.
2019/1896 recital 36 (adapted)
new
(43) The reporting of events incidents related to unauthorised secondary movements
, unauthorised border crossing, cross-border crime and threats of hybrid nature
affecting the management of external borders and other events in EUROSUR
will should contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows
towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational
awareness. It should also contribute to improvement of the prevention of illegal
immigration and cross-border crime at Union level. The access of the Commission and
other Union Agencies operating in the area of freedom, security and justice, as well as
EMSA and EFCA to the European situational picture should bring added value to the
Union’s preparedness for the existing and upcoming threats. The implementing act
laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the
rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures should further define the
type of reporting to best meet this objective. An impact level attributed to each
reported event or incident by a national coordination centre contributes to the
assessment of the impact level assigned to a given border section by the Agency. The
security at the external borders has a major impact on the vulnerability of a given
border section as well as on the overall situation at Union level. Therefore, any
incidents related to threats to physical security of the border guards or coast guards
performing border management tasks or the security of the border infrastructure at the
border crossing point or between them, should be reported in EUROSUR.
new
(44) Events and incidents may require urgent action to be taken. It must therefore be
possible to report them in a timely manner in order to allow a timely response to such
events. In principle, a report on an event or incident should be sent as soon as it is
detected, and no later than 24 hours after the detection. However, in case of a
significant deterioration of the situational at a given border section, namely when
reported events are likely to have an impact on the external border, the Member State
concerned should provide the Agency with adequate information in real time which
should be followed by an adequate alert in the European situational picture for other
Member States to be aware of the changes in the migratory situation at the given
border section. The same procedure should apply to incidents having an impact on the
situation at the external borders. In case of a deterioration of a situation at a given
external border section, the Agency should launch EUROSUR fusion services
following consultation with the Member State concerned and ensure regular
monitoring of the situation. This Member State is informed immediately once any
atypical behaviour or trend is observed during this process.
EN 43 EN
2019/1896 recital 37 (adapted)
new
(45) The EUROSUR fusion services are a coordinated suite of advanced monitoring and
Earth observation tools managed and supplied by the Agency. They build on should
be based on the common application of surveillance tools and inter-agency
cooperation at Union level, including the provision of Copernicus security services.
Existing and future EU space systems may support the operations of the Agency
and the Member States through secure positioning, navigation and timing (Galileo,
LEO PNT) and secure connectivity (GOVSATCOM, IRIS2), including where
terrestrial systems are unavailable, subject to the applicable conditions for access to
those services. EUROSUR fusion services should provide the Member States and
the Agency with value-added information services related to EIBM European
integrated border management which, when analysed together, complement the
situational picture of a specific area .EUROSUR fusion services should be expanded
to support border checks, air border surveillance and the monitoring of migration
flows. In order to improve the situational awareness and contribute to effective
cooperation on information exchange at Union level, EUROSUR fusion services are
made available to the Commission, the EEAS, other Union agencies operating in the
area of freedom, security and justice, EMSA and EFCA, in accordance with the agreed
working arrangements. The Agency should prioritise the provision of EFS in case of
requests from multiple entities. One of the elements to be considered is the impact
level on the relevant border section. Information acquired from the EFS should be
included in the European situational picture. By pooling demand and acquiring those
services centrally, the Agency can make them available more cost-efficiently than if
equivalent services were procured separately by each Member State or requesting
entity. During rapidly evolving situations at the external borders, the Commission
should be able to draw on relevant information and analysis available in the European
situational picture and on outputs from EUROSUR fusion services made available
under this Regulation to support Union-level migration preparedness, early-warning
and crisis-response arrangements, including the Migration Preparedness and Crisis
Blueprint and, where activated, the Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements,
in accordance with the applicable access, security and classification rules.
2019/1896 recital 38
new
(46) The practice of travelling in small and unseaworthy vessels has dramatically increased
the number of migrants drowning at the southern maritime external borders.
EUROSUR and the provision of EUROSUR fusion services for the surveillance of
maritime border and pre-frontier areas should considerably improve the operational
and technical ability of the Agency and the Member States to detect such small vessels
and to improve the situational awareness and reaction capability of the Member
States, thereby contributing to reducing the loss of lives of migrants, including in the
framework of search and rescue operations. Without affecting the division of
responsibilities for declaring and coordinating search and rescue activities, which is
EN 44 EN
defined in international law, the Agency should prioritise the provision of EUROSUR
fusion services in contexts where it is believed that such services can contribute to
saving lives. In such cases, the Agency and the requesting Member State(s) should
also cooperate proactively and in good faith to ensure that the provision of the service
is complemented with adequate maritime, aerial, and human operational capabilities to
contribute to saving lives at sea.
2019/1896 recital 27
new
(47) The communication network established under this Regulation should be based on and
replace the EUROSUR communication network developed in the framework of
Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council32 . The
communication network established under this Regulation should be used for all
secured information exchanges within the European Border and Coast Guard. It
should also support, as appropriate, the communication and information sharing by
other information systems managed by the Agency for the purposes of this
Regulation. The level of accreditation of information sharing within the
communication network should reflect the operational needs of the Member States
and of the Agency and allow for the exchange of information in a multi-classification
environment, from sensitive non-classified information up be increased to the
classification level of CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL in order to improve
information assurance between the Member States and with the Agency.
new
As a general rule, the classification for the communication network should be
RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED in order to ensure smooth and effective
information exchange between Member States and the Agency. However, where
justified by operational needs and the sensitivity of the information concerned,
specified components, services or exchanges using the communication network should
be able to handle EU classified information up to CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU
CONFIDENTIAL or the equivalent national classification level. This decision should
be taken by the management board on the initiative of a Member State or the executive
director, and following a thorough discussion within the management board and
consultation with the Security Accreditation Board. In such a situation, the adequate
security accreditation decisions taken by the Security Accreditation Board should
follow.
new
(48) In order to ensure a coherent and secure operation of the communication network and
of the relevant communication and information systems managed by the Agency under
this Regulation, the authority responsible for their security accreditation should be
established. Building on the existing EUROSUR security accreditation architecture in
32 Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013
establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) (OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 11).
EN 45 EN
accordance with Section 2 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/581,
the Security Accreditation Board should act as the security accreditation body for the
European and the external components of EUROSUR, and for information exchange
within the European Border and Coast Guard, without affecting the responsibilities of
the national security accreditation authorities of the Member States for their national
components.
(49) The Security Accreditation Board is an independent technical body exercising its
functions autonomously from the functions of the Agency’s management board. In
order for it to carry out all of its activities quickly and effectively, the Security
Accreditation Board should be able to set up appropriate subordinate bodies acting on
its instructions. In order to ensure that it is able to accomplish its tasks, it should also
be provided that Member States supply the Board with any necessary documentation,
grant access to classified information in the framework of the information system,
including EUROSUR, and supporting systems (including the Communication
Network) and to any areas falling within their jurisdiction to duly authorised persons,
and that they should be responsible at local level for the accreditation of the security of
areas that are located within their territory.
(50) Security accreditation decisions concerning communication and information systems
managed and used solely by the Agency, other than those falling within Article 17(2),
should be taken by the Security Accreditation Authority in accordance with the
security rules of the Agency.
(51) Given the specific nature and the complexity of some of the information systems or
frameworks, like EUROSUR, it is essential for the security accreditation activities to
be carried out in a context of collective responsibility for the security of the Union and
of the Member States, by making efforts to reach a consensus and by involving all
parties with an interest in security, and for permanent risk monitoring. It is also
imperative that technical security accreditation activities be entrusted to professionals
who are duly qualified in the field of accrediting complex systems and who have an
adequate level of security clearance.
2019/1896 recital 31
This Regulation should not hinder Member States from also making their national
coordination centres responsible for coordinating the exchange of information and for
cooperation with regard to other components of European integrated border management.
2019/1896 recital 32
The quality of the information exchanged between the Member States and the Agency and the
timeliness of the exchange of such information are prerequisites for the proper functioning of
European integrated border management. Building on the success of EUROSUR, that quality
should be ensured through standardisation, the automation of the information exchange across
networks and systems, information assurance and control of the quality of the data and
information transmitted.
EN 46 EN
2019/1896 recital 33
The Agency should provide the necessary assistance for the development and operation of
EUROSUR, including the interoperability of systems, in particular by establishing,
maintaining and coordinating EUROSUR.
2019/1896 recital 39
It is recognised in this Regulation that migratory routes are also taken by persons in need of
international protection.
2019/1896 recital 40 (adapted)
new
(52) The Agency should prepare general and tailored risk analyses based in particular,
on the information and data shared by the Member States, other agencies, third
countries and international organisations obtained in the course of the operational
activities of the Agency and monitoring of media and internet activities, including
online platforms and open source information, within the limits of the Agency
mandate and in the context of the management of the external borders of the Union.
The risk analyses outputs should be developed based on a common integrated risk
analysis model, to be applied by the Agency itself and by Member States. The Agency
should based also on information provided by Member States provide adequate
information covering all aspects relevant to EIBM European integrated border
management, especially border control, return, and in particular returns stemming
from the return border procedure the phenomenon of unauthorised secondary
movements of third-country nationals within the Union in terms of trends, volume and
routes, prevention of cross-border crime including facilitation of unauthorised border
crossings, trafficking in human beings, terrorism and threats of a hybrid nature
affecting the management of external borders. The risk analyses should also focus
on the situation in relevant third countries, in particular identifying evolving
trends in the implementation of visa policy including document fraud, visa abuse, and
visa misuse and fraudulent practices) so as to allow for appropriate measures to be
taken or to tackle identified threats and risks with a view to improving the integrated
management of the external borders. That risk analysis should support situational
awareness and the identification of strategic and operational risks, including in the
framework of EUROSUR.
2019/1896 recital 41 (adapted)
Given its activities at the external borders, the Agency should contribute to preventing and
detecting cross-border crime, such as migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and
terrorism, where it is appropriate for it to act and where it has obtained relevant information
through its activities. It should coordinate its activities with Europol, which is the agency
responsible for supporting and strengthening Member States' actions and their cooperation in
preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States. The cross-
EN 47 EN
border dimension is characterised by crimes that are directly linked to unauthorised crossings
of the external borders, including trafficking in human beings or smuggling of migrants. In
accordance with Council Directive 2002/90/EC33, Member States are able to decide not to
impose sanctions where the aim of the behaviour is to provide humanitarian assistance to
migrants.
2019/1896 recital 42
(53) In a spirit of shared responsibility, the role of the Agency should be to monitor
regularly the management of the external borders, including the respect for
fundamental rights in the border management and return activities of the Agency. The
Agency should ensure proper and effective monitoring not only through situational
awareness and risk analysis, but also through the presence of experts from its own
staff in Member States. The Agency should therefore be able to deploy liaison officers
to Member States for a period of time during which the liaison officer reports to the
executive director. The reports of the liaison officers should form part of the
vulnerability assessment.
2019/1896 recital 43
new
(54) The Agency should carry out a vulnerability assessment based on objective criteria to
assess the capacity and readiness of the Member States to face challenges at their
external borders and to contribute to the standing corps and technical equipment pool.
The vulnerability assessment should include an assessment of the equipment,
infrastructure, staff, budget and financial resources of Member States as well as their
contingency plans to address possible crises at the external borders and return as
part of the common system for returns . It should also include EUROSUR data
quality which should contribute to significant progress in the provision of accurate and
complete data by member States for the development of up-to-date, comprehensive
and complete situational picture and thus reliable situational awareness. Member
States should ensure that classification level of the information shared in the
vulnerability assessment enables the effective use of vulnerability assessment in the
multiannual EIBM coordination scheme and integrated planning outputs and building
synergies with Schengen evaluation mechanism. Member States should take
measures to address any deficiencies identified in that assessment. The executive
director should identify the measures to be taken and recommend them to the Member
State concerned. The executive director should also set a time limit within which those
measures should be taken and closely monitor their timely implementation. Where the
necessary measures are not taken within the set time limit, the matter should be
referred to the management board for a further decision. The management board
should proceed on that matter as soon as possible, within the deadline prescribed in its
internal rules.
33 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry,
transit and residence (OJ L 328, 5.12.2002, p. 17).
EN 48 EN
2019/1896 recital 44
If the Agency is not provided with the accurate and timely information necessary for carrying
out a vulnerability assessment, it should be able to take that fact into account when
performing the vulnerability assessment, unless duly justified reasons are provided for
withholding the data.
new
(55) The vulnerability assessment should be also available to third countries which request
and agree to that, in particular the neighbouring third countries on the way of
accession., Any findings should be communicated to the designated national authority
in a third country for appropriate follow-up. Support of the Agency to neighbouring
third countries in the area of vulnerability assessment may contribute to more secure
external borders of the Union and better alignment of border management standards in
partner third countries. Such support may foster greater cooperation between the
Agency and partner third countries also in the area of risk analysis. The assistance to
third countries should complement the Agency's support for Member States in the
application of Union measures relating to the implementation of EIBM.
2019/1896 recital 45 (adapted)
new
(56) The vulnerability assessment and the Schengen evaluation mechanism established by
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/92234 1053/201335 are two complementary mechanisms
for guaranteeing Union quality control on the proper functioning of the Schengen area
and ensuring constant preparedness at both Union and national levels to respond to
any challenges at the external borders. While the Schengen evaluation and
monitoring mechanism is the primary method for evaluating the implementation of
and compliance with Union law in the Member States, the vulnerability assessment
also plays an important role in ensuring compliance of capabilities in the Member
States and the whole European Border and Coast Guard community in that regard. The
synergies between the two mechanisms should continue to be enhanced so as to
contribute to a clear the synergies between the vulnerability assessment and the
Schengen evaluation mechanism should be maximised with a view to establishing an
improved situational picture of the functioning of the Schengen area, avoiding, to the
extent possible, duplication of efforts on the Member States' side, and ensuring
the ensure better-coordinated use of the relevant Union financial instruments
supporting the management of the external borders and return . For that purpose,
the regular exchange of information between the Agency and the Commission on the
34 Council Regulation (EU) 2022/922 of 9 June 2022 on the establishment and operation of an evaluation
and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis, and repealing Regulation
(EU) No 1053/2013 (OJ L 160, 15.6.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/922/oj). 35 Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring
mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive
Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and
implementation of Schengen (OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 27).
EN 49 EN
implementation and results of both mechanisms should be established
continue to be regularly maintained and further efforts should be made to ensure
closer coordination in the issuance, monitoring and closure of recommendations .
The Agency should also develop its internal pool of experts to provide observers to
Schengen evaluation and monitoring activities from its staff under the profiles
indicated by the European Commission. All these elements should be addressed in the
existing cooperation arrangements between the Commission and the Agency.
2019/1896 recital 46
new
(57) Given that the Member States establish border sections, to which the Agency attributes
impact levels, and that the reaction capabilities of the Member States and of the
Agency should be linked to those impact levels, a fourth impact level — the critical
impact level — should be established to be attributed to a border section on a
temporary basis where the Schengen area is at risk and where the Agency should
intervene. However, not every ‘critical’ single indicative impact level of the
reported event in EUROSUR would amount to a ‘critical’ impact level attributed in
the end by the Agency to a given border section. The latter impact level is a sum of
single events that build a global, European, picture.
2019/1896 recital 47
(58) Where a high or critical impact level is attributed to a maritime border section due to
an increase of illegal immigration, the Member States concerned should take that
increase into account for the planning and conducting of search and rescue operations
since such a situation could generate an increase in requests for assistance for persons
in distress at sea.
2019/1896 recital 20
(59) The implementation of this Regulation does not affect the division of competence
between the Union and the Member States or the obligations of Member States under
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea, the International Convention on Maritime Search and
Rescue, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol thereto, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and other
relevant international instruments.
EN 50 EN
2019/1896 recital 21
new
(60) The implementation of this Regulation does not affect Regulation (EU) No 656/2014
of the European Parliament and of the Council36. Sea operations should be carried out
in a way that, in all instances, ensures the safety of the persons intercepted or rescued,
the safety of the units that take part in the sea operation in question and the safety of
third parties. For joint sea operations taking place in third countries under status
agreements, Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 is to be applied mutatis mutandis.
2019/1896 recital 48 (adapted)
new
(61) The Agency should organise appropriate technical and operational assistance to
Member States in order to reinforce their capacity to implement their obligations with
regard to external border control and to face challenges at the external borders
resulting from an increased number of arrivals of irregular migrants or cross-border
crime. Such assistance should be without affecting prejudice to the relevant
national authorities' competence to initiate criminal investigations. In that respect, the
Agency should, either on its own initiative and with the agreement of the Member
State concerned or at the request of that Member State, organise and coordinate joint
operations for one or more Member States, deploy border management teams,
migration management support teams and return teams (collectively referred to as
‘teams’) from the standing corps and provide the necessary technical equipment.
Border management teams, migration management teams and return teams can be
composed of one or more standing corps officers as the need may be.
2019/1896 recital 49 (adapted)
new
(62) Where there is a specific and disproportionate challenge at the external borders, the
Agency should, either on its own initiative and with the agreement of the Member
State concerned or at the request of that Member State, organise and coordinate rapid
border interventions and deploy both teams from the standing corps , including the
European border and return reserve, and technical equipment, including from the
rapid reaction equipment pool. The rapid reaction equipment pool should contain a
limited number of items of equipment needed for possible rapid border interventions.
Rapid bBorder interventions should provide reinforcement for a limited period of time
in situations where an immediate response is required and where such an intervention
would provide an effective response. To ensure that such intervention is effective,
Member States should make available staff that they second to the Agency,
provide to the Agency for short-term deployment and deploy for the purposes of the
36 Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational
cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 93, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/656/oj).
EN 51 EN
reserve for rapid reaction registered in the European border and return reserve
available to form relevant teams and provide the necessary technical equipment.
Where the crew deployed with the technical equipment of a Member State originates
in that Member State, it should count as part of that Member State's contribution to the
standing corps. The Agency and the Member State concerned should agree upon an
operational plan.
2019/1896 recital 50 (adapted)
new
(63) Where a Member State faces specific and disproportionate migratory challenges at
particular areas of its external borders characterised by large, inward, mixed migratory
flows, the Member States should be able to rely on increased technical and operational
reinforcements. Those reinforcements should be provided in hotspot areas by
migration management support teams. Those teams should be composed of
operational staff to be deployed from the standing corps and experts from the
European Union Agency for Asylum Support Office ( EUAA EASO),
Europol and, where relevant, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights,
other Union bodies, offices and agencies, and Member States. The Commission should
ensure the necessary coordination of the assessment of needs submitted by Member
States. The Agency should assist the Commission in the coordination among the
different agencies on the ground. The Commission should, in cooperation with the
host Member State and relevant Union agencies, establish the terms of cooperation
for the area of operation of the management migration support team at hotspot
areas. The Commission should ensure the cooperation of the relevant agencies within
their respective mandates and be responsible for coordinating the activities of the
migration management support teams.
2019/1896 recital 51
new
(64) It is recognised in this Regulation that migratory routes are also taken by persons in
need of international protection. Member States should ensure that any authorities
which are likely to receive applications for international protection, such as the police,
border guards, immigration authorities and personnel of detention facilities, have the
relevant information. They should also ensure that such authorities' personnel receive
the necessary level of training which is appropriate to their tasks and responsibilities
and instructions to inform applicants as to where and how applications for
international protection may be lodged and instructions as to how to refer persons in a
vulnerable situation to the appropriate referral mechanisms.
2019/1896 recital 52 (adapted)
In its conclusions of 28 June 2018, the European Council reconfirmed the importance
of relying on a comprehensive approach to migration and considered that migration is
a challenge not only for one Member State but also for Europe as a whole. In that
EN 52 EN
respect, it highlighted the importance for the Union of providing full support to ensure
an orderly management of migration flows.
2019/1896 recital 53 (adapted)
(65) The Agency and EASO EUAA should cooperate closely in order to address
effectively migratory challenges characterised by large inward mixed migratory flows,
in particular at the external borders. In particular, the Agency and EASO
EUAA should coordinate their activities and support Member States to
facilitate procedures regarding international protection and the return procedure with
regard to third-country nationals whose applications for international protection are
rejected. The Agency and EASO EUAA should also cooperate in other
common operational activities such as shared risk analysis, the collection of statistical
data, training, and support to Member States in connection with contingency planning.
2019/1896 recital 54 (adapted)
new
(66) National authorities carrying out coast guard functions are responsible for a wide
range of tasks, which may include maritime safety, security, search and rescue, border
control, fisheries control, customs control, general law enforcement and environmental
protection. The Agency, the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) and the
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) should therefore strengthen their
cooperation both with each other and with the national authorities carrying out coast
guard functions to increase maritime situational awareness and to support coherent and
cost-efficient action. Synergies between the various actors in the maritime
environment , including through the organisation of multipurpose operations,
capacity building and information sharing should be in line with European
integrated border management EIBM and maritime security strategies and
with the respective mandates of the agencies. For that purpose, EUROSUR fusion
services should be made available to EMSA and EFCA to complement the existing
cooperation on information exchange and information deriving from the Common
Information Sharing Environment (CISE) should be included in the European
situational picture .
2019/1896 recital 55
In hotspot areas, the Member States should cooperate with the relevant Union agencies, which
should act within their respective mandates and powers, under the coordination of the
Commission. The Commission, in cooperation with the relevant Union agencies, should
ensure that activities in hotspot areas comply with relevant Union law and fundamental rights.
EN 53 EN
2019/1896 recital 56
new
(67) Where justified by the results of the vulnerability assessment monitoring of
EUROSUR or risk analysis or where a critical impact level has been temporarily
attributed to one or more border sections, the executive director of the Agency should
recommend to the Member State concerned to initiate and carry out joint operations or
rapid border interventions. In the spirit of shared responsibility, the Member State
concerned should assess that recommendation. Where the Member State does not
intend to follow the recommendation, its reasoned negative response should be
referred for further assessment to the management board which may make
recommendations setting out, where necessary, the operational response and the time
limit for its implementation.
2019/1896 recital 57
new
(68) Where external border control is rendered ineffective to such an extent that it risks
jeopardising the functioning of the Schengen area, either because a Member State does
not take the necessary measures in line with a vulnerability assessment or because a
Member State facing specific and disproportionate challenges at the external borders
has not requested sufficient support from the Agency or is not implementing such
support, a unified, rapid and effective response should be delivered at Union level. For
the purpose of mitigating these risks, and to ensure better coordination at Union level,
the Commission should propose to the Council a decision that identifies the measures
to be implemented by the Agency and requires the Member State concerned to
cooperate with the Agency in the implementation of those measures. The
implementing power to adopt such a decision should be conferred on the Council
because of the potentially politically sensitive nature of the measures to be decided,
which are likely to touch on national executive and enforcement powers. The Agency
should then determine the actions to be taken for the practical execution of the
measures indicated in the Council decision. The Agency should draw up an
operational plan with the Member State concerned. The Member State concerned
should facilitate the implementation of the Council decision and the operational plan
by fulfilling, inter alia, its obligations as provided for in this Regulation. If a Member
State does not comply with that Council decision within 30 days and does not
cooperate with the Agency in the implementation of the measures contained in that
decision, the Commission should be able to trigger the specific procedure provided for
in Article 29 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 to address exceptional circumstances
putting the overall functioning of the area without internal border control at risk .
new
(69) Where the conditions necessary to carry out operations safely and in full compliance
with the applicable legal obligations are not met, such operations should be suspended
or terminated. Such important decision should be taken by the executive director after
consultation with the management board. Following the termination of the previous
EN 54 EN
operation, the host Member State may submit a new request for support. After
assessing the situation, including the circumstances that led to the termination of the
previous operation and the merits of the new request, the executive director may, after
consultation with the management board, approve the request.
2019/1896 recital 58
new
(70) The standing corps should be composed of four three categories of operational
staff, namely statutory staff, staff seconded to the Agency by the Member States for a
long term, staff provided by Member States for short-term deployments ,
and national officers forming part of the European border and return reserve staff
forming part of the reserve for rapid reaction for rapid border interventions.
Operational staff should consist of border guards, return escorts, return specialists, and
other relevant staff. The standing corps should be deployed in the framework of teams.
The actual number of operational staff deployed from the standing corps should
depend on operational needs. The Agency should endeavour to recruit and retain
qualified staff from the broadest possible geographical background. In the spirit of
shared responsibility, the Agency should require the staff it employs, in particular the
statutory staff of the standing corps, including statutory staff deployed in operational
activities, to possess the equivalent level of training, special expertise and
professionalism as staff seconded or employed by the Member States. Therefore, the
Agency should review and evaluate whether its statutory staff conduct themselves
properly in operational activities in the field of border control or return.
2019/1896 recital 59
new
(71) In order to facilitate the cross-border deployment of the standing corps and the
Agency’s operational assets, the Union and the Member States should progressively
work towards greater administrative interoperability and practical recognition
arrangements, where appropriate, in areas such as firearm-related authorisations,
statutory technical inspections of vehicles and other operational compliance
requirements, without affecting the applicable national law of the host Member
State. Operational staff deployed as members of the teams should have all the
necessary powers to carry out border control and return tasks, including the tasks
requiring executive powers, set out in relevant national law or in this Regulation.
Where statutory staff exercise executive powers, the Agency should be liable for any
damage caused. To ensure the effective performance of their tasks, members of the
teams deployed in a Member State should be granted equivalent access rights to
relevant Union databases, such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa
Information System (VIS), and the Entry/Exit System (EES), under the same
conditions as the border guards of the host Member State. In particular, when acting as
designated border authorities in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU)
2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council37, they should be authorised
37 Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017
establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-
country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for
EN 55 EN
to consult, enter, amend, and erase data in the EES, in full compliance with the EES
legal framework.
2019/1896 recital 60
Member States should contribute to the standing corps in accordance with Annex II for long-
term secondments and Annex III for short-term deployments. The individual contributions of
Member States should be established on the basis of the distribution key agreed during the
negotiations in 2016 on Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 for the purposes of the rapid reaction
pool and set out in Annex I to that Regulation. That distribution key should be proportionally
adapted to the size of the standing corps. Those contributions should also be established in a
proportionate way for the Schengen associated countries.
new
(72) Category 1 operational staff can be deployed in the field or perform operational
activities at the headquarters. The place of employment of the statutory staff of the
Agency performing administrative functions should generally be the Member State
where the Agency’s seat is located. For statutory staff deployed as members of the
teams, the location of the deployment should as a general rule be considered as the
place of employment for the purposes of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the
European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the Union,
laid down in Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/6838. Taking into
account the specificities of deployments to third countries, statutory staff deployed to
third countries as well as to Schengen associated countries should maintain the place
of employment in the Member State where the Agency’s seat is located. Category 1
operational staff are required to perform duties under particular arduous working
conditions and following specific shift work arrangements that should be adequately
compensated. Those specific working conditions and arrangements should therefore be
duly taken into account in the relevant legislation. The Agency may adopt further
general implementing provisions to the Staff Regulations tailored to its operational
and organisational needs, considering the highly specialised and particular nature of
the mandate of the Agency and duties of its staff members, in line with the procedure
set out in Article 110(2) of the Staff Regulations.
2019/1896 recital 61
(73) When selecting the numbers and profiles of staff to be indicated in the decision of the
management board, the executive director should apply the principles of equal
treatment and proportionality, in particular with regard to the national capabilities of
Member States.
access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the
Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 (OJ L 327,
9.12.2017, p. 20, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2226/oj). 38 OJ L 56, 4.3.1968, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1968/259(1)/oj.
EN 56 EN
2019/1896 recital 62
(74) The exact timing for short-term deployments from the standing corps and for making
available technical equipment co-financed under the specific actions of the Internal
Security Fund or any other dedicated Union funding should be agreed between each
Member State and the Agency through annual bilateral negotiations, taking into
account capacity and proportionality. When requesting national contributions to the
standing corps, the executive director should apply as a general rule the principles of
proportionality and equal treatment of Member States with the aim of preventing
situations that would substantially affect the discharge of national tasks in one
Member State by requesting the deployment of the annual contributions of that
Member State in one particular period of four months. Such arrangements should
include the possibility for Member States to fulfil their obligations regarding
deployment periods by means of non-consecutive periods. With regard to short-term
deployments from the standing corps, Member States should also be able to fulfil their
obligations for short-term deployment in a cumulative manner, by deploying more
staff for shorter periods or by deploying the individual staff members for more than
four months in accordance with the planning agreed through annual bilateral
negotiations.
2019/1896 recital 63
Without prejudice to the timely conclusion of the operational plan regarding sea
operations, the Agency should provide participating Member States, at the earliest
possible stage, with specific information on the relevant jurisdiction and applicable
law, in particular on the prerogatives of the commanders of ships and aircraft, the
conditions of the use of force and the imposition of restrictive or custodial measures.
new
(75) In addition to the contribution to the standing corps in accordance with Annex II for
long-term secondment and Annex III for short-term deployments, which should
remain stable over time, Member States should contribute national officers to the
European border and return reserve. The Member States should ensure the vast
representation of different talents in the European border and return reserve including
border guards, return specialist, return escort or other relevant staff, in order to ensure
resilience and respond to evolving challenges. The individual contributions of Member
States should be established on the basis of the distribution key agreed during the
negotiations in 2016 on Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 for the purposes of the rapid
reaction pool, as updated in the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896. That distribution key
should be proportionally adapted to the size of the standing corps and reflected in
Annex IV. Those contributions should also be established in a proportionate way for
the Schengen associated countries. in accordance with Annex IV. While the members
of the European border and return reserve should primarily perform duties necessary
to implement the EIBM at national level, they could be convocated by the executive
director in case of an emerging and disproportionate need in the area of border
management or return, or a situation at the external borders requiring urgent action,
EN 57 EN
where other categories of the standing corps which are at the disposal of the Agency
turn to be insufficient or a specific professional expertise is indispensable to address
certain operational needs. The contribution of Member States in this regard should be
considered as part of their solidarity towards other Member States and the Agency,
assuming their shared responsibility in implementing EIBM with the aim of ensuring
the highest standards and most resilient border management and effective returns
throughout the Union.
2019/1896 recital 64
new
(76) The long-term development of human resources to secure the contributions of the
Member States to the standing corps should be supported by a financial support
system. For that purpose, it is appropriate to authorise the Agency to use the award of
grants to the Member States without a call for proposals under financing not linked to
costs subject to the fulfilment of the conditions set out in Regulation (EU, Euratom)
2018/104639 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council40. The financial
support should enable provide Member States to hire and train additional staff to
provide them with the necessary flexibility to comply with the mandatory
contributions to the standing corps. The financial support system should take into
account the time required for recruitment and training, and it should therefore be based
on the N + 2 rule. The dedicated financing system should strike the right balance
between the risks of irregularities and fraud and costs of control. This Regulation sets
the essential conditions for triggering the financial support, namely the recruitment
and training of the adequate number of border guards or other specialists
corresponding to the number of officers seconded to the Agency for a long term or the
effective secondment or deployment of officers during the Agency's operational
activities. Given the lack of relevant and comparable data on actual costs across
Member States, the development of a cost-based financing scheme would be overly
complex and would not address the need for a simple, fast, efficient and effective
financing scheme. For the purpose of fixing the amount of such financing to different
Member States, it is appropriate to use as a reference amount the annual salary of
contractual agents in function group III, grade 8, step 1 of the institutions of the Union,
adjusted by a corrective coefficient per Member State in line with the principle of
sound financial management and in the spirit of equal treatment. When implementing
such financial support, the Agency and Member States should ensure that the
principles of co-financing and no double funding are complied with.
39 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on
the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No
1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU)
No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1). 40 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September
2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).
EN 58 EN
2019/1896 recital 65
new
(77) In order to alleviate the possible impact on the national services related to the
recruitment of statutory staff for the standing corps, support should be provided to the
relevant services of Member States to cover training investments for new personnel
replacing such departing personnel departing the national authorities forming the
European Border and Coast Guard .
2019/1896 recital 69
new
(78) The Agency's workforce should consist of staff performing the tasks devoted to the
Agency, either in the Agency’s headquarters as the Agency’s administrative staff
or as part of the standing corps. Statutory staff within the standing corps should
primarily be deployed as members of the teams. When needed, they can be assigned
to perform operational activities in the headquarters or antenna offices, including for
instance operational training, duty and surveillance, real time assessment, document
expertise. It should be possible to recruit only a limited and clearly defined number
of statutory staff to perform supportive functions enable for the establishment
functioning of the standing corps, in particular at headquarters
2019/1896 recital 66
new
(79) To ensure the consistent implementation of its operational and logistical activities,
including the deployment of the standing corps and technical equipment and to
facilitate cooperation between the Agency and the host Member State or host third
country, the Agency should develop its chain of command to avoid that decision
making becomes overcentralised and therefore too distant from operational needs. It
should serve as the hierarchical line of authority based on delegated operational
management within the Agency and implemented through its contingents which might
be further subdivided into sections and groups at tactical level. The chain of command
should be responsible to manage the deployed standing corps and other relevant staff
participating in the operational activities of the Agency including by exercising certain
delegated powers of the executive director in the relevant areas. In view of the
deployment of the standing corps on the territories of third countries, the Agency
should develop the capabilities for its own command and control structures as well as
a procedure to ensure that the members of the teams can be held civilly and criminally
liable.
new
(80) To assist Member States to swiftly address any crises and emergencies at the external
borders of the Union, a quick reaction force capability should be established. The
Agency could also establish, where operationally desirable under its contingents, a
EN 59 EN
quick reaction force, able to rapidly respond to urgent operational needs arising at
contingent or Union level. Such a quick reaction force could be deployed upon the
request of the host Member State to support crisis situations both at the relevant border
section or to free up national resources at other border sections.
(81) In order to establish specific arrangements for the Agency’s operational response in
situations of crisis and force majeure at the external borders, as defined in Regulation
(EU) 2024/1359, it is appropriate to empower the Executive Director to recommend to
the Member State concerned to request the Agency to initiate, reinforce or adapt
operational support. In order to ensure a swift and effective response, the Agency
should give priority to the deployment of officers from the European Border and
Return Reserve already present in the Member State concerned, as well as from the
Agency’s quick reaction force. In view of the urgent nature and complexity of such
deployments, the monitoring of compliance with fundamental rights should be carried
out ex post, so as to ensure an adequate focus on the operational response and to adapt
such monitoring to operational needs in exceptional circumstances, while preserving
the possibility for the Member State concerned to request the earlier involvement of
fundamental rights monitors.
2019/1896 recital 75
new
(82) Taking into account the enhanced mandate of the Agency, the setting up of the
standing corps and its strengthened presence on the ground at the external borders and
its increased engagement in the field of return, it should be possible for the Agency to
establish antenna offices situated at locations in the proximity of its significant
operational activities for the duration of those activities, to act as an interface between
the Agency and the host Member State, to deal with coordination and logistical and
support tasks and to facilitate cooperation between the Agency and the host Member
State.Taking into account the enhanced mandate of the Agency, the setting up of the
standing corps and the Agency’s operational chain of command, its strengthened
presence on the ground at the external borders and its increased engagement in the
field of return, it should be possible for the Agency to establish , as a part of its
contingent management structure, antenna offices situated at locations in the
proximity of its significant operational activities for the duration of those activities, to
act as an interface between the Agency and the host Member State, to deal with
coordination and logistical and support tasks and to facilitate cooperation between the
Agency and the host Member State on the territory of the Member States or third
countries. The aim of the antenna offices should be to ensure the forward presence of
the contingent command personnel and to facilitate and improve the coordination of
operational activities within that specific area .
2019/1896 recital 76 (adapted)
(83) In light of the fact that inter-agency cooperation forms part of EIBM European
integrated border management, the Agency should closely cooperate with all relevant
Union bodies, offices and agencies, in particular with Europol and EASO
EUAA . Such cooperation should take place at the level of headquarters,
and in operational areas and, where relevant, at the level of antenna offices.
EN 60 EN
2019/1896 recital 67 (adapted)
In order to allow for effective deployments from the standing corps beginning on 1 January
2021, certain decisions and implementing measures should be taken and put in place as soon
as possible. Therefore, the Agency, together with the Member States and the Commission,
should engage in the preparation of such implementing measures and decisions for adoption
by the management board. Such a preparatory process should encompass the relevant
recruitment by the Agency and the Member States as referred to in this Regulation.
2019/1896 recital 68 (adapted)
new
In order to ensure the continuity of the support for operational activities organised by the
Agency, however, all deployments, including under the rapid reaction pool, to be made by 31
December 2020 should be planned and implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU)
2016/1624 and in accordance with the annual bilateral negotiations carried out in 2019. To
that end, the relevant provisions of that Regulation should only be repealed with effect from 1
January 2021.
2019/1896 recital 70
(84) To overcome the persistent gaps in the voluntary pooling of technical equipment from
Member States, in particular as regards large-scale assets, the Agency should have its
own necessary equipment to be deployed in joint operations or rapid border
interventions or any other operational activities. The development of the Agency’s
own technical capabilities and of the technical equipment pool should respond to the
operational requirements identified through risk analysis, vulnerability assessments
and operational planning, including, where relevant, maritime and aerial surveillance
capabilities and advanced processing and analytical tools, while remaining
proportionate to the Agency’s mandate and resources. Those Aassets owned by
the Agency should be authorised by the Member States as being on government
service. While the Agency has been legally able to acquire or lease its own technical
equipment since 2011, that possibility was significantly hindered by the lack of
budgetary resources.
new
(85) In order to support operational effectiveness, interoperability and cost-efficiency, the
Agency should be able, for specific categories of technical equipment, to conduct joint
procurement procedures with Member States or to act as a central purchasing body, in
accordance with the financial rules applicable to the Agency. Appropriate safeguards
should be provided as regards financial contributions, service fees, liability
arrangements, conditions of use and the avoidance of double financing from Union
funds. Appropriate arrangements should also be in place for the registration,
deployment, maintenance, servicing and logistical support of the Agency’s own
technical equipment throughout its lifecycle.
EN 61 EN
(86) In order to improve the availability, coordination and effective use of maritime
capabilities for the implementation of this Regulation, the Agency should be able to
support, where appropriate, the coordination of maritime assets made available by
Member States, without affecting the ownership of those assets and to the
responsibilities of the Member States concerned
2019/1896 recital 71 (adapted)
new
(87) Consequently, in order to match the level of ambition underlying the establishment of
the standing corps, the Commission earmarked a significant envelope under the 2021-
2027 multiannual financial framework to allow the Agency to acquire, maintain and
operate the necessary air, sea and land assets corresponding to its operational needs
the Commission will, within the policy reference framework set out in Article 22(2)
of the NRPP Regulation, encourage Member States to finance measures in the
National and Regional Partnership Plans that will complement Frontex own equipment
with equipment financed by Member States under their National and Regional
Partnership Plans and that can be put at the disposal of the Agency . While the
acquisition of the necessary assets could be a lengthy process, especially for large
assets, the Agency's own equipment should ultimately become the backbone of the
operational deployments with additional contributions by Member States to be called
upon in exceptional circumstances. The Agency's equipment should be largely
operated by the Agency's technical crews that are part of the standing corps. In order
to ensure the effective use of the proposed financial resources, the acquisition of the
necessary assets should be based on a multiannual strategy decided as early as possible
by the management board. It is necessary to ensure the sustainability of the Agency by
means of future multiannual financial frameworks and to maintain comprehensive
EIBM European integrated border management.
new
(88) In order to ensure that the European Border and Coast Guard has access to state-of-
the-art, interoperable and resilient technical capabilities, the Agency should be able to
acquire or lease technical equipment and, where appropriate, participate in, coordinate
or carry out joint procurement procedures together with Member States or other Union
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies. Where appropriate, the Agency should also be
able to act as a central purchasing body, in accordance with the financial rules
applicable to the Agency. Such acquisition, leasing and procurement should be guided
by the capability roadmap, the Agency’s multiannual strategy for technical capabilities
and the relevant Union financial and procurement rules. It should also take into
account life-cycle costs, interoperability, operational risks, research and innovation
developments and the need to reduce critical dependencies, including dependencies on
suppliers established in third countries, where relevant.
(89) In order to ensure that EIBM benefits from state-of-the-art, secure and interoperable
capabilities, the Agency should monitor, support and contribute to research and
innovation activities relevant for border management and return. The Agency should
assist the Member States and the Commission in identifying research and innovation
priorities and in supporting the preparation and implementation of relevant Union
EN 62 EN
programmes. It should also be able to receive funding under, and carry out activities
funded by, relevant Union programmes in the areas covered by this Regulation and,
where the Commission delegates the relevant powers, implement parts of those
programmes. In doing so, the Agency should contribute to the coordination of the
European innovation ecosystem for border management, support the uptake and
testing or evaluation of relevant technologies and systems, and take into account the
need to reduce critical dependencies and support European strategic autonomy. Where
the Agency develops, procures, tests or deploys artificial intelligence systems in the
implementation of this Regulation, it should do so in accordance with Regulation (EU)
2024/1689 and other applicable Union law, taking account of the intended purpose and
risk classification of the system. The Agency should ensure appropriate risk
management, data governance, transparency, accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity,
human oversight and fundamental-rights safeguards. Artificial intelligence should
support, and not replace, accountable human decision-making, in particular where
decisions may affect individuals.
2019/1896 recital 72 (adapted)
In the implementation of this Regulation, the Agency and the Member States should make the
best possible use of existing capabilities in terms of human resources as well as technical
equipment, both at Union and national level.
2019/1896 recital 73 (adapted)
(90) In the implementation of this Regulation, the Agency and the Member States
should make the best possible use of existing capabilities in terms of human resources
as well as technical equipment, both at Union and national level. The long-term
development of new capabilities within the European Border and Coast Guard should
be coordinated between the Member States and the Agency in line with the
multiannual strategic policy cycle for EIBM European integrated border
management, taking into account the long duration of certain processes. That includes
the recruitment and training of new border guards, which, during their career, could
serve both in Member States and as part of the standing corps, the acquisition,
maintenance and disposal of equipment, for which opportunities for interoperability
and economies of scale should be sought, and the development of new equipment and
related technologies, including through research.
2019/1896 recital 74
new
(91) The capability roadmap should converge the capability development plans of Member
States and the multiannual planning of the Agency's resources to optimise long-term
investment to best protect the external borders. In order to ensure that national
capability development plans respond to identified operational needs and deficiencies,
those plans should take into account the results of quality control mechanisms,
including the vulnerability assessment carried out by the Agency and the Schengen
evaluation and monitoring mechanism. This should help ensure that capability
EN 63 EN
development, investment planning, recruitment and training are better linked to
identified gaps, risks and strategic priorities, without affecting the respective
procedures and responsibilities under those mechanisms. In order to ensure that
national capability development plans remain relevant and reflect actual capability
needs, Member States should update those plans regularly and following substantial
changes. Such changes may include significant changes in the risk analysis, relevant
findings of the vulnerability assessment or of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring
mechanism, changes in national financial programming affecting border management
or return capabilities, or changes in the national legal framework, organisational
structure or allocation of competences relating to border management and return.
2019/1896 recital 77 (adapted)
new
(92) The training activities of the Agency should increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of the standing corps deployments, ensure greater convergence and high
standards in the implementation of the Union law on border management and return,
promote best practices, facilitate cooperation and interoperability of the standing corps
officers in multinational settings and ensure clarity with regard to the standing corps
officers’ roles and responsibilities. The Agency and the Member States, in
particular their training and educational entities and academies, should cooperate
closely with respect to the training of the standing corps, while ensuring that training
programmes are based on the strategic training needs, harmonised and foster the
common values enshrined in the Treaties. In order to effectively organise and
implement trainings, Tthe Agency should be able, after obtaining the approval of
the management board to set up an Agency training centre centres,
including on the basis of agreements with selected specialised institutions for
training and education as well as the Agency's partnership academies in Member
States to facilitate further the inclusion of a common European culture in the
training provided. The management board should oversee the strategic development
of the Agency’s training capabilities.
2019/1896 recital 78
new
(93) The Agency should further develop and regularly update common core curricula
and adequate training tools for border management and return, including specific
training on the protection of vulnerable persons, including children. It should also
offer additional training courses and seminars related to integrated border management
tasks, including for officers of the competent national bodies. To ensure a
consistent delivery of training, the Agency should also use “train the trainers”
methodology. The Agency should provide border and coast guards, return
specialists, return escorts and other relevant staff who are members of the standing
corps, as well as forced-return monitors and fundamental rights monitors, the
members of the standing corps with the necessary, high-quality training, including
tailored specialised training relevant to their tasks and powers. That should include
training on relevant Union and international law and on fundamental rights. To
foster synergies and promote a coherent Union approach to specialised training, the
EN 64 EN
Agency should cooperate closely with the European Union Agency for Law
Enforcement Training (CEPOL). In cooperation with Member States and third
countries, the Agency should be able to organise training activities and offer additional
specialised courses and seminars related to integrated border management tasks for
officers of their competent national authorities, including The Agency should be
authorised to organise training activities in cooperation with Member States and third
countries on their territories. The training provided to the competent national
authorities should also include relevant courses for the staff in third countries in
charge of visa applications.
new
(94) The Agency, in cooperation with the management board, should establish, develop and
regularly update EIBM training curricula for members of the staff of relevant national
authorities and administrations, responsible for border management and return matters,
who form part of the European border and return reserve. It should provide training to
staff of the European border and return reserve in order to guarantee that its members
possess the necessary skills and competences to operate in a cohesive manner in any
operational area while also contributing to strengthen national European Border and
Coast Guard capacities.
2019/1896 recital 79 (adapted)
The return of third-country nationals who do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the conditions
for entry, stay or residence in the Member States, in accordance with Directive 2008/115/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council41, is an essential component of the
comprehensive efforts to tackle illegal immigration and represents an important issue of
substantial public interest.
new
(95) Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 establishes a common system for returns, providing the
Union with a common framework to ensure that third-country national with no right to
stay are effectively returned, and foresees a central coordination and operational role
for the Agency. The effective implementation of the common system for returns is an
essential component of a credible and comprehensive Union migration policy. The
implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, together with the new common
rules establishes by Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 calls for stronger coordination and
cooperation at Union level to ensure the effective implementation of returns across the
Union. The Agency should therefore play a central role in the strategic planning,
coordination and operational delivery of return-related activities, enabling Member
States to pool resources and capabilities, increasing the scale and efficiency of returns
and ensuring that the Union is equipped to implement effectively the common system
established by Regulation (EU) 2026/2280.
41 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
nationals (OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98).
EN 65 EN
(96) To enable the Agency to effectively fulfil its responsibilities within the common
system for returns, it should establish a dedicated operational structure responsible for
ensuring continuous situational awareness, anticipating operational needs and
supporting the planning, organisation and deployment of return and reintegration
activities. A Return Coordination Centre should therefore be established within the
Agency. The Agency should also establish a SIRENE office to support the operation
of the Return Coordination Centre by exchanging and ensuring the availability of
supplementary information related to SIS alerts on return and for refusal of entry and
stay in accordance with Regulations (EU) 2018/186042 and (EU) 2018/186143 of the
European Parliament and of the Council.
(97) To ensure coordinated and efficient implementation of return activities at Union level,
the Agency should be responsible for planning return operations through a rolling
operational plan based on the needs assessment and information provided to the
Member States to the Return Coordination Centre.
2019/1896 recital 80 (adapted)
new
(98) Effective return requires adequate operational planning and operational capacity
that can be rapidly mobilised. The Agency should strengthen its role to become
the Union entity responsible for the planning, coordination and implementation of
returns step up its assistance to Member States for returning third-country nationals,
subject to Union return policy and in compliance with Directive 2008/115/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council44 Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 . In
particular, the Agency should strategically plan, coordinate and organise and
carry out return operations from one or more Member States and organise and
conduct return interventions to reinforce the return systems of Member States that
require increased technical and operational assistance to comply with their obligation
to return third-country nationals in accordance with that Directive implement the
return border procedure and Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 .
new
(99) In addition to its role in the planning, coordination and implementation of return
operations and other return-related activities, the Agency should, in full respect for
fundamental rights and without affecting the Member States' responsibility for issuing
return decisions, provide comprehensive technical and operational assistance to
42 Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on
the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals
(OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1860/oj ). 43 Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on
the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border
checks, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, and amending and
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 (OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 14,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1861/oj ).
44 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
nationals (OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/115/oj).
EN 66 EN
Member States in the return process. Such assistance should include support for the
pre-return, return, and post-return activities, as well as support to Member States in the
collection of information, the identification of third-country nationals, the acquisition
of travel documents, return and reintegration counselling, the provision of technical
equipment, as well as the operational resources, interpreting services and specialised
expertise.
(100) Where this Regulation refers to tasks carried out by the Agency on the basis of a return
decision, or to technical and operational assistance provided on the basis of a return
decision, such return decision should be understood as a return decision issued by a
Member State in accordance with, and respecting the requirements of, Regulation
(EU) 2026/2280, including returns ordered under Article 2(4), points (a) and (b),
thereof.
(101) The Agency should maintain a pool of qualified forced-return monitors to respond to
the requests of the Member States to monitor return operations on their behalf. The
pool should be composed of personnel of the competent bodies of the Member States
who carry out forced-return monitoring activities, fundamental rights monitors, and
qualified experts from relevant entities These forced return monitors should be
specifically trained to ensure that the needs of persons in situations of vulnerability are
adequately met during return operations.
(102) Reintegration is an important component of the common system for returns. The
Agency should therefore strengthen its role in supporting the planning and
implementation of post-arrival and reintegration assistance, including through the
management of a Union Reintegration Programme, with a view to ensuring coherence
and coordination of reintegration assistance provided by the Member States and
alignment with Union priorities in the field of return, readmission and reintegration.
As a key actor in the common system for returns, the Agency should contribute to
ensuring that reintegration assistance provided by the Agency and the Member States
forms part of a coherent and coordinated approach. The Agency and the Member
States should ensure that reintegration assistance is planned, coordinated and
implemented in accordance with the framework, principles and criteria set out in
Article 44(5) and (6) of Regulation (EU) 2026/2280, taking into account, where
relevant, the specific needs of persons in situations of vulnerability, thereby ensuring
coherence, maximising synergies and avoiding duplication of efforts. A continuum
between the reintegration assistance provided by the Agency and further longer-term
reintegration, including with the involvement of the communities of the returnee,
should be sought, ensuring complementarity between the reintegration activities of the
Agency and relevant initiatives undertaken in the framework of the Union’s external
action, building on existing support and fostering synergies between the activities of
the Agency, the Member States and other relevant actors. The Agency, in consultation
with the Commission, should identify priority third countries for the provision of
reintegration assistance. In order to ensure coherence with the Union’s external action,
it should take into account the relevant external policy objectives.
(103) The Agency’s coordinating role in the field of reintegration should concern
reintegration activities linked to returns from the Union. This should be without
prejudice to, where it is best placed, the Agency carrying out or supporting
reintegration activities in third countries, where it is in the interest of the Union. Such
activities should complement, and be conducted in synergy with, relevant initiatives
undertaken in the framework of the Union’s external action, including those
supporting reintegration in partner countries, thereby fostering synergies, ensuring
EN 67 EN
continuity of assistance and supporting a coherent approach to sustainable
reintegration while avoiding duplication of effort.
(104) The effective functioning of the common system for returns requires the Agency to
have the necessary information and operational capabilities to fulfil its strengthened
role. Currently, there is no comprehensive Union-level operational picture of
secondary movements of third-country nationals subject to return decisions or of
attempts by persons subject to entry bans to enter the Union. While the Schengen
Information System is the main Union-wide IT system relevant to monitoring such
movements and eu-LISA can produce statistics on SIS alerts on return, the exchange
of supplementary information takes place largely on a bilateral basis without being
stored in the SIS central system. As a result, detailed statistics on hits on SIS alerts
cannot be produced by eu-LISA or the Member States, limiting the Union’s capacity
to identify cross-border trends and assess developments in these areas. Information on
hits on alerts on return and on alerts for refusal of entry and stay entered in SIS,
together with the possibility to consult the relevant alerts associated with those hits, is
necessary to provide the Return Coordination Centre with reliable and timely
operational data regarding the movements of third-country nationals subject to return
decisions and entry bans. This information should enable the Return Coordination
Centre to identify operational trends, including secondary movements of persons
subject to return decisions, assess vulnerabilities and risks on return, anticipate
emerging needs and support the prioritisation, coordination and deployment of
operational resources. Accordingly, the Agency should establish a SIRENE Office
within the Return Coordination Centre allowing it to process supplementary
information related to SIS alerts.
2019/1896 recital 81
The Agency should, in full respect for fundamental rights and without prejudice to the
Member States' responsibility for issuing return decisions, provide technical and operational
assistance to Member States in the return process, including in the identification of third-
country nationals and in other pre-return activities of the Member States the acquisition of
travel documents for return, in cooperation with the authorities of the relevant third countries.
2019/1896 recital 82
(105) The Agency should allow, subject to the agreement of the Member State concerned,
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment of the Council of Europe to conduct visits to where it carries
out return operations, within the framework of the monitoring mechanism established
by the members of the Council of Europe under the European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
2019/1896 recital 83
The assistance to Member States in carrying out return procedures should include the
provision of practical information on third countries of return relevant for the implementation
of this Regulation, such as the provision of contact details or other logistical information
EN 68 EN
necessary for the smooth and dignified conduct of return operations. The assistance should
also include the operation and maintenance of a platform for the exchange of data and
information necessary for the Agency to provide technical and operational assistance in
accordance with this Regulation. That platform should have a communication infrastructure
enabling the automated transmission of statistical data by the Member States' return
management systems.
new
(106) The Agency should operate and further develop the integrated return management
platform (IRMA), as a dedicated platform supporting the exchange of information
necessary for the provision of technical and operational assistance in the field of
return, readmission and reintegration.
2019/1896 recital 84
(107) The possible existence of an arrangement between a Member State and a third country
does not absolve the Agency or the Member States from their obligations or liability
under Union or international law, in particular as regards compliance with the
principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment.
2019/1896 recital 85
Member States should be able to cooperate at operational level with other Member States or
third countries at the external borders, including as regards military operations with a law
enforcement purpose, to the extent that that cooperation is compatible with the actions of the
Agency.
2019/1896 recital 86 (adapted)
new
(108) The Agency should improve the exchange of information and cooperation with other
Union bodies, offices and agencies, such as Europol, eu-LISA, EASO
EUAA , EMSA, EFCA, the European Union Customs Authority, the
European Union Satellite Centre, EASA and EEAS, including relevant CSDP
missions and operations, as well as relevant international organisations and the
Network Manager of the EATMN in order to make the best use of information,
capabilities and systems which are already available at European Union level ,
including synergies of activities between the Agency and those entities , such as
Copernicus, the Union Earth observation and monitoring programme.
EN 69 EN
2019/1896 recital 87 (adapted)
new
(109) In support of the Union’s external action policy, migration policy and as an
important element of EIBM, the Agency should cooperate with the partner third
countries through technical and operational assistance. Cooperation with third
countries is an important element of European integrated border management. The
cooperation should serve to promote European border management and return
standards, to exchange information and risk analysis, and to facilitate the
implementation of returns with a view to increasing their efficiency and to supporting
third countries in the area of border management and return migration, including
through the deployment of the standing corps where such support is required to protect
external borders and the effective management of the Union's migration policy.
Cooperation with third countries should take place in the framework of the
external action of the Union and in line with the principles and objectives laid down in
Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The Commission should ensure
consistency between European integrated border management EIBM and other Union
policies in the field of the Union's external action and, in particular, the Common
Security and Defence Policy. The Commission should be assisted by the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Such cooperation
should take place with regard to, in particular, the activities of the Agency taking place
on the territory of third countries or involving the officials of third countries in areas
such as risk analysis, planning and conduct of operations, training, information
exchange and cooperation.
new
(110) The Agency should be enabled to support third-country authorities with occasional
and ad hoc technical assistance activities. Where more structural and long-term
technical cooperation is envisaged, working arrangements could be agreed with the
relevant third country authorities to set out the framework for cooperation. Technical
assistance may also be provided under status agreements that include technical
assistance support in their scope. Technical assistance to third countries typically
could include training, capacity building and support for voluntary return or
reintegration that does not involve the exercise of executive powers.
(111) To ensure coherence in the Union’s external action, the Agency should coordinate its
activities in third countries with the Commission and the European External Action
Service, including through timely consultation before launching, substantially
modifying or discontinuing activities, taking account of relevant Union-funded
programmes.
(112) For the deployment of the standing corps on the territory of a third country with
executive powers, a status agreement should be negotiated between the Union and the
third country. The scope of status agreements may be targeted to the partner third
country’s needs and interests. Targeted status agreements may have a geographical
scope limitation or may limit themselves to a certain type of assistance, for example
activities at international airports or only return assistance tasks. Status agreements
may cover both border management assistance and return-related assistance, as the
EN 70 EN
need may be. Status agreements may also include provisions enabling the Agency to
provide technical assistance in the form of e.g. capacity building and training to lower
the administrative burden and allow for both technical and operational assistance to be
provided under a single cooperation tool, if appropriate and desired.
(113) The type of tasks to be performed by operational staff or other relevant staff
determines whether a status agreement is necessary. Deployment of operational or
other relevant Agency staff on the territory of a host third country requires the
provision of adequate privileges and immunities in the host country and should be
based on an international agreement of the Union with this country, such as a status
agreement. A status agreement is also necessary in cases where operational assistance
requiring executive powers is to be provided. The determination of whether a certain
task consists of operational assistance requiring executive powers or technical
assistance should be based on a case-by-case analysis performed taking into account
whether it is necessary to perform tasks which entail the exercise of public authority or
direct enforcement of public power which would, in a national context, be conferred
by law to be exercised or enforced by a competent national authority as part of powers
of a public body.
(114) In addition to the key role of the Agency in planning, organising and carrying out
returns from the Union to third countries and while such return-related support to
Member States should remain the Agency’s priority, it should be able to provide
support to return-related activities taking place in, or starting from, third countries, as
part of a whole-of-route approach to migration management. Such support should
contribute to preventing illegal arrivals and unauthorised movements towards the
Union and to ensuring the effective implementation of the Union’s return policy. The
Agency should therefore be able to provide technical or operational support to third
countries in areas such as capacity building, training, or returns of persons staying
illegally on their territory, where this is in line with the Union’s policy and priorities,
as expressed, for instance, in the European Asylum and Migration Management
Strategy adopted pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351. The
implications in terms of resources and costs, as well as the legal and technical
feasibility of implementing what has been agreed with the third country, should be
considered before cooperation is initiated.
(115) Support to third countries in the area of return may include both technical and
operational assistance. Technical assistance does not involve the exercise of executive
powers. Whether such return-related assistance requires the exercise of executive
powers should be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific
tasks and context of the support, the extent to which the assistance is provided under
the direct authority of the public authorities of the third country, as well as the need for
privileges and immunities for the Agency staff operating in the third country. The
Agency could provide operational assistance to third countries involving the exercise
of executive powers, provided that the Union has concluded an international
agreement with the third country. Such an agreement could form an integral part of the
Union’s status agreement in the area of border management or be concluded separately
for the area of return, provided that all elements of the model status agreement and
relevant safeguards are included in that agreement. A new model status agreement
should include the relevant provisions relating to return. International agreements of
the Union foreseeing operational assistance to third countries in the area of return
should be interpreted as status agreements for the purposes of this Regulation.
EN 71 EN
(116) Based on an international agreement, the Agency should be able to support returns
from a third country, based on a return decision from a Member State, where a
strategic interest of the Union is identified. The Agency should also be able to support
returns from third countries on the basis of an individual obligation to leave
established under their national return legislation, providing that specific safeguards
are met and where there is a strategic interest of the Union that should be identified by
the Commission in accordance with the Union’s policy and priorities.
(117) Specific safeguards should be laid down in the international agreements with third
countries on return, such as, for instance, the commitment by the third country to
guarantee that the principle of non-refoulement is respected in a specific case, that the
person is under an individual obligation to leave that country in accordance with
national law, following a due process, and that such obligation is fulfilled at the time
of return. In general, robust safeguards should be required, directly corresponding to
the level of alignment with Union rules and standards. Furthermore, if force and
means of constraint may be used during an operation, clear rules should be in place
detailing their use in line with the principles of proportionality and necessity. Specific
safeguards should also be included for persons in situations of vulnerability in return.
(118) The Agency may support Member States in their activities developed under the
agreements referred to in the Schengen Borders Code, in particular as regards
agreements at shared border crossing points with third countries. Such support may
take the form of technical assistance as well as operational deployments with
executive powers in support of Member States’s border management staff deployed at
the shared border crossing points. The assistance of the Agency may support entry/exit
checks to enter or leave the EU, including the Entry/Exit System (EES).
2019/1896 recital 88
(119) Where the Commission recommends that the Council authorise it to negotiate a status
agreement with a third country, the Commission should assess the fundamental rights
situation relevant to the areas covered by the status agreement in that third country and
inform the European Parliament thereof.
new
(120) For the purposes of the Agency’s technical and operational support to third countries,
the Commission should draw up a Model working arrangement and a Model status
agreement. The Model working arrangement may serve as a guide to the Agency in
their discussions with third country authorities. The Model status agreement should be
used by the Commission as a basis for negotiating status agreements with third
countries. The Model status agreement provisions should reflect the Agency’s tasks,
role and obligations under this Regulation and Union law, and should include
appropriate provisions, including on privileges and immunities of staff deployed.
EN 72 EN
2019/1896 recital 89
Cooperation with third countries should take place in the framework of the external action of
the Union and in line with the principles and objectives laid down in Article 21 of the Treaty
on European Union (TEU). The Commission should ensure consistency between European
integrated border management and other Union policies in the field of the Union's external
action and, in particular, the Common Security and Defence Policy. The Commission should
be assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Such cooperation should take place with regard to, in particular, the activities of the Agency
taking place on the territory of third countries or involving the officials of third countries in
areas such as risk analysis, planning and conduct of operations, training, information
exchange and cooperation.
new
(121) The Agency’s expertise in the area of EIBM should be used whenever possible in the
external dimension of the Agency’s activities, in particular through the
implementation of projects supported by Union funding in third countries relevant for
the management of external borders and return.
2019/1896 recital 90
new
(122) In order to ensure that the information contained in EUROSUR is as complete and up
to date as possible, in particular with regard to the situation in third countries, the
Agency should cooperate with the authorities of third countries either in the
framework of bilateral and multilateral agreements between the Member States and
third countries, including regional networks, through working arrangements concluded
between the Agency and the relevant authorities of third countries or in the
framework of status agreements concluded between the Union and third countries .
For those purposes, the European External Action Service and Union delegations and
offices should provide all information that could be relevant for EUROSUR. In
order to ensure security and appropriate handling of information in EUROSUR,
Member States should consult the Agency on the situation in a given third country and
consult the Commission on the draft provisions of the bilateral or multilateral
agreements.
2019/1896 recital 91 (adapted)
(123) This Regulation includes provisions on cooperation with the authorities of third
countries because well-structured and permanent exchange of information and
cooperation with such countries, including but not limited to neighbouring third
countries, are key factors for achieving the objectives of EIBM European
integrated border management. It is essential that any exchange of information and any
cooperation between Member States and third countries take place in full compliance
with fundamental rights. It is essential that any exchange of information and any
EN 73 EN
cooperation between the Agency, Member States and third countries take
takes place in full compliance with fundamental rights.
2019/1896 recital 92
The assistance to third countries should complement the Agency's support for Member States
in the application of Union measures relating to the implementation of European integrated
border management.
2019/1896 recital 93
It should be possible for the bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded by Member
States with third countries in the areas covered by European integrated border management to
contain security sensitive information. Where notified to the Commission, such information
should be handled by the Commission in accordance with the applicable security rules.
2019/1896 recital 94
(124) To establish a comprehensive situational picture and risk analysis covering the pre-
frontier area, the Agency and the national coordination centres should collect
information and coordinate with immigration liaison officers deployed in third
countries by Member States, the Commission, the Agency or other Union bodies,
offices and agencies.
2019/1896 recital 95 (adapted)
The False and Authentic Documents Online (‘FADO’) system was established by Council
Joint Action 98/700/JHA45 within the General Secretariat of the Council enabling Member
States' authorities to have at their disposal information on any new forgery methods that are
detected and on the new genuine documents that are in circulation.
2019/1896 recital 96 (adapted)
In its conclusions of 27 March 2017, the Council stated that the management of the FADO
system is outdated and that a change of its legal basis is required in order to continue meeting
the requirements of justice and home affairs policies. The Council also noted that synergies
could be exploited in that regard using the Agency's expertise in the area of document fraud
and the work the Agency has already been carrying out in the field. It is therefore intended
that the Agency take over the administration and the operational and technical management of
the FADO system from the General Secretariat of the Council as soon as the European
Parliament and the Council have adopted the relevant legal act on the FADO system replacing
Joint Action 98/700/JHA.
45 Joint Action 98/700/JHA of 3 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the
Treaty on European Union concerning the setting up of a European Image Archiving System (FADO)
(OJ L 333, 9.12.1998, p. 4).
EN 74 EN
2019/1896 recital 97 (adapted)
Prior to the adoption of the relevant legal act on the FADO system, it is desirable to ensure
that the FADO system is fully operational until the transfer is effectively carried out and the
existing data are transferred to the new system. The ownership of the existing data would then
be transferred to the Agency.
2019/1896 recital 98
(125) Any processing of personal data by the Agency within the framework of this
Regulation should be conducted in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the
European Parliament and of the Council46.
2019/1896 recital 99
(126) Any processing of personal data by Member States within the framework of this
Regulation should be conducted in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the
European Parliament and of the Council47 or Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European
Parliament and of the Council48, as applicable.
new
(127) Where the Agency acts as a data controller in accordance with Union law it should be
able to restrict, where necessary and proportionate, the rights of data subjects of access
to, rectification, completion, erasure of personal data and restriction of processing. In
order to specify the circumstances in which, and the conditions under which, the
Agency may decide to restrict the rights, the Commission should adopt a delegated
act. In the performance of its tasks, the Agency may process operational personal data
only as set out in this Regulation and is to do so in compliance with Chapter IX of
Regulation (EU) 2018/1725. For the purposes of cooperating with Europol, Eurojust
and competent national law enforcement authorities, the Agency may exchange
operational personal data with the requesting Union Agency or competent national law
enforcement authority for the performance of their respective mandates. Personal data
46 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No
45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj). 47 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016,
p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj). 48 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for
the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the
execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/680/oj).
EN 75 EN
may only be processed in the framework of EUROSUR exceptionally, such as in cases
where the Agency needs to process personal data in emergency situations, in particular
to ensure the protection and saving lives of individuals and for the purposes of
providing situational awareness in situations posing imminent threat to the integrity of
the external borders In that context, personal data could be processed such as video
images of persons captured during such emergency situations, including facial images,
identification numbers of means of transport, geographical location of incidents, or
data allowing to identify vulnerable groups, including age, gender, physical and
mental state.
2019/1896 recital 100
(128) In the context of return, third-country nationals frequently do not hold any
identification documents and do not cooperate as regards the establishment of their
identity by withholding information or providing incorrect personal data. Given the
particular policy need for expedient return procedures, it is necessary for the Agency
to be able to restrict certain rights of data subjects so as to prevent the abuse of such
rights from impeding the proper implementation of return procedures and the
successful enforcement of return decisions by the Member States or from preventing
the Agency from performing its tasks efficiently. In particular, the exercise of the right
to the restriction of processing could significantly delay and obstruct the carrying out
of the return operations. Furthermore, in some cases, the right of access by the third-
country national could jeopardise a return operation by increasing the risk of
absconding should the third-country national learn that the Agency is processing his or
her data in the context of a planned return operation. The right to rectification could
increase the risk that the third-country national in question will mislead the authorities
by providing incorrect data. In order to enable the Agency to restrict certain rights of
data subjects, it should be able to adopt internal rules on such restrictions.
2019/1896 recital 101
new
(129) In order to properly implement its tasks in the area of return, to support the
implementation of Regulation (EU) 2026/2280, including by assisting Member
States in the proper implementation of return procedures and the successful
enforcement of return decisions, as well as to facilitate return operations, the Agency
might need to transfer the personal data of returnees to third countries. Such
transfers should support the effective implementation of return procedures and
cooperation with the authorities of third countries for the purposes of return and
readmission. The third countries of return are not often subject to adequacy
decisions adopted by the Commission under Article 45 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679
or under Article 36 of Directive (EU) 2016/680, and have often not concluded or do
not intend to conclude a readmission agreement with the Union or otherwise provide
for appropriate safeguards within the meaning of Article 48 of Regulation (EU)
2018/1725 or within the meaning of the national provisions transposing Article 37 of
Directive (EU) 2016/680. However, despite the extensive efforts of the Union in
cooperating with the main countries of origin of illegally staying third-country
nationals subject to an obligation to return, it is not always possible to ensure that such
EN 76 EN
third countries systematically comply with the obligation established by international
law to readmit their own nationals. Readmission agreements concluded or being
negotiated by the Union or the Member States which provide for appropriate
safeguards for personal data cover a limited number of such third countries. Where
such agreements do not yet exist, personal data should be transferred by the Agency
for the purposes of facilitating the return operations of the Union, provided that the
conditions laid down in point (d) of Article 50(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU)
2018/1725 are met.
2019/1896 recital 102
Any transfer of personal data by Member States to third countries should be carried out in
accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive (EU) 2016/680, as applicable. In
the absence of readmission agreements, and as an exception to the requirement that adequacy
decisions have been adopted or appropriate safeguards have been provided for, it should be
possible for Member States to transfer personal data to the authorities of third countries for
the purposes of implementing Union return policy. It should be possible to use the derogation
for specific situations provided for in Article 49 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Article 38
of Directive (EU) 2016/680, as applicable, subject to the conditions set out in those articles.
new
(130) The Agency should be allowed to transfer the data referred to in Articles 37 to 39 of
Regulation (EU) 2026/2280, for the purposes referred to in this Regulation and in
compliance with Chapter V of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725. It is recalled that such
transfers may take place even systematically if necessary based on the derogation
referred to in Article 50(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, where no
adequacy decision or appropriate safeguards are available in particular where the
Agency can reasonably demonstrate that such appropriate safeguards are unlikely to be
entered into in the foreseeable future considering the political situation in, or positions
taken by, the third country concerned.
2019/1896 recital 103
(131) This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised
by Articles 2 and 6 TEU and by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (‘the Charter’), in particular respect for human dignity, the right to life, the
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the
prohibition of trafficking in human beings, the right to liberty and security, the right to
the protection of personal data, the right of access to documents, the right to asylum
and to protection against removal and expulsion, non-refoulement, non-discrimination
and the rights of the child.
EN 77 EN
2019/1896 recital 104 (adapted)
(132) This Regulation should establish a complaints mechanism for the Agency in
cooperation with the fundamental rights officer, to safeguard the respect for
fundamental rights in all the activities of the Agency. This should be an administrative
mechanism whereby the fundamental rights officer should be responsible for handling
complaints received by the Agency in accordance with the right to good
administration. The fundamental rights officer should review the admissibility of a
complaint, register admissible complaints, forward all registered complaints to the
executive director, forward complaints concerning members of the teams to the home
Member State, and register the follow-up by the Agency or that Member State. The
mechanism should be effective, ensuring that complaints are properly followed up.
The complaints mechanism should be without affecting prejudice to access to
administrative and judicial remedies and not constitute a requirement for seeking such
remedies. Criminal investigations should be conducted by the Member States. In order
to increase transparency and accountability, the Agency should report on the
complaints mechanism in its annual report. The report should cover in particular the
number of complaints it has received, the types of fundamental rights violations
involved, the operations concerned and, where possible, the follow-up measures taken
by the Agency and Member States. The fundamental rights officer should have access
to all information concerning respect for fundamental rights in relation to all the
activities of the Agency. The fundamental rights officer should be provided with the
resources and staff necessary to enable him or her to effectively perform all his or her
tasks in accordance with this Regulation. The staff provided to the fundamental rights
officer should have the skills and seniority that correspond to the expansion of
activities and powers of the Agency.
new
(133) The protection of fundamental rights is the responsibility of the European Border and
Coast Guard. The fundamental rights officer plays an important role in promoting the
respect of the fundamental rights by the Agency. To ensure that the monitoring and
reporting of the respect of fundamental rights reflects the distribution of
responsibilities in the common system, it is also appropriate to ensure the liaison
between the Agency’s fundamental rights officer and the competent national
authorities. This should allow the fundamental rights officer to focus its work on the
activities performed by the staff of the Agency, while liaising with the relevant
national authorities by transmitting information about any incidents that may concern
them.
(134) The fundamental rights officer is supported in his or her role by the fundamental rights
monitors. To ensure that the monitors prioritise border sections deemed most relevant
from a fundamental rights perspective, increase the agility in the deployment of
fundamental rights monitors, and to ensure that the fundamental rights officer targets
the resources available to him or her in an effective manner, it is appropriate to assign
the fundamental rights monitors to operations based on a risk assessment.
EN 78 EN
2019/1896 recital 105
(135) The Agency should be independent as regards technical and operational matters and
have legal, administrative and financial autonomy. To that end, it is necessary and
appropriate that it should be a Union body having legal personality and exercising the
implementing powers that are conferred upon it by this Regulation.
2019/1896 recital 106
new
(136) The Commission and the Member States should be represented within a management
board to exercise oversight over the Agency. When appointing the management
board members or their alternates, Member States should ensure the balance between
the border and coast guard component on one hand and return component on the other.
Member States should ensure that the management board member and alternate are
able to appropriately represent the border management and return related aspects
within the Agency’s mandate. The management board should, where possible,
consist of the operational heads of the national services responsible for border
management and return or their representatives , with relevant expertise and
powers to take operational decisions and provide strategic guidance . The parties
represented in the management board should make efforts to limit turnover of their
representatives in order to ensure continuity of the management board's work. The
management board should be entrusted with the necessary powers to establish the
Agency's budget, verify its execution, adopt appropriate financial rules, establish
transparent working procedures for decision-making by the Agency and appoint the
executive director and three deputy executive directors, each of whom should be
assigned responsibilities in a certain field of competence of the Agency, such as
managing the standing corps, overseeing the Agency's tasks regarding returns or
managing the Agency's involvement in large-scale IT systems. The Agency should be
governed and operated taking into account the principles of the common approach on
Union decentralised agencies adopted on 19 July 2012 by the European Parliament,
the Council and the Commission.
new
(137) It is important to streamline the existing governance structure and discussion fora
within the Agency to ensure increased efficiency without excessive administrative
burden. In particular, the role of the High-Level Round Table on Returns should be
reinforced to ensure proper consideration of return matters in the management board,
along with the existing working groups to the management board. These should be
reconstituted as specific configurations of the executive board. The executive board in
its various configurations should be responsible for supporting the preparation and
follow-up of strategic, administrative and budgetary decisions, evaluation of activities
and EIBM. Such arrangements should facilitate effective decision-making while
preserving the respective responsibilities of the management board and the executive
director. Discussion in the different configurations should help to guide the strategic
orientation of the management board.
EN 79 EN
2019/1896 recital 107
(138) Given the involvement of the European Parliament in the matters governed by this
Regulation, the chairperson of the management board should be able to invite an
expert of the European Parliament to attend the meetings of the management board.
2019/1896 recital 108
new
(139) Each year, the management board should prepare a single programming document.
When preparing that document, the management board should take into account the
recommendations of the Interinstitutional Working Group on decentralised agencies'
resources , the opinion of the Commission as well as the comments made by the
European Parliament and the Council .
2019/1896 recital 109
(140) In order to guarantee the autonomy of the Agency, it should be granted a stand-alone
budget with a revenue which comes mostly from a contribution from the Union. The
Agency's budget should be prepared in accordance with the principle of performance-
based budgeting, taking into account the Agency's objectives and the expected results
of its tasks. The Union budgetary procedure should be applicable as far as the Union
contribution and any other subsidies chargeable to the general budget of the Union are
concerned. The auditing of accounts should be undertaken by the Court of Auditors. In
exceptional situations where the available budget is deemed insufficient and the
budgetary procedure does not allow an adequate response to fast-developing
situations, the Agency should have the possibility of receiving grants from Union
funds to fulfil its tasks.
2019/1896 recital 110
(141) The executive director, in his or her capacity as an authorising officer, should assess
the financial risks related to the Agency's activities on a regular basis and take the
necessary mitigating measures in accordance with the financial framework applicable
to the Agency and inform the management board accordingly.
2019/1896 recital 111
The Agency is expected to face challenging circumstances in the coming years as regards
fulfilling exceptional needs for recruiting and retaining qualified staff from the broadest
possible geographical basis.
EN 80 EN
2019/1896 recital 112
In the spirit of shared responsibility, the Agency should require the staff it employs, in
particular the statutory staff of the standing corps, including statutory staff deployed in
operational activities, to possess the same level of training, special expertise and
professionalism as staff seconded or employed by the Member States. Therefore, the Agency
should review and evaluate whether its statutory staff conduct themselves properly in
operational activities in the field of border control and return.
2019/1896 recital 113
(142) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
Council49 should apply without restriction to the Agency, which should accede to the
Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the
Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities
concerning internal investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)50.
2019/1896 recital 114
(143) In accordance with Council Regulation (EU) 2017/193951, the European Public
Prosecutor's Office should be able to investigate and prosecute fraud and other
criminal offences affecting the Union's financial interests as provided for in Directive
(EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council52.
2019/1896 recital 115
(144) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council53
should apply to the Agency. The Agency should be as transparent as possible about its
activities, without jeopardising the attainment of the objective of its operations. It
should make public the information about all of its activities. It should likewise ensure
that the public and any interested party are rapidly given information with regard to its
work.
49 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council
Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/883/oj). 50 OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 15. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/883/oj. 51 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).
52 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight
against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj). 53 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145,
31.5.2001, p. 43 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj).
EN 81 EN
2019/1896 recital 116
(145) The Agency should also report on its activities to the European Parliament, to the
Council and to the Commission to the fullest extent.
2019/1896 recital 117 (adapted)
The Commission should carry out an evaluation of this Regulation. That evaluation should
assess, inter alia, the attractiveness of the Agency as an employer for the recruitment of
statutory staff with a view to ensuring the quality of the candidates and geographical balance.
2019/1896 recital 118
The external borders referred to in this Regulation are those to which the provisions of Title II
of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 apply, which includes the external borders of Schengen Member
States in accordance with Protocol No 19 on the Schengen acquis integrated into the
framework of the European Union, annexed to the TEU and to the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU).
2019/1896 recital 119
(146) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation,
implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should
be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European
Parliament and of the Council54.
2019/1896 recital 120
(147) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely the development and implementation
of a system of integrated management of the external borders to ensure the proper
functioning of the Schengen area, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States acting in an uncoordinated manner but can rather, by reason of the absence of
controls at internal borders, the significant migratory challenges at the external
borders, the need to monitor efficiently the crossing of those borders, and the need to
contribute to a high level of internal security within the Union, be better achieved at
Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU. In accordance with the principle of
proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is
necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
54 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011
laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of
the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13 ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj).
EN 82 EN
new
(148) This Regulation should apply on the territory of the Member States of the European
Union and the Schengen associated countries. It should apply to the outermost regions
within the meaning of Article 355(1) and Article 349 of TFEU. It should not apply to
the overseas countries and territories listed in Annex II to the TFEU.
2019/1896 recital 121
(149) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Regulation constitutes a development of the
provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by
the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of
Norway concerning the latters' association with the implementation, application and
development of the Schengen acquis 55, which fall within the area referred to in Article
1, point A, of Council Decision 1999/437/EC56. The Arrangement between the
European Community and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the
modalities of the participation by those States in the European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States
of the European Union57 provides for rules on the participation by those countries in
the work of the Agency, including provisions on financial contributions and staff.
2019/1896 recital 122
(150) As regards Switzerland, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of
the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European
Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss
Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of
the Schengen acquis58 which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of
Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision
2008/146/EC59.
55 OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36. 56 Council Decision 1999/437/EC of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of the
Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the
Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation,
application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 31) ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1999/437/oj). 57 OJ L 188, 20.7.2007, p. 19. 58 OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 52. 59 Council Decision 2008/146/EC of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Community, of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss
Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and
development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 1 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2008/146/oj).
EN 83 EN
2019/1896 recital 123
(151) As regards Liechtenstein, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions
of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European
Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of
Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement
between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation
on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and
development of the Schengen acquis60 which fall within the area referred to in Article
1, point A of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council
Decision 2011/350/EU61.
2019/1896 recital 124
(152) The Arrangement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Swiss
Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein, of the other part, on the modalities
of the participation by those States in the European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the
European Union62 provides for rules on the participation by those countries in the
work of the Agency, including provisions on financial contributions and staff.
2019/1896 recital 125
(153) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark
annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of
this Regulation and is not bound by it, or subject to its application. Given that this
Regulation builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark shall, in accordance with
Article 4 of that Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the Council has
decided on this Regulation whether it will implement it in its national law.
2019/1896 recital 126 (adapted)
This Regulation constitutes a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis in which the
United Kingdom does not take part, in accordance with Council Decision 2000/365/EC63; the
60 OJ L 160, 18.6.2011, p. 21. 61 Council Decision 2011/350/EU of 7 March 2011 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union,
of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and
the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement
between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss
Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen
acquis, relating to the abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons (OJ L 160,
18.6.2011, p. 19 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/prot/2011/349/oj). 62 OJ L 243, 16.9.2010, p. 4. 63 Council Decision 2000/365/EC of 29 May 2000 concerning the request of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 131,
1.6.2000, p. 43).
EN 84 EN
United Kingdom is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not
bound by it or subject to its application.
2019/1896 recital 127
(154) This Regulation constitutes a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis in
which Ireland does not take part, in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC64;
Ireland is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not bound
by it or subject to its application.
2019/1896 recital 128 (adapted)
(155) The Agency should facilitate the organisation of specific activities in which the
Member States may avail themselves of the expertise and facilities which Ireland and
the United Kingdom may be willing to offer, on terms to be decided on a case-by-case
basis by the management board. To that end, representatives of Ireland may be invited
to attend meetings of the management board which allow them to participate fully in
the preparation of such specific activities. Representatives of the United Kingdom may
be invited to attend the meetings of the management board until the day on which the
Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom pursuant to Article 50(3) TEU.
2019/1896 recital 130 (adapted)
A controversy exists between the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom on the
demarcation of the borders of Gibraltar.
2019/1896 recital 131 (adapted)
The suspension of the applicability of this Regulation to the borders of Gibraltar does not
imply any change in the respective positions of the States concerned.
2019/1896 recital 132 (adapted)
(156) The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article
28(2) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council on 7 November 2018 42(2) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 and delivered an
opinion on 30 November 2018 […] 65,
64 Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of
the provisions of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 64, 7.3.2002, p. 20,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2002/192/oj). 65 OJ L […].
EN 85 EN
2019/1896 recital 133 (adapted)
This Regulation aims to amend and expand the provisions of Regulations (EU) 2016/1624 and
(EU) No 1052/2013. Since the amendments to be made are substantial in number and nature,
those legal acts should, for the sake of clarity, be repealed,
2019/1896 (adapted)
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
CHAPTER I
EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD
Article 1
Subject matter principles
1, This Regulation establishes a European Border and Coast Guard to ensure the
harmonised implementation of the European integrated border management
(‘EIBM’) at the external borders with a view to managing those borders
efficiently in full compliance with fundamental rights in order to enable the free
movement in the area without internal border controls and to increasing the efficiency
of the Union return policy.
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It also:
(a) lays down rules governing the EIBM at the external borders;
(b) lays down the rules governing the role of the European Border and Coast Guard
Agency in the field of the common system for returns in accordance with Article 1(1)
and Chapter IX of Regulation (EU) 2026/2280;
(c) provides for the necessary framework to develop cooperation with third countries in
the management of the external borders and return.
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2. TThis Regulation addresses migratory challenges and potential future
challenges and threats at the external borders taking into account the comprehensive
approach as set out in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 . It ensures a high
level of internal security within the Union in full respect of fundamental rights, while
safeguarding the free movement of persons within the Union. It contributes to detection,
EN 86 EN
prevention and combating of cross-border crime at the external borders. This Regulation
lays down rules on the detection, prevention and countering of cross-border crime in the
context of the management at of the external borders.
Article 2
Definitions
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:
(1) ‘external borders’ means external borders as defined in point 2 of Article 2, point 2, of
Regulation (EU) 2016/399;
(2) ‘border crossing point’ means border crossing point as defined in point 8 of Article
2, point 8, of Regulation (EU) 2016/399;
(3) ‘border control’ means border control as defined in point 10 of Article 2, point 10, of
Regulation (EU) 2016/399;
(4) ‘border checks’ means border checks as defined in point 11 of Article 2, point 11, of
Regulation (EU) 2016/399;
(5) ‘border surveillance’ means border surveillance as defined in point 12 of , point 12, of
Regulation (EU) 2016/399;
(6) ‘air border surveillance’ means the surveillance of any flight of a manned or unmanned
aircraft and its passengers or cargo for the purpose of the management of the external
borders, which arrives to or departs from the territory of the Member
States which is not an internal flight as defined in point 3 of Article 2, point 3, of Regulation
(EU) 2016/399 or that is crossing the external borders ;
(7) ‘situational awareness’ means the ability to monitor, detect, identify, track and understand
illegal cross-border activities in order to find reasoned grounds for reaction measures on the
basis of combining new information with existing knowledge, and to be better able to reduce
the loss of lives of migrants at, along or in the proximity of the external borders;
(8) ‘reaction capability’ means the ability to perform actions aimed at countering illegal cross-
border activities at, along or in the proximity of the external borders, including the means and
timelines to react adequately;
(9) ‘EUROSUR’ means the framework for information exchange and cooperation between the
Member States and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency;
(10) ‘situational picture’ means an aggregation of geo-referenced near-real-time data and
information received from different authorities, sensors, platforms and other sources which is
transmitted across secured communication and information channels and can be processed
and selectively displayed and shared with other relevant authorities in order to achieve
situational awareness and support the reaction capability at, along or in the proximity of the
external borders and the pre-frontier area;
(11) ‘external border section’ means the whole or a part of the external border of a Member
State, as defined by national law or as determined by the national coordination centre or any
other responsible national authority;
(12) ‘cross-border crime’ means any serious crime with a cross-border dimension that is
committed or attempted at, along or in the proximity of the external borders;
(13) ‘pre-frontier area’ means the geographical area beyond the external borders which is
relevant for managing the external borders through risk analysis and situational awareness;
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(14) ‘incident’ means a situation relating to illegal immigration, cross-border crime and
threats of hybrid nature affecting the management of external borders or a risk to the lives
of migrants at, along or in the proximity of, the external borders;
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(15) ‘event’ means a situation, which is likely to have an impact on the external borders either
as regards security of the external borders, migration, cross- border crime, threats of hybrid
nature affecting the management of external border or the protection and saving of the lives of
migrants, including border incidents, or that may affect the functioning of EUROSUR,
including any of its technical components.
(16) ‘capability roadmap’ means the strategic planning document of the European Border and
Coast Guard determining the stages and timelines for developing and acquiring the necessary
human, technical, and operational capabilities at Union and national level to implement
EIBM.
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(1715)‘statutory staff’ means staff employed by the European Border and Coast Guard
Agency in accordance with the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (the
‘Staff Regulations’) and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the Union (the
‘Conditions of Employment’) laid down in Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No
259/6866;
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(18) ‘statutory staff deployed as members of the teams’ means standing corps category 1
officers who have undergone the appropriate training in accordance with Article 67(3) and are
effectively deployed in operational areas;
(19) ‘staff of the Agency’ means statutory staff and seconded national experts;
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(2016)‘operational staff’ means border guards, return escorts, return specialists and other
relevant staff constituting the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps in accordance
with the four categories set out in Article 54(1)66(1), acting , where applicable, as
members of the teams having executive powers, where applicable , carrying out operational
activities at the Agency’s headquarters, in antenna offices or in the context of operational
training, and the statutory staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel
Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit that are not deployable as
members of the teams;
66 OJ L 56, 4.3.1968, p. 1.
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(2117)‘member of the teams’ means a member of the European Border and Coast Guard
standing corps deployed through border management teams, migration management support
teams and return teams;
(2218)‘border management teams’ means teams formed from the European Border and Coast
Guard standing corps to be deployed deployed during joint operations at the external
borders and rapid border interventions in Member States and third countries;
(2319)‘migration management support teams’ means teams, of experts which provide
technical and operational reinforcement to Member States on their territory at locations
designated for the screening in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 of the European
Parliament and of the Council67 and for debriefing, including in support of the implementation
of the return border procedure in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1349, and where
necessary composed of operational staff, experts from the European Union Agency for
Asylum Support Office (EASO EUAA ) and Europol and, where relevant, experts
from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), other Union bodies, offices
and agencies and Member States;
(2420)‘host Member State’ means a Member State in which a joint operation or a rapid border
intervention, a return operation or a return intervention takes place, or from which it is
launched, or in which a migration management support team is deployed;
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(25) ‘host third country’ means a third country in which a joint operation or border
intervention, a return operation or return intervention takes place, or from which it is
launched;
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(2621)‘home Member State’ means the Member State from which a staff member is deployed
or seconded to the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps;
(2722)‘participating Member State’ means a Member State which participates in a joint
operation, rapid border intervention, return operation, return intervention or in a deployment
of a migration management support team, by providing technical equipment or staff of the
European Border and Coast Guard standing corps, as well as a Member State which
participates in return operations or return interventions by providing technical equipment or
staff, but which is not a host Member State;
(23)‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the
host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member
States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory
challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the
external borders;
67 Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024
introducing the screening of third-country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC)
No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817 (OJ L, 2024/1356, 22.5.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1356/oj).
EN 89 EN
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(28) ‘debriefing’ means a voluntary and confidential interview with a third country national,
who remains anonymous thereafter, conducted by a qualified member of the team for the
purposes of migration management and risk analysis, independently of the screening activities
set out in Regulation (EU) 2024/1356;
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(2924) ‘return’ means return as defined in point 3 of Article 3, point 5, of Regulation (EU)
2026/2280 , provided the term is used in the context of returns from the Member States ;
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(30) ‘return process’ means all stages of the process aimed at ensuring the return of a third
country national including, where applicable, readmission and reintegration;
(31) ‘return decision’ means a return decision as defined in Article 3, point 4, of Regulation
(EU) 2026/2280;
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(25)‘return decision’ means an administrative or judicial decision or act stating or declaring
the stay of a third-country national to be illegal and imposing or stating an obligation to return
that respects Directive 2008/115/EC;
(3226)‘returnee’ means an illegally staying third-country national who falls within the
scope of Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 is the subject of an enforceable return decision;
(3327)‘return operation’ means an operation that is organised or coordinated by the European
Border and Coast Guard Agency and involves assistance to their implementation technical
and operational reinforcement assistance to their implementation provided to one or
more Member States or, where relevant, to third countries, under which returnees are
returned from one or more Member States or from a third country are returned,
either on a forced or voluntary basis, irrespective of the means of transport;
(3428)‘return intervention’ means an activity of the European Border and Coast Guard
Agency providing Member States or, where relevant, third countries with enhanced
technical and operational assistance consisting of the deployment of return teams and the
organisation of return operations;
(3529)‘return teams’ means a member of, or teams formed from, the European Border
and Coast Guard standing corps to be deployed during return operations, return interventions
in Member States or third countries or other operational activities linked to the
implementation of return-related tasks;
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(3630)‘immigration liaison officer’ means immigration liaison officer as defined in point 1 of
Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1240 of the European Parliament and of the Council68;
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(37) ‘executive power’ means the power and authority necessary to perform tasks conferred
by applicable Union, international or national law relating to border management or return
which entail the exercise of public authority by operational staff or other relevant staff or
direct enforcement of public power by operational staff ;
(38) ‘pilot project’ means an initiative of an experimental nature related to the tasks of the
Agency referred to in Article 11(1)(33), designed to test its feasibility and usefulness to
pursue the objectives of the European Border and Coast Guard, with clearly determined
resources and specific objectives. It is limited in time and scope and subject to regular
reporting to the management board;
(39) ‘technical assistance’ means any technical, logistical or financial support, provided by
the Agency in line with its mandate and tasks, which does not involve the exercise of
executive powers;
(40) ‘operational assistance’ means any support, provided by the Agency in line with its
mandate and tasks and carried out by operational staff or other relevant staff, which involves
the exercise of executive powers;
(41) ‘identification mission’ means an official travel by representatives of third-country
authorities to the territory of one or more Member States, at the invitation of those Member
States’ authorities and coordinated by the Agency, for the purpose of verifying and
confirming the nationality of their nationals who are illegally staying in the Union and
complete the identification process.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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Article 3
European integrated border management
1. European integrated border management EIBM shall consist of the following
components:
(a) border control, including measures to facilitate legitimate border crossings and,
where appropriate: measures related to the prevention and detection of cross-border
crime and threats of hybrid nature affecting the management of the external
borders, in particular migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, and terrorism;
and mechanisms and procedures for the identification of vulnerable persons and
unaccompanied minors, and for the identification of persons who are in need of
international protection or wish to apply for such protection, the provision of
information to such persons, and the referral of such persons
68 Regulation (EU) 2019/1240 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the
creation of a European network of immigration liaison officers (OJ L 198, 25.7.2019, p. 88 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1240/oj).
EN 91 EN
(b) search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea launched and carried out in
accordance with Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 and with international law, taking
place in situations which may arise during border surveillance operations at sea;
(c) analysis of the risks for internal security and analysis of the threats that may affect
the functioning or security of the external borders
(d) information exchange and cooperation between Member States in the areas covered
by this Regulation, as well as information exchange and cooperation between
Member States and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, including the
support coordinated by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency
(e) inter-agency cooperation among the national authorities in each Member State which
are responsible for border control or for other tasks carried out at the border, as well
as between authorities responsible for return in each Member State, including the
regular exchange of information through existing information exchange tools,
including, where appropriate, cooperation with national bodies in charge of
protecting fundamental rights
(f) cooperation among the relevant Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in
the areas covered by this Regulation, including through regular exchange of
information
(g) cooperation with third countries in the areas covered by this Regulation, focusing in
particular on neighbouring third countries and on those third countries which have
been identified through risk analysis as being countries of origin or transit for illegal
immigration;
(h) technical and operational measures within the Schengen area which are related to
border control and designed to address illegal immigration and to counter cross-
border crime better;
(i) the return of third-country nationals who are the subject of return decisions issued by
a Member State as part of the common system for returns ;
(j) the use of state-of-the-art technology including large-scale information systems;
(k) a quality control mechanism, in particular the Schengen evaluation mechanism, the
vulnerability assessment and possible national mechanisms, to ensure the
implementation of Union law in the area of border management;
(l) solidarity mechanisms, in particular Union funding instruments.
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(m) supporting the implementation of the Union visa policy and preventing abuses by
third-country nationals of short-stay visas, long-stay visas and residence permits,
including through creating synergies with national authorities responsible for the
assessment of applications for short-stay visas, long-stay visas and residence permits.
EN 92 EN
2019/1896 (adapted)
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2. Fundamental rights, education and training, as well as research and innovation shall be
overarching components in the implementation of European integrated border management.
Article 4
European Border and Coast Guard
The national authorities of Member States responsible for border management, including
coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks, the national authorities
responsible for return and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (‘the Agency’) shall
constitute the European Border and Coast Guard.
Article 5
European Border and Coast Guard Agency
1. The Agency shall be governed by this Regulation.
2. The Agency shall include tThe European Border and Coast Guard standing corps (‘the
standing corps’) referred to in Article 5466 with shall have a capacity of up to
30 000 10 000 operational staff to be developed in accordance with Annex I.
3. To ensure coherent EIBM European integrated border management, the
Agency shall facilitate and render more effective the application of Union measures relating
to the management of the external borders, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/399, and of
Union measures relating to return.
4. The Agency shall contribute to the continuous and uniform application of Union law,
including the Union acquis on fundamental rights, in particular the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), at external borders. Its contribution shall
include the exchange of good practices.
Article 6
Accountability
The Agency shall be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council in
accordance with this Regulation.
Article 7
Shared responsibility for the European Integrated Border Management and the
common system for returns
1. The European Border and Coast Guard shall implement EIBM European
integrated border management as a shared responsibility of the Agency and of the national
authorities responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent that they
carry out maritime border surveillance operations and any other border control tasks. Member
States shall retain primary responsibility for the management of their sections of the external
borders.
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2. The Agency shall provide technical and operational assistance in the implementation
of measures relating to return as referred to in Article 48 Articles 55, 63 and 64 of this
Regulation, upon request of the Member State concerned or on its own initiative and with the
agreement of the Member State concerned. Member States shall retain sole responsibility for
issuing return decisions and for adopting the measures pertaining to the detention of returnees
in accordance with Directive 2008/115/EC Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 .
3. Member States shall ensure the management of their external borders and the
enforcement of return decisions, in close cooperation with the Agency, in their own interests
and in the common interest of all Member States in full compliance with Union law, including
respect for fundamental rights, and in accordance with the multiannual strategic policy cycle
for European integrated border management EIBM referred to in Article 8.
4. The Agency shall support the application of Union measures relating to the
management of the external borders and the enforcement of return decisions by reinforcing,
assessing and coordinating the actions of Member States and by providing technical and
operational assistance in the implementation of those measures and in return matters. The
Agency shall not support any measures or be involved in any activities related to controls at
internal borders. The Agency shall be fully responsible and accountable for any decision it
takes and for any activity for which it is solely responsible under this Regulation.
5. Member States may cooperate at an operational level with other Member States or
third countries, where such cooperation is compatible with the tasks of the Agency. Member
States shall refrain from any activity which could jeopardise the functioning of the Agency or
the attainment of its objectives. Member States shall report to the Agency on that operational
cooperation with other Member States or third countries at the external borders and in the
field of return. The executive director shall inform the management board of such matters on
a regular basis and at least once a year.
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6. To support the implementation of the common system for returns, the Agency shall be
responsible for the strategic planning, prioritisation, coordination and implementation of
return operations, for forced and voluntary returns, and other return-related activities, in line
with the Union's migration policy priorities and based on the operational needs of the Member
States, and in accordance with the procedures laid down in this Regulation.
7. When carrying out national return operations, Member States shall act in coordination with
the Agency.
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Article 8
Multiannual strategic policy cycle for European integrated border management
1. The Commission and the European Border and Coast Guard shall ensure the
effectiveness of European integrated border management EIBM by means of a
multiannual strategic policy cycle for a period of seven years. That cycle shall comprise the
development, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and, where necessary, amendment of
EN 94 EN
the multiannual strategic policy that is adopted developed in accordance with the
procedure laid down in paragraph 4 paragraphs 3 to 10 .
2. The multiannual strategic policy for the EIBM European integrated border
management shall set out how the challenges in the area of European integrated border
management are to be addressed in a coherent, integrated and systematic manner. It shall set
out the policy priorities and provide strategic guidelines for a period of five years in relation
to the components set out in Article 3.
3. The multiannual strategic policy cycle for European integrated border management
shall consist of four stages as set out in paragraphs 4 to 8.
43. On the basis of the strategic risk analysis for EIBM European integrated border
management referred to in Article 29(2) 34(2), the Commission shall prepare a policy
document developing a multiannual strategic policy for EIBM European integrated
border management. The Commission shall submit that policy document to the European
Parliament and to the Council for discussion. Following that discussion, the Commission,
shall adopt a communication establishing the multiannual strategic policy for EIBM
European integrated border management.
54. In order to implement the multiannual strategic policy for EIBM European
integrated border management , within six months following its adoption, the Agency
shall, by a decision of the management board, on the basis of a proposal from the executive
director that is prepared in close cooperation with the Member States and the Commission,
establish a technical and operational strategy for EIBM European integrated border
management. Where justified, the Agency shall take into account the specific situations of the
Member States, in particular their geographical locations. The technical and operational
strategy shall address, within the Agency’s mandate, the components referred to in be
in line with Article 3 and shall be consistent with the multiannual strategic policy for
EIBM European integrated border management. It shall promote and support the
implementation of European integrated border management EIBM in all Member
States.
65. In order to implement the multiannual strategic policy for EIBM European
integrated border management , within six months following the adoption of the technical
and operational strategy referred to in paragraph 4 the each Member States shall
establish or update national strategies for EIBM European integrated border
management through close cooperation between all national authorities responsible for the
management of external borders and return.
Those national strategies shall be in line with address the relevant components referred to
in Article 3 and shall be consistent with the multiannual strategic policy for
European integrated border management EIBM referred to in paragraph 2 and with
and the technical and operational strategy referred to in paragraph 4 .
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Member States shall transmit their national strategies for EIBM to the Agency and to the
Commission, within the period laid down in the first subparagraph.
6. After receiving from the Member State concerned a national strategy for EIBM
referred to in paragraph 5, the Agency shall assess its completeness in view of Article 3 and
its consistency with the multiannual strategic policy for EIBM referred to in paragraph 2 and
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the technical and operational strategy referred to in paragraph 4. The Agency shall engage in a
dialogue with the Member State concerned with a view to addressing any issues identified in
that assessment.
Following that assessment, the Agency shall report to the Member State concerned and the
Commission. The executive director shall submit that report to the executive board. The
report shall identify, where appropriate, issues relating to the completeness of the national
strategy and its consistency with the multiannual strategic policy for EIBM and with the
technical and operational strategy. It may also refer to the consistency of the national strategy
with the national capability development plan referred to in Article 9(4) and recommend
measures to address the issues identified.
7. Where the Agency identifies persistent issues, including serious inconsistencies with
the multiannual strategic policy for EIBM or with the technical and operational strategy,
persistent delays in the submission or update of the national strategy, or significant gaps in its
completeness, the executive director shall, after consulting the Member State concerned and
the Commission, recommend measures to be taken and the time limit for their
implementation.
8. The executive director shall inform the management board at least once a year of the
implementation of paragraphs 6 and 7, including any persistent issues identified in relation to
national strategies.
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79. Four Six years after the adoption of the multiannual strategic policy for
European integrated border management EIBM , the Commission shall carry out a
thorough evaluation of its implementation. The results of that evaluation shall be taken into
account in the preparation of the following multiannual strategic policy cycle. Member States
and the Agency shall provide the Commission with the necessary information in a timely
manner for the carrying out of that evaluation. The Commission shall communicate the results
of that evaluation to the European Parliament and to the Council.
810. Where the situation at the external borders or in the area of return requires a change of
the policy priorities, the Commission shall amend the multiannual strategic policy for
European integrated border management EIBM or relevant parts thereof in accordance
with the procedure set out in paragraph 43.
Where the Commission amends the multiannual strategic policy as provided for in the first
subparagraph , the Agency shall, within three months of that amendment, review the
technical and operational strategy referred to in paragraph 4 and, where necessary, be
adapted update it in accordance with the procedure set out in that paragraph .
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Member States shall, where necessary, update their national strategies and transmit them to
the Agency and to the Commission within six months following the update of the technical
and operational strategy.
The Agency shall assess the updated national strategies in accordance with paragraph 6.
EN 96 EN
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Article 9
Integrated planning
1. On the basis of the multiannual strategic policy cycle for European integrated border
management EIBM , and taking into account the information available in the
framework of EUROSUR, risk analysis, vulnerability assessments, relevant findings of the
Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism and the European Asylum and Migration
report adopted pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, the European Border
and Coast Guard shall establish and carry out an integrated planning process for border
management and return., including That process shall include operational planning,
contingency planning and capability development planning processes. That integrated
planning process , and shall be established in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of
this Article.
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The integrated planning process shall be aligned with the multiannual EIBM planning
coordination scheme referred to in Article 10.
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2. Member States and the Agency shall adopt operational plans for border management
and return.
The operational plans of Member States related to border sections with high and critical
impact levels shall be coordinated with Member States and with the Agency with a view to
implementing the necessary cross-border measures and providing for support by the Agency.
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The Agency shall adopt operational plans for its own activities in the areas of border
management and return.
The elaboration of operational plans of Member States related to external border sections to
which a high or critical impact level has been attributed in accordance with Article 39 shall be
coordinated, where relevant, with the Member States responsible for neighbouring external
border sections and with the Agency, with a view to implementing the necessary coordinated
operational measures, including measures involving neighbouring external border sections
and, where appropriate, support by the Agency.
Member States shall communicate to the Agency, by 1 November each year, starting from the
year of entry into force of this regulation, their operational plans relating to return, through
the Return Coordination Centre established by Article 54. On the basis of those plans, the
Agency shall assess return needs and capabilities, and shall plan, match and pool resources for
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return activities in accordance with the role assigned to it under Chapter II, Section 8.
Member States shall indicate their priorities regarding the nationalities and profiles of the
returnees.
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For the activities of the Agency, operational planning processes for the following year shall be
set out in an annex to the single programming document referred to in Article 102122. For
each specific operational activity of the Agency , operational planning processes shall
result in the operational plans referred to in Article 3843 and Article 74(3)89(3). The
operational plans or parts thereof may be classified where appropriate, in accordance with
Article 11192.
3. Member States shall each adopt a contingency plan for the management of their
borders and return. In line with national integrated border management strategies, the
contingency plans shall describe all the necessary measures and resources for the possible
reinforcement of capabilities, including logistics and support both at national level and from
the Agency.
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3. Member States shall each adopt a national contingency plan for the operational
management of their external borders and return and shall keep it up to date. In line with their
national strategies for EIBM, the national contingency plans shall define the necessary
measures and resources for an efficient management of the external borders, addressing
migratory challenges and potential threats at those borders, and ensuring the continuity and
efficiency of return activities.
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The part parts of the contingency plans that require additional support from the
European Border and Coast Guard shall be jointly prepared by the Member State concerned
and the Agency, in close coordination with neighbouring Member States where
relevant . Member States shall share the adopted national contingency plans, or the
parts thereof relevant for border management and return, with the Agency and the
Commission upon request.
4. Member States shall adopt national capability development plans for border
management and return in line with their national strategies for European integrated
border management strategies. Those national capability development plans shall describe the
medium- to long-term evolution of the national capabilities for border management and
return.
The national capability development plans shall address the development of each component
the relevant components of EIBM European integrated border management, in
particular by setting out the multiannual recruitment and training policy
needs of border guards and return specialists at the national level and yearly
contributions to the European border and return reserve in accordance with Annex I , the
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acquisition, and maintenance and interoperability of equipment and systems, any
critical dependencies from non-European suppliers, necessary research and
innovation development activities, and the corresponding funding requirements and
sources.
5. The national contingency plans and national capability development plans
referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 shall be based on scenarios that are derived from risk
analysis , including, where relevant, the strategic risk analysis referred to in Article 34(2),
and shall take into account the results of vulnerability assessments and relevant findings of the
Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism . Those scenarios shall reflect the possible
evolution of the situation at the external borders and in the area of illegal immigration and the
challenges identified in the multiannual strategic policy cycle for European integrated border
management. Those scenarios shall be set out in the contingency plans and national capability
development plans to which they relate. Those scenarios shall address, in particular,
increases in threats at the external borders, their persistence or sudden escalation, increased
demand for returns, circumstances affecting the effectiveness of return procedures, and the
challenges identified in the multiannual strategic policy cycle for EIBM. Those scenarios shall
be set out in the national contingency plans and national capability development plans to
which they relate. The national contingency plans shall identify, where possible, the scenarios
or circumstances in which support from the Agency may be requested.
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6. Each Member State shall transmit its national capability development plan to the
Agency and the Commission no later than six months after the deadline for establishing or
updating its national strategy for EIBM under Article 8(5) or, where relevant, Article 8(10).
Member States shall update their national capability development plans at least every three
years and following any substantial change affecting their capability development needs for
border management and return, in particular in the allocation of competences relating to
border management and return. They shall transmit the updated national capability
development plan to the Agency and the Commission within one month of their adoption.
Where a Member State fails to transmit a national capability development plan or an update
thereof within the applicable deadlines, or where the transmitted plan is incomplete or
inconsistent with the methodology referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article, the Agency shall
invite the Member State concerned to complete or adjust the plan within a reasonable period.
Where the Member State concerned does not complete or adjust the plan within that period,
the executive director shall inform the management board. The Agency may take that failure
into account, as appropriate, in the vulnerability assessment referred to in Article 37.
7. The methodology and procedure for establishing, updating and submitting the national
contingency plans and national capability development plans referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4
of this Article shall be adopted by the Agency, taking into account the multiannual EIBM
coordination scheme referred to in Article 10, after consultation of the Member States and the
Commission, on the basis of a proposal of the executive director.
The methodology and the procedure shall be regularly updated and shall reflect scenario-
based planning. They shall be accompanied by guidance for their application and standardised
templates for the parts of the national contingency plans that require support from the Agency.
Member States shall establish, update and submit the plans referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4
EN 99 EN
in accordance with that methodology. Those plans and any updates thereto shall be complete,
accurate and up to date.
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6. The methodology and the procedure for establishing the plans referred to in paragraphs 3
and 4 shall be adopted by the management board, after consultation with the Member States,
on the basis of a proposal of the executive director.
7 8. The Agency shall , on an annual basis, prepare and update an overview of
the national capability development plans. That overview shall take into account
the and a multiannual strategy for the acquisition of the Agency's equipment referred to in
Article 6377 and the multiannual planning for the profiles of staff for the standing
corps.
The Agency shall share that overview with the Member States and with the Commission with
a view to identifying possible capability gaps, complementarities with Union initiatives in
the field of security and defence, synergies and opportunities for interoperability and
cooperation in the various areas covered by the national capability development plans,
including joint procurement and, where appropriate, public procurement of innovation .
On the basis of the identified capability gaps, synergies, and opportunities for
cooperation, the Agency shall, where appropriate, may invite the Member States
concerned to participate in follow-up actions for cooperation.
8 9. The management board shall meet at least once a year to discuss and approve the
capability roadmap of the European Border and Coast Guard. The capability roadmap shall be
proposed by the executive director on the basis of the overview referred to in paragraph
8, of the national capability development plans, taking into account, inter alia, the results
of the risk analysis and vulnerability assessments carried out in accordance with Articles 2934
and 3237, relevant findings of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism, and
the Agency's own multiannual plans. The capability roadmap shall prioritise the identified
capability gaps and set out actions and indicative timelines to address them. Once the
capability roadmap is approved by the management board, it shall be annexed to the technical
and operational strategy referred to in Article 8(45).
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Article 10
Multiannual European integrated border management planning coordination scheme
1. The Agency shall, on a proposal from the executive director, and after consultation with the
Member States and the Commission, adopt a multiannual EIBM planning coordination
scheme.
2. The EIBM planning coordination scheme shall set common timelines for the preparation,
transmission, updating and review of the main planning documents and information required
under this Regulation, including the national strategies for EIBM, the national contingency
plans, the national capability development plans, the return planning information referred to
in Article 54(3), the capability roadmap and the relevant strategic and operational planning
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documents of the Agency. It shall support the coherence, predictability and timely alignment
of the integrated planning process referred to in Article 9. The scheme shall respect the
deadlines laid down in this Regulation and shall not introduce additional reporting
obligations.
3. The EIBM planning coordination scheme shall be updated where necessary, in particular
following the adoption, amendment or evaluation of the multiannual strategic policy for
EIBM referred to in Article 8, and taking into account the strategic risk analysis, relevant
findings of vulnerability assessments and other relevant strategic, operational and analytical
information.
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CHAPTER II
FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD
SECTION 1
TASKS OF THE EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY
Article 10 11
Tasks of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency
1. The Agency shall perform the following tasks:
(43) monitor migratory flows and carry out risk analysis as regards all aspects of
integrated border management , including through processing open-source
information and the analysis of aggregated data derived from monitoring of online
platforms ;
(1) monitor the operational needs of Member States related to the implementation of
returns, including by collecting statistical and operational data;
(2) carry out vulnerability assessments for border management and return
including assessments of the capacity and readiness of Member States to face threats
and challenges at the external borders;
(3) monitor the management of the external borders through deploy liaison officers
of the Agency and return liaison officers of the Agency in Member States
and in third countries ;
(4) monitor compliance with fundamental rights in all of its activities at the external
borders and in return operations;
(5) support the development and operation of EUROSUR;
(6) assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational
assistance at the external borders by coordinating and organising joint operations,
taking into account that some situations may involve humanitarian emergencies ,
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response to civil protection tasks, and rescue at sea in accordance with Union and
international law;
(7) assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational
assistance at the external borders by launching rapid border interventions at the
external borders of those Member States facing specific and disproportionate
challenges, taking into account that some situations may involve humanitarian
emergencies and rescue at sea in accordance with Union and international law;
(8) provide technical and operational assistance to Member States and third countries in
accordance with Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 and international law, in support of
search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea which may arise during
border surveillance operations at sea;
(9) deploy the standing corps in the framework of border management teams, migration
management support teams and return teams (collectively referred to as ‘teams’)
during joint operations, as well as in rapid border interventions, return operations and
return interventions;
(10) set up a technical equipment pool, including a rapid reaction equipment pool, to be
deployed in joint operations, in rapid border interventions and in the framework of
migration management support teams, as well as in return operations and return
interventions;
(11) develop and manage, with the support of an internal quality control mechanism, its
own human and technical capabilities to contribute to the standing corps, including to
the recruitment and training of the members of its staff acting as members of the
teams, and the technical equipment pool;
(12) within the framework of the migration management support teams at hotspot areas:
(i) deploy operational staff and technical equipment to provide assistance
in screening as set out by the (EU) Regulation 2024/1356 and debriefing
as referred to in point (14) , identification and fingerprinting;
(ii) where appropriate, establish a procedure for referring and
providing initial information to persons who are in need of international
protection or wish to apply for such protection, including a procedure for the
identification of vulnerable groups, in cooperation with EASO EUAA
and competent national authorities;
(n) provide assistance at all stages of the return process without entering into the merits of
return decisions, which remain the sole responsibility of the Member States, assist with the
coordination and organisation of return operations and provide technical and operational
support to implement the obligation to return returnees and technical and operational support
to return operations and interventions, including in circumstances requiring increased
assistance
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(13) organise and carry out debriefings, upon request of the national authorities;
(14) plan, coordinate, and carry out return operations by air, land and sea from the
Member States, manage and operate a Union reintegration programme as well as
provide technical and operational assistance to Member States’ activities in all
EN 102 EN
phases of the return process, including return counselling, to implement the common
system for returns;
(15) support the digitalisation of all phases of the return, readmission and reintegration
processes and develop, coordinate, and manage IT tools in these areas;
(16) support Member States with the implementation of the return border procedure in
accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1349, in particular with the return of persons
who were refused entry in accordance with Article 4(6) of that Regulation;
(17) support third countries with returns, by way of technical and operational assistance;
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(18) (o) set up and manage a pool of forced-return monitors;
(a) (p) deploy return teams during return interventions
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(19) support the national authorities in combating cross-border crime, in particular
migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and terrorism, and threats of hybrid
nature affecting the management of external borders, including by deployment of
members of the teams;
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(20) (q) within the respective mandates of the agencies concerned, cooperate with
Europol and Eurojust and provide support to Member States in circumstances
requiring increased technical and operational assistance at the external borders in the
fight against cross-border crime and terrorism;
(21) (r) cooperate with EASO EUAA within their respective mandates, in
particular to facilitate measures in cases where third-country nationals whose
applications for international protection have been rejected by means of a final
decision are subject to return;
(22) (s) cooperate with the FRA, within their respective mandates, in order to ensure
the continuous and uniform application of the Union acquis on fundamental rights;
(23) (t) cooperate with the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) and the
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), within their respective mandates, in
order to support national authorities carrying out coast guard functions, as set out in
Article 8096, including the saving of lives at sea, by providing services, information,
equipment and training, as well as by organising or coordinating multipurpose
operations;
EN 103 EN
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(24) cooperate with other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies;
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(25) (u) cooperate with third countries in relation to the areas covered by this
Regulation, including through the possible operational deployment of border
management teams in third countries;
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(26) cooperate with international organisations;
(27) cooperate with Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations;
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(28) (v) assist Member States and third countries in the context of technical and
operational assistance cooperation between them in the matters covered by
this Regulation;
(w) assist Member States and third countries in the training of national border guards,
other relevant staff and experts on return, including through the establishment of
commontraining standards and programmes, including on fundamental rights;
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(29) assist Member States in development of integrated planning with a view to achieve
the EIBM objectives;
(30) provide training and assistance in the organisation of training to Member States and
third countries;
(31) provide support to Member States, including to their consulates in third countries,
and to Union delegations, on the implementation of the EU common visa policy, and
to authorities responsible for the assessment of applications for long-stay visas and
residence permits;
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(32) (x) participate in the development and management of research and innovation
activities relevant for the control of the external borders, including the use of
advanced surveillance technology, and develop its own pilot projects, where
necessary, for the carrying out of activities as provided for in this Regulation;
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(33) (y) develop technical standards for information exchange;
(34) (z) support the development of technical standards for equipment in the area of
border control and return, including for the interconnection of systems and networks,
and support, as appropriate, the development of common minimum standards for
external border surveillance, in line with the respective competences of the Member
States and of the Commission;
(35) (aa) establish and maintain the communication network referred to in Article 1415;
(36) (ab) develop, and operate and maintain , in accordance with Regulation (EU)
2018/1725, information systems that enable swift and reliable exchanges of
information regarding emerging risks in the management of the external borders,
illegal immigration and all stages of the return process, and that support the
carrying out of border checks, in close cooperation with the Commission, Union
bodies, offices and agencies as well as the European Migration Network established
by Council Decision 2008/381/EC69;
(37) (ac) provide the necessary assistance for the development and maintenance of
a common information-sharing environment, including interoperability of systems,
as appropriate;
(38) (ad) follow high standards for border management and return allowing for
transparency and public scrutiny in full respect of the applicable law and ensuring
respect for, and protection and promotion of, fundamental rights;
(39) (ae) manage and operate the False and Authentic Documents Online system
referred to in Article 79 94 and a compliance programme to carry out compliance
checks of travel documents and support the Member States and third
countries by facilitating the detection of document fraud;
(40) (af) fulfil the tasks and obligations entrusted to the Agency under Regulation (EU)
2018/1240 and ensure the setting up and operation of the ETIAS Central Unit in
accordance with Article 7 of that Regulation;
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(41) fulfil the tasks and obligations entrusted to the Agency under Regulation (EC) No
767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council70.
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(42) (ag) assist Member States in facilitating persons to cross the external borders at
the border crossing points and at locations determined in the international
agreements;
69 Council Decision 2008/381/EC of 14 May 2008 establishing a European Migration Network (OJ L 131,
21.5.2008, p. 7 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2008/381/oj). 70 Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 concerning
the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay
visas (VIS Regulation) (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 60, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/767/oj).
EN 105 EN
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(43) implement projects supported by Union funding, in particular in third countries.
2. Debriefings referred to in paragraph 1, point (14), shall not allow for the identification or
tracing of the interviewed third country national and, where it takes place adjacent to
screening activities, it shall take place only after the completion of the preliminary health and
vulnerability checks required by Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1356.
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23. The Agency shall communicate on matters falling within its mandate. It shall provide
the public with accurate, detailed, timely and comprehensive information about its activities.
Such communication shall not be detrimental to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article, and in particular shall not reveal operational information which, if made public,
would jeopardise attainment of the objective of operations. The Agency shall communicate
without prejudice to affecting Article 92111 and in accordance with relevant
communication and dissemination plans adopted by the management board and in close
cooperation, where appropriate, with other bodies, offices and agencies.
SECTION 2
INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND COOPERATION
Article 11 12
Duty to cooperate in good faith
The Agency, the national authorities responsible for border management, including coast
guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks, and the national authorities
responsible for return shall be subject to a duty to cooperate in good faith and an obligation to
exchange information.
Article 12 13
Obligation to exchange information
1. In order to perform the tasks conferred on them by this Regulation, the Agency, the
national authorities responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent
that they carry out border control tasks, and the national authorities responsible for return
shall, in accordance with this Regulation and other relevant Union and national law regarding
the exchange of information, share in a timely and accurate manner all necessary information.
2. The Agency shall take appropriate measures to facilitate the exchange of information
relevant to its tasks with the Commission and the Member States.
Where information is relevant to the performance of its tasks, the Agency shall exchange that
information with other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies for the purpose of risk
analysis, collecting statistical data, assessing the situation in third countries, training and the
support to Member States in connection with contingency planning. For that purpose, the
EN 106 EN
necessary tools and structures shall be developed between the Union bodies, offices and
agencies.
3. The Agency shall take all necessary measures to facilitate the exchange of information
relevant for its tasks with Ireland and the United Kingdom where that information relates to
the activities in which they participate it participates in accordance with Article 70 84
and Article 100(5) 119(6).
Article 13 14
National contact points
1. Each Member State shall appoint a national contact point for communication with the
Agency on all matters pertaining to the activities of the Agency, without prejudice to the role
of the national coordination centres. The national contact points shall be reachable at all times
and shall ensure the timely dissemination of all information from the Agency to all the
relevant authorities within the Member State concerned, in particular the members of the
management board and the national coordination centre.
2. Member States may designate up to two staff members representing their national
contact point to be assigned to the Agency as liaison officers. The liaison officers shall
facilitate communication between the national contact point and the Agency and may, where
necessary, attend relevant meetings.
3. The Agency shall provide liaison officers with the necessary premises within its
headquarters and with adequate support for the performance of their duties. All other costs
that arise in connection with the deployment of liaison officers shall be covered by the
Member State. The management board shall specify the rules and conditions of the
deployment, as well as the rules concerning adequate support to be provided.
Article 14 15
Communication network
1. The Agency shall establish and maintain a communication network in order to provide
communication and analytical tools and allow for the exchange of sensitive non-classified and
classified information in a secure manner and in near real time within the European Border
and Coast Guard , and among, the national coordination centres.
Any system or application using the communication network shall comply with Union law on
data protection throughout its life cycle.
2. The communication network shall be operational twenty-four hours a day and seven
days a week. It and shall allow for secure handling, storing, transmission and
processing of sensitive non-classified information and EU classified information up to the
level of RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED or equivalent national classification levels.
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3. Where justified by operational needs and the sensitivity of the information concerned, the
management board may, at the request of a Member State or the executive director and after
consulting the Security Accreditation Board, decide that specified components, services or
exchanges using the communication network may handle EU classified information up to
EN 107 EN
CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or the equivalent national classification level, in
accordance with the applicable security rules.
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43. The communication network shall allow for:
(a) bilateral and multilateral information exchange in near real time;
(b) audio and video conferencing;
(c) secure handling, storing, transmission and processing of sensitive non-classified
information;
(d) secure handling, storing, transmission and processing of EU classified information
up to the level of CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL or equivalent national
classification levels, ensuring that classified information is handled, stored,
transmitted and processed in a separate and duly accredited part of the
communication network.
25. The Agency shall provide technical support and ensure that the communication
network is permanently available and can support the communication and information system
systems managed by the Agency as referred to in Article 18 .
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Article 16
Security Accreditation Authority
1. A Security Accreditation Authority shall be established within the Agency. That
Authority shall be the security accreditation body for the communication and information
systems managed and used solely by the Agency, other than those falling within Article 17(2).
2. The composition, functioning and the tasks of the Security Accreditation Authority
shall be laid down in the security rules of the Agency referred to in Article 111.
3. The Security Accreditation Authority shall cooperate with the Commission Security
Authority, as laid down in Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/444, in the
accreditation of communication and information systems deployed for the exchange of EU
classified information with other agencies, bodies, the relevant authority of a third country
and international organisations.
Article 17
Security Accreditation Board
1. The Security Accreditation Board shall be established within the Agency.
2. The Security Accreditation Board shall be the security accreditation body for the
communication network regarding the European and external components of EUROSUR and
Agency-managed applications and communication and information systems that are deployed
on, directly connected to, or directly accessible through that network.
EN 108 EN
3. The Security Accreditation Board shall act independently when performing its tasks. It
shall be composed of one representative of each Member State and two representatives of the
Commission. The Agency’s security officer shall act as secretary to the Board. The Board
may set up subordinate bodies to assist it in preparing its decisions. The Commission shall
adopt an implementing act laying down detailed rules on the functioning of the Security
Accreditation Board and on the security accreditation process.
4. Without affecting the responsibilities of the security accreditation authorities of the
Member States for their national components, the Security Accreditation Board shall take the
security accreditation decisions for the components, systems and applications referred to in
paragraph 2 and shall approve the relevant interconnections. Where a security accreditation
decision falls under the responsibility of the Agency but may affect the security of those
components, systems, applications or interconnections, the Security Accreditation Board shall
be consulted by the Security Accreditation Authority referred to in Article 16 before that
decision is taken.
5. Countries associated with the implementation, application and development of the
Schengen acquis shall participate in the Board. They shall each have one representative and
one alternate on the Board. The arrangements developed under the relevant provisions of their
association agreements that specify the nature and extent of, and the detailed rules for, the
participation by those countries in the work of the Agency, including provisions on financial
contributions and staff, shall apply.
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Article 15 18
Information exchange systems and applications managed by the Agency
1. The Agency may take all necessary measures to facilitate the exchange of information
relevant to its tasks with the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Member
States and, where appropriate, other Union institutions, and the Union bodies, offices and
agencies and international organisations listed in Article 68(1) 82(1) and (2) and third
countries as referred to in Article 7185.
2. The Agency shall develop, deploy and operate an information system or
systems capable of exchanging classified and sensitive non-classified information with the
actors referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, and of exchanging personal data referred to in
Articles 86102 to 91 110 in accordance with Article 92111.
3. The Agency shall deploy the information systems referred to in paragraph 2 of this
Article on the communication network referred to in Article 1415 as appropriate.
Article 16 19
Technical standards for information exchange
The Agency shall develop technical standards in cooperation with the Member States in order
to:
(a) interconnect the communication network referred to in Article 14 15 with
national networks used for establishing the national situational pictures referred to in
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Article 25 28 and other relevant information systems for the purpose of this
Regulation;
(b) develop, and establish interfaces between, relevant information exchange
systems and software applications of the Agency and of the Member States for the
purpose of this Regulation;
(c) broadcast situational pictures and, as appropriate, specific situational pictures
as referred to in Article 27 30 and ensure communication between relevant units and
centres of competent national authorities and with the teams deployed by the Agency
by using various means of communication such as satellite communications and
radio networks;
(d) report the position of own assets, making the best possible use of the
technological development of the satellite navigation system established under the
Galileo programme in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 2021/696 1285/2013 of
the European Parliament and of the Council71.
Article 1720
Information assurance
Member States shall ensure via their national coordination centre and under the supervision of
the competent national authorities that their national authorities, agencies and other bodies,
when using the communication network referred to in Article 14 15 and the information
exchange systems of the Agency:
(a) have proper and continuous access to the relevant systems and networks of the
Agency or to systems and networks connected to them;
(b) comply with the relevant technical standards referred to in Article 16 19;
(c) apply equivalent security rules and standards as those applied by the Agency for the
handling of classified information;
(d) exchange, process and store sensitive non-classified and classified information in
compliance with Article 92 111.
SECTION 3
EUROSUR
Article 18 21
EUROSUR Integrated framework
This Regulation establishes EUROSUR as an integrated framework for the exchange of
information and for operational cooperation within the European Border and Coast Guard
(EUROSUR) in order to improve situational awareness and to increase reaction
capability for the purposes of in border management, including the detection,
prevention and combating of illegal immigration, cross-border crime and threats of hybrid
71 Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing
the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing
Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013 and (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision No
541/2014/EU OJ L 170, pp. 69–148 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj
EN 110 EN
nature affecting the management of external borders, and contributing to ensuring the
protection and saving the lives of migrants.
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Article 19 22
Scope of EUROSUR
1. EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and
for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection,
identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the
following purposes purpose of:
(a) detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration migration; , and
cross-border crime at external borders ; and
(b) contributing to ensuring the protection and saving lives of migrants.
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EUROSUR shall also include information on security at the external borders and threats of
hybrid nature affecting the management of external borders.
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2. EUROSUR shall not be used for any legal or administrative measure taken once the
competent authorities of a Member State have intercepted cross-border criminal activities or
unauthorised crossings by persons of the external borders.
Article 20 23
EUROSUR components
1. Member States and the Agency shall use EUROSUR for the exchange of information
and for the cooperation in the field of border control, taking into account existing information
exchange and cooperation mechanisms. EUROSUR shall consist of the following
components:
(a) national coordination centres as referred to in Article 21 24;
(b) national situational pictures as referred to in Article 25 28;
(c) a European situational picture as referred to in Article 26 29, including information
on external border sections with corresponding impact levels;
(d) specific situational pictures as referred to in Article 27 30;
(e) EUROSUR fusion services as referred to in Article 28 31;
(f)integrated planning as referred to in Article 9.
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2. The national coordination centres shall provide the Agency, via the communication
network referred to in Article 14 15 and relevant systems, with such information from
their national situational pictures and, as appropriate, from specific situational pictures, which
as is required for the establishment and maintenance of the European situational
picture.
3. The Agency shall give the national coordination centres, via the communication
network, unlimited access twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, to specific situational
pictures and to the European situational picture.
Article 21 24
National coordination centres
1. Each Member State shall designate, operate and maintain a national coordination
centre. Which The national coordination centre shall coordinate the operational
cooperation , and exchange information among, all authorities having responsibility for
external border control at national level, as well as with the other national coordination
centres and the Agency.
Each Member State shall notify the establishment of its national coordination centre to the
Commission, which shall forthwith inform the other Member States and the Agency thereof.
2. Without prejudice to affecting Article 13 14and within the framework of
EUROSUR, the national coordination centre shall be the single point of contact for the
exchange of information through EUROSUR and for the cooperation with other
national coordination centres and with the Agency.
3. The national coordination centres shall:
(a) ensure the timely exchange of information through EUROSUR and timely
cooperation between all national authorities having responsibility for external border
control at national level, as well as and with other national coordination
centres and the Agency;
(b) ensure the timely exchange of information with search and rescue, law enforcement,
asylum and immigration authorities and manage the dissemination of relevant
information at national level through EUROSUR ;
(c) contribute to an effective and efficient management of resources and personnel,
including infrastructure and technical equipment used for border management ;
(d) establish and maintain the national situational pictures in accordance with Article 25
28;
(e) support the coordination, planning and implementation of national border control;
(f) coordinate the national border control systems, in accordance with national law;
(g) contribute to regularly measuring the effects of national border control for the
purposes of this Regulation;
(gh) coordinate operational measures with other Member States and third countries,
without prejudice to affecting the competences of the Agency and of the other
Member States;
(h) (i) exchange relevant information with the immigration liaison officers of their
Member State, where designated, through appropriate structures established at
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national level, with a view to contributing to the European situational picture and
supporting border control operations;
(i)(j) under the supervision of the competent national authorities, contribute
to the information assurance of national information systems and the Agency's
information systems.
4. Member States may charge regional, local, functional or other authorities which are in
a position to take operational decisions with ensuring situational awareness and reaction
capability in their respective areas of competence, including the tasks and competences listed
in paragraph 3, points (c), (e), (f) and (g) of paragraph 3.
5. The decision of a Member State to allocate tasks in accordance with paragraph 4 shall
not affect the national coordination centre in its ability to cooperate and exchange information
with other national coordination centres and the Agency.
6. In pre-defined cases, as determined at national level, a national coordination centre
may authorise an authority referred to in paragraph 4 to communicate and exchange
information with the regional authorities or the national coordination centre of another
Member State or the competent authorities of a third country on condition that such
authorised authority regularly informs its own national coordination centre of such
communication and exchange of information.
7. The national coordination centre shall operate twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week.
Article 22 25
EUROSUR Handbook
1. The Commission shall, in close cooperation with the Agency and any other relevant
Union body, office or agency, adopt and make available a practical handbook for the
implementation and management of EUROSUR (the ‘EUROSUR Handbook’). The
EUROSUR Handbook shall provide technical and operational guidelines, recommendations
and best practices, including in relation to cooperation with third countries. The Commission
shall adopt the EUROSUR Handbook in the form of a recommendation.
2. The Commission may decide, after consultation with Member States and the Agency,
to classify parts of the EUROSUR Handbook as RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED in
compliance with the rules laid down in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.
Article 23 26
Monitoring of EUROSUR
1. The Agency and the Member States shall ensure that procedures are in place to
monitor the technical and operational functioning of EUROSUR against the objectives of
achieving an adequate situational awareness and reaction capability at the external borders.
2. The Agency shall continuously monitor the quality of the service offered by the
communication network referred to in Article 14 15 and the quality of the data shared in the
European situational picture and prepare on a yearly basis a report with the main findings
taking into account the results of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism .
3. The Agency shall transmit information collected as part of the monitoring under
paragraph 2 to the national coordination centres and the relevant command and control
EN 113 EN
structures used for the Agency's operations as part of the EUROSUR fusion services. Such
information shall be classified RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED.
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4. The executive director shall, without undue delay, take the appropriate steps in accordance
with Article 46, after having consulted the management board where:
a) the monitoring reveals data quality deficiencies having a serious impact on the
vulnerability of a given border section or reveals significant anomalies or emerging
trends which may indicate a risk of escalation at the external borders;
b) an incident of a large scale occurs or an event emerges on an external border section ;
c) the results of the report referred to in paragraph 2 identify persistent delays in reporting
of information or insufficient quality of reported data by a Member State;
d) the results of the monitoring of online platforms reveal suspicious behaviours or
trends.
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SECTION 4
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Article 24 27
Situational pictures
1. The national situational pictures, the European situational picture and the specific
situational pictures shall be produced through the collection, evaluation, collation, analysis,
interpretation, generation, visualisation and dissemination of information.
2. The situational pictures referred to in the first subparagraph 1 shall consist of the
following information layers:
(a) an events layer that includes events and incidents related to unauthorised border
crossings, and cross-border crime , threats of hybrid nature affecting the
management of external borders and other events, and, where available,
information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding
migratory trends, volume and routes;
(b) an operational layer that contains information on operations, including the
deployment plan, area of operations, and the position, time, status and type of assets
participating as provided for in the operational plan or a EUROSUR cooperation
plan referred to in Article 30(4) ;
(c) an analysis layer that contains analysed information which is relevant for the
purposes of this Regulation and, in particular, is relevant to the attribution of impact
levels to the external border sections, such as imagery and geo-data, key
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developments and indicators, analytical reports, and other relevant supporting
information.
23. The situational pictures referred to in paragraph 1 shall allow for the identification and
tracing of events and incidents , operations and corresponding analysis relating to
situations where human lives are at risk.
4. The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the
information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific
situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be
provided, the entities responsible for collecting processing, archiving and transmitting specific
information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules
and related quality control mechanisms. That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance
with the examination procedure referred to in Article 122(2) 142(2).
Article 25 28
National situational pictures
1. Each national coordination centre shall establish and maintain a national situational
picture in order to provide all authorities having responsibility for external border control at
national level with effective, accurate and timely information.
2. The national situational picture shall be composed of information collected from the
following sources:
(a) the national border surveillance system in accordance with national law;
(b) stationary and mobile sensors operated by national authorities having responsibility
for external border surveillance;
(c) patrols on border surveillance and other monitoring missions;
(d) local, regional and other coordination centres;
(e) other relevant national authorities and systems, including immigration liaison
officers, operational centres and contact points;
(f) border checks;
(g) the Agency;
(h) national coordination centres in other Member States;
(i) authorities of third countries, on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements and
regional networks referred to in Article 7286;
(j) ship reporting systems in accordance with their respective legal bases;
(k) other relevant European and international organisations
(l) other sources.
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3. The national coordination centre shall report events and incidents to the Agency
within 24 hours after being made aware of an event has occurred or is likely to occur.
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34. Each national coordination centre shall attribute a single indicative impact level,
ranging from ‘low’ and ‘medium’ to ‘high’ and ‘ critical very high, to each incident
or event in the events layer of the national situational picture. All incidents and
events shall be shared with the Agency.
45. Each national coordination centre may decide, at the request of the competent national
authorities, to restrict access to information related to national security, including military
assets, on a need-to-know basis.
56. The national coordination centres of neighbouring Member States may share with each
other, directly and in near real time, the situational picture of neighbouring external border
sections, including the positions, status and type of own assets operating in the neighbouring
external border sections.
Article 26 29
European situational picture
1. The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to
provide the national coordination centres, and the Commission and other Union agencies
operating to protect the European area of freedom, security, and justice established under Title
V of Part Three of the Treaty, as well as EFCA and EMSA, in line with their respective
mandates, with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the
external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements. Working
arrangements referred to in Article 82(3) of this Regulation with those Agencies shall
determine the conditions for the provision of information from the European situational
picture.
2. The European situational picture shall be composed of information collected from the
following sources:
(a) national coordination centres, and national situational pictures and information and
reports received from immigration liaison officers to the extent required by this
Article deployed in the context of Regulation 2019/1240 ;
(b) the Agency, including the information and reports provided by its liaison officers in
accordance with Articles 31 36 and 77 92;
(c) Union delegations and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and
operations as provided for in point (j) of the second subparagraph of Article 68(1)
82(1), point (n) ;
(d) other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations
listed in accordance with Article 68(1) 82 ;
(e) authorities of third countries, on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements and
regional networks as referred to in Articles 72 86, 87, status agreements as referred
to in Article 88(3) and working arrangements as referred to in Article 73(4) 88(6);
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(f) aggregated and anonymised data derived from the monitoring of online platforms
carried out in relation to monitoring of migratory flows referred to in Article 33(1),
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(g) (f) other sources.
3. The events layer of the European situational picture shall include information relating
to:
(a) incidents and other events contained in the events layer of the national situational
pictures;
(b) incidents and other events contained in the events layer of the specific
situational pictures as provided for in Article 27;
(c) incidents and other events in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid
intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot including in area of
operation of the migration management support teams .
4. The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on
the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots
including in area of operation of the migration management support teams. It
shall , and include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the
Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data
and information packages for the media.
5. Information on own assets used in the operational layer of the European
situational picture may, where appropriate, be classified as RESTREINT UE/EU
RESTRICTED.
6. In the European situational picture, the Agency shall take into account the impact
levels that were assigned to specific incidents or events in national situational pictures
by the national coordination centres. For any incident or event in the pre-frontier area,
the Agency shall assign a single indicative impact level and shall inform the national
coordination centres thereof.
Article 27 30
Specific situational pictures
new
1. Member States may establish specific situational pictures necessary for cooperation
and exchange of information in the framework of EUROSUR under bilateral or multilateral
agreements with third countries.
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1 2. The Agency and the Member States may establish and maintain specific situational
pictures necessary for cooperation and exchange of information in the framework of
EUROSUR in order to support specific operational activities at the external borders or to
share information with Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and international
organisations listed on the basis of working arrangements referred to in Article 68(1)
82(1) or third countries as provided for in accordance with Article 75 90 .
23. The specific situational pictures shall be composed of subset of contain pre-
agreed information from the national and European situational pictures as
provided for in the plans referred to paragraph 3 .
34. The detailed rules for establishing and sharing the specific situational pictures shall be
set out in an operational plan for joint operations. the operational activities concerned
Where a specific situational picture is established in the framework of bilateral or
multilateral cooperation with third countries, the detailed rules for establishing and sharing the
specific situational picture shall be set out in a bilateral or multilateral agreement or, where
that cooperation takes place under a working arrangement, in a EUROSUR cooperation
plan. and in a bilateral or multilateral agreement where a specific situational picture is
established in the framework of bilateral or multilateral cooperation with third countries.
5. Any sharing of information under this paragraph 3 shall be carried out in
accordance with the principle of originator's consent.
Article 28 31
EUROSUR fusion services
1 The Agency shall coordinate the EUROSUR Fusion Services. in order to supply the
national coordination centres, the Commission and itself with information on the external
borders and on the pre-frontier area on a regular, reliable and cost-efficient basis.
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1. The Agency shall coordinate and be able to use the EUROSUR fusion services. Such
coordination and use shall concern the tasks set out in paragraph 2 of this Article. The Agency
shall provide information on the external borders and on the pre-frontier area, upon request
and on cost-efficient basis, to the Commission, the EEAS, other Union agencies operating to
protect the European area of freedom, security, and justice established under Title V of Part
Three of the Treaty, and EFCA and EMSA, in accordance with their mandates, or the Agency
itself.
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2. The Agency shall provide the national coordination centre, at its request, with
information on areas located at the external borders of the that Member State to
which it belongs and on the pre-frontier area, which may be derived from include :
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(a) the selective monitoring of designated third-country ports and coasts which have
been identified through risk analysis and information as being embarkation or transit
points for vessels or other craft used for illegal immigration or cross-border crime;
(b) the tracking of vessels or other craft over high seas and the tracking of aircraft, where
those vessels, other craft or aircraft are suspected of, or have been identified as, being
used for illegal immigration or cross-border crime, including in the case of persons in
distress at sea, with a view to transmitting that information to the relevant authorities
that are competent for search and rescue operations , also with the use of
information from CISE ;
(c) monitoring of designated areas in the maritime domain in order to detect, identify
and track vessels and other craft being used for, or suspected of being used for,
illegal immigration or cross-border crime, including in the case of persons in distress
at sea with a view to transmitting that information to the relevant authorities that are
competent for search and rescue operations;
(d) monitoring of designated areas of air borders in order to detect, identify and track
aircraft and other forms of equipment being used for, or suspected of being used for,
illegal immigration or cross-border crime;
(e) environmental assessment of designated areas in the maritime domain and at the
external land and air borders in order to optimise monitoring and patrolling activities;
(f) selective monitoring of designated pre-frontier areas or areas at the external
borders which have been identified through risk analysis and information as being
potential departure or transit areas for illegal immigration or cross-border crime;
(g) monitoring migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume
, nationalities and routes;
(h) media monitoring, open source intelligence information collection and analysis
of internet activities in line with Directive (EU) 2016/680 or Regulation (EU)
2016/679, as applicable, for the purpose of preventing illegal immigration or cross-
border crime including the facilitation of illegal immigration and trafficking in
human beings ;
(i) analysis of information derived from large-scale information systems for the purpose
of detecting changing routes and methods used for illegal immigration and cross-
border crime;
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(j) monitoring threats of hybrid nature affecting the management of external borders
including the instrumentalisation of migration, disinformation, or cross-border
criminal activity.
3. The Agency shall provide information, upon their request, to the Commission, the EEAS,
other Union agencies operating to protect the European area of freedom, security, and justice,
established under Title V of Part Three of the Treaty, and EFCA and EMSA, in accordance
with their mandates, on areas located at the external borders and on the pre-frontier area. That
information shall be provided subject to the consent of the Member States concerned and on
the basis of a working arrangement with the requesting side.
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4. The Agency shall prioritise EUROSUR fusion service requests. The priority shall be given
to a request from a national coordination centre. Where two or more national coordination
centres made a request, the assessment of the priority shall take into account the single
indicative impact level on the incidents related to illegal immigration, cross-border crime or
threats of hybrid nature affecting the management of external borders occurring at the relevant
border section or other events.
5. The information on areas at the external borders and on the pre-frontier area collected by
activating the EUROSUR fusion services shall, where relevant, be included in the European
situational picture.
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36. The Agency may refuse a request from a national coordination centre for technical,
financial or operational reasons. The Agency shall notify the national coordination centre in
due time of the reasons for such a refusal.
47. The Agency may use, on its own initiative, the surveillance tools referred to in
paragraph 2 for collecting information on the pre-frontier area, which is relevant for the
European situational picture.
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Article 32
Advance warning mechanism
1. As a derogation from Article 28(3), when the single indicative impact level on incidents or
events taking place at a given border section increases, the national coordination centre shall
notify the Agency immediately. The Agency shall report this information in the European
situational picture in the form of an alert and support the given national coordination centre in
monitoring the migratory situation at this given border section in accordance with Article 26.
2. As a derogation from Article 31(7), where a high or critical impact level is attributed to an
external border section, the Agency shall launch EUROSUR fusion service(s) or intensify the
existing one(s) over the external border section concerned and consult the Member State
concerned thereof immediately. Information deriving from this EUROSUR fusion service(s)
shall be included in the European situational picture.
3. Where the Agency identifies any atypical activity in the monitored external border section
in connection with security of external borders or migratory movements, it shall notify the
national coordination centre concerned immediately and take the appropriate steps in
accordance with Article 46.
4. Where the results of the vulnerability assessment, the Agency’s risk analysis or crisis
management, early warning and forecasting tools identify emerging illegal immigration or
cross-border crime threats in pre-frontier area, the Agency shall launch the EUROSUR fusion
services on its own initiative as referred to in Article 31(7). Information deriving from the
EUROSUR fusion services shall be shared in the European situational picture, with the
Commission, the EEAS and other Union agencies as referred to in Article 31(1).
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5. Where the Agency identifies any atypical activity in connection with security of external
borders or migratory movements while performing the EUROSUR fusion services as referred
to in paragraph 4, it shall notify all national coordination centres immediately and include that
information in the European situational picture in the form of an alert. The Agency shall take
the appropriate steps in accordance with Article 46.
Article 33
Online monitoring and response centre
1. The Agency shall set up and operate an online monitoring and response centre. The tasks of
the centre shall be to:
(a) monitor, for the purpose of risk analysis, situational awareness and prevention of risks
relevant for management of external borders and migration, the publicly accessible
user generated content specified in paragraph 3 of this Article, provided by recipients
of intermediary services referred to in Article 3, point (g), of Regulation (EU)
2022/2065;
(b) notify online platforms in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065
of illegal content on their service, including where acting as a trusted flagger within
the meaning and according to the procedure set out in Article 22 of that Regulation;
(c) take actions determined in any relevant code of conduct within the meaning of Article
45 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065;
(d) take actions determined in any crisis protocol, in particular in accordance with Article
48 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065;
(e) ask the national competent authorities to issue, where appropriate, orders to request
information or to act against illegal content as referred to in Articles 9 and 10 of
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065.
2. The Agency shall ensure that the risk analysis of aggregated data derived from online
monitoring of content provided by recipients of intermediary services is included in the
European situational picture referred to in Article 29(2), point (f).
3. The online monitoring and response centre shall monitor the online content which
facilitates, promotes or provides instructions for unauthorised crossing of the external borders
of the Union, in a manner likely to endanger the security of those borders or the safety of
persons crossing, or intending to cross, them. In particular, it shall focus on the following:
(a) content calling for, organising or providing instructions on unauthorised crossing of
the external borders;
(b) content relating to smuggling of migrants or other cross-border criminal activity;
(c) content inciting violence at the borders;
(d) calls for, or provides information on, the disruption of border infrastructure;
(e) content calling for or providing information relevant for:
(i) instrumentalisation and weaponisation of migration;
(ii) disinformation;
(iii) cyber incidents affecting border management systems or technical infrastructure;
(iv) interference with infrastructure relevant to border management; and
(v) cross-border criminal activities forming part of a broader hybrid campaign.
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4. The Agency may ask the Commission to encourage and facilitate the drawing up of
voluntary codes of conduct at Union level within the meaning of Article 45 of Regulation
(EU) 2022/2065, to address specific challenges of tackling different types of content referred
to in paragraph 3 of this Article and systemic risks, in accordance with Union law.
5. The Commission shall draw up a crisis protocol pursuant to Article 48 of Regulation (EU)
2022/2065 to address the crisis situations at the external borders.
6. The online monitoring and response centre shall cooperate with relevant Union agencies, in
particular the European Centre Against Migrant Smuggling established at Europol.
7. Where, in the course of its activities, the monitoring and response centre identifies a need
for coordination, cooperation or support in relation to the content relevant for prevention and
combating of migrant smuggling, it shall notify Europol or other relevant EU entity to that
effect and, where appropriate, initiate the procedure for sharing the relevant information with
Europol, in accordance with the applicable rules on the exchange of information under this
Regulation.
8. The online monitoring and response centre shall cooperate with other relevant independent
stakeholders in the area of online monitoring, in particular external actors active in media
monitoring, for the purpose of identifying content relevant to the management of external
borders and migration flows.
9. The online monitoring and response centre shall report to the Commission on its activities
on a regular basis and, upon request, share the risk analysis and other outputs related to its
operations. The online monitoring and response centre shall also inform the Commission
about:
(a) requests to the intermediary service providers referred to in paragraph 1, points (b) to
(e);
(b) online content identified at the intermediary service providers as an online platform
requiring development of counternarrative by the Commission and the Agency;
(c) information in the European situational picture and EUROSUR, in accordance with
paragraph 3.
10. The Agency may cooperate with the relevant border management authorities or other
competent authorities of third countries with due regard to the existing bilateral and
multilateral arrangements applicable to that country, countries on the response to the online
content identified by the online monitoring and response centrer at intermediary service
providers.
11 Upon a proposal from the Executive Director, the Management Board shall adopt
implementing rules on how the online monitoring and response centre operates, including on
its tasks and composition. Union bodies or agencies may participate in preparation of the
implementing rules in accordance with their respective mandates.
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SECTION 5
RISK ANALYSIS
Article 29 34
Risk analysis
1. The Agency shall monitor migratory flows towards the Union, and within the Union in
terms of migratory trends, volume and routes, and other trends or possible challenges at the
external borders and with regard to return. For that purpose, the Agency shall, by a decision of
the management board based on a proposal from the executive director, establish a common
integrated risk analysis model, which shall be applied by the Agency and the Member States.
The common integrated risk analysis model shall be established and updated, where needed,
on the basis of the outcome of the evaluation of the implementation of the multiannual
strategic policy cycle for EIBM European integrated border management referred to in
Article 8(79) and taking into account the effective functioning of the common system for
returns .
2. The Agency shall prepare general annual risk analyses, which shall be submitted to the
European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission applying the security rules
adopted in accordance with Article 92 111, and tailored risk analyses for operational activities
, including dedicated risk analysis focusing on specific third countries, identifying evolving
trends in document fraud for the purpose of short stay and long stay visas, visa abuses, and
visa misuse and fraudulent practices, and abuses in relation to long-stay visas and residence
permits, for the Agency’s support to Member States in visa policy . Every two years, the
Agency, in close consultation with the Member States, shall prepare and submit to the
European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission a strategic risk analysis for
EIBM European integrated border management. Such strategic risk analyses shall be
taken into account for the preparation of the multiannual strategic policy cycle for
EIBM European integrated border management. The Agency shall prepare such
general annual risk analyses and strategic risk analyses on the basis of information received,
including from the Member States. Personal data shall be anonymised in the results of such
risk analyses.
3. The risk analyses referred to in paragraph 2 shall cover all aspects relevant to
EIBM European integrated border management with a view to developing a pre-
warning mechanism.
4. The Agency shall process and use for the purpose of risk analysis only anonymised
and statistical data obtained from the monitoring of hub platforms referred to in Article 29(2),
point (f), and debriefing referred to in Article 45(5), point (b).
45. The Agency shall publish comprehensive information on the common integrated risk
analysis model.
56. Member States shall provide the Agency with all necessary information regarding the
situation, trends and possible threats at the external borders and in the field of return. Member
States shall regularly, or upon the request of the Agency, provide it with all relevant
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information such as statistical and operational data collected in relation to EIBM
European integrated border management that is included in the list of mandatory information
and data to be exchanged with the Agency as referred to in Article 100(2) 119(2), point (5), as
well as information from the analysis layers of the national situational pictures as provided for
in Article 2528.
67. The results of the risk analysis shall be submitted to the management board and shared
with the competent authorities of the Member States in a timely and accurate manner.
78. Member States shall take results of the risk analysis into account for integrated
planning, and when planning their operations and activities at the external borders and
their activities with regard to return.
89. The Agency shall incorporate the results of a common integrated risk analysis model
in its development of common core curricula for training as referred to in Article 6275.
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SECTION 6
PREVENTION AND RESPONSIVENESS
Article 30 35
Determination of external border sections
For the purposes of this Regulation, each Member State shall divide its external borders into
external border sections. Those sections shall consist of land, sea and, where a Member State
so decides, air border sections. Each Member State shall notify such external border sections
to the Agency.
Member States shall notify any change of external border sections to the Agency in a timely
manner to ensure the continuity of risk analysis by the Agency.
Article 31 36
Agency liaison officers in Member States
1. The Agency shall ensure the regular monitoring of all Member States' management of
the external borders and return through liaison officers of the Agency.
The Agency may decide that a liaison officer covers up to four one or more Member
States which are geographically close to each other.
2. The executive director shall appoint experts from the statutory staff to be deployed as
liaison officers. The executive director shall, on the basis of risk analysis and in consultation
with the Member States concerned, make a proposal on the nature and terms of the
deployment, the Member State or region to which a liaison officer may be deployed and
possible tasks not covered by paragraph 3. The proposal from the executive director shall be
subject to approval by the management board. The executive director shall notify the Member
State concerned of the appointment and shall determine, together with that Member State, the
location of deployment.
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3. The liaison officers shall act on behalf of the Agency, and their role shall be to foster
cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and the national authorities responsible for
border management, including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control
tasks, as well as the national authorities responsible for return. The liaison officers shall, in
particular:
(a) act as an interface between the Agency and the national authorities responsible for
border management, including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border
control tasks, as well as the national authorities responsible for return;
(b) support the collection of information required by the Agency for the monitoring of
illegal immigration and risk analyses referred to in Article 2934;
(c) support the collection of information referred to in Article 3237 and required by the
Agency to carry out vulnerability assessments and prepare a report for that purpose;
(d) monitor the measures taken by the Member State at external border sections to which
a high or critical impact level has been attributed in accordance with Article 3439;
(e) contribute to promoting the application of the Union acquis relating to the
management of the external borders and return, including with regard to respect for
fundamental rights;
(f) cooperate with the fundamental rights officer, where necessary, with a view to
promoting respect for fundamental rights in the work of the Agency in line with
point (e);
(g) where possible, assist the Member States in preparing their contingency plans
concerning border management;
(h) facilitate the communication between the Member State concerned and the Agency,
share relevant information from the Agency with the Member State concerned,
including information about ongoing operations;
(i) report regularly and directly to the executive director on the situation at the external
borders and the capacity of the Member State concerned to deal effectively with the
situation at the external borders; report also on the execution of return operations
towards relevant third countries;
(j) monitor the measures taken by the Member State with regard to a situation requiring
urgent action at the external borders as referred to in Article 4247;
(k) monitor the measures taken by the Member State with regard to return and support
the collection of information required by the Agency to carry out the activities
referred to in Articles 48 55, 63 and 64 .
4. If the reporting by the liaison officer referred to in paragraph 3, point (i), raises
concerns about one or more aspects relevant for the Member State concerned, the executive
director shall inform that Member State without delay.
5. For the purposes of paragraph 3, the liaison officer shall, in compliance with the
national and Union security and data protection rules:
(a) receive information from the national coordination centre concerned and the relevant
national situational picture established in accordance with Article 2528;
(b) keep regular contacts with national authorities which are responsible for border
management, including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control
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tasks, as well as the national authorities responsible for return, whilst informing the
national contact point concerned.
6. The report of the liaison officer referred to in paragraph 3, point (i), of this Article
shall form part of the vulnerability assessment referred to in Article 3237. The report shall be
transmitted to the Member State concerned.
7. In carrying out their duties, the liaison officers shall take instructions only from the
Agency.
Article 32 37
Vulnerability assessment
1. The Agency shall establish a common vulnerability assessment methodology by
decision of the management board, on the basis of a proposal from the executive director
prepared in close cooperation with the Member States and the Commission. That
methodology shall include objective criteria against which the Agency shall carry out the
vulnerability assessment, the frequency of such assessments, how consecutive vulnerability
assessments are to be carried out, and arrangements for an effective system for monitoring the
implementation of recommendations of the executive director as referred to in paragraph 7.
2. The Agency shall monitor and assess the availability of the technical equipment,
systems, capabilities, resources, infrastructure and adequately skilled and trained staff of
Member States necessary for:
(a) border control as referred to in point (a) of Article 3(1), point (a),
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(b) return as referred in Article 3(1), point (i),
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In that context, the Agency shall assess the national capability development plans referred to
in Article 9(4) and, where available, contingency plans referred to in Article 9(3) as
regards the capacity to perform border control taking into account the fact that some national
capabilities may be partially used for purposes other than border control. For future planning,
the Agency shall carry out such monitoring and assessment as a preventive measure on the
basis of the risk analyses prepared in accordance with Article29(2)34(2).
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The Agency shall monitor and assess in qualitative and quantitative terms, the Member States'
capacity to carry out all border management and return-related tasks, including, where
appropriate, their capacity to deal with the potential arrival of large numbers of persons on
their territory or with a potential large number of returns to be processed within the legally
prescribed deadlines.
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The Agency shall also monitor and assess the quality of data in the framework of EUROSUR
and findings of the report referred to in Article 26(2) specifically with regard to the European
situational picture.
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3. The Agency shall carry out such monitoring and assessment at least once a year,
unless the executive director, on the basis of risk analysis, the results of the Schengen
evaluation and monitoring mechanism or a previous vulnerability assessment, decides
otherwise. In any event, each Member State shall be subject to monitoring and assessment at
least once every three years.
34. Without prejudice to affecting Article 9, Member States shall, at the request of
the Agency, provide information as regards technical equipment, staff and, to the extent
possible, the financial resources available at national level to carry out border control and
return-related activities . Member States shall also provide information on their
contingency plans on border management and return-related activities at the Agency's
request.
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5. The Agency may refer to other Union agencies for information relevant for tasks related to
assessment and monitoring in accordance with paragraph 2.
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46. The aim of In the vulnerability assessment is for the Agency shall :
(a) to assess the capacity and readiness of Member States to face present and upcoming
challenges at the external borders;
(b) to identify, especially for those Member States facing specific and disproportionate
challenges, possible immediate consequences at the external borders and subsequent
consequences on the functioning of the Schengen area;
(c) to assess their capacity to contribute to the standing corps and to the technical
equipment pool, including the rapid reaction equipment pool; and
(d) to assess the hosting capacity of Member States with regard to support from the
European Border and Coast Guard in line with Article 9(3);
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(e) assess the capacity and readiness of Member States to face present and upcoming
challenges related to return, and in particular in relation to the implementation of the return
border procedure in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1349.
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2019/1896 (adapted)
That assessment shall be without prejudice to not affect the Schengen evaluation
mechanism.
5. In the vulnerability assessment, the Agency shall assess, in qualitative and quantitative
terms, the Member States' capacity to carry out all border management tasks, including their
capacity to deal with the potential arrival of large numbers of persons on their territory
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7. The Agency may carry out vulnerability assessment in accordance with paragraph 2,
point (a), in the neighbouring third countries, upon their request. The conditions related to
such third country vulnerability assessment shall be determined in a working arrangement
referred to in Article 88(4) and shall be in line with the applicable legal framework, including
on the exchange of classified information, where applicable. The result of the vulnerability
assessment performed for the third country shall be communicated in the form of a
recommendation by the executive director to the relevant authority of the third country. The
procedure referred to in paragraphs 8 to 13 shall not apply to third countries.
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86. The preliminary results of the vulnerability assessment shall be submitted to the
Member States concerned. The Member States concerned may comment on that assessment.
79. Where necessary, the executive director, in consultation with the Member State
concerned, shall make a recommendation setting out the necessary measures to be taken by
the Member State concerned and the time limit within which such measures are to be
implemented. The executive director shall invite the Member States concerned to take the
necessary measures on the basis of an action plan developed by the Member State in
consultation with the executive director.
810. The executive director shall base the measures to be recommended to the Member
States concerned on the results of the vulnerability assessment, taking into account the
Agency's risk analysis, the comments of the Member State concerned and the results of the
Schengen evaluation mechanism.
The recommended measures shall be aimed at eliminating the vulnerabilities identified in the
assessment in order for Member States to increase their readiness to face present and
upcoming challenges at the external borders by enhancing or improving their capabilities,
technical equipment, systems, resources , data quality in EUROSUR and contingency
and capability development plans. The executive director may offer the technical
expertise of the Agency to the Member States to support the implementation of the
recommended measures.
911. The executive director shall monitor the implementation of the recommended
measures by means of regular reports to be submitted by the Member States on the basis of
the action plans referred to in paragraph 7.
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Where there is a risk that a Member State will not implement a recommended measure within
the time limit set in accordance with paragraph 7, the executive director shall immediately
inform the member of the management board from the Member State concerned and the
Commission. In consultation with the member of the management board from the Member
State concerned, the executive director shall enquire of the relevant authorities of that
Member State about the reasons for the delay and offer support by the Agency to facilitate the
implementation of the measure recommended.
1012. Where a Member State does not implement the necessary measures of the
recommendation within the time limit set in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article, the
executive director shall immediately refer the matter to the management board and
notify the Commission. The management board shall adopt a decision on the basis of a
proposal from the executive director as soon as possible and not later than 4 weeks
following such proposal. The decision of the management board shall , setting out the
necessary measures to be taken by the Member State concerned and the time limit within
which such measures are to be implemented. The decision of the management board shall be
binding on the Member State. If the Member State does not implement the measures within
the time limit provided for in that decision, the management board shall notify the Council
and the Commission and further action may be taken in accordance with Article 4247. The
Agency shall refrain from any actions in relation to the recommended measure within 6
months from the moment of notifying the Council and the Commission.
1113. The vulnerability assessment, including a detailed description of the outcome of the
vulnerability assessment, the measures taken by the Member States in response to the
vulnerability assessment and the status of the implementation of any measures previously
recommended, shall be transmitted, in accordance with Article 92111, on a regular basis and
at least once a year to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission.
Article 3338
Synergies between the vulnerability assessment and the Schengen evaluation mechanism
1. The synergies between the vulnerability assessment and the Schengen evaluation
mechanism shall be maximised in order to establish an improved situational picture on the
functioning of the Schengen area, avoiding, to the extent possible, the duplication of efforts
on the Member States' side, and ensuring a better coordinated use of the relevant Union
financial instruments supporting the management of the external borders and return .
2. For the purpose referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission and the Agency shall
establish the necessary arrangements to share with each other in a regular, secured and timely
manner all information related to the results of vulnerability assessments and the results of the
evaluations carried out within the framework of the Schengen evaluation mechanism in
fields of the area of border management and return . Those information-sharing
arrangements shall cover include in particular the reports of vulnerability assessments
and reports of Schengen evaluation visits, subsequent recommendations, action plans and any
updates on the implementation of the action plans provided by the Member States.
3. For the purposes of the Schengen evaluation mechanism as it relates to external border
management and return , the Commission shall share the results of the vulnerability
assessments with all the members of the Schengen evaluation teams involved in the
evaluation of the Member State concerned. Such information shall be considered sensitive
within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2022/922 and shall be treated accordingly.
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4. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 2 shall cover results of the evaluations
carried out within the framework of the Schengen evaluation mechanism in the area of return
to ensure the full awareness of the Agency of the identified deficiencies in view of enabling it
to propose appropriate measures to support Member States concerned in that regard.
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4. The Agency shall train and maintain a pool of suitably qualified Agency observers in
Schengen evaluations and monitoring activities referred to in Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation
(EU) 2022/922 and shall nominate observers from this pool for specific evaluations and
monitoring activities according to the specific profiles indicated by the Commission.
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Article 34 39
Attribution of impact levels to external border sections
1. On the basis of the Agency's risk analysis and vulnerability assessment and in
agreement with the Member State concerned, the Agency shall attribute or change the
following impact levels to each external border section or change such levels , taking into
account the implementation of effective returns in those external border sections, including in
the context of the border procedure in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1349 :
(a) low impact level where the incidents related to illegal immigration or cross-border
crime occurring at the relevant border section or other events have an
insignificant impact on border security or a medium impact level is compensated
by effective returns ;
(b) medium impact level where the incidents related to illegal immigration or cross-
border crime occurring at the relevant border section or other events have a
moderate impact on border security or a high impact level is compensated by
effective returns ;
(c) high impact level where the incidents related to illegal immigration or cross-border
crime occurring at the relevant border section or other events have a
significant impact on border security or a critical impact level is compensated by
effective returns.
2. In order to swiftly address a crisis situation at a particular external border section,
where the Agency's risk analysis shows that incidents related to illegal immigration or cross-
border crime occurring at the relevant external border section or other events
including the single indicative impact levels attributed to a given incident or event in the
framework of EUROSUR have a decisive impact on border security to such an extent that
they risk jeopardising the functioning of the Schengen area, the management board shall, in
agreement with the Member State concerned based on a proposal from the executive
director , attribute a ‘critical’ impact level to that external border section.
3. Where the management board does not agree with the proposal of the executive
director referred to in paragraph 2 there is no agreement between the Member State
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concerned and the Agency on the attribution of a ‘critical’ impact level to an external border
section, the impact level that was previously attributed to that border section shall remain
unchanged.
4. The national coordination centre shall constantly assess in close cooperation with
other competent national authorities whether there is a need to change the impact level of any
of the external border sections by taking into account the information contained in the
national situational picture and inform the Agency accordingly.
5. The Agency shall indicate the impact levels attributed to the external border sections
in the European situational picture.
Article 35 40
Reaction corresponding to impact levels
1. The Member States shall ensure that border control at the external border sections
corresponds to the attributed impact levels in the following manner:
(a) where a low impact level is attributed to an external border section, the national
authorities responsible for external border control shall organise regular border
control on the basis of risk analysis and ensure that sufficient personnel and
resources are being kept available for that border section;
(b) where a medium impact level is attributed to an external border section, the national
authorities responsible for external border control shall, in addition to the measures
taken under point (a) of this paragraph, ensure that appropriate border control
measures are being taken at that border section; where such border control measures
are taken, the national coordination centre shall be notified accordingly; the national
coordination centre shall coordinate any support given in accordance with Article
21(3)24(3);
(c) where a high impact level is attributed to an external border section, the Member
State concerned, in addition to the measures taken under point (b) of this paragraph,
shall ensure, through the national coordination centre, that the national authorities
operating at that border section are given the necessary support and that reinforced
border control measures are taken; that Member State may request support from the
Agency subject to the conditions for initiating joint operations or rapid border
interventions as laid down in Article 3641;
(d) where a critical impact level is attributed to an external border section, the Agency
shall notify the Commission thereof; the executive director, in addition to the
measures taken under point (c) of this paragraph, shall issue a recommendation in
accordance with Article 41(1)46(1), taking into account the ongoing support by the
Agency; the Member State concerned shall respond to the recommendation in
accordance with Article 41(2)46(2).
2. The national coordination centres shall regularly inform the Agency of the measures
taken at national level pursuant to points (c) and (d) of paragraph 1, points (c) and (d).
3. Where a medium, high or critical impact level is attributed to an external border
section which is adjacent to the border section of another Member State or of a third country
with which agreements, arrangements or regional networks, as referred to in Articles 7286
and 7388, are in place, the national coordination centre shall contact the national coordination
centre of the neighbouring Member State or the competent authority of the neighbouring third
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country and shall endeavour to coordinate together with the Agency the necessary cross-
border measures.
4. The Agency shall, together with the Member State concerned, evaluate the attribution
of impact levels and the corresponding measures taken at national and Union level. That
evaluation shall contribute to the vulnerability assessment to be carried out by the Agency in
accordance with Article 3237.
SECTION 7
ACTION BY THE AGENCY AT THE EXTERNAL BORDERS
Article 3641
Actions by the Agency at the external borders
1. A Member State may request the Agency's assistance in implementing its obligations
with regard to external border control. The Agency shall also carry out measures in
accordance with Articles 4146 and 4247.
2. The Agency shall organise the appropriate technical and operational assistance for the
host Member State and it may, acting in accordance with the relevant Union and international
law, including the principle of non-refoulement, take one or more of the following measures:
(a) coordinate joint operations for one or more Member States and deploy the standing
corps and technical equipment;
(b) organise rapid border interventions and deploy the standing corps and technical
equipment;
(c) coordinate activities for one or more Member States and third countries at the
external borders, including joint operations with third countries;
(d) deploy the standing corps in the framework of the migration management support
teams to, inter alia, hotspot areas in order to provide technical and operational
assistance, including, where necessary, in return activities;
(e) within the framework of operations referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of this
paragraph and in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 and international
law, provide technical and operational assistance to Member States and third
countries in support of search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea
which may arise during border surveillance operations at sea.
(f) (f)give priority treatment to the EUROSUR fusion services.
3. The Agency shall finance or co-finance the activities referred to in paragraph 2 from
its budget in accordance with the financial rules applicable to the Agency.
4. If the Agency has substantial additional financial needs due to a situation at the
external borders, it shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission
thereof without delay.
Article 3742
Initiating joint operations and rapid border interventions at the external borders
1. A Member State may request that the Agency launch joint operations to face
upcoming counter challenges, including illegal immigration, present or future threats
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at its external borders or cross-border crime, or provide increased technical and operational
assistance when implementing its obligations with regard to external border control. As part
of such a request, a the Member State may also shall indicate the profiles of
operational staff needed for the joint operation in question, including those staff having
executive powers, as applicable.
2. At the request of a Member State faced with a situation of specific and
disproportionate challenges, especially the arrival at points of the external borders of large
numbers of third-country nationals trying the territory of that Member State without
authorisation irregularly, the Agency may deploy a rapid border intervention for a limited
period of time on the territory of that host Member State.
3. The executive director shall evaluate, approve and coordinate proposals made by
Member States for joint operations or rapid border interventions. Joint operations and rapid
border interventions shall be preceded by a thorough reliable and up-to-date risk
analysisthereby enabling the Agency to set an order of priority for the proposed joint
operations and rapid border interventions, taking into account the impact levels attributed to
external border sections in accordance with Article 34 and the availability of resources.
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2. Member State may request the Agency to launch, for a limited period of time, a border
intervention at its external borders to counter specific existing or emerging disproportionate
challenges, such as the arrival of large numbers of third-country nationals attempting an
unauthorised entry to the territory of that Member State.
3. The executive director shall evaluate and approve requests for joint operations or
border interventions and coordinate them. Joint operations and border interventions shall be
preceded by a thorough reliable and up-to-date risk analysis, take into account the results of
vulnerability assessment and of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism as well
as relevant information available in EUROSUR, and be decided on the basis of prioritisation
methodology established by the Agency. Prioritisation methodology shall take into account in
particularly impact levels and availability of resources.
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4. The objectives of a joint operation or rapid border intervention may be achieved as
part of a multipurpose operation. Such operations may involve coast guard functions and the
prevention of cross-border crime, focusing on the fight against migrant smuggling, or
trafficking in human beings or terrorism , and migration management, focusing on
identification, registration, debriefing and return.
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5. The requesting Member State shall ensure conditions allowing for the effective deployment
of operational staff and the use of technical assistance provided by the Agency.
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Article 3843
Operational plans for joint operations
1. In preparation of a joint operation the executive director, in cooperation with the host
Member State, shall draw up a list of technical equipment, staff and profiles of staff needed,
including those staff having executive powers, as applicable, to be authorised in accordance
with Article 82(2)98(2). That list shall be drawn up taking into account the host Member
State's available resources and the host Member State's request under Article 3742. On the
basis of those elements, the Agency shall define a package of technical and operational
reinforcement as well as capacity-building activities to be included in the operational plan.
2. The executive director shall draw up an operational plan for joint operations at the
external borders taking into account the available risk and threat analysis at national and
Union level, results of vulnerability assessment and the Schengen evaluation and monitoring
mechanism . The executive director and the host Member State, in close and timely
consultation with the participating Member States, shall agree on the operational plan
detailing the organisational and procedural aspects of the joint operation.
3. The operational plan shall be binding on the Agency, the host Member State and the
participating Member States. It shall cover all aspects considered necessary for carrying out
the joint operation, including the following:
(a) description of the situation, with modus operandi and objectives of the deployment,
including the operational aim;
(b) the estimated time that implementation period of the joint operation is expected
to last in order to achieve its objectives;
(c) the geographical area where the joint operation will take place;
(d) a description of the tasks, including those requiring executive powers, responsibilities,
including with regard to the respect for fundamental rights and data protection requirements,
and special instructions for the teams, including those deriving from relevant decisions of
the management board and of the executive director, inter alia on permissible consultation
of databases and permissible service weapons, ammunition and equipment in the host
Member State;
(e) the composition of the teams as well as the deployment of other relevant staff;
(f) command and control provisions including the names and ranks of the border guards
of the host Member State responsible for cooperating with the members of the teams and the
Agency, in particular the names and ranks of those border guards who are in command during
the period of deployment, and the place of the members of the teams in the chain of
command;
(eg) the plan of human and technical resources technical equipment to be deployed
during the joint operation, including specific requirements for deployment of technical
equipment such as conditions for use, requested crew, transport and other logistics, and
financial provisions;
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(fh) detailed provisions on immediate incident reporting by the Agency to the management
board and to relevant national authorities;
(gi) a reporting and evaluation scheme containing benchmarks for the evaluation report,
including with regard to the protection of fundamental rights, and final date of submission of
the final evaluation report;
(hj) regarding sea operations, specific information on the application of the relevant
jurisdiction and applicable law in the geographical area where the joint operation takes place,
including references to national, international and Union law regarding interception, rescue at
sea and disembarkation; in that regard the operational plan shall be established in accordance
with Regulation (EU) No 656/2014;
(ik) the terms of cooperation with third countries, other Union bodies, offices and agencies
or international organisations;
(jl) general instructions on how to ensure the safeguarding of fundamental rights during
the operational activity of the Agency;
(km) procedures whereby persons in need of international protection, victims of trafficking
in human beings, unaccompanied minors and persons in a vulnerable situation are directed to
the competent national authorities for appropriate assistance;
(ln) procedures setting out a mechanism to receive and transmit to the Agency complaints
against any person participating in an operational activity of the Agency, including border
guards or other relevant staff of the host Member State and members of the teams, alleging
breaches of fundamental rights in the context of their participation in an operational activity
of the Agency;
(mo) logistical arrangements, including information on working conditions and the
security environment of the areas in which the joint operation is to take place;
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(n) cooperation mechanisms between national civil protection authorities and the national
authorities responsible for border management and the potential involvement of the members
of the teams in their implementation.
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4. The operational plan, Aany amendments thereto to or adaptations
thereof of the operational plan shall require be subject to the agreement of the
executive director and the host Member State, after consultation of the participating Member
States. The Agency shall send immediately a A copy of the operational plan, its
amendments and adaptations amended or adapted operational plan shall immediately be
sent by the Agency to the participating Member States.
5. This Article Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall apply mutatis mutandis to all operations of
the Agency.
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Article 39 44
Procedure for launching a rapid border intervention
1. A request by a Member State to launch a rapid border intervention shall include a
description of the situation, possible aims and envisaged needs, and including the staff
needed, including those staff having executive powers, as applicable. If required, the
executive director may immediately send experts from the Agency to assess the situation at
the external borders of the Member State concerned.
2. The executive director shall immediately inform the management board of a Member
State's request to launch a rapid border intervention.
3. When deciding on the request of a Member State, the executive director shall take into
account the findings of the Agency's risk analyses and the analysis layer of the European
situational picture as well as the outcome of the vulnerability assessment referred to in Article
3237 and any other relevant information provided by the Member State concerned or another
Member State.
4. The executive director shall immediately assess the possibilities for redeployment of
available members of the teams within the standing corps, in particular statutory staff and
staff seconded to the Agency by the Member States, present in other operational areas. The
executive director shall also assess the additional need to deploy operational staff in
accordance with Article 5769 and, once staff within the required profiles have been
exhausted, to request the Member States making sufficient number of staff from the
European border and return reserve available for deployments activate the reserve for rapid
reaction in accordance with Article 5870.
5. The executive director shall take a decision on the request to launch a rapid border
intervention within two working days from the date of receipt of the request. The executive
director shall simultaneously notify the Member State concerned and the management board
in writing of the decision. The decision shall state the main reasons on which it is based.
6. When taking the decision referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article, the executive
director shall inform the Member States about the possibility of requesting additional
operational staff in accordance with Article 5769 and, where applicable, Article 5870 by
indicating possible numbers and profiles of staff to be provided by each Member State.
7. If the executive director decides to launch a rapid border intervention, he or she shall
deploy available border management teams from the standing corps and equipment from the
technical equipment pool in accordance with Article 6478, and where necessary, he or she
shall decide on the immediate reinforcement by one or more border management teams, in
accordance with Article 5769.
8. The executive director together with the host Member State shall draw up and agree
upon an operational plan as referred to in Article 38(2)43(2) immediately and, in any event,
no later than three working days from the date of the decision.
9. As soon as the operational plan has been agreed upon and provided to the Member
States, the executive director shall immediately deploy the operational staff available through
redeployments from other operational areas or other duties.
10. In parallel to the deployment referred to in paragraph 9, and where necessary to secure
the immediate reinforcement of the border management teams redeployed from other areas or
duties, the executive director shall request from each Member State the number and profiles
of additional staff to be additionally deployed from their national lists for short-term
deployments as referred to in Article 5769.
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11. If a situation arises where the border management teams referred to in paragraph 7 and
the staff referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article are insufficient, the executive director may
activate the reserve for rapid reaction by requesting request from each Member State
the number and profiles of additional staff to be deployed as provided for in Article 5870.
12. The information referred to paragraphs 10 and 11 shall be provided in writing to the
national contact points and shall indicate the date on which the deployments of staff from
each category are to take place. A copy of the operational plan shall also be provided to the
national contact points.
13. Member States shall ensure that the number and profiles of staff are immediately made
available to the Agency to guarantee a complete deployment in accordance with Article 5769
and, if applicable, Article 5870.
14. The deployment of the first border management teams redeployed from other areas
and other duties shall take place no later than five working days after the date on which the
operational plan is agreed between the executive director and the host Member State.
Additional deployment of border management teams shall take place, where necessary, no
later than 12 working days after the date on which the operational plan is agreed.
15. Where the rapid border intervention is to take place, the executive director shall, in
consultation with the management board, immediately consider the priorities with regard to
the Agency's ongoing and planned joint operations at other external borders in order to
provide for possible reallocation of resources to the areas of the external borders where a
strengthened deployment is most needed.
Article 4045
Migration management support teams
1. Where a Member State faces disproportionate migratory challenges at particular
hotspot areas of its external borders characterised by large inward mixed migratory flows, that
Member State may request technical and operational reinforcement by migration management
support teams composed of experts from relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies that
shall operate in accordance with their mandates.
That Member State shall submit a request for reinforcement and an assessment of its needs to
the Commission. On the basis of that assessment of needs, the Commission shall transmit the
request, as appropriate, to the Agency, to EASO EUAA , to Europol and to other
relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies.
2. The relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies shall examine, in accordance with
their respective mandates, the Member State's request for reinforcement and the assessment of
its needs for the purpose of defining a comprehensive reinforcement package consisting of
various activities coordinated by the relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies, to be agreed
upon by the Member State concerned. The Commission shall coordinate that process.
3. The Commission, in cooperation with the host Member State and the relevant Union
bodies, offices and agencies in accordance with their respective mandates, shall establish the
terms of cooperation at the hotspot area and shall be responsible for the coordination of the
activities of the migration management support teams.
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4. Where achieving the operational objective may be ensured by requesting the support of the
Agency only, a Member State may request technical and operational assistance directly from
the Agency by notifying the Commission. In such a case, the support may be provided within
the framework of a multipurpose operation.
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45. The technical and operational reinforcement provided, with full respect for
fundamental rights, by the standing corps in the framework of migration management support
teams may include the provision of:
(a) assistance, with full respect for fundamental rights, in the screening of third-country
nationals arriving at the external borders, including the identification, registration, and
debriefing of those third-country nationals and, where requested by the Member State, the
fingerprinting of third-country nationals and providing information regarding the purpose of
these procedures;
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(b) debriefing of third-country nationals who have completed screening in accordance
with Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 or who are subject of screening;
2019/1896 (adapted)
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(cb) initial information to persons who wish to apply for international protection and
other persons on and the referral of those persons to the appropriate procedure as
referred to in Article 18(5) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 competent national authorities of
the Member State concerned or to the experts deployed by EASO;
(dc) technical and operational assistance in the field of return in accordance with Article
4855, 63 and 64, including the preparation and organisation of return operations;
(ed) necessary technical equipment.
56. Migration management support teams shall include, where necessary, staff with
expertise in child protection, trafficking in human beings, protection against gender-based
persecution or fundamental rights.
Article 4146
Proposed actions at the external borders
1. On the basis of the results of the vulnerability assessment , monitoring of
EUROSUR or where a critical impact level is attributed to one or more external border
sections and taking into account the relevant elements in the Member State's contingency
plans, the Agency's risk analysis and the analysis layer of the European situational picture, the
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executive director shall recommend to the Member State concerned to request that the Agency
initiate, carry out or adjust joint operations, rapid border interventions or any other relevant
actions by the Agency as set out in Article 3641 aiming at addressing the threats and
challenges at the affected border sections .
2. The Member State concerned shall respond to the recommendation of the executive
director referred to in paragraph 1 within six working days. In the event of a negative
response to the recommendation, the Member State shall also provide the justifications
underlying that response. The executive director shall notify inform the management
board and the Commission without delay about the recommended actions and the
justifications for the negative response. with a view to assessing whether urgent action may be
required in accordance with Article 4247. The absence of a reply shall be considered as a
negative response.
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3. The management board shall assess the information provided and, on the basis of a
proposal from the executive director, may make recommendations to the Member State
concerned, as appropriate, not later than 2 weeks following the proposal. The
recommendations of the management board, where necessary, shall lay down the operational
actions and the time limit within which those actions are to be implemented, including with
the support of the Agency.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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Article 4247
Situation at the external borders requiring urgent action
1. Where external border control is rendered ineffective to such an extent that it risks
jeopardising the functioning of the Schengen area because:
(a) a Member State does not implement the necessary measures in accordance with a
decision of the management board referred to in Article 32(10)37(11); or
(b) a Member State facing specific and disproportionate challenges at the external
borders has either not requested sufficient support from the Agency under Articles
3742, 3944 or 4045 or is not taking the necessary steps to implement actions under
those Articles or under Article 4146;
the Council, on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, may adopt without delay a
decision by means of an implementing act to identify measures to mitigate those risks to be
implemented by the Agency and requiring the Member State concerned to cooperate with the
Agency in the implementation of those measures. The Commission shall consult the Agency
before making its proposal.
2. Where a situation requiring urgent action arises, the European Parliament shall be
informed of that situation without delay as well as of any subsequent measures and decisions
taken in response.
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3. To mitigate the risk of putting the Schengen area in jeopardy, the Council decision
referred to in paragraph 1 shall provide for one or more of the following measures to be taken
by the Agency:
(a) organise and coordinate rapid border interventions and deploy the standing corps,
including teams from the European border and return reserve in accordance with
Article 70 reserve for rapid reaction;
(b) deploy the standing corps in the framework of the migration management support
teams, in particular at hotspot areas;
(c) coordinate activities for one or more Member States and third countries at the
external borders, including joint operations with third countries;
(d) deploy technical equipment;
(e) organise return interventions.
4. The executive director shall, within two working days from the date of adoption of the
Council decision referred to in paragraph 1:
(a) determine the actions to be taken for the practical execution of the measures
identified in that decision, including the technical equipment and the number and
profiles of the operational staff needed to meet the objectives of that decision;
(b) draw up a draft operational plan and submit it to the Member States concerned.
5. The executive director and the Member State concerned shall agree on the operational
plan referred to in point (b) of paragraph 4, point (b), within three working days from the date
of its submission.
6. The Agency shall, without delay, and in any case within five working days from the
establishment of the operational plan, deploy the necessary operational staff from the standing
corps for the practical execution of the measures identified in the Council decision referred to
in paragraph 1. Additional teams shall be deployed as necessary at a second stage, and in any
case within 12 working days from the establishment of the operational plan.
7. The Agency and the Member States shall, without delay, and in any case within 10
working days from the establishment of the operational plan, send the necessary technical
equipment and competent staff to the destination of deployment for the practical execution of
the measures identified in the Council decision referred to in paragraph 1.
Additional technical equipment shall be deployed as necessary at a second stage in
accordance with Article 6478.
8. The Member State concerned shall comply with the Council decision referred to in
paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall immediately cooperate with the Agency and take the
necessary action to facilitate the implementation of that decision and the practical execution
of the measures set out in that decision and in the operational plan agreed upon with the
executive director, in particular by implementing the obligations provided for in Articles
4349, 8298 and 8399.
9. In accordance with Articles 5769, 70 and, where relevant, Article 3944, the
Member States shall make available the operational staff determined by the executive director
in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article.
10. The Commission shall monitor the implementation of the measures identified in the
Council decision referred to in paragraph 1 and the actions that the Agency takes for that
purpose. If the Member State concerned does not comply with the Council decision referred
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to in paragraph 1 of this Article within 30 days and does not cooperate with the Agency in
accordance with to paragraph 8 of this Article, the Commission may trigger the procedure
provided for in Article 29 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399.
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Article 48
Actions in situations of crisis at the external borders
1. In a situation of crisis and force majeure as defined in Article 1 of Regulation (EU)
2024/1359, the executive director shall recommend to the Member State concerned to request
that the Agency initiate, carry out or adjust joint operations, border interventions or any other
relevant actions by the Agency as set out in Article 41. The Member State concerned shall
respond to that recommendation within forty-eight hours.
2. For the purposes of the actions referred to in paragraph 1, the Agency shall, as a
priority, deploy officers from the European border and return reserve that are already
available in that Member State and the Agency’s quick reaction force.
3. The Agency may provide its technical and operational support to the Member State
concerned without a formal revision of the operational plan governing any existing joint
operation or the negotiation of a new or additional operational plan.
4. In view of the urgency of the deployment of the technical and operational support, the
monitoring referred to in Article 129(2), point (b), and to Article 130(2), point (a), shall be
exercised through ex-post review of the activities performed by the Agency during the crisis
situation, unless otherwise requested by the Member State concerned.
5. Within a month from the deployment of the technical and operational support, the
Agency and the Member State concerned shall inform the management board about the
progress as regards the update of the existing or a new operational plan.
2019/1896 (adapted)
Article 4349
Instructions to the teams
1. During the deployment of border management teams, return teams and migration
management support teams, the host Member State or, in the case of cooperation with a third
country in accordance with the a status agreement with the third country
concerned, shall issue instructions to the teams in accordance with the operational plan.
2. The Agency, through its coordinating officer, may communicate its views to the host
Member State on the instructions given to the teams. In that case, the host Member State shall
take those views into consideration and follow them to the extent possible.
3. In cases where the instructions issued to the teams are not in compliance with the
operational plan, the coordinating officer shall immediately report to the executive director,
who may, if appropriate, take action in accordance with Article 46(3)52(3).
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4. Members of the teams shall, in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of
their powers, fully respect fundamental rights, including access to asylum procedures and
human dignity, and shall pay particular attention to vulnerable persons. Any measures taken
in the performance of their tasks and in the exercise of their powers shall be proportionate to
the objectives pursued by such measures. While performing their tasks and exercising their
powers, they shall not discriminate against persons on the basis of any grounds such as sex,
race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or
any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual
orientation in line with Article 21 of the Charter.
5. Members of the teams who are not statutory staff shall remain subject to the
disciplinary measures of their home Member State. The home Member State shall provide for
appropriate disciplinary or other measures in accordance with its national law regarding
violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations in the course of any
operational activity by the Agency.
6. Statutory staff deployed as members of the teams shall be subject to disciplinary
measures as provided for in the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment and
measures of a disciplinary nature provided for in the supervisory mechanism referred to in
Article 55(5)67(5), point (a).
Article 44 50
Coordinating officer
1. The Agency shall ensure the operational implementation of all the organisational
aspects of joint operations, pilot projects or rapid border interventions, including the presence
of statutory staff.
2. Without prejudice to affecting Article 6073, the executive director shall
appoint one or more experts from the statutory staff to be deployed as a coordinating officer
for each joint operation or rapid border intervention. The executive director shall notify the
host Member State of the appointment.
3. The coordinating officer shall act on behalf of the Agency in all aspects of the
deployment of the teams. The role of the coordinating officer shall be to foster cooperation
and coordination among host and participating Member States. At least one fundamental
rights monitor shall assist and advise the coordinating officer. In particular, the coordinating
officer shall:
(a) act as an interface between the Agency, the host Member State and the members of
the teams, providing assistance, on behalf of the Agency, on all issues relating to the
conditions of the deployment to the teams;
(b) monitor the correct implementation of the operational plan, including, in cooperation
with the fundamental rights monitors, as regards the protection of fundamental rights
and report to the executive director on this;
(c) act on behalf of the Agency in all aspects of the deployment of the teams and report
to the Agency on all those aspects;
(d) report to the executive director where the instructions issued to the teams by the host
Member States are not in compliance with the operational plan, in particular as
regards fundamental rights and, where appropriate, suggest that the executive
director consider taking a decision in accordance with Article 4652.
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4. In the context of joint operations or rapid border interventions, the executive director
may authorise the coordinating officer to assist in resolving any disagreement on the
execution of the operational plan and deployment of the teams.
Article 45 51
Costs
1. The Agency shall fully cover the following costs incurred by Member States in
making available their staff for the purposes of deploying them from the standing corps as
members of the teams to the Member States and to third countries for a short term in
accordance with Article 5769 or to the Member States through the reserve for rapid reaction
European border and return reserve in accordance with Article 5870:
(a) travel costs from the home Member State to the host Member State, from the host
Member State to the home Member State, within the host Member State for the
purposes of deployment or redeployment within that host Member State or to another
host Member State, and for the purposes of deployments to, and redeployments
within or to, another third country;
(b) costs related to vaccinations;
(c) costs related to the need of special insurance needs of persons and assets
owned by the Agency which have been made available in the joint operation ;
(d) costs related to health care, including psychological assistance;
(e) daily subsistence allowances, including accommodation costs.
2. On the basis of a proposal of the executive director, the management board shall adopt
detailed rules as regards the reimbursement of the costs incurred by staff deployed for a short
term in accordance with Articles 57 69 and 58, and shall update them as necessary. To ensure
compliance with the applicable legal framework, the executive director shall make such
proposal after receiving the positive opinion of the Commission. The detailed rules shall be
based to the extent possible on simplified cost options in accordance with points (c), (d) and
(e) of Article 129(1), points (c), (d) and (e), of Regulation (EU, Euratom)
2024/25092018/1046. Where relevant, the management board shall ensure consistency with
the rules applicable to mission expenses of statutory staff.
Article 46 52
Decisions to suspend, terminate or not launch activities
1. The executive director shall terminate any activity of the Agency if the conditions to
conduct those activities are no longer fulfilled. The executive director shall inform the
Member State concerned prior to such termination.
2. The Member States participating in an operational activity by the Agency may request
that the executive director terminate that operational activity. The executive director shall
inform the management board of such request.
3. The executive director may, after informing the Member State concerned, withdraw
the financing of an activity or suspend or terminate it if the operational plan is not respected
by the host Member State.
4. The executive director shall, after consulting the fundamental rights officer and
informing the Member State concerned, withdraw the financing for any activity by the
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Agency, or suspend or terminate any activity by the Agency, in whole or in part, if he or she
considers that there are violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations
related to the activity concerned that are of a serious nature or are likely to persist.
5. The executive director shall, after consulting the fundamental rights officer, decide not
to launch any activity by the Agency where he or she considers that there would already be
serious reasons at the beginning of the activity to suspend or terminate it because it could lead
to violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations of a serious nature.
The executive director shall inform the Member State concerned of that decision.
6. The decisions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be based on duly justified
grounds. When taking such decisions, the executive director shall take into account relevant
information such as the number and substance of registered complaints that have not been
resolved by a national competent authority, reports of serious incidents, reports from
coordinating officers, relevant international organisations and Union institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies in the areas covered by this Regulation. The executive director shall
inform the management board of such decisions and provide it with justifications therefor.
7. If the executive director decides to suspend or terminate deployment by the Agency of
a migration management support team, he or she shall inform about that decision the
other relevant bodies, offices and agencies active in the hotspot area of that decision.
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8. If the executive director is considering suspending or terminating in whole a joint operation
in a Member State, in accordance with paragraph 4, the executive director shall consult the
management board. The management board shall urgently consider the matter. The executive
director shall take a decision following the consultation of the management board. To restore
the operational activities, the same procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis.
2019/1896
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Article 47 53
Evaluation of activities
The executive director shall evaluate , in cooperation with the Member States, the
results of all the Agency's operational activities.
He or she shall transmit detailed evaluation reports to the management board within 60 days
following the end of those activities, together with the observations of the fundamental rights
officer.
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After consulting the host Member State, Member States participating in the operational
activity and any other Member State expressing interest in such discussions, the executive
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director shall transmit detailed evaluation reports to the management board as defined in the
respective operational plan, together with the observations of the fundamental rights officer.
On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall establish
the rules applicable to organising such consultations with the Member States.
2019/1896
The executive director shall make a comprehensive analysis of those results with a view to
enhancing the quality, coherence and effectiveness of future activities, and shall include that
analysis in the Agency's annual activity report. The executive director shall ensure that the
Agency takes the analysis of those results into account in future operational activities.
SECTION 8
ACTION BY THE AGENCY IN THE AREA OF RETURN
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Article 54
Return Coordination Centre
1. The Agency shall establish and maintain within its organisational structure a Return
Coordination Centre.
2. The Return Coordination Centre shall have the following tasks:
(a) ensuring the continuous collection of operational information related to return, to
support situational awareness, identifying operational needs of Member States, and
informing operational planning;
(b) analysing operational data, including forecasts of Member States’ needs for support,
assessing the Member States’ and the Agency’s operational capabilities, and
matching identified needs with available resources;
(c) supporting the planning and coordination of reintegration assistance, including
through the analysis of forecasted demand and relevant operational trends, reported
by Member States in accordance with Article 56(3);
(d) sharing, on a regular basis, with Member States information on planned return
operations;
(e) drawing up, updating and implementing the rolling operational plan referred to in
Article 59;
(f) support the Agency in carrying out the risk analysis and the vulnerability assessment
referred to in Article 11;
(g) ensuring the collection of operational information to support operational needs for
return from third countries and inform operational planning.
3. By 1 November every year, starting from the year of entry into force of this regulation,
Member States shall inform the Agency of their indicative planning as regards the number of
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returnees and the third countries of return, both with respect to relevant national return
operations, and of to their needs for assistance or coordination by the Agency. In addition, for
the return border procedure under Regulation (EU) 2024/1349, Member States shall inform
the Agency of the applicable deadlines for return and any procedural or operational aspects
relevant for the organisation and carrying out such returns.
4. The Agency shall share the data referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 with the Commission.
2019/1896 (adapted)
Article 48 55
Return -related tasks
1. Without entering into the merits of return decisions, which remain the sole
responsibility of the Member States, and in accordance with the respect for fundamental
rights, general principles of Union law and international law, including international
protection, the respect for the principle of non-refoulement and children's rights, with regard
to return, the Agency shall:
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(a) plan and coordinate return operations and other return-related activities, through the
Return Coordination Centre, in particular the matching, pooling and allocation of
operational resources;
2019/1896 (adapted)
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(ab) based on a return decision issued by a Member State, provide in
particular the following technical and operational assistance to Member States in the area
of return , readmission and reintegration , including in:
(i) the collection of information necessary for issuing return decisions, the
identification of third-country nationals subject to return procedures and other
pre-return, return-related and post-arrival and post-return activities of the
Member States, to achieve an integrated system of return management among
competent authorities of the Member States, with the participation of relevant
authorities of third countries and other relevant stakeholders;
(ii) the acquisition of travel documents, including by means of consular
cooperation, without disclosing information relating to the fact that an
application for international protection has been made or any other information
that is not necessary for the purpose of the return;
(i) (iii) the organisationand implementation coordination of return
operations and provide assistance in relation to voluntary returns in cooperation
with Member States, for both forced and voluntary returns ;
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(ii) provision of assistance to returnees throughout the pre-return, return and post-
return phases, taking into account the specific needs of vulnerable persons;
(iii) the management of reintegration services;
2019/1896
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(iv) assisted voluntary returns from the Member States, providing assistance to
returnees during the pre-return, return-related and post-arrival and post-return phases,
taking into account the needs of vulnerable persons;
(cb) provide technical and operational assistance to Member States experiencing challenges
with regard to their return systems related to other pre-return, return and post-return
activities, in particular:
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(i) collection of personal and non-personal data necessary to achieve the tasks
listed in this paragraph;
(ii) identification of third-country nationals subject to return procedures;
(iii) development of capacities to support and carry out, at the request of a Member
State, activities in the context of the identification and confirmation of
nationality of returnees, including necessary technical equipment and expertise
and accompanying returnees for the purposes of transfer within a Member
State or between Member States;
(iv) facilitation, support and coordination of identification missions carried out by
third country authorities on the territory of one or more Member States;
(v) facilitation of the acquisition of travel documents, including by means of
consular cooperation without disclosing information relating to the fact that an
application for international protection has been made or any other information
that is not necessary for the purpose of the return;
(vi) return and reintegration counselling, where applicable, as referred to in
Regulation (EU) 2026/2280, as well as the development of standardised return
and reintegration counselling guidelines;
(vii) provision of interpreting services;
(viii) support to ensure the availability of returnees for return purposes and to
prevent returnees from absconding, in implementation of measures taken by
Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2026/2280, and advice on,
and assistance in relation to, alternatives to detention;
(ix) provision of technical equipment, resources and expertise for the
implementation of return decisions;
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2019/1896
(c) develop, in consultation with the fundamental rights officer, a non-binding reference
model for national IT systems for return case management which describes the structure of
such systems, as well as provide technical and operational assistance to Member States in
developing such systems compatible with the model;
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(d) develop and, where applicable, operationally manage, the model document and
specifications (‘RECAMAS Model’), the IT reference implementation (‘Frontex
RECAMAS’), the integrated Union readmission case management system (‘iRCMS’) and the
Union reintegration case management system (‘RIAT’) referred to in Regulation (EU) …/…
of the European Parliament and of the Council [Return Digitalisation Regulation];
2019/1896 (adapted)
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(de) operate and further develop an integrated return management platform
(‘IRMA’) and a communication infrastructure that enables the linking of the return
management systems of the Member States with the platform connected to all relevant
systems (national RECAMAS, iRCMS and RIAT) for the purpose of exchanging data and
other information, necessary for supporting Member States for return, readmission
and reintegration purposes, including the automated transmission of statistical data, and
provide technical and operational assistance to Member States in connecting to IRMA
the communication infrastructure;
(ef) organise, promote and coordinate activities enabling the exchange of data and
other information for the purpose of return, readmission and reintegration and the
identification and pooling of best practices in return matters between the Member States;
(fg) finance or co-finance from its budget, in accordance with the financial rules applicable
to the Agency, the operations, interventions and activities referred to in this Chapter,
including reimbursing the costs incurred for the necessary adaptation of the national IT
systems for return case management all national RECAMAS for the purpose of
ensuring secure communication to the integrated return management platform IRMA ;
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(h) provide technical and operational assistance to third countries in the area of return.
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2019/1896
2. The technical and operational assistance referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 shall
include activities to help Member States carry out return procedures by the competent national
authorities by providing, in particular:
(a) interpreting services;
(b) practical information, including the analysis of such information, and
recommendations by the Agency on third countries of return relevant for the
implementation of this Regulation, in cooperation, where appropriate, with other
Union bodies, offices and agencies, in particular EASO;
(c) advice on the implementation and management of return procedures in compliance
with Directive 2008/115/EC;
(d) advice on and assistance in the implementation of measures taken by Member States
in compliance with Directive 2008/115/EC and international law that are necessary
to ensure the availability of returnees for return purposes and to prevent returnees
from absconding and advice on and assistance in relation to alternatives to detention;
(e) equipment, resources and expertise for the implementation of return decisions and
for the identification of third-country nationals.
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2. When performing the tasks listed in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Agency shall give
priority to supporting returns in the context of the return border procedure referred to in
Regulation (EU) 2024/1349.
2019/1896
3. The Agency shall aim at building synergies and connecting Union-funded networks and
programmes in the field of return in close cooperation with the Commission and with the
support of relevant stakeholders, including the European Migration Network.
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Article 56
Reintegration assistance
1. The Agency shall coordinate the provision of post-arrival assistance and reintegration
at Union level, in cooperation with the competent authorities of the Member States and, where
appropriate, with relevant authorities of third countries and other relevant entities.
2. The Agency shall, in particular, perform the following tasks:
(a) identify and analyse the needs of the Member States, maintain an overview of
available reintegration programmes and capacities, and coordinate the provision of
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post-arrival assistance and reintegration by matching identified needs with available
Union and national resources;
(b) facilitate coordination and cooperation between Member States, relevant Union
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and entities in Member States and third
countries in the field of post-arrival assistance and reintegration, including through
the exchange of information and best practices;
(c) develop, implement and manage a Union-level reintegration programme;
(d) facilitate the referral of the returnees to relevant development programmes available
in third countries that can contribute to long-term reintegration, including by
supporting cooperation with third country authorities and mechanisms responsible
for referrals and reintegration, where such authorities and mechanism exist.
3. In developing, implementing and managing the programme referred to in paragraph 2,
point (c), the Agency shall take into account the Union priorities in the field of return and
readmission, and in particular:
i) the European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy adopted
pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351;
ii) the implementation of the return border procedure pursuant to Regulation
(EU) 2024/1349;
iii) the assessment of the level of cooperation of third countries with Member
States on readmission in accordance with Article 25a of Regulation (EC)
No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council72;
iv) the implementation of Union readmission agreements or arrangements;
v) the implementation of any other Union instrument relevant for the
cooperation on readmission.
4. Each year, the Agency shall establish, in consultation with the Commission and by
means of a decision of the management board, the priority third countries for the provision of
reintegration assistance for the following year, taking into account the priorities referred to in
paragraph 3.
5. By 1 November every year, starting from [year of entry into force of this regulation
+1], Member States shall provide the Agency with forecasts of the expected demand for
reintegration assistance during the following financial year. On the basis of that information,
the Agency shall plan and prioritise the allocation of the financial, technical and operational
resources necessary for the implementation of reintegration assistance.
6. The Agency shall finance the Union-level reintegration programme referred to in
paragraph 2, point (c), from its budget, in accordance with the financial rules applicable to the
Agency.
72 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/810/oj).
EN 150 EN
2019/1896 (adapted)
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Article 49 57
Integrated return management platform (IRMA) Information exchange systems
and management of return
1. The Agency shall operate and further develop IRMA , in accordance with point
(d) of Article 48(1)55(1), point (d) ,. IRMA shall be connected to the communication portal
referred to in Article [14] of Regulation (EU) …/… [Return Digitalisation Regulation]. an
integrated return management platform for processing information, including personal data
transmitted by the Member States' return management systems, that is necessary for the
Agency to provide technical and operational assistance. Personal data shall only include
biographic data or passenger lists. Personal data shall be transmitted only where they are
necessary for the Agency to assist in the coordination or organisation of return operations to
third countries, irrespective of the means of transport. Such personal data shall be transmitted
to the platform only once a decision to launch a return operation has been taken, and shall be
erased as soon as the operation is terminated.
Biographic data shall only be transmitted to the platform where they cannot be accessed by
members of teams in accordance with Article 17(3) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 of the
European Parliament and of the Council73.
The Agency may also use the platform for the purpose of securely transmitting biographic or
biometric data, including all types of documents which can be considered as proof or prima
facie evidence of the nationality of third-country nationals subject to return decisions, where
the transmission of such personal data is necessary for the Agency to provide assistance, at
the request of a Member State, in confirming the identity and nationality of third-country
nationals in individual cases. Such data shall not be stored on the platform and shall be erased
immediately following a confirmation of receipt.
2. As part of IRMA, tThe Agency shall develop, deploy and operate information
systems and software applications allowing for the exchange of information referred to in
Article 36(6) of Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 via the communication portal referred to in
Article [14] of Regulation (EU) …/… [Return Digitalisation Regulation] for the purpose of
return , readmission and reintegration within the European Border and Coast Guard ,
including exchanging data relating to identification of third-country nationals . IRMA
shall include systems and software applications and for the purpose of organising or
coordinating such return activities by the Agency exchanging personal data.
3. Personal data shall be processed in accordance with Articles 86 102,, 87 104,, 88105
and 91110, as applicable.
73 Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November
2018 on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country
nationals (OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 1).
EN 151 EN
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Article 58
The Agency’s role in relation to the Schengen Information System
1. A SIRENE office shall be established within the Return Coordination Centre of the
Agency.
2. The Agency shall, through the SIRENE office, ensure the exchange and availability of
supplementary information, in accordance with Regulations (EU) 2018/1860 and (EU)
2018/1861.
3. Member States shall inform the Agency through the exchange of supplementary
information of any hit on alerts on return and alerts for refusal of entry and stay.
Member States may exceptionally not inform the Agency if doing so would jeopardise the
safety of an individual or be contrary to essential interests of the security of the issuing
Member State.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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Article 50 59
Return operations in the common system for returns
1. Without entering into the merits of return decisions, which remain the sole
responsibility of the Member States, the Agency shall provide Member States with technical
and operational assistance and shall ensure the coordination or the organisation of return
operations organise and coordinate return operations and support their implementation in
cooperation with Member States in accordance with Article 55(1), points (a) and (b), ,
including through the chartering of aircraft for the purpose of such operations and organising
returns on scheduled flights or by other means of transport. The Agency may on its own
initiative and with the agreement of the Member State concerned, coordinate or organise
return operations on its own initiative .
2. Member States shall provide operational data on returns necessary for the assessment
of return needs by the Agency through the platform referred to in Article 49(1) and shall
inform the Agency of their indicative planning as regards the number of returnees and the
third countries of return, both with respect to relevant national return operations, and of their
needs for assistance or coordination by the Agency. Following the reporting by Member
States of their operational data referred to in Article 54, Tthe Agency shall draw up and
maintain a rolling operational plan to ensure the effective coordination of Member States’
operational needs and available resources in the area of return to provide the requesting
Member States with the necessary operational assistance and reinforcements, including
through technical equipment. The Agency shall may, either on its own initiative and
with the agreement of the Member State concerned or at the request of a Member State,
include in the rolling operational plan the dates and destinations of return operations it
considers necessary, based on a the needs assessment carried out in accordance
with Article 54 . The management board shall decide, on the basis of a proposal from the
executive director, on the modus operandi of the rolling operational plan. Prior to the start
EN 152 EN
of a return operation, Tthe Member State concerned shall confirm to the Agency that all
returnees covered by such a return operation organised or coordinated by the Agency
are the subject of a an enforceable return decision that can be enforced .
Where members of the teams are deployed, they shall consult the Schengen Information
System prior to the return of any returnee in order to check whether the return decision issued
in relation to that returnee has been suspended or whether its enforcement has been
postponed.
The rolling operational plan shall contain the elements necessary for carrying out a return
operation, including those concerning the respect for fundamental rights, and shall refer to,
inter alia, relevant codes of conduct and procedures for monitoring, reporting and the
complaints mechanism.
new
3. Without affecting paragraph 4 of this Article, the Agency shall, on the basis of a risk
assessment, select the forced-return operations to be monitored and determine the phases of
those operations that require monitoring.
In the selected operations at least one forced-return monitor from the pool established under
Article 60 or from the monitoring system of the participating Member States shall be present
during the phases of the return operation identified as requiring monitoring.
The monitoring shall be carried out on the basis of objective and transparent criteria.
The forced-return monitors shall submit a report on each monitored forced-return operation to
the executive director, the fundamental rights officer and to the competent national authorities
of all the Member States involved in the given operation. If necessary, appropriate follow-up
shall be ensured by the executive director and competent national authorities respectively.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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34. The Agency may provide technical and operational assistance to the Member States
and may also, either on its own initiative and with the agreement of the Member State
concerned or at the request of the participating Member States, ensure the coordination or the
organisation of return operations for which the means of transport and return escorts are
provided by a third country of return (‘collecting return operations’). The participating
Member States and the Agency shall ensure that the respect for fundamental rights, the
principle of non-refoulement, the proportionate use of means of constraints and the dignity of
the returnee are guaranteed during the entire return operation. At least one Member State
representative, and one forced-return monitor from the pool established under Article 5160 or
from the monitoring system of the participating Member State, shall be present throughout the
entire return operation until arrival at the third country of return.
45. The executive director shall draw up a return plan for collecting return operations
without delay. The executive director and any participating Member State shall agree on the
plan detailing the organisational and procedural aspects of the collecting return operation,
taking account of the implications for the fundamental rights and risks of such operations.
Any amendment to or adaptation of that plan shall require the agreement of the parties
referred to in paragraph 34 and in this paragraph.
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The return plan for collecting return operations shall be binding on the Agency and any
participating Member State. It shall cover all the necessary steps for carrying out collecting
return operations.
(e) 5. Every return operation organised or coordinated by the Agency shall be
monitored in accordance with Article 8(6) of Directive 2008/115/EC. The monitoring
of forced-return operations shall be carried out by the forced-return monitor on the
basis of objective and transparent criteria and shall cover the whole return operation
from the pre-departure phase until the handover of the returnees in the third country
of return. The forced-return monitor shall submit a report on each forced-return
operation to the executive director, the fundamental rights officer and to the
competent national authorities of all the Member States involved in the given
operation. If necessary, appropriate follow-up shall be ensured by the executive
director and competent national authorities respectively.
6. If the Agency has concerns regarding the respect of fundamental rights at any stage of
a return operation, it shall communicate them to the participating Member States and to the
Commission.
7. The executive director shall evaluate the results of the return operations and shall
transmit every six months a detailed evaluation report to the European Parliament, to the
Council, to the Commission and to the management board covering all return operations
conducted in the previous semester, together with the observations of the fundamental rights
officer. The executive director shall make a comprehensive comparative analysis of those
results with a view to enhancing the quality, coherence and effectiveness of future return
operations. The executive director shall include that analysis in the Agency's annual activity
report.
8. The Agency shall finance or co-finance return operations from its budget, in
accordance with the financial rules applicable to the Agency, giving priority , as a general
rule, to those return operations conducted by more than one Member State,
return operations in the context of the return border procedure, in accordance with
Regulation (EU) 2024/1349, and return operations from Member States or from hotspot
areas.
Article 51 60
Pool of forced-return monitors
1. The Agency shall, after taking due account of the opinion of the fundamental rights
officer, constitute a pool of forced-return monitors from competent bodies of the Member
States who carry out forced-return monitoring activities in accordance with Article 8(6) of
Directive 2008/115/EC and who have been trained in accordance with Article 62 75 of this
Regulation.
2. The management board shall, on the basis of a proposal from the executive director,
determine the profile and the number of forced-return monitors to be made available to that
pool. The same procedure shall apply with regard to any subsequent changes in the profile
and overall numbers.
Member States shall be responsible for contributing contribute to the pool by
nominating forced-return monitors corresponding to the defined profile, without prejudice
affecting to the independence of those monitors under national law, where national
law so provides. The Agency shall also contribute fundamental rights monitors or other
qualified staff or seconded experts of the fundamental rights office as referred to in Article
EN 154 EN
110 130 to the pool. Forced-return monitors with specific expertise in child protection and
the needs of persons in a vulnerable situation shall be included in the pool .
3. Member States' contribution of forced-return monitors to return operations and
interventions for the following year shall be planned on the basis of annual bilateral
negotiations and agreements between the Agency and Member States. In accordance with
those agreements, Member States shall make the forced-return monitors available for
deployment at the request of the Agency, unless they are faced with an exceptional situation
substantially affecting the discharge of national tasks. Such a request shall be made at least 21
working days before the intended deployment, or five working days in the case of a rapid
return intervention.
4. The Agency shall make the forced-return monitors available upon request to
participating Member States to monitor, on their behalf, the correct implementation of the
return operations and return interventions throughout their duration. It shall make available
forced-return monitors with specific expertise in child protection for any return operation
involving children.
5. Forced-return monitors shall remain subject to the disciplinary measures of their home
Member State in the course of a return operation or return intervention. Statutory staff
deployed as forced-return monitors shall be subject to the disciplinary measures provided for
in the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment.
Article 52 61
Return teams
1. The Agency may deploy return teams either on its own initiative and with the
agreement of the Member State concerned or at the request of that Member State. The Agency
may deploy such return teams during return interventions, in the framework of migration
management support teams or as necessary to provide additional technical and operational
assistance in the area of return. Where necessary, return teams shall contain officers with
specific expertise in child protection.
2. Article 40(2) 45(2) to (6) and Articles 43, 44 and 45 49, 50 and 51 shall apply mutatis
mutandis to the return teams.
Article 53 62
Return interventions
1. Where a Member State is facing a burden when implementing the obligation to return
returnees , including where carrying out the border procedure according to Regulation
(EU) 2024/1349 , the Agency shall provide the appropriate technical and operational
assistance in the form of a return intervention, either on its own initiative and with the
agreement of the Member State concerned or at the request of that Member State. Such
intervention may consist in the deployment of return teams to the host Member State,
providing assistance in the implementation of return procedures and the organisation of return
operations from the host Member State.
Article 5059 shall apply also to return operations organised or coordinated by the Agency in
the framework of return interventions.
2. Where a Member State is facing specific and disproportionate challenges when
implementing its obligation to return returnees, the Agency shall provide the appropriate
technical and operational assistance in the form of a rapid return intervention, either on its
EN 155 EN
own initiative and with the agreement of the Member State concerned or at the request of that
Member State. A rapid return intervention may consist in the rapid deployment of return
teams to the host Member State, providing assistance in the implementation of return
procedures and the organisation of return operations from the host Member State.
3. In the context of a return intervention or a rapid return intervention , the executive
director shall draw up an operational plan without delay, in agreement with the host Member
State and the participating Member States. The provisions of Article 3843 shall apply mutatis
mutandis.
4. The executive director shall take a decision on the operational plan as soon as possible
and, in the case referred to in paragraph 2, within five working days. The decision shall be
immediately notified, in writing, to the Member States concerned and to the management
board.
5. The Agency shall finance or co-finance return interventions from its budget in accordance
with the financial rules applicable to the Agency.
new
Article 63
Technical assistance provided by the Agency to third countries in the area of return
1. The Agency may provide technical assistance to third countries in the area of return such as
training, capacity building and support for voluntary return and reintegration that does not
involve the exercise of executive powers.
2. When deciding on the assistance to be provided to a specific third country, the Agency
shall take particular account of the priorities of the migration policy of the Union and
prioritise, in consultation with the Commission, countries according to their relevance for
achieving the Union’s objectives.
3. In cases where a structural or long-term cooperation on technical assistance is envisaged,
the Agency may conclude working arrangements with the relevant third-country authority as
referred to in Article 88(6).
4. Article 55(1) and Articles 85, 88 and 89 shall apply mutatis mutandis to technical
assistance provided in accordance with this Article.
Article 64
Operational assistance provided by the Agency to third countries in the area of return
1. The Agency may provide operational assistance to third countries in the area of return,
based on an international agreement concluded by the Union .
2. The assistance referred to in paragraph 1 shall take place in full respect of fundamental
rights, including the principle of non-refoulement, and relevant international obligations and
standards, and shall be subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraphs 4
and 5. The assistance may concern one of the following:
(a) return, based on a return decision issued by a Member State, from a third country
where a strategic interest of the Union is identified by the Commission taking due
account of the criteria referred to in Article 65, in particular in relation to the
EN 156 EN
implementation of the return border procedure referred to in Regulation (EU)
2024/1349;
(b) return from a third country based on an individual obligation to leave established
under the national law of:
i) a third country that has been granted the status of candidate country for
accession;
i) a third country that is bound by the European Convention on Human
Rights;
ii) a third country that is designated as safe third country at Union level in
accordance with Articles 59 and 60 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the
European Parliament and of the Council74; or
iii) any other third country respecting international human rights standards
and principles, in accordance with international law, including the
principle of non-refoulement, where a strategic interest of the Union is
identified by the Commission taking due account of the criteria referred
to in Article65, including in relation to the return caseload and the
geopolitical context.
For the Agency’s assistance Article 55(1) shall apply mutatis mutandis.
3. Operational assistance to third countries, as referred to in paragraph 1, shall be based on an
international agreement concluded by the Union, provided that all elements of the model
status agreement pursuant to Article 91(1) of this Regulation and the relevant safeguards set
out in paragraphs 4 or 5 of this Article are included in that agreement.
4. Agreements referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article covering operational assistance in the
area of voluntary return shall include the requirements laid down in Article 88(3), including
provisions on the scope of the assistance, the tasks and powers of the members of the return
teams, and their privileges and immunities, including provisions on civil and criminal liability
in accordance with Article 115(2). Such agreements shall include the following additional
safeguards, taking into account the existence, or lack thereof, of applicable international
instruments already providing such safeguards and of the specific situation of countries
referred to in paragraph 2, points (b)(i) to (iii), of this Article:
(a) the commitment by the third country to respect international human rights standards
and principles in accordance with international law;
(b) the commitment by the third country that any person to be subject of Agency’s
return-related assistance is under the individual obligation to leave that third country
in accordance with national law, following a due process, and that the Agency is
satisfied of that obligation at the time of return;
(c) the commitment by the third country to guarantee that the principle of non-
refoulement was respected in the specific case, and to provide the Agency the
mechanism through which such respect is generally ensured at national level;
(d) a mechanism for the Agency to report incidents to the third country;
74 Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing
a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU (OJ
L, 2024/1348, 22.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1348/oj).
EN 157 EN
(e) an independent mechanism to monitor the effective application of the agreement.
5. Where the operational assistance is to cover forced return, the international agreements
referred to in paragraph 3 shall include the safeguards and requirements referred to in
paragraph 4 and the following additional safeguards:
(a) the commitment to respect the needs of vulnerable persons;
(b) clear rules regarding the proportionate use, where necessary, of force and means of
constraints during the return operation.
6. Articles 59, 85, 88 and 89 shall apply mutatis mutandis to operational assistance provided
in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 5 of this Article.
Article 65
Cooperation with third countries in the area of return
Cooperation with third countries in the area of return shall be in line with the Union’s policy
priorities in the area of migration, security, and border management and with the Union’s
external action policies priorities and shall take into account the European Asylum and
Migration Management Strategy adopted pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351.
Implications concerning resources and costs, including the impacts on the Agency’s capacity
to provide return-related support to Member States shall also be considered before the
Commission recommends to the Council to authorise it to negotiate an agreement with a third
country.
2019/1896
SECTION 9
CAPABILITIES
Article 54 66
European Border and Coast Guard standing corps
1. A European Border and Coast Guard standing corps with the capacity set out in Annex
I shall be part of the Agency. The standing corps shall be composed of the following four
categories of operational staff in accordance with the annual availability scheme set out in
Annex I:
new
The standing corps shall support the European Border and Coast Guard in the implementation
of European Integrated Border Management, and support in the field of the common system
for returns. The standing corps shall be composed of three categories of operational staff and
a European border and return reserve of operational staff to maintain the capacity of the
European Border and Coast Guard in the area of management of external borders and return.
The capacity of the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps shall be set out in
EN 158 EN
Annex I determining the multiannual availability scheme. The categories of operational staff
and a European border and return reserve of operational staff shall be as follows:
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
(a) category 1: statutory staff deployed as members of the teams in operational areas in
accordance with Article 5567 and in antenna offices referred to in Article 73, statutory staff
performing operational activities at the Agency’s headquarters, staff carrying out operational
training of standing corps, and statutory as well as staff responsible for the functioning of
the ETIAS Central Unit;
(b) category 2: staff seconded from Member States to the Agency for a long term as part
of the standing corps in accordance with Article 5668;
(c) category 3: staff from Member States who are ready to be provided to the Agency for
a short-term deployment as part of the standing corps in accordance with Article 5769; and
(d) category 4: the reserve for rapid reaction consisting of staff from the Member States
who are ready to be deployed in accordance with Article 58 for the purposes of rapid border
interventions in accordance with Article 39. European border and return reserve: staff from
Member States who have undergone training by the Agency and are ready to be deployed in
accordance with Article 70.
2. The Agency shall deploy members of the standing corps as members of the border
management teams, migration management support teams and return teams in joint
operations, rapid border interventions, return interventions or any other relevant operational
activities in the Member States or in third countries. Such activities shall only be carried out
with the authorisation of the Member State or the third country concerned.
new
The standing corps shall also carry out operational activities at the Agency’s headquarter or in
antenna offices and provide operational training.
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
The actual number of staff deployed from the standing corps shall depend on the operational
needs.
Deployment of the standing corps shall be complementary to the efforts undertaken by the
Member States.
3. When providing support to the Member States, the members of the standing corps
deployed as members of the teams shall have the ability to carry out border control or return
tasks, including tasks requiring executive powers provided for in the relevant national law or,
in the case of statutory staff, the tasks requiring executive powers set out in Article
55(7)67(7).
EN 159 EN
The members of the standing corps carrying out border control shall meet the
requirements for specialised training and professionalism as provided for in the third
subparagraph of Article 16(1) , third subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 or other
relevant instruments. The members of the standing corps who are not required to carry out
border control shall meet the professional requirements relevant to the performance of their
tasks.
4. On the basis of a proposal from the executive director taking into account the
Agency's risk analysis, the results of the vulnerability assessment and the multiannual
strategic policy cycle for EIBM European integrated border management, and building
on the numbers and profiles of staff available to the Agency through its statutory staff and
ongoing secondments, by 31 March of each year the management board shall adopt a
decision:
(a) defining the profiles of, and setting out the requirements for, operational staff;
(ba) on the number of staff per specific profile of categories 1, 2 and 3 staff to form teams
in the following year, based on the expected operational needs for the following year;
(cb) specifying further the contributions set out in Annexes II and III by setting the specific
numbers and profiles of staff per Member State to be seconded to the Agency in accordance
with Article 5668 and to be nominated in accordance with Article 5769 in the following year;
(dc) specifying further the contributions set out in Annex IV by setting the specific
numbers and profiles of staff per Member State under the reserve for rapid reaction to be
provided in the following year in the event of rapid border interventions in accordance with
Articles 39 and 58; and specifying the number of officers from the Member States to
undergo the training in accordance with Article 70 for becoming part of the European border
and return reserve, in the following year;
(d) setting out an indicative multiannual planning of profiles for the subsequent years to
facilitate the long-term planning for the Member States' contributions and the recruitment
of statutory staff.
2019/1896
new
5. The crew for technical equipment provided in accordance with Article 6478 shall be
taken into account as part of the contributions for short-term deployments provided by the
Member States pursuant to Article 5769 for the following year. With a view to preparing the
relevant management board decision referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, the Member
State concerned shall inform the Agency about its intention to deploy the technical equipment
with the corresponding crew by the end of January of each year.
6. For the purpose of Article 73, the Agency shall develop and ensure the command and
control structures for the effective deployment of the standing corps on the territory of third
countries.
76. The Agency may recruit a sufficient number of statutory staff, which may account for
up to 4 % of the total number of the standing corps set out in Annex I, for supportive or
monitoring functions for the establishment of the standing corps, for the planning and
management of its operations and for the acquisition of the Agency's own equipment to
support or monitor the functions of the deployed standing corps .
EN 160 EN
new
Those functions and the maximum ceiling for staff performing them shall be established by a
decision of the management board, on the basis of a proposal from the executive director and
taking into account the needs of the Agency. The ceiling shall be a proportion of the total
number of the standing corps categories 1, 2 and 3.
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
7. The statutory staff referred to in paragraph 6 7 and the staff responsible for the
functioning of the ETIAS Central Unit shall not be deployed as members of the teams, but
shall nevertheless be counted as category 1 staff for the purposes of Annex I.
Article 55 67
Statutory staff in the standing corps
1. The Agency shall contribute members of its statutory staff (category 1) to the standing
corps to be deployed in operational areas as members of the teams with the tasks and powers
provided for in Article 82 98, including the task of operating the Agency's own equipment.
2. When recruiting staff, the Agency shall ensure that only candidates who demonstrate a
high level of professionalism, adhere to high ethical values and possess appropriate language
skills are selected.
3. In accordance with Article 62(2)75(6), following their recruitment, the statutory staff
to be deployed as members of the teams shall undergo necessary border-guard or return-
related appropriate training, including on fundamental rights and on the protection of
personal data , as relevant to the profiles of staff decided by the management board in
accordance with Article 54(4) 66 , taking into account their previously acquired
qualifications and professional experience in the relevant areas. Only staff having
successfully completed the operational training shall be employed as standing corps in
accordance with Article 114(4).
The training referred to in the first subparagraph shall be conducted in the framework of
dedicated training programmes designed by the Agency. and, on the basis of The training
shall be based on agreements between the Agency and with selected Member
States and implemented by the Agency and in their specialised
national institutions for training and education, including the Agency's partnership
academies in Member States.
Adequate training maps shall be designed for each staff member after his or her their
recruitment to ensure that he or she is they are always professionally duly
qualified to fulfil border guard or return-related the tasks assigned to them .
Training maps shall be regularly updated. The Agency shall cover the full cost of training.
Statutory staff who act as technical crew operating the Agency's own equipment shall not
need to undergo full border guard or return-related training.
EN 161 EN
4. Throughout their employment, the Agency shall ensure that its statutory staff
discharge their duties as members of the teams in accordance with the highest standards and
in full compliance with fundamental rights.
5. On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall:
(a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the
provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific
measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force
during deployments;
(b) establish rules for the executive director to authorise statutory staff to carry and use
weapons in accordance with Article 8298 and Annex V, including on mandatory
cooperation with the competent national authorities, in particular of the Member
State of nationality, the Member State of residence, and the Member State of the
initial training; those rules shall also address how the executive director ensures that
the conditions for issuing such authorisations continue to be met by statutory staff, in
particular as regards handling weapons including the performance of regular
shooting tests;
(c) establish specific rules to facilitate the storage of weapons, ammunition and other
equipment in secured facilities and their transportation to the operational areas.
In relation to the rules referred to in the first subparagraph, point (a), of the first subparagraph
of this paragraph, the Commission shall give an opinion on to assess their compliance
with the Staff Regulations and Conditions of Employment, in accordance with Article 110(2))
of the Staff Regulations. The fundamental rights officer shall be consulted on the proposal
from the executive director with regard to those rules.
6. The staff of the Agency staff who are not qualified to perform border guard or
return-related tasks shall only be deployed during joint operations or return operations
for coordination, monitoring of fundamental rights and other related tasks. They shall not
form part of the teams.
7. The Member States shall take measures to ensure that tThe statutory staff to be
deployed as members of the teams is enabled to effectively exercise the following
executive powers shall be able to perform, in accordance with Article 9882, the following
tasks requiring executive powers, in accordance with the profiles of staff and relevant
training:
(a) border checks on persons in accordance with Article 8(2) and (3) of Regulation
(EU) 2016/399 the verification of the identity and nationality of persons,
including the consultation of relevant Union and national databases;
(b) the authorisation of authorising entry where the entry conditions, as laid
down in Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399, are fulfilled;
(c) the refusal of refusing entry in accordance with Article 14 of Regulation (EU)
2016/399;
(d) the stamping of travel documents in the cases provided for in accordance with
Article 21(2) 11 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 2016/399;
(e) the issuing or refusing of visas at the border in accordance with Article 35 of
Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council and
introducing relevant data in the Visa Information System;
EN 162 EN
(f) border surveillance in accordance with Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399
, including patrolling between border crossing points to prevent unauthorised border
crossings, to counter cross-border crime and to take measures against persons who
have crossed the border illegally, including interception or apprehension;
new
(g) intercepting or apprehending persons during border control and referring them to the
competent authorities;
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
(gh) registering of fingerprints of persons apprehended in connection with the
unauthorised crossing of an external border in Eurodac in accordance with Chapter III
of Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 2024/1358 of the European Parliament and of the
Council75 76;
new
(i) checking of the means of transport and objects in the possession of the persons
crossing the border;
2019/1896
(hj) liaising with third countries with a view to identifying and obtaining travel documents
for returnees;
75 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the
establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation
(EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member
States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac
data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and
amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational
management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013,
p. 1, ELI: …).). 76 Regulation (EU) 2024/1358 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on the
establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of biometric data in order to effectively apply
Regulations (EU) 2024/1351 and (EU) 2024/1350 of the European Parliament and of the Council and
Council Directive 2001/55/EC and to identify illegally staying third-country nationals and stateless
persons and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement
authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU)
2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) No 603/2013
of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L, 2024/1358, 22.5.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1358/oj)
EN 163 EN
new
(k) identifying third-country nationals subject to return procedures;
(l) carrying out returns by air, land or sea;
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
(im) escorting third-country nationals subject to forced-return procedures.
Article 56 68
Member States' participation in the standing corps through long-term secondment
1. The Member States shall contribute to the standing corps by seconding operational
staff to the Agency as members of the teams (category 2). The duration of individual
secondments shall be 24 months. With the agreement of the home Member State and the
Agency, individual secondments may be prolonged once for another 12 or 24 months. In
order to facilitate the implementation of the financial support system referred to in Article
6174, secondments shall, as a general rule, start at the beginning of a calendar year.
2. Each Member State shall be responsible for ensuring the continuous contribution of
operational staff as seconded members of the teams in accordance with Annex II. The
payment of costs incurred by staff deployed under this Article shall be made in accordance
with the rules adopted pursuant to Article 95(6)114(7).
3. The operational staff seconded to the Agency shall have the tasks and powers of the
members of the teams in accordance with Article 8298. The Member State that has seconded
those operational staff shall be considered to be their home Member State. During the
secondment, the locations and duration of the deployments of seconded members of the teams
shall be decided by the executive director in accordance with the operational needs. The
Agency shall ensure the continuous training of the operational staff during their secondment.
4. By 30 June of each year, each Member State shall indicate the candidates for
secondment among their operational staff in accordance with the specific numbers and
profiles of staff decided by the management board for the following year as referred to in
Article 54(4)66(4). The Agency shall verify whether the operational staff proposed by
Member States correspond to the defined profiles of staff and possess the necessary language
skills. By 15 September of each year, the Agency shall accept the proposed candidates or, in
cases of non-compliance with the required profiles, insufficient language skills, misconduct or
infringement of the applicable rules during previous deployments, shall refuse the candidates
in question and request that the Member State propose other candidates for secondment.
5. Where, due to force majeure, an individual operational staff member cannot be
seconded or is unable to continue his or her secondment, the Member State concerned shall
ensure that that staff member is replaced by another operational staff member having the
required profile.
Article 57 69
Member States' participation in the standing corps through short-term deployments
EN 164 EN
1. In addition to the secondments under Article 5668, by 30 June of each year, the
Member States shall contribute to the standing corps by nominating border guards and other
relevant staff to the preliminary national list of available operational staff for short-term
deployments (category 3) in accordance with the contributions set out in Annex III and in
accordance with the specific numbers and profiles of staff decided by the management board
for the following year as referred to in Article 54(4)66(4)]. The preliminary national lists of
nominated operational staff shall be communicated to the Agency. The final composition of
the annual list shall be confirmed to the Agency after the conclusion of the annual bilateral
negotiations by 1 December of that year.
2. Each Member State shall ensure that nominated operational staff are available at the
request of the Agency in accordance with the arrangements set out in this Article. Each staff
member shall be available for a period of up to four months within a calendar year. However,
Member States may decide to deploy an individual staff member beyond four months. Such
an extension shall be counted as a separate contribution of that Member State for the same
profile or another required profile if the staff member possesses the necessary skills. The
payment of the costs incurred by staff deployed under this Article shall be made in accordance
with the rules adopted pursuant to Article 45(2)51(2).
3. The operational staff deployed under this Article shall have the tasks and powers of
the members of the teams in accordance with Article 8298.
4. The Agency may verify whether the operational staff nominated for short-term
deployments by Member States correspond to the defined determined profiles of staff
and possess the necessary language skills. The Agency shall refuse nominated operational
staff in cases of insufficient language skills, misconduct or infringement of the applicable
rules during previous deployments. The Agency shall also refuse nominated operational staff
in the event of non-compliance with the required profiles unless the operational staff member
in question qualifies for another profile allocated to that Member State. In the event of the
refusal of a staff member by the Agency, the Member State concerned shall ensure that that
staff member is replaced by another operational staff member having the required profile.
5. By 31 July of each year, the Agency shall request that Member States contribute
specific individual operational staff members for deployment as part of joint operations for
the following year within the required numbers and profiles. The periods of individual
deployment shall be decided in the annual bilateral negotiations and agreements between the
Agency and Member States.
6. Following the annual bilateral negotiations, Member States shall make the operational
staff from the national lists referred to in paragraph 1 available for specific deployments
within the numbers and profiles specified in the request of the Agency.
7. Where, due to force majeure, an individual operational staff member cannot be
deployed in accordance with the agreements, the Member State concerned shall ensure that
such staff member is replaced by another staff member from the list with the required profile.
8. In the event of an increased need for the reinforcement of an ongoing joint operation, a
need to launch a rapid border intervention or a new joint operation not specified in the
relevant annual work programme or in the corresponding result of annual bilateral
negotiations, the deployment shall be carried out within the limits set out in Annex III. The
executive director shall inform the Member States without delay about the additional needs by
indicating possible numbers and profiles of operational staff to be provided by each Member
State. Once an amended operational plan or, where relevant, a new operational plan is agreed
upon by the executive director and the host Member State, the formal request for the number
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and profiles of operational staff shall be made by the executive director. The members of the
teams shall be deployed from each Member State within 20 working days from that formal
request without affecting Article 3944.
9. Where the risk analysis or any available vulnerability assessment shows that a
Member State is faced with a situation that would substantially affect the discharge of its
national tasks, that Member State shall contribute operational staff in accordance with the
requests referred to in paragraph 5 or 8 of this Article. However, those contributions shall not
cumulatively exceed half of that Member State's contribution for the year in question as set
out in Annex III. Where a Member State invokes such an exceptional situation, it shall
provide comprehensive reasons and information on the situation to the Agency in writing, the
content of which shall be included in the report referred to in Article 6579.
10. The duration of the deployment for a specific operation shall be determined by the
home Member State., However but in any event it shall not be less than
60 30 days, except where the operation of which the deployment is a part of has a
duration shorter than 30 days that period .
11. The technical crew taken into account for the contributions of Member States in
accordance with Article 54(5)66(5) shall only be deployed in accordance with the agreements
arising from the annual bilateral negotiations for the corresponding items of technical
equipment referred to Article 64(9)78(10).
By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of this Article, Member States shall include in their
annual lists the technical crew referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph only after
the conclusion of the annual bilateral negotiations. Member States may adjust the relevant
annual lists in the event of any changes of the technical crew during the year in question.
Member States shall notify those changes to the Agency.
The verification referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article shall not concern the competence to
operate the technical equipment.
Crew members having exclusively technical duties shall only be indicated by function on
national annual lists.
The duration of deployment of technical crews shall be determined in accordance with Article
6478.
Article 58
Member States' participation in the standing corps through the reserve for rapid
reaction
1. The Member States shall contribute operational staff to the standing corps by means of
a reserve for rapid reaction (category 4) to be activated for rapid border interventions in
accordance with Article 37(2) and Article 39, provided that the operational staff in category 1,
2 and 3 have already been fully deployed for the rapid border intervention in question.
2. Each Member State shall be responsible for ensuring that operational staff are
available in the numbers and with the corresponding profiles decided by the management
board for the following year as referred to in Article 54(4), at the request of the Agency
within the limits set out in Annex IV and in accordance with the arrangements set out in this
Article. Each operational staff member shall be available for a period of up to four months
within a calendar year.
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3. The specific deployments in the framework of rapid border interventions from the
reserve for rapid reaction shall take place in accordance with Article 39(11) and (13).
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Article 70
European border and return reserve
1. By 30 June each year, each Member State shall submit to the Agency a preliminary
national list of border guards, return specialists, return escorts and other eligible relevant staff
for EIBM training, in accordance with Annex IV. That list shall be subject to bilateral
negotiations between the Member State concerned and the Agency. The final composition of
the national list shall be agreed by 1 December at the latest.
2. Within the following year, the Agency shall provide an EIBM training in accordance
with Article 76 to the staff included in the agreed national lists. All costs related to the
delivery of such training shall be borne by the Agency.
3. Based on operational needs and risk analysis, the executive director shall establish the list
of profiles for which shortages have been identified for the following year and the number of
staff of the European border and return reserve to receive the relevant specialised training
referred to in Article 75. Subject to the approval of the Member State concerned, any staff of
the European border and return reserve may undertake specialised training.
4. The Member States shall make available to the Agency their staff qualified as members of
the European border and return reserve for border interventions, return interventions, for
assisting any return-related activities of the Agency or for measures to be taken by the Agency
in accordance with Article 47(3).
5. By derogation from paragraph 4, Member States may refuse to make their staff available to
the Agency in case of duly justified exceptional circumstances which would substantially
affect the discharge of national tasks in the area of border management and return.
2019/1896 (adapted)
Article 59
Review of the standing corps
1. By 31 December 2023, in particular on the basis of the reports referred to in Article
62(10) and Article 65, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the
Council a review of the overall number and composition of the standing corps, including the
size of individual Member States' contributions to the standing corps, as well as of the
expertise and professionalism of the standing corps and of the training it receives. The review
shall also examine whether it is necessary to maintain the reserve for rapid reaction as part of
the standing corps.
The review shall describe and take into account existing and potential operational needs for
the standing corps covering rapid reaction capacities, significant circumstances affecting the
capability of Member States to contribute to the standing corps and the evolution of the
statutory staff as regards the contribution of the Agency to the standing corps.
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2. By 29 February 2024, the Commission shall, where necessary, submit appropriate
proposals to amend Annexes I, II, III and IV. Where the Commission does not submit a
proposal, it shall explain the reasons therefor.
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Article 71
Chain of command and contingents
1. The Agency shall develop the hierarchical line of authority based on delegated operational
management within the Agency and implemented within contingents to the deployed standing
corps and other relevant staff participating in the operational activities of the Agency in all
areas related to the decision making under the responsibility of the executive director.
2. As part of its command-and-control structures, the Agency may establish contingents
in the geographically designated area of operation or for the thematic operational activities.
Contingents established based on a geographical approach shall cover all operational areas at
the external borders and operational activities in third countries.
The contingent shall be led by contingent commander, appointed by the executive director
from Category 1 of the standing corps. The contingent commander shall be responsible for the
management of deployed human resources and technical equipment assigned to a contingent.
The executive director may assign the contingent commander the tasks of a coordinating
officer referred to in Article 50.
Article 72
Quick reaction force
1. The Agency shall establish a quick reaction force composed of deployable standing corps
officers trained and equipped to be rapidly deployed at short notice.
2. The quick reaction force shall cover all operational areas at the external borders and in third
countries and may also be integrated within individual contingents, on the basis of risk
analysis.
3. The Agency may deploy the quick reaction force for a maximum period of one month in
response to a request by one or more Member States for operational needs not already
provided for in an operational plan, to counter urgent and unforeseen challenges that may
affect the integrity of the external borders and in view of available resources. The deployment
of the quick reaction force may also reinforce ongoing operational activities, including by
amending or adapting relevant operational plans.
4. In cases where the situation referred to in paragraph 3 persists beyond the time of
deployment of the quick reaction force, a border intervention may be launched in line with the
procedure outlined in Article 44.
5. In view of the urgency of the deployment of the technical and operational support, the
monitoring referred to in Article 129 (2)(b) and in Article 130(2)(a) shall be exercised through
ex-post review of the activities performed by the Agency during the deployment of the quick
reaction force, unless otherwise requested by the Member State concerned.
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2019/1896 (adapted)
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Article 60 73
Antenna offices
1. Subject to an agreement with the host Member State or the explicit inclusion of this
possibility in the status agreement concluded with the host third country, the Agency may
establish , as a general rule, as a part of its operational contingent management structure,
antenna offices on the territory of that Member State or third country in order to ensure the
forward presence of the contingent command personnel, to facilitate and improve
coordination of operational activities, including in the field of return, organised by the Agency
in that Member State, in the neighbouring region, or in that third country within that
specific area of responsibility of the contingent and in order to ensure the effective
management of the human and technical resources of the Agency. The antenna offices shall
be established in accordance with operational needs for the period of time necessary for the
Agency to address the operational requirement for a forward presence in the region.
carry out significant operational activities in that specific Member State, in the neighbouring
region, or in the third country concerned. That period of time may be prolonged, if necessary.
new
2. The establishment and location of antenna offices in third countries shall be decided in
close coordination with the Commission and the European External Action, with a view to
ensuring consistency with the Union's external action and presence in the third country
concerned. Where feasible and subject to the agreement of the European External Action
Service, antenna offices may be co-located with the relevant Union Delegation.
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
Before an antenna office is established, all budgetary consequences shall be carefully assessed
and calculated and the relevant amounts shall be budgeted in advance.
23. The Agency and the host Member State or host third country in which the antenna
office is established shall make the necessary arrangements to provide the best possible
conditions needed to fulfil the tasks assigned to the antenna office. The place of employment
for the staff working in antenna offices shall be set in accordance with Article 95(2). The
arrangement with the host Member State or the host third country shall ensure that antenna
offices are established on the basis of appropriate safeguards for the functioning of the
antenna office, including the necessary privileges and immunities for the antenna offices, their
equipment and personnel deployed thereto.
3. The antenna offices shall, where applicable:
(a) provide operational and logistical support and ensure the coordination of Agency's
activities in the operational areas concerned;
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(b) provide operational support to the Member State or the third country in the
operational areas concerned;
(c) monitor the activities of the teams and regularly report to the Agency's headquarters;
(d) cooperate with the host Member State or host third country on all issues related to the
practical implementation of the operational activities organised by the Agency in that
Member State or third country, including any additional issues that might have
occurred in the course of these activities;
(e) support the coordinating officer referred to in Article 44 in his or her cooperation
with the participating Member States on all issues related to their contribution to the
operational activities organised by the Agency and, where necessary, liaise with the
Agency's headquarters;
(f) support the coordinating officer and fundamental rights monitors assigned to monitor
an operational activity in facilitating, where necessary, the coordination and
communication between the Agency's teams and the relevant authorities of the host
Member State or host third country as well any relevant tasks;
(g) organise logistical support relating to the deployment of the members of the teams
and the deployment and use of technical equipment;
(h) provide all other logistical support regarding the operational area for which a given
antenna office is responsible, with a view to facilitating the smooth running of the
operational activities organised by the Agency;
(i) support the Agency's liaison officer, without prejudice to his or her tasks and
functions referred to in Article 31, in identifying any current or future challenges for
the border management of the area for which a given antenna office is responsible,
for the implementation of the return acquis and regularly report to the Agency's
headquarters;
(j) ensure the effective management of the Agency's own equipment in the areas
covered by its activities, including the possible registration and long-term
maintenance of that equipment and any logistical support needed.
4. Each antenna office shall be managed by a representative of the Agency appointed by
the executive director as a head of an antenna office. The head of the antenna office shall
oversee the overall work of the office and shall act as its single point of contact with the
Agency's headquarters.
45. On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall
decide on the establishing, composition, duration and, where needed, possible prolongation of
the duration of the operation of an antenna office taking into account the opinion of the
Commission and the agreement of the host Member State or the host third country.
56. The host Member State shall provide the Agency with assistance to ensure operational
capacity.
7. The executive director shall report to the management board on a quarterly basis on
the activities of antenna offices. The activities of the antenna offices shall be described in a
separate section of the annual activity report.
Article 61 74
Financial support for the development of contributions to the standing corps
EN 170 EN
1. Member States shall be entitled to receive funding under the Agency’s budget
on a yearly basis in the form of financing not linked to costs, in order to support the
development of human resources to secure maintain their level of contributions
to the standing corps as set out in Annexes II, and III and IV, in accordance
with point (a) of Article 125(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046
2024/2509. That financing shall be payable after the end of the year concerned and upon
fulfilment of conditions laid down in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article. That financing shall
be based on a reference amount as set in paragraph 2 of this Article and shall amount to,
where applicable:
(a) 100 % of the reference amount multiplied by the number of operational staff
indicated for the year N + 2 for secondment in accordance with effectively
seconded in a given year, within the limits set in Annex II;
(b) 37 % of the reference amount multiplied by the number of operational staff
effectively deployed in accordance with Article 5769 within the limit set in Annex III
and in accordance with Article 58 within the limit set in Annex IV, as applicable;
(c) a one-off payment of 50 % of the reference amount multiplied by the number of
operational staff recruited by the Agency as statutory staff; that payment shall apply
to staff departing from national services forming part of the European Border and
Coast Guard, who were granted unpaid leave from their national services to join the
Agency being in active service no longer than 15 years at the time of recruitment
by the Agency.
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2. Under their National and Regional Partnership plans, Member States may claim a
financial amount of EUR 21 000 per national officer trained by the Agency with a view of
becoming part of the European border and return reserve in accordance with Article 70 and
Annex IV.
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
2 3. The reference amount referred to in paragraph 1, points (a), (b) and (c) shall be
equivalent to the annual basic salary for a contract agent in function group III, grade 8, step 1
as set out in Article 93 of the Conditions of Employment and subject to a correction co-
efficient applicable in the Member State concerned.
3 4. The annual payment of the amount referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1, point (a), of
this Article shall be due in relation to the number of staff effectively seconded for the given
year, within the limit set in Annex II. The reference amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall be
calculated for a reference period of one year, or based on the duration of the secondment.
only become due provided that the Member States increase their respective overall national
border guard staffing accordingly through the recruitment of new staff in the period
concerned. The relevant information for the purpose of reporting shall be provided to the
Agency in the annual bilateral negotiations and shall be verified through the vulnerability
assessment in the following year. The annual payment of the amount referred to in paragraph
1, point (b), of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be due in full in relation to the number of staff
effectively deployed for a consecutive or non-consecutive period of four months in
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accordance with Article 5769 within the limit set in Annex III. and in accordance with Article
58 within the limit set in Annex IV. For effective deployments referred to in point (b) of
paragraph 1 of this Article,t The payments shall be calculated on a pro rata basis with a
reference period of four months , or based on the duration of the deployment, and shall
only be due provided that the conditions under Article 69(10) are met .
The Agency shall grant an advance payment linked to the annual payments of the amounts
referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1, points (a) and (b), of this Article in accordance
with the implementing act referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article following the submission
of a specific and justified request by the contributing Member State.
4 5. The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down detailed rules for the
annual payment and the monitoring of the applicable conditions provided in paragraph 3.
Those rules shall include the following arrangements:
(a) arrangements for advanced payments upon fulfilment of the conditions set out
in paragraph 3 of this Article, as well as the
(b) arrangements for pro-rata the calculations of the financing referred to in
paragraph 1, points (a) and (b) , including with respect to cases where the deployment
is shorter than the reference period;
(c) arrangements for the calculations of the financing where the deployment of
technical crew would exceptionally exceed the maximum national contributions set out in
Annex III.
That implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure
referred to in Article 122(2) 142(2).
5 6. When implementing the financial support under this Article, the Agency and the
Member States shall ensure compliance with the principles of co-financing and no double
funding.
Article 6275
Training
new
1. The Agency shall set up a uniform framework to ensure and support the organisation,
management and delivery of a training for all standing corps officers. It shall be able to
cooperate with the relevant training and education entities of the Member States, including the
partnership academies.
Before adopting practical measures for the development of the training framework, the
Agency shall consult the management board.
2. The Agency shall carry out the training activities in relevant training centres set up by the
Agency.
3. The Agency shall provide the following trainings:
(a) basic training for statutory staff to be deployed as members of the teams, taking into
account the specific needs of the various profiles of the standing corps, in particular
those not requiring the exercise of executive powers;
(b) pre-deployment training for all participants in operational activities of the Agency;
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(c) the specialised trainings for the standing corps in thematic operational areas and
functions relevant for the performance of their tasks and powers;
(d) the relevant specialised training to forced return monitors and fundamental rights
monitors.
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
14. For the purpose of paragraphs 1 and 2, tThe Agency shall, taking into account
the capability roadmap referred to in Article 9(89), where available, and in close
cooperation with the appropriate training entities of the Member States and the Agency’s
partnership academies , and, where appropriate, EASO EUAA , FRA, the
European Institute for Gender Equality, the European Union Agency for the Operational
Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-
LISA) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), develop
and regularly update specialised and profile- specific training tools, modules and
programmes with particular emphasis on including specific training in the protection of
children and other persons in a vulnerable situation. Training content shall take into account
relevant research outcomes developments and best practices. The Agency shall
provide border guards, return specialists, return escorts and other relevant staff who are
members of the standing corps as well as forced-return monitors and fundamental rights
monitors with specialised training relevant to their tasks and powers. The Agency shall
conduct regular , including, where relevant, scenario-based training exercises in
specific operational areas with those border and coast guards and other members of
the teams in accordance with the specialised training plan referred to in the annual
work programme of the Agency. Candidate countries may, where appropriate, be invited to
participate in such exercises.
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5. The Agency shall ensure that the training is based on strategic training needs and
reflects the capability priorities identified in the capability roadmap referred to in Article
9(9).
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
26. The Agency shall ensure that, in addition to the training referred to in Article
55(3)67(3), all statutory staff to be deployed as members of the teams have received adequate
training in relevant Union and international law, including on fundamental rights, access to
international protection, guidelines for the purpose of identifying persons seeking protection
and directing them towards the appropriate procedures, guidelines for addressing the special
needs of children, including unaccompanied minors, victims of trafficking in human beings,
persons in need of urgent medical assistance and other particularly vulnerable persons, and,
where it is intended that they participate in sea operations, search and rescue, prior to their
initial deployment in operational activities organised by the Agency.
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Where relevant for the profiles of staff, Ssuch training shall also cover the use of force
in accordance with Annex V.
37. For the purpose of specialised training referred to in paragraph 2, the Agency,
on the basis of agreements with selected Member States, shall implement the necessary
training programmes in those Member States' specialised institutions for training and
education, including the Agency's partnership academies in Member States. The Agency shall
ensure that the specialised training follows the common core curricula, and the
Agency’s training methodology. is harmonised and It should aim to fosters mutual
understanding and a common culture based on the values enshrined in the Treaties. The
Agency shall cover the full cost of training , including through multiannual grants .
When carrying out specialised training, the Agency shall also cooperate closely with
CEPOL, taking due account of its role in coordinating centres of excellence.
The Agency, after obtaining the approval of the management board, may set up an Agency
training centre to further facilitate the inclusion of a common European culture in the training
provided.
48. The Agency shall take the necessary initiatives to ensure that all staff of the Member
States who participate in the teams from the standing corps have received the training referred
to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2.
59. The Agency shall take the necessary initiatives to ensure training for staff involved in
return-related tasks who are allocated to the standing corps or to the pool referred to in Article
5160. The Agency shall ensure that statutory staff andall staff , including statutory
staff , who participate in return operations or return interventions have received training in
relevant Union and international law, including on fundamental rights, access to international
protection and on referral of vulnerable persons, prior to their participation in operational
activities organised by the Agency.
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10. The Agency shall provide training courses on the functioning of Frontex RECAMAS,
iRCMS and RIAT, in compliance with Article [24(3)] of Regulation (EU) …/… [Return
Digitalisation Regulation].
11. The Agency shall provide the training at Union level for instructors and trainers of the
border guards, coast guards and return authorities of Member States, including with regard to
fundamental rights, access to international protection and relevant maritime law.
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
612. The Agency shall establish, and further develop and regularly update common
core curricula for the training of border and coast guards and provide training at
European level for instructors of the border guards of Member States, including with regard to
fundamental rights, access to international protection and relevant maritime law, as well as a
common curriculum for the training of and the staff involved in return-related tasks.
Those common core curricula shall aim to promote the highest standards and best
practices in the implementation of Union border management and return law. The Agency
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shall draw up the common core curricula after consulting the consultative forum referred to in
Article 108 (the ‘consultative forum’) and the fundamental rights officer. Member States shall
integrate the common core curricula into the training they provide to their national border
and coast guards and staff involved in return-related tasks. The Agency shall
monitor that integration through its Interoperability Assessment Programme. Where gaps are
identified through the Interoperability Assessment Programme, Member States shall take
them into account when further developing or updating the national capability development
plans referred to in Article 9(4).
713. The Agency shall may also organise training activities and offer additional
training courses and seminars on subjects related to external border control and return of
third-country nationals for officers of the competent services of Member States and, where
appropriate, of third countries , including on their territory .
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Such trainings may include courses on document security as well as the functioning of
Frontex RECAMAS, iRCMS and RIAT in accordance with Article [24(3)] of Regulation
(EU) …/… [Return Digitalisation Regulation].
2019/1896 (adapted)
8. The Agency may organise training activities in cooperation with Member States and
third countries on their territory.
9. The Agency shall establish an exchange programme enabling border guards
participating in its teams and staff participating in the return intervention teams to acquire
knowledge or specific know-how from experience and good practices abroad by working with
border guards and staff involved in return-related tasks in a Member State other than their
own.
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14. The Member States shall take into account the training provided by the Agency to their
staff for the progression of their career insofar as the training and qualifications are relevant
for the purpose of performing tasks and powers withing their respective national authorities.
2019/1896
1015. The Agency shall establish and further develop an internal quality control mechanism
to ensure a high level of training, expertise and professionalism of statutory staff, in particular
statutory staff who participate in the operational activities of the Agency. On the basis of the
implementation of the quality control mechanism, the Agency shall prepare an annual
evaluation report which shall be annexed to the annual activity report.
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Article 76
Training for European border and return reserve
1. The training curricula for the staff referred to in Article 70 shall be established and
regularly updated by a decision of the management board, on the basis of a proposal from the
executive director. The curricula shall be complementary to the basic training provided to this
staff by the Member States.
2. The Agency shall deliver the EIBM training with the view of ensuring that the staff
referred to in Article 70 is prepared to be deployed as category 2 or 3 officers, or to be
activated for the purpose of border interventions, return interventions or for measures to be
taken by the Agency in accordance with Article 47(3). The training shall combine theoretical
modules and, where appropriate, scenario-based simulation exercises.
3. The training shall cover all relevant aspects of EIBM, in particular:
(a) relevant Union and international law on border management and return, including
relevant case law;
(b) working methods, procedures, tools and systems of the Agency;
(c) management and use of the technical equipment deployed in the operational
activities of the Agency;
(d) the use of IT systems in the area of migration and border management and return;
(e) the identification of false, fraudulently obtained or fraudulently used travel and
identity documents;
(f) specific framework for deployments in third countries, including rules on privileges
and immunities;
(g) safeguards to ensure the respect of fundamental rights during operational activities,
including the applicable codes of conduct referred to in Article 97;
(h) any other relevant expertise in the area of border management and return.
4. The completion of the EIBM training shall be a prerequisite to join the European
border and return reserve.
2019/1896 (adapted)
Article 63 77
Acquisition or leasing of technical equipment
1. The Agency may acquire, either on its own or as co-owner with one or more
Member State States , or lease technical equipment to be deployed during joint
operations, pilot projects, rapid border interventions, activities in the area of return, including
return operations and return interventions, migration management support team deployments
or technical assistance projects in accordance with the financial rules applicable to the
Agency.
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2. Without prejudice to Article 168 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, the Agency may
carry out, coordinate, and participate in joint procurement procedures with one or more
Member States or other Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, for technical
equipment and related operational capabilities, including digital, analytical and, where
appropriate, AI-enabled tools supporting EIBM, in accordance with the applicable Union
financial and procurement rules.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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23. On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall
adopt a comprehensive multiannual strategy on how the Agency's own technical capabilities
are to be developed. That strategy shall take into account the multiannual strategic
policy cycle for EIBM European integrated border management, including the
capability roadmap referred to in Article 9(89), where available, the indicative multiannual
planning for the profiles of staff for the standing corps referred to in Article 66(4), point (d),
relevant research and innovation activities, and the budgetary resources made available for
that purpose in the multiannual financial framework.
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The strategy shall contribute to the development of state-of-the-art, interoperable and resilient
capabilities for the European Border and Coast Guard and shall take into account the need to
reduce critical dependencies on technical equipment, including dependencies on suppliers
established in third countries.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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To ensure compliance with the applicable legal, financial and policy frameworks, the
executive director shall only make the proposal after receiving the positive opinion of the
Commission.
The multiannual strategy shall be accompanied by a detailed implementation plan specifying
the timeline for acquisition or leasing, procurement planning , joint procurement
possibilities, life-cycle costs, staffing and training implications, and risk mitigation
measures .
To ensure compliance with the applicable legal, financial and policy frameworks, the
executive director shall consult the Commission on the strategy and the implementation plan
before making the proposal. The proposal shall take into account the opinion of the
Commission.
If the executive director management board, when proposing adopting the strategy
and the implementation plan, decides to depart departs from the opinion of the
Commission, the executive director it shall provide the Commission with a justification
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for doing so. Following the adoption of the multiannual strategy, the implementation plan
shall become part of the multiannual programming component of the single
programming document referred to in point (k) of Article 100(2) 122.
43. The Agency may acquire technical equipment by decision of the executive director in
consultation with the management board in accordance with the applicable procurement rules.
Any acquisition or leasing of equipment entailing significant costs to the Agency shall be
preceded by a thorough needs and cost-benefit analysis , including, where appropriate, an
assessment of interoperability, life-cycle costs, operational risks and critical dependencies .
Any expenditure related to such acquisition or leasing shall be provided for in the Agency's
budget adopted by the management board.
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Where appropriate, and in accordance with the applicable Union financial and procurement
rules and without prejudice to Article 168 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, the
Agency may act as contracting authority or central purchasing body for the procurement of
technical equipment and related operational capabilities, including digital, analytical and AI-
enabled tools.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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45. Where the Agency acquires or leases major technical equipment such as aircraft,
service vehicles or vessels, the following conditions shall apply:
(a) in the case of an acquisition by the Agency or co-ownership with one or more
Member States , the Agency shall agree with one the Member State or
Member States concerned that that Member States is to provide that that the
equipment be registered as being on government service; whereas in accordance with
the applicable law of that Member State, including prerogatives and immunities
of that technical equipment shall be governed by the national law of the
registering Member State in accordance with its obligations under international
law;
(b) in the case of leasing, the technical equipment shall be registered in a
Member State.
6. On the basis of a model agreement drawn up by the Agency and approved by the
management board, the Member State of registration and the Agency shall agree on terms
ensuring the operability of the equipment. Those terms shall cover, where relevant,
registration, deployment, maintenance, servicing, logistical support, insurance, liability,
technical crew, command and control arrangements, and deregistration or disposal.
In the case of co-owned assets co-owned with one or more Member States , the terms
shall also cover the periods of full availability of the assets for the Agency and determine the
use of those assets, including specific provisions on rapid deployment during rapid border
interventions and the financing of those assets.
67. Where the Agency does not have the required qualified statutory staff, the Member
State of registration or the supplier of technical equipment shall provide the necessary experts
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and technical crew to operate the technical equipment in a legally sound and safe manner, in
accordance with the model agreement referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article and planned on
the basis of the annual bilateral negotiations and agreements referred to in Article
64(9)78(10). In such a case, technical equipment owned solely by the Agency shall be made
available to the Agency upon its request and the Member State of registration may not invoke
the exceptional situation referred to in Article 64(9)78(10).
When requesting a Member State to provide technical equipment and staff, the Agency shall
take into account the particular operational challenges facing that Member State at the time of
the request.
Article 64 78
Technical equipment pool
1. The Agency shall set up and keep centralised records of equipment in a technical
equipment pool composed of equipment owned either by the Member States, or by the
Agency , or co-owned by the Agency and one or more Member States, and equipment
co-owned by the Member States and by the Agency for its operational activities.
2. Equipment solely owned by the Agency shall be fully available for deployment at any
time.
3. Equipment co-owned by the Agency at a share of more than 50 % shall also be
available for deployment in accordance with an agreement between the Agency and
the Member State or Member States concerned, and the Agency, concluded in
accordance with Article 63(5)77(6).
4. The Agency shall ensure , to the extent necessary for its operational
activities, the compatibility,and interoperability and secure use of the equipment
listed in the technical equipment pool.
5. For the purposes of paragraph 4, the Agency, in close cooperation with the Member
States and the Commission, shall define technical standards requirements for the
equipment to be deployed in the activities of the Agency, where necessary. Those
requirements shall take into account relevant Union and international standards, operational
needs, interoperability, security requirements, life-cycle considerations and, where relevant,
the need to reduce critical dependencies, including dependencies on suppliers established in
third countries. Equipment that is acquired by the Agency, whether as sole or co-owner,
and equipment owned by Member States which is listed in the technical equipment pool shall
meet those standards requirements .
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6. Where technical equipment is acquired through joint procurement procedures carried out or
coordinated by the Agency in accordance with Article 77(2), where appropriate, the Agency
and the participating Member States shall agree, before the launch of the procurement
procedure, on the conditions under which such equipment may be registered in the technical
equipment pool and made available for the Agency’s operational activities.
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2019/1896 (adapted)
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67. On the basis of a proposal from the executive director taking into account the
Agency's risk analysis, and the results of vulnerability assessments , the capability roadmap
referred to in Article 9(9), where available, and the multiannual strategy referred to in Article
77(3), the management board shall decide, by 31 March of each year, on the minimum
number of items of technical equipment required to meet the needs of the Agency in the
following year, in particular as regards carrying out joint operations, migration management
support team deployments, rapid border interventions, activities in the area of return,
including return operations and return interventions. The Agency's own equipment shall be
included in the minimum number of items of technical equipment. That decision shall
establish rules relating to the deployment of technical equipment in the operational activities.
If the minimum number of items of technical equipment proves to be insufficient to carry out
the operational plan agreed for such activities, the Agency shall revise that minimum number
on the basis of justified needs and of an agreement with the Member States.
78. The technical equipment pool shall contain the minimum number of items of
equipment identified as needed by the Agency per type of technical equipment. The
equipment listed in the technical equipment pool shall be deployed during joint operations,
migration management support team deployments, pilot projects, rapid border interventions,
return operations or return interventions.
89. The technical equipment pool shall include a rapid reaction equipment pool containing
a limited number of items of equipment needed for possible rapid border interventions. The
contributions of Member States to the rapid reaction equipment pool shall be planned in
accordance with the annual bilateral negotiations and agreements referred in paragraph 910 of
this Article. For the equipment on the list of the items in that pool, Member States may not
invoke the exceptional situation referred to in paragraph 910 of this Article.
The Member State concerned shall send the equipment on that list, together with the
necessary experts and technical crew, to the destination for deployment as soon as possible,
and, in any event, no later than 10 days after the date on which the operational plan is agreed.
The Agency shall contribute to this pool with equipment at the Agency's disposal as referred
to in Article 63(1)77(1).
910. Member States shall contribute to the technical equipment pool. The contribution by
Member States to the pool and deployment of the technical equipment for specific operations
shall be planned on the basis of annual bilateral negotiations and agreements between the
Agency and Member States. Those annual bilateral negotiations and agreements shall
concern, where relevant, the planned periods of availability, the operational specificities, the
applicable crew requirements and the conditions for deployment of the technical equipment
concerned. In accordance with those agreements and to the extent that it forms part of the
minimum number of items of technical equipment for a given year, Member States shall make
their technical equipment available for deployment at the request of the Agency, unless they
are faced with an exceptional situation substantially affecting the discharge of national tasks.
If a Member State invokes such an exceptional situation, it shall provide, in writing,
comprehensive reasons and information on the situation to the Agency, the content of which
shall be included in the report referred to in Article 65(1)79(1). The Agency's request shall be
made at least 45 days before the intended deployment of major technical equipment and at
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least 30 days before the intended deployment of other equipment. The contributions to the
technical equipment pool shall be reviewed annually.
1011. On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall
decide, on a yearly basis, on the rules relating to technical equipment, including the required
overall minimum numbers of items per type of technical equipment and the terms for the
deployment and reimbursement of costs as well as on the limited number of items of technical
equipment for a rapid reaction equipment pool. For budgetary purposes that decision shall be
taken by the management board by 31 March of each year.
1112. Where a rapid border intervention takes place, Article 39(15)44(15) shall apply
accordingly.
1213. Where unexpected needs for technical equipment for a joint operation or a rapid
border intervention arise after the minimum number of items of technical equipment has been
set and those needs cannot be met from the technical equipment pool or the rapid reaction
equipment pool, Member States shall, where possible, on an ad hoc basis, make the necessary
technical equipment available for deployment to the Agency upon its request.
1314. The executive director shall regularly report to the management board on the
composition and the deployment of equipment which is part of the technical equipment pool,
including any capability gaps identified . Where the minimum number of items of
technical equipment required in the pool has not been met, the executive director shall inform
the management board without delay. The management board shall take a decision on the
prioritisation of the deployment of the technical equipment urgently and take the appropriate
steps to remedy the shortfall. The management board shall inform the Commission of the
shortfall and the steps it has taken. The Commission shall subsequently inform the European
Parliament and the Council thereof and of its own assessment.
1415. Member States shall register in the technical equipment pool all the means of transport
and operating equipment financed or co-financed with purchased under the specific
actions of the Internal Security Fund in accordance with Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No
515/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council77 or, where relevant, any other future
dedicated Union funding made available to the Member States with the clear objective of
increasing the operational capacity of the Agency or of the European Border and Coast
Guard . That technical equipment shall form part of the minimum number of items of
technical equipment for a given year for as long as it is operational and for at least the
period required under the applicable Union funding decision or rules. Where such equipment
is no longer operational, is replaced, is disposed of, or no longer meets the relevant technical
standards or operational requirements, the Member State concerned shall inform the Agency
without delay. The Agency and the Member State concerned shall agree on the appropriate
update of the records of the technical equipment pool, including, where relevant, the
registration of replacement equipment .
Upon a request made by the Agency in the framework of the annual bilateral negotiations, the
Member States shall make technical equipment financed or co-financed with
under the specific actions of the Internal Security Fund or by any other future dedicated Union
funding as specified in the first subparagraph of this paragraph available for deployment to
the Agency. Each item of equipment shall be made available for a period of up to four months
as planned in the annual bilateral negotiations. Member States may decide to deploy an item
of equipment beyond four months. In the case of an operational activity referred to in Article
77
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3944 or 45 of this Regulation, Member States may not invoke the exceptional situation
referred to in paragraph 910 of this Article.
1516. The Agency shall manage the records of the technical equipment pool as follows:
(a) classification by type of equipment and by type of operation;
(b) classification by owner (Member State, Agency, other);
(c) overall numbers of items of equipment required;
(d) crew requirements if applicable;
(e) other information, such as registration details, transportation and maintenance
requirements, national applicable export regimes, technical instructions, or other
information relevant to appropriate use of the equipment;
(f) indication as to whether an item of equipment was financed from Union funding;
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(g) indication as to whether an item of equipment was acquired through joint
procurement or is co-owned by the Agency and one or more Member States;
(h) information on availability periods and any operational limitations relevant to
deployment;
(i) indication as to whether the item meets the technical requirements referred to in
paragraph 5;
(j) information on the expected period during which the item is to remain registered in
the technical equipment pool, including, where relevant, the applicable period under
Union funding rules, and information on replacement, disposal or withdrawal from
service.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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1617. The Agency shall finance 100 % of the deployment of technical equipment which
forms part of the minimum number of items of technical equipment provided by a given
Member State for a given year. The deployment of technical equipment which does not form
part of the minimum number of items of technical equipment shall be co-financed by the
Agency, up to a maximum of 100 % of the eligible expenses, taking into account the
particular circumstances of the Member States deploying such technical equipment.
Article 65 79
Reporting on the Agency's capabilities
1. On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall
adopt and submit to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission an
annual report on the implementation of Articles 51, 55, 56, 57, 58, 63 60, 67 to 70 , 77
and 6478 (‘annual implementation report’).
2. The annual implementation report shall include, in particular:
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(a) the number of staff that each Member State has committed to the standing
corps, including through the reserve for rapid reaction, and to the pool of forced-
return monitors;
(b) the number of statutory staff that the Agency has committed to the standing
corps;
(c) the number of staff actually deployed from the standing corps, by each
Member State and by the Agency per profile in the previous year;
(d) the number of items of technical equipment that each Member State and the
Agency has committed to the technical equipment pool;
(e) the number of items of technical equipment deployed by each Member State
and the Agency in the previous year from the technical equipment pool;
(f) commitments to and deployments of equipment from the rapid reaction
equipment pool;
(g) the development of the Agency's own human and technical capabilities.
3. The annual implementation report shall list the Member States that invoked the
exceptional situation referred to in Article 57(9)69(9) and Article 64(9)78(10) in the previous
year and include the reasons and information provided by the Member State concerned.
4. To ensure transparency, the executive director shall inform the management board on
a quarterly basis on the elements listed in paragraph 2 in relation to the ongoing year.
Article 66 80
Research and innovation
1. The Agency shall proactively monitor , support and contribute to research and
innovation activities relevant for EIBM European integrated border management,
including activities concerning the use of advanced border control technology
technologies, return-related technologies, situational awareness, interoperability,
and the testing and evaluation of technologies and systems. In doing so, the Agency
shall take taking into account the multiannual strategic policy cycle for EIBM, the
capability roadmap referred to in Article 9(89) , relevant operational needs, and the need to
promote state-of-the-art, secure and interoperable capabilities . The Agency shall
disseminate the results of that research to the European Parliament, to the Member States and
to the Commission in accordance with Article 92. It may use those results as appropriate in
joint operations, rapid border interventions, return operations and return interventions.
2. The Agency, taking into account the capability roadmap referred to in Article 9(8),
shall assist the Member States and the Commission in identifying key research and
innovation priorities for European integrated border management themes. The Agency
shall assist Member States and the Commission in the preparation and implementation of
relevant Union programmes drawing up and implementing the relevant Union framework
programmes for research and innovation activities in the areas covered by this Regulation,
including the Union Framework Programmes for Research and Innovation and relevant
instruments under the European Competitiveness Fund .
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3. The Agency may receive funding under, participate in activities supported under, and
carry out research and innovation activities funded by, relevant Union programmes, including
activities supporting the development, uptake, deployment, and operational integration of
innovative solutions and capabilities relevant for EIBM, in accordance with the applicable
rules governing those programmes, the provisions of Regulation 2024/2509 and the financial
rules applicable to the Agency.
4. Where the Agency contributes to the preparation, programming or implementation of
Union funding programmes while also participating in activities supported under those
programmes, the Commission and the Agency shall take all necessary measures to avoid
conflicts of interest and ensure an appropriate separation between those roles.
5. Where the Commission has delegated the relevant powers to it, the Agency may
implement parts of Union programmes supporting research and innovation activities relevant
for EIBM. For that purpose, the following tasks may be delegated:
2019/1896 (adapted)
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The Agency shall implement the parts of the Framework Programme for Research and
Innovation which relate to border security. For that purpose, and where the Commission has
delegated the relevant powers to it, the Agency shall have the following tasks:
(a) managing some stages of programme implementation and some phases in the
lifetime of specific projects on the basis of the relevant work programmes adopted by
the Commission;
(b) adopting the instruments of budget execution for revenue and expenditure and
carrying out all the operations necessary for the management of the programme;
(c) providing support in programme implementation.
46. The Agency may plan and implement pilot projects regarding matters covered by this
Regulation , demonstration projects, trials and testing activities, and where appropriate,
support the operational validation, uptake, deployment and integration of innovative solutions
relevant for EIBM, including in cooperation with Member States, the Commission, other
Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, research organisations, industry and other
relevant actors, in accordance with the applicable rules .
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7. The Agency shall promote coordination within the European innovation ecosystem for
border management, including by facilitating exchanges between Member States, the
Commission, relevant Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, research organisations,
industry and other relevant actors. Such coordination shall aim to support the uptake of
relevant research and innovation results, avoid unnecessary duplication, identify capability
gaps and operational needs, and contribute to the development of interoperable and secure
solutions. The Agency shall contribute, where relevant, to the activities of the EU Innovation
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Hub for Internal Security and may consult the Joint Research Centre to coordinate and
implement innovation activities.
8. In carrying out the activities referred to in paragraphs 1 to 7, the Agency shall take into
account the need to reduce critical dependencies, including dependencies on suppliers
established in third countries, where relevant, and to support European strategic autonomy in
capabilities relevant for EIBM.
2019/1896
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59. The Agency shall make public information on its research and innovation projects,
including pilot and demonstration projects, the cooperation partners involved and the project
budget , subject to Article 111 and to the protection of classified information, sensitive
non-classified information, intellectual property rights, security interests and commercial
confidentiality .
SECTION 10
THE EUROPEAN TRAVEL INFORMATION AND AUTHORISATION SYSTEM
(ETIAS)
Article 67 81
ETIAS Central Unit
1. The Agency shall ensure the setting-up and operation of an ETIAS Central Unit as
referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1240.
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2. The Agency shall, upon request of the Member States, provide support in relation to
the manual verification of different identities pursuant to Article 29a of Regulation (EU)
2019/817 and Article 29a of Regulation (EU) 2019/818. Such support shall be provided
through the ETIAS Central Unit.
2019/1896 (adapted)
SECTION 11
COOPERATION
Article 68 82
Cooperation of the Agency with Union institutions, bodies, offices, agencies, and
international organisations
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1. The Agency shall cooperate with Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and
may cooperate with international organisations, within their respective legal frameworks, and
shall make use of existing information, resources and systems available in the framework of
EUROSUR.
In accordance with the first subparagraph, the Agency shall cooperate, in particular, with:
(a)the Commission and;
(b) the European External Action Service (EEAS);
(bc) the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
(Europol);
(cd) the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) ;EASO
(de) the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA);
(ef) the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation
(Eurojust);
(g) the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL);
(fh) the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) ;
(gi) the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA);
(j) and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA);
(hk) the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT
Systems (eu-LISA);
(l) the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA);
(im) the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA); and the Network Manager of
the European Air Traffic Management Network (EATMN)
(jn) CSDP missions and operations, in accordance with their mandates, with a view to
ensuring the following:
(i) the promotion of European integrated border management EIBM
standards;
(ii) situational awareness and risk analysis:
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(o) the European Union Customs Authority (EUCA), established by Regulation (EU)
2026/2108 of the European Parliament and of the Council78;
(p) the European Anti Fraud Office (OLAF);
(q) the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA).
78 Regulation (EU) 2026/2108 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2026
establishing the Union Customs Code and the European Union Customs Authority, and repealing
Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 (OJ L, 2026/2108, 19.9.2026, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/2108/oj).
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2019/1896 (adapted)
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2. The Agency may also cooperate with the following international organisations or other
bodies established by an international agreement between States , as relevant to its tasks,
within their respective legal frameworks , in particular :
(a) the United Nations through its relevant offices, agencies, organisations and other
entities, in particular the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International
Organization for Migration, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the
International Civil Aviation Organization;
(b) the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol);
(c) the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) ;
(d) the Council of Europe and the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of
Europe;
(e) the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre — Narcotics (MAOC-N).
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(f) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);
(g) the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD);
(h) the European Space Agency (ESA);
(i) the entity appointed as Network Manager of the European Air Traffic Management
Network (EATMN);
(j) the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL);
2019/1896 (adapted)
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23. The cooperation referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall take place within the
framework of working arrangements concluded by the Agency with Union
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations or bodies the
entities referred to in paragraph 1. Such arrangements shall be subject to the Commission's
prior approval. The Agency shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of any such
arrangements.
34. As regards the handling of classified information, the working arrangements referred
to in paragraph 23 shall provide that the Union body, office or agency or international
organisation or body concerned comply with security rules and standards equivalent to
those applied by the Agency. An assessment visit shall be conducted prior to the conclusion
of an arrangement and the Commission shall be informed of the outcome of the assessment
visit.
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45. tThe Agency shall also engage in cooperation with the Commission, EUCA and,
where relevant, with Member States and the EEAS in activities relating to the customs area,
including risk management, where those activities support each other. That cooperation shall
not affect be without prejudice to the existing competence of the Commission, of the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the Member
States.
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The Agency and EUCA may cooperate on strategic analyses, threat assessments, research and
innovation, training and the coordination of activities carried out by competent border and
customs authorities, within their respective mandates. Such cooperation shall not confer
customs control powers on the Agency.
The Agency and EUCA may exchange, upon request, non-personal data, including aggregated
data that do not allow individuals to be identified, necessary for risk analysis and operational
coordination related to border management, within their respective mandates and subject to
the safeguards laid down in this Regulation. No personal data shall be transmitted by the
Agency to EUCA for those purposes. The Agency may obtain non-personal data from the EU
Customs Data Hub in accordance with Article 43 of Regulation (EU) 2026/2108. Such
cooperation shall not confer direct access to EUROSUR or establish an automated flow of
EUROSUR data into the EU Customs Data Hub.
The working arrangement referred to in paragraph 3 shall specify the arrangements for
verifying requests and for the use and further disclosure of exchanged information, including
compliance with applicable security requirements and requirements for originator’s consent.
2019/1896 (adapted)
5. Union institutions, bodies, offices, agencies, and the international organisations referred to
in paragraph 1, shall use information received from the Agency only within the limits of their
competence and insofar as they respect fundamental rights, including data protection
requirements.
Any transmission of personal data processed by the Agency to other Union institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies under points (c) and (d) of Article 87(1) shall be subject to
specific working arrangements regarding the exchange of personal data.
The working arrangements referred to in the second subparagraph shall include a provision
ensuring that personal data transmitted to Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies by
the Agency may be processed for another purpose only if authorised by the Agency and if
compatible with the initial purpose for which the data were collected and transmitted by the
Agency. Those Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall keep written records of a
case-by-case compatibility assessment. Any transfer of personal data by the Agency to
international organisations under point (c) of Article 87(1) shall be in accordance with the
data protection provisions laid down in Section 2 of Chapter IV. In particular, the Agency
shall ensure that any working arrangement concluded with international organisations
regarding the exchange of personal data under point (c) of Article 87(1) complies with
Chapter V of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 and is subject to the authorisation of the European
Data Protection Supervisor, where provided for by that Regulation. The Agency shall ensure
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that personal data transferred to international organisations are only processed for the
purposes for which they were transferred.
6. The exchange of information between the Agency and Union institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies, and international organisations referred to in paragraph 1, shall be
conducted via the communication network referred to in Article 1415 or via other accredited
information exchange systems which fulfil the criteria of availability, confidentiality and
integrity.
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7. In its cooperation with Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and
international organisations, the Agency shall make use of existing information, resources and
systems available in the framework of EUROSUR, where appropriate.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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Article 69 83
European cooperation on coast guard functions
1. Without affecting prejudice to EUROSUR, the Agency shall, in cooperation
with EFCA and EMSA, support national authorities carrying out coast guard functions at
national and Union level and, where appropriate, at international level by:
(a) sharing, fusing and analysing information available in ship reporting systems and
other information systems hosted by or accessible to those agencies, in accordance
with their respective legal bases and without affecting prejudice to the
ownership of data by Member States;
(b) providing surveillance and communication services based on state-of-the-art
technology, including space-based and ground infrastructure and sensors mounted on
any kind of platform;
(c) building capacity by drawing up guidelines and recommendations and by
establishing best practices as well as by providing training and exchange of staff;
(d) enhancing the exchange of information and cooperation on coast guard functions,
including by analysing operational challenges and emerging risks in the maritime
domain;
(e) sharing capacity by planning and implementing multipurpose operations and by
sharing assets and other capabilities, to the extent that those activities are coordinated
by those agencies and are agreed to by the competent authorities of the Member
States concerned.
2. The precise forms of cooperation on coast guard functions between the Agency, EFCA
and EMSA shall be determined in a working arrangement in accordance with their respective
mandates and with the financial rules applicable to those agencies. Such an arrangement shall
be approved by the management board of the Agency and the administrative boards of EFCA
and EMSA. The Agency, EFCA and EMSA shall use information received in the context of
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their cooperation only within the limits of their legal framework and in compliance with
fundamental rights, including data protection requirements.
3. The Commission shall, in close cooperation with the Member States, the Agency,
EFCA and EMSA, make available a practical handbook on European cooperation on coast
guard functions. That handbook shall contain guidelines, recommendations and best practices
for the exchange of information. The Commission shall adopt the handbook in the form of a
recommendation.
Article 7084
Cooperation with Ireland and the United Kingdom
1. The Agency shall facilitate operational cooperation of the Member States with Ireland
and the United Kingdom in specific activities.
2. For the purposes of EUROSUR, the exchange of information and cooperation with
Ireland and the United Kingdom may take place on the basis of bilateral or multilateral
agreements between Ireland or the United Kingdom respectively and one or several
neighbouring Member States or through regional networks based on those agreements. The
national coordination centres shall be the contact points for the exchange of information with
the corresponding authorities of Ireland and the United Kingdom within EUROSUR.
3. The agreements referred to in paragraph 2 shall be limited to the following exchanges
of information between a national coordination centre and the corresponding authority of
Ireland or the United Kingdom:
(a) information contained in the national situational picture of the Member State, to the
extent such information was transmitted to the Agency for the purposes of the
European situational picture;
(b) information collected by Ireland or the United Kingdom which is relevant for the
purposes of the European situational picture;
(c) information as referred to in Article 25(5)28(5).
4. Information provided in the context of EUROSUR by the Agency or by a Member
State which is not party to an agreement as referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be shared with
Ireland or the United Kingdom without the prior approval of the Agency or that Member
State. The Member States and the Agency shall be bound by the refusal to share that
information with Ireland or the United Kingdom.
5. The onward transmission or other communication of information exchanged under this
Article to third countries or to third parties shall be prohibited.
6. The agreements referred to in paragraph 2 shall include provisions on the financial
costs arising from the participation of Ireland or the United Kingdom in the implementation of
those agreements.
7. Support to be provided by the Agency pursuant to points (n), (o) and (p) of Article
1011(1) , points (15), (16), (17), (18), and (19), shall cover the organisation of return
operations of Member States in which Ireland or the United Kingdom also participates.
8. The application of this Regulation to the borders of Gibraltar shall be suspended until
the date on which an agreement is reached on the scope of the measures concerning the
crossing by persons of the external borders.
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Article 7185
Cooperation with third countries
1. The Member States and the Agency shall cooperate with third countries for the
purpose of European integrated border management EIBM and migration policy in
accordance with points (g) and (i) of Article 3(1) , taking into account Union
priorities in the area of border management, migration and return .
2. On the basis of the policy priorities set out in accordance with Article 8(43), the
Agency shall provide technical and operational assistance to third countries within the
framework of the external action policy of the Union, including with regard to the protection
of fundamental rights and personal data and with regard to the principle of non-refoulement.
3. The Agency and Member States shall comply with Union law, including norms and
standards which form part of the Union acquis, where cooperation with third countries takes
place on the territory of those third countries.
4. The establishment of cooperation with third countries shall serve to promote European
integrated border management EIBM standards.
Article 72 86
Cooperation of Member States with third countries
1. Member States may cooperate at an operational level with one or more third countries
in relation to the areas covered by this Regulation. Such cooperation may include the
exchange of information and may take place on the basis of bilateral or multilateral
agreements, other forms of arrangements, or through regional networks established on the
basis of those agreements.
2. When concluding the bilateral and multilateral agreements referred to in paragraph 1
of this Article, Member States may include provisions concerning the exchange of
information and cooperation for the purposes of EUROSUR in accordance with Articles 7590
and 89.
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Prior to entering into negotiations with one or several third countries regarding the exchange
of information through EUROSUR, Member States shall assess and take into account the
general situation in the third country concerned, and consult the Agency on the EUROSUR
provisions of the agreement and on the rules for establishing the specific situational picture
and data security.
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3. The bilateral and multilateral agreements and other forms of arrangements referred to
in paragraph 1 shall comply with Union and international law on fundamental rights and on
international protection, including the Charter, the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, the 1967 Protocol thereto, and in particular the principle of non-refoulement. When
implementing such agreements and arrangements, Member States shall assess and take into
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account the general situation in the third country on a regular basis, and shall have regard to
Article 8 of this Regulation.
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Article 87
Agency support to activities of Member States under agreements with third countries
1. Agreements with third countries relating to the application of the Schengen acquis in
respect of third countries, territories or other relevant entities or agreements concluded in
accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/399 may provide for the deployment of border
management teams for operational and technical assistance.
2. Member States that intend to negotiate agreements referred to in paragraph 1, shall
inform the Commission, the Council, the Parliament, the EEAS and the Agency of that
intention.
3. When concluding the agreements referred to in paragraph 1, the respective Member
State or Member States shall include provisions related to the Agency’s support. Those
provisions shall be based on the model provisions provided for by the Commission in
accordance with Article 91(3).
4. The agreements referred to in paragraph 1 may be concluded only after the
Commission approved them by a decision. Prior to concluding such agreements, the Member
State or Member States shall submit the text of the agreements as negotiated to the
Commission.
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Article 73 88
Cooperation between the Agency and third countries
1. The Agency may cooperate, to the extent required for the fulfilment of its tasks, with
the authorities of third countries competent in matters covered by this Regulation. The
Agency shall comply with Union law, including norms and standards which form part of the
Union acquis, including where cooperation with third countries takes place on the territory of
those third countries.
2. When cooperating with the authorities of third countries, as referred to in paragraph 1
of this Article, the Agency shall act within the framework of the external action policy of the
Union, including with regard to the protection of fundamental rights and personal data, the
principle of non-refoulement, the prohibition of arbitrary detention and the prohibition of
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, with the support of, and in
coordination with, Union delegations and, where relevant, CSDP missions and operations in
accordance with point (j) of the second subparagraph of Article 68(1) 82(1), point (n).
3. In circumstances requiring the deployment of border management or return
teams from the standing corps to a third country where the members of the teams will exercise
executive powers, a status agreement shall be negotiated on the basis of the model status
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agreement referred to in Article 7699(1) and subsequently it shall be concluded by the Union
with the third country concerned on the basis of Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union(TFEU). The status agreement shall cover all aspects that are necessary
for carrying out the actions. It shall set out, in particular, the scope of the operation,
provisions on civil and criminal liability, the tasks and powers of the members of the teams
, individual specialists or experts , measures related to the establishment of an antenna
office and practical measures related to the respect of fundamental rights. The status
agreement shall ensure that fundamental rights are fully respected during those operations and
shall provide for a complaints mechanism.
Where the status agreement allows for the deployment of return teams, this Article shall
not affect the application of Article 64. Status agreements may be targeted and have a limited
scope of activities to be performed or a limited geographic scope. Status agreements may
complement working arrangements on technical assistance. The European Data Protection
Supervisor shall be consulted on the provisions of the status agreement related to the transfer
of data if those provisions differ substantially from the model status agreement.
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4. Status agreements as referred to in paragraph 3 may also provide for technical
assistance by the Agency to the third country. Working arrangements on technical assistance
may complement status agreements.
5. References to a status agreement in this Regulation shall be construed as including
agreements withing the meaning of Article 64(3).
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46. Where available, tThe Agency shall also act within the framework of working
arrangements concluded with the authorities of third countries referred to in paragraph 1 of
this Article in accordance with Union law and policy, in accordance with Article 7691(545).
The working arrangements referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall specify
the scope, nature and purpose of the cooperation and shall be related to technical
assistance the management of operational cooperation. Such working arrangements may
include provisions concerning the exchange of sensitive non-classified information and
cooperation in the framework of EUROSUR in accordance with Article 87, Article
7489(3) and Article 90(6) .
The Agency shall ensure that the third countries to which information is transferred only
process that information for the purposes for which it was transferred. Any working
arrangements on exchanging classified information shall be concluded in accordance with
Article 76(4) of this Regulation. The Agency shall request prior authorisation from the
European Data Protection Supervisor where those working arrangements provide for the
transfer of personal data and where provided for by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
57. The Agency shall contribute to the implementation of the Union external policy on
return and readmission within the framework of the external action policy of the Union and
regarding matters covered by this Regulation , including through the agreements referred to
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in paragraph 3 of this Article and Article 64 and through working arrangements referred to in
paragraph 4 of this Article and Article 63 and in line with the conditions laid out therein .
68. The Agency may receive Union funding in accordance with the provisions of the
relevant instruments supporting third countries and activities relating to them. Prior to
engaging a third party for the implementation of projects funded by the Union in the area of
the Agency’s competence and expertise, the Commission shall consider giving priority to the
Agency providing the necessary support to the project, without prejudice to the methods of
budget implementation as set out in Article 62 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 . It
The Agency may launch and finance technical assistance projects in third countries
regarding matters covered by this Regulation and in accordance with the financial rules
applicable to the Agency. Such projects shall be included in the single programming
document referred to in Article 102122.
79. The Agency shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission
of activities conducted pursuant to this Article and, in particular, of the activities related to
technical and operational assistance in the field of border management and return in third
countries, and the deployment of liaison officers, and shall provide them with detailed
information on compliance with fundamental rights. The Agency shall make public the
agreements, working arrangements, pilot projects and technical assistance projects with third
countries in accordance with Article 114(2)134(2).
810. The Agency shall include an assessment of the cooperation with third countries in its
annual reports.
Article 7489
Technical and operational assistance provided by the Agency to third countries
1. The Agency may coordinate operational cooperation between Member States and third
countries and provide technical and operational assistance to third countries in the context of
EIBM European integrated border management.
2. The Agency may carry out actions related to European integrated border management
EIBM on the territory of a third country subject to the agreement of that third country.
3. Operations on the territory of a third country shall be included in the annual work
programme adopted by the management board in accordance with Article 102122, and shall
be carried out on the basis of an operational plan agreed between the Agency and the third
country concerned and in consultation with the participating Member States. Where a
Member State or Member States neighbour the third country or border the operational area of
the third country, the operational plan and any amendments thereto shall be subject to the
agreement of that Member State or those Member States. Article 11(1), point (9), and
Articles 3843, 4349, 4652, 4753 and 5466 to 5769 shall apply mutatis mutandis to
deployments in third countries.
4. The executive director shall ensure the security of the staff deployed in third countries.
For the purpose of the first subparagraph, Member States shall inform the executive director
of any concern related to the security of their nationals should they be deployed on the
territory of certain third countries.
Where the security of any staff member deployed in third countries cannot be guaranteed, the
executive director shall take appropriate measures by suspending or terminating the
corresponding aspects of the technical and operational assistance provided by the Agency to
that third country.
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5. Without prejudice affecting to the deployment of the members of the standing
corps in accordance with Articles 5466 to 5870, the participation of Member States in
operations on the territory of third countries shall be voluntary.
In addition to the relevant mechanism referred to in Article 5769(9) and paragraph 4 of this
Article, where the security of its participating staff cannot be guaranteed to the satisfaction of
the Member State, that Member State may opt out of its respective contribution to the
operation in the third country in question. Where a Member State invokes such an exceptional
situation, it shall provide comprehensive reasons and information on the situation to the
Agency in writing, the content of which shall be included in the report referred to in Article
6579. Such reasons and information shall be provided during the annual bilateral negotiations
or no later than 21 days prior to the deployment. The deployment of staff seconded in
accordance with Article 5668 shall be subject to the consent of the home Member State
communicated upon notification by the Agency and no later than 21 days prior to the
deployment.
6. Where cooperation for the purposes of EUROSUR is envisaged in accordance with
Articles 21, 30 and 90, Ooperational plans as referred to in paragraph 3 may shall
include provisions concerning the exchange of information and cooperation for the
that purpose of EUROSUR in accordance with Articles 75 and 89.
Article 7590
Exchange of information with third countries in the framework of EUROSUR
1. The national coordination centres and, where relevant, the Agency shall be the contact
points for the exchange of information and cooperation with third countries for the purposes
of EUROSUR.
2. The provisions concerning exchange of information and cooperation for the purposes
of EUROSUR contained in the bilateral or multilateral agreements referred to in Articles
72(2) 86 and 87 and in the status agreements shall address:
(a) address the specific situational pictures shared with third countries;
(b) address the data originating from third countries which can be shared in the
European situational picture and the procedures for sharing those data;
(c) set out the procedures and conditions by which the information derived
from the EUROSUR fusion services can be provided to third countries'
authorities;
(d) provide the detailed rules regarding cooperation and the exchange of
information with third-country observers for the purpose of EUROSUR.
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3. The requirements set out in paragraph 2 shall apply to the Agency mutatis mutandis
where cooperating with third countries for the purposes of EUROSUR in the framework of a
working arrangement.
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34. Information provided in the context of EUROSUR by the Agency or by a Member
State which is not party to an agreement as referred to in Article 7286(1) shall not be shared
with a third country under that agreement without the prior approval of the Agency or of that
Member State. The Member States and the Agency shall be bound by the refusal to share that
information with the third country concerned.
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5. Where there is operation on the territory of a third country, the detailed rules for the
cooperation in the framework of EUROSUR shall be set out in the operational plan as referred
to in Article 89(3).
6. Where there is no operation on the territory of a third country, the detailed rules for the
cooperation shall be set out in a EUROSUR cooperation plan, as referred to in Article 30(4).
The EUROSUR cooperation plan shall be agreed between the Agency and a third country
authority. The EUROSUR cooperation plan shall be binding for both parties.
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Article 76 91
Role of the Commission with regard to cooperation with third countries
1. The Commission, after consulting the Member States, the Agency , and other
relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies FRA and the European Data Protection
Supervisor, shall draw up a model for the status agreement for actions conducted on
the territory of third countries. It shall set out, in particular, the scope of the agreement,
provisions on civil and criminal liability, privileges and immunities of the Agency, its assets
and premises as well as those of the members of the teams and other relevant staff, the tasks
and powers of the members of the teams, measures related to the establishment of an antenna
office where relevant, practical measures related to the respect of fundamental rights, and
optional provisions on the possibility for technical cooperation.
2. The Commission, in cooperation with the Member States and the Agency, shall draw
up model provisions for the exchange of information in the framework of EUROSUR in
accordance with Articles 7084(2) and Article 7286(2).
The Commission, after consulting the Agency and other relevant Union bodies, offices or
agencies, including FRA and the European Data Protection Supervisor, shall draw up a model
for the working arrangements referred to in Article 7388(6). That model shall include
provisions related to fundamental rights and data protection , the exchange of sensitive
non-classified information and cooperation in the framework of EUROSUR safeguards
addressing practical measures.
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3. The Commission, after consulting the Agency and other relevant Union bodies, offices or
agencies, shall draw up model provisions for bilateral or multilateral agreements of Member
States with third countries on shared border crossing points that provide for technical and
operational assistance of border management teams from the standing corps in line with
Article 87. Those model provisions shall include in particular:
(a) the privileges and immunities of deployed members of the teams and other relevant
staff, including provisions on civil and criminal liability;
(b) the exercise of executive powers by members of the teams;
(c) the tasks and powers of the members of the teams and the elements operational plans.
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34. Before a new bilateral or multilateral agreement as referred to in Article 7286(1) is
concluded, the Member States concerned shall notify the Commission of the draft provisions
related to border management and return.
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When the agreement provides for the exchange of information in EUROSUR, Member States
shall consult the Commission on the draft provisions at least prior to concluding the
negotiations.
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The Member States concerned shall notify the provisions of such existing and new bilateral
and multilateral agreements related to border management and return to the Commission,
which shall inform the Council and the Agency thereof.
45. Before the management board approves any working arrangements between the
Agency and competent authorities of third countries or international organisations , the
Agency shall notify them to the Commission, which shall give its prior approval. Before any
such working arrangement is concluded, the Agency shall provide the European Parliament
with detailed information as regards the parties to the working arrangement and its envisaged
content.
56. The Agency shall notify the operational plans referred to in Article 7489(3) to the
Commission. Any decision to deploy liaison officers to third countries in accordance with
Article 7792 shall be subject to receiving the prior approval of the Commission. The
European Parliament shall be kept fully informed of those activities without delay.
Article 7792
Liaison officers of the Agency in third countries
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1. The Agency may deploy experts from its statutory staff and other experts as liaison
officers of the Agency , who should enjoy the highest possible protection when
carrying out their duties in third countries. They shall form part of the local or regional
cooperation networks of immigration liaison officers and security experts of the Union and of
the Member States, including the network set up pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1240. By
decision of the management board, the Agency may lay down the specific profiles of liaison
officers, depending on the operational needs with regard to the third country concerned,
including in the area of return .
2. Within the framework of the external action policy of the Union, priority for the
deployment of liaison officers shall be given to those third countries which, on the basis of a
risk analysis, constitute a country of origin or transit regarding illegal immigration or with
third countries that have been identified as a priority country of return of individuals seeking
to enter the Union illegally .
3. The Agency may receive liaison liaisons officers posted by those third countries. on
a reciprocal basis. The management board shall, on the basis of a proposal from the executive
director, adopt the list of priorities on a yearly basis.
4. The deployment of liaison officers of the Agency shall be approved by the
management board following the opinion a prior approval decision of the Commission.
3 5. The tasks of the Agency's liaison officers of the Agency shall include
establishing and maintaining contacts with the competent authorities of the third country to
which they are assigned with a view to contributing to the prevention of and fight against
illegal immigration and the return of returnees, including by providing technical assistance in
the identification of third-country nationals and the acquisition of travel documents. Such
tasks shall be carried out in compliance with Union law and shall respect fundamental rights.
The Agency's liaison officers of the Agency shall coordinate closely with Union
delegations, with Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/1240 and, where
relevant, with CSDP missions and operations as set out in point (j) of the second
subparagraph of Article 68(1)point (m)82(1), point (n). Wherever possible, they shall have
their offices in the same premises as the Union delegations.
4 6. In third countries where return liaison officers of the Agency are not deployed
by the Agency, the Agency may support a Member State in deploying a European
return liaison officer (EURLO) as referred to in Regulation (EU) 2019/1240 to provide
support to the Member States, as well as to support the Agency's activities, in accordance with
Article 48 Articles 55, 63 and 64 .
Article 78 93
Observers participating in the Agency's activities
1. The Agency may, with the agreement of the Member States concerned, invite
observers of Union institutions, bodies, offices, agencies or international organisations and
CSDP missions and operations referred to in point (j) of the second subparagraph of Article
68(1)82(1), point (m), to participate in its activities, in particular in joint operations and pilot
projects, risk analysis and training, to the extent that their presence is in accordance with the
objectives of those activities, may contribute to the improvement of cooperation and the
exchange of best practices, and does not affect the overall safety and security of those
activities. The participation of such observers in risk analysis and training may take place only
with the agreement of the Member States concerned. As regards joint operations and pilot
projects, the participation of observers shall be subject to the agreement of the host Member
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State. Detailed rules on the participation of observers shall be included in the operational plan.
Those observers shall receive appropriate training from the Agency prior to their
participation.
2. The Agency may, with the agreement of the Member States concerned, invite
observers from third countries to participate in its activities at the external borders, return
operations, return interventions and training, as referred to in Article 62 65, to the extent that
their presence is in accordance with the objectives of those activities, may contribute to
improving cooperation and the exchange of best practices, and does not affect the overall
safety of those activities or the safety of third-country nationals. Detailed rules on the
participation of observers shall be included in the operational plan. Those observers shall
receive appropriate training from the Agency prior to their participation. They shall be
required to adhere to the codes of conduct of the Agency while participating in its activities.
3. The Agency shall ensure that the presence of observers does not pose any risk related
to respect for fundamental rights.
CHAPTER III
FALSE AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS ONLINE (FADO)
DOCUMENT SECURITY, IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AND VISA
SUPPORT
Article 79 94
Document security and identity management
1. The Agency shall take over and operate the False and Authentic Documents Online
(‘FADO’) system established in accordance with Joint Action 98/700/JHA Regulation
(EU) 2020/493 of the European Parliament and of the Council79. .
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2. The Member States shall share with the Agency specimens of their travel and identity
documents and provide updates in case of any changes therein.
3. Member States and third countries may make temporarily available or donate permanently
to the Agency false, fraudulently obtained or fraudulently used travel and identity documents
they have confiscated in accordance with their national law.
4. Member States shall ensure that the Agency’s staff is enabled to carry authentic, specimen
and false documents for the purposes of implementing this Regulation.
5. The Commission may, in order to perform the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation,
request the Agency to carry out compliance checks of travel and identity documents in
particular where it is necessary to ensure the essential interest of the security of the Union.
Such compliance checks shall include verifications on physical, optical and electronic
79 Regulation (EU) 2020/493 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 on the
False and Authentic Documents Online (FADO) system and repealing Council Joint Action
98/700/JHA (OJ L 107, 6.4.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/493/oj).
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components of travel and identity documents. Such compliance checks shall not involve the
processing of personal data.
6. The Agency may carry out the compliance checks referred to in paragraph 5 on the request
of a third party for a fee. The revenue generated by the fees shall be considered internal
assigned revenue and support the operation of the Agency’s tasks under this Chapter. Any
revenue remaining after covering the costs shall be entered into the Union budget. Such
compliance checks shall not involve the processing of personal data.
7. The Commission shall lay down the applicable fees by means of an implementing act. That
implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to
in Article 142(2).
8. The Agency shall assist Member States in the detection of false documents, including by
setting up and operating a helpdesk service to support their border management, return,
migration and visa authorities, joint operations, pilot projects, border interventions and
migration management teams, where necessary. Such assistance may be provided to third
country authorities in accordance with Article 88.
9. The Agency shall offer and provide regular training in document security to the national
authorities of Member States and Union delegations. It may also offer trainings to third
country authorities upon their request as referred to in Article 75(13), second subparagraph.
10. The Agency may develop, operate and maintain technological solutions to support the
verification of the authenticity and integrity of travel and identity documents.
11. The ETIAS Central Unit may be involved in providing assistance referred to in paragraphs
8 and 9.
Article 95
Visa support office
The Agency shall ensure the setting-up and operation of a visa support office to support
Member States competent authorities, including in third countries and Union delegations in
particular as regards:
(a) training on matters relevant to the implementation of the common visa policy in
particular document verification and the detection of document fraud in the
assessment of applications for short-stay visas and long-stay visas and residence
permits;
(b) risk assessment and country analysis, including ad hoc risk analysis focused on
specific third countries, evolving trends in document fraud for the purpose of short
stay visa, visa abuses and visa misuse and fraudulent practices, and in document
fraud and other abuses in relation to long-stay visas and residence permits;
(c) prevention and detection of document fraud, including travel, identity documents and
other supporting documents, in relation to short-stay visas as well as to long-stay
visas and residence permits.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1
GENERAL RULES
Article 80 96
Protection of fundamental rights and a fundamental rights strategy
1. The European Border and Coast Guard shall guarantee the protection of fundamental
rights in the performance of its tasks under this Regulation in accordance with relevant Union
law, in particular the Charter, and relevant international law, including the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol thereto, the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and obligations related to access to international protection, in particular the
principle of non-refoulement.
For that purpose, the Agency, with the contribution of and subject to the endorsement by the
fundamental rights officer, shall draw up, implement and further develop a fundamental rights
strategy and action plan, including an effective mechanism for monitoring respect for
fundamental rights in all the activities of the Agency.
2. In the performance of its tasks, the European Border and Coast Guard shall ensure that
no person, in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement, be forced to disembark in,
forced to enter, or conducted to a country, or be otherwise handed over or returned to the
authorities of a country where there is, inter alia, a serious risk that he or she would be
subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution, or other inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment, or where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or
her race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, or from which there is a risk of expulsion, removal, extradition or return to
another country in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.
3. In the performance of its tasks, the European Border and Coast Guard shall take into
account the special needs of children, unaccompanied minors, persons with disabilities,
victims of trafficking in human beings, persons in need of medical assistance, persons in need
of international protection, persons in distress at sea and other persons in a particularly
vulnerable situation, and shall address those needs within its mandate. The European Border
and Coast Guard shall in all its activities pay particular attention to children's rights and
ensure that the best interests of the child are respected.
4. In the performance of its tasks, in its relations with Member States and in its
cooperation with third countries, the Agency shall take into account the reports of the
consultative forum referred to in Article 108128 and the reports of the fundamental rights
officer.
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Article 8197
Code of conduct
1. The Agency shall, in cooperation with the consultative forum, draw up and further
develop a code of conduct which shall apply to all border control operations coordinated by
operational activities of the Agency and all persons participating in the
operational activities of the Agency. The code of conduct shall lay down procedures
intended to guarantee the principles of the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights with
particular focus on vulnerable persons, including children, unaccompanied minors and other
persons in a vulnerable situation, as well as on persons seeking international protection.
2. The Agency shall, in cooperation with the consultative forum, draw up and further
develop a code of conduct for return operations and return interventions, which shall apply
during all return operations and return interventions coordinated or organised by the Agency
, and all persons participating in return activities of the Agency . That code of conduct
shall describe common standardised procedures to simplify the organisation of return
operations and return interventions, and shall assure return in a humane manner and with full
respect for fundamental rights, in particular the principles of human dignity, the prohibition of
torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and security
and the right to the protection of personal data and non-discrimination.
3. The code of conduct for return shall in particular pay attention to the obligation of
Member States to provide for an effective independent forced-return monitoring system
as set out in Article 8(6) of Directive 2008/115/EC Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2026/2280
and to the fundamental rights strategy.
Article 82 98
Tasks and powers of the members of the teams
1. Members of the teams shall have the capacity to perform tasks and exercise powers for
border control and return as well as those which are necessary for the realisation of the
objectives of Regulations (EU) No 656/2014, and (EU) 2016/399 and Directive
2008/115/ECRegulation (EU) 2026/2280.
2. The performance of tasks and the exercise of powers by members of the teams, in
particular those requiring executive powers, shall be subject to the authorisation of the host
Member State on its territory as well as to applicable Union, national or international law, in
particular Regulation (EU) No 656/2014, as described in the operational plans referred to in
Article 38.
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2. Members of the teams, including statutory staff, shall be authorised to perform tasks
on the territory of the host Member State requiring the exercise of executive powers listed in
Article 67(7). The Member States shall enable the members of the teams to perform any other
operational tasks. The operational plans referred to in Article 43 shall specify the relevant
profiles and the tasks requiring executive powers. Those tasks shall be performed without the
presence of the border guards of the host Member States unless otherwise determined in the
operational plan.
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3. While performing their tasks and exercising their powers, members of the teams shall
fully ensure respect for fundamental rights and shall comply with Union and international law
and the national law of the host Member State.
4. Without prejudice to affecting Article 95114(1) as regards statutory staff,
members of the teams shall only perform tasks and exercise powers under instructions from
and, as a general rule, in the presence of border guards or staff involved in return-related tasks
of the host Member State. The host Member State may authorise members of the teams to act
on its behalf.
5. The host Member State may report incidents related to non-compliance with the
operational plan by members of the teams, including in relation to fundamental rights, to the
Agency via the coordinating officer for possible follow-up, which may include disciplinary
measures.
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6. When, in the context of an investigation carried out by the fundamental rights officer,
its preliminary findings demonstrate the lack of involvement of any members of the teams, the
fundamental rights officer shall transmit any relevant information to the competent national
bodies and close the investigation.
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76. Statutory staff who are members of the teams shall wear the uniform of the standing
corps while performing their tasks and exercising their powers. Members of the teams who
are seconded from Member States for a long term or who are deployed for a short term shall
wear their own uniform while performing their tasks and exercising their powers.
By way of derogation from the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the decision of the
management board referred to in point (a) of Article 5466(4), point (a) shall indicate the
profiles to which the obligation to wear a uniform does not apply due to the specific nature of
the operational activity.
All members of the teams shall wear visible personal identification and a blue armband with
the insignias of the Union and of the Agency on their uniforms, identifying them as
participating in a joint operation, migration management support team deployment, pilot
project, rapid border intervention, return operation or return intervention. For the purposes of
identification vis-à-vis the national authorities of the host Member State, members of the
teams shall at all times carry an accreditation document, which they shall present upon
request.
The design and specifications for the uniforms of the statutory staff shall be established by a
decision of the management board, on the basis of a proposal from the executive director
made after receiving the opinion of the Commission.
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87. For staff who are seconded to the Agency or deployed from a Member State for a
short term, the ability to carry and use service weapons, ammunition and equipment shall be
subject to the home Member State's national law.
The ability to carry and use service weapons, ammunition and equipment by the statutory staff
who are deployed as members of the teams shall be subject to the framework and detailed
rules laid down in this Article and Annex V.
For the purpose of implementing this paragraph, the executive director may authorise
statutory staff to carry and use weapons in accordance with the rules adopted by the
management board, in line with point (b) of Article 5567(5), point (b).
98. Members of the teams, including statutory staff, shall be authorised for the relevant
profiles by the host Member State to perform tasks during a deployment that require the use
of force, including the carrying and use of service weapons, ammunition and equipment, and
shall be subject to the consent of either the home Member State or, for statutory staff, the
Agency. The use of force, including the carrying and use of service weapons, ammunition and
equipment, shall be exercised in accordance with the national law of the host Member State
and the modalities of its use shall be determined in the operational plan in the presence
of border guards of the host Member State. The host Member State may, with the consent of
the home Member State or the Agency, where appropriate, authorise members of the teams to
use force on its territory in the absence of border guards of the host Member State.
The host Member State may prohibit the carrying of certain service weapons, ammunition and
equipment, provided that its own law applies the same prohibition to its own border guards or
staff when involved in return-related tasks. The host Member State, in advance of the
deployment of the members of the teams, shall inform the Agency of the permissible service
weapons, ammunition and equipment and of the conditions for their use. The Agency shall
make this information available to Member States.
109. Service weapons, ammunition and equipment may be used in legitimate self-defence
and in legitimate defence of members of the teams or of other persons in accordance with the
national law of the host Member State in line with relevant principles of international human
rights law and the Charter.
1110. For the purpose of this Regulation, the host Member State shall authorise members of
the teams to consult Union databases, the consultation of which is necessary for fulfilling
operational aims specified in the operational plan on border checks, border surveillance and
return, through their national interfaces or another form of access provided in the Union legal
acts establishing such databases, as applicable. Members of the teams shall, in particular
perform any other action necessary to ensure the fulfilment of their responsibilities when
acting as border authorities pursuant to the Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, in accordance with
that Regulation. The host Member State may also authorise members of the teams to
consult its national databases where necessary for the same purpose. Member States shall
ensure that they provide such database access in an efficient and effective manner. Members
of the teams shall consult only those data which are strictly necessary for performing their
tasks and exercising their powers. The host Member State shall, in advance of the deployment
of the members of the teams, inform the Agency of the national and Union databases which
may be consulted. The Agency shall make this information available to all Member States
participating in the deployment.
That consultation shall be carried out in accordance with Union data protection law and the
national data protection law of the host Member State.
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1211. Decisions to refuse entry in accordance with Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399
and decisions refusing visas at the border in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EC)
No 810/2009 shall be taken only by border guards of the host Member State or by members of
the teams if they are authorised by the host Member State to act on its behalf.
Article 83 99
Accreditation document
1. The Agency shall, in cooperation with the host Member State, issue a document in the
official language of the host Member State and another official language of the institutions of
the Union to the members of the teams for the purpose of identifying them and as proof of the
holder's rights to perform tasks and exercise powers as referred to in Article 8298. That
document shall include the following features of each member of the teams:
(a) name and nationality;
(b) rank or job title;
(c) a recent digitised photograph; and
(d) tasks authorised to be performed during the deployment.
2. The document shall be returned to the Agency at the end of each joint operation,
migration management support team deployment, pilot project, rapid border intervention,
return operation or return intervention.
Article 84 100
Civil liability of the members of the team
1. Without prejudice to affecting Article 95114, where members of the teams are
operating in a host Member State, that Member State shall be liable in accordance with its
national law for any damage caused by them during their operations.
2. Where such damage is caused by the gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the
members of the teams seconded or deployed by the Member States, the host Member State
may request the home Member State to reimburse it for any sums that the host Member State
has paid to the injured parties or persons entitled to receive such sums on behalf of the injured
parties.
Where such damage is caused by gross negligence or wilful misconduct by the statutory staff,
the host Member State may request the Agency to reimburse it for any sums that the host
Member State has paid to the injured parties or persons entitled to receive such sums on
behalf of the injured parties. This shall be without prejudice to not affect any action
before the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) against the Agency
in accordance with Article 98117.
3. Without prejudice to affecting the exercise of its rights vis-à-vis third parties,
each Member State shall waive all its claims against the host Member State or any other
Member State for any damage it has sustained, except in cases of gross negligence or wilful
misconduct.
4. Any dispute between Member States, or between a Member State and the Agency,
relating to the application of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article which cannot be resolved by
negotiations between them shall be submitted by them to the Court of Justice of the
European Union .
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5. Without prejudice to affecting the exercise of its rights vis-à-vis third parties,
the Agency shall bear the costs of damage to its equipment during deployment, except in
cases of gross negligence or wilful misconduct.
Article 85 101
Criminal liability of related to the members of the teams
Without prejudice to affecting Article 95114, during a joint operation, pilot project,
migration management support team deployment, rapid border intervention, return operation
or return intervention, members of the teams in the territory of the host Member State,
including statutory staff, shall be treated in the same way as officials of the host Member State
with regard to any criminal offences that might be committed against them or by them.
SECTION 2
PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA BY THE EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST
GUARD
Article 86 102
General rules on processing of personal data by the Agency
1. The Agency shall apply Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 when processing personal data.
2. The management board shall adopt internal rules on the application of Regulation
(EU) 2018/1725 by the Agency, including rules concerning the data protection officer of the
Agency.
The Agency may, in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, adopt internal
rules restricting the application of Articles 14 to 22, 35 and 36 of that Regulation. In
particular, the Agency may, for the performance of its tasks in the area of return, provide for
internal rules restricting the application of those provisions on a case-by-case basis as long as
the application of those provisions would risk jeopardising return procedures. Such
restrictions shall respect the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms, shall be
necessary and proportionate to the objectives pursued and shall contain specific provisions,
where relevant, as referred to in Article 25(2) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
3. The Agency may transfer the personal data referred to in Articles 49, 88 and 89 to a
third country or to an international organisation in accordance with Chapter V of Regulation
(EU) 2018/1725 insofar as such transfer is necessary for the performance of the Agency's
tasks. The Agency shall ensure that personal data that are transferred to a third country or to
an international organisation are only processed for the purpose for which they were provided.
The Agency shall indicate, at the moment of transferring personal data to a third country or to
an international organisation, any restrictions on access to or use of those data, in general or
specific terms, including as regards transfer, erasure or destruction. Where the need for such
restrictions becomes apparent after the transfer of personal data, the Agency shall inform the
third country or the international organisation accordingly. The Agency shall ensure that the
third country or international organisation concerned complies with such restrictions.
4. Transfers of personal data to third countries shall not prejudice affect the rights
of applicants for international protection and of beneficiaries of international protection, in
particular as regards non-refoulement and the prohibition against disclosing or obtaining
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information set out in Article 30 of Directive 2013/32/EU 7(2) of Regulation (EU)
2024/1348of the European Parliament and of the Council80.
5. Member States and the Agency, as appropriate, shall ensure that information that is
transferred or disclosed to third countries pursuant to this Regulation is not transmitted
onward to other third countries or third parties. Provisions to that effect shall be included in
any agreement or arrangement concluded with a third country providing for the exchange of
information.
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Article 103
Cooperation between the European Data Protection Supervisor and national
supervisory authorities
The European Data Protection Supervisor and national supervisory authorities shall ensure
coordinated supervision of the processing of personal data under this Regulation in
accordance with Article 62 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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Article 87 104
Purposes of processing of personal data
1. The Agency may process personal data only for the following purpose of
performing its tasks referred to in Article 11(1) of this Regulation. Where the Agency
processes personal data when carrying out its activities related to monitoring online platforms
for the purpose of risk analysis in line with Article 11(1), point (1), the Agency shall not
collect or store any personal data derived from that activity.
(a)performing its tasks of organising and coordinating joint operations, pilot projects, rapid
border interventions and in the framework of the migration management support teams as
referred to in Articles 37 to 40;
(b) performing its tasks of supporting Member States and third countries in pre-
return and return activities, operating return management systems, as well as
coordinating or organising return operations and providing technical and operational
assistance to Member States and third countries in accordance with Article 48;
(c) facilitating the exchange of information with Member States, the Commission,
the EEAS and the following Union bodies, offices and agencies and international
organisations: EASO, the European Union Satellite Centre, EFCA, EMSA, EASA
and the Network Manager of the EATMN, in accordance with Article 88;
(d) facilitating the exchange of information with the law enforcement authorities
of the Member States, Europol or Eurojust in accordance with Article 90;
80 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 60).
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(e) risk analysis by the Agency in accordance with Article 29;
(f) performing its tasks in the framework of EUROSUR in accordance with
Article 89;
(g) operating the FADO system in accordance with Article 79;
(h) administrative tasks.
2. Member States and their law enforcement authorities, the Commission, the EEAS, and
those Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations referred to in points
(c) and (d) of paragraph 1, that provide personal data to the Agency shall determine the
purpose or the purposes for which those data are to be processed as referred to in paragraph 1.
The Agency may decide to process such personal data for a different purpose which also falls
under paragraph 1 only on a case-by-case basis after having determined that such processing
is compatible with the initial purpose for which the data were collected and if authorised by
the provider of the personal data. The Agency shall keep written records of case-by-case
compatibility assessments.
3. The Agency, the Member States and their law enforcement authorities, the
Commission, the EEAS, and those Union bodies, offices and agencies and international
organisations referred to in points (c) and (d) of paragraph 1, may indicate, at the moment of
transmitting personal data, any restrictions on access to those data or use of such data, in
general or specific terms, including as regards the transfer, erasure or destruction of such data.
Where the need for such restrictions becomes apparent after the transfer transmission
of personal data, they shall inform the recipients accordingly. The recipients shall comply
with such restrictions.
Article 88 105
Categories of personal data processed Processing collected during joint
operations, return operations, return interventions, pilot projects, rapid border
interventions, and migration management support team deployments
1. Before each joint operation, return operation, return intervention, pilot project, rapid
border intervention or migration management support team deployment, the Agency and the
host Member State shall determine in a transparent manner the responsibilities for compliance
with the data protection obligations. When the purpose and the means of processing are
jointly determined by the Agency and the host Member State, they shall be joint controllers
by means of concluding an arrangement between them.
For the purposes referred to in points (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) of Article 87 104(1), the
Agency shall only process the following categories of personal data collected by the Member
States, by members of the teams, by its staff or by EASO that have been transmitted to it in
the context of joint operations, return operations, return interventions, pilot projects, rapid
border interventions, and migration management support team deployments:
(a) the personal data of persons who cross the external borders without authorisation ;
(b) personal data are necessary to confirm the identity and nationality of third-country
nationals within the framework of the return activities, including passenger lists;
(c) licence plate numbers, vehicle identification numbers, telephone numbers or ship and
aircraft identification numbers which are linked to the persons referred to in point (a), and
which are necessary for analysing routes and methods used for illegal immigration.
EN 208 EN
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(a) the personal data of persons who cross or attempt to cross the external borders and the
external borders of third countries, in which joint operations take place;
(b) personal data that is necessary for the purpose of performing the Agency’s tasks
related to return, readmission and reintegration referred to in Article 57, in compliance with
Regulation (EU) 2026/2280 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1349;
(c) other categories of personal data which are linked to the persons referred to in point
(a), and which are necessary for analysing routes and methods used for illegal immigration.
2019/1896
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2. The personal data referred to in paragraph 1 may be processed by the Agency in the
following cases:
(a) where the transmission of those data to the authorities of the relevant Member States
which are responsible for border control, migration, asylum or return,
readmission, reintegration or to relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies, is
necessary for those authorities or Union bodies, offices and agencies to fulfil their
tasks in accordance with Union and national law;
(b) where transmission of those data to the authorities of relevant Member States,
relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies, third countries of return or international
organisations is necessary for the purpose of identifying third-country nationals,
acquiring travel documents or enabling or supporting return;
(c) where necessary for the preparation of risk analyses.
2019/1896
Article 10689
Processing of personal data in the framework of EUROSUR
new
1. Personal data may exceptionally be processed in EUROSUR for the purposes of Article 21:
(a) where identification numbers of means of transport processed for the purposes of border
control relate to identifiable individuals, or
(b) where necessary to ensure the protection or saving lives of individuals in emergency
situations, or
(c) where providing situational awareness in the case of an imminent threat to the integrity of
the external borders.
EN 209 EN
2019/1896 (adapted)
21. Where the national situational picture requires the processing of personal data, those
data shall be processed in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, where applicable,
Directive (EU) 2016/680. Each Member State shall designate the authority which is to be
considered as controller within the meaning of point 7 of Article 4 of Regulation (EU)
2016/679 or point (8) of Article 3 of Directive (EU) 2016/680, as applicable, and which shall
have central responsibility for the processing of personal data by that Member State. Each
Member State shall notify the details of that authority to the Commission.
2. Ship and aircraft identification numbers shall be the only personal data that are
permitted to be accessed in the European situational and specific situational pictures and the
EUROSUR fusion services.
3. Where the processing of information in EUROSUR exceptionally requires the
processing of personal data other than ship and aircraft identification numbers, any such
processing shall be strictly limited to what is necessary for the purposes of EUROSUR in
accordance with Article 18.
4. Any exchange of personal data with third countries in the framework of EUROSUR
shall be strictly limited to what is absolutely necessary for the purposes of this Regulation. It
shall be carried out in accordance with Chapter V of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 by the
Agency, and in accordance with Chapter V of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, with Chapter V of
Directive (EU) 2016/680, as applicable, and with the relevant national provisions on data
protection transposing that Directive, by the Member States.
35. Any exchange of information under Articles 72(2), 73(3) and 74(3) which provides a
third country with data that could be used to identify persons or groups of persons whose
request for access to international protection is under examination or who are under a serious
risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or any
other violation of fundamental rights, shall be prohibited.
6. Member States and the Agency shall keep records of processing activities in
accordance with, Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Article 24 of Directive (EU)
2016/680, and Article 31 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, as applicable.
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Article 107
Restriction of data subject rights
1. Where the Agency is a data controller in accordance with Union law and is competent to
address a request by a data subject to exercise their rights of access to, rectification,
completion, erasure of personal data and restriction of processing,, the Agency may take a
decision to restrict those rights, in whole or in part to the extent that, and for as long as such a
partial or complete restriction constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a
democratic society with due regard for the fundamental rights and legitimate interests of the
person concerned in accordance with paragraph 2:
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2. The Commission shall adopt a delegated act specifying the circumstances in which, and the
conditions under which, the Agency may decide to restrict the rights referred to in paragraph
1.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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Article 90 108
Processing of operational personal data
1. Where the Agency, in the performance of its tasks under point (q) of Article 1011(1),
point (21), of this Regulation, processes personal data which it has collected while monitoring
migratory flows, carrying out risk analyses or in the course of operations for the purpose of
identifying suspects of cross-border crime, it shall process such personal data in accordance
with Chapter IX of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725. Personal data processed for that purpose,
including licence plate numbers, vehicle identification numbers, telephone numbers and ship
or aircraft identification numbers which are linked to such persons, shall relate to natural
persons whom the competent authorities of the Member States, Europol, Eurojust, or the
Agency have reasonable grounds to suspect are involved in cross-border crime. Such personal
data may include personal data of victims or witnesses where those personal data supplement
the personal data of suspects processed by the Agency in accordance with this Article.
2. The Agency shall only transmit personal data as referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article with to ::
(a) Europol or Eurojust or the EU Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and
Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) where they are this is
strictly necessary for the performance of their tasks respective mandates and
in accordance with Article 68;
(b) the competent law enforcement authorities of the Member States where they are
strictly this is necessary for those authorities for the purposes of preventing,
detecting, investigating or prosecuting serious cross-border crime.
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Article 109
Common provisions on indirect information exchange on the basis of a hit/no-hit system
1. The Agency shall take all appropriate measures to ensure indirect access by Europol
and Eurojust, to the indexes of personal data processed by the Agency in the performance of
its tasks under Article 11(1), points (14) and (21), held by the Agency, by means of an
automated hit/no-hit system queried by Europol or Eurojust.
2. Indirect access to information under paragraph 1 shall not affect any restrictions
indicated by the provider of that information. In case of a hit with information that is subject
to restrictions to onward transmissions, the hit/no-hit system referred to in paragraph 1 shall
not notify the searching agency of that hit. In that case, the Agency shall contact expeditiously
the provider of the information to inquire if the information that generated the hit can be
EN 211 EN
shared with the searching agency. Where the provider lifts those restrictions in that specific
context, the Agency shall transmit the information that generated the hit to the searching
agency. Where the provider of the information maintains those restrictions, the Agency shall
comply with those restrictions and not transmit the information that generated the hit to the
searching agency.
3. In the case of a hit, the Agency shall initiate the procedure by which the information
that generated the hit is to be transmitted to the searching agency as referred to in paragraph 1,
in accordance with any restrictions pursuant to this Regulation.
4. Searches of information in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be carried out
only for the purpose of identifying whether information available at Europol or Eurojust
matches information processed at the Agency for the purpose of Article 11(1), points (14) and
(21).
5. The Agency shall allow searches in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 only by
persons designated by Europol or Eurojust as authorised to perform such searches.
6. The Agency, Europol, and Eurojust shall inform each other and take appropriate steps
if, as a result of a hit in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3, there are indications that data
may be incorrect or may conflict with other data.
7. Where necessary for the implementation of the hit/no-hit system referred to in
paragraphs 1 to 6, the technical procedure, as well as performance and availability
requirements, shall be laid down by means of an implementing act.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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Article 91 110
Data retention
1. The Agency shall delete personal data as soon as they have been transmitted to the
competent authorities of Member States, other Union bodies, offices and agencies, in
particular EUAA , or transferred to third countries or international organisations or
used for the preparation of risk analyses. The retention period shall, in any event, not exceed
90 days after the date of the collection of those data. Data shall be anonymised in the results
of risk analyses.
2. Personal data processed for the purpose of performing return-related tasks shall be
deleted as soon as the purpose for which they have been collected has been achieved, and
shall be deleted no later than 30 days after the end of those tasks.
2. Personal data processed for the purpose of return and readmission shall be deleted
following the confirmation of return. Personal data processed for the purpose of reintegration
shall be stored for two years following the confirmation of return. When a return decision is
deleted or withdrawn, the corresponding data shall be deleted immediately. Personal data
processed for the purpose of the development and operational management of iRCMS and
RIAT shall be stored in compliance with Article [20] of Regulation (EU) …/… [Return
Digitalisation Regulation].
3. Operational personal data processed for the purposes of Article 90108 shall be deleted
as soon as the purpose for which they have been collected has been achieved by the Agency.
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The Agency shall continuously review the necessity of storing such data, in particular the
personal data of victims and witnesses. In any case, the Agency shall review the necessity of
storing such data no later than three months after the start of initial processing of such data,
and every six months thereafter. The Agency shall decide on the continued storage of personal
data, in particular the personal data of victims and witnesses, until the following review, only
if such storage is still necessary for the performance of the Agency's tasks under Article
90108.
4. This Article does not apply to personal data collected in the context of the FADO
system.
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5. The Agency shall delete the data referred to in Article 109 one year after the date of
collection of those data.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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Article 92 111
Security rules of the Agency on the protection of classified information and
sensitive non-classified information
1. The Agency shall adopt its own security rules covering the physical security within
the Agency, including the security of the communication and information systems in the
Agency and the protection of that shall be based on the principles and rules laid down in
the Commission's security rules for protecting European Union classified information (EUCI)
and sensitive non-classified information, including, inter alia, provisions for the exchange
of such information with third countries and international organisations, and processing and
storage of such information as set out in Commission Decisions (EU, Euratom) 2015/44381
and (EU, Euratom) 2015/44482. Any administrative arrangement on the exchange of classified
information with the relevant authorities of a third country or international organisation
or , in the absence of such arrangement, any exceptional ad hoc release of European
Union classified information (EUCI) to those authorities, shall be subject to the
Commission's prior approval.
2. The management board shall adopt the Agency's security rules following approval by
the Commission. When assessing the proposed security rules, the Commission shall ensure
that they are compatible with Decisions (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 and (EU, Euratom)
2015/444.
3. Classification shall not preclude information being made available to the European
Parliament. The transmission and handling of information and documents transmitted to the
European Parliament in accordance with this Regulation shall comply with the rules
81 Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 of 13 March 2015 on Security in the Commission (OJ L
72, 17.3.2015, p. 41 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2015/443/oj). 82 Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/444 of 13 March 2015 on the security rules for protecting
EU classified information (OJ L 72, 17.3.2015, p. 53http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2017/46/oj).
EN 213 EN
concerning the forwarding and handling of classified information which are applicable
between the European Parliament and the Commission.
SECTION 3
GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND ORGANISATION OF THE AGENCY
Article 93 112
Legal status and location
1. The Agency shall be a body of the Union. It shall have legal personality.
2. In each of the Member States, the Agency shall enjoy the most extensive legal
capacity accorded to legal persons under their laws. It may, in particular, acquire or dispose of
movable and immovable property and may be party to legal proceedings.
3. The Agency shall be independent in implementing its technical and operational
mandate.
4. The Agency shall be represented by its executive director.
5. The seat of the Agency shall be Warsaw, Poland.
Article 94 113
Headquarters agreement
1. The necessary arrangements concerning the accommodation to be provided for the
Agency in the Member State in which the Agency has its seat and the facilities to be made
available by that Member State, as well as the specific rules applicable to the executive
director, the deputy executive directors, the members of the management board, Agency staff
and members of their families in that Member State shall be laid down in a headquarters
agreement between the Agency and the Member State in which the Agency has its seat.
2. The headquarters agreement shall be concluded after obtaining the approval of the
management board.
3. The Member State in which the Agency has its seat shall provide the best possible
conditions to ensure the proper functioning of the Agency, including multilingual, European-
oriented schooling and appropriate transport connections.
Article 95 114
Staff
1. The Staff Regulations, the Conditions of Employment and the rules adopted in
by agreement between the institutions of the Union for giving effect to those Staff
Regulations and those Conditions of Employment shall apply to statutory staff.
2. The place of employment shall in principle be the Member State where the Agency's
seat is located.
3.2. Statutory staff who are subject to the Conditions of Employment shall in principle be
engaged initially for a fixed period of five years. Their contracts may in principle be renewed
only once, for a fixed period of a maximum of five years. Any further subsequent
renewal of the contract shall be for an indefinite period.
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The executive director shall inform the management board on a yearly basis of renewed
contracts of an indefinite period.
3. For the statutory staff deployed as members of the teams, the place of deployment shall, as
a general rule, be considered as the place of employment for the purposes of the Staff
Regulations and the Conditions of Employment and Other Servants.
4. Statutory staff to be deployed as members of the teams shall be engaged under a contract
referred to in Article 3a of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants for the
duration of the operational training referred to in Article 67(3).
Statutory staff can be deployed as members of the teams after having succeeded the
operational training, and be engaged with a new contract under Article 3a or Article 2f of the
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants.
2019/1896
45. For the purpose of implementing Articles 3136 and 4450, only statutory staff who are
subject to the Staff Regulations or to Title II of the Conditions of Employment may be
appointed as liaison officers or coordinating officers. For the purpose of implementing Article
5567 only statutory staff who are subject to the Staff Regulations or of the Conditions of
Employment may be deployed as members of the teams.
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6. The Agency may make use of seconded national experts.
7. The Management Board shall adopt a decision laying down rules on the secondment of
national experts to the Agency.
2019/1896 (adapted)
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58. The management board shall adopt implementing rules for giving effect to the Staff
Regulations and Conditions of Employment in agreement with the Commission pursuant to
Article 110(2) of the Staff Regulations.
69. Subject to prior approval by After receiving a positive opinion of the
Commission, the management board shall:
(a) adopt rules related to staff from Member States to be seconded to the Agency in
accordance with Article 5668;
(b) update amend them as necessary.
Those rules shall include, in particular, the financial arrangements related to those
secondments, including insurance, and training. Those rules shall take into account the fact
that the staff are seconded to be deployed as members of the teams and are to have the tasks
and powers provided for in Article 8298. Such rules shall include provisions on the conditions
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of deployment. Where relevant, the management board shall aim to ensure consistency with
the rules applicable to reimbursement of the mission expenses allowances and
reimbursements of the statutory staff deployed as members of the teams .
Article 96 115
Privileges and immunities
1. Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the
Treaty on European Union (TEU ) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its
statutory staff.
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2. The status agreements referred to in Article 87 shall set out the applicable privileges
and immunities of persons deployed on behalf of the Agency under joint operations in third
countries.
3. Bilateral or multilateral agreements of Member States with third countries that provide for
the possibility of the Agency’s engagement, in line with Article 87, shall set out the applicable
privileges and immunities of persons deployed on behalf of the Agency in the host third
country.
2019/1896 (adapted)
Article 97116
Liability
1. Without affecting prejudice to Articles 84 100 and 85 101, the Agency shall be
liable for any activities it has undertaken in accordance with this Regulation.
2. The contractual liability of the Agency shall be governed by the law applicable to the
contract in question.
3. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give
judgment pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by the Agency.
4. In the case of non-contractual liability, the Agency shall, in accordance with the
general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused
by its departments or by its staff in the performance of their duties, including those related to
the use of executive powers.
5. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in disputes
relating to compensation for the damage referred to in paragraph 4.
6. The personal liability of statutory staff towards the Agency shall be governed by the
provisions laid down in the Staff Regulations and Conditions of Employment applicable to
them.
Article 98117
Actions before the Court of Justice of the European Union
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1. Proceedings may be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union
for the annulment of acts of the Agency that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis
third parties, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU, and for failure to act, in accordance with
Article 265 TFEU, for non-contractual liability for damages caused by the Agency and,
pursuant to an arbitration clause, contractual liability for damages caused by acts of the
Agency, in accordance with Article 340 TFEU.
2. The Agency shall take the necessary measures to comply with judgments of the Court
of Justice of the European Union .
Article 99 118
Administrative and management structure of the Agency
1. The administrative and management structure of the Agency shall include:
(a) a management board;
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(b) an executive board;
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(c) (b) an executive director;
(d) (c) deputy executive directors; and
(e) (d) a fundamental rights officer;
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2. The administrative and management structure of the Agency shall be supported by:
(a) a data protection officer;
(b) an internal audit capability;
(c) an accounting officer;
(d) an inspections and control office;
(e) the Security Accreditation Authority;
(f) the Security Accreditation Board.
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3. A consultative forum shall assist the Agency as an advisory body.
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Article 100 119
Functions of the management board
1. The management board shall be responsible for taking the strategic decisions of the
Agency in accordance with this Regulation.
2. The management board shall:
(1) (a) appoint the executive director on the basis of a proposal from the Commission in
accordance with Article 107127;
(2) (b) appoint the deputy executive directors on the basis of a proposal from the
Commission in accordance with Article 107127;
(3) (c) adopt decisions on establishing antenna offices or prolonging the duration of their
operation in accordance with Article 6073(5) by a majority of two thirds of the
members with a right to vote;
(4) (d) adopt decisions on conducting the vulnerability assessment in accordance with
Article 3237(1) and (12), with the decisions setting out measures adopted under
Article 3237(1012) being passed by a majority of two thirds of the members with a
right to vote;
(5) (e) adopt decisions on the lists of mandatory information and data to be exchanged
with the Agency by the national authorities responsible for border management,
including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks, as well
as the national authorities responsible for return and operational cooperation with
third countries , to enable the Agency to perform its tasks, without prejudice to
affecting obligations established by this Regulation, in particular by Articles
4957 and 86102 to 103106;
(6) (f) adopt decisions on the establishment of a common integrated risk analysis model
in accordance with Article 2934(1);
(7) (g) adopt decisions on the nature and terms of the deployment of liaison officers in
Member States in accordance with Article 3136(2);
(8) (h) adopt a technical and operational strategy for European integrated border
management EIBM in accordance with Article 8(45);
(9) (i) adopt decisions on the profiles and the numbers of operational staff for the
management of borders , returns and migration within the standing corps, in
accordance with Article 54(4);
(10) adopt decisions on the numbers of operational staff for the management of
borders, returns and migration within the standing corps, in accordance with Article
66(4);
(11) (j) adopt the Agency's annual activity report for the previous year and transmit it,
by 1 July of each year at the latest, to the European Parliament, to the Council, to the
Commission and to the Court of Auditors;
(12) (k) before 30 November of each year, and after duly taking into account the
opinion of the Commission, adopt, by a majority of two thirds of the members with a
right to vote, a single programming document containing, inter alia, the Agency's
multiannual programming and its work programme for the following year and
forward it to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission;
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(13) (l) establish procedures for the executive director to take decisions relating to the
technical and operational tasks of the Agency;
(14) (m) adopt, by a majority of two thirds of the members with a right to vote, the
annual budget of the Agency and exercise other functions in respect of the Agency's
budget pursuant to Section 4 of this Chapter;
(15) (n) exercise disciplinary authority over the executive director , the fundamental
rights officer and the data protection officer and, in consultation with the
executive director, over the deputy executive directors , the accounting officer and
the internal audit capability officer ;
(16) (o) establish its rules of procedure;
(17) (p) establish the organisational structure of the Agency and adopt the Agency's
staff policy;
(18) (q) adopt an anti-fraud strategy that is proportionate to the risk of fraud, taking
into account the costs and benefits of the measures to be implemented;
(19) (r) adopt internal rules for the prevention and management of conflicts of interest
in respect of its members;
(20) (s) exercise, in accordance with paragraph 8, with respect to statutory staff, the
powers conferred by the Staff Regulations on the Appointing Authority and by the
Conditions of Employment on the Authority Empowered to Conclude a Contract of
Employment (the ‘appointing-authority powers’);
(21) (t) adopt implementing rules for giving effect to the Staff Regulations and the
Conditions of Employment in accordance with Article 110(2) of the Staff
Regulations;
(22) (u) ensure adequate follow-up to findings and recommendations stemming from
the internal or external audit reports and evaluations, as well as from investigations
of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);
(23) (v) adopt and regularly update the communication and dissemination plans
referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 10115(2);
(24) (w) appoint an accounting officer, subject to the Staff Regulations and the
Conditions of Employment, who shall be completely independent in the performance
of his or her duties;
(25) (x) decide on a common vulnerability assessment methodology, including the
objective criteria against which the Agency shall carry out the vulnerability
assessment, the frequency of such assessments and how consecutive vulnerability
assessments are to be carried out;
(26) (y) decide on enhanced assessment and monitoring of a Member State as referred
to in Article 3237(2);
(27) (z) appoint the fundamental rights officer and a deputy fundamental rights officer
in accordance with Article 109129;
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(28) appoint the data protection officer and a deputy data protection officer;
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(29) appoint the internal audit capability officer;
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(30) (aa) establish special rules in order to guarantee the independence of the
fundamental rights officer in the performance of his or her duties;
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(31) establish special rules in order to guarantee the independence of the data protection
officer in performance of his or her duties;
(32) authorise the negotiations for the deployment of a liaison officers of the Agency in
Member States or in third countries;
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(33) (ab) authorise the opening of negotiations and approve the working
arrangements with third countries and international organisations ;
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(34) ensure regular discussion on the Agency’s third country cooperation activities to
ensure alignment with the Union’s policy priorities in the area of migration and
return;
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(35) (ac) subject to the prior approval of the Commission, adopt the security rules of the
Agency on protecting EUCI European Union classified information and
sensitive non-classified information as referred to in Article 92111;
(36) (ad) appoint a security officer, subject to the Staff Regulations and the Conditions
of Employment, who shall be responsible for the security within the Agency and
act as secretary to the Security Accreditation Board , including for the protection
of classified information and sensitive non-classified information;
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(37) discuss the biannual report of the executive director evaluating the results of the
return operations coordinated and organised by the Agency, together with the
observations of the fundamental rights officer;
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(38) determine, on the basis of a proposal from the executive director, profile and number
of forced-return monitors to be made available to the pool of forced-return monitors
and any subsequent changes thereto;
(39) establish, in consultation with the Commission, the priority third countries for the
provision of reintegration assistance for the following year, taking into account the
priorities referred to in Article 56(3);
(40) decide, on the basis of a proposal of the executive director, on the modus operandi of
the rolling operational plan ensuring the effective coordination of Member States’
operational needs and available resources in the area of return, in accordance with
Article 59(2);
(41) establish the rules of procedure of the Programme Management Board referred to in
Article [16(4)] of Regulation (EU) …/… [Return Digitalisation Regulation];
(42) adopt the RECAMAS Model, Frontex RECAMAS, iRCMS and RIAT, as referred to
in Article 55(1), point (d), as well as any future technical evolutions thereof;
(43) adopt the reports on the development and activities of Frontex RECAMAS, national
RECAMAS, iRCMS and RIAT pursuant to Article [37(1)] of [Return Digitalisation
Regulation];
(44) ensure the publication of the lists of authorities and points of contact referred to in
Article [32] of Regulation (EU) …/… [Return Digitalisation Regulation];
(45) adopt decisions on processing of personal data and operational personal data by the
Agency;
(46) define the area of competence, the tasks and the role of its working groups in line
with Article 125;
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(47) (ae) decide on any other matter where provided for in this Regulation.
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(48) adopt, on a proposal from the executive director, the methodology and procedure
referred to in Article 9(7);
(49) adopt, on a proposal from the executive director, the multiannual EIBM planning
coordination scheme referred to in Article 10;
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3. The annual activity report referred to in paragraph 2, point (j11), shall be made
public.
34. Proposals for decisions of the management board, as referred to in paragraph 2, on
specific activities of the Agency to be carried out at, or in the immediate vicinity of, the
external borders of any particular Member State or on working arrangements with third
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countries as referred to in Article 73(4)88(6) shall require a vote in favour of their adoption by
the member of the management board representing that particular Member State or the
Member State neighbouring that third country, respectively.
45. The management board may advise the executive director on any matter related to the
development of operational management of the external borders and training, including
activities related to research.
56. Should Ireland or the United Kingdom request to participate in specific activities, the
management board shall decide thereon.
The management board shall take its decisions on a case-by-case basis. In its decisions, the
management board shall consider whether the participation of Ireland or the United Kingdom
contributes to the achievement of the activity in question. The decisions shall set out the
financial contribution of Ireland or the United Kingdom to the activity for which the request
for participation has been made.
67. The management board shall forward annually to the European Parliament and to the
Council (‘the budgetary authority’) any information relevant to the outcome of the evaluation
procedures conducted by the Agency.
8. The management board shall adopt, in accordance with Article 110(2) of the Staff
Regulations, a decision based on Article 2(1) of the Staff Regulations and on Article 6 of the
Conditions of Employment, delegating relevant appointing-authority powers to the executive
director and setting out the conditions under which this delegation of powers can be
suspended. The executive director shall be authorised to sub-delegate those powers.
Where exceptional circumstances so require, the management board may by way of a decision
temporarily suspend the delegation of the appointing-authority powers to the executive
director and those sub-delegated by the latter. It may then exercise them itself or delegate
them to one of its members or to a statutory staff member other than the executive director.
Article 101120
Composition of the management board
1. Without prejudice to affecting paragraph 3, the management board shall be
composed of one representative of each Member State and two representatives of the
Commission, each with a right to vote. To this effect, each Member State shall appoint a
member of the management board as well as an alternate who will represent the member in
his or her absence. Both shall possess the competencies and the mandate to fulfil their
responsibilities across the full range of the Agency’s activities in border management and
return. The Commission shall appoint two members and two alternates. The duration of the
terms of office shall be four years. The terms of office shall be renewable extendable.
2. The management board members shall be appointed on the basis of the degree of their
relevant high-level experience, their expertise in the field of operational cooperation on border
management and or return, and their relevant managerial, administrative and
budgetary skills. Member States and the Commission shall aim to achieve a gender-balanced
representation on the management board.
3. Countries associated with the implementation, application and development of the
Schengen acquis shall participate in the Agency. They shall each have one representative and
one alternate on the management board for appropriate representation in the management
board for decisions which concern their participation in the work of the Agency or activities
of the Agency in the field of border management and return with an impact on them.
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Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply to the appointment of their representatives . The
arrangements developed under the relevant provisions of their association agreements that
specify the nature and extent of, and the detailed rules for, the participation by those countries
in the work of the Agency, including provisions on financial contributions and staff, shall
apply.
Article 100121
ExecutiveBoard
17. The management board may shall establish an executive board composed of up
to four representatives of the management board, including its chairperson and of the
Agency and a representative the representatives of the Commission.
2. The executive board shall to assist the management board it and the
executive director with regard to the preparation of the decisions, setting the priorities for
operation and related distribution of the budget of the Agency, preparation of the
programmes and activities to be adopted by the management board.
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3. While exercising this preparatory role, the executive board may sit in different
configurations, to discuss in particular on matters related to:
(a) budget and accounts;
(b) evaluation of activities;
(c) EIBM;
(d) return.
Depending on the matter discussed, the designated member of the executive board may
delegate the participation in a particular meeting when it sits in different configurations.
The rules concerning the composition, possible delegation of participation and chairing of
specific configurations of the executive board shall be determined in a decision of the
management board.
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4. The management board may delegate certain clearly defined tasks to the executive board,
in particular where this improves the efficiency of the Agency. It may not delegate to the
executive board tasks related to decisions that must be passed by a majority of two thirds of
the members of the management board with a right to vote .
The Executive Board may take certain provisional, urgent decisions on behalf of the
management board when necessary. The executive board shall not take decisions that must be
EN 223 EN
passed by a majority of two thirds of the members of the management board with a
right to vote .
Article 102122
Multiannual programming and annual work programmes
1. The management board shall, by 30 November of each year, adopt a single
programming document containing, inter alia, the Agency's multiannual programming and
annual programming for the following year, on the basis of a draft put forward by the
executive director and endorsed by the management board. The single programming
document shall be adopted taking into account a positive opinion of the Commission and, as
regards the multiannual programming, after having consulted the European Parliament and
the Council. If the executive director proposes management board decides not to take
into account elements of the opinion of the Commission, it shall provide a thorough
justification to the Commission and shall inform the management board . The obligation
to provide a thorough justification shall also apply to the elements raised by the European
Parliament and the Council during the consultation. The management board shall forward the
single programming document to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the
Commission without delay.
2. The single programming document referred to in paragraph 1 shall become
definitive after the final adoption of the general budget. It shall be adjusted accordingly where
necessary.
3. In line with the multiannual strategic policy cycle for EIBM European
integrated border management, the multiannual programming shall set out overall strategic
programming for the medium and long term, which shall include objectives, expected results,
performance indicators and resource planning, including the multiannual budget, staff and the
development of the Agency's own capabilities, including indicative multiannual planning of
the profiles of staff for the standing corps. The Agency’s capability development planning
shall be brought together within the multiannual programming, covering staff, training,
technical equipment and the corresponding resource needs, taking into account the national
capability development plans and the capability roadmap referred to in Article 9. The
multiannual programming shall set out the strategic areas of intervention and what needs to be
done to achieve the objectives. It shall include strategic actions for the implementation of the
fundamental rights strategy referred to in Article 8096(1) and a strategy for relations with
third countries and international organisations as well as the actions linked to that strategy.
It shall also include a strategy identifying third countries of return requiring immediate and
long-term actions to improve the effectiveness of return, as well as accompanying actions.
4. The multiannual programming shall be implemented by means of annual work
programmes and shall, where appropriate, be updated following the outcome of an evaluation
conducted pursuant to Article 121141. The conclusion of those evaluations shall also be
reflected, where appropriate, in the annual work programme for the following year.
5. The annual work programme shall contain a description of the activities to be
financed, comprising detailed objectives and expected results, including performance
indicators. It shall also contain an indication of the financial and human resources allocated to
each activity, in accordance with the principles of activity-based budgeting and management.
The annual work programme shall be consistent with the multiannual programming. It shall
clearly indicate tasks that have been added, changed or deleted compared with the previous
financial year.
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6. The annual work programme shall be adopted in accordance with the Union legislative
programme in relevant areas of the management of the external borders and return.
7. Where, after adoption of an annual work programme, a new task is assigned to the
Agency, the management board shall amend the annual work programme.
8. Any substantial amendment to the annual work programme, especially a modification
resulting in a reallocation of the budgetary resources above 2 % of the annual budget, shall be
adopted by the same procedure as that applicable to adoption of the initial annual work
programme. The management board may delegate to the executive director the power to make
non-substantial amendments to the annual work programme.
Article 103 123
Chair of the management board
1. The management board shall elect a chairperson and a deputy chairperson from among
its members with a right to vote. The chairperson and the deputy chairperson shall be elected
by a majority of two thirds of the members of the management board with a right to vote
for a period of four years, with a possibility to be re-elected once . The deputy
chairperson shall ex officio replace the chairperson in the event of his or her being prevented
from attending to his or her duties.
2. The terms of office of the chairperson and deputy chairperson shall expire when their
respective membership of the management board ceases. Subject to this provision, the terms
of office of the chairperson or deputy chairperson shall be four years. Those terms of office
shall be extendable once.
Article 104 124
Meetings of the management board
1. Meetings of the management board shall be convened by its chairperson. In
principle, the meetings of the management board shall be held at headquarters of the
Agency.
2. The executive director shall take part in the deliberations without the right to vote.
3. The management board shall hold at least two ordinary meetings a year. In addition, it
shall meet at the initiative of the chairperson, at the request of the Commission, or at the
request of at least one third of the members of the management board. Where necessary, the
management board may hold joint meetings with the management boards of EASO
EUAA, eu-LISA and Europol.
4. Ireland shall be invited to attend the meetings of the management board.
5. The United Kingdom shall be invited to attend meetings of the management board that
take place before the day on which the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom
pursuant to Article 50(3) TEU.
65. Representatives of EASO EUAA, eu-LISA and Europol shall be invited to
attend the meetings of the management board. A representative of FRA shall be invited to
attend meetings of the management board where points relevant to the protection of
fundamental rights are on the agenda.
76. The chairperson of the management board may also invite an expert of the European
Parliament to attend the meetings of the management board. The management board may also
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invite representatives of other relevant Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. The
management board may invite, in accordance with its rules of procedure, any other person
whose opinion may be of interest to attend its meetings as an observer.
8. The members of the management board may, subject to the provisions of its rules of
procedure, be assisted by advisers or experts.
9. The secretariat for the management board shall be provided by the Agency.
Article 105 125
Voting
1. Without prejudice to affecting Article 100119(2), points (c3), (d4), (k12) and
(m14), of Article 100(2) Article 103123(1), and Article 107127(2) and (4), the management
board shall take its decisions by an absolute majority of its members with a right to vote.
2. Each member shall have one vote. In the absence of a member, his or her alternate
shall be entitled to exercise his or her right to vote. The executive director shall not vote.
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3. In the event that the Commission raises serious concerns on a draft decision presented
to the management board on matters related to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
2019/71583 or the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, the
management board shall postpone the adoption of the decision. Within 15 days, the
management board shall re-examine and adopt that decision in second reading either with a
two-thirds majority of its members with a right to vote, including the Commission
representatives, or by a four fifths majority of its members with a right to vote appointed by
Member States.
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34. The rules of procedure shall set out the voting arrangements in greater detail. Those
rules shall include the conditions for a member to act on behalf of another member as well as
any quorum requirements.
45. Representatives of countries associated with the implementation, application and
development of the Schengen acquis shall have limited voting rights corresponding to their
respective arrangements. In order to allow the associated countries to exercise their right to
vote, the Agency shall detail the agenda identifying the points for which a limited voting right
has been granted.
Article 106 126
Functions and powers of the executive director
83 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial
regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 122,
10.5.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/715/oj).
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1. The Agency shall be managed by its executive director, who shall be completely
independent in the performance of his or her duties. Without affecting prejudice to the
respective competencies of the Union institutions and the management board, the executive
director shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other body.
2. The European Parliament or the Council may invite the executive director to report on
the carrying out of his or her tasks. This includes reporting on the activities of the Agency, the
implementation and monitoring of the fundamental rights strategy, the annual activity report
of the Agency for the previous year, the work programme for the following year and the
Agency's multiannual programming and any other matter related to the activities of the
Agency. The executive director shall also make a statement before the European Parliament,
if requested, and shall answer in writing any question put forward by a Member of the
European Parliament within 15 calendar days from receipt of such question. The executive
director shall report regularly to the appropriate bodies and committees of the European
Parliament.
3. Except where specific deadlines are provided for in this Regulation, the executive
director shall ensure that reports are transmitted to the European Parliament, to the Council
and to the Commission as soon as possible, and in any event within six months of the end of
the reporting period, unless the executive director duly justifies a delay in writing.
4. The executive director shall be responsible for the preparation and implementation of
the strategic decisions taken by the management board and for the taking of decisions related
to the operational activities of the Agency in accordance with this Regulation. The executive
director shall have the following functions and powers:
(a) to propose, prepare and implement the strategic decisions and programmes and
activities adopted by the management board within the limits set out in this
Regulation, its implementing rules and any applicable law;
(b) to take all necessary steps, including the adoption of internal administrative
instructions and the publication of notices, to ensure the day-to-day administration
and functioning of the Agency in accordance with this Regulation;
(c) to prepare each year the draft single programming document and to submit it to the
management board for endorsement before that draft is sent to the European
Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission by 31 January;
(d) to prepare each year the annual activity report on the Agency's activities and submit
it to the management board;
(e) to draw up a draft statement of estimates of the revenues and expenditure of the
Agency as part of the single programming document pursuant to Article 115135(2)
and implement the budget pursuant to Article 116136(1);
(f) to delegate his or her powers to other statutory staff members subject to rules to be
adopted in accordance with point (o) of Article 100118(2);
(g) to adopt a recommendation on measures in accordance with Article 3237(9),
including decisions proposing that Member States initiate and carry out joint
operations, rapid border interventions or other actions referred to in Article 3641(2);
(h) to evaluate, approve and coordinate proposals made by Member States for joint
operations or rapid border interventions in accordance with Article 3742(3);
(i) to evaluate, approve and coordinate requests made by Member States for return
operations and return interventions in accordance with Articles 50 59 and 5362;
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(j) to ensure the implementation of the operational plans referred to in Article 3843,
Article 4247 and Article 53(3)62(3);
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(a) to activate the quick reaction force in situations requiring rapid operational
reinforcement at the external borders on in other locations as referred to in Article
72;
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(k) to ensure the implementation of the Council decision referred to in Article 4247(1);
(l) to withdraw financing of activities in accordance with Article 4652;
(m) to assess, prior to any operational activity of the Agency, whether there are violations
of fundamental rights or international protection obligations that are of a serious
nature or are likely to persist in accordance with Article 4652(4) and (5)];
(n) to evaluate the results of activities in accordance with Article 4753;
(o) to identify the minimum number of items of technical equipment required to meet the
Agency's needs, in particular as regards carrying out joint operations, migration
management support team deployments, rapid border interventions, return operations
and return interventions, in accordance with Article 6478(7);
(p) to propose chain of command for the standing corps and the establishment of
antenna offices or the prolongation of the duration of their operation in accordance
with Article 6073(5);
(q) to appoint the heads of the antenna offices in accordance with Article 6073(4);
(r) to prepare an action plan following up on the conclusions of internal or external audit
reports and evaluations, as well as on investigations by OLAF, and to report on
progress to the Commission twice a year and to the management board on a regular
basis;
(s) to protect the financial interests of the Union by applying preventive measures
against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities by means of effective checks
and, if irregularities are detected, by recovering amounts that were wrongly paid and,
where appropriate, imposing effective, proportionate and dissuasive administrative
and financial penalties;
(t) to prepare an anti-fraud strategy for the Agency and present it to the management
board for approval.
5. The executive director shall be accountable for his or her activities to the management
board.
6. The executive director shall be the legal representative of the Agency.
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7. Decisions of the executive director shall be made available to the members of the
management board promptly after adoption.
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Article 107 127
Appointment of the executive director and the deputy executive directors
1. The Commission shall propose at least three candidates for the post of executive
director and for the posts of each of the deputy executive directors on the basis of a list,
following the publication of the post in the Official Journal of the European Union and, as
appropriate, other press or internet sites.
2. On the basis of a proposal from the Commission, as provided for in paragraph 1, the
management board shall appoint the executive director on the grounds of merit and
documented high-level administrative and management skills, including relevant senior
professional experience in the field of management of the external borders and return. Before
appointment, the candidates proposed by the Commission shall be invited to make a statement
before the competent committee or committees of the European Parliament and answer
questions put by its or their members.
Following such statements, the European Parliament shall adopt an opinion setting out its
views and may indicate a preferred candidate.
The management board shall appoint the executive director taking those views into account.
The management board shall take its decision by a majority of two thirds of the members with
a right to vote.
If the management board takes a decision to appoint a candidate other than the candidate
whom the European Parliament indicated as its preferred candidate, the management board
shall inform the European Parliament and the Council in writing of the manner in which the
opinion of the European Parliament was taken into account.
The power to dismiss the executive director shall lie with the management board, acting on a
proposal from the Commission.
3. The executive director shall be assisted by three deputy executive directors. Each
deputy executive director shall be assigned a specific area of responsibility. If the executive
director is absent or indisposed, one of the deputy executive directors shall take his or her
place.
4. On the basis of a proposal from the Commission, as provided for in paragraph 1, the
management board shall appoint the deputy executive directors on the grounds of merit and
appropriate administrative and management skills, including relevant professional experience
in the field of management of the external borders and return. The executive director shall be
involved in the selection process. The management board shall take its decision by a majority
of two thirds of the members with a right to vote.
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The management board shall have the power to dismiss the deputy executive directors in
accordance with the procedure set out in the first subparagraph.
5. The term of office of the executive director shall be five years. By the end of that
period, the Commission shall undertake an assessment that takes into account an evaluation of
the executive director's performance and the Agency's future tasks and challenges.
6. The management board, acting on a proposal from the Commission that takes into
account the assessment referred to in paragraph 5, may extend the term of office of the
executive director once for another period of up to five years.
7. The term of office of the deputy executive directors shall be five years. The
management board, acting on a proposal from the Commission, may extend that term once for
another period of up to five years. The proposal of the Commission shall take into account
the performance of the deputy executive directors and the Agency’s foreseen tasks and
challenges.
8. The executive director and the deputy executive directors shall be engaged as
temporary agents of the Agency under point (a) of Article 2 of the Conditions of
Employment.
Article 108 128
Consultative forum
1. A consultative forum shall be established by the Agency to assist it by providing
independent advice in fundamental rights matters. The executive director and the management
board, in coordination with the fundamental rights officer, may consult the consultative forum
on any matter related to fundamental rights.
2. The Agency shall invite EASO EUAA , FRA, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant organisations to participate in the consultative
forum. On the basis of a proposal from the fundamental rights officer that was made after
consulting the executive director, the management board shall decide on the composition of
the consultative forum and the terms of the transmission of information to the consultative
forum. The consultative forum shall, after consulting the management board and the executive
director, define its working methods and set up its work programme.
3. The consultative forum shall be consulted on the further development and
implementation of the fundamental rights strategy, on the functioning of the complaints
mechanism, on codes of conduct and on the common core curricula. The Agency shall inform
the consultative forum of the follow-up to its recommendations.
4. The consultative forum shall prepare an annual report of its activities. That report shall
be made publicly available.
5. Without affecting prejudice to the tasks of the fundamental rights officer, the
consultative forum shall be provided with effective access in a timely and effective manner to
all information concerning the respect for fundamental rights, including by carrying out on-
the-spot visits to joint operations or rapid border interventions subject to the agreement of the
host Member State or the third country, as applicable, to hotspot areas and to return operations
and return interventions, including in third countries. Where the host Member State does not
agree to an on-the-spot visit by the consultative forum to a joint operation or to a rapid border
intervention carried out on its territory, it shall provide the Agency with duly justified reasons
in writing.
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Article 109 129
Fundamental rights officer
1. A fundamental rights officer shall be appointed by the management board on the basis
of a list of three candidates, after consultation with the consultative forum. The fundamental
rights officer shall have the necessary qualifications, expert knowledge and professional
experience in the field of fundamental rights.
2. The fundamental rights officer shall perform the following tasks:
(a) contributing to the Agency's fundamental rights strategy and the corresponding
action plan, including by issuing recommendations for improving them;
(b) monitoring the Agency's compliance with fundamental rights, including by
conducting investigations into any of its activities;
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(c) liaising, where necessary, with the relevant national authorities, including by
consulting them in the context of any investigation as referred to in point (b);
2019/1896 (adapted)
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(d) promoting the Agency's respect of fundamental rights;
(e) advising the Agency where he or she deems it necessary or where requested on any
activity of the Agency without delaying those activities;
(f) providing opinions on the operational plans drawn up for the operational activities of
the Agency, on pilot projects and on technical assistance projects in third countries;
(g) providing opinions on working arrangements;
(h) carrying out on-the-spot visits to any joint operation, border intervention, pilot
project, migration management support team deployment, return operation or return
intervention, including in third countries;
(i) providing the secretariat of the consultative forum;
(j) informing the executive director about possible violations of fundamental rights
by the staff of the Agency during activities of the Agency;
(k) selecting and managing the fundamental rights monitors;
(l) performing any other tasks, where provided for by this Regulation;
The secretariat referred to in point (i) of the first subparagraph shall receive instructions
directly from the consultative forum.
The tasks performed by the Fundamental Rights Officer shall concern operational
activities undertaken by the staff of the Agency.
3. For the purposes of point (j) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 2, the fundamental
rights officer shall, in particular:
(a) appoint the fundamental rights monitors;
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(b) assign fundamental rights monitors to operations and activities as provided for in
Article 110130(4);
(c) nominate fundamental rights monitors as forced-return monitors for the pool referred
to in Article 5160;
(d) ensure that fundamental rights monitors are adequately trained;
(e) report to the executive director on possible violations of fundamental rights in
relation to behaviour of by the staff of the Agency reported to him or her by the
fundamental rights monitors as the fundamental rights officer deems necessary;
The executive director shall reply to the fundamental rights officer as to how concerns
regarding possible violations of fundamental rights as referred to in point (e) of the first
subparagraph have been addressed.
The fundamental rights officer may entrust any of the tasks provided for in points (a) to (i)
and (k) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 to one of the fundamental rights monitors.
4. The management board shall lay down special rules applicable to the fundamental
rights officer in order to guarantee that the fundamental rights officer and his or her staff are
independent in the performance of their duties. The fundamental rights officer shall report
directly to the management board and shall cooperate with the consultative forum. The
management board shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the
fundamental rights officer. In addition, the fundamental rights officer shall publish annual
reports on his or her activities and on the extent to which the activities of the Agency respect
fundamental rights. Those reports shall include information on the complaints mechanism and
the implementation of the fundamental rights strategy.
5. The Agency shall ensure that the fundamental rights officer is able to act
autonomously and is able to be independent in the conduct of his or her duties. The
fundamental rights officer shall have sufficient and adequate human and financial resources at
his or her disposal necessary for the fulfilment of his or her tasks.
The fundamental rights officer shall select his or her staff, and that staff shall only report to
him or her.
6. The fundamental rights officer shall be assisted by a deputy fundamental rights officer.
The deputy fundamental rights officer shall be appointed by the management board from a list
of at least three candidates presented by the fundamental rights officer. The deputy
fundamental rights officer shall have the necessary qualifications and experience in the field
of fundamental rights and shall be independent in the conduct of his or her duties. If the
fundamental rights officer is absent or indisposed, the deputy fundamental rights officer shall
assume the fundamental rights officer's duties and responsibilities.
7. The fundamental rights officer shall have access to all information concerning respect
for fundamental rights in all the activities of the Agency.
Article 110 130
Fundamental rights monitors
1. Fundamental rights monitors, employed as statutory staff, shall constantly assess the
fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, provide advice and assistance in that
regard and contribute to the promotion of fundamental rights as part of EIBM
European integrated border management.
2. Fundamental rights monitors shall have the following tasks:
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(a) monitoring compliance with fundamental rights and providing advice and assistance
on fundamental rights in the preparation, conduct and evaluation of the operational
activities of the Agency which the fundamental rights officer has assigned to them to
monitor;
(b) acting as forced-return monitors;
(c) contributing to the training activities of the Agency on fundamental rights as
provided for in Article 6275, including by providing training on fundamental rights.
32a. For the purposes of paragraph 2, point (a), of the first subparagraph, fundamental rights
monitors shall, in particular:
(a) follow the preparation of operational plans and report to the fundamental rights
officer to enable him or her to fulfil his or her tasks as provided for in point(e) of
Article 109(2)129(2), point(e);
(b) conduct visits, including long-term visits, where operational activities take place;
(c) cooperate and liaise with the coordinating officer as provided for in Article 4450 and
provide advice and assistance to him or her;
(d) inform the coordinating officer and report to the fundamental rights officer on any
concerns related to possible violation of fundamental rights within the Agency's
operational activities; and
(e) contribute to the evaluation of activities as referred to in Article 4753.
43. Without prejudice to paragraph 54, the fundamental rights officer shall assign the
fundamental rights monitors to operations based on a risk assessment. at least one
fundamental rights monitor to each operation. The fundamental rights officer may also decide
to assign fundamental rights monitors to monitor any other operational activity he or she
considers relevant.
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The risk assessment shall be prepared by the fundamental rights officer in coordination with
the executive director, draw on the impact level on the external border sections attributed in
accordance with Article 39 and be based on any factors identified per border section that
would be relevant for the evaluation of the compliance with fundamental rights, including the
geographical context and the actors involved.
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
Fundamental rights monitors shall have access to all areas in which the operational activity of
the Agency takes place and to all its documents relevant for the implementation of that
activity.
54. Fundamental rights monitors may be nominated by the fundamental rights officer as
forced-return monitors for the pool referred to in Article 5160. Where fundamental rights
monitors act as forced-return monitors, Article 50(5) 59(6) and Article 5160 shall apply,
mutatis mutandis.
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65. The fundamental rights officer shall appoint the fundamental rights monitors and they
shall be under his or her hierarchical supervision. Fundamental rights monitors shall be
independent in the performance of their duties. When present in an operational area,
fundamental rights monitors shall wear insignia that clearly allow for their identification as
fundamental rights monitors.
76. The Agency shall ensure that by 5 December 2020 at least 40 fundamental rights
monitors are recruited by the Agency. The executive director shall assess on an annual basis
whether the number of fundamental rights monitors needs to be increased in consultation with
the fundamental rights officer. Following that assessment, the executive director shall, where
necessary, propose an increase in the number of fundamental rights monitors to the
management board for the following year depending on operational needs.
87. Following their recruitment, fundamental rights monitors shall undergo enhanced
fundamental rights training, taking into account previously acquired qualifications and
professional experience in the relevant areas. Throughout their employment, the Agency shall
ensure that fundamental rights monitors discharge their duties in accordance with the highest
standards. Adequate training maps shall be designed for each fundamental rights monitor to
ensure their continuous professional development to enable them to fulfil their role as
fundamental rights monitors.
Article 111 131
Complaints mechanism
1. The Agency shall, in cooperation with the fundamental rights officer, take the
necessary measures to set up and further develop an independent and effective complaints
mechanism in accordance with this Article to monitor and ensure respect for fundamental
rights in all the activities of the Agency.
2. Any person who is directly affected by the actions or failure to act on the part of staff
involved in a joint operation, pilot project, rapid border intervention, migration management
support team deployment, return operation, return intervention or an operational activity of
the Agency in a third country, and who considers himself or herself to have been the subject
of a breach of his or her fundamental rights due to those actions or that failure to act, or any
party representing such a person, may submit a complaint in writing to the Agency.
3. Only complaints that are substantiated and involve concrete fundamental rights
violations shall be admissible.
4. The fundamental rights officer shall be responsible for handling complaints received
by the Agency in accordance with the right to good administration. For that purpose, the
fundamental rights officer shall review the admissibility of a complaint, register admissible
complaints, forward all registered complaints to the executive director and forward
complaints concerning members of the teams to the home Member State, including the
relevant authority or body competent for fundamental rights in a Member State for further
action in accordance with their mandate. The fundamental rights officer shall also register and
ensure the follow-up by the Agency or that Member State.
5. In accordance with the right to good administration, if a complaint is admissible,
complainants shall be informed that the complaint has been registered, that an assessment has
been initiated and that a response may be expected as soon as it becomes available. If a
complaint is forwarded to national authorities or bodies, the complainant shall be provided
with their contact details. If a complaint is declared inadmissible, the complainant shall be
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informed of the reasons and, if possible, provided with further options for addressing their
concerns.
The Agency shall provide for an appropriate procedure in cases where a complaint is declared
inadmissible or unfounded.
Any decision shall be in written form and reasoned. The fundamental rights officer shall
reassess the complaint if the complainant submits new evidence in situations where the
complaint has been declared inadmissible or unfounded.
6. In the case of a registered complaint concerning a staff member of the Agency, the
fundamental rights officer shall recommend appropriate follow-up, including disciplinary
measures, to the executive director and, where appropriate, referral for the initiation of civil or
criminal justice proceedings in accordance with this Regulation and national law. The
executive director shall ensure the appropriate follow-up and shall report back to the
fundamental rights officer within a determined timeframe and, if necessary, at regular
intervals thereafter, as to the findings, the implementation of disciplinary measures, and
follow-up by the Agency in response to a complaint.
If a complaint is related to data protection issues, the executive director shall consult the data
protection officer of the Agency before taking a decision on the complaint. The fundamental
rights officer and the data protection officer shall establish, in writing, a memorandum of
understanding specifying their division of tasks and cooperation as regards complaints
received.
7. In the case of a registered complaint concerning a member of the teams from a host
Member State or from another participating Member State, including a seconded member of
the teams or seconded national expert, the home Member State shall ensure appropriate
follow-up, including disciplinary measures, referral for the initiation of civil or criminal
justice proceedings as necessary, and other measures in accordance with national law. The
relevant Member State shall report back to the fundamental rights officer within a determined
time period as to the findings and follow-up to the complaint, and, if necessary, at regular
intervals thereafter. The Agency shall follow up on the matter if no report is received from the
relevant Member State.
Where the relevant Member State, within the determined time period, does not report back or
provides only an inconclusive response, the fundamental rights officer shall inform the
executive director and the management board.
8. Where a member of the teams is found to have violated fundamental rights or
international protection obligations, the Agency shall request that the Member State remove
that member immediately from the activity of the Agency or the standing corps.
9. The fundamental rights officer shall include information on the complaints mechanism
in his or her annual report, as referred to in Article 109129(4), including specific references to
the Agency's and Member States' findings and the follow-up to complaints.
10. The fundamental rights officer shall, in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 9 and after
consulting the consultative forum, draw up a standardised complaint form requiring detailed
and specific information concerning the alleged breach of fundamental rights. The
fundamental rights officer shall also draw up any further detailed rules as necessary. The
fundamental rights officer shall submit that form and such further detailed rules to the
executive director and to the management board.
The Agency shall ensure that information about the possibility and procedure for making a
complaint is readily available, including for vulnerable persons. The standardised complaint
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form shall be made available on the Agency's website and in hardcopy during all activities of
the Agency in languages that third-country nationals understand or are reasonably believed to
understand. The standardised complaint form shall be easily accessible, including on mobile
devices. The Agency shall ensure that further guidance and assistance on the complaints
procedure is provided to complainants. Complaints shall be considered by the fundamental
rights officer even when they have not been submitted in the standardised complaint form.
11. Any personal data contained in a complaint shall be handled and processed by the
Agency, including the fundamental rights officer, in accordance with Regulation (EU)
2018/1725 and by Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and
Directive (EU) 2016/680.
Where a complainant submits a complaint, that complainant shall be understood to consent to
the processing of his or her personal data by the Agency and the fundamental rights officer
within the meaning of point (d) of Article 5(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
In order to safeguard the interests of the complainants, complaints shall be dealt with
confidentially by the fundamental rights officer in accordance with national and Union law
unless the complainant explicitly waives his or her right to confidentiality. When
complainants waive their right to confidentiality, it shall be understood that they consent to
the fundamental rights officer or the Agency disclosing their identity to the competent
authorities or bodies in relation to the matter under complaint, where necessary.
Article 112 132
Interparliamentary cooperation
1. In order to address the specific nature of the European Border and Coast Guard, in that
it is composed of national authorities and the Agency, and to ensure that the scrutiny
functions of the European Parliament over the Agency and of the national parliaments over
their respective national authorities are effectively exercised, as provided for in the Treaties
and by national law respectively, the European Parliament and the national parliaments may
cooperate in the framework of Article 9 of Protocol No 1 on the Role of National Parliaments
in the European Union annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU.
2. When invited by the European Parliament and the national parliaments meeting within
the context of paragraph 1, the executive director and the chairperson of the management
board shall attend such meetings.
3. The Agency shall transmit its annual activity report to the national parliaments.
Article 113 133
Language arrangements
1. Regulation No 184 shall apply to the Agency.
2. Without affecting prejudice to decisions taken on the basis of Article 342
TFEU, the annual activity report and the work programme shall be produced in all official
languages of the Union.
3. The translation services required for the functioning of the Agency shall be provided
by the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union.
84 Regulation No 1 of 15 April 1958 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic
Community (OJ 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1958/1(1)/oj).
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Article 114 134
Transparency and communication
1. The Agency shall be subject to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 when handling
applications for access to documents held by it.
2. The Agency shall communicate on matters falling within the scope of its tasks on its
own initiative. It shall make public relevant information, including the annual activity report,
the annual work programme, the code of conduct, strategic risk analyses, and comprehensive
information on past and current joint operations, rapid border interventions, pilot projects,
technical assistance projects with third countries, migration management support team
deployments, return operations or return interventions, including in third countries, and
working arrangements, and shall ensure, without affecting prejudice to Article 92111,
in particular that the public and any interested party are rapidly given objective, detailed,
comprehensive, reliable and easily understandable information with regard to its work. It shall
do so without revealing operational information which, if made public, would jeopardise
attainment of the objectives of operations.
3. The management board shall lay down the practical arrangements for the application
of paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. Any natural or legal person shall be entitled to address written correspondence to the
Agency in any of the official languages of the Union. He or she shall have the right to receive
an answer in the same language.
5. Decisions taken by the Agency pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No
1049/2001 may give rise to a complaint being lodged with the European Ombudsman or to an
action before the Court of Justice of the European Union , under the conditions laid
down in Articles 228 and 263 TFEU respectively.
SECTION 4
FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS
Article 115 135
Budget
1. The revenue of the Agency shall consist, without prejudice to affecting other
types of income, of:
(a) a contribution from the Union entered in the general budget of the European Union
(Commission section);
(b) a contribution from the countries associated with the implementation, application and
development of the Schengen acquis, as established in the respective arrangements
that specify their financial contribution;
(c) Union funding in the form of contribution agreements or ad-hoc grants in accordance
with the Agency's financial rules referred to in Article 120140 and with the
provisions of the relevant instruments supporting the policies of the Union;
(d) fees for services provided;
(e) any voluntary contribution from the Member States.
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2. The expenditure of the Agency shall include its administrative, infrastructure,
operational and staff-related expenses.
3. The executive director shall draw up a draft statement of estimates of the Agency's
revenue and expenditure for the following financial year, including an establishment plan, and
shall forward it to the management board.
4. Revenue and expenditure shall be balanced.
5. The management board shall, on the basis of the draft statement of estimates drawn up
by the executive director, adopt a provisional draft estimate of the Agency's revenue and
expenditure, including the provisional establishment plan. The management board shall
forward them to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission by 31
January every year, as part of the draft single programming document.
6. The management board shall send the final draft estimates of the Agency's revenue
and expenditure including the draft establishment plan accompanied by the preliminary work
programme to the Commission by 31 March every year.
7. The estimate shall be forwarded by the Commission to the budgetary authority
together with the draft general budget of the European Union.
8. On the basis of the estimate, the Commission shall enter in the draft general budget of
the European Union the estimates it deems necessary for the establishment plan and the
amount of the contribution to be charged to the general budget, which it shall place before the
budgetary authority in accordance with Articles 313 and 314 TFEU.
9. The budgetary authority shall authorise appropriations for the contribution to the
Agency.
10. The budgetary authority shall adopt the establishment plan for the Agency.
11. The management board shall adopt the Agency's budget. It shall become final
following final adoption of the general budget of the European Union. Where appropriate, it
shall be adjusted accordingly.
12. Any modification to the budget, including the establishment plan, shall follow the
same procedure.
13. For any building project likely to have significant implications for the budget of the
Agency, the provisions of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/71585 shall apply.
14. To finance the deployment of rapid border interventions and return interventions, the
budget of the Agency adopted by the management board shall include a financial operational
reserve amounting to at least 2 % of the allocation provided jointly for joint operations at the
external borders and operational activities in the area of return. After the end of each month,
the executive director may decide to reallocate a sum equivalent to one twelfth of the
appropriations of the reserve to other operational activities of the Agency. In such a case, the
executive director shall inform the management board.
15. Budgetary commitments for actions extending over more than one financial year may
be broken down over several years into annual instalments.
85 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial
regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 122,
10.5.2019, p. 1).
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Article 116 136
Implementation and control of the budget
1. The executive director shall implement the Agency's budget.
2. By 1 March of a financial year N + 1, the Agency's accounting officer shall
communicate the provisional accounts for the financial year N to the Commission's
accounting officer and to the Court of Auditors. The Commission's accounting officer shall
consolidate the provisional accounts of the institutions and decentralised bodies in accordance
with Article 245 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.
32. The Agency shall send a report on the budgetary and financial management for year N
to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Court of Auditors by 31 March of year
N + 1.
4. The Commission's accounting officer shall send the Agency's provisional accounts for
year N, consolidated with the Commission's accounts, to the Court of Auditors by 31 March
of year N + 1.
53. On receipt of the Court of Auditors' observations on the Agency's provisional accounts
for year N, pursuant to Article 246 252 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/25092018/1046,
the executive director shall draw up the Agency's final accounts under his or her own
responsibility and forward them to the management board for an opinion.
64. The management board shall deliver an opinion on the Agency's final accounts for
year N.
75. By 1 July of year N + 1, the executive director shall send the final accounts, together
with the opinion of the management board, to the European Parliament, to the Council, to the
Commission and to the Court of Auditors.
86. The final accounts for year N shall be published in the Official Journal of the
European Union by 15 November of year N + 1.
97. The executive director shall send the Court of Auditors a reply to its observations by
30 September of year N + 1. He or she shall also send this reply to the management board.
108. The executive director shall submit to the European Parliament, at the latter's request,
any information required for the smooth application of the discharge procedure for year N, in
accordance with Article 261267(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/25092018/1046.
119. On a recommendation from the Council acting by qualified majority, the European
Parliament shall, before 15 May of the year N + 2, give a discharge to the executive director
in respect of the implementation of the budget for the year N.
Article 117 137
Combating fraud
1. In order to combat fraud, corruption and other illegal activities, the provisions of
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 shall apply without restriction. The Agency shall
accede to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 concerning internal investigations
by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and shall adopt, without delay, the appropriate
provisions applicable to all staff of the Agency using the template set out in the Annex to that
Agreement.
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2. The Court of Auditors shall have the power of audit, on the basis of documents and of
on-the-spot inspections, over all grant beneficiaries, contractors and subcontractors who have
received Union funds from the Agency.
3. OLAF may carry out administrative investigations, including on-the-spot checks and
inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU,
Euratom) No 883/2013 and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/9686 with a view to
establishing whether there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the
financial interests of the Union in connection with a grant agreement or grant decision or a
contract funded by the Agency.
4. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the European Public Prosecutor's
Office (EPPO) may investigate and prosecute fraud and other illegal activities affecting the
financial interests of the Union as provided for in Directive (EU) 2017/1371.
5. Without affecting prejudice to paragraphs 1 to 4, working arrangements with
third countries and with international organisations, grant agreements, grant decisions and
contracts of the Agency shall contain provisions expressly empowering the Court of Auditors,
OLAF and EPPO to conduct such audits and investigations, in accordance with their
respective competences.
Article 118 138
Prevention of conflicts of interest
The Agency shall adopt internal rules requiring the members of its bodies and its staff to
avoid any situation liable to give rise to a conflict of interest during their employment or term
of office and to report such situations.
The Agency shall ensure that there is transparency as regards lobbying by means of a
transparency register and by disclosing all its meetings with third-party stakeholders. The
transparency register shall include all meetings and contacts between third-party stakeholders
and the executive director, deputy executive directors and heads of division in matters
concerning procurements and tenders for services, equipment or outsourced projects and
studies. The Agency shall keep a record of all meetings of its staff with third-party
stakeholders in matters concerning procurements and tenders for services, equipment or
outsourced projects and studies.
Article 119 139
Administrative inquiries
The activities of the Agency shall be subject to the inquiries of the European Ombudsman in
accordance with Article 228 TFEU.
Article 120 140
Financial provision
The financial rules applicable to the Agency shall be adopted by the management board after
consulting the Commission. They shall not depart from Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715
86 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks
and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities' financial
interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2 ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2185/oj).
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No 1271/2013 unless such a departure is specifically required for the Agency's operation and
the Commission has given its prior consent. In this framework, the management board shall
adopt specific financial rules applicable to the Agency's activities in the area of cooperation
with third countries in the field of return.
Article 121 141
Evaluation
1. Without prejudice to affecting Article 6259, by 5 December 2023 48
months after entry into force of this Regulation] at the latest, and every four years
thereafter, the Commission shall carry out an evaluation of this Regulation. The evaluation
shall assess in particular:
(a) the results achieved by the Agency, having regard to its objectives, mandate,
resources and tasks;
(b) the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's performance and its working
practices in relation to its objectives, mandate and tasks;
(c) inter-agency cooperation at the European Union level, including the
implementation of European cooperation on coast guard functions;
(d) the possible need to modify the mandate of the Agency;
(e) the financial implications of any such modification;
(f) the functioning of the standing corps and, as from the second evaluation, its overall
number and composition;
(g) the level of training, specialised expertise and professionalism of the standing corps;
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(h) the attractiveness of the Agency as an employer for the recruitment of statutory staff,
with a view of ensuring quality of the candidates and geographical balance;
(i) overall evaluation of EUROSUR accompanied, where necessary, by appropriate
proposals to improve its functioning.
2019/1896 (adapted)
The evaluation shall include a specific analysis on the way the Charter and other relevant
Union law has been complied with in the application of this Regulation.
2. The evaluation shall also assess the attractiveness of the Agency as an employer for
the recruitment of statutory staff, with a view of ensuring quality of the candidates and
geographical balance.
23. When carrying out the evaluation, the Commission shall seek input from relevant
stakeholders, including the consultative forum and FRA.
34. The Commission shall send the evaluation reports together with its conclusions on the
reports to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the management board. The
management board may issue recommendations regarding changes to this Regulation to the
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Commission. The evaluation reports and the conclusions on the reports shall be made public.
The Member States and the Agency shall provide the Commission with the information
necessary to draft the evaluation reports. Where necessary, the evaluation reports shall be
accompanied by legislative proposals.
45. The Agency shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on
the functioning of EUROSUR by 1 December 2021 [24 months after entry into force of
this Regulation] at the latest and every two years thereafter.
Member States shall provide the Agency with the information necessary to draft those reports.
5.6. As part of the evaluation referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall provide an
overall evaluation of EUROSUR accompanied, where necessary, by appropriate proposals to
improve its functioning.
The Member States and the Agency shall provide the Commission with the information
necessary to produce the overall evaluation referred to in the first subparagraph.
When carrying out the overall evaluation referred to in the first subparagraph, the
Commission shall seek input from relevant stakeholders, including the consultative forum and
FRA.
CHAPTER V
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 122 142
Committee procedure
1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee (‘the European Board and Coast
Guard Committee’). That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation
(EU) No 182/2011.
2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011
shall apply.
Article 123 143
Repeal and tTransitional provisions
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1. The European Border and Coast Guard as established by this Regulation shall replace
and succeed the European Border and Coast Guard established by Regulation (EU)
2019/1896.
2. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency as established by this Regulation shall
replace and succeed the European Border and Coast Guard Agency established by Regulation
(EU) 2019/1896.
3. The Agency shall continue the activities initiated pursuant to Regulation (EU)
2019/1896 that are not concluded before the date of application of this Regulation. Such
activities shall be continued in line with this Regulation.
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4. Decisions, implementing measures, rules and arrangements adopted pursuant to
Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 shall remain in force until repealed or replaced under this
Regulation.
5. The Management Board shall repeal decisions and measures adopted pursuant to
Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, which do not comply with this Regulation.
6. Staff employed by the Agency on the date of application of this Regulation shall retain
the rights and obligations arising from their contracts of employment and appointments.
7. For the standing corps who have been deployed on a long term mission for two years at the
location of the deployment which will become their place of employment at the entry into
force of this regulation, it will be considered that they are already at the place of employment
and that they did not have to change their place of residence to comply with the obligation set
out in Article 20 of the Staff Regulations.
8. The communication network established under this Regulation shall replace and succeed
the EUROSUR communication network developed in the framework of Regulation (EU)
2019/1896.
9. The executive director of the Agency shall, for the remaining period of her or his term
of office, continue to exercise the duties and responsibilities of executive director under this
Regulation. The other conditions of the contract shall remain unchanged.
10. The members of the management board shall continue their work and exercise their
functioning until the expiry of their mandates and the appointment of the new representatives
of the management board are appointed in accordance with Article 116 of this Regulation.
2019/1896 (adapted)
6. In order to effectively contribute the required numbers of statutory staff to the first
deployments of the standing corps and the setting up of the ETIAS Central Unit, the Agency
shall launch the necessary preparations, including recruitment and training, as of 4 December
2019 and in accordance with the budgetary rules.
7. Until 5 December 2021, Member States may provide information to EUROSUR on
border checks and air border surveillance on a voluntary basis.
Article 144
Repeal
Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 is repealed (EU) No 1052/2013 with the exception of
Article 9(3), (5), (7) to (10) and Article 10(5) and (7) thereof, which are repealed with effect
from the date of the entry into force of the implementing act referred to in Article 24(3) of this
Regulation.
References to the repealed acts Regulation shall be construed as references to this
Regulation and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex VI VII to this
Regulation.
Article 124 145
Entry into force and applicability
EN 243 EN
1. This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
2. Article 7994 shall apply from the date when the Agency confirms the takeover
of the effective transfer of the system referred to in that Article.
3. Article 12(3), Article 70 and Article 100(5), insofar as they concern the cooperation
with the United Kingdom, shall apply until the day on which the Treaties cease to apply to the
United Kingdom pursuant to Article 50(3) TEU or, provided that a withdrawal agreement
concluded with the United Kingdom in accordance with Article 50(2) TEU has entered into
force by that date, until the end of the transition period set in that withdrawal agreement.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in
accordance with the Treaties.
Done at Brussels,
For the European Parliament For the Council
The President The President
EN 1 EN
LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL STATEMENT
1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE ................................................. 3
1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative ...................................................................................... 3
1.2. Policy area(s) concerned .............................................................................................. 3
1.3. Objective(s) .................................................................................................................. 3
1.3.1. General objective(s) ..................................................................................................... 3
1.3.2. Specific objective(s) ..................................................................................................... 3
1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact ...................................................................................... 3
1.3.4. Indicators of performance ............................................................................................ 3
1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to: ................................................................................. 4
1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative .............................................................................. 4
1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for
roll-out of the implementation of the initiative ............................................................ 4
1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g.
coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For
the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting
from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise
created by Member States alone. ................................................................................. 4
1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past .................................................. 4
1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with
other appropriate instruments ....................................................................................... 5
1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for
redeployment ................................................................................................................ 5
1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact .................................... 6
1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned ............................................................. 6
2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES................................................................................... 8
2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules .................................................................................... 8
2.2. Management and control system(s) ............................................................................. 8
2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation
mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed .................. 8
2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up
to mitigate them............................................................................................................ 8
2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between
the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the
expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure) ........................................... 8
2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities ................................................................ 9
3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE ............ 10
3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s)
affected ....................................................................................................................... 10
EN 2 EN
3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations ................................... 12
3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations.................................... 12
3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget ............................................................................. 12
3.2.1.2. Appropriations from external assigned revenues ....................................................... 17
3.2.2. Estimated output funded from operational appropriations......................................... 22
3.2.3. Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations ............................... 24
3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget .............................................................................. 24
3.2.3.2. Appropriations from external assigned revenues ....................................................... 24
3.2.3.3. Total appropriations ................................................................................................... 24
3.2.4. Estimated requirements of human resources.............................................................. 25
3.2.4.1. Financed from voted budget....................................................................................... 25
3.2.4.2. Financed from external assigned revenues ................................................................ 26
3.2.4.3. Total requirements of human resources ..................................................................... 26
3.2.5. Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments ................ 28
3.2.6. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework.............................. 28
3.2.7. Third-party contributions ........................................................................................... 28
3.3. Estimated impact on revenue ..................................................................................... 29
EN 3 EN
1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the
European Border and Coast Guard (recast).
1.2. Policy area(s) concerned
Policy area: Home Affairs
Activity: Home affairs, migration and border management
Budget lines: European Border and Coast Guard Agency
1.3. Objective(s)
1.3.1. General objective(s)
Ensure the development and implementation of the European integrated border
management in line with Article 77(1)c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, encompassing well-coordinated and effective management of the
EU’s external borders, returns, visa policy and measures at the external borders
contributing to security in the EU in order to increase the effectiveness of the
European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG).
1.3.2. Specific objective(s)
Specific objective 1: Ensure Frontex’s effectiveness as regards supporting Member
States (and Schengen Associated Countries) in managing the EU’s external borders,
including when it comes to cooperation with various actors (Member States
authorities involved in combating cross-border crime, returns and visa, third
countries, EU agencies, international organisations), and ensure that the effectiveness
of returns, the prevention of illegal arrivals as well as the situational awareness via
EUROSUR is enhanced.
Specific objective 2: Strengthening the EBCG’s human and technical capabilities,
including by improving the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the standing
corps and the planning, acquisition and availability of technical equipment.
Specific objective 3: Ensure coherent design and implementation of EIBM, including
management of the external borders and return, across EU Member States based on
harmonised training, synergies in planning, reinforced quality control processes and
increasing European Border and Coast Guards to 30 000 officers equipped with
state-of-the-art equipment.
Horizontal objective 1: Ensure that the oversight mechanisms in Frontex and the
EBCG remain adequate to the tasks resulting from the development and
implementation of EIBM and the new legal environment set up by the
implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum and the Return Regulation.
1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact
Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted.
Overall impact:
The initiative concerns the revision of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 on the EBCG,
with the objective of reinforcing the mandate, capacities, and operational
EN 4 EN
effectiveness of the EBCG, including its standing corps, operational support
functions, and cooperation with Member States and third countries. The proposal will
generate direct and indirect benefits and has the capacity to affect the following
stakeholders:
- Member States/Schengen Associated Countries (SAC) (public authorities
responsible for border management and coast guard, police and other law
enforcement authorities, authorities and services responsible for return, visa,
migration and asylum);
- European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and other relevant EU
agencies (in particular Europol);
- Frontex Management Board;
- EU citizens and third-country nationals.
More specifically:
Direct benefits and impacts:
- Expected improvement in operational efficiency and effectiveness in border
management;
- More strategic and more efficient support from Frontex to the Member States on
returns, including greater capabilities;
- Broader mandate, including for returns from third countries, to further reinforce
Frontex’s role as the Union’s central actor in the common system for returns;
- Expected improvements in cooperation with competent authorities as regards
combatting cross-border crime and smuggling;
- Better implementation of the EU common visa policy by Member States, consulates
and visa authorities;
- Expected improvements in preventing document fraud and other abuses through
better identification of risks related to issuing of visa and verification of documents
required for short and long term visas and residence permits;
- More comprehensive situational awareness encompassing also hybrid threats
(which may lead to swifter decision-making and allocation of resources by the
competent national authorities);
- Enhanced cooperation with third countries and international organisations as
regards border management and returns;
- Strengthened standing corps composed of better trained staff with diversified
profiles, with employment conditions adjusted to the specificity of the tasks;
- Improved planning and procedures to better deliver on pooling technical
equipment;
- Modernised training architecture of the European Border and Coast Guards
adjusted to the new tasks of the Agency.
- Maintaining a robust degree of oversight and monitoring of activities involving
Frontex in view of the Agency’s growth.
Indirect benefits and impacts:
EN 5 EN
- Further safeguard the effective functioning of the area of freedom, security and
justice;
- Strengthened public trust in the Union’s capacity to ensure the safe and effective
management of the external borders and guarantee the internal security of the Union.
1.3.4. Indicators of performance
Specify the indicators for monitoring progress and achievements.
Specific Objective 1:
- Coherence of the conditions across the EU for the standing corps to support border
control tasks paired with increased demand for standing corps;
- Increased number of entries and reports (single events and incidents) to EUROSUR
and of national authorities accessing EUROSUR;
- Increase of the number of third countries cooperating with Frontex on border
management;
- Increased number of training and capacity building activities on return delivered
from the EU to third countries;
- Increased cooperation of Frontex with other Union institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies as well as international organisations.
- Initiation of negotiations for either new or updated international agreements
allowing return-related operational support and/or reflecting new possibilities on
return;
- Increase of overall percentage of effective EU returns performed with Frontex
support or coordination (year to year);
- Increase of overall percentage of returns from the EU performed as voluntary
returns with Frontex support or coordination.
Specific Objective 2:
- Increased recruitment of standing corps across the EU paired with the increased use
of standing corps across Member States;
- Increased availability of technical equipment for Frontex operational activities,
including the Agency’ own equipment and Member State equipment registered in the
technical equipment pool.
Specific Objective 3:
- Increased capacity and offer in Frontex training paired with necessary and
comparable set of skills of standing corps;
- Increased number of national plans consulted with Frontex paired with increased
number of deficiencies in border management and returns addressed at early stage.
1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to:
a new action
a new action following a pilot project / preparatory action87
☒the extension of an existing action
87 As referred to in Article 58(2), point (a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation.
EN 6 EN
a merger or redirection of one or more actions towards another/a new action
1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative
1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for
roll-out of the implementation of the initiative
The implementation of the initiative envisages a strengthened role of the European
Border and Coast Guard Agency in supporting Member States, including by
gradually expanding its capabilities (human and technical resources), ensuring its
effectiveness and the coherent implementation of EIBM, encompassing both the
management of the external borders and returns as essential components. The roll-
out should start upon the entry into force and application of the Regulation and will
require a gradual scaling-up of resources.
Implementation will notably require: (1) the increase of Frontex capabilities,
including the recruitment of new category 1 officers and the establishment of a new
European border and return reserve, (2) setting up a comprehensive training
framework for all categories of standing corps, including developing a training
curriculum for the new reserve and having in place all infrastructure and materials
required to support its development, (3) the implementation of the new elements in
the Agency’s multiannual acquisition strategy of technical equipment, (4) the
negotiation of appropriate cooperation frameworks in the form of working
arrangements, status agreements or other international agreements with partner third
countries, EU entities and international organisations, (5) reinforcement of Frontex’s
role and tools in the area of return, with strengthened governance (6) the
development of the digital solutions entrusted to Frontex under the Regulation (EU)
…/… [Return Digitalisation Regulation], as well as support with training and
implementation of these tools.
Indicative milestones are counted from the year of entry into application of the new
Regulation, and referred to Y.
Commission:
- Y+1 and subsequent years: adoption of tertiary legislation, notably on the financial
support for the contributions to the standing corps.
Frontex:
- Y+3; Y+5; Y+7: reach the set milestones for the recruitment of category 1 staff
and training of the European border and return reserve;
- Y+1 and subsequent years: development and regular review of a training
framework for all standing corps officers, including the European border and return
reserve;
- Y to Y+7 (continuous): ensure the continuous delivery of the appropriate training to
all standing corps officers, including basic, pre-deployment and specialised training;
- Y to Y+7 (continuous): implementation of the multiannual strategy for the
acquisition, leasing and development of the Agency’s technical equipment, together
with the annual planning of the technical equipment pool through the Management
Board decision on minimum numbers and the annual bilateral negotiations with
Member States;
- Y to Y+7 (continuous): implementation of agreed working arrangements, status
agreements as well as international agreements in the area of border management and
EN 7 EN
return in the partner third countries, with the partner EU entities and international
organisations for the purposes of technical assistance and operational support, as
relevant;
- Y to Y+7 (continuous): implementation of the Agency’s coordinating role in
strategically planning of return activities, including the pooling and matching of
operational needs and available resources within the common system for returns;
- Y to Y+7 (continuous): coordination and roll out of wider range of return-related
support to Member States covering the entirety of return, readmission and
reintegration stages;
- Y + 4: development of digital components for return case management in line with
the Regulation (EU) …/… [Return Digitalisation Regulation] and support with the
implementation /training in the Member States;
- Y to Y+7 (continuous): increase and optimisation of standing corps officers with a
return-related profile.
Member States:
- Y+3; Y+5; Y+7: reach the set quotas for the number of national officers to be
trained by Frontex and become part of the European border and return reserve;
- Y to Y+7 (continuous): align relevant Union funded acquisitions with Frontex
operational needs and technical standards, register the equipment in the technical
equipment pool and make it available to the Agency in accordance with Article
78(15).
1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g.
coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For
the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting
from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise
created by Member States alone.
The challenges addressed by this proposal are inherently transnational and cannot be
effectively tackled by Member States acting alone. The management of the Union's
external borders is a shared European responsibility, and shortcomings in one part of
the external border may have consequences for the functioning, security and integrity
of the Schengen area as a whole. Geopolitical developments, pressure, hybrid threats,
increasingly sophisticated criminal and smuggling networks, and the growing need
for digital and operational capabilities have further highlighted the need for a
coordinated Union response. Fragmented national approaches limit the effectiveness
of border management, return operations and crisis preparedness, and cannot
adequately address challenges that extend beyond the territory or capacities of
individual Member States. Action at Union level is, therefore, both necessary and
more effective.
The effective management and control of the Union’s external borders is in the
interest of all Member States. The abolition of internal border controls within the
Schengen area means that external border management directly affects the
functioning, security, and integrity of the Union as a whole. Perceived deficiencies in
the management of external borders, combined with migratory challenges and
security risks, have led in the past to the reintroduction of internal border controls
undermining trust between Member States. Abuses of visa to the Union also place
strain on that trust. All these elements underscore the need for greater resilience and
EN 8 EN
coordination of current border management systems. To that end, effective European
integrated border management and an effective Union return policy are mutually
reinforcing and indispensable for the area of freedom, security and justice and the
functioning of the Schengen area.
Furthermore, the full implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum88 and the
new Return Regulation89 come at a time where the Union needs to increase the
effectiveness of returns. Despite sustained efforts by Member States and Union
agencies, a substantial proportion of third-country nationals subject to a return
decision does not effectively return to their country of origin. The return rate,
together with differences in Member State’s capacities, operational practices and
varying levels of cooperations with third countries, call for a stronger coordination at
Union level.
The common European system for returns, established by the Return Regulation, is
intended to address these long-standing challenges: reduce fragmentation of national
practices, improve enforcement of return decisions and recognise them mutually,
enhance cooperation on readmission and reintegration, and ensure that return
procedures are carried out more efficiency and consistently across the Union, in full
respect of fundamental rights. Its implementation, based on common rules,
strengthened operational cooperation and a more coordinated approach among
Member States, will require effective operational capacity and coordination at Union
level.
In this context, while Member States remain responsible for issuing and enforcing
return decisions, the ambition of the common system for returns requires a stronger
Union-level operational framework, based on enhanced coordination, common
planning, information exchange and the efficient mobilisation of available resources.
In addition, the new procedures and tools made available to the Member States by
the Pact on Migration and Asylum, and particularly the objective to swiftly process
third-country nationals arriving at external borders and to return those with no right
to stay in the EU through a newly established ‘return border procedure’, will further
increase the operational demands on Member States and the need for effective
strategic planning and coordination across the Union.
Against this background, the role of Frontex should be adapted and further
strengthened in the area of return, so that the Agency can fulfil its potential as the
central Union actor in the common system for returns. Within this framework, the
Agency should have a stronger role in the strategic planning, prioritisation,
coordination and implementation of return-related activities, including voluntary and
forced return operations, ensuring a coherent Union approach aligned with the
Union’s migration policy priorities and responsive to the operational needs identified
together by Frontex and Member States.
88 Communication on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum COM(2020) 609 final (23 September 2020) 89 On 16 October 2026, the Regulation establishing a common system for the return of third-country
nationals staying illegally in the Union, replacing the Return Directive entered into force. The Regulation
marks a major step towards a more effective, coherent and coordinated Union return policy, based on common
rules, strengthened operational cooperation and a shared approach among Member States. It addresses
longstanding challenges linked to fragmented national practices, improves the enforcement and mutual
recognition of return decisions, enhances cooperation on readmission and reintegration, and ensures that return
procedures are carried out more efficiently and consistently across the Union, in full respect of fundamental
rights.
EN 9 EN
To this end, the Agency should be equipped with the capabilities needed to translate
identified operational needs into coordinated action, e.g. by pooling and matching
available resources and capabilities. The implementation of the Common European
System for Return should be complemented by a reinforced governance structure and
the external dimension should be strengthened. Close cooperation with third
countries of origin and transit on return, readmission, and reintegration, can
significantly facilitate effective return processes. The Union’s capacity to support
and coordinate such cooperation therefore contributes to the overall effectiveness of
the return system. In line with the whole-of-route approach to migration management
and the broader objectives of the 2026 European Asylum and Migration Management
Strategy, the Agency should assume a stronger operational role in cooperation with
third countries in the area of return. It is therefore proposed that Frontex should be
able to carry out return-related activities in, or from, third countries where this
contributes to the Union's migration objectives and policy priorities, including the
organisation and coordination of return operations, cooperation on identification, and
other operational return needs identified by the Agency and Member States.
Operational activities involving the exercise of executive powers should, however,
be conducted only when provided for in the relevant status agreements, which should
establish the conditions for such cooperation, including the respective responsibilities
of the parties and the necessary safeguards.
As per Article 7 of the EBCG Regulation, implementing EIBM is a shared
responsibility of Member State and Frontex. In this spirit, it is necessary to take
action to reinforce the capabilities of the EBCG, both in terms of human and
technical resources. In particular, the involvement of the European Border and Coast
Guard Agency allows for pooling of expertise and techncial assets, common risk
analysis and situational awarness, interoperability of systems, and enabling the rapid
deployment of personnel and equipment where needed. It also reinforces the
coordination of return operations, promotes the consistent application of common
standards, and enhances cooperation with third countries, thereby increasing the
effectiveness of national authorities while fully respecting their operational
responsibilities.
The added value of EU-level coordination has been demonstrated in practice through
joint operations, border interventions, and coordinated responses to sudden migratory
or security-related developments. The Agency’s role in supporting return operations,
training, vulnerability assessments, and cooperation with third countries has further
shown that Union action enhances consistency, mutual trust, and solidarity among
Member States, while contributing to the uniform application of EU law.
1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past
On 2 February 2024, the Commission published a report on the evaluation of the
current EBCG Regulation, including a review of the Stading Corps.
The evaluation found that:
- Operational support provided by Frontex was valued by Member States and has
contributed to achieving the objectives of the EBCG Regulation;
- Frontex has become an essential actor in the common EU system for return,
effectively supporting Member States through all phases of the return procedures;
- Common training standards provided by Frontex contributed to improving the
training of national border guards;
EN 10 EN
- Frontex contributed to improved situational awereness at external borders;
- Frontex provided added value by offering additional human resources to Member
States and third countries facing migratory challenges;
- Frontex cooperation with third countries was well regarded by key stakeholders;
- Frontex effectively cooperated with other EU Agencies;
- Frontex has well established oversight structure.
At the same time, the evaluation also identified that the effectiveness of the
Regulation was impacted by a number of factors:
- Uncertainties concerning the extent of Frontex’s role in preventing, detecting and
countering cross border crime;
- Shortfalls and capacity gaps in Frontex’ mandate, its ability to cover deployment
needs on returns, and gaps in the return governance;
- Lack of Frontex’s own training facilities, reliance on Member States’ training
infrastructures and unavailability of trainers;
- Challenges for the implementation of EIBM due to divergent operational
procedures across Member States and weak alignment on EIBM standards;
- Limitations in providing up to date and comprehensive situational monitoring;
- Challenges deriving from the application of the Staff Regulation to Frontex
operational staff;
- Challenges linked to cooperation with other Agencies, international organisations
and third countries.
Overall, the evaluation concluded that the EBCG Regulation is relevant to address
the current needs and challenges at the external borders and that it provides a clear
EU added value, as its objectives could not have been achieved sufficiently by
Member States acting alone.
At the same time, the current framework does not allow to fully respond to the
operational needs of the Member States as regards the involvement of the Agency in
border management and in returns. Additionally, the new procedures and tools made
available to the Member States by the Pact on Migration and Asylum, and
particularly the objective to swiftly process third-country nationals arriving at
external borders and to return those with no right to stay in the EU, may require
additional capacity to support Member States in these areas.
The proposed measures are therefore intended to reflect the results of the 2024
evaluation of the EBCG Regulation and address obstacles in the development of
Frontex capabilities (i.e. human resources and technical assets available to Frontex),
ambiguities and gaps in the current mandate of Frontex as well as unused
opportunities affecting the efficiency of EBCG community in border management,
return, and cooperation with third countries.
1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with
other appropriate instruments
Frontex has been explicitly mentioned in the President’s political guidelines (2024-
2029) as a key component of the EU’s border management priorities, highlighting
the need to strengthen the Agency “notably to equip it with state-of-the-art
EN 11 EN
technology for surveillance and situational awareness, along with its own equipment
and personnel to ensure it can protect our borders in all circumstances with strong
governance and the full respect of fundamental rights”, and to increase “the number
of European Border and Coast Guards to 30 000”. Furthermore, the political
guidelines refer to putting in place “new common approach on returns, with a new
legislative framework to speed up and simplify the process, ensure that returns take
place in a dignified manner, digitalise case management [...]” as well as the Union’s
aim to “continue strategic relations on migration and security with non-EU countries,
especially countries of origin and transit” and the “step up our work on returns,
preventing illegal immigration and fighting human smuggling”.
On 16 July 2025, the Commission presented its proposal for the Multiannual
Financial Framework (“MFF”) for 2028-2034, with a financial envelope of EUR
11.888 billion allocated to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.
The figures presented in the LFDS concern the human and financial resources
needed for the Agency to continue to perform its current tasks, as well as to be able
to implement the new measures introduced by the proposal compared to the current
EBCG Regulation. The measures with the most significant impact on resources are,
in particular, the strengthening of the Agency’s human and technical capabilities, the
enhancement of Frontex’ role in return, and the scope of its foreseen cooperation
with third countries.
The impact on human and financial resources is estimated as follows:
Human resources
Overall, the Agency’s staff is expected to increase by 1 650 staff in the next MFF
period 2028-2034.
European Border and Coast Guard standing corps category 1 staff (Frontex’s own
operational staff):
The standing corps category 1 are expected to reach 3 000 staff by 2027 under the
current mandate. In order to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard
standing corps, this number is expected to double over time. In the next Multiannual
Financial Framework period (2028-2034), 1 500 new staff will be allocated to the
Agency, gradually reaching a total of 4 500 by 2034. The increase of category 1
reflects the expansion of the Agency’s mandate, also in view of the needs linked to
different profiles of operational staff. These include, in particular:
- A continued need to maintain a substantial proportion of border and coast
guardsthat can be deployed flexibly across border checks and surveillance, including
tasks to support national authorities in accordance with the Screening Regulation90
(currently estimated at over 50% of the standing corps).
- A significant increase in the share of standing corps with return profiles (currently
estimated just over 10% of the standing corps91) to respond to the enhanced role of
the Agency as the Union actor in the common system for returns, including
implementation of support to Member States for the return border procedure under
90 Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024
introducing the screening of third-country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC)
No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817 91 Management Board Decision 8/2025 of 26 March 2025 adopting the European Border and Coast Guard
standing corps annual planning for 2026 and indicative multiannual planning of profiles.
EN 12 EN
Regulation (EU) 2024/1349, the new Return Regulation, as well as returns from third
countries, and the estimated increase in the share of returns supported or coordinated
by Frontex.
Additionally, the following functions will be needed to ensure adequate support in
performing the Agency’s tasks:
- Growing needs for operational trainers, both matching the increase in category 1
staff to be trained, need to ensure uniform as well as specialised training for all
categories of standing corps and the development of a new European border and
return reserve,
- Needs linked to measures for supporting operations in the field from the
headquarters,
- Increased support to Member States on detecting fraudulent documents and
identifying visa fraud cases,
- Needs linked to increased level of cooperation and support, on border management
and return, with third countries of origin and transit,
- Increased role of the Agency in strategically planning and coordinating return-
related activities,
- Where the Agency operates maritime assets under its control, needs linked to the
appropriately qualified crew members who can be required for their operation,
- Continued needs for the ETIAS’s Central Unit staff,
- The possibility to recruit a limited number of staff to enable monitoring and support
of the daily management and deployment of the standing corps.92
Administrative staff (headquarters):
For the period 2021-2027, the Agency’s administrative staff remained stable at 1 000
while the standing corps gradually grew to reach 10 000. However, and in order to
support the Agency’s significant growth, the Agency will be allocated 150 additional
administrative staff, therefore progressively reaching 1 150 by 2034. The overall
financial cost for Frontex’ administrative staff is estimated at EUR 1.057 billion.
Financial resources
- The strengthening of European Border and Coast Guard standing corps:
Overall, the maintenance and strengthening of the European Border and Coast Guard
standing corps in the period of 2028-2034, including staffing costs of category 1, will
amount to EUR 5.89 billion.
Under the current mandate, the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is
expected to reach 10 000 staff in 2027. In addition to Frontex’s own staff, the
standing corps consists of border management and return staff of Member States
seconded to Frontex on a long-term basis (category 2) and deployed at Frontex on a
short-term basis (category 3).
The revised mandate envisages the strengthening European Border and Coast Guards
to 30 000 over time, with the following impact on the MFF 2028-2034:
- Increase of category 1 staff to 6 000 over time, reaching 4.500 by 2034;
92 For the purposes of the costs, this is assumed at 4% of the standing corps categories 1, 2 and 3.
EN 13 EN
Some measures are proposed to address the specificities of the standing corps
operational staff and improve their effectiveness and cost-efficiency:
- Category 1 officers will be engaged as contract agents for the duration of their
mandatory basic training. If they succeed the training, they will be recruited as
contract agent in a higher function group or as temporary agent depending on their
profile;
- The place of deployment of the standing corps will not any longer be tied to the
Agency’s seat as a default rule and therefore administered in line with the mission
system but it will be considered in most cases as their place of employment for the
purposes of the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment (long-term
deployments in Member States). This will rationalise the system of financial
allocations for standing corps category 1, making it better tailored for long-term
operational service, and reducing its financial and administrative impact. The amount
of savings will be dependent on the deployment/employment locations of the
category 1 officers and on the relevant allowances applicable when relocating to a
different place of employment. When comparing the deployment costs under the
currently applicable mission system and the costs estimated under the revised
approach to deployments, the average annual savings for the next MFF period are
estimated at EUR 122 million93.
- The Commission will propose that standing corps officers will be eligible for
additional allowances linked to shiftwork patterns and arduous working conditions
by means of delegated acts to be adopted under Articles 56a and 56c of the Staff
Regulations.
Overall, the financial resources for category 1 take these changes into account, and
include staffing costs, mission costs for deployment in third countries, allowances
linked to arduous working conditions94 and basic and specialised training costs,
assuming that the basic training will take place in a training centre located in
Warsaw.
- No increase in category 2, with its capacity remaining stable at 1.500;
Seconded staff is considered to be deployed in the different operational areas
(including headquarters). The main costs will be therefore related to deployments,
ensuring consistency with the rules applicable to allowances and reimbursements of
the deployable statutory staff. These include relevant allowances linked to working
conditions (e.g. shift work, standby duties, arduous conditions) and mission costs for
deployments in third countries. Additionally, financial resources are taken into
account to cover training needs.
- No increase in category 3, with its numbers remaining stable at 5.500 and a
budgeted capacity of 35%95;
The main costs of this part of the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps
are related to their deployments, which are considered for a duration of up to four
93 The estimates only take into account the difference between the deployment costs for category 1 based
on the current system and the revised deployment costs based on missions to third countries (subject to long-term
mission reductions) and arduous allowance, not the impact on staffing costs. 94 The estimates for this allowance are based on the currently applicable cumulative ceiling between shift work
and arduous work. 95 This remains in line with the current budgeted capacity.
EN 14 EN
months per year. Additionally, financial resources are taken into account to cover
training needs.
- The development of a new European border and return reserve, expected to
increase to 17 000 over time, reaching 6 000 by 2034.
The European border and return reserve is composed of officers coming from the
EBCG national authorities, who would remain at the disposal of the Member States.
They would undergo a tailored EIBM training programme provided by Frontex and
would contribute to the tasks of the Agency through subsequent potential
deployments in emergency situation and/or when joining categories 2 and 3 of the
standing corps.
The financial resources envisaged for this reserve are training costs, under the
assumption that the training will take place in a training centre in Warsaw, and
deployment costs in cases of exceptional, short-term deployments. The number of the
European border and return reserve is expected to gradually grow to 6 000 by 2034
as set out in the new Annex I of the EBCG Regulation proposal (capacity of the
standing corps and category beyond 2027 in accordance with Article 66). The
growth is estimated to be slower in the first years, allowing the Agency to build its
training capabilities, with the first batch of European border and return reserve
officers trained in 2030.
Financial support for the contribution to the standing corps Article 74
The contributions of Member States to the standing corps and, in line with the
proposal, to the new European border and return reserve continue to be linked to a
financial support system. The type of contribution under Frontex budget is linked to
(1) the effective long-term secondment or short-term deployment to the standing
corps and (2) a one-off support for the possible impact on the national services linked
to the recruitment of new statutory staff granted unpaid leave from their national
services to join the Agency, assumed at 50% of the new recruits in 2028, and
gradually growing to 70% by 2034.
Technical equipment
Overall, the budget envisaged for strengthening the Agency’s technical capabilities is
EUR 1.886 billion.
The estimated budget covers the Agency’s operational needs and assets and services
assumed to be acquired, leased or chartered. This includes terrestrial assets, linked
where relevant to the growth of the standing corps, the purchase of a limited number
of small maritime assets (e.g. coastal patrol boats), and access to bigger maritime
assets (e.g. coastal patrol vessels and offshore patrol vessels), through leasing or
chartering arrangements considered as of 2030, subject to confirmation of their legal
and operational feasibility, including registration, command, crewing and the
exercise of border control tasks by standing corps on board96. The budget also covers
stable aerial surveillance needs through framework contracts and investments to
modernise equipment (e.g. innovative state-of-the-art equipment).
The approach envisages therefore only a limited increase of equipment that is under
the Agency’s effective control. For large assets, Frontex will continue to rely on
96 Any such vessel would need to be registered in a Member State and operated under arrangements
ensuring compliance with the applicable maritime rules, Member State responsibility and the lawful
performance of border surveillance activities.
EN 15 EN
Member States’ equipment that is made available through voluntary pledging,
equipment financed or co-financed with Union funding and subject to the obligations
stemming from Article 78(15), and chartering options.
- The Agency’s role in the area of return
Overall, the budget envisaged for the Agency’s support in return activities is EUR
2.029 billion.
The proposal envisages an expanded role and new tasks for Frontex in the area of
return, responding as well to the tasks assigned to Frontex in view of the Screening
Regulation and the Return Border Procedure Regulation, as well as the new Return
Regulation. The assumption is that the share of return operations supported by
Frontex will grow in the next MFF period (2028-2034), starting with 65 000
returnees in 2028, in line with Frontex past data. While the growth is envisaged to be
higher in the first years, taking into account the start of the implementation of the
return border procedure and an increased uptake of Frontex support by Member
States, the extent of the growth would gradually reduce over time.
Financial impacts are also expected to derive from the new measures linked to
Frontex role in supporting returns from third countries, both technically and
operationally. The share of this support, as well as the number of third countries
concerned, is expected to gradually grow over time.
Additional costs are linked to the expansion of the EU Reintegration Programme
(EURP), taking into account growing needs and a broadened geographical coverage,
the setting up of a SIRENE office, and the costs associated with supporting the
initiatives foreseen by Regulation (EU) …/… [Return Digitalisation Regulation],
particularly for the development and maintenance of digital tools to be covered by
Frontex97.
At the same time, savings are expected due to improved coordination and increased
efficiency of Frontex-managed returns (e.g. better seat-fill and pooling), as well as
positive financial effects deriving from an expected increase of voluntary returns
over forced ones.
- Expanded cooperation with third countries, international organisations and
EU entities in the area of border management
Overall, the budget envisaged for the Agency’s expanded cooperation with third
countries, international organisations and EU entities is EUR 112.79 million. It does
not include any form of cooperation with third countries on return matters, as this is
addressed in the previous section on the Agency’s role in the area of return.
To reflect the increased ambition of the role of Frontex in cooperation in the external
dimension on border management, with a strong focus on cooperation with third
countries of origin and transit for migration, it is assumed that the annual cost, based
on Frontex past expenditure, is increased by 100%. This derives from the assumption
that Frontex will support an increased number of third country partners with
technical and operational support that requires adequate resources (financial,
technical and human resources) for implementation.
97 Legislative Financial and Digital Statement accompanying the proposal on the digitalisation of case
management in the area of return, readmission and reintegration, amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1726,
Regulation (EU) 2019/817, Regulation (EU) 2019/818 and Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 (Return Digitalisation
Act).
EN 16 EN
- Continuation of the Agency’s existing activities
The Agency is expected to continue to perform additional operational activities in
line with the current mandate. Therefore, the remaining costs linked to the Agency’s
operational budget haven been considered at EUR 859.64 million. These include
information and data analytics (continued operation, maintenance and necessary
upgrades to EUROSUR and associated communication network, including
requirements for 24/7 availability, interoperability and exchange of classified
information), operation of ETIAS, strengthening of existing capacities, digitalisation
and operational support, and oversight activities. These costs are based on the 2027
annual budget projected over seven years with a 2% annual inflation rate.
When summed, these amount to a global envelope of EUR 11.837 billion over the
next MFF and 5.650 staff at the end of 2034, which align with the Commission
legislative proposal for the 2028-2034 MFF.
The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for
illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial
Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the
post-2027 period remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on
the 2028-2034 MFF and thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary
procedure. All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.
1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for
redeployment
Achieving the intended operational impact requires substantial investments in human
and technical resources for the Agency to effectively continue to perform its
activities and be able to act in line with the new tasks and strengthened mandate
envisaged in the proposal.
The envisaged activities are expected to be covered by the budget assigned to
Frontex under the Commission legislative proposal for the 2028-2034 MFF (EUR
11.88 billion).
Incoming revenue can also be considered. This includes the fee generated by the
operation of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System, expected to
cover costs related to ETIAS operational expenditures98, and could include, in the
course of the next MFF period (2028-2034), additional revenues from fees generated
from Frontex-run services, including for instance by providing services linked to
carrying out compliance checks of travel and identity documents (Article 94) and
other fees to be further defined as appropriate.99
Additionally, it is necessary to ensure Member States’ operational and capability
readiness for European Integrated Border Management, including return-related
capacities, in line with their responsibilities within the European Border and Coast
Guard. This includes sufficient and adequately trained staff, up to standards technical
and digital capacities for border checks, border surveillance, screening, EUROSUR
and secure information exchange, as well as interoperable return case-management
capacities.
Experience with the technical equipment pool has also shown that voluntary
contributions do not always fully cover Frontex’s operational needs, particularly for
98 Article 86 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1240 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1411. 99 These fees could not be quantified at this stage.
EN 17 EN
maritime and aerial assets. The equipment that has been co-financed under the
ISF/BMVI specific actions has provided significant operational capacity. This
supports maintaining targeted Union funding linked to Frontex operational needs and
technical standards, registration in the technical equipment pool and clear availability
obligations.
Therefore, with a view to ensure operational readiness and the capacity to fulfil
Member States’ obligations to provide contributions to the European Border and
Coast Guard standing corps and technical equipment pool, two additional aspects are
considered under the border management funds, within the appropriations provided
in the Commission proposal for the 2028-2034 MFF (EUR 15.4 billion):
- The salaries of national staff performing border management and return that would
become part of the European border and return reserve may be supported under the
National and Regional Partnership Plans (provided that such salaries are part of a
measure that is associated to a reform or an investment in the scope of the BMV
Regulation).
- The technical equipment acquired, leased or chartered by Frontex may be
complemented by large scale equipment purchased by Member States under the
National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPPs). Where such equipment is
financed or co-financed with Union funding with the clear objective of increasing the
operational capacity of the Agency or of the European Border and Coast Guard, it
should be registered in the technical equipment pool and made available to the
Agency in accordance with the EBCG Regulation.
The implementation of the proposal will also entail additional activities for the
Commission services, notably the Directorate-General for Migration and Home
Affairs (DG HOME), in relation to governance, oversight, policy coordination and
the preparation and adoption of implementing acts.
EN 18 EN
1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact
limited duration
– in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY
– financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations and
from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.
unlimited duration
– Implementation with a start-up period from YYYY to YYYY,
– followed by full-scale operation.
1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned
Direct management by the Commission
– by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;
– by the executive agencies
Shared management with the Member States
Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to:
– third countries or the bodies they have designated
– international organisations and their agencies (to be specified)
– the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund
– bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation
– public law bodies
– bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that they
are provided with adequate financial guarantees
– bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the
implementation of a public-private partnership and that are provided with adequate financial
guarantees
– bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the
common foreign and security policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, and
identified in the relevant basic act
– bodies established in a Member State, governed by the private law of a Member
State or Union law and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance with sector-specific rules, with
the implementation of Union funds or budgetary guarantees, to the extent that such bodies are
controlled by public law bodies or by bodies governed by private law with a public service
mission, and are provided with adequate financial guarantees in the form of joint and several
liability by the controlling bodies or equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for
each action, limited to the maximum amount of the Union support.
EN 19 EN
2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES
2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules
The monitoring and reporting of activities implemented by Frontex under indirect
management will follow the provisions laid down in Frontex’s new Regulation, the
Financial Regulation100 and in line with the Common Approach on decentralised
agencies101.
The Agency is subject to regular monitoring and reporting requirements. The
Management Board of the Agency shall adopt each year a consolidated annual
activity report of the Agency for the previous year and forward it by 1 July at the
latest to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of
Auditors. This report shall be made public. Every four years, the Commission shall
conduct an evaluation in accordance with the evaluation criteria of the Commission
guidelines to assess particularly the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of the
Agency’s performance and its working practices in relation to its objectives, mandate
and tasks. The evaluation shall, in particular, address the possible need to modify the
mandate of the Agency, and the financial implications of any such modification
Frontex will submit a Single Programming Document (SPD) annually to the
Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council, setting out its multiannual
and annual work programmes, objectives, expected results, and performance
indicators. This document is prepared taking into account the opinion of the
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council. Additionally, Frontex will
adopt a Consolidated Annual Activity Report (CAAR), which assesses progress
against the SPD’s objectives. The Management Board approves this report before it
is transmitted to the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council, the Court of
Auditors, and national parliaments by 1 July each year. This report shall be made
public.
In line with Article 141 of the revised European Border and Coast Guard Regulation,
the Commission will conduct an evaluation of the Regulation 48 months after entry
into force at the latest and every four years, assessing its added value, impact,
effectiveness, efficiency, and working methods. The evaluation may propose
structural or operational modifications, including financial implications. The
Commission submits the evaluation report together with its conclusions to the
European Parliament, the Council and to the Management Board, which can issue
recommendations to the Commission. The evaluation report and its conclusions are
made public.
2.2. Management and control system(s)
2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation
mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed
Indirect management
Considering that the proposal impacts the annual EU contribution to Frontex, the EU
budget will be implemented via indirect management.
100 Financial regulation applicable to the general budget of the Union 101 Joint Statement on decentralised agencies.
EN 20 EN
Pursuant to the principle of sound financial management, the budget of Frontex shall
be implemented in compliance with effective and efficient internal control. Frontex
is therefore bound to implement an appropriate control strategy coordinated among
appropriate actors involved in the control chain.
Regarding ex-post controls, Frontex, as a decentralised agency, is notably subject to:
- internal audit by the Internal Audit Service of the Commission
- annual reports by the European Court of Auditors, giving a statement of
assurance as to the reliability of the annual accounts and the legality and regularity of
the underlying transactions
- annual discharge granted by the European Parliament
- possible investigations conducted by OLAF to ensure, in particular, that the
resources allocated to agencies are put to proper use.
- As partner DG to Frontex, DG HOME will implement its Control Strategy on
decentralised agencies to ensure reliable reporting in the framework of its Annual
Activity Report (AAR). While decentralised agencies have full responsibility for the
implementation of their budget, DG HOME is responsible for regular payment of
annual contributions established by the Budgetary Authority.
- Finally, the European Ombudsman provides a further layer of control and
accountability at Frontex.
Based on the evaluation of the current legal framework, the Impact Assessment
accompanying the proposal for a new European Border and Coast Guard Regulation,
and the significant increase in financial and human resources expected to support the
implementation of the proposal, the existing governance and control framework
should be maintained to ensure the continuity of the existing robust setup, including
by also allocating adequate human and financial resources to its components in a
forward-looking manner in order to preserve the existing degree of financial
oversight, accountability, good governance and compliance with principles of sound
financial management:
- The existing internal framework for good governance (in particular the Agency’s
independent and control bodies) should remain unchanged, and continue to apply to
all of the Agency’s activities
- The entities within this framework should receive adequate human and financial
resources to carry out their tasks
- The proposal provides a clearer overview of the Agency’s structure including its
independent and control bodies, to ensure their independence and their involvement
in relevant Agency processes
2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up
to mitigate them
For the budget implemented by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, the
Single Programming Document must provide information on the internal control
systems, while the Consolidated Annual Activity Report (CAAR) must assess the
progress against the Single Programming Documents’ objectives, including as
regards risk assessment. The Agency needs to ensure a continuous improvement of
these systems through effective risk assessment and management processes.
EN 21 EN
Additionally, as partner DG of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, DG
HOME runs an annual risk management exercise to identify and assess potential high
risks related to agencies’ operations. Risks considered as critical are reported
annually in DG HOME management plan and are accompanied by an action plan
stating the mitigating action. In this respect, DG HOME will continue follow-up on
risks concerning elevated security threats, including cyber incidents, resources and
capabilities shortages which impede the fulfilment of the Agency’s growing mandate
and increased regulatory complexity which impacts operational delivery.
2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between
the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the
expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure)
The ratio of “control costs/value of payments” is reported on by the Commission.
The 2025 AAR of DG HOME reports 0.10% for this ratio in relation to Indirect
Management Entrusted Entities and Decentralised Agencies, including the European
Border and Coast Guard Agency.
The European Court of Auditors confirmed the legality and regularity of Frontex’
annual accounts for 2024.
2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities
Within this legal framework, the Management Board of Frontex is required to adopt
and regularly update an internal anti-fraud strategy. Frontex adopted an updated anti-
fraud strategy 2025-2027 and its action plan on 20 November 2024. In accordance
with that framework, Frontex will continue enhancing anti-fraud controls and
culture, reinforce anti-corruption measures, such as control and inspections in areas
vulnerable to corruption, raise awareness on negligence which may be linked to
irregularities and potential fraud. It will ensure a proactive approach via controls,
investigations and inspections, timely implementation of recommendations and
enhance internal, external and inter-agency anti-fraud networks. Frontex will
continue to participate in fraud prevention activities carried out by OLAF and report
suspected fraud and financial irregularities to the Commission without delay.
The proposal also strengthens internal governance and financial oversight of the
Agency, including by setting up different configurations of the executive board. This
may lead to formalising the management board working group for budget and
accounts currently being responsible for monitoring audit findings and ensuring
follow-up of recommendations issued by audit and scrutiny bodies.
In addition, the Commission retains powers to object to Management Board
decisions that may give rise to risks of financial mismanagement or non-compliance
with Union law. Frontex’ activities will remain subject to the applicable Union
financial, audit, data protection and accountability frameworks, including oversight
and investigations by OLAF, EPPO, the Court of Auditors, Internal Audit Service as
well as the Agency’s Internal Audit Capability.
DG HOME will continue to apply its Anti-Fraud Strategy in line with the
Commission's Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS), which also covers decentralised agencies
within its remit, including Frontex.
EN 22 EN
3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget
line(s) affected
• Existing budget lines
In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.
Heading of
multiannual
financial
framework
Budget line Type of
expenditure Contribution
1: Economic, social and territorial cohesion,
agriculture, rural and maritime prosperity and
security
Diff./Non-
diff.102
from
EFTA
countries 103
from
candidate
countries104
From
other
third
countries 105
other assigned
revenue 106
1
[XX.YY.YY.YY] Decentralised agencies
European Border and Coast Guard
(Frontex)
Non-diff. NO NO YES YES
• New budget lines requested
In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.
Heading of
multiannual
financial
framework
Budget line Type of
expenditure Contribution
Number
Diff./Non-
diff.
from
EFTA
countries
from
candidate
countries
from
other
third
countries
other assigned
revenue
[XX.YY.YY.YY]
Diff./Non
-diff. YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO
[XX.YY.YY.YY]
Diff./Non
-diff. YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO
[XX.YY.YY.YY]
Diff./Non
-diff. YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO
102 Diff. = Differentiated appropriations / Non-diff. = Non-differentiated appropriations. 103 EFTA: European Free Trade Association. 104 Candidate countries including third countries with whom preliminarily negotiations have been initiated
in view of future opening of the accession process. 105 Frontex receives contributions from the countries associated with the Schengen
Agreement (NO, IS, CH, LI) 106 Earmarked Revenue: Specific external funds designated for special projects or joint external programs
(like the deployment of specific surveillance tech) are occasionally received from other Commission services
and managed by the agency as earmarked or ad-hoc grants.
EN 23 EN
3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations
3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations
– The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations
– The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below
3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget [the operational budget and the related overall EU contributions still need to be subject to review, to
align with the MFF ceilings]
EUR million (to three decimal places)
Heading of multiannual financial framework 1 Economic, Social and territorial cohesion, agriculture, rural and maritime
prosperity and security
European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) Year
2028 Year
2029 Year
2030 Year
2031 Year
2032 Year
2033 Year
2034
TOTAL
MFF 2028-
2034
Budget line: <…….> / EU Budget contribution to the agency107 1.434,56 1.463,76 1.585,50 1.688,04 1.793,19 1.885,51 1.987,26 11.837,81
The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next
Multiannual Financial Framework. The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period remain subject to
the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary procedure.
All appropriations and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.
EUR million (to three decimal places)
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL MFF
2028-2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
TOTAL operational
appropriations Commitments (4)
1.434,56
1.463,76
1.585,50
1.688,04
1.793,19
1.885,51
1.987,26
11.837,81
107 Commitments and payments are identical.
EN 24 EN
(including
contribution to
decentralised agency)
Payments (5)
1.434,56
1.463,76
1.585,50
1.688,04
1.793,19
1.885,51
1.987,26
11.837,81
TOTAL appropriations of an
administrative nature financed from the
envelope for specific programmes
(6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL
appropriations
under HEADING 1
Commitments =4+6
1.434,56
1.463,76
1.585,50
1.688,04
1.793,19
1.885,51
1.987,26
11.837,81
of the multiannual
financial framework Payments =5+6
1.434,56
1.463,76
1.585,50
1.688,04
1.793,19
1.885,51
1.987,26
11.837,81
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL
MFF 2028-
2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
• TOTAL operational
appropriations (all
operational headings)
Commitments (4)
1.434,56
1.463,76
1.585,50
1.688,04
1.793,19
1.885,51
1.987,26
11.837,81
Payments (5)
1.434,56
1.463,76
1.585,50
1.688,04
1.793,19
1.885,51
1.987,26
11.837,81
• TOTAL appropriations of an
administrative nature financed from the
envelope for specific programmes (all
operational headings)
(6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL Commitments =4+6
1.434,56
1.463,76
1.585,50
1.688,04
1.793,19
1.885,51
1.987,26
11.837,81
EN 25 EN
appropriations
Under Heading 1 to 3
of the multiannual
financial framework
(Reference amount)
Payments
=5+6
1.434,56
1.463,76
1.585,50
1.688,04
1.793,19
1.885,51
1.987,26
11.837,81
EUR million (to three decimal places)
DG: HOME Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL
MFF 2028-
2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
Human resources 0,814 1,202 1,202 1,396 1,396 1,396 1,590 8,996
Other administrative expenditure 0,225 0,225 0,225 0,225 0,225 0,225 0,225 1,575
TOTAL DG
HOME 1,039 1,427 1,427 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,815 10,571
TOTAL appropriations under
HEADING 4 of the multiannual
financial framework
(Total
commitments
= Total
payments)
1,039 1,427 1,427 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,815 10,571
EUR million (to three decimal places)
EN 26 EN
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL
MFF 2028-
2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
TOTAL
appropriations under
HEADINGS 1 to 4
Commitments 1.435,594 1.465,185 1.586,9301.689,6621.794,8061.887,1351.989,070 11.848,383
of the multiannual
financial framework Payments 1.435,594 1.465,1851.586,9301.689,6621.794,8061.887,1351.989,070 11.848,383
EN 27 EN
3.2.3. Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations
– The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an
administrative nature
– The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative
nature, as explained below
3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget
The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for
illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial Framework.
The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period
remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and
thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary procedure. All appropriations
and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.
VOTED
APPROPRIATIONS
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year TOTAL
2028 -
2034 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
HEADING 4
Human resources 0,814 1,202 1,202 1,396 1,3961,3961,590 8,996
Other administrative
expenditure 0,225 0,225 0,225 0,225 0,2250,2250,225 1,575
Subtotal HEADING 4 1,039 1,427 1,427 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,815 10,571
Outside HEADING 4
Human resources 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000.0000.000 0.000
Other expenditure of an
administrative nature 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000.0000.000 0.000
Subtotal outside
HEADING 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOTAL 1,039 1,427 1,427 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,815 10,571
3.2.4. Estimated requirements of human resources
– The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources
– The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained
below
3.2.4.1. Financed from voted budget
The estimated impact on expenditure and staffing for 2028 and beyond is added for
illustrative purposes only and does not pre-judge the next Multiannual Financial Framework.
The source of financing and scope of Union financial commitment in the post-2027 period
remain subject to the outcome of interinstitutional negotiations on the MFF 2028-2034 and
thereafter shall be determined through the annual budgetary procedure. All appropriations
and staffing allocations as of 2028 are indicative.
Estimate to be expressed in full-time equivalent units (FTEs)108
VOTED APPROPRIATIONS Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034
108 Please specify below the table how many FTEs within the number indicated are already assigned to the
management of the action and/or can be redeployed within your DG and what are your net needs.
EN 28 EN
Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff)
20 01 02 01 (Headquarters and
Commission’s Representation
Offices)
2 4 4 5 5 5 6
20 01 02 03 (EU Delegations) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Indirect research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Direct research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines (specify) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
• External staff (in FTEs)
20 02 01 (AC, END from the
‘global envelope’) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
20 02 03 (AC, AL, END and
JPD in the EU Delegations) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Admin. Support
line • at
Headquarters 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[XX.01.YY.YY] • in EU
Delegations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(AC, END - Indirect research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(AC, END - Direct research) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines (specify) -
Heading 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines (specify) -
Outside Heading 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 6 8 8 9 9 9 10
DG HOME needs a total of 10 FTEs to ensure the implementation of the proposal in full. In
line with the stable staffing principle, the human resources required for this proposal will be
covered by internal redeployment within the Commission. At this stage, of the 10 FTEs
needed, DG HOME is in the position to repurpose 3 available permanent posts.109
The DG HOME staff required to implement the proposal (in FTEs):
To be covered by
current staff
available in the
Commission
services
Exceptional additional staff
To be financed
under Heading 4
or Research
To be financed
from BA line
To be financed
from fees
Establishment 6 N/A
109 These redeployment efforts – while fully respecting the stable staffing principle – will likely require
deprioritisation of tasks within the Commission services. The Commission will revisit the needs and the
scope for redeployment within the indicated number of staff, following an agreement on the next MFF.
EN 29 EN
plan posts
External staff
(CA, SNEs, INT) 4
Description of tasks to be carried out by:
Officials and temporary staff - 2 ADs: for the preparation of the secondary legislation, the oversight
and policy coordination of the implementation of the Regulation,
especially regarding the Agency’s new tasks (e.g. training capacities for
the border reserve), and for preparation of the Management Board and
the Executive Board in its different configurations.
- 1 AD: with skills in relation to communication and social media
monitoring to support, tasked with overseeing the work with Frontex’s
new monitoring unit.
- 1 AD: to manage, coordinate and oversee the tasks related to the
expanded mandate of the Agency in the area of return particularly to
cover the increased need in the mandate for the Agency to coordinate
with the Commission, including the need for reinforced governance and
representation as the Agency mandate for return is substantially
increased and enhanced strategic alignment with overall EU priorities.
The tasks would also involve overseeing the work to set up the Return
Coordination centre. This task would also involve following the
reinforced role of Frontex to provide support on return from third
countries including where relevant preparing for and negotiating return
(status) agreements which need to be negotiated by the Commission.
There will also be a need to coordinate the deployment, especially to
third countries, of different (return) liaison officers of the Agency and
of the Union in general.
- 1 AST: with budgetary skills to support the management of the new
EBCG regulation and the revision of the implementing act linked to
Article 74 on the financial support for the contributions to the standing
corps and to support the financial and budget management for the
recruitment and increase of standing corps, managing the EU facility
and overall coordination of the NRPPs in relation to the funding support
for the implementation of the new mandate.
- 1 AST: to support functions for the overall reinforced mandate on
return, including ensuring presence of the policy officer in relevant
Frontex networks, follow up on rolling requests. Support for
governance (management board, executive board), and legislative
process (status agreements).
External staff - 1 CA: with budgetary skills to reinforce the capacity of the DG to
follow up specifically on the budgetary increase for return as well as to
oversee and manage the increase of the Standing Corps for return and
reintegration coordination.
- 1 CA: to monitor and follow-up on the external dimension of the Union
policy on managing the external borders, including the relevant
activities of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex),
support international relations by contributing to negotiations with third
countries, status agreements and working arrangements. Contribute to
the internal security policy of the EU from the perspective of border
management, and manage the increase of the Standing Corps for border
management.
- 1 SNE:to advise and coordinate the tasks related to the expansion of the
Agency’s mandate on reintegration support which will require regular
alignment with the European Commission to ensure that the expansion
is in line with relevant priorities.
- 1 SNE: to support functions related to acquisition of technical
equipment by coordinating with the Member States and Frontex on the
EN 30 EN
procurement process as well as to coordinate the recruitment and
training of standing corps in the border reserve. Support the
implementation of the Technical and Operational Strategy for European
Integrated Border Management (TO-EIBM).
3.2.8. Estimated human resources and the use of appropriations required in a
decentralised agency
Staff requirements for administrative staff (full-time equivalent units)
Agency: FRONTEX Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
Temporary agents
(AD Grades) 275 289 289 303 303 317 317
Temporary agents
(AST grades) 275 289 289 302 302 316 316
Temporary agents
(AD+AST) subtotal 550 578 578 605 605 633 633
Contract agents 230 241 241 253 253 264 264
Seconded national experts 220 231 231 242 242 253 253
Contract agents and
seconded national experts
subtotal
450 472 472 495 495 517 517
TOTAL staff 1000 1050 1050 1100 1100 1150 1150
The development of the statutory staff as part of the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps
(full-time equivalent units)
Agency: FRONTEX Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
Temporary agents
(AD Grades) 750 753 815 878 940 1003 1065
Temporary agents
(AST grades) 750 752 815 877 940 1002 1065
Temporary agents
(AD+AST) subtotal 1500 1505 1630 1755 1880 2005 2130
Contract agents 1500 1745 1870 1995 2120 2245 2370
TOTAL staff 3000 3250 3500 3750 4000 4250 4500
Appropriations covered by the EU budget contribution in EUR million (to three decimal places)
EN 31 EN
Agency: FRONTEX Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL
2028 -
2034
Title 1: Staff expenditure
587,99
614,07
670,73
726,23
788,08 €
850,61
914,13
5.151,85
Title 2: Infrastructure
and operating
expenditure
0.00
Title 3: Operational
expenditure
846,56
849,69
914,77
961,81
1.005,11
1.034,90
1.073,12
6.685,96
TOTAL of
appropriations covered
by the EU budget
1.434,56
1.463,76
1.585,50
1.688,04
1.793,19
1.885,51
1.987,26
11.837,81
Overview/summary of human resources and appropriations (in EUR million) required by the
proposal/initiative in a decentralised agency
Agency: FRONTEX Year
2028
Year
2029
Year
2030
Year
2031
Year
2032
Year
2033
Year
2034
TOTAL
2028 -
2034
Temporary agents
(AD+AST) 2050 2083220823602485 2638 2763 -
Contract agents 1730 1986211122482373 2509 2634 -
Seconded national
experts 220 231231242242 253 253 -
Total staff 4000 4300 4550 4850 5100 5400 5650 -
Appropriations covered
by the EU budget
1.434,56
1.463,76
1.585,50
1.688,04
1.793,19
1.885,51
1.987,26
11.837,81
Appropriations covered
by fees
(if applicable)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appropriations co-
financed
(if applicable)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOTAL
appropriations
1.434,56
1.463,76
1.585,50
1.688,04
1.793,19
1.885,51
1.987,26
11.837,81
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 27.10.2026 COM(2026) 1030 final
ANNEXES 1 to 7
ANNEXES
to the
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL
amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard
{SEC(2026) 1030 final} - {SWD(2026) 1030 final} - {SWD(2026) 1031 final}
EN 1 EN
2019/1896
ANNEX I
Capacity of the standing corps per year and category in accordance with Article 5466
new
Category/Year Category 1
Statutory staff
European border and
return reserve
Total for the standing
corps
2030 3 500 500 11 000
2032 4 000 3 000 14 000
2034 4 500 6 000 17 500
2019/1896
Category/Year Category 1
Statutory
staff
Category 2
Operational
staff for long-
term
secondments
Category 3
Operational
staff for short-
term
deployments
Category 4
Reserve for
rapid reaction
Total for
the
standing
corps
2021 1000 400 3600 1500 6500
2022 1000 500 3500 1500 6500
2023 1500 500 4000 1500 7500
2024 1500 750 4250 1500 8000
2025 2000 1000 5000 0 8000
2026 2500 1250 5250 0 9000
2027 and
beyond
3000 1500 5500 0 10000
EN 2 EN
2019/1896
ANNEX II
ANNUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO BE PROVIDED BY MEMBER STATES TO THE
STANDING CORPS THROUGH THE LONG-TERM SECONDMENT OF STAFF IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 5668
Country/Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 and beyond
Belgium 8 10 10 15 20 25 30
Bulgaria 11 13 13 20 27 33 40
Czech Republic 5 7 7 10 13 17 20
Denmark 8 10 10 15 19 24 29
Germany 61 73 73 110 152 187 225
Estonia 5 6 6 9 12 15 18
Greece 13 17 17 25 33 42 50
Spain 30 37 37 56 74 93 111
France 46 56 56 83 114 141 170
Croatia 17 22 22 33 43 54 65
Italy 33 42 42 63 83 104 125
Cyprus 2 3 3 4 5 7 8
Latvia 8 10 10 15 20 25 30
Lithuania 10 13 13 20 26 33 39
Luxembourg 2 3 3 4 5 7 8
Hungary 17 22 22 33 43 54 65
Malta 2 2 2 3 4 5 6
Netherlands 13 17 17 25 33 42 50
Austria 9 11 11 17 23 28 34
Poland 27 33 33 50 67 83 100
EN 3 EN
Portugal 8 10 10 15 20 25 30
Romania 20 25 25 38 50 63 75
Slovenia 9 12 12 18 23 29 35
Slovakia 9 12 12 18 23 29 35
Finland 8 10 10 15 20 25 30
Sweden 9 11 11 17 23 28 34
Switzerland 4 5 5 8 11 13 16
Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Liechtenstein1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Norway 5 7 7 10 13 17 20
TOTAL 400 500 500 750 1000 1250 1500
1 Liechtenstein will contribute through proportional financial support.
EN 4 EN
2019/1896
ANNEX III
ANNUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO BE PROVIDED BY MEMBER STATES TO THE
STANDING CORPS FOR SHORT-TERM DEPLOYMENTS OF STAFF IN ACCORDANCE
WITH ARTICLE 5769
Country/Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 and beyond
Belgium 72 70 80 85 100 105 110
Bulgaria 96 93 107 113 133 140 147
Czech Republic 48 47 53 57 67 70 73
Denmark 70 68 77 82 97 102 106
Germany 540 523 602 637 748 785 827
Estonia 43 42 48 51 60 63 66
Greece 120 117 133 142 167 175 183
Spain 266 259 296 315 370 389 407
France 408 396 454 481 566 593 624
Croatia 156 152 173 184 217 228 238
Italy 300 292 333 354 417 438 458
Cyprus 19 19 21 23 27 28 29
Latvia 72 70 80 85 100 105 110
Lithuania 94 91 104 111 130 137 143
Luxembourg 19 19 21 23 27 28 29
Hungary 156 152 173 184 217 228 238
Malta 14 14 16 17 20 21 22
Netherlands 120 117 133 142 167 175 183
Austria 82 79 91 96 113 119 125
Poland 240 233 267 283 333 350 367
EN 5 EN
Portugal 72 0 80 85 100 105 110
Romania 180 175 200 213 250 263 275
Slovenia 84 82 93 99 117 123 128
Slovakia 84 82 93 99 117 123 128
Finland 72 70 80 85 100 105 110
Sweden 82 79 91 96 113 119 125
Switzerland 38 37 43 45 53 56 59
Iceland 5 5 5 6 7 7 7
Liechtenstein1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Norway 48 47 53 57 67 70 73
TOTAL 3600 3500 4000 4250 5000 5250 5500
1 Liechtenstein will contribute through proportional financial support.
EN 6 EN
2019/1896
new
ANNEX IV
Contributions to be provided by Member States to the standing corps through the reserve for
rapid reaction European border and return reserve in accordance with Article 7058
new
Country 2030 2032 2034
Belgium 10 60120
Bulgaria 13 80160
Czech Republic 7 4080
Denmark 10 58116
Germany 75 450900
Estonia 6 3672
Greece 17 100200
Spain 37 222444
France 57 340680
Croatia 22 130260
Italy 42 250500
Cyprus 3 1632
Latvia 10 60120
Lithuania 13 78156
Luxembourg 3 1632
Hungary 22 130260
Malta 2 1224
Netherlands 17 100200
EN 7 EN
Austria 11 68136
Poland 33 200400
Portugal 10 60120
Romania 25 150300
Slovenia 12 70140
Slovakia 12 70140
Finland 10 60120
Sweden 11 68136
Switzerland 5 3264
Iceland 1 48
Liechtenstein* 0 00
Norway 7 4080
TOTAL 503* 3.000 6.000
2019/1896
Country Number
Belgium 30
Bulgaria 40
Czech Republic 20
Denmark 29
Germany 225
Estonia 18
Greece 50
Spain 111
France 170
EN 8 EN
Croatia 65
Italy 125
Cyprus 8
Latvia 30
Lithuania 39
Luxembourg 8
Hungary 65
Malta 6
Netherlands 50
Austria 34
Poland 100
Portugal 30
Romania 75
Slovenia 35
Slovakia 35
Finland 30
Sweden 34
Switzerland 16
Iceland 2
Liechtenstein1 0
Norway 20
TOTAL 1500
1 Liechtenstein will contribute through proportional financial support.
EN 9 EN
2019/1896 (adapted)
ANNEX V
GENERAL RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE, INCLUDING TRAINING AND THE
SUPPLY, CONTROL AND USE OF SERVICE WEAPONS , AMMUNITION AND
NON-LETHAL EQUIPMENT, APPLICABLE TO STATUTORY STAFF DEPLOYED AS
MEMBERS OF THE TEAMS
new
1. DEFINITION OF THE USE OF FORCE
For the purposes of this Annex, ‘use of force’ means the recourse by statutory staff deployed
as members of the teams to any physical constraint imposed on a person necessary for
achieving the legitimate law enforcement objective or ensuring legitimate self-defence and
defence of others in the performance of their functions, which may include the use of hands
and body, service weapons, including firearms, or equipment.
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE USE OF FORCE AND WEAPONS
For the purposes of this Regulation, ‘use of force’ refers to recourse by statutory staff
deployed as members of the teams to physical means for the purposes of performing their
functions or ensuring self-defence, which includes the use of hands and body and the use of
any instruments, weapons, including firearms, or equipment.
Weapons, ammunition and equipment shall only be carried and used during operations.
Carrying or using weapons, ammunition and equipment during off duty periods shall be
prohibited.
In accordance with Article 8298(8) and the relevant provisions of the respective status
agreements , the use of force and weapons by statutory staff deployed as members of the
teams shall be exercised in accordance with the national law of the host Member State or
third country, in the presence of border guards of the host Member State or third
country .
Weapons, ammunition and equipment shall only be carried and used during
operational activities in the Member States or in third countries . Carrying or using
weapons, ammunition and equipment during off duty periods shall be prohibited .
Without prejudice to the authorisation by the host Member State or third country and the
applicability of its national law to the use of force during operations operational
activities, the use of force and weapons by statutory staff deployed as members of the
teams shall comply with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and
duty of precaution (the ‘core principles’) as set out below.
EN 10 EN
The operational plan agreed between the executive director and the host Member State or
third country shall define the conditions for carrying and using weapons in accordance with
national law or operating procedures during operations operational activities .
new
The principle of Legality
All circumstances related to use of force shall be regulated by a legal and administrative
framework of the host Member States and third countries, specified in the operational plans of
the operational activities.
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
The Principle of Necessity
The use of force, whether through direct physical contact or by the use of weapons or
equipment, shall be exceptional and shall only take place where it is strictly necessary to
achieve the legitimate law enforcement objective or ensure the performance of the
Agency’s duties or in legitimate self-defence and defence of others . Force shall
only be used as a last resort, after every reasonable effort has been made to resolve a situation
using non-violent means, including by means of persuasion, negotiation, or mediation. The
use of force or coercive measures shall never be arbitrary or abusive.
The Principle of Proportionality
Whenever the lawful use of force or firearms is unavoidable, statutory staff deployed as
members of the teams shall act in proportion to the seriousness of the situation and the
legitimate objective to be achieved. During operational activities, the proportionality principle
shall guide both the nature of the force used (e.g. the need for the use of weapons) as well as
the extent of the force applied. Statutory staff deployed as members of the teams shall not use
more force than is absolutely necessary to achieve the legitimate law enforcement objective.
The Agency shall provide equipment to statutory staff deployed as members of the teams
which is necessary to enable the appropriate level of force to be applied. If a firearm
weapon is used, statutory staff deployed as members of the teams shall ensure that such
use causes the least possible injury and minimises injury and damage to the greatest possible
extent. Where the measures lead to an unacceptable result, statutory staff deployed as
members of the teams may waive the measure. The principle of proportionality requires the
Agency to provide equipment and self-defensive tools to statutory staff deployed as members
of the teams which are necessary to enable the appropriate level of force to be applied.
The Duty of Precaution
Operational activities carried out statutory staff deployed as members of the teams shall fully
respect and aim to preserve human life and human dignity. All necessary steps that can
minimise the risk of injury and damage during operations shall be taken. This obligation
includes a general obligation for statutory staff deployed as members of the teams to give
clear warnings of their intention to use force, unless giving such a warning would unduly
place the members of the teams at risk or would create a risk of death or serious harm to
others, or would be clearly inappropriate or ineffective in the particular circumstances.
EN 11 EN
3.2 SPECIFIC RULES FOR THE MOST COMMONLY USED INSTRUMENTS OF FORCE
WEAPONS AND (EQUIPMENT OF STATUTORY STAFF DEPLOYED AS MEMBERS OF
THE TEAMS)
In accordance with the core principles, the use of force shall only be permissible to the extent
that the use of force is necessary for achieving the immediate legitimate law
enforcement aim objective, and only after:
– attempts to resolve a potentially violent confrontation by means of persuasion,
negotiation, mediation have been exhausted and failed;,
– a warning of the intention to use force has been given.
Where it is necessary to escalate the level of intervention (for example, using a weapon
firearm or a different kind of weapon), clear warning of such an escalation shall also be
given unless giving such a warning would unduly place members of teams at risk or would
create a risk of death or serious harm to others, or would be clearly inappropriate or
ineffective in the particular circumstances.
(A) Weapons
Firearms
To protect the right to life, statutory staff deployed as members of the teams should make
every reasonable effort to exclude the use of firearms.
Statutory staff deployed as members of the teams shall not use firearms against persons,
except in the following circumstances, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to
achieve the necessary objectives:
– the use of firearms by statutory staff deployed as members of the teams is a last
resort in an extreme emergency, especially if there is any risk that bystanders might
be endangered;,
– the use of firearms by statutory staff deployed as members of the teams is necessary
to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of death or serious injury;,
– the use of firearms by statutory staff deployed as members of the teams is to prevent
an imminent threat of death or serious injury.,
– the use of firearms by statutory staff deployed as members of the teams is to repel an
actual attack or prevent an impending dangerous attack on essential institutions,
services or facilities.
Prior to the use of firearms, statutory staff deployed as members of the teams must give a
clear warning of their intention to use such firearms. Warnings may be given orally or by the
firing of warning shots.
Non-lethal weapons
Baton
Approved Batons may be used as a means of defence or as a weapon, as appropriate, in line
with the core principles as defined in Section 2 of this Annex. , as follows:
when lesser use of force is considered clearly unsuitable for the purpose,
to avert an actual or impending attack on property.
Prior to the use of batons, statutory staff deployed as members of the teams must give a clear
warning of their intention to use batons them . In using batons, statutory staff deployed
EN 12 EN
as members of the teams shall always aim to minimise the risk of injury suffered and avoid
contact with the head or body parts with vital organs, including the kidney, or the groin
area .
Lachrymatory agents (e.g. pepper spray)
ApprovedLachrymatory agents may be used as a means of defence or as a weapon, as
appropriate, in line with the core principles as defined in Section 2 of this Annex. , as
follows:
– when lesser use of force is considered clearly unsuitable for the purpose,
– to avert an actual or impending attack.
new
Prior to the use of lachrymatory agents, statutory staff deployed as members of the teams shall
give a clear warning of their intention to use them.
Service dogs
Only service dogs and their handler specifically trained for use of force, may be used, in line
with the core principles, as defined in Section 2 of this Annex.
Prior to the use of service dogs, statutory staff deployed as members of the teams shall give a
clear warning of their intention to use them.
2019/1896 (adapted)
new
(B) Other equipment
Handcuffs
Handcuffs shall only be placed on persons who are considered to present a danger to
themselves or to others, in order to ensure their safe detention or transportation and to ensure
the safety of statutory staff deployed as members of the teams and other members of the
teams may be used, in line with the core principles, as defined in Section 2 of this
Annex .
Handcuffs shall only be used for the shortest time possible and only where strictly necessary.
34. PRACTICAL RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE, SERVICE WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND
EQUIPMENT DURING OPERATIONS
General practical rules on the use of force, weapons and other equipment during
operations
In accordance with Article 82(8), The statutory staff deployed as members of the
teams are to exercise their executive power, including the shall use offorce in
accordance with the provisions of Article 98 . , under the command and control of the host
Member State, and shall only use force, including using weapons, ammunition and
equipment, in the presence of the border guards of the host Member State following the
authorisation of the competent authorities of the host Member State. Nevertheless, the
competent authorities of the host Member State may authorise statutory staff deployed as
EN 13 EN
members of the teams, with the consent of the Agency, to use force in the absence of officers
of the host Member State.
The host Member State may prohibit the carrying of certain service weapons, ammunition and
equipment in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 82(8).
Without prejudice to the authorisation by the host Member State and the applicability of its
host Member State and third country national law to the use of force during
operations operational activities , the use of force and weapons by statutory staff
deployed as members of the teams shall:
(a) comply with the core principles and specific rules referred to in Part
Section 2;
(b) respect fundamental rights as guaranteed under international and Union law,
including, in particular, under the Charter, the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the United Nations Basic
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, and the
United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials;
(c) comply with the Agency’s code of conduct.
45. CONTROL MECHANISM
The Agency shall provide the following safeguards in relation to the use of force, weapons,
ammunition and equipment, and shall provide a stocktaking in its annual report.
Training
The training provided in accordance with Article 6275(2) shall cover theoretical and practical
aspects in relation to the prevention of and use of force. The theoretical training shall
incorporate psychological training, including training in resilience and working in situations
of high pressure, as well as techniques for avoiding the use of force, such as negotiation and
mediation. The theoretical training shall be followed by obligatory and adequate theoretical
and practical training on the use of force, weapons, ammunition and equipment and on
applicable fundamental rights safeguards. In order to ensure a common practical
understanding and approach, the practical training shall end with a simulation relevant to the
activities to be carried out during the deployment and shall include a practical simulation
involving the operationalisation of fundamental rights safeguards.
The Agency shall provide statutory staff deployed as members of the teams with annual
ongoing training on the use of force. Such training shall take place as per the training
provided for in Article 7562(2). In order for statutory staff deployed as members of the teams
to be permitted to carry service weapons and to use force, they shall be required to have
successfully completed the annual ongoing training. The annual ongoing training shall cover
theoretical and practical aspects as described in the first paragraph. The annual ongoing
training shall last at least 24 hours in total, with the theoretical training taking at least 8 hours
and the practical training taking at least 16 hours. The practical training shall be divided into
at least 8 hours for physical training, using physical restraint techniques, and at least 8 hours
for the use of firearms.
Use of narcotics, drugs and alcohol consumption
Statutory staff deployed as members of the teams shall not consume or be under the influence
of alcohol while on duty.
EN 14 EN
Statutory staff deployed as members of the teams shall not possess or use narcotics or drugs,
unless prescribed on medical grounds. Statutory staff deployed as members of the teams
requiring drugs for medical purposes shall immediately inform their immediate superior of
such a requirement. Their participation in operational activities may be reviewed having
regard to potential effects and side-effects associated with the use of the substance.
The Agency shall establish a control mechanism to ensure that its statutory staff deployed as
members of the teams do not carry out their functions under the influence of narcotics, drugs
or alcohol. That mechanism shall be based on regular medical testing of statutory staff
deployed as members of the teams in order to identify any possible consumption of narcotics,
drugs or alcohol. Any positive test results shall be immediately reported to the executive
director.
Reporting
Any incidents involving the use of force shall be immediately reported through the chain of
command to the coordination structure relevant responsible for each operation
operational activity and to the fundamental rights officer and the executive director.
The report shall provide full details of the circumstances in which such use arose.
The above reporting is without prejudice to the reporting mechanism defined by the
national law of the host Member State or third country.
Duty to cooperate and inform
Statutory staff deployed as members of the teams and any other participants in operations
shall cooperate in the gathering of facts related to any incident which was reported during an
operational activity.
Supervisory mechanism
The Agency shall establish a supervisory mechanism as referred to in point (a) of Article
55(5).
Complaints mechanism
Any person may report suspected breaches by statutory staff deployed as members of the
teams of the rules on the use of force applicable under this Annex through the complaints
mechanism provided for in Article 111.
Sanctions
Without prejudice to Article 85, where the Agency establishes that a member of its statutory
staff deployed as a member of the teams has performed activities in breach of the rules
applicable under this Regulation, including fundamental rights protected under the Charter,
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
international law, the executive director shall take adequate measures, which may include the
immediate recall of that statutory staff member from the operational activity, and any
disciplinary measures in accordance with the Staff Regulations, including the removal of the
statutory staff member from the Agency.
Role of the fundamental rights officer
The fundamental rights officer shall verify and provide feedback on the content of induction
and refresher training paying special regard to aspects relating to fundamental rights and how
fundamental rights can be protected in situations where the use of force is necessary, and
ensure relevant preventive techniques are included.
EN 15 EN
The fundamental rights officer shall report on the respect for fundamental rights within the
law enforcement practices of the host Member State or host third country. That report shall be
submitted to the executive director and shall be taken into account in the design of the
operational plan.
The fundamental rights officer shall ensure that incidents related to the use of force and use of
weapons, ammunition and equipment are thoroughly investigated and reported without delay
to the executive director. The results of such investigations shall be transmitted to the
consultative forum.
All activities related to the use of force, weapons, ammunition and equipment shall be
regularly monitored by the fundamental rights officer, and all incidents shall be reported in
the fundamental rights officer’s reports as well in the annual report of the Agency.
56. PROVISION OF SERVICE WEAPONS , AMMUNITIONS AND EQUIPMENT OF STATUTORY
STAFF DEPLOYED AS MEMBERS OF THE TEAMS
Authorisation of weapons
For the purposes of determining the exact service weapons, ammunition and other equipment
to be used by statutory staff deployed as members of the teams, the Agency shall establish an
exhaustive list of items to be included in personal equipment sets.
Personal equipment sets shall be used by all statutory staff deployed as members of the teams.
The Agency may also complement personal equipment sets with additional weapons,
ammunition or other equipment specific for the purpose of carrying out specific tasks within
one or two types of teams.
The Agency shall ensure that all weapons, including firearms, ammunition and equipment
provided to statutory staff deployed as members of the teams comply with all the necessary
technical standards.
Authorisation of weapons, ammunitions and equipment
new
In accordance with Article 43(3), point (d), the operational plans shall include the weapons,
ammunition and equipment authorised by the host Member State and third country to be used
by statutory deployed as members of the teams.
2019/1896
weapons, ammunition and equipment that are authorised for use shall be listed in the
operational plan in line with the requirements on admissible and prohibited weapons of the
host Member State.
Instructions for duty period
Weapons, ammunition and equipment may be carried during operations and shall be used
only as measures of last resort. Carrying or using weapons, ammunition and equipment during
off-duty periods shall not be allowed. The Agency shall establish specific rules and measures
to facilitate the storage of weapons, ammunition and other equipment of statutory staff
EN 16 EN
deployed as members of the teams during off-duty periods in secured facilities as referred to
in point (c) of Article 55(5).
EN 17 EN
2019/1896 (adapted)
ANNEX VI
CORRELATION TABLE
Regulation (EU)
2016/1624
Regulation (EU) No
1052/2013
This Regulation
Article 1, first
sentence
— Article 1, first paragraph
Article 1, second
sentence
— Article 1, second paragraph
Article 2, point (1) — Article 2, point 1
— — Article 2, points (2), (4), (5), (6), (9)(15),
(16), (17), (18), (29), and (30)
Article 2, point (2) — Article 2, point (3)
— Article 3, points (b), (c),
(d), (f) and (g)
Article 2, points (7), (8), (10), (11), and
(13)
Article 2, point (16) Article 3, point (e) Article 2, point (12)
— Article 3, point (i) Article 2, point (14)
Article 2, point (9) — Article 2, point (19)
Article 2, points (5)
to (7)
— Article 2, points (20) to (22)
Article 2, points (10)
to (15)
— Article 2, points (23) to (28)
Article 4, points (a)
to (d)
— Article 3(1), points (a) to (d)
Article 4, point (e) — Article 3(1), points (e) and (f)
Article 4, points (f)
to (k)
— Article 3(1), points (g) to (l)
— — Article 3(2)
Article 3(1) — Article 4
Article 6 — Article 5
EN 18 EN
Article 7 — Article 6
Article 5(1) — Article 7(1)
— — Article 7(2)
Article 5(2) and (3) — Article 7(3) and (4)
Article 8(2) — Article 7(5)
— — Article 8(1) to (4)
Article 3(2) — Article 8(5)
Article 3(3) — Article 8(6)
— — Article 8(7) and (8)
— — Article 9
Article 8(1), point
(a)
— Article 10(1), point (a)
— — Article 10(1), point (b)
Article 8(1), point
(b)
— Article 10(1), point (c)
Article 8(1), point
(c)
— Article 10(1), point (d)
— — Article 10(1), point (e)
Article 8(1), point
(s)
— Article 10(1), point (f)
Article 8(1), point
(d)
— Article 10(1), point (g)
Article 8(1), point
(e)
— Article 10(1), point (h)
Article 8(1), point
(f)
— Article 10(1), point (i)
Article 8(1), point
(g)
— Article 10(1), point (j)
Article 8(1), point
(h)
— Article 10(1), point (k)
— — Article 10(1), point (l)
EN 19 EN
Article 8(1), point
(i)
— Article 10(1), point (m)
Article 8(1), point
(l)
— Article 10(1), point (n)
Article 8(1), point
(n)
— Article 10(1), point (o)
Article 8(1), point
(o)
— Article 10(1), point (p)
Article 8(1), point
(m)
— Article 10(1), point (q)
— — Article 10(1), points (r) and (s)
Article 8(1), point
(t)
— Article 10(1), point (t)
— — Article 10(1), point (u)
Article 8(1), point
(u)
— Article 10(1), point (v)
Article 8(1), point
(p)
— Article 10(1), point (w)
Article 8(1), point
(q)
— Article 10(1), point (x)
— — Article 10(1), point (y)
Article 8(1), point
(j)
— Article 10(1), point (z)
— Article 6(1), point (a) Article 10(1), point (aa)
Article 8(1), point
(r)
— Article 10(1), point (ab)
Article 8(1), point
(s)
— Article 10(1), point (ac)
— — Article 10(1), points (ad) to (ag)
Article 8(3) — Article 10(2)
Article 9 — Article 11
Article 10 — Article 12(1)
EN 20 EN
— — Article 12(2) and (3)
Article 23 — Article 13(1), (first sentence)
— — Article 13(1), second sentence
— — Article 13(2) and (3)
— Article 7(1) Article 14(1)
— Article 7(2) Article 14(2)
Article 44(1) — Article 15(1) and (2)
— — Article 15(3)
— — Article 16
— — Article 17
— Article 1 Article 18
— Article 2(1) and (2) Article 19(1)
— Article 2(3) Article 19(2)
— Article 4(1), points (a) and
(b)
Article 20(1), points (a) and (b)
— Article 4(1), point (d) Article 20(1), point (c)
— — Article 20(1), points (d), (e) and (f)
— Article 4(2) and (3) Article 20(2) and (3)
— Article 5(1), (2) and (3) Article 21(1), (2) and (3), points (a) to
(h)
— — Article 21(3), points (i) and (j)
— Article 17(1), (2), and (3) Article 21(4), (5), and (6)
— Article 5(4) Article 21(7)
— Article 21 Article 22
— Article 22(1) Article 23(1)
— — Article 23(2) and (3)
— Article 8(1) and (2) Article 24(1)
EN 21 EN
— — Article 24(2)
— — Article 24(3)
— Article 9(1) Article 25(1)
— Article 9(2), points (a) to
(e)
Article 25(2), points (a) to (e)
— — Article 25(2), point (f)
— Article 9(2), point (f) Article 25(2), point (g)
— Article 9(2), point (g) Article 25(2), point (h)
— Article 9(2), point (h) Article 25(2), point (i)
— Article 9(2), point (i) Article 25(2), point (j)
— Article 9(2), point (j) Article 25(2), point (k)
— Article 9(2), point (k) Article 25(2), point (l)
— Article 9(4) Article 25(3)
— Article 9(5), point (a),
second sentence
Article 25(4)
— Article 9(10) Article 25(5)
— Article 10(1) Article 26(1)
— Article 10(2), points (a)
and (b)
Article 26(2), points (a) and (b)
— Article 10(2), point (d) Article 26(2), point (c)
— Article 10(2), point (e) Article 26(2), point (d)
— — Article 26(2), point (e)
— Article 10(2), point (f) Article 26(2), point (f)
— Article 10(3), point (a) Article 26(3), point (a)
— — Article 26(3), point (b)
— Article 10(3), point (c) Article 26(3), point (c)
— Article 10(5) Article 26(4)
— Article 10(6) Article 26(5)
EN 22 EN
— Article 10(4) Article 26(6)
— — Article 27
— Article 12(1) Article 28(1)
— Article 12(2), points (a),
(b), and (c)
Article 28(2), points (a), (b) and (c)
— — Article 28(2), point (d)
— Article 12(2), point (d) Article 28(2), point (e)
— Article 12(2), point (e) Article 28(2), point (f)
— — Article 28(2), points (g), (h) and (i)
— Article 12(4) and (5) Article 28(3) and (4)
Article 11 — Article 29(1), (2), (3) and (5) to (8)
— — Article 29(4)
— Article 14 Article 30
Article 12 — Article 31(1), (2) and (4) to (7), and
Article 31(3), points (a) to (e), and (g) to
(j)
— — Article 31(3), points (f) and (k)
Article 13 — Article 32(1) to (8), (10) and (11)
— — Article 32(9)
— — Article 33
— Article 15(1) Article 34(1)
— — Article 34(2)
— — Article 34(3)
— Article 15(2) Article 34(4)
— Article 15(3) Article 34(5)
— Article 16(1), (2), and (3) Article 35(1), points (a), (b) and (c) and
Article 35(2)and (3)
— — Article 35(1), point (d)
EN 23 EN
— Article 16(5) Article 35(4)
Article 14 — Article 36(1), (3) and (4) and Article
36(2) points (a) to (e)
— Article 16(4), point (a) Article 36(2), point (f)
Article 15(1), (2),
and (3)
— Article 37(1), (2), and (3)
Article 15(5) — Article 37(4)
Article 16 — Article 38(1), (2) and (4) and Article
38(3), points (a) to (k) and points (m) to
(o)
— — Article 38(3), point (l) and Article 38(5)
Article 17 — Article 39(1), (2), (3), (5), (7) to (10) and
(13) to (15)
— — Article 39(4), (6), (11) and (12)
Article 18 — Article 40(1), (2), (3) and (5) and Article
40(4), points (a), (b) and (c)
— — Article 40(4), point (d)
Article 15(4) — Article 41(1)
— — Article 41(2)
Article 19 — Article 42
Article 21 — Article 43(1) to (5)
— — Article 43(6)
Article 22 — Article 44
Article 24(1), points
(a) to (e) and Article
24(2)
— Article 45(1)
— — Article 45(2)
Article 25 — Article 46(1) to (4) and (7)
— — Article 46(5) and (6)
Article 26 — Article 47
EN 24 EN
Article 27(1), point
(a)
— Article 48(1), point (a)(i)
Article 27(1), point
(c)
— Article 48(1), point (a) (ii) and(iii)
— — Article 48(1), point (a)(iv)
Article 27(1), point
(b)
— Article 48(1), point (b)
— — Article 48(1), points (c) and (d)
Article 27(1), point
(d)
— Article 48(1), point (e)
Article 27(1), point
(e)
— Article 48(1), point (f)
Article 27(2) — Article 48(2), points (a) to (d)
— — Article 48(2), point (e)
Article 27(3) — Article 48(3)
— — Article 49
Article 28 — Article 50
Article 29 — Article 51
— — Article 52(1)
Article 32(2) — Article 52(2)
Article 33 — Article 53
— — Article 54
— — Article 55
— — Article 56
— — Article 57
— — Article 58
— — Article 59
— — Article 60
— — Article 61
EN 25 EN
Article 36(1) — Article 62(1)
— — Article 62(2) and (3)
Article 36(2) — Article 62(4)
Article 36(4) to (8) — Article 62(5) to (9)
— — Article 62(10)
Article 38(1) — Article 63(1)
— — Article 63(2)
Article 38(2) to (5) — Article 63(3) to (6)
Article 39(1) to (12)
and (14) to (16)
— Article 64
— — Article 65(1) and (2)
Article 20(12),
Article 39(13)
— Article 65(3)
— — Article 65(4)
Article 37 — Article 66(1) to (4)
— — Article 66(5)
— — Article 67
Article 52(1) Article 18(1), (2) and (3) Article 68(1), first subparagraph and
second subparagraph, points (a) to (g)
— — Article 68(1), point (i) and (j)
— — Article 68(1), third subparagraph, points
(a) to (d)
— Article 18(3) Article 68(1), third subparagraph, point
(e)
Article 52(2) Article 18(5) Article 68(2)
Article 52(4) Article 18(5) Article 68(3)
Article 52(3) — Article 68(4)
Article 52(4) Article 18(6) Article 68(5)
— Article 18(4) Article 68(6)
EN 26 EN
Article 53 — Article 69
Article 51(1) — Article 70(1)
— Article 19 Article 70(2) to (6)
Article 51(2) and (3) — Article 70(7) and (8)
Article 54(1) and (2) — Article 71(1), (2) and (3)
— — Article 71(4)
— Article 20(1) Article 72(1)
— — Article 72(2)
— Article 20(3) Article 72(3)
Article 54(2) — Article 73(1) and (2)
Article 54(4) — Article 73(3) and (4)
Article 54(8) — Article 73(5)
Article 54(9) — Article 73(6)
Article 54(11) — Article 73(7) and (8)
Article 54(3) — Article 74(1), (2) and (3)
— — Article 74(4), (5) and (6)
— Article 20(1) Article 75(1) and (2)
— Article 20(7) Article 75(3)
Article 54(5) — Article 76(1)
— — Article 76(2), (3) and (4)
Article 55(4) — Article 76(5)
Article 55(1), (2)
and (3)
— Article 77(1), (2) and (3)
— — Article 77(4)
Article 52(5) — Article 78(1)
Article 54(7) — Article 78(2)
— — Article 78(3)
EN 27 EN
— — Article 79
Article 34 — Article 80
Article 35 — Article 81
Article 40 — Article 82(1), (3), (4) and (6) to (11)
— — Article 82(2) and (5)
Article 41 — Article 83
Article 42 — Article 84
Article 43 — Article 85
Article 45(1) and (2) — Article 86(1) and (2)
— — Article 86(3), (4) and (5)
Article 46(1) — Article 87(1), points (a), (b), (c), (e), (f),
and (h)
— — Article 87(1), points (d) and (g)
Article 46(3) and (4) — Article 87(2) and (3)
— — Article 88(1), first subparagraph
Article 47(1), points
(b) and (c)
— Article 88(1), second subparagraph,
points (a) and (c)
— — Article 88(1), second subparagraph,
point (b)
Article 47(2) — Article 88(2), points (a) and (c)
— — Article 88(2), point (b)
— Article 13 Article 89(1) and (2)
— — Article 89(3)
— Article 20(4) and (5) Article 89(4) and (5)
— — Article 89(6)
— — Article 90
— — Article 91
Article 50 — Article 92
EN 28 EN
Article 56 — Article 93
Article 57 — Article 94
Article 58 — Article 95(1), (4), (5) and (6)
— — Article 95(2) and (3)
Article 59 — Article 96
Article 60 — Article 97
— — Article 98
Article 61 — Article 99
Article 62(1) and (3)
to (8)
— Article 100(1) and (3) to (8)
Article 62(2), first
subparagraph, points
(a) to (g) and points
(i) to (z)
— Article 100(2), first subparagraph, points
(a), (b), (d), (f) to (z) and point (ab)
— — Article 100(2), first subparagraph, points
(c), (e), (aa), (ac), (ad), (ae)
Article 62(2),
second
subparagraph
— Article 100(2), second subparagraph
Article 63 — Article 101
Article 64 — Article 102
Article 65 — Article 103
Article 66 — Article 104(1) to (5) and (7) to (9)
— — Article 104(6)
Article 67 — Article 105
Article 68(1), (2)
and (3), points (a) to
(j) and points (l) to
(r)
— Article 106(1), (2), (5) and (6) and
Article 106(4), points (a) to (l), (n), (o),
(r), (s) and (t)
— — Article 106(3)
— — Article 106(4), points (m), (p) and (q)
EN 29 EN
Article 69 — Article 107(1) to (7)
— — Article 107(8)
Article 70 — Article 108
Article 71 — Article 109(1), (4) and (7)
— — Article 109(2), (3), (5)and (6)
— — Article 110
Article 72 — Article 111
— — Article 112
Article 73 — Article 113
Article 74 — Article 114
Article 75 — Article 115(1) to (14)
— — Article 115(15)
Article 76 — Article 116
Article 77 — Article 117(1), (2), (3) and (5)
— — Article 117(4)
Article 78 — Article 118
— — Article 119
Article 79 — Article 120
Article 81(1) — Article 121(1), first subparagraph, points
(a) to (e) and Article 121(1), second
subparagraph
— — Article 121(1), first subparagraph, points
(f) and (g)
— — Article 121(2) and (3)
Article 81(2) — Article 121(4)
— Article 22(2) Article 121(5)
— Article 22(3) and (4) Article 121(6)
— — Article 122
EN 30 EN
Article 82 — Article 123
Article 83 — Article 124
Article 2, points (3)
and (4)
— —
Article 8(1), point
(k)
— —
Article 8(1), points
(t) and (u)
— —
Article 20(3) to (11) — —
Article 27(1), point
(c)
— —
Article 27(4) — —
Article 30 — —
Article 31 — —
Article 32(1) — —
Article 36(3) — —
Article 44(2) — —
Article 45(3) and (4) — —
Article 46(2), (3)
and (4)
— —
Article 47(3) — —
Article 48 — —
Article 49 — —
Article 62(2), first
subparagraph, point
(h)
— —
— Article 2(4) —
— Article 3, point (a) —
— Article 3, point, (h) —
— Article 4(1), points (c), (e) —
EN 31 EN
and (f)
— Article 4(4) —
— Article 6(1), points (b), (c),
(d)
—
— Article 6(2) —
— Article 7(3), (4) and (5) —
— Article 9(2), point (k) —
— Article 9(5), point (b) —
— Article 9(6) —
— Article 9(7) —
— Article 9(8) —
— Article 9(9) —
— Article 9(10) —
— Article 10(2), points (c)
and (f)
—
— Article 10(7) —
— Article 11 —
— Article 12(3) —
— Article 16(4) —
— Article 20(2) —
— Article 20(6) —
— Article 20(8) —
— Article 20(9) —
— Article 23 —
— Article 24 —
EN 32 EN
ANNEX VI
Repealed Regulation with the amendment thereto
Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament
and of the Council
(OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1896/oj)
Regulation (EU) 2021/1134 of the European Parliament and
of the Council
(OJ L 248, 13.7.2021, p. 11, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1134/oj)
only Article 9
____________
ANNEX VII
CORRELATION TABLE
Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 This Regulation
Article 1
-
Article 1
Article 2, point (15) and (16)
Article 2
Article 2, point (15)
Article 2
Article 2, point (17)
-
Article 2, points (21) and (22)
Article 2, point (23)
Article 2, points (18) and (19)
Article 2, points (26) and (27)
-
- Article 2, point (28)
Article 2, point (24)
-
Article 2, points (25) to (30)
-
-
-
Article 3
Article 2, point (29)
Article 2, point (30)
Article 2, points (31) to (36)
Article 2, points (37) to (41)
Article 3(1), point (m)
Article 7(6) and (7)
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 4
Article 5
EN 33 EN
Article 6
Article 7
Article 8
Article 8(3)
Article 8(4) to (6)
-
Article 8(7) and (8)
-
Article 9
Article 9(6)
Article 9(7) and (8)
-
-
Article 10
Article 10(1), points (a) to (m)
Article 10(1), point (m)(i) and (ii)
Article 10(1), point (n)
-
Article 10(1), point (o)
Article 10(1), point (p)
-
Article 10(1), points (q) to (t)
-
Article 10(1), point (u)
Article 10(1), point (w)
-
Article 10(1), point (v)
-
Article 10(1), points (x) to (af)
-
Article 10(1), point (ag)
-
-
Article 10(2)
Article 11
Article 6
Article 7
Article 8
-
Article 8(3) to (5)
Article 8(6) to (8)
Article 8(9) and (10)
Article 9(6)
Article 9
Article 9(7)
Article 9(8) and (9)
Article 9(10)
Article 10
Article 11
Article 11(1), points (1) to (13)
Article 11(1), point (13)(i) and (ii)
-
Article 11(1), points (14) to (18)
Article 11(1), point (19)
-
Article 11(1), point (20)
Article 11(1), points (21) to (24)
Article 11(1), point (25)
Article 11(1), point (26)
-
Article 11(1), points (27) and (28)
Article 11(1), point (29)
Article 11(1), points (30) to (32)
Article 11(1), points (33) to (41)
Article 11(1), point (42)
Article 11(1), point (43)
Article 11(1), point (44)
Article 11(2)
Article 11(3)
Article 12
EN 34 EN
Article 12
Article 13
Article 14
-
Article 14(1), points (a) and (b)
Article 14(2)
-
-
Article 15
Article 16
Article 17
Article 18
Article 19
Article 20
Article 21
Article 21(3), point (g)
Article 21(3), points (h) to (j)
Article 22
Article 23
-
Article 24
-
Article 24(2) and (3)
Article 25
-
Article 25(3) to (5)
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Annex I
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION
27.03.2026
SEC(2026) 1030
REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD OPINION
{COM(2026) 1030}
{SWD(2026) 1030-1031}
Impact assessment / Revision of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation
________________________________
This opinion concerns a draft impact assessment which may differ from the final version.
Commission européenne/Europese Commissie, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË - Tel. +32 22991111 [email protected]
EUROPEAN COMMISSION REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD
Brussels, RSB
Opinion
Title: Impact assessment / Revision of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation
Overall opinion: POSITIVE WITH RESERVATIONS
(A) Policy context The European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) Regulation tasks “the European Border and Coast Guard Agency or “Frontex” to implement the European Integrated Border Management (EIBM) as a shared responsibility of Frontex and the Member States. Frontex assists Member States with implementing the operational aspects of border management through joint operations and rapid border interventions, risk analysis, information exchange, cooperation with third countries and the return of persons with no right to stay in the EU. The EBCG regulation provides for the EBCG standing corps, a dedicated uniformed force composed mostly of border and coast guard officers as well as return-related profiles. Frontex has been explicitly mentioned in the President’s political guidelines (2024-2029) as a key component of the EU’s border management and migration priorities, highlighting the need to strengthen the Agency.
(B) Key issues The Board notes the additional information provided and commitments to make changes to the report. However, the report still contains significant shortcomings. The Board gives a positive opinion with reservations because it expects the lead Service to rectify the following aspects: (1) The report does not sufficiently define policy measures, which leads to feasibility,
impacts and unintended consequences not being adequately assessed. (2) The current problems related to the application of the Staff Regulations to the
standing corps are not sufficiently described; the proposed policy measures regarding the deployment scheme, their coherence with the Staff Regulations and related cost (savings) are not assessed.
2
(3) The analysis of impacts on fundamental rights lacks in depth and breadth to fully inform about the possible social cost, for example in areas such as data protection. The report does not sufficiently present the mitigation measures to counterbalance the risks.
(4) The report does not offer a sufficiently detailed assessment of costs and benefits per stakeholder group, backed by well-supported assumptions, granular assessments and evidence.
(C) What to improve 1) The report should better describe the policy measures in order to allow for a clear
assessment of feasibility, impacts, potential to achieve the objectives and unintended consequences.
2) The impact analysis related to fundamental rights should include and better explain all relevant aspects of the policy measures potentially negatively impacting fundamental rights, such new types of personal data and social media monitoring against the role, governance and functioning of the Agency. This analysis should allow identification of the key risks to fundamental rights and the necessary safeguards, e.g. with regard to data protection given the Agency’s expanded role in handling more and more sensitive data, social media monitoring, in particular in relation to the tasks and responsibilities of the Agency in relation to returns.
3) Regarding the measures related to the standing corps, the interplay of the proposal with the Staff Regulations should be assessed in depth. At the level of problems, the analysis should identify the areas where, given the specificities of the functioning of the standing corps, the application of the Staff Regulations creates issues and excessive costs, including the current long-term mission regime. The report should then analyse what changes or derogations to the Staff Regulations would be needed for each of the related measures, including potential spillover effects on other decentralised agencies and problems emanating from a fragmented application of the Staff Regulations.
4) The report should analyse more extensively the magnitude or range of costs, cost- savings and other concrete benefits of the measures to the various stakeholders, supporting the analysis with justified assumptions, enough granularity in the assessment and better evidence. Benefits should be more clearly analysed with regards to the gaps identified in the problem analysis. Costs and benefits should be diligently summarised in Annex 3. In particular, the cost-effectiveness of the new deployment allowance regime should be described and assessed, taking into account the attractiveness of the standing corps vis-à-vis national border guard conditions.
5) The readability of the report should be improved by providing all key information in the most succinct way possible in the main body of the report, in particular regarding presentation and assessment of the policy measures. It should also include more visual aids in the form of tables and graphs.
Some more technical comments have been sent directly to the author Service.
3
(D) Conclusion The lead Service may proceed with the initiative. The lead Service must revise the report and its executive summary in accordance with the Board’s findings before launching the interservice consultation. Full title Revision of the European Border and Coast Guard
Regulation
Reference number PLAN/2025/801
Submitted to RSB on 25 February 2026
Date of RSB meeting 25 March 2026
Electronically signed on 27/03/2026 11:49 (UTC+01) in accordance with Article 11 of Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2121
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 27.10.2026 SWD(2026) 1030 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL
amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard
{COM(2026) 1030 final} - {SEC(2026) 1030 final} - {SWD(2026) 1031 final}
i
Table of contents
1. Introduction: legal and political context ............................................................................................... 1
2. What is the problem and why is it a problem? ..................................................................................... 5
3. Why should the EU act? ..................................................................................................................... 15
4. What should be achieved? .................................................................................................................. 16
5. What are the various options to achieve the objectives? .................................................................... 17
6. What are the impacts of the different policy options and who will be affected? ............................... 29
7. How do the options compare? ............................................................................................................ 45
8. Preferred measures ............................................................................................................................. 50
9. How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated? ...................................................................... 55
Annex 1: Procedural information ............................................................................................................... 56
Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation (Synopsis report) ................................................................................ 61
Annex 3: Who is affected and how? .......................................................................................................... 69
Annex 4: Analytical Methods .................................................................................................................... 72
Annex 5: Problem drivers .......................................................................................................................... 78
Annex 6: Complementary information on selected drivers – returns ...................................................... 100
Annex 7: Evolution since the evaluation of the EBCG Regulation ......................................................... 108
Annex 8: Overview of policy options and measures ................................................................................ 111
Annex 9: Comparison of the policy options: ........................................................................................... 138
Annex 10: Assumptions for the expansion of the standing corps under Policy Options 1, 2 and 3 ........ 139
Annex 11 Costs Assessment [including significant economic impacts] .................................................. 146
Annex 12: Discarded options ................................................................................................................... 157
Annex 13: Monitoring and Evaluation framework (MEF) for the preferred policy measures ................ 161
Annex 14: Competitiveness Check .......................................................................................................... 170
Annex 15: Sme test .................................................................................................................................. 171
ii
Glossary
Term or acronym Meaning or definition
ALDO Advanced-Level Document Officer
AMIF Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
BCP Border Crossing Point
BMVI Border Management and Visa Instrument
CCC Common Core Curriculum
CISE Common Information Sharing Environment
CEOS Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union
CF Consultative Forum
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
DPO Data Protection Officer
EASA European Union Aviation Safety Agency
EBCG European Border and Coast Guard
EEAS European External Action Service
EES Entry-Exit System
EDPS European Data Protection Supervisor
EIBM European integrated border management
EFCA European Fisheries Control Agency
EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats.
EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency
ERCC Emergency Response Coordination Centre
ETIAS European Travel Information and Authorisation System
EUAA European Union Agency for Asylum
EUDPR Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 European Data Protection Regulation
EURLOs European Return Liaison Officer
EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System (an integrated framework for
the exchange of information and for operational cooperation within
the EBCG to improve situational awareness and to increase reaction
capability for the purposes of border management, including the
detection, prevention and combating of illegal immigration and
cross-border crime)
EURP EU Reintegration Programme
FADO False and Authentic Documents Online
FAR Frontex Application for Returns
FLOs Frontex Liaison Officers
FRESO Frontex Return Escort and Support Officer
FRM Fundamental Rights Monitor
FRO Fundamental Rights Officer
FWA Fixed-wing aircraft
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
iii
HLRTR High-Level Round Table on Returns
IAC Internal Audit Control
HRS Human Resources and Corporate Services Division
ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development.
ICO Internal Controls Office
IOM International Organization for Migration
IRMA Integrated Return Management Application
ISF Internal Security Fund
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
JO Joint Operation
JORA Joint Operations Reporting Application
KPI Key performance indicator
MB Management Board
MEF Monitoring and Evaluation Framework
NCC National coordination centre
NCDP National capability development processes
NCDPs National capability development plans
OPLAN Operational plan
OPD Operational Planning Division
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OTP Operational Training Programme
PD Problem driver
PM Policy measure
PO Policy option
RECAMAS RECAMAS reference model
RS Return Specialist
RIAT Reintegration Assistance Tool
RPAS Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
SACs Schengen Associated Countries, i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway,
and Switzerland
SAR Search and rescue
SCH-EVAL Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism (SCH-EVAL),
SIM Security and Information Management Division
SIRENE Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries
SIS Schengen Information System
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
TA Thematic area
TE Technical equipment
TEP Technical equipment pool
UCPM Union Civil Protection Mechanism
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VA Vulnerability assessment
VIS Visa Information System
iv
C-UAS Counter-Unmanned Aircraft systems
C-UxVs Counter-Unmanned Vehicles and Vessels systems
1
1. INTRODUCTION: LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
1.1. Legal context
The objective of EU policy in the field of external border management is to develop and implement
European integrated border management (‘EIBM’) at the national and EU level. The integrity of
the Schengen area, one of the most tangible achievements of the EU, depends on robust border
management. The EBCG Regulation tasks the European Border and Coast Guard (‘EBCG’)1 and the
national authorities responsible for border management with jointly implementing EIBM.
Figure 1. The role of Frontex in European integrated border management and coordination with other
EU Agencies
The EBCG Regulation is the primary legislative instrument applicable to the European Border and
Coast Guard Agency (‘Frontex’). Since taking up its responsibilities on 1 May 2005, Frontex2 has
been successful in assisting Member States with implementing the operational aspects of external
border management through joint operations and rapid border interventions, risk analysis, information
exchange, cooperation with third countries and the return of persons with no right to stay in the EU.
The EBCG Regulation provides for the EBCG standing corps, a dedicated uniformed force composed
mostly of border and coast guard officers as well as return-related profilesdeployed upon request of a
Member State to support a wide range of activities with a focus on external border controls (i.e. checks
at the border crossing points and border surveillance) and returns. They maintain a presence at
1 The European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) comprises the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (‘Frontex’),
the national authorities responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border
control tasks and the national authorities responsible for return. 2 Frontex was originally established as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, by Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October
2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union (OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, p. 1).
2
Frontex’s headquarters in Warsaw, and standing corps officers are also deployed in third countries.
The EBCG Regulation also identifies components of EIBM3 a policy tool to implement the gradual
introduction of an integrated management system for external borders. The scope of EIBM is broad
and includes border control, return, cooperation with third countries, inter-agency cooperation, the use
of state-of-the-art technology, compliance with fundamental rights, training, quality control, and EU
funding instrument. It sets out the rules applicable to establishing the policy cycles for EIBM. The
EIBM strategy (2023-2027), provides a common, multiannual framework for EU’s external borders
management, and explicitly tasks the EBCG with ensuring consistently high-performing border
management standards at every external border section, and in returns. The EBCG Regulation also
incorporates the rules applicable to EUROSUR4.
Figure 2. Overview of the EIBM components
On 2 February 2024, the Commission published a report on the evaluation of the EBCG Regulation
including a review of the Standing Corps. The report was based on data available until the end of
20235. The evaluation did not cover Frontex’s integrated capability planning (relevant for EIBM under
the EBCG Regulation) as this key element for delivering on objectives related to acquisition and
deployment of technical equipment was only established once the evaluation was almost completed6.
Overall, the evaluation found the EBCG Regulation to be adequate to the needs and challenges on the
3 This includes 12 thematic components referred to in Article 8 of the EBCG Regulation and 3 overarching components
(fundamental rights, research and innovation, as well as education and training). 4 EUROSUR is an integrated framework for the exchange of information and for operational cooperation within the EBCG
to improve situational awareness and to increase reaction capability for the purposes of border management, including the
detection, prevention and combating of illegal immigration and cross-border crime. 5 See COM(2024) 75 final. The Commission carried out the evaluation and review between May 2022 and October 2023,
involving consultations with the Member States’ authorities, the European Parliament, the Council, Frontex itself, and
relevant EU agencies, including the Fundamental Rights Agency. This work has also been supported by an external study. 6 Management Board Decision 23/2024 adopted on 25 September 2024 on the Capability Roadmap of the EBCG, the
update of the Technical and Operational Strategy for EIBM (2023-2027) and the methodology and procedure for
establishing the National Capability Development Plans.
3
external borders. It has also identified certain gaps and areas for improvement, which were set out in
an action plan7 and regularly updated in cooperation between the Commission and Frontex. In June
2024, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council identified several operational challenges affecting
the effectiveness of EIBM, including organisational, technical, and governance shortcomings that
require structural improvements within Frontex and its oversight mechanisms. It also emphasised the
need for adaptable and well-equipped operational capacities, especially in adjusting the standing corps
to evolving security threats, ensuring efficient recruitment, training, and deployment. In its conclusions
of March 2025, the European Council, reiterated the EU’s determination to strengthen security at its
external borders and ensure their effective control, in line with EU and international law.
Moreover, Frontex itself identified a number of components of the current border management and
return framework that need to be developed from a fragmented and reactive system into an integrated,
forward looking and resilient system. This system should be based on improved strategic planning,
further investments in human and technical resources, training, and technology, enhanced cooperation
among Member States and with third countries, and a commitment to maintaining ethical standards
and fundamental rights throughout operational activities. These elements are important prerequisites
for Frontex’s future contribution to border management and returns as well as the overall security of
the Schengen area8. For details concerning the findings of the evaluation, their links with the current
proposal, and the results of the ongoing monitoring of the implementation of the Regulation, see
Annex 7.
1.2. Political context
Frontex has been explicitly mentioned in the President’s political guidelines (2024-2029) as a key
component of the EU’s border management priorities, with comments stating the need to strengthen
Frontex by equipping it with state-of-the-art surveillance and situational awareness technologies and
increasing the EBCG standing corps to 30 000 officers. The political guidelines also refer to Frontex
in the context of making internal security and law enforcement cooperation a clear priority. In order
to tackle effectively migrant smuggling and cross-border threats, closer cooperation between Europol,
Frontex and national law-enforcement authorities will need to cooperate closely and exchange
information as part of a broader EU internal security strategy, in order to better address cross-border
criminality.
The Pact on Migration and Asylum9which became fully applicable as of June 2026 aims to reinforce
the EU’s external borders through harmonised screening procedures, stringent border protocols, and
improved data management systems. The new rules transform the EU’s capacity to manage migration,
asylum, and returns, and contribute to managing the EU’s external borders, in a fair and firm manner.
The new procedures and tools made available to Member States by the Pact – specifically the swift
processing of third-country nationals arriving at external borders10 and the return of those with no
right to stay in the EU – may require increases in human resources dedicated in the border management
and returns.
Preventing and combating illegal migration is one of the objectives of external border controls11 and
7 The action plan included measure to be taken by Frontex, the Management Board, Member States and the Commission. 8 Frontex: White Paper on reinforcing Frontex to future-proof the European Integrated Border Management, Ares(2025)
4183014 (23/05/2025). 9 Communication on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum COM(2020) 609 final (23 September 2020). 10 Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 introducing the screening
of third-country nationals at the external borders [2024] OJ L 1356/1 11 See Recital 6 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code): […]. Border control
4
as such a Frontex task. Illegal migration and internal security based on the protection of external
borders continue to be a political priority of the EU, requiring a common and coordinated response by
all Member States, as confirmed in the five-year European asylum and migration management
strategy12. The Strategy prioritises maintaining external border integrity as key to internal security,
including the development of a robust and effective EIBM and strengthening Frontex’s operational
support to Member States.Alongside this alsoeffective return and readmission are one of the five
objectives of the Strategy. Therefore, over the next five years, the EU must also be fully invested in
building a comprehensive common European system for return. Furthermore, the protection of external
borders is the first line of defence for internal security within the Schengen area. The new European
internal security strategy ProtectEU13 considers border security as one of the steps taken so far
‘towards building a European security apparatus’.
Recent geopolitical developments have greatly impacted the EU’s external borders and will continue
to do so, placing Frontex ever more at the forefront of the growing efforts to effectively protect Europe,
its citizens and values. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has created a hostile geopolitical
context on Europe’s eastern borders. At the same time, the EU faces a spectrum of cross-border hybrid
threats that are intensifying and adding further complexity to its border management and security
environment, such as the instrumentalisation and weaponisation of migration, a trend that challenges
traditional approaches to the management of external borders and continues to put strain on several
land borders14. Cross-border crime remains a persistent threat to the EU’s external borders. Over half
of the most threatening criminal networks operating in the EU are involved in drug trafficking.
Organised networks also engage in vehicle theft, firearms smuggling and document fraud. Moreover,
migrant smuggling networks have become increasingly sophisticated. A consequence of continuous
external border pressure is the increased reintroduction of internal border controls, which have been
put in place repeatedly since the 2015 migration crisis15. Such measures, if continued or widened,
undermine trust in Schengen and threaten the principle of free movement, one of the cornerstones of
EU integration. Abuses of visa also affect the trust between Member States. The situation is aggravated
by the intrinsic limitations of the current return system, where, despite the increase of the share of
Frontex returns, the overall number of effective returns remains low. These trends call for reviewing
and reinforcing the current capacities of the EBCG.
Under the EBCG Regulation, Frontex is tasked with assisting the Member States in returning third-
country nationals, subject to EU return policy and in compliance with Directive 2008/115/EC. The
role of Frontex in returns also requires a review, including in the context of the Regulation
establishing a common EU system for the return16 of third-country nationals staying illegally within
the EU and the proposal for a Regulation on the digitalisation of case management in the area of return,
readmission and reintegration.
Cooperation with third countries is an intrinsic component of the EU’s management of the external
should help to combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings and to prevent any threat to the Member States’
internal security, public policy, public health and international relations. 12 COM(2026) 45 final, adopted on 29 January 2026 ‘[…] maintaining the integrity of the Union’s external borders and of
the Schengen area as an area without internal border controls is a key element of an integrated and comprehensive approach
to migration management.’ 13 COM(2025) 148 final adopted on 1 April 2025 14 European Commission (2023) Communication establishing the multiannual strategic policy for European integrated
border management. 15 State of Schengen report 2023. 16 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return
of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament
and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC, COM/2025/101 final. Political
agreement was achieved by the European Parliament and the Council on 1 June 2026.
5
borders. The importance of such cooperation and a whole-of-route approach to migration have been
also highlighted in the European asylum and migration management strategy17. The Strategy
recognised the need to maintain deep cooperation with the enlargement partners and to continuously
support them, also by relevant EU agencies, with a focus, inter alia, on strengthening border
management, supporting alignment with the EU acquis on migration, asylum and visa policies and
enhancing readmission and return. The positive impact of cooperating with partner countries has
already been demonstrated by the conclusion of status agreements with neighbouring countries in the
Western Balkans and with Moldova. The deployment of the standing corps based on these agreements
has had a tangible impact on the ability of these partner countries to manage their borders, particularly
in curbing illegal crossings and managing migratory flows on the Western Balkan route18. The new
generation of status agreements signed since 202219 with all Western Balkan partner countries builds
on that success and shows that expanding Frontex’s cooperation with neighbouring countries, EU
accession candidates and potential candidates, other third countries relevant to managing migratory
flows to the EU (e.g. in west and north Africa) supports the EU’s efforts under the Pact on Migration
and Asylum. Frontex’s cooperation with partner third countries plays a role also in the Union’s overall
regional, route-based partnership approach.
The visa system is Europe’s first line of security screening, helping to prevent illegal migration,
organised crime, and terrorism. The first-ever EU visa policy strategy20 reaffirms the dual nature of
Europe’s visa policy, namely, to protect the EU’s security and integrity, and to enable legitimate bona
fide travel that benefits the EU. It acknowledges Frontex’s role in setting up a 24/7 ETIAS assistance
centre to support both travellers and carriers. It also recognises a need for greater support from Frontex
to Member States in visa policy, such as in detecting fraudulent documents or developing risk analysis
product. Frontex, with its expertise on documents security and capacities in developing risk analysis
product, can play an important role in delivering on the strategy objectives. It can also be instrumental
in combating abuses of EU visa policy and residence permits.
While these legal and policy developments significantly expand expectations for Frontex’s operational
role, support functions and responsiveness, the legal framework governing Frontex has remained
unchanged. In its current form, the EBCG Regulation does not allow these evolving expectations to
be met through interpretation alone, without legal modifications. This growing mismatch between
expectations and legal mandate directly affects Frontex’s ability to deliver in an effective, efficient
and predictable manner.
2. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHY IS IT A PROBLEM?
2.1. Problem overview
Europe is facing constantly changing and increasingly complex challenges at its external borders.
While it is difficult to precisely predict how these challenges will unfold in the long term, the EBCG
must be capable of responding effectively to unforeseen future risks. Frontex’s mandate has been
strengthened over the last decade to reinforce the EU framework on external border management, yet
several interconnected legal, operational and structural issues still hinder Frontex’s operations and
involvement in achieving EIBM objectives.
17 See p. 5, COM(2026) 45 final. 18 Since 2019, the overall numbers of migratory flows on the Western Balkan route decreased (registrations on arrival in
2019 of 80 323 to 35 287 in 2025) [IOM Western Balkan – Mixed Migratory Flow Report (December 2025)]. 19 Status Agreement between the European Union and: Montenegro, OJ L 140, 30.5.2023, pp. 4; the Republic of North
Macedonia, OJ L 61, 27.2.2023, pp. 3; the Republic of Serbia, OJ L, 2025/480, 13.3.2025; the Republic of Albania, OJ L,
2023/2107, 5.10.2023; and Bosnia and Herzegovina, OJ L, 2025/1346, 11.7.2025. 20 COM(2026) 43 final.
6
The key deliverables set out by the EBCG Regulation, such as the ability to reach 10 000 standing
corps officers, must be completed by the end of 2027. Developing a new medium to long-term strategic
framework for EU external border protection is necessary, as Frontex forecasts persistent migratory
and security pressures21: despite the current decline in numbers22 of illegal border crossings into the
EU23, the outlook remains uncertain, particularly given that migrant smuggling continues to have a
significant impact on both the EU’s external borders and its internal security. As recalled in the
European asylum and migration management strategy24, over 90% of irregular migrants who reach the
EU use services of smugglers for parts or entirety of their journey. While border control and
management systems such as ETIAS, Entry/Exit System (EES) and the Visa Information System (VIS)
will strengthen information exchange and security within the EIBM system, attempted illegal border-
crossings will continue at the land and sea borders, as migrants might try to evade enhanced controls
at border crossing points and divert to alternative routes. The cross-border threats, be it criminal,
terrorist, hybrid or cyber, are expected to continue impacting the EU and its security.
The three identified problems reflect i) the findings of the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation25,
ii) lessons learnt from the application of the EBCG Regulation after the evaluation, and iii) the
evidence collected as part of the study accompanying the Impact Assessment. Taken together, these
problems and their underlying drivers reflect two overarching challenges identified in the evaluation
and subsequent implementation experience: the rigidity and limited adaptability of the current legal
framework, and the fragmented and uneven implementation of EIBM across the EBCG community.
The identified problem areas as presented in the Problem Tree Figure 3 below include:
■ Problem 1. EBCG efficiency in border management and return is undermined by ambiguities,
gaps and unused opportunities.
■ Problem 2. Frontex capabilities cannot sufficiently develop to respond to increasing needs and
EIBM objectives.
■ Problem 3. Development and implementation of EIBM is undermined by deficiencies in
training, planning and Frontex quality control mechanism.
These problems are closely interlinked and rooted in a need for a more forward-looking approach,
particularly on how to use the standing corps as a key resource for delivering on EIBM objectives and
responding to potential long-term challenges.
2.1.1 Problem 1 – EBCG efficiency in border management and return is undermined by
ambiguities, gaps, and unused opportunities
The study accompanying the Impact Assessment has identified ambiguities and gaps in the division of
tasks and consistency of responsibilities of Frontex, which go beyond the issues identified in the 2024
evaluation of the EBCG Regulation. These ambiguities and gaps are partially the consequence of the
design of the EIBM which is based on the so called ‘four-tier access control model’ which requires
that migration and security at the EU’s external borders are managed through a layered approach i.e.
measures in third countries, measures with neighbouring third countries, border control measures at
the external borders, and measures within the Schengen area and return. Taking into account the
21 Frontex Strategic Risk Analysis Report 2024. 22 The latest Frontex data show that detections of irregular border crossings at the EU’s external borders fell by over one-
quarter (26%) in 2025. 23 The latest Frontex data show that detections of illegal border crossings at the EU’s external borders fell by over one-
quarter (26%) in 2025. 24 See p. 1 COM(2026) 45.
7
shared-responsibility model, combined with differences in Member States’ national frameworks and
operational practices, the mandate and status of Frontex – when they come up against the mandate and
status of the Member States – create recurring uncertainties about the division of tasks and
responsibilities within the EBCG community, which can affect operational effectiveness and
accountability.
Figure 3. Problem tree
8
Under tier 1 Member States are primarily responsible for actions to strengthen cooperation with third
countries to prevent illegal migration, with the supportive role of Frontex depending on the existence
of working arrangements (and potentially also status agreements) with the third countries concerned,
but also on the interest of Member States in conferring Frontex tasks in relation to visa policy. Under
tier 2, which is focused on the neighbouring third countries, Frontex plays a pivotal role by
implementing status agreements on behalf of and with the support of all Member States. On the other
hand, the role of Frontex is limited by uncertainties and lack of clarity concerning Frontex’s exact
powers in combating cross-border crime including migrant smuggling, information sharing, but also
international law (e.g. applicable to maritime and Search and Rescue (‘SAR’) operations). Under tier
3, which concerns the EU’s external borders, responsibility for border management falls primarily on
the Member States, with operational support from Frontex depending as a general rule on requests
from Member States; ‘unsolicited’ Frontex actions are theoretically possible only if a lack of action
by Member States is believed to put the EU’s internal security in jeopardy. The ambiguities observed
under tier 2 involving combating cross-border crime, information sharing, and emergency
interventions also affect the performance of Frontex under this tier.
Moreover, the limitations concerning the exercise of executive powers by the standing corps, which
are crucial for border control or to contribute to combating cross-border crime, are a systemic problem,
often flagged in vulnerability assessment and through the Schengen evaluation mechanism. This also
adversely affects the ‘hosting capacities’ of the Member States, which need to ensure the availability
of adequate assistance to the standing corps officers in order to comply with these requirements. Under
tier 4, focused on the measures within the Schengen area, which is the exclusively responsibility of
the Member States, the role of Frontex is limited to monitoring secondary movements and providing
support in implementing return policy. On the latter, the effectiveness of Frontex’s support for returns
from the EU is hampered at different levels due primarily to structural capacity constraints, specialised
staffing shortages, fragmented monitoring arrangements and limited operational access to key systems,
which prevent Frontex from fully delivering on the increasing political ambition when it comes to
returns.
If not addressed in a timely and effective manner, in the long term the ambiguities and gaps identified
will undermine the readiness of the EBCG and overall effectiveness of its actions, making the EU
susceptible to threats linked to the shifting geopolitical landscape. The accountability gaps are also
likely to become exacerbated by i) the anticipated increase in human and technical capabilities that
will be needed to respond to the level of threats resulting from this shifting geopolitical landscape, and
ii) the expected increase in the number of enforceable return decisions by the Member States, following
the implementation of the Pact, and in particular the Return Border Procedure Regulation, and adoption
of the Return Regulation26.
The accountability gaps under this problem result from many different drivers, described in greater
detail in Annex 5, Section 1. The first problem driver (PD1.1) concerns the lack of clarity on key
tasks in the Frontex mandate and gaps, which in turn manifests itself in four thematic areas:
1. The first thematic area concerns the division of tasks in relation to external border
management, and in particular border controls, which stems from the fact that the concept of
shared responsibility is not sufficiently clear. While reflecting national sovereignty, this
concept limits Frontex’s operational value and creates uncertainties about jurisdiction and
responsibility during incidents and in general terms. This thematic area often leads to
26 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of
third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament
and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC.
9
restrictions on the executive powers of the standing corps or a lack of progress in ensuring
effective access to the databases they need for their work, as well as potentially to missed
operational opportunities that could arise from a greater freedom to act independently or of on
own initiative respecting national sovereignty (examples could include faster and better tailored
responses to operational developments, or possibly also a broader contribution to SAR
operations at the sea – though limitations here also derive from international law).
2. Similarly, the lack of clarity affects the contribution of Frontex to the fight against cross-
border crime, which is the second thematic area under this policy driver. Due to the
multidimensional character of border control, covering both migration and security aspects, the
EBCG frequently faces uncertainties over overlaps with law-enforcement competences, which
differ among Frontex27 and its national counterparts, but even among national law enforcement
and border management authorities. Moreover, Frontex’s contribution is further hampered by
burdensome procedural and administrative limitations related to sharing operational personal
data with Europol, a cooperation that is seen as instrumental in building the situational
awareness required to better support the Member States in the fight against cross-border crime.
These limitations originated largely as a result of an EDPS audit on Frontex debriefing
activities28, which resulted in inadequately low levels of data sharing by Frontex.
3. By contrast, the role that Frontex can already play in helping the Member States respond to
instances of instrumentalisation of migrants raises question about another thematic area, i.e.
the potential value of giving Frontex a mandate to support the Member States in responding to
emergencies and hybrid threats manifesting at the external borders.
4. In a similar vein, the expertise of Frontex in risk analysis and identification of documents fraud,
as compared to its limited use in practice by the Member States, could possibly be a reason for
reinforcing its role in EU Visa Policy and combating abuses of visa policy and residence
permits to the EU, being the fourth thematic area.
The second problem driver (PD1.2) extends to ambiguities observed in relation to the fragmented
implementation of EUROSUR – the integrated framework for the provision of situational awareness
to the EBCG and, as such, the key element of collective insight into the situation at the EU external
borders. While the significant progress made so far in the implementation of EUROSUR should be
acknowledged, there are lingering issues, like insufficient EUROSUR data quality or fragmented
European situational picture, that require addressing, in order to make EUROSUR a sustainable and
future-proof tool that effectively contributes to the pursuit of the objectives under second and third
tier29.
The third problem driver (PD1.3) concerns Frontex’s cooperation with third countries, CSDP
missions and international organisations, which is hampered by legal constraints. The closed list of
international organisations provided in Article 68 of the EBCG Regulation prevents structured Frontex
cooperation with important potential partners30. Frontex’s effectiveness under this driver is also
hindered by administrative burdens on strategically engaging with relevant third countries. For
27 The EBCG Regulation’s legal basis is Chapter 2 on policies on border checks, asylum and immigration in the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, which is distinct from the Chapter 5 on police cooperation covering traditional
law enforcement authorities. Such a distinction between these two thematic areas is often not present in national contexts,
creating an asymmetry between Frontex’s competences and those of national authorities. 28 EDPS Audit report on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) of 5 and 6 October 2022, EDPS Case
number 2022-0749 (edps_-_23-05-24_audit_report_frontex_executive_summary_en.pdf). 29 Interviews with: Frontex EIBM Division; Other EU agencies and bodies; Frontex OPC; Frontex (2025) EUROSUR:
State of implementation and outlook; Report to the Council of the European Union. 30 Interviews with Frontex INTEL Division, Frontex Operations Centre, Frontex STRAT Division; DG HOME; ICF (2023)
Study supporting the evaluation of the EBCG Regulation and review of the standing corps.
10
working arrangements to allow for structured capacity building activities require extensive work on
personal data protection safeguards including the prior approval of the European Data Protection
Supervisor. This leads to significant delays before Frontex starts providing capacity building activities
in third countries. Combined, these obstacles limit Frontex’s ability to engage effectively and
strategically with key external actors31.
The fourth and final problem driver related to Problem 1 (PD1.4) concerns Frontex’s effectiveness on
returns and a range of structural, operational, and legal challenges that limit its ability to provide
comprehensive, consistent and coordinated support to the Member States and to address complex
migration flows. While Frontex has significantly increased its role in return operations in recent years,
Frontex is not living up to its full potential and must improve efforts to fulfil its role as a key element
in the common system for returns and becoming the Union actor for return. At present, fewer than one
out in four persons illegally staying in the EU is effectively returned from the EU to a third country32.
Data suggests that Frontex is unable to fulfil the demand for support for returns that exist today. In
2024, acting upon requests by Member States, Frontex supported around 40% of the effective returns
that took place from the EU33, which implies that Member States opted for other solutions, including
own return operations, for almost 60% of all returns. This in turn implies that national or AMIF funding
was frequently used to funding return operations, despite the possibility of relying on Frontex and
using these funds elsewhere. This fragmentation, both operational and financial, is believed to have
significant consequences for the EU and its Member States in terms of efficiency losses and synergies
that have gone unidentified. While the Frontex-supported share of returns has increased significantly
in recent years, several factors are already causing this growth to level off and plateau. These include
internal factors such as available resources and expertise, but also EBCG-wide issues such as a lack of
centralisation and coordination at EU level, or inadequate representation of return actors in Frontex’s
decision-making structures, and external factors such as ineffective cooperation with third countries
where, or from where, Frontex is legally not allowed to support returns activities. Looking ahead, if
unaddressed, these factors will continue to hinder Frontex’s ability to meaningfully support an
ambitious EU policy agenda on return and Member States needs and, in turn, undermine the credibility
and effectiveness of the EU’s return framework as a component of its migration management system.
These issues will further be compounded by the entry into force, in June 2026, of the Return Border
Procedure Regulation: Member States will request greater and more diverse support, which Frontex
may struggle to provide with its current resources, degree of expertise, working methods, and EBCG-
wide structures in place. Furthermore, Frontex’s current mandate would limit Frontex’s ability to
potentially support the Member States on carrying out returns from third countries with which Member
States have concluded an agreement pursuant to the Return Regulation. Further information on this
driver is provided in Annex 6.
2.1.2 Problem 2 - Frontex capabilities cannot sufficiently develop to respond to increasing
needs and EIBM objectives
The European Border and Coast Guard capabilities encompass the standing corps and technical
equipment.
31 While Frontex is already mandated to cooperate with CSDP missions (Article 68(1)(j) EBCG Regulation), uptake has
been minimal (only two working arrangements signed with EUAM Ukraine (active) and EUBAM Libya (discontinued)).
Contributing factors include a low level of awareness of the complementarity of mandates and what Frontex could offer to
support CSDP missions combined with the legal constraints on the side of the CSDP mission mandates that do not foresee
for example secondment of staff from Frontex to the mission. The latter is a consequence of initial mission mandates
preceding Frontex or the 2019 EBCG Regulation and the updated mandate of Frontex. Awareness of complementarity
seems to be lacking also at the time of renewal of CSDP mission mandates and leads to a missed opportunity. 32 The overall return rate across the EU in the first half-year of 2025 stands at 24% (Eurostat). 33 Frontex supported Member States with 56 263 returns out of 136 714 in 2024. (IRMA and Frontex evaluation report on
the results of returns implemented in the second half of 2024, available at: Frontex Public Registry of Documents).
11
The standing corps is composed of different categories of personnel, reflecting different forms of
recruitment and secondment, as defined in the EBCG Regulation:
Category 1 consists of statutory staff of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, recruited
directly by Frontex and subject to the Staff Regulations and including: (1) staff deployed as members
of the standing corps to carry out operational tasks under its command, (2) operational support staff
and (3) ETIAS Central Unit staff.
Category 2 comprises long-term seconded staff from Member States made available to Frontex for
extended periods, whose work is coordinated by the Agency.
Category 3 includes short-term deployed staff from Member States for specific operations or limited
duration to reinforce operational capacity.
Category 4 consisted of operational staff from Member States as reserve for rapid reaction to be
activated for rapid border interventions. This category was phased out in 2025.
As explained in the study accompanying the Impact Assessment, various weaknesses in the current
standing corps architecture have led to efficiency problems and the leeway for addressing them without
modifications in its design, is limited. The weaknesses manifest in constant challenges in recruitment
by Frontex and fulfilling the national quotas for Categories 2 and 3 as wells as disparities in skills and
working conditions of the standing corps officers have undermined the effectiveness of the resources
that Frontex could offer to the Member States as well as cooperation between the local resources and
those seconded by Frontex. Currently, the annual recruitment capacity is estimated at a maximum of
1 000 recruits which is very ambitious34. Frontex also faces challenges in achieving a geographically
balanced and representative workforce35. The competition for experienced personnel between Frontex
and Member States affects all categories equally. Relying on Member States alone to recruit, train and
nominate specialised officers is unsustainable in the long term, as it results in trade-offs between
national priorities and EU objectives36.
The vulnerability assessment mechanism and Schengen evaluations regularly identify staff shortages
at the external borders. However, this is not followed up by the increased use of the standing corps,
often owing to the absence of a level playing field in skills but also other reasons, addressed under
Problem 1. Yet, given the high level of threats on external borders arising from the shifting geopolitical
landscape, the architecture and the size of the standing corps has become inadequate to contribute to
the 4 -tier access control model and EIBM objectives and be future proof, when one takes into account
that its development is a lengthy process that needs to be implemented over time, with the multiannual
financial framework carefully factored in.
While all these weaknesses result from one major driver (PD2.1), i.e. challenges in developing
standing corps, tensions in different thematic areas contribute to this situation, which are described
in more detail Annex 5, Section 2. In brief, the identified weaknesses stem from the limited labour
market of professionals with a law enforcement background eligible to work as standing corps officers,
the application of the Staff Regulations and its implementing rules to the operational staff of Frontex,
which can lead to practical challenges for the standing corps’ effective performance of their tasks
during operations, and short-term career pathways leading to a loss of skilled personnel, high turnover
34 Interview with Frontex Deputy Executive Director of Administration and Information Management, Human Resources
and Corporate Services Division (HRS) and Information Management Division (SIM)). 35 Data from 2025 shows the over-representation among Frontex staff of Greece (+18% deviation from total population),
Poland (+16%) and Romania (+12%), while the three most under-represented countries are Germany (-17% deviation),
France (-13% deviation) and Italy (-6%) Source: Frontex (2025) Recruitment and staffing data. 36 Interviews with Frontex Capabilities Division, Frontex Information Management Division and Croatian authorities.
12
and structural renewal cycles in Frontex’s workforce37. Uncertainties regarding the role and powers of
standing corps officers vis-à-vis national authorities during joint operations also create significant
operational inefficiencies. This ultimately hampers efforts to build a harmonised operational culture
and limits Frontex’s role in strengthening border management practices among Member States,
hindering the goal of a unified European integrated border management system. Moreover, the
financial support system established to support the Member States in developing Categories 2 and 3
has a number of shortcomings which have been identified by the Member States already in the 2024
evaluation. Additional limitations are due to inability of the system to reflect structural changes in the
national authorities that are unrelated to staffing trends38 or the absence of adequate recovery tools in
case of discrepancies between the support received and the quota of officers provided. The overall
adequacy of the financial support is also an issue39. Due to correction coefficients, which do not
adequately account for changes in the costs of living, reimbursement levels are sometimes inadequate,
and Member States are left to cover outstanding costs of Category 2 and 3 deployments40.
The standing corps’ efficiency is also limited by issues with Frontex support and monitoring staff
(including the back-office coordination capacity), which cannot be guaranteed to keep pace with the
growth of Frontex. The size of so-called non-deployable statutory staff which can be recruited by
Frontex ‘for the purpose of carrying out supportive or monitoring functions for the establishment of
the standing corps, the planning and management of operations and the acquisition of technical
equipment’ (operational support staff), is limited in the EBCG Regulation to up to 4% of the 10 000
officers (400 in 2027).
Another major factor is persistent shortages in specialised profiles of deployed officers, which do not
match Member States’ operational needs and thus negatively affect mission success and Member
States’ confidence in Frontex’s operational capabilities. Advanced-level document officers (ALDOs),
debriefing officers, European coast guard functions officers, information officers, and motor vehicle
crime detection officers are among the most sought-after profiles. There is also an increasing need to
diversify return-related specialist profiles, and select, recruit and train in a dedicated way return
specialists so that Frontex can meet Member States’ growing needs and requests for support in
achieving EU policy priorities in this field. While the profile shortage issue is closely related to
Member States’ training infrastructure constraints, Frontex’s own standing corps-focused training, and
the fragmented implementation of strategic and operational planning across the EBCG (and hence
Problem 3), it is also an important part of the overall architecture of the standing corps, relevant for
determining its added value and capacity to support the Member States.
Technical equipment used in operational deployments such as mobile border surveillance and border
checks tools, vessels, vehicles, and IT systems remains the property of the contributing Member State
or of Frontex, depending on the procurement and deployment arrangement, and is registered in the
technical equipment pool for Frontex’s operational activities. In line with the EBCG Regulation41, the
deployment of equipment must be aligned with the needs for technical equipment set out in plans for
Frontex’s operational activities but can only occur with the authorisation of the host Member State,
37 ICF, 2026, Feasibility study to develop and assess potential options for the further reinforcement of the capabilities of
the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) under Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, case study on standing corps Capability
Development in the Annex to the study accompanying the Impact Assessment. 38 For instance, Member States subject to enlargement of the Schengen area relocated staff for border activities to other
authorities due to the decrease of their external border, therefore reducing the overall staff of their national border guards. 39 See Case Study on Standing Corps Capability Development in the Annex to the study accompanying the Impact
Assessment. 40 ICF (2023);Study supporting the evaluation of the EBCG Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and the review of the standing
corps p. 110, p. 155; Survey with national authorities. 41 Article 64 of the EBCG Regulation.
13
while Frontex is responsible for their coordinated, optimised use. The study accompanying the Impact
Assessment collected evidence that there is a mismatch between planned technical equipment (TE)
deployments and actual availability42. While there is a structural difficulty in aligning domestic
resource planning with EU-level commitments as national technical equipment pools are typically
tailored to national priorities and budget constraints43, other factors also influence underdevelopment
of technical equipment and logistic support (PD2.2), which are seen in the under-deployment of
technical equipment (particularly visible for fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and patrol vessels),
adversely affecting the EIBM objectives. Insufficient anticipation of fluctuating operational
requirements, incomplete capability planning and legal or operational bottlenecks within the
procurement and deployment processes, are frequent issues. Uncertainty about asset availability a year
in advance and lack of clarity on deployment locations complicate internal planning for equipment
deployments, due also to the fact that data-sharing and communication systems are often outdated and
incompatible across authorities, which negatively impacts coordination and information exchange.
Additional issue, identified already in the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation44 concerns the
funding-based rules which in practice can create counter-efficient situations, where ISF-purchased
technical equipment must be deployed in other MSs for a defined period, even if there is an Frontex
Joint Operations in the same Member State.
Overall, the financing model requires further study and reflection, to assess Frontex’s own cost
modelling which indicates that over a long enough horizon purchasing surveillance aircraft could
become more economical than leasing.
Frontex currently does not own or operate of its maritime assets. Similarly to aircraft, maritime vessels
require significant logistical support and infrastructure for operation and maintenance, including a
range of specialists, naval bases/docking facilities and shipyards. There are also legislative
complexities related to registering, responsibility for operating and maintenance of such assets. Under
international maritime law, a vessel is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state whose flag it
flies, and maritime vessels must fly the flag of a nation state. This means that the ship’s home nation
has the power to enforce its laws on the vessel and its crew, regardless of their location on the high
seas (‘flag state jurisdiction’)45.
Logistical constraints add complexity to deployments, affecting both the Member States and Frontex
by reducing time for operational tasks and disrupting workflow continuity. Equipment, uniforms, and
weapons must be collected from the scarce, designated locations, generating logistic burdens. For more
details on this driver and underlying causes, see Annex 5 Section 2.
2.1.3 Problem 3 - Insufficient harmonisation in design and application of the EIBM
The EIBM, besides being an objective set out in TFEU46, is the main tool for creating the synergies
between the EU and the national level that are needed to efficiently manage the EU’s external borders
in the shared responsibility model. While an evaluation of EIBM strategic policy is scheduled for
42 Interview with Frontex Equipment and Logistics Division. 43 Some Member States interviewed highlighted that the equipment they possess does not always match the operational
needs of Frontex missions. A few noted that the fact that domestic needs can override commitments made under EU funding
rules, which can create tension between national priorities and obligations to Frontex. Others highlighted that deployment
of equipment is often constrained by the availability of trained personnel, especially for maritime assets. 44 ICF. (2023). Study supporting the evaluation of the EBCG Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and the review of the Standing
Corps. 45 A mission pennant could provide some degree of clarity for assets and personnel deployed on vessels. However, most
interventions take place outside territorial seas and may involve third countries that are not party to relevant international
conventions (e.g. Turkey has not signed UNCLOS Convention). The attempts to create a unique European flag failed so
far. In 2023, the European Commission launched a new study to explore European flag, but no follow-up action was taken. 46 See Article 77(1)(c) TFEU.
14
2026-202747, the study accompanying the Impact Assessment demonstrated insufficient
harmonisation in the design and application of the EIBM, due mainly to training deficits,
inadequacy of the existing planning tools to overcome divergent operational procedures across
Member States, and weak follow-up measures to ensure alignment with EIBM standards. The lessons
learnt from the deployment of the standing corps to date, together with the challenges identified in the
preparations for the implementation of the Pact demonstrate that delivering on this objective requires
measures that, while respecting specific national situations, reduce divergence in operational practices
and training and strengthen alignment with EIBM standards, thereby facilitating efficient cooperation
in the protection of the external borders.
More specifically, the EIBM is implemented partially or in an uneven manner. This weakens
coherence, efficiency, and preparedness across the EBCG. The border management operations,
training of the standing corps and technical equipment are subject to different rules across the EBCG.
As it emerges from the vulnerability assessment reports and Schengen evaluation, there are important
gaps in advanced skills which may suggest inadequate training48. The study accompanying the Impact
Assessment confirms that training system architecture is insufficient to keep the pace with the
development of Frontex. This is due to insufficient resources, limitations in the scope of the offered
training, especially for return-related functions, a lack of clear rules on recognising work at Frontex at
the national level as part of staff’s career progression, but also infrastructure problems and slow
adaptability of curricula (e.g. to reflect practical exercises, involve neighbouring third countries or
include findings from risk analysis products).
Moreover, the strategic and operational planning for EIBM is fragmented. For instance, the absence
of a legally binding requirement for Member States to align their national strategies with the technical
and operational EIBM strategy limits Frontex’s ability to oversee implementation, as it lacks the
authority to enforce compliance or trigger corrective measures in cases of underperformance. This gap
also has a negative impact a coherent and forward-looking capability roadmap. A further gap concerns
the limited integration of Frontex’s risk analysis products into strategic and capability planning cycles.
Despite the legal obligation49 that risk analyses cover all tiers of EIBM to enable pre-warning and
preparedness, current outputs largely focus on migratory flows at external borders, with insufficient
coverage of returns, third-country conditions, and intra-Schengen movements. In the absence of an
integrated forward-looking framework, there is no systematic link between operational risk analyses
and capability development planning. The lack of a clear policy framework and division of roles, both
at headquarters and in the field, makes it difficult to ensure that operational planning cycles are
information-led and mutually reinforcing. The Management Board’s role in steering long-term
planning has also been described as reactive, further weakening collective accountability for shared
capability development under the EBCG framework50.
Finally, the lessons learnt from quality control mechanisms such as vulnerability assessment and
Schengen evaluation mechanism are underused. The enforcement of vulnerability assessments
features structural weaknesses that undermine the evidence-based planning and alignment of
resources. There is no early warning system to identify structural gaps and promote smoother
alignment with EIBM standards in EU candidate countries ahead of accession. Moreover, it does not
include return and enforcing recommendations issued in the vulnerability assessment process remains
incomplete in practice. There is also a lack of a clear structure allowing for quality assurance of the
47 It is expected in 2027, meaning it will not be possible to deliver a formal evaluation of the strategic policy adopted in
2023 earlier. 48 A VA simulation exercises carried out in 2025 at three airports pointed to gaps in skills to detect document fraud. 49 Article 29(3) of the EBCG Regulation. 50 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation and targeted stakeholder consultations carried out for the supporting study.
15
actions taken by Frontex.
All these issues are captured in Problem 3 and explained more in detail in Annex 5 Section 3, under
problem drivers related to training architecture (PD3.1), and (PD3.2) concerning strategic and
integrated planning as well as quality assurance.
3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?
3.1. Legal basis
The proposal seeks to ensure coordinated and effective management of the EU’s external borders and
returns by removing gaps and ambiguities, strengthening Frontex’s human and technical capabilities
and promoting a coherent implementation of EIBM. These areas are already covered by the EBCG
Regulation meaning that the proposal will require the same legal basis as the current provisions. The
legal basis for the EBCG Regulation is provided by Articles 77(2)(b) and (d), and by Article 79(2)(c)
of the TFEU. Article 77(2)(b) empowers the EU to establish legislation governing checks on
individuals crossing external borders. Article 77(2)(d) supports the adoption of measures required for
the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders. Article 79(2)(c)
authorises the implementation of measures to address illegal migration, including removal and
repatriation of individuals residing without valid authorisation.
3.2. Subsidiarity and proportionality
Effective management and control of the EU’s external borders is in the interest of all Member States.
The abolition of internal border controls within the Schengen area means that external border
management directly affects the functioning, security, and integrity of the EU as a whole51. Recent
geopolitical developments have further increased the need for a stronger EU response, adapted to the
new circumstances. These comprise sustained migratory pressure at certain sections of the external
borders, including instability at the EU’s eastern borders and the rise of hybrid threats, smuggling and
criminal networks using new tactics, the growing relevance of digital tools for surveillance and
situational awareness, and the emergence of crisis situations that may simultaneously affect several
Member States and challenge conventional border management strategies. All these elements
underscore the need for greater resilience and coordination of current border management systems.
Ensuring the return of individuals without a legal right to stay is an EU priority. Despite the increased
involvement of Frontex, the number of effective returns to third countries remains low52. Many of the
current shortcomings in the application of the EU’s return policy stem from limited coordination
between national systems, a challenge that requires a focused collective response at the EU level. EU-
level action, in particular, through Frontex, ensures a common framework, operational support,
pooling of expertise, and streamlined third-country contacts, enhancing Member States’ capacity to
implement returns effectively and in line with EU law. The increased efficiency gains envisaged from
the new legal framework on return (the Return Regulation and the proposal on digitalisation of case
management for return, readmission and reintegration) is expected to lead to an increase in overall
returns. Frontex is already acting as a major player in returns from the EU and its role, in planning and
strategically coordinating coherent EU level actions, needs to match the increasing ambitions for the
common system for returns. Such coordinated action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States
51 See Recital 6 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 (Schengen
Borders Code). 52 European Commission (2024) State of Schengen Report 2024.
16
acting in isolation, making EU-level measures necessary and more effective.
The need for coordinated action is evident not only in situations of disproportionate migratory pressure
on certain Member States, but also in potential spillover effects through secondary movements and
beyond. Emerging cross-border risks require constant planning and harmonised standards that only
EU-level coordination can provide53. As per Article 7 of the EBCG Regulation, implementing EIBM
is a shared responsibility of the Member States and Frontex. In this spirit, it is necessary to take action
to reinforce EBCG capabilities, both in terms of the manpower and technical assets. In particular, the
involvement of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency allows for pooling of expertise,
common risk analysis, interoperability of systems, and rapid deployment of technical and human
resources, which individual Member States may not be able to mobilise in a timely manner on their
own. The reinforcement of the standing corps is a chance of bringing benefits to the national level.
Enhanced harmonisation of rules governing operational support, clearer allocation of responsibilities
between Frontex and Member States, and reinforced coordination mechanisms at EU level increase
the effectiveness of national border authorities, rather than replacing them.
The added value of EU-level coordination has been demonstrated in practice through joint operations,
rapid border interventions, and coordinated responses to sudden migratory or security-related
developments. Frontex’s role in supporting return operations, training, vulnerability assessments, and
cooperation with third countries has further shown that EU-level action enhances consistency, mutual
trust, and solidarity among Member States, while contributing to the uniform application of EU law.
The considered measures do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the general and specific
objectives.
4. WHAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED?
4.1. General objectives
The general objective:
GO1. Ensure the development and implementation of the European integrated border
management in line with Article 77(1)c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, encompassing well-coordinated and effective management of the EU’s external borders,
returns, visa policy and measures at the external borders contributing to security in the EU in
order to increase the effectiveness of the EBCG.
4.2. Specific and horizontal objectives
The specific and horizontal objectives described below are a response to the problems identified in
Section 2.
SO1. Ensure Frontex’s effectiveness in supporting Member States (and Schengen associated
countries) in managing the EU’s external borders, including cooperation with various actors
(Member States’ authorities involved in combating cross-border crime, returns and visa, third
countries, EU agencies, international organisations), and ensuring that the effectiveness of
returns, the prevention of illegal arrivals, and situational awareness via EUROSUR is enhanced.
SO2. Strengthen the EBCG human and technical capabilities, including improving the
operational effectiveness and efficiency of the standing corps and procedures applicable to the
technical capabilities;
53 Frontex (2025) Annual Risk Analysis Report 2025/2026.
17
SO3. Ensure coherent design and implementation of EIBM across EU Member States based on
harmonised training, synergies in planning, reinforced quality control processes and standing
corps of 30 000 officers equipped with the state-of-the-art equipment;
HO1.Ensure that the oversight mechanisms in Frontex and the EBCG remain adequate to the
tasks resulting from the development and implementation of EIBM.
Horizontal issue of adequacy of governance and oversight. The 2024 evaluation of the EBCG
Regulation did not recommend any changes to the oversight architecture, but it did point out some
areas affecting the performance of the existing structures.
The study accompanying the Impact Assessment confirmed the existence of practical difficulties
affecting how Frontex performs its obligations related to investigating incidents in the activities of
Frontex. Overall, Frontex’s oversight bodies (i.e. the Fundamental Rights Office (FRO), Internal
Controls Office (ICO), Internal Audit Control (IAC), and the Data Protection Office (DPO)) reported
limited resources to perform their tasks.
These issues will be partly addressed through non-legislative efforts, primarily by prioritising the
existing staffing and resourcing of these bodies in line with their tasks. Furthermore, the long-term
fitness of the oversight framework of Frontex and the EBCG, will depend on focusing on enhancing
the effectiveness of the existing components of the framework in place.
5. WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES?
5.1. What is the baseline from which options are assessed?
The baseline assumes persistent structural problems (legal gaps, ambiguous legal framework, and
mandate limitations) as well as entrenched practices (e.g. returns, data sharing, strategic planning, or
equipment procurement) that demand multi-actor coordination to resolve. The baseline scenario also
assumes that at least some of the strategic risks and challenges identified in the Strategic Risk Analysis
Report (Frontex 2024)54 will materialise, putting pressure on the entire Schengen area. As such, the
baseline scenario reflects on how and to what extent the measures and proposals adopted after 2019
which are being still implemented or negotiated, would address the identified problems. It also takes
into account the use of the tools at the disposal of Frontex, in particular Management Board and
Executive Director decisions, to compensate gaps or provide guidance. In addition, the baseline
reflects that the operating environment and the political/legal framework have evolved materially since
the evidence cut-off of the 2024 evaluation (data until end-2023). The full implementation of the Pact
on Migration and Asylum (applicable as of June 2026), the completion of negotiations on the Return
Regulation and the intensification of hybrid threats and instrumentalisation and weaponisation of
migration reinforce the need for a more responsive EBCG capacity. Under the baseline, Frontex and
the EBCG community would continue to rely primarily on incremental non-legislative adjustments
and existing tools, which, while improving specific processes, are not expected to resolve the structural
limitations identified in Problems 1-3 nor to provide sufficient flexibility and surge capacity to respond
to rapidly evolving operational needs.
Some issues covered by policy drivers PD1.1, PD1.2 and PD1.4 (Problem 1) which have been
identified in the Action Plan and the Roadmap55, would continue to be subject to non-legislative
measures (e.g. Frontex Management Board decisions). In particular, for PD1.1, the staged roll out of
the contingents under the Frontex Chain of Command (FC2) concept based on the Management Board
54 Strategic_Risk_Analysis_2024_Report.pdf 55 A document prepared in cooperation between the Commission and Frontex.
18
decisions56, is to be finalised at the end of 2026. It will contribute to increasing trust and bringing more
stability and predictability for standing corps57. Frontex’s presence at border crossing points is
expected to increase over time, mainly to support the introduction of the Entry-Exit System58 and to
support second-line checks (especially document fraud expertise). However, first-line checks by
Frontex officers would remain limited, with access to databases varying across Member States. The
exercise of executive powers in the context of combating cross-border crime would remain unchanged.
Cooperation with Europol would continue to be hampered by the perceived lack of clarity over the
correct way to implement the existing rules on exchanging operational personal data between the two
Agencies, as mentioned in audit findings and recommendations by the EDPS. Frontex’s role in
supporting visa policy would remain limited to ad hoc initiatives while Frontex’s involvement in
emergency response actions would remain unclear. Frontex contributions to response to hybrid threats
would be focused on addressing the instrumentalisation and weaponisation of migration, and the use
of EUROSUR as a situational awareness tool in its current scope.
For PD1.2, the full implementation of EUROSUR would be completed in 2027 allowing the automated
provision and sharing of statistical data and information on incidents, which would accelerate the
decision-making process on the right operational response. The technical issues related to the
functioning of EUROSUR would continue to be addressed in the EUROSUR Handbook which would
be subject to revision in 2027. The other issues, not directly captured in the 2024 evaluation could be
subject to ad hoc actions and initiatives (e.g. new Management Board decisions, decisions by the
Executive Director, guidelines and best practices issued by Frontex, operational plans).
For Frontex’s footprint in external dimension (PD1.3), status agreements and working arrangements
in the area of border management would remain the only framework of cooperation for Frontex to
support third countries. Working arrangements would remain subject to the current administrative and
data-protection compliance steps (including, where relevant, prior involvement of the EDPS), which
can result in delays before operational cooperation (including capacity building and information-
sharing modalities) can start. Frontex would continue being one of the possible providers in technical
cooperation projects in third countries and Frontex would be able to cooperate structurally with the
international organisations specifically listed in the Regulation, while cooperation with CSDP mission
would be, in principle possible but limited.
Finally, for returns (PD1.4), Frontex would retain its current mandate to support the Member States
on return, however within a changing and more ambitious legislative landscape, due to the entry into
force in June 2026 of the Return Border Procedure, the Return Regulation, where political agreement
between the co-legislators was reached on 1 June 2026 and taking into account the possible adoption
of the proposal for the digitalisation of case management in the areas of return, readmission and
reintegration. At the Member State level, the existing issues, including fragmentations and operational
inefficiencies, would persist, while the number of returns to be implemented is expected to grow under
the new legal situation, without sufficient resources both at the national and EU level to handle them
and to respond to the periodic surges.
56 Management Board Decision 45/2023 of 22 November 2023 on the new organisational structure of Frontex and
Management Board Decision 7/2025 adopted on 26 March 2025 on amending Management Board Decision 45/2023,
leading to establishment of seven border management and two thematic return-profile contingents. 57 The implementation of the Executive Director Decision No R-ED-2024-112 on the Deployment and Rotation system for
category 1 and 2 standing corps officers is expected to allow for sufficiently long deployments (minimum 2 years), also
justifying the investment by the hosting Member State in the training e.g. access to the databases. 58 The Entry/Exit System (EES) is Europe’s new border management system for registering non-EU nationals travelling
for a short stay, each time they cross the external borders of 29 European countries. Starting from 12 October 2025, Member
States progressively roll out the system at their external borders over a period of six months.
19
Frontex’s capability gaps (Problem 2) would persist with regard to the standing corps and technical
equipment (PD2.1 and PD2.2), affecting Frontex readiness to support Member States in EU border
management and returns. The short-term career pathways available would continue the high turnover
in Frontex’s workforce, putting a strain on Frontex’s long-term organisational stability. Disparities in
working conditions and uncertainties regarding the role and powers of standing corps officers in
dealings with national authorities during joint operations would persist, undermining the objective of
developing and implementing EIBM standards. Shortcomings related to the application of the
Article 61 financial compensation mechanism would remain unsolved. Mismatches between the
availability of specific officer profiles and the operational needs of Member States, together with
constrains on available equipment and logistical support, would continue to jeopardise the standing
corps’ readiness for deployment. The solutions pertinent to PD2.1 and PD2.2 offered by the decisions
of the Management Board would remain limited (e.g. decision establishing operational horizontal
functions and activities within the standing corps)59. The human resources available to the EBCG, as
well as its overall capital in terms of expertise and field experience, will predictably reach a ceiling in
2027, when the number of 10 000 deployable officers is met. According to this scenario, it may lose
momentum, stagnate, and decrease in the years thereafter. This would result in an effective decline in
the EBCG’s overall ability to respond to situations and challenges at the external borders, including in
terms of its ability to deploy officers that are well-trained, interoperable among national and EU
services, and able to deploy rapidly and provide immediate support, particularly in times of crises.
Finally, different forms of uneven take up of EIBM (Problem 3) would continue to affect the efforts
to build a harmonised operational culture and improve the efficiency of the EBCG in the short and
long term. The solutions for training (PD3.1) would continue to rely on the three-tier EBCG Academy
concept60 and temporary solutions, such as the establishment of an ‘operational trainer’ function within
the standing corps. However, the scalability and timing of such benefits will depend on the finalisation
of the EBCG Academy training framework and will be limited to a duration of pilot exercise, such as
that on operational trainer function61. The system will continue to face capacity and staffing challenges
as well as problems in ensuring adequate, high-quality and uniform training opportunities. However,
the process of establishing the new training framework only started recently and some of the measures
it provides are temporary, making the assessment of the impact difficult. Therefore, in the absence of
harmonised training standards, divergent training availability and quality would persist, limiting
interoperability across the EBCG. For EIBM planning cycles (PD3.2) the baseline would persist with
uneven maturity and weak coordination of national strategies for EIBM and capability planning, weak
links between national strategies and recruitment and capability development cycles and delays in
submitting inputs making the strategic planning only partially information-led, which would only
allow for limited systematic integration of risk analysis into capability development and investment
planning. The quality assurance would take place, in addition to the Schengen evaluation mechanism,
via vulnerability assessments focusing on the external borders but its take-up in the context of different
strains of work of Frontex would remain limited and its enforcement would be limited in case of
persisting deficiencies. The Management Board would oversee the effectiveness of Frontex actions,
but underrepresentation of return authorities would hinder oversight in the area of returns.
While the 2024 evaluation reached positive conclusions on several aspects of Frontex’s performance,
its scope and evidence base largely reflect a pre-Pact operating environment. As such, it does not fully
capture the scale of operational, legal and organisational challenges arising from the forthcoming
59 Management Board Decision 17/2025 of 12 June 2025 60 Frontex Management Board meeting. Explanatory note: Training delivery: Towards sustainable solution, Ref.
Ares(2025)230171 – 13/01/2025. 61 Frontex Management Board meeting. Explanatory note: The concept of trainers for the European Border and Coast
Guard Academy, Ares(2026)233415 – 09/01/2026.
20
application of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, the evolving return framework and the increased
reliance on Frontex for sustained, large-scale operational support. Under the baseline scenario, these
challenges would persist and intensify, limiting Frontex’s ability to respond effectively without
structural changes.
5.2. Description of policy options
Three identified policy options (PO) encompass both legislative and non-legislative measures to
achieve Specific Objectives and deliver the General Objective to develop and implement an European
integrated border management that will increase the effectiveness of the EBCG.
Policy Options (PO) are presented separately to reflect different levels of ambition and of legal
integration and enforceability. While PO1 focuses on targeted clarifications and adjustments within
the existing cooperation paradigm and logic, PO2 entails a qualitative shift towards more harmonised
and enforceable EIBM implementation across Member States. Although certain measures could be
combined, considering them separately offers a clearer assessment of the impacts resulting from
different levels of EU intervention. PO3 implies the most ambitious measures under which EBCG
functioning would rely on standing corps and a central role for Frontex.
All policy measures (PM) are numbered. The numbering vertically follows the policy options (PO)
by policy driver (PD) and can go across different thematic areas (Frontex mandate, returns, standing
corps and EIBM planning and quality assurance). Annex 8 provides a summary overview of the
baseline scenario and proposed policy options and measures they encompass. Annex 10 complements
the reasoning behind the gradual increase of the standing corps, as proposed under PO2 and PO3.
Annex 12 provides an overview of discarded measures.
5.2.1 Policy option 1: Targeted modifications to address shortcomings and gaps
Policy Option 1 (PO1) targets EBCG effectiveness by addressing shortcomings identified in the 2024
evaluation of the EBCG Regulation and the subsequent implementation issues, while increasing the
overall preparedness of the EBCG for rapid-onset crises. Under this option, the current pace of EIBM
development and implementation EIBM would be maintained.
5.2.1.1 Policy measures relevant to Problem 1
Under PO1, Problem 1 would be addressed by a mix of targeted amendments in the EBCG
Regulation, within the limits of the current mandate, and non-legislative measures, to boost the
performance of Frontex in the first three tiers of the access control model and EUROSUR, and increase
the overall efficiency of the EBCG in returns.
For PD1.1 (Frontex mandate), policy measures will focus on the following two thematic areas62.
Border controls: with PM 1.1.1 to better recognise executive powers of the standing corps; PM 1.1.2
to broaden the list of Frontex tasks; PM 1.1.3 to mandate modifications in relevant national policies
to ensure effective access for Frontex officers and assets (such as vessels) to perform frontline duties
– this includes the use of national databases; PM 1.1.4 to reinforce the chain of command and
contingent-based operational concept; PM 1.1.5 (non-legislative) to ensure appropriate funding to
increase the hosting capacities of Member States, and PM 1.1.6 (non-legislative) to modify EU and
national policies ensuring access for Frontex frontline duties and encouraging action on host Member
62 No measures under O1 are proposed for two other thematic area, namely visa policy and emergencies/hybrid threat.
21
States’ behalf.
Combating cross-border crime: with PM 1.1.7 to clarify the Frontex’s role in countering cross-
border crime; PM 1.1.8 to clarify the analytical and situational awareness-support functions of
Frontex; PM 1.1.9 to enhance sharing operational personal data between Frontex and Europol/Eurojust
while maintaining data protection safeguards, and PM 1.1.10 (non-legislative) to complement Frontex-
Europol/Eurojust cooperation, for instance, through the use of standard operating procedures and data
protection awareness initiatives. A similar level of ambition would apply to EUROSUR (PD1.2), with
a number of technical legislative amendments (PM1.2.1- PM1.2.8). For more details see Annex 8.
The most innovative element under PO1 would concern broadening the list of specific incidents for
which data is collected in the situational pictures (PM 1.2.6). For PD1.3 (external dimension) the
following policy measures (PM) would be proposed: PM 1.3.1 standardises Frontex’s working
arrangements with third countries/international organisations, mirroring the EUAA model; these
would remain practical cooperation agreements, needing Commission’s prior approval without being
treated in practice as administrative arrangements on the transfer of personal data that are subject to
EDPS approval; PM 1.3.2 (non-legislative) to encourage the update of existing working arrangements
to the new mandate of Frontex including EUROSUR; PM 1.3.3 (applicable exclusively to cooperation
with third countries) to simplify the rules for deployment of Frontex Liaison Officers in third countries,
and PM 1.3.4 (non-legislative) to enable pre-arrival checks at airports in third countries under existing
operational plans. PM 1.3.5 (applicable exclusively to cooperation with CSDP missions) to foster
closer cooperation and a greater understanding of complementary mandates, while leveraging
Frontex’s EIBM expertise in CSDP missions with a border management component; PM 1.3.6.A
applicable exclusively to cooperation with international organisations (e.g. NATO) with whom
Frontex could cooperate.
A number of measures would be proposed for PD1.4, in particular: PM 1.4.1A focusing on enhancing
the coordination of operational return activities, such as by adopting EU-level guidance documents,
and PM 1.4.10 adjusting Frontex’s return operational plans; PM 1.4.2A mandating regular information
sharing, or PM 1.4.6 further clarifying in the legal text the existing preconditions for Frontex to assist
Member States with return operations or reintegration support. PM 1.4.8 to increase Frontex’s support
on returnees’ identification and reintegration, including strengthening Frontex’s role in identification
missions with third countries; PM 1.4.5A to create a legal base for reintegration and to streamline
Frontex’s related activities; PM 1.4.7 re-focusing and strengthening the EU Reintegration Programme;
PM 1.4.9 to enhance the interoperability of existing digital tools to manage return; PM 1.4.11
encouraging the provision of more training and capacity-building activities on return to partner third
countries; PM 1.4.12 increasing the number and specialisation of Frontex staff working on return; and
PM 1.4.13A reviewing the deployment of EU Return Liaison Officers. PM 1.4.4 to ensure that this
revamped framework retains adequate monitoring and quality assurance, including expanding the
vulnerability assessment for the EU external borders to cover return and to better integrate it into EIBM
risk analysis; PM 1.4.3 adjusting the EU’s return monitoring system to ensure it has adequate resources
and to ensure a similar level of obligations between Frontex and Member States, while enhancing
Frontex’s own internal oversight mechanisms and focusing on more delineated governance on return
and borders, around the operational activities.
5.2.1.2 Policy measures relevant to Problem 2
For the Frontex capabilities addressed under Problem 2, PO1 proposes the following policy measures
(PM) per thematic area under PD2.1 (challenges in development of standing corps).
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Standing corps architecture: PM 2.1.1 to triple the standing corps to 30 000 officers to increase
Frontex’s capacity to support Member States in border management and return. Under this PM the
current Categories 1, 2 and 3 would be increased proportionally in line with the pace of growth
envisaged under Annex I of the EBCG Regulation, reaching 30 000 officers by 2041. The Member
States’ annual contributions for standing corps Categories 2 and 3 would also be proportionally
increased, in line with the logic set out in Annexes II and III. The need to expand the standing corps
under this option (and even more under the subsequent ones) would reflect the increase of tasks in the
following areas: returns(capability to lead and carry out operations leading to increased demand for
return counsellors, escorts, coordinators, and monitors); cross-border crime (expanded detection and
prevention functions at borders increasing demand for investigative, analysis, and surveillance profiles
(constant across the options)); strategic and operational planning (stronger EU-level planning
capacity and pooling to ensure coherent capability development and surge planning); training and
qualification system (an expanded instructor base and training offer to deliver and absorb the expanded
responsibilities). PM 2.1.2 to revise the limitations applicable to statutory staff dedicated to
‘supportive or monitoring functions’. This may include increasing the current ceiling for operational
support staff, clarification on the professional functions it covers, and tasking the Management Board
with adjusting operational support functions to match annual capability needs assessments. PM 2.1.3
to clarify the concept of ‘deployment’ along the lines of the existing Executive Director Decision63.
PM 2.1.4 to correct shortcomings identified under Article 61 (financial support mechanism) paired
with non-legislative measures such as harmonised templates and clearer timelines for data submission
and verification. PM 2.1.5 (non-legislative) to help addressing gaps in seconding and nominating
Category 2 and 3 (e.g. early warning mechanism and deployment handbook).
Employment conditions (under PD2.1): PM 2.1.6 to clarify that passing the training is mandatory for
continuing employment with Frontex. PM 2.1.7 to adjust the relevant delegated acts on work pattern
(shift work, stand-by duty) to operational reality and to provide compensation scheme for particularly
difficult or risky working conditions. PM 2.1.8 the revision of the definition of the place of
employment in the EBCG Regulation, to allow, as a general rule, the place of deployment to become
the place of employment.
PO1 includes only one policy measure on technical equipment (PD2.2): PM2.2.1 to improve
coordinated implementation of EU border-management IT systems by increased legal certainty, with
more structural interventions addressed under PO2/PO3, in line with their more integrated approach.
5.2.1.3 Policy measures relevant to Problem 3
For training structure, strategic and integrated planning cycles and quality assurance – which were
identified as the main pillars of EIBM under Problem 3 and grouped under PD 3.1 and PD3.2 –PO1
includes the following policy measures per thematic area.
Training structure (under PD3.1): PM 3.1.1 to support and strengthen consistent integration and
application of the Common Core Curricula. PM 3.1.2 to develop specialised (sub)profiles for trainers64
in key operational domains (e.g. return escorting, document checks, or border surveillance). PM 3.1.3
to introduce voluntary, scenario-based joint training exercises in key operational areas (e.g. on hybrid
threats), open, where appropriate, to candidate and potential candidate countries. PM 3.1.4 to introduce
a mandatory common pre-deployment training for Category 2 and 3. These would be complemented
by measures to: consolidate and stabilise entry-level training (PM 3.1.5); expand the trainer pool (PM
3.1.6), reinforce return component in training (PM 3.1.7); expand the existing specialised training
63 Decision 112/2024 on the deployment and rotation system of the standing corps officers Category 1 and 2. 64 Training as an operational function of the standing corps would be formally recognised enabling the structured use of
standing corps officers as trainers in support of Frontex’s activities.
23
modules (PM 3.1.8); improve the recognition of Frontex’s certificates for career progression and
qualification in Member States (PM 3.1.9); and ensure that adequately trained and experienced officers
are deployed for key specialist roles (PM 3.1.10). Policy measures under this option would include
legislative and non-legislative ones.
Strategic and integrated planning (under PD3.2): policy measures proposed under this option would
aim to strengthen coherence, comparability and transparency across Member States and would be
exclusively non-legislative (PM.3.2.1-PM3.2.6). For more details see Annex 8.
Quality assurance (under PD3.2): PM 3.2.7 to ensure completeness of the vulnerability assessment
process (in particular, to include return logistics once a return decision has been issued) while PM
3.2.8 would expand the geographical area concerned by allowing for voluntary participation in
vulnerability assessments of EU candidate and potential candidate countries.
5.2.2 Policy option 2: Towards a more integrated EBCG – Improving the harmonised
implementation of EIBM
Policy Option 2 (PO2) largely builds on measures proposed under PO1 but goes a step further by
proposing measures to seize the unused opportunities and thus to match the level of ambition in other
policy areas (in particular return). With a new category of standing corps and reinforced training, it
significantly changes the approach to shared responsibility, transforming the EBCG from a set of
fragmented and reactive systems to a more harmonised and EIBM-based structure that is better
equipped to face the volatile geopolitical situation. Under this option the development of technical
equipment would be supported by a mix of legislative and non-legislative measures; training offered
to different categories of the standing corps as well as EIBM planning cycles and quality assurance
would be significantly reinforced.
5.2.2.1 Policy measures relevant to Problem 1
Policy measures (PM) proposed under PO2 to address Problem 1, will be as follows: For two thematic
areas of the PD1.1 i.e. border management and combating cross-border crime the proposed
measures would be the same as under PO1. For the two remaining thematic areas under this problem
driver, i.e. emergencies and hybrid threats, and visa policy, PO2 would propose PM1.1.11 to reflect
specific coordination mechanisms for different types of emergencies in operational plans (OPLANs);
PM1.1.12 to ensure that there is a working arrangement between Frontex and the European
Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations Directorate-General (DG ECHO)
determining conditions of cooperation in relation to emergencies impacting external borders;
PM1.1.10 to oblige Frontex to prepare dedicated risk analysis products relevant to visa policy on a
regular basis. Finally, with PM 1.1.11, Frontex would be encouraged to develop a new visa support
office tasked with providing training sessions on detecting fraudulent documents and identifying visa
fraud cases and helping to interested national authorities with combating abuses of the visa policy and
residence permits to the EU. As regards policy measures relevant for PD1.2 on EUROSUR, PO2 adds
three policy measures to the PO1 proposal: PM 1.2.9 to address the gaps related to the processing of
personal data for the purposes of EUROSUR; PM 1.2.10 to include statistical and anonymised data
from the social media monitoring; and PM 1.2.11 to ensure that data quality reported in EUROSUR
is improved. For PD1.3 relating to the external dimension, PM1.3.6A (relevant for cooperation with
international organisation) would be replaced by PM 1.3.6B, where the closed list of the international
organisations would be removed (not replaced) allowing such cooperation subject to Management
Board approval. In addition to the measures proposed under PO1 (PM 1.3.1, PM 1.3.2, PM 1.3.3, PM
1.3.4, PM 1.3.5) another policy measures would be proposed: PM 1.3.7 increase Frontex’s role in EU-
funded border management projects in third countries.
24
With regard to PD1.4 (returns), the following policy measures would be proposed to complement or
expand upon those listed under PO1: PM 1.4.14B making Frontex the EU’s main operational actor
for all EU-funded and/or EU-coordinated return operations and related pre and post return activities;
PM 1.4.1B centralising EU return planning and coordination within Frontex, including resource
allocation and a 24/7 Return Support Desk; and PM 1.4.2B requiring Frontex to collect and regularly
present return-related statistical data; PM 1.4.17B reviewing Frontex access rights to the Schengen
Information System to develop capacities in relation to identification of third-country nationals, as
well as setting up a SIRENE office in Frontex; PM 1.4.5B to create the legal base for Frontex’s broader
responsibility for reintegration efforts from the EU, as well as for assuming that role in the
digitalisation of return, readmission and reintegration. Frontex would also provide structural support
for return counselling and reintegration counselling across the EU (PM 1.4.18); PM 1.4.13B
enhancing Frontex’s return-related support to partner third countries by introducing Frontex Return
Liaison Officers and PM 1.4.16B to allow the possibility, under strict conditions and safeguards, for
Frontex to support, organise, and coordinate return actives in or from third countries, including return
operations; PM 1.4.15 ensuring proper oversight of the new return framework through uniform
monitoring standards for Frontex and Member States, as well as adequate internal governance and
oversight within Frontex. For PD1.4 – thematic area on governance in returns – PO2 comprises
legislative and non-legislative measures (to be adopted as Management Board decisions), to ensure
that return is better managed through the Management Board, while maximising the use of existing
structures (e.g. working groups). In particular, PM 1.4.19B to reinforce the role of the executive board
and strengthen the coordination between preparatory working groups and the Management Board; PM
1.4.20 to introduce internal rules in Frontex to strengthen coordination between Frontex Working
Groups (such as the HLRTR for strategic coordination, and the Working Group on EIBM for quality
assurance) and the Management Board; PM 1.4.21 to establish a dedicated working group on returns
to address for instance strategic planning, technical or operational issues and report regularly to the
Management Board to ensure operational focus.
5.2.2.2 Policy measures relevant to Problem 2
The PO2 includes the following policy measures (PM) for Frontex capabilities addressed under
Problem 2. Under PD2.1 encompassing i) standing corps architecture, and ii) employment
conditions as separate thematic areas, the following PMs from PO1 would be preserved: PM 2.1.2,
PM 2.1.3, PM 2.1.4, PM 2.1.5. PM 2.1.6, PM 2.1.7, PM 2.1.8. For standing corps size specifically,
the reasoning justifying the increase presented under PO1 remains valid, with additional grounds found
in the new visa-related tasks for Frontex. PO2 replaces PO1’s PM 2.1.1A with PM 2.1.1B, which
introduces a new standing corps category of 20 000 officers by 2041, serving as the EU’s EIBM
operational and emergency-response force. This category would enhance Frontex’s capacity to assist
Member States during emergencies and crises, while preserving the demand-driven approach and
aligning with the shared-responsibility framework. The new category would have the following
features:
- It would be tasked with promoting the consistent application of EU standards across the
operational domains of EIBM, including returns. Accordingly, the new Category 5 would
comprise staff from Member State national authorities that have completed a comprehensive
Frontex training curriculum taken from the EBCG training strategy. Such ‘top-up’ training
would be complementary to national training systems and be focused on Frontex working
methods and principles and objectives of EIBM.
- Category 5 officers would remain in their national administrations and become part of the pool
of officers that Member States can nominate for Categories 2 and 3. At the same time, thanks to
greater familiarity with Frontex and European border management, they would be able to easily
25
support joint operations in their host Member State.
- They would be available for deployment under exceptional and scenario-driven circumstances,
functioning as a flexible pool rather than a permanently deployed component. The conditions for
triggering deployment would have to be defined.
- To illustrate the contributions from Member States to the pool of trainable standing corps, an
indicative Category 5 reference quota has been calculated by multiplying its Category 4 share
of the EU total by the projected size of the Category 5 reserve by 2041 (see Annex 10).
- The introduction of Category 5 would require an expansion of the financial support system
under Article 61, as adjusted under PM2.1.4. Another option is funding it through the Border
Management and Visa funding instrument in the new Multiannual Financial Framework,
creating a simplified, performance-based compensation system65. See also Annex 10.
In addition to more comprehensive Category 5, this option would also envisage additional policy
measures to ensure reliable contributions from Member States for Categories 2 and 3, for instance, by
making the Deployment Handbook compulsory for all the actors (PM2.1.9), adjusting the financing
support mechanism to Category 5 (PM2.1.10) and developing an oversight and enforcement
mechanism (PM2.1.11).
On the second thematic area (employment conditions), the following additional policy measures
would be proposed: PM2.1.12 to develop a system allowing to take into account the outcome of the
compulsory training66; some implementing measures like PM2.1.13 could also promote indefinite
contracts by tying continued service to regular fitness assessments and enabling transitions to non-
operational roles. Under PD2.2 – technical equipment and IT systems a policy measure PM2.2.1
proposed under PO1 would be complemented by targeted legislative and operational measures. These
would secure Frontex’s equipment access and deployment capacity, while excluding large-asset
ownership. In particular, PM2.2.2 would reinforce Frontex capacities to act as a central purchasing
coordinator for some categories of equipment, using the possibility of joint procurement. Along with
that, under PM2.2.3 a central logistics structure within Frontex would be created to coordinate
deployment, maintenance, and servicing of owned equipment across borders. Under PM2.2.4
participation in coordinated maritime presence (CMP) operations would be strengthened, enabling
EU-level coordination of national assets without Frontex ownership. PM2.2.5 would expand the scope
of the technical equipment pool (TEP) to all operational needs (including enhanced maritime and aerial
surveillance capabilities and advanced processing/analytical tools). Finally, on the execution side,
PM2.2.6 would lead to a stepped mechanism to address persistent non-compliance by Member
States/SACs with agreed TEP availability commitments. To support implementation, Member States
would gradually introduce EU-wide recognition mechanisms in areas where there are obstacles to
deployment (e.g. firearm permits, vehicle roadworthiness tests), and compliance with TEP
commitments would be reflected through an indicator linked to the future BMV funding framework
(PM2.2.7).
5.2.2.3 Policy measures relevant to Problem 3
For the different EIBM pillars identified under Problem 3, PO2 largely builds on the measures
proposed under PO1. These are measures intended to respond to training (PD3.1) and the thematic
area of quality control (PD3.2). For training, specifically,policy measures from PO1 (PM3.1.1 -
65 The methodology and means of the mechanism are still to be determined and depend on the final outlook of the funding
instrument. 66 For instance, based on measures included under Policy Option 1, a contract system could be developed matching
Frontex’s training system that caters for long-term career spans, where one-year contracts would be offered at a lower entry
grade for officers having to undertake the mandatory training, renewed into a higher grade only for officers having
successfully passed the training, subject to a new probation period based on the job performance and not a training.
26
PM3.1.10) would be complemented by the following: PM3.1.11 prioritising scenario-based training
for mid- and senior-level staff to ensure interoperable operational planning, command and
coordination skills for staff, assuming command roles within standing corps deployments; PM3.1.12
establishing a dedicated EU top-up training for standing corps Category 5, coordinated and funded
by Frontex67. Delivering on PM3.1.12 would need to be paired with non-legislative measures to
increase internal capacity in the EBCG Academy (PM3.1.13) and a significant expansion of the trainer
pool growth (PM3.1.14).
For the thematic area of EIBM planning (PD3.2), the non-legislative measures proposed under PO1
(PM 3.2.1- PM3.2.6) would be replaced by a combination of legislative and non-legislative measures
to improve coherence, comparability and transparency across Member States. In particular, the
voluntary coordination by the Member States would be replaced by governance instruments endorsed
by the Management Board with a view to making EIBM planning more predictable and enforceable
within existing structures. For instance, the Management Board would be obliged to adopt a formal
multiannual EIBM planning calendar setting common timelines across key planning products, such as
national strategies for EIBM, NCDPs, capability roadmaps, strategic risk analyses, and vulnerability
assessments (PM3.2.9). This would be paired with obligations on Member States to comply with the
updated NCDP methodology and to provide regular updates of planning inputs of hight quality
(PM3.2.10). For more details on accompanying non-legislative measures (PM3.2.11-PM3.2.12) see
Annex 8.
In the thematic area of quality assurance (PD3.2) the policy measures proposed under PO1 (PM3.2.1
and PM 3.2.2) would be complemented by PM3.2.13, including EUROSUR data quality to
vulnerability assessment and PM3.2.14, strengthening the enforcement of recommended measures in
case of persistent vulnerabilities. Additionally, non-legislative measures would be proposed to use a
vulnerability assessment escalation procedure within EIBM planning (PM 3.2.15) and to review
resources, structures, and working methods Frontex’s key oversight bodies and the Management Board
to enhance quality assurance of Frontex activities as important part of the EIBM process (PM 3.2.16).
5.2.3 Policy option 3: EBCG based on standing corps and central role of Frontex
PO3 represents the most ambitious approach, implying the largest scope of modifications in the EBCG
Regulation. PO3 seeks to expand the EBCG’s mandate and strengthen its capabilities where
appropriate, to maximise Frontex’s potential in border management, return and achieving EIBM
objectives.
5.2.3.1 Policy measures relevant to Problem 1.
Under this option, three scenarios have been identified for tackling the division of responsibilities
within the EBCG (PD1.1) under Problem 1 (this is not addressed under PO1 and 2). Under
Scenario A, Member States retain primary responsibility for protecting their borders but may transfer
additional responsibilities to Frontex under specific conditions and for limited periods. This scenario
assumes enhanced Frontex capabilities, including expanded Category 1 staff and own technical
resources. Under Scenario B, Frontex would assume greater leadership during serious deficiencies or
critical border pressure (this is assessed using vulnerability assessments or Schengen evaluations). It
would review and approve national capability development plans to ensure consistency with EU
priorities. It would also be granted the right to initiate deployments when national action is delayed or
inadequate. Member States would be obliged to align national operational planning and resource
allocation with Frontex’s strategic priorities, mandating personnel and technical assets contributions
67 Its completion would be a prerequisite for registration as Category 5. The general programme would combine theoretical
modules with practical, scenario-based exercises. The curriculum would complement national training systems by
providing components that are difficult to deliver at the national level.
27
when necessary. Under Scenario C (an ‘extreme’ scenario), Frontex would assume primary
responsibility for the EU’s external borders, with a standing corps that would be increased to 30 000.
Joint command and control structures would be established, placing Member State assets and
personnel under Frontex command or shared command. The same measures as under PO1 would
address the thematic areas related to i) border controls and ii) combating cross-border crime as part
of PD1.1. By contrast, no measures would be proposed for the emergency situations thematic area.
As regards the last thematic area under PD1.1 (visa policy), the measures proposed under PO1 and 2
would be complemented by PM1.1.13 (to establish an explicit competence for Frontex to provide
regular training on detecting fraudulent documents and identifying visa fraud cases); PM1.1.14 (to
enable the temporary deployment of standing corps officers to support Member States’ consular
delegations in processing visa applications); and PM1.1.15 (to deploy Frontex staff to third countries
to carry out the pre-vetting of visa-required travellers before they start their journey to the Schengen
area). EUROSUR (PD1.2) measures proposed under PO1 and 2 (PM1.2.1-PM1.2.11) would be
complemented by measures to upgrade: EUROSUR into an omni-used border surveillance tool
covering the entire EIBM – and particularly returns (PM1.2.14); the ‘surveillance infrastructure at the
Member State level’ (including fixed and mobile systems, geo-location of patrols and assets)
(PM1.2.15); and ‘prevented entries’ at external borders outside border crossing points as a new
indicator for migratory pressure (PM1.2.16) – paired with development of Frontex in-house AI tools
to analyse data from multiple sources (PM1.2.17). Furthermore, policy measures would be proposed
to enable broader access to personal data for maritime, land, and air border situational awareness under
clearly defined safeguards (PM1.2.12) and to enable personal data-processing in relation to social
media monitoring as part of EUROSUR (PM1.2.13). As regards PD 1.3 (the external dimension),
measures proposed under PO1 (PM1.3.1, PM1.3.2, PM1.3.3, PM1.3.3, PM1.3.4 and PM1.3.5) and
PO2 (PM1.3.6 and PM1.3.7) would be complemented by PM1.3.8 to support or join existing bilateral
arrangements between Member States and third countries – subject to Management Board approval
safeguards 68.
As regards PD1.4 (the thematic area on returns), measures proposed under PO1 and 2 would be
complemented by the following measures. Policy measures would further centralise the EU return
framework around Frontex as the central actor coordinating all EU return operations. There would not
in principle be any opt-out possibility for the Member States to perform national return operations
because this task would be supported by the 27/7 Return Support Desk (PM1.4.14C). This approach
would also entail giving Frontex full access to the SIS (including creation of alerts) and establishing a
SIRENE office at Frontex (PM1.4.17C). Policy measures would enhance Frontex’s return activities
in third countries, including by allowing Frontex to lead (finance, organise and coordinate) return
operations in or from third countries under new status agreements that would allow the deployment of
Frontex return teams, with clear conditions and safeguards in place (PM1.4.16C). The Frontex EU
Reintegration Programme would become a fully-fledged EU reintegration service. Its offices would
be staffed with reintegration case workers in third countries. A legal basis would be created for Frontex
to take over responsibility for the digitalisation of return, readmission and reintegration (PM1.4.5C).
As regards measures under PD1.4 concerning governance on return, the policy measures under PO2
would be complemented or partly replaced by rules on a dedicated system governance for returns
(PM1.4.19C).
68 These safeguards include Management Board approval to ensure alignment with Agency priorities and collective
oversight; clear rules on immunities, privileges, and responsibilities for Frontex staff participating in operations under
Member State-led arrangements; the presence of a trilateral arrangement or agreement; and clarifying the roles and rights
of the Member State, Frontex and the third country.
28
5.2.3.2 Policy measures relevant to Problem 2
As regards Frontex capabilities addressed under Problem 2 (with regard to standing corps
architecture and employment conditions as separate Thematic Areas), the same policy measures
would be preserved as under PO2 (and PO1). Like PO2, this option would involve the introduction of
Category 5 in order to better implement EIBM across the entire EBCG and to provide a uniformly
trained and qualified, nationally based pool of officers that would be available for deployment in
exceptional circumstances. This would complement the statutory expansion by ensuring access to
additional trained personnel if operational pressure exceeds the capacity of Categories 1-3. All the
characteristics of the new Category 5 described under PO2 would also apply under this option. The
reasoning behind increasing the overall size of the standing corps as presented under PO1 and 2 would
remain valid. The main difference would concern the size of the standing corps. Accordingly, under
PM2.1.1C, Category 1 would be increased to at least 5 000 officers by 2041 (the target for the new
Category 5 would therefore be 18 000), while the structure and size of Categories 2 and 3 would
remain unchanged. The distribution of profiles within the expanded Category 1 would be determined
through operational planning. An indicative breakdown is presented in Annex 10. This is based on
projected workload and the specialised functions that are expected to arise from the mandate
expansions. These calculations may not reflect the reality of Frontex’s recruitment strategies, but they
do illustrate the scale of reinforcement needed to meet anticipated operational and support demands.
As regards technical equipment and IT systems (PD2.2), PO3 would complement the measures
under PO1 and 2 with the following policy measures. PM2.2.7 would develop and operate EU-owned
strategic technical capabilities for border surveillance (particularly maritime and aerial assets),
including support functions (logistics, maintenance and training), paired with reinforcement of
relevant resources within Frontex. PM2.2.8 would further strengthen compliance with commitments
made by Member States to the TEP (for example, with a stepped mechanism based on remedial
measures, conditionalities linked to funding, and escalation possibility). PM2.2.9 would prepare the
way for the gradual introduction of EU-wide recognition mechanisms in areas that hinder Frontex’s
technical capabilities (e.g. firearm permits, vehicle roadworthiness tests and insurance). PM2.2.10
would enable seamless cross-border deployment of Frontex-operated vessels and aircraft (for
example, adoption of an EU mission flag or pennant – on the basis of a multilateral arrangement for
mutual recognition in cooperation with EASA and EMSA). Under PM2.2.11, Frontex would become
a central purchasing coordinator. Unlike PO2, the feasibility of joint procurement would be explored
for large seaborne and airborne assets, with categories determined in cooperation with Member States
/ SACs.
5.2.3.3 Policy measures relevant to Problem 3
As regards the different pillars of EIBM identified under Problem 3 and as regards training structure,
PO3 combines measures proposed under PO1 (PM3.1.1-PM3.1.10) as well as measures proposed
under PO2 (PM3.1.11-PM3.1.14) with regard to top-up training for Category 5. In addition, PO3
introduces the following non-legislative measures. PM3.1.15 would scale up the training of Category 1
to meet the needs of the expanded standing corps and the broader mandate. This would include
adapting the operational training programme, reinforcing the central training capacity and further
expanding decentralised training deliveries in Member States. For the thematic area related to EIBM
planning, PO3 would build on the measures under PO1 and 2 (PM3.2.1-PM3.2.6 and PM3.2.9-
PM3.2.12) and introduce the following additional legislative measures. PM3.2.17 would mandate
Member States to adopt national EIBM strategies that are aligned with the multiannual EIBM strategic
policy within set timelines and to transmit them to Frontex and the Commission. PM3.2.18 would
29
require NCDPs to be updated at least every three years (or whenever there is any material change) and
for them to be transmitted within one month. PM3.2.19 would amend the rules applicable to joint
procurements with specific obligations as regards cooperation between Frontex and Member States in
follow-up actions. PM3.2.20 would raise the planning brief from an analytical support tool to a core
component of a capability cycle supervised by the Management Board. It would do so by obliging the
Management Board to formally approve the Capability Roadmap every year and to create an annual
oversight mechanism to ensure the coherent translation of risk analysis and vulnerability assessment
outputs into capability development and deployment decisions. No new measures (compared with
PO2) would be proposed as regards quality control.
6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS AND WHO WILL BE AFFECTED?
This section summarises the main expected impacts (economic, social, environmental and on
fundamental rights) of measures that are considered under different policy options (POs) in response
to different problems, problem drivers (PDs) and thematic areas (TAs) in order to make it easier to
identify the issues that are most relevant for the affected stakeholders. The assessment relies on the
evidence collected throughout the Impact Assessment study – including on (as far as possible) the
quantification and monetisation of the impacts considered. The impacts are as far as possible quantified
on the basis of available assessments or modelling. Where dedicated modelling/monetisation was not
possible due to a lack of data, a qualitative assessment was performed to ensure transparency on the
full range of potential effects. Annexes 3 and 4 provide further details on the methodological
approach, detailed tables and estimates. The impacts are assessed in relation to the baseline, on a scale
ranging from -3 (significant negative impact) to 3 (significant positive impact). This Section is
complemented by Annex 11 (cost assessment).
6.1. Economic impacts
The economic impacts primarily relate to the costs of adopting the legislative measures. The following
stakeholder groups are expected to be affected by the proposed measures: the Member States; the
national authorities responsible for border management, returns and coast guard functions (and, to
some extent, police and other law enforcement authorities); Frontex itself and other relevant EU
agencies (particularly Europol and EU-LISA); industry stakeholders (particularly manufacturers and
service providers of border surveillance and control capabilities); EU citizens; and third-country
nationals (particularly migrants, asylum seekers and persons who have exhausted their legal rights to
remain in the EU). The proposed measures would entail significant costs for Frontex’s budget and
would also, to some extent, generate regulatory costs for Member States (e.g. EUROSUR).
Moreover, the digitalisation of return case management systems is expected to generate efficiency
gains and cost savings for Member States and relevant national authorities over time. It would do so
by reducing manual processes, streamlining information exchange and enabling a more efficient use
of resources. The proposed measures might also generate direct and indirect benefits (including
improved operational efficiency and effectiveness in border management); improvements in
combating cross-border crime and smuggling, and by addressing risks related to the issuing of visa
and verification of documents; more comprehensive situational awareness (which may lead to swifter
decision-making and resources); enhanced cooperation in the external dimension; and enhanced return
activities (see Annex 3).
However, where it is possible to quantify costs linked to Frontex’s budget (in line with the available
data), it is also important to take due account of any limitations on quantifying the economic impacts
on other stakeholders (e.g. industry).
30
Figure 1. Overview of estimated costs to Frontex’s budget (EUR million), by policy option and
thematic area, and including both existing costs and impact of policy measures
Thematic area
Policy option 1 Policy option 2 Policy option 3 Preferred policy
option
2028-2034 2035-2041 2028-2034 2035-2041 2028-2034 2035-2041 2028-2034 2035-2041
Returns 1 337 1 910 1 143 1 668 1 168 1 592 1 143 1 668
Standing corps
size and
composition
9 117 16 352 6 547 7 093 6 632 8 371 6 632 8 371
Technical
equipment 1 831 2 478 1 704 1 956 1 918 2 535 1 704 1 956
Other * 868 900 954 985 954 985 954 985
Total (not
adjusted for
inflation)
13 153 21 640 10 348 11 702 10 672 13 483 10 433 12 980
* Linked to measures that reduce costs to and existing/unchanged budget lines.
Industry impacts are mainly driven by measures under PD2.2 on technical equipment and IT systems.
Under PO2 and 3, reinforcing Frontex’s role in joint procurement / central purchasing (PM2.2.2 and
PM2.2.12) and expanding the TEP (PM2.2.5) would be expected to increase the scale and
predictability of procurement for certain equipment categories and associated services (including
maintenance and logistics) – while also potentially reducing transaction costs through the aggregation
and standardisation of requirements. In the aerial surveillance area, the choice between continued
leasing and potential future ownership models has direct implications for the market structure and for
suppliers’ investment incentives. Frontex’s own modelling illustrates the different cost and
expenditure profiles over time.
Figure 4 below provides a general overview of the economic impacts, taking into account different
stakeholders and areas of concern (as described above). A negative number represents a negative
economic impact (i.e. it is a cost for the budget). A positive number represents a positive economic
impact (i.e. it is a saving for the budget).
Figure 4. Overview of economic impacts across thematic areas and policy options 1-3 Problem/Driver Thematic area PO1 PO2 PO3
PD1.1 Border controls -1 -1 -1
PD1.1 Countering cross-border crime 0 0 0
PD1.1 Emergencies and hybrid threats N/A 0 N/A
PD1.1 Visa policy N/A 0 -1
PD1.2 EUROSUR -1 -2 -3
PD1.3 Cooperation with third countries and CSDP missions 0 -1 -2
PD1.3 Cooperation with international organisations -1 -1 -1
PD1.4 Returns -2 -2 -3
PD2.1 Standing corps architecture -3 -1 -2
PD2.1 Employment conditions for the standing corps 2 1 1
PD2.2 Technical equipment and IT systems 0 -1 -3
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Problem/Driver Thematic area PO1 PO2 PO3
PD3.1 Standing corps training -1 -2 -2
PD3.2 EIBM management strategic and integrated planning 1 1 1
PD3.2 Quality assurance mechanisms 1 1 1
6.1.1 Thematic areas with relatively insignificant economic impacts
This section includes areas where the policy options are either not expected to involve any noticeable
and quantifiable costs or savingsor are expected to have minimal cost or saving implications (often
due to minor adjustments in Frontex’s current scope of activities).
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.1 (Frontex’s mandate). Across the policy options,
the legislative measures concerning improvements in border control in terms of legislative clarity
(PM1.1.1, PM1.1.2 and PM1.1.3) as well as the definition of deployments and chain of command
(PM1.1.4) would entail some limited costs but deliver substantial operational gains. Some Member
States may have to carry out significant IT and infrastructure upgrades using Frontex and EU funds
support, but these would be one-off investments that would be offset by long-term efficiency gains.
Neither the legislative clarifications concerning the exercise of executive powers (PM1.1.7 and
PM1.1.8) nor the rules on data sharing with Europol (PM1.1.9) wouldhave a direct economic
impact. Some savings are possible due to more efficient use of available resources if standing corps
officers perform executive powers more autonomously. The increase in the number of the standing
corps officers involved in Europol-coordinated joint action days (JADs) and EMPACT operational
actions could also lead to security gains that could have economic value 69. In 2024, with roughly
65 standing corps Category 1 specialists focusing on cross-border crime and vehicle crime 70, Frontex
played an important role in these exercises 71. The hypothetical increase of these specialists to around
150 (more than doubling current capacity) would probably expand potential participation in JADs and
EMPACT actions, both quantitatively and geographically. It would also increase Frontex’s ability to
assist Member States in pre-operational planning and post-operational follow-up – thus deepening not
only its presence but also its qualitative contribution 72. As regards visa policy, only PO3 (with
exceptional deployments in third countries (PM1.1.16)) could entail more significant extra costs – due
to the difference between a ‘typical’ deployment and this specific deployment mission in consulates
in third countries. However, the overall impact would be minimal due to the exceptional and short-
term nature of such deployments. Clarifications of Frontex’s role in emergency situations and hybrid
threats at the EU’s external borders (PM1.1.11 and PM1.1.12) do not have an economic impact in
themselves.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.3 (external dimension). Only PO2 and 3 could
entail limited extra costs. These would be due to Frontex’s increased engagement in more third
countries and related EU-funded projects in border management, because this would require extra
appropriate human and administrative resources to execute the projects. PO3 (with PM1.3.8 as well
as policy measures under other options) would have a moderate economic impact because Frontex
69 These actions had sizeable outputs. 503 stolen vehicles, 740 firearms, large quantities of drugs (e.g. about 49 tonnes of
cocaine), almost 99 million cigarettes, as well as 1 374 identified victims (including 153 children) and 401 migrant
smugglers were detected. 70 Frontex (2025) Consolidated Annual Activities Report 2024, p. 36. 71 Frontex led or co-led 7 of the 9 JADs implemented across the EU. It also participated in 101 operational actions (9 times
as the action leader, 22 times as a co-leader and 70 times as a participant). 72 The study accompanying the Impact Assessment (using 2024 results as a baseline) indicates that this would, for example,
mean the following: annual detections of stolen vehicles rising from 503 to 650-800; seizures of illicit drugs (e.g. cocaine)
rising from about 49 tonnes to roughly 64-79 tonnes of cocaine; seizures of illicit firearms rising from 740 to about
950-1 200; and identified victims of trafficking and smuggling rising from 1 374 to around 1 800-2 200 (with a similar
proportional rise in identified smugglers – from 401 to roughly 520-640).
32
would operationalise activities in third countries by supporting or joining the bilateral arrangements of
Member States. This could increase administrative, human resource and financial burdens (due, for
example, to increased equipment or financing needs). PO1 (with PM1.3.1-1.3.5) would not entail
additional costs because it focuses on modifying existing practices and removing legislative limitations
and because it would only moderately increase the number of Frontex’s activities in the future. For
cooperation with international organisations, the additional cost of PO1 (PM1.3.6A) and PO2
(PM1.3.6.B) would be limited, because the administrative burden and human resources would be
spread over a longer period that would be necessary in order to negotiate underlying working
arrangements and because the number of international organisations that are relevant to Frontex’s
mandate is limited.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD3.2 (planning and quality assurance). Measures
proposed across all policy options are expected to entail only limited additional costs,because they
are largely based on the existing tools and communication platforms 73, even if Frontex and the
Member States would be required to carry out some additional administrative tasks in order to
introduce the template and ensure the coordination of planning cycles or strategic planning calendar
by synchronising all major planning and reporting requirements across the EBCG 74. The benefits of
the proposed measures across the policy options (better coordination, transparency and preparedness)
would counterbalance costs 75. Likewise, measures proposed as regards vulnerability assessment –
expanding its scope (PM3.2.7, PM3.2.8 and PM3.2.13) and the enforceability of recommended
measures (PM3.2.14) – would have a minimal but positive economic impact, because they would
enhance information flows without imposing new operational requirements. The capacities of key
internal oversight bodies (i.e. DPO, FRO, IAC and ICO) under PM3.2.16 would require minimal
additional resources, because the measures could entail an increase in administrative and staffing costs,
recruitment of staff and investment in training – but without establishing new structures.
6.1.2 Thematic areas with potentially more significant economic impacts
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.4 (returns). The economic impacts would relate to
the projected costs of return activities, as well as to costs and savings linked to specific policy
measures. They include the costs of return-related equipment (e.g. charter flights) but do not include
the costs of deploying standing corps officers as part of return operations, because these are regarded
as part of the standing corps architecture and are linked to the growth of the standing corps. The
baseline costs are derived from the 2024 return costs – assuming an 8% annual growth rate until 2034
and a moderated 2% growth rate thereafter to reflect uncertainty about long-term trends. In line with
historical data and expert opinions, the number of Frontex-supported returnees is assumed to be 60 000
annually (scaling with the cost growth rate). Expansion of Frontex’s coordination role in returns (PO2
and PO3) results in additional governance costs that are estimated at 2.5% of baseline costs for PO2
and 5% for PO3. Expanding Frontex’s role may increase costs due to a potential increase in the number
of returnees processed – compared with the baseline scenario. However, the full extent of these costs
cannot be quantified at this stage. Conversely, this expansion would also generate cost savings due to
the increased efficiency of Frontex-managed returns. These savings may arise from operational
efficiencies on charters, reduced instances of booking or aborting of scheduled forced returns, fewer
empty charter seats and a shift towards voluntary returns. Savings are based on the cost differential
between voluntary returns (EUR 560) and forced returns (EUR 3 414 or EUR 6 000, depending on the
73 For instance, the methodology for national capability development plans (NCDPs) is reflected in the template approved
by the Management Board (Decision 28/2024). 74 Frontex already provides methodological and IT support (for example, via communication channels used for
vulnerability assessments). 75 For example, development of scenario-based planning would make planning more practical and crisis-ready by applying
risk analysis and intelligence in concrete scenarios. This would improve preparedness and enhance the resilience of national
systems. Costs would be limited to using the staff time of Frontex experts.
33
return case). Returns measures under PO1 are expected to require some investment but also to generate
efficiency gains (e.g. lower per-case costs over time). In particular, improving operational coordination
is expected to generate some efficiency gains (by, for example, strengthening Frontex’s role in
planning and coordinating returns through PM1.4.1A) that could potentially lower the operational
costs for return-related activities over time compared with the baseline – while also allowing Frontex
to play a greater role in returns and, overall, increasing the volume of return-related activities.
Additional economic impacts would be generated by increased administrative, HR and IT
development/expansion costs linked to the introduction of shared platforms or the creation of an EU
platform for identification data; as well as to Frontex’s responsibilities concerning the proposal to
digitalise case management in the areas of return, readmission and reintegration (including
consolidating and enhancing the interoperability of several digital tools managing cases in these areas)
(PM1.4.8, PM1.4.9 and PM1.4.10). Focusing and strengtheningthe EURP and leveraging increased
capacity-building activities in third countries may also have moderate additional budgetary impacts
for Frontex (PM1.4.7) as well as increase the resources necessary for the monitoring system (PM1.4.3)
and the expanded vulnerability assessment (PM1.4.4). However, these costs will not be addressed here
because they are directly linked to the proposal for a regulation on digitalisation of case management
in the area of return, readmission and reintegration 76. The overall amount envisaged for returns under
PO1 is estimated at around EUR 1.3 billion in the first MFF period and EUR 1.9 billion in the second
MFF period. PO2 significantly alters Frontex’s role and generates significant costs by making Frontex
the default return operator (PM1.4.14B) and expanding third-country return activities (PM1.4.16B) –
thereby significantly increasing the number of activities and return operations (in terms of both
absolute numbers and the share of all activities supported by Frontex). However, it was not possible
to capture the full extent of these costs, because the number of returnees processed by Frontex may be
greater than expected. The development of in-house identification capacities at Frontex will have a
significant economic impact due to the need for additional HR, IT and technical resources. Improving
return coordination is expected to generate total savings of EUR 194 million for 2028-2034 and
EUR 242 million for 2035-2041. These will be achieved by reducing charter costs through better seat-
fill and pooling; by reducing the number of cancelled forced-return bookings; and from the positive
financial effects deriving from favouring voluntary returns over forced ones (PM1.4.1B). Some costs
can be expected to be generated by Frontex’s assumption of responsibility for reintegration efforts of
the EU and taking on a role in the digitalisation of return, readmission and reintegration (PM1.4.5B);
the introduction of Frontex return liaison officers (PM1.4.13B); and support on standardised return
and reintegration counselling (PM1.4.18). The overall EU return figures (including the share of
Frontex-supported returns among all returns effected by Member States) are expected to increase due
to Frontex’s enhanced coordination role and assistance efforts. Efficiencies may also be generated
because there will now be a permanent, professionalised workforce (such efficiencies may include
smoother planning of return escorts, more predictable deployment cycles and potentially lower per-
case costs over time), but these gains are unlikely to outweigh the substantial investment required.
Considering both costs and savings, the overall costs envisaged under PO2 (taking into account this
limitation) are estimated at around EUR 1.14 billion in the first MFF and nearly EUR 1.67 billion in
the second MFF. PO3 would centralise all EU returns under Frontex and involve the permanent
deployment of return specialists and escorts (PM1.4.14C). Additionally, enhanced cooperation with
third countries (including the deployment of return specialists in third countries would be envisaged)
(PM1.4.16C), together with the refocusing and strengthening of the EURP (PM1.4.7). Technical
equipment costs also rise markedly – reflecting the additional IT systems, operational equipment and
infrastructure required to support a larger and more active operational workforce. Overall, estimated
76 The estimated cost entailed by expanding Frontex’s role on digital matters ranges between EUR 115 million and
EUR 147 million (assuming two years of one-off development and six years of ongoing maintenance and support). For
more details, please refer to the impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal to digitalise case management
in the area of return, readmission and reintegration.
34
costs would be EUR 1.17 billion in the first MFF and EUR 1.6 billion in the second MFF (assuming
the same limitations as those under PO2). The expected cost savings would amount to
EUR 170 million for 2028-2034 and EUR 318 million for 2035-2041. They would be achieved by
centralising EU return operations under Frontex, thus allowing the EU to leverage economies of scale
(for example, via joint procurement of service providers). Centralised planning and pooling may
generate operational efficiencies (e.g. improved aircraft fill rates, greater consistency in the use of
return escorts and logistical resources, and reduced costs associated with separate national contracts
with external partners). Larger volumes could also drive down per-beneficiary costs and improve
negotiating power with implementing partners. However, the initial transition would entail
considerable set-up costs that would probably not be offset over time. The overall necessary budget is
expected to increase due to the need to increase the assistance provided by Frontex in all phases of the
return procedure.
The measures proposed across policy options in the area of governance for returns reflect the
development of Frontex’s tasks and the standing corps role. They build on existing structures and
processes and would not generate additional costs. They would at most require only minimal
administrative adjustments (for example, in the secretariat of the Management Board) that Frontex’s
budget would have to cover.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD2.1 (standing corps). The increase in size to 30 000
in the formula proposed under all policy options will have very different economic impacts, depending
on the composition of the different categories. The economic impact considered in relation to the
standing corps architecture includes staffing costs for Category 1 (including operational expenditure);
deployment costs for all categories (taking into account the potential savings linked to a new
deployment system defined under PM2.1.8); and the financial support provided to Member States
under Article 61. These are the largest cost drivers in all the options. PO1 envisages significantly
higher costs in both MFFs (tripling by 2041) due to the gradual expansion of all categories. In this
scenario, the staffing costs for Category 1 alone (reaching 9 000 officers by 2041) would account for
EUR 3.5 billion in the first MFF and nearly EUR 6.5 billion in the second MFF. Deployment costs
based on the revised deployment system (considered at 100% capacity across all categories) would
also be very significant, reaching EUR 1.9 billion and EUR 3.6 billion in the first and second MFFs
respectively. Costs linked to the financial support under Article 61 would amount to EUR 2.5 billion
and EUR 4.7 billion in the first and second MFFs respectively. PO2’s standing corps architecture
maintains the current categories in line with the 2027 targets but also introduces a new Category 5
(20 000 officers) that would entail significant costs for Frontex (albeit to a much more moderate
extent). Staffing costs for Category 1 would amount to nearly EUR 2.6 billion in both MFFs.
Deployments and financial support under Article 61 for all existing categories would amount to
EUR 1.5 billion and EUR 1.3 billion in the first and second MFFs respectively. The new Category 5
deployment costs would have a very moderate impact – given the exceptional nature of their
deployments – and are estimated at approximately EUR 25 million in each MFF. The costs linked to
the financial support under Article 61 for new Category 5 would be more significant. These are
calculated using the Category 3 methodology and estimated at EUR 295 million. PO3 combines the
growth in Category 1 staff (assumed to be 5 000 officers by 2041) with the introduction of the new
Category 5 (18 000 by 2041). Staffing costs would be significantly lower than under PO1 under this
policy option but would still be greater than under PO2 – particularly in the second MFF
(EUR 2.9 billion and EUR 3.8 billion in the first and second MFFs respectively). Deployment costs
for Category 1 in PO3 would also be higher than under PO2 and the difference would increase in the
second MFF (approximately EUR 114 million). The costs for Categories 2 and 3 in PO3 would remain
the same as under PO2, but Category 5 costs linked to the financial support under Article 61 would be
lower (EUR 73 million and EUR 265 million in the first and second MFFs respectively).
35
Other measures linked to the standing corps architecture across all policy options (PM2.1.2, 2.1.3,
2.1.4 and 2.1.5) are not expected to generate additional economic impacts. However, some measures
linked with the employment conditions of the standing corps would generate costs and savings.
These are significantly affected by the underlying number of standing corps Category 1. PM2.1.8
proposes a change to the current mission system (establishing the place of deployment as the place of
employment in most cases). Deployments to third countries remain estimated under the generally
applicable mission framework. For example, by comparison with the costs generated by the current
mission system in PO3, this approach would result in average annual savings of EUR 131.8 million
for PO3 in MFF1 and EUR 170 million in MFF2 (taking into account deployment costs for Category 1
and Category 2 standing corps officers). These savings are calculated on the basis of deployment costs
alone and not on the basis of the impact on salaries and staffing costs. Additionally, the current
allowances linked to work patterns applicable to Category 1 officers would be extended, generating
additional costs that would be covered by staffing costs.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD3.1 (training). The impacts of standing corps training
measures concern costs related to the increase in Frontex’s training capacity, which is itself directly
linked to the growth of the standing corps. The costs are primarily driven by the expansion of the
EIBM top-up training for Category 5 (PO2 and PO3), alongside basic and specialisation training for
all categories. The calculation of the specialisation training costs is based on the number of deployable
standing corps officers. The overall training costs are based on the assumption that a training centre
would be established in Warsaw for Category 1 basic training and Category 5 top-up training (under
PO2 and PO3). Overall, the costs are estimated at nearly EUR 43 million (MFF 1) and
EUR 74 million (MFF2) under PO1; EUR 98 million (MFF1) and EUR 193 million (MFF2) under
PO2;and EUR 97 million (MFF1) and EUR 180 million (MFF2) under PO3. The cost estimates for
the standing corps are subject to two key limitations and uncertainties (these are detailed in
Annex 11). First, the overall figures rely on generic assumptions (detailed costs and human resource
requirements would be definitively determined at later stages of implementation). The unit costsused
as a basis for calculating deployment costs are based on expenditure data from 2024 (a year without
major crises). The estimates may therefore understate the financial implications of large-scale or crisis-
driven deployments (e.g. sudden migration pressures or hybrid threats). Second, training centre costs
assume a scaled-up rental model based on Frontex’s initial estimate for 600 officers. This approach
takes increased capacity needs into account but not the potential purchase of a dedicated building (this
could entail higher upfront costs but reduce expenses in the longer term).
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD2.2. Technical equipment is one of the main cost
drivers, covering impacts linked to Frontex’s technical capabilities (particularly the technical
equipment pool (TEP); state-of-the-art situational awareness tools; and mobile and portable equipment
for the standing corps deployments). Under PO3, it also covers the potential shift from the current
service-based and Member-State-pooled model towards EU-owned strategic aerial and maritime
surveillance assets. Under PO1 and PO2, Frontex continues to lease or rent aerial surveillance services
under framework contracts. There are no plans to increase the scope of aerial surveillance activities.
Maritime surveillance assets remain primarily pooled from Member States. It should be noted that all
policy options entail Frontex providing personal, portable and mobile equipment for standing corps
Categories 1 and 2 – while Category 3 deploys with Member State-owned equipment and uniforms.
Moreover, it is assumed that Member State contributions to the TEP will remain at current levels,
given uncertainty around future co-financing under specific actions. Under PO1, no material change
is expected for technical equipment (beyond legal clarity on ETIAS/FADO tasks under PM2.2.1), so
budgetary impacts remain limited. Under PO2, measures to improve access to and availability of
technical equipment include reinforcing Frontex’s role as central purchasing coordinator via joint
procurement (PM2.2.2); establishing a central logistics and fleet-management structure (PM2.2.3);
36
strengthening participation in Coordinated Maritime Presence (PM2.2.4); expanding the TEP
(PM2.2.5); and introducing a stepped mechanism to address persistent non-compliance with agreed
TEP-availability commitments (PM2.2.6). These measures are not expected to materially change the
overall expenditure envelope for technical equipment in the quantified cost assessment, which remains
aligned with PO1. The overall costs for technical equipment under PO1 are therefore estimated at
nearly EUR 1.83 billion (in the first MFF) and EUR 2.47 billion (in the second MFF). The overall
costs for technical equipment under PO2 are estimated at nearly EUR 1.7 billion (2028-2034) and
EUR 1.95 billion (2035-2041). Other technical equipment (e.g. vehicles, mobile surveillance systems,
PPE/uniforms and portable detection equipment) is costed on the basis of historical framework
contract values (scaled in proportion to Category 1 and 2 deployments). For reference, in 2024, this
corresponded to approximately EUR 5 000-6 000 per deployed Category 1 and 2 officer. Under PO3,
Frontex would shift from a service-based, Member State-pooled model towards EU-owned strategic
technical capabilities for border surveillance assets (PM2.2.7). This would entail significant costs
– particularly when Frontex progressively shifts from predominantly renting and contracting out
services towards owning assets (particularly in aerial and maritime surveillance); and develops the
associated maintenance/logistics capacity (e.g. insurance, contracted support, specialist crew,
operational bases, hangars and docking/ shipyard arrangements). These dynamics are reflected in the
cost assessment (Annex 11), including modelling of ‘rent’ versus ‘own’ scenarios for key capabilities.
The ‘own’ scenario assumes a progressive replacement of Member-State-pooled assets by 2041.
Alternative mixes (for example, limiting Frontex ownership to coastal patrol boats and vessels while
co-financing or chartering offshore patrol vessels) would materially alter the capital / operating
expenditure profile and infrastructure needs. The overall costs for technical equipment under PO3 are
estimated at nearly EUR 1.92 billion (2028-2034) and EUR 2.53 billion (2035-2041). Additionally,
some moderate costs are expected to arise from expanding and modernising the TEP under both policy
options (estimated at around EUR 10 million per year in MFF1 and EUR 15 million per year in the
MFF2 period). Overall, the measures proposed under PO3 are expected to have the highest cost
impact. They go beyond clarifications and incremental improvements and instead address the main
3% of Category 1: (i) higher and more predictable availability of deployable operational capacity
(standing corps build-up and deployment system (PM2.1.1); (ii) improved availability of technical
equipment (including strategic capabilities and stronger compliance with TEP commitments)
(PM2.2.7-PM2.2.8, building also on PM2.2.5-PM2.2.6); (iii) stronger interoperability and integrated
planning across Member States and Frontex (removing operational bottlenecks to deploy and operate
assets across borders and harmonising key enablers (PM2.2.9-PM2.2.10); a reinforced EIBM planning
cycle and capability-planning supervised by the Management Board (PM3.2.7-PM3.2.14) plus
interoperable command / training elements where relevant; and (iv) a more sustainable capability
model for key functions (moving from ad hoc short-term arrangements towards a structured capability
model for aerial and maritime surveillance with appropriate support functions and coordinated
procurement/logistics)(PM2.2.7 and PM2.2.11, building also on PM2.2.3). PO3 would deliver more
far-reaching capability autonomy (particularly through an ‘own’ model for strategic aerial/maritime
assets) but would also involve higher budgetary costs. The preferred approach for technical equipment
therefore remains PO2, because it strengthens access, availability, deployability and compliance
– within a broadly stable expenditure envelope and with lower implementation risk.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.2 (EUROSUR). The implementation of measures
to improve and expand EUROSUR will entail significant costs because the Member States will need
to invest in technological solutions and additional human resources. Under PO1, most expenses are
generated by the extension of the scope of data to be collected in EUROSUR covering internal security,
including hybrid threats and the provision of the forward-looking situational picture (PM1.2.6 and
PM1.2.1). Moderate costs are linked to the inclusion of EUROSUR data quality in the vulnerability
assessment processes provided under PO1 and PO2 (PM1.2.11 and PM3.2.3) because Member States
would need to provide more data than are currently required under the existing legislative framework
37
(this would in turn require additional staff). However, the costs under PO1 and PO2 would be
mitigated by positive operational gains (i.e. enhanced reliability of situational awareness at the
regional and EU levels; and more concrete, timely and accurate data that will enable better planning,
tasking and decision-making in border surveillance and related operations). The most resource-
intensive and technologically ambitious set of changes is proposed under PO3: both the inclusion in
EUROSUR of new categories of data (e.g. the return-related information or new indicators on
prevented entries) (PM1.2.16) and enabling Frontex to directly access the outputs from the national
surveillance assets (PM1.2.15) would require not only significant human resources from Member
States and Frontex but also require adjustments to the existing IT solutions. The development of an in-
house AI tool by Frontex (PM1.2.17) – a technological novelty in itself – would absorb a significant
part of Frontex’s budget. This assessment focuses solely on the ICT-related costs of expanding
EUROSUR as an information exchange and operational cooperation framework. It excludes the costs
of state-of-the-art surveillance tools, which are addressed separately under technical equipment
(PD2.2). Furthermore, the costs can only be assessed once the scope of the changes (particularly in
PO3) has been well defined. These costs will depend on several factors. One key factor would be
Frontex’s practical choice between using the existing infrastructure to roll out new EUROSUR features
and developing entirely new IT solutions. Another factor would be the availability of IT specialists
and their contracts (Frontex own staff or external contractors), hardware licences and their quantities.
Other factors include the scope of one-off costs and recurrent ones; the level of Member States’ IT
progress in implementing the existing EUROSUR; the extent of changes to the business architecture;
and market uncertainties and risks. The uncertainty surrounding the final scope of modifications means
that accurate cost estimates cannot yet be provided.
6.2. Social impacts
Figure 5. Overview of social impacts across policy options (PO) of policy measures (PM) responding
to problem driver (PD) / thematic area (TA)
Problem driver Thematic area PO1 PO2 PO3
PD1.1 Border controls 3 3 2
PD1.1 Countering cross-border crime 1 N/A N/A
PD1.1 Emergencies and hybrid threats N/A 2 N/A
PD1.1 Visa policy N/A 2 2
PD1.2 EUROSUR 2 2 1
PD1.3 Cooperation with third countries and CSDP missions 2 2 3
PD1.3 Cooperation with international organisations 2 2 2
PD1.4 Returns including governance 2 2 2
PD2.1 Standing corps architecture 2 3 3
PD2.1 Employment conditions for the standing corps 2 2 1
PD2.2 Technical equipment and IT systems 1 1 1
PD3.1 Standing corps training 3 3 3
PD3.2 EIBM management strategic and integrated planning 1 2 1
PD3.2 Quality control mechanisms 1 2 2
This initiative is expected to affect the same stakeholder groups as economic impacts.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.1. Across all policy options, the policy measures for
thematic areas related to border control and combating cross-border crime are expected to have a
range of positive operational impacts on all stakeholders concerned. Measures such as recognising
the executive powers of the standing corps (PM1.1.1) or granting Frontex first-line access (PM1.1.3)
are intended to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of deployments – by improving deployment
38
readiness, the interoperability of officers and clarity in roles and responsibilities. PM1.1.4 (related to
Frontex’s operational concept) and PM1.1.5 (on funding for Member States’ hosting capacity) are
intended to, respectively, establish Frontex’s operational structures in legislation and assist the
Member States in establishing the infrastructure needed to host joint deployments. Officers would be
more interoperable with counterparts from other national authorities and Frontex – thus improving
working conditions and the subdivision of tasks and responsibilities. These changes would give
national authorities clear operational counterparts – thus improving joint deployment effectiveness,
promoting mutual trust and reducing the operational burdens currently associated with Frontex
deployments. This would in turn have the benefit of normalising joint operations as a flexible tool to
achieve operational objectives. There would also be positive institutional impacts linked to efficiency
gains because resources that are currently tied to escorting Frontex staff would be freed up. Granting
the standing corps access to relevant databases in first-line border checks would allow them to
contribute to border checks more comprehensively. Taken together, these measures would have a
positive social and economic impact on travellers and cross-border trade by making it possible to
reduce the time spent in queues at borders (particularly at land borders). They would also – together
with the revision of rules applicable to the processing of operational personal data – make the handling
of illegal crossings more effective, reduce cross-border crime and promote safer communities
(particularly those near the EU’s external border). Overall, the EU’s external border would be better
managed and safer, with greater trust between competent authorities and citizens in the EU and
confidence in the value that the EU (including Frontex) can add to the management of borders and
migration. The scenarios considered under PO3 (reinforcing the autonomy of Frontex or shifting the
entire responsibility for border management and return to Frontex) would increase Frontex’s exposure
– across all three scenarios. Expanding Frontex’s capacities is expected to be a lengthy process that
will last until 2041. This imbalance could in some circumstances (e.g. increased migratory pressure as
well as incidents at the borders or at the sea) undermine trust in Frontex, thus diminishing the overall
positive social impacts of measures proposed under this thematic area.
Only PO2 contains measures for the emergencies and hybrid threats thematic area. These measures
would positively impact social outcomes by enabling coordinated EU responses to emergencies and
hybrid threats, and by improving interoperability with national efforts. They would thus strengthen the
EU’s overall resilience and responsiveness. As regards the visa policy thematic area, all the measures
under PO2 and PO3 would have a positive impact on operations, but each option’s score would be
driven by different underlying factors but for different underlying reasons. Measures under PO2 would
enable consular staff to better anticipate risks, standardise practices to combat visa shopping and fraud
trends, and disrupt fraud networks at an early stage 77. Additional measures under PO3 would have a
neutral score due to the need for more extensive legal modification and necessary resources – thus
maintaining the score for the measures proposed under PO2 (and PO3).
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.2. The policy measures considered for EUROSUR
under PO1 and PO2 would have various positive operational impacts (particularly for NCC, national
authorities and Frontex). Measures proposed under PO1 (PM1.2.1-PM1.2.8) would improve the
operation of EUROSUR by boosting situational awareness and thus preparedness within EBCG.
PM1.2.9 and PM1.2.10 (both proposed under PO2) would require additional safeguards for two
reasons. The first reason is the need to ensure alignment with the principles of data minimisation and
purpose limitation. The second reason is the need to avoid negative societal impacts, such as
discriminatory profiling or misuse in the context of data added under PM1.2.9 and the use of social
media monitoring under PM1.2.10.These would counterbalance the operationally positive impacts of
reinforcing the forward-looking approach, response capabilities, the earlier detection of smuggling
routes, recruitment and facilitation. The overall score of measures under PO1 and PO2 would therefore
77 Most national authorities (65% – 23 out of 35) that responded to the survey of 17 Member States agreed or strongly
agreed that Frontex should conduct country-risk analyses.
39
be the same. This also feeds into the broader consideration of whether increasing the volume and
categories of personal data to be processed within the framework of EUROSUR would enhance
EUROSUR’s ability to fulfil its stated objectives – or hinder it. Achieving near real-time situational
awareness requires more complete, timely and accurate data. It does not necessarily require any
processing of personal data. Additional roles for EUROSUR (e.g. hypothetical EBCG-wide exchanges
of potentially relevant personal data) could compromise and distract attention from this overarching
situational-awareness-related objective. Policy measures in PO3 (PM1.2.12-PM1.2.18) would
therefore score lower. Broadening the scope of personal data that could be processed in EUROSUR
would redefine EUROSUR’s purpose and could increase situational awareness and predictive
capabilities, but it would also have significant economic impacts and require dedicated resources that
would have to be diverted from elsewhere – thus undermining the operational impacts. Incomplete
or incorrect operationalisation could result in no improvement in situational awareness and an inability
to perform the expected additional tasks. It could also have negative operational and institutional
impacts. In addition, PM1.2.12-PM1.2.18 would require the establishment of an entirely new
framework for oversight and data protection compliance – in order to prevent potential negative social
impacts such as violations of data subjects’ rights, disproportionate surveillance and the social
reactions that these impacts would reasonably generate.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.3. Measures covering collaboration between Frontex
and key third countries and CSDP missions and international organisations are expected to have
a positive impact across all options (particularly on third-country border management authorities;
international organisations and CSDP missions; Member State authorities and border guards; EU
citizens; and migrants and asylum seekers). The measures proposed under all three options would
enable Frontex to work with these partners more effectively. They would also have an overall positive
institutional and operational impact on border and migration management – the measures proposed
under Options 1 and 2 and PM1.3.8 (which proposes that Frontex should support/join Member States’
bilateral arrangements with third countries) emerging as the most impactful thanks to their cumulative
effect, with the result that Option 3 scores the highest. Faster and more flexible arrangements could
also enable more capacity-building, training and joint initiatives with key third countries; as well as
build public confidence in the EU’s border and migration management efforts in these countries and
their regions (social impact). A more flexible deployment of Frontex liaison officers would allow
resources to be allocated more efficiently, thus eliminating unnecessary administrative burdens.
Enhancing Frontex’s flexibility in cooperating with international organisations under both PO1 and
PO2 would enable collaboration with organisations that are relevant prospective partners but currently
out of scope (institutional and social impact).
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.4. The overall objective of measures proposed in the
area of return is to strengthen operational impacts (particularly on Member States and national
authorities that are responsible for returns) – first and foremost by increasing the number of effective
returns from the EU to third countries. Measures such as requiring the adoption of EU-level guidance
document and aligning planning cycles (PM1.4.1A) and, even more so, making Frontex the main EU
actor on return as well as pre-return and post-return related activities (PM1.4.1B) would increase
EBCG-wide coordination – identifying and exploiting synergies while ensuring that returns across the
EU are performed coherently and in consistent compliance with high standards. This would in turn
have various positive social impacts, particularly for returnees. Returnees would benefit from
uniformly high standards for treatment across pre-return, return, and post-return, in full compliance
with EU law and international standards. These measures would also boost the effectiveness of the
EU’s return framework as a whole – leading to the timely return of a greater share of persons currently
residing in the EU without a legal right to stay. This could in turn increase the credibility of the EU’s
return framework – thus not only increasing citizens’ trust in the EU institutions but also discouraging
attempts to enter illegally that all too often involve dangerous methods and result in loss of human life.
A similar logic applies to PM1.4.5B (establishing the legal bases for Frontex’s reintegration activities
40
so that it can assume greater responsibility for reintegration efforts through the Frontex EURP and
play a role in digitalisation) and PM1.4.18 (on Frontex supporting the development of standardised
return counselling and reintegration counselling across the EU). Extending reintegration support for
returnees to more countries would have a significant operational impact because earlier counselling
to more people and with a wider geographic reach would improve access to voluntary returns, which
are operationally cheaper and easier to arrange. This approach would also have the positive social
impact of providing better support for persons in vulnerable situations and promoting sustainable
reintegration, thus making the return process more humane and predictable. Similarly, standardised
return counselling and reintegration would improve reintegration outcomes and have a significant
social impact forreturnees, who would receive more uniform and timely information as well as high-
quality assistance tailored to their specific circumstances. PM1.4.16B (enabling Frontex to support
third-country-to-third-country returns) would have a varied social impact. From the institutional
impact standpoint, Frontex support could alleviate migratory pressure on partner countries along
migratory routes towards the EU, thus building trust with third countries’ authorities and facilitating
broader cooperation. From the social impact point of view, helping people to return home from places
where they may have become stranded while making their way towards the EU should help to prevent
them from falling prey to migrant smugglers and human traffickers. Frontex’s support to third
countries is also an opportunity to promote the application of good practices and strengthen
cooperation with third countries. Potential risks exist, but appropriate safeguards should be put in place
to ensure that Frontex operates in full compliance with EU law and international standards. PM1.4.16B
will therefore need to be accompanied by appropriate safeguards and carried out alongside pragmatic
mitigating measures. Stronger, more transparent and accountable governance for returns paired with
adequate oversightcould result in positive operational impacts (for example, more effective
monitoring; stronger overall compliance with safeguards; enhanced timeliness and quality of
investigations into incidents; and robust responses to identified wrongdoings and potential cases of
fraud), thus fostering a culture of responsibility and accountability within Frontex and the EBCG as a
whole. Such measures could in turn foster positive social impacts that are related to public confidence
in the EU’s capacity to manage migration flows and external border security in a manner that upholds
EU values and legal standards. They could also discourage cross-border crime. A recognised role for
working groups (e.g. the HLRTR and the EIBM working group) and strengthened coordination would
have positive operational impacts (including more effective cooperation and improved oversight of
the Management Board on return activities) and could ensure quality assurance on the return
framework – addressing technical, operational and implementation issues more efficiently and
ensuring operational focus (PM1.4.19B, PM1.4.20 and PM1.4.21).
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD2.1 (standing corps). The introduction of a new
Category 5 is, along with targeted top-up training, expected to have considerable positive operational
impacts – primarily by promoting a more harmonised understanding and uptake of common EU
standards and principles of EIBM by all the EBCG’s officers. Related measures (e.g. PM2.1.1B
establishing Category 5 as a capabilities-harmonisation reserve within the standing corps), would
strengthen interoperability in joint operations as well as enhance mutual trust, officers’ preparedness
and the professionalism of all EBCG staff. The policy measures could improve conditions for standing
corps officers by making Frontex a more attractive employer that offers the possibility of a long-term,
transparent career path. This would involve improving officer motivation, compensation and
employment conditions. The measures would also have the institutional impacts of providing the
EBCG as a whole with a ‘common language’ for border management. That would enable each national
authority (and Frontex) to use the available resources with greater impact and flexibility. These
measures could also improve the overall quality and consistency of Frontex deployments, thus making
the workforce more stable and professional. These impacts would translate into positive social
impacts. An interoperable workforce at the external borders that operates according to uniform and
consistently high standards would translate into smoother and more efficient border-crossing
41
experiences for legal border-crossers (e.g. travellers and traders). It would also more effectively hinder
cross-border crime, thus making communities safer and reducing crime in our society as a whole. This
cascade of positive impacts would grow over time (along with the increase in the number of officers
that will undergo EIBM training to qualify as Category 5 officers and then go on to apply this training
in their daily tasks and deployments).
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD2.2. Measures across all policy options in relation to
equipment primarily affect operational delivery capacity (availability, deployability and reliability of
technical equipment and related IT enablers). Their impacts are therefore mostly indirect, building
towards reduced disruptions for lawful travellers and border communities – due to operations
becoming more predictable and effective; more consistent border surveillance and response; and
improved safety and working conditions for deployed staff (thanks to less ad hoc logistical support
and fewer operational disruptions). This explains why the overall social impact score remains positive
but limited across all the options. Under PM2.2.1 (PO1), the key added value would be greater legal
clarity on Frontex tasks linked to the management of ETIAS and FADO that have a small positive
social impact. This greater legal clarity would be achieved by reducing uncertainty and supporting a
more coherent implementation of EU border-management IT systems. However, PO1 does not
materially change the underlying model of technical equipment availability (TEP levels and recurring
shortages remain broadly driven by existing planning and budget constraints), so wider social effects
are expected to remain limited. Under PO2, the proposed measures are expected to contribute to more
reliable deployments and better workflow continuity (PM2.2.2-PM2.2.7 will reduce the time lost to
avoidable logistical problems and administrative friction). This could in turn slightly improve staff
safety and working conditions as well as increase the predictability of operations for border
communities. It is nevertheless important to note that these are enabling measures whose effects
depend on practical uptake. The net social impact therefore remains moderate rather than
transformative. Under PO3, the approach builds on PO2 and supports a more strategic technical
capability model for border surveillance. This includes options that would gradually reduce reliance
on short-term ad hoc arrangements (for example, through scenarios in which Frontex moves towards
a more substantial aerial and maritime capability) and associated operational support functions
(PM2.2.8-PM2.2.12). This could over time strengthen the predictability of surveillance support and
resilience in specific high-pressure contexts. That could in turn translate into modest positive social
outcomes (perceptions of security and reduced disruption). However, the societal effects remain
largely indirect and implementation-sensitive. The overall score remains limited because the primary
impact channel is operational and budgetary (any broader societal effects would be incremental and
contingent on safeguards and good governance).
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD3.1. Measures related to the standing corps training
are expected to have an overall positive impact across all three policy options. From the operational
perspective, the suggested policy measures (e.g. PM3.1.3, PM3.1.7, PM3.1.10 and PM3.1.11) would
strengthen cooperation and facilitate interoperability in multinational settings. This would in turn
improve the preparedness and readiness of the standing corps for operational deployments – especially
by filling the gaps in scarce, specialised profiles. Similarly, the measures proposed for training are
expected to have a significantly positive social impact. They would make the training quality of the
growing standing corps more stable, harmonised and consistent (e.g. PM 3.1.1, PM3.1.4, PM3.1.12
and PM3.1.13). This would foster homogeneity and a shared operational culture across the EBCG
(e.g. PM3.1.15). It would also enhance mutual trust between national and EU staff and improve the
quality of service provided to the EU’s citizens – thanks to consistently high common professional
standards. Proposed measures such as PM3.1.9 would also create clearer and more predictable
professional pathways and long-term career development for standing corps officers. The proposed
measures would therefore increase motivation and the attractiveness of joining the standing corps;
improve staff retention in Frontex; and boost staff mobility – thereby further contributing to an
interoperable standing corps architecture. Some policy measures (e.g. PM3.1.6 and PM3.1.14) could
42
also have a positive impact on broader employment opportunities at the Member State and/or EU
levels.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD3.2. Proper EIBM planning is expected to have a
positive operational and institutional impact because it will boost coordination, transparency and
institutional learning across the EBCG. The measures proposed for EIBM planning would make joint
actions more coherent, strengthen trust among actors and support more effective prioritisation across
the system. Similarly, improved transparency would foster good-faith cooperation and collective
situational awareness. As regards the Annual EIBM Strategic Outlook, the social impact would be
moderately positive – through enhanced coordination, transparency and institutional learning across
the EBCG network. These impacts could be further enhanced through a careful selection and design
of the KPIs and responsibilities of the National EIBM Planning Coordinator, in line with PM3.2.12.
All the measures proposed across the different options for integrated planning would have a
moderately positive or positive impact. This is because they strengthen the link between risk analysis
/ vulnerability assessment outputs and capability planning; clarify roles and timelines; and promote
more consistent follow-up and accountability across the EBCG network. However, measures proposed
under PO3 (PM2.3.17-PM3.2.20) could increase the administrative burden and therefore affect the
overall score. The social impact of the vulnerability assessment follow-up (e.g. PM3.2.14) and the
oversight for EIBM planning is moderately positive. This latter measure builds on established
mechanisms rather than creating new ones. It is therefore proportionate and creates a politically
acceptable way to strengthen accountability without increasing administrative burden – thereby
resulting in positive social and institutional impacts. The other social impacts of expending
vulnerability assessment would be moderately positive. Expanding the scope of vulnerability
assessment to returns (PM3.2.7) would improve transparency, preparedness and coordination in a
sensitive policy area – by developing situational awareness of operational readiness in returns.
Moreover, planning for the voluntary inclusion of EU candidate and potential candidate countries
(PM3.2.8) could build trust and smooth future integrations – thanks to enhanced cooperation,
preparedness and structured engagement.
6.3 Environmental impacts
Overall, the policy options and measures are not expected to have significant environmental impacts
– either positive or negative. Some individual measures could have positive environmental impacts,
particularly by potentially reducing the carbon footprint of Frontex’s activities (e.g. measures that
expand its coordinating role on returns; and planning and pooling resources that would reduce wasted
flight capacity and emissions per returnee). Similarly, for the use of advanced technologies (for
example, to enhance situational awareness): access to an upgraded situational picture would enable the
more effective deployment of officers and resources (e.g. fewer and more targeted interventions along
a border section that is being monitored with advanced technology such as sensor suites). However,
these effects are likely to be minimal because the expansion of the Frontex’s mandate and the larger
volumes of activities undertaken (e.g. in the areas of returns) will offset these gains and result in limited
negative environmental impacts (due, for example, to the need to build, heat and maintain larger
infrastructure for headquarters and training centres or to hold practical scenario-based exercises that
simulate complex operational context). Frontex’s acquisition of more technologically advanced assets
(e.g. for aerial surveillance or maritime patrolling) could be seen as having a direct negative
environmental impact – but for the fact that these assets would operationally complement or replace
assets operated by the national authorities 78, which may be less technologically advanced and/or have
a worse environmental footprint.
78 This has been the case for aerial surveillance in some of Frontex’s operational theatres.
43
6.4 Impacts on fundamental rights
Figure 6. Overview of impacts on fundamental rights across thematic areas and options Problem/Driver Thematic area PO1 PO2 PO3
PD1.1 Border management 3 3 2
PD1.1 Border controls 1 1 1
PD1.1 Countering cross-border crime -1 N/A N/A
PD1.1 Emergencies and hybrid threats N/A 0 N/A
PD1.1 Visa policy N/A 1 1
PD1.2 EUROSUR -1 -1 -2
PD1.3 Cooperation with third countries and CSDP missions 0 0 1
PD1.3 Cooperation with international organisations 0 0 0
PD1.4 Returns including governance 1 1 -1
PD2.1 Standing corps architecture 1 1 1
PD2.1 Employment conditions for the standing corps 0 0 0
PD2.2 Technical equipment and IT systems 0 0 0
PD3.1 Standing corps training 1 2 2
PD3.2 EIBM management strategic and integrated planning 0 0 0
PD3.2 Quality-control mechanisms 1 1 1
The impacts on fundamental rights related to the proposed measures primarily concern third-country
nationals that are subject to the EBCG’s border-control and migration-management activities. The
impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights is limited or positive – thanks to strengthened border
management and the countering of cross-border crime. Measures related to Frontex’s human and
technical capabilities (PD2.1 and PD2.2) will not have a direct impact on fundamental rights.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.1
Border management thematic area. More efficient standing corps deployments at external borders
would moderately improve respect for fundamental rights (e.g. the right to free movement and the
right to good administration) by making operations faster, safer and more effective – while also
minimising risks from understaffing or limited powers. The Age’s oversight bodies would continue to
ensure Frontex’s compliance with EU law across all its tasks and activities.
Combating cross-border crime thematic area. The measures proposed under PO1 for combating
cross-border crime should have a neutral impact on fundamental rights because Frontex has an
overarching obligation to comply with EU law in all its operations 79. For example, broader data-
sharing powers (PM1.1.6 and PM1.1.8) could facilitate an increased volume of transmissions of
operational personal data by Frontex and could thus increase associated data protection-related risks,
but these risks are mitigated by the overall strong procedural safeguards in the applicable EU legal
instruments (including the GDPR, EUDPR and the regulations of the relevant agencies) as well as the
national legal frameworks. Moreover, the data in question would concern serious cross-border crime
and a more effective framework for its transmission would contribute to guaranteeing the safety and
well-being of all affected people – be they migrants who fall prey to these criminal groups; citizens in
communities affected by their activity; or even the officers that are tasked with disrupting their criminal
activity and can at times be faced with violence as a result. Any potential risks can and should be
mitigated – firstly by carefully delineating the tasks and responsibilities of Frontex, Europol, Eurojust
and the national authorities; and secondly by ensuring that the appropriate structural safeguards are in
79 In the call for evidence, one contribution (jointly prepared by six NGOs) highlights the point that the strict necessity
requirement in Article 90 reflects the highly sensitive nature of personal data that may be processed in migratory and border
contexts. The contribution therefore stresses the point that this requirement should not be altered; input from DG JUST.
44
place atFrontex. Frontex’s role in combating cross border crime could also have a moderately positive
impact (for example, as regards the right to liberty and security).
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.2. Expanding Frontex’s ability to enrich EUROSUR
situational awareness by processing additional personal data can have an impact on personal data
processing – particularly in the context of potentially more ‘invasive’ activities proposed under PO3
(e.g. adding new types of personal data (PM1.2.12) or social media monitoring (PM1.2.13)). These
risks will nevertheless be significantly mitigated by the safeguards that are in the EU data protection
framework and that could be complemented by additional safeguards specific to any additional data-
processing activity that may be deemed necessary for the fulfilment of Frontex’s mandate. For
example, monitoring social media platforms could increase the EU’s ability to manage illegal
migratory flows, but the activity must be performed for the clear, limited and targeted purpose of
producing aggregated and anonymised data for risk analysis – and must not result in collection, storage
or undue processing of personal data.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.3. Measures that are proposed with regard to
cooperation with third countries, CSDP missions and international organisations – such as
aligning the procedure for signing working arrangements to other JHA agencies (PM1.3.1) – should
have a neutral fundamental rights impact. They would have the positive impact of expediting the
procedures related to working arrangements without diminishing the data protection framework, in
line with EDPS’ overall oversight role based on the EUDPR. PM1.3.7 makes Frontex a main partner
in EU-funded border management projects and would have a neutral impact because full regard must
be paid to fundamental rights when implementing such projects – regardless of the entity tasked with
them. PM1.3.8 enables Frontex to join or support bilateral agreements between Member States and
third countries, and could have positive impacts on fundamental rights due to the involvement of
Frontex’s operational apparatus and the broader application of EIBM standards.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD1.4. Most policy measures proposed under PO1 and
PO2 would have a positive impact on fundamental rights. Some preferred measures would create a
more efficient and uniform return mechanism (for example, PM1.4.1A would introduce an obligation
to adopt EU-level guidance documents and shared planning cycles; PM1.4.14B would make Frontex
the default EU operational actor for returns; and PM1.4.1B would allow Frontex to administer
resources according to a shared return calendar). This would in turn enhance and standardise the
safeguards for returnees across all Frontex-supported return activities, because streamlined processes
would shorten the duration of return processes. Harmonised standards would ensure that identification
is conducted transparently and with respect for data protection rules. Measures such as PM1.4.15 (on
the development of uniform standards on return monitoring) and PM1.4.18 (on Frontex performing
standardised return counselling) would achieve a similar degree of consistency and standardisation for
return monitoring and for the provision of counselling to prospective returnees, respectively – while
also encouraging voluntary returns. However, measures such as PM1.4.16B (extending Frontex
support to third-country return operations) represent potential risks in terms of differences between the
EU’s legal framework and third-country procedures. These can be mitigated through appropriate
safeguards (e.g. ensuring compliance with international standards or including relevant protections in
legally binding instruments). These considerations will depend on the specific form of support that
Frontex may provide and on how such support could be framed in this regulation in terms of scope,
legal bases and associated prerequisites and safeguards. In all scenarios, potential negative
fundamental rights impacts will be significantly mitigated by ensuring that clear legal safeguards are
put in place and that ad hoc, scenario-based mitigating measures are agreed upon and implemented at
the operational level.
Impacts of policy measures responding to PD3.1 (training). Overall, the measures proposed across
the different policy options would have a positive impact on fundamental rights. The proposed
measures (e.g. PM3.1.1) would – by systematically embedding fundamental-rights-sensitive training
45
in both curricula and practical exercises, as well as by strengthening the enforceability and monitoring
aspects – support the adoption of a uniform approach to fundamental rights protection and compliance
in EU border management. Moreover, some of the proposed measures (e.g. PM3.1.3) would ensure
that decisions with human rights implications (e.g. identification and referral of vulnerable persons,
and conditions for the use of force and cultural mediation) could also be carried out and internally
applied in realistic training settings. A stronger and more consistent training coverage in certain areas
(e.g. use of force and return procedures) could also standardise the uptake of more human-rights-
compliant approaches to these tasks. Achieving a more uniform and consistently high performance in
all border management and return-related tasks throughout the EBCG (as proposed by measures such
as PM3.1.9 and PM3.1.12) would have additional positive fundamental rights impacts (for example,
more consistent identification and provision of support to persons in vulnerable situations or seeking
international protection; and overall smoother and more efficient facilitation of legitimate border
crossings). These positive impacts would be further guaranteed by the parallel reinforcement of the
existing monitoring and quality assurance framework; and increased by the direct link to EIBM in the
Common Core Curriculum and the training curriculum for the new Category 5 – where fundamental
rights compliance features as a horizontal, overarching component.
The horizontal objective of maintaining internal oversight capacities at the current level in relation to
Frontex’s planned growth means that several policy measures should be accompanied by
improvements to the existing structures. The measures proposed to improve the governance on returns
would make a particular contribution to this: strengthening the role and coordination between the
HLRTR and the EIBM Working Group and the Management Board, through quality assurance on the
return framework (PM1.1.20); and establishinga dedicated working group on returns that would
address technical, operational and implementation issues with appropriate reporting to the
Management Board (PM1.4.21). Moreover, enhancements of the capacities of the Frontex’s key
oversight bodies proposed under PM3.2.16 would make it possible to preserve the existing framework
and safeguards; and mitigate any oversight deficiencies that could arise from Frontex’s increase in size
and tasks. Overall, the implementation of PM3.2.16 in parallel with the other policy priorities would
preserve Frontex’s overall good governance framework and its ability to ensure legal compliance.
7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?
This section brings together the results of the preceding impact analysis in order to examine how each
option performs against the key criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. It also highlights
their relative strengths and weaknesses. It then compares the options, presenting their overall
performance across the different criteria. The method for rating the measures and the guiding questions
for each criterion are presented in detail in Annex 4. The effectiveness and efficiency of the analysed
measures are described under the same section in order to avoid repetition. This comparative analysis
of the policy options is summarised in a table in Annex 9.
7.1 Effectiveness and efficiency
Effectiveness is the extent to which the measures under the different policy options are expected to
contribute to the identified objectives in Section 4. The measures proposed across the different policy
options could address the general objective referred to in Section 4.1. For the specific objectives
identified in Section 4.2, the only relevant measures are those that are proposed in order to address one
specific problem. SO1 is accordingly expected to be achieved by policy measures that have been
identified in response to Problem 1 (PM1.1.1-PM1.4.19). The relevant policy measures for SO2
(PM2.1.1A-PM2.2.12) respond to Problem 2. The relevant policy measures for SO3 respond to
Problem 3 (PM3.1.1-PM3.2.20). Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between the policy objectives
and the assessment criteria, which served as independent benchmarks for evaluating the potential
effectiveness of the options.
As regards efficiency, the analysis below reflects the impacts identified in Section 6.
46
Figure 7. Links between objectives and assessment criteria
General objective Specific objectives Assessment criteria per problem
Ensure the
development and
implementation of
EU integrated
border management
in line with
Article 77(1)(c) of
the Treaty on the
Functioning of the
European Union,
(encompassing well-
coordinated and
effective
management of the
EU’s external
borders, returns and
visa policy; and
measures at the
external borders
that contribute to
EU security) in
order to increase the
EBCG’s
effectiveness
SO1 – Ensure Frontex’s
effectiveness in supporting Member
States (and Schengen Associated
Countries) in managing the EU’s
external borders – including by
cooperating with various actors
(relevant third country authorities;
Member States’ authorities,
including those involved in
combating cross-border crime,
returns and visa; relevant EU
agencies; and international
organisations).
Ensure that the prevention of illegal
arrivals, the effectiveness of returns
and situational awareness via
EUROSUR are enhanced.
• Ref. PD1.1: coherence of the conditions across the EU for the standing corps to support border control tasks – combined with increased demand for standing corps;
• Ref. PD1.2: increased numbers of entries into EUROSUR and of national authorities accessing EUROSUR;
• Ref. PD1.2: increased number of reports (single
events and incidents) introduced into EUROSUR;
• Ref. PD1.3: increased number of third countries cooperating with Frontex on border management;
• Ref. PD1.4: increased number of training and capacity-building activities on returns delivered to third countries;
• Ref. PD1.4: initiation of negotiations for new/updated status agreements to allow return-
related operational support and/or reflect new possibilities regarding returns;
• Ref. PD1.4: increased percentage of overall effective EU returns performed with Frontex support or coordination (year-on-year);
• Ref. PD1.4: increased overall percentage of returns from the EU that are performed as voluntary returns with Frontex support or coordination.
SO2 – Strengthening the EBCG’s
human and technical capabilities
(including by improving the
operational effectiveness and
efficiency of the standing corps and
procedures applicable to the
technical capabilities).
• Ref. PD2.1: increased recruitment of the standing
corps across the EU paired with the increased use
of standing corps across the Member States (at
national level and in other Member States);
• Ref. PD2.2: expected increase in technical
equipment made available to the Member States by
Frontex.
SO3 – Ensure the coherent design
and implementation of EIBM across
the EU Member States on the basis
of harmonised training; synergies in
planning; reinforced quality-control
processes; and a standing corps of
30 000 officers equipped with state-
of-the-art equipment.
• Ref. PD3.1: increased capacity and offer in
Frontex training paired with an obligatory and
comparable set of skills for the standing corps;
• Ref. PD3.2: an increased number of national plans
on which Frontex has been consulted paired with
an increased number of deficiencies in border
management and returns addressed at an early
stage.
With regard to SO1, the effectiveness of PO1 would be based on the optimal positive effects of
measures responding to PD1.1 (i.e. the border controls thematic area and the combating cross-border
crime thematic area. The remaining two thematic areas (emergencies and hybrid threats, and visa
policy) would not contribute in the absence of any measures proposed under PO1. Legislative
clarifications (for example, on executive powers) would standardise conditions for standing corps
across the EU, thus addressing current ambiguities. In parallel, the proposed measures would ensure
synergy with the efforts to promote a broader and more uniform uptake of EIBM, thus contributing
significantly to the general objective.. In these two thematic areas of PD1.1, the efficiency of PO1
measures would have very positive institutional and social impacts (3); positive impacts on
fundamental rights (1) – except TA on combating cross-border crime (-1); and limited negative
economic impacts related to the costs of implementation (for example, the costs of infrastructure and
47
tools relevant for accessing databases) (-1), but these do not undermine their optimal added value. PO1
performs less well in terms of effectiveness for the other aspects covered by Problem 1: PD1.2
(EUROSUR), PD1.3 (external dimension) and PD1.4 (returns). In the case of PD1.2, PO1 contributes
to SO1 by enhancing EUROSUR but does not go beyond the current framework and therefore
underdelivers on GO. In terms of efficiency, it has limited positive social impacts (2) and slightly
negative impacts on fundamental rights and economic impacts (-1). In the cases of PD1.3 and PD1.4,
the proposed measures respond to the most acute problem drivers but do not live up to the level of
ambition as regards border management objectives in tiers 1 and 2 of the access control model in third
countries as well as in return policy. In terms of efficiency, the social impacts exceed the economic
impacts when it comes to cooperation with external actors (PD1.3) and counterbalance each other in
the case of returns (PD1.4). Impacts on fundamental rights are neutral to moderately positive.
As regards PO2, the measures proposed with regard to PD1.1 are the same as under PO1for the first
two thematic areas. With regard to the remaining thematic areas (emergencies and hybrid threats, and
visa policy), the proposed measures offer satisfactory added value in the absence of measures proposed
under PO1 and PO3. They score relatively highly (2) in social impacts with no economic impacts and
therefore have moderately high efficiency. Overall, PO2 has good results in terms of SO1 with regard
to PD1.2 (EUROSUR). This is because it complements the measures proposed under PO1by
expanding the information processed through the system to enrich the situational picture and by
extending it to important strategic areas such as returns (thereby also complementing other measures
to pursue objectives in that policy area). The efficiency of PO2 in EUROSUR is slightly lower than
that of PO1due to higher economic impacts (-2). With regard to PD1.3, the effectiveness of the
measures proposed under PO2 is comparable with that for PO1as regards cooperation with third
countries and the CSDP missions thematic area. This is because they build on PO1and because
PM1.3.7 (added under PO2) only complements these measures in terms of legal certainty. However,
the effectiveness of the measures proposed with regard to the cooperation with international
organisations thematic area is greater than under PO1because it offers a solution that is more future-
proof (with PM1.3.6B). The efficiency of PO2 with regard to measures responding to PD.1.3 is
positive overall – with limited negative economic impacts (-1/-1), moderate positive social
impacts (2/2) and a neutral impact on fundamental rights across the thematic area (0/0). As regards
PD1.4, the effectiveness of the proposed measures goes a step further than PO1. This isthanks to a
more comprehensive set of measures; the identification of shared needs among the Member States;
and the provision of EU-level tools and coordination mechanisms that individual Member States or
national return actors could not develop.
Measures in PO2 regarding organisational governance are relevant here because they reflect the
existing deficit in the representation of return actors in Frontex’s decision-making structures. These
measures ensure effectiveness by recognising the existing expertise in key Frontex working groups
(e.g. the HLRTR and WG EIBM). They are intended to formalise their role in Management Board
proceedings in order to guarantee better strategic steering and quality assurance on returns in Frontex
decision-making. The efficiency of the measures proposed in response to PD1.4 remains positive
despite heavier economic impacts (-2) that are, however, counterbalanced by moderate positive social
impacts (2) and limited positive impacts on fundamental rights (1).
As regards PO3, the effectiveness and efficiency of measures responding to PD1.1 (except in the visa
thematic area) remains the same (in the absence of new measures, as compared with PO1 and PO2).
With specific regard to the visa policy thematic area, efficiency decreases slightly due to the higher
negative economic impact (-1). With regard to PD1.2, effectiveness remains at the same level as under
PO2 because the proposed measures build on PO1 and PO2 (adding new elements whose role in
increasing the use of EUROSUR cannot be assessed at this stage because some of the proposed
measures would alter the purpose of EUROSUR as a purely situational-awareness tool). However, the
48
efficiency of measures proposed under PO3 decreases because they have the highest negative
economic impact (-3) and this is not offset by the positive social impact (1), which is lower than under
PO2, and the negative impact on fundamental rights (-2). As regards PD1.3 (the external dimension),
the effectiveness and efficiency of the measures proposed for the thematic area on cooperation with
third countries and CSDP increases, while the thematic area cooperation with international cooperation
remains at the same level (in the absence of new measures). For cooperation with third countries,
PM1.3.8 should (on top of all the measures proposed under PO1 and PO2) contribute to the objective
of increasing the formalised cooperation ties involving Frontex and third countries by also providing
Frontex with the flexibility to, where appropriate, join or support existing bilateral cooperation
agreements between Member States and third countries. The efficiency of PO3 with regard to the
thematic agreement on cooperation with third countries and CSDP should increase – thanks to the
positive social impacts (3) and impact on fundamental rights (1) and despite the negative economic
impacts (-2). With regard to PD1.4 (returns), PO3 remains highly effective, but its efficiency is
negative due to high economic costs (-3) and the negative impact of fundamental rights (-1) as well as
to efficiency constraints in the area of governance due to the multiplication of actors in the decision-
making processes. These are not offset by the positive social impacts (2).
Regarding SO2, the effectiveness of PO1 with regard to PD2.1 (the standing corps architecture
thematic area) is because the solutions to the identified deficiencies would hamper effective Frontex
deployments both now and in the future. This can only be achieved by building in strong synergies
between the national and EU objectives in policy recruitment, but that is only possible with the new
category of the standing corps proposed under these two POs. The efficiency of PO1 in this regard is
significantly affected by the proposed model’s high economic costs due to the increase in the standing
corps to 30 000, based on simple tripling all current categories (-3). This element is barely offset by
the overall positive social impacts (2) and impacts on fundamental rights (1). With regard to the
thematic area on employment conditions, PO1 measures provide a solid basis for addressing the
identified problems, which are then fully reflected in PO2 and PO3. They are also efficient, thanks to
positive economic and social impacts (2 each), while the impact on fundamental rights is neutral. In
view of the model applied to achieving 30 000 standing corps, the effectiveness of PO2 and PO3 in
the thematic area on standing corps architecture is higher than for PO1. As regards the efficiency of
the proposed measures, both PO2 and PO3 have high social impacts (3) and a positive impact on
fundamental rights (1). Their economic impacts are slightly less negative under PO2 (-1) than PO3 (-
2), but this does not affect the overall assessment of efficiency for these two options. For the thematic
area on employment, measures proposed under PO2 score better than PO3 in terms of effectiveness,
because PM2.1.14 might be more difficult to implement. In terms of efficiency, PO2 scores better (2)
than PO3 (1) due to better social impacts (PO2 -2 and PO3 -1), while the positive economic impacts
are the same (1) and there is no impact on fundamental rights. The effectiveness of measures proposed
under PO1 to address PD2.2 (technical equipment) is positive but limited because it is focused on IT
systems alone. The efficiency of this policy option is also positive (albeit limited) overall, with only
social impacts standing out (1). The effectiveness of PO2 is much greater than for PO1 – thanks to its
comprehensive approach to obstacles in interoperability, procurement and logistics. PO2 is also
balanced in terms of efficiency – thanks to limited negative economic impacts (-1), positive social
impacts (1) and the neutral impact on fundamental rights. PO3’s large-scale asset acquisition offers
greater operational value but the high economic and logistical costs counterbalance its coherence and
efficiency gains.
As regards SO3, the measures proposed under PO1 with regard to PD3.1 (training) provide a solid
basis for measures that are also proposed under PO2 and PO3. Structural improvements in the training
architecture produce a positive result in effectiveness. The efficiency of PO1 is positive because the
limited negative economic impacts (-1) are more than counterbalanced by the very positive social
impacts (3) and the positive impact on fundamental rights (1). PO2 maintains a positive balance in
terms of effectiveness, because the proposed measures should, on top of PO1,make it possible to
49
accommodate the new Category 5 of the standing corps. The efficiency of PO2 also remains positive
because its high positive social impact (3) and positive impact on the fundamental rights (2) more than
counterbalance its higher negative economic impacts (-2). PO3 (including not only PO1 but also the
structured leadership training pathway and dedicated EU top-up training for the category under PO2)
ensures the best effectiveness,particularly by further scaling up training for Category 1. However, the
efficiency of PO3 is undermined by the negative economic impacts (-2), although these are
counterbalanced by the same high positive score in terms of social (3) and fundamental rights (2)
impacts as in PO2. The effectiveness of the measures proposed under PO1 in response to PD3.2 (the
planning and quality assurance thematic areas) would be compromised by the non-legislative
character of measures proposed with regard to EIBM planning; weak interoperability; and the absence
of measures to ensure follow-up to vulnerability assessment and general reinforcement of quality-
assurance structures within Frontex. The efficiency of PO1 would be slightly positive, with limited
positive economic and social impacts under both thematic areas (1), a neutral impact of the measures
concerning planning on fundamental rights (0) and a limited positive impact of the measures
concerning vulnerability assessment on fundamental rights (1). Effectiveness is expected to increase
under PO2 –due to more probable progress in ensuring planning coherence and strategic coordination;
and due to much more robust modifications in quality assurance (based not only on widening the scope
of vulnerability assessment but also on ensuring appropriate follow-up to the recommendations issued
in this process – including in relation to EIBM planning – and on proposals that reflect the necessary
changes in terms of internal oversight). The efficiency of PO2 remains consistently positive. There are
limited positive economic impacts (1) and social impacts (2) across this thematic area. Only impacts
on fundamental rights differ slightly between thematic areas (0 for EIBM planning and 1 for changes
related to quality control mechanisms). Measures proposed under PO3 also score highly in terms of
effectiveness – despite their higher administrative and political burdens in relation to EIBM planning
(quality assurance measures remain the same as under PO2). The efficiency of PO3 is comparable with
that of PO2 – the only difference concerns the slightly lower social impacts of measures related to
EIBM planning (1 instead of 2).
7.2 Coherence
Internal coherence assesses how various elements of the proposed options are expected to work
together to achieve the objectives. External coherence assesses how they would complement the
developments in other areas relevant for the measures at stake. All policy options (POs) are designed
to be coherent with the general objective and in principle, the measures under each PO are designed to
be compatible with each other. This is reflected in the cumulative character of several measures, often
with PO3 encompassing measures proposed under PO1 and PO2. However, in few cases the proposed
measures relevant for specific problem drivers are mutually exclusive. The policy measure numbering
reflects this (e.g. measures proposed with regard to the size of the standing corps marked as 2.1.1A
under PO1, 2.1.1B under PO2 and 2.1.1.C under PO3).
Regarding the coherence of measures addressing standing corps employment conditions (PD2.1),
under PO1 and PO2, measures such as ensuring compensation for shift or arduous work enhance
attractiveness and fairness, while measures linked to training (PM 2.1.12) and long-term career paths
(PM 2.1.13) more clearly define contract pathways. These measures could be developed through
delegated acts80 or the amendment of the EBCG Regulation, while continuing to ensure coherence
with the broader EU administrative framework. The proposed measures would respond to limitations
which do not take into account that standing corps staff operates under different working arrangements
(e.g. shift work) of the host Member States and is deployed to various operational areas that diverge
80 E.g. Related to Council Regulation 300/76 (shift work), Council Regulation 495/77 (stand-by duty) and Council
Regulation 858/2004 (arduous working conditions).
50
in terms of hardship working conditions (e.g. safety of staff, place and nature of work). They would
alleviate administrative and financial burden of the current deployment system, which currently entails
processing and managing a substantial number of mission orders and claims. Both PO1 and PO2
improve alignment with the objectives of the EBGC Regulation and with Member States’ practices in
the field of border management, while remaining within the framework of the Staff Regulations. The
envisaged measures, especially those related to the arduous working conditions, while catering for
specific situation of Frontex’s standing corps, would be carefully weighed against the currently
applicable system, particularly in view of their potential spill-over effect.
The internal coherence has the same high positive score across policy options for measures responding
to PD1.1, except TA visa policy, where internal coherence is affected by the need to expand the legal
basis of the new legislative act for measures proposed under PO3. On EUROSUR-related measures
(PD 1.2), changes in EUROSUR’s overall purpose mean that PO3 has less external coherence than
PO2, in particular for the much broader personal data processing and the expansion of EUROSUR to
cover returns, which may clash with legislation in other areas.
In the external dimension (PD1.3) the external coherence with the factors outlined in Section 1.2 is
the highest under PO3, which is proposing the most ambitious CSDP-related measures to strengthen
cooperation with third countries. Similarly, with regard to cooperation with international organisations,
the highest coherence is assured by the most ambitious measures, which are proposed under PO2 (and
also apply to PO3). On returns (PD1.4) the coherence across all POs is at the same level. This takes
into account the close links with the existing return acquis but also the unknown factor in ensuring
coherence with the recent proposals in the area of return.
The internal coherence is particularly relevant for PD2.1 (standing corps) and PD3.1 (training). PO3
scores highest for internal coherence for these, because it is instrumental in contributing to EIBM
objectives. Regarding the standing corps, the strong links with PD3.1 and with PD1.1 (conditions of
deployment and development of contingents) make coherence a decisive distinguishing criterion as
compared to PO2, whereas in training, coherence, along with effectiveness, draw the distinction line
with regard to PO2. The coherence of measures relevant for remaining PDs is mostly the same across
the POs (i.e. slightly positive for PD2.1 – TA employment conditions and for PD3.2 – controls of
assurance TA and positive for PD3.2 – EIBM planning TA), thus demonstrating that the measures
proposed in response to these PDs provide necessary foundations for achieving more general
objectives related to EIBM. Only for PD2.2 (technical equipment) is coherence slightly affected
under PO3, due to the possible and not yet identified links with other policy areas, in particular
defence.
8. PREFERRED MEASURES
Table 1provides an overview of the preferred option per thematic area under each problem
driver/problem. For more details see Annex 9.
For the purposes of this Impact Assessment, ‘preferred measures’ refers to the combination of
measures that performs best against the assessment criteria by thematic area, rather than a single
policy option applied uniformly across all areas. This reflects that the underlying problems, legal
constraints and implementation feasibility differ across policy drivers. The cumulative impacts of this
preferred combination are assessed in the impact analysis by tracing how that combination jointly
contributes to the general and specific objectives. For this reason, their economic impacts are assessed
together with their effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. Measures that entail higher costs may
therefore still be selected where they provide additional operational capacity, greater long-term
effectiveness or make the EBCG framework more coherent.
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For two thematic areas under PD1.1: border control and the fight against cross-border crime, the
selection of PO1 is driven by the need to address persistent shortcomings in the current EBCG border
management model (including fragmented operational practices, uneven Member State cooperation,
and limited capacity to either host or use deployments of the standing corps). The measures concerning
Frontex’s role in countering cross-border crime under PO1 make it possible to act on identified
efficiency losses and missed opportunities, such as with regard to transmissions of operational personal
data to Europol (without undermining the existing, strong data protection framework), without
encroaching on Europol’s mandate and exceeding the legal basis of the EBCG Regulation.
PO2 provides the preferred mix of policy measures for emergencies and hybrid threats. It enables
Frontex to maximise the support it can provide to the Member States in emergency situations, without
overstepping the boundaries of its legal basis and of the supporting competence of the EU in civil
protection, under Articles 6 and 196 TFEU. The PO2 measures respect the principle of subsidiarity
and avoid overlaps with mechanisms such as the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).
For visa policy, the measures under PO2 would maximise benefits to the EBCG without needing to
modify the legal basis of the EBCG Regulation. The measures are moderate, but in line with the
EBCG’s ambitions for Frontex in visa policy. They are coherent with other proposed policy measures,
by cementing Frontex’s role as a central provider of trainings and specialisation, and enhancing its risk
analysis capabilities and extending them to the visa policy area.
For EUROSUR, the preferred measures under PO2 clarify various sources of legal uncertainty, with
the intention of streamlining data sharing processes to enhance the Member States’ operational
cooperation. As such, PO2 presents the preferred mix of measures as they provide effective remedies
to existing issues, while presenting an appropriate degree of forward-looking ambition in full
compliance with the applicable data protection rules without requiring an overhaul of EUROSUR’s
capabilities that would risk revolutionising its intended purpose for limited operational gains and at
high economic cost.
For Frontex’s cooperation with third countries and CSDP missions, PO3 is the preferred option
as it offers the most comprehensive set of measures, including those proposed under PO1 and PO2
cementing Frontex as the main partner for border management components of EU projects in third
countries. PO3 aligns with the priority of maximising the value of Frontex’s support to Member States
and pursuing the broadest possible uptake of EIBM, including cooperation on border management
with third countries.Measures under PO2 regarding Frontex’s cooperation with international
organisations grant Frontex the maximum possible flexibility to identify potential partners and
establish constructive cooperation with them, without weakening existing structures for oversight or
strategic steering.
PO2 is the preferred set of measures regarding Frontex’s role in returns. This set of measures offers
the strongest overall performance across all criteria by addressing several existing issues while
enabling Frontex to support the EU’s ambitious policy on return. At the same time, these measures
achieve these objectives in a way that is effective, proportional, and coherent with other objectives,
such as the effective implementation of EIBM, the development of the standing corps, and the
sustainable growth of Frontex. PO2 would be much more efficient than PO1, by identifying shared
needs among the Member States and providing EU-level tools and coordination mechanisms that could
not be developed by individual Member States or national return actors. Connected to this, the
measures in PO2 were also selected regarding organisational governance, to reflect the existing
deficit in representation of return actors in Frontex’s decision-making structures. At the same time,
PO2 avoids the risk of mixed effects under PO3, which by imposing the obligation to add return
authorities as MB members could also make MB meetings more complex or potentially chaotic.
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For the standing corps’ architecture, recruitment and distribution of resources, PO3 is the
preferred set of measures. These measures plan the growth of the standing corps to a total of 30 000 in
a way that is sustainable and coherent with operational realities and necessities, as well as political
ambitions in remits such as return. While PO1 also tries to achieve this by expanding the numbers of
officers available for Frontex deployments, this option is the least cost-effective and would also require
a growth pace that would be difficult to sustain for both Frontex and Member States, risking creating
capability imbalances. Additionally, only PO2 and PO3 succeed in also addressing the need to
maximise flexibility and interoperability in Joint Operations, and in promoting the uptake of EIBM as
the ‘common language’ in return and border management across the EBCG, significantly increasing
their effectiveness. This in turn also maximises the cost-effectiveness of the proposed measures. PO3
would maximise the effectiveness of Frontex deployments. It also includes measures that link
Frontex’s expansion to its mandate, while the overall growth of the standing corps would be gradual,
not risk draining the resources of the Member States, and establish important forward-looking
components (such as a highly interoperable Category 5 reserve force and the infrastructure, expertise,
and framework to train European border and coast guard officers to consistently high standards in line
with EIBM). This set of measures also provides for a number of technical adjustments that ensures
that Frontex can support this growth.
Regarding the employment conditions of the standing corps, PO2 addresses shortcomings in the
current employment framework that impair the functioning of the standing corps. While PO1
introduces a new system for the deployment of the standing corps and related compensation
framework, PO2 scores higher in effectiveness by creating a system that would better align with the
training and progression planned for standing corps officers. PO2 is also perceived as more coherent
with other adjacent measures, such as the measures affecting the architecture and recruitment of the
standing corps (by, for example, enabling experience accumulation and mitigating turnover ratios
among experienced officers by including the possibility to facilitate indefinite contracts after certain
periods of service). This would also support the objectives related to making Frontex a provider of
trainings for excellence in border management and return activities. All sets of policy measures are
believed to coherently pursue the objectives of the EBCG Regulation and support the EBCG’s needs
and objectives, but PO2 appears more efficient.
For technical equipment and IT systems, PO2 is the preferred option. This is because PO1 has a
limited scope, as it focuses on providing legal clarity as regards IT systems, but PO2 is significantly
more effective, as it takes a comprehensive approach to tackling the interoperability, procurement, and
logistics-related barriers that currently hamper the operational effectiveness of Frontex, more
extensively addressing the identified problems. It enables Frontex to invest in advanced technologies
to enhance its technical capabilities and ensure it provides to the Member States the support dictated
by their operational needs, guaranteeing a high degree of preparedness even in unforeseen
circumstances. Accordingly, these measures perform strongly in terms of effectiveness and coherence
by calling for harmonised processes and EU-level coordination to identify and exploit synergies across
the EBCG. PO2 thus strikes the best balance between ambition, feasibility, proportionality, and the
ability to resolve existing issues and remain prepared to address future necessities.
For standing corps’ training, PO3 offers the most comprehensive and scalable training architecture,
capable of supporting the expansion of the standing corps in line with the abovementioned relevant
preferred policy measures. PO3 has the structural improvement introduced under PO1 and PO2, but
also provides for the necessary training programme adaptations, capacity expansions, and strengthened
delivery mechanisms required to train a much larger force and ensure interoperability across services
and categories, therefore mutually complementing the measures concerning the new Category 5. PO3
also scores highly on coherence due to its support of EU-level interoperability objectives while
recognising, and relying upon, shared responsibilities between Frontex and the national authorities of
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the EBCG.
For EIBM strategic and integrated planning, PO2 is the preferred option due to its delivery of strong
and sustainable improvements in planning coherence and strategic coordination, which are areas where
deficiencies were identified. At the same time, it imposes minimal administrative burdens and avoids
the legislative sensitivities associated with PO3. PO2 does introduce additional administrative steps,
but (i) they are proportional to the measures’ success in reducing duplications, clarifying timelines,
and ensuring better planning cohesion and (ii) they impose a less intrusive governance mechanism
(with associated administrative burdens) than PO3. PO2 also scores strongly on coherence by
proposing a future-proof framework for integrated capability planning for the EBCG that is both more
comprehensive than PO1 and less administratively and politically burdensome than PO3.
For quality assurance mechanisms, PO2 is the preferred option. Itprovides the strongest and most
balanced framework by combining the broader Vulnerability Assessment scope with a structured,
proportionate enforcement mechanism based on better use of vulnerability assessments and better
framing the existing internal oversight instances. At the same time, it ensures their reinforcement and
legal clarifications where evidence suggests that the relevant provisions in the Regulation are
incomplete or unclear, and therefore cause bureaucratic inefficiencies (e.g.: absence of an Article on
the Frontex Serious Incident Reporting mechanism, lack of clarity on mandate to process complaints).
PO2 scores highly on effectiveness not only by targeting situational awareness, but also by introducing
credible incentives to drive improvements in Member States’ compliance. These measures are also
efficient, as they involve minimal costs while delivering greater predictability, fewer repeated follow-
ups, and thus lowering administrative burdens, and reduced duplications with the Vulnerability
Assessment cycle. PO2 also scores highly on coherence, aligning closely with the existing Schengen
evaluation and EU funding oversight mechanisms. PO2 has all the benefits achieved by the measures
in PO1, and adds the structured enforcement mechanisms necessary to reduce current vulnerabilities
and improve the reliability of the system as a whole.
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Table 2 – Overview of the preferred option under each thematic area and problem/driver Thematic area Problem/Driver Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Border management Problem 1, Driver 2.1.1.1 X 2=1
• Countering cross-border crime Problem 1, Driver 2.1.1.1 X 2=1
• Emergencies and hybrid threats Problem 1, Driver 2.1.1.1 X
• Visa policy Problem 1, Driver 2.1.1.1 X
EUROSUR Problem 1, Driver 2.1.1.2 X
Cooperation with third countries and
CSDP missions
Problem 1, Driver 2.1.1.3 X
Cooperation with international
organisations
Problem 1, Driver 2.1.1.3 X 2=3
Returns Problem 1, Driver 2.1.1.4 X
Organisational governance in return Problem 1, Driver 2.1.1.4 X
Standing corps size, recruitment and
distribution of resources
Problem 2, Driver 2.1.2.1 X
Employment conditions of the standing
corps
Problem 2, Driver 2.1.2.1 X 2=3
Technical equipment and IT systems Problem 2, Driver 2.1.2.2 X
Standing corps training Problem 3, Driver 2.1.3.1 X
EIBM strategic and integrated planning Problem 3, Driver 2.1.3.2 X
Quality assurance Problem 3, Driver 2.1.3.2 X 3=2
8.1 Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (simplification and improved efficiency)
In compliance with the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme, all initiatives
aimed at revising existing EU legislation should seek to simplify and reduce the administrative burden
on Member States.
The study accompanying the Impact Assessment reveals that the preferred options for most thematic
areas would require stronger involvement of the Member States in order to reinforce the EBDG’s
capacities to respond to the challenges related to border management and effective returns. This greater
involvement would in practice increase the administrative burden on Member States, due to both the
new (or more explicit) obligations on the Member States in the EBCG Regulation and the decisions
that the Frontex Management Board or Executive Director adopt to support the implementation of
EIBM objectives. However, this increased burden (related in particular to stronger coordination of
planning, acquisitions of technical equipment, information sharing, trainings) would be offset by the
positive impact on the overall security in the Schengen area, thanks to more efficient border
management and returns. The measures accompanying the increase of the standing corps size (in
particular the modified training architecture and revolutionised financial support) should significantly
alleviate the burdens related to the recruitment and upkeep of the new Category 5.
The regulatory burden related to the preferred options would vary per thematic area, but in general
would be of limited scope, as many of the proposed measures aim to remove gaps and clarify
ambiguities. The new mechanisms would build on the existing structures, in particular for training and
returns.
8.2 Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach
This initiative will entail neither administrative costs nor savings for the private sector. It will not incur
any costs for the public. However, this initiative will improve the level of security and protection of
citizens in the EU. Adjustment costs will mostly concern public authorities.
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9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?
The Commission will monitor and evaluate the actual impacts of this initiative through the existing
mechanisms. To avoid duplication of efforts, the monitoring would rely on indicators used in Frontex
Strategic Planning Documents and Annual Activity Reports, as being relevant to track performance.
This is complemented by new indicators, which will require additional data collection.
The proposed indicators are primarily quantitative in nature and focus predominantly on outputs.
While they provide an initial framework for monitoring progress, they do not yet capture the full
breadth of outcomes that preferred policy measures aim to achieve. Additional and more specific
elements of the monitoring and evaluation framework, particularly those related to longer-term results,
qualitative content and shifts in behaviours or systems, will need to be developed and refined
progressively once each selected policy measure is operationalised in further detail.
In addition, the current evaluation mechanism established in the EBCG Regulation (Article 121 on the
2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation and Article 59 on the review of the standing corps), as well
as reporting obligations to the European Commission, European Parliament, Council of the EU, and
to the Management Board will remain in place. Frontex Management Board will also continue to
provide a forum to evaluate the different measures related to these proposed policy options.
Annex 13 provides a Monitoring and Evaluation framework for the preferred policy measures, with a
set of indicators per thematic area.
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ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION
1. Lead DG, DECIDE Planning / Commission Work Programme references
DG Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) is the lead DG. The agenda planning (Decide) reference
assigned to the evaluation and impact assessment is PLAN/2025/801. This initiative is part of the
Commission Work Programme of 2026.
2. Organisation and timing
On 24 January 2025 DG HOME published a call for service for carrying out an external study to
support the evaluation of the revision of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 on the European Border and
Coast Guard an impact assessment for a legislative proposal81.The selected tenderer – ICF – carried
out a study between 2 April 2025 and [2 February 2026]. The reports issued by the contractor (an
inception report, two interim reports and a final report) were designed to feed into the Commission’s
impact assessment work. The contractor organised several meetings to discuss the problem definition,
the objectives to be achieved and to develop and evaluate the policy options.
The Interservice Steering Group was set up in June 2025 and is chaired by SG. It assists DG HOME
in the development of the impact assessment and the proposal. The following DGs are part of the
steering group: BUDG, COMM, DEFIS, ECHO, EEAS, EMPL, ENEST, ESTAT, GROW, HR, IAS,
INTPA, JRC-ISPRA, JRC, JUST, MARE, MENA, MOVE, OLAF, TAXUD.
The steering group members were given the opportunity to comment in writing on all the contractor’s
outputs.
The steering group was convened 4 times and reviewed and approved in writing the following
documents: the questionnaires for the stakeholders’ consultation, call for evidence; public
consultations questionnaire, Commission’s Impact Assessment Report (i.e. this document).
• 11 June 2025 – kick-off meeting
• July 2025 – the steering group commented in written consultations on the questionnaire for
public consultations and the draft first interim report
• 15 October 2025 – the second interim report was sent to the Commission.
• 15 December 2025 – the contractor presented the draft final report and the preferred policy
option and its impacts were discussed. There was also an update on the public consultation
process and discussions were held with stakeholders.
• 10 February 2026 – presentation and discussion on the draft Impact Assessment.
The steering group also met bilaterally with DGs to address specific issues of interest, in particular
with DG HR, DG JUST.
DG HOME shared with ICF all the comments the DGs made and considered all the comments as
81 The call for service was issued via framework contract HOME-2024-BMVI-TF2-FW-EVA1-4023. Four contractors
submitted an offer. The evaluation committee considered a number of criteria, namely: compliance with the technical
specifications described in the terms of reference; demonstrated understanding of the background of the programme, policy
or legislation; the quality of the proposed methodology; and the quality of the proposed team and organisation of work;
quality control measures. The Commission awarded the contract to ICF.
57
regards the draft impact assessment.
3. Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board
On 25 February 2026, DG HOME submitted the draft impact assessment to the Regulatory Scrutiny
Board and the Board meeting took place on 25 March 2026. On 27 March 2026 the Board issued a
positive opinion with reservations. The Board’s recommendations have been addressed as shown in
the table below.
Regulatory Scrutiny Board recommendation Changes introduced in the revised impact assessment report
1. Better describe the policy measures to
allow a clear assessment of their feasibility,
impacts, potential to achieve the objectives,
and consequences.
The presentation of the policy measures has been strengthened by
setting them out more systematically and with greater detail.
Section 5 now allows a clearer assessment of measures related to (i)
working arrangements in the context of external dimension, (ii)
employment conditions and the definition of the place of
employment, (iii) safeguards and oversight mechanisms in the return
framework, (iv) standing corps architecture, and (v) division of
responsibilities within the EBCG. This makes it easier to understand
their scope and practical implementation, and provides a firmer basis
for assessing their feasibility, likely impacts, contribution to the
objectives, and associated trade-offs.
2. Clarify fundamental rights implications
of each policy measure, including collection
of new types of personal data and social
media monitoring.
The fundamental rights implications of the relevant policy measures
were clarified. The report now specifies that any social media
monitoring by Frontex would be subject to a strict and limited
approach, solely for the specific purpose of supporting risk analysis
through the collection of aggregated and anonymised data. This
would not entail the collection or storage of personal data.
The data protection implications of the EUROSUR policy options are
also presented more comprehensively in Section 6. The potential
impacts on fundamental rights (also with regard to returns) have also
now been assessed in more detail throughout the report.
3. Explain how the proposal relates to the
Staff Regulations, in particular with
regard to the measures concerning the
standing corps.
The analysis of coherence between the proposed measures on the
standing corps and the Staff Regulations was strengthened in
Section 7.2. The revised report clarifies that the measures under the
preferred options remain within the Staff Regulations framework.
The description of problems arising from the application of the Staff
Regulations and their implementing rules to Category 1 operational
staff were expanded and clarified in Annex 5. The policy measures
under PO1 and PO2 on employment conditions were revised to better
reflect the actual scope of the proposed changes.
By contrast, the PO3 measures on employment conditions were
moved to the discarded measures in Annex 12 due to divergence
from the Staff Regulations and potential spillover effects.
4. Strengthen analysis of costs, cost-savings
and benefits, with clearer assumptions and
more granular evidence.
The analysis of costs, cost-savings and benefits was strengthened in
Section 6.1 on economic impacts, with additional rationale
transferred from Annex 11 on cost assessment.
The revised report provides clearer explanations of the underlying
assumptions, as well as of the uncertainties and limitations affecting
the analysis. It also highlights the limits to the quantification of
economic impacts for stakeholders other than Frontex. In addition,
the one-off and recurrent costs for Frontex were added in Annex 3, in
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line with Annex 11.
Finally, the concept of the deployment system was updated to reflect
the approach whereby, as a general rule, the place of employment is
also the place of deployment, together with the relevant allowances.
The related costs and savings were further explained in Annex 11 and
Section 6.
5. Improve readability of the report and
include visual aids.
Overall readability of the report was improved, in particular in the
sections presenting and assessing the policy measures. Targeted
drafting improvements were introduced across the report in order to
make the structure clearer and the analysis easier to follow.
The revised report incorporates visual aids, including diagrams,
tables and infographics to facilitate the presentation of complex
information. A diagram was added to the introductory section to
illustrate Frontex’s role within the European Integrated Border
Management (EIBM), including its links and coordination with other
EU agencies and the wider EIBM architecture.
An overview table of the EIBM components was also added to
provide a consolidated presentation of the components of EIBM.
These changes make complex information more accessible for all
stakeholders.
4. Evidence, sources and quality
4.1 External contractor
An external contractor was commissioned to carry out a preparatory study to collect the evidence
necessary for the Commission’s impact assessment. The final report in the study was submitted on
2 February 2026.
During the work on the study, the contractor engaged with stakeholders in the following manner:
• Surveys and interviews:
o The standing corps survey was launched on 16 June and was closed on 30 June. The
survey collected 433 replies.
o The national authorities survey was launched on 25 June and concluded on
10 October 2025. The survey gathered 48 replies from 24 EU Member States and
3 Schengen associated countries.
o 140 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders at the
international, EU, and national levels. Interviews were conducted both online and in-
person. Online interviews sometimes gathered more than one participant or authority.
• A set of field visits were conducted in selected Member States (Bulgaria, Finland, Spain and
Italy) to enhance the study team’s understanding of challenges related to the implementation
of EIBM under the EBCG Regulation and to gather forward-looking insights for assessing
different policy options and initiatives. The visits covered a number of Frontex’s and Member
States’ operational activities and included face-to-face interviews with relevant stakeholders.
The feedback collected informed the problem definition, the development and assessment of
policy options, and the preparation of thematic case studies. The findings were then used to
inform a set of thematic case studies.
• Workshops
o The first expert workshop was held online on 23 May 2025. Experts undertook an
initial assessment of policy measures’ descriptions, assumptions, and details. Key
considerations were briefly presented in the workshop, with detailed feedback on each
59
policy measure provided later in writing.
o The second expert workshop was held online on 24 July 2025. The workshop gave
the opportunity to discuss the draft policy options. Ahead of the workshop, experts’
inputs on the problem definition and draft policy options were collected, with the aim
to focus the discussion on specific elements that warranted specific discussions.
o The third expert workshop was held on 20 October 2025. During the workshop,
experts provided feedback on the proposed policy options and measures and the
rationale for discarding some policy measures.
• Thematic case studies: Four thematic case studies were drafted, which provided a deeper
understanding of the key challenges and feasibility of potential policy options by conducting
an in-depth analysis on specific angles of the key themes. The thematic focus of the four case
studies (CS) was as follows.
o CS1: Standing corps’ capability development
o CS2: State of the Art Technical capabilities
o CS3: Operational concept and Chain of Command
o CS4: Returns and International Cooperation
4.2 COMMISSION own initiatives
DG HOME also organised two technical meetings:
- Schengen Border Code Committee – 6 June 2025 – with a focus on possible changes in the
mandate of Frontex;
- EBCG expert group – 9 October 2025 – to discuss the standing corps and reinforcement of
technical capabilities.
Both meetings gathered representatives of the Member States representing different authorities.
Representatives from the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
Affairs (LIBE committee) and from Frontex were also invited.
4.3 FRONTEX
• ICF carried out a number of interviews with FRONTEX senior management and relevant units
for the purpose of the study.
• The Frontex executive director prepared a White Paper outlining some ideas for the future
reinforcement of Frontex which was presented at the June meeting of the management board.
• On 22 July 2025 the Frontex executive board discussed the next steps.
• On 17 August 2025, Frontex distributed another discussion paper ‘The future of Frontex: long-
term priorities for the EIBM and the revision of the EBCG Regulation’. The document outlined
the three areas of possible intervention and provided specific questions for each of them on: (i)
capabilities (the standing corps, technical equipment and training); (ii) third country
engagement (operational support, strategic level and capacity building) and (iii) returns (future
role and functions).
• The Frontex management board discussed the future of Frontex, including the revision of the
EBCG Regulation, at the management board meeting of 24-25 September 2025 as well as at
the extraordinary meeting of the management board on 20 October 2025. The main focus of
discussions was on capabilities, third country engagement and returns. Following the 107th
meeting in November 2025, the Management Board endorsed the summary of these
discussions.
4.4. COUNCIL
There were preliminary exchanges of views with the Member States at different levels in 2025 and
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2026:
• 16 April 2025– Frontiers WP (general discussion)
• 21 May 2025 - SCIFA (general discussion)
• 16 September 2025 - Senior Officials Meeting (general discussion)
• 30 September 2025 – JHA Counsellors (preparation for the discussion in the Council)
• 14 October 2025 – Schengen Council
• 5 November 2025 – Frontiers WP (continuation of discussion)
• 2 December 2025 – Frontiers WP (finalisation of discussions)
• 10 December 2025 – JHA Counsellors
• 19 December 2025 – COREPER approved a summary report prepared by the Danish
Presidency
• 6-7 May 2026 – SCIFA (continuation of discussion)
• 8-9 July 2026 - SCIFA (finalisation of discussions).
4.5. EUROPEAN Parliament
The first exchange of views with EP took place in April, at the Schengen Scrutiny Working Group of
the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE committee).
DG HOME presented an update to the Working Group on 16 October 2025. DG HOME provided a
further update, followed by another exchange of views, on 11 June 2026. Frontex’s future mandate
was also discussed at the event on 2 July 2026 launching a study on Frontex’s future, which was
commissioned by the European Greens.
4.6. Other sources
The impact assessment also builds on the Commission’s evaluation of Regulation (EU) 2019/189682,
internal analyses, and supporting reports and studies produced by the Commission and relevant EU
bodies, as well as information provided by Frontex and Member States.
The evidence base is complemented by stakeholder input gathered through:
- Call for evidence published by DG HOME on the Commission’s ‘Have your say’ webpage on
31 July 2025 until 11 September 2025.
- Public consultation from 21 August 2025 to 27 November 2025, which was also published on ‘Have
your say’ webpage (for more details, see Annex 2).
82 See COM(2024) 75 final. The Commission carried out the evaluation and review between May 2022 and October 2023,
based on a broad consultation exercise involving Member States’ authorities, the European Parliament, the Council,
Frontex itself, and relevant EU agencies, including the Fundamental Rights Agency. This work has also been supported by
an external study.
61
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT)
This Annex presents the synopsis report of the consultation activities undertaken for the evaluation
and impact assessment of the proposal amending the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation.
1. CONSULTATION ON THE ROADMAP/INCEPTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT
1.1 Introduction
The Call for Evidence was launched on the European Commission’s website (‘Have Your Say’ Portal)
on 31 July and closed on 11 September 202583. This Annex provides an overview of respondents’
profile and their views.
Some respondents attached position papers, academic articles, and reports to support their
submissions. This Annex summarises the main points raised in these materials. In some cases, the
annexes included extensive public reports or detailed academic studies. While this Annex provides an
overview of their key messages, specific insights from these sources have been integrated into the
main body of the Second Interim Report as part of the evidence base underpinning the findings, where
relevant.
1.2 Respondents’ profile
The Call for Evidence gathered 25 replies from a diverse range of stakeholders: EU citizens (12),
academic and research institutions (5)84, NGOs (4)85, companies (2), one business association, and one
public authority (see figure below).
Respondents’ profile by- stakeholder type
Source: Produced by ICF
Contributions came from nine Member States (Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia) and from the US86 and the UK87.
83 European Border and Coast Guard – update of EU rules 84 One academic submitted three different replies to the call for evidence, because their attached documents exceeded the
size limit for a single response. Another respondent (SHARED project) attached a contribution which is the result of a
collaboration of three different universities. 85 Among the NGOs that responded to the call for evidence, there was one reply from a coalition representing six NGOs. 86 The ‘Entrust’ company 87 Academic/research institution: University of Westminster
62
Respondents’ profile - geographical distribution
Source: Produced by ICF
1.3 Views of respondents
In response to the call for evidence, respondents expressed a wide range of views, often reflecting
broader debates about migration, border management, and the role of the European Border and Coast
Guard (EBCG), including Frontex. Other respondents focused on specific issues involving Frontex’s
mandate, its activities, and the EBCG Regulation itself.
Some individuals, NGOs and academics criticised stronger border enforcement, pointing to concerns
about pushbacks, asylum rights, transparency, accountability and the risk that expanding Frontex
would worsen fundamental rights violations. Several people argued instead for more humane
migration policies, stronger oversight, and investment in root causes abroad.
Others supported a stronger Frontex role, stricter external border controls, more effective returns, and
additional operational support, especially in frontline regions. Further contributions from public and
private actors called for more tailored regional support, better cooperation with third countries,
stronger training and safeguards, and more flexible, innovation-friendly rules and technologies for EU
border management.
2. CONSULTATION STRATEGY
2.1. Public consultation
The Commission carried out an open public consultation targeting the general public with the aim of
collecting information, evidence, and views on the issues at stake and to feed into the evaluation
questions. The questionnaire was available in all official languages of the EU institutions88 and
remained open on the Commission’s public consultation website from 21 August 2025 to
27 November 2025.
Of the 19 contributions received, 7 (37%) were submitted by EU citizens, followed by 4 (21%) non-
governmental organisations, 2 (11%) companies/businesses and 1 (5%) regional public authority.
There were 5 (26%) contributions from other respondents, which included one NGOs network, two
international organisations, one federation, and Frontex Consultative Forum, see Figure 1.
88 Except Gaelic.
63
Figure 1: Public consultation responses by type of respondent
Source: European Commission89
A third of responses came from Germany (6 or 32%). The second largest number of contributions
came from Belgium (3 or 16%), followed by Italy (2 or 11%), Switzerland (2 or 11%) and Spain (2 or
11%,). This was followed by Greece (1 or 5%), Latvia (1 or 5%), United Arab Emirates (1 or 5%) and
Poland (1 or 5%), see Figure 2.
Figure 2: Responses to public consultation by country
Source: European Commission90.
2.2. Online survey by ICF
The online survey targeted national authorities form EU Member States and Schengen Associated
89 European Commission, Have your Say - European Border and Coast Guard – update of EU rules 90 European Commission, Have your Say - European Border and Coast Guard – update of EU rules
64
countries. It opened on 25 June 2025 and concluded on 10 October 202, and was then distributed to
national authorities via email, through Permanent Representations.
The survey focused on gathering the views and insights of national authorities on the following issues:
standing corps; training concept; Frontex mandate, governance, and oversight; returns; standing corps
support to EU visa policy; situational awareness capabilities; state-of-the-art technology and
equipment and national training capabilities and needs.
The survey gathered 48 replies from 24 EU Member States and 3 Schengen associated countries. Some
countries submitted a single consolidated reply reflecting the views of all relevant national authorities,
while others provided multiple replies from different authorities. The type of national institutions
replying to the survey is showcased in the graph below.
2.3. Stakeholder interviews
The contractor carried out 140 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders at the international,
EU, and national levels. Stakeholder consultations targeted representatives from Frontex, standing
corps personnel, European Commission, other EU agencies and bodies relating to EBCG operations,
Frontex Consultative Forum members and Member States’ authorities. Interviews were conducted
both online and in-person, with the online interviews sometimes gathering more than one participant
or authority. The table below (Table 1) provides an overview of conducted interviews.
Table 1: Overview of stakeholder interviews conducted
Stakeholder
type
Details
Frontex • Strategy, Governance and External Relations Division (STRAT) (3)
• Human Capital Division (PERSONNEL) (2)
• Capability Transformation Division (TRANSFORM) (2)
• Equipment and Logistics Division (EQUIP)
• EIBM Intelligence Division (INTEL) (3)
65
• Human Resources and Corporate Services Division (HRS) (3)
• Operational Management Division (OMD) (2)
• Operational Planning Division (OPD) (3)
• Operational Support Division (OSD) (3)
• Return Division (RET)
• Executive Director
• Data Protection Officer
• Management Board Secretariat
• ETIAS Central Unit Division
• Deputy Executive Director for Operations
• Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) and Deputy FRO
• EIBM Intelligence Division (Analysis Unit : Travel Flow Analysis
Sector)
Standing corps • Frontex Contingent Commanders (4)
• Deputy Contingent Commander (2)
• Fundamental Rights Monitors (2)
• Liaison Officers in Third Country (2)
• Cross-border Crime Detection Officers (2)
• Return Contingents (3)
• Cross-border crime detection officers (3)
• Debriefing Officers (5)
• Section Leaders (2)
• Advanced Level Document Officer
European
Commission
• DG MENA A2
• DG INTPA A2
• DG INTPA A3
• DG INTPA G6
• DG HOME A3
• DG HOME B2
• DG HOME B4
66
• DG HOME C1
• DG HOME C4
• DG HOME C5
• DG HOME B1
• DG HOME E1
• DG HOME F2
• DG ENEST B1
• DG MOVE
• DG JUST (2)
• DG HR (3)
• Paymaster Office (PMO)/ Office for administration and payment of
individual entitlements
• Secretary General
• EU Return Coordinator
• DG HOME Director General
• DG BUDG
Frontex
Consultative
Forum
members
• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
• Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA)
• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Regional Office for Europe (OHCHR)
• European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)
• Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CBBE)
• International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
• Save the Children
• OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR)
Other EU
agencies and
bodies
• CEPOL
• EEAS (2)
• EFCA
• Eurojust
• EMSA
• EUDPS
67
• Europol
• SatCen
• EU Ombudsman
Member
States’
authorities
• France (Ministry of Interior (2), Border management/return authority)
• Estonia (Border management authority)
• Germany (Border management authority, Return authority)
• Croatia (Ministry of Interior, Border management/return authority)
• Hungary (Ministry of Interior, Border management authority)
• Czech Republic (Border management authority)
• Romania (Border management authority)
• Sweden (Ministry of Interior, Border management authority)
• Malta (Border management authority)
• Netherlands (Return authority)
• Italy (Ministry of Interior (3); Border management/return authority (5))
• Bulgaria (Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Border
management/return authority)
• Spain (Border management authorities (3))
• Finland (Ministry of Interior, Border management/return authorities
(5), Border and coast guard academy)
• Greece (Hellenic Coast Guard)
• Czech Republic (Return authority)
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3. RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES
3.1 Public consultation
Respondents identified search and rescue operations, consistent standards across the EU, and
cooperation with EU and international partners among the main areas for further strengthening.
Respondents also supported reinforcing mechanisms to detect and address fundamental rights
violations, including stronger fundamental rights complaints mechanisms and oversight.
Training and harmonisation were generally considered to have positive impacts, particularly through
common standards and training for national border and coast guard officers.
Concerns were raised regarding Frontex’s role in returns and third-country deployments, as well as the
use of emerging technologies. The concerns emphasised the need for clear responsibilities,
accountability and compliance with fundamental rights and data protection requirements.
Views on expanding the standing corps and Frontex’s technical capabilities were mixed.
3.2 Online survey by ICF
The ICF survey identified improvements associated with Frontex’s new operational command
structure, including a clearer chain of command and improved standing corps coordination. At the
same time, administrative burdens, duplication and differences in procedures and standards across
countries and missions were identified as factors affecting operational efficiency. Respondents
identified improvements to reimbursement arrangements and financial incentives as potential
measures to facilitate standing corps deployment.
Training was identified as a key area for further development, particularly regarding document checks,
returns, identification of vulnerable persons and technological proficiency. National training
authorities highlighted common EU-level standards as a means of improving operational coherence,
including in the application of EU and international law, screening procedures and shared EU systems
such as EUROSUR, JORA, and IRMA. The new standing corps category for emergency responses
was also identified as a potential source of added value for Member States.
3.3 Stakeholders interviews
Stakeholders identified operational challenges affecting Frontex deployments, including difficulties
integrating EU-level officers into national operations and inefficiencies linked to the deployment
requirements for EU co-financed assets. They also highlighted gaps in preparedness, including the
absence of vulnerability assessments for EU candidate countries, and identified a Deployment
Handbook as a potential means of improving coherence with national practices. Stakeholders
emphasised that Frontex should complement rather than duplicate national capabilities. The potential
expansion of technical equipment was considered to have mixed coherence in light of the associated
financial, logistical and support requirements.
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ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW?
1. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE
The initiative concerns the revision of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 on the EBCG, with the objective
of reinforcing the mandate, capacities, and operational effectiveness of the EBCG, including its
standing corps, operational support functions, and cooperation with Member States and third countries.
The initiative therefore has the capacity to affect the following stakeholders:
- Member States / Schengen associated countries (public authorities responsible for border
management and coast guard, police and other law enforcement authorities, authorities and
services responsible for return and visa, migration and asylum authorities);
- European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and other relevant EU agencies (in
particular Europol);
- Frontex management board;
- EU citizens and third-country nationals.
2. SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
Table 1 - Overview of benefits – preferred option
Direct benefits and impacts Group affected / additional comments
Expected improvements in operational
efficiency and effectiveness in border
management
Border and coast guard authorities / EU
citizens / consulates / third country
nationals
Expected improvements in combating cross-
border crime and smuggling
Border and coast guard authorities /
national law enforcement authorities /
Frontex / Europol / Eurojust / third country
nationals / EU citizens
Expected improvements in addressing risks
related to issuing of visa and verification of
documents
Border and coast guards authorities / visa
authorities (consulates in particular) /
third-country nationals
More comprehensive situational awareness:
Enhanced data sharing in EUROSUR may lead
to swifter decision-making and resource
allocation
Border and coast guard authorities /
Frontex
Enhanced cooperation in external dimension Border and coast guard authorities / return
authorities / Frontex / EU delegations /
consulates/third-country nationals
Enhanced returns Authorities and services responsible for
returns at different stages / Frontex / third
country nationals
Increased standing corps composed of better
trained staff and more diversified
Border and coast guard authorities /return
authorities and services / consulates /
Frontex
70
Direct benefits and impacts Group affected / additional comments
Employment conditions adjusted to the
specificity of the tasks
Standing corps / Frontex
Expected expansion of responsibilities in
supporting Member States with regard to
returns, visa policy, pooling technical
equipment and cooperation with third
countries;
Frontex
Modernised training architecture Frontex EBCG academy and national
training authorities
Indirect benefits and impacts
Anticipated improvements in security and
internal security
EU citizens
Potential for removing persistent controls at
internal borders thanks to improvement of
controls at external borders
EU citizens
Increased trust in institutions and EU policies EU citizens
Adequate oversight as regards activities
involving Frontex
EU citizens / third country nationals
Summary of costs and benefits
As a tool for assessing the costs and benefits, the Commission used the relevant parts of the
Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines’ Toolbox.
Table 2 - Cost overview according to the standards set out in the Better Regulation Guidelines
Overview of Costs (2028-2034) - Preferred Option (in m EUR)
Citizens /
consumers Businesses Administrations
One-
off Recurrent
One-
off Recurrent
One-
off Recurrent
Staffing costs (including
HQ staff) Direct costs Not applicable Not applicable 3 949
EBCG standing corps -
deployment costs Direct costs Not applicable Not applicable 1 517
EBCG standing corps -
training costs Direct costs Not applicable Not applicable 97
EBCG standing corps -
subsidies* Direct costs Not applicable Not applicable 10 1 059
Technical equipment Direct costs Not applicable Not applicable 1 704
Return activities Direct costs Not applicable Not applicable 1 143
Other operational
expenditure
Direct costs Not applicable Not applicable 954
Direct regulatory fees
and charges Not applicable
Direct enforcement
costs Not applicable
Indirect costs Not estimated
* The costs calculation takes into account a one-off payment (yearly) for Category 1 Standing Corps
Officers under Article 61(c).
An overview on the costs’ calculation is given in Annex 11 (costs assessment).
71
All one-off and recurrent costs are implementation costs. No regulatory charges, hassle costs,
administrative costs or indirect costs were identified and therefore are not quantified.
No costs stemming from new or removed administrative burdens (i.e. from the application of the ‘one
in, one out’ approach) have been identified.
Table 3 - Overview of relevant UN Sustainable Development Goals
Sustainable
Development
Goals
Expected progress towards the goal
No 3: Good health
and well-being
More efficient border controls based on well-trained standing corps and more efficient returns
are expected to enhance access to healthcare for irregular migrants and returnees.
Better and more uniform training in all aspects of border management and return will also lead
to a greater degree of care for individuals, including with regard to the appropriate support to
unaccompanied minors, the provision of services to persons in vulnerable situations, and the
identification of victims of trafficking, among others.
Improved data sharing among Member States may facilitate timely interventions, including
search and rescue operations, and thus prompter access to medical services.
No 10: Reduced
inequalities
The modified training framework is expected to ensure a more uniform application of EIBM
across the Member States and cover all aspects of border management, contributing to
responsible and well-managed migration policies, based on the safe and effective management
of the external borders. This will also lead to more equitable treatment of migrants across
Member States.
No 16: Peace,
justice, and strong
institutions
The initiative is expected to strengthen the rule of law and enhance security within the EU.
Ensuring that suggested policy measures feature adequate oversight and governance components
will further strengthen Frontex’s accountability and stakeholders’ access to justice.
Clarifying the role of Frontex in the fight against cross-border crime will enhance Frontex’s
contribution in the fight against transnational crime, contributing to overall EU efforts on this
front.
Improved coordination among Member States may lead to more effective management of
migration related challenges, potentially reducing public distrust towards institutions.
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ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS
1. Methodology
The Commission’s impact assessment methodology served to structure and guide the analyses carried
out by in the feasibility study91. The work focused on assessing the feasibility and impacts of policy
options.
The methodological approach derived from the analysis of the list of guiding questions as per the
Better Regulation Guidelines by the contractor. During the study these questions were categorised into
a set of thematic areas.
Based on the inputs provided by the contractor, DG HOME further refined the problems, the thematic
areas and the policy options.
1.1. Data collection and analysis phase
The data collection and analysis phase comprised a set of tasks and sub-tasks, which are outlined
below.
Part 1: The inception phase consisted of a preliminary identification of policy objectives and of
policy options. Identifying these elements formed a critical foundation of the study, as they ensured
(i) the overall coherence of the initiative, (ii) clear links between the problem drivers and the proposed
policy options, and (iii) clear outlining of the assessment of their impacts, in line with the requirements
of the Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox.
Part 2: DG HOME launched a call for evidence and a public consultation questionnaire on the
‘Have Your Say’ portal. The call for evidence was launched on the portal on 31 July and closed on
11 September 2025. The public vconsultation was launched on 21 August and closed on 27 November
2025. Both initiatives aimed at gathering the views of the general public (e.g. EU citizens, NGOs,
business associations, academics, private companies, and public authorities) to ensure a broad and
inclusive evidence base.
Part 3: Targeted consultation activities were divided into five subparts.
Subpart 1 (targeted surveys): Two online survey questionnaires were created and launched in the
form of an online survey. The first targeted national authorities from Member States and Schengen
associated countries. Relevant authorities targeted include Ministries of the Interior, national
authorities responsible for border management and return procedures, national police and border guard
training academies, as well as Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The second survey questionnaire was
designed for EBCG standing corps.
The online surveys were then distributed via email. In particular:
• The standing corps survey was launched on 16 June and was closed on 30 June. The survey
collected 433 replies.
• The national authorities survey was launched on 25 June and concluded on 10 October 2025.
The survey gathered 48 replies from 24 EU Member States and 3 Schengen associated countries.
Subpart 2 (targeted interviews): 140 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key
stakeholders at the international, EU, and national levels. Interviews were conducted both online and
in-person. Online interviews sometimes gathered more than one participant or authority.
Subpart 3 (field visits): A set of field visits were conducted in selected Member States (Bulgaria,
Finland, Spain and Italy) to enhance the study team’s understanding of challenges related to the
91 ICF, 2026, Feasibility study to develop and assess potential options for the further reinforcement of the capabilities of
the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) under Regulation (EU) 2019/1896.
73
implementation of EIBM under the EBCG Regulation and to gather forward-looking insights for
assessing different policy options and initiatives. The visits covered a number of Frontex’s and
Member States’ operational activities and included face-to-face interviews with relevant stakeholders.
The feedback collected informed the problem definition, the development and assessment of policy
options, and the preparation of thematic case studies. The findings were then used to inform a set of
thematic case studies.
Subpart 4 (expert workshops and validation interviews): Three expert workshops were organised,
and a series of validation interviews were conducted with key Frontex staff.
• The first expert workshop was held online on 23 May 2025. Experts undertook an initial
assessment of policy measures’ descriptions, assumptions, and details. Key considerations were
briefly presented in the workshop, with detailed feedback on each policy measure provided later
in writing.
• The second expert workshop was held online on 24 July 2025. The workshop gave the
opportunity to discuss the draft policy options. Ahead of the workshop, experts’ inputs on the
problem definition and draft policy options were collected, with the aim to focus the discussion on
specific elements that warranted specific discussions.
• The third expert workshop was held on 20 October 2025. During the workshop, experts provided
feedback on the proposed policy options and measures and the rationale for discarding some policy
measures.
Subpart 5 (thematic case studies): Four thematic case studies were drafted, which provided a
deeper understanding of the key challenges and feasibility of potential policy options by conducting
an in-depth analysis on specific angles of the key themes. The thematic focus of the four case studies
was as follows:
• Case study 1: standing corps’ capability development
• Case study 2: state-of-the-art technical capabilities
• Case study 3: operational concept and chain of command
• Case study 4: returns and international cooperation/
Part 4: Analysis and assessment of impacts part of the methodology was divided into seven subparts.
Subpart 1: Development of a problem definition, including problem drivers and consequences. The
analysis was later on refined through the analysis of new evidence collected.
Subpart 2: Identification of the baseline scenario, describing how the identified problems would
evolve in the absence of EU action. The baseline scenario, also referred to as Option 0 (No
Intervention), is structured around key aspects and issues where significant gaps and challenges persist.
These areas form the basis for the policy measures included in the policy packages, which are
subsequently assessed.
Subpart 3: Identification of specific policy objectives, setting the level of ambition for the
reinforcement of the capabilities of the EBCG under Regulation (EU) 2019/1896.
Subpart 4: Development of four policy packages (in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines),
each one progressively more ambitious.
• Option 0 assumes no EU action.
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• Option 1 aims to improve EBCG effectiveness by addressing current shortcomings with
legislative measures.
• Option 2 seeks harmonisation of national practices for better EIBM implementation and a
comprehensive legislative proposal tackling EBCG Regulation issues.
• Option 3 proposes expanding EBCG’s mandate and capabilities for a more integrated EU
response through substantial legislation.
Subpart 5: Analysis of the effects and impacts of policy options, focusing on costs and benefits for
various stakeholders. In line with the Better Regulation Toolbox and the general requirements for
impact assessments, the analysis covered economic, social, environmental, and fundamental rights
impacts, quantifying and monetising where possible.
Expected impacts were categorised using a scoring system outlined below:
• -3 = Significant negative impact (compared to the baseline)
• -2 = Moderate negative impact (compared to the baseline)
• -1 = Minimal negative impact (compared to the baseline)
• 0 = No impact
• 1 = Minimal positive impact (compared to the baseline)
• 2 = Moderate positive impact (compared to the baseline)
• 3 = Significant positive impact (compared to the baseline)
Subpart 6: Comparison of options and the identification of the preferred policy option. This scored
the consequences of each measure or group of measures relative to the baseline scenario against the
key criteria of necessity, efficiency, effectiveness, coherence and proportionality, in order to determine
the preferred policy option.
In practice, each policy measure was assessed against the five criteria using the key questions outlined
above, as per the evaluation scale described below. The baseline is always assessed as 0.
The preferred policy option for each thematic area was selected as emerging from the comparison.
Subpart 7: Review of the existing monitoring and evaluation arrangements within the EBCG
Regulation, and determination of whether additional arrangements are necessary to monitor progress
towards policy objectives.
The current evaluation mechanism in the Regulation consists of Article 121 (EBCG Regulation
evaluation) and Article 59 (standing corps review). It also includes extensive reporting obligations for
Frontex to the European Commission, European Parliament, Council of the EU, and the Frontex
management board. Those obligations cover operational activities, return activities, fundamental
rights, EUROSUR, and more.
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Policy monitoring and evaluation relied on three elements:
• Indicators: Developing a set of SMART indicators for evaluating the preferred (policy) options,
once implemented. These measured progress against stated objectives;
• Monitoring mechanisms: Advising the Commission on how to monitor implementation of the
proposed (policy) options, incorporating (or adding) to existing monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms;
• Evaluation arrangements: Advising on suitable evaluation timelines and methods.
The study identified the relevant indicators for the preferred option.
1.2. Methodology for assessment of impacts
Figure 2 - Intervention logic
Three assessment criteria guided the assessment of the measures identified under each policy option:
a) effectiveness (degree to which the options are likely to meet the initiative’s objectives);
b) efficiency (costs benefits and their distribution across stakeholders);
c) coherence (internal and with other main EU policies/legislation).
Effectiveness was assessed by examining the extent to which the intervention achieved its stated
objectives. This included assessment of the information and data in the accompanying study,
stakeholder feedback and assessment criteria identified in Figure 7 (‘Links between objectives and
assessment criteria’) in Section 7.1 of the main impact assessment report.
Efficiency was evaluated by analysing the relationship between resources used and results achieved.
This included assessing financial costs, social impacts including, where appropriate, administrative
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burden and implementation efforts at EU and national level as well as impact on the fundamental
rights. The proportionality of costs relative to benefits was also considered.
Coherence was examined by assessing the internal consistency of the intervention and its alignment
with related EU legislation and broader policy objectives. The analysis identified potential overlaps,
gaps or inconsistencies with other instruments at EU and national level.
2. Caveats and limitations
The data collected for the study has several limitations that should be borne in mind when interpreting
the findings. We summarise these limitations below, along with the mitigation measures taken by the
study team to address them where possible. However, the results are considered valid.
• Gaps and inconsistencies in survey responses
The survey targeting national authorities resulted in 48 replies from 24 EU Member States and
3 Schengen associated countries. Approaches to responding to the survey varied. Some
respondents submitted a single, consolidated reply that reflected the views of all relevant
authorities (e.g. Ministries of Interior, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Police Training Academies).
Other respondents provided multiple separate replies from different institutions. In other cases,
respondents submitted a single reply which did not capture the perspectives of all relevant targeted
authorities. Moreover, instances of internal divergence between authorities within the same
country were also observed, particularly as regards opinion-based questions.
To account for these variations, the study team analysed the survey responses in detail, carefully
distinguishing between cases where a particular view represented a majority of national authorities
and those where it represented a majority of Member States / Schengen associated countries (e.g.
when one country submitted multiple replies).
The analysis also systematically flags divergences within Member States and Schengen associated
countries. Where divergences were noted with regard to factual questions, the study team
conducted follow-up research and consultations to ensure that correct inputs were considered as
part of the analysis.
• Limitations of the public consultation
The public consultation gathered 19 replies (seven EU citizens, four NGOs and one network of
NGOs, two companies, one regional authority, two international organisations, and the Frontex
Consultative Forum for Fundamental Rights), from nine countries (seven Member States, one
Schengen Associated Country, one third country).
The findings of the public consultation should be interpreted with caution due to several structural
limitations. First of all, the low number of responses received (19) limits the statistical robustness
of the results and implies they may not be considered representative of the broader EU population
or of all stakeholders involved in EU border management. This issue is further exacerbated by the
fact that respondents were unevenly distributed across stakeholder categories, with a relatively
strong presence of NGOs, EU citizens reporting a high personal familiarity with the EBCG
framework, and institutional actors. This could have the outcome of skewing results towards
governance, fundamental rights, and oversight concerns, as opposed to more technical issues or
matters that might represent a priority for other key Frontex stakeholders, such as the national
authorities responsible for border management or return in the Member States.
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Finally, it is important to note that self-selection bias is likely, as respondents choosing to engage
with the consultation will most likely opt to do so due to strong pre-existing views on Frontex and
EU border governance. This is in itself not necessarily a negative thing, as it can lead to more
informed responses. Moreover, it is a dynamic that is to some extent always true for any voluntary
survey.
In this case, however, the impact of self-selection bias could be enhanced by the low number of
responses received, and the results skewed by the fact that the survey concerns a polarising,
relatively politicised topic. These biases and limitations were mitigated through extensive
consultation of other stakeholders in other settings, allowing the Public Consultation to serve as
additional and complementary data to the main data collection and stakeholder consultation efforts
listed above.
• Subjectivity of stakeholders’ views
Data collected from stakeholders (including through interviews, surveys, and visits in the field), is
self-reported, meaning that it represented the subjective views, rather than objective conclusions.
To help mitigate this, the report relies on the triangulation of various data sources. In addition,
stakeholders consulted as part of this study for interviews, surveys, and field missions included
individuals with relevant expertise on the EBCG Regulation and Frontex.
• Limitations linked to the cost assessment
The cost assessment necessarily relies on assumptions about the future scale and scope of
Frontex’s activities, which cannot currently be verified with certainty. In particular, the
unpredictability of migratory flows is a major limitation, as these will have a strong impact on
operational needs and expenditures. Another caveat concerns the reliance on unit cost estimates
based on expenditure in 2024 as a starting point.
While these figures are robust from an empirical perspective, 2024 is generally considered a
relatively stable year without any significant crises. Consequently, the estimates may understate
the potential cost implications of large-scale or crisis-driven deployments. Other caveats related to
specific categories of costs are explicitly described under Annex 11 (Thematic area with significant
impact – cost assessment).
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ANNEX 5: PROBLEM DRIVERS
1. Problem drivers relevant for Problem 1
1.1.Driver: Frontex’s mandate lacks clarity on key tasks and has gaps.
Border controls
The concept of ‘shared responsibility’ that underpins the EBCG Regulation92 creates accountability
gaps and uncertainties regarding operational jurisdiction (e.g. as regards maritime SAR operations)93.
As identified in the study accompanying the Impact Assessment94, without a specific request from
Member States (or host third countries that have a status agreement) for Frontex support through
standing corps deployment or through a rapid border intervention, Frontex lacks the mandate and
therefore the authority to intervene independently. This means that operational needs which could
justify support from Frontex, are addressed in different manners across the EU95. During field
activities, Frontex also often96 lacks the authority to independently exercise the ‘executive powers’97
necessary to ensure compliance with the Schengen Border Code or to act upon detected illegal border
crossings in the situations involving law enforcement authorities.
The limitations concerning the performance of the executive powers are connected with hosting
capacity. In practical terms, the number of standing corps officers that a Member State is able to host
is often limited by the availability of host officers who are able to provide support, in English, so that
Frontex can exercise its executive powers98. While such support is operationally justified during the
initial deployment phase, it becomes burdensome over time and raises concerns regarding the efficient
use of available resources (both local officers and standing corps) that could be used for other tasks99.
92 Article 7 of the EBCG Regulation defines border management as a shared responsibility between Member States and
Frontex but ultimately places primary responsibility on the individual Member States for the management of their section
of the external border. In concrete terms, the sharing of responsibility and the implementation of operational support is
subject to bilateral negotiations between Frontex and each Member State. These are reflected in Operational Plans for Joint
Operations and return support for each Member State. For each type of border section or crossing point, Frontex adapts its
responsibilities to align with national needs, hosting capacity, and the legal and operational context. Discrepancies in how
Frontex contingent structures operate across the EU still exist. 93 As regards maritime search and rescue operations, the overarching legislative framework is grounded in international
maritime law, which makes the responsibility for declaring and coordinating search and rescue operations exclusively a
national competence. Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 applies this framework and further defines Frontex’s role in maritime
border surveillance. However, the EBCG Regulation is not very explicit about key components of search and rescue —
such as the duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea as a primary responsibility during maritime operations —
and could better define Frontex’s operationalisation of its limited mandate in this domain. 94 Study supporting the impact assessment [ICF feasibility study]; first expert workshop; interview with Frontex cross-
border-crime detection officer; interview with national authorities. 95 The justifications for these decisions are not made public or formally articulated. The core issue appears to lie in differing
operational standards and approaches to preventing irregular entries, and in the overall level of trust. 96 Frontex may exercise executive powers independently only upon the specific consent of the host Member State which
may be given for specific tasks or periods as defined in the specific operational plan of the joint operation. In practice, this
is very rarely the case. Member States prefer for standing corps officers to act only on the command and control and in the
presence of the host Member State authorities. 97 Article 55(7) of the EBCG Regulation. 98 Typically, in joint operations at land borders, Frontex patrol vehicles include one host officer and two Frontex standing
corps. 99 Interviews with Frontex contingent commanders, Frontex group leaders and national authorities; survey with standing
corps.
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The administrative and practical challenges can equally affect the interest of the Member States in
deployments and the effectiveness of deployed standing corps. For instance, often the first-line kiosks
at border crossing points are prepared to host only one officer, while Member States require a local
agent to accompany a standing corps officer inspecting travel documents. Acommodation is another
recurring problem. In the survey accompanying the study, 27% of respondents reported that their
country does not have capacity to provide accommodation for Frontex personnel during deployments
at all. Others indicated at least some level of capacity (with 23% who said to have it to a moderate
extent and 13% to a small extent). Only two countries claim to largely have this capacity.
In particular, the access for Frontex officers to relevant databases becomes crucial to ensure the full
use of the advanced-level document officers deployed or to help with reducing waiting time at the
border crossing points in busy periods. Yet, in practice, access to such databases is often only available
either in the local language or with limited English interfaces and requires specialised training.
Frontex’s efforts have led to a decrease in restrictions in accessing the databases in the number of
Member States has decreased100, but it is still an issue in most of the Member States101. According to
vulnerability assessments and Schengen evaluations, staff shortages and challenges with accessing
databases at different border crossing points are a recurring problem.
Combating cross-border crime and smuggling
Frontex’s support to the fight against cross-border crime, in particular migrant smuggling, is subject
to constraints and various interpretations as already signalled in the 2024 evaluation. While some of
these limitations are justified by its core mandate as Frontex’s primary responsibility is not focused on
ensuring internal security, certain limitations arise from ambiguity or gaps in the EBCG Regulation.
On the one hand a definition of ‘cross-border crime’ in the EBCG Regulation102 is broader compared
to Europol’s definition103. On the other, the EBCG Regulation104 does not provide clear provisions on
what constitutes ‘detection of cross-border crime’ or ‘operational assistance’ in the context of border
management105. This creates uncertainties regarding the type of cross-border crime covered by the
competence of Frontex.
In addition, Frontex’s statutory staff can exercise executive powers, which are also relevant in the
context of combating cross-border crime, only if this is authorised by the national authorities of the
host Member State, thus engaging national resources and sometimes putting in question the added
value of deployment106.
These structural and operational limitations are particularly problematic in the context of migrant
smuggling, which remains a persistent form of cross-border crime. The EU Action Plan against
migrant smuggling107 calls on Frontex to support law enforcement authorities and Europol by
100 Frontex developed the ‘traffic lights’ system, ensured exchange of best practices and provided grants to support
translation of interfaces. 101 In 2025 only 11 Member States offered full access to the national databases, while 11 had some restrictions and 6 not
allowing such access. 102 Article 2(12) of the EBCG Regulation. 103 In the Europol Regulation cross-border crime is defined by the involvement of two or more Member States, referring
to ‘serious crime’ and specifically ‘terrorism’ and ‘forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by Union
policy’. Annex I to the Europol Regulation includes a full list of specific areas of crime. 104 Article 5 of the EBCG Regulation. 105 Article 5(3) of the EBCG Regulation: ‘the Agency shall facilitate and render more effective the application of Union
measures relating to the management of the external borders’. 106 Article 82(2) of the EBCG Regulation. See also European Court of Auditors. (2021). Frontex’s support to external
border management: Not sufficiently effective to date (Special Report No 08/2021). Publications Office of the European
Union. https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_08/SR_Frontex_EN.pdf. Interview with: DG HOME C4;
National authority. 107 European Commission (2021) A Renewed EU action plan against migrant smuggling COM/2021/591 final.
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providing updated profiles of suspicious vessels to be monitored, identified, seized, and, once relevant
criminal investigations are completed by the competent authority, disposed of. It also encourages
exchange of information on suspicious vessels with Europol. However, Frontex’s current mandate
does not clarify which analytical and situational-awareness support functions Frontex could engage in
to assist Europol with migrant smuggling. This creates a mismatch between Frontex’s mandate and
the expected cooperation outcome. So, despite being a key area of concern for EU internal security
and border management, the current legal and operational framework does not give Frontex enough
tools to meaningfully contribute to counter-smuggling efforts.
Data transfer to Europol
Practice shows that transmissions of operational personal data108 by Frontex to Europol presents
challenges, preventing Frontex from contributing to the fight against serious cross-border crime,
including migrant smuggling.Article 90 of the EBCG Regulation regulating Frontex’s processing of
operational personal data and internal Management Board decisions109 impose strict limits on how and
when Frontex can transmit such data to Europol110.
This should be positively viewed as guaranteeing high safeguards for data subjects. However, due to
lack of clarity, in practice these same limitations are also being interpreted as requiring Frontex to
assess whether every request for operational personal data by Europol is ‘strictly necessary’ for the
fulfilment of Europol’s mandate. This is not explicitly mandated by Article 90, which instead simply
sets ‘strict necessity’ as a logical prerequisite, but does not impose this assessment on Frontex.Frontex
finds it practically impossible to assess this itself, but Europol (as the originator of such requests) could
better provide this ‘strict necessity’ justification for its own requests to Frontex.
The current dynamic creates a situation where Frontex needs to make an assessment without the
necessary information — namely whether the requested data would be strictly necessary and whether
Europol could obtain it any other way — to support a Europol investigation or activity. In turn, this
could result in flawed assessments that negatively impact data subjects’ rights, expose Frontex to risks
of mishandling personal data, and obfuscate both agencies’ responsibility to correctly implement data
protection rules. To mitigate these risks, at present Frontex is arguably interpreting these provisions in
an overly strict manner, resulting in extremely long request processing times, frequent rejections of
Europol requests, and limited data exchanges between the agencies111. More broadly, this can lead to
missed opportunities in the fight against cross-border crime. The complexities of Frontex’s data
protection framework are exacerbated by the limited resources of the Frontex data protection office
team and Frontex staff’s limited understanding of data protection rules and their implications112.
Visa policy
Although the EU visa policy is a key element of the EIBM four-tier access control model, Frontex has
108 EUDPR Article 3(2): ‘operational personal data’ means all personal data processed by Union bodies, offices or agencies
when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Chapter 4 or Chapter 5 of Title V of Part Three TFEU to meet
the objectives and tasks laid down in the legal acts establishing those bodies, offices or agencies. Because operational
personal data refers to all personal data processed for the purposes of carrying out law-enforcement tasks, and Frontex does
not have a legal basis in judicial cooperation in criminal matters or police cooperation, its processing of operational personal
data is extremely limited by design. 109 Frontex Management Board Decision 4/2024 adopting general rules on the application of the Data Protection Regulation
by the Agency, and Frontex Management Board Decision 5/2024 adopting the rules on processing operational personal
data by Frontex. 110 Another difficulty exists in the inability to identify an exhaustive list use-cases for when Frontex would be needing to
process operational personal data as such, in the sense of the EUDPR. 111 These limitations came about as a result of the EDPS audit on Frontex debriefing activities – which results in inadequate
levels of data sharing between by Frontex. 112 Interview with Frontex data protection office; Frontex data protection office activity report.
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a limited role to play in supporting Member States in this area. At the same time, national consular
services still suffer from reductions of resources dedicated to visa processing imposed during
pandemic and never restored which makes a central level support even more needed.
Ad hoc training sessions or webinars offered by Frontex are not sufficient to meet the scale and
complexity of the challenges faced by the Member States113. In particular, the specific expertise on
document fraud techniques and trends and risk assessment could be valuable to prevent visa abuse114
but Frontex’s support in this area remains limited115. The absence of a dedicated EU agency for visas
to support Member States on visa policy is apparent from the first EU Visa Strategy adopted on
29 January 2026. This is a problem, since the efficient implementation of the common rules in this
area calls for increased coordination of the operational cooperation between the Member States and an
EU agency would be best placed to help with that coordination.
Emergencies and hybrid threats
Over the past decade, Europe has faced a growing number of natural disasters and major health
emergencies, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. These events have required national border authorities
to implement special measures or undertake activities outside the procedures set out in the Schengen
Border Code116. Hybrid threats at the external borders can trigger the same need for exceptional border
procedures and rapid reinforcement, for instance through instrumentalisation of migration, sabotage
or disruption of border infrastructure and IT systems, or hostile/unlawful use of unmanned aerial
systems (UAS) for reconnaissance, smuggling facilitation or disruption around sensitive border areas
(including border crossing points and nearby critical infrastructure). This strengthens the case for
clearer provisions on crisis coordination arrangements and for the use of relevant surveillance /
counter-UAS capabilities within the limits of the legal framework.
Frontex’s mandate does not explicitly allow support to Member State authorities in exceptional
situations beyond traditional border management, preventing Frontex from assisting Member States
during such crisis situations117. In practical terms, the types of support that may be needed in such
exceptional situations (upon request by the host Member State) include: personnel deployed to sustain
border checks and manage exceptional flows at border crossing points; operational coordination and
contingency planning support; mobile surveillance and situational awareness support (including
temporary deployment of surveillance assets and technical support to ensure continuity of information
exchange); and logistical support to enable sustained deployments (transport, accommodation,
communications, equipment readiness). Where the mandate and/or operational planning framework
does not clearly cover such crisis-specific support, assistance risks remaining ad hoc and slower, with
gaps being covered only through national arrangements and civil protection mechanisms.
Frontex also does not have the competence to respond to broader hybrid threats except for
instrumentalised migratory flows, where migration flows are used as an instrument to disrupt borders,
increase geopolitical pressure, and influence socio-political life in a given country. The EBCG
113 Source: Interview with Frontex ‘Operations Support Systems’ Unit. 114 Interviews with: DG HOME; Frontex Operations Support Systems Unit; Frontex (2025) Enhancing EIBM through more
effective cooperation with third countries – a deep dive paper on third country engagement; Frontex (2025) White Paper
on reinforcing Frontex to future-proof the EIBM. 115 The 2024 Consolidated Annual Activity Report indicates that Frontex launched a call for a Pilot Analytical Activity on
Fraudulent Obtained Visa, and that 13 Member States expressed interest. See Frontex (2025) Consolidated Annual Activity
Report 2024. caar-2024.pdf 116 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the
rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, pp. 1-52. 117 Interviews with Frontex OPD for the purpose of the study accompanying the Impact Assessment;
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Regulation mentions hybrid threats only in a non-binding recital118, which does not give Frontex
operative authority to act on them.
This inability to assist national authorities when addressing other types of emergencies (e.g. natural
disasters or hybrid threats) may be perceived as missed opportunities in the EU’s overall resilience
and have negative consequences for local perceptions of Frontex. It is also important to consider that
the rapidly evolving phenomenon of hybrid threats might require fundamentally new, complex and
well-coordinated operational response involving competencies for border management that do not
exist at present.
1.2 Driver: fragmented implementation of the European Border Surveillance System
(EUROSUR)
The fragmented implementation of EUROSUR (the integrated framework for the provision of
situational awareness to the EBCG community and a key element of collective insight into the situation
at the EU external borders) has hindered the attainment of the system’s full capacity. While
acknowledging the progress made so far in the implementation of EUROSUR and recognising that its
implementation is not due to be completed until the end of 2026, it is already clear that several
operational and technical issues will continue to hinder EUROSUR’s effectiveness and are not likely
to be solved with the completion of the implementation process. There are also a number of issues that
require modification and improvement in order to address the operational needs of the Member States
and Frontex, and to make EUROSUR a sustainable and future-proof tool119.
The study accompanying the Impact Assessment indicated several aspects, mostly concerning the
implementation by Member States. Those include inconsistent development of ‘national situational
pictures’120, in particular the operational layer as it is shared among relevant national authorities only
by half of the Member States121, and shortcomings affecting data quality and completeness, including
timeliness and accuracy of reported information122.
Implementation issues also persist in the real-time exchange of surveillance data and the
interoperability of national systems with EUROSUR’s central platform123. According to Frontex, in
the final quarter of 2024, 46% of single events were reported late and data provided were incomplete
(in 39% of cases exact location was missing, in 45% cases the nationality of migrants or suspects was
omitted)124. This has a detrimental effect on EUROSUR’s effectiveness, leading to persistent gaps in
situational awareness and reducing EU’s ability to anticipate and respond to border-related risks125.
118 See Recital 40 of the EBCG Regulation which outlines Frontex’s role in preparing risk analyses that cover ‘threats of a
hybrid nature’ among other elements relevant to integrated border management. 119 Interviews with: Frontex EIBM Division; Other EU agency and body; Frontex OPC; Frontex (2025) EUROSUR: State
of implementation and outlook; Report to the Council of the European Union. 120 The national situational picture is the aggregation of operational, tactical and strategic information at national level,
enabling Member States to maintain situational awareness of activities, risks and incidents at their external borders and to
support effective border management and decision-making. The 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation concluded that
the fragmented national situational pictures derive from inconsistent application of the EUROSUR-related provisions by
Member States. Half of the Member States share the operational layer among relevant national authorities and only half
share their national situational picture with neighbouring Member States. 121
The 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation. 122 While the EUROSUR legal framework sets out requirements for data quality, it lacks enforcement mechanisms. 123 Frontex report to the Council of the European Union, EUROSUR – State of implementation and Outlook, March 2025.
Other issues: the performance across national coordination centres is uneven. There is also legal uncertainty regarding the
respective roles of national coordination centres and national Frontex points of contact. 124 Frontex (2025) Presentation of Data Quality Report. 125 Frontex (2025) EUROSUR: State of implementation and outlook; Report to the Council of the European Union; Frontex
(2025) Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2024; Interviews with Frontex, national authorities. The majority of national
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However, the increased need for better situational awareness to capture all types of threats at external
borders while supporting the objectives of return policy, puts in question the relevance of the scope of
EUROSUR to the address the current situation at the EU external borders. First, EUROSUR does not
encompass the full spectrum of EIBM, such as internal security threats, including threats of a hybrid
nature which are becoming a persistent phenomenon in the EU. Second, Article 89(2) of the EBCG
Regulation allows access to only two types of personal data in EUROSUR: i) information on ship and
ii) aircraft identification numbers, although an exception exists to allow the processing of other
personal data in EUROSUR for exceptional purposes strictly connected to the purposes of EUROSUR.
As a result, Frontex does not collect ownership personal data that could benefit situational awareness.
Third, in practice data exchanged in EUROSUR between Member States and Frontex is commonly
labelled as sensitive non-classified, and a small part is classified as RESTREINT UE/EU
RESTRICTED. At the same time, the Regulation requires the systems be126. This creates a clear
misalignment between the practice and legal obligations leading to overclassification of information
which hampers effective information exchange between Member States and Frontex. Fourth, in order
to ensure effective monitoring and timely identification of suspicious flights, including commercial
and private flights, but also remotely piloted aircrafts, there is a need to further clarify the scope of ‘air
border surveillance’ provided already in recital 35 and Article 2(6) of the EBCG Regulation. Finally,
from the perspective of Frontex, the lack of a clearly forward-looking approach aiming at identification
of potential strategic and operational risks in border management amounts to a loss of opportunity to
develop a more proactive situational awareness tool, driven by multi-factor, all-source analysis127 that
could allow for deeper insights on risks and challenges affecting the EU external border128. All of the
above-mentioned gaps result in European situational picture which negatively impacts situational
awareness and reaction capability at the EU level129.
1.3 Driver: Challenges encountered by Frontex in the external dimension
The study accompanying the Impact Assessment showed that Frontex remains constrained by several
structural and procedural challenges130. Its cooperation with third countries, international organisations
and CSDP missions is hampered by legal constraints. Those constraints increase its administrative
burden and limit its ability to engage effectively and strategically with stakeholders and its position as
a key actor in the EU’s engagement outside Europe131. The closed list of international organisations
provided in Article 68 of the EBCG Regulation also limits Frontex structural cooperation132.
authorities responding to the survey disagreed with the following statement: ’the type and scope of information received
and shared via EUROSUR is sufficient for effective border management’. 126 Article 14 of the EBCG Regulation provides that Frontex establishes and maintains the communication network
responsible to the exchange of sensitive non-classified and classified information up to CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU
CONFIDENTIAL with, and among, national coordination centres. 127 Frontex report to the Council of the European Union, EUROSUR – State of implementation and Outlook, March 2025. 128 Decision of the Executive Director No R-ED-2025-27 on the adoption of the EIBM Intelligence policy implementation
roadmap. 129 Frontex report to the Council of the European Union, EUROSUR – State of implementation and Outlook, March 2025. 130 European Commission (2024) Commission Staff Working Document. Evaluation report from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council; Frontex (2025) Deep Dive. Enhancing EIBM through more effective cooperation
with third countries- a deep dive paper on third country engagement; Frontex ICU (2025) Briefing Note. International
cooperation and EBCG Regulation; Interviews with: Frontex STRAT Division; Frontex OPC; EIBM Intelligence Division;
INTEL Division; DG HOME; Frontex FLO; European Commission SG; other EU agency and body. 131 Frontex is already mandated to cooperate with CSDP missions (Article 68(1)(j) EBCG Regulation), but uptake has been
minimal (only two working arrangements signed with EUAM Ukraine (active) and EUBAM Libya (discontinued)).
Prospects for new working arrangements with Frontex seem rather low. Contributing factors are (i) low awareness of the
complementarity of mandates and what Frontex could offer to support CSDP missions and (ii) legal constraints on CSDP
mission mandates, which do not provide for Frontex staff to be seconded on CSDP missions, for example. 132 Interviews with Frontex INTEL Division, Frontex Operations Centre, Frontex STRAT Division; DG HOME; ICF
(2023) Study supporting the evaluation of the EBCG Regulation and review of the standing corps.
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Limitations of the status agreements including their limited attractiveness
Status agreements are legally binding agreements between the EU and a third country that allow the
third country to request operational support from Frontex (including tasks requiring executive powers).
They also regulate aspects like the privileges and immunities of Frontex staff deployed to the third
country. Status agreements currently cover only part of Frontex’s mandate by allowing for the
deployment of border management teams only. They are not a tool that can currently be used to foster
cooperation on return with third countries133. The Commission has had difficulties opening
negotiations for new agreements with non-neighbouring countries largely due to these third countries’
reluctance to any potential deployment of Frontex personnel on their territory134.
The increasing volume of travel to the EU and concurrent rise in visa abuse cases135 mean there is a
growing need to strengthen the capacity to identify potential irregular passengers at third-country
airports prior to boarding136. In several partner countries, Member State liaison officers carry out pre-
departure checks137, which illustrate the effectiveness of such upstream measures. Comparable
activities can, in principle, also be performed by standing corps officers acting under the authority of
the host country and in accordance with its legal framework.
However, in practice, such pre-departure activities have rarely and only to a limited extent been
included in operational planning, due to third countries’ limited awareness of the possibility of
receiving such support and that border checks on exit are less relevant from a border management
perspective. Nonetheless, such pre-departure checks might serve the mutual interest of the country of
departure and country of destination to reduce the readmission cases. As a result, opportunities to
integrate pre-departure screening or document security support into operational plans at third-country
airports have not been seized, despite their potential contribution to ensuring that passengers travelling
to the Schengen area meet the entry conditions under the Schengen Borders Code.
Administrative procedure related to working arrangements perceived as excessive
Frontex may cooperate with the border management authorities of third countries on the basis of non-
binding working arrangements which aim at establishing capacity building measures such as training.
However, the process for authorising the signature of the working arrangements is regarded as slow138.
Unlike other Justice and Home Affairs agencies (such as Europol or the EUAA139), the EBCG
133 Capacity building activities on returns can be done in the context of working arrangements with third country authorities
(under Article 73 EBCG Regulation). 134 Interviews with Frontex STRAT Division; EIBM Intelligence Division; INTEL Division; DG HOME; DG INTPA; DG
MENA; Frontex FLO; European Commission SG; European Commission (2024) Commission Staff Working Document.
Evaluation report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 135 IATA (2025) Global Air Passenger Demand Reaches Record High in 2024; Frontex(2025) Annual Risk Analysis
2025/2026. In 2024 air continued to be the most popular way of entering and leaving the Schengen area, with half a billion
passengers.136 Air travel remains a significant entry avenue, also due to migrants exploiting visa-free regimes and transit hubs (Frontex
(2025) Annual Risk Analysis 2025/2026). Interviews with: DG HOME; Frontex Operations Support Systems Unit; Frontex
(2025) Enhancing EIBM through more effective cooperation with third countries – a deep dive paper on third country
engagement; Frontex (2025) White Paper on reinforcing Frontex to future-proof the EIBM. 137 Interview with Frontex Operations Support Systems Unit; Frontex (2025) Enhancing EIBM through more effective
cooperation with third countries – a deep dive paper on third country engagement; 138 Interviews with: Frontex STRAT Division; Frontex OPC; EIBM Intelligence Division; INTEL Division; DG HOME
(2); FLO; European Commission SG; other EU agency and body; ICF (2023) Study supporting the evaluation of the EBCG
Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and the review of the standing corps; Frontex (2025) Enhancing EIBM through more effective
cooperation with third countries – a deep dive paper on third country engagement; Frontex (2025) Briefing Note on
International cooperation and EBCG Regulation;139 For instance, Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2303 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December
2021 on the European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 (on cooperation with third
countries) only provides that the EUAA ‘[…] may carry out such cooperation within the framework of working
85
Regulation requires Frontex to obtain authorisation from the European Data Protection Supervisor
(EDPS) before concluding working arrangements with third countries140. This requirement seems
disproportionate since (i) those working arrangements are non-binding instruments and (ii) the
personal data exchanged as part of those working arrangement would only to a very limited extent be
exchanged with a third-country authority as a direct and natural consequence of their cooperation.
More consequential personal data transfers occur for example when Frontex plans a training or
conference activity with the third country authority in question and, for that purpose, needs to share
the necessary information regarding Frontex staff, trainers or participants (e.g. names, contact data
etc.)141.
The administrative procedure linked to receiving formal prior approval for each individual working
arrangement seems disproportionate142 if we contrast the type of capacity building activity Frontex is
to pursue (and the limited personal data transferred as a result) with the time it takes to complete these
administrative steps143. The delays created by this administrative procedure mean Frontex cannot
effectively engage in capacity building activities in third countries, which are at the core of its mandate.
Frontex has also encountered difficulties concluding working arrangements with international
organisations for the same reasons144.
Deployment and role of Frontex Liaison Officers (FLOs)
Deploying FLOs is another example of a process that involves an excessive administrative burden but
arrangements concluded with those authorities in accordance with Union law and policy. The Management Board shall
decide on those working arrangements, which shall be subject to prior approval by the Commission. Frontex shall inform
the European Parliament and the Council before a working arrangement is concluded.’ 140 Frontex (2025) Enhancing EIBM through more effective cooperation with third countries – a deep dive paper on third
country engagement; input from DG HOME. 141 Under Article 73(4) of the EBCG Regulation Frontex is obliged to request prior authorisation from the EDPS where
those working arrangements provide for the transfer of personal data and where provided for by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725
(the EUDPR). Article 48(3) of the EUDPR provides that, subject to the authorisation of the EDPS, appropriate safeguards
for data transfers may also be established through contractual clauses or provisions in administrative arrangements between
public authorities or bodies, in particular where these include enforceable and effective data subject rights. The term ‘in
particular’ suggests that enforceability is a key criterion, but not necessarily an absolute requirement. Frontex’s working
arrangements with third country authorities are non-binding and typically do not meet this enforceability threshold. 142 In order to receive formal approval from the EDPS, Frontex needs to engage in an extensive collection of information
and drafting of a transfer impact assessment which takes several months to prepare. This includes a detailed description of
all transfers (controller, joint, controller or processor; type of transfer, format of transfer [encrypted, pseudonymised, plain
text etc.], frequency of the transfer, volume of transfer, onward transfer possibilities, categories of personal data, categories
of data subjects) and an extensive analysis of the legal landscape of the third country, taking into account the accession to
international treaties, independence of local data protection authorities, data subject rights, remedies available, other laws
and practices allowing access to data by national authorities (such as surveillance laws), identification and adoption of
supplementary measures of technical, contractual or organisational nature and any options of the data protection officer.
(EDPS - Transfer Impact Assessment checklist - Article 4(3) EUDPR). This assessment requires the involvement of a large
number of staff, from the international cooperation unit staff negotiating the working arrangement, to units that will play a
part in implementing the foreseen activities, and the DPO office. The transfer impact assessment is submitted together with
the draft negotiated text of the working arrangement to the EDPS of an opinion which takes additionally several months,
and is often preceded by additional revision requests, prolonging the procedure. 143 For example, the request for EDPS authorisation for a recent draft working arrangement with Cabo Verde that Frontex
sent to the EDPS at the end of August 2025 was still pending reply at the end of February 2026). This was despite the fact
that (i) this draft working arrangement included the necessary personal data protection provisions as provided for in the
Commission’s Model Working Arrangement (that had received a positive EDPS opinion) and (ii) Cabo Verde has a data
protection regime like that of the EU, and (iii) Frontex and the Frontex DPO had prepared an extensive transfer impact
assessment before sending the request to the EDPS. The file involved over 6 months of administrative steps just for the
EDPS authorisation, which precedes the formal Commission and Management Board approval and the actual signature of
the working arrangement. This is excessive for organising capacity building activities like training courses. 144 Frontex (2025) Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2024. In 2024, negotiations to conclude working arrangements
with IOM and UNHCR failed in the absence of the agreement on the provisions related to personal data exchange.
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which, for Frontex staff, is instrumental in establishing partnerships and encouraging broader structural
cooperation. It also fundamental for capacity building and technical assistance projects in third
countries. In line with the EBCG Regulation145, the Management Board is required to adopt a list of
priorities for FLOs on a yearly basis, although its purpose and effect are limited as the list of priorities
rarely changes146.
Cooperation with Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions remains underused.
The evaluation of the EBCG Regulation found that there was growing interest from both Frontex and
the EEAS in furthering Frontex’s cooperation in the context of CSDP missions147. This growing
interest was also clear from feedback gathered by Frontex staff consulted for the purpose of the
study148. However, despite the existence of a working arrangement between Frontex and the EEAS
from 2014149, operational coordination in the context of CSDP150 missions remains limited compared
with political expectations regarding Frontex’s engagement in third countries and the potential for
closer cooperation between Frontex and CSDP missions. It would be in the EU’s interest to allow
Frontex to make better use of the established presence of CSDP missions, to contribute Frontex’s
expertise on integrated border management and to build relationships with local partners in third
countries where Frontex does not have such established ties151. A key factor hindering deeper
engagement is the civilian nature of most CSDP missions, which tend to focus more on strategic
advice, capacity building and rule-of-law support than on operational border management. There is,
though, political interest in engaging with countries in this area and therefore an opportunity to use
Frontex’s capabilities, but Frontex’s mandate does not allow it to directly support CSDP missions.
Restrictions on cooperation with international organisations. The EBCG Regulation152 provides
an exhaustive list of organisations with which Frontex may conclude working arrangements.
Broadening the scope of Article 68 was already recommended in the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG
Regulation and evidence gathered during the study accompanying the Impact Assessment supported
this finding153. Working arrangements that were agreed with certain key stakeholders prior to the entry
into force of the 2019 EBCG Regulation, such as the International Centre for Migration Policy
Development (ICMPD) – a key player in implementing EU-funded projects relating to migration and
border management in third countries – had to be terminated because the current EBCG Regulation
does not make provision for them. This brought to an end the long-standing structured cooperation
between ICMPD and Frontex, which is clearly a missed opportunity and an undesirable outcome.
1.4 Driver: gaps and ambiguities affecting the effectiveness of Frontex in terms of returns
Frontex provides Member States with crucial technical, operational and financial support relating to
145 Article 77(2) of the EBCG Regulation. 146 Frontex STRAT Division (2); FLO; Frontex (2025) Briefing note – international cooperation and EBCG Regulation. 147 European Commission (2024) Commission Staff Working Document. Evaluation report from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council, eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52024SC0075.148 Interviews with: Frontex Operations Directorate; EEAS (2); DG INTPA; DG HOME; Frontex (2025) White Paper on
reinforcing Frontex to future-proof the European Integrated Border Management. Frontex (2025) Enhancing EIBM through
more effective cooperation with third countries – a deep dive paper on third country engagement. 149 Working arrangement between Frontex and the European External Action Service. Available at:
https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/document/european-external-action-service-working-arrangement. 150 Frontex only concluded working arrangements with the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger)
and the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine). 151 Interview with EEAS, Frontex Operations Directorate; Frontex STRAT Division; DG HOME. 152 Article 68 of the EBCG Regulation. 153 Interviews with Frontex INTEL Division, Frontex Operations Centre, Frontex STRAT Division; DG HOME. In
addition, 56% (19 out of 34) of national authorities from 17 countries that responded to the survey agreed that Frontex
should be mandated to cooperate with any international organisation, provided it is approved by the Management Board.
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returns. Currently, fewer than 1 in 4 individuals without the right to stay in the EU are effectively
returned from the EU to a third country154. In 2024, Frontex supported over 40% of the effective returns
that took place in the EU (56 263 out of 136 714)155 while many return-related activities continue to
be carried out by Member States using national or AMIF funding156157. Although the Frontex-
supported share of return activities has risen significantly (it stood at under 30% in 2019), the rate of
growth appears to be slowing due to a number of different factors, some of which were identified in
the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation and in the study accompanying the Impact Assessment.
Despite the increase in Frontex’s returns operations in recent years, its effectiveness in terms of returns
is constrained by a range of structural, operational and legal challenges that limit its ability to provide
consistent and coordinated support to Member States. The Commission plans to adopt a proposal on
digitalising case management in the area of return, readmission and reintegration. In that context, there
is a need to strengthen Frontex’s role and reflect the necessary mandate changes in the revision of the
EBCG Regulation to bring about tangible benefits for EU migration and border-management policy.
As outlined by the President of the Commission in the 2024-2029 political guidelines158, given the
current situation, the EU has a high level of ambition regarding increasing the number of returns. At
the same time, the political guidelines stress the need to strengthen the EBCG. Therefore, both
ambitions reflect the objective of ensuring that Frontex can support the additional needs of Member
States in order to achieve EU policy priorities, including the return of third-country nationals without
the right to stay in the EU.
Additional information on gaps and ambiguities affecting the effectiveness of Frontex in terms of
returns is given in Annex 6.
2. Problem drivers relevant for Problem 2
2.1 Driver: challenges in developing the standing corps
Recruitment and retention of Category 1. The size of the Category 1 standing corps has increased
progressively since it was established and is projected to reach the target of 3 000 officers by 2027
(Figure 1).
154 The overall return rate across the EU in the first half of 2025 stood at 24% (Eurostat). 155 IRMA and FRONTEX Evaluation Report on the results of returns implemented in the second half of 2024, available at:
Frontex Public Register of Documents.
157 IRMA and FRONTEX Evaluation Report on return operations conducted in the first six months of 2025, available at:
Frontex Public Register of Documents. 158 Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024-2029 ‘A Union that Strives for More. My Agenda for
Europe’.
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Figure 1: Comparison of the target and actual number of officers in the standing corps, Categories 1
and 2, per year
Source: Produced by ICF using Frontex data. Target quotas are based on Frontex Management Board
decisions adopting standing corps annual plans (i.e. the number of officers expected to be available
for operational duties). Data on deployable staff are based on annual Frontex implementation reports.
The study accompanying the Impact Assessment showed that there are several challenges affecting
the recruitment of Category 1 officers. Interviews with Frontex stakeholders highlighted the fact that
Frontex taps into the same resources as national services, creating direct competition for experienced
personnel159 with a background in law enforcement.
Another challenge is related to the frequency of deployments and to the remoteness of certain
deployment locations, resulting in operational, psychological and family-related problems (e.g.
housing or schooling for children)160. These problems are also a frequent source of complaints161
affecting motivation and job satisfaction162.
Ensuring realistic planning of recruitment is also a challenge. Owing to the constraints faced by
training and recruitment entities, annual recruitment capacity is currently estimated to be a maximum
of 1 000 recruits163. For more details on training constraints, see Problem 3. Frontex also faces
challenges in achieving a balanced and representative workforce164. The 2024-2027 Frontex Human
Resources Strategy acknowledges this imbalance and attributes it to disparities in national working
conditions and salary levels, which affect the relative attractiveness of Frontex contracts165. Officers
159 Interviews with Frontex Human Capital Division, Frontex Capabilities Division and Frontex Contingent Commander. 160 Interview with Frontex Contingent Commander. Interview with Frontex Human Resources Unit. 161 Survey of standing corps: greater flexibility and transparency regarding deployment and rotation decisions was
highlighted as an area for improvement (38%; 44 out of 115 – Open question). 162 Interview with Frontex Human Capital Division. 163 Interview with Frontex Deputy Executive Director of Administration and Information Management, Human Resources
and Corporate Services Division (HRS) and Information Management Division (SIM). 164 Staffing data from 2025 show that certain countries are over-represented in Frontex, namely Greece (+18% deviation
from total population), Poland (+16%) and Romania (+12%), while the three most under-represented countries are
Germany (-17% deviation), France (-13% deviation) and Italy (-6%). Source: Frontex (2025), Recruitment and staffing
data. 165 Management Board Decision 44/2023 of 22 November 2023 adopting the Frontex Human Resources Strategy 2024-
2027.
89
themselves also feel that there are inefficiencies regarding staffing166.
Finally, the lack of a structured, long-term career pathway for standing corps officers affects the
prospect of retaining staff. The use of 5+5 year fixed-term contracts167 as a rule, and the lack of
structured opportunities for progression (for example, the prospect of securing a permanent contract)
within Frontex are key factors that deter new applicants168.
EU Staff Regulations and Conditions of Employment (CEOS). Unlike other categories,Category
1 standing corps staff are covered by the Staff Regulations. The 2024 evaluation of the EBCG
Regulation highlighted the challenges in applying the EU employment framework to Frontex’s
operational staff, as, in some cases, the applicable rules are not the most appropriate for operational,
uniformed staff with executive powers169. Recent consultations with Frontex and European
Commission stakeholders highlighted the fact that applying a civilian employment framework to
Frontex’s operational staff hinders the standing corps’ ability to effectively perform tasks during
operations, as it leads to a mismatch between the working conditions offered to standing corps
Category 1 officers and the reality of their duties170.
In particular, the following issues have an impact on Frontex’s operational staff.
• The duration of the probation period: under the EU framework, probation for newly
recruited staff lasts nine months. This is not aligned with the length of the operational training
programme necessary for the deployment of standing corps Category 1 officers, which lasts
approximately one year. This means that, by the end of their probation period, officers are still
in training and not yet performing the duties for which they were recruited. As a result, the
probation period can only reflect their performance during training and not when they are
actually on duty. Additionally, this can result in officers being officially appointed to their post
before they have successfully completed the training.
• Working patterns: national border guard services typically operate under specific working
patterns that allow for a wide variety of shift and stand-by schemes. However, these are only
partially covered by the implementing rules of the EU Staff Regulations which lay down the
conditions and related allowances for stand-by duty171 and shift work172. When on deployment,
Frontex standing corps officers need to accept shifts and work schedules that differ from the
working conditions in the Member State of deployment. While financial entitlements for these
different working conditions are already applicable to standing corps Category 1 officers, the
current EU legal framework does not cover all patterns they are expected to work during their
operational activities, leading to inconsistencies and practical operational challenges.
166 Survey of standing corps: only 53% of respondents (158 out of 298) agreed Frontex was attracting the required staff
and 49% (135 out of 298) agreed that Frontex was retaining the people it needed to achieve Frontex’s mission. 167 According to Article 95(3) ‘the contract should follow a 5+5 years approach in principle’. Permanent contracts are
therefore possible, but not used. 168 Survey of standing corps; Interview with Frontex Human Capital Division. 169 European Commission (2024) Commission Staff Working Document. Evaluation accompanying the report from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. COM(2024) 75 final. 170 See Case Study on standing corps capability development in the Annex to the study accompanying the Impact
Assessment. 171 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1945/2006 of 11 December 2006 amending Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC)
No 495/77 determining the categories of officials entitled to, and the conditions for and rates of, allowances for regular
standby duty. 172 Council Regulation (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) No 300/76 of 9 February 1976 determining the categories of officials
entitled to allowances for shiftwork, and the rates and conditions thereof. Available at: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1976/300/oj/eng.
90
• Deployment conditions173: under Article 95(2) of the Regulation, Warsaw is ‘in principle’
the official place of employment for all statutory staff. As a result, long-term deployments to
other Member States or third countries are managed under the mission framework174, with
allowances and entitlements (daily subsistence allowance and accommodation costs) that were
designed for short-term duty travel rather than long-term operational service. Given the
growing number of standing corps Category 1 staff175, this entails a significant financial and
administrative burden for Frontex, which needs to process and manage a substantial number
of mission orders and claims. Additionally, the current system does not reflect the specific
features of and differences between operational deployments to different locations and the
related working conditions (difficulties depending on the type of work, risks related to the
tasks performed).
• Permanent contracts: while legally possible176, it is not standard practice for Frontex to offer
permanent contracts owing to a number of limitations of the EU retirement framework. In
most EU Member States, law-enforcement personnel benefit from early-retirement schemes,
linked to the unique demands and risks associated with their professions. However, the EU
framework sets the retirement age at 66, with early retirement only being possible with a
reduced pension.
Additionally, the feasibility study177 identified a number of limitations linked to promotion and career
progression, including the disconnect between the Frontex role-based ranking system and the career-
based system under the Staff Regulations.
The 2024-2027 Frontex Human Resources Strategy also acknowledges these limitations, noting that
there was no precedent for the standing corps, as the first uniformed category of EU staff with
executive powers, and that it could not have been set up with an alternative employment framework
catering toFrontex’s specific needs.
Seconding and nominating standing corps staff in Categories 2 and 3. The competition between
Frontex and the Member States for experienced personnel also affects Categories 2 and 3. Moreover,
difficulties in organising deployments178 and the cancellation of planned deployments by the host
Member States without warning179 are mentioned as obstacles that can make it difficult for Member
State authorities to fulfil standing corps quotas (as set out for these two categories in Annex II and III
to the EBCG Regulation). In that connection, Frontex stakeholders also mention the misalignment
between the fixed numerical target for standing corps contributions and the operational performance
of the EBCG community as a whole180.Several national authorities consider that further increasing
Category 2 and 3 contributions would amplify the cumulative strain on resources and limit coverage
173 See European Commission (2017). Guide to missions and authorised travel accompanying the Commission Decision
on the general provisions for implementing Articles 11, 12 and 13 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations of Officials
(mission expenses) and on authorised travel. Annex. C(2017) 5323 final. 174 Commission Decision of 13.5.2025 on the general provisions for implementing Articles 11, 12 and 13 of Annex VII
to the Staff Regulations of Officials and on authorised travel, C(2025) 2495 final. 175 The number of standing corps Category 1 staff is projected to reach 3 000 by 2027 under the current EBCG
Regulation. 176 Article 95(3) of the EBCG Regulation sets out the 5+5 year contract model as the principal recruitment period for
standing corps staff, with the possibility to offer a permanent contract after the first five-year renewal. 177 ICF, 2026, Feasibility study to develop and assess potential options for the further reinforcement of the capabilities of
the EBCG under Regulation (EU) 2019/1896. 178 One common issue, for example, is that deployment location is often communicated only a couple of weeks prior to the
date of departure. Interviews with Frontex standing corps staff in Category 2; Maltese authorities. 179 In the first half of 2025, 570 planned deployments were cancelled by Member States/SACs. See Frontex (June 2025).
Report on Capabilities to the Management Board. 180 Frontex (2025). Developing, delivering and deploying capabilities − A deep-dive into the Agency’s future as a partner
to Member States.
91
of core operations at national level181. As such, reliance on Member States alone to recruit, train and
nominate specialised officers for secondment is unsustainable in the long term, as it results in trade-
offs between national priorities and EU objectives182.
The length of deployments for Category 2 and 3 officers is a contentious issue, and was already
flagged up in the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation. Despite longer deployment periods being
more effective for operations, several Member States would not wish to have longer deployments183.
On the one hand, short deployments – particularly in the case of Category 3 officers – are considered
to be less operationally effective by Frontex stakeholders, as time is needed for officers to familiarise
themselves with their tasks and adapt to local working dynamics184. On the other hand, longer
deployments hamper national planning and may make it more difficult for officers returning from
secondment to rejoin national operations. Member States do not systematically plan for when officers
return to national service following their deployment with Category 2185. As a result, those officers
frequently face uncertainty regarding their professional future186. Half of the Member States are not in
favour of increasing the deployment duration for Category 2, and over one third are against increasing
the deployment duration for Category 3187.
The financial support system. The EBCG Regulation makes provision for a financial support
mechanism to help Member States secure their standing corps contributions188. This mechanism, which
already featured in the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation, was identified as being cumbersome
for the Member States189. Other limitations were also identified, namely that (1) the system does not
provide for any flexibility in the event of structural changes in the national authorities, which may be
unrelated to staffing trends190, rendering the Member State ineligible for funding and (2) the maximum
quota used to calculate the financial support provided to Member States in view of their Category 2
contributions might differ from the actual number of officers later provided for secondment to Frontex.
However, no recovery mechanism is available in such cases, as the only condition for receiving the
support is increasing the overall border guard staffing in the year concerned191. These shortcomings
make the system particularly inefficient192.
The amount of financial support is also an issue193. Correction coefficients, which do not properly
account for changes in the cost of living, can sometimes lead to insufficient reimbursement, where
181 Survey of national authorities (7 out of 27 – Open question). 182 Interviews with Frontex Capabilities Division, Frontex Information Management Division and Croatian authorities. 183 Survey of national authorities. 184 Interviews with Frontex standing corps. 185 Interview with Frontex Capabilities Division. 186 Interviews with Frontex Information Management Division and national authority. See also Problem 3, unsystematic
training recognition in national career progression. 187 Survey of national authorities. 188 Article 61(1) of the EBCG Regulation. 189 Survey of national authorities: 67% (16 out of 24 respondents from 15 Member States) selected ‘simplifying
administrative procedures for reimbursements’ as a solution that would improve the efficiency of the financing system
under Article 61. 190 For instance, Member States affected by the enlargement of the Schengen area relocated staff involved in border
activities to other authorities owing to the reduction of their external border, therefore reducing the overall number of their
national border guard staff. 191 See Case Study on Standing Corps Capability Development, Annex 6 to the study accompanying the Impact
Assessment. 192 Frontex (2025). Input to the IFC feasibility study conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the framework
of possible amendments to Regulation 2019/1896. 193 The compensation is calculated on the basis of the annual salary of a contractual agent in Function Group III, grade 8,
step 1, adjusted using a correction coefficient for each Member State. See Case Study on Standing Corps Capability
Development in the Annex to the study accompanying the Impact Assessment.
92
Member States are left to cover the outstanding costs of Category 2 and 3 deployments194.
Shortages of certain profiles in the standing corps. The standing corps’ effectiveness is limited by
persistent shortages of deployed officers with the specialist profiles needed by the Member States’ for
operations. Currently, among Category 1 statutory staff, the profiles with shortages are advanced-level
document officers (ALDOs), debriefing officers, officers in European coast guard roles, information
officers, and motor vehicle crime detection officers (Figure 2). Recent Frontex Joint Operation (JO)
evaluation reports confirm these trends and highlight that there is also low coverage (below 50%) for
dog handlers195. Member States have also flagged up non-existent or insufficient capacity for cultural
mediators and translators, border-control experts, and returns procedure and return operations
specialists196. The return-related specialist profiles need to be diversified further, including
reinforcement and streamlining of return liaison officer deployments, so that Frontex can meet
Member States’ growing needs given EU policy priorities in this field.
Figure 2: Overview of deployable Category 1 standing corps officers as of 31/12/2024
Profile Nominated MB Decision Coverage
Advanced-level document officer 64 100 64%
Debriefing officer 85 95 89%
European coast guard functions officer 1 14 7%
Information officer 29 64 45%
Motor vehicle crime detection officer 37 54 68%
Source: ICF, based on Frontex Implementation Report 2024
The issue of profile shortages is also closely related to Member States’ training infrastructure
constraints, Frontex’s own standing corps-focused training, and the fragmented implementation of
strategic and operational planning across the EBCG. All of these aspects are addressed in more detail
under Problem 3. Currently, the recruitment of specialised officers relies heavily on Member States’
capacity to recruit, train and second officers197.
Limit on Frontex support and monitoring staff. The structure of the standing corps includes non-
deployable statutory staff that can be recruited by Frontex ‘for the purpose of carrying out supportive
or monitoring functions for the establishment of the standing corps, the planning and management of
operations and the acquisition of technical equipment’198 (operational support staff). This number is
limited in the EBCG Regulation to up to 4% of the 10 000 officers (400 in 2027). As of January 2026,
the operational support staff category has a total of 292 statutory staff (240 operational support posts
and 52 fundamental rights monitors)199, both included in the 4% group.
Any increase in Frontex operations will have an impact on additional resources as regards support and
monitoring staff. It is expected that by 2027Frontex’s operational footprint will exceed its back-office
coordination capacity (Frontex plans to recruit approximately 1 000 additional Category 1 operational
staff in 2026-2027, while the targets for Category 2 secondments and Category 3 nominations are also
expected to increase by 500). This might make it difficult to accommodate the increased technical,
194 ICF (2023);Study supporting the evaluation of the EBCG Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and the review of the Standing
Corps p. 110, p. 155; Survey of national authorities. 195 Frontex (2025) Frontex Evaluation Report: Joint Operation Terra; Joint Operation Italy; Joint Operation Bulgaria. 196 Field mission to Italy in the context of the study accompanying the Impact Assessment; Survey of national authorities. 197 Interviews with Frontex Capabilities Division, Frontex Information Management Division and national authorities. 198 Article 54(7) of the EBCG Regulation. 199 Frontex recruitment and staff figures, overview as of 31/1/2026.
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logistical and planning requirements that come with the increased capabilities beyond 2027200.
Despite the progressive decentralisation of certain roles to contingent-level cross-cutting structures,
HQ coordination and logistics capacity will remain essential for the entire Agency201. The ceiling set
for operational support staff, which is already at over 70% of the overall capacity, therefore increases
reliance on Category 1-3 officers performing certain cross-cutting duties.
Two key issues can be flagged up concerning the 4% limit on operational support staff.
• The 4% cap set by the EBCG Regulation will hinder Frontex’s ability to provide logistical and
monitoring support as it expands its operational scope202. Moreover, Frontex’s divisions
compete for resources within the operational support staff cap.
• The scope of the duties covered by the 4% ceiling is unclear. The Regulation does not specify
the tasks that can be assigned to support staff and there is no consolidated list of duties
classified as ‘supportive or monitoring’203.
2.2 Driver: challenges relating to technical equipment and logistic support
A misalignment between planning and available resources. The study accompanying the Impact
Assessment collected evidence showing that there is a mismatch between planned technical equipment
(TE) deployments and actual availability204. The under-deployment of key technical equipment, such
as fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and patrol vessels and boats is a prominent concern. Key causes
include fluctuating operational requirements, overly ambitious planning targets, incomplete capability
planning and legal or operational bottlenecks in the procurement and deployment processes.
Seasonality trends in operational requirements further compound these challenges205. Data sharing and
communication systems are often outdated and incompatible with those used by other agencies and
Member States206.
From the Member States’ perspective, challenges related to pooling technical equipment for Frontex
operations are often due to the structural difficulty of aligning domestic resource planning with EU-
level commitments, as national technical equipment pools are typically tailored to national priorities
and budget constraints207.
In practice, technical equipment for seaborne and airborne surveillance is the biggest challenge and
these are the equipment categories for which Frontex has the greatest unmet needs, although, in the
200 Interview with Frontex Operations and Capabilities Divisions and Frontex Equipment and Logistics Division. 201 According to the Frontex recruitment and staffing overview of 31/3/2025, the Operational Support Division was
expected to handle the administrative preparation for the deployment of 41% more officers, while working with fewer
staff. 202 Because the 4% ceiling is too low to cover all support and monitoring needs of a 10 000-strong standing corps, Frontex
has progressively relied on ‘operational horizontal activities’ and ‘operational horizontal functions’ to fill the gap
(Management Board Decision 17/2025 defines these as support and coordination functions performed by standing corps
officers, at both central (HQ) and contingent level). These functions include roles such as operational coordination, return
support activities, operational training and field logistics. The roles are filled by standing corps officers from Categories 1,
2 and 3, and recorded separately from the 4% statutory support staff. The 2025 HR recruitment and staffing overview
shows that 360 standing corps officers (13.95% of the corps) were assigned to horizontal functions, of which 192 officers
performed central-level activities and 168 served in contingent-level command teams. 203 See Article 54(7) of the EBCG Regulation. Interviews with the Frontex Human Resources Unit. 204 Interview with Frontex Equipment and Logistics Division. 205 Frontex (2025). Eight New Contingent Commanders Graduate - Report on Capabilities to the Management Board. 206 Interview with Frontex ETIAS Central Unit Division, Interview with Frontex Data Protection Office. 207 Some Member States interviewed highlighted that the equipment they have does not always meet the operational needs
of Frontex missions. A few noted that the fact that domestic needs can override commitments made under EU funding
rules may create tension between national priorities and Frontex obligations. Others highlighted that deployment of
equipment is often constrained by the availability of trained personnel, especially for maritime assets.
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survey of national authorities carried out as part of the study accompanying the Impact Assessment, a
large proportion of respondents were unable to provide an estimate208. Other relevant categories of
equipment include ground-based surveillance equipment, personal communication equipment and C-
UAS/C-UxV systems, and enablers.
Additional barriers identified in the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation209 included the
operational readiness of equipment procured through EU funding instruments such as BMVI.
Technical equipment purchased under the ISF must be deployed in other Member States for a certain
period of time, even if there is a Frontex Joint Operation in the same Member State. Failing to consider
this technical equipment for deployment may lead to inefficiencies, given that it is already in the host
country.
Figure 3: In your country, what percentage increase is needed in each of the currently available
equipment categories to fulfil Frontex requests? (n=24)
Source: Produced by ICF, survey of national authorities
From the perspective of Frontex, uncertainty about the availability of national assets a year in advance,
or lack of clarity on deployment locations, complicate internal planning for TEP technical equipment
deployments210. Certain types of equipment are available in very limited quantities, which makes it
difficult to fulfil both national requirements and EBCG obligations211.
Logistics. Constraints in terms of logistics add complexity to deployments, affecting both the Member
States and Frontex. Equipment, uniforms and weapons must be collected from limited, designated
locations, increasing the need to travel for logistical purposes. This reduces time for operational tasks
and disrupts workflow continuity. Persistent challenges concern weapons transportation, rental of
unmarked patrol vehicles and insufficient provision for fuelling and maintenance212. In the interviews,
208 Survey of national authorities (33% and 20% said that the increase would need to be more than 5%; 10 and 5 out of 24). 209 ICF. (2023). Study supporting the evaluation of the EBCG Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and the review of the Standing
Corps. 210 ICF. (2023). Study supporting the evaluation of the EBCG Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and the review of the Standing
Corps. This is particularly the case for helicopters, unmanned aerial systems and maritime surveillance equipment 211 Ibid. 212 Under the system in place from 2020 to 2022, Frontex added to its own resources with cars rented individually by
officers. Given the high cost of that system, Frontex has transitioned to a centralised ‘duty car rental’ system. At present,
owing to concerns about manageability and the lack of the required fleet-management tools, the Frontex fleet has been
capped at 500 owned vehicles. This is despite the fact that transportation vehicles are required by at least 50% of the
deployed Category 1 and Category 2 officers to travel from their accommodation to their place of work (border crossing
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Member States also highlighted deployment inefficiencies caused by transportation and maintenance
costs213.
Frontex’s approach to date has been to retain a small logistical footprint by leasing or contracting
services and minimising ownership214. This can be explained by the absence of EU-wide recognition
mechanisms for vehicle roadworthiness tests, firearm permits and insurance procedures, which has
forced Frontex to navigate fragmented national systems across the EU. Moreover, according to Frontex
staff, the procurement rules impose extensive legal compliance requirements. Retaining a small
logistical footprint has enabled Frontex to avoid these limitations and develop its operational portfolio
relatively quickly, while minimising the burden of managing maintenance, facilities, infrastructure and
human resources throughout the equipment’s lifespan215.
On the other hand, existing gaps in the technical equipment pool for larger items mean that Frontex is
required to develop its own technical capabilities, especially for aerial and maritime assets. However,
there are significant challenges, including the complex legal framework and high logistical and
financial costs216.
Joint procurement and procurement on behalf of Member States. While joint procurement is a
possibility explicitly mentioned in the EBCG regulation, the current EU legislative framework does
not give Frontex the power to act as a central contracting authority or a central purchasing body on
behalf of national border agencies or in their name217. In order for a decentralised agency such as
Frontex to undertake joint procurement with a Member State (where permitted under the EU financial
rules) or to act as central purchasing authority on behalf of Member States, its founding regulation
must provide an explicit legal basis for these activities. In addition, it must include provisions regarding
crucial aspects such as fees for these services and limitations on liability to avoid exposing the EU
budget to excessive risks. It should also include provisions to prevent double funding by Member
States through both the EU budget and fees for procurement services218.
Nevertheless, only a minority of respondents to the survey of Member States’ authorities support joint
procurement, but this varies greatly depending on the type of equipment. Joint procurement of
airborne, ground-based and seaborne surveillance equipment received the most support from national
authorities219, while joint procurement of weapons220 and other personal equipment received the least
point or regional/local border police headquarters) and/or for transporting migrants/returnees. To achieve efficiency gains,
Frontex should actively develop its fleet management capabilities. However, at present this is dealt by a small unit, and the
fleet management service is outsourced to a private party. Interview with Frontex Equipment and Logistics Division;
Interview with Frontex Contingent Commander Bulgaria. 213 Interviews with National Authorities. 214 Frontex. (2023). Management Board Decision 28/2023 of 15 September 2023 adopting the Multiannual Strategy for
the Acquisition and Management of the Agency’s Equipment. In 2023 Frontex adopted its first Multiannual Strategy for
the Acquisition and Management of the Agency’s Equipment. The strategy outlines a long-term plan to improve the
availability and reliability of core assets, while also enhancing efficiency in procurement processes. It sets out plans for a
gradual scaling-up of portable and personal equipment in parallel with the expected increase in staffing levels. The strategy
reflects the constraints imposed by the current legislative framework and the budgetary ceilings set by the current MFF. It
also considers the possibility of identifying synergies and opportunities for collaboration with national authorities,
including on joint procurement, something which has not been explored so far. 215 Interview with Frontex Equipment and Logistics Division; Interview with Frontex Operations Divisions and Units (DED
OPD); Interview with Frontex Contingent Commander Italy and Malta. 216 Interview with Operations Divisions and Units - DED OPD. 217 Article 9(7) of the EBCG Regulation allows Frontex to identify synergies and invite Member States to cooperate,
including through joint procurement. However, Article 90 of the EBCG Financial Regulation and Article 168 of the EU
Financial Regulation only permit joint procurement in limited cases (i.e. specifically for administrative needs with host
Member States or for duly justified operational needs) requiring detailed agreements on procedures, applicable law and
dispute resolution. 218 Interview with DG BUDG. 219 Survey of national authorities (44%, 42% and 37%; 10, 10 and 9 out of 24). 220 Survey of national authorities (21%; 5 out of 24). 29% disagreed or strongly disagreed.
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support.
Aerial surveillance. The recent EUR 184 million four-year contract for aerial surveillance services221
has raised questions about the efficiency of renting, versus owning, equipment. The data from
Frontex’s framework contracts for aerial surveillance indicate that Frontex has spent around
EUR 20 million per year on renting Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) and approximately
EUR 30 million on fixed-wing aircraft (FWA)222. Although this approach is costly, Frontex argues
that it is more financially advantageous than outright acquisition, and provides flexibility,
circumventing the restrictive regulations that apply to non-commercial planes flying across different
national airspaces. According to Frontex, although owning aerial equipment could pose a risk to
operational responsiveness due to the regulatory constraints mentioned above, greater uniformity in
procurement could offset the costs223.
However, Frontex’s own cost modelling indicates that, over a long enough period of time, purchasing
surveillance aircraft can become more economical than leasing. For example, a simulation by Frontex
shows that acquiring a new crewed low-altitude turboprop surveillance aircraft would cost about
EUR 3.75 million in year 1, rising to approximately EUR 34.3 million by year 4 and then stabilising
at EUR 11.7 million per year. This amounts to roughly EUR 151 million over 11 years. Industry
interviews show that, beyond approximately 10-12 years of use, outright purchase typically results in
net savings over leasing. Therefore, these findings suggest that, despite high upfront costs, an ‘own
asset’ approach could reduce average annual costs in the longer term.
Maritime assets. Frontex currently does not own or operate any maritime assets, such as vessels. This
is due to the legislative complexities of registering and operating vessels. Under international maritime
law, a vessel is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state under whose flag it flies, and maritime
vessels must fly the flag of a nation state. This means that the ship’s home nation has the power to
enforce its laws on the vessel and its crew, regardless of their location on the high seas (‘flag state
jurisdiction’)224.
Another factor hindering the development of seaborne capabilities is the significant financial resources
required to operate ships. As with aircraft, maritime vessels require significant logistical support and
infrastructure for operations and maintenance, including a range of specialists, naval bases/docking
facilities and shipyards for maintenance.
3. Problem drivers relevant for Problem 3
3.1 Driver: the needs of EIBM cannot be sufficiently addressed by the current training
framework
Limitations of the common core curriculum model. The EU-level framework for harmonising
professional standards in border management, based on the Common Core Curriculum for Border and
221 EU Funding & Tenders Portal. 222 See the Annex on the cost assessment for a more detailed presentation of these data. 223 Interview with Frontex Equipment and Logistics Division. 224 Over the past few decades, the European Union has made several attempts to create a single European flag. However,
these attempts have so far been unsuccessful. In 2023, the European Commission launched a new study with the objective
of proposing an attractive European flag comparable to those of other international registers, but with enhanced social and
environmental conditions; European Commission. (2023). Call for tenders. Study on Flag State Responsibilities and ‘Open
Registers’ for Vessels Registration. Available at: https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/funding-opportunities/calls-tenders/study-flag-
state-responsibilities-and-open-registers-vessels-
registration_en#:~:text=It%20announced%20the%20European%20Commission,LinkedIn. Even if a mission pennant were
used, which could provide some degree of clarity for assets and personnel deployed on vessels, most operations take place
in international waters, outside territorial seas, and may involve third countries that have not acceded to the relevant
international conventions (Turkey has not signed UNCLOS Convention).
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Coast Guard Training (CCC Basic and CCC Mid-level Management Training CCC-ML)225, is not
accompanied by any enforcement tools226.
While the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation found that differences in training standards
reduced consistency of operational performance and undermined the effectiveness of joint
deployments227, this was not confirmed by the national authorities in the survey carried out for the
study accompanying the Impact Assessment228.
Insufficient coverage of return-related tasks. There is no dedicated CCC for return-related tasks,
despite this being a legal obligation229. The CCC Basic includes only limited modules on return
support230 leaving tasks such as escorting, counselling, monitoring and coordination to be addressed
through nationally designed programmes231. However, the standing corps officers participating in a
survey expressed a need for more structured EU-level return training232.
Too few practical exercises. Current training schemes provide few opportunities for structured, cross-
border joint exercises, which are essential for developing interoperable competences and mutual
understanding among national contingents. Survey data indicated strong demand for EU-level practical
training formats233. According to Frontex officials, the lack of a regulatory mandate limits
opportunities to test and improve interoperability in the field234.
Poor integration with EU capability planning and operational needs. While Frontex operational
training is increasingly linked to capability planning, the CCC uses an independent revision process
which is not systematically aligned with the EU-level capability planning framework or national
capability development processes (NCDP). National training institutions do not consistently use
NCDPs to plan training, highlighting a disconnect between strategic planning and practical
implementation.
Scope and quality of training for Category 1. The 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation found
the quality and consistency of Category 1 training to be uneven, with significant gaps in specialised
capabilities and practical preparedness. Since its launch in 2020, the basic six-month course for
Category 1 has been expanded and extended in duration and is now the Operational Training
Programme (OTP), with profile-specific modules and leadership components. Levels of participation
by standing corps officers in specialised training have grown steadily235, but views on the training are
mixed. While 35% of standing corps officers that took part in a survey strongly agreed that basic
225 Developed in collaboration with Member States, fundamental rights bodies and international partners. 226 Article 62(6) of the EBCG Regulation formally requires Member States to integrate the CCC into their training
programmes. However, the results of the survey carried out for the study accompanying the Impact Assessment show that,
in practice, Member States have discretion in terms of how and to what extent they include the CCC Basic and CCC-ML
in their training. 227 Ibid. 228 27% of respondents agreed that variations between standing corps officers and national staff have caused difficulties in
joint operations, while 43% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 16% disagreed. 229 Article 62(6) of the EBCG Regulation. 230 Interview with Frontex EBCG Academy. 231 The findings of a survey of national authorities show that 67% of training academies (12 out of 19) deliver return
training mainly as part of continuous or in-service professional development, making this the most common approach. 232 70% of respondents endorsed the introduction of additional return-related training and information provision. ICF
survey of standing corps officers. 233 ICF survey of national authorities. A majority of national academies (58%, 11 out of 19) highlighted joint operational
exercises as one of the areas where Frontex’s centralised training could most effectively complement national systems and
pointed to scenario-based deployment training. 234 Interview with Frontex EBCG Academy. 235 With 1 174 participants in 2021, 1 194 in 2022 and 1 817 in 2023.
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training enabled them to carry out their duties effectively, 41% considered it sufficient only to a certain
extent, and 1 in 5 stated it was adequate to a limited extent or not at all.
Scope and quality of training for Categories 2 and 3. Frontex’s training activities have mainly
targeted Category 1 officers. In the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation, Member States reported
a lack of training opportunities for Category 2 and 3 officers, highlighting persistent gaps in both
access to and quality of training for these two categories236. Member States underlined that Category
2 and 3 officers also require more targeted and structured training. Furthermore, Category 3 officers
often do not receive pre-deployment training and rely entirely on ad hoc peer support in the field.
Survey evidence supports these concerns, with 80% of standing corps respondents agreeing that there
is a need for a common pre-deployment training programme coordinated by Frontex on European
border management and operations. Meanwhile, 79% agreed that there is a need for pre-deployment
training specifically targeting national authorities.
Unsystematic recognition of training in national career progression. The 2024 evaluation of the
EBCG Regulation did not explicitly examine training recognition, but it noted systemic barriers to
career continuity for standing corps officers. In many Member States, officers must resign from their
national services to join Frontex, leading to the loss of career entitlements. Evidence from surveys
conducted as part of the study accompanying the Impact Assessment confirms that recognition of
Frontex training remains limited237. Moreover, 87% of officers indicated that they had received no
institutional career benefits from completing Frontex training, with only a few isolated cases of
promotion, new assignments or increased responsibilities being reported. National authorities
confirmed this picture. In addition, only eight Member States indicated that Frontex training is
integrated into national qualification frameworks, while over half (57%) reported that it is not.
Consequently, there is strong demand to change the current practice: 79% of standing corps
respondents considered it would be valuable for Frontex training to be formally recognised for national
promotions or professional advancement, with 54% rating this as ‘very valuable.’238
Infrastructure constraints. Until recently, Frontex relied primarily on Member States’ partnership
academies to host its training activities. With the gradual roll-out of the EBCG Academy concept,
Frontex intends to move towards a more centralised delivery model for standing corps Category 1
training, while Member States are expected to continue supporting specialised modules through the
emerging network of Specialisation Training Centres. In addition, in the future, tactical training should
be provided closer to the operational field, at the level of Contingents.
Despite this shift, structural challenges remain. The increasing amount of training required to meet
standing corps targets has intensified pressure on the overall training system239. Survey evidence
236 According to the survey conducted for the study accompanying the Impact Assessment, for Category 2 and 3 officers,
40% of Member State respondents agreed that the general training provided meets their operational needs, while a
combined 47% either expressed no clear opinion or disagreed. The pattern is similar for specialised profiles, with just 26%
of respondents agreeing that specialised training is adequate for Categories 2 and 3, compared to 24% who disagreed or
strongly disagreed. 237 Among standing corps respondents, 44% reported that their training was not formally recognised, though it contributed
to professional development, while only 11% stated that it was recognised under a national qualification framework and
10% that it was included in personal development planning. A quarter of respondents (25%) did not know whether their
training was recognised at all. 238 The 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation highlighted that career ambition was a key driver for joining the standing
corps (cited by 65% of Category 1 officers), yet the lack of recognition undermines long-term professional development
for both statutory and seconded staff. 239 Between 2024 and 2026, the number of standing corps officers is set to rise substantially – Category 1 officers will go
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confirms that this growing demand continues to outpace available capacity. 84% of training academies
(16 out of 19) reported that they did not have the facilities to host additional activities, and 68% (13
out of 19) highlighted that competing national priorities or already full training calendars restricted
their capacity to accommodate Frontex requests240.
Scarcity of trainers. The lack of a stable, dedicated pool of instructors for Frontex is another core
constraint that hampers training delivery. While currently the overall concept for trainers includes four
different categories241, Frontex continues to rely primarily on trainers provided by the Member States
or its own staff who act as trainers. However, highly qualified national trainers are often unavailable
due to competing operational duties and limited financial incentives, compounded by limited advance
coordination with national training coordinators on scheduling and availability. Survey evidence
confirms that staff capacity continues to be one of the main bottlenecks242.
In parallel, no dedicated trainer role exists within the standing corps. Under the EBCG Regulation,
standing corps officers are assigned to border, migration management or return teams for operational
activities, leaving little scope to establish permanent training posts and to build a stable and dedicated
internal pool of trainers, especially operational practitioners capable of delivering practical modules.
Despite attempts to temporarily overcome these shortcomings243, this continues to be a bottleneck.
3.2 Driver: fragmented strategic and operational planning and limitations in quality control
Fragmented implementation of strategic and operational planning. Frontex strategic planning is
constrained by poor coordination and the uneven maturity of national planning. The absence of a
legally binding requirement for Member States to align their national strategies with the Technical and
Operational EIBM Strategy limits Frontex’s ability to oversee implementation, as it lacks the authority
to enforce compliance or trigger corrective measures in cases of underperformance. This gap also
negatively impacts the ability to draw up a coherent and forward-looking capability roadmap.
Despite efforts by Frontex to provide templates, guidance and methodological support for the
preparation of national strategies for EIBM, the overall maturity of national planning remains uneven.
Many national strategies are still not fully linked to recruitment cycles, force generation processes (i.e.
personnel mobilisation to make staff available for deployments) or capability development planning.
Frontex’s strategic planning is constrained by the absence of timely or comprehensive data from
Member States, with several national capability development plans being delayed and classified
contingency measures being unavailable to Frontex. Moreover, coordination of strategic and
operational planning between Frontex and Member States/Schengen Associated Countries remains
poor – there is no formal mechanism to synchronise timelines, assess progress or ensure harmonised
implementation of EIBM priorities.
Insufficient integration of risk-analysis products into planning cycles. A further gap concerns the
from 1 000 to 1 873, Category 2 from 750 to 1 250, and Category 3 from 4 250 to 5 250 – further increasing the need for
training infrastructure. 240 Capacity data illustrate the same pressures – in 2023, four academies reported 100% use of their training centres, while
others operated at between 50% and 90% occupancy, with some projecting further increases by 2025. 241 Member State trainers, staff from headquarters and standing corps Categories 1, 2 and 3 acting as trainers, as well as
external experts. Frontex: Explanatory note on the concept of trainers for the European Border and Coast Guard Academy,
Ares(2026) 233415 (9/1/2026). 242 89% of national academies (17 out of 19) reported limited availability of training staff as a barrier to scaling up
cooperation with Frontex; at the same time, many institutions expressed willingness to help – 84% (16 out of 19) indicated
they could contribute trainers or subject-matter experts, suggesting willingness outstrips practical capacity. 243 Frontex: Explanatory note on the concept of trainers for the European Border and Coast Guard Academy, Ares(2026)
233415 (9/1/2026).
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limited integration of Frontex’s risk-analysis products into strategic and capability planning cycles.
Despite the legal obligation244 requiring risk analyses to cover all tiers of EIBM to enable pre-warning
and preparedness, current outputs largely focus on migratory flows at external borders, with
insufficient coverage of returns, third-country conditions and intra-Schengen movements. This narrow
scope is delaying the full implementation of EIBM and reduces the relevance of risk analysis for
forward-looking capability development.
As highlighted in the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation, there is no shared understanding of
how risks linked to returns should be measured, resulting in significant information gaps. Interviews
carried out for the study accompanying the Impact Assessment also emphasised the need to bolster
Frontex’s ‘intelligence function’ i.e. forward-looking analysis capability by linking horizon-scanning
and field data with capability needs, as this would transform risk analysis into a strategic decision-
making tool.
In the absence of an integrated forward-looking framework, there is no systematic link between
operational risk analyses and capability development planning. The lack of a clear policy framework
and division of roles, both at headquarters and in the field, makes it difficult to ensure that operational
planning cycles are information-led and mutually reinforcing. The Management Board’s role in
steering long-term planning has also been described as reactive, further weakening collective
accountability for shared capability development under the EBCG framework245.
Limited scope of vulnerability assessment recommendations and insufficient follow-up.
Vulnerability assessment offers a one-sided view of the situation at the external borders, but there is
no early warning system allowing structural gaps to be identified and ensuring smoother alignment
with EIBM standards in EU candidate countries ahead of accession. Moreover, the vulnerability
assessment does not include return.
The enforcement of recommendations issued through the vulnerability assessment process is
incomplete in practice. While most of the recommendations are implemented on time thanks to the
cooperation between Frontex and the Member States concerned, there are a number of vulnerabilities
that have been present for years. The formal escalation pathway under the EBCG Regulation246 is
rarely used and considered sensitive247.
ANNEX 6: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SELECTED DRIVERS – RETURNS
Frontex is a key operational player in the area of returning people from the EU to third countries and
it provides Member States with technical and operational support. However, the current mandate has
its limitations, and as such Frontex is not realising its full potential. In the Commission’s view and as
outlined in the impact assessment, there is a clear need for Frontex to play a greater role in returns.
This view has been expressed by the Member States on multiple occasions248.
244 Article 29(3) of the EBCG Regulation. 245 Feasibility study supporting this Impact Assessment – interview findings. 246 Article 42 of the EBCG Regulation. 247 To date, the first step of the escalation procedure, where the Management refers instances of non-compliance to the
Commission and Council, has been applied in only a few cases. The second step of escalation, where the Commission
proposes action from the Council, has not been used once. 248 Future of Frontex: main results of the discussions held at the Management Board meeting on 20 October 2025.
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The Commission believes that, in the context of the recent Regulation establishing a common EU
system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, Frontex’s role in relation
to returns also requires a review to give it a greater role and more capacity to provide operational
support, including in terms of staffing and budget, while retaining Frontex’s obligation to ensure that
EU law and international standards are upheld fully throughout the return process.
This need for a review is a consequence of the following shortcomings and gaps which have been
identified.
a) Structural gaps in governance of returns, planning and strategic assessment of returns
Shortcomings in governance. As identified in the 2024 Evaluation, the national authorities
responsible for return activities have so far not been properly integrated into the Frontex governance
framework (e.g. Management Board)249. Management Board members are almost never responsible
for return-related activities, given that, in many Member States, the responsibility for returns is spread
across multiple institutions, making it difficult to identify a single point of reference at national level.
Frontex’s governance of returns, resources and planning systems has not kept pace with policy
requirements. While the governance of returns is supported by the ‘High-Level Round Table on
Returns’ working group, it lacks formal decision-making powers. Furthermore, even though the High-
Level Round Table on Returns is supposed to provide the Management Board with strategic points on
return, effective follow-up is often hampered by the fact that the sitting Management Board members
lack the appropriate mandate or decision-making power.
Lack of synergies. While Member States provide regular statistics250, there is no forward-looking
reporting and planning mechanism or system251 which could allow Frontex to identify potential
opportunities to further extend its support to Member States in line with EU policy priorities; this
makes return operations reactive and fragmented. Information on Member States’ operational return
capacity (e.g. numbers of return counsellors or detention centre capacity), emerging trends (e.g.
anticipated volumes of upcoming returns) or compliance with best practices (e.g. the RECAMAS
reference model) is not systematically available to Frontex.
Data is exchanged on a case-by-case basis252 and there is no obligation to cooperate with Frontex. This
has an impact on the existing possibility for Frontex to coordinate or organise return operations on its
own initiative (with the agreement of the Member State concerned)253.
Differences between national and Frontex procedures often require internal changes to align processes,
creating a double layer of administrative requirements254. This can offset the financial benefits of using
249 Interviews with: Frontex Return Division; DG MENA; DG INTPA; DG HOME; national authorities; European
Commission (2024) Commission Staff Working Document. Evaluation report from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council: eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52024SC0075. 250 National statistics are provided on a regular basis, for example on the number or return decisions issued and the number
of effective returns. 251 The Integrated Return Management Application (IRMA) is a platform operated by Frontex based on Article 49(1) of
the EBCG Regulation to facilitate the exchange of information between Member States, Schengen Associated Countries,
Frontex and other EU bodies and agencies. However, it is not sufficient and, in practice, until a request is made by a
Member State, Frontex has no clear overview of Member States’ needs for a given period. Interviews with the Frontex
Return Division for the purpose of the study revealed that, typically, Member States provide return-related data via IRMA
when they request specific support from Frontex, at which point a needs assessment is conducted to understand the Member
States’ technical and operational needs. 252 Interview: RET Division and C1. 253 CF (2023) Study supporting the evaluation of the EBCG Regulation and the review of the standing corps; Interview
with Frontex Return Division. 254 Interviews with national authorities.
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Frontex services, as national authorities must maintain parallel systems to comply with both national
and Frontex rules. For example, as highlighted by some Member States, there are differences in the
model applied to cash assistance on reintegration (before departure or upon arrival). This can, for
instance, create difficulties in terms of putting beneficiaries with different types of assisted voluntary
return on the same charter flight. Furthermore, it often causes Member States to rely on long-standing
partners such as IOM, whose programmes can be more flexible.
Vulnerability assessment. Finally, return-related capacity and needs are not part of the vulnerability
assessment of the EU’s external borders255, even though the EBCG Regulation256 requires Frontex to
monitor trends not only in migration flows and external border threats but also in the field of returns257.
The second quality control mechanism, the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism (SCH-
EVAL), does make provision for return-focused evaluations, but evaluations occur only once every
seven years and focus primarily on the functioning of national return procedures to support the overall
Schengen acquis, without assessing preparedness in terms of staff, infrastructure and budget and with
no contingency planning specifically for returns258.
b) Operational gaps in Frontex support for returns, including capacity constraints for specialised
return staff and return monitoring
Despite the fact that Frontex’s role in return operations has grown in recent years, the effectiveness of
Frontex in this area is constrained by a range of operational, legal and structural challenges that limit
its ability to provide consistent and coordinated support to the Member States.
Logistics. Logistical and escorting challenges hinder the smooth organisation of returns. Member
States face difficulties in using the Frontex Application for Returns (FAR) system due to its
administrative complexity, strict rules on the number of return escorts and limited flexibility in terms
of route selection, which often prioritises the cheapest flights over operational feasibility. Transporting
returnees across Member States to reach departure airports or organising connecting flights via other
EU airports require special permissions and coordination with transit countries. To make the border
procedure fully operational, Frontex should be empowered to assist with the transport of returnees
during the return process (e.g. from the border area to the airport; from the border area to the consulate
for identification purposes); this might include the provision of videoconference equipment for
identification purposes, etc.
Fragmentation. Return contingents currently operate separately from other Frontex deployments,
with minimal coordination of logistics and administration, causing confusion for national authorities
and leading to inefficiencies.
Lack of interoperability between digital systems. There is limited interoperability between the
Frontex-managed systems (IRMA and FAR) and the Commission-managed system (RIAT), as well as
national or third-country digital systems and case-management tools. This hampers the seamless
exchange of return and reintegration data, requiring Member States to maintain parallel systems for
return, reintegration and readmission.
Access to the Schengen Information System (SIS). Frontexdoes not have general access to the SIS.
For return purposes, the standing corps currently has access to SIS only under the authority of a
255 Under Article 32 of the EBCG Regulation, the vulnerability assessment is a mandatory, continuous mechanism through
which Frontex evaluates each Member State’s capacity to manage the external border. 256 Article 29 of the EBCG Regulation. 257 Interview with Frontex Return Division, interview with DG HOME. 258 Feedback from first expert workshop, Interview with Frontex Return Division: emerging vulnerabilities in national
return systems – such as increasing absconding rates, insufficient detention capacity or lack of staff for voluntary return
counselling – often go undetected and unaddressed at EU level.
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Member State in which they are deployed. Frontex does not have access to the SIRENE259 channel or
the additional information exchanged there. This hampers smooth interaction with Member States,
which are responsible for entering and managing alerts on returns, and makes Frontex action in third
countries more cumbersome.
Data transfer limitations. Under Chapter V of the Data Protection Regulation for EU institutions
(EUDPR), the transfer of personal data outside the EU is strictly regulated. The EBCG Regulation260
provides a legal basis for personal data transfers that is strictly limited to return-related contexts and
when data sharing is necessary for operational purposes261. In practice, there are very few international
agreements or other appropriate safeguards in place that could serve as a mechanism for transfers.
As a result, most transfers rely on a derogation on the grounds of ‘important reasons of public
interest.’262 However, this derogation is intended to be used only as a last resort, and the current
interpretation is that it is to be used only on a case-by-case basis, and does not provide the predictability
or legal certainty required for consistent, large-scale return operations. This leads to operational delays
and limits Frontex’s ability to effectively support Member States. For instance, without reliable
mechanisms for routine data transfers, processes such as obtaining travel documents or conducting
identity verification with third-country authorities are hampered or delayed. This limits Frontex’s
operational capacity and creates uncertainty in its cooperation with third countries on returns263. The
Return Regulation aims to mitigate these issues through its provisions on return-, readmission- and
reintegration-related data transfers to third countries.
Challenges related to identification. In 2024, return specialists made 1 089 requests for emergency
travel documents, identification or travel documents264 and 34 identification265 mission needs were
approved. Frontex also developed good practices on identification and acquisition of travel documents.
Member States see the added value in Frontex’s involvement in identification266. However, Frontex’s
current mandate in the field of identification of third-country nationals sometimes prevents authorities
in the Member States from requesting Frontex’s operational support. This applies to cases which, by
virtue of the national legislation, require the same authorities to proceed with identification or
documentation of the person throughout the process and therefore the consular authorities need to be
involved prior to the issuance of return decisions in relation to which Frontex can in principle not
provide support. Coordination between Member States and Frontex in dealing with third-country
authorities is often inconsistent, sometimes leading to duplicated efforts or inefficiencies (e.g. the third
country or the organising Member State may invoke internal rules prohibiting Frontex from observing
interviews). Due to slow coordination between Member States, joint identification missions organised
by Frontex are sometimes delayed or cancelled. There are not enough European return liaison officers
259 SIRENE stands for Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries in the context of SIS. 260 Article 88(2)(b) of the EBCG Regulation. 261 Interview with Frontex Return Division. 262 Art. 50(1)(d) of the EUDPR. 263 It should be borne in mind that Member States also encounter similar issues themselves, and this is not an isolated issue
encountered by Frontex, although in this case the issue stems from mirroring provisions in the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR - Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1). 264 Frontex, Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2024. 265 Identification refers to the process of confirming a returnee’s nationality and identity so that the necessary travel
documents can be issued for their return to their country of origin. This is often done through identification missions by
third-country authorities to the EU, where representatives of those authorities meet with Member State authorities in person
to verify identities and facilitate the issuing of documents. See Frontex, Return operations, available at:
https://www.frontex.europa.eu/return-and-reintegration/return-operations/returns/. 266 According to the survey (open-ended responses under Q61 – 3 out of 21) and interviews with national authorities,
identification missions have proven highly valuable for procuring travel documents, with Frontex support enabling Member
States to pool resources and carry out more missions overall.
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(EURLOs). Moreover, their role and the rules governing their deployment, including their selection
and physical office/presence in third countries (by default they are posted to the diplomatic mission of
their Member State of origin) need to be reviewed in line with EU policy priorities. The effective
operation of the return border procedure267 requires enhanced support for identification, including
logistics, deployment of short- and long- term identification missions, capacity building of third
countries, including purchase (and not only ‘loans’) of equipment necessary for identification.
Staff shortages. Frontex is facing shortages of specialised return staff, with uneven national capacities
and reliance on voluntary Member State contributions, unpredictable deployments and limited ability
to deliver consistent, high-quality support for return-related activities, including return operations. The
shortages concern in particular the return specialists (RSs) and Frontex return escort and support
officers (FRESOs). They are essential for delivering return counselling, providing ground and
escorting support, and ensuring that return operations are carried out in compliance with applicable
fundamental rights standards268. For example, the limited availability of FRESOs hampers the
streamlined organisation and support of returns by commercial flights with a stopover in a Member
State. Currently, in most cases Member States and Frontex have to use direct flights only. This limits
Frontex’s scope to assist with returns. In addition, innovative staff categories necessary for Frontex to
match the EU policy ambition on returns outlined above are currently missing from the standing corps.
These staff categories include, for example, return case managers, return cultural mediators, return
digitalisation experts, interpreters and specialist profiles to deal with returnees who are vulnerable,
who pose a security risk or who have specific medical issues.
Adequate staffing is also a challenge for the return monitoring framework (see below).
With the return border procedure applicable as from June 2026, Member States’ support needs will be
of a different nature and will generally increase. Frontex is currently not adequately equipped to fulfil
related key operational tasks.
Number of dedicated return staff currently employed by Member States
Member
State
Return
specialists
Specialised
vulnerable
person
escorts
Return
monitors
Return
counsellors
Other
voluntary
return
specialists
Fundamental
rights
monitors
Readmission
specialists
Other
return
support
staff (if
relevant)
AT0 0 0 0 9 0 0 5
BE7 1 2 4
BG3 0 3
HR4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
CZ16 5 16 2
DK 150
FI300269 20 3 5 5 3 5 15
FR1
DE1 0 0 0 1 0 0 31
267 Under Regulation (EU) 2024/1349 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a
return border procedure, and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1148, OJ L, 2024/1349, 22.5.2024. 268 According to the Frontex (2025) Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2024, in 2024, only 65% of the Member States’
requests for deployment of return specialists were met due to lack of human resources, especially in Category 2. 269 300 police officers in Finland carry out forced returns from Finland. They are either escort leaders or escorting police
officers.
105
EL8 5
IS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LV1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LT16 0 3 16 0 16
MT8 2 5 2 8 5 2
PL22 4 22
RO3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
SI4 10 2 26 4
Profile Cat. 1 Cat. 1 Cat. 2 Cat. 2 Cat. 3 Cat. 3 Total
days
Total
officers
deployed
Total
deployment
days
Total
officers
deployed
Total
deployment
days
Total
officers
deployed
Total
deployment
days
Total
deployment
days (Cat.
1, 2, 3)
Frontex
return
escort and
support
officer
50 18 227 29 10 535
282 2 684 31 446
Return
specialist 12 4 673 19 6 711
81 5 129 16 513
Source: Frontex Annual Implementation Report 2024
Despite efforts to professionalise and expand the standing corps, demand for these specialised profiles
exceeds the resources available. In 2025, operational needs for RSs and FRESOs rose by 3% compared
with initial forecasts, but staffing gaps persisted. A total of 41 deployment periods for RSs were
cancelled (28 by Frontex and 13 by Member States), while four RS posts and four FRESO posts
remained unfilled as of May 2025. This reflects the ongoing challenge of maintaining adequate and
predictable deployment levels across the EU270.
Based on the survey carried out as part of the study accompanying the impact assessment, staffing
capacity varies significantly across Member States. Some Member States report high numbers in
specific roles, such as Denmark with 150 staff in other return support roles, while other Member States,
such as Austria and Latvia, report very low or zero staffing in most categories271. Some countries
demonstrate a more balanced distribution of staff across different functions, such as Lithuania and
Malta, while in others, staffing is concentrated in just one or two categories.
Seven countries272 identified specific shortages of return specialists, return monitors and readmission
specialists, while four reported recruitment difficulties. The Czech Republic experienced the broadest
challenges across multiple roles. Belgium and Germany, for example, highlighted shortages of return
counsellors and monitors273.
It is also important to note that figures from the Member States cover only specialised roles, such as
270 Frontex (2025), Assessment of Availability of Capabilities – Annex I: Report to the Management Board, Ares
(2025)4338489, 29 May 2025. 271 Survey involving national authorities. 272 Survey involving national authorities: BE, HR, CZ, DE, IS, PL, RO. 273 Survey involving national authorities (10%, 2 out of 21).
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return specialists, counsellors, monitors or escorts, and do not reflect the broader administrative and
enforcement staff involved in return processes. National administrations involved in issuing return
decisions, managing detention facilities, and general police or security personnel used for escorts are
typically not included in the figures. This means that the real capacity available at national level is
significantly higher than what is reflected in the survey data.
Recruitment of sufficiently qualified personnel toFrontex’s standing corps is generally difficult and
time-consuming. Differences in recruitment practices also further exacerbate capacity issues274. A total
of 12 countries275 recruit staff with non-law-enforcement or non-border-management backgrounds for
at least one return-related role. Conversely, three countries276 do not recruit staff from outside law
enforcement or border management backgrounds for any of the listed roles.
Additional factors that limit effectiveness include language barriers, procedural incompatibilities
between national systems and Frontex operations, and the need for embedded teams with interpreters
and local knowledge. In some Member States, return-related tasks are outsourced to private service
providers, which can reduce the added value of deploying Frontex RS or FRESO officers. There is
also a shortage of trainers, particularly those qualified to teach police tactics for in-flight security.
Frontex has introduced measures, such as the commanders’ training programme and a new system of
ranks, to improve leadership and deployment coordination. However, these reforms have not resolved
the structural shortfall, which stems from limited national resources and heavy reliance on voluntary
contributions by Member States. This reliance creates instability, as national authorities can cancel or
reduce deployments without warning, leaving Frontex unable to meet operational needs consistently.
Return monitoring deficiencies. Under the EBCG Regulation277, ‘[e]very return operation organised
or coordinated by Frontex shall be monitored in accordance with Article 8(6) of Directive
2008/115/EC […]’278. Frontex’s Code of Conduct for Return Operations279 and Management Board
Decision 06/2022280 require that any activity with fundamental rights implications must be
communicated to the Fundamental Rights Office before decisions are taken. This puts a strain on the
Fundamental Rights Office, which faces staff shortage281. Moreover, the current return monitoring
system is fragmented and heavily reliant on monitors from the national systems appointed to the Forced
Return Monitoring Pools. Many national oversight bodies lack sufficient staffing or funding to
effectively participate, while some do not recognise Frontex’s Fundamental Rights Office as their
counterpart at European level. This is because this function is perceived to lack comparable
independence as the Fundamental Rights Office remains part of Frontex itself. This creates gaps in
coverage and inconsistencies in oversight quality and means that Frontex has access only to a limited
number of resources provided by the Member States.
274 Survey involving national authorities: BG, DE, PL, SI. 275 Survey involving national authorities: AT, BE, CZ, DK, FI, FR, DE, LV, LT, MT, RO, SI. 276 Survey involving national authorities: BG, IS, PL. 277 Article 50(5) of the EBCG Regulation. 278 Ibid. 279 Frontex (2021), Code of Conduct for Return Operations and Return Interventions, available at:
https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/document/code-of-conduct-for-return-operations-and-return-interventions-previous-version/280 Management Board Decision 06/2022 designating a reporting officer for the Deputy Fundamental Rights Officer’s
annual appraisals 2022 and 2023 (recorded in the minutes of the 88th Management Board meeting). 281 Although the overall size of the Fundamental Rights Office’s team increased significantly between 2023 and 2025 (from
10 staff in 2020 to 65 by 2025), this remains insufficient relative to Frontex’s growing mandate and operational volume.
In 2023, Frontex coordinated nearly 50 return operations, supporting the return of almost 40 000 individuals – a 57%
increase compared with 2022 – yet the Fundamental Rights Office’s capacity has not grown in line with this expansion.
As a result, monitoring resources must be prioritised for high-risk operations, such as collective returns to volatile
destinations, leaving many national or smaller-scale operations unmonitored. Moreover, the current EBCG Regulation only
extends responsibilities connected to monitoring (amongst other things) to monitors, rather than to all staff members of the
Fundamental Rights Office, which includes administrative and support staff as well, limiting the Office’s flexibility beyond
what the numbers alone suggest.
107
c) Challenges at different stages (pre-return activities, return counselling and EU reintegration
programme)
Pre-return activities. Frontex strives to provide training or best-practice guidance on return case
management to national authorities and contributes to identification missions. It also supports return
counselling through the deployment of return specialists, although there are not enough trained staff282.
Frontex’s role in the pre-return area remains limited to case-by-case requests from Member States.
Member States are required to (i) identify the third-country nationals subject to a return decision (and
they often struggle to do so)283; (ii) assess any vulnerabilities or protection needs; (iii) provide
counselling and information regarding the return process in a format and language accessible to the
third-country national; and (iv) cooperate with the relevant authorities in their country of origin or
potential country of return284.
EU reintegration programme. Frontex plays an active role in post-return reintegration through the
EU reintegration programme (EURP), previously known as the Joint Reintegration Service (JRS)285.
While the programme expanded its geographical scope to 41 third countries, with plans for further
expansion, there are still gaps in focus and coverage especially in countries that are important for
returns in terms of the EU’s and/or Member States’ policy priorities. Other challenges concern rigidity
with regard to the provision of immediate assistance upon arrival in the country of origin, which is not
uniform for all types of returnees. Similarly, there is limited flexibility as regards the form of assistance
(for instance, offering cash assistance in countries where arranging in-kind services is unrealistic),
which continues to pose a constraint on the programme’s operational effectiveness. Lastly, there are
constraints in outreach to the authorities of the countries of origin covered by the programme owing
to inefficient coordination and lack of long-term monitoring of the programme286. This highlights the
need for more tailor-made and specific support. In addition, there are significant discrepancies between
the sums granted by Member States to returnees. As a rough estimate, average support (converging
with the figures from the EURP) is around EUR 1 000 per person for reintegration plus EUR 200 upon
arrival in the case of forced return, and around EUR 2 000 plus EUR 600 in the case of voluntary
return, in the latter case plus EUR 1 000 per family member. A degree of EU harmonisation of the
sums granted and centralised management by Frontex would enhance the credibility and consistency
of this important pillar of a humane return system.
Return counselling. Frontex has taken on a growing role in return counselling287. In the second half
of 2024 alone, Frontex return specialists conducted 8 491 individual counselling sessions, resulting in
4 337 voluntary return declarations288. In 2024, Frontex provided training on return and reintegration
282 Interviews with national authorities underscoring the need for adaptation to the local context, counselling tasks
performed by staff and linguistic challenges. 283 EMN (2024), Asylum and Migration Overview – Return Chapter. 284 There are also significant differences between Member States in how they manage the pre-return phase. Some may lack
sufficient capacity or infrastructure to meet best-practice standards for vulnerability checks, counselling, or cooperation
with third countries. See European Court of Auditors (2021), Special Report 05/2021: Frontex’s support to external border
management. Available at: https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/news.aspx?nid=15349 285 Frontex, Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2024. In 2024, the number of reintegration cases provided through the
EURP doubled in comparison with 2023, totalling 9 308 cases. 286 Member States have different reintegration models, including offering different packages such as higher amounts or
only in-cash assistance. While they value the EURP, they stressed the need for better monitoring and evaluation of
outcomes. 287 Return counselling is a key step in the return process, taking place both before and after the issuance of return decisions.
It involves providing migrants with clear, accurate and tailored information about their rights, obligations and available
options, including voluntary return and reintegration support. Counselling sessions help individuals understand the
practical and legal consequences of their choices, such as applying for asylum, remaining with no right to stay, or accepting
assisted voluntary return. They also cover logistical aspects like travel arrangements, financial assistance and reintegration
opportunities in the country of origin. 288 Frontex Evaluation Report, 2024 on the results of returns implemented in the second half of 2024, p. 11.
108
counselling to 136 Member State staff and 50 return specialists289.
While this demonstrates Frontex’s increasing operational involvement, significant challenges remain.
Counselling is highly labour-intensive, often requiring multiple individual sessions alongside group
sessions, and must be adapted to local contexts, particularly in transit countries where migrants may
abscond or have very limited time before moving on290. Language barriers between Frontex staff and
national authorities, as well as the need for close coordination, further complicate delivery291.
Moreover, Member States vary greatly in their capacity and approach.
d) Lack of mandate for return activities from third countries,
As migration flows increasingly involve transit countries, there is growing demand292 for Frontex to
expand its operational scope in third countries293. With respect to activities taking place in, or starting
from, third countries, Frontex can currently only assume a limited role as Frontex’s competence is
legally limited to carrying out returns from the EU. Frontex does not have the mandate to support
return operations departing from third countries (third-country-to-third-country), nor assist in return
activities taking place in third countries, and as such cannot deploy its standing corps to third countries
for operational support in the area of return294. Frontex is currently only mandated to provide capacity-
building assistance to third countries to support their ability to receive returnees from EU Member
States or general return-related capacity-building activities such as training. All of this limits the EU’s
ability to respond to complex transit migration patterns and to strategically leverage Frontex’s
operational expertise. Frontex should be able to do more in third countries, in particular to support and
coordinate returns from third countries, which could include return operations from third countries.
Certain third countries may be in need of assistance from Frontex to ease migration pressure on them
stemming from migration towards the EU – a topic which is very relevant in the context of the ‘whole-
of-route approach’ – and to support countries neighbouring the EU. Frontex’s presence in third
countries would have to be increased significantly to achieve this.
ANNEX 7: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE EVALUATION OF THE EBCG
REGULATION
Overall, the evaluation concluded that the EBCG Regulation is relevant to addressing the current needs
and challenges at the external borders and that it provides a clear EU added value, as its objectives
could not have been achieved sufficiently by Member States acting alone. While largely consistent, its
effectiveness was impacted by a number of internal and external factors. Some of those stem from the
Regulation itself, while others are the product of organisational, technical, logistical and
implementation shortcomings, as well as rapid changes and the development of threats and challenges
at the external borders, since illegal migration continues to be a major challenge and remains at the top
of the EU’s policy and political agenda.
The evaluation found that the operational support provided by Frontex was valued by Member States
and has contributed to achieving the objectives of the EBCG. However, the absence of a clear law
289 Frontex, Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2024. 290 Interviews with national authorities. 291 Ibid. 292 Growing demand comes from some third countries and from several Member States. Frontex has been contacted by
Western Balkan countries requesting that it manage returns from transit countries to countries of origin. (Frontex, Briefing
Note, International cooperation and EBCG Regulation, Internal ref. STRAT/ICU/06/2025.) 293 Interview: HOME C1 and Frontex. 294 Status agreements between the EU and third countries are currently limited to the deployment of border management
teams, in line with Article 73(3) of the EBCG Regulation. Therefore, return-related tasks are not included within the scope
of status agreements and cannot be the reason for standing corps deployment.
109
enforcement mandate has also caused uncertainties and led to various interpretations of the exact
boundaries regarding Frontex’s tasks in contributing to the prevention, detection and countering of
cross-border crime. This lack of clarity around Frontex’ role in the fight against cross-border crime
persists today (see Problem 1).
As regards returns, the evaluation acknowledged that Frontex has become an essential actor in the
common EU system of returns, effectively supporting Member States through all phases of return
procedures. However, several factors hindered its effectiveness in return operations and return-related
activities. These included shortfalls and capacity gaps in Frontex’s ability to cover deployment needs
(e.g. FRESO). In addition, the evaluation noted that return authorities were not sufficiently represented
on the Management Board. With the exception of the establishment of the High-Level-Round Table
on Returns (a working group with no decision-making power), no major development has occurred to
date on these aspects. These issues persist today and are described in the Problem definition (Problem
1 and Annex 6).
On oversight mechanisms, the evaluation highlighted the limited use of Article 112 of the EBCG
Regulation (on interparliamentary cooperation). It also found that the resources of some of the
oversight bodies were insufficient. As regards fundamental rights, the Serious Incident Report
mechanism is not regulated in the Regulation, and several factors have an impact on its effectiveness
(e.g. limited cooperation and follow-up by national authorities). The evaluation also identified
problems concerning the lack of clarity of Article 111 and the implementation of Article 46. Most of
these challenges persist today and are reflected in the Problem definition (Problem 1 and Problem 3).
As regards training, the evaluation found that the common training standards provided by Frontex
helped to improve the training of national border guards. However, the evaluation also identified
challenges affecting Frontex training. These include the fact that Frontex does not have its own training
facilities, Frontex’s reliance on Member States’ training infrastructure and the unavailability of
trainers. Moreover, factors related to EIBM, including integrated capability planning, were not fully
implemented at the time of the evaluation. Hence, key aspects of EIBM could not be evaluated.
Important developments since the evaluation included the adoption of the EBCG’s capability roadmap,
the update of the technical and operational strategy for EIBM (2023-2027), and the establishment of a
methodology and procedure for establishing the national capability development plans. Despite these
important milestones, the implementation of EIBM presents challenges, due to divergent operational
procedures across Member States and weak alignment with EIBM standards (Problem 3). These
challenges persist today and are described in the Problem definition (Problem 3).
The evaluation found that Frontex contributed to improved situational awareness at external borders
through its products, including risk analysis, vulnerability assessments and situational monitoring,
particularly in the framework of EUROSUR. Nevertheless, several factors impacted its ability to
provide up-to-date and comprehensive situational monitoring. This stems from limitations in the
EBCG Regulation related to processing of operational personal data by Frontex (including in the
context of EUROSUR and for risk analysis purposes) and is partially due to certain implementation
issues (including reporting by Member States in the context of EUROSUR and delays in Frontex
providing risk analysis products in all four tiers of EIBM). Issues related to the implementation of
EUROSUR persist today and are described in Problem 1. In addition, the enforcement of vulnerability
assessments continues to undermine the evidence-based planning and alignment of resources (Problem
3).
Based on the evaluation, Frontex provides added value by offering additional human resources to
Member States and third countries facing migratory challenges. However, the evaluation found that
the application of the EU Staff Regulations to the Category 1 standing corps staff presents challenges.
This is because the Staff Regulations were not intended to meet the needs of an operational service
with executive powers, which causes inconsistencies in areas such as working conditions, selection
110
procedures, deployment locations, leave entitlements and disciplinary measures. Such challenges
persist today and are reflected in the Problem definition (Problem 2).
The evaluation found that the lack of a clear command-and-control structure for the standing corps
hampered operational effectiveness. An important development since the evaluation was the rollout of
Frontex Chain of Command (FC2), which is the operational management structure used by Frontex to
carry out operational activities through decentralised management of the standing corps and other
relevant staff. Evidence collected as part of this study indicate that the new chain of command structure
in joint operations improved operational effectiveness.
The evaluation found gaps for certain standing corps profiles (e.g. advanced-level document officers,
dog handlers), and challenges related to the limited access to key databases by the standing corps.
These issues persist today and are reflected in the Problem definition (Problem 2).
According to the evaluation, Frontex’s cooperation with third countries was well regarded by key
stakeholders. However, challenges related to the conclusions of working arrangements were identified,
due to discussions tied to data protection. The evaluation also pointed out that while Frontex’s
cooperation with international organisations was effective, the exhaustive list of organisations that
Frontex can cooperate with (as enshrined in Article 68) limits cooperation with some relevant
organisations or international partners. These challenges persist today and are described in the Problem
definition (Problem 1). Although the evaluation concluded that cooperation with other EU agencies
(e.g. EMSA, EFCA, Europol) and bodies (EEAS as part of CSDP missions) was effective, it
highlighted the importance of avoiding overlaps and better specifying the Frontex mandate when
compared with agencies such as Europol. The study accompanying the impact assessment found that
after the evaluation, new problems have emerged, particularly when it comes to challenges affecting
cooperation between Frontex and Europol on the fight against cross-border crime.
111
ANNEX 8: OVERVIEW OF POLICY OPTIONS AND MEASURES
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on
standing corps and
central role of Frontex
1a. Problem Driver 1.1 – Thematic Area: Border controls
Member States will continue retaining
primary responsibility for border
checks and surveillance, with Frontex
operating only upon request while
executive powers are exercised as a
rule only in the presence of host
Member States. Over time, long-term
deployments, antenna offices and
stronger local structures will build
trust, potentially leading to broader
responsibilities for Frontex.
Frontex’s presence at border crossing
points is expected to increase,
especially for logistical support (e.g.
entry-exit system) and second-line
checks. However, first-line checks by
Frontex officers will remain limited,
and access to the border check system
will vary across Member States.
The staged rollout of the seven border
management and two thematic return-
PM 1.1.1 Recognise executive powers
of the standing corps (within the limits
set out by the Treaties) and broaden
the list of tasks of the standing corps.
PM 1.1.2 Broaden the list of Frontex
tasks to incorporate the conduct of
debriefing interviews, which are a
potential source of operational
information and operational personal
data, and return counselling
interviews.
PM 1.1.3 Mandate modifications in
relevant national policies to ensure
effective access of Frontex officers
and assets (such as vessels) to perform
frontline duties, including with the use
of a national database.
PM 1.1.4 The chain of command and
contingent-based operational concept
introduced by the Management
The same as Option 1Option 1 +
Several scenarios for
division of responsibilities:
Middle scenario A, where
Member States retain
primary responsibility for
protection of their borders,
but under certain conditions
and for a limited time, more
responsibilities may be
transferred to Frontex.
Leadership scenario B,
where Frontex could be
granted greater leadership
and primacy in situations of
serious shortcomings or
critical border pressure. It
would also be entrusted
with reviewing and
approving national
112
profile contingents under the Frontex
Chain of Command (FC2) concept
will continue until the end of the 2026.
The Antenna Offices will be gradually
established to support the work of the
new Contingents and will gradually
grow in terms of the size of stationed
personnel.
Board’s Decision would be reflected
in the EBCG Regulation to ensure
more predictability. Additional
powers could be delegated to
Contingent Commanders/Section
Leaders (issues identified in Case
Study 3).
PM 1.1.5 Ensure funding (e.g. through
the BMVI) directed at increasing
Member States’ hosting capacity for
the standing corps at border crossing
points, as well as the transformation
and adaptation of border crossing
points to improve access by the
standing corps to border control
systems.
PM 1.1.6 Modifications to EU and
national policies to ensure effective
access of Frontex officers and vessels
so that they can perform frontline
duties (e.g. facilitating the recognition
of Frontex-deployed human resources
and technical assets as equivalent to
national authorities by port and airport
operators); strengthen and encourage
host Member State to authorise
members of the teams to act on its
behalf, when operationally justified.
capability development
plans and be granted the
right to initiate deployments
when national action is
delayed or inadequate.
Member States would be
obliged to align national
operational planning and
resource allocation with
Frontex’s strategic
programming, making it
obligatory to provide
personnel and technical
assets when identified as
necessary. (See also EIBM
strategy and integrated
planning below.)
An ‘extreme’ scenario C
could be considered where
Frontex assumes primary
responsibility for the
external borders of the EU.
Member State assets and
staff are under the command
of Frontex or in joint
command with Frontex.
1b. Problem Driver 1.1 – Thematic Area: Cross-border crime
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on
standing corps and
113
central role of Frontex
Frontex’s ability to meaningfully
contribute to crime detection at the
external borders will continue to be
hindered by legal ambiguity and
limited executive powers.
Cooperation with Europol will remain
limited, often reactive in nature and
hampered by data-sharing constraints.
Frontex will be unable to provide
timely or systematic intelligence to
Europol on cross-border criminal
activities, hampering efforts to tackle
cross-border crime effectively.
PM 1.1.7 Define and describe
Frontex’s cross-border crime
detection tasks. These could include
detection of drugs, stolen vehicles,
illicit goods, illicit firearms, detection
and identification of victims and
perpetrators of human trafficking and
migrant smuggling, and assistance to
Member States in identifying cross-
border criminal networks during
border control activities.
PM 1.1.8 Describe the analytical and
situational awareness support
functions that form part of the
assistance Frontex may provide (e.g.
risk analysis and monitoring of
migratory flows, criminal information
analysis, open-source information
analysis).
PM 1.1.9 Revise the rules for sharing
operational personal data to facilitate
more effective and timely
transmission of operational personal
data between Frontex and
Europol/Eurojust while maintaining
data protection safeguards, with the
objective of clarifying the division of
responsibilities in establishing
necessity as a prerequisite for the
transmission of operational personal
The same as Option 1The same as Option 1
114
data from Frontex to Europol.
PM 1.1.10 Complementary measures
should include awareness-raising
activities on data protection rules and
the establishment of standard
operating procedures or of an
‘information governance model’
between Frontex and Europol to foster
the swift exchange of data on the basis
of specific and targeted requests, thus
reducing the administrative burden
and speeding up responses.
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on standing
corps and central role of
Frontex
1c. Problem Driver 1.1 – Thematic Area: Emergencies and hybrid threats
Frontex’s mandate does not explicitly
cover support to Member States’
authorities in exceptional situations
beyond the traditional scope of border
management. This limitation restricts
Frontex’s ability to provide
operational assistance during crises,
including natural disasters or hybrid
threats, where its resources could offer
added value.
Under Regulation (EU) 2024/1359
addressing crisis situations and cases
No measure PM 1.1.11 Obligation to include
cooperation mechanisms in
OPLANs between national civil
protection authorities and
national border management
authorities, as well as SOPs on
how the standing corps could
assist national authorities when
addressing the consequences of
natural disasters and hybrid
threats.
PM 1.1.12 Obligation for
No measure
115
of force majeure in the field of
migration and asylum, a Member State
facing a situation of crisis or force
majeure may request support from
Frontex.
Frontex to conclude a
memorandum of understanding
with DG ECHO/the ERCC, with
a view to facilitating the
exchange of information and
enhancing situational awareness.
The standing corps could
participate in the UCPM training
and exercises in order to better
understand coordination
mechanisms and emergency
response operations.
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on
standing corps and
central role of Frontex
1d. Problem Driver 1.1 – Thematic Area: Visa policy
Frontex’s implementation of the four-
tier access control model will continue
to be fragmented, given the fact that
Frontex is not responsible for
supporting the EU’s visa policy.
The increased use of false documents
and identity fraud by travellers
attempting to circumvent visa or travel
authorisation requirements will pose
growing challenges for consular staff,
who may not always be fully equipped
to detect and respond to such
scenarios.
No measure PM 1.1.13 Explicit responsibility
for Frontex to provide regular
training sessions on detecting
fraudulent documents and
identifying visa fraud cases.
PM 1.1.14 Obligation on the part
of Frontex’s Analysis Unit to
develop dedicated risk analysis
products focused on specific
third countries, identifying
evolving trends in document
fraud, visa abuse and visa
shopping.
Option 2 +
PM 1.1.16 Possibility of
temporary deployment of
standing corps officers to
help Member States’
consular delegations
process visa applications
during peak periods. (This
measure would mean that
the legal basis of the EBCG
Regulation would need to
be supplemented.)
116
PM 1.1.15 Expand the training
currently offered by Frontex for
the consular staff of EU Member
States by providing regular
training sessions, e.g. on
detecting fraudulent documents
and identifying cases of visa
fraud.
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on
standing corps and
central role of Frontex
2. Problem Driver 1.2 – Thematic Area: EUROSUR
EUROSUR will continue to develop
and to serve as the main platform to
support situational awareness.
Although EUROSUR 2.0 is expected
to improve the delivery of near real-
time situational awareness on
migration flows, issues related to data
quality and data quantity, delays in
incorporating national data into
EUROSUR and overclassification of
information will remain.
The restricted scope of personal data
outlined in Article 89(2) will continue
to negatively impact situational
awareness.
PM 1.2.1 Broaden EUROSUR’s
objective to include identification of
potential strategic and operational risk
in order to provide a forward-looking
situational picture.
PM 1.2.2 Clearly outline and
distinguish the roles of the NCCs and
National Frontex Points, including
24/7 duties.
PM 1.2.3 Clarify the scope of air
border surveillance and establish the
obligation of civil-military
information exchange linked to
EUROSUR.
Option 1 +
PM 1.2.9 Revise the EBCG
Regulation to add new categories
of data that can be processed to
enrich the data for the purpose of
situational awareness.
PM 1.2.10 Allow EUROSUR to
include statistical or aggregated
and anonymised data derived
from social media monitoring
activities outside of EUROSUR.
PM 1.2. 11 Integrate EUROSUR
data quality aspects into the
Vulnerability Assessment by
+ Option 2 (including O1)
PM 1.2.12 Enable broader
processing of personal data
by removing ship and
aircraft identification
numbers as the sole
personal data to be
processed in EUROSUR
and by adding new
categories of personal data.
These modifications would
eventually lead to
redefinition of the purpose
of EUROSUR.
PM 1.2.13 Broaden the
117
Without robust quality enforcement
mechanisms, quality shortcomings
and incompleteness will persist.
In the absence of improved access to
key information/data on all types of
threats, Frontex will continue to
operate with fragmented situational
awareness.
PM 1.2.4 Differentiate data-sharing
rules with third countries vs EU
partners to allow flexible cooperation.
PM 1.2.5 Reduce overclassification
and enable mixed classified
(limited/confidential) communication
networks.
PM 1.2.6 Broaden the scope of the
situational pictures to include internal
security events or incidents of a hybrid
nature.
PM 1.2.7 Remove integrated planning
as a EUROSUR component but use
EUROSUR as a source for integrated
planning.
PM 1.2.8 Incentivise Member States
to ensure appropriate quality data in
EUROSUR via the dedicated EU
funds (e.g. BMVI).
expanding the assessment to
cover the full set of
responsibilities and capabilities
for collecting, validating and
sharing surveillance information.
Rather than duplicating the
existing EUROSUR data quality
report, the Vulnerability
Assessment would use it as a
diagnostic tool and as a baseline
for evaluating whether
recommendations issued to
Member States lead to tangible
improvements. This would
eventually serve as an
enforcement mechanism for the
provision of data quality in
EUROSUR by Member States.
scope of personal data that
could be processed in the
context of social media
monitoring, which would
become part of EUROSUR.
PM 1.2.14 Broaden the
scope of EUROSUR to
cover the entire EIBM,
including return (through
the establishment of a
separate return layer in the
situational picture) [to be
decided following the
proposal on the
digitalisation of returns].
PM 1.2.15 Enhance
Frontex’s direct access to
outputs from national
surveillance assets (e.g.
direct access to national
integrated surveillance
system equivalent to the
access that
local/regional/national
coordination centres have –
including fixed and mobile
systems, geo-location of
patrols and assets, or, in a
broader sense, the
‘surveillance infrastructure
at the Member State level’).
PM 1.2.16 Add to
EUROSUR a new indicator
118
for migratory pressure for
the ‘prevented entries’ at
external borders outside
border crossing points.
PM 1.2.17 Develop
Frontex’s in-house AI tools
to analyse data from
multiple sources.
PM 1.2. 18 Give Member
States financial support to
link their systems together.
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on
standing corps and
central role of Frontex
3a. Problem Driver 1.3 – Thematic Area: Cooperation with third countries and CSDP missions
The operational limitations of existing
status agreements are likely to persist
and even intensify. The key enablers,
such as equipment registration, staff
legal status and Frontex’s recognition
as a legal entity, will remain
unaddressed. This will limit the
capacities of Frontex to autonomously
deploy personnel, move and operate
equipment, and engage effectively
with local authorities.
Frontex’s cooperation with third
PM 1.3.1 Align the procedure for
signing working arrangements with
the approach applied to other EU
agencies (e.g. EUAA).
PM 1.3.2 Encourage Frontex to
review the need to update existing
working arrangements, such as
between Frontex and the EEAS but
also with international organisations
or third countries, to align them with
Frontex’s new mandate and enable, for
example, access to EUROSUR.
Option 1 +
PM 1.3.7 Explicitly recognise
Frontex, in the EBCG
Regulation, as the main partner
for border management
components of projects
implemented in third countries.
This may require corresponding
adjustments to be made to
funding regulations.
Options 1 + 2 +
PM 1.3.8 Enable Frontex to
support/join existing
bilateral arrangements
between Member States and
third countries, following
the Management Board’s
approval.
119
countries will remain constrained,
with slow progress on concluding
working arrangements and status
agreements.
However, the adoption of a new model
working arrangement with a data
protection annex for third countries,
on which the EDPS has given a
positive opinion, is expected to
alleviate this situation to a certain
extent. The same applies to the newly
published EDPS model administrative
arrangement for transfers of personal
data from EU institutions to public
authorities in third countries and the
EDPS model administrative
arrangement for transfers of personal
data from EU institutions to
international organisations.
Administrative burden will remain due
to the requirement for the
Management Board to adopt a list of
priorities on the deployment of liaison
officers in third countries on a yearly
basis, although no changes are
required from one year to the next.
PM 1.3.3 Remove the requirement for
the Management Board to adopt an
annual list of priorities on the FLOs in
third countries.
PM 1.3.4 Establish a Commission-led
regular dialogue between the EEAS
and Frontex to foster closer
cooperation and a greater
understanding of the complementary
mandates of Frontex and the CSDP
missions and to leverage Frontex’s
EIBM expertise in CSDP missions that
have a border management
component.
PM 1.3.5 Encourage dialogue with
third countries in which status
agreements are in place to make it
possible to prepare updated
operational plans to facilitate pre-
arrival checks at airports as part of
third countries activities, including the
development of standard operating
procedures and task division.
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on
standing corps and
central role of Frontex
120
3b. Problem Driver 1.3 – Thematic Area: Cooperation with international organisations
The closed list of international
organisations in Article 68 will
continue to limit Frontex’s ability to
establish structured cooperation with
key partners beyond those explicitly
named.
Progress on updating or concluding
working arrangements with
international organisations and EU
agencies will remain slow.
PM 1.3.6A The amended list of
international organisations would
include additional international
organisations (e.g. NATO) with whom
Frontex could cooperate.
[same as PM 1.3.1] Revise the
procedure for concluding working
arrangements with other international
organisations in order to align it with
the procedure used by other EU
agencies with the approach adopted
for other EU agencies.
Same as Option 1 on procedure
for concluding working
arrangements with international
organisations.
PM 1.3.6B The list of
international organisations
would include a more
flexible/open narrative, allowing
Frontex to cooperate with
international organisations
relevant to its mandate, removing
the ‘closed’ list, but requiring
prior authorisation of the
Management Board to ensure
relevance for the mandate.
Same as Option 2
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on
standing corps and
central role of Frontex
4a. Problem Driver 1.4 – Thematic Area: Returns
Without EU-level action, fragmented
national return systems, operational
inefficiencies and growing pressures
on Member States would persist or
worsen, leading to rising backlogs,
higher absconding rates and
difficulties upholding fundamental
rights. The lack of reform could also
PM 1.4.1A Introduce the obligation to
adopt EU-level guidance documents
and establish structured and binding
coordination mechanisms between
annual planning cycles and other EU
and national planning.
PM 1.4.2A Mandatory regular
information sharing by Member States
Option 1 +
PM 1.4.14B Frontex would
become a default operational
actor in all EU-coordinated
and/or EU-funded return
operations (both voluntary and
forced). Member States could
continue organising their own
Options 1 + 2 +
PM 1.4.14C Frontex would
assume a central role in
coordinating all EU return
operations (based on return
decisions issued by the
Member States), and in
principle without the
121
prevent Frontex from fulfilling
ambitions of swifter returns under the
Pact on Migration and Asylum and the
proposed Return Regulation.
As the border procedure, a key pillar
of the EU’s reformed migration
management, came into force in June
2026, pressure will significantly
increase, particularly on frontline
Member States, to swiftly return
individuals by utilising this procedure.
The proposal for a Return Regulation
aims to significantly improve the
efficiency of the return process in
Member States. This increase in
Member States’ capacities to return
will require Frontex to play a greater
and central role in coordinating,
supporting and operationalising
returns. An expansion of Frontex’s
operational responsibilities in areas
such as organising joint return
operations, providing operational
support to return operations beyond
EU territory, and providing
interoperable digital tools to
harmonise procedures EU-wide will
also be required. All these new aspects
would require the EBCG Regulation to
be amended.
with Frontex on forced and voluntary
returns.
PM 1.4.3 Adjust the EU’s return
monitoring system by increasing
resources, enlarging the Forced Return
Monitoring Pool.
PM 1.4.4 Expand the vulnerability
assessment of the EU’s external
borders on return to better integrate it
into EIBM risk analysis, EU standards
and training for monitors.
PM 1.4.5A Create a legal basis for
reintegration to increase
accountability and streamline
Frontex’s related activity.
PM 1.4.6 Further clarify in the legal
text the existing preconditions for
Frontex to assist Member States with
return operations or reintegration
support.
PM 1.4.7 Refocus and strengthenthe
EU reintegration programme (EURP)
and broaden the EURP’s scope to
include pre-return counselling and
assistance for migrants considering
voluntary return.
PM 1.4.8 Create a shared EU platform
for identification data and strengthen
Frontex’s role in organising and
facilitating joint identification
missions with third countries.
returns, with national funds.
PM 1.4.1B Frontex would be
mandated to proactively plan,
match and pool resources for
return flights and shared escort
needs. Frontex would establish a
24/7 Return Support Desk
providing real-time operational
assistance.
PM 1.4.2B Frontex would
collect system-relevant statistical
data on all planned, ongoing and
terminated return operations and
share it in a secure manner with
all Member States and the
Commission.
PM 1.4.15 Frontex to develop
uniform standards to be applied
by both Frontex and EU Member
States on return monitoring, in
line with the Return Regulation
to promote consistent practices
across all EU-supported return
operations. Frontex would
continue to provide logistical and
technical support for deploying
monitors.
PM 1.4.16B Frontex would
support and coordinate returns
from thirdcountries, where clear
conditions and legal safeguards
are in place, to address
immunities and privileges of
possibility of Member
States opting out of
performing national return
operations. Frontex would
absorb many operational
return functions currently
managed by Member States
or external partners like the
IOM, subject to the
introduction of appropriate
oversight and quality-
control mechanisms.
PM 1.4.16C Frontex’s
mandate would be
expanded to lead return
operations from one third
country to another third
country under new return
status agreements, allowing
the deployment of Frontex
return teams on the territory
of a third country, where
clear conditions and legal
safeguards are in place.
PM 1.4.17C Frontex would
be able to enter and update
information in SIS; a
SIRENE office would then
be created at Frontex,
similar to Europol.
PM 1.4.5C The Frontex
EU reintegration
programme would be
122
PM 1.4.9 Consolidation and enhanced
interoperability of several digital tools
managing return, readmission and
reintegration cases.
PM 1.4.10 Adjust Frontex’s Return
Operational Plans’ sequencing and
introduction of shared platforms to
exchange information on return
schedules, charter capacity and escort
needs.
PM 1.4.11 Leverage existing
provisions in the EBCG Regulation to
facilitate the provision of training and
capacity-building on return processes
to partner third countries, particularly
in transit regions.
PM 1.4.12 Enhance the number and
profiles of specialised Frontex return
staff.
PM 1.4.13A Revamp the deployment
of EU return liaison officers
(EURLOs).
deployed staff as well as
guarantee overall compliance
with EU law.
PM 1.4.17B To be able to
perform its strengthened return
responsibilities, Frontex would
receive general read access to the
Schengen Information System
(SIS), beyond the current limited
access by the standing corps via a
Member State during a specific
return operation. A SIRENE
office would be created in
Frontex, similar to Europol.
PM 1.4.5B Create a legal basis
for Frontex’s broad
responsibility for reintegration
efforts on the part of the EU, and
a legal basis for Frontex
assuming a role in the
digitalisation of return,
readmission and reintegration
efforts.
PM 1.4.13B Introduce Frontex
return liaison officers in third
countries.
PM 1.4.18 Frontex to provide
structural support in developing
standardised return counselling
and reintegration counselling
across the EU, aimed at
promoting voluntary returns.
turned into a fully-fledged
EU Reintegration Service.
Moreover, instead of
Frontex contracting service
providers in third countries,
Frontex would establish
offices with their own
reintegration case workers
in third countries. Steps
would also be taken to
create a legal basis for
Frontex assuming a role in
the digitalisation of return,
readmission and
reintegration.
123
Frontex return specialists would
become a shared resource.
4b. Problem Driver 1.4 – Thematic area organisational governance with respect to returns
The governance of the EBCG will
remain narrowly focused on Frontex,
rather than encompassing the full
EBCG.
The Management Board will continue
to act in a reactive manner, also due to
the large number of issues brought to
its attention and requiring a decision
from it, with limited proactive,
strategic leadership needed to steer the
development of the entire EBCG.
The lack of decision-making power (or
integration of return authorities in
Frontex’s governance) on the part of
the HLRTR and limited meaningful
engagement with the MB will
continue, preventing the EBCG from
ensuring strategic alignment or
decision-making on return activities.
No measures PM 1.4.19B Explicitly recognise
the role of working groups in the
legal text, and strengthen
coordination between
preparatory working groups,
such as the high-level round table
on returns, and the Management
Board.
PM 1.4.20 Introduce internal
rules (e.g. through a MB
Decision) to strengthen
coordination between Frontex
working groups (particularly the
HLRTR for strategic steering and
the EIBM WG to ensure quality
assurance on the return
framework) and the MB.
PM 1.4.21 A dedicated working
group on returns would address
technical, operational and
implementation issues and report
to the Management Board, to
ensure operational focus.
Option 2 +
PM 1.4.19C Revise the
rules of the Management
Board to include a dedicated
system of governance for
returns, strengthening the
role of return authorities in
Frontex’s governance
structure.
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on
standing corps and
central role of Frontex
124
5a. Problem Driver 2.1 – Thematic Area: Standing corps architecture (recruitment, retention and size)
Frontex’s recruitment strategy will
remain targeted at reaching 10 000
officers by 2027, i.e. 3 000 Category 1
officers, 1 500 Category 2 officers and
5 500 Category 3 officers.
Recruitment will become
replacement-driven, with
approximately 200 new Category 1
hires per year. This will be intensified
once the first cohorts of Category 1
officers reach the end of their 5+5 year
contracts, if not renewed for an
indefinite duration.
The 4% limit on operational support
and monitoring staff will continue to
significantly constrain Frontex’s
effectiveness and efficiency across
different logistical, technical and
operational activities.
The standing corps will continue to not
be geared to cater to the increased need
for specific profiles for return
specialists. The standing corps is
currently geared to officers with a law
enforcement background. However,
many of the specialist profiles required
to better support return, such as return
counselling, cultural mediation and
medical and vulnerability support,
would not require a law enforcement
PM 2.1.1A Increase standing corps
Categories 1, 2 and 3 from 10 000
officers to 30 000 to boost Frontex’s
capacity to support Member States and
anticipate the increased demand for
support in view of the implementation
of the Pact.
PM 2.1.2 Amendments to the EBCG
Regulation to raise the ceiling of 4%
of the total permanent deployment
component of the SC and a provision
enabling the MB to establish the scope
of the operational support function
based on an annual capability needs
assessment.
PM 2.1.3 The concept of
‘deployment’ would be included in the
EBCG Regulation to reflect the
deployment and rotation system.
PM 2.1.4 Article 61 and its
implementing acts would be revised to
align the conditionality for payment
for Category 2 with the actual
secondment of officers (rather than the
increase in national staffing) and
introduce harmonised templates and
clearer timelines for data submission
and verification.
PM 2.1.5 Creation of a Deployment
Option 1 + the following
modifications as regards standing
corps
PM 2.1.1B Category 5 within the
standing corps is conceived as a
capability-harmonisation
reserve, designed to promote the
consistent application of EU
standards across the operational
domains of EIBM, including
returns. Category 5 officers
would be staff from Member
State national authorities who
complete a comprehensive
Frontex training curriculum
aligned with the EBCG Training
Strategy to overcome the
challenges related to competing
by Frontex and Member States
for the same professionals. This
would serve as a ‘top-up’ to
national training systems, rather
than replacing them.
Officers selected by Member
States to be part of Category 5
would be identified based on a
capability needs assessment
process, to be carried out jointly
by Frontex and Member States.
Category 5 would be available
Options 1 and 2 + (except
solution for the overall size
of the standing corps, which
should be replaced by the
following):
PM 2.1.1C A substantial
expansion of the standing
corps to 30 000 by 2041,
aligned with a wider
mandate covering returns,
visa support, crime
detection and technical
equipment.
Gradual growth of Category
1 (at least 5 000 by 2041)
combined with the
introduction of Category 5
as described in Option 2
(18 000 by 2041) [numbers
TBD], embedding the
reserve force available for
exceptional circumstances
into the expansion while
keeping Member States’
contributions fixed.
Standing corps size: factors
concerning its growth:
- Returns: Capability to
lead and carry out
operations, resulting in
125
background or training.
Burdensome administrative
requirements linked to eligibility
conditions stemming from Article 61
will continue to pose barriers to
secondments rather than facilitating
them.
Handbook to provide a common
framework for deployment procedures
and establish an early warning
mechanism for Member States to flag
anticipated shortfalls in Category 2
and 3 contributions.
[numbering continues for another
thematic area, as this concerns the
entire problem driver]
for deployment in exceptional
cases. Deployment would be
capability-driven, with Frontex
selecting the teams or units best
suited to the specific operational
scenario, rather than mobilising
the entire pool or having it as a
permanently deployed
component.
The rollout of Category 5 would
be progressive. The reserve is
expected to start in 2030 and
reach 20 000 by 2041.
PM 2.1.9 The Deployment
Handbook proposed under
Option 1 would be made binding
through a Management Board
decision as an enforceable
framework applicable to all those
involved in standing corps
deployments.
PM 2.1.10 The introduction of
Category 5 would require an
expansion of the financial
support system under
Article 61, as adjusted under
PM 2.1.4. An alternative
measure could envisage covering
this financial support under the
border management and visa
funding instrument in the new
Multiannual Financial
Framework, creating a
increased demand for return
counsellors, escorts,
coordinators and monitors
(increasing across the
Options).
- Cross-border crime:
Expanded detection and
prevention functions at
borders increasing demand
for investigative, analysis,
and surveillance profiles
(constant across the
Options).
- Strategic and
operational planning:
Stronger EU-level planning
capacity and pooling to
ensure consistent capability
development and surge
planning (increasing across
the Options).
- Training and
qualification system: An
expanded instructor base
and training offer to deliver
and absorb the expanded
responsibilities (increasing
across the Options).
- Visa policy: More
structured operational
support to consular
services.
126
simplified, performance-based
compensation system.
PM 2.1.11 An oversight and
enforcement mechanism is added
to the Regulation to ensure
reliable contributions from
Member States for Categories 2
and 3. Persistent non-compliance
would be escalated to the MB.
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on standing
corps and central role of
Frontex
5b. Problem Driver 2.1 – Thematic Area: Employment conditions
Starting in 2030, the first cohort of
Category 1 standing corps officers will
reach the end of their 10-year
contracts. This will mark the
beginning of a predictable and
recurring cycle of contract expirations,
with subsequent cohorts exiting the
service each year based on their year
of entry. Without a mechanism for
contract renewal or transition to
indefinite contracts, Frontex will face
a sharp increase in annual attrition
among Category 1 staff, potentially
losing hundreds of trained officers per
year.
Include targeted changes to the
employment and working conditions
of the standing corps operational staff.
PM 2.1.6 Determine that passing the
training is mandatory for continuing
employment with Frontex.
PM 2.1.7 Adjust work patterns (shift
work, stand-by duty) to operational
reality and provide a compensation
scheme for particularly difficult or
risky working conditions/nature of
work.
PM 2.1.8 Amend the current
Option 1 +
PM 2.1.12 Develop a system
making it possible to take into
account the outcome of
compulsory training (e.g. a
contract system could be
developed which would be
aligned with Frontex’s training
system and cater for long-term
career prospects; one-year
contracts would be offered at a
lower entry grade for officers
having to undertake mandatory
training; transfer into a higher
Same as Option 2
127
Frontex will therefore need to
intensify recruitment efforts
significantly. This includes scaling up
selection, onboarding and especially
training capacity, which is currently
capped at around 1 000 officers per
year.
The need to replace large portions of
the operational workforce on a rolling
basis will place significant strain on
HR, logistics and budget planning of
Frontex.
The limitations deriving from the
application of certain provisions of the
EU Staff Regulations/CEOS and its
implementing rules to Category 1
operational staff will continue to
hamper its effectiveness. These
include the degree to which Frontex
Category 1 staff can integrate into
operational arrangements in joint
operations due to work-time patterns,
the mission system applicable to
standing corps deployments, the
mismatch between probation and
training duration and long-term staff
retention.
provision on the place of employment
in the EBCG Regulation to allow, as a
general rule, the place of deployment
to become the place of employment.
Develop implementing measures to
facilitate recruitment and promotions
(e.g. reclassify staff based on criteria
relating to operational merit).
grade would only apply to
officers successfully passing the
training).
PM 2.1.13 Some implementing
measures could be envisaged to
facilitate the use of indefinite
contracts (e.g. making continued
service conditional upon periodic
physical and psychological
fitness assessments, allowing
officers to transition into non-
operational leadership or
functions).
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on standing
corps and central role of
Frontex
128
6. Problem Driver 2.2 – Thematic Area: Technical equipment and IT systems
The development of capabilities
within the EBCG will continue to
follow the strategic direction set out in
the 2024 edition of the Frontex
capability roadmap.
Frontex will maintain its current
approach to equipment acquisition,
leasing and joint management within
existing budgetary limits. Although
the capability roadmap is expected to
progress, the full implementation of
the multiannual acquisition strategy
remains uncertain due to financial
constraints.
The technical equipment pool (TEP) is
likely to remain at current levels.
There are no clear indications in the
EU or national budgets to suggest a
significant expansion. Consequently,
shortages of critical equipment are
expected to persist, particularly during
the summer months when operational
demand peaks.
IT systems:
PM 2.2.1 Clear references to the
activities and tasks linked to the
management, operation, and
coordination mechanisms of ETIAS
and FADO would be added to the
EBCG Regulation.
Same as Option 1 for IT systems.
PM 2.2.2 Frontex capacities
would be reinforced to act as a
central purchasing coordinator
for some categories of
equipment, using the possibility
of joint procurement.
PM 2.2.3 A central logistics unit
within Frontex would be
established to coordinate
deployment, maintenance and
servicing of owned equipment
across borders. This would
include a fleet management
system for patrol cars.
PM 2.2.4 Participation in
Coordinated Maritime Presence
(CMP) operations would be
strengthened, enabling EU-level
coordination of national assets
without Frontex ownership.
PM 2.2.5 The technical
equipment pool (TEP) would be
expanded to better cover priority
operational needs, including
enhanced maritime and aerial
surveillance capabilities and
advanced processing/analytical
IT systems:
Same as Option 1
Technical equipment
options for FX:
Scenario 1 – Limited
increase: In the near term,
Frontex expands only
modestly, extending current
leased air-surveillance
arrangements and
potentially adding a small
category of seaborne assets,
such as coastal patrol boats.
Land-border equipment
would grow only in line
with staffing.
Scenario 2 – Medium
ambition: Most assets
remain leased, but Frontex
acquires or charters a small
core fleet of unmanned
aerial vehicles or mid-range
patrol vessels for
deployment in priority
areas, feeding data directly
into EUROSUR. Sensor,
communication and
interoperability upgrades
129
tools; acquisition and
maintenance of very large assets
would remain outside the scope
of Frontex.
PM 2.2.6 An enforcement
mechanism will be developed for
cases of persistent non-
compliance of Member
States/SAC with their
commitments to the TEP. This
would be paired with measures to
ensure compliance with the TEP
commitments via the new BMV
funds as one of the indicators.
PM 2.2.7 EU-wide recognition
mechanisms in areas such as
firearm permits and vehicle
roadworthiness tests will be
gradually introduced.
accompany this, while
leasing of manned aircraft
and chartering of coastal
patrol vessels/offshore
patrol vessels continues.
Scenario 3 – Long-term
high ambition: Frontex
gradually builds a fully
owned maritime and aerial
surveillance fleet
comparable to those of
Member States. The first
decade focuses on
procurement,
staffing/operating crew and
developing needed
capabilities and the
supporting logistics and
bases, consistent with Case
Study 2 and Frontex’s long-
term surveillance plans.
Until full capabilities are
developed, leasing of
equipment continues.
PM 2.2.8 Frontex’s
coordination and logistics
capacities will need to adapt
to ensure adequate support
for deploying and managing
large aerial and maritime
equipment.
PM2.2.9 A joint operational
framework will be
130
developed to support the
deployment of maritime
assets.
PM 2.2.10 For
harmonisation and
interoperability, same as
Option 2, with the addition
of the establishment of a
multilateral agreement for
mutual recognition,
coordinated by the EASA
and the EMSA, to facilitate
cross-border deployment of
Frontex-operated vessels
and aircraft.
PM 2.2.11 A European
mission flag or pennant will
be adopted.
PM 2.2.12 Joint
procurement and co-
financing: Same as Option
2, but Frontex will also
explore the possibility of
co-ownership and
chartering for large
maritime assets.
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on
standing corps and
central role of Frontex
131
7. Problem Driver 3.1 – Training architecture
Without stronger EU-level
mechanisms to enforce and align
training standards, deeper
harmonisation across the EBCG will
remain limited.
The Common Core Curriculum (CCC)
will continue to face fragmented
implementation due to its non-binding
nature, with national differences in
training duration and structure
sustaining disparities in preparedness.
The CCC’s limited alignment with
long-term capability planning and the
absence of a dedicated return-related
curriculum weaken its strategic
relevance and consistency across
deployments.
The recently launched three-tier
EBCG Academy concept is expected
to reach full operational maturity by
2027.
Although the establishment of the
EBCG Academy Training Centre is a
positive step that will enhance
sustainability and efficiency of
training delivery, capacity and staffing
challenges are expected. Ensuring
training quality across the three-tier
model will be equally critical.
The ongoing formal accreditation of
PM 3.1.1 Frontex would strengthen
enforceability of the Common Core
Curriculum for border and coastguard
basic training in the EU and the CCC
for border and coastguard mid-level
management training in the EU (CCC-
ML) by transforming the CCC
interoperability assessment
programme (CCC-IAP) into a
compliance and follow-up
mechanism, requiring Member States
to submit formal responses and
improvement plans, with systematic
monitoring and reporting.
PM 3.1.2 Frontex would expand the
trainer pool by introducing a standing
corps trainer profile, supported by
targeted recruitment, certification, and
training-of-trainers, while
incentivising Member States to second
national trainers through quota credits
and enhanced benefits.
PM 3.1.3 Frontex would introduce
voluntary joint training exercises in
key operational areas, supported by a
clear legal basis, to strengthen
interoperability, common standards
and preparedness, with scenario-based
delivery under certified trainers.
Where appropriate, joint exercises
could be open to candidate countries.
Option 1 +
PM 3.1.11 A structured
leadership training pathway for
mid- and senior-level staff
(Categories 1-3 and 5) would be
developed to strengthen
interoperability in command and
coordination skills and ensure
interoperable operational
planning.
PM 3.1.12 Introduce a dedicated
EU top-up training pathway for
Category 5. The training would
be funded by Frontex. It would
not replace national systems but
would provide a harmonised
entry point, ensuring
comparability of competences
across the EU. Successful
completion of the programme
would serve as the prerequisite
for registration as Category 5
officers.
The general programme would
combine theoretical modules on
EU law, mandatory and recurrent
training on fundamental rights,
and EIBM principles with
practical, scenario-based
exercises simulating complex
operational contexts.
Option 1 + structured
leadership training pathway
under Option 2 + a
dedicated EU top-up
training for Category 5 + (in
case of expanding category
1)
PM 3.1.15 Scale up the
training of Category 1 to
meet expanded standing
corps needs with the
operational training
programme restructured in
two stages: an initial period
at the EBCG Academy
Training Centre, followed
by a field-training phase
delivered at contingents or
antenna offices.
The EBCG Academy would
need to be upgraded to
Division level, with more
permanent staff to
coordinate course design,
scheduling, quality
assurance, and certification.
Trainer availability would
be expanded by introducing
a dedicated Category 1
trainer sub-profile,
supplemented by national
experts.
132
the EBCG Academy as a recognised
training provider, once completed,
would ensure that Frontex-issued
certificates – particularly in
specialised areas such as document
expertise or return operations – can be
recognised by Member States and
universities alike. However, without
additional measures, the recognition
of Frontex training in national systems
will remain uneven and largely
symbolic.
PM 3.1.4 Frontex would deliver
mandatory common pre-deployment
training for Categories 2 and 3.
PM 3.1.5 Frontex would consolidate
and stabilise entry-level/core standing
corps training in a dedicated EBCG
Academy Training Centre to reduce
reliance on ad hoc hosting by Member
States.
PM 3.1.6 Frontex would incentivise
schemes at individual and Member
State level to expand the trainer pool
(career-linked recognition).
PM 3.1.7. Reinforce return component
in training. Frontex would accelerate
the development of a dedicated
Common Core Curriculum for return
functions through a task force, clear
workplan, and engagement of Member
State experts and EU bodies.
PM 3.1.8 Expand the existing
specialised training modules to ensure
sufficient training opportunities and
address capability shortages (e.g.
document check, dog handlers).
PM 3.1.9 Frontex would develop a
structured approach to ensure
recognition and transferability of its
accredited training by encouraging
mutual recognition with national
academies.
Different delivery approaches
could be pursued alone or in
combination: centralised training
in Warsaw, mobile training
teams deployed to national sites,
or through accredited national
training institutions. The latter
option would require a legislative
amendment to empower Frontex
to act as a self-accrediting body,
responsible for accrediting,
overseeing and quality-assuring
national programmes.
PM 3.1.13 Increase and expand
the internal capacity (of the
EBCG Academy) with additional
permanent staff to handle the
increased training needs.
PM 3.2.14 Further expand the
pool of trainers, including
Member State trainers (national
experts).
Centralised expansion
would focus on the newly
established training facility,
capable of hosting a large
share of OTP cohorts. This
would be complemented by
a further expansion of
partnership agreements
with national academies for
specialised training.
The Learning Management
System (LMS) would be
expanded to deliver
preparatory and refresher
modules online.
133
PM 3.1.10 Strengthen assessment,
certification and role-matching of
officers to specialist roles to ensure
that adequately trained and
experienced officers are deployed for
key specialist roles.
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on
standing corps and
central role of Frontex
8. Problem Driver 3.2 – Thematic Area: Strategic and integrated EIBM planning
While national authorities remain
formally obliged to prepare EIBM
strategies, these inputs are uneven in
quality, delayed in delivery and
weakly aligned with EU-level
priorities.
Without a mandatory reporting or
enforcement mechanism, Frontex will
continue to have only partial visibility
of how strategies are implemented and
little leverage to correct gaps or
inconsistencies.
Frontex’s ability to consolidate
national inputs into a coherent
technical and operational strategy will
remain limited.
(non-legislative measures only)
PM 3.2.1 Introduction of a biennial
peer review mechanism to allow
Member States to engage in mutual
learning and exchange good practices,
paired with the possibility for the most
advanced candidate countries to
participate as observers in this peer-
review process.
PM 3.2.2 Frontex would develop a
reporting template for national IBM
strategies to use when submitting
biennial implementation updates on
their national IBM strategies. This
template could also be shared with
candidate countries, which, as part of
their accession negotiations, are
PM 3.2.9 The EBCG
Regulation would oblige the
Management Board to adopt a
formal multiannual EIBM
planning calendar setting
common timelines across key
planning products, such as
national strategies for EIBM,
NCDP, the capability roadmap,
strategic risk analysis and
vulnerability assessment.
PM3.2.10 The EBCG
Regulation would oblige the
Member States to comply with
the updated NCDP
methodology including a
mandatory guidance annex and
PM 3.2.17 Member States
would be legally required
to adopt or update their
national EIBM strategy
aligned with the
multiannual EIBM
strategy within six months
of each new cycle and
transmit them to both
Frontex and the European
Commission. Member
States would also be
required to submit
triennial or earlier updates
in the event of significant
operational or institutional
changes.
134
required to align their IBM strategies
with EIBM standards.
PM 3.2.3 Frontex would establish a
fixed multiannual planning calendar
aligned with the EBCG cycle in order
to ensure synchronisation of planning
cycles for national strategies, national
capability development plans
(NCDPs), the standing corps
programming, the TO EIBM Strategy
and vulnerability assessments. Frontex
would coordinate this process through
structured guidance and annual
planning workshops, ensuring that
submissions are timely and consistent.
This would improve consistency and
create a more systematic link between
strategy, capability development and
operational deployment.
As regards integrated planning, the
proposed measures would include the
following:
PM 3.2.4 Frontex would promote
better use by the Member States of the
standardised methodology and
template adopted by the Frontex
Management Board (Decision
28/2024) for the NCDPs and ensuring
that Frontex regularly updates the
template.
PM3.2.5 Frontex would enhance its
guidance and technical support to
Member States to ensure that all
scenario-based planning
elements, plus standardised
contingency planning templates
for the parts of the national
contingency plans that require
Frontex support. They would
also be obliged to provide
regular updates of planning
inputs and submit them in a
timely manner, ensuring that
they are of a high quality.
PM 3.2.11 The Management
Board would adopt a formal
EIBM planning calendar and
update the Decision 28/2024 on
the NCDP methodology with a
mandatory guidance annex and
more stringent requirements for
scenario-based planning.
Frontex would support
implementation through an
annual strategic outlook.
PM 3.2.12 Frontex would issue
an annual plan and propose a
limited set of planning KPIs
(e.g. timeliness/completeness of
submissions, capability
readiness indicators) to support
comparability and follow-up. It
would also standardise
contingency planning
templates.
[numbering continues for
PM 3.2.18 With regard to
integrated planning,
Member States would be
obliged to update their
NCDPs at least every three
years or whenever a
material operational or
institutional change occurs
and transmit them within
one month of adoption.
PM 3.2.19 Amendment of
the rules applicable to joint
procurements making it
obligatory for Frontex to
invite Member States to
participate in follow-up
measures, including joint
procurement or
coordinated investments
where synergies or
capability gaps are
identified through the
planning process.
PM 3.2.20 Elevate the
planning brief from an
analytical support tool to a
core component of a
Management-Board-
supervised capability cycle
by obliging the
Management Board to
formally approve the
Capability Roadmap each
135
NCDPs are forward-looking and
adaptable to crisis situations. To that
end, they would need to embed
scenario-based capability planning as
provided for in the methodology (i.e.
be based on risk analysis and
vulnerability assessments).
PM 3.2.6 Frontex would embed a
stronger forward-looking function in
the EIBM planning cycle, so that
operational data and analysis
systematically inform capability
planning.
[numbering continues for another
thematic area, as this concerns the
entire problem driver
another thematic area, as this
concerns the entire problem
driver]
year, creating an annual
oversight mechanism to
ensure the consistent
translation of risk analysis
and vulnerability
assessment outputs into
capability development
and deployment decisions.
Policy option 0 – Baseline Policy option 1
Targeted modifications to address
shortcomings and gaps
Policy option 2
Towards a more integrated
EBCG
Policy option 3
EBCG based on standing
corps and central role of
Frontex
9. Problem Driver 3.2 – Quality assurance (vulnerability assessment and evaluation of the efficient use of resources)
Without consistent enforcement of
mitigation measures, persistent
vulnerabilities are likely to continue.
Returns will remain outside the scope
of the Frontex vulnerability
assessment. The absence of
vulnerability assessments for EU
candidate countries will continue to be
Only measures concerning the scope
of the VA would be proposed (without
addressing the issue of the follow-up
to the recommendations).
PM 3.2.7 The scope of the VA would
be broadened to cover returns
logistics. The assessment would focus
specifically on the capacity and
Option 1 +
PM 3.2.13 The scope of the VA
would be broadened to cover all
aspects of EUROSUR data
quality.
PM 3.2.14 A graduated
enforcement system would be
introduced to ensure persistent
Same as Option 2
136
a growing blind spot, given their direct
relevance to the stability of the EU’s
external borders.
The VA’s role in improving
EUROSUR data quality will not
materialise.
readiness of Member States to
organise and monitor voluntary and
forced returns once a return decision
has been issued. This would include
evaluating the availability of human,
financial, and infrastructural resources
necessary to carry out the logistical
aspects of the return procedure.
PM 3.2.8 The scope of the VA could
be expanded on a voluntary basis to
include EU candidate countries whose
border management systems have a
direct impact on the stability of the
EU’s external borders.
Synergies with SCH-EVAL would be
reinforced to reduce the administrative
burden on the Member States.
vulnerabilities identified by the
VA are effectively addressed. To
that end, the existing graduated
response system to persistent
vulnerabilities would be better
framed in terms of the
obligations of Frontex,
Management Board and Member
States. At a higher stage of
escalation, the European
Commission could adopt
complementary measures until
corrective actions are taken.
PM 3.2.15 Necessary
adjustments to enable control and
follow-up via VA of the cases of
non-submission or persistently
low-quality updates of the EIBM
strategic and integrated planning
products.
PM 3.2.16 Enhancement of
quality control measures through
the review of resources,
structures and working methods
of Frontex internal oversight
bodies, as well as the
Management Board, to maximise
their efficiency and ensure their
ability to provide appropriate
support for Frontex’s anticipated
growth and expanded mandate.
137
138
ANNEX 9: COMPARISON OF THE POLICY OPTIONS:
The evaluation scale:
positive
slightly positive mixed effect no effect slightly negative negative
++ + +/- 0 - --
Thematic area Baseline Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Border management 0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
++
+
++
++
+
++
++
+
++
Countering cross-border
crime
0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
++
+
++
++
+
++
++
+
++
Emergencies and hybrid
threats
0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
NA ++
+
++
NA
Visa policy 0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
NA ++
+
+
++
+
+/- EUROSUR 0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
+
+
+
++
+/-
++
+
+/-
+/-
Cooperation with third
countries and CSDP
missions
0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
+
+
0
+
+
+
++
++
++ Cooperation with
international
organisations
0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
+
+
+
++
++
++
++
++
++
Returns 0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
+
+
+
++
+
+
++
-
+
Organisational
governance
0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
NA
++
+
0
++
+/-
0
Standing corps size,
recruitment and
distribution of resources
0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
+
--
+
++
+/-
+
++
+/-
++
Employment conditions
of the standing corps
0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
+
+
+
++
++
+
++
++
+
Technical equipment and
IT systems
0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
+
+
+
++
+
++
++
++
+/-
Standing corps training 0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
+
+-
+
+
+
+
++
+
++ EIBM strategic and
integrated planning
0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
+
+
++
++
+
++
+
+
++
Quality control
mechanisms
0 Effectiveness:
Efficiency:
Coherence:
+
+
+
++
+
++
++
+
++
139
ANNEX 10: ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE STANDING
CORPS UNDER POLICY OPTIONS 1, 2 AND 3
This annex presents the assumptions motivating the proposed increases in standing corps size,
included under Policy Options 1, 2 and 3.
Summary of policy options on standing corps size and composition
Baseline PO1 PO2 PO3
Category 1 3 000 9 000 3 000 (at least) 5 000
Category 2 1 500 4 500 1 500 1 500
Category 3 5 500 16 500 5 500 5 500
Category 5 0 0 20 000 18 000
Total 10 000 30 000 30 000 30 000
The assumptions reflect the evolving responsibilities of Frontex and the ambition to reinforce
Frontex support to Member States at the EU’s external borders, as well as in operations outside
the EU and return activities. Such objectives are anchored in EU policy priorities, such as
restoring a fully functioning Schengen area, strengthening returns systems and supporting
Member States under migratory pressure.
Assumptions also take into account the operational context at the EU’s external borders and
strategic foresight around likely future threats and capability shortfalls. They reflect the need to
create additional capacity for rapid and effective response to threats manifesting at the external
borders, while maintaining sound EIBM principles to ensure seamless cooperation of all levels
of EBCG.
Finally, the assumptions for expanding the size of the standing corps are also calibrated to remain
consistent with the European Commission’s political guidelines, which envisage a progressive
increase of the European Border and Coast Guard workforce towards 30 000 officers295.
The annex presents an overview of current gaps and consequences, linked to the operational
context at the EU’s external borders and EIBM uptake. It provides the assumptions underpinning
the expansion envisaged in the different policy options. Assumptions draw on the latest available
data and forward-looking planning documents.
Gaps and consequences of Member State’s crisis response capacity
Despite improvements in EU border management over recent years, Member States face
structural limitations in responding to large-scale or simultaneous crises at the borders. A direct
consequence of continuous external border pressures is the increased reintroduction in internal
border controls by Member States. The Schengen free-travel area has seen repetitive cases of
reintroduced internal border controls often in place repeatedly since the 2015 migrant crisis296.
Such measures, if continued or widened, undermine trust in Schengen and threaten the principle
of free movement, one of the cornerstones of the EU integration. Moreover, maintaining internal
border controls not only fragments Schengen but also reduces the overall manpower available
where it is most needed – at the external borders which are under pressure due to irregular
295 European Commission, Statement by President Ursula von der Leyen on the Commission’s political priorities,
17 July 2024. 296 State of Schengen report 2023
140
migration flows, hybrid threats and activities by smuggling networks.
While the European Commission has set a clear policy priority to restore a fully functioning
Schengen, strong external borders are the prerequisite for a Schengen Area free of internal border
checks. By bolstering the EU’s ability to handle crises at the external frontier (through a dedicated
reserve force)the justification for unilateral controls at the internal borders would be undermined.
The challenges faced by the Member States related to manning internal borders during
reintroduced controls are part of a more general problem related to uneven capacity of EU border
management. While reintroduction of internal border controls is a choice of the national
authorities and concerns areas where Frontex has no mandate to act, it only proved the thesis that
Member States rely on ‘fragmented and reactive systems’ that cannot scale effectively in major
emergencies. Sudden increases in migratory flows therefore expose structural limits in national
surge capacity and delay the initiation of joint operations297. Schengen evaluations show that
almost half of all Schengen countries face shortcomings related to human resources, training,
implementation of border check procedures298. National border services are already operating
under high demand due to the implementation of EES and ETIAS. These recent developments
require trained personnel at border-crossing points and consular posts, further reducing the
margin for reallocating staff during a crisis.
When border emergencies occur, Member States first prioritise risks at their own borders rather
than sending personnel to the most at-risk sections of the EU’s external borders in another
Member State. This can create challenges to deliver on agreed standing corps quotas without
affecting national capabilities. It also leads to the general perception that personnel contributed
to joint operations can ‘deplete national capabilities’, leaving Member States without adequate
resources to sustain core functions299.
All these elements demonstrate the need for a radical change of the approach, whereby the pool
of adequately prepared and equipped professionals would be available at any time to perform
tasks at national level or in another Member States, as part of the standing corps.
Persistent external border pressures and evolving threats
Europe’s eastern flank faces unprecedented strains from hostile geopolitical manoeuvres. The
series of Belarus-provoked incidents of 2021 at the EU external borders, explicitly condemned
by EU leaders as a ‘hybrid attack’ instrumentalising migrants, demonstrated how quickly a
external country can create surges in arrivals at the EU border. In the wake of Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine, migratory pressure on the EU’s eastern borders remained high300.. Threats in this
region are highly unpredictable, driven by opaque political decision-making in Minsk and
Moscow301. These hybrid tactics and conflict spillovers demand a robust, rapidly deployable EU
force to support frontline Member States.
Ongoing instability across the Middle East and North Africa is likely to continue to foment
heightened migratory flows in the Mediterranean. Frontex risk analysis highlights multiple
drivers: renewed hostilities or regional escalation could prompt refugee outflows, while
protracted conflicts and economic downturns in Syria, Afghanistan, and beyond continue to
297 Frontex White Paper On reinforcing Frontex to future-proof the European Integrated Border Management. 298 European Commission (2025). 2025 State of Schengen Report. Available at: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:3daaaadb-2021-11f0-b1a3-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF 299 Frontex White Paper On reinforcing Frontex to future-proof the European Integrated Border Management. 300 Belarus - Consilium. In 2023, 4 700 illegal entries via Belarus were recorded, a 236% increase over the prior
year. The majority of arrivals were Afghans, Syrians, Turks and Iraqis 301 https://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2024-2025.pdf
141
spur migration302. In sub-Saharan Africa, large-scale displacements (e.g. from Sahel conflicts or
Sudan) are already impacting the Central Mediterranean route. Frontex analysis warns that
adverse developments in the Sahel are likely to lead to further peaks in West African migration
routes toward Europe. These scenarios point to sudden, large-scale influxes on Europe’s southern
shores, for which current resources (national and EU) may be insufficient.
High migratory pressure often coincides with security threats. Europol and Frontex assessments
note that organised smuggling networks exploit any gaps in border control, and polarised global
conditions mean high-risk individuals could attempt to infiltrate amidst flows. The migration
strategy adopted on 29 January highlights security threats linked to irregular migration,
particularly migrant smuggling, human trafficking, document fraud and the possible exploitation
of migration routes by organised crime networks.
Futureproofing external border management (2027–2041)
Looking ahead, there is a need to anticipate long-term pressures rather than respond on a case-
by-case basis. Frontex underlines that border management must move towards a more integrated,
forward-looking approach, supported by sufficient and professionally trained human resources
to meet emerging risks and technological changes. Border management planning should reflect
an environment characterised by hybrid threats, geopolitical volatility and rapidly shifting
migratory routes. The long-term expectation is that crises will remain multi-directional and may
occur simultaneously on different sections of the border.
Futureproofing also requires the ability to activate ‘multiple tactical response options’, including
quick-reaction units and specialised teams for emergency. The increased overall size of the
standing corps would allow Frontex to maintain several response configurations in parallel, an
essential requirement for the high-impact scenarios anticipated over the next decade.
The introduction of new EU-wide systems such as EES and ETIAS will strain further operational
peaks for border authorities and national ETIAS units.
The State of Schengen Report and the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism highlight that ensuring
a stable Schengen area requires sustained investment in external border capabilities and the
capacity to deliver rapid assistance where needed. This aligns with the Commission’s broader
strategic direction to enhance preparedness, improve resilience at the external borders and ensure
continuity of operations during crises.
PO1: In line with this, a substantial reinforcement of deployable capabilities is assumed to be
justified in light of current pressures, anticipated future demands and the long-term requirements
for maintaining an effective and resilient external border. A gradual increase in standing corps
Categories 1, 2 and 3 from 10 000 officers to 30 000 by 2041 is expected to significantly
increase the EBCG’s capacity to respond to the challenges described above.
Gaps and consequences of limited EIBM uptake in the EBCG and limited hosting capacity
among Member States
While the linear growth proposed in PO1 would create the capability necessary to deal with any
development at the external borders, it fails to address the equally significant shortcomings
identified with regard to uptake of EIBM across the EBCG, the connected lack of common
standards in border management and returns, and the limited hosting capacity of the Member
State, among others.
The implementation of European Integrated Border Management (EIBM) represents a strategic
302 https://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2024-2025.pdf
142
priority for the EU, to be spearheaded operationally by Frontex. Yet, the implementation and
operationalisation of EIBM remains challenging, due to various reasons including a persistent
fragmentation of practices, training, and systems at national level and vis-à-vis Frontex’s own
practices and systems. The currently limited implementation of EIBM as the standardised
approach to border management and return limits the EBCG’s impact: it creates artificial and
undesirable barriers to the ability of deployed officers (regardless of whether they belong to the
national authorities or Frontex) to provide efficient support, integrate quickly into the operational
framework and deliver added value in the area of their specific expertise. This limits the
effectiveness, impact, and interoperability of the entire framework, which hinges on the
deployment of officers where they are operationally needed including away from their home
Member State.
Moreover, Member States lack hosting capacity, meaning they have limited ability to support
the deployment of Frontex standing corps for Joint Operations and other related activities in their
territory, even in cases where their support is requested and needed. The various limitations to
hosting capacity include, to a large extent, the limited availability of English-speaking officers.
The Member States also lack the resources to sufficiently train their border guards to fulfil
Category 2 and Category 3 requirements, order to successfully deploy them, especially in
specialised profiles. The introduction of a framework to consistently train national officers, and
thereby qualify them as Category 5 standing corps officers, aims to tackle and efficiently mitigate
all these aforementioned issues. A well-trained Category 5 reserve would signal that the EU has
not only improved its capability to absorb sudden migration inflows but has taken decisive
measures to ensure that EIBM is equally strong and effective across all the EU’s external borders.
This in turn would create the conditions to safeguard Schengen’s integrity even amid future
challenges.
PO2: envisages the introduction of 20 000 category 5 officers by 2041 as the EU’s EIBM
operational force and reserve personnel.
PO2 builds on the introduction of a new Category 5, endeavouring to ensure that the standing
corps remains adaptable to future operational and strategic demands, while also more
comprehensively addressing the aforementioned challenges related to the thus far limited uptake
and implementation of EIBM across the EBCG. Category 5 officers would be required to
complete a comprehensive EIBM-based training curriculum, delivered and funded by Frontex
and aligned with the European Border and Coast Guard Training Strategy. Successful completion
of this top-up training would allow officers to be formally registered as members of the Category
5 standing corps. Over time, this growing force of officers having received Frontex’s EIBM-
focused training will positively impact the EBCG’s uptake of EIBM and the Member States’
limited hosting capacity.
A permanent and centrally trained Category 5 reserve force supports capability alignment by
providing a pool of officers certified according to uniform and consistently excellent EU
standards, while ensuring that surge deployments maintain operational coherence with Member
State border forces during peak pressure.
Moreover, and as described above, the current setup entails risks of capability imbalances. This
is due to reliance on national contributions which are needed not only for the protection of the
EU external border but also preserving the conditions necessary for the functioning of the
Schengen area. Repeated deployments may deplete national services and lead to uneven
operational readiness. In addition, Frontex points to the need for a ‘baseline capability solution’
at the EU’s external borders and stresses that the future EBCG workforce should operate as a
‘single operational ecosystem’ based on interoperable procedures, common training standards
and uniform certification303. This objective fully complies with the Treaty-based objective of
303 Frontex White Paper On reinforcing Frontex to future-proof the European Integrated Border Management.
143
gradually introducing an integrated management system for external borders.
Projected size and contributions for Category 5 under PO2
To illustrate the approximate order of magnitude of the Category 5 reserve, who would be
nominated for Frontex EIBM training, the table below applies to Category 5 the same
proportional distribution across Member States as used for Category 4 which consisted of
operational staff from Member States as reserve for rapid reaction and has been phased out in
2025. For each Member State, the indicative Category 5 reference quota is calculated by
multiplying its Category 4 share of the EU total by the projected size of the Category 5 reserve
by 2041. This approach reflects the functional similarity between the two categories, both of
which rely on nationally-based officers available for exceptional deployments.
However, unlike Category 4 contributions being fixed on pre-determined numerical quotas, the
Category 5 contributions would be introduced based on a capability need assessment, to be
carried out jointly by Frontex and Member States. This could ensure that the reserve contains the
specific profiles and assets required for different crisis scenarios. In practice, it is expected that
only a subset of Category 5 officers would be deployed, depending on the specific crisis scenario
and operational requirements, leaving this Category for most of the time at the disposal of the
national authorities. Therefore, no ex ante estimate of deployable numbers is provided, and the
table reports only indicative reference quotas.
Reference quota for the introduction of Category 5
Country Cat 4 quota Share of total
(%)
Cat 5 ref. quota
2034 (6 000)
Cat 5 ref quota
2041 (20 000)
Austria 34 2.3 136 453
Belgium 30 2.0 120 400
Bulgaria 40 2.7 160 533
Croatia 65 4.3 260 867
Cyprus 8 0.5 32 107
Czech Republic 20 1.3 80 267
Denmark 29 1.9 116 387
Estonia 18 1.2 72 240
Finland 30 2.0 120 400
France 170 11.3 680 2 267
Germany 225 15.0 900 3 000
Greece 50 3.3 200 667
Hungary 65 4.3 260 867
Iceland 2 0.1 8 27
Italy 125 8.3 500 1 667
Latvia 30 2.0 120 400
Liechtenstein 0 0.0 0 0
Lithuania 39 2.6 156 520
Luxembourg 8 0.5 32 107
Malta 6 0.4 24 80
Netherlands 50 3.3 200 667
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Norway 20 1.3 80 267
Poland 100 6.7 400 1 333
Portugal 30 2.0 120 400
Romania 75 5.0 300 1 000
Slovakia 35 2.3 140 467
Slovenia 35 2.3 140 467
Spain 111 7.4 444 1 480
Sweden 34 2.3 136 453
Switzerland 16 1.1 64 213
PO3: increase of Category 1 to at least 5 000 officers by 2041 and introduction of 18 000
Category 5 officers by 2041 as the EU’s EIBM operational force and reserve personnel
PO3 is based on the assumption that measures responding to Driver 2.1 proposed under PO1 and
PO2 (as regards recruitment, career progression, retention and deployment incentives) are fully
implemented. Additionally, PO3 takes into account the measures proposed in response to Driver
3.1 as regards EU-level training. It is also reflecting the increase of Frontex’s responsibilities in
border management, combating cross-border crime, visa policy, situational awareness, returns,
and cooperation with non-EU countries as proposed under selected policy options for these
thematic areas. These measures expand Frontex’s mandate and are expected to lead to increased
operational demand for long-term and specialised Frontex deployments in Member States and,
where relevant, in non-EU countries. As such, measures proposed under PO3 are relevant to
address all the identified problems. PO3 aims to address the same EIBM-related and hosting
capacity-related challenges tackled in PO2 by proposing the same training framework for
Category 5, albeit foreseeing lower numbers of participating officers.
The above-mentioned measures would justify sustained annual intake of new statutory staff of
Category 1 officers from approximately 3 000 statutory officers by 2027 to a projected 5 000
officers by 2041. This is foreseen in parallel with the introduction of a new Category 5 for
capability-harmonisation, following EIBM top-up training (as described in PO2 – see details
above).
The increase of Category 1 reflects the clarification and expansion of Frontex’s mandate, in
particular as regards returns, Visa policy and training, but also crime detection officers and border
and coast guard officers:
• Return: Making Frontex the default operational actor on return, and implementing a set
of additional measures supporting this new Frontex role (e.g. mandating Frontex to
proactively organise return operations, plan, match and pool resources, standardise return
counselling and reintegration and establish a uniform standard for return monitoring), in
line with the PM proposed for this area, would require a significant increase in the
proportion of the standing corps working on returns, from the current +/- 200 staff
envisaged for 2026 (just over 10%) of the current total Category 1 staff304.
• Visa policy: The measures linked to visa policy (PM 1.1.13; 1.1.14; 1.1.15) also assume
an increase in staffing, possibly affecting both of Advanced-Level Document Officers
(ALDOs), currently at a rate of approximately 8.7% of the Category 1 staff, and ETIAS
Central Unit (expected to reach over 200 staff by 2027), among others.
304 Management Board Decision 8/2025 of 26 March 2025 adopting the European Border and Coast Guard standing
corps annual planning for 2026 and indicative multiannual planning of profiles.
145
• Trainers: Assuming a trainer-to-trainee ratio of 1:8 (of the cat.1 and the new cat. 5 to be
trained), the estimated requirement is for 250 trainers.
Additionally, the measures proposed to address problem 1 (PM 1.1.1; PM 1.1.2; PM 1.1.6; PM
1.1.7), might lead to increased demands for the following profiles:
• Border and coast guards: Measures such as better recognition of executive powers of the
standing corps (PM 1.1.1), broadening the list of Frontex tasks (PM 1.1.2) or ensuring
access for Frontex frontline duties (PM 1.1.6), are expected to increase demand for this
profile. In the planning for 2026 (MB Decision 8/2025), over 50% of the standing corps
Category 1 were identified as expected operational needs, making up the largest share of
deployable standing corps. This tendency is expected to continue as Frontex needs to
recruit for broad capability needs, and must retain a substantial proportion of officers who
can be deployed flexibly across border checks, surveillance, hotspots, seasonal
operations, and rapid-response situations.
• Crime detection officer: The measures proposed under PO1, clarifying the role of Frontex
in countering cross-border crime (PM1.1.7), are also assumed to lead to an increased
demand for this profile (in the planning for 2026, approximately 8% of the standing corps
Category 1 were identified as expected operational needs).
Finally, the overall increase in size and tasks would also include an increase in the operational
support staff ceiling
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ANNEX 11 COSTS ASSESSMENT [INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC
IMPACTS]
Introduction:
This assessment complements Section 6.1 of the Impact Assessment report as regards the
costs which would be incurred exclusively by Frontex between 2028 and 2041 (i.e. not by
Member States or the EU budget for borders, migration and security).
The table below provides an overview of the areas considered for the cost assessment,
clarifying a distinction of the impact of each thematic area, in each option:
Non-significant impact indicates areas where the policy options are not expected to have any
noticeable cost or saving implications that can be quantified.
Low impact indicates areas where the policy options are expected to have a minimal cost or
saving implications, often due to minor adjustments in Frontex’s current scope of
activities.
High impact indicates areas where the policy options are expected to have large and
significant cost or saving implications, often due to large expansions of Frontex’s mandate or
capabilities.
Overview of areas considered for the cost assessment
Thematic area PO1 PO2 PO3
Border management and hosting capacity Non-
significant Non-
significant
Non-
significant
Countering cross-border crime Non-
significant
Non-
significant
Non-
significant
Emergencies and hybrid threats Non-
significant
Non-
significant
Non-
significant
Visa policy Non-
significant
Non-
significant
Non-
significant
EUROSUR Non-
significant Low impact High impact
Cooperation with third countries and CSDP
missions Low impact Low impact Low impact
Cooperation with international organisations Non-
significant
Non-
significant
Non-
significant
Returns High impact High impact High impact
Standing corps size High impact High impact High impact
Employment conditions for the standing corps High impact High impact High impact
Standing corps training High impact High impact High impact
Technical equipment and IT systems High impact High impact High impact
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Thematic area PO1 PO2 PO3
EIBM management strategic and integrated
planning
Non-
significant
Non-
significant
Non-
significant
Quality control mechanisms Non-
significant
Non-
significant
Non-
significant
The analysis focuses on the areas with ‘high impact’, namely standing corps (including training),
technical equipment, returns and EUROSUR (as regards policy options 3).
The assessment is largely based on the analysis made in the study accompanying the impact
assessment, applying therefore in most cases the same methodology and key caveats and
limitations.
At the same time, for the following costs, different assumptions and/or base for calculations have
been considered:
• Staffing costs are calculated based on the personnel costs for Temporary and Contract
Agents, updated by DG BUDG at the latest applicable figures in January 2026;
• The financial support under Article 61 is calculated based on the reference amount as
provided in the EBCG Regulation, taking into account 100% capacity of Categories 2 and 3.
For Category 1, the costs are calculated on the basis of Article 61(c) (a one-off payment of 50
% of the reference amount multiplied by the number of operational staff recruited by Frontex
as statutory staff), for Category 2 they are based on Article 61(a) (100 % of the reference
amount) multiplied by the number of operational staff indicated for secondment in
accordance with Annex II,and for Category 3, in line with Article 61(b) (37 % of the
reference amount) multiplied by thecapacity of Category 3 in line with Annex III. In line
with Article 61(2), the reference amount corresponds to the annual basic salary for a contract
agent in function group III, grade 8, step 1305;
• Deployment costs
- For Category 1, deployment costs include mission costs for deployment in non-EU
countries, and allowances linked to arduous working conditions306. Seconded staff, i.e.
Category 2 of standing corps officers, is considered to be deployed in the different
operational areas (including headquarters). The main costs will be therefore related to
deployments, ensuring consistency with the rules applicable to allowances and
reimbursements of the deployable statutory staff. These include relevant allowances
linked to working conditions (e.g. shift work, standby duties, arduous conditions) and
mission costs for deployments outside the EU.
- Deployments for Category 2 and 3 are considered for 100% of Category 2 and 3
capacities. This reflects the assumptions for the expansion of the standing corps under the
different policy options proposed in the impact assessment (see Annex 10).
- For cat. 3 and cat. 5, the deployment costs are calculated on the basis of unit costs307
defined in the feasibility study. The reliance on these unit costs is based on 2024 as the
latest available data.
305 The reference amount used is updated at the latest available figures from July 2025, amounting to 3 475.62,
multiplied by 12. 306 The estimates for this allowance are based on the currently applicable cumulative ceiling between shift work
and arduous work. 307 The ‘unit costs’ for different expenditure categories are calculated based on the analysis of the feasibility study
148
- As these costs are considered per unit per year, they are reduced by taking into account
the duration of deployments for Categories 3 and 5 (4 months for Category 3 and assumed
at 6 months for Category 5).
• Training costs
- Costs for Category 1 basic training are based on Frontex estimates for the establishment
of a training centre in Warsaw catering for approximately 600 learners308. As the training
centre is envisaged to be established within 50 km from Frontex Headquarters, this
implies that statutory staff would not be on mission for the duration of the training.
Mission-related costs have therefore not been taken into account.
- The % of Category 2 and 3 officers to be trained each year is considered in line with the
analysis of the feasibility study309. However, as 100% deployment capacity is assumed,
the % is calculated based on the total number of Categories 2 and 3 to be seconded and
nominated each year.
- Category 5 officers are assumed to receive the top-up training only once and it is assumed
that this training will be centralised in Warsaw. The costs for the rental of the training
centre estimated by Frontex for 600 Category 1 officers are scaled up in PO2 and PO3 to
cater for trainings of Category 5 and a higher number of Category 1.
The following additional limitations are highlighted:
• Overall, the costs estimates are based on generic assumptions. It is expected that the detailed
costs and human resources will be further defined at a later stage.
• The reliance on unit cost estimates based on expenditure in 2024 as a starting point. 2024 is
generally considered a relatively stable year without any significant crises. Consequently, the
estimates may understate the potential cost implications of large-scale or crisis-driven
deployments.
• The staffing costs are based on the figures as of 2026 and no inflation has been taken into
account. The cat. 1 staffing costs and the HQ staff costs are calculated by taking the correction
coefficient for place of employment being Warsaw, Poland into account.
• The training centre costs are based on the initial rental estimation made by Frontex with the
capacity to train 600 officers. It is therefore assumed that, considering a scaling up of the
costs based on the increasing number of learners will cater for the increased capacities. The
estimates for the purchasing of a building for training activities, which might require a
substantial initial financial commitment to establish and acquire all necessary capabilities to
deliver large-scale training and lower subsequent running costs for delivering the actual
training courses, have not been considered in the cost assessment.
• The amount of savings linked to the deployment costs are dependent on the actual
deployment/employment locations and on the relevant allowances applicable when relocating
to a different place of employment.
The number of standing corps officers is based on the policy scenario of reaching a total of 30 000
accompanying the impact assessment, which take as a reference the total expenditures registered by Frontex in 2024.
The relevant unit costs are then multiplied by the applicable number of SC officers each year between 2028 and
2041, to generate the total cost estimates. In the case of training, deployment or Article 61 compensation, the unit
costs are only multiplied by the number of SC officers assumed to be trained, deployed or eligible for compensation. 308 EBCG Academy Training Centre – building project Early information in accordance with Art. 272(2) of
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) 309 The feasibility study accompanying the impact assessment considers respectively 44% and 8% of Category 2 and
3 FTE officers in Frontex in 2024.
149
across all categories by the end of 2041. The size and composition of standing corps in the
respective policy options is assumed as follows:
• PO1: The current number of standing corps categories is gradually increased over the two
MFF periods, reaching respectively 9 000 Category 1, 4 500 Category 2 and 16 500 Category
3.
• PO2: The current number of standing corps categories remains stable through the two MFFs
(respectively at 3 000 Category 1, 1 500 Category 2 and 5 500 Category 3). At the same time,
a new Category 5 as EU’s EIBM operational force and reserve personnel is established. This
category is envisaged to grow to 20 000 by 2041.
• PO3: The current number of standing corps Categories 2 and 3 remain stable through the two
MFFs. Category 1 is expected to gradually grow to at least 5 000 officers by 2041, while
Category 5 (established in line with PO2) is envisaged to reach 18 000 by 2041.
Assumptions on the development of the standing corps (2028-2041) for the purpose of the cost
assessment
Policy option 1 Policy option 2 Policy option 3
2028 2034 2041 2028 2034 2041 2028 2034 2041
Cat. 1 3 000 5 500 9 000 3 000 3 000 3 000 3 000 3 750 5 000
Cat. 2 1 500 2 750 4 500 1 500 1 500 1 500 1 500 1 500 1 500
Cat. 3 5 500 9 000 16 500 5 500 5 500 5 500 5 500 5 500 5 500
Cat. 5 0 0 0 0 6 000 20 000 0 6 000 18 000
Overview of cost assessment of the areas with high impacts for each policy option (EUR million),
taking into account existing costs and the impact of policy measures:
Thematic area
PO1 PO2 PO3 Preferred
Option
MFF1 MFF2 MFF1 MFF2 MFF1 MFF2 MFF1 MFF2
Returns 1 337 1 910 1 143 1 668 1 168 1 592 1 143 1 668
Standing corps size (including HQ and training)
9 117 16 352 6 547 7 093 6 632 8 371 6 632 8 371
Technical equipment
1 831 2 478 1 704 1 956 1 918 2 535 1 704 1 956
Other 868 900 954 985 954 985 954 985
Total* 13 153 21 640 10 348 11 702 10 672 13 483 10 433 12 980
*The totals are not adjusted for inflation.
Standing corps size (including HQ and training)
Staffing costs – HQ staff (all policy options)
The average personnel costs applicable as of January 2026 are used for the estimates on human
resources, respectively at EUR 194 000 per year for TA, EUR 105 000 per year for CA and
EUR 108 000 per year for SNE. The average costs include an amount corresponding to operating
expenditure, mainly building and IT-related costs (EUR 31 000 per year). Given the expansion
150
of Frontex’s mandate and the growth of the standing corps, Frontex’s HQ staff (which is not part
of Category 1) is assumed to gradually grow from the current 1 000 staff to 2 000 staff by 2041.
The current proportion of TA, CA and SNE is maintained (respectively at 55%, 23% and 22% of
the total).
The total cost for HQ staff is estimated at EUR 1 billion in the first MFF and 1.5 billion in the
second MFF.
Staffing costs – standing corps Category 1
The proportion of TAs and CAs are assumed at 50/50.
PO1: Category 1 is expected to reach 5 500 by 2034 and 9 000 by 2041. This would account for
EUR 3.5 billion in MFF1 and EUR nearly 6.5 billion in MFF2.
PO2: Category 1 is expected to remain stable at 3 000 through the two MFF periods. This would
account for EUR 2.58 billion in each MFF period.
PO3: Category 1 is expected to reach 3.750 by 2034 and 5 000 by 2041. This would account for
EUR 2.86 billion in MFF1 and EUR 3.8 billion in MFF2.
Employment conditions for the standing corps
The place of deployment of the standing corps will no longer be administered in line with the
mission system as a default rule but will be considered, in most cases, as their place of
employment for the purposes of the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment (long-
term deployments in Member States). This will rationalise the system of financial allocations
mainly for standing corps Category 1, making it better tailored for long-term operational service,
and reducing its financial and administrative impact. While relevant allowances are already
applicable to standing corps officers Categories 1 and 2 depending on specific tasks and working
conditions (shift work, standby duties), it is envisaged to widen their applicability to all relevant
work patterns310. Allowances linked to arduous working conditions also become applicable, with
estimates included under deployment costs.
Deployment costs
The total deployment costs based on the current mission system (including daily subsistence
allowance, accommodation, transport) are calculated by multiplying the deployment unit costs
as indicated above by the number of standing corps officers assumed to be deployed in a given
year.
This method does not calculate deployment costs based on the current system of daily subsistence
allowance (DSA), but it is instead based on the actual expenditure incurred by Frontex in a given
year.
PO1: The number of officers to which deployment costs are attributed is based on the following
assumptions:
• Deployable Category 1 officers are equal to the total number of Category 1 officers minus
operational support staff, assumed to be 10% of the combined total number of Category 1,
Category 2 and Category 3, and minus ETIAS staff. Additionally, all Category 1 new entrants
receive basic training in their first year. Deployment costs are therefore assumed to occur
only from the second year after recruitment.
310 Considered under staffing costs.
151
• Deployments of Categories 2 and 3 are assumed at 100%. However, this might need
adjustments to reflect the possible impact deriving from (1) the growth of Category 1, (2) the
actual needs / requests from Member States as per the migration situation and (2) the hosting
capacities of Member States most affected.
PO2 and PO3: the same assumptions apply as above. In addition, the following assumptions
apply for the deployment of Category 5:
• The unit cost of Category 3 is applied, reflecting the fact that they would only be called on
for emergency deployments, which are assumed to be relatively short-term in nature. This is
similar to the current situation, in which Category 3 officers, and in principle Category 4, face
similar deployment costs311.
• Category 5 officers are assumed to be deployed twice per MFF period for an approximate
duration of 6 months, with a number of 300 officers per deployment.
Overall, the total deployment costs for all categories for each policy option would be as follows:
• PO1: nearly EUR 1.9 billion for the first MFF period and EUR 3.6 billion for the second
MFF.
• PO2: EUR 1.5 billion for each MFF.
• PO3: nearly EUR 1.5 billion for the first MFF and EUR 1.6 billion for the second MFF.
Financial support for the development of the standing corps (Article 61 compensations)
The costs assessment for the financial support mechanism provided to Member States and
Schengen Associated Countries is based on Article 61 of the EBCG Regulation312 and on the
relevant reference amount established in it313.
The following assumptions have been applied per category:
• For Category 1, compensation applies to 3% of officers, consistent with the proportion of
category 1 officers eligible for compensation in 2024.
• For Category 2 and Category 3, compensation applies to 100% of deployed officers.
• For Category 5 (applicable for PO2 and PO3), the Category 3 calculation methodology has
been applied. This reflects an implicit assumption that, on average, training for Category 5
would be short-term, similar to Category 3.
For the purpose of the cost assessment, it is assumed that the current financial support system for
Member States under Article 61 remains unchanged and is applied to Category 5 deployments,
as it would have been for Category 4 had it been deployed. The impact assessment considers
simpler, more flexible and fairer alternatives; however, since Member State contributions depend
311 Frontex. (2023). Management Board decision 4/2023 of 24 January 2023 on financing deployments of
operational staff, Category 3 and Category 4, of the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps. 312 (a) 100 % of the reference amount multiplied by the number of operational staff indicated for the year N + 2 for
secondment in accordance with Annex II; (b) 37 % of the reference amount multiplied by the number of operational
staff effectively deployed in accordance with Article 57 within the limit set in Annex III and in accordance with
Article 58 within the limit set in Annex IV, as applicable; (c) a one-off payment of 50 % of the reference amount
multiplied by the number of operational staff recruited by Frontex as statutory staff; 313 The reference amount must be equivalent to the annual basic salary for a contract agent in function group III,
grade 8, step 1, as set out in Article 93 of the Conditions of Employment and subject to a correction co-efficient
applicable in the Member State concerned.
152
on bilateral negotiations, it is not possible to predict the financial effects compared to the current
system.
An alternative measure envisages moving this financial support under the BMV funding
instrument in the new MFF (2028-2034). This change could be applied for all categories,
generating significant savings for Frontex budget, depending on the different policy option
(approximately EUR 2.56 billion for PO1 in MFF1,EUR 1.3 billion in PO2 and EUR 1 billion in
PO3). At the same time, the modalities of this option are still being explored and remain
dependent on the outcome of the MFF negotiations.
Overall, the total financial support under Article 61 for all categories and for each policy option
would be as follows:
• PO1: EUR 2.56 billion for the first MFF period and EUR 4.7 billion for the second MFF.
• PO2: nearly EUR 1.3 billion for each MFF.
• PO3: EUR 1 billion for the first MFF and EUR 1.26 billion for the second MFF.
Training costs for all categories
It is assumed that the training capacities will be adjusted so that they are sufficient for the
proposed expansion.
To compute total training costs, unit costs are multiplied by the number of SC officers assumed
to undergo training in each year. In line with Frontex’s classification, training costs are
distinguished into the following categories and related assumptions:
• Category 1 basic / entry-level training. All Category 1 new joiners receive basic training in
their first year. As a result, subsequent specialisation trainings are assumed to occur only from
the second year after recruitment. The costs are aligned with the ones envisaged for the
training centre.
• Category 1 specialisation (including profile) training. 60% of Category 1 officers undergo a
profile-related specialisation training every year, one year after recruitment. These training
costs are based on the number of deployable standing corps officers which is calculated by
taking into account the difference between the number of officers recruited and the number
of HQ support staff.
• Category 2 training. 44% of Category 2 officers are trained each year.
• Category 3 training. 8% of Category 3 officers are trained each year.
• Category 5 training (applicable for PO2 and PO3). 100% of the newly appointed Category 5
officers are trained each year. The unit costs for training Category 5 officers have been
assumed at approximately EUR 7 693 per learner (see feasibility study accompanying the
impact assessment).
Overall, the total training costs for all categories for each policy option would be as follows:
• PO1: nearly EUR 43 million for the first MFF period and EUR 74 million for the second
MFF.
• PO2: EUR 98 million for the first MFF and EUR 193 million for the second MFF.
• PO3: nearly EUR 97 million for the first MFF and EUR 180 million for the second MFF.
Costs of the training centre
In addition to the costs of training, the assessment incorporates the planned establishment of a
training centre in Warsaw.
The rental costs for the training centre are based on Frontex preliminary assumptions, estimating
this at approximately EUR 2.5 million/year for 600 learners. The costs are however scaled up
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proportionally to the envisaged increased number of learners (Category 1 and Category 5),
depending on the respective Policy Option.
Technical capabilities – economic impact and cost assessment
This thematic area covers the economic impacts linked to Frontex’s technical capabilities,
notably the TEP, state-of-the-art situational awareness tools, and the provision of mobile and
portable equipment for standing corps deployments. Under Policy option 3, it also covers the
potential shift from the current service-based and Member State pooled model towards EU-
owned strategic aerial and maritime surveillance assets.
Key assumptions (all policy options)
- Frontex provides personal, portable and mobile equipment for standing corps Categories 1
and 2.
- Categories 3 and 5 are deployed with Member State-owned equipment and uniforms.
- Member State contributions to the TEP are assumed to remain broadly at current levels, given
uncertainty on future co-financing under specific actions.
- Where enforcement measures are introduced (Policy options 2 and 3), compliance
requirements and identified gaps in TEP availability are assumed to increase in the short term
as reporting becomes more complete.
PO1 and PO2: Frontex continues to lease or rent aerial surveillance services under framework
contracts, while maritime surveillance assets remain primarily pooled from Member States.
Incremental costs are expected mainly from expanding and modernising the TEP in line with the
European Border Surveillance Reference Architecture (EBS-RA). The overall costs technical
equipment under PO1 are estimated at nearly 1.83 billion (2028-2034) and 2.47 billion (2035-
2041) and for PO2 are estimated at nearly EUR 1.7 billion (2028-2034) and EUR 1.95 billion
(2035-2041).
PO3: Under the ‘own’ scenario, Frontex would progressively acquire and operate large aerial
assets (fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles) and selected maritime assets (coastal
patrol boats (CPB) and coastal patrol vessels (CPV), and potentially offshore patrol vessels
(OPV)). This would entail significant upfront capital expenditure (asset purchase) and recurring
operating expenditure (maintenance, insurance and contracted support), as well as additional
enabling infrastructure and staffing (e.g. operational bases, hangars, docking/shipyard
arrangements and specialist crews).
The overall costs for technical equipment under PO3 are estimated at nearly EUR 1.9 billion
(2028-2034) and EUR 2.53 billion (2035-2041). These estimates assume a progressive
replacement of Member State–pooled assets by 2041. Alternative mixes (e.g. limiting Frontex
ownership to CPB/CPV while relying on co-financing or chartering for OPVs, including the use
of host Member State crews) would materially change the capital expenditure and operating
expenditure profile and infrastructure requirements. Other technical equipment (e.g. vehicles,
mobile surveillance systems, PPE/uniforms and portable detection equipment) is costed on the
basis of historical framework contract values and scaled proportionally with Category 1 and 2
deployments; for reference, in 2024 this corresponds to approximately EUR 5 000-6 000 per
deployed Category 1/2 officer.
Return
Baseline for all policy options
The baseline costs are derived by taking the cost for returns for 2024 as basis and assuming an
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8% growth rate per year until 2034314. From 2034 onwards, a more moderate growth rate of 2%
per year is assumed, due to the uncertainty about future developments in returns. In line with
historical patterns and experts’ opinions, the number of returns (measured as the number of
returnees) implemented with Frontex support is assumed to be 60 000 per year. This figure
increases annually in to the assumed growth rate of associated costs. While PO2 and PO3 would
introduce a major shift in Frontex’s role on return and envisage expanding the scope of return
activities also in and from non-EU countries, it was not possible to capture the full extent of these
costs, which might lead to an increase in the number of returnees processed by Frontex compared
to the assumed growth.
Coordination in returns (PO2 and PO3)
The possible costs linked to an expanded role of Frontex on digital matters are not addressed
here. Additional governance costs are estimated at 2.5% of baseline costs for option 2 and 5%
for option 3315.
The savings linked to improved returns coordination are calculated as follows:
- Operational savings on charters (seat-fill and pooling): 15% of the unit charter cost
(EUR 6 000) multiplied by the number of charter returnees (assumed 22% of all returnees).
- Savings due to reduced booking or aborting of scheduled forced returns: 10% of the unit cost
per forced returnee (EUR 3 414) multiplied by the number of forced returnees (assumed 40%
of all returnees).
- Savings due to fewer wasted charter seats: 2% of the unit charter cost (EUR 6 000) multiplied
by the number of charter returnees (assumed 22% of all returnees).
- Savings due to shift to voluntary returns: under option 2, the share of voluntary returns
(assumed at 60% in 2028) increases by 0.5% each year; under option 3, by 1% each year.
Savings are calculated based on the cost differential between voluntary (EUR 560) and forced
(EUR 3 414) returns.
- The resulting figures relate to Frontex-assisted returns and only reflect the cost savings
incurred by Frontex. While savings for Member States are to be expected, it is beyond the
scope of this assessment to calculate them.
EUROSUR (PO3)
This assessment covers the financial costs of the technological (IT-related) nature generated by
the expansion of the scope of EUROSUR as information exchange and operational cooperation
framework. It does not cover the costs related to state-of-the-art surveillance tools as these were
presented above.
The extension of the scope of EUROSUR to cover return-related information, the direct access
of Frontex to the outputs from the national surveillance assets as well as the development of the
in-house AI tools will be the most resource-intensive measures under this option. It will involve
the development of entirely new features of EUROSUR which will add to the complexity of the
314 The growth rate is the same as in the 2028-2032 scenario 1 (‘Growth of the current scope of operations’) in the
Frontex note with technical budgetary simulations. However, the cost estimates provided in that note for 2028-2032
were not considered, as they implied an annual rate of growth of 37%, which was deemed unjustified based on
historical trends. Additionally, costs were adjusted to avoid double-counting with deployment costs of Frontex staff;
based on Frontex reports on return operations between 2021 and 2023, the share of annual return costs linked to
Frontex staff on board is estimated at around 11%. 315 While this is a relevant development, its assessment is outside the scope of this exercise and the study in general.
However, it is taken into account when assessing the policy options and their cost implications.
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existing IT architecture.
The ICT-related costs are linked to the development of the IT applications and information
systems, but also to the availability of sufficient talented ICT specialists to deliver necessary
services. This remains a challenge as the ICT market is volatile, and good experts are in high
demand. Furthermore, the costs of hardware, licences, maintenance and outsourcing are likely to
increase due to inflation, high demand and volatile market situation316.
As an example, the development of only one new feature of EUROSUR under the EBCG
Regulation cost Frontex around EUR 14 million in total. This comprised the development of the
business infrastructure, engagement of the external IT services and establishment of the security
environment for EUROSUR. At the same time, the development of one IT project costs EUR 8.5
million annually317, excluding maintenance and administration.
These figures represent only the implementation costs endured by Frontex. There are separate
investments to be made at the national level by Member States. Depending on the scope of
modifications to be made into the existing business architecture following the extension of the
scope of EUROSUR to include new data sets under this policy option, the financial implications
may vary. As this is not possible to provide accurate estimates of the endured costs related to the
implementation of the measures under this policy option, they have not been included into the
final cost calculation.
Other costs
Coordination with non-EU countries
The calculation of costs associated with an expanded mandate in the area of cooperation with
countries outside the EU is based on Frontex’s past expenditure records318. To reflect the
increased ambition of the policy options, it is assumed that the annual cost of cooperation with
these countries will increase by 50% under PO1 and by 100% under policy PO2 and PO3.
Existing and unchanged budget lines
The following expenditure categories have been taken into account for the overall costs of the
preferred policy option:
Title 2 – Infrastructure and operating expenditure: all costs under this title are included,
except for the portion of ICT costs which are expected to increase in line with the size of the SCs
and the potential expansion of EUROSUR to cover return-related information under Option 3.
Title 3 – Operational expenditure:
• Information and data analytics (24/7, EUROSUR under PO1 and PO2)
316 Frontex ICT Strategy 2022-2027, Management Board Decision 55/2022 adopting Frontex Information
Management Framework and ICT Strategy 2022-2027, Warsaw, 22 September 2022. 317
Data for the work carried out in 2025. 318 Based on the 2023 Consolidated Annual Activity Report, which provides a breakdown on the financial resources
allocated to Frontex activities, including cooperation with non-EU countries. combined with the resources allocated
under Title IV of the Frontex budget, namely the annualised amounts (the total project amount divided by the
project’s duration in years) of relevant grant agreements (Strengthening of Africa – Frontex Intelligence Community
(AFIC), EU4BorderSecurity, IPA III migration (Phase 3), IPA III security).
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• Strengthening capacities
• ETIAS
These areas are assumed to be largely unaffected by the policy options. For 2028, the values for
these categories are taken from Frontex note on technical budgetary simulations, scenario 1. From
2029 onwards, these values are assumed to grow linearly at a rate of 2% per year.
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ANNEX 12: DISCARDED OPTIONS
This Annex describes policy measures which have been discarded for technical reasons (e.g. not
feasible to set up practically), legal reasons (e.g. the EU does not have a mandate to act in a
specific field or would require additional legal basis for the EBCG Regulation), or reasons related
to stakeholder support (e.g. the majority of relevant stakeholders are against a proposed measure).
These measures were discarded at an earlier stage and therefore have not been assessedfor impact.
Search and Rescue
The assessment of potential amendments to the Frontex mandate regarding Search and Rescue
concluded that such changes would be neither effective nor feasible, primarily due to legal
reasons. The overarching legislative framework is grounded in international maritime law.
Regulation 656/2014 applies this framework and further defines Frontex’s role in maritime
border surveillance. Within this context, Frontex has supported Member States in SAR activities
through joint or multipurpose operations.
However, Frontex does not have a mandate to conduct independent search and rescue (SAR)
operations and may only support Member States within the framework of Joint Operations and/or
under coordination of national Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs). Frontex
involvement is therefore subject to the leadership of Member States or external countries and
takes place under the command of the relevant MRCCs coordinating SAR operations. Any
changes in this regard would require changes in international law.
Situational awareness
The assessment of potential amendments to the Frontex mandate regarding Search and Rescue
concluded that such changes would be neither effective nor feasible, primarily for legal reasons.
The overarching legislative framework is grounded in international maritime law. Regulation
656/2014 applies this framework and further defines Frontex’s role in maritime border
surveillance. Within this context, Frontex has supported Member States in SAR activities through
joint or multipurpose operations. However, Frontex does not have a mandate to conduct
independent search and rescue (SAR) operations and may only support Member States within
the framework of Joint Operations and/or under coordination of national Maritime Rescue
Coordination Centres (MRCCs).
Frontex involvement is therefore subject to the leadership of Member States or non-EU countries
and takes place under the command of the relevant MRCCs coordinating SAR operations. Any
changes in this regard would require changes in the international legal framework. In the context
of EUROSUR, several policy measures were initially considered but ultimately discarded.
Among these was a proposal to require national authorities to systematically collect data on
secondary movements in order to strengthen the European Situational Picture (ESP). The
institutional setup at Member State level does not allow national authorities to collect secondary
movements statistics319.
Another discarded option concerned possible introduction of some results from the Vulnerability
Assessment into EUROSUR. The interviews with Frontex indicated that while in theory some
elements of the vulnerability assessment may add more clarity to situational awareness, the
practical value for day-to-day operations remain unclear, leading to an undue administrative
burden to Member State authorities. Moreover, the idea of including information from quality
319 Interviews with EIBM Intelligence Division.
158
control mechanisms (such as SCHE-VAL or the Vulnerability Assessment at national and EU
levels) into EUROSUR received rather low levels of support from Member States: 23% (8 out of
35 from 5 Member States) agreed320 that this would enhance reaction capabilities, and 26% (9
out of 35 from 7 Member States) were neutral321. Another 31% (11 out of 35 from 10 Member
States) disagreed322, while 20% (7 out of 35 from 6 Member States) stated they did not know323.
Countering cross-border crime
During the analysis of potential changes to the EBCG Regulation in relation to countering cross-
border crime the possibility of expanding of Frontex’s role in this area. This would allow Frontex
to carry out crime detection activities (e.g. arrest, police patrol outside border areas) requiring
the use of executive powers independently, without relying on prior authorisation from Member
States.
However, this option was ultimately discarded. This is because measures expanding crime
detection activities without depending on Member States’ authorities by default would go beyond
the current legal basis of the EBCG Regulation324, implying that a different legal basis would
need to be chosen to anchor this type of mandate. Such expansion would also risk creating
duplication with Europol’s mandate325, which also remains strictly supportive to national
authorities. While both police cooperation326 and border management327 relate to an area of
shared competence under EU law328, police cooperation/law enforcement is a particularly
sensitive domain, where Member States’ sovereignty remains primary329. Indeed, the option is
not supported by the majority of national authorities that expressed a view on this issue330.
Emergencies
The EU holds only a supporting competence in the field of civil protection, as outlined in Articles
6 and 196 TFEU. This means that national civil protection authorities remain primarily
responsible for addressing and managing the consequences of natural disasters and other large-
scale emergencies, including human-induced disasters. In addition, at EU level, coordination in
the field of disaster response is already ensured by the European Commission (DG ECHO), which
manages the Emergency Response Coordination Centre and the Union Civil Protection
Mechanism (UCPM)331.
320 BG, FI, FR (4), SK, ES 321 AT, CZ, FI (2), HU (2), LT, NL 322 BE, HR, DK, EL, LV (2), LU, MT, PL, SI, ES 323 BG, DK (2), FR, DE, RO, ES 324 Arts. 77(2)(b) an 79(2)(c) TFEU do not refer to preventing or combating cross-border crime. Art. 77(2)(b) only
refers to ‘carrying out checks on persons and efficient monitoring of the crossing of external borders’. 325 Art. 88 TFEU indicates that Europol’s mandate is ‘to support and strengthen action by the Member States’ police
authorities and other law enforcement services’. 326 Title V, Chapter 5 of the TFEU. 327 Title V, Chapter 2 of the TFEU. 328 Art. 4 TFEU. 329 In that sense, Europol focuses on cooperation between police and other law enforcement authorities and Eurojust
on cooperation between national investigation and prosecution authorities. In the case of Europol, some Member
States are reportedly opposed to giving Europol autonomous executive powers and are expected to veto any move
to strengthen Europol in this way. Cf. European Parliamentary Research Service. (2025, May 15). Strengthening
Europol’s mandate (Briefing No. PE 772.865). European Parliament.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/772865/EPRS_BRI(2025)772865_EN.pdf 330 Interview with national authorities. 331 The UCPM can be activated by Member States and UCPM Participating States in a wide range of emergencies,
including natural disasters (such as floods, wildfires, earthquakes and storms), or other emergencies such as large-
scale migration influxes, industrial accidents and attacks on critical infrastructure. The UCPM is activated when
national capacities are insufficient to cope with the emergency.
159
Against this backdrop, a formal expansion of Frontex’s mandate in this area is not considered
necessary and would potentially duplicate with UCPM-related activities. Instead, the proposed
policy measure (see Policy Option 2: Emergencies) would strengthen cooperation between
Frontex and DG ECHO, ensuring that standing corps can support relevant national authorities
when needed and requested, in a complementary manner to the assistance provided through the
UCPM.
Returns
The option aimed at expanding Frontex’s mandate to include Dublin transfers at the occasion of
organising returns was discarded because such transfers fall under the EU asylum framework
rather than the border management and return framework. The Dublin Regulation332, based on
Article 78(2)(e) of the TFEU, establishes rules for determining which Member State is
responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in the EU. By contrast, the EBCG
Regulation is grounded in Articles 77(2)(b) and (d) and 79(2)(c) TFEU, which relate to external
border management and returns to countries outside the EU.
Extending Frontex’s mandate to cover intra-EU Dublin transfers would therefore require a
change in the EBCG Regulation’s legal basis, shifting from the migration and border
management provisions to those governing asylum cooperation. This would entail a fundamental
alteration to the scope and purpose of the EBCG Regulation. Given that the Dublin framework
already provides for bilateral cooperation and responsibility-sharing mechanisms between
Member States, expanding Frontex’s mandate in this area was considered legally unfeasible and
beyond Frontex’s current remit.
Harmonisation and interoperability
The gradual introduction of EU-wide recognition mechanisms in areas currently constraining
Frontex’s technical and operational capabilities was carefully considered. The establishment of a
multilateral agreement to enable seamless cross-border deployment of Frontex-operated vessels
and aircraft, supported by the harmonisation of certification and inspection regimes coordinated
by EASA and EMSA, was examined. The possible adoption of a European mission flag or
pennant, drawing on the fisheries control model, was also considered as a means of providing
legal clarity and a visible operational mandate for EBCG assets and personnel operating across
Member States and in international waters. In addition, the development of common operational
directives, procedures, rules of behaviour, including the use of force, and administrative
arrangements for joint operational areas involving host Member States, Frontex, other Member
States and non-EU countries was analysed.
However, it was concluded that these measures cannot be effectively delivered through a revision
of the EBCG Regulation alone. They would require intergovernmental agreements, alignment
with sector-specific legal frameworks, and coordination with competent EU agencies and
international partners that extend beyond the scope and legal effect of the Regulation. As such,
while these options remain relevant from an operational and strategic perspective, they were
ultimately discarded as part of proposed revisions to the Regulation, on the grounds that the
challenges identified cannot be adequately addressed through amendments to the EBCG
Regulation and are better pursued through complementary legal instruments, administrative
arrangements, and operational cooperation mechanisms.
332 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast).
160
Employment conditions for the standing corps
The evidence provided as part of the study identified several issues linked to promotion and
career progression and early retirement. While some measures presented in the impact assessment
can be implemented to partly address these issues, while remaining in line with the EU
employment framework, other identified measures would require diverging from the Staff
Regulations and might lead to potential spillover effects and impacts to the broader EU civil
service, as they are not necessarily exclusively linked to a standing corps specific need.
These include the possibility of top-up pension or bridging allowance covering the period
between the early-retirement age and the standard EU pension age of standing corps officers,
transfer of national pension rights into the EU pension scheme, aligning the advancement across
function groups/types of posts with the standing corps’ function-based hierarchy and the
establishment of a new financial right in the form of a deployment allowance based on hardship.
Because all EU staff (hence including staff in decentralised agencies) are subject to the same
statutory provisions pursuant to the principle of universal coverage by the Staff Regulations,
Frontex cannot establish independent or deviating staff schemes with regards to e.g. pensions
benefits. Its founding regulation (adopted under Art. 77/79 TFEU) does not - and legally cannot
- create an autonomous employment regime outside the Staff Regulations laid down pursuant to
Article 336 TFEU.
Organisational governance
The evidence gathered as part of this study indicated that the main challenge affecting the
organisational governance structure of the EBCG is the (limited) extent to which inputs from the
working groups feed into the Management Board discussions, as well as the limited integration
of return authorities into the governance structure. Hence, national authorities that chose to
express a view on this issue did not support potential measures that would aim at completely re-
design the governance structure.
While the overall governance structure was considered solid, its functioning and extent to which
the Management Board is informed by work conducted by working groups (including the High-
Level Round Table on return) is limited and should be strengthened. Based on the above,
measures aimed at completely reshaping the EBCG governance have been discarded. Conversely,
proposed measures aim at strengthening the mechanisms through which the working groups
inform the Management Board, and better integrate return authorities in the overall governance
framework.
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ANNEX 13: MONITORING AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK (MEF) FOR THE PREFERRED POLICY
MEASURES
Thematic
area/Preferred PO
Indicators Sources Data collection
frequency
Border control (division
of responsibilities,
ambiguities and gaps
affectingcross-border
crime, hybrid
threats/emergencies, visa
policy)
Policy Option 1=2
MS/SAC satisfaction level with the operational
impact of deployed human resources (HR) and
technical equipment (TE), including in countering
cross-border-crime
Number and person-days of deployed Standing
Corps officers in joint operations, rapid border
interventions or any other operational activities in
the area of border management
Efficiency of deployed resources
Number and focus of EMPACT activities where
Frontex is a leader/co-leader/participant versus
number of overall EMPACT activities
Number of OPLANs that include detailed provisions
on Standing Corps support to national authorities to
address emergencies/hybrid threats
Number of requests from Member States to Frontex
and DG ECHO/ERCC to address hybrid threats and
emergencies
Number of Frontex transverse activities contributing
to improving operational results on detection and
prevention of document and identity fraud
Number of MS requesting risk analysis products
related to documents fraud in non-EU countries
Frontex Evaluation
Reports of Joint
Operations
Working arrangements
Frontex Consolidated
Annual Activity Reports
Operational Plans
ETIAS-related reports
MS/SAC satisfaction
surveys circulated by
Frontex
Single Programming
Document
Vulnerability
Assessments
Assessment of the
Operational Initiation
document
MB meeting minutes
Yearly
162
Number and person-days of standing corps involved
in delivering training to MS consulates
Number of requests for operational personal data
received from Europol and replied to by Frontex
EUROSUR
Policy Option 2
Delivery of the milestones set in the EUROSUR
programme roadmap
Number of EUROSUR Fusion Services provided to
core users
Level of satisfaction of core users with provided
EUROSUR Fusion Services
Information on the state of play regarding the
accreditation of (inter)connections (and their
extensions) to the EUROSUR central component
given by the EUROSUR Security Accreditation
Board
Overall state of data quality in EUROSUR as
provided by Member States
State of the interconnection of the EUROSUR
European component with national components
(possible challenges and mitigating measures)
Timely production and distribution of reports by the
Risk Analysis Unit
Number of incidents reported in EUROSUR on
internal security events or incidents of a hybrid
nature
Frontex Consolidated
Annual Activity Reports
Frontex Evaluation
Reports of Joint
Operations
Frontex report to the
European Parliament
and the Council on the
Functioning of
EUROSUR
EUROSUR data quality
reports
Single Programming
Document
Yearly
163
Timeliness of reporting to EUROSUR provided by
Member States
Number of data/information reported to EUROSUR
by Member States as classified information and the
level of classification
Number of status agreements and working
arrangements (with non-EU countries, international
organisations, EU institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies, CSDP missions) that include EUROSUR-
related provisions
Cooperation with non-
EU countries,
international
organisations and CSDP
missions /
Policy Option 3
Number of status agreements and working
arrangements signed (or updated) (with non-EU
countries, international organisations, EU
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including
CSDP missions), in comparison to a) negotiations
that have not been opened despite there being a
mandate to negotiate and the reasons why, b)
negotiations that have been opened but have not
been successfully finalised (and the reasons why)
Number of Liaison officers deployed in relevant
CSDP missions or international organisations and
their activities
Number and person-days of deployed Standing
Corps officers in external countries
Number of CSDP missions with which Frontex staff
cooperates outside of working arrangements (ad hoc
basis)
Number of non-operational activities/projects
undertaken in external countries
Number of Frontex Liaison Officers (FLOs)
deployed outside the EU, in comparison to a)
negotiations that have not been opened despite there
being a mandate and the reasons why, b)
New/updated working
arrangements and Status
Agreements
Frontex Consolidated
Annual Activity Reports
Frontex Evaluation
Reports of Joint
Operations
Frontex reports on
cooperation with non-
EU countries
Single Programming
Document
Yearly
164
negotiations that have been opened but have not
been successfully finalised (and the reasons why)
Returns/
Policy Option 2
Number of non_EU nationals returned (or supported
in returning voluntarily) with Frontex support,
including number of those returned with Frontex
support departing from a non-EU country
Number of Frontex-organised return operations
Ratio of monitored return operations
Ratio of identification assistance provided
Number of reintegration cases through the EU
Reintegration Programme
Number of Member State staff trained by Frontex on
return and reintegration counselling
Ratio of FRESO deployed versus number of MS’
requests for FRESO
Enumeration of developed guidelines/good practices
for the standardisation and/or optimisation of returns
aspects/processes
Number and mission-days of EURLOs deployments
Enumeration of events related to contribution in the
implementation of EU return policy
Enumeration of technical assistance projects for
non-EU countries on return, readmission and
reintegration
Number and enumeration of non-EU countries
supported with return operations (collecting return
operations or other return operations)
Number of meetings of High-Level Round Table on
Returns
Number of recommendations by the High-Level-
RoundTable on Returns
Return operations
reports
Frontex reports on the
evaluation of the return
operations
EURLO regular
reporting to Frontex
EU Reintegration
Programme Annual
Reports
Frontex Consolidated
Annual Activity Reports
Relevant internal and
external audit reports
HLRT minutes/reports
Management Board
Single Programming
Document
Yearly/Biannual
165
Governance and
oversight / Policy
Option 2
Fundamental rights
Timely request by the Executive Director to FRO
for opinions before signing OPLANs, WAs.
Timely delivery of FRO opinion on requests by the
Executive Director.
Number of monitored operational actions per host
Member State/non-EU country and monitored return
activities
Ratio of denied access to FRO/FROMs to
operational areas and relevant documents and
activities (by national authority)
Number of field monitoring days reported in the
FRO reporting system
Timely reporting on follow-up to FRO’s
recommendations
Timely involvement of Consultative Forum on
matters related to breaches of fundamental rights
Number of SIR and complaints, investigations and
degree of cooperation of Agency and relevant
national authorities, including their findings and
follow up.
Timely delivery of Fundamental Rights Impact
Assessments and Fundamental Rights Due Diligence
(on TC cooperation)
Number of replies to FRO opinions and CF
recommendations
Data protection
Guidelines and SOP covering all relevant processing
activities
Timely delivery of Transfer Impact Assessments
(TIAs) and Data Protection Impact Assessments
(DPAs)
Frontex Consolidated
Annual Activity Reports
Frontex FRO Annual
Activity Reports
FRO monitoring tool
(OCEAN)
Consultative Forum on
Fundamental Rights
annual reports
SIRs
Frontex DPO Annual
Compliance Reports
MB Decisions
MB meeting minutes
HLRTR meeting
minutes and
recommendations
Internal and external
audits
Single Programming
Document
Publicly available
studies/evaluations
Yearly (MB
reporting)
166
Number of training sessions on data protection, units
and entities involved, number of sessions delivered
to field presences, number of processors of personal
data reached
Number of guidelines on data protection issued and
followed up by Frontex
Timely DPO advice related to DPIAs and TIAs
Other governance and oversight elements
Timely completing of reporting obligations towards
the MB and other external entities, as well as
publishing public information
Follow-up to any recommendations from relevant
scrutiny bodies and external evaluations
Annual Activity Reports and Single Programming
Document timeliness and legal compliance
Number of documents delivered meeting set
timelines for MB meetings, Working Group on
Budget and Accounts, EIBM Working Group
Employment conditions
of the Standing Corps /
Policy Option 2
Percentage (%) of job offers sent to candidates
within calendar year, versus the allocated vacant
posts as of January in the same year
Occupancy and turnover rates
Number of internal reassignments and internal
mobility
Number of MS nationalities that are over- and
under-represented within the Standing Corps
Implementation of Frontex Human Resources
Strategy
Data on contract renewals
Recruitment and
turnover rates from HR
management reports
Human Resources
Reports
Audits on HR Planning
Allocation and
Recruitment
Single Programming
Document
Frontex Consolidated
Annual Activity Reports
Updates on HR Strategy
implementation
Yearly
167
Standing Corps size and
composition /
Policy Option 3
Overall number and person-days of HR (SC and
other relevant staff and host MS co-financed staff)
deployed during the operational activity
Overall number of standing corps recruited,
seconded, nominated, or trained
Member States satisfaction with the operational
impact of deployed HR
Ratio of SC officers assigned to general operational
functions
Percentage of deployment periods per operational
year where there is a gap between confirmed
commitments and uncovered needs
Frontex Evaluation
Reports of Joint
Operations
Quarterly report on
capabilities/ report on
capabilities
development to MB
Annual Implementation
report
Single Programming
Document
Frontex Consolidated
Annual Activity Reports
Vulnerability
Assessment
Updates on HR Strategy
implementation
Yearly/Quarterly
Technical equipment and
IT systems /
Policy Option 2
Overall number of asset-days of maritime, aerial,
terrestrial and portable assets (host and participating
MS, Frontex owned, co-owned, and leased)
deployed during the operational activity
Ratio of Frontex’s own Technical Equipment (TE)
included in the pool of TE
Extent of unfulfilled Frontex technical equipment
requests
Share of TE Pool spent on very large assets
Timeliness of the deployment of TE
Ratio of Standing Corps officers equipped with the
state of the art equipment
Frontex Evaluation
Reports of Joint
Operations
Single Programming
Document
Frontex Consolidated
Annual Activity Reports
Minimum Number of
Items of TE (MNITE)
Grants awarded
Yearly
168
Ratio of available versus filled positions assigned to
logistics
Percentage of deployment periods per operational
year where there is a gap between confirmed
commitments and uncovered needs
Training /
Policy Option 3
Number of new harmonised training programmes
developed
Numbers of new or revised handbooks, training
sessions delivered, trained trainers and trainees
Operational Training Programme implemented
Number of training programmes for SC Categories
1, 2 and 5 delivered
Number of training programmes delivered to FRMs
Number of training activities organised within the
EBCG Academy and in cooperation with the
partnership academies network
Number of training sessions delivered to mid and
senior-level staff for command roles
Number of training activities specifically focused on
enhancing interoperability in command and
coordination
Frontex Consolidated
Annual Activity Reports
Single Programming
Document
Internal evaluations
carried out covering
trainings
Yearly
EIBM /
Policy Option 2
Forecast picture for the first (situation in non-EU
countries) and second (measures with neighbouring
countries) tier of the EIBM access control model is
available for two of the main migratory routes
towards the EU.
Reports to MB with recommendations on next steps
as regards TOEIBM
Adopting MB Decision establishing updated
TOEIBM
EIBM practical implementation guide issued
Frontex Consolidated
Annual Activity Reports
Single Programming
Document
National EIBM
strategies
Frontex reports on
results of Research and
Innovation activities
Every 2 years
169
Programme of work for the EIBM Working Group
implemented
Strategic guidance annex uptake by Member States’
submissions
Timeliness of Member States’ submissions set out in
the strategic planning calendar adopted by the MB
Comparability of Member States’ submissions
Timely delivery of assessments of MS/SAC
according to the Common Vulnerability Assessment
Methodology
Delivery of vulnerability assessment knowledge
products portfolio
Timely production and provision of bi-annual
vulnerability assessment reports to EU institutions
by the Capacity and Readiness Unit
170
ANNEX 14: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK
1. Overview of impacts on competitiveness
Dimensions of
competitiveness
Impact of the initiative
(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / n.a.)
References to sub-sections of the
main report or annexes
Cost and price competitiveness n.a.
Main report – sections on economic
impacts / stakeholders affected
(initiative targets public authorities)
International competitiveness n.a. Main report – sections on economic
impacts / stakeholders affected
Capacity to innovate n.a. Main report – sections on economic
impacts / stakeholders affected
SME competitiveness n.a.
Main report – ‘Application of the ‘one
in, one out’ approach’ (no admin costs
for private sector)
2. SYNTHETIC ASSESSMENT
Overall, this initiative aims to address challenges related to the efficiency of the EBCG and the
adequate implementation and further development of EIBM. The measures under consideration
primarily concern the organisation, planning, governance, operational cooperation and internal
capacities of public authorities (Frontex and Member States’ competent authorities). They do not
introduce regulatory obligations for economic operators, set product requirements or alter market
access conditions or the rules governing competition in the internal market.
Accordingly, no direct impacts on competitiveness are expected across the four dimensions
(cost/price competitiveness, international competitiveness, capacity to innovate and SME
competitiveness). For the purposes of the competitiveness check, the initiative is therefore
assessed as not applicable.
While the implementation of some measures may entail public procurement by Frontex and/or
Member States (e.g. for technical equipment and related services, including IT components,
integration, maintenance, training and other support services), this reflects how public authorities
may operationalise the measures, rather than an impact stemming from new requirements on
undertakings. Such procurement would be conducted under the applicable EU and national public
procurement rules and would not, in itself, constitute a competitiveness effect attributable to the
initiative (no new compliance burden or market constraint is created for operators, including
SMEs).
Stakeholder input from economic operators received during the Call for Evidence does not alter
this conclusion, as the initiative remains focused on public-sector operational capacity and
governance under the EBCG framework rather than on regulating private-sector activity.
171
ANNEX 15: SME TEST
This initiative primarily concerns the organisation, planning and operational capacities of public
authorities (Frontex and Member States’ competent authorities) under the EBCG framework. It
does not introduce obligations for economic operators, create new compliance requirements or
regulate market behaviour.
Accordingly, the initiative is not expected to have specific or disproportionate impacts on SMEs,
and an SME test is assessed as not applicable. Any costs associated with implementation would
mainly relate to public authorities (including possible public procurement of equipment or related
services), and do not constitute SME impacts attributable to the initiative.
The public consultation did not include a dedicated SME section, and no SME-specific impacts
were identified.
EN EN
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 27.10.2026 SWD(2026) 1031 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL
amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard
{COM(2026) 1030 final} - {SEC(2026) 1030 final} - {SWD(2026) 1030 final}
1
Executive Summary Sheet
Impact assessment for a proposal
for the revision of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard
A. Need for action
What is the problem and why is it a problem at EU level?
The EU faces complex challenges at its external borders: it remains subject to significant migratory pressure, resulting in oftentimes unpredictable developments requiring urgent and flexible responses. Recent geopolitical developments have also created a hostile geopolitical context at the EU’s Eastern border, resulting in hybrid threats and attempts by non-EU countries to instrumentalise migration to undermine the EU and its Member States. Border management is a shared competence of the EU, operationally spearheaded by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the relevant authorities of the Member States, operating together as the European Border and Coast Guard. In responding to this complex environment, the overarching challenges are the following:
1) the efficiency of the EBCG in border management and return is undermined by ambiguities, gaps and unused opportunities;
2) the capabilities of Frontex are not able to sufficiently develop to respond to increasing needs and to the objectives of European Integrated Border Management (EIBM);
3) the development and implementation of EIBM is undermined by deficiencies in training, planning and Frontex quality control mechanisms.
These problems materialise in various interconnected ways. The efficiency losses of the EBCG are driven primarily by the lack of clarity on key tasks, gaps in Frontex’s mandate, challenges related to the implementation and architecture of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and the limited role of Frontex in the external dimension. They are also driven by limitations in Frontex’s mandate in the area of return, including relevant governance aspects, which no longer matches the needs and ambitions of EU return policy.
Frontex’s ability to develop capabilities to respond to operational needs is limited by challenges in the size and overall structure of the standing corps, as well as insufficient technical equipment and logistic support structures. Lastly, the effective implementation of EIBM is limited by the lack of a framework to train European border guards uniformly according to EIBM standards, and the fact that strategic planning, integrated planning and quality assurance remain fragmented, which limits their role in achieving EIBM objectives.
Objectives: What should be achieved?
The general objective is to ensure the development and implementation of the European integrated border management in line with Article 77(1)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to increase the effectiveness of the EBCG to be able to respond to the fluid and challenging situation at the EU external border, and in the area of return. The specific objectives aim to:
• Enhance Frontex’s effectiveness across the spectrum of its competencies, namely in its support for the Member States (and Schengen Associated Countries) in managing the EU’s external borders, in the effectiveness of its contribution to return activities, in the prevention of illegal arrivals, and in terms of the situational awareness provided to the EBCG via EUROSUR;
• Strengthen the EBCG human and technical capabilities and enhance effectiveness of their deployment in Frontex’s operational activities;
• Ensure the coherent design and implementation of EIBM across EU Member States, based on harmonised training, synergies in planning, reinforced quality control processes, and an overall standing corps of 30 000 officers equipped with the state-of-the-art equipment.
2
What is the value added of action at the EU level (subsidiarity)?
Given the cross-border and cross-sector nature of managing external borders, as well as the significant synergies that can be unlocked through better coordination in the area of return, the identified objectives cannot be achieved by Member States acting alone or in an uncoordinated way. The effective management and control of the Union’s external borders is in the interest of all Member States. Emerging cross-border risks require constant planning and harmonised standards that only EU-level coordination can provide. Recent geopolitical developments have further increased the existing need for a reinforced, flexible, and adapted Union response in the management of external borders. Despite progress, the number of effective returns to external countries remains low, with many of the current shortcomings in the operationalisation of the EU’s return policy stemming from limited coordination between national systems. This is a challenge that requires a focused, collective response at the EU level, as part of the common return system. In particular, the involvement of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency allows for pooling of expertise, common risk analysis, interoperability of systems, and rapid deployment of technical and human resources, which individual Member States may not be able to mobilise in a timely manner on their own.
B. Solutions
What are the various options to achieve the objectives? Is there a preferred option?
3
The impact assessment evaluates three identified policy options, all of which encompass both legislative and non-legislative measures and aim to deliver on the identified Specific Objectives, albeit to varying extents, reflecting different levels of ambition regarding the General Objective to develop and implement EIBM to increase the effectiveness of the EBCG.
• Policy Option 1 aims to enhance the effectiveness of the EBCG by addressing issues identified in the 2024 evaluation of the EBCG Regulation and other shortcomings identified in the implementation of the Regulation. It reflects the need to increase the overall preparedness of the EBCG to face emergency and crisis situations that may develop quickly at the border. Under this option, the current pace of developing and implementing EIBM is to be maintained.
• Policy Option 2 largely builds on measures proposed under Option 1 and goes a step further by proposing measures to seize various unused opportunities and match the level of ambition in other policy areas, in particular return. By introducing a new category within the standing corps, paired with a reinforced emphasis on training, it significantly changes the approach to EBCG shared responsibility for border management and return. It gives foundations to transform the EBCG from fragmented and reactive systems to a more harmonised and EIBM- based structure that is better equipped to respond to the volatile geopolitical situation it faces.
• Policy Option 3 represents the most ambitious approach, proposing the largest scope of modifications in the EBCG Regulation. It envisages, where appropriate, an expansion of the EBCG’s mandate and further reinforcement of capabilities, with a view to exploiting to the maximum the potential of Frontex in border management and return and delivering on EIBM objectives.
The proposed measures touch upon different areas, from border management to return, from training to technical equipment, featuring different realities and contexts. Accordingly, the preferred approach is not to select one preferred option but rather to select the most appropriate policy measures under different policy options, responding to different problems and problem drivers. This approach is expected to deliver the most positive impact on achieving the aforementioned objectives while ensuring high effectiveness, consistency, and proportionality across the board.
C. Impacts of the preferred option
What are the benefits of the preferred option (if any, otherwise of main ones)?
The expected benefits result from specific policy measures under different policy options, where the selected policy measures can be grouped in the following manner:
• Border control and combating cross border crime: the preferred option should provide a level-playing field across the EBCG allowing standing corps officers to perform tasks in the first and second line of border controls at the external borders. This, in turn, should increase operational efficiency, with benefits for EU citizens through increased security, better use of resources and smoother border procedures.
• Support in exceptional situations: the preferred option should improve the timeliness and quality of data provided by Member States in EUROSUR and complement the situational picture by adding aggregated and anonymised information from social media monitoring and data on threats of hybrid nature affecting the management of the external borders, which in the end will contribute to improved situational awareness and lead to enhanced prevention of and response to potential emergency or crisis situations.
• Cooperation with external partners: the preferred option should facilitate the development of operational cooperation with non-EU countries in the area of border management and return.
• Return: the preferred measure should ensure more efficient returns based on better use of Frontex resources and assets.
• Standing corps and training architecture: the preferred measures should provide
4
foundations for a stronger, more agile, and uniform EU force, consisting of border guards and return specialists operating based on the same understanding of their tasks and objectives.
• Conditions applicable to employment and technical equipment: the preferred measures should allow for reinforcing the human and technical capabilities at the disposal of Frontex and Member States to respond to current and foreseeable needs in border management and return.
• Measures supporting the implementation of EIBM: the preferred measures should improve planning coherence, strategic coordination and quality assurance, as the prerequisites for the efficient use of human and technical resources, in a more proactive manner and adjusted to operational needs.